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INTELLIGENCE AXIOM

"...To remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors or emoluments is the height of inhumanity..."

-- Sun Tzu

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

1917-1950

(With Limited Tabular Data to 1960)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

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FOREWORD

The primary objective of this history project was to provide those charged with CIC planning, training and operations with a means for exploiting past successes and preventing repetitions of failures, while at the same time establishing a basic permanent record amenable to augmentation, correction, and chronological continuity.

In this initial draft of the History of Counter Intelligence Corps, the researchers, writers and editors pass on for critical reading, correction and amendment a basic manuscript of some 1,600,000 words, or the equivalent of four standard size volumes of official military history.

The great bulk of the work was accomplished during the years 1953-1955 by a special team headed by Lt. Col. Franklin P. Jordan of the Military Intelligence Reserve and Maj. Ann Bray of the Woman's Army Corps. Subsequently others concerned with limited revision and additional editing, and with production. The latter was accomplished as Fort Holabird Printing Plant facilities were available.

To produce a manuscript of maximum value to planners, instructors and operators, research was required by the original group quite beyond that required for a detailed historical recitation of interest to students and others desiring merely a general background of the Corps. To accomplish even the latter, however, it was necessary to cover the records of some 300 CIC detachments operating in a total of more than 60 countries during a period of 33 years. An estimated 25,000 CIC personnel were involved. The achievement of the primary objective was complicated by a number of unique problems.

In the first place, the Counter Intelligence Corps has never been an official "Corps" at all. It never has enjoyed the prerogatives of a formal army technical service, such as the Signal Corps, the Medical Corps, the Corps of Engineers--or even the Military Police. For the first quarter of a century of its existence the "Corps" was authorized no officer spaces, yet officers commanded its enlisted personnel in all phases of the work and themselves were outstandingly active in operations. Obviously a study based on the enlisted record alone would prove useless; it was necessary to carefully examine a mass of official records of G2's, S2's and intelligence officers of many organizations, as well as the official and informal notations of individual counterintelligence officers. These sources were traced down to post, camp and station level.

While researched sources provided abundant proof for the justification of CIC's existence in terms of its contribution to the total military effort, the CIC historian would prefer much more material against which to apply an objective rule. This, it is believed, must await the future, when possibly enemy records of the war years, as well as Soviet records of the same and subsequent years,

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may reveal the extent to which CIC efforts specifically and admittedly countered unfriendly intentions. In some instances this was uncovered in the project's research program and has been included in the narrative. But unfortunately for the historian, the bulk of this kind of information either never is reduced to permanent record in the first place, or if it is formalized, is among the documents of top priority for destruction upon development of a major military threat from any source.

All military-minded readers will appreciate that security classification factors seriously affect the availability and useability of documentary material. "Top Secret" was established in 1944 as classification for sensitive documents. Since then, regulations provided for periodic survey to effect downgrading. Yet even today research at Army record depositories in Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri, Alexandria, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Md., will reveal that there has been little downgrading of counterintelligence and related files. Through extensive interviewing, it is believed that this deficiency has been considerably offset in the material written up to the termination of hostilities in World War II and most phases of the Occupation Era. However, in general, readers of all CIC history of the year 1945 and subsequently, doubtless will realize that locked in some Top Secret vault possibly still being used may be documents that would at least modify some phases of the information they are reading. Until such time as a general down-grading reclassified this material, all history written beyond 1945 must be considered preliminary and possibly subject to extensive rewriting.

A different type of limitation of sources is part of the inevitable problem of the historian in attempting to determine the point at which research of source material reaches a point of diminishing returns and further research will neither add any information of material value nor change the validity of material already written. Added to this is the more practical consideration of cost in time and manpower of research beyond the point where returns indicate the highest place of productivity. During the main phase of the project more than 150,000 pages of CIC official documents were read and evaluated and, where pertinent, summarized or extracted. In addition, nearly 500 persons were interviewed and nearly 100 collateral reference books read or screened. There are many more persons who could have been profitably interviewed had time and circumstances permitted. It is hoped that the comments and criticisms of many readers of this manuscript will provide additional information and that there will then be an opportunity for a revision.

Writing a comprehensive history of the Corps was started following World War I. A special debt of gratitude is due to Col. Cabot Ward, G-2, Service Supply, AEF., for his comprehensive volume prepared in 1919. This portrayed problems and solutions which, if profited from, could have prevented their recurrence again and again. Unfortunately, no such adequate history was prepared

of work of the CIP with the combat troops in action or in occupation during World War I, nor of intelligence work in the United States.

Between the World Wars, in the "years of neglect," little history was made or written by the Corps. By the time CIP went into swift mobilization for World War II, World War I lessons had been buried in the musty stacks of unprocessed official records in the archives. There would have been little time to read and study them had they been available.

A comprehensive history should have been written following World War II, but the overwhelming demands on CIC agents in the Occupation Era created such a current workload that the project was not even considered. A brief summary was hastily prepared in late 1943 when the CIC in the United States was being merged with the Office of the Provost Marshal General, but it was not expanded or amplified after the war and remained a summary. So it was that when the Korean conflict began, there was no background of World War II CIC experience for guidance; even worse, historical data on the activities of CIC in the Occupation of Korea following World War II, had been buried in other files. For the second major conflict in less than a decade CIC personnel went into action with little benefit of the lessons their fellow agents had learned the hard way long years before.

Fortunately, in 1951 when Brig. Gen. John K. Rice was Chief of CIC, a history of the Counter Intelligence Corps was prepared for use at the CIC School. Although this history encountered all the problems of publication prepared under a short suspense date, it met such a favorable response that plans were made in 1952 by Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, then Chief of CIC, for a comprehensive history. In November 1952, the project was assigned to the special research-writing unit under Lt. Colonel Jordan.

Research soon revealed that the unorthodox command structure of CIC had resulted in its historical records passing through many command channels and that no requirement had existed that copies be furnished CIC headquarters. In some cases G2's summarized their CIC reports and discarded the reports themselves. In other cases, reports went forward but in some instances were lost when all G2 records were lost. Some were destroyed. In sum, vast gaps existed in available information. There were no CIC tactical reports from Europe from D-Day until mid-August found in available records at the CIC Center in 1952 when the project was started. It became apparent that personal interviews of participants would be the only means of obtaining some vitally important information. Had the project been postponed several years, this would have been nearly impossible, since many of the key personalities already were deceased, while others were scattered world-wide and in many cases addresses lost. Memories were lapsing, too, since even parts of World War II activities were more than 10 years old.

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Another factor had to be considered: In 1947, two free lancer writers were authorized to write a history of the Corps and former members of the Corps were officially encouraged to give them information; many of these former CIC personnel not only gave these writers detailed interviews, but furnished them with various supporting documents; re-interviews and patient digging uncovered duplicate sources to such an extent that it is believed this loss was partially offset, but undoubtedly there are some of the documents that would be of value even now.

In summary, the words of Gen. George Washington apply. Writing of one of his reports in a letter to Congress he said "...in its first edition may not be free from error; time will discover its defects and experience suggest the remedy and such further improvements as may be necessary; but it was right to give it a beginning..."*

* Army Almanac, page 34.

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AUTHORITY

Letter of Instructions for the Historical Project

HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS CENTER
Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland

CICC-CS 27 November 1953

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions: Historical Project

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Counter Intelligence Corps Center
Fort Holabird, Maryland
ATTN: OIC, Historical Project

PART ONE

Mission, Purpose and Responsibilities

1. MISSION: It is the desire of the Chief, CIC, that an official history of CIC be written. This mission will consist of two phases:

a. Compilation and writing of a complete and comprehensive history of the Counter Intelligence Corps from its inception to the current Armistice of the Korean War.

b. Organization of a practical system for subsequent operation by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, CIC Center, that will insure the collection on a world-wide basis and the preservation at the CIC Center of suitable source material from which future phases of CIC history can be written.

2. REFERENCES:

a. AR 220-305, Field Organizations, Unit Lineage and Battle Honors, dated 18 March 1949 (Paragraph 1).

b. SR 220-345-1, Field Organizations, Unit Histories, dated 7 February 1950.

c. DA Circular No. 100, Military History Indoctrination Plan, dated 26 November 1952.

d. AR 220-315, Field Organizations, Unit Awards, dated 11 April 1952 (Paragraphs 37-40).

e. Pamphlet DA No. 20-200, Historical Study, Guide to the Writing of American Military History, dated August 1951.

f. FM 101-5, Staff Officer's Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure, dated July 1950, as amended (Paragraphs 17 and 34, RESTRICTED).

g. AR 210-10, Installations, Administration, dated 12 January 1950.

h. SR 345-220-5, Records Administration--Files Utilization Procedures, dated 21 January 1952.

i. SR 345-250-70, Records Administration--Maintenance and Disposition of Intelligence and Security Administration Records, dated 21 January 1952.

j. AR 380-5, Military Security, Safeguarding Security Information, dated 6 June 1952, as amended.

k. SR 380-310-2, Counter Intelligence Corps, Procedures for Personnel, Administration and Training, dated 1 August 1952, RESTRICTED.

l. Letter, DA, (AGAC) (M) 380.01 (6 April 53) G-2-PC, "Instructions Pertaining to CIC Personnel," dated 7 April 1953, RESTRICTED.

3. PURPOSES:

a. Scope: This CIC history is to be world-wide in scope and to ".....pick up, absorb, broaden as and if appropriate, but not cancel, all Counter Intelligence Corps histories and diaries already written." This history will be produced in such detail and in such a manner that it will become the officially approved basis for all subsequent histories and can be edited and downgraded to serve one, several, or all of the following purposes:

(1) Professional Use: A typewritten monograph, possibly classified SECRET and with supporting documentation included as appropriate for use of high level planning particularly at G3 levels.

(2) Semi-Professional Use: Possibly mimeographed and possibly classified CONFIDENTIAL, referenced but without supporting data attached.

Some highly sensitive sections removed or paraphrased. For use in Advanced Courses and by officers in high level positions who require an intimate understanding of the Corps--its capabilities and its problems.

(3) Student Use: Possibly offset printed and unclassified as the CIC history to be used at CIC School in basic courses and for all personnel assigned duties with the Corps or in positions where they deal with the Corps.

(4) General Use: Possibly letter press printed and unclassified. For the general information and education of all Army personnel to facilitate mutual respect, proper understanding of the utilization of the Corps and cooperation with it. This could also serve for orientation of personnel of related outside agencies and even the general public to show the value received from this tax requirement.

b. Classification: The basic manuscript and drafts derived from it will be safeguarded as outlined in paragraph 7f.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: Responsibilities for the production of this history will be as follows:

a. The CIC, Historical Project, under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, will be directly responsible for the production of this history by requisitioning the necessary personnel, facilities and funds and for obtaining the necessary clearances and approvals for material used.

b. The Commanding Officer, 902d CIC Detachment, with the concurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, will furnish seven military personnel, if available, for special duty with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, CIC Center, for completion of the Historical Project; said personnel to remain under the administrative jurisdiction of the 902d CIC Detachment.

c. The Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, will approve the general plan of approach and treatment and from time to time review preliminary drafts of chapters or sections of the study to insure that the general approach and treatment are in line with the desires of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps and that the full significance of events is realized and commented upon by writers.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, CIC Center, will provide within the spaces made available, on request, qualified researchers, writers, editors, proofreaders, typists and such other personnel as may be necessary as authorized in paragraph 8.

e. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, CIC Center, will grant designated personnel of the Historical Project access to classified files of the Central Counter Intelligence Corps Files which are deemed essential to the production of this history. The G2 will, upon request from the OIC, Historical Project, downgrade or obtain authority to downgrade any classified document or information obtained from the Central Counter Intelligence Corps Files, as appropriate.

f. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, CIC Center, will provide the necessary office space, supplies, equipment, transportation or other facilities necessary for the completion of the project.

g. The Fiscal Officer, Budget and Accounting Division, Comptroller's Office, CIC Center, will provide, on recommendation of the OIC, Historical Project, and after approval by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, a budget for TDY, transportation costs and incidental expenses in connection with the collection of prime source material for an historical study. Specific expenditures within this budget will be on request for the OIC, Historical Project, with approval by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

PART TWO

Organization and Procedures

5. PHASED SEQUENCE: This historical project will be divided into two phases as follows:

a. Organization Study Research: This is the collection from all prime sources possible--at the CIC Center, at Army Records Depositories and from first hand account by participants, where possible--of material which can be used in combat lessons and for the writing of any history at a later date. Initial objective is the preparation of an official monograph with supporting documents in the form of a preliminary draft.

b. Official History Writing: Following the completion of an approved preliminary draft, the copy will be submitted to the Historical Division, Department of the Army, for approval as an official history as defined by SR 220-345-1, paragraph 2b, so that appropriated or nonappropriated funds may be allocated for

the writing, rewriting and editing necessary and for printing the type or types of publications agreed upon. Other types of publications as listed in paragraph 3, this letter, will be produced as unofficial unit histories as defined in SR 220-345-1, paragraph 2c.

6. ORGANIZATION: (Omitted)

7. PROCEDURES: Assembly of prime source material, organization of that material and writing of that material will follow these general procedures:

a. Assembly: Material will be collected from files of the CIC Center and the School; CIC detachments and other CIC units world-wide. Additional documentation will be secured from Army Records Centers at Alexandria, Virginia; Kansas City, Missouri; Historical Division, Washington, D.C., G2 files, the Pentagon; and in personal interviews or by telephone or mail with prime sources.

b. Debriefing Contracts: All returnees to the CIC Center or the School, will, as part of their processing, fill out an historical questionnaire indicating what phases of CIC history they have personal knowledge of. Questionnaires will be forwarded to the Historical Project, c/o G3, CIC Center, so that arrangements for interviews can be made if the source appears profitable.

c. Organization:

(1) Material will be organized into a chronological sequence broken into significant phases of activity as tentatively outlined in paragraph 6 above. Units will be traced through all their changes rather than following literally a numerical or named unit as such.

(2) Normal chapter sequence for combat activities will be as follows:

(a) The situation or problem faced.

(b) The assigned mission or objective.

(c) The personnel and equipment available.

(d) The terrain, weather and morale.

(e) Preparation for the mission; tactics, etc.

(f) What was actually done or accomplished.

(g) Results; what was learned, good or bad.

d. Writing: (Omitted)

e. Writing Policies: (Omitted)

f. Classification: Classification will be in accordance with AR 380-5 and eventual publication and distribution will be in consonance with paragraphs 5 and 14 of SR 380-310-2, and letter DA AGAC (M) 380.01 (6 Apr 53) G2-PC, "Instructions Pertaining to CIC Personnel," 7 April 1953. The final classification of the final drafts will not be considered during the collection, organization and preparation of the preliminary draft. However, all classified information will be handled, transmitted and stored in accordance with current security regulations.

g. Liaison: Liaison will be maintained with the Historical Division, Department of the Army and the Historical Project, G2, DA.

PART THREE

Administration

8. PERSONNEL: (Omitted)

9. BUDGET AUTHORIZATION: (Omitted)

10. COMMUNICATION AUTHORIZATION: Direct communication is authorized officers of the Historical Project to expedite collection of historical data from prime sources as follows:

a. By Personal Visits: Visit will be authorized provided permission of subject is received and travel funds are approved by G3 and provided that a report of interview is written for the files.

b. By Telephone: Officers of the Historical Project are authorized to make outside official calls to prime sources for the purpose of arranging an interview; for making arrangements for forwarding data by mail; for confirmation of a specific fact, date, or identity; and for obtaining leads to people who can furnish first hand information. A Class "A" telephone will be provided that the Historical oject. The OIC, Historical Project, is responsible for the proper and economical

use of this means of communication. Procedures required by CIC Staff Procedure Manual, Chapter 6, paragraph 62e, will be followed.

c. Mail: Initial contacts with all prospective prime sources of material will be by letter over the signature of the Chief, or Deputy Chief, CIC. Prior to writing such letters, names of those to be contacted will be checked through G2, CIC Center.

11. TIME AUTHORIZATION: (Omitted)

12. REPORTS: (Omitted)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL CAMPBELL:

/s/ David G. Erskine
DAVID G. ERSKINE
Colonel, Arty
Chief of Staff

A. R. STIRLING
CWO USA
Asst Adj

[redacted]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

C[redacted]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND CREDITS

THE STAFF

The Officer-in-Charge of the main writing project desires to express his appreciation for the intense interest, hard work, and the long hours put in by the staff of this project. All were skilled craftsmen, each in his or her own way, yet in so many ways similar that whatever the work at hand, it was done cheerfully and well.

Tribute is due especially to Ann Bray, Maj., W.A.C., Assistant Officer-in-Charge, who came with the project in March 1953 and remained with it to its termination two and a half years later. Her editorial skill, particularly in research, organization, writing and editing all the phases of CIC in combat, deserve highest praise, and her complete devotion to the project in all its phases entitles her to a rating of superior.

During the three-year operation of the project, its originally authorized strength of seven turned over three times so that the Roster shows:

1. OFFICERS

Lt. Col. Franklin E. Jordan	Capt. Irene Taylor
Maj. Henry W. Lowe	Capt. Walter J. Unrath
Maj. Ann Bray	Capt. Benjamin W. Phillips

2. ENLISTED

Thomas Jones	M.M. Meyer	John G. Myles	John E. Pohl
David A. Lloyd	Maurice Amder	D.J. Harrison	D.L. Markusch
R.H. Hudson	W.D. Catterson	D.S. Lamm	G.H. Gates
R.G. Rollins	J.K. Smart	B.R. Bridges	Allen Stiles

Of those trained in writing, the following deserve special mention for their contribution to the project in skill and effort:

Myles Lloyd Hudson Catterson Lamm Gates Smart Bridges

In addition more than three dozen enlisted personnel worked with the project as temporary typists and clerical assistants.

FRANKLIN E. JORDAN
Lt. Col., Inf.
Ft. Holabird - 1955

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GLOSSARY

A2	Air General Staff Officer (or Section) dealing with intelligence
AAF	Army Air Forces
AAFPOA	Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area
AAFSSS	Army Air Force Special Services Section
AAG	Army Advisory Groups
AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
AEF	American Expeditionary Forces WW I
ADSEC or ASCZ	Advance Section Communication Zone
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
AFMIDPAC	United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific
AFPAC	United States Army Forces in the Pacific
AFPOA	Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
AFTC	Air Force Training Command
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
AIB	Air Intelligence Board
AJDC	American Joint Distribution Committee
Alaskan Department	So named on 1 November 1943 formerly called the Alaskan Defense Command
AMA	Agricultural Marketing Administration
AMET	Africa-Middle East Theater
AMEW	Africa-Middle East Wing

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AMG	Allied Military Government
AMGOT	American Military Government of Occupied Territories also an obsecene word in Turkish.
ANVIL	Operational name for the invasion of Southern France WW II
AOT	Allied-occupied territory
APO	Army Post Office
AR	Army Regulations
ARC	American Red Cross
ASCZ	Advance Section Communications Zone
ASF	Army Service Forces
ATC	Air Transport Command
ATSC	Air Technical Service Command
AUS	Army of the United States
AVALANCHE	Operational name for the invasion of Salerno
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
BDM	Bund Deutcher Madel (League of German Girls, subdivision of Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth))
BIS	Bureau of Information and Statistics of the National Military Council Chinese Nationalist Government
Blubrichter	"Blood Judge" (German)
BSI	British Solomon Islands
BSM	Bureau Securite Militaire (Fr)

CA	Civil Affairs
CAFW	Central African Wing
CAO	Civil Affairs Officer
Carabinieri	Italian Civil Police in peace time. In an emergency it is under the operational control of the Army and used with the various arms and services such as Infantry, Armor, and Artillery. The Carabinieri is considered the elite of the Italian Armed Forces.
CBI	China-Burma-India
CBIT	China-Burma-India Theater
CCC	Chinese Combat Command
CEAD	Central African Division
CG	Commanding General
CI	Counter Intelligence
CIB	Counter Intelligence Branch
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
CICC	Counter Intelligence Corps Center
CID	Counter Intelligence Division also Criminal Investigation Division
CIG	Counter Intelligence Group
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area
CIP	Corps of Intelligence Police
CIS	Counter Intelligence Section
CIT	Combat Interrogation Team

CLN	Committee of National Liberation (Italian)
CO	Commanding Officer
"COBRA"	First Army's code name for the breakout from Normandy
ComZ	Communications Zone
Contact Office	Initial name for the CIC unit in Hawaii
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
CP	Command Post also Communist Party
CPUSA	Communist Party in the United States
"CONQUER"	Code name for 9th U.S. Army
(U) Counter Subversive System	(U) Secret informants recruited on a ratio of one to each 30 persons in the military establishment for the purpose or reporting exclusively any evidence of espionage, sabotage, or subversion within the War Department. The system was started in 1917 and abolished following the Army Inspector General's report on Intelligence in 1943. While CIC had no part in operation of the system, the agents worked the cases which arose from reports submitted by these informants.
CPA	Central Pacific Area
CPBC	Central Pacific Base Command
C/S	Chief of Staff also Countersabotage
CT	Combat Team
CWC	Catholic Welfare Council
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer
DA	Department of the Army

DAF	German Workers Front
Delimitations Agreement	An agreement entered into by CIC, FBI, and ONI as to the jurisdiction of the various organizations.
DEML	Detached Enlisted Mens List
Deutsches Arbeitsfront	German Labor Front
DP	Displaced Person
DP-48	Displaced Persons Screening Project
"Dragoon"	The code name used for the operation in Southern France first known as Operation "Anvil"
DS	Detached Service
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
Edelweiss	Anti Nazi organization of Catholic Youths
EM	Enlisted man (men)
EOT	Enemy Occupied Territory
EST	Eastern Standard Time
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, United States Army
FA	Field Artillery
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FFI	Forces of the Interior (French)
FI	Front de l'Independence (Belgium)

Finance Guards	An Italian uniformed police organization dealing with immigration, and the enforcement of customs laws.
Fitchie	French for filing
Flugforschungsinstitut	Flight Research Institute German Airforce
FNU	First Name Unknown
Fragebogen	A personnel questionnaire which was required of each arrestee, city official, job applicant and etc.; by the German government.
FSP	Field Security Police
FSS	Field Security Section
FSW	British Field Security Wing
G1	General Staff Officer (or Section) Dealing with Personnel
G2	General Staff Officer (or Section) Dealing with Intelligence
G3	General Staff Officer (or Section) Dealing with Plans and Training
G4	General Staff Officer (or Section) Dealing with Supply or Logistics
G5	General Staff Officer (or Section) Dealing with Military Government
GAC	German Armistice Commission
Gamma Swimmers	German frogmen, saboteurs
"Galahad"	Code name for General Merrill's Burma Jungle Force, popularly known as "Merrill's Marauders"

Garmis Control	The registration of all visitors at hotels, pensions and other public lodging houses.
Gau	Province
Gestapo	Geheime Staatspolizie (State Secret Police)
GHQ	General Headquarters
GI	Government Issue
GIS	German Intelligence Service
"Gisbomb"	The plan for the aerial attack on German Intelligence Service installations
GO	General Order
GD	Garde de Communication (a subversive French organization)
GPU	Soviet Intelligence Agency
HICOG	High Commissioner for Germany
HJ	Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth)
HQ	Headquarters
"Husky"	Operational name for invasion of Sicily
IB	India-Burma
ID	Intelligence Division
I & E Office (Officer)	Information office or officer concerned with the dissemination of information and education to the troops rather than the general public who are served by a public information officer.
IO	British Intelligence Officer WW I
IPW	Interrogation, Prisoners of War

IRO	International Refugee Organization
IS	(WEA) That section of British Intelligence which handled penetration agents.
Intelligence Reviewing Board	A Board composed of the heads of CIC, FBI, and ONI who reviewed the findings of the Preliminary Hearing Board (Hawaii)
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JICA	Joint Intelligence Collection Agency
JICPOA	Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area
"Justice"	Believed to be the code name for XII Corps
KCP	Korean Communist Party
KIBEIS	Persons born in Hawaii but returned to Japan for the formative educational years.
KDO	Abwehr Kommando
Kempei Tai	Japanese Secret Police comparable to the German Gestapo
Kripo	German Criminal Police
Kwomintang	Chinese Nationalistic Government Central Chinese Government
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
LVF	La Volonte Francaise
Maire	French for Mayor
Maquis	Armed French civilians who were recognized as the combat section of the FFI.
"Market Garden"	Code name for the largest airborne operation ever attempted.

MG	Military Government
MI	Military Intelligence
MI_4	Negative Branch British Counter Intelligence
MI_{5b}	British Counter Intelligence Service
MID	Military Intelligence Division
DIDPAC	(United States Army Forces) Middle Pacific
MII	Military Intelligence Interpretation
Military Governors Review Board	A board that reviewed the findings of the Intelligence Reviewing Board in the Hawaiian Islands concerning interned persons. The final authority.
MILIZ	A police force with a command structure paralleling that of the Luxembourg Union, Fun de Lelzeburger Frecheitsorganisationen Resistance Group.
MIS	Military Intelligence Service also Military Intelligence Section
MLR	Main Line of Resistance
MO	Modus Operandi
MP	Military Police
MTO	Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MTOUSA	Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army
NAAF	North African Air Force
NAFD	North African Division
NAFW	North African Wing

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NATOUSA	North African Theater of Operations, United States Army
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NCAC	Northern Combat Area Command
NCAS	Navy Civil Affairs Section
NCICA	National Counter Intelligence Corps Association
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
Nisei	American-born citizen of Japanese ancestry
NKVD	Russian Police Organization
NOPOE	New Orleans Port of Embarkation
"NORWIND"	Code name for the German offensive against 7th Army begun on 1 January 1945.
NSDAP	National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi)
NWYMA	North West Young Mens Association. A group of men who had fled from North Korea.
NYPE	New York Port of Embarkation
OB	Order of Battle
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OCT	Office of the Chief of Transportation
OD	Bawakenshovepen - a resistance group of the Home Guard of the Netherlands
OIC	Officer-in-Charge
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OP	Observation Post

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OSI	Office of Special Investigations (Air Force)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
"Overlord"	Operational name for invasion of Normandy
OWI	Office of War Information
PBS	Peninsular Base Section
PGC	Persian Gulf Command
PGSC	Persian Gulf Service Command
PI	Philippine Islands
"Pickup"	The code name for the operation to pickup suspects in the Hawaiian Islands following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
PI	Photo Interpreter
PLA	People's Liberation Army (North Korean)
POA	Pacific Ocean Area
POE	Port of Embarkation
PPF	Parti Populaire Francaise (French)
Preliminary Hearing Board	A board set up in the Hawaiian Islands to review the cases of interned persons.
PT&T	Post Telephone and Telegraph
PW (or POW)	Prisoner of War
PWE	Prisoner of War Enclosure
PX	Post Exchange
QM	Quartermaster
QMC	Quartermaster Corps

RAF	Royal Air Force
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
Reichssicherheitshauptampt	The Nazi Party security organization
RIP	Refugee Interrogation Post
RNP	Rassemblement National Populaire
"Roecher Deutscher Ehre"	"Avengers of German honor" An underground organization.
Razwedupr	Soviet Military Intelligence Service
RHSA	Reich Office of State Security
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Combined Nazi Security Organizations)
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
SA	Steirmfalteirlungen (Nazi Party Storm Troopers or Brown Shirts)
SS-SchutzStaffeln or Protective Guard	Considered the most important of all Nazi Party formations. Its original function was to guard Party leaders; by the time of World War II their task was officially defined as that of insuring the internal security of the insuring the internal security of the Reich. The SS was organized in three main divisions: The General (Allegemeine) SS; the Armed (Waffen) SS; and the Security Service (Sicherhertsdrinst) or SD of the SS.
SD	Sicherheitsdienst (Secret Police and Secret Service of the SS.
S2	Regimental or Battalion Staff Officer (or Section) dealing with Intelligence
SA	Special Agent
SAC (or SAIC)	Special Agent in Charge

SC	Signal Corps
SCI	Special Counter Intelligence
Security Subsection of the Control Office	A subsection of the Hawaiian CIC office concerned with installation security.
SFPOE	San Francisco Port of Embarkation
Shadow Plants	Set up and organized by the government exclusively for war production but operated by private parties during WW II.
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SIC	Security Intelligence Corps
SIM	Servizio Informazioni Malitaire (The Italian Counterespionage System)
SIME	Security Intelligence Middle East
SIPO	Sicherheitzpolizei (Security Police)
SKLP	South Korea Labor Party
SLOE	Special List of Equipment
SNAFU	"Situation Normal all Fouled Up"
SOI	Summary of Information
SOL	Societe de L'Ordre Legionnaire
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOPACBACOM	South Pacific Base Command
SOS	Services of Supply
SS Schutz Staffeln	Elite Guard of Nazi Party
SPA	South Pacific Area

SR	Special Regulations
STAPO	Staatspolizei (Political Police)
Schulrat	School Administrator
TAF	Tactical Air Force
TBA	Table of Basic Allowances
TC	Transportation Corps
TD	Tank Destroyer
TDY	Temporary Duty
T/E	Table of Equipment
TH	Territory of Hawaii
TNT	Tri-nitro toluene
T/O	Table of Organization
T/O & E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TODT	An organization known as Todt, popularly called OT, was a semi-military German organization, formed by Dr. Todt in 1938 to build the German Westwall and later utilized by the Army Engineers for construction work both in Germany and in occupied countries. After Dr. Todt's death in 1942, the organization Todt came under the control of Prof. Albert Speer. It was organized into battalions with a nucleus of specialist German personnel and a large amount of hired or impressed foreign labor.
"Torch"	Operational name for the Invasion of North Africa
Torhsuginin	Unofficial Japanese counsular agents

Trans-Pacific Travel Control Bureau	An agency activated by the military governor to make recommendations concerning travel in Hawaii.
TRT	Tactical Reserve Team
TWX	Transmitted Wireless Exchange (Army Telegram)
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission in Korea
USA	United States Army
USAF CBI	United States Army Forces, China-Burma-India
USAFCPA	United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
USAFICA	United States Army Forces in Central Africa
USAFIK	United States Army Forces in Korea
USAFIL	United States Army Forces in Liberia
USAFIME	United States Army Forces in the Middle East
USFET	United States Forces Far Eastern Theater
USAFISPA	United States Armed Forces in South Pacific Areas
USAFMIDPAC	United States Army Forces Middle Pacific
USAFPOA	United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
USAFWP	United States Armed Forces, South West Pacific
USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea

USAT	United States Army Transport
USFA	United States Forces in Austria
USFET	United States Forces, European Theater
USO	United Service Organization
U.S.S.	United States (Navy) Ship
Vehme	An organization of fanatics from various uniformed Nazi parties, set up to seek revenge on all enemies of the Third Reich.
VIP	Very Important Person
WD	War Department
WDGS	War Department General Staff
Wehrwolf	Code name for Abwehr R- Afgoben or stay-behind saboteurs.
WOJG	Warrant Officer, Junior Grade
W/T	Wireless Transmitter
WTF	Western Task Force
WW II	World War II
ZI	Zone of the Interior

Appendix I

ANTECEDENTS OF THE CIC

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ANTECEDENTS OF THE CIC

Except for a few instances during the War-Between-the-States in 1861-1865, there is no evidence of any type of counterintelligence organization in the United States Army prior to the inception of the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I.*

No American general has ever shown a greater appreciation of the value of intelligence than George Washington.** Within a week after taking command of the Continental Army at Boston he was making arrangements for recruiting agents behind the British lines. But the long careers of such traitors as Dr. Benjamin Church of Massachusetts and Gen. Benedict Arnold of Connecticut are evidence that there was virtually no appreciation of the importance of counterintelligence agents. Study of the careers of both these notorious traitors reveals a number of situations where an Army counterintelligence system would have discovered their activities at a much earlier date than the time when their treachery was exposed.***

During the 86 years between the Revolutionary War and the War-Between-the-States, there is little evidence of either positive intelligence or counterintelligence activities in the United States Army except for the "Mexican Spy Company," organized during the Mexican War by Gen. Winfield Scott, and for positive intelligence and combat intelligence carried out by the Army scouts during the various Indian wars. Some mapping projects providing terrain intelligence were carried out during the period and at various times a total of seven Army officers were sent to Europe as military observers. That was it.****

Modern Army intelligence may be dated from the Crimean War when, in 1855, the British Army established a "Topographical and Statistical Section" which developed slowly for another 20 years when it reached the status of an "Intelligence Branch of the Adjutant General's Department.***** Improved means of observation and communication--better roads, steamships, railroads, balloons, the telegraph, cable, telephone, camera, typewriter and microphone--were making

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* For a detailed history of the origin and development of United States Army Intelligence from 1775 to 1917, readers are referred to the History of Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, Vols. 1, 2, and 3, by Bruch Bidwell, OCMH, 1953-55.

** Morton Pennypacker, George Washington's Spies, Long Island Historical Society, 1951.

*** History of Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, 1775-1917, Vol 1 (c) Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C.

**** Ibid.

***** Maj Gen Sir George Aston, KCB ("Secret Service" Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, New York, 1930.

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espionage a much more practical occupation, although it still had not reached the point where it was evident that organizations were necessary to counter it.

Only during the War-Between-the-States, 1861-1865, when the Confederate intelligence system became recognized as a security threat, was there any evidence of countermeasures; even then, these were incidental to the major efforts of collecting positive intelligence. Within three months after the war started, Allen Pinkerton had organized an intelligence service for Gen. George McClellan, but there is no evidence of any counterintelligence organization. Superintendant John Kennedy of the New York Police Department, organized for the War Department an intelligence service which is believed to have included counterintelligence work although available records provide no specific information of it.

Some efforts were made to counter the activities of Confederate spies operating in Washington, D.C., when the War Department took over the Detective Police force of the State Department and acquired the colorful L. C. Baker, who soon became a brigadier general and Army Provost Marshal. In 1863, a reorganization resulted in the establishment of the "Army Bureau of Military Information," with Col. G. H. Sharpe, Deputy Provost Marshal, in charge.

The most clearly identified counterintelligence activity occurred in Baltimore, where Maj. H. B. Smith was chief of the Union Army Secret Service of the Middle Department. Maryland was the most divided of the border states, with many troops of both sides and with the state split by loyalties to their kin folks in the army. At Baltimore, Major Smith set up a deserter and refugee screening center specifically to catch Confederate spies. Little is known, however, of the results of his work.*

During the next 52 years until World War I, there is only modest evidence of Army counterintelligence activities--for that matter, only modest evidence of intelligence activities of any kind; but these were significant. In 1882, the United States Navy established its Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and three years later the Army established the forerunner of its own intelligence service--the "Military Information Division" of the Adjutant General's Department. Maj. William J. Volkmar and one clerk comprised the Division!

Inventions of the era continued to provide more and better tools for the espionage agent--automobiles and airplanes, celluloid photographic film and photographic printing papers, color photography and motion pictures, wireless and dictating recorders. By 1908, the British War Office had recognized this new threat to security and organized its CIC equivalent, "The Special Branch."

* For details of this era, see also The Spy in America by Byron Price.

In the American Army, what intelligence growth there was concerned the collection of positive intelligence. In 1870, Gen. Philip H. Sheridan accompanied the German Army as an observer during the Franco-Prussian War. The Commanding General of the United States Army (General Sherman) made a European tour shortly thereafter.

From 1880 a regular system of acquiring foreign military information was established when all Army officers traveling abroad were ordered to avail themselves of "all opportunities within their reach of obtaining information of value to the military service." Reports were to be made in writing. Six years later this collection effort was broadened to include orders for all Army Bureau chiefs, Department and Division commanders and the Adjutant Generals of the several states and territories to provide military information. Although not so labeled, much of this domestic intelligence was inherently of counterintelligence interest.

Intelligence collection was further expanded by the establishment of the Military Attache system in 1888, a system which proved so valuable that British Intelligence soon copied it. Unfortunately, United States Army commanders were not so much impressed and, during the war with Spain in 1898, crippled its effectiveness by assigning 11 of the 16 attaches back to troop duty, and reducing Military Intelligence Division from 11 to 2 officers.

Although counterintelligence was not recognized as such during this period, a growing need for better security was evident. In 1889 a "Security" regulation of the Secretary of War limited dissemination of Military Information Division data to the Commanding General of the Army and Bureau Chiefs. By the time the United States Army had organized its General Staff in 1904 with Intelligence as G2, the Adjutant General ha published a text describing the Military Intelligence mission as "The Service of Security and Information."

In 1908, all United States Army intelligence went into an eclipse when G2 (MI) was transferred to the Army War College and remained as an incidental function until revived by the necessity in World War I.

On the eve of World War I, in 1913, the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, summed up the status of Army Intelligence as having no training system for officer replacements; not evaluating its reports; not briefing Military Attaches with the intelligence data available; furnishing "incomplete" official monographs and failing to properly coordinate military information matters. No action had been taken, however, by the time General Wood finished his term the following year.

Fortunately, the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice was operating, and in 1914 broke up a passport forging ring which was assisting

some 800 German reserve officers to return to Germany from the United States. Fortunately, too, an American newspaper, the Providence (R.I.) Journal and the British Intelligence Service in the United States were financing the counterespionage activities of Victor Voska, a Czechoslovakian, who had penetrated the German Intelligence Service in the United States and kept the British informed. In turn, the British kept the American authorities informed. In spite of this, the German saboteur, Franz von Rintelin was able to come to New York and set up an organization which sank 30 allied ships before detection.

Although trouble had been brewing along the Mexican border since 1911, it was not until 1914 that the Army units along the border were instructed to detail officers "in addition to other duties," as Intelligence officers and to collect information from refugees and other sources but "not to cross the border." Two years later all Department commanders were ordered to detail Intelligence Officers at their headquarters; and on the eve of World War I, Adjutant Generals of the several states were ordered to provide for military intelligence coverage on a nationwide basis and establish offices in the principal cities.

Another sign of awakening appreciation of military intelligence was an increase in 1914 of the Military Information Committee budget from $10,000 to $11,000--the first increase since 1903.

In 1915, Maj. Ralph Van Deman, who had been interested in intelligence ever since his first assignment in the work while a second lieutenant in 1897, was reassigned to the Army War College which had absorbed Army intelligence seven years before through a merger of the Second and Third Divisions of the General Staff.*

Major Van Deman discovered that he was the only officer in the Division who had any training or experience in military intelligence. From 1908 on, when military intelligence work had been delegated to a committee of the War College, it virtually had ceased to exist; by the time Van Deman arrived in 1915, a large table was piled high with telegraphic reports from Military Attaches and other intelligence officers in the field which had never been filed. An officer had been assigned to read them and their use had terminated at that point.

With the approval of Brig. Gen. M. M. Macomb, Chief of the War College Division, Van Deman submitted numerous memoranda to the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, pointing out that on the threshold of war, the Army was being deprived of vital information it had collected by not having a Military Information Division to process and disseminate it, and recommending correctives. For more than a year these pleas were largely ignored.

* For details of this eram see Van Deman, R.H., Memoirs, Vol 1, 1949, (Central Records Facility).

In an effort to make some of the information available, however, Van Deman obtained permission to have the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth publish some of these reports and distribute them to the Army, since no personnel of the War College could be spared to handle dissemination.

Had Van Deman been allowed to handle this project, material benefits could have been derived, but instead, another officer selected without even consulting Van Deman wrote the first report to be distributed under the new plan.

Whether intentionally or accidentally, the report selected was not information obtained by American Intelligence officers but was a copy of a report which had been obtained from the British under a pledge of secrecy by the United States Military Attache in London. The new plan was terminated then and there! America entered the First World War on 6 April 1917. Intelligence reports from all over the world were rushed to the War Department by telegram and cable, only to be deposited in the War College files.

Shortly after the declaration of war, both the British and French governments sent missions to Washington; each mission had an officer representing military intelligence. These officers were sent to the War College, but as there was no American counterpart, their visits "consisted entirely of conversation."

With the consent of the President of the War College, Van Deman went to the Army Chief of Staff shortly after the war started and explained the problem. Whereupon General Scott said that he saw no reason for the United States Army to have a military information service since both the British and French had such organizations. The United States should ask them to furnish us any necessary information.*

Undaunted by this refusal, Van Deman obtained permission to appeal to the Chief of Staff again and then again. At that point, General Scott not only ordered Van Deman to cease advocating a military information service, but gave him strict orders not to see the Secretary of War on the subject.**

Major Van Deman then had to make a decision that represents the most dangerous occupational hazard of the military profession for the individual. He had done his best to persuade his superior to act. He could quit now and have the deep sympathy and respect of every Army officer who has fought for his beliefs and lost. Or he could risk what many men value more than life itself--his professional reputation--and fight for his firm conviction.

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* Van Deman, Ralph H, Maj Gen, Memoirs, 1949, Vol 1, AIC, Ft Holabird, Md., (Cen Rec Fac).

** Ibid.

Van Deman was too much the soldier to disobey the orders forbidding him to go to the Secretary of War, but shortly thereafter discovered that his good friend the Chief of Police of the District of Columbia usually breakfasted at a club with the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. In due time the Chief found it expedient to outline certain intelligence problems to Secretary Baker.

At this same time, Lady Luck seemingly smiled. Van Deman was assigned to escort a famous and respected woman novelist on a tour of training camps in the vicinity of the nation's capital, in connection with a survey she was making at the request of the Secretary of War. In conversations, she mentioned that she had recently talked with an American who was serving with British Intelligence in Europe and spoke strongly of the importance placed on the work by Allied military authorities. Never one to miss an opportunity, Van Deman quickly explained the Army situation and his problem. The novelist became excited and said she would see the Secretary of War that day. And she did. Thus doubly targeted, the Secretary became interested.

He telephoned the President of the Army War College and ordered Van Deman to report to him. Forty-eight hours later, orders went out to establish such a branch, and since Van Deman was the only officer with any knowledge of the work, on 3 May 1917, he was assigned to organize it.

Unfortunately, the Secretary of War's order established the Army Military Intelligence Service as a branch of the War College. More than another year of constant effort was required to win independent status, and it was not until 26 August 1918 that it was reestablished as the Second (G2) Division of the General Staff; and Army intelligence was permanently back as an active part of the service.

This position called for a general officer as Chief, but Van Deman then began to pay for his maneuvering over the head of the Chief of Staff. Before the change was made, Van Deman was ordered to Europe and the brigadier generalship was awarded another officer. "Accidentally," General Van Deman's number on the promotion list was dropped back 40 spaces, * and it was not until 1927, 10 years later after he had "gone out of line," that he became a brigadier general. This promotion came only seven years after assignments other than intelligence, following World War I.

Thanks to Van Deman's courage, there was an intelligence organization in the Army General Staff to welcome the request from the American Expeditionary Force for a secret service unit which became the origin of the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps. In fact, Van Deman's belief in the importance of counter-intelligence led to a criticism in one instance that he had neglected other phases

* 201 File, Van Deman, Ralph H, Army Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Mo.

of intelligence to favor it.* Although the record provides no evidence to support the validity of this criticism, the record does show that Van Deman recognized the dangers of communism and the need to combat its activities more than a quarter of a century before most of his contemporaries and associates were even aware of its existence, much less its nature and its international aspects.**

Thus was Army counterintelligence born out of the indifference and opposition that had marked the history of Army intelligence itself. And even though it would prove its worth in World War I, this would be forgotten in the long interval of peace that followed and it would not be until World War II and the subsequent occupation era that the Army Counter Intelligence Corps would become an important and respected part of the Army team.

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* History of the MID, WDGS, Vol 2, (1917-1919) by Bruce Bidwell, Col, Inf, Draft 1954, (Conf) Chap X, p 3, (Office Chief, Military History) Wash 25, D.C.

** Van Deman, Memoirs, Vols 2 and 3, 1950 and 1951, (Cen Rec Fac).

Appendix II

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FORT HOLABIRD

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THE TEN YEAR HOME OF THE CIC AND FORT HOLABIRD 1945-1955

By 1955 Fort Holabird had been the home of the Counter Intelligence Corps for 10 years. But it had come into existence as Camp Holabird for other purposes in December of 1917, during World War I. The Army had purchased 153 acres of land between Shell Road* (now Holabird Avenue) and Colgate Creek to establish its first motor transport depot officially known as the Holabird Quartermaster Depot. In the more than two score years since then the post has grown to a 240 acre area and to its initial investment of $50,000 for land, the improvements in buildings, roads and facilities have increased its value to more than thirteen and a half million dollars. It became a Fort on 15 April 1950.

The post was named Holabird in honor of Brig. Gen. S. B. Holabird, Quartermaster General of the Army 1883-1890. It was operated by the Quartermaster Corps until July 1942 when it became Holabird Ordnance Motor Base. In October 1943 when the Ordnance Corps transferred automotive development to Aberdeen, it became Holabird Signal Depot. The post remained a huge Signal depot until the end of 1954. Since the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has a deed to a right-of-way bisecting the post, permanent connections existed for a rail shop and in 1937 the Army railroad repair shops came to Camp Holabird. These were developed into the largest plant of its kind in the U. S. (By the end of the 1950's however, Department of the Army was finalizing plans for decentralizing the shops, with their removal from Ft. Holabird.) The Holabird military reservation always has had a number of varied tenants, such as a branch of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, a branch of Army Finance Corps, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau of the Provost Marshal General, and numerous other units.

Intelligence activities first came to Holabird, 7 July 1943, when Counter Intelligence Corps agent candidates were given an automotive course there. In August 1943, the CIC Staging Area was established at Camp Holabird and operated until May 1944. CIC returned to Camp Holabird on 10 October 1945 and its Center and School were there 10 years later, when it was announced on September 1954, that they would become part of the Army Intelligence Center. On 1 May 1955, the CIC School, which had moved into a new million dollar building in January, became the Army Intelligence School. A Department of Field Operations Intelligence also had been created. Similarly Combat Intelligence training which had been taught at Fort Riley, Kansas, became a Department of the new consolidated School.

During World War II, Camp Holabird had a population of some 7,600 and was commanded for the first time by a general officer--Brig. Gen. Herbert J. Lawes. In 1947, Brig. Gen. G. V. Keyser became the first general officer to

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* Shell Road was made of Oyster Shells.

NOTE: Sources to 1947, Historical Issue of the Holabird Herald, March 1947, Vol 5, No. 5, published by the Holabird Signal Depot.
Sources 1947-1955, Post Engineer Records, and Army Orders, dates cited.

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be chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps and in 1954, Maj. Gen. Boniface Campbell became the first Commanding General of the Army Intelligence Center.

Camp Holabird has many claims to "firsts." There in 1919 the first motor pool was operated for Washington diplomats. In 1920 the first transcontinental motor convoy started from Holabird. In 1925 the first Army fire truck was built there. In 1940, Holabird tested and developed the newly created jeep and developed "Superman" the famed 6x6 Army truck that General Eisenhower called one of the major factors in winning the war; the first Army amphibious vehicles were tested in Colgate Creek mud which by this time was replacing the creek canal that had enabled Holabird to have its own dock and boats in 1918. While under the Signal Corps, Camp Holabird was the development site of the photographic equipment for the first atomic tests and for radar to detect buzz bombs approaching London. During World War I, Holabird processed all military vehicles for Europe. In its many schools it has taught members of all the various armed services and representatives of many foreign governments.

Commanding officers of Holabird, under its various designations since its formal activation early in 1918, have been.

NAME	DATE OF COMMAND
Col. Franklin S. Leisenring	Mar 1918 to 7 May 1919
Col. Wm. D. Chitty	7 May 1919 to 5 Dec 1919
Lt. Col. George P. Hawes, Jr.	5 Dec 1919 to 30 Jun 1920
Lt. Col. George B. Sharon	1 Jul 1920 to 9 Dec 1920
Maj. Charles G. Mortimer	9 Dec 1920 to 11 Jan 1921
Col. George E. Ball	11 Jan 1921 to 10 Jun 1924
Col. Wm. G. Gambrill	3 Jul 1924 to 12 Aug 1926
Col. Edgar S. Stayer	12 Aug 1926 to 29 Aug 1932
Col. Brainerd Taylor	30 Aug 1932 to 31 Dec 1936
Col. D. K. Mitchell	31 Dec 1936 to 16 Aug 1938
Brig. Gen. H. J. Lawes	17 Aug 1938 to 30 Oct 1943

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NAME	DATE OF COMMAND
Col. Lawrence Watts	8 Nov 1943 to 30 Jul 1947
Brig. Gen. George V. Keyser	31 Jul 1947 to 10 Jan 1948
Brig. Gen. E. A. Zundel	11 Jan 1948 to 24 Aug 1949
Brig. Gen. John K. Rice	25 Aug 1949 to 20 Aug 1951
Brig. Gen. Phillip Gallagher	20 Aug 1951 to 20 Aug 1953
Maj. Gen. George B. Barth	20 Aug 1953 to 22 Oct 1953
Maj. Gen. Boniface Campbell	22 Oct 1953 to 27 Nov 1956
Maj. Gen. Richard G. Prather	28 Nov 1956 to --

The various "Chiefs" of CIC at Holabird (only) have been:

Brig. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel	26 Apr 1947 to 8 Jun 1949
Maj. Gen. John K. Rice	9 Jun 1949 to 19 Aug 1951
Maj. Gen. Phillip E. Gallagher	20 Aug 1951 to 19 Aug 1953
Maj. Gen. George B. Barth	21 Aug 1953 to 18 Oct 1953
Maj. Gen. Boniface Campbell*	22 Oct 1953 to 27 Nov 1956
Maj. Gen. Richard G. Prather	27 Nov 1956 to --

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* General Campbell was the first Commanding General of the newly constituted Army Intelligence Center.

NOTE: Several Deputy Commanders bore the dual responsibilities of commanding Holabird as well as heading up CIC for limited periods. Included among these were Col. M. C. Noble, Col. J. E. Raymond and Col. Frank M. Hosterman.

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Appendix III

ROSTER OF WORLD WAR II DEAD

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CIC PERSONNEL WHO DIED IN WORLD WAR II

NOTE: This list has been compiled from available records but is not considered complete.

NAME	RANK	ASN	UNIT	DATE AND CAUSE OF DEATH
Albee, Theodore	S/Sgt	36245299	509th CIC Det	21 Dec 44, KIA
Allen, Eldon L.	1st Lt	01997966	17th Abn Div	24 Mar 45, KIA
Allmond, Roy C.	Sgt	34683156		13 Aug 45, plane crash
Anderson, John A.	T/Sgt	7031364	Philippines	11 Jan 43, diphtheria in POW camp
Ball, Milton J.	Cpl	37695828	955th CIC Det	21 Jul 45, amoebic dysentery on Leyte
Benjamin, Alfred H. Jr.	S/Sgt	12037266	5th Army CIC	8 Mar 43, auto accident in North Africa
Benson, Frank E. Jr.	Cpl	31194868	101st Abn Div	6 Jun 44, KIA Normandy
Bibee, Raymond E.	Capt	0364633	Philippines	Prison camp
Bolan, Robert B.	Cpl	3528580	505th CIC Det	10 Aug 44, DOW
Brassington, Theodore	T/Sgt	6885507	South Pacific	24 Oct 44, KIA
Califf, John W.	S/Sgt	36065479	1st Div CIC	31 Aug 44, KIA, Vic-sur-aisne
Cameron, Gerard G.	1st Lt	0285316	218th CIC Det	24 Mar 45, KIA, glider crash
Campbell, Robert L.	Sgt	3946177	204th CIC Det	24 Apr 45, KIA, north Italy
Cobean, Raymond L.	1st Lt	01104090	310th CIC Det	14 Jun 45, KIA, Okinawa
Cummins, Peter M. Jr.	Capt	01797609	Germany	Shot while POW in Germany

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NAME	RANK	ASN	UNIT	DATE AND CAUSE OF DEATH
Datuin, Bernabe M.	S/Sgt	6614098	Philippines	2 Feb 45, KIA
Dineen, William P.	Sgt	35452289	5th Inf Div	3 Dec 44, KIA
Drisko, Grenfeld D.	M/Sgt	19046103	Philippines	31 Jul 44, shot and burned by Japanese while POW
Dunbar, Edward	Sgt			1945, KIA Okinawa
Dunbar, Glenn S.	2d Lt	01683991	27th Inf Div	14 Jun 45, KIA, Okinawa
Erwin, Jack	1st Lt	0337557	Philippines	20 Jul 42, malaria while PW
Fagan, Francis C.	Cpl	31279385	446th CIC Det	3 May 45, polio
Gaines, Gail A.	Cpl	17121489	11th CIC Det	13 Aug 45, plane crash Okinawa
Gaspar, Ahmad Jr.	S/Sgt	6866029	Philippines	Last seen on Bataan
Giordano, Anthony B.	T/Sgt	33021656	34th CIC Det	
Giordano, Anthony F.	Sgt	32422260	34th CIC Det	5 Nov 43, KIA Italy
Glass, Harry B.	2d Lt	0890456	Philippines	Malaria while PW
Goldstein, William	Cpl	17081013	609th CIC Det	7 May 45, auto accident
Gordon, Will S.	T/Sgt	6584783	Philippines	Oct 44, sank in PW ship
Halloran, Paul Leavy	S/Sgt	37130199	428th CIC Det	23 Apr 45, KIA Italy
Henderson, Charles W.	1st Lt	01299235		Oct 44, sank in PW ship
Hunter, Woodrow G.	Sgt	35467922		18 May 44, KIA, Insoemaar Is.

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NAME	RANK	ASN	UNIT	DATE AND CAUSE OF DEATH
Jensen, Elvin O.	Cpl	32984638	306th CIC Det	25 Oct 44, KIA Leyte
Keeler, Ralph	Capt			Prison ship or shortly after recapture
Keys, Oscar W. Jr.	M/Sgt	13043787		13 Aug 45, plane crash Okinawa
Limbach, Charles	Sgt	22449431	310th CIC Det	5 Apr 45, drowned Okinawa
Murphy, Harold G.	2d Lt	0995449	II Corps CIC	14 Feb 43, KIA Tunisia
Newbold, David E.	Sgt	3809011		28 Oct 44, endocrinitis
Norton, John H.	Capt	026238		Plane crash
Odriozola, Arlos A.	Cpl	39538361		28 May 44, fell from Empire Hotel
Olsen, Erling	S/Sgt			
Owens, Clarence E.	T/Sgt	44181678		Plane reported missing
Panard, Anthony G.	Sgt	36513660	3d Div CIC	DOW Italy
Papurt, Maxwell J.	Maj.	0298501		29 Nov 44, KIA
Rae, Nelson S.	T/Sgt	32010983	2d Div CIC	12 Jan 45, DOW
Ray, Edward L.	Maj			1944, cerebral hemorrhage
Raymond, Nelson W.	Maj	0235991	Philippines	9 Jan 45, PW ship
Rees, Nelson B.	Cpl	39135534	43d CIC Det	16 Jan 45, accidentally shot

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NAME	RANK	ASN	UNIT	DATE AND CAUSE OF DEATH
Robinson, Frank L.	Cpl		101st Abn Div	6 Jun 44, KIA Normandy
Robinson, Lansing	S/Sgt	12032452	45th CIC Det	4 Aug 43, polio
Rubsam, John L.	Capt	01284581	34th CIC Det	2 Feb 44, KIA Italy
Sloan, Charles			99th Inf CIC	17 Dec 44, KIA, Bullingen
Smith, Lewis W.	S/Sgt	39682328		29 Dec 44, plane crash North Africa
Soper, Donald R.	Cpl	31402089		13 Aug 45, plane crash, Okinawa
Stemple, Max L.	S/Sgt	15115609	101st Abn Div	6 Jun 44, KIA, Normandy
Stephens, Howard V. Jr.	2d Lt	01183423	99th Inf CIC	17 Dec 44, KIA, Bullingen
Tornetta, Anthony J.	Cpl	33774516	17th Abn Div	24 Mar 45, glider crash
Walcott, John C.	1st Lt	01000678	5th Army CIC	18 Nov 43, auto crash, Italy
Wallbaum, Robert F.	S/Sgt	6577508	Philippines	24 Oct 44, PW on hospital ship
Woods, John Thomas	T/Sgt	36449632	35th CIC Det	8 Nov 44, KIA, France
Yamaguchi, George T.	T/4	3992974		13 Aug 45, plane crash, Okinawa

Appendix IV

ROSTER OF AWARDS, WORLD WAR II

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CIC PERSONNEL AWARDS DURING WORLD WAR II

NOTE: This list has been compiled from available records but is not considered complete...additions are desired.

RANK, NAME, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Alajajian, Jerry A. Cpl 31366242		Bronze Star	
Abeles, Seymour B. T/Sgt 12098762	CBI	Bronze Star	1 Oct 45; heroism on Kutkai, Burma, 15 Feb 45
Alfieri, Mario		Knight Officer Crown of Italy	27 Jun 46
Allen, Eldon Leroy 1st Lt 01997966	17th Ab CIC	Bronze Star Purple Heart French Fourragare Netherlands Orange Lanyard	
Allen, Lyndon B. Capt 0384068		Bronze Star w/OL	
Allmond, Roy C. Sgt 34683156		Bronze Star	
Allocca, Joseph F. Cpl 32793434	77th Inf Div	Bronze Star	For period 7 Dec 44-25 Dec 44 in Leyte, Philippine Island
Amerman, Harry L. Capt 0885353	5th Army	Bronze Star	For period 11 Sep 43-5 Jun 44 in Italy
Amols, Seth G.	10th Mtn Div	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Anderson, Alexander A. 2d Lt 0887501	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	27 Feb 45; for period 20 Sep - 4 Oct 44 in Germany
Anderson, Arthur E. 2d Lt 0200617	78th Inf Div	Bronze Star Purple Heart	For period 24 Dec 44-17 Apr 45 in Germany

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RANK, NAME, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Anderson, Gordon M. S/Sgt	29th Inf Div	Bronze Star	5 Mar 45; action under difficult conditions
Anderson, Hilding A. T/Sgt 39121766	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	For period 26 Jun 44-26 Apr 45 in France, Belgium, Germany
Apatsky, Joseph 1st Lt		Bronze Star	
Appleton, Oliver D. 1st Lt 01305705	4th Inf Div	Bronze Star	19 June 44
Aronson, Zola A. Sgt 32356752	3d Army	Bronze Star	13 Jan 45
Arrizabalaga, Ramon Jr. 2d Lt 01695718	5th Army	Bronze Star	For Svc 3 Jul 44
Auer, Bernard M. M/Sgt 32779827		Bronze Star	
Axtell, Clayton M. T/Sgt 02000890	80th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Babilya, Peter J. T/Sgt 32451073	XV Corps	Bronze Star	25 Jul 44 - 9 May 45
Bacon, Leonard L. T/Sgt	V Corps	Bronze Star	For accomplishment 16 Jun 44 - 26 Jul 44
Badger, Daniel B. 1st Lt 0887384	VII Corps	Bronze Star	6 Jun 44 - 8 May 45 in France, Belgium and Germany
Baily, James B. S/Sgt 36361351		Bronze Star	
Baker, William C. S/Sgt	303d CIC Det	Bronze Star	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Ballou, Alfred F. 1st Lt 0944664		Legion of Merit	
Bamberger, Werner Pvt 32795266	87th CIC Det	Bronze Star	Apr 45
Banyar, Frank G. Sgt 3348735	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	7 Dec 44
Baraty, Edward T/Sgt 36198261	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	11 Aug 45
Barbee, Frank L. 1st Lt 01686234	SWPA	Bronze Star w/Oak Leaf	18-21 May 44 in Dutch Guinea
Barnett, Lynn 2d Lt 02039557	88th Inf Div	Bronze Star	11 May 44 - 1 Mar 45, Italy
Barr, Horace Sgt		Purple Heart	
Barros, Russell D. Lt Col 0298071	309th CIC Det	Bronze Star, Uichi	1953
Barry, Edward P. 1st Lt 0477785		Legion of Merit	11 Jan 44
Bates, John L., Jr. 2d Lt 1327079		Bronze Star	28 Nov 45
Beatty, Walcott H. Capt 0350834	3d Army 421st CIC Det	Bronze Star	14 Jan 45
Beck, Ernst A. S/A	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	15 Mar - 28 Apr 45
Beebe, Richard W. 1st Lt 01281023	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	27 Feb - 26 Apr 45 in Germany
Beesley, Charles H. 2d Lt 01996447	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	8 Dec 44; Normandy France

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Benjamin, Alfred H., Jr. S/Sgt 12037266	5th Army CIC	Legion of Merit	23 Sep 43; from Sep 42 - Mar 43 (captured German agent)
Bennett, Edwin (NMI) Maj 0311957	XII Corps	Bronze Star	31 Jan 45
Benson, Frank Edwin, Jr Cpl 311964868		Purple Heart	
Bergman, Victor C. T/Sgt 36358587	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	15 Aug 44 - 1 May 45 in France and Germany
Bessman, Leonard M. 1st Lt 0454641	II Corps	Distinguished Service Cross Purple Heart	GO 33 11 Mar 43
Biedenharn, Albert M. Sgt 38250981	1st Army	Purple Heart	8 Dec 44
Biron, Henry A. S/Sgt 31072805	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	6 Dec 44
Birt, Francis Sgt 35462109	79th Inf Div	Bronze Star	30 Jun 45
Bishop, Robert F. T/Sgt	94th Inf Div	Bronze Star	1 Aug 45
Black, Theodore M. 1st Lt 01318274	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	6 Mar 44 - 15 Jun 44 ETO
Blackstock, James S/A		Silver Star	
Blake, Emmet R. 1st Lt 01998673	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Purple Heart	16 Nov 44 - 15 Apr 45, 7 Apr 45
Blaser, Glenn Frank S/Sgt 19153177	315th CIC Det	Bronze Star	11 Mar 45

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Bogatay, George W. S/Sgt 13122391	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	26 Jun 44 - 26 Apr 45 in France, Belgium and Germany
Bogatin, Lavin Capt	79th Inf Div	Bronze Star	3 Jun 45
Boggs, Robert D. S/Sgt 32882881		Bronze Star	15 Sep 44 - 7 May 45
Bolan, Robert Brennan Cpl 35328580	505th CIC Det	Purple Heart (posthumously)	
Boren, Robert Daniel 1st Lt 01996376	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Bowen, Albert R., Jr. Capt 01304669	VIII Corps	Bronze Star	25 Jun 44 - 1 Mar 45
Bower, William N. 1st Lt 01691499	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	4 Sep 44 - 10 Sep 44 in France
Boyce, Bernard F., Jr. 1st Lt 01318379	4th Inf Div	Bronze Star	6 Jun to 15 Sep 44 in France
Bradford, Lowell Lt Col		Legion of Merit	
Brandeis, Erich Pvt	87th CIC Det	Bronze Star	Apr 45
Brannon, Louis T/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Breckinridge, James W. T/Sgt 31118934	SWPA	Bronze Star	12 Jun - 18 Jul 44 near Maffin Bay, New Guinea
Brennecke, Francis Christian Lt Col 0205865	315th CIC Det	Bronze Star	11 Mar 45

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Brockmeier, Robert T/Sgt 35663172	7th Army 307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	16 Aug 44 - 1 May 45 in France and Germany
Brooks, James D. M/Sgt 35142890		Bronze Star	
Brown, Keirn C. 2d Lt 02006878	70th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Burglund, Oliver O. 1st Lt	3d Army	Croi de Guerre w/Etaile de Bronze	5 Jun 45
Burke, Martin P. M/Sgt		Legion of Merit	
Burt, Francis Sgt		Bronze Star	
Calevas, Harry A. 2d Lt 02026847		Bronze Star	
Califf, John William S/Sgt 36065479	1st Div CIC	Bronze Star Purple Heart (Posthumously)	
Camell, Kenneth E. Sgt 17271159	2d CIC Det	Bronze Star	2 Jan 52
Cameron, Gerald Guyot 1st Lt 0286316	17th Ab Div	Purple Heart	
Cameron, Jack B. 1st Lt 0477070		Legion of Merit	
Camp, Charles S. 2d Lt 01686324	SWAP	Silver Star Bronze Star w/OL	12 Jun - 18 Jul 44, New Guinea
Campbell, Robert L. Sgt 3946177		Purple Heart	
Burkley, Joseph A. Capt 02056689	210th CIC Det	Distinguished Flying Cross Airman Medal Bronze Star	1945 1944 1952

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Canon, Jack Y. 1st Lt 0432768		Silver Star	
Carey, William T. Maj 02040783	201st CIC Det	Bronze Star	9 Jun 52
Carr, Donald J. T/Sgt 31115278		Bronze Star	
Casserly, John P.	104th Inf Div	Bronze Star	23 Oct 44 - 8 May 45 in Belgium, Holland and Germany
Caziaro, Dean H. Capt 02036591		Bronze Star w/OL Purple Heart	
Chamberlin, Wells F. Sgt 36369266	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	16 Jan 45; France
Champagne, Roger S/A	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	15 Mar 45 - 28 Apr 45; Germany
Charon, George WOJG W2147663		Bronze Star	
Chrapciak, Martin S/A	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	15 Mar - 28 Apr 45 in Germany
Christman, George W. Cpl 33746987	7th CIC Det	Purple Heart	2 Dec 44, Leyte, Philippine Island
Clapp, David B., Jr. Cpl 12109340	CIB	Bronze Star	27 Oct 45
Clifford, Charles E. SFC 31301604		Bronze Star	
Coakley, Daniel J. S/Sgt 31158355		Purple Heart	
Cole, Buster S/Sgt 18104302		Soldiers Medal	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Colgate, Craig, Jr., 2d Lt		Bronze Star	30 Sep 45
Collins, Ulysses S. T/Sgt 36053621	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	26 Jun 44 - 26 Apr 45, France, Belgium and Germany
Conick, Charles B. 2d Lt 0885450	1st Army	Bronze Star w/OL	15 Apr 44 - 5 Jun 44; England
Connelly, David I. 1st Lt 02036592	24th Inf Div	Bronze Star	20 Oct 44 - 20 Nov 44, Leyte
Conner, Thomas J. 1st Lt 01060604	100th Inf Div	Bronze Star	8 Nov 44 - 8 May 45, France and Germany
Conyers, Ben J. 2d Lt 01992697	70th CIC Det	Purple Heart	15 Nov 44
Cook, Herman Francis S/Sgt 33546610	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Cook, Victor I. 1st Lt 01032073		Bronze Star	
Coppola, Alfred A.	91st Div	Bronze Star	13 Aug 45
Costello, Harry G., Jr. Capt 0348071	206th CIC Det	Legion of Merit	Jan 44 - Mar 45
Court, Newton H. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Cowan, Edwin F. Capt 01691527	428th CIC Det	Croce di Cavaliere Ufficiale nell' Ordine della Corona d'Italia Military and Hospital Order of St Mary of Bethlehem, Commendatore	25 Mar 46
Cox, Clarence C. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Cox, Joe B. Sgt	IV Corps	Bronze Star	30 May 45
Cross, Eric M. Sgt 39139844	XV Corps	Bronze Star	28 Dec 44 - 9 May 45 in Holland and Germany
Crowell, Kenneth G. Lt Col 0261022	7th Army	Bronze Star	27 Dec 44; service from Jan to Nov 44 in North Africa, Italy, 11 Mar 45
Crutcher, Marshall Bayard T/Sgt 39383603	315th CIC Det		
Crystal, John C. Maj	IV Corps	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Cunningham, James S. S/Sgt 39838711		Bronze Star	
Cunningham, Paul		Knight, Crown of Italy	27 Jun 46
Cunningham, Robert J. 2d Lt 02001720	5th Army	Bronze Star	3 Nov 43 - 28 Feb 45 in Italy
Cunningham, Robert S. S/A		Bronze Star	
Cuom, Anthony M/Sgt		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45
Dale, Thomas J. Pfc 33253256	39th CIC Det	Bronze Star	14 Oct 44 - 1 Jan 45
Daly, Philip J. M/Sgt	V Corps CIC	Bronze Star	6 Jun - 25 Oct 44
Daly, Walter J. Maj		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Daniel, Gately N. 1st Lt 0957567	201st CIC Det	Airman Medal Bronze Star Pres U Cit (Navy)	1951 1951 1950
Dannenberg, Martin E., Jr. M/Sgt 33372008		Bronze Star	15 Sep 44 - 7 May 45
Day, John T. 1st Lt 01060760		Bronze Star	
De Guinzbourg, Victor Maj		Croix de Guerre	
De Loach, Wilbur V. Capt	6th Armd Div	Bronze Star w/OL	14 Feb 45
DeMare, Paul S/A	204th	Purple Heart	22 Apr 45
Denlinger, Richard G. 1st Lt 01996339	302d CIC Det	Bronze Star	1944
Denton, James G. 1st Lt 01999433	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	26 Jun 44 - 26 Apr 45 in France, Belgium and Germany
De Simone, Jack A. 2d Lt 02039684	5th Army	Bronze Star	9 Apr 45
Dewing, Charles W. T/Sgt 12025756		Legion of Merit	
Di Bona, Louis G. Sgt 3136937	1st Armd Div	Bronze Star	5 Apr - 1 Nov 44 in Italy
Dietz, Ralph E. T/Sgt 36073164	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	7 Aug 44 - 7 Mar 45 in France, Belgium and Germany
Dillman, Francis A. Sgt 36692371		Purple Heart	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Dineen, William Patrick Sgt 35452289	5th Inf Div	Purple Heart	(Posthumously)
Dinning, Woodford W. S/Sgt 34333644	5th Inf Div	Bronze Star	6 Feb 45
Divillo, Francis M. S/Sgt 31105505	1st Armd Div	Bronze Star	5 Apr 44 - 31 Jan 45 in Italy
Donahoe, Bernard M. Capt 010304022		Bronze Star	
Dorsett, James K., Jr. Maj 0302283	207th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre avec Etoile de Vermeil	29 Jan 45
Doud, John L., Jr. 2d Lt 02012100	611th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Doud, William E. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Dougherty, John L. Jr. 2d Lt 02012100	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	2 Dec 44 - 9 May 45 in Belgium, Holland and Germany
Dougherty, M. F. Maj 01306990	181st CIC Det	Bronze Star	1951
Downing, Frederick C. T/Sgt 12037637	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	11 Jun 44 - 30 Apr 45 in France, Belgium, Holland & Germany
Dreshler, Harold Franklyn 1st Lt 01796054	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Drisko, Grenfeld D. M/Sgt 19046103		Purple Heart	
Drolsum, Darrel D. T/Sgt 36731760	35th Inf Div	Bronze Star	11-21 Dec 44 in France

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Dunbar, Glenn S. Lt 01683991	27th Inf Div	Purple Heart	
Duncan, Thomas N. 2d Lt 02005596	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	26 Jun 44 - 26 Apr 45 in France, Belgium and Germany
Duvall, Andrew R., Jr Capt 0400020	69th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Eckman, George R. Col 051005	441st CIC Det	Legion of Merit	1953
Edris, Robert B. S/Sgt 32600314	CBI	Bronze Star	27 Oct 45
Ellert, Arthur R. Cpl 31096193		Bronze Star	
Ellis, Charles A. Maj 0181368		Silver Star	
Ellison, Herbert T.S., Jr.	IV Corps	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Elmer, Fred Sgt 42066857		Bronze Star	
Emmet, Thomas A. 1st Lt 01998061	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre avec Etoiled Argent	30 Aug 45
Ensign, Robert Sgt 36064458	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Erskine, David G. Col		Legion of Merit	
Erwin, Jack 1st Lt 0337557		Silver Star	
Evans, Townsend 1st Lt 01591704	104th Inf Div	Bronze Star	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Eveland, Wilbur C., Jr. Capt 01590440	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
Fain, Douglas W. S/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Farell, Joseph H., Jr. 1st Lt 01922585	3d CIC Det	Silver Star	15 Jun 1951
Farley, Eugene E. 2d Lt 01999762	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	18 Dec 44
Farrell, Martin P. 1st Lt 01895563	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Fasola, Alfred F. Capt 01297345	75th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Feldman, Henry T/5		Bronze Star	16 Jun 45
Filley, Walter O. T/Sgt 11095828	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Filopula, Taisto C. Sgt 06103882	76th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Finch, Richard F. S/Sgt 32807114	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	17 Dec 44
Finn, David H. 2d Lt 01690894		Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Fisher, James A. S/Sgt AF13032713		Bronze Star	
Fong, Edmund T/Sgt 19121395		Bronze Star	
Forte, Saverio		Military and Hospital Order of St. Mary of Bethlehem, Cavaliere	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Fossieck, Theodore H. Maj 0366196	XV Corps	Bronze Star	
Foster, John S. Capt	35th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Footheroup, James	6th Army Gp	Bronze Star	
Fourness, John C. S/Sgt 36248030	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Fowler, Robert		Knight, Crown of Italy	
Foyt, Anton T/Sgt 38111031	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Francazi, Bruno 1st Lt 01703588		Bronze Star Knight Cross of Italy	
Francazi, Rene R. Capt 01691521	428th CIC Det	Bronze Star	1945
Frederick, Harold 1st Lt 01030241		Bronze Star	
Frederick, William M. Maj 0262226	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
French, Woodrow W. 2d Lt 01998090	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	16 Jan 45
Fricano, Anthony S. Sgt 6982022	Iceland Det	Bronze Star	26 Apr 44
Fuld, Arthur J. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Fuller, Marvin E.	428th CIC Det	Croce di Cavaliere Ufficiale nell' Ordine della Corona d'Italia	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Funk, Donald M. S/Sgt		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45
Furniss, James P. 1st Lt 01683479	5th Army	Silver Star Bronze Star (2)	
Gagan, Thomas A. Maj		Bronze Star	
Galloway, Jennis R. Lt Col 0352592		Legion of Merit	
Ganges, Clarence B. T/Sgt 37313160	204th CIC Det	Bronze Star	7 May 45
Gannon, William F. S/Sgt	101st CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Gardner, James R. 1st Lt 0885354	II Corps	Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Gelwicks, Harold G. Maj 0391046	CBI	Bronze Star	3 Nov 45
Gentile, Charles F. 2d Lt 02024420	CBI	Bronze Star	10 Feb 46
Giacobbe, Wadie M/Sgt 6135665		Bronze Star	
Gilmore, John G. Sgt 20109855	III Corps	Bronze Star	11 Feb 45
Ginniger, (Fnu) Cpl		Bronze Star	
Gloe, Frederick H. T/Sgt 16049041	7th CIC Det	Bronze Star	19 Apr - 30 Jun 45, Okinawa
Gluckin, Lawrence Capt 01305022		Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Goergen, Joseph H. Sgt 42022166	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Goff, Marvin C. Maj 0477075		Soldier's Medal Bronze Star	25 Feb 44, heroism in South Pacific
Gonzales, Richard M. S/Sgt 01309058	79th CIC Det	Bronze Star	23 Jul 45
Goodson, Carl K. Capt 01798255	94th CIC Det	Bronze Star	4 Aug 45
Gordon, Peter 2d Lt	10th Mtn Div	Bronze Star	
Gordon, William R. Capt 01304716	77th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Gorman, Edward A. 2d Lt 02012424		Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Gray, Jesse G. 2d Lt		Bronze Star	
Gregg, Robert E. S/Sgt 37381797	321st CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Grieve, William G. Maj 0477077	CBI	Bronze Star	2 Oct 45
Grimes, Oscar M., Jr Capt 02048321	97th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Gross, Herman Pfc 33620081	XIX Corps	Purple Heart	
Gross, Phillip S. Capt 01317629	2d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Guenther, Rupert W. Capt 01302642	45th CIC Det	Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Guinzbourg, Victor S. 1st Lt 01692505	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre Honorary Legionaire FC (FFL)	 30 Aug 45
Gunderson, Robert W. T/Sgt	87th CIC Det	Bronze Star	Apr 45
Gutman, Harvey E. Sgt 39323075	70th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Haan, Kenneth W. Capt 01799635	Iceland Det	Bronze Star	
Hadgis, Michael W. S/Sgt 37609353		Bronze Star	
Hager, Eric H. 1st Lt 02027731		Bronze Star	
Hahn, Horace L. 1st Lt 01597120	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Hallet, James B. Capt 01304523	3d Army	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile de Bronze	13 Jan 45 5 Jun 45
Halleran, Paul L. S/Sgt 37130199	428th CIC Det	Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Hamilton, William B. T/Sgt 33180485		Bronze Star	
Hammond, John Capt 0390543		Bronze Star	
Hanlon, John G. SFC 20607967		Bronze Star (2)	
Hanna, David L. 1st Lt 01999796	104th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Hanna, George R. Capt 01641357	7th Inf Div	Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Hanson, August W. 2d Lt		Bronze Star	
Hanson, Leonard T/Sgt 37172595	1st Army	Purple Heart	8 Dec 44
Hanville, Melvin Capt		Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Harary, Joseph A. T/Sgt 35124486		Legion of Merit	
Hardin, Fariss Maj 0377196	CBI	Soldier's Medal Bronze Star	12 Sep 45 8 Oct 45
Hardin, Kenneth E. 1st Lt		Bronze Star	
Harkins, James J. T/Sgt 39091124		Bronze Star	
Harris, William D. Maj 01300030		Bronze Star	
Harvey, Herbert Sgt		Bronze Star	
Harwell, David Sgt	29th Inf Div	Purple Heart	
Harwell, Sam E. 1st Lt 01592773	87th CIC Det	Bronze Star	Apr 45
Haseltine, Marshall 1st Lt 01691501	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile de Vermeil	30 Aug 45
Havelin, Alan D. WOJG W2152963	442d CIC Det	Silver Star Bronze Star	1951 1951
Haynes, Alexander G. Sgt 36247574	4th Inf Div	Bronze Star	

'AME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Hazard, Rowland K. T/Sgt 32885999	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
Hearn, Norman J. Lt Col 0337846	12th Army Gp	Bronze Star	
Heegaard-Jensen, Paul A. 1st Lt 0452613		Silver Star Croix de Guerre	20 Jun 43
Held, Edwin W. T/5 34789358	430th CIC Det	Bronze Star	30 May 45
Hemingway, John H. Capt 01302652	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Herald, Virgil H. Capt 0234251	CBI	Bronze Star	30 Nov 45
Hermann, Louis G. S/Sgt 33003756		Bronze Star	
ıernandez, Christian S/A	204th CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Hickman, Glenn Howard 1st Lt 01326240	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Himmelright, John R. Maj 01100148		Bronze Star Croix de Guerre	
Hinkle, Wayne W. 2d Lt 02001136	XX Corps	Bronze Star	
Hitchcock, Rex W. Cpl	29th Inf Div	Purple Heart	
Hock, William G. M/Sgt 15067864	XII Corps	Bronze Star	6 Jan 45
Hoebel, Henry L. S/Sgt 13126110	70th CIC Det	Bronze Star	2 May 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Hofammann, Albert G., S/A	Jr VI Corps	Bronze Star	
Hoffman, Paul L. T/Sgt 32619586	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Holden, William P. S/Sgt 11087328	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Holland, Keith E. S/Sgt 37436199		Purple Heart	
Holland, William C. 2d Lt 02024476	CBI	Bronze Star	10 Feb 46
Hollis, James R. Capt 01285424		Bronze Star	
Holloway, Geoffery L. Cpl 19068113		Bronze Star	
Honig, Robert S. T/Sgt 37387366	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Horwitz, Milton G. 2d Lt 0206966		Bronze Star	
Hoss, Robert L. T/Sgt 39166475		Bronze Star	
Howard, Barr Sgt 12109366	4th Inf Div	Purple Heart	Mine explosion
Howell, Dillard W. 2d Lt 02012099	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
Howes, Alfred L. Capt 0347348		Legion of Merit	
Hubbard, Joseph C. 1st Lt 01798577	III Corps	Bronze Star	9 Jun 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Hull, Allan F. S/Sgt 33461989	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	6 Dec 44
Hunter, James R. 2d Lt 02024421	CBI	Bronze Star	10 Feb 46
Hunter, Woodrow G. Sgt 35467966	SWPA	Bronze Star Purple Heart	 Posthumously
Hurley, James W. T/Sgt 32060230		Bronze Star	
Hurley, William F. T/Sgt 37321351	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Hurt, Wesley R. Sgt 38070278	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Hutchinson, Joseph C. 2d Lt 02007147		Bronze Star	
Hwass, Edward Robert Sgt 36362068	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Ingargiola, Henry B. 2d Lt 02039583	5th Army	Bronze Star Military and Hospital Order of St. Mary of Bethlehem, Commendatore	7 Mar 45 15 Dec 43
Iwai, Gero Lt Col		Bronze Star	
Jackson, William K. S/Sgt		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45
Jacobi, William R. Capt		Bronze Star	
Jacobus, Philip F. 1st Lt 01061435	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
Jay, Leon H. Sgt 38011829		Purple Heart	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Jeka, Ralph J. T/Sgt 36807488	XIX Corps	Purple Heart	Wounded 24 Apr 45, Germany
Jensen, Elvin C. Cpl 32984638	306th CIC Det	Purple Heart	Posthumously
Jensen, Garth H. T/Sgt 13029871	1st Army	Purple Heart	8 Dec 44
Jensen, Leslie A. Capt 01080550	106th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Johnson, Darrell L. T/Sgt 39161352	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Johnson, William A. S/Sgt 33220491		Bronze Star	
Jones, George R. S/Sgt 33259883		Bronze Star	
Jordan, Dale M. S/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Julian, Brooks P. Capt 01305784	104th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Kalish, Jacob T/Sgt 13052075	70th Inf Div	Bronze Star	10 Aug 45
Kandel, Paul Sgt		Bronze Star	
Kane, John D. T/Sgt 32395894		Bronze Star	
Kaplanoff, Carl G. Capt 01053665		Bronze Star	
Kaufman, Walter J. Major		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Keefe, William E. Maj 0280156	III Corps	Bronze Star	
Keeler, Clark B. 2d Lt	II Corps	Bronze Star	27 Nov 45
Kelm, Edwin K. Sgt	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Kennon, Clement R. T/Sgt 36120790		Bronze Star	
Kent, Henry S/Sgt 39256729	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Keys, Oscar W., Jr. M/Sgt 13043787		Bronze Star	
Kimball, Harvey L. Sgt 37420140		Bronze Star	
King, Nathaniel P. Capt 0320596		Bronze Star (2)	
Klein, Morris J. S/Sgt 32659215		Bronze Star	
Knapp, Todd B. M/Sgt 19102496	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Knight, Jack W. T/Sgt 38361940	XXIII Corps	Bronze Star	
Koonce, Donald S. 2d Lt 097104		Bronze Star	
Kotulak, Bernard J. 2d Lt 02024477	CBI	Bronze Star	2 Mar 46
Krieger, William D. S/Sgt 13071919	6th CIC Det	Bronze Star	9 Jan - 25 Feb 45, Luzon

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Kubicek, Robert A.	IV Corps	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Kurzon, Raymond S/Sgt 36554475	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Labatt, Blair P. Maj 0452996		Legion of Merit	
Ladner, George A. 1st Lt 02024363	CBI	Bronze Star	10 Feb 46
LaFreniere, Victor C. Sgt 11091507	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	9 Dec 44
Lang, Richard C. Sgt 3595327	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	9 Dec 44
Lederman, Harry M. Pfc 39726152	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Lemler, Fremont F. S/A		Bronze Star	
Leslie, Robert J. T/Sgt	V Corps	Bronze Star	
Lewis, Crosby 2d Lt 0885878	II Corps	Silver Star	
Linder, Wayne C. S/Sgt 37524441		Bronze Star	
Lindquist, James J. S/Sgt 3208117		Silver Star Purple Heart	
Linnane, William F. S/A 36355732	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Lobb, Anthony W. Maj 0276013	XX Corps	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre	5 Jun 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Lovett, Edward G., Jr. S/Sgt 35472747	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	9 Dec 44
Lowry, Clarence, W. 1st Lt 01649185		Bronze Star	
Lucaire, William 2d Lt 02039558		Bronze Star	
Lucchesi, Mario J. T/Sgt	II Corps	Bronze Star	11 May 45
Lyman, Samuel K. 1st Lt	6th Armd Div	Bronze Star Purple Heart	14 Feb 45
Lynch, Mark J. 1st Lt 02036670		Bronze Star	
Lyon, Ferndall G. Cpl 37319637	35th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
MacDonald, Earl G. S/A 32383327	Air Force	Bronze Star Air Medal	
MacKeith, James A. S/Sgt 32562704	421st CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Maher, William A. Sgt 31043296	4th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Malbuisson, Paul R. S/Sgt 32868766		Bronze Star	
Marino, John 2d Lt	IV Corps	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Martin, Walter F. T/Sgt 35261778		Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Mason, Gordon B. 1st Lt 01695615	5th Army	Bronze Star	9 Apr 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Matsumoto, Miles D. S/Sgt 30102900		Bronze Star Purple Heart	
Matteson, Robert E. S/A	80th CIC Det	Silver Star	Gallantry in action
Mattos, Anthony R. Capt 01316307		Bronze Star	
Maxwell, Drummond F. S/Sgt 32901027	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
May, Robert S., Jr. Sgt	2d Inf Div	Bronze Star	19 Jul 44
Mayfield, Ellis O. 1st Lt	29th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
McBurney, William H. T/Sgt 38264302	XXIII Corps	Bronze Star	
McCourt, James E. T/Sgt 36324262		Purple Heart	
McCoy, Scott D. 2d Lt 02006343	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	24 Aug 45
McDonald, George H. Capt 0316824	70th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
McDuff, Alvie L. Maj 0357360	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile de Vermeil	16 Jan 45 30 Aug 45
McGee, Leo C. T/Sgt 33311679	90th Inf Div	Bronze Star	18 Mar 45
McGettigan, Edward W. S/Sgt	91st Inf Div	Bronze Star	
McGovern, Harold T. M/Sgt 31148432	CBI	Bronze Star	25 Sep 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
McGrane, Henry M. T/Sgt	35th Inf Div	Purple Heart	
McGuire, Martin Major	101st Abn Div	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre (Belgium)	
McInerney, Maurice F. Capt 01284547	418th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
McKay, Morris N. 1st Lt 01505930		Bronze Star	
McKee, Floyd E.	92d Inf Div	Bronze Star	16 Jun 45
McKenna, John P. Capt 01302681	12th Army Gp	Croix de Guerre Ordre Grand Ducal de la Couronne de Chene in the Degree of Chevalier (Luxembourg)	11 Jul 45
McKennan, Bradley 2d Lt	101st CIC Det	Purple Heart	
MacKenzie, Donald E. Maj 0313378	CBI	Bronze Star	
McQuade, John S. Capt		Bronze Star	
McRae, Leonard K. Sgt	82d CIC Det	Purple Heart	
McVey, William L. S/Sgt 37002781	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Meisel, George M. Sgt 37341986	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	19 Jun 45 for meritorious service
Meisetz, Fred E. 1st Lt 0941970	2d Inf Div	Bronze Star	For bravery
Meixner, Leo R. CWO W2136450		Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Mejorada, Celerino Q. Pvt		Bronze Star	
Metastasio, Arthur P. 2d Lt 01998085	206th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Miller, Albert B. Capt 01589378	28th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Miller, Dwight P. S/Sgt 6556677	Iceland Det	Bronze Star	6 May 44
Miller, Edgar R. Capt		Silver Star Bronze Star	
Mills, Jack W. S/Sgt	VI Corps	Bronze Star	
Miner, Horace A. Capt 0309579	II Corps	Legion of Merit	
Mohn, Leon S/Sgt	6th CIC Det	Bronze Star	26 Mar 45; Luzon 9 Jan - 23 Feb 45
Molinet, Fausto E., Sr. S/A	45th Inf Div	Purple Heart	25 Oct 44; wounds received in mine explosion 15 Oct 44
Moore, Lowell G. Lt Col 0536192		Bronze Star	
Morena, Geno Lt Col 043539	428th CIC Det	War Cross for Merit (Italy)	9 Apr 47
Morgan, Charles R. T/Sgt 32283141	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Morrison, Douglas J. Sgt	88th Inf Div	Bronze Star	9 Apr 45
Morton, Maurice M. Capt 01304771	85th Inf Div	Bronze Star	13 Apr 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Morton, William M., Jr. 2d Lt 02009159	90th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Moseley, Frank A. Sgt 38159147		Bronze Star	
Moseley, George T. 1st Lt 01692516	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile de Argent	30 Aug 45
Murphy, Francis J. T/Sgt 11034206		Bronze Star	
Murphy, Vincent L. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	30 Sep 45
Musick, Milton T/Sgt 12132215	CBI	Soldier's Medal	17 Sep 45
Myer, John D. S/Sgt 15316931		Bronze Star	
Nahas, Albert G. Sgt 31246009	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Neagoy, George S/Sgt 35528573		Bronze Star	
Nelson, Edward J. S/Sgt 39112323	79th Inf Div	Bronze Star	31 Jun 45
Nissen, Clyde T. Capt 01325803	III Corps	Bronze Star	9 Jun 45
Norton, Arthur H. W. S/Sgt 38462315	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Norvish, Franklin S/Sgt 31270173	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Nugent, John H. III Sgt 33524230	6th CIC Det	Bronze Star	16 Sep 45; Luzon 9 Jan - 15 Aug 45

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
O'Brien, James F. 1st Lt 0159645		Bronze Star	
Olsen, James M. T/Sgt 36254844	70th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
O'Neal, Carl F. Capt 01946826		Bronze Star Croix de Guerre	
O'Neil, James F. 1st Lt	75th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
O'Neill, Harvey J. Cpl 36732375		Bronze Star	
Osborne, Walter D. Capt	3d Army	Croix de Guerre with Etoile d'Bronze	5 Jun 45
Oyler, Robert B. 2d Lt 02000896	XX Corps	Bronze Star	
Pagnotta, Leo J. S/A 02038788	426th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Palmer, Hugh J. S/Sgt	29th Inf Div	Bronze Star	Volunteered to evacuate wounded from beach during battle.
Panard, Anthony G. Sgt 36513660	3d Inf Div	Purple Heart	Posthumously
Paquette, Origene J., Jr. 1st Lt 02000632	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile d'Vermeil	30 Aug 45
Pedigo, Walter S., Jr. Sgt 13103713	5th Inf Div	Bronze Star	6 Feb 45
Pellegrino, Harry M. Capt 01703588		Bronze Star	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Pennewell, Noah A. Capt 0282456	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Parper, George A. 2d Lt 01998661	307th CIC Det	Legion of Merit Croix de Guerre with Etoile d'Vermeil	25 Apr 45 30 Aug 45
Persico, Thomas M. 1st Lt 01326718	CBI	Bronze Star	10 Feb 46
Petty, John F. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	30 Sep 45
Pfeiffer, John W. 1st Lt 02049060	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	30 Jul 45; for meritorious service
Phifer, Nelson L. Cpl 33032454		Bronze Star	
Pingley, Robert L. Pfc 15078391	34th CIC Det	Silver Star	Risked life for rescue
Pinneo, Dee W. Capt 0297413	20th Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Platt, John O. Capt 02035042		Bronze Star	
Porter, Marion E. Capt 0452309	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star Purple Heart	 16 Aug 44
Powell, Francis E. M/Sgt 33272367	7th Army	Bronze Star	
Powell, Irving L. S/Sgt 12312317		Bronze Star	
Powers, Ralph W. Maj 0300234	428th CIC Det	Legion of Merit Honorary Legionaire FC (FFL)	 1 Dec 44

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Qualters, Thomas J.		Legion of Merit	16 Aug 45
Rae, Nelson S. T/Sgt 32010983	2d Inf Div	Purple Heart	Posthumously
Ragonetti, Anthony		Knight, Crown of Italy	
Reber, John H. 1st Lt 01887407	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Reed, Sumner C. 2d Lt 02007508		Bronze Star	
Rees, Nelson B. Cpl 39135534	43d CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Regan, John F. 2d Lt 01695709	85th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Regis, Peter 2d Lt 02006404	307th CIC Det	Croix de Guerre Legion of Merit	30 Aug 45 27 Jan 45
Rennert, William J. T/Sgt 32164861	7th Inf Div	Purple Heart	Wounded on 8 Dec 44 on Leyte
Richards, Robert R. 1st Lt 01692517	7th Army	Bronze Star	
Richardson, John H. 2d Lt 01999058	5th Army	Bronze Star	9 Apr 45
Riddle, Daniel M. Major	V Corps	Bronze Star	
Riley, George B. 2d Lt 0200594	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Robinson, Frank L. Cpl	101st Abn Div		
Rogers, Martin Sgt 32635274	970th CIC Det	Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Rohner, Emil J. Sgt 32183424	IV Corps	Bronze Star	30 Mar 45
Romney, Henry Sgt 32903808	78th CIC Det	Bronze Star (2) Purple Heart	
Roney, John H. S/Sgt 15078972	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Rood, Wilson A. Lt 01320075		Bronze Star	
Rothwell, Robert G. S/Sgt 32532012	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	3 Dec 44
Russell, Bertram R. 2d Lt 02046604	3d Inf Div	Purple Heart	Wounded on 20 Feb 44 at Nettuno, Italy
Ryan, Richard N. 2d Lt 0885623		Silver Star	
Ryan, Robert N. Lt		Legion of Merit	
Ryken, Peter S. Cpl 37487128		Purple Heart	
Ryan, Thomas E. Cpl	101st Abn Div	Purple Heart	Wounded Oct 44 after jump at Eindhoven
St. Angel, Frank G. 1st Lt 0514221	CBI	Bronze Star	
Sagi, Julius R. 2d Lt 01683480	5th Army	Bronze Star	19 Dec 44
Salstrom, Edward O. 1st Lt 01844922	XXII Corps	Bronze Star (2)	
Schnakenberg, Henry J. Sgt		Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Schiller, John T/Sgt 32533544	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Schonberg, Emil K. Sgt 35409298	6th CIC Det	Purple Heart	27 Jun 45, Luzon
Schrantz, George N. Lt Col 0287238		Bronze Star	
Schroeder, Charles M/Sgt 35459137	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Schroeder, William E. 2d Lt 02026925		Bronze Star	
Schwartschild, Henry Cpl		Bronze Star	
Scoboria, Francis M. Sgt 11048900	77th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Scott, Robert H. S/Sgt 36061949	CBI	Bronze Star	
Soranage, William D. Sgt 35759695		Bronze Star	
Seaton, Charles T., Jr. T/Sgt 39013992	97th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Seitz, John H. S/A	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Seminara, Ignazio F. 1st Lt 01326028		Bronze Star	
Seymour, Emery W. S/Sgt 3246117	204th CIC Det	Bronze Star	30 May 45 for action against enemy in Italy
Shafton, Edward M/Sgt 17041031	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Shriver, Emory L. S/Sgt 37669671	XII Corps	Bronze Star	28 Feb 45
Simone, Jack A. S/A		Bronze Star	
Sims, John E. Capt 0190869	90th Inf Div	Bronze Star Croix de Guerre with Etoile d'Bronze	5 Jun 45
Sims, Ralph Maj 041770		Bronze Star	
Skelton, Joseph S.		Bronze Star	1 Jan 45
Slater, Russell R. T/Sgt - 15078235	XV Corps	Bronze Star	
Smith, Guthrie J. 2d Lt 02006383	100th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Smith, Willard R. S/Sgt 34827474		Bronze Star	
Sparks, Bertel M. 1st Lt 02000894	307th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Spatcher, Francis 1st Lt 01341829		Bronze Star	
Spiegler, John L. S/Sgt	970th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Spingarn, Stephen J. Lt Col 0902874	305th CIC Det	Legion of Merit Bronze Star	6 Dec 44 20 Feb 45
Stienway, Charles G. 1st Lt 01031133	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star Purple Heart	2 Dec 44
Stephens, Howard W., Jr. 2d Lt 01183423	99th Inf Div	Purple Heart	Posthumously

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Stern, Siggi Sgt 32521979	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Stevens, Harold L. T/Sgt 20270564	II Corps	Bronze Star	15 Jan 45
Stilwell, James E. Capt 01596196		Bronze Star	
Stone, Duane G. M/Sgt 36058519	XVI Corps	Bronze Star	
Stradinger, Oscar 2d Lt 02046605	II Corps	Bronze Star	
Stramel, Bruce E. S/Sgt 36359858	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Sullivan, Daniel J. Sgt 31204818		Purple Heart	
Sullivan, Daniel B.	II Corps	Purple Heart	
Suman, John G. 1st Lt 01032736	102d Inf Div		1 Apr 45
Sussman, Carl Cpl 35921895	80th CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Suszan, Michael J.	10th Mtn Div	Bronze Star	14 Jun 45
Sutton, Horace Capt 01288138	102d Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Tahmoush, Albert J. S/Sgt		Bronze Star	
Thiele, Joseph C. Lt	V Corps	Bronze Star	
Thorn, John H. Capt 01647755	CBI	Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Tobler, Frederick C. Sgt		Bronze Star	
Tokushige, Carl Sgt 10103122		Bronze Star	
Tonini, Melio A. Capt 01280496	305th CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Tornetta, Anthony J. Cpl 33774516	17th Abn Div	Purple Heart	
Towne, Maurice H. T/Sgt 16059003		Bronze Star	
Tozier, Roy G. Sgt		Bronze Star	
Trabant, Warren Cpl 39133789	14th Armd Div	Bronze Star	30 Jul 45
Travis, Porter M., Jr. S/Sgt 14098345	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	
Travis, Porter 1st Lt 01999434		Bronze Star (2)	
Trout, Clarence W. 1st Lt 01103443	SWPA	Bronze Star	
True, Ralph O., Jr. T/Sgt		Bronze Star	30 Sep 45
Turnbull, Harry G. Sgt 36486126	509th CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Tyng, William W. 1st Lt 02001448	CBI	Bronze Star	2 Mar 46
Udoff, Philip S. 2d Lt 01317629	3d Armd Div	Bronze Star	

NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Underwood, Donald E. T/Sgt 39838636	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Unger, Sam M. T/5	35th CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Van Otten, Andrew C. S/Sgt	29th Inf Div	Bronze Star	For achievements on Omaha Beach
Varenick, Michael I. T/Sgt 36254960	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Vogel, Rudy C. S/Sgt 39451725		Bronze Star	
Voorhees, John D. T/Sgt 32466459		Bronze Star	
Vreeland, G. Harry Sgt 33627433		Bronze Star	
Walker, John E. Sgt 33223014	6th CIC Det	Bronze Star	11 Feb 45, New Guinea campaign
Walton, Louis S. Capt 01797215		Bronze Star	
Wardell, Hilliare P. Maj 0291100	III Corps	Bronze Star	2 Mar 45
Warner, Jack R. T/Sgt 35369976	29th Inf Div	Bronze Star	Meritorious service against enemy in Western Europe
Warren, Alba H., Jr 2d Lt 01999197	5th Army	Bronze Star	7 Mar 45
Weber, Gerald J. 2d Lt 01695616	5th Army	Bronze Star	19 Dec 44
Weems, Julian T. 1st Lt 01996503	2d Inf Div	Purple Heart	28 Mar 45

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Weidner, Clinton R. Capt 01317851	63d Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Weimer, Robert M. 1st Lt 01318377	1st Inf Div	Bronze Star	3 Dec 44
Weinstein, Benjamin J. Sgt 42056151	6th CIC Det	Bronze Star	16 Sep 45; Luzon, 9 Jan - 15 Aug 45
Westling, Delbert S. Sgt 20907429	7th Inf Div	Purple Heart	Wounded 8 Dec 44 on Leyte
Wilkins, Ernest J. T/Sgt 18044174		Purple Heart	Wounded 17 Mar 45 in Germany
Willer, James F.	94th CIC Det	Bronze Star	4 Aug 45
Williams, David S. Capt 0418545	315th CIC Det		11 Mar 45
Williams, Robert H. 1st Lt 0887435	4th Inf Div	Purple Heart Bronze Star	Wounded 14 Apr 45 land mine. (Was S/Sgt at that time.)
Williford, Duane A. Sgt 19062916	SWPA	Bronze Star	
Wilson, Alvin M. S/Sgt 36415484	100th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Wirth, Otto T/Sgt	303d CIC Det	Bronze Star	
Wisniewski, Leo R., Jr. T/Sgt 15140178	CBI	Bronze Star	8 Nov 45
Wittrock, Norman B.	II Corps	Legion of Merit	
Wojuschonski, Henry A. SFC 37414827		Bronze Star	

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NAME, RANK, ASN	UNIT	DECORATION	DATE AND REASON FOR DECORATION
Wood, Alvin R. Sgt 36062496	SWPA	Soldier's Medal	
Woods, John T. T/Sgt 36449632	35th CIC Det	Purple Heart	
Wright, David S/Sgt 20516717	VII Corps	Bronze Star	
Wussow, Paul A. Sgt 36752753	99th Inf Div	Purple Heart	Wounded 27 Dec 44 in Belgium
Wyles, Paul V. T/Sgt 35385321	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Wyllie, Robert Capt 01862105		Bronze Star	
Young, George D. Capt 01302014	99th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Zellar, Jay B. T/Sgt 35290753	26th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Zernicke, George A. Sgt 36957120	76th Inf Div	Bronze Star	
Zuk, Peter T/Sgt	94th CIC Det	Bronze Star	4 Aug 45
Zullo, Frank		Knight, Officer, Crown of Italy	27 Jun 46

Appendix V

ROSTER OF COMMANDING OFFICERS, WORLD WAR II

(Incomplete)

NOTE: Some names of commanders in years subsequent to WW II have been included.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
DETACHMENTS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
1st	Aamodt, Hubert N. Steinway, Charles G. Wallace, William H., Jr. Pettus, Erle, Jr. Roy, James E.
2d	Cameron, Jack B. Wright, Lee Herald, Virgil Jenkins, Arthur D. Mcauliffe, Fred Harrison, Thomas O.
3d	Young, William Jensen, Claire R. Greene, Walter E. Vidal, Joseph Russell, Bertram R. Lampe, Alerd S.
4th	Aamodt, Hubert Appleton, Oliver D. Glantz, Robert
5th	Hawley, Robert L. Smith, James R., Jr. Smith, Weldon A. Allen, Lyndon B. McKenna, John P.
6th	Webster, James P. McKenna, John P.
7th	Greene, Frank Hutchinson, Sam C. Hill, Mark F. DeLoach, Wilbur V. Sinn, Donald F. Mohar, Andrew V., Jr.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
8th	McQuade, John C. Mohr, Henry A.
9th	Hammond, John G. Howard, Taylor Musick, Joseph W. Hartley, Harold T. Conick, Charles B.
10th	Boyles, Edward E. Furniss, James D. Cave, Franklin
11th	Carey, William T. Alicki, John A. Webster, Dean H. Dalgliesh, George E. Gaziarc, Dean H.
13th Abn Div	McGeoch, Charles H.
16th	
17th	Stalker, Ian F. Black, William W. Gacobbi, Wadie Vignovich, Demetri
18th	
19th	
20th	
21st	
22d	
23d	
24th	Hogan, Elton Connley, David I. Graham, David

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DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
25th	Holman, Natt B. Merrick, Thomas L.
26th	Pennewell, Noah A.
27th	
28th	Miller, Albert B.
29th	Mayfield, Ellis O.
30th	Handville, Melvin Crowell, Kenneth G.
31st	Trout, Clarence W.
32d	Lynch, Mark J.
33d	Donahoe, Bernard M.
34th	Rubsam, John L. Forkey, Leo O.
35th	Foster, John S. Ayr, Allenby H.
36th	Hammond, John G. Stilwell, James E.
37th	Hammond, John G.
38th	Baldwin, George A.
40th	Klein, Earl A.
41st	Gluckin, Lawrence
42d	Donnell, Newman R.
43d	Hodgson, Ray W.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
44th	Cummings, Peter M. DeCindis, Edward A. Harrison, Thomas O.
45th	Guenthner, Rupert W.
47th	Lampe, Alerd S.
59th	
60th	
63d	Weidner, Clinton R.
65th	Tynes, S. B.
66th	Ansbacher, Edgar A. LeRoy, Warren S. Renke, Harry Yarborough, William P. Clay, Jeff III
69th	Duvall, Andrew H.
70th	Kalish, Jacob
71st	Zabaldeno, Frank C.
75th	Gassinger, Henry A.
76th	Zernicke, George A.
78th	Ruge, Neil M.
79th	Bogatin, Irvin Gonzales, Richard M.
80th	McMillen, Thomas R.
81st	

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
82d	Wallace, William H., Jr.
	Himmerright, John R.
	Kummer, Alber J.
	Pell, Joe C., Jr.
(ABN)	Pearce, John C.
	Jacobi, William F.
83d	Victor, Oliver A.
84th	Murray, W. R.
	Harwell, Sam E.
	Jenkins, Arthur D.
	Morton, Maurice M.
85th	Morton, Maurice M.
87th	Harwell, Sam E.
	Arnold, Frank S.
	Riback, Harry W.
88th	Riback, Harry W.
89th	Geers, John P.
	Gilineau, Robert H.
90th	Osborne, Walter D.
91st	Dennis, William M., Jr.
92d	Arriza Balaga, Ramon
93d	Townsend, Caspar W. B., Jr.
94th	Goodson, Carl K.
95th	Castle, James C.
97th	Grimes, Oscar
99th	Young, George D.
100th	Mattos, Anthony R.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
101st	Sutton, Horace A.
103d	Suman, John G. Hudson, Dugald W.
104th	Julian, Brooks P.
106th	Coad, Francis E.
108th	Huckins, Joseph Keyes, Carleton C. Hickman Holeman Hosterman, Frank Fellows Deniston Greenbough Barrows, R.
109th	Fruthchey, Russell W. Grimes, George Blake, Homer C.
111th	Slattery, Arthur R. Veazey, Harold A. Grimes, George Trevathan, Louis B.
112th	Burdette, Maurice R. Geens, M. W. Reese, Robert M.
113th	Shanke, Wade L. Wilson, George L. Marion, Stanley Longshore
114th	
116th	Saltz, Louis C. Huntoon, David H. Derzis, Pete M. Parish, John N. Shaw, Emmon R. Dorin, William, Jr.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
119th	
120th	
121st	
122d	
123d	Wilson, George L.
125th	
128th	
129th	
130th	
132d	
134th	Wilson, George L.
136th	
137th	
138th	
151st	Crystal, John C.
163d	Crowell, Kenneth G.
181st	Murphy, John Mann, Thomas J. Dougherty, Millard F. Yanorsky, John
182d	Keenan, Albert J., Jr.
191st	Hessevick, George I. Wolfe, Hiram N., Jr.
199th	Erskine, David G.

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
201st	Smith, Merle J. Miner, Horace Cook, Victor I. Heegaard-Jensen, Paul A.
202d	Sinehart, Alan F. Lewis, Crosby
203d	Failey, James R. Crego, Clyde A. Wardell, Hillaire Taylor, Royce R., Jr. Denas, Joseph M. Riddlebarger, George E.
204th	Crystal, John C.
205th	Trumps, Shirly R. Lewis, Micheal J. Weil, Eric L. Stewart, Sanlen S.
206th	Costello, Harry G., Jr. Crowell, Kenneth G. Crystal, John G.
207th	Carpi, Walter L. Dorsett, James K. Finneman, David F. Bennett, Edwin Udoff, Philip
208th	Bowen, Albert R., Jr.
209th	Clark, Allen B.
210th	Hurley, Joseph P. Vasso, Edward J.
211th	Sims, Ralph
212th	Bogin, Isaac

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
213th	Huntington, Clarence
214th	Goff, Marion C., Jr.
215th	Fossieck, Theodore
216th	Frederick, William W.
218th	Dalgliesh, George E. Dearing, Albin P. Alicki, John A. Himmelright, John R.
219th	Gagen, Thomas A. Baker, Ernest S.
220th	Lobb, Anthony W.
221st	Somerville, John F.
222d	Rutledge, Frederick R.
223d	Elliott, Loran L.
224th	Day, Emmett E. Meurlott, Bryon M.
231st	
233d	
235th	
237th	
238th	
239th	
240th	Huntington, Clarence
242d	Fosseck, Theodore R.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
244th	
245th	Somerville, John F.
248th	
252d	
254th	
255th	
257th	
260th	
261st	Reese, Robert M.
262d	
263d	
264th	
266th	
268th	
271st	
272d	
273d	
275th	
277th	
278th	
279th	
280th	

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
282d	
283d	
284th	
285th	Schmiedeke, John A.
286th	Schmiedeke, John A.
288th	
289th	
301st	Mineo, Horace M.
303d	Foothrap, James F.
305th	Spingarn, Stephen J. Snowden, F. C.
306th	Labatt, Blair P.
307th	Crowell, Kenneth G.
308th	Smith, Henry G. McKean, John B. Flaherty, Gordon Turner, Chapman Curtis, Worth M. DeReimer, Louis Spingarn, Stephen
309th	Guinan, Richard C.
311th	
315th	Brenneck, Francis C.
316th	Fossieck, Theodore Post, Harry W. Trumble, John W.

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
330th	
332d	
333d	
334th	Wilson, George L.
338th	
340th	
341st	
342d	
343d	
346th	
347th	
357th	Hough, P. O.
400th	Shoals, George R. Barry, Edward P. Barrett Nokes
401st	Shaw, Emmon P. Lutjens, Paul R. Ehrle, John W. Cibatti, Philip R.
416th	
418th	Gagan, Thomas A. Hearn, Norman J. Snowden, Floyd C.
420th	Ray, Edward L.
425th	Kaufman, Walter J.

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
426th	Snowden, Floyd C. Ribsam, John P.
427th	Pickard, Lucien L. Smith, Henry G.
428th	Nast, Walter W. Brady, Cecil C. Picard, Lucien Reed, Clark E. Crowell, Kenneth G. Cronk, Norman H. Read, Clarence Ray, Edward L. Powers, Ralph W. Kaufman, Walter J., Jr.
429th	Hill, Leroy Price, Milton H. Schwarzwalder, John C.
430th	Stewart, Ferguson C. Cameron, Jack B. Grimes, George R.
431st	Fortunato, N. A.
441st	Eckman, George R. Galloway, Jennis R. Baker, Elverson E. Grimes, George R. Stewart, Archibald DeLoach, Wilbur V. Momii, Tom T.
447th	Applegate, Thomas W.
448th	Roach, Philip O.
449th	Bledsoe, James A.
450th	Swanson, Kenneth L.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
451st	Geismer, Alan S.
452d	De Luca, Andrew A.
453d	Chenery, Charles E.
454th	Wood, Eugene H.
455th	Emmest, Leonard J.
456th	Canon, Jack Y.
457th	Goodrick, Carl H.
458th	Sayers, William H.
459th	McCall, James W.
473d	Smith, Thomas D., Jr.
474th	Chilton, Walter C.
479th	Camp, Charles S.
480th	Gilmore, Charles E.
481st	Bingham, Charles M.
482d	Stapleton, John T.
483d	Cook, Denver F.
484th	Claflin, Beecher N.
485th	Hanna, George R.
486th	Cuddeback, Howard L.
487th	Skinker, Dudley G.
488th	McGillicuddy, Daniel F.
489th	Wather, Frank J.

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
490th	Douglass, Arthur R.
491st	Friederich, Robert E.
492d	Hurst, Paul A.
493d	bradfort, Lowell L., Jr.
501st	Ray, Richard Lindsay, Richard W. Crystal, John C.
502d	Beebe, Richard W. LaBranche, R. R.
503d	Black, Theodore
504th	O'Rourke, Michael J. Condon, Frederick W. Flinn, Thomas E. Coats, Charles E. Denas, Joseph M. Riddlebarger, George E.
505th	McKenna, John P.
506th	DeLoach, Wilbur V.
507th	Bramback, Walter
508th	Gillet, Louis E. Huebner, Arnold J.
509th	Donohue, Edward S.
510th	Schracter, Karl G.
511th	Galbraith, Robert C.
512th	Criqui, Francis B.
513th	Packer, Olan, Jr.

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
514th	Hahn, Horace J. Beirdron, Edward F.
516th	Richardson, John E.
520th	Pinneo, Dee W. Putledge, Frederick R. Matthews, Eric F.
521st	
522d	
536th	Eggers, Fred W.
613th	Lander, William T.
701st	Hutchins, Leroy W. Grant, Andrew R. Pell, Joe C., Jr. Marcotte, Romeo A.
702d	Kiernan, Edward F. Fish, Lloyd B.
704th	Horseman, George
705th	Burdette, Maurice
766th	Barry, Edwin J. Collins, George B. Huckins, Joseph
801st	Inwood, Jerome A.
810th	
811th	
820th	
837th	
847th	

[redacted]

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
861st	
862d	
867th	
890th	Dalrumple, Lester R. Jaudon, Elbert W.
901st	Bremer, August W. Tarbell, Albert W.
902d	Zegolis, George
904th	Recor, Loren E.
906th	
912th	
913th	
914th	
915th	
916th	Lutjens, Paul R. Stewart, Salen S.
917th	
918th	
919th	
922d	
924th	
926th	
927th	

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
928th	
929th	
930th	
931st	
932d	
934th	
935th	
936th	
937th	
938th	
939th	
940th	
941st	
942d	
943d	
944th	
945th	
946th	
947th	
948th	
949th	
950th	

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
951st	Moddemeyer, William O., Jr.
952d	
953d	
954th	
955th	
956th	
957th	
958th	
959th	
960th	
961st	
962d	Richards, Jack A.
964th	
966th	
967th	
968th	
969th	Blake, Frank O.
970th	Stevens, R. D. Nadel, Harold
971st	Reed, Jack B. Robert, Theodore J. Huckins, Joseph Baker, Harry W.
972d	

DETACHMENTS	FORMER COMMANDING OFFICERS
973d	
974th	
999th	
1108th	
1111th	Buckley, Robert G. Roberts, Theodore J.
1110th	Sergeant, Maurice D. Reed, Jack B.
1135th	
7620th	
7627th	
7629th	Lewis, James M.

Appendix VI

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT

(Summary)

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT 1950-1953

Forword

As previously stated, research on CIC in the Korean Conflict soon revealed that many documents essential to a detailed account were still too highly classified to include in a history covered by "Confidential." Similarly, much information furnished by persons interviewed concerned material meriting a security classification above "Confidential" and, consequently, these reports could not be included.

This account is actually a preliminary survey furnishing the reference points from which a historical writer in the future can prepare a complete text. While for the casual reader it furnishes some indication that CIC had a vital part in the conflict, the limitations of this outline should be kept constantly in mind. From the historical viewpoint, delay will provide the benefits of time in which to gain a more accurate perspective and objective evaluation than is possible of activities only shortly removed from the status of current events.

The future writer will, when the security classification is reduced, find that there are many aspects of Operation Salamander, Big and Little Switch, and control elements of Task Force Indianhead deserving special attention. There are numerous other operations not designated by special names and titles in various files of the Army Intelligence Center which will undoubtedly be either regarded as regraded or available for regrading by that time. A roster of key personnel who should be both interviewed and consulted for names of others to interview is appended to this report. It is hoped readers will suggest others.

An extremely valuable guide for interviewing these sources is the pamphlet "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Korea" published by the CIC School in November 1951. Although originally published as "Secret" this publication was downgraded to "Confidential" in August 1954 since its author (Maj. Mark K. Hansen) was not identified in the text and his observations on administration, operations liaison and equipment were not authenticated by reference to other source documents or by footnotes showing detachment or participant. While this same omission invalidates its current use as a prime historical document, its importance as a future guide should not be overlooked.

--THE EDITORS

[redacted]

KOREAN CONFLICT 1950-1953

In January 1950 the Korean Chief of Staff reported to the United Nations Commission on Korea that an Army of 175,000 troops had been organized by North Korea and that among these troops were 20,000 Korean Communists who had formerly served with the Chinese Communist Forces. On 10 May 1950 the Korean Defense Minister reported to the same agency that North Korean troops had moved to the 38th parallel in a strength of 185,000 men, 173 tanks, 32 naval vessels and 197 planes. He added that 6,000 trained guerrillas had been moved into South Korea.

On 12 May 1950 this information was given two officers of the staff of Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, who agreed with the estimates of strength but did not recognize any imminent danger, and thought the South Koreans could handle the Northern forces. *

Counterintelligence sources in Japan disagreed with this finding; in fact they anticipated the invasion of South Korea in July and passed on the information that the North Koreans expected to complete conquest of the Southern Republic by fall of the same year. **

In 1945 when the 441st CIC Detachment took over responsibility for counter-intelligence coverage in Japan, all tactical units in the command were relieved of their detachments. It was felt that integrated control of counterintelligence would better the security position in Japan and permit much greater coverage.

At the time of the 1946 integration, however, there is evidence that a plan was contemplated whereby agents with the 441st would be earmarked, at least on paper, for duty with given tactical units, should an emergency arise. *** It was also contemplated that a plan would be drafted for equipping the units so earmarked from 441st supply channels. Such a plan was drafted by Col. Paul A. Hurst but records and interviews do not disclose its disposition or whether it was later disregarded.

In 1949 another plan formulating detachments for duty with tactical units was drafted by the 441st, but it appears questionable that this plan was adopted or followed for the Korean emergency. No record of a supply plan in this era can be found. ****

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* World Almanac for 1951, edited by Harry Hanson, published by the N.Y. World Telegram and The Sun.

** Historical Rpt, Part II, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, Office of the ACofS, G2, GHQ, FEC, Tab 34, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Interview with Col Paul A. Hurst, OSI 4th Dist Hq, Washington, D.C., 18 Aug 55.

**** Interview with Lt Col N.B. Rolle, Ft Holabird, Md, 1 Sep 1955.

[redacted]

Nor is there any record of a plan for emergency utilization and deployment of CIC at the Center. Although it was problematical in early 1950 that the United States would become involved if a Korean War occurred and even more questionable, if we disregard intelligence reports, when the conflict actually would occur, there is no record of preparation for the expanded intelligence coverage that would be necessary even if this country retained a nonbelligerent status. In 1949, CIC experienced an overstrength of considerable size, and in late 1949 and early 1950, records reveal that the Center was not preparing for expanded use of CIC, but on the contrary, actually was preparing to contract and control CIC manpower. *

CIC Agents Not Ready for Combat

CIC agents sent into Korea with the first tactical units were not trained or experienced in CIC combat operations nor were they in a state of general preparedness for the emergency. One document bluntly states that the commander of the 441st had foreseen the need for combat field training long before the conflict in Korea, and had set up a program for such training. ** This program, however, did not include indoctrination into actual CIC operations with a tactical unit, but offered such courses as basic infantry skills of map reading, first aid and field sanitation.

Although many agents with the 441st were combat veterans, very few, if any, had experience with CIC in a combat situation. *** This would account to some extent for the confusion which dominated the initial days in Korea in some of the earliest detachments sent with our forces. One officer reported that after the detachment was physically set up and in a position to operate, no one knew what should be done first. The problem was solved by putting agents to the task of creating an informant net in the area, not with special targets or information in mind, but simply because it seemed a good idea to have information. ****

It was for the purpose of meeting this lack of training that an actual course in CIC combat operations was set up by the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan. The course was instituted within a matter of weeks after the Korean conflict broke out and was included in a staging program which lasted from three weeks to three months for each newly organized detachment, depending on the urgency of the need for the unit in the combat zone. ***** The course, itself, lasted about two weeks.

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* Staff Conference Notes, CIC Center, 1950 (Conf) (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Historical Rpt, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 50, Office of ACofS, G2, GHQ, Far East Command, Part II, p 78, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Interview with Capt Walter Petrie, Ft Holabird, Md, 31 Aug 1955.

**** Ibid

***** Interview with Lt Col N.B. Rolle, Ft Holabird, Md, 1 Sep 1955.

[redacted]

It was to the S4 section of the 441st that fell the duty of equipping the CIC units destined for Korea when our forces first entered the action. S4 actually equipped five units from its own stores and supervised the equipping of seven more teams by various districts. Radios were practically unobtainable and the nonavailability of several Engineer and Signal items necessitated resort to commercial substitutes. Procurement of the equipment from 441st supplies worked a hardship on local investigations, since no authority existed for replacements. The situation was remedied by arrangement with G4, FEC, for substitution of the items.

Difficulties raised in outfitting the early detachments sent to Korea, prompted the S4 of the 441st to list the following lessons learned:

> "...Central stockpiling of equipment needed under combat conditions, or cataloging of sources for such material, would have readily enabled CIC districts and areas to equip teams, would have avoided depletion of investigative and other equipment at district and area levels, or would have made these supplies available from existing logistical sources even on short notice; upon issuance of authorization for the establishment of a CIC combat-type team, equipment issue could have been accomplished through G4 channels upon the establishment of a priority for the need; in the preparation of requisitions for combat-type CIC teams, special emphasis should be placed on the procurement of organizational equipment for weapons, organizational vehicular tools and equipment, cleaning and preserving supplies, ammunition and expendable supplies."*

Historical Recapitulation

Discussion of CIC's role in Korea is facilitated by drafting a framework for reference in the fast moving and ever changing tactical situation. A chronological presentation of the events involved may prove of assistance.

On 25 June 1950, the North Koreans invaded the southern Republic; two days later the United States entered the fray with United Nations (UN) support. Seoul fell to the North Korean (NK) armies on 28 June and on the first day of July, the 24th Infantry Division was flown into the action. On 8 July, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was named United Nations commander and as the month progressed, Republic of Korea (ROK) and UN forces were backed down the peninsula into the Pusan perimeter. By 6 September, the North Korean offensive had reached its high point, when the city of Pohang was taken, deep in South Korea.

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* Historical Rpt, 1 Jan - 30 Oct 50, O ACofS, G2, GHQ, FEC, Part II, p 81, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 15 September, the X Corps was moved out from the Pusan area and made an amphibious landing at Inchon, the port city of Seoul, capital of South Korea. Simultaneously, I and IX Corps moved out of the perimeter and pushed northward to reach Seoul on 26 September. On 7 October, about three and one half months after the invasion, United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, reaching Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, on 19 October and sending advance forces to within a few miles of the Yalu River and Manchurian border inside of a week. It was at this point that the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces became apparent. *

Communist China promised support to North Korea in early October 1950, prior to crossing of the 38th parallel by UN Forces. In October, an intensive anti-US propaganda program was begun to prepare the Chinese people for war. It was earlier than this, however, that a marshaling of Chinese forces began on the Manchurian border. In July, an estimated 116,000 regulars were in Manchuria, but a month later the force had been increased by 100,000 men and in August there were 250,000 troops in the area. This number was doubled by a transfer of troops from South and Central China in September, and at the date of the first UN encounter with Chinese troops, there were in excess of 850,000 troops massed in the area. **

The buildup was not at first alarming, for the troops were from the Fourth Chinese Army Group, normally stationed in Manchuria, but moved south to participate in operations against Hainan and Formosa. It first appeared that they were merely being progressively returned to former locations. It was only when units not component parts of the Fourth Army Group began to appear that serious consideration was given to intervention possibilities of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). By this time, 10 corps, each with three divisions, were poised at the border and the precedent set by the Chinese was carefully examined.

The nucleus of the North Korean Army was formed by release from Chinese forces of all men of Korean origins in 1949 and 1950. When the obvious sympathies of the Chinese were thus considered, the potential of 30 divisions within marching distance of the UN front had serious connotations.

Sizeable entry of these forces into the Korean conflict began about 14 October. Chinese broadcasts reported, however, that these were only token forces from three corps, and not until 3 November was it estimated that these forces were vanguards for soon-to-arrive divisions and armies. By the end of November it

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* Korean Conflict Chronology, compiled by Capt Earl D. Kiem, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

** Command Report of Intelligence Activities, MIS Section, G2, GHQ, FEC/UNC, Nov 1950, Chap V, p 78, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

was clear that UN troops were engaging the Third and Fourth CCF Field Armies and the independent CCF 66th Corps, while the First CCF Field Army was being held in reserve. Total strength of the CCF was estimated to be in excess of 220,000 men. *

On 26 November, the Chinese Communist forces buttressed the routed remnants of the North Korean Armies and opened an offensive drive that pushed UN forces south through Pyongyang in early December and forced the sea evacuation of troops that had been stranded at Chosin Reservoir from Hungnam on the east coast. By the first of the year, the Red forces had recaptured Seoul, but the UN set up a strong defensive line about 30 miles south of that city that stemmed the advance. Offenses and counteroffensives brought the UN forces back to Seoul by 15 March 1951, and back to the 38th parallel by the end of that month. On 11 April 1951, General MacArthur was removed from command and replaced by Gen. Matthew Ridgway. After more than three additional months of fierce but stalemated action, truce talks were opened on 8 July at Kaesong. There followed more than two years of "on-again off-again" truce talks and accompanying continuation of fighting. Then an armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. **

441st and Korean CIC

The part which the 441st CIC Detachment played in preparing detachments for duty in the Korean conflict cannot be overstated.

Simultaneous with the approval of the United Nations for commitment of Far East forces, the 441st took steps to have tactical CIC teams ready for shipment into the combat area on 72 hours notice. On 1 July 1950, when first UN ground forces were committed to action, the 441st manned and equipped what was to become the 24th CIC Detachment which accompanied the 24th Infantry Division. By 10 July, five detachments from the 441st attached to American Ground and Service Forces were in Korean action.

After this initial effort, planning continued at Tokyo Headquarters, since it was clear that additional ground forces would have to be committed. When the 1st Marine Division arrived in Japan, the 441st provided it with a detachment, and although the 2d Division arrived in Japan with a detachment formed from the 115th CIC Detachment at Sixth Army, the 441st was called upon to provide assistance with linguist personnel and in the procurement of the Special List of Investigative Equipment. Six more detachments were furnished during August and September 1950. During the same period augmentation teams were formed

* Ibid, p 80.

** Chronology of Korean Conflict, compiled by Capt Earl D. Klem, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

for the 3d Infantry Division and Eighth Army detachments. By 30 September, a little over two months after the outbreak of the UN police action, approximately 234 agents had been furnished by the 441st to tactical units in Korea.

All CIC units committed to Korea were ordered by the Theater G2, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, to maintain contact with the parent organization. Copies of operational reports as well as summaries of activities and recommendations for more efficient utilization of personnel and equipment were required to be sent to Headquarters, 441st CIC Detachment. To expedite transmittal, the reports were forwarded through Headquarters, Eighth United States Army Korea, where a daily courier pickup was made.

The fluid situation in the initial stages of the conflict and the lack of combat know-how on the part of the agents sent from Japan confined the major part of CIC activity to security surveys, screening of refugees and line crossers and the preparation of target lists for the projected offensive action to move north.

At one point, all detachments were confined to the Pusan perimeter and directed activities toward safeguarding the security of that area and particularly the port city of Pusan. During this period, the widest counterintelligence security coverage possible was maintained and CIC either supervised or actually handled patrolling of roadblocks, water and power stations, areas surrounding various army installations, various headquarters and command posts, and port facilities.*

Surprisingly, a search of available records does not provide, as such, a list of detachments committed during the Korean action. A back-check through the Adjutant General's records on divisions, corps, and armies committed, however, makes possible a reasonably complete roster.

The 2d, 3d, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th, and 45th CIC Detachments accompanied respective infantry divisions of the same numerical designation into Korea. The First Cavalry Division was provided counterintelligence service by the 191st CIC Detachment, and the First Marine Division, a component of X Corps, had its own CIC detachment, the 181st. I and IX Corps of the Eighth Army, and the independent X Corps, had attached to them, respectively, the 201st, 209th and 210th CIC Detachments. The 308th CIC Detachment was assigned to Eighth Army.

The 442d CIC Detachment served the Far East Liaison Group, while the 705th and 704th CIC Detachments held down static missions with the 3d and 2d

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* Historical Report, Part II, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 1950, O AC of S, G2, GHQ, FEC, Tab 34, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Logistical Commands. The 801st CIC Detachment was first assigned to assist the 705th in the Seoul-Inchon area, but later moved to join the 308th at Eighth Army Headquarters.*

Korean Operations

Although the Korean Police Action brought out certain combat innovations and showed the increased importance in stressing night maneuvers, infiltration tactics, and general importance of the foot soldier, it added little that was new or novel to CIC operations.

Reporting on the activities of each individual detachment committed during the three year period of hostilities would serve no useful purpose. Screening of Monthly Reports of CIC activities without particular regard to the unit concerned provides, however, a representative cross section of cases that could have been handled by any of the detachments involved. When cases or investigations processed by a detachment appear unique, appropriate credit and mention is given.

308th CIC Detachment

The 308th CIC Detachment was hurriedly formed and equipped to accompany the Eighth U.S. Army into Korea by the 441st CIC Detachment in Tokyo. In the early period of formation, 17 men were taken from the Tokyo office of the 441st, and placed under the command of Maj. Gordon Flaherty. The force was eventually increased to a total strength of 37 men. None had any combat CIC experience. The detachment first set up headquarters at Taegu but dropped back to Pusan by August 1950. With the advance northward, headquarters was moved to Seoul by the end of September, and advance headquarters was established for a short time in Pyongyang. Once withdrawal south began in November, the headquarters was removed again to Taegu where it remained until the cease-fire was accepted. With the cease-fire, the detachment moved back into Seoul.

As the first CIC unit in combat during the Korean conflict, the 308th found itself without operational or administrative SOP to fall back on. Such documents were drafted and forwarded to other units as they entered the conflict. Since it was first and was the detachment of Eighth Army, the 308th became a control center and agency for CIC in Korea. Reports from all other detachments were channeled through the unit, where they were examined, screened and a copy retained for a central file. The original copy of all reports went back to the G2, United Nations Command, in Tokyo. The records available do not show authority for the 308th to assume this role as a coordinator, but the need for some central

* Historical Data Cards, Organization and Records Section, TAGO, Pentagon, Wash, D.C.

control was recognized by all unit commanders; the 308th at Eighth Army headquarters appeared to be the logical agency to do this, it assumed the burden and discharged it.

Since all forces in Korea, with the exception of X Corps, were under Eighth Army, other reports came into the hands of the 308th for processing. X Corps was consolidated and absorbed into Eighth Army when the withdrawal southward began in December. From the Daily, Weekly and Monthly Activity Reports forwarded through the 308th, the 308th drew items for a summary of activities throughout Korea, which they disseminated to all detachments. X Corps was included in distribution and often contributed items of counterintelligence interest even before its integration into Eighth Army.

Operations

The 308th spent the first weeks in Korea in setting up an internal organization and in procuring interpreters, translators, and housekeeping personnel. Liaison with Korean and United Nations agencies was an early project, and the first real performance of CIC duties came in security surveys of the detachment office, Eighth Army Headquarters, the Taegu Ordnance Depot and the local Signal depot.

Since the detachment was operating in the country of a friendly foreign government, and there was no military government agency, it was often impossible to integrate operations as CIC did in combat when the operational area was hostile; South Korea was a "host" nation to the United Nations troops. When a program of integrating Republic of Korea troops into Eighth Army components was inaugurated, the 308th was ordered to run background investigations on the Korean troops. This task proved impossible because of a lack of files and the language barrier involved, and it was later turned over to the ROK Army G2. He agreed to do all in his power to investigate the subject troops, but faced the same lack of adequate records that CIC had encountered. Not only were most official records in the north country which was occupied at that time by North Korean troops, but many had been burned to avoid the possibility of capture during the hasty withdrawal south.

While the 308th was at Pusan it had no area coverage responsibility and set up a pattern that was to be followed throughout the conflict. This involved doing very little tactical or positive intelligence work. The detachment was employed in integration of reports and Prisoner of War interrogation and also began to set up project and target files. When the detachment moved north to Taegu from Pusan, the evacuation security work was handled by the First Cavalry Division team in conjunction with the 308th.

While the detachment was in Taegu, the work continued along the same lines that had been established in Pusan. Considerable target information was supplied the 181st CIC Detachment which was staging with the First Marine Division for the Inchon landings. Target files for the 181st were scanty, and much credit for the job done at Inchon should go to the 308th. As the United Nations troops moved north into Seoul, the 308th aided in the reduction of targets in the city, and all detachments concerned relied heavily on the files and target lists drafted by the 308th. There was not, however, any integrated plan for the intelligence reduction of Seoul. Still a wealth of information was quickly collected and many target personalities were picked up.

During the advance northward and the layover at Seoul, refugee control became the principal problem of the 308th. There were no control centers or check points as CIC generally contemplates them, and the Korean National Police generally handled this problem. CIC was called upon to advise and recommend, but when positive steps were taken, the old problem of operating within the framework of an existing foreign government arose.

Until the detachment moved into Seoul, there was no planning for a move north of the 38th parallel. Once in Seoul, however, the detachment was directed to prepare target lists for an expanded mission in any part or portion of Korea. Target planning and processing of reports took up the short static period in Seoul just prior to the move northward into Pyongyang.

Task Force INDIANHEAD

As a part of the target planning of the 308th at Seoul, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang figured prominently. Informant and report sources provided a mass of information and the list of targets and personalities assumed formidable proportions. On 16 October 1950 the Eighth Army G2 told the commanding officer of the 308th to turn over to him all material on Pyongyang and prepare a CIC plan for reduction of the city. The next day a staff meeting was held and the plan was discussed, and the material compiled by the 308th analyzed and accepted. It was determined that the reduction of the city could best be effected by formation of a special task force for the job, hence the conception of Task Force INDIANHEAD.

The group was formed by taking six men from the 308th CIC Detachment, 10 men from the 2d CIC Detachment, and one or two from other detachments in Eighth Army to make up a total force of 22 men. Six operational two-man teams were formed, and 10 men were held in reserve for assignment to targets after the city was taken or for assistance to other teams. The task force was commanded by the G2, 2d Infantry Division, and the commanding officer of the 2d CIC Detachment acted as operations officer for the unit. Something over a company of troops from 2d Division were detailed to the force, with armor, for any tactical support

necessary to make the unit self sustaining if resistance was encountered. As it happened, the city was deserted when the task force entered and the troops were used as guard and jailor personnel. Also assigned to the force were Korean interpreters, Interrogation of Prisoner of War teams, and engineers for demolition work.

The Force enjoyed considerable success and collected several thousand documents and a few target personnel. The favorable results of the operation led to the development of new CIC techniques for target reduction and other "task force" missions during the Korean conflict. On the same order, but not so successful from the standpoint of material collected, was a task force organized to reduce Seoul when we moved into the city after the withdrawal down the peninsula in November 1950. *

201st CIC Detachment

The 201st CIC Detachment had its inception in August 1950 when a group of 17 agents was put on detached service from the 441st in Japan to Eighth Army Headquarters at Taegu. It was contemplated that the groups would be put with I Corps which was still in the process of formation with troop elements being sent from V Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. An advance party of four agents was sent from Tokyo by plane to set up offices for the group and make initial liaison contacts. The rest of the detachment followed by ship and rail, arriving a week later to find offices set up. Within the month, the unit was designated the 201st CIC Detachment and attached to I Corps.

Initial supplies for the detachment were provided by the 441st, and all needed equipment was available with the exception of winter clothing. This was eventually furnished through I Corps channels. All agents in the detachment, with the exception of the commanding officer, had CIC experience but none had ever been with CIC in combat operations.

One agent in the group, Capt. Walter E. Petrie, reports that after the detachment was settled in Taegu, confusion reigned supreme. The big problem was, what should be done first?

The commanding officer, Maj. Louis A. Shone, II, first put his agents to establishing liaison with other detachments in the Taegu area and with Korean civil authorities. At this time, September 1950, the Eighth Army still had headquarters in Taegu and army, corps, and division size detachments were all represented. During this lull in operations, according to Petrie, informant nets

* Interview with Capt Ben Obata, Army Intelligence School, Ft Holabird, Md., 24 Sep 1955.

were created without special targets or information in mind, but merely because it gave the men some experience in dealing with Koreans. I Corps finally took positive form and was initially composed of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division, the 1st ROK Infantry Division, and a British Brigade consisting of two battalions, the Gloucesters and the Sutherland and Highlanders. Since the 201st was intended as a tactical unit to move with Corps headquarters, there was no necessity for a network of field offices.

Internal CIC liaison with I Corps was created, and the first experience with combat activities arose when the First Cavalry Division began to send back to Corps, for extensive interrogation, captured North Koreans. Only two or three prisoners trickled back per week, and the work was not onerous.

Liaison with ROK CIC and Korean National Police was felt to be extremely poor during the early months the detachment served in Korea. Captain Petrie felt that this was caused in large part by the attitude of American agents that with our arrival in Korea, we were to take over and run the show with Korean agencies merely providing assistance. The Korean agencies felt, understandably, that they knew more about the country and what was going on than the newcomer American forces and that the treatment of them as underlings and assistants to an American hierarchy was neither warranted or wise. It was only after agents began to treat the Korean agencies with respect and as equals in the war that cooperation and liaison improved.

No policy was established by the Far East Command for the channelling of reports during the early period of the war. As stated, the 308th at Eighth Army, by liaison cultivation and little more, became the office of record for the area and acted as a semiauthoritative coordinating agency for all CIC in Korea. Captain Petrie was of the opinion that there should and could have been a stronger central control and coordinating echelon.

On to the Wars

Prior to the UN breakthrough from the Pusan perimeter, friendly forces were bottled into the southeastern portion of the Korean peninsula. At the time, IX Corps was holding the west end of an arched line with the 25th Infantry Division, the 2d Infantry Division, and the 2d and 6th ROK Divisions. X Corps, with the First Marine Brigade, the 7th Infantry Division, and the 3d Infantry Division, drew back

to Pusan to stage for the Inchon landing. I Corps held the east end of our defensive line with support and control in the far west invested in ROK forces.

It should be made clear that I and IX Corps were parts of Eighth Army, while X Corps for a time was responsible only to the Far East Command. This caused considerable coordination difficulty in Korea during the early months of the advance net of the perimeter.

With the Inchon landing, X Corps began its advance toward Seoul from the west and moved quickly to pocket NK forces into the southern portions of the peninsula.

To close the trap, IX Corps began to move north, making at the same time a westward sweep. I Corps moved through the center of the peninsula trying at all times to continue the east end of the line maintained by IX Corps and form a pocket for the NK forces. I and II ROK Corps moved up the east side of the peninsula far ahead of I and IX Corps, but holding when they reached the 37th parallel to straighten the front with UN forces. North Korean troops in our rear were mopped up by IX Corps elements.

As I and IX Corps moved into the Seoul area, X Corps was pulled from the action to prepare for landings at Wonsan. With the movement northward from Seoul after line-straightening operations, IX Corps remained in the eastern side of the line, I Corps moved through the west central sectors and X Corps along with I and II ROK Corps moved to the west end of our line. During this hurried movement north, the work of the 201st was necessarily rushed to keep pace with the forward elements of the Corps. At all times, the 201st kept its headquarters with the forward elements and no attention was given the rear areas unless specifically requested. CIC headquarters were always near, but not in, the Corps command post. During the advance, the 201st interrogated line crossers, aided in the screening of refugees, and formulated such security plans as were needed in the rapidly changing situation. The tactical intelligence job of CIC during this period was of greatest importance.

In August 1950, tactical CIC teams were assigned additional temporary functions of collecting positive intelligence, order of battle information, and, in some cases, intelligence and reconnaissance missions.* This was necessitated by the shortage of experienced tactical intelligence personnel. The work became of prime importance to CIC, for close liaison with G2s made it clear that their primary interest was in tactical information needed for the immediate situation rather than in counterintelligence reports. On the advance north, and

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* Annex 3 to Historical Rpt, 1 Jan - 31 Oct 1950, O ACof S, G2, GHQ, FEC, Tab 34, p 6, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

during the strategic withdrawal to the south, the greater part of CIC energies was directed toward this positive intelligence effort.

Not far north of Seoul, the retreat of the North Korean Army became a rout, and even our forwardmost elements were encountering little resistance. In the race to the Yalu, our columns kept largely to the main roads and rarely fanned out to map up or pick up bypassed troops.

As this left vast areas of the countryside unexplored and unexploited, it invariably occurred that in villages behind our front-lines the government changed hands almost simultaneously with our passing. Committees were formed in most communities which took over governmental functions and control from Communist officials. Still, North Korean forces roamed at large through these areas and kept agents operating behind UN lines. To counteract this situation, it became an I Corps practice to dispatch two CIC agents in a jeep, with an interpreter, to cover the areas bypassed and ignored by our tactical troops. Once in contact with a village committee, these agents would collect all intelligence information possible and radio reports to headquarters. It was not uncommon for the teams to accept the surrender of North Korean troops and often the jeep trailers were filled with surrendered arms and equipment. Many enemy agents and deserters were picked up through the cooperation of village officials who afforded UN forces excellent cooperation. No instances were recalled by Captain Petrie when these teams encountered resistance in attempting to round up NK troops or agents.

Not until UN forces had withdrawn from the Yalu to Seoul did the 201st run into a static situation. It was during this period that the detachment intensified its activity by prolonged interrogations of refugees and prisoners of war. While the more routine CIC duties of security surveys and inspections were carried out as necessary, they were not considered of prime importance.

Task Force INDIANHEAD in which the 201st participated deserves additional mention at this point. Prior to entering Pyongyang, the Task Force target area, while the 1st Cavalry Division remained across the river and a ROK division was circling to enter the city from the east, the 201st formulated a plan for intelligence reduction of the Pyongyang zone. But when the 201st moved to forward positions, preparatory to entering the city with the first wave of troops, they found another CIC group prepared to usurp their job.

Several days prior to this, on 16 October 1950, the G2 of 2d Infantry Division had been directed by Eighth Army headquarters to organize a special force of CIC agents to reduce Pyongyang. The reason for not informing I Corps CIC of this plan, when its troops were at the very door of the city, does not appear. When the agents of the 201st discovered the mission of the task force, they generously

put themselves at the disposal of that unit and made it a joint operation. The force, augmented by 201st agents, entered Pyongyang with the first troop elements on 18 October and remained in operation for five days. Many documents, publications, films and pieces of materiel of value were obtained. The items provided top-level strategic, economic, industrial and political intelligence which would otherwise have been lost without the effective operation conducted by the unit.

In March 1951, when the UN retook Seoul after the January withdrawal from the city, the 201st planned and executed a similar operation with some measure of success. Elements of the 3d CIC Detachment worked with the 201st, but information obtained was meager since the city had been occupied for only three months and the withdrawal of North Korean (NK) and Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) troops on that occasion was orderly.

In May 1951, when the 201st had taken up a static position with I Corps, on what eventually became the cease-fire line, Captain Petrie was sent on a new assignment to the island of Kangwah-do. The island lies at the mouth of the Han River on which Seoul is situated and at that time, extended across the battle lines on the mainland. The UN had no troops on the island and it was known that agents from North Korea were using it as an entryway and that the island also was serving as a vital link in black market operations between North and South Korea.

The isolated area was occupied by guerrilla forces who were unquestionably participating in the black market trade and perhaps even aiding enemy agents, but who were by and large sympathetic to the UN cause.

A British sergeant who had had experience with guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia during World War II was first sent to the island to establish liaison. A few days later, Captain Petrie was sent to handle intelligence security in the area and stop the flow of black market goods through the island. The two lone UN men on the island did an effective job.

The travel of agents from North Korea through the island was effectively cut off by placing armed guerrillas at all available landing beaches where a swimmer or boat might come ashore. The task was not too great, for most of the island had sheer cliffs along the beach which made access impossible. At the same time, this step effectively stopped the flow to the island of textiles and manufactured goods from the north and foodstuffs from the south, the stock-in-trade of the black market.

Petrie managed to keep open a route for our agents in North Korea. Many agencies involved in the conflict utilized the route through Kanwah-do to place agents in the north, and in every case, Petrie coordinated and directed the travel of these men. In addition to organizing the guerrilla police units which patrolled the beaches on the island, Petrie managed to go farther and instigate and suggest

harrassment raids by the guerrillas into North Korea. Petrie described the guerrillas as little more than bandits, but their forays into North Korea for food, ammunition and loot had a definite value to the UN cause. Petrie left the island in September 1951, to return to Japan. *

201st CIC Detachment

The 201st CIC Detachment with I Corps, moved frequently as did most units in December 1950. The detachment was broken into sections, the majority travelling with the Corps advance command post and the remainder attached to the Corps forward command post. ** During late December and most of January, the detachment was largely occupied with the questioning of refugees and suspected hostile agents, sent up from forward echelons for intensive interrogation at a more stable level. The pattern for saturation employment of agents by the enemy was easily discerned during this period, and appropriate information directives thereon were forwarded through the Corps and Eighth Army structures. ***

2d CIC Detachment

The 2d CIC Detachment entered the Korean Police Action during August 1950. It was assigned the usual preliminary matters of security surveys and the development of liaison contacts. All agents wore the "U.S." collar insignia and were addressed as "Mister." Certain equipment and logistic shortages immediately became evident. Tentage provided the detachment was inadequate as was the amount of transportation vehicles and trailers. The fluid tactical condition during the early months of the conflict necessitated frequent and immediate moves by the unit; only the procurement of trailers and trucks from other units gave the detachment the mobility required. ****

Administrative difficulties also put in the usual appearance. The commander of the 2d CIC Detachment found that the usual Monthly Report forms did not allow a fair reporting of the detachment's activities. No provision was made on the forms for some types of investigations handled and the commander, Capt. Virgil H. Herald, suggested that the forms be abandoned as useless during the fluid tactical stages of combat duty. During October 1950, Captain Herald reported that his detachment was providing assistance to military police and guard details to prevent infiltration and tie ups along the main supply route. He added that routine refugee screenings

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* Interview with Capt Walter E. Petrie, AI School, Ft Holabird, Md., 3 Aug 55.

** Monthly Report of CIC Activities, 201st CIC Det, Dec 1950, signed by Capt Paul Clifford, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

*** Ibid, Jan 1951.

**** Monthly Report of CIC Activities, Aug 1950, 2d CIC Det, signed by Capt Virgel Herald, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

in conjunction with Korean National Police had revealed a number of guerrilla and North Korean troops causing scattered fighting at remote control and check points. He closed the report with the recommendation that agents be given thorough training in basic infantry principles before being sent into the area. *

During December 1950 the 2d CIC Detachment and the 2d Division felt the effects of heavy personnel and equipment losses incurred during action in the latter part of November. The situation tactically was extremely fluid and refugee screenings were kept at a minimum but still deemed necessary to protect command post security. All records and office equipment of the detachment were lost in combat in November and clerical work was temporarily eliminated and clerical personnel employed in assisting agents.

The detachment found that during combat with the division, investigations had, of necessity, to be short and quickly conducted. Interrogations were handled under great pressure, and tactical moves often caused investigations that merited development to be dropped and abandoned.

Casualties within the detachment caused the commander to forward the suggestion that agents, hospitalized and sent to Japan, be returned to their units through channels other than regular replacement facilities. Frequently, he reported, the system in use delayed the return of men at periods when they were most vitally needed, and in some instances, caused them to be permanently lost to their detachment. **

3d CIC Detachment

The 3d CIC Detachment reports for late 1951 present some idea of the popular occupation of detachments in refugee screening. During November, almost no other CIC work was accomplished, although a considerable time was devoted to interrogation of prisoners of war and the collection of positive intelligence. Continual screening of refugees was undertaken through patrolling of road networks and National Police check points within the area under jurisdiction of the 3d Division. ***

During December, the 14 agents with the 3d Detachment screened more than 2,000 indigenous personnel with 3d Division and conducted almost 900 interrogations. The detachment also participated in Operation Skunkhunt in December, when all reserve troops of the division were turned over to CIC supervision for clearing of all indigenous personnel within the division sector. Twenty-five

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* Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities, Oct 1950, 2d CIC Det, /s/ Capt Virgel Herald, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac)

** Ibid.

*** Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities, Jan 1951, 3d CIC Det, /s/ Maj Wilbur Young, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

security risks screened from over a thousand persons rounded up in the operation were turned over to Corps for further interrogation. *

The detachment also endeavored to provide counterintelligence support down through subordinate levels of 3d Division.

The officer who served as S2 of the 7th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, reported excellent tactical and nontactical support by the 3d CIC Detachment during late 1950 and early 1951. The detachment commander, Maj. Clare R. Jensen, made daily visits to the S2s at regimental level and freely offered whatever assistance he could provide. In 1951, when the regiment was holding a position at the s-curve in the Inchon River about 50 miles north of Seoul and on the main supply route, the 3d CIC Detachment gave its first concrete assistance by screening all indigenous employees. The regiment at that time had a rear area of almost division size, and the difficulty of the job was increased by the fact that few records were available to facilitate the checking process.

The 3d CIC gave troop lectures at the request of the S2, especially directed at pointing out the dangers of allowing children the free run of all positions. Some trouble had been experienced with the use of children as low level agents by the North Koreans, and the S2 reported less fraternization with the children after the CIC lectures.

The 7th Regiment S2 also recalled that it was standard procedure to call in CIC to check areas being vacated for documents which might have been overlooked or left behind.

An enlisted man with psychological difficulties was removed from active duty with the 7th Regiment after CIC investigated his story and claim that he had been ambushed. The right flank of the regiment was protected by troops of the British Brigade, and since the British rely upon a "strong point" method of holding a front line, rather than offering a continuous line of resistance, there had been some infiltration through their line into 7th Regiment rear areas by North Korean troops. It was thought, however, that increased security and guard vigilance had removed the possibility of further infiltration when the enlisted man concerned reported that he had been ambushed while driving his truck within the regimental area. The truck was riddled with holes, but when the man was questioned to get information on the raiding party in order to preclude further action by it, his story was not consistent.

Under CIC interrogation the man admitted that being confined to duties in the rear area, he had come to feel "out of it" and wanted to attract some attention with

* Ibid. Dec 1951.

[redacted]

his "ambush" story. He admitted to emptying two clips of carbine ammunition into the truck and confessed that he had neither met or seen a raiding party. The man was turned over to higher headquarters for disposition. *

24th CIC Detachment

As stated, the first CIC detachment into Korea was the 24th, which moved into the area with the 24th Infantry Division on 1 July 1950. Agents were deployed from division level in teams down through the regiments. A reserve force was held at division and used for assistance at lower levels or put onto higher level cases.

The fluid and changing situation during the early months of the conflict required agents be put to the task of refugee screening and control and the gathering of positive intelligence information. When the 24th began its advance north in September, the mission changed to one more common to CIC, but limited positive intelligence gathering continued. In most cases, positive intelligence leads were passed to other agencies for information or action, but occasionally, CIC was called upon to follow through on atrocity investigation and civil matters. **

During December 1950 the 24th CIC supervised the screening of more than 13,000 refugees and recommended routing that kept traffic off the main supply route in the division sector. All Korean males of military age were carefully examined, particularly when the division moved across the 38th parallel, to minimize the danger of enemy troop infiltration. Clearance of Korean Nationals employed or integrated with the division proved a difficult task for the detachment, since few records were available to verify statements. ***

In January 1951 the southbound refugee traffic was heavy because of the rapid advance of NK and CCF armies. The detachment screened in excess of 25,000 refugees during the month and assisted Military Police in searching personal belongings to seize contraband arms or would-be infiltrators. Several prisoners of war were interrogated by the detachment to assist in the collection of positive intelligence. ****

In February, as the United Nations stemmed the Communist march south, refugee traffic again began to move north through the division sector, but in much smaller volumes than had been handled in the movement southward. It

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* Interview with Maj J.F. McAuliffe, At Ft Holabird, Md., 26 Sep 1955.

** Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities, Oct 1950, 24th CIC Det, /s/ Capt Harvey Cook; (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

*** Ibid, Dec 1950.

**** Ibid, Jan 1951.

was also during this month that American prisoners of war were liberated at a compound just south of Seoul, and a comprehensive Summary of Information on Communist indoctrination and brainwashing techniques was compiled by interrogation of the men by 24th Detachment agents. *

Since the 24th was heading the advance north of the UN forces in March, little refugee traffic passed through the division sector. Main attention was once again turned to gathering of positive intelligence required by the G2 and maintenance of the security of division and subordinate command posts. Indoctrination of troops into procedure in event of capture was concentrated on during this period, as well. **

In April the spring offensive of the CCF started another flow of refugees south through the Division area as the 24th engaged in retrograde movement. Korean National Police actually handled the check and control points by this time, but CIC supervision was required. This was to be the last great difficulty with refugee movement, since shortly after this the tactical situation became stabilized and reasonably static. Communist propaganda leaflets began to appear in great volume during this period, and though CIC collected them whenever possible and sent forward reports, it was impossible to stop air drops and arrival of the literature. ***

With the first truce overtures being delivered in June, it became apparent that current positions held by the 24th Division could become permanent, and an ambitious program of refugee evacuation out of the division sector was begun. Civil assistance personnel handled the actual movement of refugees, under CIC supervision. More than 18,000 were relocated during the two month period. A mobile check point unit was created to pick up those who by accident or design avoided or by-passed screening stations.

A Summary of Information during this period from the 24th CIC Detachment contains a case which illustrates a feeling that was becoming current during mid-1951. Few persons took such direct action, however.

A letter was picked up in APO channels leaving Korea, because of its address to Joseph Stalin, Premier, Moscow, Russia. Examination disclosed a return address on the envelope, which CIC traced and used to conclude the case. The author of the letter was found and admitted that he had drafted the letter to the Soviet premier. In it he urged Stalin to exert his influence to bring the Korean hostilities to a close and to cease antagonism of the United Nations so that the war would end and "we can all go home." ****

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* Ibid, Feb 1951.
** Ibid, Mar 1951.
*** Ibid, Apr 1951.
**** Ibid, May and Jun 1951.

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25th CIC Detachment

In December 1950, as United Nation forces regrouped to the rear in the face of the Communist advance, the 25th CIC Detachment was faced with a refugee situation that defied control. An estimated quarter of a million refugees moved through the division sector; all that could be done was to route them off the main supply route between Pyongyang and Seoul. Spot screening was attempted and was distressingly successful, for the number of enemy soldiers, agents, and guerrillas who were picked up at these points was very large. CIC in the division rear, at Taejon, reported refugee movement at the rate of 10,000 to 15,000 a day south through that city. *

181st CIC Detachment

The 181st CIC Detachment with the 1st Marine Division managed to keep 10 agents in the field out of a total personnel strength of 16 men. The unit urged in November 1950 that a central control office be set up in Korea to obtain maximum efficiency from all detachments. The report pointed out the lack of inter detachment coordination because of the lack of such control. **

During December 1950, the 181st worked no cases because of the tenuous tactical situation during the withdrawal of the detachment and Marine division from Hungnam, North Korea. The only work of the detachment consisted of positive intelligence missions that would aid the G2 in expediting the evacuation. When the 1st was landed at Masan some distance south of Hungnam, the 181st advocated and implemented a vigorous propaganda program directed against guerrilla bands in the area. The campaign was directed along lines emphasizing the need to fight and protect Korea against China, a former ruler of Korea. ***

The zone of 1st Marine Division responsibility changed in January 1951, and all agents were delegated duties to assist regimental combat team S2s in counter-intelligence and security work occasioned by the physical move. In its monthly report for this period, the 181st passed along the information that most agents picked up by the detachment during refugee screening operations carried some means of identification on their persons. Elementary as it may have seemed, the detachment commander recommended that all suspect persons be given a thorough body search to check for such documents. The rugged and hilly terrain

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* Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities, 25th CIC Det, Dec 50, /s/ Lt Col Arthur Slattery (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

** Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities, Nov 50, 181st CIC Det, /s/ Maj Millard F. Dougherty, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

*** Ibid, Dec 1950.

[redacted]

handled by the division gave rise to an operational difficulty during this period. Radios used for control of agent teams did not function efficiently, and a request for more powerful sets was made. *

The evacuation of Seoul and Inchon as the Communist forces advanced in January put the detachment back on the job of refugee screening. The detachment commander admitted in his report that security screening was inadequate, but added that the movement south of the civilians had been fairly orderly. He noted, too, that while division policy was to stop northern movement of refugees through the division sector, there was no policy with regard to movement south. During the month, the detachment captured 12 persons believed to have been connected with an espionage ring. All carried broken copper spoons, presumably as a means of identification, and four of the men had allegedly been signaling the enemy with a heavy mirror. Tactical considerations prevented immediate investigation by the 181st, and the prisoners were sent up to X Corps for exploitation. **

Seven couriers were picked up by the 181st in May; under CIC interrogation, all admitted to performing espionage missions for the enemy. No pattern could be determined in questioning of the men. The ages of the men varied from 17 to 75 years and no definite schooling or training was common to all. All had short range missions and carried a Japanese coin as a common means of identification.

Evidence collected during June 1951, when 31 agents were apprehended by the 181st, led to the conclusion that the enemy was attempting a "saturation" policy with regard to espionage activities. Five women were among the agents sent to Corps for further questioning and all had short range tactical missions. A new item of information that the agents were instructed to determine was whether Japanese National troops were being employed with the UN force. ***

During August 1951, as the static nature of the division's employment became apparent, the 181st began a program to screen all indigenous employees. The detachment coordinated the program with the ROK liaison office and found it could handle as many as 50 cases a day. The screening included detailed interrogation into background and personal history; political and social affiliations; and a check of available files. If the processing was satisfactorily completed, new passes were issued. Persons hired for more responsible positions such as interpreter or translator were required to fill out personal history statements which were sent to Eighth Army for a check of the central CIC files. ****

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* Ibid, Jan 1951.
** Ibid, Apr 1951.
*** Ibid, Jun 1951.
****Ibid, Aug 1951.

[redacted]

704th Detachment with Second Logistical Command

First records available for the 704th CIC Detachment, attached to the Second Logistical Command, pick the unit up in mid-October 1950, subsequent to the breakthrough from the Pusan perimeter. The detachment was composed in large part, of men formerly with the 441st in Japan. Sub-offices were maintained in Masan and Koje-do and the area of responsibility included the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.

Close liaison was maintained by the detachment with the Korean National Police, and it was felt that assistance from that branch was preferable to coordination with ROK CIC, for, by and large, that group was immature and inexperienced. Much reliance was placed on civilian interpreters, since only two agents in the detachment spoke Korean.

In the headquarters office at Pusan, the biggest job for agents was providing port and personnel security. Surveys of port facilities were run at regular intervals and patrol activity by agents in troop congregation centers and along the docks was common. Most troops moved to Korea during 1950 came through Sasebo, Japan, to Pusan and were then moved by truck up the peninsula. Liaison contacts with shipmasters proved a valuable source of strategic and tactical intelligence. Positive intelligence activities of the detachment ranged from covering holiday demonstrations to obtaining civilian opinions of interest at high military levels.

As a part of the port security program, indoctrination lectures were given incoming troops on security measures and the safeguarding of military information. The talks were generally informal and were given in whatever locations were available. Their purpose was as much a capsule indoctrination of troops to Far East culture as the implementation of security measures.

The Pusan office was involved in a case, in 1950, which required the apprehension and return to their homeland of several Japanese who had come to Korea as houseboys and cooks for American troops and officers. News agencies got wind of the presence of Japanese in Korea and almost gave rise to an incident by reporting the presence of Japanese with our tactical units. Although the Japanese were not in combat, their presence provided a possible source of embarrassment, making their hasty and discreet removal from the area adamant.

The 704th had little to do with refugees, but left its screening and detention in large part to Korean National Police. The unit did establish informant nets within refugee camps in order that order of battle information might be picked up and to establish a source for identification of enemy agents. Actual handling of the refugees was left to Korean National Police.

[redacted]

Assistance was also given by the Korean National Police in stamping out Korean civilian espionage rings. At least three operating rings were brought to the attention of CIC through informants, and in every case Korean police handled civilians involved, calling on CIC only for supervisory assistance and aid in interrogation. It was generally felt that the rings were formed by underground Communist elements of the South Korean Labor Party but the tie-in with this organization could not be definitely established. One CIC agent who worked with the Korean Police in the arrest of a ring felt that the more important people never were apprehended. The rings were well organized and administered, but a clear dichotomy was made between the information-gathering level and the group responsible for analysis and forwarding of the information. It was this latter group that apparently escaped capture. The information sought by the rings was largely order of battle and arrival, strength and departure of troops from the port cities; general effectiveness cannot be estimated.

Guerrilla Activity

Even during the Japanese occupation, guerrilla bands had flourished in the Chiri-San area of South Central Korea. When our troops broke out from the Pusan perimeter and advanced north, North Korean troops cut off behind our lines took to the Chiri-San hills and either joined existing guerrilla forces or formed bands of their own. At any rate, there were guerrilla forces in excess of 30,000 men at large in the mountainous area to the rear of UN armies. The job of keeping tab on the disposition and activities of the group fell upon the 704th and was given to Agent Tero Miyagishima.

For supply and arms the guerrillas depended upon raids of village settlements in the area, and could properly be considered bandits rather than resistance forces. Since we had no troops in the area, coverage was most difficult. While there was evidence that the guerrillas were providing a prisoner escape route from Koje-do island, just off the tip of Korea, to North Korean front-lines, thereby indicating Communist sympathy, no tie-up between Communist forces and the guerrillas was concretely established. It was felt that the Communist-dominated South Korean Labor Party was aiding the renegade hill forces, perhaps even directing espionage and sabotage activities by the guerrillas, but again no positive evidence was found.

To effect coverage in this area where neither South Korean or American forces had control, Miyagishima set up an informant net which varied in size from 20 to 30 men. After initial recruitments were made from persons who offered their services to CIC, it was generally the case that these agents would create their own nets, often from among an immediate family group. The system worked well and brought in a steady flow of information which gave thorough coverage of the area. The informants

maintained contacts in the isolated hill villages and were of the opinion that penetration of the bands was virtually impossible and amounted to a suicide assignment. All information then was second hand, at best, and came in large part from villagers who dealt with the guerrillas or had other first-hand contacts. The only treatment of the problem was to evaluate the information accordingly.

Miyagishima moved over the entire southern peninsula area by boat and truck to keep in touch with his informants; he tried to make the circuit at least once a month. Most informants were able to forward reports to the Masan office at least once a week and from that point they were analyzed, incorporated and sent forward.

An attempt to control the guerrilla forces was made in December 1951, when a ROK division was sent into the Chiri-San area with orders to capture and wipe them out. The mopping up was dubbed "Operation Rathole" and its success appears questionable. Miyagishima said news stories as late as August 1955 reported the existence of guerrilla activity in the Chiri-San area. *

801st CIC Detachment

The 801st CIC Detachment arrived in Korea at Pusan on 14 December 1950; it was originally designated Provisional CIC Detachment. After designation as the 801st, it served first as a bolstering force to the 210th CIC Detachment attached to X Corps, but after two weeks with that unit it was attached to the Second Logistical Command to assist the 704th CIC Detachment. Finally, the 801st was transferred to Eighth Army control. The detachment was a rear area unit and did not at any time come in contact with forward elements.

Cases handled by the detachment varied little from normal CIC operations. However, detachment records do add clarity to the supply problem in Korea. The 801st found that tentage provided was totally inadequate and mess facilities woefully short. The unit was never close enough to other masses to pool facilities and considerable "scrounging" of utensils and kitchen supplies was necessary to set up a functional kitchen. Motor transportation was insufficient but the situation was solved by "borrowing" a two-and-a-half ton cargo truck. It was found that the truck was not only desirable but essential to the mobile type of operations encountered in Korea.

Photographic equipment proved of great value to the detachment, but the portable darkroom included in the TO & E was too large and cumbersome for transportation. Confidential funds were readily available for the payment of

* Interview with Lt Tero Miyagishima, Ft Holabird, 28 Jul 1955.

indigenous employees and informants but it was suggested that payment in food and clothing would produce better results than were obtained with local money.*

CIC During Truce Negotiations

After August 1951 the line in Korea became stabilized. Fighting continued and action varied from light to heavy but the deployment and assigned areas of units became static, and the frantic movement that had characterized the first year of the Korean action abruptly stopped.

As the battle situation settled down, the stream of refugees that had harassed CIC during the first year dried up and detachment employment became largely routine.**

Security became a prime CIC consideration. Since units were rotated regularly from line to reserve duty in rear areas, the security of these movements became a CIC operation. Surveys and checks were organized on an irregular schedule, and posters and calendars urging observance of AR 380-5 were procured and disseminated.***

Detachment training was instituted as time became available and shortcomings that had appeared during combat phases were remedied. Some detachments employed a system of internal rotation so that each man could perform any assignment for which he was required within the detachment framework.****

Badges and credentials of agents were generally held at the detachment headquarters and agents were issued cards which insured them freedom of movement and adequate identification, but which did not identify the men as CIC agents and could be destroyed easily.*****

As operations settled, instances of misuse of CIC personnel in prisoner of war interrogations and on positive intelligence missions was stopped, for the most part, since detachment commanders were given the opportunity to educate G2 and S2 officers as to proper employment of CIC. Still, many investigations outside the normal purview of CIC's mission continued due to a shortage of investigative personnel in the area.******

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* Rpt dtd 14 Jan 52 signed by Sgt Millard E. Futch, 111th CIC Det, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

** Returnees Rpt on Korea dtd 15 Nov 54 signed by Maj Haggard, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

*** Command Rpt for June 1953, RCS CSGRO-28 (RI), 2d CIC Det, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

**** Command Rpt for July 1953, 7th CIC Det (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

***** Command Rpt for Oct 1953, 308th CIC Det, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

****** Command Rpt for Aug 1953, all detachments, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

High level liaison contacts did much to improve CIC's position during this period. Support of the security program promulgated by detachments on the part of General Van Fleet and his chief of staff did much to give CIC stature and cooperation at lower levels. Security lectures to incoming troops before they were assigned to the line became a general practice. The lectures were directed at acquainting the men with CIC, its mission, and how mutual assistance could benefit both CIC and the troops. *

Security coverage for military and governmental personnel touring the Korean area during 1952 and 1953 provided considerable work for CIC. Almost every combat unit had official visitors; in all cases, CIC was delegated the duty of providing security for these parties, either alone or in conjunction with some other agency. **

During truce negotiations it became apparent that there might be certain conflicts of interest between Korean Nationals and American troops in Korea because of the attitude of the Korean President relative to a peace that would leave Korea divided. This raised problems for CIC in that most detachments had been relying all during Korean duty on indigenous interpreters and translators. Where the aims of the Korean government and the United Nations coincided, there was no reason to doubt the loyalty and trustworthiness of these employees but where a conflict of interests arose, some difficulty appeared in relying on the services of Korean Nationals.

As the situation developed, some interpreters resigned and others refused to do any task which might appear inimical to the best interests of the Korean government. This led to numerous requests for Korean linguists whose loyalty to the United States was firmly established. ***

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* Command Rpt for Oct 1953, 3d CIC Det (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
** Command Rpt for Jun 1953, 7th CIC Det, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
*** Command Rpt for Jul 1953, 2d CIC Det, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Appendix VII

HIGHLIGHT INDEX

This is a highlight index only. It does, however, list more than 100 personalities, 150 places, and 400 subjects covering most of the significant items. The date having been determined, the Chronology (Volume II) will furnish a quick reference. Details may be located by consulting the various volumes as listed in the Table of Contents.

INDEX TO NAMES BY DATE OF REFERENCE

Aaron, H. R.	Capt	18 Apr 1947	Burress, W. A.	Maj Gen.	30 Nov 1946
Adams, E. S.	Maj Gen	19 Dec 1941	Cameron, J. B.	1st Lt	9 Jul 1943
Adkinson, N. K.	Lt Col	5 Jul 1943	Clark, M. W.	Lt Gen	15 Dec 1944
Albert, H.	Spy	24 Jul 1915	Chamberlain, S.	Lt Gen	11 Jun 1946
Axis Sally (Mildred Gillars)	Traitor	14 Mar 1946	Churchill, M.	Brig Gen	5 Jun 1918
			Churchill, W.		Mar 1946
Arnold, H. H.	Gen	Dec 1947			
			Cole, B.	S/Sgt	27 Jan 1944
Arrizabalaga, R.	2d Lt	16 Nov 1944			
			Collins, J. L.	Lt Gen	24 Nov 1944
Baker, L. C.	Brig Gen	15 Feb 1862			
			Connelly, D. I.	1st Lt	22 Dec 1944
Barry, E. P.	Capt	11 Jan 1944			
			Cook, V. I.	1st Lt	Oct 1944
Bennett, E.	Maj	25 Jan 1945			
		*27 Jun 1945	Donovan, W.	Maj Gen	13 Jun 1942
Bessman, L. M.	Lt	13 May 1943	Dorey, H.	Brig Gen	15 Aug 1930
Bissell, C.	Maj Gen	7 Feb 1944	Drum, H. A.	Brig Gen	14 Nov 1924
		11 Jan 1946		Maj Gen	9 Oct 1933
					9 Dec 1933
Bissell, J. T.	Col	1 Jan 1943			
			Eddy, M. S.	Lt Col	Dec 1940
Bolling, A. R.	Maj	15 Jul 1940			
	Lt Col	1 Apr 1941	Eisenhower, D.	Brig Gen	9 Mar 1942
				Maj Gen	5 May 1942
Bradford, L. J.	Maj	Jun 1942			14 Feb 1943
		Jun 1943			4 Nov 1944
		9 Oct 1943		Gen	Mar 1946
					3 Mar 1947
Bradley, O. N.	Maj Gen	Feb 1943			21 Nov 1947
	Lt Gen	May 1944			
	Gen	21 Nov 1947	Eisenhower, J.	2d Lt	Dec 1945
Bryden, W.	Brig Gen	16 Jul 1943	Erskine, D. G.	Maj	12 Aug 1941
					22 Nov 1941

NOTE: Rank is listed only as date of references.

[redacted]

Ford, S. H.	Col	1 May 1927
Forney, L. R.	Col	14 Sep 1943 6 Feb 1947
Gillette, K. M.	Capt	1 Sep 1942
Goff, M. C.	Capt	25 Feb 1944
Groves, L. R.	Maj Gen	14 Aug 1945
Handy, T. T.	Maj	22 Jul 1930
Hagood, J.	Maj Gen	18 Aug 1930
Heegard-Jensen	1st Lt	20 Jun 1943
Heintzleman, S.	Brig Gen	8 Sep 1921
Himmler, H.	Nazi	Aug 1947
Hodge, J. R.	Lt Gen	1 Jul 1946
Hodgson	Capt	6 May 1947
Hough	Maj	6 May 1947
Huebner, C. R.	Lt Gen	30 Nov 1946
Hughes, J. H.	Brig Gen	5 Dec 1933 30 Mar 1935
Irwin, G. L.	Maj Gen	26 Aug 1930
Kennedy, J.	COP	1861-1865
Keyser, G. V.	Brig Gen	*18 Apr 1947 Dec 1947
Kibler, H. R.	Col	*10 May 1943 *13 Jul 1945 24 Mar 1945
Knight, H. E.	Brig Gen	1 Feb 1935
Kroner, H.	Brig Gen	1 Jan 1943
Jacobson,	Capt	6 May 1947
Lassiter, W.	Maj Gen	2 May 1929
Lee, R. E.	Brig Gen	1 Feb 1942
Lerch, A. L.	Maj Gen	25 Aug 1944
Leydecker, C. E.	Lt Col	18 Jun 1946 Dec 1946 11 Apr 1947 6 May 1947 21 May 1947
Lincoln, F. H.	Col	27 Nov 1935
Livesay, W. G.	Maj Gen	23 Nov 1944
McCabe, W. E.	Col	1 Jul 1937
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Nolan, D. E.	Brig Gen	1 Sep 1920 5 Dec 1924
	Maj Gen	16 Aug 1930
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Parker, Frank	Maj Gen	20 Aug 1930
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Rowan	Lt	1898
Russell, B. R.	2d Lt	13 May 1944
Sagi, J. R.	1st Lt	19 Dec 1944
Schloz-Klink, G.	Nazi	Aug 1947
Scott, W.	Gen	15 May 1847
Sharpe, G. H.	Col	30 Mar 1863
Sheen, H. G.	Capt	*7 Oct 1941
	Lt Col	1 Aug 1942
Sheward	Lt	6 May 1947
Sims, R.	Capt	Jun 1942
Smith, A. T.	Brig Gen	3 Jan 1931
Smith, H. B.	Maj	1864
Spingarn, S.J.	Lt Col	6 Dec 1944
Staudt, G. L.	Maj	*19 Feb 1944 27 Mar 1944
Stearns, J. E.	Lt Col	18 Apr 1947
Stradinger, O.	2d Lt	20 Apr 1944
Strong, G. V.	Maj Gen	5 May 1942 1 Jan 1943 12 May 1943 6 Sep 1943 14 Sep 1943
Tojo, H.	War Min	11 Sep 1945
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Trudeau, A. G.	Brig Gen	26 Sep 1946
Turner, A. C.	Capt	Jun 1918

Truman, H. S.	Pres	16 Jan 1947 26 Jul 1947
Van Deman, R. H.	Col	3 May 1917
Vandenberg, H.	Lt Gen	11 Jan 1946
Von Hummel, H.	Nazi	1 May 1946
Von Rintelin, F.	Capt	3 Apr 1915
Voska, V.	Czech	1914-1917
Wagner, A. L.	Col	1885
Walker, T. J.	Maj	Jul 1942 19 Jul 1943
Ward, Cabot	Maj	Jun 1918
Washington, G.	Lt Gen	28 Jul 1775
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Beaune, France — 1918

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Bermuda — 12 Aug 1941

Bolling Field, D. C. — 11 Dec 1941

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	24 Dec 1935
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Heidelberg, Germany	13 May 1946
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India 25 Feb 1944
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4 Dec 1945

Ireland 23 Jan 1942

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25 Dec 1943
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Landerman, France 15 Aug 1944

Langres, France 1917

Leavenworth, Kan. 25 Sep 1943

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Logan Field, Md. 5 Jul 1943

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Jul 1942

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1911-1916
17 May 1938

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Naples, Italy 8 Mar 1944

New Delhi, India Sep 1943
5 Jun 1945
4 Dec 1945
30 Apr 1946

Newfoundland 6 Sep 1941

New Caledonia Jun 1942

New York (See 2d Corps Area)

New Zealand Sep 1943

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30 Jun 1941
6 Sep 1943 8 Sep 1941
Mar 1944 1 Nov 1941

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13 Nov 1942
25 Jul 1943
15 Nov 1943

Oak Ridge, Tenn. 9 Jul 1943
(Manhattan Project) 1 Feb 1944
25 Apr 1944

Ogden, Utah 4 Jul 1943

Okinawa 1 Apr 1945
1 Mar 1946
15 Dec 1947

Omaha, Neb. 24 May 1928

Pacific Theater Apr 1946
15 Jul 1946
1 Jan 1947

Panama Canal 3 Mar 1921
23 Aug 1926
11 Nov 1942 22 Jul 1930
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24 Apr 1943 23 May 1935
2 Aug 1943 4 Apr 1939
15 Mar 1944 11 Jan 1941
6 Sep 1945 21 Apr 1941

Papua, New Guinea 2 Jul 1942

Paris, France Jan 1918
18 Jan 1919

Pearl Harbor, H.I. 7 Dec 1941

Peking, China 28 May 1927
10 Sep 1940

Penn State Univ. 4 Jul 1943

Persian Gulf Command 16 Dec 1944

Philippines Dept. 26 Jun 1923
5 Feb 1925
2 Apr 1926
2 Sep 1945 10 Oct 1935
Nov 1945 5 May 1938
23 Jan 1946 12 Sep 1941
1 Mar 1946 6 May 1942
28 May 1946 Jul 1944
4 Jul 1946 20 Oct 1944
Aug 1947 9 Jan 1945
15 Dec 1947 3 Feb 1945

Poland 1 Sep 1939

Port Moresby, N.G. 17 Oct 1942

Pyrenees, Spain 15 Aug 1944

Pueblo, Mexico 15 May 1847

Puerto Rico 19 Nov 1939
27 Nov 1939
16 Jul 1941
1 Jun 1943

Red Bank, N.J. Mar 1941

Regensberg, Germany 14 Jul 1947

Rome, Italy 5 Jun 1944

St. Nazaire, France 25 Nov 1917

San Antonio, Tex. 30 Jun 1941

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	19 Nov 1946
	Aug 1947
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	10 May 1941
	3 Jul 1941
24 May 1944	28 Aug 1941
27 Jun 1944	5 Dec 1941
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Tours, France	Jun 1918
Trieste (TRUST)	1 May 1947
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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME X

CIC IN BASE COMMANDS

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
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[redacted]

October 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

1449

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CIC IN BASE COMMANDS

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Appendix 1: Roster of Personnel

Part IV: CIC in The Iceland Base Command

Part IV

CIC IN THE ICELAND BASE COMMAND

Half-way between New York and Moscow on the great-circle air route from America to Europe, a bleak, glacier-dotted island hugs the rim of the Arctic Circle--Iceland.

Here, in a strange land of bubbling volcanoes, placid lakes, and ice-covered wastes, CIC agents manned a remote insular outpost throughout the long years of the war, keeping a lonely security watch over bustling harbors and airdromes.

Global war thrust new significance upon little Iceland. For centuries, its clannish, peace-loving people had tilled the soil and fished the seas, maintaining always a policy of strict neutrality--no army, no navy, no fortifications. But in 1940, when German armies swept into Denmark (whose king was Iceland's titular sovereign) British forces moved swiftly to occupy Iceland. Soon troop ships were steaming into harbors previously reserved for fishing boats, and soldiers were drilling at camps near Reykjavik, Iceland's capital and largest city.

Icelanders received the British coolly. The Althing, Iceland's parliament and the oldest legislative body in the world, insisted that the island country would remain neutral. Iceland's prime minister urged courtesy toward the British, but from the first, Icelanders were suspicious and resentful of the troops. On 10 May 1941, the anniversary of the British occupation, many of the native population wore black armbands in silent protest.[1]

First U.S. Troops Arrive

The first American troops in Iceland, a force of 4,400 Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade, received no warmer reception when they landed at Reykjavik on 7 July 1941, although the United States sent its men into the island at the invitation of Iceland's government. The 33d Pursuit Squadron of the Air Corps landed in Iceland a month after the Marines, and by mid-September, Army ground troops were arriving. First American ground troops in Iceland were 5,000 men of the 10th Infantry and the 46th Field Artillery Battalion, who landed as an advance detachment of the 5th Division. With the complete buildup of American forces in the summer of 1942, the U.S. Army officially relieved the British of the

1 Rpt on Iceland prepared by Capt F. R. Stevenson, a British Intelligence Officer assigned to RAF Hq in Iceland, dtd 15 Apr 43, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

burden of protecting Iceland from invasion. The Iceland Base Command became a part of the European Theater of Operations.[2]

The coolness of the Icelanders toward American and British troops gradually thawed. As reports of Allied victories reached the little island, whispered sentiment began to favor the Allies, though neutrality remained the official government policy throughout the war. Natives made friends with American soldiers, and cooperation became the watchword.

Before this change in atmosphere, however, Special Agents Weldon M. Jacobs and Donald S. Connell had arrived on 17 November 1941. Transferred from the Third Corps Area at Washington, D.C., these agents were the first members of the detachment, DEML-CIP, activated in the Iceland Base Command on the day they arrived. Maj Richard D. Stevens, an infantry officer who had been working in the G2 office, was designated as commanding officer of the new detachment, which was to work under the staff supervision of Maj George A. A. Jones, assistant chief of staff, G2, for the Iceland Base Command.[3]

Faced by Problem of Employment

Problems popped up immediately. Not the least of these was the question of how to employ the agents. With more than 3,700 miles of coastline, broken by innumerable fjords and small ports, Iceland was particularly vulnerable to the clandestine landing of enemy agents from German submarines. Communications between the small coastal towns were limited and unreliable. There were no railroads, and the poor roads which linked some of the fishing villages were blocked by snow from mid-November until late April. Major Stevens had to determine where his two agents could work most effectively.

It was decided that Connell, a staff sergeant, would be assigned to the Port Control Office at Reykjavik, where he was to work closely with British authorities.[4] Soon he was boarding all incoming and outgoing ships, checking passengers and crews against subversive watch lists and asking them routine screening questions. Other port control duties included inspection of baggage and mail, blockade of docks during embarkation and disembarkation of troops, security lectures to

2 U.S. Army in WWII, The ETO Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I, May 41 - Sep 44, Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, Washington, D.C., 1953, pp. 14-19.

3 Roster attached as Appendix 1, Part IV.

4 Monthly CIP Summary Nr 1 for period 17 Nov 41 - 30 Nov 41, prepared by Maj George A. A. Jones, AC of S, G2; IBC, dtd 1 Dec 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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survivors of torpedoed ships, and liaison with Icelandic authorities and with British, Norwegian, and United States Navies.[5] Port Control assumed new importance as more and more convoys steamed through the North Atlantic and as lend-lease to Russia was accelerated.

Meanwhile, Special Agent Jacobs, a technical sergeant, was placed on duty in the G2 office at Camp Pershing, although he first spent several days at headquarters of the British Field Security Corps in Iceland to learn how their files were organized.[6]

In addition to normal investigative work, Jacobs was required to set up the detachment's files and administrative system. He also wrote the monthly Counter Subversive Summary and Counter Intelligence Summary for the G2 of the Iceland Base Command.[7]

Personality Clash Hampers Operations

A misunderstanding on the day Connell and Jacobs arrived in Iceland resulted in considerable ill will between the agents and their superior officers, and records of the early days of the detachment indicate a personality clash which hampered detachment operations.

Believing that they would work in civilian clothes as they had in Washington, Connell and Jacobs were disgruntled when Major Stevens and Major Jones ordered them into uniform. Neither of the agents spoke the Icelandic language, and Major Jones felt they would be less conspicuous among the native population if they were in uniform.[8] Connell insisted that he

The situation was aggravated when three additional agents arrived in Iceland on 25 January 1942. The three, Staff Sergeants Kjartan L. Christopherson, Mark F. Hill, and William F. Updegraff, also arrived in civilian clothes.

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5 Rpt, CIC Experiences in Iceland, prepared by Capt Charles E. Larkin for Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, dtd Aug 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

6 Monthly CIP Summary Nr 1 for period 17 Nov 41 - 30 Nov 41, prepared by Maj George A. A. Jones, AC of S, G2, IBC, dtd 1 Dec 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

7 Miscellaneous Notes on Iceland; an undated report prepared by Special Agent Weldon M. Jacobs, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

8 Monthly CIP Summary Nr 1 for period 17 Nov - 30 Nov 41, by Maj George A. A. Jones, AC of S, G2, IBC, dtd 1 Dec 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Meeting the new arrivals as their ship docked, Connell and Jacobs

and Neither Major Jones nor Major Stevens were notified that the new agents had arrived.

Finally, two days after the trio landed in Reykjavik, Connell introduced them to Major Jones. When Major Jones ordered the men into uniform, Connell protested, and a bitter argument followed. After tempers had cooled, Major Jones agreed that

Updegraff, in uniform, worked out of the G2 office at Camp Pershing.[10]

Need for More Agents Becomes Critical

Personal differences cropped up frequently in these early days on Iceland, but they soon were forgotten in the press of duty and in the face of war. Mounting counterintelligence responsibilities focused attention on the critical need for more agents, more officers, and more equipment for the island command.

Major Gen C. H. Bonesteel, commanding general of the Iceland Base Command, took a personal interest in the procurement of additional CIC personnel. On 27 February 1942, General Bonesteel forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Field Forces, a recommended table of organization which called for 14 officers and 103 enlisted men for the Counter Intelligence Corps in Iceland. He received no reply to his request until 5 May 1942, when The Adjutant General advised him that authorization was being secured for three officers, twelve special agents, thirty-five agents, and nine clerks. Within twenty-four hours, General Bonesteel radioed The Adjutant General that nothing less than his original request would be satisfactory.

When repeated correspondence through official channels failed to result in any substantial increase in CIC quotas for Iceland, General Bonesteel, on 21 July 1942, wrote a personal letter to Major Gen George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, in which he outlined the counterintelligence situation in his command and asked for General Strong's assistance. At that time, only nine Special Agents were on duty in Iceland, and one of them was preparing to

9 Rpt on Conditions Found in Iceland by Special Agent Donald S. Connell, covering a period from Nov 41 to Jan 42, undated, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

10 Monthly CIC Summary Nr 3, period: 1 Jan 42 to 31 Jan 42, prepared by Maj Richard D. Stevens, dtd 1 Feb 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

return to the United States to attend Officer Candidate School. Five officers from the G-2 section were performing counterintelligence duties, resulting in what General Bonesteel called an "undue burden" on the G2 office.

"Iceland must be considered as three separate and distinct sectors which are isolated from each other except for telephone or radio communication, and movements by ship a considerable portion of the year," General Bonesteel wrote in explanation of his requests. "This means that each of these sectors must be self-sustaining tactically and for counterintelligence measures."

The Reykjavik area, General Bonesteel explained, was the most important of the three. He listed its principal subdivisions as Reykjavik and its harbor, a naval base at Hvalfjord, the Vestmann Islands, the Borganes and Bordeyri sector, and an important airdrome at Keflavik. He indicated that a separate CIC organization at Keflavik would be desirable. The other major areas, as General Bonesteel saw them, were the area around Akureyri and the Budareyri sector, consisting of the towns of Budareyri, Seydisfjordur, and Hofn. Because of transportation and communication difficulties, General Bonesteel insisted that separate counterintelligence organizations for each of the sectors were essential.[11]

Additional Agents Authorized

The letter to General Strong brought quick results. On 24 August 1942, General Strong notified General Bonesteel that the five G2 officers who had been performing counterintelligence duties were being transferred to CIC and that five additional officers were being assigned to the Iceland Base Command. Moreover, additional special agents were being assigned to bring the Iceland CIC detachment up to its full authorized strength of 29, and an additional allotment of 56 agents and 18 clerks was being made for the Iceland Base Command.

General Bonesteel's request for 17 jeeps, three one-half-ton trucks, and three pickup trucks for CIC use was denied.[12]

When additional agents were authorized, it often became necessary to recruit them locally, since it was difficult to obtain replacements either directly from the United States or through the European Theater of Operations, in which the Iceland Base Command technically was included. Almost two-thirds of the men in the Iceland detachment in 1943 were taken into CIC after they had first been assigned

11 Ltr, Maj Gen C. H. Bonesteel to Maj Gen George V. Strong, AC of S, G2, WD, 21 Jul 42, (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

12 Ltr, MID 322.999 CIC, Maj Gen George V. Strong to Maj Gen C. H. Bonesteel, CG, IBC, 24 Aug 42, (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

to the Iceland Base Command in other capacities. For these men, there was little formal CIC training. They watched and learned while they worked.

However, when new agents arrived from the United States, officers of the detachment briefed them on the work in Iceland in special, one-week orientation courses. The first of these courses was held in the fall of 1942. Political, social, economic, and geographic conditions in Iceland were stressed, and the newcomers were warned what problems they would be likely to face.[13]

13 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Operations in Iceland, 30 April 1945, p. 301, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

Agents Work in Outlying Sections

By May 1943, nine officers and 98 enlisted men were on duty with CIC in Iceland,[20] and Colonel Stevens (he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel) had established single "cells" of agents in outlying areas of the island. Some agents were completely isolated in bleak outposts for six months or more during the long winter.[21] In these areas where travel over snowbanks could be made only on foot, skis and snowshoes were standard equipment for CIC agents.[22]

Much of their work was watching--scanning the skies for enemy aircraft, watching the shoreline for German submarines, and looking for strangers in the small fishing villages. If it was a lonely mission, it was a necessary one. The enemy would not try to send all his agents through the busy port control office in Reykjavik.

Meanwhile, CIC operations in Reykjavik had expanded into many new areas besides port control. German nationals had to be watched closely. Censorship, press and radio control, safeguarding of military information--all these responsibilities were thrust upon CIC.[23]

20 Roster, CIC Det, Iceland Base Command, dtd 6 May 43, (Unclassified), (Central Records Facility). NOTE: Combined Roster of 6 May 43 and 1 May 44 attached as Appendix 1.

21 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Opns in Iceland, prepared by Historical Section, ETOUSA, dated 30 Apr 45, p. 300, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

22 Rpt, CIC Experiences in Iceland, prepared by Capt Charles E. Larkin for Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, dtd Aug 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

23 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Opns in Iceland, prepared by Historical Sec, ETOUSA, dtd 30 Apr 43, p. 300, 301, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Espionage Investigations Important

Besides port control activities, investigation of suspected espionage was the bulk of the detachment's work. Of 68 cases closed in July 1943, more than half involved suspected espionage. In October 1943, 113 cases were closed, of which 47 were espionage investigations and 45 were routine personnel security checks.

Some sample cases during this period: Reykjavik businessman who wanted to visit the United States was found to be a potentially dangerous former Nazi; a bomb, dropped from an unidentified plane onto a house in Reykjavik, was found by Royal Air Force and CIC personnel to be only a practice bomb; the theft of dynamite from a municipal storehouse in the Vestmann Islands was investigated; a merchant seaman was discovered attempting to carry uncensored messages to the United States.[25] In April and again in August 1943, CIC agents interrogated crews of German airplanes shot down over Iceland by Army Air Force P-38's.[26]

CIC strength reports for 1943 do not reflect an accurate picture of the number of persons engaged in counterintelligence work, for rosters were padded with names of mechanics, janitors, orderlies, and drivers who had been taken into the Corps. At one time during 1943, 13 such persons were filling vacancies authorized for agents because personnel for housekeeping duties could not be

24 Rpt, CIC Experiences in Iceland, prepared by Capt Charles E. Larkin for Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, dtd Aug 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

25 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Opns in Iceland, prepared by Historical Section, ETOUSA, dated 30 April 1945, p. 302, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

26 Rpt, Unit History, CIC, Iceland Base Command, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Army Service Forces, 17 May 45, p. 5, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

procured otherwise within the Iceland Base Command.[27] Later, however, these men were transferred out of CIC but were placed on duty with the detachment. Other personnel who worked with, but were not assigned to the detachment, included five civilian interpreters and translators.[28]

By the end of February 1944, the detachment had dwindled to seven officers and 74 enlisted men. Capt Harold A. Saberhagen signed the monthly information report for February as acting chief of the CIC detachment in Iceland.

Training Intensified in February 1944

Training was intensified during February 1944. Five agents and one officer attended advanced French classes taught by a professional instructor engaged by the detachment. Four agents studied advanced German, and one officer and seven enlisted men began a course in elementary German. Small arms instruction and firing were conducted throughout March. Believing that many of the agents in the Iceland Base Command eventually would see combat duty in Europe, Captain Saberhagen recommended that materials for individual study be prepared and distributed to agents who were faced with the possibility of an European assignment. Another significant phase of training was a policy of rotating agents within the Iceland Base Command. Captain Saberhagen wrote:

> Due to the shortage of personnel and the necessity of continuous activities, in many fields, in connection with the occupation of Iceland, it has been impossible to conduct an extensive training program. However, a policy of rotating personnel to assignments with our various sections has been followed in the past and will be continued. This gives the individuals concerned a practical up-to-date knowledge of all phases of CIC work in an occupied nation.

Routine investigations of suspected espionage, along with port control duties, continued to be the bulk of the detachment's work. A breakdown of the case load in February 1944, a typical month, revealed the following:

	Cases closed	Cases pending
Personnel	3	8
Disaffection	5	3
Sedition	1	0

27 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Opns in Iceland, prepared by Historical Sec, ETOUSA, dtd 30 Apr 45, p. 302, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

28 Rpt, CIC Experiences in Iceland, prepared by Capt Charles E. Larkin for Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, dtd Aug 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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	Cases closed	Cases pending
Treason	0	0
Espionage	51	16
Sabotage	0	3
Violation of AR 380-5	2	10
Totals	62	40

If the number of cases seems small in proportion to the size of the detachment, it must be remembered that agents were not assigned to one big pool at headquarters in Reykjavik but were widely dispersed throughout Iceland. U.S. military forces were concentrated in a few localities, and the task of guarding the long coastline was left largely to CIC agents. That made it necessary to station operatives in as many different places as possible.[29]

Five Detachments Created

Partly because of this need for dispersal, the detachment was drastically reorganized in the summer of 1944. The Provisional Detachment was abandoned, and five new detachments were created, with a total strength of seven officers and 75 enlisted men. Completed on 12 July 1944, the reorganization led to activation of the 461st, 462d, 463d, 464th, and 465th CIC Detachments in the Iceland Base Command. The 461st became Headquarters Detachment, with its offices at Camp Tripoli, Reykjavik. Port control duties were assumed by the 462d CIC Detachment. The 463d was given jurisdiction in the Reykjavik Defense Area; the 464th, the Akureyri-Seydisfjordur Defense Area; and the 465th, the Keflavik Defense Area.[30]

The policy of dispersing agents throughout the island paid rich dividends in the spring of 1944, when agents in the Akureyri-Seydisfjordur Defense Area captured five enemy agents and obtained a wealth of information about German espionage and sabotage schools.

Enemy Agents Captured

Early in May, a civilian informant in Seydisfjordur notified Agents Dwight P. Miller, Jr., and Kenneth F. Haan that three suspicious strangers had been seen

29 CIC Monthly Situation Rpt, Iceland Base Command, for Feb 44, Capt Harold A. Saberhagen to AC of S, G2, Iceland Base Command, dtd 1 Mar 44, (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

30 Ltr, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Iceland Base Command, 13 Apr 45, subj: Unit History--Counter Intelligence Corps Det, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

in the area. It took a dangerous boat trip up a raging river and an exhausting mountain climb through heavy snows for the agents to reach the spot where the strangers had been seen--but it was worth it. Miller and Haan captured a German soldier and two Icelanders who revealed under interrogation that they had come ashore from a German submarine only three days before. The three, all trained enemy espionage agents, said they had been sent to Iceland to report by radio on military and naval installations along the East Coast of Iceland, along with information relative to convoys and shippings, weather, and anything else they might observe. Agents obtained from the prisoners lists of instructors in several German sabotage and espionage schools, floor plans of various German offices, codebooks, and information concerning the type of sabotage instruction German agents were receiving.

Only a few weeks earlier, Agent Anthony Fricano, also acting on a tip from a civilian informant, apprehended two enemy agents while they were asleep in a farm house on Iceland's East Coast. Both were native Icelanders who had been trained in Germany and returned to Iceland on an espionage mission.

Agents Miller, Haan, and Fricano were awarded Bronze Stars for their capture and interrogation of the enemy agents.[31]

Agents in other areas of Iceland were just as busy, although their work was less spectacular.

Air Passengers Screened

The heart of the Keflavik Defense Area was a major airdrome, where hundreds of transient aircraft landed weekly with civilian passengers, European war casualties, and combat and ferry aircraft crews. CIC resident agents at the airdrome screened all passengers arriving at Keflavik and instructed them in security measures in force at the airdrome. Shipping control was a minor, but important, CIC function at Keflavik, since fishing fleets from the Faroe Islands often docked there.

Liaison was important to the agents at Keflavik, too. Besides the usual liaison with British and American military and naval chieftans, the agents also served as guides and interpreters for visiting members of American, British, and Russian legations.[32]

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31 Report, Unit History, CIC, Iceland Base Command, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Army Service Forces, 17 May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

32 Ltr, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Iceland Base Command, 13 Apr 45, subj: Unit History--Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Liaison With British Important

An investigation in December 1944 illustrates the effectiveness of this liaison. An intelligence officer of the British Royal Navy notified CIC that British radio units had, on several occasions, picked up German language broadcasts apparently being sent from a hidden transmitter in the vicinity of Meeks Field, near Keflavik. The British believed the broadcasts were originating at some point along the coast, where movements of all incoming and outgoing vessels could be noted and reported to German submarines.

With the aid of three Signal Corps radio operators equipped with mobile transmitters and receivers, two CIC agents began monitoring wave lengths over which the German broadcasts had been heard. At the same time, voice contact was maintained with the U.S. Navy radio net. If the CIC agents heard German voices, they were to contact the Navy net, which would relay the warning to Signal Corps personnel waiting at Keflavik with radio directional finders. Upon determining the site of the enemy transmitter, the direction finders were to report to CIC agents who would then apprehend the operators.

For 16 hours the agents listened, as a convoy passed from Reykjavik Harbor through the outer bay to the ocean. No German voice was heard. The monitoring eventually was terminated with negative results, but the operation demonstrated clearly the close cooperation between CIC, British Intelligence, and the U.S. Navy and Signal Corps.[33]

Port Control Duties Grow

In Reykjavik, port control duties continued to grow. During December 1944, a typical month, CIC agents cleared 76 ships arriving from foreign ports and completed security checks of another 49 vessels awaiting departure from Reykjavik. A total of 1,494 passengers and crew members were screened on their arrival in Reykjavik Harbor, and 1,170 were paneled before departure. More than a thousand pieces of incoming mail were censored. Port control also was extended to the near-by cities of Hafnarfjordur and Vestmannaeyjar.

By the spring of 1945, agents in Reykjavik were maintaining close liaison with Allied legations, Althing, subsidiary agencies of the Icelandic government, photographic laboratories, newspaper editors, and local police. Through these measures, agents were able to win the confidence and the cooperation of the civilian population. In a report dated 13 April 1945, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson, chief of the counterintelligence sub-section of the G2 office, noted that CIC agents were performing "a variety of public relations functions...which are not exactly

33 Monthly Information Rpt for Dec 44, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Army Service Forces, dtd 1 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

in keeping with official duties but are paramount to maintaining the confidence and aid of Icelanders in safeguarding the security of the country."[34]

Problems of CIC in Iceland Reviewed

With the defeat of German armies on the Continent, CIC's role in Iceland was completed. Iceland had remained neutral; its government, stable throughout the war, no longer feared enemy invasion. Agents of the 461st, 462d, 463d, and 464th CIC Detachments sailed for the United States early in June 1945, and their detachments were deactivated. The 465th CIC Detachment was deactivated six months later.[35]

In retrospect, several problems which plagued the CIC organization in Iceland come to light.

Not the least of these was the language problem encountered by agents assigned to the Iceland Base Command. Little known and difficult to learn, the Icelandic language was a very real barrier to agents who found it necessary to deal with the native population. Despite the use of civilian interpreters and translators and the periods of language instruction given new agents, the detachment's efficiency was materially reduced by the inability of its operatives to speak the native tongue. In a report prepared in November 1944, Capt Howard K. Hutchinson, acting chief of the Iceland Detachment, commented:

> Experience in Iceland indicates that too much emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity for agents to speak the language of the locality to which they are to be assigned. Developments in the past have conclusively demonstrated that the value of an experienced agent is at least halved by his inability to speak Icelandic...

Captain Hutchinson also recommended that agents be given "training in the political complexion, economic setup, and cultural standards of the countries or localities to which they will be assigned."[36] Had agents bound for Iceland been given such briefing before leaving the United States, or while en route to Iceland, the detachment could have eliminated the week of orientation which was found necessary for all new agents.

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34 Ltr, Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson to CG, Iceland Base Command, 13 Apr 45, subj: Unit History--Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

35 Historical Data Cards of 461st, 462d, 463d, 464th, and 465th CIC Detachments, (Central Records Facility).

36 Monthly Information Report, Capt Howard K. Hutchinson to CG, Army Service Forces, 1 Nov 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

From the standpoint of the enlisted men within the detachment, the lack of opportunity for advancement in CIC was a disturbing factor. More than once agents complained that the best ratings went to clerks, while the responsibility assumed by investigative personnel went unrecognized.[37] A tour of duty in bleak, remote Iceland was never popular, but it was even less so when agents remained in grade for two years at a time while their superior officers received frequent promotions. One agent who served more than a year and a half in Iceland reported:

> The only real problem in regard to the agents in the Iceland detachment is the universal one--promotions. It will be two years this summer since anyone in the detachment has been promoted. Officers are promoted almost regularly on a six month basis. While this is relatively unimportant, the men no longer feel that there is any incentive.[38]

Long tours of duty in Iceland did not help morale. After a 1943 inspection tour of the European Theater of Operations, Lt Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., reported that no rotation policy existed for CIC agents in Iceland. Agents who had been in Iceland for as much as two years had to sit back and watch while their friends in line units were rotated at 18-month intervals. One officer who had served with CIC in Iceland for 26 months had his scheduled rotation cancelled at the last minute by a G1 ruling that CIC rotation would have to be arranged by the War Department rather than by Headquarters, Iceland Base Command.[39]

Vacillation on the question of whether the first CIC agents in Iceland were to work in uniform or in civilian clothes led to the compromise of identities in a few instances. Agents would be seen in uniform one day and in civilian clothing the next. Icelanders soon dubbed the G2 office "chameleon, the lizard which changes colors." The situation became so acute at one time that officials of the

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37 A History of G2, ETOUSA, Appendix A, CIC Opns in Iceland, prepared by Historical Section, ETOUSA, dtd 30 Apr 45, p. 303, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

38 Memo, Special Agent Jon H. Bjornson to Chief, CIC Branch, undtd, subj: Rpt on Iceland Assignment, (Central Records Facility).

39 Memo, Lt Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., to Chief, CIC, 25 Oct 43, subj: Visit to European Theater of Operations' Headquarters, London, England, and Certain Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments in that Theater of Operations, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

40 Memo, MID 322.999 CIC, Maj Lowell J. Bradford to Maj Hugh D. Wise, Jr., 14 Jan 43, subj:

(Central Records Facility).

...tish Praise CIC Thoroughness

But not all persons with whom CIC agents worked in Iceland were critical. British intelligence officers had words of praise for the thoroughness of the CIC investigators. A British report in the spring of 1943 compared CIC agents with noncommissioned officers of the British Field Security Corps in this manner:

> The C.I.C. agent is mainly an individual investigator, acting on a complaint from some other source, handed down to him through official channels, as opposed to the F.S.N.C.O. who searches himself for complaints....Therefore there is less free-lancing in the C.I.C. and more control from the top, but there is greater investigational thoroughness and always a discontent with anything less than a completely thorough local investigation....C.I.C. agents excell on the practical side, owing to training in surveillance, and in the use of their many pieces of mechanical equipment...[41]

Those words from a British intelligence officer who saw CIC in action are a fitting tribute to the manner in which CIC agents carried out their mission in Iceland.

41 Rpt, Iceland, Capt F. R. Stevenson, Intelligence Corps, RAF Hq, Iceland, to H. C. Simmonds, London, dated 15 Apr 43, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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APPENDIX I

ROSTER OF ICELAND BASE COMMAND CIC DETACHMENT

ROSTER OF
ICELAND BASE COMMAND CIC DETACHMENT

The following roster has been taken from two rosters, one dated 6 May 1943 and the other 1 May 1944. It is not necessarily complete.

Officers

Stevens, Richard D. (Commanding Officer)
Hjalmarson, Dori (Commanding Officer)
Browning, Earl S.
Hutchinson, Howard K.
Johnson, Alvin
Larkin, Charles E.
Lindjord, Haakon
Mahlum, Edward
Saberhagan, Harold A.
Stefansson, Ragnar
Wheeler, Walter B.

Enlisted Agents

Bjornson, John H.
Reeves, Delmore E.
Kandrac, Stephen C.
Miller, Dwight T., Jr.
Swantek, Andrew H.
Alexander, Harry E.
Conway, Joseph L.
Fricano, Anthony S.
Grumbly, Charles H.
Hutchinson, Edward K.
Koudelka, Edward R.
McAleer, Frank H.
Piekarski, Kasimir J.
Rakow, William J.
Thordarson, Ingvar M.
Valk, Joseph E.
Zoeller, Bilbert J., Jr.
Bergstrom, Harry V.
Burke, Frank W.
Carlson, Arthur F.
Edgar, Philip L.
Franklin, Arthur H.
Fritsche, Noble S.
Gray, Robert V.
Jackson, George S.
Keane, James M.
Luttermoser, Oscar F.
Melsted, Haraldur F.
Mingrone, Jimmie B.
Murchison, Cameron
Neff, Frederick L.
Ragnor, Ragnor H.
Roller, Otto J.
Schmaus, Joseph A.
Turner, Donald C.
Waara, Robert
Cardin, Gerald
Cope, Donald F.
Hastings, Martin V.
McDermott, Richard G.
Schaub, Julian J.
Stoppelli, Louis F.
Rainwater, Loye H., Jr.
Sachs, Robert F.
Malloy, Charles J.
Nelson, Richard M.
Zeuthen, Leon H.
Blankenship, Lonnie R.
Cronin, Richard
Goldbeck, Herman G.
Haan, Kenneth W.
King, William H.
Kujala, Eino O.
Olmstead, Edward P.
Pupanek, Michael R.
Sweet, Francis R.
Towns, Dorner K.
Young, John L.
Applebaum, Milton
Brotherton, Earl
Cochis, George A., Jr.
DelValle, John P., Jr.
Foley, Barry S.
Frick, Robert O.
Goldberg, Emanuel
Hayes, Thomas J.
Kapustianyk, Paul
Loftus, Frank
McCormick, Edgar T.
Meyers, Charles F.
Muhleman, Harry W.
Nayko, Nicholas

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Roster (Continued)

Phelan, Edward P., Jr.
Richard, Douglas M.
Savickas, Bruno F.
Tyson, Kenneth S.
Underwood, Claxton H.
Wolfe, Gomer A.
Coningswood, Roy
Harrison, Alfred
Mattson, Everett D.
Moore, George A.
Stone, William H., Jr.
Christopherson, Kjartan L.
Jonathan, Virgil
Hanson, August
Bruder, Charles W.
Wagner, John J.
Jarstad, Gordon K.
Xavier, Peter L.
Bower, Malcolm
Hall, Joseph W.
Puller, James B., Jr.
Davison, William
Larsen, Carl W.
Cole, Buster
Steussy, Fred
Young, Stuart Adams
McGough, William P.
McIntosh, James David
Holmegard, Henry C.
Anderson, Leroy
Erdoes, Frank
Nissen, Clyde T.
Williams, George P.
Shields, James P.
Kinyon, Lyle
Goette, Joseph A.
Kaiser, Willi E. F.
Pariseau, Theodore
Dennis, Amos T.
McLeod, Amos T.
Klein, John J.
Cotteril, Charles T.
Smith, Russell L., Jr.
Halloran, Kenneth A.
Mingrone, Jimmie S.
Matko, Frank, Jr.
Reilly, John J.
Tennenbaum, Alex P.
Cole, James H.
Langham, Edward L.
O'Connor, Azades
Hennessey, Robert J.
Wetherbe, Horace S.
Kallevig, Steinar
Provance, Gilson L.
Stubblefield, Thomas G.
Stout, George J.
Fuss, Karl
Merkel, Walter F.
Meyter, Charles F.
Nicholson, Jesse W.
Jacobs, Weldon M.
Connell, Donald S.
Hill, Mark F.
Updegraff, William F.

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Part V: CIC in The Middle East 1942-1945

Part V

CIC IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1942-1945

The need for American counterintelligence in the Middle East originated in the security requirements of U.S. installations and personnel in the area. These requirements were underscored by the volume of intelligence activity, including espionage and sabotage, being carried on by other world powers. Ambitious nations had perennially viewed the Middle East, crucial for its strategic position and its rich oil resources, as a target for influence or conquest. Their intelligence organizations, which over the years had played a significant role in the struggle for control of the Moslem-Arab regions, were particularly active in 1941 and 1942.[42] But the factors that combined to draw U.S. troops, and then CIC, into the area can best be considered in the light of military developments that reached a crisis in the summer of 1942, when the German advance reached its zenith.

Allied forces were suffering reverses in North Africa and Russia as Axis armies bombarded El Alamein defenses and rolled toward Stalingrad in what was envisioned as a gigantic pincer movement threatening the entire Middle East.[43] An Allied retreat from Egypt and even the fall of Russia became real eventualities.[44] In this foreboding military context the first contingent of CIC agents was ordered to Cairo.

Preceding CIC into the area, and more directly responsible for its arrival, were U.S. military units that had been increasing steadily in number since February 1942, and American civilians who had been performing military missions there since several months prior to Pearl Harbor.[45] The types of direct participation by Americans in the Middle Eastern war activities at these early dates were of three kinds: missions, established after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act to work on the shipment of war goods to the Allies and to assist in the efficient maintainance of American equipment;[46] the U.S. Army Middle East Air Force,[47]

42 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," prepared by Evaluation Branch, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

43 The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King; Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1943, to the Secretary of War, by General of the Army George C. Marshall, p. 103; and Biennial Report, 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945, pp. 146 and 155.

44 A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley, p. 189.

45 Biennial Report, by George C. Marshall, 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1943, pp. 98, 138.

46 Biennial Report, by Marshall, pp. 70 and 98.

47 This was a kind of advance echelon for the Ninth Air Force, which was established in the Middle East on Nov 12, 1942. (The Army Almanac, p. 596).

which, several months before the northwest Africa landings, was flying missions against Rommel's armies and against enemy supply lines across the Mediterranean;[48] large ordnance and aircraft depots, built in the Middle East, "at a time when the enemy's success in Libya and Egypt indicated a long campaign of recovery on the part of the United Nations in the Middle East with a possible withdrawal to bases in Eritrea or the Levant."[49] As over-all control of these activities was transferred to the military, a theater-level command was designated in June 1942 for the United States Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME).[50]

CIC Opens Cairo Headquarters

On September 20, 1942, a month after they had been directed to assemble, four officers and 27 noncommissioned agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps sailed from New York for Suez. By November 12 the detachment[51] had set up headquarters in Heliopolis, near Cairo, under the command of Captain George Haig.[52] Its principal objective, Captain Haig stated, was "to subdue or eliminate activities or sabotage work of the Axis agents there."[53] Unfortunately the CIC agents had received little background training, and their initial efforts were aimed necessarily at gaining some understanding of the psychology and customs of the peoples, the local political problems and the activities of Allied and enemy intelligence agencies. Further, they needed to "sell" the Corps both to Allied intelligence and to U.S. Army staff officers who, for the most part, knew little about CIC. Thus much time was devoted toward overcoming obstacles which never should have existed rather than in the performance of CIC responsibilities.[54]

Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Query, who had arrived 17 November to replace Captain Haig as commanding officer of the detachment, sent agents to various regions to lay the groundwork for field offices, while others attended courses at

48 Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1943, p. 99.
49 Ibid, p. 122.
50 The Army Almanac, p. 606.
51 Originally the CIC personnel comprised two detachments, designated as Casual Detachments 6615-RRR and 6615-SSS, but upon their arrival in the Middle East they became one, generally referred to as the "USAFIME CIC Detachment." On 1 August 1944, it became the 400th CIC Detachment. (400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, pp. 1, 6) NOTE: No roster of this detachment is available.
52 "History of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Middle East, September 1942 to May 1945," prepared by the 400th CIC Detachment, Africa-Middle East Theater, Cairo, Egypt, 20 May 1945, Part I, p. 1, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
53 Letter, 3 Sep 1942, by Capt George Haig, "Psychological Warfare Service for the Middle East," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
54 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 2.

a British Military Police school and at a Royal Air Force Security Investigations Branch school. By early December the Levant and Eritrea field offices had been established. In February a field office was set up in Teheran for coverage of Iran and Iraq. Offices were to be added in later months at crucial points throughout the Middle East and much of Africa.[55]

In the short span between the time CIC was first directed to the Middle East and the time they were in a position to begin operations, the military situation had changed radically. With the British Eighth Army's drive across Libya, and the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria, the enemy's ejection from Africa appeared certain. Moreover, the threat of a German invasion of the Middle East by way of the Caucasus had dissipated; by January 1943 the Red Army was advancing westward. American construction programs in the Middle East consequently were curtailed[56] and, with less demand for security measures at depots, CIC could concentrate more on the neutralization of enemy intelligence activities and on the collection of political information. The latter mission, although not assigned to CIC until after its arrival, was to become its most time-consuming task.[57]

Political Factors Affect CIC

Those political factors peculiar to each country which are pertinent to an understanding of problems that affected the Corps can best be discussed separately with the resumes of CIC activities in each region, but certain patterns that existed throughout most of the Middle East can be mentioned here. The Axis once had military control over wide areas. With their withdrawal they left behind organized intelligence groups and innumerable collaborators. Also, they had made some headway, through elaborate propaganda campaigns, in influencing the peoples of the nonbelligerent nations, convincing many of an ultimate Axis victory, and exploiting anti-colonial feelings against Allied nations.[58]

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55 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, pp. 2, 3; and Memorandum by CIC agent Charles V. Sloan, "Review of CIC Activities in the Middle East," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

56 Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1943, p. 122.

57 Memorandum, 13 September 1943, by Lt Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., "Visit to Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Middle East and Field Offices of the Counter Intelligence Corps of that Area," p. 2; and "Briefing Material, USAFIME," November 1943, p. 4, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

58 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943;" 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 1; and "Subject Matter of Axis Broadcasts to the Middle East through June 1943," prepared by Evaluation Branch, CIG, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Besides the Axis, Russia, too, was attempting to further its imperialistic ambitions in the area. Finally, local political elements, as well as professional renegades, were in a position to harm the Allied war efforts if their activities were not checked. Threats to Allied security were not always instigated by enemy agents; frequently they were by-products of the maneuvers that various nationalist groups - e.g., the Zionists and Arabs in Palestine - practiced in trying to weaken each other and to realize their own ambitions for postwar power.[59] Although proven espionage and sabotage by Axis agents was limited, professional spy and saboteur networks did exist, and were continually strengthened by agents arriving by parachute and submarine.[60] The need for Allied counter-intelligence and counterpropaganda steps was unquestioned.

The success that counterintelligence organizations were to attain, once they were well established, is recorded in numerous reports made in later months concerning enemy agents apprehended before they could accomplish their missions. A few of the more significant cases are mentioned later. Here, an indication of the types of activity that would confront CIC can be found in the missions of a German parachute party captured in Palestine in October 1944. Interrogation of its personnel - two of the five were Gestapo members - revealed that the group's objectives were to sabotage Allied installations, to help in the military training of Arabs and incite revolts, and to relay military information to Germany by radio. They were equipped with radio sets, sabotage material, arsenic with instructions for its use as a poison, forged Danish passports, U.S. Navy discharge papers, money, medicine and three types of high-grade secret ink. A number of Arab contacts were to assist them in their mission. In this instance, the sabotage group was rounded up a few days after landing near Jericho, Palestine, after setting off from Athens. Because of their early capture and because their equipment was damaged and scattered in the jump, they presumably had been unable to accomplish any of their objectives.[61] It will be seen that such attempts were made continually throughout the war.

The responsibility for security in most of the Middle East belonged primarily to the British, but both Americans and Free French intended to protect their own interests to some extent at first hand.[62] Some doubt arose, however, concerning the wisdom of having CIC operate in certain Middle Eastern countries. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh D. Wise, Jr., then Assistant Chief of CIC, mentions in a report of

59 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 1; and "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 3, 8.

60 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943;" 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 1; "Briefing Material, USAFIME"; and Memorandum, 20 December 1944, by Agent John G. Heyn, Hq, 305th CIC Detachment, "400th CIC Detachment" (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

61 Summary of Information, 9 December 1944, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Palestine Parachute Party," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

62 Col Wise's Report, pp. 2, 3; and "Briefing Material," p. 4.

13 September 1943, "It is recommended that further study be made of the advisability of placing CIC personnel on duty in rear echelon or static areas where an Allied country has been established over a period of years and bears the counter-intelligence responsibility for the area while it is jointly occupied."[63]

That some misunderstandings did arise is indicated in a report, dated August 1943, by 2d Lieutenant Thomas J. Nokes, CIC's Liaison Officer in USAFIME:

> "One rather pointed question regarding policy, although not always expressed, is ... 'of what authority or for what purpose are you Americans in this area anyway?' and in view of the fact that other Allies, specifically the Greeks and the Poles, were discouraged from similar representation in these areas, this question deserves a sensible answer. The British are in these areas because they are responsible for the tactical security of their troops and installations. Where American local interest seems to be out of proportion to the American troops or installations, the right of various American organizations in the area appears to be based upon British or French courtesy."[64]

Although some British officers may have questioned the intentions of the United States in having intelligence organizations in the area,[65] they provided, after a time, full cooperation.

British Intelligence Cooperates With CIC

It became apparent soon after CIC began working in the Middle East that its operations would become immeasurably more effective if it could develop close relations with the ranking British counterintelligence organization. Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) was a large, experienced agency, on a higher level than the Field Security Wing (FSW), the usual CIC counterpart in other areas. Early attempts to establish liaison met with limited success. The British at first seemed unimpressed by CIC and reluctant to cooperate fully. Several weeks of indecision passed before SIME decided to work with the Corps.[66] Then, however, subordinate British intelligence agencies were required to give CIC maximum

63 Col Wise's Report, p. 13.
64 Special Liaison Report, 7 August 1943, by Lt Thomas J. Nokes, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
65 Col Wise's Report, p. 10.
66 Ibid, p. 10; 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 3; and "Weekly Intelligence Summary," 7-13 February 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, p. 5, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

cooperation. Excellent relations followed, and the results were mutually advantageous.[67]

Indicative of SIME's policy is the following excerpt from a directive of Colonel (later Brig) R. J. Maunsell, Head of SIME, dated 29 August 1943:

> "The American Intelligence Services have an important role to play in the Middle East area, not only on behalf of the United States Government, but indirectly on behalf of the British and Allied Governments as well. In particular, as far as SIME is concerned, the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps should be assisted in every possible way and its officers treated with the same degree of confidence as the officers of SIME. It should be borne in mind that the officers of the CIC are valuable colleagues, who are in a position not only to assist us in our activities, but also to provide us with objective and independent information which should be of particular value."[68]

A number of CIC agents received formal intelligence training through SIME.[69] CIC was given access to SIME files, and information was transferred freely in both directions.[70] CIC became the normal channel of communication between SIME and all other American intelligence organizations, and SIME held the corresponding position in respect to CIC contacts with British intelligence.[71] The two groups shared certain facilities and equipment. Their top-level representatives met periodically to discuss political and military trends affecting security, and CIC personnel were assigned to work regularly with SIME. The latter group included Lieutenant Nokes, the CIC Liaison Officer, and a number of agents who were

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67 Col Wise's Report, p. 10; 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 3; "Briefing Material," p. 4 and Lt Nokes' "Special Liaison Report," p. 1.

68 Extract copy by Lt Thomas J. Nokes of letter, 29 August 1943, from Col R. J. Maunsell, "Relations with U.S. Intelligence Officers" (Exhibit "C" in 400th CIC Detachment's History) (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

69 Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment"

70 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 4; Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 2; and "Weekly Intelligence Summary," 7-13 February 1943, p. 5.

71 Extract of letter from Col R. J. Maunsell, "Relations with U.S. Intelligence Officers;" Letter June 20, 1944, by Lt Thomas J. Nokes, "CIC-SIME Liaison Exclusive of Field Office and Balkan Planning Section Cooperation" (Exhibit "D" in 400th CIC Detachment's History) (Unclassified); Col Wise's Report, p. 10; and Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment."

stationed at various times in British interrogation and examination centers.[72] The extent to which the liaison developed is shown in an extract of a letter written 3 June 1944, by Brigadier Maunsell to Colonel John Toumlin, director of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the Middle East, reaffirming the established policy:

> "The only matter at issue, as far as I am concerned, refers to the channels of communication between your organization and mine. When the American services first started to establish themselves in the Middle East I suggested to CIC, and they entirely agreed, that they should be the exclusive routine channel for all contact between ourselves and American secret organizations, and that we should be the exclusive channel for contacts between CIC and other British secret organizations. This seems to me a logical and economic procedure, since CIC is the closest American analogue to SIME and since OSS were to work in the closest cooperation with their British counterpart ISLD. There are a number of other good reasons why this seems to me the best working arrangement. First among them is the fact that CIC and ourselves thoroughly understand each other's manner of operation and, in addition, there are CIC officers working in SIME offices. Secondly, it seems more desirable that any queries on matters of security by OSS should be made to CIC, which is the responsible American body; if CIC were unable to provide the answer to any query they would refer the question to SIME, who might have the information desired; this should not only serve to protect OSS security, but would keep CIC fully informed on all matters pertaining to American security. Thirdly, the whole purpose of having a U.S. Liaison Officer with SIME would be stultified if direct contacts at all levels between SIME and other American organizations became a matter of routine. It was not, of course, intended that this arrangement should in any way preclude direct discussions or contacts between you and myself, or between your senior officers and mine, on such matters as cannot be dealt with effectively through a third party. On the contrary, we welcome such personal contacts. I am afraid that you may have gained the impression that we may not be anxious to cooperate with you. This is very far from any idea I have ever entertained; in fact I regard it as our absolute duty to do everything possible to assist any American service to the best of our powers. But it is my belief that the channels of communication through

72 Lt Nokes, "CIC-SIME Liaison Exclusive of Field Office and Balkan Planning Section Cooperation;" Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment;" Memorandum by CIC Agent Joseph H. Martin, 21 December 1944, "CIC Activities of 400th CIC Detachment;" (Unclassified); and "Weekly Report," 13-21 June 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, p. 1, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

CIC will enable us to do our task, in so far as your organization is concerned, more efficaciously."[73]

The beneficial results of the relationship with SIME were not only immediate ones of an operational nature. They also included what amounted to a concentrated education for CIC agents by their more experienced colleagues in counterintelligence operations, particularly counterespionage. Moreover, this liaison increased CIC's prestige within the American Army.[74]

Liaison With U.S. Intelligence Agencies

It might be noted here that liaison between the Corps and other American intelligence agencies varied in scope and efficiency. With OSS, relations in this theater were close and mutually helpful, each organization furnishing the other with all pertinent information it had collected - though on occasion confusion arose over channels of liaison with British intelligence.[75] By June 1943, CIC could report that it had constant, productive liaison from headquarters with OSS and the Office of Naval Intelligence as well as with SIME and the French Surete Generale.[76] On the other hand, there appears to have been little coordination of activities with the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA), at least by the fall of 1943. Colonel Wise believed this situation existed because "the JICA agency is disorganized and ineffectual."[77] Lieutenant Nokes remarked in his report of August 1943, that in many areas, "little liaison exists among the various American organizations where, in many instances, one group does not know what the other group is doing."[78] Some contact was made with the Office of War Information and the Military Attaches, and in Egypt information relevant to CIC's mission was obtained from Lend-Lease and diplomatic representatives. In general, the Corps maintained as close a liaison as was practicable with all Allied intelligence organizations, principally as a means of obtaining assistance in the evaluation of sources and information.[79]

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73 Extract by Lt Thomas J. Nokes of letter, 3 June 1944, from Brig R. J. Maunsell to Col John Toumlin (Exhibit "F" in 400th CIC Detachment's History, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

74 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 4; and Col Wise's Report, p. 10.

75 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 1; and Col Wise's Report, p. 11.

76 "Weekly Report," 23 May - 5 June 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, p. 1., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

77 Col Wise's Report, p. 2.

78 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 1.

79 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 4; and Col Wise's Report, p. 5.

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CIC Selects Targets, Establishes Central Control

With the uncertainty that arose from overlapping, or nonexistent, limits of jurisdiction, and with the absence of a clearly defined mission,[80] the selection of areas to which CIC, USAFIME was to direct its energies had to be based on the exigencies of the hour and its capabilities to perform tasks. Besides opening avenues for information through other agencies, CIC men were posted under cover in spots where they could keep immediately abreast of political developments. Security coverage was set up in sensitive locations, and routine investigations of military personnel were carried out. Undercover agents were placed in Eritrean construction depots to investigate suspected saboteurs. Preliminary steps were taken to develop centralized control of all field offices and to establish a central records file at the CIC theater headquarters.[81]

Cairo remained the center of American counterintelligence in the Middle East. The Chief, CIC, USAFIME, operated virtually as the AC of S, G2's counterintelligence officer in addition to commanding the detachment. All CIC personnel were attached to theater G2, though assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, War Department (MIS, WD), until 10 April 1944, when they were assigned to the Commanding General, USAFIME.[82] When the Persian Gulf Service Command became a separate theater in December 1943,[83] administrative control of its CIC detachment remained with USAFIME. Reports from all field offices were sent through Cairo, then to both the Chief, CIC and the Chief MIS, WD. The central card and report files multiplied rapidly, and by November 1943, the former contained some 25,000 names.[84]

Cairo also provided practical training for incoming personnel reporting to the theater chief. Newly arrived agents usually worked with more experienced ones in Egypt before being sent to other field offices. A regular training program that emphasized languages and technical subjects was conducted.[85]

Colonel Query retained command of the USAFIME detachment until December 1943, when he was transferred to the United States. His successor, Major Dana H. Boone, was moved to the Office of the Chief, CIC, in January; and Captain Edward P. Barry assumed command. When Captain Barry was transferred to OSS in October 1944, Captain Joseph E. Barrett acted as CO until Captain Thomas J. Nokes was

80 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 4; and Col Wise's Report, p. 5.
81 Ibid, Part II, pp. 4, 5; and Col Wise's Report, p. 2.
82 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 6; and "Briefing Material," p. 2.
83 The Army Almanac, p. 606.
84 "Briefing Material," pp. 2, 5.
85 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 6; Training Schedule, 400th CIC Detachment for period 6-31 January 1945, (Exhibit "K" in 400th CIC Detachment's History); and Col Wise's Report, pp. 5, 8.

recalled in November from the Military Attache's office in Turkey. Captain Nokes remained in charge through the spring of 1945. Major George R. Shoals commanded the 400th CIC during the months prior to its inactivation in November 1945.[86]

Delta Group Covers Egypt

After USAFIME was divided into regions for CIC activity, Cairo also housed the headquarters of the "Delta Group" CIC, which provided direct coverage of Egypt. At various times the Delta, Eritrea, Western Desert (or Ninth Air Force), West Africa, Palestine, Levant, and Persian Gulf (or Iraq-Iran) groups comprised the intermediate echelon between theater headquarters and field offices.[87] Delta Group offices were set up in Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said and Suez.[88] Their work is succinctly outlined in Colonel Wise's report of September 1943. Agents stationed in the Cairo field office had the following functions:

(1) Investigate suspected enemy activities.

(2) Live at various hotels, keeping tab on suspected persons and those associating with them.

(3) Watch consistent travellers who are suspected of being couriers.

(4) Watch prostitutes who are suspected of gathering information for the enemy, and night spots which are suspect or where suspected individuals are wont to be.

(5) Do some personal conduct cases - these are few and do not involve much trouble since they usually involve military contacts with persons who are already the subject of CIC attention.

(6) Conduct personnel investigations when referred by Provost Marshal upon the grounds of subversive connections having been discovered or suspected.

(7) Develop and maintain widespread informant nets.

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86 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, pp. 5, 7; and Memorandum, "CIC History, 1945-1948, Africa," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

87 "Briefing Material," p. 2; and Col Wise's Report.

88 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 7; and Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment."

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(8) Make periodic trips to develop leads and check on items which develop in the environs of Cairo (e.g., in the Heliopolis airport) but where there is not sufficient cause to require men to be stationed there.

(9) Maintain contacts with Lend-Lease authorities and the State Department, receiving information with respect to matters coming to their attention which might stem from the activities of enemy agents (e.g., strikes of laborers unloading Lend-Lease materials).[89]

In addition, one agent in Cairo who had many personal contacts was charged with obtaining and evaluating information on Egypt's internal affairs, with emphasis on anything that might indicate Axis influence. This was done at the insistence of the G2, and its successful accomplishment resulted in increased prestige for CIC.[90]

Colonel Wise also describes the missions of CIC at the Alexandria field office, where two agents were assigned to perform these duties:

"(1) Check constantly on loose talk by many soldiers passing through there on leave and by sailors and merchant seamen on shore from ships.

(2) Check prostitutes and pensions for enemy agents or sympathizers engaged in securing information for transmittal to the enemy.

(3) Make repeated security checks of the port.

(4) Make investigations assigned from Cairo.

(5) Gather general information of interest to G2 and send it to Cairo."[91]

The other field offices had similar functions, though the most noteworthy responsibility for agents at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez was to aid the British in securing the vital Suez Canal area. Attempts to sabotage the canal decreased with the German retreat, but the following report reflects the seriousness of the subversive threat in the days before the Allied conquest of Africa. Lieutenant Nokes relates that:

"...the British seriously considered stretching a large net the entire length (about 90 miles) of the Suez Canal in order to tell by the breaks in the net where the enemy had dropped mines in the water. The enemy regularly dropped three different types of mines in the canal water and these were located by having British Army personnel at regular intervals along the

89 Col Wise's Report, p. 4.
90 Ibid, p. 5.
91 Ibid, p. 4.

canal watch for the splash at night and mark the spot so that the mine could be removed in the morning. An airplane was regularly flown the length of the canal with a detecting device to locate the magnetic mines. Only one large ship was sunk in the canal as the result of these mines."[92]

A considerable amount of evidence pointed to the existence of intelligence rings in Egypt, believed to have evolved from its pre-war German and Italian settlements and from Axis diplomatic agencies.[93] However, while this evidence, together with isolated instances of sabotage, demanded continuous investigation, few captured suspects could be identified with any certitude as Axis agents. A number of investigations resulted in the discovery of illegal, though not subversive, activity.

Because its investigations often led to information indicating criminal activity, CIC worked closely with the Criminal Investigation Division. A publicized case that exemplified cooperation between the two agencies occurred in Cairo in the fall of 1943. Here CIC was involved in the capture of a key operative in an international gold-smuggling gang. The capture followed a "tip" from the British Embassy that a Gaston Levy had been buying large quantities of gold in the black market. The Corps' interest in the case sprang from the fact that Levy had already been under investigation because of contacts with a suspected espionage ring. Together with Provost Marshal investigators and British agents, CIC for several weeks carefully prepared the groundwork for Levy's seizure. CIC and Military Police apprehended Levy at a Cairo airport in October 1943, and confiscated an estimated $150,000 in gold that he was transporting in a U.S. Army airplane. Levy was turned over to Egyptian authorities and imprisoned. Further arrests in other countries followed when it was revealed that Levy was part of a ring working on at least four continents.[94]

It is interesting to note that in Egypt not only were most security cases handled jointly with the British and turned over to them for ultimate disposition, as they were in other countries, but it was also necessary for the British to call in the Egyptians to assist in effecting arrests.[95]

A major security problem arose when the Allies were preparing for the invasion of Sicily. A large part of the British task force was in Egypt prior to

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92 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 7.

93 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943."

94 Summary of Information, 1 November 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Gold Smuggling in Army Aircraft;" Memorandum by Col Query, 30 December 1943, "Gold Smuggling in Army Aircraft (Gaston Levy);" and the New York Times, 29 December 1943, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

95 Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment;" and Col Wise's Report, p. 3.

the assault.[96] Despite the extensive precautions taken, the force was necessarily vulnerable. It remained a mystery that the enemy did not attempt to attack it. Lieutenant Nokes, referring to a concentration of some 200 ships in and near the harbor at Alexandria, stated, "Opinion was expressed that one bomb hit on the ships being loaded with gasoline and ammunition would have set off all the ships along the whole dock area."[97]

While the investigation of reported security violations by American personnel consumed a substantial part of the Delta Group's efforts, the number of violations committed was not great. The regular surveillance CIC kept on hotels, bars, and restaurants revealed a fairly high degree of security consciousness on the part of the U.S. troops. Along similar lines, CIC investigated many instances of censorship violations, but concluded that most of these resulted from ignorance of the regulations.[98]

CIC Works With Ninth Air Force

Libya was brought into the CIC sphere of operations in the spring of 1943. Major John T. McCafferty was placed in command of the Ninth Air Force CIC Detachment, which was to have its activities centered around the air bases in Tripoli and Benghazi. A skeleton force of agents drawn from other regions of USAFIME opened the Libyan field offices in May, and in a short time they were reinforced by a group of agents sent from the U.S.[99]

As the section's mission was broadened to include work not directly related to air force security, it came to be known as the Western Desert Group. When in September and October 1943, the Ninth Air Force left the Middle East, there was little need for continued CIC coverage of Libya. The unit was disbanded, and its personnel returned to Cairo for other assignments. In later months, however, the Tripoli field office was reopened, and functioned for a time on a small scale.[100]

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96 Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, "El Alamein to the River Sangro," E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1949, pp. 111, ff.

97 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 7.

98 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943", p. 15; and Weekly Reports, May-August (especially 18-31 July 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

99 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 3; Weekly Report, 25 April - 8 May 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, p. 5; and Weekly Report, 13-21 June 1943, p. 8.

100 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 7; Memorandum by 1st Lt Sidney V. Barnes, "Report of CIC Activities in the Middle East," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Weekly Report, 18-31 July 1943.

CIC in Libya participated in the apprehension of a number of enemy agents. Some were members of a group of Axis parachutists who landed near Benghazi in June 1943; most were captured and turned over to British authorities.[101] Others were Italians landed by submarine that August; all were captured before they could fulfill their mission, the destruction of aircraft in the Benghazi area. It was reported that the latter group, scheduled to be picked up by submarine after finishing its assignment, offered little resistance to capture. They, too, were turned over to the British for necessary action.[102] Although a ring of espionage agents was also believed to be hiding among the Italian sections of the population, a minimum amount of activity was found there. Many Italian soldiers, a large number of them deserters, were rounded up at various times, but this segment, as a whole, was not participating in subversive activity.[103]

Colonel Wise reported that by September 1943, the Western Desert Group, then commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sidney V. Barnes, was carrying out the following functions:

(1) Assisting the British in checking the holders of civilian identity cards.

(2) Investigating violations of 380-5[104] and censorship regulations by U.S. personnel.

(3) Constant check on ... the civilian population to determine its attitude toward the U.S.

(4) Investigation of subversive activities of civilians when such activities affect the U.S. Army or when the British ask for assistance.

(5) Performance of security surveys at airfields and other Army installations.

(6) Constant check on violations of the nonfraternization with Italian civilians regulations.[105]

One of the principal problems involving Americans stemmed from speculation by Ninth Air Force personnel concerning their future missions. CIC, investigating alleged "leaks" of information, concluded that rumors regarding future raids came

101 Col Wise's Report, p. 4; and Weekly Report, 13-21 June 1943, pp. 8, 9.
102 Lt Barnes' Report; and Weekly Report, 1-15 August 1943, p. 5.
103 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 15, 16; and Weekly Report, 11-17 April 1943, pp. 5, 6.
104 AR 380-5, Army Regulations pertaining to the safeguarding of military security information.
105 Col Wise's Report, p. 4.

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from accurate, though not specifically founded, loose talk by these airmen.[106] A particularly detailed investigation followed the first major raid on the Ploesti oilfields, 1 August 1943,[107] for it was suspected, partially because of the heavy losses suffered, that the Germans had been forewarned of the attack. But no proof of deliberate subversion was found.[108]

Programs of security education finally were inaugurated by air force S2s, with the advice and assistance of CIC. The Corps also aided air intelligence officers in improving what had been a generally unsatisfactory countersubversive system. In addition, CIC investigated numerous plane accidents and mishaps, but, almost without exception, insufficient evidence was found to prove or disprove sabotage.[109]

Lieutenant Barnes reported that the cooperation received from Ninth Air Force intelligence officers was often "lukewarm at best." He wrote, "We received the impression sometimes that we were looked upon as trespassers in forbidden territory."[110] This situation was in contrast to the splendid relations maintained with British intelligence in Libya and with the Adjutant General and Provost Marshal offices.[111]

CIC frequently worked with the latter, for here, as in other areas, it was summoned into cases that were normally out of its jurisdiction. In one of these, CIC assisted the Provost Marshal in an investigation into the sale of a poisonous liquor, called lagbi, to Allied troops. One soldier had died and several had become sick from drinking it. Findings showed that the liquor, which was easily made from date palms, had no apparent central source, and that its sellers seemed to be motivated by private rather than enemy-inspired desires. Several restaurants that had been selling the drink were closed, and their owners sentenced to prison.[112]

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106 Lt Barnes' Report; Weekly Report, 1-15 August 1943, p. 6; and "Periodic Summary," 16 August - 5 September 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, p. 9, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

107 Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 July 1941, to 30 June 1943, p. 99.

108 Periodic Summary, 16 August - 5 September 1943, p. 9; and Summaries of Information, September 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Rumors of Ploesti Mission," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

109 Lt Barnes' Report; and Periodic Summary, 16 August - 5 September 1943, p. 9.

110 Lt Barnes' Report.

111 Ibid.

112 Weekly Report, 1-15 August 1943, p. 6; and Periodic Summary, 16 August - 5 September 1943, p. 10.

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Agents Discover Saboteurs in Eritrean Installations

In Eritrea, Italian agents, aided by pro-Fascist elements of a large Italian population, were numerous and active in 1942 and 1943. Since the conquest of Italy's East African empire by the British in 1941, demonstrations and disturbances by these groups had been occurring frequently. After the first American installations began operating in early 1942, saboteurs, spies, and agitators turned to them as primary targets.[113] Consequently, one of the CIC detachment's first and most difficult missions in the Middle East was an anti-sabotage and anti-espionage one at these installations. By early 1943, CIC agents discovered several saboteurs in U.S. workshops and arranged for their dismissal and internment. Steps were taken to combat slow-downs, inefficiency, and other passive measures by native employees which hampered operations perhaps even more than instances of active sabotage.[114]

Although at this time the changing military situation brought about curtailment of projects and eventual closing of factories in Eritrea, the scope of CIC responsibility did not diminish immediately. On the contrary, the new unemployment problems brought about further disturbances and more frequent arrests.[115] But by the summer of 1943, the situation had become sufficiently quiet, in respect to American interests, that only two CIC agents remained in the country. Both were in an undercover capacity, one in Gura, covering the airfield and the Douglas Aircraft Corporation plant, and the other in Massawa, checking on port security.[116] A substantial amount of their time in later months was spent on the collection of political information.

As long as American personnel remained in Eritrea, many routine security investigations were necessitated. Carelessness regarding safeguarding of information was prevalent, particularly among civilian employees, and the practice was especially dangerous in view of the amount of enemy intelligence activity being carried out.[117]

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113 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 2, 16; 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 2; "Eritrea," CIC USAFIME Summary, pp. 2, 8; "Ethiopia," CIC, USAFIME Summary, p. 2; and Col Wise's Report, p. 6, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

114 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 4, Col Wise's Report, pp. 3, 6; Weekly Report, 21-27 February 1943, p. 2; and Weekly Report, 28 February - 6 March 1943, p. 3.

115 Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1943, p. 122; "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 16, 17; Weekly Report, 11-17 April 1943, p. 3; and "Eritrea," CIC, USAFIME Summary, p. 8.

116 Col Wise's Report, p. 6; and "Briefing Material," p. 2.

117 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," p. 18.

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Air Transport Bases Covered

CIC coverage extended into the equatorial regions of Africa. On 15 September 1943, the headquarters of the United States Army Forces in Central Africa (USAFICA) was joined to USAFIME.[118] With this consolidation, the Chief, CIC, USAFIME gained control over a detachment that was operating in central Africa.

This group, under the command of 1st Lieutenant Glen E. Curry, had been attached to USAFICA since March, when it debarked at Takoradi, Gold Coast, after sailing from New York. Its principal task was to help maintain security of American air bases and other military installations across central Africa. From headquarters at Accra, Gold Coast, agents carried out missions, largely security surveys, from Dakar, through Liberia, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, to the Sudan.[119] Although Liberia was a service command (United States Army Forces in Liberia) under USAFIME,[120] no agents from Cairo were working there. Coverage came principally through a detachment assigned to the Air Transport Command (ATC) and, to a lesser extent, through USAFICA.[121]

The USAFICA detachment made little contact with enemy agents, though investigations of a routine nature into possible espionage and sabotage were required regularly. For the most part, the Accra group concentrated on making recommendations for passive security precautions at the various installations. Considerable effort was put forth to combat laxity that existed in many offices regarding security regulations. Lieutenant Curry reported that often information contained in a classified document was not safeguarded as required and that troop movements and the destination of military personnel on travel status were too frequently made a matter of common knowledge.[122]

Most of the work the USAFICA detachment had been doing was taken over by the Air Transport Command CIC when the amalgamation of theaters took place. Consequently, the bulk of this group was transferred to Cairo immediately. Coverage was continued on a small scale through what was called the West African Group until June 1944, when John Dubbs, the last Accra agent, arrived at USAFIME headquarters. It was not until the spring of 1945, that the 400th CIC Detachment again established a field office in Accra.[123]

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118 The Army Almanac, p. 606.

119 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 4; Monthly CIC Situation Summary Report, 30 June 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Interview with CIC Agent Robert E. Ebaugh, August 1953.

120 The Army Almanac, p. 608; and "Briefing Material," p. 1.

121 Reports on ATC in Air Force CIC files.

122 Monthly CIC Situation Summary Report, 30 June 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFICA.

123 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, pp. 4, 6, 8; and "Briefing Material," p. 3.

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Jurisdictional confusion had arisen when this area was being covered by both the USAFICA and ATC detachments. Though the former was attached to theater, it too was operating with the Africa-Middle East Wing (AMEW), ATC.[124]

It was largely to avoid this conflict and duplicated effort that Lieutenant Curry's unit was moved to Cairo. The ATC CIC was active in other USAFIME areas also,[125] and remained independent of the theater detachment. Here, however, with a unified command over Army and Air Force, jurisdictional limitations had been fixed. Further, the broader mission of the USAFIME detachment, of which air base security was but a comparatively small part, served to minimize disputes between the two groups. Close liaison was maintained in Cairo; for example, an ATC CIC agent stationed in Khartoum, Sudan, sent copies of his reports through USAFIME.[126] Nevertheless, Colonel Wise, obviously referring to the ATC detachments, reported, "It is essential that all detachments in a given theater be responsible to and report to the Chief of the CIC in the theater and that the personnel be assigned or attached on an area rather than a unit basis."[127]

CIC Meets Internal Security Problem in Palestine

The Levant field office, established in December 1942, originally was responsible for CIC duties in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. But, in August 1943, a separate Palestine field office was opened to cover the latter two countries.[128] The headquarters of the Levant office, commanded by 2d Lieutenant Francis R. Tworzydlo, was in Beirut, Lebanon; agents worked at least part-time in Latakia and Tripolis, Lebanon, and Aleppo and Damascus, Syria. CIC's Palestine headquarters, under 2d Lieutenant Edward W. Hayden, was in Tel Aviv; agents were stationed in Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias and, later,

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124 Letter, 29 July 1943, by Col H. R. Kibler, Chief of CIC, "CIC Detachments with Air Transport Command Wings," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

125 AMEW ATC was later divided into North African Wing (NAFW) and Central African Wing (CAFW), both extending at least partially into USAFIME. 1st Lt Pat J. Kirwin was CO of the AMEW and, after the split, NAFW CIC detachments. 1st Lt Louis A. Ginocchio and 2d Lt Garland F. Smith successively commanded the CAFW unit. The wings were later renamed North African Division (NAFD) and Central African Division (CEAD). (Letter, Col Kibler, "CIC Detachments with Air Transport Command Wings;" and Reports on ATC in Air Force CIC files.) A discussion of the activities of CIC detachments with ATC is to be found in another chapter.

126 Col Wise's Report, pp. 3, 7.

127 Ibid, p. 8.

128 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 2; Weekly Report, 1-15 August 1943, p. 1; and "Briefing Material," p. 2.

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Jaffa, Palestine. Activities in Trans-Jordan were found to be insufficiently important to warrant full-time coverage.[129]

The security problem in Palestine was primarily an internal one. Axis espionage and sabotage was carried out on a small scale only, and Fascist propaganda was ineffective among the Jewish population. There were sizable pro-Axis groups among the Arabs, but most of their leaders were living as exiles in enemy countries, and the Arabs in Palestine did not present a serious direct threat to security. However, the continuous feuds and occasional outbreaks between Arabs and Zionists were always a potential threat to Allied installations, equipment and personnel.[130]

The most successful penetration of American security appears to have been carried out by intelligence agents of the Jewish para-military organization "Hagana." It was generally conceded, though not proven, that Hagana had infiltrated into U.S. headquarters in Tel Aviv.[131] While leaders of the Jewish Agency had expressed willingness to exchange information with Americans, the U.S. did not want to collaborate with them openly, for fear of further alienating the Arabs. The anti-American attitudes that already existed among many Arab groups had been based largely on allegations of pro-Zionist policies by the U.S., and this belief was continually furthered by Axis propaganda broadcasts.[132]

The largest single mission for CIC in this region was the study of internal conditions with the aim of gathering information on the identity of enemy sympathizers and on any contemplated disturbances. In addition, agents checked constantly on security of the American installations in the Tel Aviv area, on port security at Haifa and on the safeguarding of information by military personnel.[133] The serious extent to which security infractions were practiced was pointed out in a report from the Palestine office in September 1943:

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129 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 2; Col Wise's Report, p. 5; Weekly Report, 14-20 February 1943, p. 7; and Memorandum by CIC Agent Elias Hanna, "Review and Observations of CIC Activities in the Middle East," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

130 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 5; Weekly Report, 14-20 February 1943, p. 3; and "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," p. 8.

131 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," p. 8; Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 6; and Weekly Intelligence Summaries, 31 January - 6 February and 7-13 February 1943.

132 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 5, 8; "Palestine and Trans-Jordan," CIC USAFIME Summary, p. 7, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); Weekly Report, 14-20 February 1943, p. 2; and "Subject Matter of Axis Broadcasts to the Middle East through June 1943."

133 Col Wise's Report, p. 5.

"General surveillance of local restaurants, hotels and bars proved that violations of AR 380-5 are alarmingly in evidence. The volume of "loose talk" is so great that this office is not in a position to remedy the situation. Numerous military personnel have been warned of these violations. However, to effect any check it will be necessary to approach the problem from...the headquarters...whence the men come. Almost all violations concern air force personnel."[134]

In Tiberias, the CIC representative had the additional duty of watching against the smuggling of enemy agents into Palestine by way of Syria.[135]

In the spring of 1944, the migration of Jews from the Balkans into Palestine increased greatly. Because the existing refugee control system proved inadequate for complete security screening, the British opened a refugee examination camp near Haifa. CIC Agent Joseph H. Martin, who had been working with SIME at interrogation centers in Egypt, established and participated in the operation of the screening machinery at Haifa. Although earlier investigations conducted by the Jewish Agency were apparently successful in eliminating enemy agents, the Allies had to watch for potential trouble makers who might represent threats to security.[136]

Axis Intelligence Concentrated in Levant States

One of the most important problems of a strictly counterintelligence nature which faced the USAFIME detachment was found chiefly in the Levant states. What was probably the largest percentage of Axis intelligence agents being sent into the Middle East came by land, sea, and air into Syria and Lebanon.[137] To observe their arrival and prevent their operations required considerable vigilance by Allied security agencies. Moreover, the problem was complicated by the number of Greek refugees who escaped into the Levant in fishing boats. A few of the agents captured by Allied counterintelligence were found to be members of "Dashnag," an Armenian terrorist group. Besides the newcomers, German and Vichy French networks, developed prior to the Allied occupation of Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1941, were still active. It was estimated that over 400 agents and

134 "Periodic Summary," 16 August - 5 September 1943, p. 8.
135 Col Wise's Report, p. 5; and "Palestine and Trans-Jordan," CIC USAFIME Summary, p. 7.
136 Memorandum by Joseph H. Martin, "CIC Activities of 400th CIC Detachment."
137 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 4, 5; and "Levant Summary: Syria and Lebanon," 10 May 1943, CIC USAFIME, pp. 9, 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

informers had remained underground. Ringleaders directed their activities from neutral Turkey via radio and a courier system of natives and, purportedly, neutral consuls.[138]

Pro-Axis sentiment in the Levant had a number of sources, including: hatred for the French that grew out of allegedly corrupt colonial practices; the demonstrated strength of the German forces; the anti-Jewish Axis policies; and German and Italian promises to help the native groups improve living conditions and obtain independence.[139] Though this sentiment declined as the course of the war changed, it continued to impede Allied attempts to quell Axis activities in the area.

Security responsibility was shared by the British and Free French. An agreement between the two had given responsibility for military security to the British and for civil security to the French, though this division of authority led to complications. Further, the feud that existed among the various French factions - followers of De Gaulle, Giraud and General Catrous - was in itself a source of security problems.[140] CIC's part in the overall security picture was principally one of providing advice and assistance. Yet its duties of establishing contacts and keeping informed of political developments were at first predicated largely on the possibility existing in 1943 that substantial numbers of American troops would enter Syria. In later months the Corps continued to collect all possible information on political happenings as well as on intelligence activities.[141]

CIC kept in direct contact with British and French intelligence at the Aleppo examination and interrogation center, and eventually assigned an agent whose primary function was to represent the Corps in all cases which had American interest. Here, as was the case in Egypt, Palestine and Italy,[142] where the British had other Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centres, the CIC

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138 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," pp. 2-4, "Levant Summary: Syria and Lebanon," pp. 4, 8; "Summary of Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Turkey," prepared by CIC USAFIME (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); Weekly Report, 14-20 February 1943, p. 2; and Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 5.

139 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," p. 5; and "Levant Summary: Syria and Lebanon," pp. 6, 7.

140 Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," p. 3; and "Levant Summary: Syria and Lebanon," p. 10.

141 Col Wise's Report, p. 6; "Levant Summary: Syria and Lebanon," p. 10; and Memorandum by CIC Agent Robert A. Gutierrez, 3 February 1944; "Report," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

142 While Italy was outside the geographic limits of USAFIME, the interrogation of refugees from the Balkans at the port of Bari, Italy, concerned the USAFIME detachment. A CIC field office was opened in Bari in February 1944, (400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 5).

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representative worked with the British in examining suspects. A number of agents of various levels had been found among the multitudes of Balkan refugees who were questioned at these centers. CIC took part in their interrogations and in studying their methods of operations.[143]

A CIC summary of information pertaining to two agents captured in Syria is interesting and informative as an example of Axis espionage methods:

> "George Livaditis and Constantinos Photinos, the two agents who were sent to the Middle East by the Germans in the middle of this year (1943), have been tried by Tribunal Militaire and were executed at Beirut on 29 September.
>
> "Livaditis, son of a Greek father and a German mother, came to Turkey in May last on an espionage and sabotage mission in the Middle East. He was not, however, given any sabotage equipment, since part of the plan of action was that he should enlist in the Greek forces and work under cover of his military duties. After three or four months he was to desert, cross into Turkey, and report to the German Consulate at Iskenderon (Alexandretta). He was given certain accommodation addresses in Greece, Turkey, and Spain with which he could communicate in secret ink, and was also instructed to listen at specified times to the Athens radio for messages in plain-language code addressed to "Jean-Jacques." Livaditis was arrested at Aleppo while attempting to enter the Middle East, and after his interrogation was handed over to the Fighting French authorities.
>
> "Constantinos Photinos was recruited as an Axis agent by Livaditis in Greece after the German occupation. In June 1943, he left Piraeus in a caique which, it was intended, should put him ashore some miles south of Latakia. He landed, however, just north of the Turkish frontier and after a few hours was arrested by a Turkish patrol and subsequently handed over to the British authorities in Syria. As in the case of Livaditis, Photinos was expected to enlist in the Greek army in the Middle East and to carry on espionage and, more particularly, sabotage. He also was given an accommodation address and "white-headed matches" for secret writing, and was told to listen for messages on the Athens radio. Should he meet Livaditis in Syria, he was instructed not to recognize him. Photinos brought some explosive and incendiary material in a metal box

143 Lt Nokes, "CIC-SIME Liaison Exclusive of Field Office and Balkan Planning Section Cooperation;" Lt Nokes, "Special Liaison Report," pp. 3, 4; and Col Wise's Report, p. 6.

with him on the caique, but stated that he threw the box into the sea before he landed."[144]

That Allied counterintelligence measures contributed rapidly and effectively to a safer internal situation in the Levant was seen in a CIC report dated 14 October 1943:

> "It is reported that the general security situation of the Levant States is probably more satisfactory than at any time in the past eighteen months. The frontier and coastal control, which has been largely responsible for frustrating the enemy's attempts to introduce his agents, is being maintained with unrelaxed vigilance."[145]

The need for continued precautions remained, but past security measures, together with Allied successes elsewhere and a relief of food shortages in the Levant, resulted in a more satisfactory domestic situation and a more workable atmosphere for Allied activities.[146]

Persian Gulf Group Protects Lend-Lease Routes

CIC functions in Iran and Iraq differed somewhat from those in the other Middle Eastern areas. Where the collection of information in the Levant, Palestine and parts of Africa brought CIC into the field of positive intelligence, its activities in the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) were circumscribed, for the most part, within a more narrowly understood counterintelligence area. Its prime concern was to eliminate interference with the delivery of supplies to Russia, and it spent much time enforcing security measures along the rail and truck lines.[147] The sensitive political climate that arose from the occupation of Iran in sectors by British and Russians had led to an agreement that there would be no intelligence activities there. In fact, the use of CIC credentials was not allowed, and in May 1943, the G-2 division of PGSC was dissolved by order

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144 Summary of Information, 14 October 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Syria," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

145 Summary of Information, 14 October 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Syria," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). (Not the same document as above.)

146 Ibid.

147 "Historical Report, Counter Intelligence Corps, Persian Gulf Command, December 1942 to January 1945," 16 May 1945, by Lt Col John T. McCafferty, p. 5, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); Col Wise's Report, pp. 11, 12; and Weekly Report, 9-22 May 1943, p. 6.

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of Major General Donald H. Connolly.[148] CIC was then placed under the operational command of the Provost Marshal, though it continued to carry out security functions.[149]

USAFIME retained some control over this group even after PGSC became a separate theater, the Persian Gulf Command (PGC), in December 1943.[150] But, both before and after the formation of PGC, disagreement existed concerning the source and extent of authority over its CIC. USAFIME objected to the enforced operational limitations and to administrative actions involving the transfer of personnel which, it appeared, took the command of CIC away from its CO. The matter was settled following a series of conferences in September 1943. Control of the unit's activities was retained by USAFIME within the limitations that had been established by higher authority regarding the scope of intelligence operations in PGSC. After December 1943, this control was reduced to certain administrative areas.[151]

Headquarters for CIC in PGSC had been set up originally in Teheran under Lieutenant Edward P. Barry in February 1943. A second office soon was opened in Basra, Iraq, under 1st Lieutenant Edward A. Tobin; and agents were stationed along the rail and road routes leading to the Russian zone. By November the Iraq-Iran Group was the largest in the Middle East; in addition to the Teheran headquarters, there were field offices in Khorram Shahr, Ahwaz and Isfahan, Iran, and Baghdad and Mosul, Iraq. Its personnel at that time consisted of four officers and 25 agents.[152] Major John T. McCafferty assumed command of the detachment in October 1943; almost complete rotation of personnel was effected during the following three months. In April 1944, the group became the 2747th provisional detachment prior to being activated as the 468th CIC Detachment.[153] That autumn, since security requirements had lessened considerably, it was requested that the strength of the detachment be reduced to three officers and two enlisted men. However, the 468th was ordered to return to the United States and, upon its relief in January 1945, Lieutenant Colonel McCafferty and four assistants were transferred to the Provost Marshal Division, PGC. The others were 1st Lieutenant Ovid Corsatea, 1st Lieutenant David M. Weil, T/Sgt Francis O. Schue, and S/Sgt Albert L. Moccia.[154]

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148 Col Wise's Report, pp. 11, 12; and 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 3.

149 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 1.

150 The Army Almanac, p. 606.

151 Col Wise's Report, pp. 11, 12; and Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 1.

152 "Briefing Material," p. 2; 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 3; and Weekly Report, 14-20 February 1943, p. 1.

153 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," pp. 1, 2.

154 Ibid, p. 2.

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Among the duties performed by CIC in Iran and Iraq, strictly counterintelligence functions included loyalty checks and investigations of disaffection, espionage and sabotage. An estimated 600 background investigations of Officer Candidate School prospects were conducted, in addition to checks on personnel being considered for cryptographic duties and on applicants for naturalization as American citizens. Of the few disaffection cases, there were none in which disloyalty was proved.[155] Investigations into instances of sabotage, while they were carried on continually, resulted in no proof of enemy action. According to Colonel McCafferty:

> "In all cases it (suspected sabotage) appears to have been the result of an isolated grievance on the part of a tribesman, a civilian employee or possibly, in isolated cases, United States military personnel. No one type of incident has been repeated enough times to warrant the establishing of extra precautions, and investigation has not conclusively established the guilt of any person or persons."[156]

Axis intelligence had gained a foundation in Iraq and Iran in pre-war years.[157] Agents operated with a great deal of freedom until the summer of 1941, when the British put down a pro-Axis revolt in Iraq and established a "protective occupation" in Iran, placing substantial numbers of troops in both countries.[158]

But German agents continued to have contact with Berlin. They aided the vast propaganda program which exploited pan-Arab, anti-Semitic and anti-colonial sentiments, and which remained highly effective until Germany's final defeat became evident. Axis sympathizers were found in the Iranian government and army, and several tribal groups actively assisted German agents.[159]

CIC was involved in two espionage cases of particular interest. One was that of Rudolph Hamburger. Colonel McCafferty summarized the case in the following way:

> "Rudolph Hamburger (was) a widely travelled gentleman, who offered an American Army officer a substantial sum of money for information

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155 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," pp. 2, 3.

156 Ibid, p. 5 (of also "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943," p. 10).

157 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943."

158 Ibid, p. 8; and Information Please Almanac 1953, New York Herald Tribune Edition, the MacMillan Company, New York City, p. 675.

159 "Counterintelligence Situation in the Middle East through June 1943;" Weekly Report, 18-31 July 1943, p. 5; General Intelligence Summary, 26 July 1943, "Persia," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and "Subject Matter of Axis Broadcasts to the Middle East through June 1943."

relative to the operations of the Persian Gulf Command. His operations were reported to the Counter Intelligence Corps which placed Hamburger under surveillance. There was every reason to believe that Hamburger was operating for the Germans. He was arrested in May 1943, and after two days of interrogation stated that he was employed on behalf of Russian Intelligence. Hamburger was then released to British Security who turned him over to the Russians with instructions to get him out of town. Hamburger was travelling on a Central American passport, and information concerning his apprehension was widely circulated by the Military Intelligence Division to all commands throughout the world in the event he should appear in any other area."[160]

Perhaps the most important espionage agent captured in the Middle East was Franz Mayer. The case was primarily a British one, but CIC, and particularly Agent Horace D. Hodge, of Bay City, Michigan, provided assistance both in Mayer's arrest and in the roundup of his ring members. British intelligence for a long time had been aware of the existence of an espionage ring, and Mayer was well known as a German spy familiar with the Middle East. But it was not until early 1943, when Mayer's diary was recovered from a raided house, that his role as chief of German espionage in Iran became known. And it was only in August of that year, when counterintelligence agents followed a parachuted German agent to his headquarters, that Mayer was apprehended. Warned by a servant of his impending arrest, Mayer was attempting to burn papers when he was captured by Allied agents. These papers revealed his identity, included maps of all railroad tunnels in Iran with instructions signed by Hitler for their destruction, and contained lists of his agents and informants.[161] Mayer was interned, tried and executed. Approximately 130 of his Iranian collaborators were arrested by British, American and Russian security units. With the close of this case the greatest threat to the Lend-Lease program in Iran passed.[162] Moreover, according to Colonel McCafferty, "As a result of Mayer's arrest and British disclosure of the extent of cooperation by Persians in Mayer's efforts, particularly cooperation in high official sources, the Persian government declared war against Germany and became an Ally."[163]

That Mayer's arrest followed upon the Allied discovery of an agent equipped with sabotage material was ironic. For, while saboteurs were being sent from

160 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 3.
161 Ibid, p. 3; Interview with CIC Agent Robert C. Ebaugh, August 1953; and Weekly Intelligence Summary, 31 January - 6 February 1943, p. 7.
162 Summary of Information, 11 December 1943, Hq, CIC, USAFIME, "Persia," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 4; Col Wise's Report, p. 3; and Interview with Robert C. Ebaugh.
163 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 4.

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Germany with the mission of damaging the railroad and other installations along the route to Russia, Mayer's idea of the most profitable procedure to be followed differed. He believed that Germany could not be stopped in its march to India, and considered the preservation of these installations necessary in the execution of the war. He would not, therefore, permit any sabotage of the railroad or roads between Teheran and the Persian Gulf. His plan was to arouse tribes to action against trains and truck convoys, and thus to make the aid-to-Russia program ineffectual.[164]

An interesting sidelight to the case became known after Mayer's arrest. An American soldier had been told many details of the spy's operations by Mayer's mistress, as they had been related to her by Mayer. But the soldier had refused to believe her; the story was, to him, too incredible. Information that might have led to a much earlier break in the German espionage network was not received until it was useless. It seems superfluous to comment, in such a context, on the importance of CIC's mission of instilling security consciousness in military personnel.[165]

Another kind of function filled by CIC in PGC demanded giving considerable time to duties that were normally the responsibility of the Provost Marshal's investigators. Among the more important of these duties was the investigation of black market activities. By the careful, extensive use of informants, CIC identified ring leaders, and at least two major operatives were forced out of business as a result of raids.[166]

One of the biggest cases involved the loss of tires being shipped by rail to the Russian-occupied sector of Iran. CIC discovered that the tires were being thrown off open flatcars in remote mountainous regions - the first step to their being sold on the black market at prices which reached 700 to 800 American dollars. The organization that was uncovered included both Americans and Iranians. A number of the guilty were caught, and the whole activity stopped when, on CIC's recommendation, all removable goods were thereafter shipped in sealed cars.[167]

Resourceful investigative procedure was often required. A noteworthy case was the murder of a man thought to be an American. There were no clues other than a decapitated, badly decomposed body. To establish identity a CIC finger-print expert, Agent William J. Tilli, of Patterson, New Jersey, cut off the fingers

164 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 4; and General Intelligence Summary, 26 July 1943, "Persia."
165 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 4.
166 Ibid, pp. 2, 5.
167 Interview with Robert C. Ebaugh.

and put them in embalming fluid. He succeeded finally in getting a clear set of prints and eventually received from Washington identification of the victim. He was an American soldier. With cooperation from Iranian police a suspect was found. A woman who ran an illegal tavern frequented by the soldier admittedly had been annoyed by his odd humor, his habit of stroking a skull he often carried. Iranian officials thought she believed it to be the skull of a relative. Suspicion heightened when she was seen attempting to hide a butcher knife, and she was arrested. But CIC, not satisfied, persuaded authorities to arrest the local sheik, with the expectation that, through his people, information on the murder might follow. It came - via the sheik's wife. The murderer was a native who had killed the victim when the latter became drunkenly abusive. The arrest was followed by a confession, trial and hanging.[168]

Although the gathering of positive intelligence had been precluded by PGC policy, CIC followed closely political events and trends which could affect the security of American personnel and installations. In Colonel McCafferty's words, "In a country where the right and left are sharply divided and the explosive qualities of the population might easily make themselves felt in either actual harm to personnel, damage to installations or at least delay in operations, this was considered as a part of CIC mission."[169] Further, a close watch was kept on the many Americans employed in a civilian capacity for, "In a country where the prestige of the American Army is affected by American prestige as a whole, it was deemed important to report on any incident involving Americans, whether military or civilian."[170]

Security Provided for Top-Level Conferences

CIC was called upon to carry out a number of special missions, among which was the security coverage of top-level conferences held in the Middle East. In November and December of 1943, CIC, together with other Allied intelligence groups, covered the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo and the "Big Three" meeting in Teheran.[171] Agents also accompanied a special flight which transported the President of Turkey and his cabinet to their meeting with Allied leaders in Cairo. Again, in February 1945, following the Yalta Conference, CIC was responsible for the security of a series of meetings in the Suez Canal area between President Roosevelt and the Kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the Emperor of Ethiopia.[172]

168 Interview with CIC Agent William J. Tilli, August 1953.
169 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 5.
170 Ibid, p. 5.
171 Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945, p. 177; 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 5; and SIME document, "Security-Mena Conference," (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
172 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, pp. 5, 6.

[redacted]

At the Cairo conference CIC issued all admission passes and provided for security of American representatives and their billets and conference rooms, while the British arranged for security of all other VIPs and their quarters.[173] There are almost no reports available on CIC's activities at Teheran, where it shared security responsibility with British and Russians, though it is recorded that Captain Barry, of Evanston, Illinois, who was then CO of the PGSC Group, was awarded the Legion of Merit for his work during the conference.[174] On one occasion, a CIC agent, Robert C. Ebaugh, of Baltimore, impersonated President Roosevelt so that, as Ebaugh put it, "If anyone decided to take a pot-shot at the President, he would shoot me instead."[175] A rather detailed account of CIC's functions on these occasions is found in a report on the post-Yalta meetings, which gives this summary:

"The 400th CIC Detachment performed the following security functions in close cooperation with the AC of S, G2:

1. Maintained master list of all military personnel of this headquarters who knew of this movement.

2. Assigned undercover agents to pick up any rumors in public places frequented by military personnel and in towns adjacent to proposed conference area where certain advance preparations had to be made.

3. Promptly investigated every suspected leakage of information concerning the movement.

4. Security briefed all personnel selected to participate in the movement, such as drivers of the transport, Army photographers, signal corps personnel, etc., all of whom were given CIC security clearance prior to their selection.

5. Provided CIC coverage to the escorting party of each king and other dignitaries to and from the conference.

6. Surveyed in advance the conference area and made security recommendations to the officer commanding.

7. Met with the Secret Service personnel accompanying the presidential party to coordinate security precautions.

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173 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 5; and SIME, "Security - Mena Conference."

174 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 4.

175 Interview with Robert C. Ebaugh.

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[redacted]

8. Arranged for extra guards on large German and Italian POW camps in the vicinity of the conference area; and immediately prior to the arrival of the Presidential party, and during the conference, CIC undercover agents of German and Italian extraction patrolled these areas.

9. Checked all communications into and out of the restricted area and security briefed all authorized personnel coming into or departing from the conference area.

10. Constantly checked all guard control points and other security precautions immediately before and during the conferences.

11. Arranged for the questioning and detainment, under guard, of all unauthorized persons arriving into the conference area during the conference period.

12. Security briefed all participating personnel following the conclusion of the movement."[176]

In other areas of the theater CIC agents enforced security regulations as military and civilian parties moved to and from these conferences. Similarly, at various other times U.S. officials passing through USAFIME were given protection by CIC and Allied security agencies. An instance in which special precautions were required was a trip through Egypt by a group of U.S. senators in August 1943.[177]

Planning for Balkan Invasion

For a time considerable effort was expended toward preparing a detailed counterintelligence plan for the Balkans.[178] While it was agreed that CIC would not enter the peninsula until it became an area in which Allied troops were operating or until it was entered by Allied military missions, the sense of urgency surrounding the project emanated from the consideration high strategic circles

176 Monthly Information Report, Hq, 400th CIC Detachment, AMET, 13 March 1945, (Exhibit "J" in 400th CIC Detachment's History), (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

177 Periodic Summary, 16 August - 5 September 1943, pp. 1-3; and Memorandum, 11 December 1943, CIC, Accra, Gold Coast, "A portion of the official party which had participated in the recent meetings at Cairo and Teheran," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

178 "Estimate of Situations and Detailed Plan for Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Southeastern Europe," 17 March 1944, Hq, USAFIME, (unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 5.

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were giving to a Balkan invasion.[179] CIC and SIME cooperated in the counter-intelligence plan, in order to lay the groundwork for the two agencies to direct and carry out security and intelligence duties in the Balkans on an equal footing.

Theoretical assumptions based on probable military measures formed the framework for an outline of the security organizations' mode of operations. The outline, while developed from SIME methods and procedures, was similar to CIC operations in other theaters. "Operational" and "static" security teams were planned, with duties corresponding to those CIC was performing in Europe and the Pacific. It was unique in that it called for Joint American-British static units under a combined staff. The CIC-SIME teams were to direct security intelligence; CIC and FSW combat teams would be under their jurisdiction. Agents expected to take part in the Balkans expedition were being trained in Cairo and Bari, Italy.[180] After it became evident in late 1944, that the invasion would not take place, a number of the CIC personnel who had undergone this training were transferred to OSS, and the target material that had been prepared was also given to OSS. Among the agents transferred were Major Edward P. Barry, who had been CO of the USAFIME detachment from January to October 1944, Captain Francis R. Tworzydlo and 1st Lieutenant Edward W. Hayden.[181]

CIC in Turkey

In September 1944, Captain Thomas J. Nokes was placed on temporary duty in Turkey as security advisor to the U.S. Military Attache, General Richard R. Tindall. Besides carrying out his duties as security advisor, Captain Nokes represented CIC interests in Turkey, being specifically concerned with the direction from Turkey of German and Japanese agents in USAFIME. He was recalled in November to assume command of the 400th CIC Detachment. Except for this brief period CIC did not operate in Turkey until the Istanbul field office was established in early 1945.[182]

400th Disbands After V-E Day

The area covered by the 400th CIC Detachment was expanded with the formation of the Africa-Middle East Theater (AMET) in March 1945.[183] Both Turkey and the rest of Africa were added to the detachment's field of operations. At that

179 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Crusade in Europe," Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1948, pp. 198, 281-284; and Mark W. Clark, "Calculated Risk," Harper & Brothers Publishers, N.Y., 1950, pp. 368-372.

180 "Estimate of Situation and Detailed Plan for CIC Operations in Southeastern Europe."

181 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 7 and Part II, p. 5.

182 Ibid, Part I, p. 7.

183 The Army Almanac, p. 607.

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time field offices were being maintained in Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said and Suez, Egypt; Tripoli, Libya; Asmara, Eritrea; Aden, Aden; Haifa and Jerusalem, Palestine; Beirut, Lebanon; and Aleppo, Syria. Additional field offices were then opened in Istanbul, Turkey; Accra, Gold Coast; Algiers, Algeria and Casablanca, French Morocco.[184] However, the quantity of work was decreasing; and, where the detachment's strength had numbered 60 to 80 during most of 1943-44, there were but four officers and 31 enlisted agents in AMET from January to May 1945. After V-E day, two officers and eight enlisted men remained in the detachment. Their mission was to maintain the CIC central file section and to provide the now limited security coverage needed in Cairo, the Suez Canal area, Aden, the Palestine-Levant area, Algiers and Casablanca. Also, certain agents already established under cover were retained temporarily to provide intelligence coverage until OSS or the Military Attaches were able to take over.[185] During the fall of 1945, increased activities of nationalists in Egypt and Zionists in Palestine were watched closely by CIC, that such activity might not hinder the security of remaining American installations. On 15 November 1945, the 400th CIC Detachment was disbanded. Its two officers, Major George R. Shoals and Captain Stephen Smyk, were reassigned to G2, AMET, and its enlisted personnel were returned to the U.S.[186]

Personnel Problems Encountered

Most of the operational difficulties that beset the organization have been mentioned. There were, in addition, a number of personnel problems. One of the common ones in CIC, the lack of linguistic ability, was not serious in most regions of the Middle East, for a large number of the agents were linguists. According to one report, about 85 percent of the CIC personnel spoke fluently the languages necessary in the area.[187] In the Persian Gulf Command, however, this was not the case; no one in the 468th CIC wrote or spoke fluent Persian. Where agent linguists were not available, the use of interpreters became necessary. But it was pointed out that CIC agents whose primary qualification was language ability were not desirable, since their employment was too limited. Although a knowledge of the native language was essential to undercover assignments, it was thought that for most other types of work English sufficed in much of the Middle East, except French North Africa and Turkey where French was needed.[188]

184 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 8.

185 Ibid, Part I, p. 8; Memorandum, "CIC History, 1945-1948, Africa;" Letter by Capt Nokes, 31 December 1944, "Monthly Information Report, 305th CIC Detachment," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); "Briefing Material," p. 3; and Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment."

186 Memorandum, "CIC History, 1945-1948, Africa."

187 "Briefing Material," p. 4.

188 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part III, p. 1; and Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 6.

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A related problem arose from the use of interpreters. The field from which they could be drawn was limited, and Colonel McCafferty observed that in Iran most of the English-speaking natives who could be used were Armenians rather than Persians, and that, "Minorities are clannish in this country and have their grievances against the majority. Accordingly an unclear picture of the country as a whole is often obtained if information is received wholly from these groups."[189]

He thus made the recommendation that, "it be impressed on evaluating officers that information from minority groups often presents a distorted picture of the country as a whole."[190] The problem is again reflected in a statement from an earlier history, "There would appear to be need for closer attention to sources of information in an area like the Middle East both for reliability and economy."[191] The existence of feuding minority groups affected also the employment of undercover agents. It was felt that Americans of Middle Eastern origin, the logical prospects for long-term undercover assignments, tended to give information that was biased in the interests of their own groups.[192]

The rank of enlisted men was a source of operational complications when they were assigned to field and liaison duties - particularly since, a report states, "Senior American officers constantly compromise the rank of civilian clothed CIC agents in such field and liaison assignments despite all directives to the contrary."[193] It was fortunate that in some cases, Allied groups, notably SIME, were willing to consider CIC agents as officers. For example, in planning the Balkans operations, "It has been mutually agreed by CIC and SIME that CIC agents would be considered of officer status and would assume the responsibility of such. Such an agreement relieves CIC of the impossibility of matching SIME officer for officer and likewise raises CIC agents from a pure Field Security status."[194] Along these lines, Colonel Wise reported, "It is the opinion of the CIC officers of the theater that all Special Agents should be commissioned officers since the character of the work being done by them warrants it. Moreover, it is believed that direct commissions should be given."[195]

Conditions under which CIC agents were obliged to live made the establishment of a rotation system particularly important in the Middle East. Colonel Wise recommended that agents should be returned from the Middle East after nine months or a year at most. Factors of climate, food, living conditions and

189 Col McCafferty, "Historical Report, CIC, PGC," p. 6.
190 Ibid, p. 6.
191 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part III, p. 1.
192 Ibid, Part III, p. 1.
193 Ibid, Part III, p. 2.
194 "Estimate of Situations and Detailed Plan for CIC Operations in Southeastern Europe," p. 6.
195 Col Wise's Report, p. 6.

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loneliness of CIC personnel should be taken into consideration, he said.[196] Lieutenant Sidney V. Barnes added, "An agent remaining too long in the Middle East eventually becomes known as such to the natives, and further, the climatic effect on the individual induces a feeling of lassitude and boredom with the work."[197]

In most areas the summer weather was oppressive; disease abounded in improper sanitary conditions. Typhus, typhoid, smallpox and cholera innoculations were essential precautions for incoming personnel. New agents were cautioned by USAFIME CIC: "Upon arrival in the Middle East the individual should exercise great care in eating raw fruits and vegetables. An upset stomach condition, known as "gyppy" stomach, is quite prevalent. Milk and ice cream should be avoided...since these items are never in a sanitary condition."[198] In Iran, unsanitary conditions often prohibited the use of drinking water. Agent Charles V. Sloan pointed out that it was necessary to drink wine instead of water with meals. When water was safe it was expensive, for it had to be boiled - and fuel was costly.[199] In some areas the quantity of food was insufficient, as for example in Palestine where an extensive rationing program was enforced. That it made life unpleasant for CIC men is reflected in Agent Elias Hanna's plaintive comment, "For over six weeks this agent hadn't had an egg...obtainable only from the black market at an average cost of twenty cents each. Coffee and tea were always served without sugar."[200] Clothing was also a problem; agents were advised to bring civilian clothes from the U.S. rather than pay several times as much for inferior products in Cairo.[201]

USAFIME CIC Mission Summarized

A summary of CIC's accomplishments in the Middle East must place emphasis on the part it played in the collection of political information, which generally would be considered on the other side of the nebulous line between "positive" and "counter" intelligence. This collection, which had become part of its mission by direction of the theater commander, involved, in Colonel Query's estimate, 50 to 75 percent of the detachment's activities by November 1943. Through 1944, as security demands lessened, positive intelligence was entrenched more firmly as CIC's major function in USAFIME. With the shortage of activity by other U.S. intelligence organizations in the theater, CIC was the chief source of information for G2; in September 1943, it was estimated, 85 percent of the positive intelligence collected came through CIC.[202]

196 Col Wise's Report, p. 8.
197 Lt Barnes' Report.
198 "Briefing Material," p. 6.
199 Charles V. Sloan, "Review of CIC Activities in the Middle East."
200 Elias Hanna, "Review and Observations of CIC Activities in the Middle East."
201 "Briefing Material," p. 6; and Col Wise's Report, p. 7.
202 Col Wise's Report, pp. 2, 3; "Briefing Material," p. 4; and Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment."

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Colonel Wise reported:

> "The information being gathered by the CIC relates generally to the identity of enemy sympathizers and agents, the political developments which can be expected to create disorders, the economic conditions which may stir trouble, etc., including the general temper of the people with respect to the United Nations cause in general and the U.S. particularly. Since it is recognized that one of the prime aims of the enemy agents in the area is to capitalize on political and economic conditions to create trouble, the position is taken that keeping track of this is a proper CIC function."[203]

Among those areas more commonly regarded as proper to counterintelligence, the duties of conducting routine investigations and security surveys far outweighed, in time and effort consumed, the energies spent in the more colorful mission of apprehending spies and saboteurs. During its three years in the Middle East the USAFIME detachment made surveys of all U.S. installations, communications systems, and ports or areas frequented by American personnel. It conducted many hundreds of background investigations. It caused both military and civilian personnel to become security conscious by promptly investigating and bringing to light violations of security under AR 380-5. It helped maintain travel control.

Behind the capture of enemy agents were the interrogations, conducted jointly with the British, of thousands of suspects, which, in turn, were preceded by the screening of many more thousands.[204] These activities, together with the special missions - the security of top-level conferences, the establishment of liaison, the criminal investigations, the various undercover assignments[205] - were broadly the sum of CIC's achievements. But, as one historian put it:

> "The accomplishments of CIC in the Middle East might best be summarized by the fact that while CIC arrived in the Middle East totally unknown and generally regarded with suspicion and doubt, by the end of the European war, most American and Allied personnel in the area recognized CIC as a practical and productive counterintelligence organization, and matters pertaining to counterintelligence and security would rarely be acted upon without first consulting CIC."[206]

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203 Col Wise's Report, p. 2.

204 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, pp. 4-6; and Memorandum by Agent Heyn, "400th CIC Detachment."

205 In the spring of 1945 CIC undercover agent Joseph A. Harary of Woodside, N.Y., was awarded the Legion of Merit by the CG, AMET, for outstanding services of a top secret nature "of great importance to the U.S. government." (400th CIC Detachment's History, Part I, p. 8.)

206 400th CIC Detachment's History, Part II, p. 6.

Part VI: CIC in Newfoundland Base Command

Part VI

CIC IN NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND

Because of its proximity to the North American mainland, the British island of Newfoundland was marked by United States military strategists as an important line of defense even before the United States entered the war. Separated from Canada only by the St. Lawrence Bay and lying directly across the Atlantic from most of Europe, Newfoundland's rugged 6,000-mile coastline provided key locations for coast artillery emplacements for the defense of both the United States and Canada.

Preparing an adequate defense of the island was not easy. Although Newfoundland has a total area of approximately 43,000 square miles, almost two-thirds of its population of 300,000 were crowded into the little Avalon Penninsula on the southeast tip of the island. Inland, the terrain was rugged and often impassable. Transportation and communication facilities were poor with the result that it was necessary to construct not only military and naval bases, but also transportation and communication networks to connect them. By the time the United States entered the war, this defense construction on Newfoundland was well under way, with both the United States and the Canadian governments participating.

But the preparations for war were impeded by the lethargy of the Newfoundlanders themselves. Indifferent toward any war effort, they were reluctant to cooperate with defense measures such as the blackout. There were some indications that they resented the presence of troops in their midst, although lease agreements had been negotiated between United States and Newfoundland governments.[207]

U.S. Installations Established

Although the primary responsibility for the defense of Newfoundland rested with Canada, the United States established four major military and naval installations on the island, along with numerous coastal artillery outposts. Headquarters of the Newfoundland Base Command was located at Fort Pepperrell in St. John's, the capital city, located on the southeast tip of the island. With a population estimated at 50,000 in 1942, St. John's was Newfoundland's largest city and principal seaport. American forces also occupied Fort McAndrew and the Argentia Naval Base, both at Argentia; Harmon Field at Stephensville, on the St. Lawrence Bay, and the U.S. Army Air Base at Gander, to the north.

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207 Memorandum, Capt Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, dtd 29 May 42, subject: "Counter Intelligence Activities, Newfoundland Base Command," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The United States Army was assigned the protection of a large portion of the Avalon Peninsula. The defense area included St. John's, with its busy harbor, as well as important outposts at Flat Rock, Torbay, Middle Cove, Outer Cove, and Logy Bay. These outposts were manned by elements of the 3d Battalion, 3d Infantry, which maintained 24-hour patrols of all beaches in the area.

In addition to the 3d Infantry, American forces in the Newfoundland Base Command included troops of the 24th and 421st Coast Artillery Battalions, 805th Military Police Company, 58th Engineers, 21st Signal Service Company, 162d Signal Photo Company, 8th Air Corps Squadron Command, and other supporting units.[208]

Civilian Employees a Security Problem

From the first, the troops stationed in Newfoundland were considered less a security problem than the hordes of civilians who were sent to Newfoundland from the United States to rush construction of the American bases. As early as September 1941, inspectors from GHQ, Army War College, commented upon the "lack of surveillance over possible fifth-column activities" among civilian workers on the extensive construction projects.[209] Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Robinett, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ, Army War College, was among the first to suggest that CIP agents be sent to Newfoundland. On 6 September 1941, he recommended to the War Department that a minimum of two agents be assigned to the Newfoundland Base Command.[210]

Despite continual prodding by Colonel Robinett, the War Department delayed allotment of CIP quotas for Newfoundland until 6 December 1941, when two special agents, one technical sergeant and one staff sergeant, were authorized for the Base Command.[211] But action came swiftly once the quotas were set. Orders transferring Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] to the

208 Daily Strength Rpt of Newfoundland Base Command for 17 May 42, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

209 Memo, Lt Col P. M. Robinett, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, dtd 9 Sep 41, subj: "CIP's for Newfoundland Base Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

210 Memo for File, prepared by Capt Donald D. MacDonald, Chief, CIP, dtd 6 Sep 41, subject: "Newfoundland," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

211 Memo, Brig Gen Sherman Miles to TAG, dtd 6 Dec 41, subj: "Allotment, in Grades, of Enlisted Personnel to the CIP," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Newfoundland Base Command were issued on 12 December 1941,[212] and by Christmas day, both were in Newfoundland and ready to begin work.

Construction on the American bases was booming when and landed in Newfoundland. New laborers were arriving daily from the United States to join Canadian and Newfoundland citizens who already were at work. By the summer of 1942, when the construction activity was at its peak, 1,200 U.S. civilians were employed at Fort Pepperrell, 950 at Fort McAndrew, 650 at Harmon Field, and 200 at the Army Air Base at Gander. Some 10,000 Newfoundlanders were employed at the American bases at this time, with 3,000 of them at Fort Pepperrell.[213]

Problems of Undercover Agents

Both and arrived at St. John's in civilian clothing, without military equipment. Upon reporting to the S2 of the Newfoundland Base Command, they were told that they would work under cover, primarily in St. John's and at Fort Pepperrell.

But their cover was inadequate. No cover arrangements had been made before the agents sailed from the United States, and once in Newfoundland they were forced to resort to the flimsiest of stories to explain their presence there. Although had traveled in civilian clothing, his travel orders listed his rank and service number. By the time his boat docked in St. John's, fellow passengers were calling him "sergeant" and were asking why he was not in uniform. fared somewhat better en route to Newfoundland, since he had refused to accept travel orders stating his connection with the Army. In St. John's, rented a room in a civilian home, explaining that he was a U.S.O. representative. Four days later, his landlord accused him of being a spy, and was forced to move.[214]

To strengthen cover, he was ostensibly employed by the base censorship office, and to some extent, he actually censored incoming and outgoing mail. His CIC duties often required him to leave the office for extended periods, however, and he insisted throughout his stay in Newfoundland that the cover employment was

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212 Ltr, MID 322.999 CIP (192-24-41), Lt Col J. T. Bissell to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ, Army War College, dtd 24 Dec 41, subj: "Corps of Intelligence Police Personnel for Newfoundland," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

213 Memo, , to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Jun 43, subj: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

214 Memo, Capt Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, CIC, dtd 29 May 42, subj: "CI Activities, Newfoundland Base Command," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

inadequate. Nevertheless, the censorship duties did enable him to learn considerable information about persons who were suspected of subversive activities.

For six months, continued in this capacity, gradually recruiting a net of trusted informants to supply information on persons under investigation. When the S2 requested an investigation of a particular workman, made his report on the basis of personal observation and discreet inquiries of these informants.

Low Morale Source of Difficulty

During first winter in Newfoundland, low morale among civilian workers inspired more than the usual amount of gripes and not a small amount of isolationist talk, bordering on pro-Nazi sentiment. Newfoundland winters are cold and wet, with strong gales and torrential rains sweeping across the island almost continually. On dreary winter nights, the civilian workers staged drinking bouts in their barracks. Tongues were loose, and criticism of the United States often was severe. Isolationism was a favorite theme, and anti-British, pro-German arguments were popular. as a resident of one of the civilian barracks, sat in on most of these sessions and noted the identities of the men who were most critical of the United States. But invariably, investigation proved they were talkers only. When sober, they were completely loyal. checked the possibility that the offenders were slowing construction work, but he usually found the most ardent complainers to be the best workers.[215]

Later, after 17 months in Newfoundland, he wrote:

> Evidences of any organized enemy activity in that country (Newfoundland) were very small if not actually nonexistent. Invariably, suspicious individuals would prove to be "crack-pots" and "loud-mouths," and nothing in their daily life would indicate any real activity.[216]

Water-front Activity Watched

meanwhile, concentrated on coverage of water-front establishments in St. John's. The foreign element, mainly seamen, were crowded into the harbor area, which was considered to be particularly vulnerable to penetration by enemy agents. Newfoundlanders gave little evidence of war consciousness, and the local government was reluctant to enforce security measures along the water-front. After a few weeks in Newfoundland, however, established liaison with local police and often persuaded them to arrest suspicious persons lingering aroung the docks.

215 Memo, , to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Jun 43, subj: "Under cover Mission in Newfoundland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

216 Ibid.

When urgency demanded, himself made arrests. For example, a civilian informant warned that a construction worker bound for the United States on a leave of absence planned to smuggle mail past censorship authorities. stopped the individual, searched him, and took him into custody when he discovered a letter intended for posting in the United States. Under interrogation, the prisoner stated that the letter had been given him by stationed at Fort Pepperrell. Although apparently harmless from a military standpoint, the letter was highly critical of religious activities in the Army.

apparently was given no cover employment, and almost from the first he was used to conduct overt investigations. A counter subversive system had been established by the Engineers before the CIC agents arrived in Newfoundland. When the counter subversive informants reported suspicious persons, was assigned to make open investigations of the cases. On cases involving military personnel, a Military Policeman worked as assistant, obtaining information not normally available to a civilian.[217]

By the summer of 1942, identity was so widely known that he left the censorship office and worked directly out of the S2 office. In his new position, he maintained contact with Newfoundland, British, and Canadian authorities and had access to their files. In addition to reports of his own investigations, prepared most routine reports for the S2 office. His investigative work consisted primarily of records checks, surveillance of night clubs, hotels, and bars, and an occasional check on flashing lights reported by jittery Newfoundlanders. The flashing lights invariably proved to be flashlights used in violation of blackout regulations rather than enemy signaling. also traveled about Newfoundland to help establish a counter subversive reporting system.[218]

Additional Agents Requested

By the spring of 1942, both agents were so busy that Lieutenant Colonel Dyke F. Meyer, the S2 officer, notified the Military Intelligence Division in Washington that a minimum of six additional agents were needed to supplement the work of the two already in Newfoundland. Colonel Meyer reported a need for an additional agent in the St. John's area, two each at Fort McAndrew and Harmon Field, and one at the U.S. Army Air Base in Gander.[219]

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217 Memo, Capt Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 29 May 42, subject: Counter Intelligence Activities, Newfoundland Base Command, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

218 Memo, to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Jun 43, subj: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

219 1st Ind; to missing correspondence, Lt Col Dyke F. Meyer to MI Division, War Department, dtd 23 Mar 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

However, it was not until after Captain Neville K. Adkinson made an inspection trip to Newfoundland in May that action was taken to procure additional CIC personnel for the Newfoundland Base Command. Captain Adkinson noted numerous security deficiencies at Fort Pepperrell and St. John's Harbor. Guard systems were inadequate; sentries allowed unidentified persons to pass in and out of restricted areas at will. No identification system existed for civilian employees. The counter subversive system was poorly organized. He urged that at least two agents and one qualified officer be ordered to the Newfoundland Base Command to strengthen CIC work there.

Noting the difficulties which and had encountered in maintaining cover, Captain Adkinson recommended that one of the new agents for Newfoundland be employed in the United States as a timekeeper for the Base Contractors and the other as a minor official in the U.S. Consulate at St. John's. He urged every precaution to conceal their identities.[220] Major Hugh D. Wise, Chief, CIC, concurred in Captain Adkinson's recommendations, and requested the assignment of two additional agents and one officer prior to 15 September 1942.[221]

Two More Undercover Agents Assigned

In September, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph P. Gilbert were selected for the Newfoundland assignment, and extensive preparations for their undercover work were made in New York and in Washington.[222] Gilbert was employed by the Newfoundland Base Contractors as a truck driver, and Blue was instructed to report for work with the American Consulate in St. John's. Credentials, service records, orders, and similar papers were forwarded by registered mail to the S2 of the Newfoundland Base Command. Blue landed in Newfoundland on 29 September 1942, and Gilbert arrived on 8 October.

Gilbert plunged into his strenuous work as a truck driver immediately. Blue, after reporting to the American Consul, was assigned to work around the American docks as a "shipping expert." Gilbert, working sixty hours weekly in his civilian job, had little time for counterintelligence work; Blue, on the other hand, found it difficult to keep busy enough around the docks to maintain his cover.[223]

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220 Memo, Capt Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, CIC, dtd 29 May 42, subject: "Counter Intelligence Activities, Newfoundland Base Command," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

221 Memorandum, Maj Hugh D. Wise to Capt Lowell J. Bradford, dtd 16 Aug 42, subject: Counter Intelligence Corps Special Agents for Newfoundland Base Command, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

222 No action was taken on the recommendation that a CIC officer be ordered to Newfoundland.

223 Memorandum, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, dtd 10 Jun 43, subject: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Need for Undercover Deemed Ended

Actually, by the time Gilbert and Blue arrived in Newfoundland there was little need for undercover work among the civilians. Most construction projects had been completed, and the American workers were being returned to their homes on the mainland. Where and had found an abundance of work but little cover, Gilbert and Blue had adequate cover but virtually nothing to do. After two months in Newfoundland, Gilbert wrote to Captain Lowell J. Bradford:

> Jack and I haven't been able to accomplish a thing here and I don't believe that the whole set-up here is accomplishing much. I don't intend any criticism of anyone in these statements. But there don't seem to be any leads on anything and I'll be darned if I can dig any up. Jack and I both feel like we are wasting our time. The job is finishing up here and all the Americans will soon be gone.[224]

The only information furnished the S2 by Blue and Gilbert during four months undercover was, by their own evaluation, "of rather trivial importance." Blue reported the inadequacy of the guard system on the docks and the causes of petty thievery in the harbor area. Gilbert relayed a tale of flashing lights on the coast near St. John's and provided information on a house of prostitution frequented by American civilians.

Despite a lack of information, the agents continued to make weekly reports to Captain Robert L. Mushen, who had replaced Colonel Meyer as S2. Usually the reports were oral. Captain Mushen was contacted by telephone, and in a conversation as ambiguous as possible, the agents arranged to meet him at his quarters or in a parked car. Similar precautions were taken whenever Gilbert and Blue found it necessary to contact either or [225]

By January 1943, Captain Mushen was ready to concede that Gilbert and Blue could not be used to full advantage while under cover. In a report to Major Wise he wrote: "In general, these men have been able to function effectively, although there is not an abundance of material for them to work on."[226] Two months later, he asked permission to bring them into the open:

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224 Ltr, Joseph B. Gilbert to Capt Lowell J. Bradford, dtd 7 Dec 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

225 Memo, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, dtd 22 Aug 43, subj: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

226 1st Ind. by Capt Robert L. Mushen, dtd 21 Jan 43, to ltr, Maj Hugh D. Wise to S2, Newfoundland Base Command, dtd 23 Dec 42, subj: "CIC Special Agents Transferred Undercover to Newfoundland Base Command," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

It is now believed that better advantage can be taken of the services of these agents by furnishing them their credentials and allowing them to report direct to this headquarters for instructions. Due to the limited size and stable character of the work groups in which they are employed, the length of time they have been here and the fact that they are among the few American National civilians still remaining in Newfoundland, suspicions have already been aroused as to their true identities. There is, on the other hand, a considerable amount of investigation to which these men can be assigned, were they permitted to operate "in the open."[227]

Once the cover was abandoned, Gilbert and Blue joined and in the performance of routine CIC duties such as investigation of possible sabotage, security leaks, and loyalty investigations of Newfoundlanders employed on American bases or associated with U.S. Army personnel. Although it was customary for agents to secure the permission and assistance of local police before investigating Newfoundlanders, it often was necessary to make discreet inquiries without notifying the police or other Newfoundland authorities. The police tended to whitewash all Newfoundlanders. Agents also were employed to check out the usual reports of flashing lights and strangers seen in remote areas.[228]

Security Surveys Made

Security surveys conducted by CIC agents in Newfoundland brought a tightening of security at all U.S. installations on the island, although the change was most noticeable at Fort Pepperrell. When CIC agents and inspectors continued to decry the inefficacy of the civilian identification system, a fingerprint-photograph badge and identification card system was established, and restrictions on the movements of visitors were enforced. For the first time, a perimeter barrier completely enclosed the installation, with guards posted at all entrances.

Dock security remained a headache. CIC cooperated with the Port Security Office directed by British Army Intelligence in St. John's, but officials of the Newfoundland government refused to consent to any security program which would close the docks to the public. Cargos were unloaded at privately owned docks, where it was possible for anyone to watch movement of ships in and out of the harbor. U.S. Army sentries guarded military cargo destined for American

227 Ltr, Maj Robert L. Mushen to MI Service, CIC, War Department, dtd 1 Mar 43, subj: "Jack S. Blue, S/Sgt, ASN 34253082, DEML, CIC, and Joseph B. Gilbert, Sgt, ASN 12037785, DEML, CIC," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

228 Memo, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, dtd 22 Aug 43, subject: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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installations, but their only control over persons in the area was to enforce a no-smoking rule. Watchmen employed by the companies which operated the wharfs seldom displayed more than a casual interest in strangers in the area. Eventually, the Army constructed its own docks, and CIC's security recommendations were followed.[229]

Sabotage Probabilities Investigated

A sabotage scare flared in Newfoundland during the winter of 1942-43. Late in December, several civilian employees were killed when fire gutted the Knights of Columbus Hostel in St. John's. CIC agents did not investigate. When local police found indications of incendiarism, however, CIC was alerted to watch for any evidence of sabotage by fire. With raging winds lashing the Island throughout the winter months, a single incendiary device, effectively placed, could conceivably have destroyed an entire installation. A month after the blaze at the Knights of Columbus Hostel, oil-soaked papers were discovered in a back room at the USO building in St. John's. CIC was asked to check the possibility of attempted sabotage, but an investigation by Special Agent Kraft was inconclusive.[230]

Liaison Activities Important

By early 1943, CIC had established liaison with six other security organizations operating in Newfoundland. In addition to the Port Security office of British Army Intelligence, agents occasionally worked with the Canadian Army Security Division, Canadian Army and Navy Intelligence, the Security Division of the Newfoundland Constabulary, and the Office of Nava. Intelligence. According to a report prepared by Special Agents Blue and Gilbert, liaison between CIC and these agencies was good, with the exception of the Security Division of the Newfoundland Constabulary and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Newfoundland agency was said to be lax in answering requests for investigations of Newfoundlanders, and the Office of Naval Intelligence was reported to be reluctant to furnish information to CIC.[231]

Personnel Turnover in 1943

The year 1943 brought a complete turnover in CIC personnel in Newfoundland. First to leave the Base Command was Special Agent Coleman, who was selected to

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229 Memo, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, dtd 22 Aug 43, subj: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

230 Memo, to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Jun 43, subject: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

231 Memo, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, dtd 22 Aug 43, subj: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

attend Infantry Officers' Candidate School.[232] who with had come to Newfoundland in December 1941, returned to the United States on 1 June.[233] And on 3 August, the Commanding General of the Newfoundland Base Command was instructed to issue orders transferring Blue and Gilbert to the Fourth and Second Service Commands, where they had been stationed prior to their Newfoundland assignment.[234]

As replacements, Staff Sergeant Edward E. Knauss and Corporal Edward J. Flynn were ordered to the Newfoundland Base Command, apparently in the summer of 1943.[235] Working in uniform, they lived in regular Army barracks with other enlisted men assigned to Base Headquarters at Fort Pepperrell.

It is not apparent why Knauss and Flynn were required to work in uniform, since other CIC agents in the Newfoundland Base Command had always worn civilian clothing. From the first, the uniforms hindered their work. Gilbert and Blue wrote:

> The position of these agents (Knauss and Flynn) is difficult inasmuch as the men with whom they live are aware that the agents are doing investigative work of some sort. This makes the men suspicious of the agents, because they are not absolutely sure of their position and feel that they might be watching their activities. These agents have also found it difficult...inasmuch as their work often calls for their interviewing commissioned officers who are none too cooperative when they realize they are being questioned by a sergeant....It is frequently necessary for them to visit other installations to conduct investigations that seem to be of great importance. Officers seem to doubt that the enlisted men have the training and experience necessary, and place little confidence in their work....Agents Flynn and Knauss feel that this attitude on the

232 1st Ind., Maj Hugh D. Wise, to S2, Newfoundland Base Cmd, dtd 31 Oct 42, to ltr, Capt Robert L. Mushen to Chief, CIC, dtd 20 Oct 42, subj: "Officer Candidate Schools," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

233 1st Ind., Capt Herbert J. O'Connor to Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS, dtd 7 Jun 43, to missing correspondence, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

234 Ltr, AG 220.3 (30 Jul 43) PE-A-B, TAG to Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, dtd 3 Aug 43, subj: "Transfer of CIC Enlisted Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

235 An unidentified, unsigned, penciled note in CIC Files, dtd 9 Apr 43, lists Knauss and Flynn among men being considered as replacements for Gilbert and Blue in Newfoundland. In a report dtd 22 Aug 43, Gilbert and Blue state that "At the present time Special Agents Knauss and Flynn are stationed at Base Headquarters, Ft Pepperrell, Newfoundland." See Memo, Spl Agents J. S. Blue and J. B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, cited above.

part of officers whom they contact tends to undermine confidence in themselves and detracts from their ability to conduct a successful investigation.[236]

CIC agents in Newfoundland officially became a part of the 466th CIC Detachment assigned to the Newfoundland Base Command on 25 July 1944, when the Commanding General activated the 466th under provisions of Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, dated 24 January 1944. Strength of the new detachment was set at one technical sergeant and one staff sergeant.[237]

The detachment was returned to the United States for deactivation on 4 September 1945.[238]

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236 Memo, Special Agents Jack S. Blue and Joseph B. Gilbert to Chief, CIC, dtd 22 Aug 43, subject: "Undercover Mission in Newfoundland," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

237 Historical Data Cards, 466th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files). NOTE: Complete roster of detachment is attached as Appendix 1.

238 Ibid.

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APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

ROSTER, NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND

Enlisted Men

Coleman, Clair H.
Kraft, Richard P., Jr.
Blue, Jack Stanley
Gilbert, Joseph B.
Knauss, Edward E.
Flynn, Edward J.

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[redacted]

Part VII: CIC With U.S. Forces, South Atlantic

[redacted]

Part VII

CIC WITH U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTH ATLANTIC

Even before the United States activated the South Atlantic Command in World War II, CIC had men in that area performing a counterintelligence mission. Although Brazil maintained a nonbelligerent status until 22 August 1942, elements of the Air Transport Command were allowed the use of bases within that country for operations against the enemy. The tremendous importance of these bases will explain, in part, the need for attention to counterintelligence matters.

Fighter planes could not be flown across the Atlantic to Europe without the installation of extra tanks and equipment. Transport planes and bombers could be ferried without too much difficulty, but the large fuel load required naturally cut down on the amount of cargo that could be carried. To eliminate these difficulties, a ferrying route through South America, Ascension Island and North Africa to the Continent was set up.[239]

United States Army Forces, South Atlantic Command (USAFSA) was created in November 1942, to secure the cooperation of Brazilian Armed Forces and provide logistic support to Air Transport Command bases in Brazil and at Ascension and Fernando do Noronha Islands. As early as May 1942, however, Air Transport Command bases were operating along the ferrying route in Brazil and Ascension Island, as part of the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command.

The earliest CIC activity in the area occurred in May 1942, when two CIC agents, Anthony Mattos and Jose Bensaude, were temporarily relieved of assignment to CIC and assigned to the South Atlantic Wing to provide counterintelligence coverage in the area. These agents served at South Atlantic Wing Headquarters in Natal, Brazil, in more or less of a counterintelligence capacity from May to November 1942.[240]

In February 1943, the Commanding General of Air Transport Command requested that a CIC detachment be attached to the South Atlantic Wing. The request was approved and first elements of the detachment began to arrive in May 1943.

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239 Memo for Chief, CIC from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, dtd 25 Sep 1943, Subj: Field Trip through USAFSA, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

240 The experiences of these agents are detailed in the Chapter, CIC With the Air Force.

Although USAFSA had been activated by this time, the detachment was sent on orders signed by Brigadier General C. R. Smith, Air Transport Command Executive Officer, and no notice was given to the G2, USAFSA or to the A2 of the South Atlantic Wing. Major General Robert L. Walsh, Commanding General of USAFSA and Commanding General of the SAW, ATC, did not object to the arrival of countersabotage and liaison sections of the detachment in the theater, but made every effort to block the entry of a counterespionage section into his command. He felt that the maintenance of undercover agents in the counterespionage section might endanger the friendly relations between Brazil and the United States. No action was taken upon his suggestions. By June 1943, the detachment, broken into countersabotage, liaison, and counterespionage sections, was operating throughout the command at ATC bases. General Walsh's objection to the counterespionage section led to repercussions which will be expanded later.

The South Atlantic Wing Detachment

These three sections within the South Atlantic Wing, ATC detachment worked as follows:

The countersabotage section was headed by 1st Lieutenant Louis A. Ginocchio and manned by five agents and a clerk. The men were dispersed to various bases within the Wing and placed undercover as mechanics and line inspectors. They remained under the command of Lieutenant Ginocchio and submitted reports to him relative to their mission, which was, primarily, to check and investigate all actual and apparent sabotage to planes and material passing through the Wing. They were expected, also to develop leads as requested and maintain observation on the acts and sentiments of Brazilian employees within the military bases.

The liaison section was a two-man affair, consisting of Lieutenant Anthony R. Mattos and a clerk. The section's function was to maintain liaison with Brazilian governmental agencies, coordinate the evacuation of suspected subversive Brazilians from the area of military installations, secure cooperation from Brazilian agencies in determining the loyalty of Brazilians working for the U.S. Army, and perform administrative functions required by the detachment. The section office was at USAFSA Headquarters, Recife, Brazil.

The counterespionage section consisted of four agents and was under the direction of Lieutenant Mattos. All men in this section were quartered privately and operated as civilians. Its mission was two-fold; checking leads developed by the countersabotage section and developing informant nets among American and Brazilian civilians. The group also reported on loose talk by military or civilian

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translents and cooperated and maintained close liaison with the American Consular Service, as well as Naval Intelligence and FBI agents in the area.[241]

The fear on the part of General Walsh that the presence of American undercover agents in Brazil might endanger American-Brazilian relations led him to issue orders that the CIC undercover section of the South Atlantic Wing leave the command. However, at a conference with Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, General Walsh agreed to allow the detachment to remain if Brazilian authorities were informed of the nature of CIC work and the name of the commanding officer. He further stipulated that the activities of the group be directed against American and Axis nationals and not against citizens of Brazil.

To implement and assist in setting up such a program, Major Lowell J. Bradford, Liaison Officer, CIC, made a field trip through the USAFSA headquarters and installations in September 1943. Major Bradford suggested that the section be transferred to USAFSA rather than remain with the ATC Wing, but otherwise merely implemented the suggestions of General Walsh. Under those general conditions the detachment continued in operation until January 1944.[242]

At that time, the liaison and counterespionage or undercover section were transferred to USAFSA Headquarters and the countersabotage section was moved and attached to the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command.

Another detachment was sent to the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command in February 1944, these men operating in uniform as War Department Inspectors. The detachment restricted its operations to the Headquarters at Natal and was withdrawn from the area in May 1944.

Meanwhile, the 432d CIC Detachment was sent and attached to Headquarters, USAFSA, in March 1944. The detachment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Frank L. Reed, continued in operation until deactivation of the Command on 15 October 1945.[243]

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241 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Major Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

242 Memo for Chief, CIC from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, dtd 25 Sep 43, Subject: Field Trip through USAFSA, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

243 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Major Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Intelligence Coverage by Attaches

Reports from September through December 1943 indicate the important assistance given CIC by Military Attaches in providing intelligence coverage in the South Atlantic Command.

When the G2 received reports that German saboteurs had landed on the Brazilian Coast and made inquiries of CIC, a letter to the Naval Attache in Rio de Janeiro brought a prompt explanation. Two men had been put ashore in a rubber boat from a fishing vessel with radio equipment and a considerable amount of money. Both confessed that they had come to Brazil as German espionage agents and were taken into custody by the Brazilian general staff. Early correspondence indicated that the general staff was monitoring the frequencies assigned the agents and might attempt transmission of messages in accordance with the codes and schedules confiscated from them.[244]

Information on all developments of the case was freely interchanged between the Attaches and CIC. In the final correspondence in the file, dated 10 December 1943, it was reported that the Brazilian Army was operating the radios in a closely guarded secret operation. The Attache at Rio de Janeiro advised that the circuit was probably compromised since it was popularly known that the agents had been captured. The Brazilians, however, felt that they had a valid and uncompromised contact.[245]

Personnel

One of the major tasks of the 432d CIC Detachment was the clearing of military personnel for cryptographic and other classified duties. Investigative files and cross files on such personnel were set up and maintained throughout the tenure of the unit in the Command.

Clearances on Brazilian personnel employed by U. S. Forces were handled by the detachment through close liaison with Brazilian Political Police, Maritime Police and Army agencies. The primary aim was to screen out those persons with subversive tendencies, and the presence or absence of such tendencies was ascertainable only through a continuing coordination effort with Brazilian agencies. To further this clearance program of Brazilian nationals, a Joint Intelligence Committee was set up, composed of representatives of American Army, Navy and civilian intelligence agencies. This agency acted as a central liaison

244 Ltr from Brig Gen C. M. Adams, Military Attache to Col John Raymond, G2, USAFSA, dtd 29 Sep 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

245 Ltr from Maj A. F. Fuller, Asst Military Attache to Colonel Raymond, dtd 10 Dec 43, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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instrumentality in dealing with Brazilian agencies. Between March 1944 and May 1945, 1,546 Brazilian employees were investigated by the 432d and reports forwarded for action.[246]

Control of suspected subversive personnel was maintained by alert detection of the presence of unauthorized persons in or near USAFSA installations. A free exchange of information with Brazilian and American agencies in the area facilitated control, and a card file was maintained and kept current on all individuals coming to CIC attention. Even the most minute and seemingly irrelevant information was collected and noted on each individual's card for possible use at a later date.[247]

The full cooperation of Brazilian political police made possible extensive relocation of Axis sympathizers and suspected subversives, upon CIC recommendation, to areas remote from operational and strategic installations. An informant net created and fostered by the detachment was invaluable in furnishing warnings to the detachment relative to movements and activities of the many Axis sympathizers in the area. Complete coverage could not have been attained in any other way because of the limited number of agents at the disposal of the Command.[248]

Technical Facilities

The 432d did not have a technical laboratory in the South Atlantic area, but the movement of planes through the area on the tremendous wartime ferrying scale gave the detachment ready communication and access to facilities in the Zone of the Interior.

A case involving an objectionable note on a desk calendar was investigated by agents. After handwriting and printing specimens of all suspects were taken, comparative analysis of the specimens and objectionable notation was necessary to resolve the case. An expert opinion was necessary since the notation was not only morally objectionable, but possibly indicative of pro-Nazi leanings. Within 13 days, the documents had been forwarded to Washington, processed and returned to the detachment. On the basis of CIC investigation, the person who made the notation was removed to nonsensitive duties.[249]

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246 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

247 Ibid and List of Subversives, compiled 12 Aug 44 by 432d CIC Det, Reclife and Pernambuco area, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

248 Ibid, p. 12.

249 Case File, Subject: "Investigation-Handwriting," 432d CIC Det, December 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Physical Security

Agents with the detachment made security surveys of all installations in the theater and submitted reports to the S2 or A2 of the installation involved. Agents were also detailed to study plans and reports on physical security forwarded to the Command G2 for consideration, and their recommendations were sent back through the G2 and forwarded to the originating agency.

Within the scope of the detachment's port security program came ship security matters. As a part of this program a conference with the Chief of Police and the president of the Brazilian Stevedores Syndicate was arranged to establish maximum security in loading and unloading American ships. Although arrangements could not be made to have just one crew of men handle all stevedoring aboard a particular vessel, it was agreed that steps would be taken to facilitate patrolling of the stevedore crews by having them wear a minimum of clothing, little more than shorts. To check on persons coming aboard the vessels, it was further agreed that the head of the crew would furnish the Military Policemen at the gangway with a roster of stevedores on a given job. This would provide a check list for control of persons boarding or alighting from the boats during the unloading process.[250]

In many instances, the port security job was complicated by the fact that vessels suspected of carrying contraband or illegal goods would be of a registry foreign to either Brazilian or American authority, and despite the fact that the vessel would put into a Brazilian port, the authority of CIC to investigate was simply nonexistent. Only through tedious and delicate liaison contacts could CIC obtain any information or access to such vessels.

In one instance, an Argentine ship arrived at Rio Grande de Sol, Brazil, and informants brought word to CIC that the ship was carrying strategic materials destined for export from Argentina to Germany. Examination of the vessel was effected only after high level liaison contacts were made through the American Embassy and then the inspection was performed by Brazilian rather than American agents. Although this particular inspection was fruitless, the detachment considered the work involved to be worthwhile since it resulted in a procedure being set up by which inspection of foreign vessels could be effected by CIC upon the application for proper authority from the Brazilian military establishment.[251]

250 Memo for AC of S, G2, from Lt A. R. Mattos, dtd 6 May 1944, Subject: Conference, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

251 File, Title, "Ships (Miscellaneous)" 432d CIC Det, covering period January-February 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Commercial Firms

When USAFSA installations were set up during the early years of World War II, it was found in many cases that business firms in the vicinity were pro-Axis. With the cooperation of informants and Brazilian political authorities, most of the firms were weeded out and the Brazilian government often caused personnel of these firms to relocate.[252]

Although it was not within the scope of CIC's mission in Brazil to investigate activities of the Brazilian Army, information obtained by CIC and disseminated to proper Brazilian authorities led to the arrest of one officer and eight enlisted Brazilian Army personnel for the sale of government owned arms and ammunition to unknown persons in Pernambuco. The lead on the case came to CIC through an informant in a shop selling small arms who was disgruntled at having lost the sale to the Brazilian Army personnel.[253]

252 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

253 File, Title, "Army-Navy Sales" 432d CIC Det, undated, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Safeguarding Military Information

Because of the presence of known Axis sympathizers in the Brazil and USAFSA area, the 432d was called upon to enforce AR 380-5 to the letter. Poster and slogan campaigns were constantly being run, and the most trifling infringements of regulations were reported to the appropriate commander in view of the delicate situation in which American forces were involved. Not only were safeguards against information reaching Axis sources important but the nature of operations was such that Brazilian-American amity might also be shaken if information were leaked. All news releases to the Brazilian press were coordinated with G2, USAFSA, and the Commander of the 432d. Close coordination was maintained with the theater censors, and a policy on comments regarding Brazilian political matters was established.[254]

As a part of the safeguarding program, mail security was considered to be of the greatest importance. In June 1944, the detachment investigated pilferage of mail aboard planes passing through the command, but finally concluded that the pilferage had not and could not have occurred at USAFSA bases.[255] During the next month, security surveys were run at all mail handling depots and temporary storage areas. Although some instances of slit mail bags and consequent pilferage continued to arise, the number so sharply decreased that CIC closed its investigation and left final corrective procedures to Army Postal Inspectors.[256]

The last incident of importance recorded by the 432d with regard to mail security occurred in March 1945. A minor crisis arose when several pieces of mail and official correspondence addressed to USAFSA Headquarters in Recife, Brazil, were given to a sergeant, on leave in the city, by a hotel clerk along with a request to see that they were properly delivered. An immediate CIC investigation was ordered by the Commanding General and the results of the investigation, though not spectacular, showed a careful tracing by CIC. It appeared that all mail addressed to USAFSA at Recife was delivered to Panair do Brasil since there was no direct service to USAFSA. A civilian employee of the Panair company, who had some remote connection with the U.S. Army, would then take the mail to the clerk of the largest hotel in Recife and request the clerk to give the mail to the first man from the post that he saw in town. CIC recommended correction

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254 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

255 Ltr, dtd 24 Jun 44, to G2 USAFSA from Lt Robert Darby, file of 432d CIC Det- "Mail Security," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

256 Memo, dtd 4 Jul 44, Subject: Mail Thefts at Natal, from S/A Matthew Dailey, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

of the situation by institution of a courier service between the post office and USAFSA installations.[257]

Sabotage

Although the 432d was the only CIC detachment assigned in the South Atlantic Command, it had no jurisdiction on Air Transport Command bases within USAFSA. The Air Transport Command had no CIC of its own after May 1944, but relied on Intelligence and Security Officers for investigations. Most often, however, Air Transport Commands would call upon CIC for investigative assistance and such requests were honored whenever possible. Eventually, despite a shortage of CIC agents at USAFSA Headquarters, two agents of the 432d were permanently assigned to Air Transport Command bases at Belem and Ascension Island.[258]

The "Gatun" Case

The U.S. Army Transport Gatun caused the 432d no end of investigative difficulty. A breakdown of the ship at sea disclosed evidence that appeared to point to sabotage. An investigation was conducted aboard the ship when it arrived at Recife and the suspicion of sabotage was confirmed. The investigation led to the conclusion that the sabotage attempt, carried out by a person familiar with marine engines, had been designed to immobilize the ship while at sea. Since repairs on the ship had been made immediately prior to the cruise to South America, recommendations were forwarded to G2, War Department, urging investigation of the incident at the shipyard in the Zone of the Interior. Many experts were called in for assistance before the case was closed at Recife.

About ten days after CIC finished the sabotage investigation of the Gatun, reports of a series of fires aboard the vessel were received. Although sabotage was again suspected, investigation disclosed that the fires were due to negligence of crew members and spontaneous combustion.[259]

257 Ltr, dtd 23 Mar 45, from Maj Frank Reed to CG, USAFSA, Subject: Investigation of Mails, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

258 The activities of agents of the 432d with regard to investigation of Air Transport Command cases are included in the Chapter on CIC with the Air Forces under the section on ATC. It was felt that such inclusion was appropriate since the agents were under operational control when assigned such cases, of Air Force I & S officers rather than the CO of the 432d.

259 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Pump Station Case

A sabotage investigation was opened in November 1944 when the water pumping station at Headquarters USAFSA caught fire and was completely destroyed.

Investigation revealed that two Brazilian employees had been trying to fill a kerosene lantern with gasoline inside the pump house and had dropped the lamp into a puddle of gasoline to start the fire. The investigation's principal value was that it pointed up the complete lack of adequate fire fighting equipment in the area and led to the implementation of a vigorous fire prevention program.[260]

The Natal Pipeline

An official of the Natal police notified the Standard Oil Company of Brazil that a sabotage attempt was planned against a pipeline owned by the company running from Natal to Parnamarim Field, a USAFSA installation. The attempt was to be made during a forthcoming uprising. When the oil company asked assistance in guarding the line, CIC was called into the case.

Investigation proved the story of impending calamity to be false and a figment of the overzealous policeman's imagination. However, a security survey of the pipeline was made, and several recommendations for improved security of the line were offered and accepted by the company.[261]

Loss of the Belo Brazil

In March 1944, the 432d had perhaps its most puzzling case of suspected sabotage. A Brazilian sailing vessel, the Belo Brazil, was chartered by the Army Transportation Officer at Belem to transport Army radio beam equipment to stations along the Brazilian coast. About two weeks later, the owners of the vessel reported that the ship had been distressed in a small storm and its mainsail had been carried away. They further stated that a subsequent storm had caused the vessel to swamp and sink with consequent loss of all cargo. The monetary loss to the United States was something over $500,000.

A Board of Officers, convened to investigate the loss of the equipment, concluded that it was doubtful that the vessel had sunk. Although the stories of the master and crew of the vessel were in accord, searches for the wreckage by Naval and Air Force components had failed to find any evidence. Divers let down

260 Report of Investigation of Pump Station Fire, dtd 18 Nov 44, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

261 File, Natal Pipeline Sabotage, 432d CIC Det, Covering period April-May 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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in the area where the vessel had reputedly been lost found no trace of the ship. Two pieces of the cargo had been washed ashore on a nearby island, but the Board felt the evidence was not conclusive, since prevailing currents would have carried all flotsam to the same beach. At this point CIC was called into the case.

CIC carefully went over the ground the Board of Officers had investigated and extended the investigation with full cooperation of Brazilian investigative agencies and other American intelligence services. Undercover agents were sent out to try to procure on the commercial market equipment similar to that lost on the Belo Brazil. Crew members of the vessel were interrogated time and time again. Extensive hydrographic studies were undertaken with the aid of Army Engineers and Signal Corps technicians. The backgrounds of the owners and agent of the vessel were carefully scrutinized.

The case was kept open for almost one year, and though little evidence was turned up that had not been presented to the Board of Officers, the Commander eventually recommended that the case be closed with the conclusion that the vessel had sunk with all cargo aboard.[262]

Political Reporting.

The undercover and liaison contacts of the 432d put the detachment in an excellent position to keep tab on the complex Brazilian political situation. By August 1944, it had become the practice to provide regular reports to the Commanding General and the War Department on current governmental developments.

Since the Brazilian Army, Navy, and Air Force were embroiled in the picture as well as the two principal political parties, it took the part-time efforts of four men to gather all necessary information. The most important facet of the system was a series of contacts which advanced information regarding future developments and facilitated more accurate estimates of the present situation. After integration and evaluation, the reports were forwarded to the Commanding General, USAFSA, the U.S. Navy, and the American Consular Service.[263]

Miscellaneous Files

The 432d, in conjunction with the issuance of political reports, maintained many related card files. One indexed all pertinent economic information procured

262 File, "Loss of Radio Beam Equipment 'Belo Brasil' ", 432d CIC Det, Period Mar-Dec 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

263 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

relative to Northern Brazil; another catalogued labor unions, officials, and general policy; finally, a separate file on all labor agitation, uprisings, demonstrations and strikes was kept current.

Tactical Intelligence

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Particular attention was given to collecting information on Argentina in view of the fact that rumors were current in 1945 that Argentina and Brazil were about to conclude a trade agreement. During the early part of 1945, Argentina had not yet declared war on the Axis powers and her loyalties were in a questionable state. Collection of information on Argentina slackened when the nation declared war on the Axis in March 1945.

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Miscellaneous Activities

All censorship intercepts forwarded to USAFSA were processed through the 432d CIC Detachment. The 432d extracted that information which appeared to be of counterintelligence value and forwarded information to Military Attaches in the areas concerned. An extensive public relations and goodwill program was carried on by officers and enlisted men of the detachment. Weekly luncheons and get-togethers were held for Brazilian Military and government personnel, and birthday and Christmas cards were mailed at proper times in the name of the detachment. All requests for assistance directed to the detachment by Brazilian military or civilian personnel were given the highest priority possible under the current caseload.[266]

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264 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, p. 11, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

265 Ibid and File, "Argentina," 432d CIC Det, covering period July 1944 through January 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

266 Ibid, p. 13.

Among miscellaneous cases handled by the detachment was one involving the pilferage of articles from baggage of personnel being air-ferried to the United States after V-E day. Investigation into the matter was ordered by the Commanding General, USAFSA, after he received a letter from a Staff Sergeant complaining of the theft of a souvenir pistol at the Belem base. A thorough survey of baggage handling and storage facilities was made along with efforts to recover articles stolen. Several recommendations for increased security were forwarded, but records do not disclose whether any stolen articles were recovered from Brazilian workmen or military personnel at the air terminals and depots. It was reported that the incidence of pilferage dropped sharply after more stringent guard regulations were implemented, but isolated cases were recorded up to the time the detachment left the theater.[267]

Ascension Island

The activities of the 432d CIC Detachment on Ascension Island have purposely been divorced and placed in a section separate from the other functions of the unit in USAFSA.

Ascension had an overall area of approximately 35 square miles, but its location about midway between South America and Africa gave it a great value as a link in the air ferrying network. The principal military activity on the island was carried on by the Air Transport Command, and though the island was a part of USAFSA, until May 1944, counterintelligence responsibility was vested in the South Atlantic Wing of Air Transport Command. Although the Wing had one CIC agent attached to it, the man was utilized in an undercover capacity and had no investigative duties. Investigations were handled by the Intelligence and Security officer who was a part of the A2 office. Coverage under the system was perhaps adequate, but when the high value of the air base from a strategic point of view was considered, the system left something to be desired. The Intelligence and Security officers were not required to have investigative training and they had many other duties which precluded the devotion of all efforts to counterintelligence activities. In addition, the knowledge of Intelligence and Security officers with regard to checking and implementing security measures was limited, and, consequently, passenger and traffic control was almost totally neglected.[268]

267 File, "Baggage Security," 432d CIC Det, period Aug through Sep 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and File, "Thefts, USAFSA," period May through Sep 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

268 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 45, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, Chief, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The security laxness on Ascension and at other Air Transport Command bases which relied upon Intelligence and Security officers for counterintelligence and security coverage is well illustrated in a case which arose during September 1943. During an in-flight inspection of landing gear aboard a C-87 transport plane, a stowaway was discovered in the nose section. The man, an Army sergeant, told Military Police at Ascension Island an almost fantastic story.

The man had been on tactical duty in North Africa when illness within his family led to his decision to return to the United States without official sanction. He left his unit in a truck convoy and then managed to stowaway on three successive flights before he was apprehended en route to Ascension. He reported that he had boarded each plane without difficulty, and had not once been questioned as to identification or leave papers. Crews and guard personnel on the planes he boarded had allowed him the freedom of the craft, and he had even been lodged in transient facilities at stops along the way. His apprehension was purely accidental and would probably not have occurred had he not concealed himself aboard the plane instead of asking permission for the ride, as was his practice. The sergeant was discovered only because of mechanical difficulty with the landing gear and his own fatigue which had led him to board the plane the night before it left. The officer who investigated the case at Ascension conservatively stated that the exploits of the Sergeant led him to believe that "a gross lack of security exists, and therefore places this and other stations in great jeopardy."[269]

This case, and others of a similar vein were reviewed by Major Lowell J. Bradford, GSC Liaison Officer, when he made a security survey of Ascension Island in 1943 at the request of the Commanding General, USAFSA. In addition to many recommendations for physical security, Major Bradford recommended that "...an experienced CIC investigator...be placed on duty...to perform passenger control and other duties..."[270] When the 432d CIC Detachment was assigned to USAFSA, Agent Asa T. Lively was sent to Ascension and remained there until the Command was deactivated.

Agent Lively was sent to Ascension undercover as a War Department Technical Representative. His cover story allowed him to mingle with both officers and enlisted men and he was generally thought to be an investigator for either the FBI or Treasury Department. Lively worked with the S2 of the Air Transport Command at the island and developed leads and conducted such investigations as were requested by Headquarters USAFSA or the operations officers of the 432d.

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269 Ltr, dtd 17 Sep 43, Subject: Stowaway, From Lt Mack G. Walters, from 432d CIC Det File, "Security at Ascension Island," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

270 Memo for Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, Subject: Security Survey of Ascension Island, from 432d CIC Det File, "Ascension Island," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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Conclusion

Just prior to deactivation of USAFSA in 1945 and the subsequent removal of the 432d from the South Atlantic, Major Frank Reed, the CIC detachment commander, summarized the justification and purpose of his unit. He wrote, "The defense of North America is closely allied with South America and in a large degree depends on the backing and unity of the South American countries." Keeping tab on activities in South America, and lending intelligence assistance to those countries during a period of emergency was a necessary activity. Since American Consular officials and Military Attaches, because of their position, were accepted as "official spies," that task fell upon and was performed by CIC.[278]

278 History of CIC in South Atlantic Theater, dtd 30 May 1945, over signature of Maj Frank Reed, 432d CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Appendix 1

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PARTIAL ROSTER OF CIC IN SOUTH ATLANTIC

Bensaude, Jose M.
Mattos, Anthony R.
Ginocchio, Louis A.
Berdaus, Charles S.
Green, John L.
Butterfield, Frederick H.
Dunn, Walter K.
Wright, James A.

These men served at various times as CIC with the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command.

<u>432d CIC Detachment</u>

Reed, Frank J. (Commanding Officer)
Mattos, Anthony R.
Galvan, Frank J.
Cloyes, Robert J.
Lively, Asa T.
Ridge, Jon M.
Tompkins, Edward B.
Wilson, Perry B.

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[redacted]

ARMY Ft Holabird

BOX NUMBER: ///

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XI

AFRICA AND SICILY, WORLD WAR II

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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March 1959
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Section 1

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS ASSIGNED ROLE IN NORTH AFRICAN INVASION

It was late August 1942. The opening offensive of the war was being fought by the United States Marines in the Solomon Islands. Off Guadalcanal a United States naval air task force was winning a decisive victory over the Japanese fleet. Churchill was in Moscow briefing Stalin on the Dieppe diversionary raid and the plans of the British Eighth Army to start its victorious drive at El Alamein in October.*

CIC agents, slightly more than one thousand in number,** were assigned in the nine Service Commands of the United States and in many of the 39 non-combat foreign areas where United States troops already had been deployed. During this summer of the first year of the war, they were making security surveys of Army installations, giving security lectures to troops, checking backgrounds, attempting to plug all leaks through which the enemy might learn of our plans. Many were frankly restive that their role would keep them in the United States or, at best, far back in the rear echelons of overseas commands.

In Washington and in London intensive planning was getting under way for one of the largest invasions in history, the invasion of North Africa which, after many conferences and numerous changes finally, on 22 September, was scheduled for 8 November 1942.*** The plans called for the penetration, with a force of 107,000 men,**** of a coast 800 miles long, extending from Safi on the west to Algiers on the north, and bounding a vast area where the deep-rooted religious and racial hatreds of the heteregenous population posed a political problem that could not be gauged in advance. Although fervently hoping that the few French officials with whom advance negotiations had been carried out would be able to prevent French opposition to our landings, each task force was primed to respond to "Play Ball," the code signal to be flashed to the entire force at the first hostile French act in any sector.*****

Three task forces were organized for the invasion. The Western Task Force, composed of the 3rd Infantry and the 2nd Armored Divisions and the major part of the 9th Infantry Division, reinforced with supporting arms and services, was to sail from the United States to invade French Morocco on the west, from Safi to Port Lyautey, under command of Major General George S. Patton. The Center and Eastern Task Forces were to sail from England. The Center Task Force, better known

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*The Army Almanac, p. 444
**Memorandum from Maj H. G. Sheen, Chief, CIC, 1 Jun 42 (A-10, p. 46) (R)
***Roosevelt and Hopkins, by Robert Sherwood, p. 616
****The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 88
*****The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 88-90

as II Corps, commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall, and consisting of the 1st Infantry Division, Combat Command "B" from the 1st Armored Division and supporting corps troops, was to land in the vicinity of Oran and establish contact on the right with General Patton's force and on the left with the Eastern Task Force, which was to land at Algiers under command of Lieutenant General K. S. N. Anderson, British. The latter was to be a combined British-American force, consisting of British commando and infantry units; two United States regimental combat teams, one from the 9th and one from the 34th Infantry Divisions; and a Ranger Battalion.*

Counter Intelligence Corps Chief Learns of Missions With Western Task Force

In Washington, later in August 1942, the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr., a reserve officer from Princeton, New Jersey, was called to the office of Major General George V. Strong, Director of the Intelligence Division of the General Staff, and told to procure from the nine Corps Service Commands approximately one hundred Counter Intelligence Corps agents for tactical employment.

"When?" asked Major Wise.

"Immediately," was the answer.

To Major Wise this was both a blow and a challenge. Until that moment no one outside the office of the Counter Intelligence Corps Chief had seemed to consider the possibility that Counter Intelligence Corps agents might do their investigating under combat situations with pistols strapped to their belts. Major Wise and Lt Col Gordon Sheen, who had left for England early in August, had visualized this possibility and had drafted a Counter Intelligence Corps Field Manual which was then being staffed through the various War Departments, without being greeted by any particular enthusiasm. It actually was accepted as a "Tentative" Field Manual on 20 November 1942, 12 days after the landings in North Africa. Even when Major Wise was directed to prepare 100 agents for the invasion, it was not clear that they would be expected to work in front areas. Major Wise knew that few of the men available had even one day's training in any of the combat arms — that for many their longest hike had been from the bus stop back to the office. But by the middle of September he had assembled 71 Counter Intelligence Corps men, 58 enlisted and 13 officers, for assignment to Western Task Force for Operation TORCH.**

Major Wise was not the only one confused about the North African invasion. Operation TORCH was credited with being responsible for the addition of the word "SNAFU" to the Army's vocabulary.*** Its code

*The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 89
**Interview with Col (Reserve) Hugh D. Wise, Aug 1953 and Aug 1954
***USA WWII WD Washington Command Post, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D. C., 1951

name was changed three times from GYMNAST to SUPERGYMNAST to TORCH. It was originally planned for March 1942. It was postponed and reconsidered. It was ordered by President Roosevelt for 25 July 1942; was changed to 7 October, to 15 October, to 7 November, and finally to 8 November. General Eisenhower was not designated Allied Commander-in-Chief until 7 August, and the debating phase of TORCH did not end until 5 September, barely 60 days before the final D-Day.* Secretary of War Stimsom wrote in his diary that even the patient General Marshall was stirred up over it. Stimson wrote, "He is naturally tired of these constant decisions which do not stay made."**

It was not until 13 August 1942 that the G2 Section for Western Task Force was initiated with the appointment of Colonel Percy G. Black as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, charged with the organization of his section and the preparation of an Intelligence Plan which would set up an intelligence system for the combat phase as well as for the territorial occupation which was to follow. It was recognized that no accurate estimate could be made as to how long the Western Task Force, widely separated as it was to be from the other Task Forces, would have to operate as a semi-independent force, a situation which placed upon the G2 Section a tremendous responsibility. Hurriedly various sub-sections were formed and assigned their tasks in the planning. Information concerning the area to be invaded was obtained from every available source, processed, evaluated and condensed for distribution to troops after sailing.

The Counterintelligence sub-section was charged with the security of the entire planning, including physical security for the Task Force Headquarters in the Munitions Building and the Ports of Embarkation, as well as with the planning for its own mission. One of the big security problems, one that seemed almost impossible of solution, was found in the preparation of the maps. Prior to this time, most of the maps prepared for the Army had been let out on contract to civilian firms by the Office of the Chief of Engineers. Security forbade this procedure, but production within the Engineer Reproduction Plant offered a hazard almost as serious when it was discovered that only a few of the 800 civilians employed in the plant had ever been investigated. As many safeguards as possible were set up. The finished maps were taken by armed guard to a warehouse in Norfolk, Virginia, where they were sorted and packaged accordingly to troop sailing lists and placed aboard ship for distribution by the Counter Intelligence Corps the second day after sailing. Only sub-Task Force Commanders received the maps before sailing; however, in order to allow subordinate commanders to work out tactical plans without compromising the destination of the Task Force, special beach head maps were made with all names blanked out and with a false North.***

(✓) In retrospect it appears that the planning staff for TORCH had been impressed with the effectiveness of the Field Security Police of the British and Canadian Armies; Field Orders outlining the Counter

*USA WWII WD Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, by Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Off. Chief Mil. History, Washington, D.C., 1953
**On Active Service, By Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, Harpers, 1947
***95-TF-3-2, G2 Annex to Final Report on Operation TORCH (Z-2) (S)

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(U) Intelligence Corps mission in both the Western Task Force and the Center Task Force reveal this influence,* For the largest invasion to date in history, it was necessary that every possible means be used to protect its security, Counter Intelligence Corps agents were trained investigators. It was assumed that a few weeks seasoning with the combat troops, added to their initial 13 weeks basic training, would enable them to carry out this assignment easily. The Counter Intelligence Corps carried it out, but not with ease.

Unfortunately the assumption that the Counter Intelligence Corps agents had had basic military training was not valid. It was true that the War Department had ordered that all inductees be given basic military training before being assigned to any duty, foreign or domestic, and the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, used every means to enforce the order, but the Service Command G2's were caught between critically conflicting responsibilities. All had backlogs of investigations of thousands of persons for sensitive positions. They had night and day work for every investigator they could get; these investigators did not require any basic military training to make investigations among the civilians. So the agents were put to work with the idea that when the pressure eased off they could catch up on the military training requirement. But the pressure never slackened and it was only when it was too late and there was no time that they realized their men were not prepared. No one had told them that the Counter Intelligence Corps had a combat mission, probably because even at War Department level it was a last minute decision. Many wouldn't believe it, but the orders were firm to fill their quotas at once and get the men to Washington for a final briefing before assignment with the combat troops of the Western Task Force, then known as Task Force "A." Soon 71 Counter Intelligence Corps agents, fresh from warm rooms and soft beds of urban life were camping with seasoned troopers of the 2nd Armored and the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions, and calling the harassed Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps harder names than the ground they slept on. They couldn't understand it and the Chief was in no position to argue or explain.**

Invasion Mission Assigned

In assigning to Counter Intelligence Corps its general mission for the invasion, the field orders, drawn up with little precedent for guidance, reveal a far-sighted conception of the Counter Intelligence Corps eventual role in combat as well as of the difficulties Counter Intelligence Corps agents would encounter through lack of understanding of their mission by commanders of other units. This is illustrated by the following excerpt:***

*Extracts from British Manual, "Security Officer's Course Field Security Wing," School of Military Intelligence, Matlock (J-72) (C)
**Interview with Lt Col Hugh G. Wise (Reserve), 8 Aug 53
***9-2, Annex 5 to Final Report on Operation TORCH, G2 Report, Western Task Force (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S)

"It is the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps to provide effective counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversive security of Task Force "A" and to detect and investigate all cases of positive or suspected disaffection, sabotage, espionage and subversion within or affecting the military service. The Counter Intelligence Corps will not serve to replace or assume the responsibility for Provost Marshal operations, tactical combat intelligence or countersubversive installations prescribed for all field force units, but will be considered as a supplemental counterintelligence agency available to the commander for the enforcement of security measures, investigations, counterintelligence discipline, and special protective operations.

"It is essential to the effective accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission that the personnel of the Corps be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent and that they be permitted to operate without restrictions upon their movements or channels of communication. Speed is the essence of counterintelligence, and lateral communication between Counter Intelligence Corps echelons is authorized whenever the circumstances require and by whatever means may be available. Members of the Counter Intelligence Corps are frequently entrusted with extremely hazardous and important missions of a secret nature requiring expeditious action and when engaged upon such missions they must not be delayed by the observance of standard customs and prohibitions.

"The Counter Intelligence Corps has a definite mission to perform and unnecessary hazards in combat action are to be avoided to effect that mission. This is not intended to deter the efforts or retard initiative of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to execute vigorous action in accomplishing their mission. Counterintelligence is a basic function of command and is an operational rather than a staff intelligence agency."

In spite of the firmness of the above directions for the utilization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, certain commanders substituted their own interpretations of the mission of counterintelligence personnel,* an ever-recurring shortsightedness that put the first Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) men who arrived in France in World War I to digging latrines and was still being met during the early days of the fighting in Korea.

Capture of the members of the German Armistice Commission with their documents and records was assigned as first priority for the Counter Intelligence Corps, with the explanation:

*95 TF 3-2, G2 Annex to Final Report on Operation TORCH, Western Task Force (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Virginia) (S)

"The German Armistice Commission has organized Moroccan industry for the delivery of all available raw materials and foodstuffs to the German war machine. Their control extends over all aviation, shipping, port, railroad, storage and merchandizing facilities and related utilities. It must be assumed that the Commission will make every effort to destroy these facilities rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the invading forces intact."

General directions specifically applicable to the Counter Intelligence Corps: "Although it is hoped that the French will not offer serious opposition to the landing of the United States Forces, security plans will be carried out as for an ordinary military operation, and resistance and Fifth Column activities must be expected. Vigorous countersabotage measures will be instituted immediately following the establishment of a beachhead. . . . The enemy can be expected to attempt: destruction of buildings and contents; injury of materiel and introduction of foreign substances into oil, and poison, glass or disease germs into food and water; and the incitation of riots, unrest and disaffection.

"Counter Intelligence Corps officers and men have been attached to the major tactical units and assigned to the various landing forces in addition to the Headquarters Detachment, Western Task Force. Following the assault, these detachments will immediately proceed to designated rendezvous points for the execution of counter-espionage and countersabotage missions. These missions will be designated in secret orders prior to embarkation."

Western Task Force Counter Intelligence Corps Makes Plans -- With 53 Days to Go

On 16 September, just 53 days before the invasion, Lieutenant Colonel William B. Parsons of Seattle, Washington, who was to head the Counterintelligence Section for the invasion, and Major Charles A. Ellis, of Brooklyn, New York, who was to command the Western Task Force Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, were called to Washington to organize the Counterintelligence Sub-Section of the G2 Section, and begin the indoctrination for the mission.*

Shortly after his arrival in Washington, Parsons called in all the officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment for a three-day intensive orientation course from September 21 to September 23. Writing for this period, Lt Col Jack B. Cameron, at that time 2d Lt Cameron, whose service with CIP and the Counter Intelligence Corps then totaled five years, described the situation as one of confusion. He prefaced his narrative by the comment, "Any paper written eleven years after the events it attempts to record and comment upon accurately, suffers one major weakness:

*95 TF 3-2, G2 Annex to Final Report on Operation TORCH, Western Task Force (S)

its author has the benefit of considerable reflection and experience which he can readily employ to accent weaknesses which were non-existent or vague to him at the time the events were taking place.... Obviously, much that appeared important in 1942 today has assumed its proper proportion and, upon reexamination, had no direct bearing on events except as they affected performance of duty...revealing is the fact that today, in the light of the Corps advancement, many criticisms we had in 1942 are not recognizable as our own defense because of our individual and collective unpreparedness brought about by a lack of planning, organization and training, and basic foundations for firm execution."*

Amusingly Colonel Cameron related the experiences of the group that gathered in Washington for orientation. After being shuttled from office to office for several hours, they finally were "herded into a small room whose walls were covered with newspapers (hiding maps of various European areas) and a colonel was ushered in. His address...was a command for the Counter Intelligence Corps to go out and 'Kill, kill, kill!' With these words rebounding in the small room and blanching the faces of the entire group, he was rushed out and extensive orientation ended."

The group then returned to Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters, Colonel Cameron wrote, where they were addressed by key Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who told them that they were "the pick of the crop" and, to accent this point, were told that "there wasn't a man at Headquarters Counter Intelligence Corps who wouldn't 'give his right arm to be in our shoes.'" A huge map, dotted with pins with names attached, was uncovered for a brief moment, but not long enough for any of the men to identify themselves with their pins.

The Detachment was divided into three sections, one to go ashore at Safi with the 2d Armored Division, one at Port Lyautey with the 9th Infantry Division, and the third at Fedala with the 3d Infantry Division.** At the conclusion of the initial invasion, certain designated members of each of these groups were to advance with the divisions, while the remainder were to stay as headquarters personnel in each of the sectors. Second Lieutenant Jack Cameron was assigned to command the 3d Infantry Division Detachment, Second Lieutenant Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen the 2d Armored Division, and First Lieutenant John G. Hammond the 9th Infantry Division Detachment. The Headquarters Section in the Fedala-Casablanca area was to be commanded by Major Ellis, the Headquarters at Safi was to be operated under Second Lieutenant Robert R. LaBranche, and the Rabat-Port Lyautey sector under Second Lieutenant William B. Cornell.***

*Ltr from Lt Col Jack B. Cameron, Hq 450th CIC Det, APO 55, to Chief, CIC, Ft Holabird, Md., Subject: "CIC Operations, French Morocco, 8-11 Nov 42," dtd 9 Feb 54.

**95 TF-2, G2 Annex to Final Report of operations of Western Task Force (Secret), French Morocco (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.), and CIC Plan, Task Force "A" (Papers sent by Col Parsons) (Z-16) (Secret)

***For rosters of these Detachments, see Appendix 1.

For their first brief training the men were sent to the tactical units to which they were to be attached. Cameron and Anthony Cuomo, his senior non-commissioned officer, went to Camp Picket where they found the rest of their group who, upon reporting to Lt Col Mercer C. Walter, the 3d Infantry Division G2, had found him as baffled by their presence as were the men themselves. "Colonel Walter, however, was an intelligent, patient man," Col Cameron wrote, "and after a discussion, we decided that eventually the War Department would spell out a specific mission or employment policy for the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment." In the meantime, they decided that since the men were counterintelligence agents, their job would be security, and on that basis they became security advisers to the G2.

Recognizing that much physical conditioning was needed for the men to pass their embarkation tests, a training program was set up immediately. "Although we were often 'kidded,' particularly when our detachment of five men went alone on full field road marches, our efforts to meet the combat standards of the Division were well rewarded by our being quickly accepted as part of the Division Team," Cameron wrote.

Shortly after their training program got under way, they were ordered to Western Task Force Headquarters at A.P. Hill where they found the remainder of the 13 officers and 50 enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, except the senior officers who had not yet reported in, cleaning cosmoline from Military Police and Headquarters Company weapons. Since the groups that had gone directly to A.P. Hill had been quartered with the Headquarters Company for the Task Force, the Headquarters Commandant had "decided the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were his to use as he saw fit, particularly as no one else wanted to claim what he called 'a citizen's army of misfits.'" The reason for his disdain was apparent. Upon the arrival of the group they had been issued eight pyramidal tents, and when one of the officers plaintively asked, "What shall we do with these?" the Detachment was off to a bad start with Headquarters Company. The situation became worse when the tents were set up, squeezed in uneven ranks between two already established rows of tents, and adopted by Military Police and Headquarters personnel as repositories for trash. the Counter Intelligence Corps never recovered in the eyes of the Headquarters Commandant, upon whom, unfortunately, they had to depend for logistical support after their arrival in North Africa. Calling this, "The bitter fruits of an untrained, non-directed group of excellent men ordered to be soldiers," Cameron added, "That they became excellent soldiers never erased the Gilbert and Sullivan operatic classification initially given this group."

Major Ellis soon arrived and, with "a firm military hand," instituted a training program and assured them that planning actually was under way and that they would be given concrete plans for their forthcoming operations upon reaching the Port of Embarkation.*

*Ltr from Col Cameron

After the bulk of the group left for Camp A.P. Hill, Colonel Parsons and a few of his key personnel remained in Washington to complete the Counter Intelligence Corps Plan for Western Task Force, then known as Task Force "A." As evidence of the feverish pressure of time, the Counter Intelligence Corps Plan was not completed until 40 hours before sailing time, and was rushed by Colonel Bob Harris, traveling by plane, to the various units at the embarkation ports.*

Although the experiences of the different groups varied, all of them during their brief time with units before embarkation, were given a certain amount of physical reconditioning work and training with weapons. They conducted security investigations and surveillances at the request of troop commanders and continued with these duties after embarkation with their units. On board they assisted in the enforcement of general security measures, dismantling privately owned radios aboard ship, enforcing blackout regulations and making certain that electrical devices such as electric shavers and diathermy machines were not used. They had the task of delivering maps to the various units on the ship. In addition they had much to learn about the subversive situation and the persons they could expect to find in the country to which they were going, information which, for security reasons, could not be given to them before sailing. Using the material delivered to them after they were on board, they set up a cross-index card system of approximately 5,000 cards of subversive suspects, arrest targets and friendly informants.**

War Diary Tells of Early Days

The War Diary kept by the Counter Intelligence Corps group assigned to the 2nd Armored Division, the only such diary of this period available to researchers, furnishes, via cryptic notations, interesting and tantalyzing glimpses of the Counter Intelligence Corps day by day activities, from 24 September, the day of their activation with Second Lieutenant Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen in command, to 29 November 1942.***

The early part of the diary carried the group through administrative details, drawing of equipment, eight-mile daily hikes, weapons practices, instructions in the use of landing nets, and orientation on the tactical situation abroad. A rumor that a private at Fort Bragg had heard, via the half-track radio, a broadcast that the Germans were prepared to meet the 2nd Armored Division at sea was tossed into the Counter Intelligence Corps lap from Washington. When traced to its source several days and 47 interviews later, the private admitted that he had "stretched the truth" in "intimating that he had heard

*Interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve), 13 Sep 53.
**G-2 Annex to Final Report on Operation TORCH, Western Task Force (S)
***Counter Intelligence Corps Second Division War Diary (T-26, Unclass.)

the broadcast"; and furthermore, he didn't know how to tune in the half-track radio.

Western Task Force Counter Intelligence Corps Heads for North Africa

The 2nd Armored Counter Intelligence Corps group and a group who were to operate a headquarters in Safi, boarded the ship on 10 October and, after establishing rendezvous with the rest of the convoy in the area of Solomon Island in Chesapeake Bay, sailed on 24 October for the west coast of Africa. They did not know until they were well on the way just where they were headed, or the exact nature of their targets.

The diary for the period aboard the ship reveals that these men were working closely with G2 officers on security problems and on plans for intelligence activities after the landing. They surveilled a suspected major, searched for clandestine radios aboard, checked locations of explosives, practiced firing their guns and studied French and German.*

While the 2d Armored Division Counter Intelligence Corps agents tried to prepare themselves for the coming invasion, other agents were similarly engaged in other parts of the convoy.

Colonel Cameron's group was divided for the voyage, Colonel Cameron, Cuomo and George L. Belt going on the Ancon which carried half of the Division staff and some combat troops, while Richard N. Ryan and John R. Humphreys went on the Division Flag Ship. Training aboard the Ancon, Cameron wrote, was restricted to "briefing and scratchy Arabic language lesson records, a must for all personnel." The material brought to them on the eve of sailing set out certain objectives: Seizure of documents and personnel in the Miramar Hotel, the headquarters of the German Armistice Commission; the detention and interrogation of all suspects of counterintelligence interest found within the Division area; and as rapid a development as possible of contacts with pro-Allied persons in order to gather intelligence and counterintelligence information for the G2. Using these objectives, they were able to formulate some plans.**

Counter Intelligence Corps Planning Begins in England for Center Task Force

Meanwhile at Norfolk House, London, simultaneous with the Western Task Force planning in the United States, officials at Allied force Headquarters, with eyes fixed on the rapidly moving calendar, were preparing the Center and Eastern Task Forces for the invasion of Oran and Algiers. Counterintelligence responsibility for the Eastern Task Force was given to the British, and for the Center, to the United States.

*For excerpts from Diary, see Appendix 2.
**Ltr from Col Cameron.

In September 1942, plans were drawn for the attachment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to tactical units on the pattern of the Field Security Police of the British and Canadian Armies, and authority was established for the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, II Corps Headquarters, by letter dated 20 October 1942, subject, "Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment."*

Behind the three foot thick walls of historic Longford Castle where II Corps had set up its headquarters, Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson, G2, and his staff turned in feverish haste to planning the mission of this newly-adopted child of the combat arms. "The II Corps G2 was a tall, brilliant and temperamental Philadelphia mainliner," wrote General Bradley in A Soldier's Story. "Known in the Army as Monk, Colonel Dickson had been graduated from West Point in 1918. After service in Siberia during World War I, he resigned from the Army. In 1940 he was hustled back into uniform and assigned to War Department Intelligence."**

In this planning as well as in subsequent operations in North Africa, the Counter Intelligence Corps leaned heavily upon the British, who passed on the results of their own four-year campaign against the same kind of administrative difficulties which plagued the Counter Intelligence Corps, in which they had won the cooperation and the esteem of all echelons of command.*** Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferrymen, British Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at Allied Force Headquarters, and Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Hill-Dillon, also British, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under whose immediate supervision Allied Security Intelligence operated, were the authors of many recommendations which were forwarded almost verbatim to the United States War Department.

A paper prepared by Colonel Hill-Dillon during this planning period is particularly revealing as to British influence upon the Counter Intelligence Corps, as well as to the desperate shortage of men to perform the planned mission.**** "Experience had proved in the various theaters of war that a body of men specially charged with counterintelligence or security duties and who work with the various formations is absolutely necessary," he wrote. "In the British forces this want is cared for by Field Security Sections consisting of one officer and 13 other ranks. One section is usually attached to each Divisional headquarters or higher formation and a varying number of sections to GHQ according to circumstances. Important ports and lines of communications headquarters also have sections attached to them."

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*History of the 202nd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (C-26) (R)

**A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 46-47

***Memorandum for General Strong, subject, "The Counter Intelligence Corps in European Theater of Operations and North Africa," 15 Feb 43 (R-27, P 344-349) (R)

****"Training and Organization of Counter Intelligence Personnel," dated 3 Oct 42, by Lt Col S. S. Hill-Dillon, Allied Force Hq. (C-35, British Most Secret)

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Colonel Hill-Dillon pointed out that the U.S. allotment of four men to the Division Headquarters, 13 to Corps and 50 to Army was inadequate and that even to meet this quota it had been necessary to draw men from other units which would be demanding their return upon completion of the TORCH assault.

"It therefore appears a matter for immediate consideration," he wrote, "whether men from the Counter Intelligence Corps or possibly from some other source in addition should be formed into units, trained in accordance with the lessons learned from recent war experiences, and attached to formations for security duties."

He continued with a recommendation that a section of one officer and 10 enlisted men be assigned to each Division, Corps headquarters and Army headquarters and a company to each Force headquarters, all of these units to move with their respective outfits, while similar Port and Lines of Communications Sections, especially trained for their work, would remain static. "This would ensure," he pointed out, "that if a formation moves into a new Theater it will have its C.I. organization with it, without depleting the static layout in the old Theater."

Only 30 Counter Intelligence Corps Men in England

As Colonel Hill-Dillon pointed out, the handful of Counter Intelligence Corps men in England could not possibly be stretched out to cover the planned mission. In all England there were only 30 Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted agents and officers assigned to General Eisenhower's forces and 10 who had arrived from the United States and were awaiting shipment to Iceland. Many of the documents concerning this period either have been destroyed or are hidden almost beyond recall in the archives, but research revealed a number of cables signed EISENHOWER, asking for additional Counter Intelligence Corps agents for ETO forces. Each was answered from Washington with assurances that the men were being assembled as rapidly as possible and that all future combat units leaving the United States would be equipped with Counter Intelligence Corps troops; no additional men, however, would arrive in time for "Special Operations," meaning Operation TORCH. A series of cables from ETO headquarters requesting authority to assign to "Special Operations" nine of the 10 men tagged for Iceland met with steady refusals, evidently since the Counter Intelligence Corps mission in Iceland, discussed in another section of this history, was considered by the War Department as more in line with the type of duty then thought to be the Counter Intelligence Corps sole mission.

On 18 October 1942 the following cablegram was dispatched from Allied Force Headquarters, signed EISENHOWER.*

"All CIC personnel in this theater (exclusive of Iceland) and their names and grades are as follows: Headquarters 8th Air Forces: 1st Lt Charles H. Ovsley; Headquarters 2nd Corps: 1st lt Leonard M. Bessman, Sergeants Harold G. Murphy and Charles E. Conick; Headquarters 5th Corps: S/Sgt John T. Ryan, T/Sgt Gilbert S. Meidrum; Headquarters 8th Ground Air Support Command: Capt Edward L. Ray; Headquarters ETO: Capt Murray C. Falkner, Major Kirby M. Gillette, 2nd Lieutenants James M. Eichelberger and Lyndon B. Allen, Technical Sergeants Frank M. Kearns, Bertram R. Russell and Martin G. Heilman, Master Sergeant Reginald M. Johnson, S/Sgts Paul S. Cooper, Miles H. Copeland, Jr., William L. Jenkins, Jr., Jules A. Nolin, Theodore R. Loney, Oscar Stradinger, George N. Landes, Charles E. Rose, Sergeants William W. Jackson and Robert H. Comfort; Headquarters Allied Forces: Captain Vincent J. Thill. The following Counter Intelligence Corps agents were commissioned 2nd Lieutenants AUS, October 1st: James R. Gardner, Alexander W. G. DePourtales, Edwin B. Smith, Harry L. Amerman. These officers not on duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps but are now on duty with G2, this headquarters. Also commissioned, on October 1st, was Lt Eichelberger shown above. With the exception of Lieutenant Allen and Ovsley and Major Gillette all of the above are scheduled for transfer to Special Operations. Reference your radiogram 1929 WXGRD minimum requirements for Special Operations are 27 men and 9 officers. Unless the Iceland Detachment now awaiting decision in our 3608 (now in London) are released to me as the situation requires the shortage of 9 men cannot be overcome. The assignment of 40 men and 10 officers in question is requested as follows:

40 men and 4 officers to this Headquarters
1 officer to the 8th Air Forces
4 officers to Headquarters, S.O.S.
1 officer to 5th Corps

Request 4 Pfc clerk typists be included among the 40 enlisted men."

Nine Diverted From Iceland

The War Department relented, granting permission for nine of the men destined for Iceland to be added to the TORCH forces, with a reminder that the number would be subtracted from the 40 men being prepared for shipment to the ETO. Accordingly, a cablegram signed EISENHOWER on 21 October 1942 indicated that the following nine enlisted men had been added to the history-making "Special Operations"; Milo M. Jensen, Watson P. Osenbaugh, James E. Cole, David S. Horner,

*Radiogram #3717, 18 Oct 42, from London to AGWAR (CM -IN -07756 -MIS Journal No 151, Oct 18, 1942 (R-27, p 591 (R)

Leonard E. Hanson, Paul V. Derguven, Rudolph P. Gollomb, Donald C. Bucher and James L. Anderson.*

While the 30 men mentioned in the first cablegram were assembling in England, no one had dreamed of the tactical combat role they were to play. The first two, , had arrived in a semi-undercover role with the first U. S. troops in Northern Ireland in January 1942. On 14 July, 15 enlisted men and five officers, under command of Major Gillette, arrived in England, and although assigned to Allied Force Headquarters, were sent by error to Cheltenham. For a month they had busied themselves at making security surveys and investigating one case of suspected sabotage, all the time wearing the uniform and insignia of their rank while the problem was being untangled through correspondence between Washington, London and Cheltenham.**

Security of Invasion is the Counter Intelligence Corps Task

By early October, with the invasion of North Africa barely a month away, these men were settled in quarters separate from the rest of the Army, wearing civilian clothes and concentrating their efforts on preventing opportunities for security leaks. Several agents were dispatched to various places in England, but the majority remained in or near London, charged with the security protection of vital headquarters and secret field exercises and investigations of both civilian and military personnel with the U. S. Army. They also had to find time for a certain amount of training for their coming mission.***

Security was critically important, not only to deny information to Axis agents but to keep the information from the pro-Ally DeGaulle forces in London, a specific order from Washington to Eisenhower because both Americans and British had reason to suspect leaks from DeGaulle's headquarters. General Eisenhower has referred to this invasion as "a most peculiar venture of the armed forces in the field of international politics; we were invading a neutral country to create a friend.**** There could be no leaks to allies where discretion as well as loyalty was not proven.

During this period there was plenty of security checking by the Counter Intelligence Corps of American personnel occupying sensitive positions. Eisenhower had relieved an American officer for a minor security breach. Without their knowing it, he had his personal staff checked and tested.***** Even the top planners were not immune from

*Radiogram #3097, 21 Oct 42, from London to AGWAR (R-27, p. 597) (R)
**CIC Operational History of Theaters (L-17) (R)
***CIC Operational History of Theaters (L-17) (R)
****Crusade in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Doubleday & Doran Co., p. 83
*****Crusade in Europe, p. 76

taking security risks. Counter Intelligence Corps agents would have spent a nervous evening had they known that during the height of the North African planning, the high staff made a quiet trip one night to a movie producer's office in London for a private showing of "The Road to Morocco."*

Widely diverse backgrounds were found among these Counter Intelligence Corps men: a Paris journalist, an immigration inspector, an auto salesman, a Sorbonne instructor, a Swiss auto racer, an attorney, and a Rhodes scholar. Seven spoke French fluently, two German, two Spanish and Norwegian; others had command of Italian, Danish or Dutch.**

At the last moment Crosby Lewis was added to the Counter Intelligence Corps roster, a happy addition as it turned out. In A Soldier's Story, General Bradley described Lewis as one of the "group of brilliant and versatile young officers" whom Colonel Dickson had drawn into his operation. The son of an Episcopal rector of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Lewis had joined the Canadian Army in 1939, shortly after the outbreak of war. Soon after the United States entered the war, he left the Black Watch as a sergeant major to join the American Army in England as a private. Upon the landing in North Africa, he was awarded a battlefield commission.***

To augment the small contingent of Counter Intelligence Corps men available for the invasion, a platoon, selected from the 1st Infantry Division, was sent along with the Counter Intelligence Corps agents, to the British Intelligence School at Matlock for training with the British Field Security Detachment. These men were indicated in invasion orders as "specially trained personnel." Training at the British School consisted of reconnaissance methods, road blocks, seizure of documents and methods of transmitting them back to headquarters, and enforcement of military security discipline. In addition they received a certain amount of training in interrogations and other subjects given in the Intelligence School in Washington, D. C.; however, the greater portion of the training was geared to field conditions, a factor which had received no attention there.****

Only four Counter Intelligence Corps men were committed to the assault forces: Bessman, Murphy, Conick and Lewis, each with a number of "specially trained personnel" to assist them. Bessman and Lewis were attached to the 1st Ranger Battalion, Conick to the 18th Infantry Regiment and Murphy to the 16th Infantry Regiment, all units then under command of the 1st Infantry Division. The other Counter Intelligence Corps men committed to "special operations" were to come in about 10 days later.*****

*Eisenhower Was My Boss, by Kay Summersby, Prentice Hall, N.Y., 1948, p. 33
**CIC Operational History of Theaters (L-17) (R)
***A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley, p. 47
****History of the 202d CIC Detachment (RESTRICTED) (K-26); and interview with Leonard Bessman at NCICA Convention, Chicago, August 1954
*****History of the 202d CIC Detachment (RESTRICTED) (K-26)

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Invasion Mission Outlined

Drawing heavily upon the experience of the British in their use of the Field Security Police, Field Orders for Center Task Force contained specific missions for these "specially trained personnel" during the initial stages of the landing:*

"In order to prevent sabotage, espionage and other subversive activities, Axis agents and sympathizers will be captured as soon as possible. They will be confined, guarded and segregated as other Prisoners of War. Their headquarters, offices and quarters will be searched for documents, ciphers, code and wireless apparati and other matter containing military information. Where possible the aid of Allied sympathizers will be solicited in connection with the search.

"Priority for capture:

"1. As first priority and of utmost importance is the capture of the members of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions.

"2. German, Italian and Japanese consular personnel.

"3. Other Axis agents.

"4. Axis sympathizers - see names listed in Appendix B (copies furnished specially trained personnel)."

The Field Orders continued with the assignment of "specially trained personnel": one officer to Headquarters Center Task Force, one to the 1st Infantry Division and one to British Liaison, 1st Infantry Division; and four enlisted men to Armored Combat Command B, six to Headquarters Center Task Force, 14 to 1st Infantry Divison and one to British Liaison, 1st Infantry Division.

"Specially trained personnel" were to work with their assigned units in the three invasion areas, Arzeu Bay, Les Andalouses and Mersa Bon Zedjar to prevent escape of Axis agents on roads out of Oran. "Suitable detachments," accompanied by "specially trained personnel," were to seize and to search certain specific objectives. One officer and eight enlisted men were to accompany detachments to the Grande Hotel, the Continental Hotel and the Hotel de France, which were being used as headquarters and quarters for the German Armistice Commission; and four enlisted men were to go with detachments to the Italian Consulate and the Hotel Miramar which housed the Italian Armistice Commission.

The orders directed that two of the "specially trained personnel" were to be dispatched to each of the two railway stations to prevent departure of Axis agents by rail. "It may be necessary," the orders

*301-3.9, Field Orders, TORCH Operation, 1st Infantry Division (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Virginia) (S)

read, "to dispatch additional parties of combat troops, accompanied, if necessary, by specially trained personnel held initially in reserve, to other points determined from questioning captives or as suggested by Allied agents. In the event of serious and prolonged opposition by the French, it may be necessary to use them for searching French Military headquarters, and for controlling the French population. It must, however, be kept in mind that their main duty is to round up and destroy the German and Italian subversive organizations in the occupied area.

"Lieutenant Bessman and remaining specially trained personnel from Headquarters Center Task Force will be held in reserve initially by 1st Infantry Division and committed to action only when needed."

This tantalizing statement winds up the Intelligence Annex to the Field Orders:

> "Agents are to perform certain missions prior to H-Hour. Detailed instructions for recognition later."

Section 2

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN ITS FIRST INVASION

For the 75 Counter Intelligence Corps agents crowded on the decks of the dark army transports along with the 112,000* other combat troops of the three task forces on the night of 7 November 1942, there was plenty to think about. Many were convinced that this tactical employment was not part of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission -- that this was a mistake which they hoped they would live to see rectified.** Few, if any, realized that the next day these agents were going to prove the worth of the Counter Intelligence Corps in combat and that this expanded mission would mark a new era in the Corps. From that time on, Counter Intelligence Corps agents would be in the assault waves of nearly every significant landing until the peace was won.

At the moment, as the 110 ship convoys escorted by 127 warships*** steamed toward the dark 800-mile coastline, there were other things to think about. For the 70 agents of the Western Task Force under Major Ellis, and the four of the Center Task Force operating directly under Colonel Dickson G2 of II Corps, there were vital missions to be accomplished in the morning when H-Hour signalled the start of D-Day.**** There were many things to worry about; in fact there were dangers which they, with their limited knowledge, had not even dreamed. General Marshall had said that success depended, above all, on secrecy.***** Had the German Armistice Commission at Casablanca and Oran been warned and escaped? Had the coastal and air defenses recently been improved as intelligence reports, via Berne, Switzerland, had started?****** Had Axis agents, peering through the barbed wire that alone separated the Gibralter airfield from Spanish territory really believed the deception stories that the huge stocks of gasoline and scores of new planes were for the relief of Malta?******* One of the transports had just been torpedoed.********

Then, particularly for the Western Task Force, there was the weather to think about, and those 50 foot swells as the Atlantic hurled itself violently against the rocky coast off Port Lyautey, Fedala, and Safi where the actual landings would be made. Would the French be friendly or would the code signal "Play Ball" flash through the Armada

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*Calculated Risk, by General Mark Clark, p. 01
**Interview with Col Hugh Wise (Reserve), former Chief of CIC, 8 Aug 53
***My Three Years With Eisenhower, by Capt Harry C. Butcher, USNR, p. 44
****The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 90
*****The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 88
******Roosevelt and Hopkins, by Robert Sherwood, p. 460
*******Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, p. 95
********Calculated Risk, by General Mark Clark, p. 102

to indicate that actual hostilities had started?* Was Robert Murphy, American underground Chief in North Africa, right when he warned General Eisenhower that there was a grave danger of assassination by Axis espionage agents?**

Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the convoy realized more keenly than many others the security danger that results when their convoy met and passed an inbound neutral merchant ship. But word had been sent through Allied intelligence agencies, and before the crew and passengers of the merchant ship could talk to anyone, the ship was intercepted and escorted to New York. Crew and passengers were kept out of communication until the North African invasion had been successfully made and the landings well secured.***

Western Task Force Moves In

The Counter Intelligence Corps agents who awakened shortly after midnight as the Western Task Force reached its rendezvous looked out across an amazingly calm sea to shore lights plainly visible along the rim of the continent which had not had a major invasion in centuries. The weather worry was over. This was to be one of those seven non-consecutive days of a month when the 50 foot swells were modified by 10 foot swells from the southwest which made a safe but choppy, seasick sea. Major General George S. Patton, Jr., commanding the Western Task Force, noted in his diary, "God is with us."****

As the sky lightened there was still no sign of an enemy alert. Counter Intelligence Corps agents could feel pleased with their part in the well-kept security. In fact the secret of the landings had been so well kept that afterward French gunnery officers said that they had thought the invasion was merely a raid.***** Members of the German Armistice Commission did not learn of it until six o'clock in the morning, shortly before they were captured.******

But "Play Ball" was signalled. The Safi Garrison Commander ordered "immediate opening of fire" when the first war vessel was seen entering the port, barely two hours after he had received the code message "Danger," flashed from the Moroccan Navy,******* and at 0703 the heavy cruiser Jean Bart, newest warship of the French Navy, opened fire

*The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 68-90
**My Three Years With Eisenhower, by Butcher, p. 145
***Naval Intelligence, NAVPERS 16047, Feb 46 (Staff & Faculty Library. 000930; CONFIDENTIAL)
****War as I Knew It, by General George S. Patton, p. 8
*****Roosevelt and Hopkins, by Robert Sherwood, p. 648
******War as I Knew It, by Patton, p. 9
*******Section 12, G2 Annex to Final Report of WTF, French Morocco (Z-2) (S)

from its mooring in the Casablanca Harbor.* As the agents were heading toward Casablanca, 16-inch shells of the new U.S.S. Massachusetts were screaming over them and into the Jean Bart, and other guns of the convoy fleet were targeting French light cruisers and destroyers. Meantime, on radios that functioned poorly and sometimes not at all,** Colonel Percy Black, General Patton's G2, was trying vainly to get his reports back to Brigadier Mockler-Ferrymen, General Eisenhower's G2, at the Allied Command Headquarters at Gibralter.

Although 360 men were killed and more than 1,000 wounded in the invasion*** the Counter Intelligence Corps contingents made the landings without injury and moved forward with the first wave combat reconnaissance troops to search enemy headquarters, command posts and prisoners, and carry out other assigned missions.

Counter Intelligence Corps Carries Out Its Mission

Only fragmentary records of Counter Intelligence Corps activities during this period are available -- evidently there wasn't much time for writing reports. But, through these fragmentary reports and the citations awarded, a partial picture of Counter Intelligence Corps during these busy days can be rounded out.

Although plans had called for the Division teams to go forward with their units and the headquarters teams to remain as static detachments, it actually did not work out that way, since the fighting ceased even before their initial missions had been completed, and the groups were rapidly shifted around to take care of the immediate security needs.****

The headquarters detachment, commanded by Major Ellis, and the 3d Division team, commanded by Lieutenant Cameron, landed at Fedala under heavy fire. After they were safely ashore, their ship, the Tasker H Bliss, was sunk by a German submarine, taking down with it all their clothing, which had been loaded on a half-track still aboard the ship.***** The first citation, a Silver Star, went to Major Ellis for returning from shore to save the lives of two men who had been wounded and thrown out of the landing boat by the intense fire from a French shore battery.******

Since Cameron had been separated from two of his men for the 16-day voyage and knew nothing of their plans, he arranged to get himself, Cuomo and Belt on a boat that was carrying certain key Division personnel

*Pictorial Record, US Army in WWII, p. 23
**Crusade in Europe, by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, p. 90
***World Almanac, p. 519
****Interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve), 13 Sep 53
*****Interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve), 13 Sep 53
******Commendations, CIC (B-9)

to the Flag Ship at 0400 on 8 November, before the actual landing. Arriving at the Flag Ship, however, he learned from Colonel Walter that Ryan and Humphreys had just left in one of the landing boats--objective Hotel Miramar. Cameron and his two remaining men had to wait their turn in the landing boats, which did not come until about 0800. Since the route to the Miramar ran parallel to the waterfront and was blocked by French and Goumier soldiers, it took them two hours to work their way to the hotel. Arriving there at 1000 hours they found Ryan and Humphreys, a Sergeant and a Pfc, commanding the Hotel. Although the Armistice Commission members had fled at the first shot they had taken all others in the building prisoner, and when one of our naval guns scored a direct hit, Ryan had herded the prisoners to the basement and, leaving Humphreys in command of them, had returned to the lobby to protect the official papers in case any of the Commission members returned for them.

A G2 observer, who arrived while Ryan was holding the hotel, started off in pursuit of the Commission, and shortly after Cameron's arrival returned with several members who had been captured by 3d Division soldiers as they were attempting to flee north to Rabat. In all, nine members were captured and three were killed. Another who was wounded was captured about a month later as the result of the acute observations of a CIC agent. Agent Cuomo, who by this time was assigned as resident agent at Port Lyautey, became ill and was hospitalized at a French hospital in Rabat. While there, he learned that the French authorities were keeping incognito a very seriously wounded German. When Cuomo reported this, Cameron recalled the report that a German Captain from the Commission had been wounded while running a road block at Rabat. The Western Task Force G2 instructed Cameron to remove the Captain to Casablanca. The French doctors at the hospital declared that he could not be moved, but with the word of an American doctor that he could be moved without danger, Cameron overrode the French doctors, and giving them no chance to appeal to higher French authorities, whisked him out by ambulance. The reason for the French desire to protect him was not apparent.

It was learned that additional Armistice Commission papers could be found in four buildings in Casablanca and, since the Counter Intelligence Corps "efforts had been sufficiently rewarding to the G-2," they were given a jeep for Detachment transportation and prepared to move in on the heels of the planned assault on Casablanca on November 11. At the last minute, the French forces capitulated and the Detachment was able to move in with the advanced regimental elements and confiscate considerable personal and official property and German mail.*

The papers captured by the Counter Intelligence Corps at Casablanca and at Fedala were considered a valuable prize, and included the list of the names and aliases of the French Intelligence Service,

*Ltr from Col Cameron; Interview with William B. Parson (Col, Reserve), 13 Sep 53; Commendation CIC (B-9); and History of the 305th CIC Detachment (UNCLASSIFIED) (L-1)

compiled by the Italian Secret Service, and German lists of French collaborators.

Ryan was awarded a Silver Star and a battlefield commission and Cameron received the Legion of Merit.

The Counter Intelligence Corps was not through with the Miramar Hotel. Three days after it was taken over as U. S. Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps agents discovered that it had been wired with listening devices by the French, who had been able to monitor it throughout the German occupation; the French had "neglected" to remove the wiring after our arrival. They also discovered, about a month later, that the French had an elaborate system by means of which they were able to monitor any telephone in the area, also a carry-over from the German occupation days; however, they were unable to establish that any information gained was going to Vichy. Some time later, agents discovered that a radio transmission beam at the Casablanca airport had been left open on a night of a heavy German bombing raid, and was believed to have led them in. While this was under investigation, the suspect was killed in an airplane accident.*

Working with the French police, Lieutenant Spingarn led a team of agents who quickly rounded up 77 Italians in the Fedala area, thus preventing them from becoming a danger to the security of the American Army during the assault.**

In the Port Lyautey area, Lieutenant Hammond's team and the headquarters detachment under Lieutenant Cornell landed with the 60th Infantry Regiment in three assault waves, two of which were under fire. However, according to a report written by Colonel Parsons who took command of the entire detachment shortly after the invasion, these groups were prevented from functioning in compliance with the instructions which had been issued by the G2 Section. Members were employed as Prisoner of War interrogation personnel and were instructed to act under the specific orders of unit G2's without consideration of their assigned mission. As a result, according to Colonel Parsons, the Counter Intelligence Corps did not effect the same results as in the Fedala and Safi areas "where they were permitted independent action in accordance with the pre-determined Counter Intelligence Plan."***

In the Safi Area, Counter Intelligence Corps teams led by Lieutenants Heegaard-Jensen and LaBranche landed under fire and immediately took over the Postal, Telephone and Telegraph offices. They cut all wires leading from that city, and, at a later date, placed all

*Interview with William B, Parsons (Colonel, Reserve) 13 Sep 53
**Counter Intelligence Annex, G2 Section, Western Task Force, 4 Jan 43 (S) (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.); and interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve) 13 Sep 53
***95 TF 3-2, G2 Annex to Final Report of Operations of Western Task Force (S), French Morocco (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.)

public utilities back into operation. They arrested 10 Italians, picked up numerous suspects for questioning, including all members of S.O.L. (Societe de L'Ordre Legionnaire, often called Brown Shirts), and captured a wireless transmitter during the combat phase. Although the S.O.L. members were released, four were later re-arrested in collaboration with the French.*

On the third day of the fighting, Lieutenant Heegaard-Jensen, accompanied by Benjamin, Fox and Funk, traveled through the enemy lines 70 miles west of Safi to pick up Van Ruyn, a German agent who controlled the Arab chieftans in the area, and on the way back detoured to disarm a fort at Oulidia and capture 8 prisoners, 10 automatic rifles and machine guns and 25 rifles. For this Heegaard-Jensen was awarded the Silver Star and Sergeant Benjamin the Legion of Merit, posthumously. Benjamin died on 8 March 1943 as a result of an automobile accident near Rabat, the Detachment's only serious casualty during the North Africa campaign.**

Captain A. L. Howes was awarded the Legion of Merit and Staff Sergeant James P. Furness the Silver Star, bringing the awards won by the men of Western Task Force CIC during the first three days to four Silver Stars, three Legion of Merit awards, and one battlefield promotion.***

Diary Gives Fragmentary Picture of Invasion

The War Diary of the 2d Armored Division CIC Detachment, mentioned previously, gives a tantalyzing glimpse of the crowded days from 8 November to the end of the month -- tantalyzing to the present day reader because these men were too busy to write the complete story.**** This was a period of investigations of flashing lights, rapid making of contacts, hurried searches of buildings and rounding up of suspected collaborators.

Exaggerated Reports Cause Concern

Certain extravagant reports of exploits of Counter Intelligence Corps agents with the Western Task Force have caused concern to some of the men who were there, especially the report that 100 enemy agents were

*95 TF-3-2, (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va., (S); History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1); Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen's file in CRF, (C); and interview with William B. Parsons (Col, Reserve) 13 Sep 53

**Counter Intelligence Annex, G-2 Section, WTF, 4 Jan 43 (Dept. Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (R); History of 305th CIC Det (L-1) (U); Heegaard-Jensen's file in CRF (C); and interview with William B. Parsons (Col, Reserve) 13 Sep 53

***History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) (U)

****See Appendix 2 for Diary excerpts.

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captured during this period.* As Major Stephen A. Spingarn phrased it in a letter written in December 1944 after he had become Chief of Fifth Army CIC in Italy; "It is believed that these exaggerated claims of counterespionage achievement, which are widely known to be thoroughly watered, can only serve to cast doubt upon the very real achievements which have been made in this and other theaters.... It is the considered opinion of this officer...that not only were there not 100 agents captured by CIC...during the period named, but it is doubtful if five documented cases could be furnished in which CIC captured an enemy agent.... French counterintelligence agencies did capture a good many agents and in some cases the CIC did assist the French, but this officer knows of some instances where the French caught and executed spies before the CIC was aware of their capture...."

Another critical analysis was written at the same time by Gerald J. Weber, who, a corporal when he went in with the Western Task Force at Fedala, later received a battlefield commission and a Bronze Star and, by the end of the war had risen to captain and was placed in charge of the Sub-detachment at Salsburg. "CIC agents were inexperienced and inept when they arrived in French Morocco, lacking training of any sort for the actual work of hunting down spies," he wrote. "Experience taught them a great deal, working with European civil and police authorities, working with foreign military agencies, learning how the job of spy-catching might be done, all of which was of great value to them when they were in a position to really begin work in the field of counterespionage.

"What CIC was really able to do in French Morocco," he continued, "was a good job of political and economic reporting. An immense amount of material was gathered on personalities and politics in Morocco, and something of the general picture of international or at least foreign, politics.... The experience taught CIC something about the psychological factors that must be faced by a counterintelligence unit in wartime. They learned what hysteria, rumor and fancy can do to distort simple and innocent facts into grave security cases. They learned that a small light shining from a house a hundred miles inland could not be a signal to enemy submarines. They learned that the way to find out about an unusual phenomenon was to go directly and look into the matter, and not to lie in the woods for a week watching it from afar and making theories about it."

Lessons Learned from Operation TORCH

In summarizing the lessons learned from Counter Intelligence Corps use in Operation TORCH, with Western Task Force, Colonel Parsons

*Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, subject, "Article on Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in North Africa in MID, War Department Publication, "Military Reports of the United Nations," #12, dated 15 Nov 43, from Stephen J. Spingarn, Major, Chief, CIC, Fifth Army, dated 7 Dec 44; and attached statement by Gerald J. Weber, Special Agent (L-9) (R)

pointed out a serious handicap which continued to be the theme song of many Counter Intelligence Corps reports for a long time:

"The absence of approved Tables of Organization for Prisoner of War teams and Counterintelligence and Censorship personnel has proved a distinct handicap, absolutely preventing the promotion of deserving individuals or replacement of personnel. It is recommended that the T/O for a Task Force Headquarters, now approved by the Chief of Staff as a guide only for limited distribution, be approved and that similar tables be prepared for a reinforced Corps operating alone.... Without a Table of Organization, Counterintelligence sections...have no means of procuring or replacing either organizational or personal equipment."*

Lack of the proper planning and issuance of equipment was pointed out. The Counter Intelligence Corps had no assigned vehicles and had to depend upon "liberated" civilian cars for transportation. And then, Colonel Parsons added, they had to be very careful where they were seen in these cars lest someone with higher authority decided to "re-liberate" them. Yet the Western Task Force CIC Detachment carried in with them 25 pounds of moulage! There were no radio monitoring equipment and no directional finders, which made it impossible for the Counter Intelligence Corps to bring to fruition their investigations of the many rumors of clandestine radio transmitters. At one time it seemed very probable that messages were being sent to Vichy from the Jean Bart, but this could not be authenticated because of the lack of equipment.**

Colonel Parsons also stressed the need of training Counter Intelligence Corps agents and the training of Divisional staffs in the use of agents. The necessity for combat training was pointed out by Parsons as it was by many other officers in the months to follow. "Officers who are not highly trained in the tactical doctrine, organization and equipment of our own army, or who have not had extensive duty with troops," he pointed out, "are of no value to the G2 Section."

Colonel Parsons made further recommendations which were to become monotonous in their repetition, chief among which were the need for linguists and the importance of selecting Counter Intelligence Corps agents on the basis of general background rather than on the basis of police experience.

The confusion resulting from a number of intelligence agencies operating in the same area, independently and often at cross-purposes, was recognized in the recommendation that "all intelligence activities in any area should be under control of the Army G2." He pointed out that all these agencies were operating independently in French Morocco:

*Lessons Learned from Operation TORCH, Western Task Force, 24 Dec 42 (I-79) (S)
**Interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve), 13 Sep 53

British Army, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Office of War Information (OWI) and Consular Agencies. His recommendation was not adopted and, although the Counter Intelligence Corps later was able to set up excellent liaison with most of the other Allied intelligence agencies throughout the war, there was always a certain amount of duplication of effort.

Perhaps the biggest lesson learned in North Africa, Colonel Parsons pointed out, was that the United States must not rely upon other countries to furnish intelligence. Americans were unprepared to evaluate information from old-world sources, long schooled in "double-dealing" and professional spying, and we made some errors because of our lack of training and experience. Some friction developed with the British, who doubted our ability to handle intelligence situations and wanted to have all information channeled through them, even in the Western Task Force area where the British had no troops. We were unwilling to give up this control, Colonel Parsons explained; this was a testing ground for the rest of the war, and we had to learn to deal with the complex situations to be met in a field that was new to us.*

Center Task Force Moves In

The Center and Eastern Task Forces left England in convoy on 25 October, separating just before reaching the Straits of Gibraltar. Both parts sailed on into the Mediterranean, overtook slower cargo convoys sent on ahead and continued on toward Malta, as part of a well-planned maneuver to outwit the enemy. At sundown on 7 November each section wheeled southward, the Center Force at attack in three areas near Oran, the Eastern to hurl its strength against both sides of the city of Algiers as well as the port itself.** Here, too, the code "Play Ball" was flashed when French shore batteries greeted the invaders with deadly fire. No official records of Counter Intelligence Corps activity with the Center Task Force are available, but part of the story has been reconstructed through interview with Leonard Bessman, who, with Crosby Lewis and several of the "specially trained personnel," landed with the headquarters section at Arzeu Bay, about 15 miles west of Oran, at H plus four hours on D-Day. They first seized four known enemy agents whose names had been given them in advance and then proceeded to Oran for their next target. Conick and Murphy who, accompanied also by "specially trained personnel" had been given similar initial assignments in their invasion areas, joined them in Oran and the whole group rushed to the Grande Hotel which advance information had indicated was the headquarters for the German-Italian Armistice Commission. In the hotel, which had been guarded by combat soldiers until their arrival, they found about 20

*Interview with William B. Parsons (Colonel, Reserve), 13 Sep 53
**Pictorial Record, U. S. Army in World War II, Office of Chief of Military History, D/A, p. 13

members of the Commission, who, seeing that flight was impossible, had changed from uniform to civilian clothing. Their claim to diplomatic immunity was disregarded; they were searched, interrogated briefly and turned over to proper authorities for shipment to England with other PW's. Numerous documents were seized during these first hurried days, but, as Bessman explained, they were moving so fast that those who seized them never learned the extent of their value.

Soon after the invasion, the soldiers who had been borrowed from the 1st Infantry Division returned to their units, and the remainder of the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who had been left in England arrived in North Africa. The Detachment set up travel controls, assisted the French police in tracking down suspected persons and attempted to develop military secrecy discipline among U. S. troops. They soon learned that another special assignment had been planned for them.*

*Interview with Leonard Bessman, NCICA, Chicago, August 1954

Section 3

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS MISSION PROVES FRUSTRATING

By mid-November Counter Intelligence Corps agents with Western Task Force and with II Corps had finished their work in the actual invasion of North Africa. With a few glowing achievements to their credit and many lessons learned for future use, each group turned to planning its immediate missions which were highly different in nature. Agents who went ashore at Oran with II Corps were to go on (their numbers slightly augmented) through the mud, the setbacks, and the final success of the Tunisian campaign, while those attached to Western Task Force settled down to the anomalous role of a counter-intelligence agency in a liberated country where the strange turnings of political fate made it necessary sometimes to treat with respect enemies who should have been friends and to refuse to help those who really were friends.

This difficult and confusing situation is outlined in a Counter Intelligence Corps report sent to War Department G2 in February 1943:*

"The military, naval and civil administration cadres in North Africa are filled by appointees who either received their jobs from the Fascist Vichy French government after the Armistice in 1940 or who were esteemed worthy by that government of retaining their positions by reason of a long record of reactionary politics." This applied, the report charged, to nearly all in authority, from Darlan on down to mayors, judges and other civil servants in the villages. Whether their collaboration had been for personal gain or because of political convictions, these men, who were acceptable to only about a quarter of the population, were recognized as standing for "ideals which were diametrically opposed to those for which the Atlantic Charter states that British and American soldiers fight."

Darlan's support, the Counter Intelligence Corps reported, was alleged to be found in minority organizations, many of whose members had been on the automatic "pick-up list" prior to the invasion. Principal among these minority organizations, all targets of CIC, were the following:

1. The Parti Populaire Francaise (P.P.F.), Doriot's party.

2. Legion d'Anciens Combattants, Veteran's party under Petain.

*Memorandum for General Strong, subject, "The Counter Intelligence Corps in European Theater of Operations and North Africa," dated 15 Feb 43. (R-27; #344-349) (R)

3. Societe de L'Ordre Legionaire (S.O.L.), a group of "strong arm" men or "Brown Shirts," recruited from the Legion d'Ancien Combattants.

4. The Legion Tricolore, set up by Laval to fight the Allies, particularly Russia.

5. The "colons," wealthy agriculturists who aided the German and Italian Armistice Commissions in the systematic pillage of the country.

6. The Italians who, until 1939, could legally hold membership in the Fascist Party and who had coveted Tunisia as an Italian colony.

7. The Falangists, who had supported Franco and the Axis cause since 1936 and who similarly coveted Oran as a Spanish province.

On the other hand, the Counter Intelligence Corps report charged, the Jews, the Free Masons, the old-style Republicans of the Herriot tradition, and the DeGaullists, the four groups that had furnished the advance information that had made it possible for the TORCH operation to proceed so successfully, had been repudiated by the Allies as politically unsafe, and many of their members had suffered internment because of their part in aiding British and American forces. "...laws forbidding Jews to own property and to practice their professions are still in effect. One can still be prosecuted for listening to an American or British broadcast. On 22 December 1942, a man was brought before the court of Oran charged with being a Free Mason."

Darlan's assassination was observed by a "florid program of elegy" by our Psychological unit, thereby causing the population who had welcomed his removal to "regard us as ingenuous," the report stated, and pointed out that the appointment of Giraud as High Commissioner, followed as it was by the arrest of 12 DeGaullists, had made the Allies' cause even more unpopular.

"The situation is intolerable for all the pro-Allied elements," the Counter Intelligence Corps report continued. "It places British and American forces in a ludicrous position, divides them among themselves and offers ample opportunity to their enemies to contrive disaffection, sabotage, and armed insurrection. Insurrection is in many quarters considered quite possible in the event that the war on the Tunisian front should take a turn for the worse. Such an insurrection would be led by men whose identity is known to the Counter Intelligence Corps, but whom we cannot touch because of the narrow jurisdiction allowed us. Similarly we have not been allowed to investigate reports of arms caches and illicit radio stations."

That this almost intolerable situation was known to those with the responsibility of making the big decisions was little comfort to the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who, as was mentioned previously, found one of their principal missions to be that of political reporting. Merits of the "deal" with Darlan as one of military expediency has been discussed by many writers, but regardless of the high-level reasons, the Counter Intelligence Corps was faced with the consequences.

Counter Intelligence Corps Units Deployed for Static Mission

On 14 November, Western Task Force moved its advanced CP into Casablanca and the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment established its headquarters in a girls' school immediately behind the police station, making use of French police personnel and files. Two days later all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from their units and assigned to Western Task Force. Cameron was appointed Executive Officer and also Officer-in-Charge of territorial coverage from Rabat to the Spanish Morocco border. Since the group that had landed with the 60th Infantry Regiment in Port Lyautey were to be added to Cameron's detachment which was to have its headquarters in Rabat, and incidentally had not been heard from since the invasion, Ellis and Cameron drove to Port Lyautey to deliver the orders transferring the men. There they found the detachment in a small beach house, doing nothing, while the Chief of Staff and the G2, accompanied by Military Police, were out on a raid based on a report that an enemy agent was in hiding nearby.

"When they returned," Colonel Cameron wrote, "Major Ellis presented the orders relieving the CIC personnel from the 60th Infantry Regiment. This was effected, but not before some unpleasantness took place between us and the Chief of Staff, Neither the G-2 nor the Chief of Staff held CIC in very high esteem. Once again, the absence of training and initial guidance as to specific missions had paralyzed the Detachment."*

During the next several months Counter Intelligence Corps agents were deployed throughout French Morocco to meet such counterintelligence situations as might arise because of the many ports subject to sabotage, the long Spanish Moroccan border and a large population of unknown loyalty. This deployment further served to coordinate action, insure dissemination of information and provide a unified policy of liaison with French authorities. Personnel were placed in Casablanca, Marrakech, Safi, Rabat, Port Lyautey, Souk el Arba and Petitjean and later were further deployed to provide coverage for all of French Morocco except those areas covered by the Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections and a large part of Algeria.**

*Ltr from Cameron

**95 TF-3-2, G2 Annex, Operation TORCH, prepared by Lt Col Parsons, dated 24 Dec 42 (R)

Daily Counter Intelligence Summaries written during November and December 1942 give evidence of the rapid change of Western Task Force Counter Intelligence Corps mission from an active counter-espionage role to the static one of protecting the security of American troops and reporting the political situation.*

With the dissolution of Western Task Force in Janaury 1942, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were assigned briefly to 1st Armored Corps, and then, on 9 February 1943, were attached to the newly formed Fifth Army. At about this time, on 4 February, the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) was created as separate from the European Theater of Operations (ETO), but the Counter Intelligence Corps assignment to NATOUSA did not come until a little later.

*Counter Intelligence Summaries, CI Section, Western Task Force (L-9) (R). Excerpts attached as Appendix 3

Section 4

II CORPS REORGANIZED FOR TUNISIA CAMPAIGN

In December 1942, Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson, II Corps G2, reorganized the available Counter Intelligence Corps personnel into a Field Security Detachment.* Its mission was to go with II Corps into Tunisia where Allied Forces had been bogged down by the winter rains, after racing for the area almost immediately after the 8 November landing. German reinforcements shuttled in by the Luftwaffe during this slow-down had set up a bridgehead protecting the Bizerte-Tunis area and extending southward to cover the bases into the coastal plain leading to Sousse, Sfax and Gabes.** The town of Sfax, on the Tunisian coast, became a key point; if it could be taken and held, it would not only break the enemy's communications line but would prevent Rommel's army from joining up with the rapidly increasing German army in the Tunis-Bizerte sector.***

Colonel Dickson had only a handful of Counter Intelligence Corps men to draw from. He had the original four who had gone in on the invasion, Bessman, Conick, Lewis and Murphy; and four men who had arrived from England about 10 days after the invasion: Second Lieutenant James R. Gardner, Technical Sergeants Bertram R. Russell and Rudolph P. Gollomb, and Staff Sergeant Oscar Stradinger. Colonel Dickson added an Italian linguist, Master Sergeant Alfred J. Rapetti from the G2 Section; Privates George Abdo, Syrian-Arabic linguist, and Paul Paone, German linguist, both from Corps Headquarters Detachment, as drivers and interpreters; and Frank Leposa, driver-mechanic. After the defeat at Faid, they picked up a straggler, a native Algerian soldier who spoke both French and Arabic, and kept him, with official sanction, throughout the campaign. During the final weeks in Tunisia, Sergeant Clark B. Keeler and Technical Sergeant Alan F. Dinehart were added.****

These men he placed under command of Captain Horace Miner, described by General Bradley in A Soldier's Story as "a quiet, pipe-smoking professor of anthropology from Ann Arbor, Michigan, who had trekked across the Sahara from a native hut in Timbuktu to get into the war." Colonel Dickson closely coordinated the activities of these men who were described by General Bradley as "brilliant and versatile."*****

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*History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R)
**The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 92
***Calculated Risk, by General Mark Clark, p. 136
****History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); Letter from Horace N. Miner (Lt Col MI Res) Sep 53; and Letter from Roy Tozier
*****A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 48

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The Counter Intelligence Corps contribution in Tunisia was unique. Counter Intelligence Corps agents roved the battlefront as Field Security teams, sometimes ahead of forward reconnaissance elements. They collected combat intelligence information, penetrated enemy lines to organize Arab nets, directed Pyschological Warfare operations, arrested enemy agents, and settled labor disputes -- all in addition to their regularly recognized duties, which included the responsibility for the security of Corps Headquarters, adequacy of the guard and password system, checking of civilians living near the CP, especially during the latter phases, and the handling of classified documents. On all Headquarters moves, they searched the old site for any documents which might be of use to the enemy, and at the first CP were responsible for camouflage security, using an artillery Cub plane for checking it.

Some of the Counter Intelligence Corps Tunisia activities were deleted from its future combat role as being too far removed from the Counter Intelligence Corps basic mission and to expensive in personnel -- two agents were captured and one was killed in Tunisia -- but these activities provided the basis upon which to plan the Counter Intelligence Corps combat mission.*

Horace Miner, now a Lieutenant Colonel MI Reserve, and Acting Head of the Sociology Department at the University of Michigan, has stated that one of the problems in planning the Counter Intelligence Corps role in Tunisia was the overwhelming concern of combat officers with defeating enemy combat troops and their reluctance to provide space for a unit which could not contribute directly to this goal; while its complementary factor was that there was practically no civil population in southern Tunisia to necessitate the use of agents for routine rear echelon security duties.

Miner added: "In the brief period in Oran when the Central Task Force was being reorganized into II Corps for movement to Tunisia, the Counter Intelligence Corps found that some of the civilians with whom highly placed Corps officers had become familiar (delicately put) were very bad security risks. Insistence upon this danger antagonized General Fredendall who initially refused to take any Counter Intelligence Corps agents to Tunisia with him." But Colonel Dickson had recognized the utility of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Miner continued, and finally secured the General's approval by stressing the possible use of the Counter Intelligence Corps in obtaining combat intelligence. Even then, the approval specified that the Counter Intelligence Corps unit must be called a "Field Security Detachment,"

*202-20.2 13157 G2 Report, Battle of El Guettar, 0 Mar 43-8 Apr 43 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S); History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); and Letter from Horace Miner.

the name given to the British equivalent of the Counter Intelligence Corps. "Thus, for the Tunisian campaign, the CIC was carried on the II Corps roster under a unit designation which had no U. S. recognition," Miner said.

Miner paid tribute to Colonel Dickson, who not only directed the Counter Intelligence Corps in its first protracted campaign, but saw to it that they were not tied down with headquarters duties. "His explicit doctrine as Corps G2 was to serve the Divisions. As a result we continually detailed personnel to the lower echelons where they reported directly to the G2's and S2's, who came to find them very useful. This practice, I believe, created the demand for division detachments."*

Leonard Bessman also credited Colonel Dickson with being the person who visualized the Counter Intelligence Corps in an expanded role, and pointed out to General Fredendall the possible usefulness of the Counter Intelligence Corps, not only in achieving security after the taking of a town, but also in escorting reconnaissance companies and in locating enemy information of combat nature as well as counterintelligence. He also stressed their value in training troops of all echelons in the protection of our own documents of intelligence value.**

Colonel Dickson's theories on reconnaissance turned out to be well founded, Bessman explained. Early in the campaign, it was discovered that division reconnaissance units were not probing deeply enough to bring back reports of much value to commanders. On several occasions one or two Counter Intelligence Corps agents would go far beyond the reconnaissance platoon and bring back information at variance with the platoon's report. Invariably it would be learned that the Counter Intelligence Corps information was the more accurate. As a result of this it became almost usual practice for a Counter Intelligence Corps agent to accompany each reconnaissance platoon, not only because they were willing to probe deeper, but because they were more accurate and more detailed in their observations than the ordinary reconnaissance soldier, including in their reports such things as conditions of utilities and communications, and the presence of booby traps and mines as well as an appraisal of the possibility of enemy presence. The specialized selection of Counter Intelligence Corps agents and their training paid off in this combat phase.***

*Letter from Horace Miner
**Interview with Leonard Bessman
***Ibid

According to Miner, transportation for the unit was obtained by devious means. At first they had no assigned vehicles, but on arrival in Tunisia were given a three-quarter ton truck. "More than once," Miner wrote, "this rather inappropriate vehicle moved into disputed territory along with or ahead of reconnaissance forces." Their vehicle was obtained when General Patton personally approved a proposal by Crosby Lewis that he be given a half dozen native Goumiers, with jeep and trailer, to try to ambush an enemy patrol whose movements he knew. "The enemy abandoned the patrol, and the Goumiers rejoined their unit," Miner wrote, "but the jeep remained with the Detachment." While detailed to the 1st Infantry Division, Charles B. Conick and Oscar Stradinger captured an Italian motortricycle, thus Miner explained, "completing our final T/E!"*

For the Counter Intelligence Corps first combat engagement in Tunisia, Miner, Bessman, and Rapetti, with Leposa as driver, went forward to join the reconnaissance unit of a 1st Armored Division Task Force for a raid on the enemy strong point at Sened Station on 1 February. On the way the battle-wise CO of the unit moved them off the road into the desert, thereby escaping a disastrous Stuka attack on the armored infantry moving up the road a hundred yards away. On their arrival in Sened Station they took over a PW as a guide to avoid enemy mines and booby traps. The Task Force set out defensive minefields and withdrew that evening, but Miner and his team remained to search enemy headquarters, which paid off with the discovery of several codes and other valuable documents. A strafing attack on the following morning forced them to withdraw briefly, but they returned to continue their search of enemy mail and the interrogation of civilians for information on enemy tank strength until one hour before an enemy counterattack recaptured the area.** A cryptic entry found in the G2 Journal probably refers to this mission:

"0630A - 31 Jan - Capt Miner called at 0630A; Arrived OK - everything working out all right."***

The story of II Corps' early setbacks in Tunisia, its ill-fated attempt to push through to Sfax on the Gulf of Gabes, its defeats at Faid Pass and Kasserine Pass in February 1943, have been well recorded. The Germans were meeting success in their efforts to prolong the conflict in North Africa, although they had abandoned hope of final victory there. Counter Intelligence Corps teams operated with 1st Armored Division and the attached infantry units which bore the brunt of the fighting in this sector.

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*Letter from Horace Miner

**History of 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); and Letter from Horace Miner

***Red Vault - II Corps - Journal and File, G2 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S)

Murphy and Collumb were up front with Combat Command "A" of the 1st Armored Division when the German Tiger tanks overran our forces at Faid Pass, raced through Kasserine Pass and on through the flat bowl that leads toward Tebessa and Thala. On 18 February, Murphy was killed and Collumb was taken prisoner, the Counter Intelligence Corps first serious combat casualties in World War II.*

A few days later, Miner and Bessman joined Combat Command "B" of the 1st Armored Division, which moved secretly to the west of Kasserine Pass, from where a counter-attack was to be launched. They took up their position at the crest of the only road over a range of hills behind which the Combat Command was assembling and stopped all forward-moving Arabs who might reveal to the enemy the concentration of armor. Those who tried to by-pass the road block were held in custody until after the attack was launched. During the attack they took action to stop the Arabs from building fires in the hills around the artillery positions, which they feared might serve as signals to the enemy positions, Bessman and Miner took their three-quarter ton truck up to the forward infantry line and then proceeded on foot, taking some prisoners, making unit identifications and searching captured positions for documents, which were transmitted to the S2. Native Algerian French soldiers, who had been left behind at the time of the first defeat, began straggling through the lines. All of these were interrogated, not only as a security measure, but also to obtain the information they had picked up about the enemy on their journey.

After Rommel was driven back, Bessman was detailed to find and arrest two Arabs who had stripped and abandoned an RAF officer who had avoided capture after being shot down behind enemy lines. One Arab managed to escape, but Bessman brought the other back for trial.

About this time an Arab line-crosser, who had been sent back by an infantry unit, was turned over to Miner for interrogation. The man admitted that he was a radio agent, trained at Colonel Fiedler's espionage center in Tunis, and detailed his mission, his code and the signal he was to use to indicate if he should be operating "under control." Bessman then took the three-quarter ton truck on up to join the reconnaissance unit of a new infantry division at the front which had been ordered to assist him in recovering the agent's radio in a village beyond our most advanced troops, but which was not known to be held by the enemy. "After a day of watchful waiting during which the reconnaissance unit refused to move into the town," Miner wrote, "Bessman took the truck in unescorted -- an uneventfully." Miner described this as the most striking example of the use of "this rather inappropriate vehicle."**

Early in March 1943, a rejuvenated II Corps, with Major General George S. Patton in command, was assigned the mission of launching a

*History of 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); and Murphy's file in CRF
**Letter from Horace Miner

diversionary offensive at El Guettar while Montgomery's Eighth Army delivered the knockout blow on the Mareth Line. According to General Bradley:

"Soon after his arrival, General Patton called a conference of division commanders at Djebel Kouif to outline his plan for the offensive. Terry Allen's 1st Infantry Division, reinforced with the 1st Ranger Battalion, was to recapture Gafsa and push east through the mountain corridor at El Guettar on the road to Gabes. With the fall of Gafsa, the 1st Armored Division, with a regiment of infantry from the 9th, was to advance over terrain from which it had been expelled in the Kasserine attack, clear the pass at Maknassey, and threaten the coastal plain from that gateway. The remainder of the 9th was to be shifted south to assist the 1st Division when it stumbled into the hornet's nest that lay in the mountains beyond El Guettar."*

A further idea of the scope of the Counter Intelligence Corps achievements in Tunisia and its plan of operations, modeled after the British Field Security Police, can be obtained from the G2 Report for the Battle of El Guettar, from 8 March to 8 April 1943.** This plan was followed throughout the Tunisian campaign. The Field Security Detachment, according to the report, was attached to the G2 Section, with the primary mission of handling counterintelligence and security, with a secondary mission of combat intelligence. During the Maknassey - El Guettar offensive, one officer or non-commissioned officer of the section always remained at Corps Command Post, with direction of the activity of the Psychological Warfare Officer as part of his duty. The others operated as field parties of two members each. Each field party was a self-contained unit, carrying its own rations and bedding.

One field party, known as an "independent party," working closely with the Derbyshire Yeomanry, went out on special missions to employ Arabs for espionage and to assist reconnaissance units. Three field parties were attached to the 1st Armored Division and two to the 1st Infantry Division. One was withdrawn from each of these for attachment to the 9th and the 34th Infantry Divisions after these joined the offensive. These parties operated, in theory, under the G2's of the Divisions to which they were attached. In actuality, they operated more often directly under the G2 of Corps who shifted them around as they were needed.***

The independent party, headed by operated as an espionage section and, in addition to performing special missions themselves, organized an Arab espionage and counterespionage

*A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 51
**202 - 20.2 13157 G2 Reports, Battle of El Guettar, 8 Mar 43-8 Apr 43 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S)
***Interview with James R. Gardner, U. S. Dept. of State

network, securing their agents through the Gendarmerie and through the Caids and Kalifs of known anti-Axis sympathies. Confidential funds, access to special native markets and certain Quartermaster supplies were authorized as payment to the Arabs for their information. According to a plan worked out in February: "Initial requirements of QM supplies will be: 12 suits underwear, wool 2 piece, medium; 12 suits underwear, wool 2 piece, small; 24 prs socks, wool; 24 mattress covers."*

One of Crosby Lewis' missions south of Faid between 1 and 4 March was described by General Bradley: "Lewis learned of Dickson's desperate need for enemy Order of Battle intelligence. He darkened his skin with shoe polish and in company with an Arab set off across the enemy lines. Several days later Lewis reported back to Dickson with the information. Monk (Colonel Dickson) dressed him down for having gone AWOL and awarded him the Silver Star."** On this mission Lewis also arranged to make the Caid of Sidi Bou Zid responsible for the loyalty and movement of Arabs in the desert no-man's land between Faid Pass and Kasserine Pass.***

Dealing with the Arabs was always a touchy problem, at which Counter Intelligence Corps agents seem to have been adept. When the Allied push brought the fighting to Gafsa in mid-March, Conick, aided by a soldier from the Division who could speak the language, set up an office at Feriana where he developed information on minefields and the enemy evacuation of Gafsa from Arabs coming from the area.****

The field parties moving on Gafsa were provided with detailed plans of action before they were sent to the Division to which they were attached for special operations. They entered captured towns and positions with the first reconnaissance units and sent back enemy information through intelligence channels, thereby making it available to front line troops while in process of transmission to Corps.

The G2 Report credits the Counter Intelligence Corps with accomplishment of the following combat missions:

a. Enemy Command Posts, Observation Posts, communication centers, bivouacs, gun positions, vehicles and trenches were searched for documents, which were analyzed and the resulting Order of Battle information checked against observed enemy losses in materiel.

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*Plan for Use of Arabs in Espionage and Counterespionage, Hq II Corps, 28 Feb 43 (J-33) (R); and History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R)
**A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 47
***Letter from Horace Miner
****Interview with James R. Gardner; and Letter from Horace Miner

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b. Civilians in captured areas were interrogated to secure information of mine fields, enemy strength, equipment, dispositions, intentions, supplies, espionage, and location of enemy CP's and officers' quarters.

c. Espionage as well as interrogation of Arabs coming into our lines from enemy territory revealed enemy dispositions, armor, fortifications and activity.

d. Enemy technical materiel was retrieved from American troops, the location of fallen aircraft signalled to the Air Service Command, location of enemy fuel and ammo dumps to Ordnance.

e. Demolitions, mined areas, gun positions, road and terrain conditions were observed and reported.

According to the G2 Report, the Counter Intelligence Corps security missions included recommendations for the control and disposition of Arabs moving through the lines and transmission of such regulations to the Arabs through their leaders; recommendations for and supervision of regulations for the handling of Allied transients, the establishment of road blocks and the use of civil passes. They arrested persons on previously prepared "pro-Axis" lists; and arranged with French authorities for the trial and execution of spies; and for the disarming of the Arabs. They checked the camouflage of Command Posts; reported breaches of security of communications and documents and checked the Corps CP after each move to see that nothing of value was left to the enemy.

Civil relations missions performed were listed: securing of civil records; securing assistance of Arab leaders and giving them directions; evacuation of French citizens from front line towns; reporting instances of looting by American troops; and obtaining information from local gendarmes.*

When the II Corps attack was launched from El Guettar in two prongs, Miner went with the 1st Armored in the northern thrust toward Maknassey where he added to his mission a count of abandoned enemy artillery, including unit and caliber, a welcome bit of Order of Battle data to Colonel Dickson. Moving into the hills on the right flank of the drive, south of Sened Station, he narrowly escaped capture, but was able to report the location of a bypassed enemy infantry company supported by artillery. The company put up strong resistance on the following day before surrendering to a battalion attack.**

The "hornet's nest" mentioned by General Bradley in his book was the frantic effort of the enemy to shake off II Corps harassment of his flank while fighting for his life at the Mareth Line. II Corps

*202 - 20.2 13157 G2 Reports, Battle of El Guettar, 8 Mar 43-8 Apr 43 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S)
**Letter from Horace Miner

diversionary offensive was successful because it caused the enemy to divert panzer corps forces, thereby easing the strain on Montgomery's Eighth Army. But it was a painful experience for II Corps and its Counter Intelligence Corps agents, as they advanced over steep rocky hills, filled with crevasses where the enemy could hide, with every passable gap carefully planted with anti-tank mines. But they threw back the attack and moved on north to join in the final asault on Bizerte. General Patton departed to plan for the invasion of Sicily, and General Bradley took over II Corps.

Miner wrote of the capture of Bessman on 7 April. "Ordered to search for documents at Bordj el Hafey, which the southern thrust was to have captured, Bessman rode into a strong enemy force, General Patton having decided to bypass the position at the last minute. Bessman's jeep was drilled through by an armor-piercing shell. He brought the enemy under automatic pistol fire, covering the withdrawal of the driver to warn Colonel Dickson, who Bessman knew was to follow him shortly. Finally wounded by machine-gun fire, Bessman was taken prisoner, but Colonel Dickson was warned in time."*

For this Bessman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross "for extraordinary heroism against an armed enemy."**

"On 7 April 1943," the citation reads, "Lieutenant Bessman attempted to enter El Hafey Bordj in advance of armored reconnaissance elements for the purpose of securing documents and other identifications in the area vacated by the enemy. He found a strong natural position, held by enemy machine guns, two field pieces and a tank. With great presence of mind, he sent his driver to the rear with information of the situation while he engaged with rifle fire, after calling upon them to surrender. He maintained a fire fight against overwhelming odds for at least two hours, enabling his messenger to warn friendly troops of the presence of this enemy force, which was in position to do great damage to any force approaching it on the Gafsa-Gabes road. Lieutenant Bessman never rejoined his unit, but has been reported as missing in action. His conduct was in accordance with the highest standards of the military service and reflected great credit upon himself and upon the Army of the United States."

An excerpt from Ernie Pyle's column shortly after this sheds further light, not only on this episode, but on the Counter Intelligence Corps operations as well:

"Northern Tunisia - (by cable) - As is bound to happen in wartime, your close friends sometimes disappear.... The closest friend I've got so far is Lt Leonard Bessman, a lawyer from Milwaukee.... We have almost definite proof that Bessman was captured and not killed....

*Letter from Horace Miner
**G. O. #33, Hq N Af TO, U. S. Army, 13 May 43 (Bessman's 201 file)

I've mentioned Lennie Bessman before in these columns.... His bravery was a byword among us long before he was captured. It was a bravery based upon idealism -- the invulnerable kind of bravery -- and it was inevitable that sooner or later he would die or fall prisoner.... He was up forward of our advance troops, for that was his job, and suddenly he found himself cut off, with a German tank in front of him and a machine-gun next on his side. Lennie jumped out of his jeep, pulled his .45 and yelled at the heavily armed enemy, "Come on out and I won't shoot!"*

The words, "up forward with our advance troops, for that was his job," gives a fair idea of how far removed was the Counter Intelligence Corps actual performance in combat from the textbooks at the school in Chicago.

But Bessman was to be heard from again. Writing of him in A Soldier's Story, General Bradley said, "Another of Dickson's most promising young officers was Captain Leonard M. Bessman of Madison, Wisconsin. After graduating from the University of Wisconsin, Bessman joined the Marine Corps in 1929 to fight as a private in the Nicaraguan campaign. Commissioned after having enlisted in the Army in 1941, Bessman was wounded and captured by the enemy while on reconnaissance with Dickson in Tunisia. In Italy he broke out of a PW camp to spend six months with partisans in the hills before making his way back to Allied Lines."**

In telling of this experience many years later Bessman explained that he and his driver ran into the enemy armor in a pass which, he had been told erroneously, one of our reconnaissance forces had gone through several hours before. He was wounded and captured while providing cover fire for the escape of his driver. His first feeling, he explained, was relief that he had left his Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badge at Corps Headquarters. As a result the enemy assumed that he was an ordinary infantry Lieutenant, and, since they realized that they were doomed in North Africa, evidently considered that anything he could tell would be only of passing interest. They therefore respected his refusal to answer any questions beyond the routine, authorized ones. "They did try to get me to talk over the radio, assure me that my voice would be heard by my parents," he said, "but I merely laughed and they laughed too and said, 'You know better,' and I said, 'We all do.'"

Bessman made two unsuccessful attempts to escape before he was flown to Italy and hospitalized in a prison camp there. After his recovery he was taken to an officer prisoner of war camp.

*Ernie Pyle's column, undated, from Bessman's 201 file
**A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 40

With the Armistice in September 1943, about five and a half months after his capture, the camp was taken over completely by the Germans. When Bessman learned that preparations were being made to transport them to Germany by rail immediately, he and two other lieutenants promptly began to survey the situation to find the best means of escape. The camp was surrounded by two barbed wire fences, about 15 feet apart, but the gate to the inside fence was left unlocked for the use of the sentries. That night they chose a time when two sentries had met in the area of the gate and had turned to go in opposite directions. They were able to slip through the gate and climb the outer fence and escape to a wooded section. They heard shots which they later learned were directed at them, but managed to escape to the protection of some Italian farmers. They had previously heard that most of the Italians, farmers particularly, were sympathetic to the Allied cause, and they found this to be true. For five and one half months they lived in the hills and in caves and were fed and cared for by the Italians, who also gave them civilian clothes.

They were discouraged by the Italians in their plans to break through the lines, because the area, a static one, was under constant patrol by the Germans and any person not in German uniform would be apprehended immediately. Finally the Italian underground informed Bessman and his two companions that a plan had been worked out. They were to go to a little canal and ask by name for a former American Italian who had been deported to Italy because he had been arrested for smuggling Chinese from Canada to the United States and who was now heading a unit in the underground. From then on they were passed from guide to guide, and, often accompanied by women, were taken finally through the lines, by way of a cemetery. In the meantime their party had been augmented by a few British officers and soldiers and a few civilians, until, with their two guides, they were a party of 12.

Their narrowest escape came on the last night, which they spent in the trap door attic of a farmhouse, in which two British officers already were hiding. A few minutes after their arrival German troops raided the house, but fortunately did not notice the trap door to the attic.

The following day they were taken to a British airborne unit to whom they were able to give considerable information concerning enemy ammunition dumps, gun positions and supply routes they had observed. The British immediately sent over bombing and fighter planes to attack these installations.*

Bessman was returned to the United States where, records have revealed, it was ruled by War Department officials that under no circumstances would he be permitted to return to the Theater because

*Interview with Leonard Bessman at NCICA Convention, Chicago, August 1954

of the danger of recapture.* However, a few months later, he was in Europe with the First Army CIC Detachment, where he was specializing in testing a German escape route near the front lines.

Lewis goes on Mission with Arabs

A scrap of paper pasted in the G2 Journal for 21 April 1943, and headed, "By telephone from Lt Crosby Lewis to SPEEDY2 (SPEEDY was the signal code name for II Corps) Via S2, 894th TD (Tank Destroyer Battalion) and G2, 9th Infantry Division," gives further evidence of the Counter Intelligence Corps activities on the battle front:

"To Colonel Dickson from HECTOR. Will confirm tomorrow reliable report enemy holding line J-324053 to J-335067 behind two separate minefields. According to local Arabs no enemy patrols in valley of Oued Sedjenane since before 13 April. Reconnaissance confirms only two possible crossings of Oued Sedjenane east of J-2083 are bridge at J-2303 and cement and stone ford at J-3306, latter impassable 40 hours after heavy rain. Am in liaison with SLIPPERY."**

This Lewis mission is further reflected in the coldly impersonal words of the official Operations Report for the period 20 April to 27 April, and the imagination must be called into play to see the dirty Arab costume, the blackened face, the rocky, barren mountains and the flies. Lewis was given the mission, according to the report, of obtaining information about the enemy from the local Arabs in the Oued Sedjenane Valley. This mission was hampered by the fact that the Arabs had been evacuated behind the lines and that contact was made with the enemy within 24 hours after he arrived in the area; however, "he was able to locate the extensive minefields in the area and to inform the units committed of their limits."***

The shift of II Corps to Northern Tunisia for the final drive on Bizerte and Ferryville on 23 April involved new problems for the Counter Intelligence Corps, as operations were now in an area densely populated with both French and Arabs. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated a civilian control system from an office in Beja until it was moved to Ferryville at the end of the campaign on 9 May. With the decision to evacuate all Arabs from the area except those required for the vital harvest of crops, the problem of determining which ones were good security risks became a consuming one; also, since the

*Bessman's file in CRF
**Red Vault -- II Corps Journal and File - G2, 13-30 Apr 43 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (S)
***202-59.2, Hq II Corps Office of CIC Corps Operations Report, 20 Apr 43, (Department Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (C)

movement of those permitted to stay was carefully restricted, espionage missions became less effective during the period.*

The successful attack toward the final objectives developed into fast moving, open warfare, and a team headed by Miner entered the French Naval post of Ferryville with an armored reconnaissance unit. Here a number of Counter Intelligence Corps targets had been assigned, including the Naval Headquarters, post and telegraph offices, police station, prison and enemy headquarters. As the only Allied troops who remained in the town, the Counter Intelligence Corps team was soon faced with a tense situation. Since the police were unable to deal with looting and riots against collaborationists, they had to call for infantry assistance until order was restored. On 10 May, the day after the Germans had surrendered throughout the II Corps sector, the French Admiral La Fleche, former Vichy commander in Ferryville, staunch Nazi collaborationist who had been active throughout the German occupation in suppressing Free French activity and resisting the Allies, returned to the city to command the Naval Post. ... ordered the Free French flags run down from public buildings and threatened the loyal chief of police with removal. His reappearance brought the dock workers and civilians to the verge of revolt, and it was evident that a quick decision was necessary. Miner made the decision and arrested the Admiral, accomplishing it without interference from his followers by picking him up early in the morning as he left his mistress' apartment. He then persuaded the dock workers to return to their work of maintaining our supply lines. For this and for his action at Sened Station, Miner was awarded the Legion of Merit.**

James R. Gardner headed the field part that entered Bizerte on 8 May ahead of the 9th Infantry Division, while enemy machine gunners and snipers were still active. He secured valuable records of pro-Axis organizations, siezed civilian mails, made contact with French government authorities and returned to report the situation to Division, thereby winning both a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart.

The Tunisian campaign ended 102 days after the invasion of North Africa. With its ending, II Corps participated in the first unconditional surrender of Axis forces to the American Army, and read with pride a letter of commendation from Brigadier General K. W. D. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Allied Force Headquarters:

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*202 - 0.3 (12052) II Corps Report of Operations, Capture of Bizerte and Surrounding Territory, 23 Apr-9 May 43 (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.) (U); History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); Interview with James R. Gardner; and Letter from Horace Miner

**History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R); and Letter from Horace Miner; and Ltr Hq II Corps, Subject: "Rear Adm Normad de la Fleche," dtd 25 May 43 (K C Depot - 6 - 10 - 283 (S)

"The activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, II Corps, have been followed with keen interest by this office during past and current operations in Tunisia. Despite the lack of appropriate field training, adequate equipment and sufficient personnel, the section has borne casualties and other hardships with fortitude and has performed its mission with exceptional efficiency. As the first United States CIC unit to undergo extensive field service in this Theater, you have established a splendid example for other sections to follow. It affords me great pleasure to forward this letter of commendation."*

In commenting on our intelligence activities in North Africa, General Bradley pointed out a situation that has been noted by certain military leaders during every time of stress in which the country has found itself:

"In their intelligence activities at AFHQ, the British outstripped their American colleagues. The tedious years of prewar study the British had devoted to areas throughout the world gave them a vast advantage which we never overcame. The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings. For too many years in the preparation of officers for command assignments, we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as intelligence. It is unrealistic to assume that every officer has the capacity for field command. Many are uniquely qualified for staff intelligence duties and indeed would prefer to devote their careers to those tasks. Yet instead of grooming qualified officers for intelligence assignments, we rotated them through conventional duty tours, making correspondingly little use of their special talents. Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in some stations G2 became a dumping ground for officers ill-suited to line command. I recall how scrupulousy I avoided the branding that came with an intelligence assignment in my own career. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the army would have found itself badly pressed for competent personnel.**

Evidence of the courage and ingenuity of the "uniquely qualified reservists" of II Corps CIC is seen in the awards won by this small group: Distinguished Service Cross, Bessman; Silver Star, Lewis; Legion of Merit, Miner; Bronze Star, Gardner, Stradinger and Conick.***

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*Ltr, Allied Force Hq, file B-369.513, Subject: "Commendation," to CO CIC Section, from Brig Gen K. W. D. Strong, ACofS, G-2, dtd 1 May 43 (K-26)

**A Soldier's Story, by General Omar Bradley, p. 33

***Decorations, Citations and Awards (A-5)

II Corps CIC Detachment, later redesignated the 202d, went on to Sicily and Italy. By the end of the fighting in Italy on 2 May 1945, the 202d had been in combat for a record-making total of 620 days; this was the Counter Intelligence Corps veteran outfit. Deactivation came on 26 June 1945, at Cormona, Italy.*

Captain Miner, Lieutenant Lewis and Sergeant Keeler, with Privates Abdo, Leposa and Paone as driver-interpreters, remained with II Corps for the invasion of Sicily. Lieutenant Gardner was assigned to Eastern Base Section and Dinehart and Stradinger, now commissioned a Second Lieutenant, to I Armored Corps, which actually was a "cover" name for Seventh Army, used during the planning stages for deception purposes. Russell became CO of the 3d Infantry Division CIC and Conick CO of the 9th, both having been commissioned as Second Lieutenants.**

The remaining members of II Corps went up to a bivouac area at Relizanne, near Oran, where they were joined by several new members, to prepare for the jump-off to Sicily. Roy Tozier, one of the newly assigned members, told of a significant incident during this waiting period. One morning, after a brief warning from Colonel Dickson, Brigadier General William B. Kean, General Bradley's Chief of Staff, came to inspect II Corps CIC. "The inspection went well," Tozier recalled. "The men were as clean as the dust permitted, and the guns were presented properly. When the inspection was over, General Kean said, 'At ease,' and made us a little speech which I won't forget:

"General Bradley has asked me to come over not only to inspect you, but to talk to you. I remember some of you from Tunisia, and I hope to get to know the others who have come as replacements. General Bradley is proud of the work you did in Tunisia, and he expects even more of you in the coming operation. We're glad to have you with us. Good luck!

"The sieve of my memory may have missed a few words or a comma," Tozier wrote, "but, essentially, that is what he said. I wonder if you can imagine what that meant to us. We were a strange group of college men who might have been officers in other branches of the service, but most of us had chosen to be corporal and sergeant-agents. After the message from General Bradley, there was no doubt in our minds that the CIC was the best of all possible places to be."***

*History of the 202d CIC Detachment (K-26) (R)
**Roster of CIC Detachment, NATOUSA, 7 Jun 43 (R-11, pp. 517-537) (R)
***Letter from Roy Tozier

Section 5

CONSOLIDATION OF ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

While II Corps men were fighting in Tunisia, their activities and accomplishments were closely studied by Counter Intelligence Corps and G2 planners at AFHQ, who were charged with defining the Counter Intelligence Corps new role of counterintelligence for rear echelon areas and field security with combat troops. The problems of organization posed by this dual role threatened at times to overshadow all of the Counter Intelligence Corps accomplishments and lessen its future usefulness.

As for the static mission, the Counter Intelligence Corps had managed by the end of January 1943 to get its feet well on the ground, but planners knew that unless certain problems were solved quickly, by firm organization and definition of mission, even this gain would be lost when the Counter Intelligence Corps teams who had been committed to the invasions of Sicily and Italy moved out.

The static mission continued to be mainly that of political reporting, but agents were also obtaining good experience in hunting down enemy agents, sifting rumors, and setting up effective security measures. A general counterintelligence situation report for the static area of North Africa for the first half of January 1943* reports increased efficiency in the interchange, evaluation and dissemination of information and the establishment of closer liaison with French Security Militaire officers in all districts. Border and visa control for the Spanish Moroccan border instituted in cooperation with French authorities and resulted in considerable intelligence information.

The friendliness between Franco's Spain and the Axis and the proximity of Spanish Morocco made it necessary that an alert be maintained against a constantly rumored influx of Axis spies. It was reported that enemy agents were entering French Morocco under cloak of Spanish diplomatic immunity, not only for espionage purposes but with the mission of persuading various leading Arabs to organize native revolts. One widely circulated rumor of an anticipated native revolt caused the French to close the port of Casablanca to all natives on the night of 10 March, with the loss of 3,400 man-hours work.**

Increased friendliness of the native population was noted, but French groups who were dissatisfied with the regime in French Morocco were continuing to expect the removal of all leaders who manifested collaborationist sympathies before 8 November 1942.

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*Counter Intelligence Summary, Hq I Armored Corps, ACofS, G-2, CI Section, 27 Dec 42 to 15 Jan 43 (L-9) (R)

**Counter Intelligence Summary, Hq Fifth Army, 25 Mar 43 (L-9) (R)

Security awareness was increased by various means. Among these was the interception of indiscretions of U. S. personnel in discussing classified military and naval information, via a monitoring unit operated by three Counter Intelligence agents in the offices of the commercial telephone exchange in Casablanca.*

Recommendations Sent to War Department

But Counter Intelligence Corps and G2 officers at AFHQ, feeling that experiences in North Africa had proved that the Counter Intelligence Corps mission had expanded far beyond that previously visualized, were busy trying to define this mission within the limits of what they knew would be expected of them by field commanders and sending forward to the War Department recommendations for changes in organization and training to meet these demands. Certain problems which continued to harass the Counter Intelligence Corps throughout the war were outlined in a letter to the Chief, CIC, dated 15 February 1943, written by Lt Edwin B. Smith, who had been vouched for by AF Hq as a person well acquainted with the situation there.**

"Partly because the CIC is a function of Command, there has been a persistent failure to adhere to War Department policy. The several detachments within the Theater have been regarded by the G2's or the Headquarters Commandants of their respective units as private property to be housed, equipped, assigned and relieved of duty without consultation of higher authority.... Many intelligence officers have no knowledge of the existence of the CIC, and many G2's and Chiefs of Staff have an inaccurate concept of its mission. There should be thorough instruction in the subject at the Command and General Staff and Intelligence Training Center schools, and there should be a positive program to inform responsible officers already in the field. Much of the mystery surrounding the CIC will be dissolved by the early distribution of the basic field manual accompanied by a cover letter from the War Department."

The manual to which he referred had been drawn up by Major Wise and Colonel Sheen before CIC embarked on its first combat mission in November 1942 and, with Wise piloting it through all the necessary branches of G2 and G3, had finally been accepted as a tentative Field Manual on 20 November 1942. Prepared before the Counter Intelligence Corps had spent one day in a combat zone, it contained sufficient guiding material and information to serve as a basis for a working detachment; yet it still had not been distributed to the persons who needed the information.***

*Counter Intelligence Summary, Hq I Armored Corps, ACofS, G2, CI Section, 27 Dec 42 to 15 Jan 43 (L-9) (R)
**Memorandum for General Strong, subject, "The Counter Intelligence Corps in ETO and North Africa," dated 15 Feb 43 (R-27; 344-349) (R)
***WD Basic Field Manual, MI, CIC (Tentative), 20 Nov 42 (R) (C-56)

Recommendations also stressed the need for acquainting finance officers with the policy of funds for Counter Intelligence Corps expenditures, a policy which had been promulgated by the War Department, but of which finance officers were uninformed. Transportation difficulties were outlined. In the field the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was required to operate semi-independently of the headquarters to which they were attached, and yet had to depend upon these units for transportation which often was not forthcoming. A Table of Basic Allowances, the recommendations stated, would eliminate this problem.

Pleas for linguists were sent forward with statements ranging from, "It is believed that future operations will require that CIC detachments be composed of personnel at least 80 per cent of whom speak the language of the particular country involved," to "CIC personnel who do not speak the language of the country in which they are to operate are valueless."

With the Counter Intelligence Corps experiences in North Africa as a basis, changes in the curriculum at the school in Chicago were recommended. It was pointed out that subjects taught at the school were aimed at static conditions in the United States and could not be applied to battle conditions where the Counter Intelligence Corps team had to operate in a forward position as a highly mobile, if noncombatant unit. Subjects dealing with such topics as the Civil Service Act, laws of search and seizure, burglary and warrants, the making of plaster casts and moulages, and military correspondence should be dropped in favor of some training in armed and unarmed combat, map reading and Order of Battle Intelligence.*

Records reveal an unusual spirit of cooperation at all levels between the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments and Britain's counterpart, the Field Security Section, and at Allied Headquarters the two organizations shared the same office and pooled their personnel and equipment for maximum efficiency. Counter Intelligence Corps reports from this period readily recognized the superiority of training and operation of the British units.

The Mediterranean Base Section was set up to cover the ports of Oran, Nemours, Arzeu, and Mostagnem, and plans were made for the establishment of additional Port Sections for the protection of shipping until footholds could be gained on the continent. However,

*Consolidated CIC Monthly Situation Summary, ETOUSA, to ACofS, G2, WD, (U), Washington, D. C., 8 Feb 43 (R-27, -- 351-364); and Ltr, subject, "CIC ETOUSA," to Chief of CIC thru ACofS, G2, WD, Washington, D. C., 28 Jan 43 (R-27, pp 365-395) (R)

early in March 1943, Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman outlined the need for certain static Counter Intelligence Corps units in addition to these Port teams.* These units were a necessity, he pointed out, since the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments assigned to units of Fifth Army would move out when Fifth Army was assigned a fighting mission, a plan which then was well under way. A static organization should be in operation so that "the subsequent commander responsible for the territory may have at his disposal personnel acquainted with local conditions who will remain in the area irrespective of the moves of units necessitated by operations of war." This organization, to be known as the Moroccan-Algerian Detachment, was to be allotted five officers and 40 men, to be increased by ten men as soon as sufficient personnel became available. However, it was not until 1 August 1943 that such a detachment, known as the Border Control Detachment, was established to continue operations after Fifth Army left North Africa for Italy.

Needs for the tactical units again were considered with the conclusion that an "irreducible minimum" would be one officer and five enlisted men per division; two officers and 11 men per Corps; and five officers and 40 men per Army Headquarters. At the time of Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman's recommendations mentioned above, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in North Africa totaled 29 officers and 150 enlisted men. These included the original Western Task Force and II Corps men, 40 men who had arrived in February from the United States under command of Captain Floyd C. Snowden, a few who had been locally recruited, mainly from G2 staffs, and a few who had come in with other units. These men were now distributed as follows: Allied Force Headquarters, two officers, seven enlisted men; Fifth Army, 17 officers, 96 enlisted men; II Corps, two officers, five enlisted men; VI Corps, two officers, 11 enlisted men; Mediterranean Base Section, four officers, 14 enlisted men; and North Africa Air Force, two officers, 17 enlisted men. His estimate of an "irreducible minimum" was 60 officers and 390 enlisted men.

In about mid-March 1943, with the arrival of a detachment of 27, under command of 1st Lieutenant John Rubsam with 1st Lieutenant John Crystal as executive, the Atlantic Base Section was set up to cover the ports of Casablanca, Fedala, Port Lyautey, Safi, Mogador and Agadir. Later the Eastern Base Section was set up to carry part of the load along the Mediterranean coast. This detachment was under command of Captain Ralph Powers, who later was to become CIC Chief for AFHQ and to win a Legion of Merit award for his work in both positions.**

*Ltr from ACofS, G2, AFHQ, to C/S AFHQ, subject, "Reorganization of Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment," dated 2 Mar 43, file B-309. 513 - A (C-35) (R)

**Decorations, Citations and Awards (A-5)

Lack of Control a Handicap

Records of this period are confusing. Almost the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the situation itself was confusing. Each Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and sub-Detachment in the outlying areas seemed to be working away at what it considered to be its mission, cooperating with or wrestling with its G2 control according to the personalities involved, obtaining transportation through the generosity of unit motor officers and tapping other sections for necessary supplies. Counter Intelligence Corps units had been supplied with equipment for fingerprinting and moulage making, handcuffs, listening and recording devices, cameras and developing facilities -- all the equipment that a highly specialized investigative unit in the United States could need. Those concerned declared that much of this equipment was of no value in a combat or near-combat situation, and actually represented a burden, especially when it had to be moved from place to place in borrowed jeeps.*

An illustration of the state of confusion and the need for overall policy planning may be seen in a report written by Major Wise in March 1943, based upon an interview with an agent returned from North Africa for hospitalization. One difficult problem in his particular detachment was concerned with clothing. Each morning they would line up in the street for roll call in uniform and then go into the house to change into civilian clothing for their day's work. All members of the detachment were required to stand frequent formal inspections, regardless of the press of investigative duties at the moment. If a surveillance were underway, it had to be dropped -- and often was lost -- because of these inspections. Pay presented another problem: each month an agent was sent out from Casablanca to obtain the signatures of all the personnel spread out over the whole western part of North Africa. According to the report, agents were forced to spend much of their time on work having no relationship to their mission, including frequent duty as chaffeurs for headquarters officer personnel. Agents were greatly frustrated by the soft-pedalling of cases because of political considerations, and especially by the iron-clad rule that the names of all confidential informants must be furnished to headquarters, with little provision for protecting these names from persons who had no connection with intelligence matters.**

Fifth Army CIC units were deployed all over Morocco and Algeria from Safi to Oran; there were units with the Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections, with the North Africa Air Force and with VI Corps; and Counter Intelligence Corps men with II Corps were in the thick of the fighting in Tunisia. Planning was under way for the invasion of Sicily. Yet there was no centralized Counter Intelligence Corps

*Report of the General Board, USFET, G2 Section, Study #13, Nov 45 (I-89 (R) and interviews with James R. Gardner and John McDonough

**Memorandum for Colonel Roderick, 10 Mar 43, signed by Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr. CIC Depot, 6-12-310)

authority in the Theater and no administrative means of shifting agents as needed or of stabilizing their mission. It was keenly felt at Allied Force Headquarters that, from the lessons learned during the North African invasion, the Counter Intelligence Corps must assume the mission of counterintelligence regardless of previous concepts of the Counter Intelligence Corps as a static investigative organization.*

An interesting and humorous sidelight on the confusion of this period is furnished by Roy Tozier, now of San Francisco, who was one of the 27 who arrived in March for the Atlantic Base Section. On a bitterly cold night, 28 February 1943, they were loaded on a truck and taken aboard the "Andes" in New York Harbor. "No one told us where we were going," Tozier wrote, "but because we had been issued mosquito netting and because we knew that some Americans were in North Africa, we deduced we were going there!" After their arrival in Casablanca they learned for the first time that they had been preceeded by the Western Task Force CIC Detachment, the group that had made the landing on 8 November 1942. It was here also that they learned that some Counter Intelligence Corps men were with combat troops in Tunisia and that they too would go into combat in the next operation. Among his group, Tozier humorously added, "was Bill Tyng, son of the last of a long line of missionaries in China. Bill had been chosen for the Counter Intelligence Corps because he spoke perfect Mandarin Chinese. So he was sent to North Africa and he couldn't speak French. He worked hard to learn French and succeeded. When he mastered French he was sent to Naples where he laboriously learned Italian, fell in love and married a charming Italian girl. It was then -- and only then -- that he was sent to the Orient, leaving his bride in Italy."**

Early in February 1943, Colonel Hill-Dillon and his American assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Roy A. Stephens, joined in an appeal that Colonel Sheen, former Chief of CIC, who was then on duty as a Counter Intelligence Staff officer in the ETO Headquarters in London, be sent to North Africa to help in establishing some kind of uniformity among Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and in coordinating their activities under Allied Force Headquarters.*** Colonel Sheen, an aggressive and practical staff officer, long a visionary of forward area counterintelligence as a Corps mission, arrived in Algiers on 15 March 1943 and, after 60 days temporary duty at AFHQ, was assigned permanently, and is credited with establishing administrative order out of chaos.

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*Ltr, Field Office, Counter Intelligence Corps, AFHQ, subject, "Tactical History of CIC in Theater," 15 Feb 43 (D-5) (U)
**Ltr from Mr. Roy Tozier, 229 19th Avenue, San Francisco, California
***Ltr, Field Office, CIC, AFHQ, subject, "Tactical History of CIC in Theater," (U) dated 15 Feb 44 (D-5); and Memorandum for General Strong, subj. "The Counter Intelligence Corps in ETO and North Africa," dated 15 Feb 43 (R-27, pp 344-349) (R)

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Colonel Sheen immediately made a tour of Algeria and Morocco where he saw at first hand the countless problems; inadequate T/O's,* where there were any T/O's at all; financial inequalities -- in many places Counter Intelligence Corps agents who were separated from their units were unable to obtain commutation of rations; unequal division of French linguists; lack of transportation; little provision for promotions; and misuse of the Counter Intelligence Corps by G2's and other authorities. Upon his return to Algiers, Colonel Sheen set up four goals in order of their urgency: the creation of a central Counter Intelligence Corps authority which would unify the Corps within the Theater; a directive establishing the mission and organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the tactical operations then being planned; the establishment of a training school in North Africa to instruct Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the combat counter-intelligence mission and to prepare them for life in the field; and a definition, in the form of a directive from higher headquarters, of the unique functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps in its static role in the North African Theater.

Certain Goals Attained

The first of these he accomplished on 20 April 1943 with the establishment of the North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, (NITOUSA),** Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment to which all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the Theater were assigned, although remaining for duty in their present stations. From then on, all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel arriving in the Theater were assigned to this Detachment, which had the authority to place them on detached service with combat or service units anyplace in the North African Theater. This Detachment soon acquired the permission of the Theater Commander to issue its own travel orders. Major Edward L. Ray, Jr., who had come to North Africa with invasion forces as Commanding Officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps group attached to Allied Force Headquarters, was placed in command, with Major Vincent W. Thill as Executive Officer.

With this initial step out of the way, Colonel Sheen, accompanied by Major Ray and Lieutenant Hoegaard-Jensen, who had been selected to command the projected Field Training School, visited the Tunisian front to examine at first-hand the activities of Counter Intelligence Corps agents there who were operating as a Field Security Section with II Corps and to consult with Field Security Personnel of the British Army. This trip, which took the party to advance posts observing the to-be-famous Hill 609 and the tremendous British artillery barrage before Enfidaville, furnished the basis for a formalized tactical counterintelligence mission, which was put into practice by the Counter Intelligence Corps a few months later in Sicily and the Italian mainland.

*Tables of Organization

**Ltr: Hq NATOUSA, File - AG - 322.099/046 A-M- Subj: "Constitution and Activition of CIC Det NATOUSA," dtd 20 Apr 43 (C)

Upon the return of the party to Algiers, there began a period of feverish activity during which the headquarters of CIC Detachment NATOUSA was set up in a two room villa at 55 Rue Foureau Lamy, a few hundred yards from Allied Force Headquarters in the St. George Hotel; a CIC Tactical Directive and a Table of Basic Allowances for Tactical Units were published, and a Field Training School was launched. It was in a very real sense a race against time, for the headquarters of Force 141, assigned the task of planning the invasion of Sicily, had asked and had been promised, that when the United States troops embarked for the operation against Sicily, every division and every Corps would be provided with a fully trained Counter Intelligence Corps unit, in addition to a section for the Seventh Army itself and two separate Port Sections attached to the Army headquarters.

With the publication on 10 June of a NATOUSA CIC Tactical Directive,* based upon the War Department (Tentative) Field Manual, first published on 20 November 1942, and broadened in scope by lessons learned during actual field operations in North Africa, and a Theater Table of Basic Allowances,** the Counter Intelligence Corps achieved a status upon which future planning could be built. The directive set up a Theater T/O under which promotions could be made, and provision for reinforcement of sections by the Detachment Commander when the situation demanded it. A Divisional section was defined as one officer and five enlisted men; a Corps section, two officers and 11 enlisted men; and an Army section, five officers and 45 enlisted men. Each section would operate under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the unit to which it was attached. This directive furnished the basis for a very similar one published on 27 July 1943 in London for the European Theater.***

The Counter Intelligence Corps Mission Defined

Both directives stated the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps as the prevention and detection of covert activities which might endanger the United States and Allied Forces. The ETOUSA directive states, "CIC Sections will not be used on Combat Intelligence missions," while the NATOUSA directive qualified with, "except those bearing on Security or in cases of emergency." This provision was subject to wide interpretation throughout the war.

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*Ltr, Allied Force Hq, file AG 37.2-3 GBI - AGM, subj, "The Counter Intelligence Corps," dated 10 Jun 43, (R-11; #298) (R)

**Ltr, Hq NATOUSA, AG 400.34-2 B-M, subj, "CIC Tables of Basic Allowances for Division and Corps," dated 6 May 1943 (C-35) (R)

***Ltr, Hq ETD, file AG 322 MGB dtd 17 Aug 43, subject, "The Counter Intelligence Corps, ETOUSA," dated 27 Jul 43 (R-27; #192 and R-27; #72-78) (R); and Ltr, Hq ETO, Maj F. A. Calvert, Chief, CIB to Col L. R. Forney, MIS, W/D, 22 Jun 43 (R-27, p 257) (R)

The only other major difference between the two directives was that while the ETOUSA directive assigned certain duties to the Counter Intelligence Corps "at the completion of the initial attack," in NATOUSA CIC was assigned to those duties "during the attack." Armed with maps showing enemy headquarters, important offices and public utilities in the target area; instructions as to the disposal of captured documents; and lists of suspects and persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause, Counter Intelligence Corps agents were to perform the following missions, either "at the completion of" or "during" the initial attack:

1. Search enemy headquarters, billets and personnel and seize significant documents.

2. Arrest known enemy agents and dangerous sympathizers and place less dangerous suspects under surveillance.

3. Contact and cultivate known friends to be used as informants.

4. Inspect public utilities, enemy supply dumps and all other installations requiring protection; and arrange for adequate guard.

5. Seize telephone exchanges and radio stations, including their records, and arrange for their protection against sabotage until they are turned over to authorized signal or communications personnel.

6. Stop all civil communication by mail, radio, telegraph or telephone except those of a local emergency nature.

7. Insure that all mail in local drop boxes is impounded and turned over as soon as possible to Field Censorship teams.

8. Transmit to the Provost Marshal all information within his purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civil police, and the extent of disorder, looting and sabotage.

9. Advise concerning the seizure of civilian arms.

10. Stop publication of all newspapers and other periodicals.

11. Familiarize themselves with local political, social and religious affairs and the character and associates of leading personalities.

12. Take necessary measures to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and materiel by our own troops.

During a period of withdrawal, the Counter Intelligence Corps was to search evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, ammunition dumps and supply depots for documents or materiel which would be of value to the enemy, and if unable to safeguard such materials, destroy them by the most effective available means. They were further to check the control of refugees along routes used by troops to eliminate the possibility of enemy infiltration.

The Counter Intelligence Corps general duties included advisory responsibility for the security of headquarters, bivouac areas, supply lines and depots and water supply; the investigation of all cases of possible subversion or harmful rumors within the armed forces; and security education through periodic lectures.

Division Sections were to advance with the units to which they were attached, turning over to the Corps Section all information and responsibility concerning the area to the rear of the Division. The Corps Section would then occupy the area until the arrival of Army CIC Section, which, in turn, would hand over the jurisdiction to a permanent or static section upon the arrival of the Army Service Forces. No section would relinquish counterintelligence and security control over a town or area until relieved by the section attached to the next higher echelon.

Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were authorized to wear brassards on their left arms, bearing the letter CIC, and were not to be used for guard, fatigue or other normal company duties.

An interesting addition was made to this directive in July 1943, illustrating a reluctance to dispense with a Counter Intelligence Corps agent's services even in case of capture. The captured agent was directed to organize security with the PW camp; assist the Escape Committee within the camp or to organize one if none was in operation; and help maintain morale of fellow prisoners. He was to assist the senior officer or non-commissioned officer in the camp and to pass on to him any instruciions he may have received from "A" Force representatives, "if he is satisfied with the reliability of such officer." All Counter Intelligence Corps agents were also instructed by this directive to establish contact with personnel who had escaped from enemy hands and arrange for their passage to the nearest official intelligence officer responsible for interrogation.* Later, in plans for the invasion of the Continent, the Counter Intelligence Corps was given the assignment of such interrogations.

*Ltr AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM, Hq AFHQ subj., "Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 25 Jul 43. NOTE: "A" Force, mentioned above, is believed to be the same organization that later was known as "Special Forces," whose responsibility was with their underground activities. (KC Depot 7-6-58) (SECRET)

The publication of a Table of Basic Allowances by Headquarters NATOUSA on 6 May 1943 gave to Counter Intelligence Corps Sections their own transportation, three jeeps per Division Section and five per Corps Section, each equipped with SCR 536 radios, and armed them with cal .45 pistols, M-1 rifles with bayonets, Thompson sub-machine guns, hand grenades, and TNT with fuses and detonators. Additional equipment such as lock-pick sets, hand cuffs, binoculars, and field desks were alloted.

The Field Security School which opened at Aine El Turk under command of Lieutenant Heegaard-Jensen* had, of necessity, to limit its course to 20 days, since it was desired to send as many men as possible through it to meet the demands of the coming Sicilian and Italian invasions. Since the Counter Intelligence Corps had to be able to operate with and live with the Infantry, basic familiarity with Infantry weapons was included in the course, as were a physical hardening program and practical field training in map reading, first aid, scouting and patrolling, booby traps and anti-personnel mines. Lecture and discussion time were devoted to the Counter Intelligence Corps Field Security mission, the Corps relationship to other intelligence agencies, the British F.S.S., the O.S.S., O.W.I., and O.N.I.; enemy espionage and sabotage organizations; enemy Order of Battle; security of sea and air ports. Basic techniques such as searching individuals and enemy Command Posts, interrogations, securing of a town from a communications standpoint, identification of enemy documents, the use of TNT, and security lectures to troops were included. For some of the subjects, outside experts were brought in to lecture and answer questions. In no case was anything like absolute mastery expected. Time was short; counterintelligence in the field was a last-minute addition to the mission of the Corps, and experience was left to be the final instructor.

Writing about this school from memory ten years later, Roy Tozier, who was to move on to Sicily and Italy with the famed II Corps CIC Detachment, recalled that at Aine El Turk, which was popularly called CIC-By-The-Sea, located on a plateau overlooking the Mediterranean, they were instructed in detecting booby-traps, bayoneting dummies, boxing, codes for use in case of capture, document interpretation and pistol shooting. "But chiefly," wrote Tozier, "we made sand hikes. We walked a million miles in that sand, sinking in slightly above the knees each step. Apparently someone had the idea that the Counter Intelligence Corps needed toughening. Ridiculous. We had fought our way through some of the toughest stag lines in some of the best universities." Later, writing of Sicily, Tozier added, "Actually Sicily was our school. The only part of the curriculum of CIC-By-The-Sea that helped us were those blank sand hikes."**

*Ltr, "Training Program for CIC School to Open near Oran on 5 May 1943," to Sheen, from Heegaard-Jensen, 29 Apr 43 (Z-8) (R)
**Letter from Mr. Roy Tozier, August 1953

With the publication in May 1943 of a directive outlining the functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps in its static role in North Africa,* Colonel Sheen achieved the last of his first four objectives, but the task of educating unit commanders on how best to utilize the Counter Intelligence Corps in the accomplishment of the over-all mission was still ahead, as were the procurement of sufficient personnel to meet field team requirements and a recognition by the War Department of the changed mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps. As time went on, an increasing number of Field Commanders came to rely upon Counter Intelligence Corps teams for the accomplishment of specific missions, but the procurement problem remained acute, and certain echelons of the War Department did not come to see eye-to-eye with Colonel Sheen on the use of Counter Intelligence Corps for field security.

No "Meeting of Minds"

At the same time that Colonel Sheen was bombarding Washington with requests for additional personnel, for more basic combat training for CIC agents, and for changes in the curriculum at the Counter Intelligence Corps School in Chicago to meet the combat counterintelligence requirements, similar requests were being sent forward by Brigadier General James C. Crockett, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at ETO headquarters in London.

In a letter to Major General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, in July 1943, General Crockett pointed out that the original concept of the Counter Intelligence Corps as "a party of highly trained investigators somewhat on the lines of the F.B.I.," while satisfactory in the Zone of the Interior and the Communications Zone, did not meet the need in the combat zone, where the call for such investigators was limited. "Our own experience in North Africa and study of British experience in other theaters," General Crockett wrote, "indicates the necessity for a counterpart of the British Field Security Detachments. These Detachments must be composed of selected personnel, well-trained as soldiers, who must also have counter-intelligence training. They are not under-cover agents but aid in security education of troops prior to combat and perform specific counter intelligence missions of a positive rather than investigative nature in the Combat Zone.... CIC Detachments attached to Division and Corps Headquarters should... be thoroughly trained as combat soldiers in order to perform field security duties in the Combat Zone. Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments with divisions in this Theater have been performing less and less the duties of special investigators and more and more the duties of field security." General Crockett further stated that the allocation of

*Ltr, Field Office, CIC, AFHQ, subject, "Tactical History of CIC in Theater," dtd 15 Feb 44 (0-5) (U); and ltr NATOUSA, subj., "Counter Intelligence file AG 322-097 (BM, dtd 4 May 43 (C) (KE Depot 7-6-55)

of one officer and five men per Division and two officers and 11 men per Corps, for which Colonel Sheen in North Africa was begging, would be inadequate for operations on the Continent and asked that an additional pool of one officer and nine men per Division be set up at Army level to supply reinforcements to Divisions when needed.*

General Strong's answer to General Crockett detailed a number of steps that had been taken during the previous two or three months: the existence upon a minimum of eight weeks basic training; the establishment of a weapons course at the preliminary training schools in the Service Commands, intensification of physical training, the addition of a number of courses at the Advanced Training School at Chicago, and the opening of a CIC Staging Area in Baltimore. But the call for more men was firmly refused. "Due to the limited overall strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," General Strong wrote, "it is not practicable to increase the size of the CIC Detachments attached to Divisions. Actually CIC Detachments with Divisions are being reduced to one officer and three enlisted men." General Crockett's case for the training of CIC in field security work was met with, "Every effort is being made to improve the CIC personnel in investigative, military and physical training. It is not believed that the CIC can properly do the much needed counter intelligence job with its limited personnel if it has to carry the field security load too."**

Letters to Colonel Sheen were written in stronger words. A letter from Colonel H. R. Kibler, Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, on 8 July 1943 reads, "Requested increases in the authorized strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps have not been favorably considered by other General Staff divisions.... no immediate prospect exists for an increase in that strength.... Since the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is a rear echelon mission of neutralizing enemy agents, and does not involve combat intelligence or combat counter-intelligence, the personnel being sent to you will not be picked for their capabilities in combat nor will they be specifically trained for combat duties. It is the desire of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, that Counter Intelligence personnel be used to accomplish the mission indicated above rather than combat duties."*** Colonel Kibler stated that 70 enlisted men, including 15 Italian linguists, were slated for shipment to North Africa within 60 days, but implied that would be all. Colonel Sheen's most recent request

*Ltr from Brig Gen James C. Crockett, ACofS, G-2, Hq ETO, to Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS, G-2, WD, Washington, D. C., 6 Jul 1943 (R-27; #229-230 (S)

**Ltr from Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS, G-2, WD, to Brig Gen James C. Crockett, ACofS, G-2, ETOUSA, dtd 14 Jul 43 (R-27; #69-70) and (R-27; 218-219) (S)

***Ltr to Col Sheen from Col Kibler, subj., "CIC Personnel," file MID 322.999 CIC (7-8-43), dtd 8 Jul 43 (R-11; #357-362) (R)

had been for an additional 180 men to bring the Theater T/O to its full strength of 437 men.

Colonel Sheen did not give up. "Regardless of the opinion of other General Staff Divisions of the War Department," he wrote on 25 July, "this headquarters is confronted with a serious problem in providing the minimum security (counterintelligence) measures essential to the protection of static installations, extended lines of communications, and tactical Air Force and Ground Force units, from the covert activities of the enemy. The only medium through which this task may be accomplished is personnel. At the moment of writing this letter we are receiving urgent requests from the Commanding General, Seventh Army, for additional CIC personnel to serve in Sicily."*

Colonel Sheen pointed out again the handicap suffered by the lack of a War Department T/O which was denying advancement to qualified enlisted men who were being offered commissions in other branches of the army. He attached a copy of the directive mentioned above and pointed out the sections pertaining to the use of the Counter Intelligence Corps as ordered by the Theater Commander, with the added comment, "Enemy agents do not confine their activities to our rear areas."

The interchange of letters continued without, as Colonel Kibler expressed it, a "meeting of minds."** In August 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh D. Wise, Jr., then Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps, left Washington for a tour of the ETO, North Africa, the Middle East, Iceland and Greenland, in an attempt to iron out some of the problems that beset Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments and charged with the responsibility of getting the Counter Intelligence Corps activities back in line with the War Department's conception of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission.***

The flow of recommendations continued -- recommendations for a Basic Field Manual to establish uniformity of mission and command; for changes in training to meet the changed mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps; for Tables of Organization to allow uniformity and deserved promotions; for Tables of Basic Allowances to ease the transportation and supply problem; and, above all, for linguists. Much was done to help the situation, both at War Department and at Theater level, but none of the problems were completely solved. Changes were made in training, but they came after the flow of CIC

*Ltr from Lt Col H. G. Sheen, ACofS, G2, AGHQ, dtd 25 Jul 43, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIC, MIS subj., "CIC Personnel". (R-11; #294) (R)

**Ltr to Col Sheen from Col Kibler, dtd 18 Aug 43, file MID 322.999 CIC (R-11, pp. 138-140) (R)

***Memo for ACofS, G-2, subj., "Travel Approval," dtd 2 Jul 43, file MID 201-Wise, Hugh D. (7-2-43) (R-11; p. 371) (R)

agents to the combat areas had slowed to a trickle. The Basic Field Manual was still under consideration as this was written, eight years after World War II had ended.

Sheen Makes His Report

In a report to the War Department* in November 1943, shortly after his return to the United States for a short period of temporary duty, Colonel Sheen reviewed the lessons learned in North Africa and the steps taken to profit from them, and made numerous recommendations for immediate action that should be taken at WD level as well as for future planning. In general he classified the handicaps under which American Military Intelligence had been operating since its "resurrection" in 1940:

"1. Lack of appreciation of the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence due to the ignorance of these subjects on the part of a vast majority of officers of the Army;

"2. Untrained and unqualified commissioned personnel selected and assigned to duty as G-2's and S-2's, Ground, Air and Service units. In this connection it is the writer's opinion that graduation from the G-2 course at Fort Leavenworth does not constitute proper training of a G-2.

"3. Lack of support to the A.C. of S, G-2, War Department, from other General Staff divisions, especially the G-1. This situation exists in lower echelons as well;

"4. Entirely too much attention devoted to the subject of combat intelligence and not enough to counterintelligence, field security and the higher conceptions of strategic intelligence in the training of G-2 personnel;

"5. Antiquated methods of operation;

"6. Inadequate collection, faulty evaluation, and inadequate dissemination of intelligence, all as a result of the five handicaps listed above."

All of these factors, Colonel Sheen said, contributed to the fact that the counterintelligence situation, as it existed in North Africa, was "one of almost utter confusion." This state of confusion was enhanced, he said, by the operations of the following uncoordinated Allied intelligence organizations: "British Intelligence Service; the French Intelligence Service; the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); a partially trained, loosely organized American Military Intelligence Service; the American Consular officials, who, prior to the invasion,

*Ltr to ACofS, G-2, WD, Washington, D. C., subj., "Report of Counter-intelligence," dtd 19 Nov 43, signed H. G. Sheen, Lt Col, GSC (SGF Library Files)

had performed certain intelligence functions, and who wished to continue such activities; the North African Economic Board; the Office of War Information (OWI); Psychological Warfare; and Joint Intelligence Collection Agency." Each of these was attempting to counter attempts at espionage and sabotage from a myriad of organizations operated by the German, Italian, Spanish and Vichy governments.

Through the cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel Bill-Dillon, British Counterintelligence Officer at AFHQ, British and American security reached "a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence," Colonel Sheen said, and intimate liaison was established with the French Securite Militaire (SM). Cooperation with other American intelligence organizations, however, was practically nil; and, in the case of OSS, and to a lesser degree, Psychological Warfare, their activities were such as to be a menace to U. S. Intelligence. Since the problems which arose in connection with OSS are treated at length in another chapter, Colonel Sheen's remarks are omitted here. Psychological Warfare, in direct contradiction to AFHQ orders that no civilians would be hired without G2 clearance, continued to employ numerous individuals who were carried on the G2 and French suspect lists. This was particularly dangerous since their work was of such nature that these employees could come into possession of highly secret information concerning future operations. In one case Psychological Warfare employed in their headquarters at Algiers a native who later was taken into custody by the Counter Intelligence Corps, turned over to the French and executed.

Colonel Sheen pointed out that experience had proved that there can be no rigid dividing line between positive intelligence and counterintelligence, and since the two are so interdependent, military intelligence should be so organized as to permit each to make use of the other. Based on experiences in field operations in North Africa, Colonel Sheen recommended that "serious consideration should be given to the organization of a unit within the Army which could be designated as an 'Intelligence Battalion,'" to consist of a headquarters and service company, a Signal Intelligence Company, Engineer Topographic Company, a Counter Intelligence Corps Company and a Prisoner of War Interrogation Company. Such a battalion, he pointed out, would be considered as Army troops and attached to the Corps Hq for service under Corps G-2, or in such manner as the situation might require. This battalion could be organized merely by utilizing already existing units and their equipment and placing such units into one organization under a single commander and under the control of the one man who needs their services most -- the G-2.

"The G-2 of any tactical unit is the only staff officer who must deal with unknown elements," he stated. "G-1, G-3 and G-4 at all times deal with known Tables of Organization, known Tables of Basic

Allowances, known supply, known terrain, etc. On the other hand, the G-2 deals with the enemy, his order of battle, his capabilities, his equipment, and his covert activities. This fact is not sufficiently appreciated by commanders and staff officers until after the first engagement with the enemy."

Colonel Sheen made numerous recommendations concerning matters previously treated in this chapter, such as need for linguists, need for training officers in other branches of the Army in the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and increases in Tables of Allowances. In addition, he concluded his recommendations with the following, which has been made by many officers since:

"That the AC of S, G-2, War Department, convene a board of officers to study the organization of military intelligence in comparison to the intelligence services of other powers and to submit recommendations for the establishment of a permanent intelligence corps. Until our military authorities recognize the importance of intelligence, and authorize the establishment of a permanent corps of professional specialists in this field, the United States Army will continue to suffer from mediocrity in one of the fundamental factors of success in battle."

The Counter Intelligence Corps Ready for Sicily

By the end of June 1943, on the eve of the jump-off to Sicily, the NATOUSA CIC Detachment consisted of 42 officers and 207 enlisted men,* considerably short of the "irreducible minimum" of 60 officers and 390 enlisted men set by Brigadier Mockler-Ferrymen in March 1943. These men were spread thin to cover the static situation in North Africa as well as to provide CIC teams for combat in Sicily and Italy. Major Edward L. Ray, Jr., was in command of the Headquarters Detachment of three officers and two enlisted men; Captain Floyd C. Snowden, Fifth Army Detachment, eight officers, 44 men; Captain Murray C. Falkner, NAAF Detachment, three officers, 16 men; 1st Lieutenant James M. Eichelberger, AFHQ Detachment, one officer, five men; Major Maxwell J. Papurt, Atlantic Base Section, two officers, 15 men; Captain Ralph W. Powers, Eastern Base Section, three officers, 11 men; Captain Clarence E. Read, Mediterranean Base Section, three officers, 11 men; Captain Robert W. Tucker, Force 141, two officers, two men; 1st Lieutenant Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen, I Armored Corps, three officers, 11 men; 1st Lieutenant Jack B. Cameron, Port Section "A", I Armored Corps, two officers, 11 men; 1st Lieutenant Harry G. Costello, Port Section "B", I Armored Corps, two officers, 11 men; Captain Horace Miner, II Corps, two officers, 11 men; and VI Corps, Master Sergeant Arthur J. Ruston, seven enlisted men. Each of the combat divisions

*Roster, CIC Detachment, NATOUSA, 30 Jun 43 (R-11, p 374) (R)

was assigned one officer and five enlisted men with command as follows: 1st Infantry Division, Second Lieutenant James E. Ray; 3rd Infantry Division, Second Lieutenant Bertram R. Russell; 9th Infantry Division, Second Lieutenant Charles B. Conick; 2nd Armored Division, Second Lieutenant Robert R. LaBranche; 82nd Airborne Division, Second Lieutenant Albert J. Kummer.

The school at Aine El Turk was in command of Captain Kenneth G. Crowell, with a staff of three officers and five enlisted men. In attendance were 20 enlisted men, most of whom were to be assigned to units for the invasion of Italy.

Changes in personnel continued during the regrouping and reorganizing for the invasions of Sicily and Italy and for static coverages of areas liberated and conquered. In May 1943 Colonel Parsons had left for the United States to command the Advanced Counter Intelligence Corps School in Chicago, and Captain Snowden had taken command of Fifth Army CIC. In July 1943, Captain Snowden left to attend the field training school and later to command the Island Base Section in Sicily. Captain Stephen A. Spingarn became commander of the Fifth Army CIC Detachment, which was charged with planning operations for AVALANCHE, the invasion of Italy.

The Counter Intelligence Corps had finished its first trial in a long and increasingly responsible combat role. Official reports agree that these first agents were inadequately trained, their missions ill-defined. Thrown into their role in the last moments of invasion planning, they had substituted courage for the combat training they had not received, intuition for the missions no one had anticipated, and resourcefulness for a Table of Basic Allowances. In spite of all its organizational difficulties and frustrations, the Counter Intelligence Corps in North Africa had won one Distinguished Service Cross, five Silver Stars, five Legion of Merit awards, and three Bronze Stars, plus the warm commendations of most of the commanders and G2's under whom they had served. But there was little time to think of honors won; Sicily and Italy were just ahead.

Appendix 1

Rosters for Western Task Force CIC

Roster, Fedala-Casablanca Area, 8 November 1942

Major Charles A. Ellis
Captain Paul N. Colliston
" Alfred L. Howes
" Stephen J. Spingarn
2d Lieutenant Lucien L. Picard
" William E. Viney
Agent Ramon Arrizabalaga
" Verne Frank Beck
" Ivan Carl Balknap
" Robert G. Caldwell
" Ignacio Carranza
" Delmar L. Cleland
" Joe B. Cox
" James C. Fitzgerald
" George W. Foote
"

Agent Remy W. Fulsher
" James P. Furniss
" Bernard J. Grennan
" James S. Joseph
" C. McIntosh
" Arthur P. Metastazio
" James J. Nolan, Jr.
" R. M. Penn
" Merle C. Ploghoft
" Arthur J. Ruston
" Julius R. Sagi
" Frank Uli
" Arthur T. Vincent
" Gerald J. Weber
" Leroy A. Woolett, Jr.
" Gustave W. Zielasko

Roster, Rabat-Port Lyautey Sector, 8 November 1942

2d Lieutenant William B. Cornell
Agent Jack R. Ashton
" Roy B. Bowers, Jr.
" Keirn C. Brown
" James T. O. Braaflaot
" Rence C. Champollion
" Charles J. Cody
" Louis Eliopulis

Agent Louis Giovino
" Gabriel A. Iash
" Gordon M. Messing
" Lawrence A. Meyers
" Philip A. O'Brien
" John E. Parish
" John E. Scanlon
" Hugh Wilson, Jr.

Roster, Safi Area, 8 November 1942

2d Lieutenant Robert R. LaBranche
Agent Alfred H. Benjamin
" Raymond J. Fox

Agent Donald M. Funk
" John G. McDonough

Roster, 3rd Infantry Division Detachment, 8 November 1942

2nd Lieutenant Jack Cameron
Agent George L. Belt
" Anthony Cuomo

Agent John R. Humphreys
" Richard A. Ryan

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Appendix 1, (Cont'd)

Roster, 9th Infantry Division Detachment, 8 November 1942

1st Lieutenant John G. Hammond
Agent Perry O. Bailey
" Abraham W. Brussell
Agent Ashleigh D. McIntosh
" Paul G. Sloan

Roster, 2d Armored Division Detachment, 8 November 1942

2d Lieutenant Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen
Agent Nicholas T. Cokenias
" Edwin F. Cowan
" Joseph M. Mitchell

Appendix 2

Excerpts from Diary of 2d Armored Division

CIC Detachment, 10 October - 23 November 1942

10 October: Transferred this day from Newport News, Va., where Detachment boarded the "Duck" -- U.S.S. Harris, formerly the President Grant, Dollar Line steamer. Picked for rations and administration by 1st Bn, 47th Inf, aboard ship.

19 October: (At sea en route Solomon Island) Arranged for housing men on hurricane deck. Holds too crowded. Arranged for mess of EM at non-com's mess. Day spent in ship orientation.

20 October: Letter directed to ... requested baggage search of Major ... formerly Quartermaster at ... Task Force "A" suspect.

21 October: Surveillance, Major ... 24 hours ... G2 re password. Lt LaBranche made ship survey of location of explosives ... Recommended guard be placed at all holds; forbid personnel from entering without pass. Army mail stopped from going ashore.

23 October: Required men to clean all guns; obtained ammunition issue. Study of Intelligence Plan.... Conference with Colonel Forde, G2; conference with Colonel Koch, Chief of Staff. Surveillance, 24 hours.

24 October: Surveillance. Discussed Prisoner of War plan with Major Hurley. Conference Colonel Koch re radio equipment. Cleaned guns. Shot Tommy-gun and .45. Acquainted men with tactical situation. Lecture on first aid. Special guard orders changed; 2 hours tour of deck after dark. Ship's guard on its toes.

29 October: LaBranche lectured on "Booby Traps." Surveillance. Further study of Intelligence Plan. French lesson. Studied German with Cokenias. Fox, Benjamin discovered fire in pantry. Gun cleaning. Exercise. Conference with General Harmon. Conference with Colonel Nelson, Signal Officer. Surveillance. Bridge game with SUBJECT.... Conference Major Chaffin to arrange landing. General orders issued empowering CIC to commandeer troops upon identification of agent.

1 November: Surveillance. Report that radio was sending from some ship in convoy. Conference Colonel Koch. Messages sent on 500 to 600 frequency. Conference Chief Signal Officer; learned that only two radios could send on this frequency. 177 Army radio and T.B.W. naval radio. Former ruled out because it must be generated by gas engine; latter hand generated. Must be on deck, however. Arranged

to have all radios taken up. Reported presence of two radios to Chief of Staff. Suggestion made that all plug entries be taped to prevent use of electric shavers. Reported that X-Ray and diathermy machines used vs. orders. Re-check of all radios. Check with Lt Craig re emergency radio with low frequencies.

4 November: Conferences with Colonel Forde and Colonel Koch re Intelligence Plan. SUBJECT kept under surveillance at all times; to be prevented from leaving ship at H-Hour.

8 November: CIC Detachment arrived at Safi; hit beach at 1000. Check on ; no such person or address. No one heard of Van Ruyn. Contact made with , Cafe Paris. Benjamin, Fox made contact Hotel de la France; has an American wife. Other agents made contact. Checked utilities -- not functioning. Lt Jensen shot out lights on hill. (3 for 3)

9 November: Agents made other contacts. Mitchell contacted Spanish refugee, soldier deserted who, for 200 francs, gave dope on Spanish and Italian situation. Picked up , member of S.O.L., pro-German. Arrested him after questioning. released by Colonel Nason of 2nd Armored Division (QM). Bombing at 0600 -- no agent hurt; two soldiers less than 100 yards away killed. Planes shot down. Checked at P.T. and T.* Contacted ; obtained information re Van Ruyn.

10 November: Benjamin, Fox, Funk and Jensen picked up Van Ruyn and wife who lived 70 miles NW of Safi. Group also disarmed fort at Oulida en route -- captured 10 automatic rifles and machine guns, 25 rifles, 8 prisoners. Van Ruyn, German agent, influential with Arabs and great friend of G.A.C.** brought to Safi for questioning. Pistol taken from Van Ruyn. M. Bedollet, described as ex-aviator, "most dangerous member of S.O.L." arrested in raid on airport. Two rifles, two pistols taken. W/T*** dismounted. Released by Colonel Nason.

11 November: Sniped at but no damage. LaBranche, Cokenias and McDonough moved into Post Office and took over communications. Enemy at Tlela (Souk), 16 miles west of Safi. Communications reported not cut. Matter taken up with Colonel Koch who ordered them out at front lines. More sniping at our pole climbers. Lines finally cut. LaBranche contacted M. Deburon (hardware store) who has 12 French (still fighting) who wanted to surrender. Arranged meeting. Benjamin made contact with men in Medina. Surrendered at 1000. Deburon gave list of S.O.L. Deshays, president of S.O.L., arrested.

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*Post Telephone and Telegraph
**G.A.C. - German Armistice Commission
***W/T - Wireless transmitter

Appendix 2 (Cont'd)

House searched for W/T. Released after questioning and all members of S.O.L. rounded up.

12 November: 10 Italians arrested and taken to Marrakech. Only those listed as suspected (10) retained....; others released after questioning. Van Ruyn questioned. Admitted entertaining G.A.C. Denied influence over Arabs despite fact that some 300 chiefs owe him money. Van Ruyn intimate with Auer, German Consul. Contacted M. Coliac, Governor General. Picked up M. Douard for questioning. He is a member of S.O.L. and adjutant to Mayor. Other members of S.O.L. questioned and released. Everybody finally slept.

13 November: LaBranche established C/S* net. Contacted Attias, American protegee. Jensen, Benjamin to Casablanca.

14 November: LaBranche and detachment continued censorship of mail, handling communications. Benjamin, Jensen conducted investigation in Mazagan, mid-way between Safi and Casablanca. Arrested Italians. Determined members of S.O.L.; others who are subversive.

15 November: Jensen, Benjamin completed investigation in Mazagan. Everything under control; garrison friendly. Only Spanish consul suspected of espionage. LaBranche instructed to report to Casablanca for duty. Colonel Randall said to get rid of Van Ruyn. Completed report on Safi and Mazagan. Questioned Governor re city officials.

16 November: LaBranche to Casablanca accompanied by Van Ruyn and wife. Assembled intelligence on Mogador, 100 miles south of Safi. Report re Mazagan forwarded to Casablanca.
, who had been hiding out in Medina, arrested. Radio and W/T at his home dismantled. and Axis agent imprisoned at Marrakech. Benjamin, Cokenias and Jensen to Mogador. Seven prisoners imprisoned there. CIC interceded for release of two Englishmen, Cecil Broom and Mr. Gordon; released. Four French "Trouble-makers" imprisoned. and his son, Italians (suspected agents) imprisoned. , very friendly. Called General Martin at Marrakech and insisted we parlez with him. Obtained list of S.O.L. members and other pro-Axis persons.

17 November: Finished up in Mogador. Broome and Cohen, head of Elmaleh and Co. very helpful. Returned to Safi. Wrote report on Mogador. On return noted that French are complaining that they are unable to hear Allied newscasts because of radio interference.

18 November: Agents spent day checking on cause for radio interference that did not exist prior to invasion. Leads developed re Van Cotten, alias Kotten, secretary to Baldovini, Chief of Police. Report that Van Cotten is German SS agent.

*C/S - Countersabotage

Appendix 2 (Cont'd)

19 November: McDonough and Cokenias sent to MP station next to police station to develop leads to Van Cotten. Radio intercepter located on top floor Municipal Service Building behind skull and X-bone insignia by Agents Mitchell and Funk. M. de Johanie, Mayor, had key. Said interceptor had not been used since 1939. Both lying because there was no dust on knobs of machine. Mitchell reported re Spanish situation. Incorporated same into base report. Further information sought by Emilio, Spanish priest and agent suspect.

20 November: Captain Bassec, French Liaison Officer from Marrakech garrison, heard of our activity and insisted we accompany him to meet General Martin in Marrakech. Lt Jensen, Lt Isenberg accompanied Bassec. Met General Martin and apprised his G2 officer, Captain Ducredique, Deuxieume Bureau, and our Intelligence re Safi sector. Also advised that M. Coddacioni Durpois (De Gaullists) were going to paint "V" signs all over Safi; straightened out right of men to wear "V's." Martin explained that France has never been strong because of political disunion; that no more would he permit De Gaullists, Leftists, Free Mason, Legion Francais des Combattants, S.O.L., etc. That there was only one thing now -- France. Explained to him the activities of Douard in spreading anti-Ally propaganda and our suspicion of Van Cotten. General Martin advised he would send De Credique to Safi.

21 November: Accompanied Captain Bassec and De Credique to Safi. Interviewed Governor. De Credique went into action. The painting of Safi, as previously we were advised, took place. Codaccioni and Durpoix arrested. Van Cotten arrested and put in enforced residence at Marrakech. Douard given 24 hours to leave town. Lantenois, labor boss and assistant head S.O.L., called to Marrakech for conference with Governor. Inquiry made into illegal use of radio interceptor; advised that same might be used to drown out Axis propaganda. Further leads on Spanish situation.

22 November: On 20 November, villa one block south of Hotel Maraba, belonging to one Sego, flashed light signals from 2130-2200 in direction of Municipal Service Building. MP's stopped signalling; house placed under surveillance. Many repercussions re arrests. Had to pacify Codaccioni's and Durpoix's wives. It is believed that, since the arrest of the two ring-leaders on either side of the fence, there will be less trouble from here in.

23 November: Obtained new list of suspects; checks with old intelligence. Located 13 deserters from French Army. Attempted to get Colonel Randall to issue orders to prevent executions; no luck yet. Checked guards at all installations. Guards stationed at power company, dock, phosphate buildings, water plant and three bridges

Appendix 3

Excerpts from Counter Intelligence Summaries

Western Task Force

16 November: A rectifier-transformer, believed to be a part of a radio transmitter, was seized at the German Consulate. Searches of other Consulates were halted ... Acting upon a report from the U.S.S. Augusta, lights producing a silhouette for ships in the harbor and coming from an office building in the Place de France were extinguished ... Jacques Arnould, manager of the Hotel Majestique, was placed in custodial detention and documents found proving his pro-German sympathies and offering his services to Germany. Umberto Lumbroso, Italian national, and Charles Fornari, known to the Deuxieme Bureau as pro-Axis sympathizers, employees of the Hotel Majestique, also were placed in custodial detention... Charles Burzynski, German National, reputedly dangerous, employee of the Hotel Majestique, was arrested.... Information from a reliable source indicated that General Bethouard, pro-Ally, arrested because of his intervention in favor of the Americans, is held in prison at Meknes by order of General Nogues.... It has been reported that the P.P.F. and S.O.L. are hindering the recalling of Frenchmen into the Army and are endeavoring to form fifth columns.

18 November: Lists of French political prisoners are being compiled, and the possibility of detrimental action by General Nogues is under investigation in cooperation with the Deuxieme Bureau... Information from a source believed reliable indicates that Katrina Lieffrigg, German agent, is in Morocco, and attempts are being made to locate her.

19 November: French officials have provided this office with documentary evidence of the anti-American activities of General Nogues and his cabinet.... A French intercept station at Rabat is reported to be intercepting all American and British wireless messages and, according to the French Director of Communications at Rabat, is attempting to break the codes. Mr. Klein, director of Aeronautical radio for the French at Rabat, is reported to be disseminating information through the radio stations at Agadir and Fez, which are not under American control.

24 November: German and Italian activity in Spanish Morrocco, especially in regard to the activities of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions and the German Intelligence Service, is being intensified.... Attempts by French civilians to cause American soldiers to adopt the German attitude toward the Jews have been noted particularly in public bars. These attempts in part seek to make the

SECRET INFORMATION

Appendix 3 (Cont'd)

soldier ask himself, "What am I fighting for, and what am I getting out of it?" .... Information from a source, reliability unknown, indicates that German propagandists are leading the Arabs to believe that all Americans are Jews and later will take away what they have given to the country.

25 November: Reports of native discontent persist, including one statement that the French cut the sugar ration of the natives one-half immediately after the American forces landed .... Reports of use of bars and beer parlors by Axis agents as a source of information and of loose talk in such places by American soldiers and sailors continue. Surveillance by CIC agents has succeeded in substantiating parts of these reports.

27 November: Investigation has disproved the report that sniping of American troops by Italians was continuing at Fedala.... There are no confirmed reports of sniping, no snipers have been caught, and no victims of sniping have been brought into the Fedala hospital.... Information from a reliable source indicates that the directors of the Spanish Falange at Casablanca have decided to cease all political activities, at least for the present. Various arms which were known to be in the hands of the Falange are now reported to be in the Spanish Consulate.

28 November: Reliable information from a source believed reliable indicates that a large number, possibly 25 per cent, of the Arab population of Casablanca have left the city as a result of fear induced by German propaganda.... The CIC Detachment at Safi has assisted the French police in securing direct evidence that two Frenchmen at Safi had misappropriated large stores of U. S. Army uniforms and foodstuffs. Prosecution is being undertaken by a Military Tribunal.

30 November: Reliable reports indicate that the Toulon occupation and scuttling of the French fleet have resulted in more cordial relations between the French and Americans. This was held true in regard to cooperation in matters of Counter-Intelligence.

3 December: Complaints continue of unrest and violence at French labor camps, which has increased since the arrival in Morocco of American troops. Workers and prisoners at the camp continue to expect liberation by the American authorities.... Information from a source believed reliable states that a German radio station is operating in Spanish Morocco, near the French Moroccan border. It is believed that the principal purpose of the station is to jam Allied broadcasts.

Appendix 3 (Cont'd)

7 December: Several copies have been received from various sources of a pamphlet published by the 5th Section of the Legion Francaise des Combattants. This pamphlet directs the members to watch the activities of everyone helping the Americans, to make a list of all persons in the de Gaullist movement, and to continue the activities of the Legion. This tract also states that "The Germans have not lost the war yet." .... Pro-American Frenchmen cannot understand why collaborationist French leaders have been left in power in North Africa. Pro-American citizens are afraid to show their sympathies because of their leaders, and pro-Axis sympathizers see no reason to change their beliefs in view of the acceptance by the Americans of French leaders with pro-Axis views.

9 December: Reports from sources considered reliable continue to indicate that dissatisfaction exists among the civilian population, particularly the natives, in regard to the cut in the sugar ration for December. As mentioned in previous reports, the ration was cut in half for the month of December, and rumors were circulated that the decrease was caused by the presence of the American forces.

11 December: Reports....indicate that the drunkenness of American soldiers is being used as a basis for anti-Ally propaganda....in the form of a whispering campaign, with statements such as, "These are the men who will be fighting the Germans in Tunisia." According to reports the whispering campaign is being conducted by members of the Legion Francaise des Combattants in bars, stores and private homes.

12 December: Increased discontent among the pro-Ally French civilians has been noted and reported by reliable sources. According to these reports, in many cases French civilians favoring the Allied cause have suffered more since the landing of the American troops in French Morocco than they did before. In many cases persecution by the French authorities has taken the form of imprisonment or eviction from dwelling places. It is also claimed that pro-Ally citizens have been discriminated against in the matter of ration coupons, but reports in regard to this matter are not deemed as reliable as the reports in regard to imprisonment and eviction.

16 December: Information from a source considered reliable states that the German Intelligence Service at Melilla, Spanish Morocco, has received a supply of American Army uniforms.

17 December: According to a reliable source, members of the S.O.L. are continuing to agitate for the formation of a separate Corps within the French Army, composed exclusively of their members, instead of mobilization of the individual members of S.O.L. into existing French army units. The formation of such a corps is strongly opposed by members of the Fighting French groups.

Appendix 3 (Cont'd)

19 December: A reliable source states that the "Centre Propaganda de la Revolution Nationale" of Casablanca is continuing the spreading of P.P.F. literature and propaganda coming from Vichy. It is being distributed to soldiers, both French and American. Women are being used as undercover agents.

CHAPTER 2

CIC IN SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

Plans Made for Campaign

While a permanent definition of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission was being sought at higher levels, the work of the 80-some agents who were to accompany the Seventh Army in Operation HUSKY already had been outlined in the Allied Force Headquarters directive of 10 June 1943.* Implementing this assignment on the beaches and in the ports of southern Sicily was the first concern of officers commanding the CIC tactical sections. In detailed sets of instructions they applied the directive's principles to a statement of the anticipated situation on the Sicilian shores - the counterintelligence targets, the means for securing them, the opposition and difficulties that could be expected. These projected views of conditions that would confront CIC represented the integration of knowledge derived from three sources. A small amount of intelligence on invasion areas was available. Tactical counterintelligence experience had been gained in Tunisia and in amphibious dress rehearsals along the North African coast. Lastly, CIC representatives were holding a series of conferences with other intelligence agencies and with staff officers concerned with tactical planning.**

The most complete CIC operational plan to be found in records of the campaign is one developed by 1st Lt Jack B. Cameron for his Port Section "A." Though intelligence was sketchy here, as it was in all sectors, Port Section "A" was to land near the Sicilian port of Licata equipped with thorough instructions and target designations. The plan called for the section to split into five teams to expedite completion of its missions. It specified civic offices, factories, utilities, and communication centers that were to be seized and gave instructions, as specific as possible, for handling each area and each type of target. Pertinent geographic, political and commercial background information on the island and the port was included. A variety of other considerations, including communication procedures, the handling of captured documents, and cautions regarding booby traps, were covered.*** Appended to the outline were a city plan and aerial photographs of the Licata area, marked with objectives. The finished plan was approved by G-2, and was favorably received by the CO of the 3d Infantry Division's 15th Regiment, to which the section was attached until the landings.****

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*Directive, Allied Force Headquarters, June 10, 1943, Subject: "The Intelligence Corps" (RESTRICTED) (See "North African Campaign.")

**"CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, Hq, CIC AFHQ (RESTRICTED)

***"CIC Port Section 'A' Mission, JOSS Force," June 19, 1943, by 1st Lt Jack B. Cameron (RESTRICTED)

****Letter, June 19, 1943, by 1st Lt Jack B. Cameron, to Lt Col H.C. Lyon, G2, ETO, Subject, "CIC Port Section 'A' JOSS Force, Operational Plan" (RESTRICTED); and Letter, September 15, 1943, by Capt Jack B. Cameron, to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, subject, "July Situation Summary, CIC Port Section 'A'" (RESTRICTED)

During the four weeks before D-day, all section commanders concentrated on completing and reviewing the first detailed CIC plans for an invasion. Agents were required to study them again and again; Lt Cameron, for example, insisted that each man memorize his instructions so that "if maps and directives are lost in landing he can still accomplish his assigned mission."* Full-scale invasion rehearsals held in late June, by the 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions near Oran and by the 3d Infantry Division near Bizerte, enabled CIC to test some phases of its plan for tactical operations.** As July 10 drew nearer, and especially after agents boarded ships in the staging ports, counterintelligence duties were already being carried out. Steps had to be taken to provide security for the invading forces. General Bradley, who commanded II Corps in Sicily, has explained:

> "With the massing of landing craft in North African ports and the training of troops in amphibious tactics, it had become impossible to conceal from the enemy agents signs of preparation for a Mediterranean invasion. Instead we could only hope to keep the four vital secrets of our plan: (1) our objective, (2) the date, (3) the strength and composition of our forces, and (4) the tactical methods we intended to employ."***

In the closing days of the pre-invasion phase, CIC sections, both those aboard ship and in the African base sections, had an important role to play in keeping these secrets from the enemy.

CIC Handles Pre-invasion Security

The American components of the HUSKY fleet were mounted in three regions. JOSS Force, which included the 3d Division and a combat command of the 2d Armored Division, was in the Bizerte area. The 1st Division and attached units of DIME Force were at Algiers. The 45th Division, newly arrived from the United States, was to sail with CENT Force from Oran. Assault forces of the British Eighth Army crowded into ports dotting the Mediterranean from Tunisia east to the Levant coast.**** At each of the American ports CIC cooperated with G2s in establishing and enforcing security regulations. The most complete available account of CIC activities at that time describes the work of the JOSS Force Sections and the Eastern Base Section around Bizerte.

To prevent information leaks, the Eastern Base Section, under Capt Ralph W. Powers, arranged for a variety of security measures, including the arrest and detention of all suspects, the establishment of road blocks to check traffic and prohibit unauthorized individuals from entering or leaving the embarkation areas, and the security of all

*"CIC Port Section 'A' Mission, JOSS Force," June 19, 1943, Lt Cameron
**Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1951, p. 118; and extract from "Intelligence Information Bulletin Number 1," November 1943, Office of the AC of S, G-2, ETO (RESTRICTED)
***Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 119
****Ibid, pp 123, 124

communications. Agents made spot checks to insure that these measures were being carried out. Tactical sections - the 3d Division section and Port Section "A" - gave lectures and ran security checks on personnel and equipment up to the time of the invasion itself. In the African ports they cooperated with the base section in establishing over-all security.* The lectures given during this period served both to encourage security consciousness and to make CIC known among the troops. Lt Cameron reported that his security talks reached every soldier in the 15th Infantry Regiment.** Their value was to be demonstrated by the success of CIC activities in Licata.

The duties of other sections were basically similar during this period. The following statement by Capt Horace M. Miner summarizes his section's work at the II Corps command post in Relizane, Algeria, and at the embarkation ports:

"The CIC Section supervised the security measures for the Corps CP including the issuance of passes to classified personnel, the guard system, security of documents, maps and models.... Intensive investigations were made of pro-Axis individuals and possible agents.... Breaches of security were investigated, the extent of compromise determined, and measures taken to limit the spread of compromise and stop recurrences."***

On the morning of 15 June 1943, II Corps CIC received word that numerous enemy parachutists had been dropped into North Africa; the whole area from Oran to Benghazi was alerted. II Corps CIC Agents went immediately to II Corps units within this area to determine whether the latter were properly briefed on the situation and prepared for it. The Agents reported that at II Corps Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and the 202d MP Company all precautions had been taken, but that the 53d Signal Battalion, 62d Engineer Company, and 401st Engineer Company were unaware of and unprepared for the emergency. A second check, made on the next day, indicated that all had doubled their guards and issued appropriate special orders.

The CIC Agents informed guards on bridges and at a traffic control post near Relizane of the danger, and they similarly informed the French Commandant of it.****

In the coordination of CIC planning with that of other units, a special task was assigned to the second port section of the Seventh

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*Extract from "Intelligence Information Bulletin Number 1," November 1943, ETO

** Letter, September 15, 1943, Capt Cameron, "July Situation Summary, CIC Port Section 'A'"

***Report of Operations of II Corps CIC Section the Sicilian Campaign," by Capt Horace Miner. (RESTRICTED)

****Headquarters, II Corps, Office of the CIC Section report dated 16 June 1943: found in folder entitled, "Detachment, Tactical, II Corps (Intelligence Reports)" KCB BX 25102 (6-10-283). (SECRET)

Army's CIC. Port Section "B," in the invasion of Sicily, was to handle security problems, not only of the port of Gela but of the entire "over-the-beach" supply program. During mid-June, 1st Lt Harry G. Costello, Jr., and his executive officer, 1st Lt Mario E. Broa, worked closely with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, the organization responsible for the supply operation. The unique nature of the program demanded a clear statement of security problems and recommendations. To meet this requirement, Lt Costello drafted a proposed order for the brigade, outlining security measures for the entire operating area, vital points, materiel, communications and military information, and pointing out the importance of individual and unit cooperation with CIC. Costello later reported that the directive "was accepted by the S-2, and I understand it has been published in order form."*

Agents Sail for Sicily with Task Force

Finally, on the afternoon of July 5, CIC teams began to sail for Sicily as part of the largest amphibious force in history.** The decision to attack the Axis homeland that summer had been made at the Casablanca conference six months before. By then the defeat of the Axis in Africa was considered a certainty, and Sicily was selected as the best target within available means that could contribute substantially to Allied goals.*** Resources were insufficient for a cross-channel assault from England or even an invasion of southern France; but some attack was necessary both to contain Axis armies that could otherwise be used in a new offensive against Russia and to maintain the momentum of the western Allies' drive.**** General Eisenhower, then the theater commander, has pointed out that the Chief reasons for selecting Sicily were: its conquest would clear the Mediterranean for Allied shipping; and it could be defended against a possible counter-attack without absorbing too much strength.***** Further, it was important to deny Sicily's air bases to the Axis and to use these bases for bombing missions against Italy and the Balkans; and it was expected

*"Informal Report of Experiences in Operation 'Husky,'" July 16, 1943, by 1st Lt Harry G. Costello, Jr. (RESTRICTED) (cf. "Preliminary Report of Activities in Operation 'Husky,'" July 13, 1943, by 1st Lt Harry G. Costello, Jr. (RESTRICTED); and Draft copy, directive, Hq, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, June 16, 1943, subject, "Security Measures" (CONFIDENTIAL)

**Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 122-124

***The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia & New York, 1947: Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War by General of the Army George C. Marshall, pp. 155, 156

****Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 104, 105; and Marshall, Biennial Report, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, p. 156

*****Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1948, p. 160

that the invasion might directly bring Italy nearer to surrender.* Between February and June, planning staffs worked out the details of the assault.**

When the Allied fleet set off for Sicily, it was not known what strategic maneuvers would follow that campaign. The size and even the event of an expedition into Italy was not established,*** though at the TRIDENT conference in Washington that May it had been decided "to extend Allied influence in the Mediterranean to the point where Italy would be forced to withdraw from the war."**** Before long Sicily would become, in retrospect, a major Allied victory and the stepping-stone to the continent. But as task forces rode a stormy Mediterranean, past recently fallen Pantelleria to rendezvous areas near Malta, the immediate goal was the conquest of a mountainous triangular island, some 10,000 square miles in area, populated by four and a half million Axis subjects, and defended by an estimated 12 or 13 enemy divisions.***** For the Counter Intelligence Corps, Sicily would have proved by mid-August the importance of its combat mission and have provided an education that would guide CIC teams throughout the world. But as transports loaded with airborne troops roared over the darkened armada approaching the beaches the night of July 9, CIC men awaited anxiously the first test of their ability to carry out counterintelligence missions in all phases of a combat campaign.

CIC Invades with Assault Troops

Before dawn on the 10th, the assault waves of the American Seventh Army - the I Armored Corps that had officially become an army at sea - stormed beaches over 69 miles of southern Sicilian shoreline. The 3d Division, a combat team of the 2d Armored Division and the 3d Ranger Battalion struck beaches on both sides of Licata; the 1st Division landed east of Gela as 1st and 4th Ranger Battalion hit that port itself; and the 45th Division, with the 753d Tank Battalion, made landings on each side of Scoglitti. To the east, the British Eighth Army, the other arm of the Allied 15th Army Group, established beachheads throughout the southeastern corner of the island.******

*Ibid, p. 160; and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 104, 120

** Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 104-120; and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 161-164

***Mark W. Clark, General, U.S. Army, Calculated Risk, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1950, p. 174; and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 166-160.

****Marshall, Biennial Report, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, p. 158.

*****Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 114; and Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, El Alamein to the River Sangro, E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., New York, 1949, p. 115.

******Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 106, 123, 576, 577; and Marshall, Biennial Report, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945. p. 159.

CIC agents rode with the first waves of assault troops at each American invasion point.* Thus, counterintelligence functions were undertaken immediately as agents rushed to secure pre-designated targets. In this instance the fulfillment of the Corp's mission was facilitated by the first-wave landings; but it might be noted that the wisdom of risking casualties in this way, with the corresponding danger to the entire CIC mission, was debated. Lt Costello reported that for Port Section "B," "the placing of part of the section in the first wave was the result of an order by the force commander," and added, "I am not sure...that such a procedure would always be wise."**

Infantry stormed through seacoast towns on D-day, with CIC playing its part according to the instructions it had received in Africa. Inland, troops of the U.S. 82d Airborne Division - and, in the British sector, their 1st Airborne Division - fought to reorganize and to repulse any attacks against the beaches. Winds of near gale proportions had seriously deflected the airborne landings and scattered paratroopers across the entire front. Despite heavy losses, the airborne troops were able to delay enemy countermeasures. Further, the storm helped the invaders gain surprise. Axis air reconnaissance did not venture out and, in General Bradley's words, "the coastal divisions relaxed, certain that we would never sail in such a sea.***

As beachheads broadened, Counter Intelligence Corps agents moved into the ports. In the Licata area Lt. Cameron had landed with assault troops at H-hour plus 45 minutes. Operating out of 15th Infantry headquarters, he began searching abandoned enemy positions. When the rest of Port Section "A" debarked four hours later, after being delayed by mechanical difficulties to its LST, it was dispersed as planned in five teams.****

After counterintelligence targets were seized in Licata, Lt Cameron was able to announce that "all CIC missions were accomplished according to plan and schedule."***** He credited the success primarily to arrangements that had been made earlier with the CO of the 15th Infantry. An entire company was placed immediately at the section's disposition for security-guard duty at CIC objectives. Moreover, as a result of the security and CIC-introductory lectures Cameron had given, CIC received assistance throughout the regiment and was able to move freely in the combat zone.******

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*"CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, Hq, CIC, AFHQ.
**"Informal Report of Experiences in Operation 'Husky,'" July 16, 1943, Lt Costello.
***Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 126.
****Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A,'" "July 31, 1943 by Capt Jack B. Cameron (RESTRICTED); and "CIC Port Section 'A' Mission, JOSS Force," 19 Jun 43; Roster attached as Appendix 1.
*****"Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A'" July 31, 1943 Capt Cameron
******Ibid; and Letter, September 15, 1943, Capt Cameron, "July Situation Summary, CIC Port Section'A'"

Second Lt Bertram R. Russell's 3d Division section near Licata with the 7th Infantry had advanced inland with the combat troops. Because it lacked its own transportation the section's operations during the first six days were limited almost completely to the performance of routine civil affairs and counterintelligence duties in the towns of Narck Palma and Canicatti. Even after the group acquired a jeep and was able to move on, its activities were continually restricted by insufficient transportation.*

Counterintelligence in Gela

At Gela, three members of CIC's Port Section "B", Lt Mario Brod and agents George B. Somers and Thadeus J. Stefanik, rode the first assault wave with the 1st Ranger Battalion under Col Darby; the remainder of the section with Lt Costello, followed two hours later.** Costello said, "the first group was able to accomplish a considerable amount of valuable work" but he did not elaborate on their activities.*** He described the section's primary problem:

> "Upon landing, it was found that there was a tremendous amount of confusion and that there were a thousand different jobs to be done, each one of which seemed equally important. As a consequence, it was found necessary to simply do one job at a time, attempting to evaluate the important tasks as best we could. In our case, it was impossible to draw up any systematized, refined plan of operation before reaching the town. That is, it was impossible to lay out definite tasks for definite teams, because the advance intelligence was so meagre."****

Despite these difficulties, much was done during the first three days. Port Section "B" searched enemy CPs and billets, and forwarded documents through G2 channels. Information of immediate tactical value was given to the Special-Force commander and to the G2 of the 1st Division. It included maps showing the disposition of coastal and mobile defense units and of mine fields, and considerable information on the enemy order of battle. From the interrogation of prisoners of war, Lt Brod obtained data on enemy units and mine fields. Inside Gela, agents seized civic offices, Fascist headquarters and communication

*Indorsement, August 11,1943, by Lt Col Mercer C. Walter, AC of S, G-2, 3d Infantry Division, to Letter, August 6, 1943 from AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, subject, "Activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps (RESTRICTED); and "Daily Activities Report," July 16, 1943, Hq, Seventh Army CIC Section, by 1st Lt Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen (RESTRICTED)

**Roster, CIC Detachment (NATOUSA, June 30, 1943, See Appendix 1, this chapter

***"Informal Report of Experiences in Operation 'Husky'," July 16,1943 Lt Costello

****"Informal Report of Experiences in Operation 'Husky,'"July 16, 1943, Lt Costello.

centers, placed them under guard, and preserved their records. CIC continued to run security checks on these installations after they were turned over to representatives of the American Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) and the Signal Corps. Town officials were taken into custody; informants were recruited; parish priests were utilized to gain the cooperation of the populace and to read proclamations. Town-criers and posters were also used to promulgate military regulations. Road blocks were set up, weapons collected, pillaging stopped, brothels checked. Part of Port Section "B" began to handle security aspects of the supply program in the area.*

Other CIC units landed near Gela. The 1st Division section commanded by 2d Lt James E. Ray, had been given the assignment of providing tactical security for its division.** However, reports of its activities during the invasion phase are not now available. The Seventh Army CIC section, under 1st Lt Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen, also was active in the area. It cooperated with Port Section "B" in securing Gela; and it sent agents forward with combat units of the 1st Division and the Rangers, and, farther west, with the 2d Division.*** The Seventh Army section's roster at that time listed three officers and 11 enlisted men (although the theater table of organization for an army section called for five officers and 45 EM).****

The 2d Armored Division CIC Section, under 2d Lt Robert R. LaBranche, debarked at Gela behind the 1st Division. Since Joseph M. Mitchell had been injured and hospitalized in Algeria, Lt LaBranche had but four agents with him in HUSKY. During the first few days they operated with a reconnaissance battalion in the Gela region before shifting west to join their own division pushing inland. *****

The 2d Armored Division section also handled civil-affairs and intelligence matters in Gela and the neighboring towns of Butera and Niscemi. An example of the work they pursued in the first days is found in resumes of activities in Butera. Agents entered the town July 14, immediately after its occupation. They searched civic buildings and former military positions. Mail found in the post office, along with maps and records taken from an Italian CP, were forwarded to G2, Seventh Army.

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*Preliminary Report of Activities in Operation Husky, July 13, 1943, Lt Costello.

**Roster, CIC Detachment NATOUSA, June 30, 1953, Complete Roster in Appendix 1.

***"Daily Activitity Report of all CIC Sections, Seventh Army," July 14, 1943, Hq, Seventh Army CIC Section, by 1st Lt Paul A Heegaard-Jensen (RESTRICTED); and "CIC Daily Activity Report," July 15, 1943, Hq, Seventh Army CIC Section, by 1st Lt Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen (RESTRICTED)

****Directive, AFHQ, June 10, 1943, "The Counter Intelligence Corps"; See Appendix 1 for Roster.

*****"Memorandum for the NATOUSA File." August 13, 1943. by LT COL Neville K. Adkinson, subject, "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Sicily" (RESTRICTED); "July Monthly Summary of Activities, 2d Armored Division." August 6, 1943, by 1st Lt Robert R. LaBranche (RESTRICTED) See App 1 for roster.

Documents from Fascist headquarters were given to AMGOT representatives. CIC stopped the populace from looting the town bank, and placed a guard over the water supply. Civil control measures were taken over by AMGOT the afternoon of the 14th, but CIC representatives remained in Butera for three more days. Besides helping to maintain order, they arrested the town's leading Fascists, had them imprisoned, and searched their homes. Information on local pro-Fascists was obtained from the mayor. With the aid of Carabinieri (civil police), CIC collected civilian firearms and turned them over to AMGOT.*

Third Port Area Attacked

The 45th Division CIC Section debarked near Scoglitti early on D-day. First Lt Rupert W. Guenthner and Agent Frank A. Messina supervised the interrogation of about 90 Italian prisoners, by order of Lt Col Francis J. Reichman, the division's AC of S, G-2. In nearby Mogli the section captured documents pertaining to enemy personnel and supplies, and in Scoglitti they searched abandoned CPs. Guenthner, Messina and Langford Baldwin (one of two agents from the II Corps section working with the division unit) attempted to enter Vittoris, but withdrew under fire. On the morning of the 11th, however, they entered the town and seized documents that included an Italian signal code manual from a radio station and list of local party members from Fascist headquarters. A riot by anti-Fascist civilians at this headquarters was quelled. As the 45th Division advanced against minor opposition, CIC group moved on to towns and airports farther inland.**

Four teams of two agents each from the II Corps CIC section also landed under fire in the Scoglitti sector. On D-day Capt Horace M. Miner and agent Clark B. Keeler, operating as a team, sent to Colonel B. A. Dickson, the II Corps G2, the first reports he received on the location and identification of enemy units, their reaction to the landing, and the location of a lost parachute battalion. The executive officer, 2d Lt Crosby Lewis, and Agent Lloyd Fangel were attached to II Corps headquarters, as were agents Peter W. Princi and Lewis V. Sevier. Langford Baldwin and Bernard H. Golden comprised a team operating with the 45th Division section. On the morning of the 11th, Capt Miner stopped remnants of an infantry battalion retreating before an enemy counterattack, assumed command, and led them back into battle until one of their own officers was contacted to take over. II Corps agents

*"Activities of CIC Section in Vicinity of Gela," July 16, 1943, by 2d Lt Robert R. LaBranche (RESTRICTED); "July Monthly Summary of Activties, 2d Armored Division," August 6, 1943, Lt LaBranche; and "Arrest of Fascist Personalities in Butera," July 17, 1943, by 2d Lt Robert R. LaBranche (RESTRICTED).

**"Report of CIC Detachment Activities in Operation HUSKY," July 21, 1943, Hq 45th Infantry Division CIC Detachment, by 1st Lt Rupert W. Guenthner (RESTRICTED); "Morning Reports and War Diary of CIC Detachment, 45th Infantry Division, for the Month of July 1943" (RESTRICTED); and Roster, CIC Detachment NATOUSA, August 5, 1943 (RESTRICTED) Appendix 1

remained active in the 45th Division area till July 18 when the balance of the section landed at Gela with transportation and other equipment. After reorganizing, the section operated throughout the II Corps area, cooperating with sections attached to the 1st and 45th Divisions.*

The remaining tactical group, the 82d Airborne Division CIC, did not jump into Sicily with its division, but landed behind troops making the amphibious assault.** Second Lt Albert J. Kummer commanded the section. The detachment was forced to operate independently of division headquarters, for the 82d was widely scattered. Units that had jumped on D-day were returning through U.S. lines all over the front; and the balance of the division, parachuting into Sicily on D-day plus 1, had been caught in American anti-aircraft fire and suffered heavily. Information on the CIC section's activities is limited, though it is known that some two weeks after D-day, it was responsible for the surrender of an entire Italian company. When the unit returned to North Africa near the end of July, it had suffered three casualties. Kummer, Stevens and Sloan had been wounded, Kummer seriously, when their jeep hit a mine.***

In addition to having sections attached to the components of the Seventh Army, CIC also was represented at 15th Army Group headquarters. A NATOUSA roster of June 30 listed a "Force 141" CIC section, comprised of Capt Robert W. Tucker, 1st Lt Marion E. Porter, Agent Thomas L. Tipton and Agent Friedrich H. Geiger. Force 141 had been the top-level planning staff for HUSKY, until it became part of General Alexander's 15th Army Group on May 15. It has not been ascertained how long the CIC section remained active, though it evidently was disbanded before August 5, the date of another CIC roster.****

All beachheads were linked and were expanding rapidly during the first week. The enemy had made but one concerted counterattack. It came near Gela on D/1, when the Hermann Goering Panzer Division hurled itself against the 1st Division. The Germans broke through almost to the beaches; but the 1st, supported by a strong naval bombardment, stubbornly held and finally threw them back, inflicting heavy losses including the destruction of more than 30 tanks. General Marshall called the attack "the most critical momemt of the invasion."***** After the panzers were repelled, American forces had little difficulty in preparing for the coordinated offensives across the island.

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*"History of the CIC Detachment, II Corps (202d CIC Detachment)" (RESTRICTED)
**"Operation of II Corps CIC in Tunisia and Sicily," September 1953, Horace Miner; and Roster CIC Detachment NATOUSA Jun 30, 1943 See Appendix 1 to this Chapter
***Interview with Harold L. Stevens and John E. Scanlon, August 1953; Roster, CIC Detachment NATOUSA, June 30, 1943, and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 126, 133, 134.
****Rosters, CIC Detachment NATOUSA, June 30 and August 5, 1943; See Appendix 1 and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 105, 106
*****Marshall, Biennial Report, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, p 162

Throughout the first phase of the campaign, the Counter Intelligence Corps had followed the pre-invasion directives closely. The fact that these directives served as flexible guides, rather than unyielding dicta, contributed to the success of the agents' activities. Lt Costello pointed out, and the observation was repeated in an AFHQ CIC summary, that, while the "main categories of action" for CIC teams must be fixed in advance, within their scope are "numerous incidental things...which cannot be foreseen" but which CIC must be prepared to handle.* All sections had concentrated on seizing targets and documents of counterintelligence interest. But they also had spent much time - and were to continue to do so - gathering information of tactical and strategic value, and performing military government functions.

After finishing its initial work in Gela, Port Section "B" was divided into two groups. While one sub-section, under Lt Brod**, moved north with the 1st Division, Lt Costello and the rest of the unit began working with the intelligence section of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade to provide security for the coastline logistics program. Between Licata and Scoglitti the "over-the-beach" method was being used to supply American forces. Ships anchored offshore discharged their cargoes into 2½-ton amphibious trucks, nick-named "ducks," which hauled the material directly to ammunitions and food dumps.*** Despite the magnitude of the security problem, and the small number of agents to handle it, the threat of sabotage was largely overcome. On August 2, Capt Heegaard-Jensen reported that, "No act of sabotage has been committed although one case of suspected sabotage is being investigated."****

General Patton's Seventh Army consisted of the II Corps, with the 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions, and a hastily improvised provisional corps on the west. The latter corps included the 3d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions, the re-organized 82d Airborne and two Ranger battalions. After the steady advances of the first week, which carried II Corps up to the center of the island, the western arm opened an all-out offensive. Porto Empedocle and Agrigento fell July 17; the provisional corps then stormed across the western end of Sicily in lightning thrusts that culminated July 22 with the fall of the key north coast port and naval base of Palermo.***** During the advance, CIC sections often entered towns with, or even before, the infantryman.

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*"Informal Report of Experiences in Operation 'Husky,'" July 16, 1943, Lt Costello (cf. "CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, H2. CIC AFHQ) (R)

**With Lt Brod were Agents Victor J. Vengrouskie, Perry Devere, Raymond Daguere, George Sommers, and Thaddeus Stefanik. Source; Port Section"B" CIC Section 1st Infantry Division; Subject: Discussion and Recommendations concerning CIC Activities; dated 5 Aug 1943; found in folder "Section, Tactical, 1st Inf Div," KCD BX 25102 (6-3-54). (CONFIDENTIAL)

***Counter Intelligence Corps Information Bulletin No.2, "Counter Intelli- Corps Operations in Sicily" (RESTRICTED)

****Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 July 43 to 31 July 43 August 2, 1943, Hq Seventh Army CIC Section, by Capt Paul A Heegaard-Jensen (RESTRICTED)

*****Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 106, 139; and Marshall, Biennial Report, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, p. 162.

When the confused days of the landings were past, CIC Agents were able to work toward a simple and understandable goal. Their basic mission has been described by Lt Brod as "establishing in occupied enemy territory all possible measures to insure the elimination of enemy activity in that occupied territory."* Such a mission he described as passive in nature; concurrent with it, however, was the active role of "obtaining, from both friendly and unfriendly sources, military information of all categories." Because CIC Agents were often the first conquering officials to enter a town, Agents of the Corps often were forced to assume, by default, other tasks which properly were within the province of Civil Affairs.

The rapidity of the offensive prevented CIC teams from undertaking thorough investigations. Divisional sections strove to remain with assault troops, in accordance with the AFHQ directive of June 10. Uncompleted investigations were handed over hurriedly to the Seventh Army section, and civil-affairs matters were passed on to AMGOT. Sometimes, however, several days passed before Seventh Army CIC or AMGOT reached a town; then, security work had to be started anew. Confusion and duplication of effort resulted inevitably from the continual change-overs.** The problem manifested itself throughout the campaign, and it affected all phases of CIC work. For example, its effect on one function, the arrest and evacuation of Fascists, was discussed in some detail by Lt Brod:

"...because of insufficient liaison and coordination of activities between divisional, corps and army CIC sections, and between all sections and the AMGOT authorities, prompt evacuation of arrested Fascists has not resulted. Furthermore, in many instances Fascists arrested by one section have been released by another without adequate consideration of the original basis of arrests;...in some instances Fascists have been released by AMGOT authority without authorization of the CIC section which originally made the arrest. This lack of coordination...frustrates the efforts of the CIC in the removal of security hazards presented by Fascist elements, and further results in baffling and confusing the general population as to the general basic policy of the Allied Government with relation to the Fascist regime."***

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*"Discussion of the CIC Mission in the Sicilian Campaign Covering Period from 10 Jul to 3 Aug 1943," by Lt Mario E. Brod; extracted from "Section, Tactical, 1st Inf Div"; KCD BX 25101 (7-6-54) (CONFIDENTIAL)

**"Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 July 43 to 31 July 43," August 2, 1943, Capt Paul A. Neegaard-Jensen; "CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, G2, CIC AFHQ; and Letter, August 14, 1943, by Lt Col H. M. Forde, AC of S, G-2, 2d Armored Division, to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, subject, "Activities CIC 2d Armored Division" (RESTRICTED)

***"Discussion of Counter Intelligence Corps Missions in the Sicilian Campaign Covering Period from July 10, 1943 to August 3, 1943," by 1st Lt Mario E. Brod (RESTRICTED)

The problem could not be solved readily, but several suggestions for eventual remedies were offered. Opinions varied, but in general the need for more agents, assigned in such a way as to insure continuity of investigations, was recognized. Second Lt Charles B. Conick, commanding the 9th Infantry Division CIC (active later in the campaign), suggested that agents attached to divisions remain in towns for a week or two before passing on duties to static teams. He pointed out that this could be done either by increasing the division sections' strength, by increasing the size of the corps sections and interchanging personnel between divisions and corps, or by attaching agents from higher echelons to divisions as towns fell.* On the other hand, the consensus was that division units should concentrate on tactical missions, and that corps or army sections should handle town security, eventually turning towns over to a static section. Capt Miner pointed out that additional personnel would be needed, both to permit complete initial coverage by the corps sections and to expedite early entry of the static groups.** To offset partially the demand for more town security agents at corps or higher echelons, Lt Col H. M. Forde, AC of S, G-2, of the 2d Armored Division, suggested reducing the strength of divisional detachments to two or three men.*** Others, however, saw the need for greater tactical security at this level.

From Seventh Army CIC headquarters, Capt Hoegaard-Jensen recommended a thorough remodeling of the table or organization - one which would provide sufficient personnel for all security functions, but which, in doing so, would require a considerable increase in Counter Intelligence Corps strength. He proposed that "at least 200 agents and officers" be attached to an army. A team of one officer and two enlisted men would work with each division, charged with tactical missions. Each CIC corps headquarters would have two officers, 10 agents and two clerks, army headquarters would consist of three officers, 10 agents and four clerks. At army there would also be at least 40 teams of an officer or senior NCO and two other agents; their function would be to enter a town immediately after its capture, and to remain there until complete coverage had been provided and they were relieved by static CIC units. Corps and army sections would do security work in large cities, as well as coordinate the activities of subordinate teams.****

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*Letter, August 22, 1943, by 2d Lt Charles B. Conick, to AC of S, G-2, 9th Infantry Division, subject, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Division CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign" (RESTRICTED)

**"Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign," Capt Miner (cf. 2d Indorsement, August 31, 1943, by Col B.A. Dickson, AC of S, G-2, II Corps, to Letter, August 22, 1943, Lt Conick, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Division CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign" (RESTRICTED)).

***Letter, August 14, 1943, Col Forde, "Activities CIC 2d Armored Division" (RESTRICTED)

****Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 July 43 to 31 July 43," August 2, 1943, Capt Hoegaard-Jensen (CONFIDENTIAL) (R)

CIC Agents First Soldiers in Agrigento

Divisional sections handled town security and civil-affairs matters throughout Sicily. During the provisional corps' offensive in the second week of the campaign, a singular example of resourceful action by CIC as the first Army unit to enter a city occurred in Agrigento, a provincial capital with 33,000 population. CIC Port Section "A," following completion of the first security measures in Licata, had divided into two groups: one, under 1st Lt Jack B. Cameron, began functioning as a tactical unit with the 3d Division; the other, led by Executive Officer 1st Lt Arthur H. Van Kirk, remained in Licata to handle port security. After being driven back by gunfire in an earlier attempt, Lt Cameron's sub-section entered Agrigento early on the morning of July 17 as combat forces by-passed the city. They were the only Americans there, and the citizens of Agrigento were rioting and looting on a large scale. However, the rest of the section rejoined the assault group in the city, and by the time the first AMGOT officials arrived that afternoon, CIC had the situation under control - principally through imaginative utilization of city officials.* Cameron reported that the following civil-affairs work was accomplished during CIC's operations in Agrigento:

"a. Rioting stopped and looting reduced to a minimum.

"b. Nine remaining members of the Carabinieri were rounded up and placed on police duty.

"c. The fire chief and 04 firemen were put to work collecting the dead.

"d. Public health doctors, civil and military, were brought in, and a general estimate of the situation as to patients, medical supplies and hospital facilities was obtained.

"e. Chief engineer of air raid and anti-aircraft emplacement was brought in, and statistics (on anti-aircraft) positions were obtained.

"f. Chief aqueduct engineer was found and directed to survey and repair all water facilities.

"g. The Vicar General for the Province of Agrigento was contacted and his proferred services were accepted in calming the civilian population.

"h. Food and fuel warehouses were located and placed under guard."**

*"Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A,'" July 31, 1943, Capt Cameron; (R) Extract from "Intelligence Information Bulletin Number 1, "November 1943, ETO (R); and "Daily Activity Report of all CIC Sections, Seventh Army," July 14, 1943, Lt Hoegaard-Jensen (R)

**"Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A,'" July 31, 1943, Capt Cameron (R)

In addition, Port Section "A" gained valuable combat intelligence from documents found in evacuated German headquarters. Necessary security measures, as indicated by CIC surveys, were recommended, a variety of other counterintelligence functions were performed. A battalion of soldiers was obtained to guard vital public installations and Fascist party buildings. Counterintelligence responsibility was taken over by agents from the Seventh Army CIC section on July 20; and on the 23d, Lt Cameron's sub-section moved on toward Palermo. Meanwhile, the other half of Port Section "A" extended its security operations to Porto Empedocle.*

In agrigento the advantages of having specially assigned tactical troops as a security guard again became apparent, as they had in Licata. According to Cameron, "Security dropped off more than 50% when Army guards were not used; and to depend on whatever units that happened to be in the area to supply guards was poor security, for the ability of such units to make men available to CIC hinged on the fluctuations of the immediate tactical situation.** Lt Brod, of Port Section "B," remarked that the nature of Counter Intelligence Corps work seemed to warrant the assignment to each CIC section of a platoon of soldiers who could relieve agents from routine patrol and guard duties, allowing them to concentrate on missions for which their special talents were needed.*** In Sicily, Carabinieri sometimes were recruited to keep watch on captured materiel, but there were times that no guards could be posted. And Cameron pointed out that, as Allied forces moved into Europe, friendly assistance could not be so readily obtained, and the increasing threats of sabotage would make the use of American Army guards all the more imperative. ****

Brod indicated another need for security guards - the hazards presented by abandoned munitions dumps:

"In Enna, three children were killed in playing with hand grenades at a dump discovered by CIC personnel. The existence of some 15 such dumps made impossible their proper safeguarding, and, aside from the fact that rumors immediately spread about the population that the American troops had intentionally left explosives around maliciously, a further security threat presented itself in that the various munitions... were available to any sabotage elements who wish to avoid themselves /of them/*****.

*"Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A,'" July 31, 1943, Capt Cameron (R)
**Letter, September 15, 1943, Capt Cameron, "July Situation Summary, CIC Port Section 'A'" (R)
***"Discussion of Counter Intelligence Corps Missions in the Sicilian Campaign covering Period from July 10, 1943 to August 3, 1943," Lt Brod; and "Suggested Method of Procedure in Operation of a Counter Intelligence Corps Section," August 11, 1943, by Lt Col R.W. Porter, Jr., AC of S, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, for 1st Lt Mario E. Brod
****Letter, September 15, 1943, Capt Cameron, "July Situation Summary, CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 July 43 to 31 July 43, August 2, 1943; Capt Hoegaard-Jensen; and Counter Intelligence Corps information Bulletin No. 2, "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Sicily" (R)
*****"Discussion of Counter Intelligence Corps Missions in the Sicilian Campaign covering Period from July 10, 1943 to August 3, 1943," Lt Brod (R)

For the safeguarding of documents, a seal device was successfully used, in the absence of sufficient guards. In more than 200 cases where impounded mail and other documents could not be transported promptly, they were placed in a sealed room. The seal on the door was accompanied by a warning that anyone breaking it would be shot. It was reported that no seals were broken except by proper authority.*

CIC In Palermo; Town Security Duties

When the first American soldiers entered Palermo July 22, splitting Sicily in two and trapping the remnants of the Italian forces in the west, they met but token resistance in the city, and large segments of the populace greeted them as liberators.** The 3d Division CIC section moved into Palermo that afternoon with a front-line patrol and immediately began fulfilling security functions. Civil control assistance was obtained from the Carabinieri; the small amount of looting going on was stopped; and a curfew was established.***

The 2d Armored Division section arrived the morning of the 23d to assist in the overwhelming task of attaining security in Palermo, which, with a population exceeding 400,000, was the largest city on the island. The 2d Armored CIC took over a former German field police building as headquarters and billets. From this and other buildings, agents secured documents left behind in the enemy's hurried departure, including mail, information on the location of military units, special orders and training manuals. Among the many duties they performed their first day in the city were the recruitment of informants, the arrest and interrogation of Fascist officials, the introduction of security steps and the establishment of a working liaison with AMGOT.****

The next day the Port Section "A" group took over port security in Palermo. It searched the port area, impounded records, and initiated security precautions and investigations. The section worked closely with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Together, CIC and ONI directed the establishment of a guard system in the shipyards and interrogated mariners regarding mines in the harbor. The CIC unit gave captured

*Counter Intelligence Corps Information Bulletin No. 2, "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Sicily."(R)

**George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1947, p. 61

***Extract from "Intelligence Information Bulletin Number 1," November 1943. ETO (R)

****Security Notes No. 4, October 19, 1943, Office of the AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, subject, "One Day in the Work of the Counter Intelligence Corps" (RESTRICTED); "July Monthly Summary of Activities, 2d Armored Division," August 6, 1943, Lt LaBranche; and Letter, July 30, 1943, by 1st Lt Robert R. LaBranche, to AC of S, G-2, 2d Armored Division, subject, "CIC 2d Armored Division Operations in Palermo" (RESTRICTED)

records to ONI officials and recruited technicians to assist them in repairing damaged vessels.* The latter step was necessary because the enemy had scuttled dozens of ships in the harbor and destroyed many installations in trying to prevent Allied use of the port. Later on the 24th, members of the Seventh Army section arrived and coordinated the operations of the various sections, as civil-affairs authority was transferred to AMGOT.**

Work in captured towns was perhaps the major Counter Intelligence Corps effort in Sicily. Besides giving outstanding performances in the development of security in large cities, as exemplified by their operations in Agrigento and Palermo, CIC combat teams laid the groundwork for the establishment of military government in almost every sizable town in the Seventh Army area. Although methods of securing towns were left largely to agents' initiative, reports from all sections demonstrate similar patterns of procedure. Town security work, with modifications set by local conditions, consisted principally of the following steps.

Investigation of local government officials' reliability was undertaken, and the cooperation of political and law enforcement agencies usually was recruited to help maintain order, since not enough U.S. soldiers were available to handle the problem. CIC questioned officials, particularly the mayor and the police chief, for information on political and military matters. Carabinieri were utilized to guide agents to enemy military installations and Fascist headquarters, which were searched for information of intelligence value. Informant nets were established. Known Fascists and anti-Fascists were interrogated. In some instances Fascists were interned and removed to rear areas, though more often, when they did not appear to be direct security threats, they were placed under technical arrest and threatened with imprisonment in case any evidence of sabotage or espionage arose. CIC frequently posted proclamations containing instructions for curfews, the collection of arms, ammunition and radio sets, and restriction of civilian activities. The proclamations also listed penalties for sabotage, espionage, looting, disorder and giving aid to enemy soldiers. Village priests and town-criers were called on to announce military regulations. CIC agents searched and guarded installations of security significance; they ran security surveys. All possible preliminary steps were taken to facilitate the work of AMGOT teams, which might arrive a day or a week after CIC's entrance. Pertinent

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*"Monthly Report, CIC Port Section 'A,'" July 31, 1943, Capt Cameron (R)

**Extract from "Intelligence Information Bulletin Number 1," November 1943, ETO; Security Notes No. 4, October 19, 1943, G-2, AFHQ, "One Day in the Work of the Counter Intelligence Corps"; and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 148

captured records were passed on to AMGOT, as well as recommendations concerning the possible future use of town officials.*

The II Corps Offensive

While the provisional corps was racing to Palermo, General Bradley's II Corps, on the American eastern front, had driven northeast from its Gela and Scoglitti beachheads, and swerved north through the geographical hub of the island. On July 23 its advance elements reached the north coast.** CIC agents had moved with attacking troops across the island. The 1st and 45th Division sections and Lt Brod's port sub-section, working under the coordination of the II Corps CIC, made preliminary searches of towns, performed civil-affairs duties and carried out combat security missions.

The II Corps section, which was to operate in a total of 28 towns in Sicily, was several times the first CIC unit to arrive in towns, particularly larger ones, though division sections normally made the initial entry. Corps CIC handled almost all investigations of Fascists in the area, although in the 1st Division sector the two division-level teams operating there handled some of the investigative work, when, occasionally, they found time for more than cursory security measures. The Corps section also had a military counterespionage and countersabotage mission to perform. Whenever the Corps CP was moved, CIC remained behind to ascertain that no documents of value had been left, breaches of security drew official reprimands. All persons entering the CP area were investigated by CIC. A system of identity checks on roads in the Corps sector was organized. Cases of wire sabotage were investigated, and in two instances all Italian deserters in the area were taken into custody. CIC also assisted in the capture of German soldiers returning to their own lines.***

*Letter, August 12, 1943, by Lt Col R. W. Porter, Jr., AC of S, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, subject, "Activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps" (RESTRICTED); "Method of Operation, CIC Section Attached to 1st Infantry Division," August 12, 1943, by Lt Col R. W. Porter, Jr., AC of S, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, for 2d Lt James E. Ray (RESTRICTED); "Suggested Method of Procedure in Operation of a Counter Intelligence Corps Section," August 11, 1943, Col Porter, 1st Division, for Lt Brod; "Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section During Sicilian Campaign," Capt Miner; Letter, August 22, 1943, Lt Conick, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Division CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign," "CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, Hq, CIC, AFHQ; Letter, August 11, 1943, by 1st Lt Rupert W. Guenthner, to AC of S, G-2, 45th Infantry Division, subject CIC Operations, Methods and Equipment" (RESTRICTED); etc.

**Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 134 - 146

***"Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign," Capt Miner (R)

Early in the campaign II Corps and 45th Division agents had seized a number of valuable documents from the Comiso and Biscari airports, which were among II Corps's primary tactical objectives in the first phase of HUSKY.* The G-2 of II Corps, Colonel B.A. Dickson, described the CIC action at Biscari in a letter:

> "On 14 July Capt Miner entered Biscari airport with enlisted men while the field was threatened by armored counterattack and strong pockets of enemy resistance remained behind. By his prompt action a German air operations room was preserved intact, with operations maps and a short wave radio transmitter, and valuable photographic equipment was saved from the grenades of the troops who later mopped up the area."** However, the collection of documents and equipment during most of this offensive, Miner reported, was left largely to other intelligence agencies, for the mobility of CIC teams was affected adversely by their inability to secure their full allotment of vehicles.***

The lack of transportation was one of CIC's principal problems. The theater table of basic allowances had allotted three reconnaissance trucks, or jeeps, to each division section and five to corps, but in Sicily, divisional sections often had only a single vehicle. In at least two cases sections were immobilized by a complete absence of transportation. The 45th Division unit was halted for two days when its truck broke down, and, as was mentioned earlier, the 3d Division CIC section operated without transportation its first six days on the island. Almost every CIC commander called attention to the urgent need for more vehicles, as their work continually was hampered by the shortage. The difficulty of obtaining space for vehicles in the invasion waves - a problem for all Army Units - was a primary cause of the deficiency. But the failure to alleviate it appeared due, in part, to confusion regarding organizational procedures. An AFHQ CIC post-campaign summary pointed to the failure of certain sections to requisition their authorized transportation. Reports from section commanders and G2s suggested they were not aware of the

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*Ibid; "Report of CIC Detachment Activities in Operation HUSKY," July 21, 1943, Lt Guenthner; and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 106

**Quoted in "Operation of II Corps CIC in Tunisia and Sicily," September 1953, Horace Miner (R)

***"Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign," Capt Miner (R)

allowance, as several recommendations were made that three, or even two, jeeps be allotted to CIC divisional sections for future operations.*

Activities of the II Corps CIC Section in Termini Imerese, screened by them on 25 July 1943, seem typical of the Section's procedure in such operations.

Once in town, the agents immediately hunted out officials of the local Carabineri (CORR), whose assistance proved of value in all phases of the subsequent work in town.

In Termini Imerese were three post offices, one of which, however, was only a sorting house, and deemed to be of no CI interest. Mail in the other two was impounded; the buildings were locked, and the key was given to the local CORR. Telephone, and telegraph offices were similarly searched and left guarded. All out-going lines were immobilized.

CORR guards secured banks, the railroad station, and various food stores. The Podesta was given control of available food stocks.

PNF Headquarters were searched thoroughly. As was usually the case, most of the important documents had been destroyed. There was found, however, a photograph of members of the Squadristi which was used as proof against those who had previously been named by local informants. Thirteen members were arrested.

Other arrests were made. Two top party officials were apprehended. Nine of the local black marketeers were taken in by the Carabineri, who were given a free hand to arrest whomever they deemed fit for such treatment.

As the agents prepared to leave, they published regulations which would control the population until the military would be in a better position to resume this responsibility. Sunset to sunrise curfew was imposed. Road-blocks were placed at three principle exits of the city, and guards placed there were given copies of the CIC Black List. **

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*CIC Table of Basic Allowances for Division and Corps," May 6, 1943, Maj A.B. King, Asst Adjutant General, NATOUSA (RESTRICTED); "CIC Operations in Sicily," November 1, 1943, Hq, CIC, AFHQ; Letter, August 14, 1943, Col Forde, "Activities CIC 2d Armored Division;" Indorsement, August 11, 1943, Col Walter, 3d Division, to Letter, AFHQ, "Activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps;" "Suggested Method of Procedure in Operation of a Counter Intelligence Section," August 11, 1943, Col Porter, 1st Div, for Lt Brod; Letter, Sept 15, 1943, Capt Cameron, "July Situation Summary, CIC Port Section 'A'"; Letter August 22, 1943, Lt Conick, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Div CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign"; "Report of CIC Det Activities in Operation HUSKY", July 21, 1943, Lt Guenthner, etc.

**II Corps CIC Section, Memorandum, Dated 25 Jul 1943; Found in Folder entitled, "Det, Tactical, II Corps, (Intelligence Reports)," RCD BX 25102 (6-10-274). (CONFIDENTIAL)

The 45th CIC Detachment seemed to have a different method. Lt Guenthner in his report stated that the detachment usually operated in two sections, one of which would contrive to enter a town or city at the earliest possible moment after it had been captured. He went on to describe in detail the manner in which his agents usually operated within the towns. First interviewed usually was the mayor from whom information of a general nature concerning political, religious, and social set-up of the town was obtained. The mayor, in addition, would be queried about the political beliefs of the leading town officials. He would be told that the town organization would be kept intact if possible. The mayor would then introduce the agent to the other town officials. Next interviewed usually was the Chief of Police. His force, if not sufficiently large already, was augmented by armed civilians. He was, in addition, charged with two specific tasks: he was to take personal responsibility for all weapons turned in by local residents, and also was personally responsible for the enforcement of any regulations issued through the Mayor's office.

The local Fascist Secretary was then located, and informed that as of the entry of the Americans he was a man without a party. He was ordered to produce a list of all Party members under his jurisdiction. Next, he was taken to his office where the CIC agents examined all documents available, and impounded those of importance.

The Postmaster was located, and told to suspend operations. All mail was impounded. Other communications leading out of town were searched out and immobilized.

Enemy installations were hunted up, then checked. The Black-List personnel listed by higher headquarters) were asked for, and local citizens were encouraged to add more names to this list of the suspected.

Obviously, this neat pattern was subject to a variety of changes--the most obvious being when citizens refused to accept orders from the mayor or police chief. Since the CIC function was, in theory, restricted to town security, civil administration matters were, whenever possible, left to AMGOT.

Lieutenant Guenthner reported that certain changes were indicated if his detachment was to carry on such work to the best advantage"*

During these same fast days of mid-July, the Division CIC Detachment was screening towns often at a rate of one a day.

On 18 July 1943, members of this detachment were caught in an air raid in Barrafranca. The CIC Agents took charge of the burial work; local citizens were queasy about digging for bodies in the ruins.

*45th CIC-Det; Report, Subject; What CIC Learned and Is Learning in Sicily;" dated 11 Aug 1943; extracted from "Correspondence, G-2 (AFHQ) To." RCD BX 25103 (7-6-70) (CONFIDENTIAL)

The agents also caught two American soldiers and an Italian soldier, all in civilian clothes, who were given to the MP's.

On 19 July the section was scheduled for work in Villerosa, but as this city had not yet fallen, the agents were forced to bivouac in the vicinity.

Now running behind schedule, the section entered Villerosa with the combat forces, and then, on the same day, moved on to Enna. The next day found the Agents in Alimena, and by 23 July they had moved on to Petraila.

Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to properly describe work in these cities. Each presented a new situation and new problems; but, when seen in relation to the overall picture, no one town was of great importance in itself.*

Lt Brod, in charge of a section of Port Section "B," reported that during the period 21 July to 26 July his group arrested 39 Fascists--Party officials, terrorists, and officers and members of the semi-secret Questura. As Fascists were arrested, anti-Fascists were liberated. Nine Arabians, jailed by the Germans for having assisted the British in Africa, were released, but they were allowed board and lodging at the Enna jail until arrangements were made for their transportation home to Africa. Eventually they were shipped with a load of PW's, but they were provided with special passes to keep their priviledged status known and advertised.

The section also encountered a score of miscellaneous prisoners--some Fascist and some anti-Fascist--who were handled individually in accordance with the situation.**

CIC Capture Valuable Documents

Although, as Capt Miner said, there were periods when CIC was unable to concentrate on the seizure of enemy documents, the fulfillment of this mission remained, nevertheless, one of the chief contributions of the Corps to the success of the Sicilian campaign. And, despite Miner's statement that, in the II Corps area, "only the 1st Division...produced outstanding results" in capturing, documents,*** Col Dickson reported

*1st Division, Memorandum Dated 24 July 1943. Folder: "Detachment Tactical II Corps (Intelligence Reports)." KCD BX 25102 (6-10-274). (UNCLASSIFIED).
**Port Section "B" Report, subject: "Prisoners of War and Political Internees to be Evacuated," dated 27 July 1943, from folder entitled "Detachment, Tactical, II Corps (Intelligence Reports)." KCD BX 25102 (6-10-275). (CONFIDENTIAL).
***"Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign," Capt Miner.

that "the Corps CIC Detachment has been the instrumentality through which Corps G-2 received captured documents of immediate value and accurate observations of forward situations."*

The most important Counter Intelligence Corps seizures were those listed in the Seventh Army section's summary of activities for July. Without specifying the sections, or places, Capt Heegaard-Jensen announced the following successes:

1. "By D + 2, CIC sections had obtained overlays of all mine fields in Sicily. This information was relayed through channels to the parties immediately concerned with the neutralization of these mine fields."

2. "Other information of immediate tactical value, ranging from the copy of the order of battle of enemy units operating in Sicily to the order of battle of units operating in the Balkans, has been obtained and forwarded through channels to the Order of Battle Section, G-2 Headquarters Seventh Army."

3. Fascist Party records, when not of immediate value to CIC, were turned over to AMGOT or to Advance Documents sections.

4. "A complete code of German radar units has been forwarded to AFHQ."

5. "This office [has records of] a complete prison system effected by the Italian Prisoner of War Group, including their informant system, the location of all prisoner of war camps in Sicily and Italy, guard precautions, rules and regulations regarding the maintenance of the prisoner of war stockade."

6. "Over 200 sacks of confiscated mail have been turned over to... Seventh Army. Mail was seized immediately upon entrance in each of over 200 towns that have been covered by CIC personnel. Mail that is not yet turned over is in safe keeping until such time as it is picked up."

7. In addition to documents, communications equipment as captured. "Thirteen wireless transmitters, eight of them intact, have been seized....Four radar units have been seized, and equipment and documents pertaining to their use have been forwarded to AFHQ. One crystal wireless transmitter, in operating condition, has been turned over to OSS for their use.**

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*Letter, August 9, 1943, by Col B.A. Dickson, AC of S, G-2, II Corps, to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, subject, "Activity of the CIC," (RESTRICTED)
**"Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 Jul 43 to 31 Jul 43," August 2, 1943, Capt Heegaard-Jensen (R)

(On October 8, Capt Heegaard-Jensen reported that by then 30 wireless transmitters had been picked up).*

Specific recognition of CIC's work in this field came in a letter, dated 23 August 1943, from Capt B. B. Shewbridge of the Advance Documents Section to Lt Col H. G. Sheen of the AFHQ, G2 section. It read in part:

"During the recent operation in Sicily, much valuable battlefield information was made readily available through the splendid cooperation of the CIC Section, Seventh Army....The Advance Documents Section wishes to express its admiration and appreciation for this tactical and operational foresight on the part of CIC personnel, and for the benefits derived therefrom."**

While screening the town of CIC agents came across who, among other things, had been charged with coding and decoding for the .*** When interviewed by Peter Carpentieri, 2d Lieutenant in the II Corps CIC Section, explained in detail the construction of the code which his office had been using, unchanged, for the last two years. He also produced the code book, which, until the CIC arrived, had been seen by no one in the past two years save himself and the safe.

stated that subjects of the utmost secrecy were usually handled verbally. The code was used for secret telegrams which dealt usually with economic problems, information on personalities, morale of the people, reaction to Fascist laws, etc.****

Final Phase of "HUSKY" Begins

With the conquest of western and central Sicily in its last stages, II Corps turned east to attack German units defending the northeast corner of the island. The British Eighth Army, after its landings in the southeast, had pushed north to the foothills of Mount Etna, where it was stopped by powerful German resistance. Whereas Italian troops in the west had fought sporadically and surrounded in large numbers, the Germans, having shifted east, appeared determined to hold what Col Dickson called the "Etna stellung." Near

*Memorandum, 8 October 1943, by Capt Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen, to Chief, CIC, subject, "Counter Intelligence Corps and its Relations with the Office of Strategic Services in Sicily"

**Quoted in Counter Intelligence Corps Information Bulletin No. 2, "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Sicily" (R)

***As yet unidentified

****The mechanics of the code, quite complex, are fully described, and a sample telegram is inclosed in the document which is the source of these paragraphs: Headquarters, II Corps Report, Subject: "Fascist Code System, dtd 25 Jul 43, found in folder, "Detachment, Tactical, II Corps (Intelligence Reports)," RCD EX 25102 (6-10-273). (C)

the end of July the 45th Division began a drive east along the north coast, with the 1st Division moving forward on its right flank. General Montgomery's British and Canadian forces increased pressure from the south and southeast.*

Resourceful CIC agents carried out their mission in a variety of ways. On 29 July 1943, the 45th Division CIC Detachment was held from their target of Tusa by enemy machine gun fire. Having a few hours of free time, Agents Robinson and Moseley of the Detachment swam out to a small ship lying deserted in the harbor of Cefalu. The ship had no transmitter; hence, it was no immediate threat to security. It carried a smashed anti-aircraft gun (with no ammunition), and ten objects which apparently were depth charges. It was seaworthy, and had a diesel engine ready to start. Agents Robinson and Moseley suggested that a guard be placed aboard. The guard was placed, and later reported that he had stopped a civilian from swimming to the boat.**

This was one of the last times that Agent Robinson was able to serve actively. Shortly after this day he contracted infantile paralysis, and he died while the campaign was yet in progress.***

In the small town of Pollizzi Generosa about this time, the II Corps CIC gave another example of its resourcefulness in performing non-CIC missions. Col Dickson's summary of the section's work was as follows:

> "On 25 July, following a report from a patrol of the 1st Division which had briefly entered Polizzi Generosa that there were riots in the town, Capt Miner went there, organized a civil guard of 150 men and restored order. Numerous German soldiers remained in the country about the town, stealing from and killing farmers and townsfolk, and presenting a threat to friendly communications. Capt Miner posted his civil defense force at night at the entrance to the town to defend it and also led a patrol which captured three German soldiers in the region."****

The patrol that captured the Germans consisted of agents Roy G. Tozier and Lewis V. Sevier. Tozier gave a humorous account of the incident. Warned by civilians that enemy soldiers were nearby, the three-man search party set off:

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*Montgomery, El Alamein to the River Sangro, pp. 119-134; and Bradley, A Soldiers Story, pp. 144-146

**45th CIC Det, Daily Rept, 30 Jul 1943, Found in folder "Correspondence File;" KCD DX 45121 (1-29-221) (CONFIDENTIAL)

***45th CIC Det, Report, Subject: "Civilian Clothing of Lansing Foxcroft Robinson, Special Agent, Deceased;" dtd 24 Oct 43; folder, "Correspondence File;" KCD DX 45121 (1-29-230-A) (C)

****Quoted in "Operation of II Corps CIC in Tunisia and Sicily," Sep 1953, Horace Miner

"Miner and Sevier together went one way. I went another. I was unlucky. I saw two soldiers some 300 yards away. I guess they weren't any more anxious to fight than I was, so they threw away their guns and, with hands raised, started toward me. In the meantime, I had done considerable shouting to Low and Miner. They joined me about the same time the Germans did. Miner spoke to the men briefly in German, learned there was another one in the valley, so he said I should guard the two and he and Low would find the other. That was fine with me. I parked myself 20 feet away from them, parked my .45 in my lap, and tossed them two cigarettes and matches. I remember feeling slightly smug at that point....Then I had a horrible feeling. I remembered that I had not inserted a bullet in the chamber of my .45. And, since they were professional soldiers and I was an erstwhile major in philosophy, I couldn't shame myself by letting them know how careless I had been. So I tossed them more cigarettes, smiled, and said something profound like 'This ist a schoen tag, isn't it.' Horace Miner was fairly flattering in his remarks about my picking up the German, and I have never told him how I guarded them with a gun which was not ready to be fired. I was awfully glad when Miner and Sevier came back with the third German."*

Lieutenant Guenthner and his swimming Agent Moseley had themselves several bad hours toward the end of July. They entered Polizza Generosa for what was supposed to be a routine screening, but such was not the case. The mayor and police chief informed the two agents that only one American officer and a handful of soldiers preceeded them, and they left as quickly as they had come. The officials stated further that many German soldiers roamed the outskirts of the town, terrorizing citizens, and demanding food at pistol point.

In addition to this threat from the outside, there was appreciable civil unrest. Mobs roamed; store windows were being smashed; homes looted.

The six-man police force had been unable to stem the turmoil; the Mayor asked for American soldiers to do the job. Capt Miner was summoned. He remained in town while Lt Guenthner and Sgt Moseley rushed off to find spare MP's at Caltavature.**

As the Allied closed in on the Etna Stellung, the 45th Division met its first stiff opposition at San Stefano; its offensive was slowed for several days. Here, Lt Lewis of the II Corps CIC and his driver, Pvt George Abdo, won commendation for heroic action by moving under fire ahead of troops to secure documents from a command post. Abdo was

*Letter, July 1953, by Roy Tozier
**45th CIC Det, Daily Rept, 25 Jul 43. Found in folder "Correspondence File", RCD BX 45121 (1-27-224). (CONFIDENTIAL)

killed when their jeep struck a mine; he was awarded a Silver Star posthumously. Lewis continued into the town, organized civil defense against the return of enemy patrols, took steps to notify friendly forces of the mine field and provided valuable information to the CO of the advancing combat unit. He subsequently received a battlefield promotion to 1st Lt.*

After the fall of San Stefano the 3d Division replaced the 45th, which was scheduled for rest and refitting in preparation for the Italian invasion.**

On 29 July 1943 Lt Carpentieri and Sgt Keeler (of the II Corps Section) were sent to AC of S, G2, 3d Infantry Division to establish an informant system. It was desired that information be obtained concerning: enemy strength and troop disposition; terrain features; condition of roads; relations between troops and civilians; and miscellaneous tactical information.

Carpentieri and Keeler found that in the areas of heavy combat best results were obtained by sending civilians into the enemy zone. Local priests and Carabinieri officials often served, and great effort was made to recruit former soldiers for the work, since they would be able to describe and evaluate their observations.

When enemy resistance was low, however, it was found difficult to send civilians into their zone; the boundaries were so vaguely drawn that the line-crossers had trouble finding their targets. Under such circumstances it seemed best to obtain information from civilians migrating from enemy-held areas, civilians in freshly evacuated towns, PW's and deserters.

Although Lt Carpentieri was well pleased with the success of his mission, he had one recommendation for such operations in the future. He reported that few civilians could accurately describe the locations of points of interest which they had observed. And, by the same token, their judgment of distance was often quite poor. Lt Carpentieri therefore suggested that anyone entrusted with such a mission in the future should be given (or have access to) a set of aerial photographs.***

The II Corps "espionage section" worked often with advance units of the 3d Division. 2d Lt Peter F. Carpentieri (of II Corps G2, assigned, because of his linguistic abilities, to work with CIC on this

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*"Operation of II Corps CIC in Tunisia and Sicily," Sep 1953, Horace Miner; Ltr, Jul 1953 from Roy Tozier; and Ltr, 9 Aug 43, Col Dickson, "Activity of the Counter Intelligence Corps"

**Bradley, A Soldiers Story, p. 148

***II Corps CIC Section; Report, Subject, "CIC Report," dtd 23 Aug 43. From folder "Detachment, Tactical, II Corps (Intelligence Reports)" KCD BX 25102 (6-10-269) (CONFIDENTIAL)

mission) and Agent Clark B. Keeler passed numerous civilian agents into enemy territory and interrogated refugees crossing the front lines. As a result of their activities, valuable tactical information was procured and furnished to the G2s of the 3d Division and II Corps, including data on roads and road-blocks, mine fields, artillery positions, and enemy strength, disposition, movement, and morale.*

Troina Falls; II Corps Drives on Messina

To the south, the 1st Division drove toward Troina; this salient of German resistance became, in General Eisenhower's words, "one of the most fiercely fought smaller actions of the war."** Reinforced by fresh troops from the 9th Infantry Division who recently had landed at Palermo, the 1st, after a week's siege, marched into the ruins of Troina - and the enemy's defeat in Sicily became imminent.*** The extent of destruction in the town is reflected in Lt Brod's statement that, after his CIC unit entered behind front-line troops, most missions during the first two days were accomplished on foot in view of the impassability of the streets...."**** After Troina fell, the 9th Division Division replaced the 1st on the front, and its Counter Intelligence Corps section, under 2d Lt Charles B. Conick, undertook investigations in towns along the line of advance.*****

The section's duties, accomplishments, and problems were along the same lines as those of the CIC sections that had landed on D-day. But, operating in the last two weeks of the campaign, the 9th Division CIC faced a new difficulty. Conick said, "This section found that because of the lateness of the campaign and the dissolution of the Fascist Party by the abdication of Mussolini, papers and records of value had already been destroyed prior to the arrival of the section;" in some towns, however, "a great deal of help was derived from records that had not been destroyed but had been kept either by the Carabinieri or the Fascist Secretary."****** These records were eventually turned over to AMGOT. Conick reported that excellent cooperation was received from AMGOT, Military Police and the various unit commanders with whom CIC worked. Recommendations concerning the retention or disposition of public officials were made, and "in every case these were followed by

*Report of Operation of II Corps CIC Section during Sicilina Campaign," Capt Miner; and "History of the CIC Detachment, II Corps (202d CIC Detachment)"

**Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 176

***Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 147-154

****"Suggested Method of Procedure in Operation of a CIC Section," 11 Aug 1943, Col Porter, 1st Division, for Lt Brod (R)

*****Rosters, CIC Detachment NATOUSA, 30 June and 5 August 1943 - See Appendix 1, this Chapter.

******Letter, 22 Aug 1943, Lt Conick, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Division CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign" (cf. supplementary reports) (R)

the AMGOT officers, and changes were made according to the CIC investigations."*

Along the north coast the 3d Division was pushing toward Messina. Its CIC section, under 2d Lt Bertram R. Russell, had left Palermo 31 July and moved into the area formerly covered by the 45th Division section. CIC advanced with the 3d Division through towns from San Stefano to Messina. Carabinieri again provided valuable aid to the Corps in establishing order in fallen towns. Reliable and cooperative, they maintained patrols, enforced curfews and other military government regulations, collected weapons, and guarded municipal buildings and counterintelligence targets. Lt Russell reported that the identification CIC gave the Carabinieri armbands marked "Civil Police," were "respected not only by the civil populace but also by the U. S. troops who moved through the town." The advance of the division was too rapid to permit complete investigation of influential Fascists. A few were arrested, however, after consultation with AMGOT, and interned in local jails.**

The Arrest of Fascists; Sicilian Campaign Ends

During some periods of the battle for Sicily, particularly those in which American forces were not advancing so quickly, the investigation and arrest of prominent Fascists and enemy agents by CIC played an important part in the maintenance of military and civil security. Afterwards, Capt Hoegaard-Jensen reported that, "The CIC...as of 25 September 1943, arrested 771 individuals, 24 of whom are classified as enemy agents and will stand trial on that basis. Seven saboteurs were arrested by the CIC and signed confessions.... In addition, the CIC penetrated and completely exposed the Italian intelligence systems operating on the Island of Sicily."*** He stated also that several prominent leaders and a number of agents of Fascist organizations were arrested and interrogated by CIC, and evacuated to Africa, and that some were employed by CIC as double agents and informants.****

Most of those whom the Corps arrested were Fascist political and police officials, potentially a major threat to security. Many were shipped to North Africa in accordance with an order from General Patton, CG of the Seventh Army, that all leading Fascists and persons considered dangerous to the Allied cause be evacuated. But some individuals, who had been arrested only because, by their office, they had symbolized Fascism to the people, but who were not regarded as serious security

*Ibid

**Letter, 24 Aug 1943, by 2d Lt Bertram R. Russell, to ACofS, G-2, 3d Infantry Division, subject, "Activities of CIC Section, 3d Infantry Division from 31 July to 18 Aug 1943" (R) (cf. "Discussion of CIC Missions in the Sicilian Campaign covering period from 10 Jul 1943 to 3 Aug 1943," Lt Brod) (R)

***Memorandum, 8 Oct 1943, Capt Hoegaard-Jensen, "CIC and its Relations with the Office of Strategic Services in Sicily" (R)

****Ibid

risks, were later released. And in some instances, where no capable replacements could be found, former party members were kept in civic offices, under the supervision of the Military Government."*

Pressing on to Messina, the 3d Division, together with elements of the 45th utilized a series of three minor amphibious landings in breaking the last lines of resistance by German rear-guard units defending the retreat across the Straits of Messina to Italy. By 15 August the Allied drive had become a race; on the 16th combat troops sped past the Cape of Milazzo; and on the morning of the 17th the meeting of American and British forces in Messina marked the close of the fight for Sicily. The following day the II Corps and 3d Division CIC groups began work in Messina that continued till British counterintelligence, which was to have jurisdiction over the eastern half of the island, assumed control.**

The 3d Division CIC had stayed with front-line elements until the finish. Lt Russell gave the following account of the section's entry into Milazzo that day before the campaign ended:

> "Troops had by-passed the Cape of Milazzo but, because of the possible documents and material of intelligence value that might be found there, the CIC entered the town. Of the several thousand inhabitants, only two were found in the town.... [They] led the CIC men to caves along the beaches where thousands of civilians went wild with joy at the sight of American uniforms. As was the usual case, many were eager to denounce several of their group who had been actively engaged in Fascist activities, but the important discoveries at the spot were not Fascist leaders but rather numerous coastal gun positions, a transmitting set in the home of an Italian officer, and documents from the headquarters of a coastal regiment. Italian prisoners were also numrous, too numerous in fact to be handled by two CIC men. These were effectively disposed of, however, by lining them up in a column of twos and starting them off down the road in the direction of the P. W. enclosure under cover of a white flag. Counterintelligence functions were carried out until CIC personnel were sent out from [II Corps] to relieve the division men."***

The mopping-up of resistance pockets in the west had been completed earlier by the 2d Armored Division and other units. With the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of defense areas for

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*"Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 Jul 43 to 31 Jul 43," 2 Aug 43, Capt Heegaard-Jensen; and CIC Information Bulletin No. 2, "CIC Operations in Sicily" (R)

**Letter, 24 Aug 43, Lt Russell, "Activities of CIC Section, 3d Infantry Division from 31 Jul to 10 Aug 43"; and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 157-164

***"Field Security (Counter Intelligence) with a Division in Sicily," by 2d Lt Bertram R. Russell (R)

units of the Seventh Army, which became responsible for the occupation of the four western provinces of Sicily (Palermo, Agrigento, Caltanissetta and Trapani), CIC sections turned to the accomplishment of their static mission - although initial investigations of by-passed villages and towns had yet to be completed in the following weeks. Later, a permanent static section was formed from Port Sections "A" and "B" and two additional port sections dispatched from North Africa. CIC sections attached to tactical units then relinquished their civil security responsibilities and directed their efforts to military security matters.*

Although combat activity had trailed off by late August, CIC work continued through the month. Agents Mosely and Messina of the 45th CIC Detachment were told of an underground organization operating throughout Sicily. A Sicilian had been located who claimed to know the exact locations of local "Communication Stations" used by the net. He had been told of other stations in Termini, Palermo and Messina -- some of which were connected with the Italian mainland. Afraid to escort CIC agents to the entrances of this "underground," he was induced to lead his good friend, Private Labelle (American) there.

Private Labelle, in turn, took agents Moseley and Messina to the "underground entrances," which proved to be, appropriately, manhole covers over the sewer system west of Trabia!

The Sicilian expected to be paid for this information; Private Labelle admitted that he wanted only publicity for his part in the work. During the conversation that followed discovery of these "underground entrances," Private Labelle admitted that he had been arrested several times for being AWOL from his organization. The manhole covers were replaced. The case was considered closed.** Indeed, even many important CIC investigations seemed at the time similarly unrewarding. A British officer at Porticello, for instance, called the 45th CIC Detachment to inform Lieutenant Guenthner that he had observed lights flashing near his billet. Agents Messina and Joy were sent to investigate. Upon their arrival in Porticello, the Agents were told that there were no British officers in the town. Some British soldiers, all enlisted men, were located a few miles off; they, in turn referred the CIC agents to the town of Aspra, where a Flight Lieutenant was living. This officer said that it was not he who had reported the lights, but that such lights did exist.

Agents Messina and Joy set off to discover what they could. They found the following violations of blackout regulations: a devotional light shining from a home in Aspra; several lights in homes at Saint Nicola; a light shining from a convent between Saint Nicola and Porticello; an Army truck with headlights ablaze; a civilian car in the same condition; numerous lights in homes about Flavia; lights in

*"CIC Operations in Sicily," 1 Nov 1943, Hq, CIC, AFHQ (R)
**45th CIC Det, Daily Report, 29 Aug 43, from folder, "Correspondence File," KCD Bx 45121 (1-29-221) (C)

doorways, windows and slits in the blinds -- all in Ponticello; lights from diverse sources in Saint Elia; bright lights from all the windows of a key radar station on the tip of the peninsula at Zaffarano; and miscellaneous other violations.

All concerned were warned.

In Porticello, incidentally, the two agents met a group of Carabinieri officials who, similarly, were attempting to have blackout regulations obeyed.*

Liaison Established with Other Units

The assumption of civil security duties by CIC during the combat period brought it into frequent contact with the Military Government teams. Although some difficulties arose between the two groups, partly because of misunderstanding of each other's missions, and partly because of the inability of AMGOT to provide early coverage of towns, increasingly profitable relations were developed over the weeks. Thus, Capt Heegaard-Jensen who had complained early in the campaign of a lack of cooperation by AMGOT, spoke by early August of the complete cooperation being achieved in some instances. Furthermore, it was suggested that with close coordination at higher levels, and with a greater mutual appreciation of the other organization's jurisdiction and functions, the problems that continued to arise could be alleviated more readily.**

CIC also established successful liaison with various intelligence organizations, including the other Army G2 branches, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Psychological Warfare Group, and British Intelligence representatives.*** But with one group, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), considerable difficulty was experienced during the Sicilian campaign. According to Major Edward L. Ray, Jr., CO of the NATOUSA CIC Detachment, OSS men "worked independently and at times at cross-purposes with the CIC"; he added, "their accomplishments in the CI field are believed to have been negligible if not nil."****

*45th CIC Det, Daily Rpt by Cpl Messina and Pfc Joy, dtd 24 Aug 43, from folder, "Correspondence File," KCD BX 45121 (1-29-220) (C)

**Daily Activity Report of All CIC Sections, Seventh Army," 14 Jul 1943, Lt Heegaard-Jensen; "Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 July 43 to 31 July 43," 2 Aug 43, Capt Heegaard-Jensen; "Memorandum for the NATOUSA File," 13 Aug 43, Col Adkinson, "CIC Operations in Sicily;" "Discussion of CIC Missions in the Sicilian Campaign covering Period from 10 Jul 43 to 3 Aug43," Lt Brod; and Letter, 12 Aug 43, Col Porter, "Activities of the CIC" (R)

***CIC Information Bulletin No. 2, "CIC Operations in Sicily" (R)

****Letter, 7 Oct 43, by Maj Edward L. Ray, Jr., to Chief, CIB, G-2, Hq, ETOUSA, subject, "CIC Operations" (R)

Capt Neegaard-Jensen reported that OSS had been directed by both Col Oscar W. Koch, ACof S, G-2, Seventh Army, and Lt Col Thomas C. Young, Jr., Counterintelligence Officer, 15th Army Group, to carry out counterintelligence functions under the CIC section commanders but that they had failed to cooperate with CIC.* It was not until later campaigns on the continent that the two agencies learned to work together in combat operations.

The accomplishments of its units in Sicily did much to strengthen CIC's reputation, first recognized by some military men in North Africa, as a necessary part of the army's combat team. The Seventh Army's G-2, Col Koch, stated: "I consider the work done by the Counter Intelligence Corps during the Sicilian campaign to have been of inestimable value,"** and the substance of his statement echoed in lower echelon intelligence channels. Col B. A. Dickson said: "The CIC detachment attached to II Corps during the operations in Sicily has performed a great variety of missions in a highly commendable manner and proven themselves indispensable both to divisions and corps..."***

Agents Gain Awards, Commendations

Individual agents were commended for their work in Sicily. Shortly after the campaign, Col L. R. Forney, Chief of the Army's Counter Intelligence Group, said of the commanding officer of the Seventh Army CIC sections, "From the standpoint of services rendered, Capt Neegaard-Jensen is probably the most distinguished officer in the entire CIC."**** In reporting his recommendation of Capt Miner for a battle promotion (which failed because of the lack of a T/O vacancy) Col Dickson said:

> "Capt Miner, as detachment commander, is to be commended and is deserving of the highest praise for the manner in which his unit has functioned. He has already been recommended to CG NATOUSA for promotion to the grade of major, and it is believed that this rank is not only richly deserved in this case but is needed for the position of corps CIC Detachment Commander in view of the relative rank of both combat unit commanders and AMGOT officials with whom he transacts business."*****

*Memorandum, 8 Oct 1943, Capt Neegaard-Jensen, "CIC and its Relations with the Office of Strategic Services in Sicily" (R)

**Quoted in CIC Information Bulletin No. 2, "Counter Intelligence Corps Operations in Sicily" (R)

***Letter, 9 Aug 1943, Col Dickson, "Activity of the Counter Intelligence Corps" (R)

****"Memorandum for General Strong," 12 Oct 1943, by Col L. R. Forney, Chief, CIC, subject, "OSS in Sicily (R)

*****Letter, 9 August 1943, Col Dickson, "Activity of the Counter Intelligence Corps"

A complete list of awards won by Counter Intelligence Corps agents in Sicily has not been compiled. However, in the II Corps section alone, several CIC men later were honored for actions performed, in whole or in part, on the island. Norbert B. Wittrock was awarded the Legion of Merit for services in Sicily and Italy; Lt Crosby Lewis won the Bronze Star Medal for services in support of combat operations in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy (in addition to the battlefield promotion mentioned earlier); and Clark B. Keeler received a Bronze Star for action in Sicily. A Purple Heart was given Daniel J. Sullivan after he was injured slightly when the II Corps CP was bombed in early August.* Records of other units are not so complete in this respect. But a memorandum by Col H. R. Kibler, Chief of CIC, on 4 September 1943, stated that twelve agents who took part in the Sicilian campaign were recommended for the Legion of Merit.** It has not been determined how many of these awards were given, or to whom.

Although its men possessed the other qualifications required for their specialized missions, CIC was hindered by a shortage of Italian-speaking agents. Interrogating through interpreters made an agent's work more difficult, and where interpreters were novices the effectiveness of CIC investigations was lessened considerably. Section commanders and G2s insisted that more CIC linguists were needed - at least one per team. In the meantime, methods of finding more capable interpreters should be sought. Italian civilians and American soldiers had been used experimentally, but the former were obvious security risks, the latter had not shown satisfactory linguistic or intellectual abilities, and neither group produced individuals with the technical training of skilled interpreters. A more thorough effort to obtain CIC linguists was to be made for the invasion of Italy.***

Sicily ended as a political and military disaster for the enemy. Mussolini had been forced to resign; Italy was looking for a way out of the war as unrest and dissatisfaction spread; and Axis armies had suffered 167,000 casualties, compared to 31,000 for the Allies.****

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*"History of the CIC Detachment, II Corps (202d CIC Detachment)"

**Memorandum, 4 September 1943, by Col H. R. Kibler, Chief, CIC, to Asst Executive Officer, CIC (RESTRICTED??)

***CIC Operations in Sicily," 1 Nov 1943, Hq, CIC AFHQ; "Memorandum for the Chief, Operations Section, CIC," 25 Oct 1943, by 1st Lt William E. Viney, subject, "Method of Operation of the CIC in NATOUSA" (R); Letter, 14 Aug 1943, Col Forde, "Activities CIC 2d Armored Division"; "Discussion of CIC Missions in the Sicilian Campaign covering period 10 Jul 43 to 3 Aug 43," Lt Brod; Letter, 22 Aug 43, Lt Conick, "Summation of Mission and Activity Report for 9th Division CIC Section during Sicilian Campaign"; "Report of CIC Activities for the Period Embracing 10 Jul 43 to 31 Jul 43," 2 Aug 43, Capt Boegaard-Jensen; etc. (R)

****Marshall, Biennial Report, 1 Jul 43 to 30 Jun 45, p. 163; and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 183

The Italian campaign was immediately ahead. Preparations for OVERLORD were being advanced. The CIC veterans of Sicily were dispersed to handle several missions: many were to move on to Italy with the Fifth Army; some were to go to England, and then France; and others were to remain in Sicily with static units finishing the job they had begun in combat.

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APPENDIX I - CIC IN THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

ROSTERS OF PARTICIPATING UNITS

Force 141

Tucker, Robert W.	Capt
Porter, Marion E.	1st Lt
Tipton, Thomas L.	T/Sgt
Geiger, Friedrich H.	S/Sgt

I Armored Corps (Seventh US Army)

Heegaard-Jensen, Paul A.	1st Lt
Lucas, John H.	1st Lt
Stradinger, Oscar NMI	2d Lt
Dinehart, Alan F., Jr.	T/Sgt
Joyce, Herbert M.	T/Sgt
Bucher, Donald C.	Sgt
Ford, Quinton U.	Sgt
French, Woodrow W.	Sgt
Haseltine, Marshall	Sgt
Metastazio, Arthur P.	Sgt
Emmet, Thomas A.	Cpl
Bergman, Victor C., Jr.	Pfc
Brockmeier, Robert NMI	Pfc
Richards, Robert R.	Pfc

Port Section "A"

Cameron, Jack B.	1st Lt
Van Kirk, Arthur H.	1st Lt
Johnson, Reginald M.	M/Sgt
Ellison, Herbert A.	Sgt
Gordon, Peter NMI	Sgt
Nadir, Nubar NMI	Sgt
Pogue, Earl G.	Sgt
Rumatz, George V.	Sgt
Smith, Richard L.	Sgt
Bailey, Perry O.	Cpl
Flynn, Francis P.	Cpl
Jacovine, Anthony E.	Cpl
Voitle, Robert F.	Pfc

Port Section "B"

Costello, Harry G., Jr.	1st Lt
Brod, Mario E.	1st Lt
Vengrouskie, Victor J.	M/Sgt
Daguerre, Raymond P.	S/Sgt
Devere, Perry A.	Sgt
Gordon, Wendell C.	Sgt
Grey, Alfred E.	Sgt
Hernandez, Crispin C.	Sgt
MacGruer, John A.	Sgt
Somers, George B.	Sgt
Stenfanik, Thadeus, J.	Sgt
Hegyi, Herman E.	Cpl
Pawson, Joseph E.	Pfc

1st Inf Div

Ray, James E.	2d Lt
Jenkins, William L.	S/Sgt
Auciello, Domenico NMI	Sgt
Cody, Charles J.	Sgt
Menendez, Warren F.	Sgt
Little, John W.	Cpl

3d Inf Div

Russell, Bertram R.	2d Lt
Jensen, Milo M.	S/Sgt
McGuire, James L.	Sgt
Panard, Anthony G.	Sgt
Williams, Richard J.	Sgt
Spina, John P.	Cpl

9th Inf Div

Conick, Charles B.	2d Lt
Ingargiola, Henry B.	T/Sgt
Hanson, Leonard E.	Sgt
Mangam, Charles R.	Sgt
Northrop, Richard M.	Sgt
Zielasko, Gustave W.	Cpl

Appendix 1 (Cont'd)

2d Armored Division

LaBranche, Robert R.	2d Lt
Leahy, Daniel A.	S/Sgt
Mitchell, Joseph M.	Sgt
Meyers. Lawrance A.	Cpl
Houser, George J.	Cpl
Mess, Charles W.	Cpl

82d Airborne Div

Kummer, Albert J.	2d Lt
Stevens, Harold L.	S/Sgt
Sloan, Paul G., Jr.	Sgt
Scanlon, John E.	Sgt
Goldenfield, Ernest A.	Pfc
Perper, George A.	Pfc

45th Inf Div

Guenthner, Rupert W.	1st Lt
Robinson, Lansing F.	S/Sgt
Mosely, George T.	Sgt
Messina, Frank A.	Cpl
Joy, Walter	Pfc
McCoy, Scott D.	Pfc

II Corps

Miner, Horace Mitchell	Capt
Lewis, Crosby	2d Lt
Baldwin, Langford NMI	S/Sgt
Golden, Bernard H.	S/Sgt
Stephens, Thomas G.	S/Sgt
Brown, Jarvis J.	Sgt
Keeler, Clark B.	Sgt
Princi, Peter W.	Sgt
Fangal, Lloyd NMI	Cpl
Sevier, Lewis V.	Cpl
Tozier, Roy G.	Cpl
Sullivan, Daniel J.	Pfc
Wittrock, Norbett NMI	Pfc

CHAPTER 3

CRITIQUE: NORTH AFRICA, SICILY

New Problems Arise

Any hopes that Maj Edward L. Ray and his staff at Allied Force Headquarters may have had that the reorganization brought about by Lt Col Gordon Sheen in the spring of 1943 had solved all of CIC's major problems were soon dispelled. From the time the tactical troops left North Africa for the invasion of Sicily until well into 1944, headquarters found a new problem arising almost every day or, worse still, had to meet a recurrent problem that had been considered solved. Many of these were administrative, arising normally, but frustratingly, from the integration of a new type of organization with a growing and changing mission into a framework already established.

Part of the difficulty arose through the fact that CIC's mission, administration, and "ground rules" were promulgated in Washington, while the actual operations were controlled by the G2 of the command to which each detachment was attached, many of whom had no knowledge of the importance of any type of intelligence. Many of these problems seemed to those who had to struggle with them to be the result of a misunderstanding of CIC's mission so great as to cause a deliberate intention to nullify the organization.

To recount these difficulties at length would be pointless, but a few of them are important for historical purposes, to illustrate how some were solved and how others depended for their solution, then as now, upon an understanding by the other services of CIC's needs and mission.

"Assigned" or "Attached" to Theater?

One of the early causes of consternation was a cable, on 28 June 1943, from the War Department announcing that all CIC personnel in the Theater "or hereafter arriving" would be "assigned" to MIS, WD, and "attached" to NATO for duty.* There followed a flow of cables and letters to the War Department and to the Chief, CIC, in an attempt to straighten out the administrative difficulties caused by this change.

"Urgently request that your message. . . . be reconsidered," one cable signed "Eisenhower" read. "If members of CIC are assigned to WD and only attached to this headquarters, we will be handicapped in administering here matters which necessitate prompt action, including replacements for casualties by promotions in the battlefield,

*Cable No 1353, from MIS, WD, to CG, NATO, Algiers, dtd 28 Jun 43 (S&F files, R-11, p 413) (C)

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disciplinary matters and similar functions ordinarily looked upon as belonging to the Commanding Officer locally.*

Letters and cables followed at a rapid pace without any real clarification of this situation or of numerous problems attendant upon it, such as promotions, transfers into and out of CIC, and a Table of Organization for the Theater.**

War Department Cooperation Necessary

Major Ray appealed to Colonel Sheen, as the highest ranking officer in the theater who was familiar with the situation there as well as being acquainted with the problems in the office of the CIC Chief, to make a trip to the United States to attempt to reach some solution for a situation which "has become intolerable."***

"The difficulties have been numerous," Major Ray wrote. "They have stemmed principally from other staff sections in this headquarters who are not familiar with the ramifications of Counter Intelligence and its methods and, unfortunately, from the War Department itself. It has been possible to overcome, one by one, the hurdles placed in our way locally, but the lack of cooperation from the CIC Branch, MIS, War Department, has brought us to a dead stop. The War Department is too remote from this theater to be familiar with our needs. Cables and letters are important to close the gap. Perhaps it is our fault, but somehow we have been unable to impress the War Department with the urgent need of certain measures which it alone can take to correct serious conditions confronting us here. For the large part no answers are even returned to us acknowledging our reports or requests or clarifying issues or correcting conditions."

Major Ray pointed out that the cable mentioned above had brought up so many fundamental issues that "it is impossible to know which way to turn to accomplish certain ends that are most vitally needed."

In spite of Major Ray's urging, it was not until October that Colonel Sheen was sent to Washington, shortly after Lt Col Hugh Wise, Assistant Chief, CIC, was sent by the War Department to North Africa. His report will be discussed later.

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*Radiogram No W-5253m from Algiers to War, dtd 20 Jul 43 (S&F files, R-11, p 320) (S)

**Ltr Hq CIC Det, NATOUSA, subject, "Organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 16 Jul 43 (S&F files, R-11, p 351) (C)

***Memo for Col Sheen, subject, "CIC Detachment (Prov), NATOUSA," dtd 2 Jul 43 (KC Depot 7-6-68) (C)

CIC Assigned to AFHQ.

On 26 August 1943, AFHQ inactivated the CIC Detachment NATOUSA and activated the 2670th Headquarters Company, CIC (Provisional) and assigned it to Allied Force Headquarters. A short time later they dropped the word "Provisional," illegally as it turned out. For purposes of simplicity the unit was to be called CIC, AFHQ. Major Ray was designated Chief, with Major Vincent J. Thill as executive and 1st Lt Bertram G. Knowles as adjutant.*

This change from NATOUSA to AFHQ was necessary, it was explained in a letter in September 1943 from Major Ray to the Chief, CIC, in Baltimore, in order that CIC would be with the highest headquarters in the Theater. At that time AFHQ controlled three commands: the 15th Army Group, comprising all tactical units; the Mediterranean Air Command, consisting of the North Africa Air Force (NAAF) and Military Air Transport Service (MATS); and Headquarters, NATOUSA, which operated all Base Commands in the Theater. In his letter Major Ray explained that, although he recognized that the "assignment" rather than an "attachment" was contrary to CIC policy as approved by the War Department, he was helpless to do anything about it. The confusion was tremendous. If CIC were "attached" to the Theater, all Morning Report records should be submitted through the Chief, CIC, to the Machine Records Unit in the Military District of Washington. However, since the Theater considered them "assigned," their records were going through the NATOUSA Machine Records Unit. This situation was further complicated by the fact that CIC was still considered by War Department as "belonging" to NATOUSA instead of to AFHQ.**

Major Ray also pointed out that with the dropping of the word "Provisional" the way was now clear for assigning personnel newly arrived in the Theater to the Company, thereby disposing of a serious problem. His optimism was short-lived, however, when he discovered less than a month later that: "The word '(Provisional)' will be included in the designation of all units which have been or shall be organized in this theater and which were not or shall not have been 'constituted and activated' under specific War Department authority."***

*Ltr AG322/152 A-O, NATOUSA, subj: "Activation of 2670th Hq Company, CIC (Prov)" dtd 13 Aug 43 (S) (KC Depot 7-6-59(1)); Ltr, Hq AFHQ, subj: "Reorganization," dtd 28 Aug 43 (S) (KC Depot 1-29-234); and Ltr AFHQ, subj: "Designation of Title," to CO 268th Hq Co, CIC, dtd 31 Aug 43 (C) KC Depot 7-6-61 (1))

**Ltr, Hq CIC, AFHQ, subj: "Reorganization," dtd 25 Sep 43 (S) (KC Depot 6-7-101 (1))

***Ltr, Hq CIC, AFHQ, subj: "Provisional Status of 2670th Hq Co, CIC, AFHQ," to Chief, CIC, WD, dtd 15 Oct 43 (S) (KC Depot 6-7-101 (2))

Assistant CIC Chief Visits North Africa

As mentioned previously Colonel Wise went from Washington to North Africa and Sicily in the fall of 1943. Between 12 September and 29 September, he visited nearly every CIC Detachment and talked with many persons concerned with CIC, both in the Corps and on the G2 staffs. There seems little doubt that his report of conditions, as well as Colonel Sheen's reports upon his return to the United States at about the same time, did much to straighten out the administrative difficulties between CIC, AFHQ, and CIC, MIS. In his report* Colonel Wise discussed some of the problems mentioned previously in this chapter and submitted numerous recommendations. He stressed the oft repeated need for linguists, stating that the War Department's failure to furnish an adequate number of men with language qualifications had materially reduced the efficiency of the Corps and, in some instances, almost rendered it useless. "It should be pointed out," he wrote, "that if CIC linguists are not furnished, the G2's and A2's will continue their present practice of securing their own linguists and using them to perform the mission which the CIC should perform but cannot perform due to language difficulties, and that the distinct danger exists of the collapse of CIC operations overseas." It was the opinion throughout the theater, he said, that the War Department policy concerning personnel with close foreign backgrounds "is erroneous and very serious."

Wise also requested the development of a procedure whereby misfits, both among officers and enlisted men, could be returned to the United States; most of these misfits, he added, represented "wash-outs" from the Service Commands during a period when it was not possible to prevent such action. He included recommendations concerning changes in the Special Equipment List, changes in T/O allocations, firmer promotion policies, changes in the CIC Training School curriculum, and much closer attention, at War Department level, to the peculiar needs of CIC and the education of officers of other services to these needs.

Three Types of Detachments in North African Theater

At the time of his visit he found three distinct types of CIC Detachments: those with static installations under NATOUSA; with Air Force installations under NAAF; and with tactical organizations under 15th Army Group. Headquarters CIC, AFHQm was responsible for placing Detachments on detached service directly to each of the Base Sections under NATOUSA; Atlantic, Mediterranean, Eastern, and Iceland Base Sections; to the Air Force installations; and to tactical organizations. Although it retained the power to move the personnel from section to section, it exercised no control over investigations or other activities. CIC Headquarters' only recourse in the case of

*Memorandum for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, dtd 4 Oct 43, subj: "Visit to AFHQ, Algiers, and Hq NATO, Algiers, and certain CIC Dets in that area," by Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Asst Chief, CIC (S&F Library) (S)

improper employment was removal of the Detachment, an expedient which was not practical, Colonel Wise pointed out, because of the repercussions which would result.

Three officers and three enlisted men were stationed at AFHQ, CIC, and one officer and four enlisted men operated a field office directly under the Counterintelligence Section of AFHQ.

A Frontier Control Section composed of two officers and 17 enlisted men were distributed as follows: one enlisted man in Casablanca; two officers and six enlisted men in Rabat, the center of the French government; and ten enlisted men stationed at three border points of exit and entry. All of these men spent most of their time in checking files and documents, work which it was agreed was not a proper function of CIC, but there seemed to be no other personnel available. It was anticipated that these men would be relieved automatically with the expected early termination of American activities in the Theater.

The two officers and 17 men with NAAF were working primarily on problems of air field security and investigation of suspected cases of sabotage, and, although this detachment was over-strength at the moment, they would all be required as soon as the anticipated move to bases in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica had been made.

One officer and four enlisted men with MATS were used exclusively in checking papers of persons entering or leaving the country. Since this work was admittedly not a CIC mission, efforts were being made to have them reassigned.

Approximately six officers and 30 enlisted men who were attached to the Eastern, Mediterranean and Atlantic Base Sections were engaged largely in port security work and in addition had certain area responsibilities in maintaining contact with civilians and French authorities. The Island Base Section, in Sicily, was composed of four port sections but, with the movement of tactical troops from the area, were expected to take over the static counterintelligence mission in Sicily.

CIC Detachments were with all tactical units then in Sicily and Italy. In his contacts with G2's and CIC officers of these units, he found that all were in agreeement that they needed additional CIC personnel and that CIC personnel were "absolutely essential for all tactical units in combat and that the performance of combat counter-intelligence and intelligence, as distinguished from reconnaissance patrol work, was an essential part of the mission." This use of CIC had been the subject of much correspondence between CIC, AFHQ, and CIC, War Department, without an agreement being reached.* The only outstanding disagreement, he learned, was as to the echelon to which CIC

*Reference Chapter 1, "North African Campaign"

detachments should be assigned, each one desiring their assignment. From Army Group down to division, each desired the assignment of CIC, with the privilege of deploying agents down to lower units as needed.

Chief of Staff Settles Trouble with G1

Although Colonel Wise in his report did not go into the desperate need in the Theater for changes in the T/O allocation, he doubtless discussed it with AFHQ officials, since there was at that time a profound disagreement between the G2 and the G1 at AFHQ, which had to be resolved before the War Department could act. It finally was resolved by the personal decision of the Chief of Staff at AFHQ, in CIC's favor.

The correspondence concerning this episode is enlightening, and it is evident that tempers flared high. One memorandum from Major Ray to Colonel T. E. Roderick, Deputy AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, attributes the following comments to the G1:*

> "G-2 is the most confused and overstaffed staff of this headquarters."
>
> "Until G-2 cleans its own house it can expect no help from us."
>
> "G-2 has many conflicting, snooper agencies that only get in each other's way."
>
> "CIC already had too many men in this theater. Its job becomes less important every day as the front has narrowed. No need to leave anyone behind in North Africa. It's more economical to let sabotage occur than ship additional personnel over."
>
> "General Strong tells you he'll increase your T/O when he sends additional personnel, but you can't count on that. I know how he operates."

After additional discussion of the attitude of the G1, Major Ray concluded his memorandum, "The fact remains, however, that if the CIC is to meet the responsibilities delegated to it by the Commander-in-Chief, it must receive additional personnel being especially trained for this Theater by the War Department. Fifth Army is crying for men, G-2, AFHQ, is fully aware that additional personnel is needed, and G-2 War Department, fully concurs and is going all-out to make the men available. Yet, G-1, AFHQ, refuses, with hardly a hearing, to support our needs."

In a personal letter to Colonel Sheen, written while Sheen was on his way to Washington in October 1943, Major Ray elaborated further on

*MEMORANDUM to Col Roderick, Hq CIC, AFHQ, from Maj Ray, dtd 21 Oct 43. (C) (KC Depot 7-6-81)

the difficulty. He explained that in answer to an AGWAR cable of 3 September requesting CIC's troop requirements for the immediate future, CIC requested 25 officers, 165 investigators, and 60 clerks for shipment during the months of November and December. However, the requisition had been turned down by G1 with the statement that the temporary T/O set up on 30 August would be the permanent T/O for the Theater, ignoring the fact that this was intended to be only temporary to take care of personnel en route to the Theater or scheduled to be en route in the immediate future.

"Now G-1 says that it will be our final T/O regardless of what the War Department amends it to be, that it (G-1) will permit no additional CIC personnel in the Theater, that we already have enough to 'cover all of Europe,' and that we'll have to find a way to get rid of the non-CIC personnel the Company is now carrying, such as the five officers and the interpreters," Major Ray wrote. "Indications are strong that our trouble stems from a personal antagonism between certain high-ranking officers in G-1 and G-2 and that we're being made the goat. Naturally, this last observation is no more than speculation, but it's based on more than a guess."*

In his appeal to the Chief of Staff to override the G1's refusal to accept additional CIC agents, Colonel Roderick flatly stated: "The work of counter-espionage, counter sabotage and military security now the duty of the Counter Intelligence Corps cannot be performed in this expanding theater with the presently contracting number of personnel." He emphasized the necessity of maintaining CIC agents in North Africa to protect military installations against covert enemy activities, and pointed out that the "existing T/O for the Counter Intelligence Corps in this theater has purposely been made elastic by the War Department so as to expand and contract automatically by exact grades as shipments arrive or depart from the theater."**

Colonel Roderick climaxed his argument by attaching a report of a survey made by Colonel Oscar W. Koch, AC of S, G-2, Seventh Army, which indicated that, with one exception, every tactical unit in Sicily had rated its CIC Detachment as "indispensible." Most of them asked that their detachments be permanently attached and especially that they be made available "during planning phases." The one exception, the 9th Infantry Division, indicated that CIC was "of some value" and that their value would be greatly increased if they were permanently attached, thereby "eliminating the CIC channel in the chain of communication and eliminating an apparent feeling on

*Ltr from Ray, CIC, AFHQ, to Sheen, CIC, MIS, WD, dtd 29 Oct 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-108)

**Ltr from Col Roderick, Office of AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, to Chief of Staff, AFHQ, subj: "Recommended Revision in the T/O for the CIC," dtd 8 Oct 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-82)

the part of the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel that they are not a part of the division."*

What To Call Detachments a Problem

Even the seemingly simple matter of naming the various detachments assumed harassing importance. AFHQ gave the various units four digit numbers and specified that they were to be known as "Sections," but since the Special List of Equipment for CIC allocated materials by "Detachments," the order had to be rescinded and the old terminology resumed. Then Fifteenth Army Group issued an order, without reference to AFHQ, CIC, giving a new set of names to the Detachments under its control.** AFHQ CIC then issued an order legitimatizing Fifteenth Army Group's order, but when the AFHQ Adjutant General learned about it, the order was rescinded on the basis that only the highest headquarters in the Theater was authorized to create numerical designations. In a letter to Major Stephen Spingarn, CO of the Fifth Army CIC Detachment, concerning the confusion among the detachments who scarcely knew from day to day what to call themselves, Major Ray explained that the situation probably would continue: "When I was in Italy I mentioned the difficulty. . . /but the CIC Officer for Fifteenth Army/ . . . still insisted the Detachments were to be called by the titles he had given them. . . It was hardly worth making an issue on the matter, so I left it at that. We've had to have him sit on matters far more important and I didn't want to stir up a hornet's nest on this matter. So carry on the way you have been. You certainly can't use. . . /this unauthorized/ . . . designation when requisitioning equipment. . . . It would have no weight whatsoever and would cause further repercussions. . . . If you hear of other Detachment commanders who are confused about the numerical designation matter, will you please clear it up informally?"***

The matter of the naming of Detachments was not resolved until August 1944, at which time it was directed that Detachments with Infantry Divisions were to be called by the Division number; with Armored Divisions by the Division numeral preceded by "50"; with Corps by "20" and with Armies by "30."**** Before this occurred, however, all detachments under Fifth Army had been instructed to include the name of their Division or Corps in their letter heads and mailing addresses as well as the arbitary number given them, in order

*Memorandum, Hq 7th Army, Office of AC of S, G-2, to Col Roderick, AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, dtd 1 Sep 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-78)
**Ltr, Hq Fifteenth Army Group, subj: "Designation of CIC Sections," dtd 23 Aug 43, file 15 AG/1454/1/G (Ib) (C) (KC Depot 1-29-233)
***Ltr, Hq, CIC, AFHQ, to Maj Spingarn from Maj Ray, dtd 21 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-8-134)
****Ltr, Hq CIC Det 5th Army, subj: "Redesignation of CIC, Fifth Army," dtd 19 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-8-128)

to avoid the mix-ups which, even in official mail, had occurred with regularity.*

Many Hurdles Overcome

As Major Ray had explained in his letter to Col Sheen in July,** CIC was able to hurdle much of their local difficulty brought on by lack of understanding of their mission and the necessary peculiarities of administration. Most of the G2's and CI Officers of the tactical units had come to rely heavily upon their CIC Detachments and to recognize that certain requirements such as the omission of insignia of rank, relief from routine military housekeeping duties, and greater individual freedom of movement were not specified in order to give preferential treatment to CIC agents, but in order to permit them to carry out their assigned responsibilities.

However, there were a few die-hards who seemed intent upon placing every obstacle in CIC's way--and unfortunately, some were in a position to carry their harassment to a frustrating degree. The most implacable of these was the CI Officer for Fifteenth Army Group, previously mentioned as having insisted upon renaming the detachments operating under Group, contrary to AFHQ directives. In refutation of a long list of charges made against CIC by this CI Officer, Major Ray, in November 1943, outlined to the AFHQ CI Officer the history of the difficulties encountered. He pointed out that, prior to the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY), the Colonel had arbitrarily taken over the task of planning CIC operations on that mission and had announced that he would set up his own field training school, assemble his own personnel and set up his own TBA, in spite of the fact that Major Ray's headquarters had been established for that purpose. As the time for the invasion was drawing near, Major Ray wrote, the Operations section of Force 141 (HUSKY Planning section) came to Major Ray and, explaining that "it was apparent that no CIC section would ever be prepared for HUSKY" if the matter were not taken out of the Colonel's hands, appealed to Ray and his staff to take over.

"In the limited time left we were able to place trained sections with all the units sufficiently in advance of D-Day. Operations Section Force 141 was profuse in its thanks for what we were able to do and professed wonderment that we were able to pull the chestnuts out of the fire at such a late date," Ray wrote. He then told of a meeting of all CIC agents on the island at the end of the campaign, at which the Colonel in a speech excoriated the CIC, charging them with being "incompetent blunderers."

*Ltr, Hq CIC, 5th Army, to all Detachments, subj: "Designation of 5th Army Detachments," dtd 20 Jun 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-130)
**Memo to Col Sheen, subj: "CIC Detachment (Prov), NATOUSA," dtd 2 Jul 43

This speech caused Colonel Koch, AC of S, G-2, Seventh Army, to rise and "commend the CIC for its 'inestimable' contribution to the operation and extend the congratulations of the Commanding General," Major Ray said.

Difficulty Seen as Desire to Control CIC

Chief among the charges made by the Fifteenth Army Group CI Officer which Major Ray found it necessary to refute were that CIC agents, by wearing U.S. insignia in place of chevrons of rank, were "endeavoring to pass themselves off as civilians and officers," and that CIC's channels of communication had caused an "administrative muddle" of great difficulty to G2's. Major Ray labeled as "ludicrous" the charge that agents pretended to be officers and pointed out that the civilian "cover" was in line with War Department and AFHQ policy. As for the second charge, he had not found a single G2 who voiced any objection to CIC channels.

Major Ray interpreted the whole difficulty as a result of the desire of the Fifteenth Army Group CI Officer to usurp complete administrative control of all agents with units operating under Group, with the privilege of transferring them from unit to unit at will. This, he explained, would bring a return of "the chaotic conditions existing before the CIC was drawn into one organization," a situation which was "too fresh in our minds to permit any consideration being given to such a proposal." Major Ray appealed for "a strong letter to clarify AFHQ policy regarding the CIC."*

Unfortunately, in spite of repeated issuance by AFHQ of policy statements concerning CIC, the campaign did not cease. Late in December, Major Ray reported, when Major Thill went to Italy for an inspection trip among the CIC units there, he at first was refused permission to visit the Fifth Army Detachment and subordinate units; finally the decree was relaxed to the extent that he was permitted to discuss with G2's and Detachment Commanders "only certain limited matters pertaining to administration, supply and personal problems."

"It is completely beyond my comprehension how. . . a lower echelon can assume the authority to dictate to a representative of the Commander-in-Chief that he cannot discuss certain matters with subordinates of his own organization," Major Ray wrote in reporting the situation to Colonel Nichols. "Under the limitations imposed, Major Thill was not permitted to discuss some of the most important subjects he went to Italy to review, such as relations between the CIC and G2's; whether the CIC was being properly employed, liaison between CIC Detachments, etc."**

*Hq, CIC, AFHQ, Memo to Col Nichols, subj: "Letter from Col T. G. Young, subj: 'Counter Intelligence Organization' November 1943," dtd 27 Nov 43, (C) (KC Depot 7-6-85)

**Ltr Hq CIC, AFHQ, Memo to Lt Col Nichols, dtd 29 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-89)

CIC Agents Have No Place to Eat

Even obtaining food for CIC agents became a pressing problem. In a desperate appeal to AFHQ for a Theater ruling permitting CIC agents to eat in junior officers' messes as did all civilians assigned to the area, Major Ray, in June 1943, tersely outlined the difficulty. "CIC personnel of ABS /Atlantic Base Section/ work in civilian clothes and therefore cannot mess with other enlisted men. Until recently they have been eating in restaurants in the town until two of the men became hospitalized as a result of malnutrition. Captain Tucker then arranged for his men to eat at officers' mess until Colonel Wanvig /AC of S, G-2, ABS/ heard about it and stopped it immediately, saying he would have no EM, whether in civilian clothing or not, messing with officers. Now the men are picking up what they can as before. Can G2 do anything about this?" he wrote.*

In November 1943 a similar appeal was made by the CO of the Mediterranean Base Section /MBS/ Detachment, Captain C. E. Read, who pointed out that his agents, by having to eat in local restaurants, were not getting proper food and that conditions in the restaurants were such as to endanger their general health. Although no records are available to indicate how the difficulty at ABS had been resolved, Captain Read's letter stated that "since such commands as AFHQ, EBS /Eastern Base Section/, ABS and Fifth Army. . . are making facilities of Officers' messes available to CIC personnel, therefore establishing a precedent. . . it is the opinion of this officer that your office could be instrumental in having a directive issued from higher authority. . . which would clearly set forth authority to permit CIC personnel the use of facilities at Officers' messes."**

Theater Ruling Defines CIC's Status, Privileges

All these pleas finally resulted in the publication of a letter on 30 December 1943, over General Eisenhower's command line, which left no doubt as to the intention of the Theater's highest headquarters as to the use and treatment of CIC.*** This letter was addressed to all commands down through Corps and Base Sections, with instructions that it should be reproduced in sufficient copies "so as to insure delivery to all echelons of command and include divisions."

This letter constituted such an important victory for CIC and is believed to be such a significant landmark in CIC's history that it is included here in full:

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*IOM to G2 AFHQ, dtd 4 Jun 43 (U) (KC Depot 6-2-30); and Memorandum for Lt Col Sheen, subj: "Messing Facilities for CIC Personnel," signed Ray, dtd 28 Jun 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-67)

**Ltr, Hq CIC AFHQ, MBS Section, signed Capt C.E. Read, to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, subj: "Mess Facilities for CIC Personnel," dtd 15 Nov 43 (C) (KCD 6-9-249)

***Ltr, file AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM, AFHQ, subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 30 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 1-29-225(1))

"1. Information has been received that some Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are being employed on functions other than those for which their personnel were trained and furnished this theater by the War Department.

"2. There have been instances where Counter Intelligence Corps personnel have been used for routine guard duty, for traffic checks, for interrogation to secure tactical information from prisoners of war, and for investigations concerned solely with criminal activities.

"3. It is again emphasized that these trained specialists will be used only for counter intelligence purposes including measures connected with counter sabotage, counter espionage, and counter subversion.

"4. It is deemed essential that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel wearing civilian clothes or the uniform prescribed for civilians be addressed and referred to as 'Mister,' not by military title, except for necessary administrative purposes, and that they be extended the same facilities and afforded the same treatment as civilians.

"5. Successful operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps frequently depend upon the rapid and concerted action of several Counter Intelligence Corps detachments or elements thereof. Therefore, coordination between personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, especially tactical, attached to separate commands will be encouraged."

PX Officer Reminded of Ruling

One can only imagine the feeling of relief with which the above letter was greeted by both the CIC and the G2 staffs at AFHQ because it should have disposed of the major causes of local harassment. Perhaps the rude awakening from that relief was a determining factor in the firmness of a letter written on 16 January 1944 by Lt Col Earle B. Nichols, Assistant G2, AFHQ, to the Army Exchange Service. In this letter he "invited" attention to paragraph four of the 30 December letter and pointed out that CIC agents, until recently, had been barred from the Casablanca Officers' PX, which was also patronized by civilians, and "even now, are allowed to purchase supplies only at a specified hour each week when the PX is not open for normal business." Colonel Nichols left no doubt but that this practice would cease immediately.*

*IOM, from G2, AFHQ, to Army Exchange Service, subj: "PX Supplies for CIC," dtd 16 Jan 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-107)

Hostile Colonel Continues His Program

Records seem to indicate that throughout the Italian campaign, generally unit commanders, G2's and other persons in a position to help or harass CIC, were brought into line, either through first hand acquaintance and dependence upon its agents, or through diplomatic liaison backed up by the undoubted authority of the 30 December letter. However, not so with the Fifteenth Army Group CI Officer, who continued his activities without any indication of cessation. Late in February 1944, Major Stephen Spingarn, CO of the Fifth Army CIC Detachment, reported that before the "S" Force moved on Rome, this officer had ordered all CIC agents to remove the U.S. insignia which identified them as civilians, and even after higher authority reversed his order, made it a point to acquaint all members of the "S" Force, Americans, British and Italians, with the fact that CIC agents were enlisted men "and should be treated as such." After the "S" Force had concluded its assigned work, he had insisted upon keeping four CIC agents with the skeleton force remaining, although continuing to criticize CIC continually. These four men, Spingarn said, were merely answering telephones and performing routine clerical work. On one occasion, according to Spingarn's report, the Colonel, in the presence of another officer, demanded to know the rank of an agent, and when the agent properly referred him to his commanding officer, "flew into a rage, and after browbeating the agent," called Spingarn and told him that "if the man were a private he had the fatigue duties of a private. . . and if he were a sergeant he had the appropriate fatigue duties. . . ."

Major Spingarn attributed the whole problem to one officer's "complete disregard of the various AFHQ directives covering the use and treatment of CIC agents and his apparent desire to degrade the status of this organization and our men. . . . It seems to me that this is a test case involving the whole status of CIC in this theater and I hope very much you can find means of dealing with it effectively."*

When, on 1 March 1944, this Colonel was replaced by Major Vincent Thill, there can be little doubt that there was general rejoicing throghout CIC in Italy. "This will be a great break for all tactical CIC in Italy, for we'll have a staunch friend in a very key position where we can make the lives of all of you ever so much easier," Major Ray wrote to Lt Crosby Lewis."**

*Memorandum for Maj Ray, Chief, CIC, AFHQ, subj: "Use of CIC Personnel with 'S' Force," dtd 28 Feb 44, from Maj Spingarn, CO Fifth Army CIC (S) (KC Depot 6-8-133)

**Ltr, Hq CIC AFHQ, from Maj Ray to Lt Crosby Lewis, CO II Corps CIC Det, dtd 1 Mar 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-6-87)

Lack of Promotion Policy Affects Morale

Officer promotions, always a difficult situation as a morale factor, became an increasingly difficult problem during the period, as it seemed impossible to obtain any set policy. One example taken from an abundance of correspondence on the subject will illustrate this difficulty. In a letter written on 13 November 1943, Colonel Kibler, War Department CIC Chief, commenting that he had noted from a recent AFHQ roster that two CIC officers had been promoted, stated: "These promotions were accomplished without reference to this Division. Your Headquarters is not authorized to promote CIC personnel, and recommendations for promotion of Officers assigned to your Headquarters should be forwarded to this Division for approval. Information is furnished that in the future, promotions of CIC commissioned personnel without previous reference to this division will result in action to relieve the Officers promoted from the Counter Intelligence Corps."**

"If this Theater has been deprived of its authority to promote officers within authorized strength, it is wondered why notification was not given," Major Ray wrote in reply, requesting clarification of present policy and referring to a War Department letter of 28 July 1943 which "authorizes promotions of CIC personnel in this Theater to be made in the normal manner providing the Theater's CIC allotment is not exceeded," and to TM 30-215: "Promotion and demotion of officers serving under commanders who have been granted authority to promote and/or demote on their own initiative will be made in conformity with existing War Department instructions, regulations and policies without reference to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department." Pending clarification of policy, Major Ray included in his letter a recommendation for promotion of a 2d Lieutenant to fill a T/O vacancy created by the death of an officer.**

When, on 25 December 1943, during a period when all had been informed that promotions were frozen, AFHQ received a WD cable announcing the promotion of a 2d Lieutenant who had not been recommended, Ray wrote a letter of protest, citing the fact that there were in the theater four 2d Lieutenants who "were more deserving by all the standards usually considered." Two of these men had had extended combat duty and three of them had been in the theater well more than a year longer than the promoted officer and outranked him by four and one half months. Pointing out the morale factors, he "urgently" requested answers to the following questions "at the earliest practicable moment":***

*WD MIS, file MID 322.999 CIC 11/11/43, from Kibler to CO, CIC Det, AFHQ, thru AC of S, G2, AFHQ, subj: "Promotion of CIC Commissioned Personnel," dtd 11 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-12-312(1))
**Ind to Kibler's ltr, 11 Nov 43, signed by Ray, 23 Nov 43
***Ltr Hq, CIC, AFHQ, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIC, MIS, War Department, subj: "Promotions," dtd 27 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-7-92)

"1. Can we expect the freeze order to be lifted in the near future?

"2. Will future promotions be made by the War Department or by the Theater in accordance with TM 30-205 and War Department letter AG 320.3 (15 Nov 43) PO-M-B, dated 22 November 1943?

"3. If they are to be made by the Theater, is approval of the War Department necessary, provided, of course, vacancies exist? Paragraphs 23.d and 24.c state that such approval is not necessary.

"4. If promotions are to be made by the War Department, will the recommendations of the Theater Detachment Commander be sought?

"5. What is the policy regarding battlefield promotions of 2d Lieutenants when no 1st Lieutenant vacancies exist? In this Theater a 2d Lieutenant may be given a battlefield promotion even when no 1st Lieutenant vacancy exists, provided the total number of Lieutenant vacancies is not exceeded. It would be extremely dangerous to the morale of this organization if CIC personnel were to be the only ones in this Theater not covered by this policy. Our personnel work and live under equally trying and dangerous conditions as others in a combat unit. It is urged that they not be discriminated against in the matter of battlefield promotion opportunity.

"6. What is the policy regarding battlefield commissions for enlisted personnel serving with combat units? The same principle applies to this subject as to battlefield promotions."

In a reply dated 27 January 1944, signed by the Adjutant General, it was explained briefly that the promotion in question was made on the basis of a Service Command allocation made before the officer left for North Africa in August but had not been acted on until 22 December; and that "new Tables of Organization for the Counter Intelligence Corps are under consideration and it is anticipated that on the approval thereof the authority to promote will be restored to the Theater."*

Some Officers Not Considered CIC by War Department

An administrative mix-up concerning the status of three CIC agents who were commissioned in England before the invasion of North Africa, five who were commissioned near the end of the North African campaign, two who had come to North Africa as officers, and two who had been taken into CIC because of outstanding abilities and who were at that time commanding Detachments, seemed impossible of solution. Each monthly information report sent to the Office of the Chief, CIC, carried

*Indorsement to Basic Communication, AG 210.2 (27 Dec 43) OB-S-B-2, to Commanding General, US Army Forces, North Africa, signed by the Adjutant General, dtd 27 Jan 44 (C) (KC Depot 7-7-92)

the names of these men. Regularly there would come from the Chief a letter stating that these men were not carried by the War Department as CIC, and, just as regularly, Major Ray would answer, "Why?" As for the ten who had been dropped from the WD roster, Major Ray never was able to learn the answer, but, in mid-August 1943 he was informed by a letter from Colonel Kibler that a screening within the Service Commands of officers who had shown the least adaptability, five vacancies had been found and "promptly alloted" to CIC, AFHQ. The seven additional spaces desired were not available, and the total strength of CIC as set in May 1942 had been reached; AFHQ's allocation of 255 men would stand.*

In answer to this letter and to a cable** which followed it, Major Ray, on 29 August 1943, again expressed his lack of understanding as to how the mix-up could have occurred. He again expressed his bewilderment at the removal of these men from CIC roles and at the statement that the Theater, the most active one in the world from a counterintelligence viewpoint, would receive no more men, although there were approximately 5,000 in the Corps.*** Referring to a statement in the cable that "eight 2d Lts were formerly CIC enlisted men but were relieved from the Corps without authorization of G2, War Department, to accept commissions," Major Ray stated, "None of these eight 2d Lieutenants was relieved from the CIC, at least by any authority overseas. If they were relieved it must have been by the War Department without any notification given us or them."

Ray suggested that perhaps three of the officers in question "were stricken from the CIC, War Department, roles on the technicality that to accept their commissions they first had to be given honorable discharges from the Army. In their case," he wrote, "they were discharged from the Army at 1000 hours, 30 September 1942, and appointed at 0800 hours the following morning. It is hardly conceivable that the period of 14 hours covering their change in status from enlisted men to officers could be the cause of their being released from the Corps, especially in view of the fact that only three of the five men were released." Two others, he pointed out, commissioned on the same orders and carried on ETO and later AFHQ rosters in exactly the same manner, had never been challenged by the War Department.

The five commissioned in North Africa received their commissions as a result of superior work and because of the need for CIC officers, he explained, and had not been "relieved from the Corps without

*Ltr file MID 322.999 (8-18-43) from Chief, CIC, to Lt Col E.C. Sheen, AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, dtd 18 Aug 43 (S) (KC Depot 6-12-314)

**Cable 5444 fr MIS, WDGBI, CIC/CIG Br, to CG, AFHQ, dtd 17 Aug 43 (C) (S&F Library files R-11, p 143)

***Ltr fr Ray, Hq CIC, AFHQ, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, WD, subj: "CIC Personnel," dtd 29 Aug 43 (KC Depot 6-7-102) (S)

authorization of G2 War Department," as stated in the cable. The other two officers had been in CIC prior to leaving for overseas, had come to North Africa with CIC Detachments, had continued to work for CIC exclusively, and had never been dropped from AFHQ-CIC rosters.

Ray appealed, as he had on numerous occasions, for the appointment to CIC of Captain Horace Miner and 2d Lt Crosby Lewis. Lewis had joined II Corps CIC Detachment in England as a private and, as one of the four agents who went in on the invasion of North Africa at Oran, was given a battlefield commission. Miner, a Reserve Officer, had come to North Africa as a member of the G2 staff, had joined CIC just before the Tunisian campaign and, as Commanding Officer, had led the Detachment through that campaign. "It is no exaggeration," Ray wrote, "to state that the pioneering of Captain Miner and Lt Lewis gave birth to the present concept of the tactical CIC that has proven itself so brilliantly in Sicily. The CIC has a debt to these two officers which mere appointment to the Corps, itself, cannot repay. Refusal of appointment, however, would be a slap in the face to them both, to whom the Corps owes so much."

This letter brought no results; in fact the problem became more acute. On 20 February 1944, Ray wrote in a personal letter to Colonel Wise that unless Lewis were appointed to CIC immediately, CIC would lose him completely. The others were being carried by CIC, AFHQ, but Lewis had been assigned to II Corps through an arrangement with the G2, and, Ray wrote, "The G2 is having his T/O troubles and will have to release Lewis completely if we cannot pick him up. We cannot pick him up in our Company unless he is a member of the CIC, for overstrength assignments are no longer allowed here." If this should happen, CIC would lose the man who "has had more tactical CIC experience than any CIC officer in the Theater or in the world, for that matter," an event that would be doubly regrettable, he explained, in view of the extreme shortage of CIC officers in the Theater. With the necessity for drawing officers to staff Detachments for forthcoming operations, there would soon be Detachments without even a Commanding Officer. "This is not only undesirable, but actually impossible in view of the fact that it takes a Commanding Officer to sign for property," he wrote.*

This letter to Colonel Wise and a cable to the War Department brought the authorization, on 29 February 1944, for Crosby Lewis,

*Ltr from Ray, CIC, AFHQ, to Lt Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Asst AC of S, G2, CIC Branch, CIC, MIS, WD, dtd 20 Feb 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-97); and Ltr from Ray, CIC AFHQ, to G2 (CI) AFHQ, subj: "Table of Organization," dtd 19 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-76)

after approximately 16 months of constant operational work under combat conditions, to become a full-fledged member of CIC.*

CIC Again "Assigned" to Theater

Welcome news arrived in a War Department letter dated 15 November 1943:

All CIC personnel in the North African Theater were to be dropped from assignment to War Department and assigned to CIC, AFHQ.** Discussing this decision, which had been reached soon after his return from his inspection trip to North Africa, Colonel Wise, eleven years later was able to throw some light on the reasons behind the reluctance, at War Department level, to take this important step. It had been felt that greater control over the use--and misuse--of CIC could be maintained if they should remain assigned to MIS, WD. As Colonel Wise explained it, "As long as both the CI Officer and the CIC Detachment Commander are 'strong,' all is well." He pointed out that after Colonel Sheen left North Africa, all the battling for CIC, even at policy level, had to be done by Major Ray, a function that actually was in the province of the CI Officer. Although Major Ray found a receptive audience in the Counter-intelligence Branch at AFHQ, it still was Ray who had to make the plans and carry them on up instead of having the plans promulgated in the proper echelon. Finally, recognizing the almost impossible administrative difficulty encountered at AFHQ, and recognizing that the situation gradually was coming under control, the decision was made to assign rather than attach CIC personnel to the Theater.***

The 15 November letter also stated that an initial Table of Organization of 52 officers and 459 enlisted men was approved; and, to complete these numbers, 11 officers and 171 enlisted men would be sent by February 1944. The T/O was to be increased automatically in the future by the exact grades of personnel arriving in the Theater with air and ground units.****

Although this T/O helped considerably in the matter of personnel, it offered little assistance in promotions, which was an exceedingly sore point. While the T/O was under consideration, Major Ray had written: "The provision whereby the T/O is automatically adjusted upon the arrival of new personnel from the United States is of no value in the matter of promotions inasmuch as the amendments will

*Ltr Hq CIC, AFHQ, subj, "Transmittal of Records," to Mil Intel DIV,WD,4 Mar 44. (Although copy of WD cable of authorization is not available, this ltr mentions cable no 1048, dtd 29 Feb 44 (SECRET)(KC Depot 6-7-96 (1)); and ltr Hq CIC, AFHQ, Ray to Lewis, dtd 1 Mar 44 (CONF)(KC Depot 6-6-87)

**Memorandum for the Adj Gen, MID (909/15/43), subj: "Tables of Organization for CIC Personnel," dtd 15 Nov 43 (S&F Library, R-10, P 95 (C) and Ltr MID 909 (11/15/43), subj: "CIC Personnel," dtd 15 Nov 43, (C) (S&F Library Files R-10, P 85)

***Interview with Colonel Wise (Reserve) August 1954

****Memorandum for the Adj Gen, 15 Nov 43, etc.; and Ltr MID, 15 Nov 43, etc.

merely provide for the additional personnel in the grades in which they arrive.*

Furthermore, the information that among those arriving were several captains, majors, and master sergeants and that 13 technical sergeants and 25 staff sergeants were included was viewed with alarm. This would mean, Ray pointed out in a letter to the Chief, CIC, that the newcomers would have to be placed in positions of lesser responsibility than persons whom they outranked while they were becoming accustomed to the great differences in work in a theater of operations from the work in the Zone of the Interior. He had been able to get almost no promotions for his men, and he expressed the fear that some of the newcomers would be "in grades higher than they held when individuals in the Theater knew them. . . almost invariably the case with shipments from the United States. . . . This creates a feeling of understandable resentment against the Corps and even against the newly arrived personnel and presents a morale problem of major magnitude."**

OSS Threatens CIC's Mission

During this period another persistent problem which had become felt in North Africa, and was not to be solved to any degree of satisfaction until just prior to the invasion of Normandy, became a source of major irritation. This problem centered about the intrusion of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into the field of counterintelligence in direct violation, at least in the opinion of CIC and G2 officers at AFHQ, of the intent of the War Department.

In his report to the War Department after his return to the United States in November 1943, Colonel Sheen stated that OSS promised to become a "dangerous element in the field of counterintelligence in a theater of operations unless effective measures can be taken by the War Department to insure that this organization is placed under the control of the AC of S G2." The main part of OSS, he said, was sent into Italy without the knowledge of the Commanding General of Fifteenth Army Group or any other person in authority, and even their presence there was discovered only when they had to appeal to the Seventh Army CIC Detachment for rations, gasoline and other supplies, no arrangements having been made for their logistical support.***

*Ltr from Ray, Hq CIC NATOUSA, to G2 AFHQ, subj: "Table of Organization," dtd 19 Aug 49 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-76)

**Ltr Hq CIC, AFHQ, from Ray, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, WD, subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," dtd 25 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-101 (2))

***Ltr to AC of S, G2, WD, Wash., D.C., subj: "Report of Counterintelligence," dtd 19 Nov 43, signed H.G. Sheen, Lt Col, CSC (S) (S&F Library files)

Colonel Sheen pointed out that he was levelling his criticisms exclusively at the counterintelligence operations of the organization and not at their assigned mission of espionage, with which he was not fully acquainted. OSS personnel, he stated, had been employed because of linguistic qualifications and backgrounds of previous travel, but had been found by experience to "lack proper perspective, intelligence evaluation and, . . . understanding of military staff appreciation of any given situation." This had resulted in the accumulation of much erroneous information; in fact, it had been observed by G2, AFHQ, he said, "that approximately 90% of OSS reports containing counterintelligence information have been flagrantly false." The Commanding Officer of OSS in North Africa, Colonel Sheen said, seemed to be an extremely capable officer, but he was "handicapped by the assignment of unscrupulous and inefficient amateurs whose activities, if continued unhampered, will seriously endanger future military operations."

One of Colonel Sheen's chief criticisms was their failure to investigate or control properly the persons they employed. He gave the example of two persons employed by OSS who, representing themselves to the French Securite Militarie as officers of the United States Army, were making an investigation of the morale of French military forces in Morocco. Upon investigation by CIC it was learned that they were Portuguese and were using OSS funds to further the ends of Communism in Morocco. OSS dismissed the two men as a result of CIC's report, but the OSS official in Casablanca, who hired them without investigation or control, remained in his position.

Colonel Sheen told of a conference held by G2 officials with General William J. Donovan, OSS Chief, in September 1943, at which, in spite of all arguments, General Donovan insisted that his agency "should be given exclusive rights in the entire field of intelligence."

Early in October 1943, Major Spingarn reported that CIC had established excellent relations with Military Government and with all Allied Intelligence agencies with the exception of OSS. He claimed that OSS had "repudiated or half-repudiated" the agreements made by their authorized representative in North Africa, since replaced. General Donovan, in answer to Spingarn's appeal, ". . . said that they would honor any 'reasonable' promise made. . . , but that I must not come to expect as a right what had been given as a gift.

"I get the definite impression," Spingarn wrote, "that OSS is fumbling in the dark, and is not operating effectively. They seem to recruit people off the streets without any adequate check. Within the past week they have found one German parachutist and one alleged German agent in their midst and turned them over to us. The latter had worked for them for a week when they became suspicious of him 'because he seemed to be listening too carefully to their conversations.' He appeared considerably the worse for wear when they turned

him over to us on 8 October. They had apparently beaten a confession, or rather three or four different confessions, out of him that he was a German agent." Spingarn added that the Special Force (SOE) operating under G2, Fifth Army, with only a fraction of the personnel that OSS had, were operating much more intelligently and effectively.*

Later in October Major Spingarn again reported: "The OSS continues to blunder along. I believe that only General Donovan's name and prestige are carrying them here. Their agents continue to steal and loot, and I continue to get reports that my agents are responsible because they dress their Italian rabble in the uniform which everyone identifies with CIC. Their native agents go about Naples making an open secret of their connection with OSS, and asking chance acquaintances if they want to work as spies for U.S. Intelligence. Yesterday OSS sent me a note asking me to catch one of their agents who had absconded (while under OSS guard) with U.S. military equipment, including firearms."**

This report and numerous others in similar vein from CIC Detachments operating in Italy caused Major Ray to write to all Detachments reminding them that full use should be made of CIC brassards as a means of clearly identifying CIC from OSS personnel, since he had "noticed with increasing alarm the placing of blame on the CIC for actions of representatives of OSS."***

One incident was reported illustraing OSS laxness in the issuance of passes, which was particularly embarrassing because it presented U.S. Intelligence in an unfavorable light to the British. Late in November 1943 British security officers picked up two men attempting to pass through the lines who claimed to be working for two men employed by U.S. Forces. Upon investigation it was discovered that the two alleged employees were in possession of passes signed by the OSS commander authorizing them to work behind enemy lines to secure information for Fifth Army. OSS officials denied issuing the passes and informed the British that the men were working for CIC. CIC investigation revealed the following: OSS had kept no records of the persons to whom passes had been issued or even the number issued; the person whose signature was on the passes had left the theater; one of the persons had an authentic letter of commendation for his work from OSS; OSS had rescinded all passes about a month prior to the incident but had failed to notify other organizations; one of them had

*Memorandum for Maj Ray, from Stephen J. Spingarn, Major, Commanding, Hq CIC, Fifth Army, dtd 10 Oct 43 (S) (KC Depot 6-8-144)
**Memorandum for Maj Ray, CO, CIC Det, AFHQ, from Maj Stephen Spingarn, CO Fifth Army CIC Det, dtd 25 Oct 43 (S) (KC Depot 6-8-142)
***Ltr from Maj Ray, Chief, CIC, AFHQ, to all divisions and corps operating in Italy, dtd 3 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-8-141)

worked briefly for CIC, having been loaned to them by OSS. CIC's conclusion was that the haphazard way in which OSS issued passes without records made it impossible to prove or disprove the validity of the passes in question, but since the men concerned were viewed with great respect by trusted informants, it was believed that the passes had been issued by OSS as claimed.*

Even more embarrassing was the case of another Italian, arrested by the British FSS (Field Security Section) on charges of giving information to the enemy, withholding information from the Allies, illegal possession of weapons, falsely pretending to be acting under MG authority, and engaging in looting and blackmail. This man also carried an OSS pass, and, although he had been arrested twice before on similar charges and turned over to OSS, he had been immediately released each time without any investigation of the charges.**

As a result of all these difficulties, Major Ray appealed to AFHQ for a directive "limiting American Army counter espionage activity to the CIC and restricting OSS activity to its proper place; namely, behind enemy lines."*** He sent a copy of his memorandum to the Chief, CIC, since, he explained, the same situation could be expected to arise in other theaters. "On the basis of information received from the European Theater," he wrote, "it appears that OSS is gearing itself to assume the high-level American counter espionage authority when and if an invasion of France is undertaken."****

In his request for a clarifying directive, Major Ray explained that since the U.S. Army in the beginning had been forced to lean heavily upon the British, there had been a tendency toward the acceptance of the British Intelligence framework for our own Army and to consider the CIC as the American counterpart of the British FSS. While the CIC had adopted many of the tactical missions of the FSS, CIC's training and mission for a static counterespionage situation had been far different. In the British Army all cases that promised to be important ones were taken over by a higher level organization, the SI(b). This had led to the attitude that there should also be a higher-level U.S. counterespionage organization, although the War Department had never envisioned such a thing, and had given to CIC the complete mission.*****

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*Ltr, CIC, Hq Fifth Army, subj: "Possession of U.S. Military Passes," from Maj Spingarn to AC of S, G2, Hq Fifth Army, dtd 25 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-8-135)

**Security Intelligence Review No 4, CIC Hq Fifth Army, dtd 19 Nov 43 (S) KC Depot 6-7-228)

***Memorandum to G2 (CI) AFHQ, subj: "The CIC and Counter Espionage," from Maj Ray, CIC, AFHQ, dtd 5 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-87)

****Ltr from CIC, AFHQ, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIC, MIS, WD, subj: "CIC and Counter Espionage," dtd 7 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-101)

*****Memorandum to G2 (CI) AFHQ, dtd 5 Dec 43, etc.

"A new American organization has recently entered the counter intelligence picture--the befuddled X-2 amateurs of the OSS, who, backed by high political influence, are injecting themselves into the American counter espionage framework on the level of the SI(b). . . . " Major Ray wrote. "It has been my observation that OSS counter espionage 'experts' are rank amateurs with little or no counter intelligence experience and but little training. Their main recommendation is their seemingly inexhaustible supply of funds and the veil of mysticism under which they have enshrouded themselves. The bluff seems to be working."

Major Ray went on to point out the lack of basic investigative training of the OSS "amateurs" and their complete lack of any experience in the investigative field. "The sending of a layman to an X-2 or SI(b) school might be compared to giving advanced invasion training to a soldier who has never had basic military training. He becomes subjected to the latest and most advanced technique in fighting and upon completion of the course is accepted as an authority. But he still hasn't learned to fire his rifle." He suggested that such additional high-level training as was deemed essential for counter intelligence operative should be given to CIC agents who had mastered the basic techniques and many of whom had had several years' experience in the work, including more than a year in overseas operations in England, North Africa, Sicily and Italy.

"Are these men," he asked, "to be the 'infantrymen' of the counter intelligence effort . . . while the less qualified men of the OSS supply the 'heavy artillery'?"

Citing the War Department directive setting out CIC's mission, Major Ray stated that "this development threatens to relegate the best qualified and trained counter intelligence personnel in the American Army to an inferior position and certainly circumvents the official policy of the War Department."

Although Major Ray did not get the directive from AFHQ, his never-ending struggle with the situation and his recurrent lucid reports may well have influenced the decisions which placed each organization in its proper sphere during the planning for the invasion of the continent.* Records also indicate that, in the latter phases of the campaign in Italy, the two organizations managed to resolve much of the friction and to work in comparative harmony.**

AFHQ Detachments Kept Informed

It was Major Ray's task also, while fighting for CIC's place in the sun, to keep his detachments, now spead all over North Africa,

*See Chapter 5, "Preparation for OVERLORD"
**See Chapter 4, "Italian Campaign"

Sicily and Italy, well informed on policy changes; arrange transfers from one detachment to another when personality problems arose, as they often did; pass on criticisms to those involved and soothe the ruffled tempers that resulted from those criticisms;and carefully and objectively consider every request and suggestion made by any member of the detachment--and records for this period indicate there were thousands.

He kept up correspondence with all of his detachments, chatty, informal letters, sometimes a "pat on the back," sometimes a tactful, but firm, suggestion for change; he also passed along to all detachments the interesting "we did it this way" suggestions that came in. The abundance of correspondence between Major Ray and his detachments would seem to qualify him for the title of champion letter writer of all CIC.

Typical of one of these letters is one written to Major Floyd Snowden in Sicily, on 29 December 1943. "Your very optimistic references to conditions within your Detachment and respect for it on the part of others was very welcome. I'd like to say that what you say conforms to other independent reports that have reached us. I have heard some very complimentary things about you. . . . the CIC is clicking better all the time, due mostly, no doubt, to the fact that its prestige is rising after many months of bitter struggle and that it is making a greater contribution to the war effort than ever before. I'll make the statement while knocking on wood that we no longer have any of the really critical problems we had to face while we were establishing ourselves as an important factor in the scheme of things in this Theater. It's gratifying how many of the G2's who were almost hostile to us before have swung around and now appreciate us and let us go ahead with our job.*

Any ideas that could help CIC Detachments to increase the respect of their G2's were passed on immediately. A typical one submitted by the CO of a Division Detachment and relayed to all other detachments recommended "that CIC agents contact combat troops immediately prior to an attack, preferably through platoon leaders, to check whether they have in their possession letters, diaries, or other documents which would be of value to the enemy and to give them a last minute warning that if captured they must reveal only their names, ranks and serial numbers." He asked that all detachments try this out and let him know of the results.**

As the brief Sicilian campaign slowed to a halt in mid-August 1943, the various participating detachments sent in a plethora of recommendations designed to improve future operations. As Port Section "B" of the

*Ltr from Ray, CIC, AFHQ, to Maj Floyd Snowden, CO, CIC Det, IBS, dtd 29 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-2-36)

**Ltr from Hq CIC, AFHQ, signed Ray, to CIC Sections with 3d, 34th 36th and 45th Inf Divs and 1st Armd Div, subj: "Security Precaution with Troops Prior to Combat," dtd 20 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 1-29-229)

1st CIC Detachment commanded by Lt Mario Brod saw it, operations were hindered by four factors: lack of personnel--especially of men trained to meet the particular problems of particular areas; lack of linguists (none of the five members of this detachment spoke the local dialect); lack of available guards; and lack of time to carry through a mission. Brod recommended that Division detachments be increased to two officers and 10 enlisted men; that a Military Police platoon of 25-30 men be made available for guard and police duties; that more effective liaison be maintained between Corps and Division detachments; that bomb disposal and munitions collection units keep CIC informed of their projects; that neither the Military Police nor Civil Affairs issue passes without CIC sanction; and that three jeeps and a trailer (or the equivalent), each with its own driver, be issued to each six-man detachment.*

II Corps CIC Detachment pointed out certain weaknesses in the relay system and recommended that Corps Detachments be reinforced so that Corps personnel would be available to enter a town almost simultaneously with the Division Detachment. In this way Division Detachments could secure posts and communications and move on, while Corps personnel would wait for the arrival of permanent static detachments, in the meantime performing counter espionage and counter sabotage work.**

A similar recommendation came in a critique of the work performed by the 2d Armored Division Detachment from Colonel H. M. Forde, AC of S, G-2. While praising the work accomplished by this Detachment, Colonel Forde also stressed what had to be left undone because of lack of personnel, lack of linguists, shortage of transportation and deficiencies in basic military training. He recommended a large pool of CIC agents, retained under control of the Theater Commander, from which agents could be assigned to move into a town immediately after the Division Detachment. "Much of the good work of the CIC Detachment during the active operations was undone because it was considered necessary for them to accompany the advance. This resulted in great inefficiency, loss of time and, occasionally, confusion and near riots," Colonel Forde wrote.***

Lt Col R. W. Porter, Jr., AC of S, G-2, 1st Infantry Division, was unstinting in his praise of the Division's CIC Detachment: "The CIC Section is absolutely necessary when operating in hostile territory. . . . The Sections attached to the 1st Infantry Division have done a splendid job. This result has been obtained primarily

*Memo, Port Section "B", 1st Inf Div CIC, subj: "Suggestion Method of Procedure in Operation of a CIC Section," dtd 11 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-3-53a)

**Ltr Hq CIC Det, AFHQ, signed Ray to CO 305A CIC Sec, Hq V Army, subj: "CIC Operational Recommendations," dtd 2 Oct 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-8-43)

***Ltr, Hq 2d Armd, subj: "Activities of CIC with Armd Div," dtd 14 Aug 43, from Col H. M. Forde, AC of S, G2, AFHQ (C) (KC Depot 7-6-73)

because all officers and men have met the situation realistically." Handicaps listed were similar to those previously mentioned; in addition, Colonel Porter recommended more training in political ideologies of the enemy; better radio and telephone communication with Division Headquarters; better delineation of the demarkation line between responsibilities of AMGOT, Military Police, local military commanders and CIC; and the sending of an MG liaison officer with the CIC Detachment in the initial occupation so that policies established at the outset could be merged with those subsequently found advisable.*

Most of the recommendations that poured in during this period followed the general pattern of those mentioned above. In addition,45th Division CIC recommended that agents actually advancing with the troops be issued one M1 rifle and one Thompson submachine gun per vehicle and, for use at close quarters, each agent should be armed with the .45 Caliber pistol; and that the "Walky-Talky" radio with its maximum range of five miles should be replaced by a more powerful radio powered by a vehicle.**

Among the comments of which CIC had a right to be proud was one from Colonel Oscar W. Koch, AC of S, G2 of Seventh Army: "Indispensible"; and one from Colonel B. A. Dickson, AC of S, G2, II Corps, "I would rate the personnel of the II Corps CIC as superior."***

All was not praise, however, and Major Ray was called upon occasionally to exercise all the tact and leadership at his command to pass on criticisms to his Detachments with suggestions for correction even when the basic criticism was felt to be unjust. One of these situations arose when Colonel Dickson wrote, "Extremely favorable expressions of the work of Division CIC Detachments have been received from three of the four Divisions which have served in II Corps. The performance of the CIC Detachment with the 45th Division was not

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*Ltr, Hq 1st US Inf Div, subj: "Activities of CIC," to AC of S, G2, AFHQ, from Lt Col R.W. Porter, Jr., AC of S, G2, 1st Inf Div, dtd 12 Aug 43 (S) (KC Depot 7-6-75)

**Ltr, Hq 45th Inf Div, subj: "CIC Operations, Methods and Equipment," to AC of S, G2, AFHQ, from Robert W. Guenther, 1st Lt CO, 45th Inf Div CIC Det, dtd 11 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-70); 1st Ind to Basic ltr from AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, to AC of S, G-2, 3d Inf Div, dtd 11 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-72)

***Ltr Hq II Corps, subj: "Activity of Counter Intelligence Corps," from Col B. A. Dickson, AC of S, G-2, to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, dtd 9 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-71); and Memo to Col Roderick, AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, from Col Oscar W. Koch, AC of S, G2, Seventh Army, dtd 1 Sep 43 (U) (KC Depot 7-6-78)

entirely satisfactory; this is believed due to the failure of the officer commanding that Detachment to grasp the full implication of his mission and to fulfill it."*

Subsequent correspondence and reports seem to indicate that much of the fault, at least, seemed to stem from the oft-repeated difficulty: lack of understanding of the G2 as to how CIC should be utilized. Since this division had come directly to Sicily from the United States, neither the CIC Detachment nor the G2 had gone through the sometimes painful indoctrination process in North Africa during which CIC Detachments learned their mission and their relationship to their tactical organization and their G2 learned how they could be of greatest help and the peculiarities of CIC administration so necessary to their performance.

In a burst of indignation at the treatment they were receiving, the CO requested that he and his entire detachment be reassigned. In violation of directives, he said, they had been assigned all types of company duties from digging latrines to standing guard [while still in the United States], even after working on investigations all day; they had been assigned numerous missions not authorized by directives, such as counting destroyed vehicles and locating abandoned guns and equipment, and they had been charged with the supervision of the C/S (Counter Subversive) system. Just before San Stefano, the CO reported, the G2 directed that the CIC Detachment, in some cases the first Allied soldiers to enter a village, go forward by foot, although there were available no reconnaissance reports of the enemy except that the areas were heavily sown with anti-personnel mines. Objection that such a venture on foot, with such a small number of men, would endanger their lives unnecessarily received no consideration, although during the first days of the operation three men on such a mission had a narrow escape when they were caught in enemy rifle fire at 200 yards.**

Recognizing that much of the tedious and varied effort to make G2 appreciate CIC and its role must be performed by the CIC Detachment itself, Major Ray suggested that the G2 tactfully be referred to the AFHQ directives; he also arranged for intercession through Seventh Army G2 and reported the matters to the AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, as another argument for a positive statement from that Headquarters. To the harried CO of the 45th Division Detachment he wrote, "Unfortunately the same conditions, to one degree or another, have confronted the

*Ltr, Hq II Corps, subj: "Activity of Counter Intelligence Corps," from Col B.A. Dickson, AC of S, G-2, to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, dtd 9 Aug 43 (C) (RC Depot 7-6-71); and Ltr Hq CIC Det, 45th Inf Div, to CO CIC AFHQ, subj: "Reports from the 145th CIC Section," dtd 21 Oct 43 (C) (RC Depot 1-29-230b)

**Ltr Hq, CIC Det 45th Inf Div, to CO, CIC NATOUSA, subj: "Difficulties Experienced with G2, 45th Inf Div," dtd 6 Aug 43 (C) (RC Depot 1-29-232A)

majority of CIC Sections placed with tactical units in the United States, but most of the difficulties have gradually been overcome after tedious indoctrination of the G2's. Your Section has not been able to receive the benefit of this because of the fact you went into action straight from the United States."*

In reporting this situation to the Chief, CIC, WD, Major Ray cited it as an "instance /which/ bears out our previous observation that greater pains should be taken in the United States to indoctrinate all G2's in the proper use of the CIC before units leave for foreign service. This should be done not only in justice to CIC personnel sent with tactical units, but to assure that the CIC mission will be effectively performed."**

Merger in the United States Creates Theater Problem

After struggling for many months to obtain application of theater rotation policies for themselves, CIC agents in the North African Theater were suddenly faced, early in January 1944, with a situation which made the large majority of them decide they didn't want rotation. This was the arrival in the Theater of War Department Circular #324, 14 December 1943, which removed CIC from control of G2, War Department, transferred, with a few exceptions, all CIC agents in the United States out of the Corps, decentralized counterintelligence functions to Service commands and merged them with those of the Provost Marshal.

In effect this meant that, since there were no stateside detachments to which they could be assigned, personnel rotating from overseas theaters automatically would be eliminated from the Corps upon their arrival and be assigned to replacement depots for ultimate disposition as rank and file casuals. This dampened the enthusiasm of most agents for a trip home.

Along with the decision to merge CIC with the Provost Marshal's forces in the Service Commands, there also was the decision to "materially reduce" the personnel in the Office of the Chief, CIC, War Department. In a letter to Major Ray on 17 January 1944, Colonel Wise said that this decision had been reached since, by the following month, "The major job of procurement, selection, equipment, distribution and shipment of an enormous organization will have been completed," and there would remain only "the staff functions of policy and general

*Ltr Hq CIC Det, NATOUSA, subj: "Functions of the CIC," to CO, CIC Section, 45th Infantry Division, dtd 11 Aug 43 (C) (KC Depot 1-29-232 A)
**Ltr, Hq CIC Det, Hq NATOUSA, to Chief, CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, WD, 2337 North Charles St., Baltimore, Md., subj: "July Situation Summary," dtd 13 Aug 43 (S) (SSS Library 2-11)

supervision and the relatively small operational job of seeing that replacement personnel are procured for us, prepared and shipped overseas."*

How short-lived was the belief that the problems of overseas procurement and training had ended is discussed in another section of this history. However, it is interesting to note here that, in spite of all their harassing problems, or perhaps because of them, Major Ray and many of the officers and agents operating under AFHQ had long been thinking in terms of post-hostility needs, which would call for special planning and additional personnel procurement. It seems probable that Colonel Wise was merely "quoting" from decisions made at higher levels, since he had discussed the matter at AFHQ during his visit in October 1943, and it was obvious that the end of hostilities and the return of CIC agents to the United States along with other combat soldiers, would leave the organization incapable of taking part in any large scale occupation activity, unless large numbers of agents were ready to be sent to the theater in their places. This wholesale exodus could be mitigated, Major Ray wrote in December 1943, by permitting CIC personnel to revert to civilian status for employment in Europe at the earliest possible moment after the end of hostilities. Major Ray had learned through conversations that many of his men would be willing to remain almost indefinitely if their status could be changed so that they could drop the various ruses "now used to conceal their enlisted status from important civilian and official informants who would reveal nothing if they knew they were dealing with enlisted personnel."**

Stressing the urgency for immediate planning, Major Ray pointed out that, without a prepared plan "ready to be put into operation immediately upon the collapse of Germany--which conceivably can come at any time--the CIC will flounder around without a specific function other than its loosely defined mission, and a state of affairs reminiscent of our early tribulations in overseas operations will occur." It was thought that several other agencies, such as OSS, AMG and JICA, would actively seek the recognition of being the U.S.'s chief CI organization--in fact, there was "talk even today of AMG establishing its own political intelligence investigative branch. By background, experience and training, CIC was better equipped to take over the "vast field. . . of political intelligence, which will be the successor of what we refer to today as civil security," he stated.***

In his reply written on 17 January 1944, the only assurance that Colonel Wise was able to give him was that, "Your problems with

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* Ltr from WDGS, MID to Ray, dtd 17 Jan 44 (C) (KC Dppot 6-12-310 (1))
**Memorandum to Colonel Kibler from Maj Ray, Hq CIC, AFHQ, subj: "Function of CIC in Post-Hostility Period," dtd 17 Dec 43 (C) (KC Depot 6-7-100)
***Ibid

respect to post hostilities activities are receiving some consideration and thought now, but final respect to the establishment of broad policy, etc., will be delayed for at least another forty-five days."*

New Theater Directive Clearly Defines CIC's Place

24 February 1944 was an important day for the Counter Intelligence Corps. On that day Allied Force Headquarters published a new directive, clearly defining CIC's mission, responsibilities, and privileges. It embodied all the salient features of previous directives which had been published bit by bit to overcome difficulties as they had arisen. Protection of identities, freedom of action, assistance by other units, channels of communication--these and many more necessary provisions--were now written into one document which firmly established CIC.**

AFHQ Plans to Move

By the end of 1943 plans were well under way for moving AFHQ Headquarters from North Africa to Italy and for the gradual phasing out of CIC in North Africa, as the need for static detachments to protect Allied supply lines decreased. With this anticipated move, the question arose as to whether AFHQ CIC should assume operational control over static CIC operations in Italy, then under the Peninsular Base Section. In setting forth the pro's and con's of such a move at the request of the AC of S, G-2, Major Ray advised against it. Although pointing out that theoretically such centralization was considered desirable, certain problems in communications and supply would somewhat offset the advantages. Also, and Major Ray's memorandum seems to indicate that this may have been his main reason, problems that had earlier plagued the Detachments with the Base Sections had largely disappeared. Two of the G2's had been replaced, he explained, "by better qualified officers," one G2 had a "change of heart about the CIC and is now employing the section to good advantage," and another "...[although] he leaves much to be desired from the ability standpoint, he has not hampered the work of the CIC Section." Major Ray seemed to feel that the situation had better be left alone.***

In April the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Eastern Base Section CIC Detachments were assigned to NATOUSA,**** and counterintelligence

*Ltr from Wise, WDGS, MID, to Ray, dtd 17 Jan 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-12-310(1))
**Ltr order, AFHQ, file AS 350.09-2 GBI-AGM, subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," to all units under AFHQ, dtd 24 Feb 44 (C) (S&S Library file) attached as Appendix 1.
***Memorandum to Lt Col Nichols, subj. "CIC Organization," from Ray, dtd 30 Nov 43 (C) (KC Depot 7-6-86)
****Ltr AFHQ CIC, subj: "Reorganization," dtd 15 Apr 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-9-244)

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in Sardinia became the responsibility of the Air Force CIC Detachment there.* At the end of July Allied Force Headquarters made their long contemplated move to Italy, where CIC AFHQ was renamed the 428th CIC Detachment. Agents of the Headquarters CIC Detachment, after gathering up many Secret and Confidential documents left by the movers, followed.**

By the middle of October 1944 the remainder of the CIC personnel in North Africa, eight agents, had been assigned to USAFIME and were expecting also to leave by the first of January.***

But Major Ray did not live to see the phase-out from North Africa, or to enjoy for long the recognition at practically all echelons that CIC had grown to full stature as an integral part of the Army, full proof of which can be seen from the planning for CIC's mission in the invasion of Europe.****

Later in May 1944, Major Ray suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, and after return to the United States, died later that year.***** Major Ralph Powers became Chief of CIC, AFHQ.******

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*Cable from CIC AFHQ to G2 AFHQ, dtd 2 Apr 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-4-73)

**Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, subj: "AFHQ Movement," dtd 28 Jul 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-9-242)

***1st Ind to ltr fr Roy G. Tozier, SAC Det "A", 428th CIC Det, dtd 18 Oct 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-9-235(1)); and Memorandum for Col Nichols, from Ralph W. Powers, Maj, Chief, CIC AFHQ, dtd 18 Nov 44 (C)

****See Chapter 5, "Preparation for OVERLORD"

*****Ltr Hq CIC, AFHQ, to Capt Mario Brod, CIC Det, Island Base Sect, from Bertram C. Knowles, dtd 1 Jun 44 (C) (KC Depot 6-2-33); and G2 records CIC Center

******Memorandum for Maj Powers, Chief CIC AFHQ, from Maj Spingarn, dtd 4 Jul 44 (S) (KC Depot 6-8-129)

AP 551 TJB/jgs

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM 24 February 1944

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps

TO: General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force.
Commanding General, Force 163, APO 512.
Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464.
Commanding General, Seventh Army, APO 758.
Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Force, APO 650
Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, APO 650.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, APO 525.
Commanding General, II Corps, APO 302.
Commanding General, VI Corps, APO 306.
Commanding General, Mediterranean Base Section, APO 600.
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782.
Commanding General, Eastern Base Section, APO 763.
Commanding General, Atlantic Base Section, APO 759.
Commanding General, Island Base Section, APO 550.
Commanding General, Northern Base Section, APO 306.

1. Letter of this headquarters, dated 10 June 1943, AG 371.2-3 GBI-AGM, Subject: The Counter Intelligence Corps; letter of this headquarters, dated 12 August 1943, AG 350.09 GBI-AGM, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps; letter of this headquarters, dated 30 December 1943, AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps, are rescinded.

2. The following instructions relative to the organization, functions and operations of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, this theater, are based upon TM 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps, dated 22 September 1943, together with experiences gained in overseas Counter Intelligence Corps operations.

3. ORGANIZATION:

a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel within the jurisdiction of this headquarters are assigned to the 2678th Headquarters Company, CIC (Prov), Personnel are placed on detached service by the commanding officer thereof (Chief, CIC, AFHQ) in detachments with tactical units, Air Forces and Base Sections, and other organizations as required.

b. The number of personnel comprising a detachment is determined by the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, based on the mission of the detachment and personnel available.

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Ltr, Allied Force Hq, AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM, dtd 24 February 1944, (Cont'd).

c. The employment of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments is a basic function of command and is an operational rather than a staff intelligence activity. Command is vested in the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment. While the general directions of Counter Intelligence Corps activities rests with the commanding officers of the organizations to which Counter Intelligence Detachments are attached, the detailed planning and execution of Counter Intelligence Corps duties are the responsibilities of the detachment commanders.

d. Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commanders may place personnel under their command on temporary duty by verbal orders with other detachments for limited periods when the situation demands, without specific authorization of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, this headquarters. The approval of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 or A-2 of the organizations concerned, is necessary in each case. Personnel thus temporarily transferred will be returned to their permanent detachments immediately upon completion of their mission.

e. Recommendations concerning promotions and demotions of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel and appointment to and release from the Corps will be referred to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, this headquarters.

4. MISSION.

a. The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to furnish appropriate commanders with personnel carefully selected and trained for investigative functions incident to the prevention or neutralization of the activities of enemy agents.

b. These trained specialists will be used only for counter intelligence purposes including activities connected with counter espionage, counter sabotage and counter subversion.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be used for combat intelligence missions, staff functions, traffic checks, routine PW interrogations, or for work which is properly a function of the Provost Marshal or Headquarters Commandant. Investigations of the black market and traffic in blue seal currency will not be undertaken by the Counter Intelligence Corps unless there is definite reason to believe counter intelligence implications exist.

5. OPERATIONS.

a. All Counter Intelligence Corps detachments normally have the following duties and responsibilities:

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(1) Investigation of reports of enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activity.

(2) Investigation of harmful rumors and suspected enemy propaganda.

(3) Investigation of disaffection and subversive cases and security violations within the armed forces.

(4) Arrest of known enemy agents and dangerous enemy sympathizers.

(5) Performance of security surveys of military headquarters and installations and recommendations for proper security measures. However, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be used to accomplish the actual protection of such installations or the implementation of the recommendations made. The function of the Corps in this connection is advisory.

(7) Establishment of informant nets through all levels of society and endeavor.

(8) Observation of civilian morale and relations between civilian and military personnel.

(9) Observation of local political and economic conditions. In this connection, it is emphasized that, while the Counter Intelligence Corps must be aware at all times of local political and economic conditions, it will confine its role to that of observer. Key personages in the civil and economic life of an occupied area will not be arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps without the concurrence of local Allied Military Government or Allied Control Commission representatives, except in emergency cases requiring immediate action.

(10) Delivery of security lectures to troop units.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments serving with commands whose jurisdiction include sea ports will undertake such investigative security duties and functions in respect thereto as are assigned them by the command officers of the responsible organizations. In this connection, care will be exercised that the responsibilities of existing United States or allied security agencies do not overlap, and that the demarcation is clearly established.

Ltr, Allied Force Hq, AG 350.09 GBI-AGM,
dtd 24 February 1944, (Cont'd)

c. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel serving with the Air Force will normally confine their activities to the security of Air Force Personnel and installations and will not concern themselves directly with territorial security matters. An exception to this is when no other Counter Intelligence Corps detachment or Allied security agency has been delegated territorial security responsibility, in which event the Air Force detachment will expand its usual activities as deemed necessary. In areas where another Counter Intelligence Corps detachment or an Allied Security agency exercises territorial control, close liaison will be maintained and counter intelligence information freely exchanged through direct channels of communication.

d. (1) In addition to the duties and functions of all Counter Intelligence Corps detachments enumerated above, tactical detachments serving with Field Armies, Corps and Divisions will perform special tactical functions:

(a) Tactical Counter Intelligence Detachments will:

1. Search evacuated enemy headquarters and seize significant documents.

2. Inspect public utilities, enemy supply dumps and all other installations requiring protection and arrange for an adequate guard.

3. Seize the telephone exchanges and/or radio stations and arrange for their protection against sabotage until they are turned over to authorized signal or communications personnel as provided in operational orders. Personnel from the nearest Signal Corps unit should be called in to assist and to perform such rehabilitation as may be needed without delay. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, carefully guarded and turned over to the Signal Corps personnel.

4. Stop all civil communications by mail, radio, telegraph and telephone except those of a local, emergency nature such as calls for medical assistance. In halting civil communications, no damage should be done to any telephone, telegraph or radio equipment.

5. Insure that all mail in civilian post boxes and drop boxes is impounded and returned as soon as practicable to Field Censor teams for examination.

6. Transmit to the Provost Marshal or Military Police Commander all information coming within his purview such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civilian police, and the extent of disorder, looting and sabotage.

7. Advise concerning the seizure of all civilian arms.

8. Stop publication of newspapers and other periodicals.

9. Take necessary measures to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and material by our own troops.

(b) Commanding officers of tactical Counter Intelligence Corps detachments attached to higher echelons will coordinate the activities of detachments serving with lower echelons to the end that proper Counter Intelligence Corps coverage is maintained at all times throughout the area.

(c) When establishing offices in towns and cities, tactical Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will clearly identify them by posting signs bearing the letters "C.I.C.".

(d) In operations, tactical Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will wear brassards on the left arm bearing the letters "C.I.C." Troops will be advised of the significance of the brassards and instructed to cooperate with personnel wearing them.

(e) Tactical detachments will take steps to inform all troops, especially the Military Police, of the existance, purpose and functions of the detachments to the end that full and immediate cooperation will be forthcoming from all when needed.

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e. Specialized Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will be formed from time to time whose duties and functions will be enumerated by the commands with which they are serving.

6. GENERAL

a. Freedom of Action. It is essential to the effective accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission that the personnel of the Corps be encouraged to exercise its initiative to the fullest extent and that it be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions upon its movement or channels of communication. In the accomplishment of its missions it will not be delayed by the observance of standard customs and prohibitions. The freedom of movement of this personnel when on assigned missions will not be hindered at any time of day or night by the Military Police or other military agency. Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badges will be honored at all times.

b. Assistance to Counter Intelligence Corps. Members of the Counter Intelligence Corps are authorized to call on all military and civilian personnel within this command for any assistance they may require in the performance of their assigned duties.

c. Civilian Clothes. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are authorized to wear civilian clothes or the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces. Normally, personnel in detachments serving with tactical units will wear the civilian uniform, while personnel in detachments serving with the Air Force or Base Sections, or in special detachments, will wear civilian clothes.

d. Protection of Identities. It is deemed essential that Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel wearing civilian clothes or the civilian uniform be addressed and referred to as "Mister", not by military title, except for necessary administrative purposes, and that they be extended the same facilities and afforded the same treatment as civilians serving with the armed forces. Unless unavoidable under combat conditions, such personnel will be billeted, messed, hospitalized and draw PX supplies under the same conditions prescribed for civilians.

e. Office Space. In order to facilitate the closest possible contact with informants, it is essential that Counter Intelligence Corps detachments have office space apart from the headquarters to which they are attached.

f. Coordination. Successful operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps frequently depend upon the rapid and concerted action of several detachments or elements thereof. Such teamwork can only

be properly developed by close and constant liaison between the commanding officers of detachments and individual contacts, where feasible, between other personnel of such detachments. To accomplish this coordination, the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, will maintain close contact with the officers in charge of detachments of his command and will require those officers to maintain close liaison among themselves at all times.

g. Channels of Communication. Counter Intelligence Corps intelligence and operational reports will be forwarded through G-2 channels, information copies being sent to the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, as required by him. Direct communication with the office of the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, will be employed for all administrative, training, technical and organizational reports or communications. Lateral communication between Counter Intelligence Corps detachments is authorized.

h.

i. Commutation of Rations and Quarters. In all cases where Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel would otherwise have to pay for meals and/or billets from personal funds, commutation of rations and/or quarters is authorized in accordance with AR 35-4520, dated 24 February 1943, or subsequent amendments thereof. Appropriate orders to accomplish this purpose will be issued by the commands to which Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are attached.

j. Per Diem. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel may be placed on per diem status when necessary in the performance of assigned duties, as provided in Section II, Circular Number 62, Headquarters, NATOUSA, dated 17 April 1943.

k. Civilian Clothing Allowance. Payment of civilian clothing allowances to Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel is provided for in Paragraph 26, TM 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps, dated 22 September 1943.

Ltr, Allied Force Hq, AG 350.09-2 GBI-AGM
dtd 24 February 1944, (Cont'd)

1. The standard form of Counter Intelligence Corps reports will not be altered except on authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or the Chief, CIC, this headquarters.

7. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

a. Equipment and supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will be requisitioned by them on authority of and in accordance with War Department letter, AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, dated 29 November 1943, Subject: Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps; and Headquarters NATOUSA, letters AG 400/305 D-O, same subject, dated 2 January 1944 and 14 January 1944.

b. Investigative equipment and supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will be requisitioned by the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, from the War Department upon request of detachments in accordance with War Department letter AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, dated 29 November 1943, Subject: Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps.

8. Sufficient copies of this communication will be duplicated by lower echelons so as to insure distribution to all echelons of command, to include divisions.

By command of General WILSON:

/s/J. L. Tarr
/t/J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

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THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

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SECTION I

AVALANCHE IS STRANGE INVASION

Early on the morning of the 9th of September 1943, the United States Fifth Army, supported by the British X Corps, disembarked on beaches along the Gulf of Salerno, in an operation known simply as AVALANCHE.

CIC men, like the thousands of other Allied Troops, felt the strangeness of this invasion. The ground on which they stood belonged to Italy and Italy was a co-belligerent, not an enemy. The evening before the landings, Marshal Badoglio had gone to the Rome broadcasting station and announced, " . . . The Italian Government has asked General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, for an Armistice. This request has been acceded to. In consequence all hostility by the Italian Armed Forces against the British and American forces must now cease."*

First CIC Men Ashore

As the first CIC men attached to the 36th Infantry Division and VI Corps felt their landing crafts touch bottom at 3:30 A.M. at Paestum, it was a question whether the AVALANCHE was descending upon the Germans, or upon themselves. The Germans had suspected an amphibious operation against the Naples and Salerno areas, and reaction was swift and vigorous. Within hours tank attacks were made and the German "88's" began spotting Allied troops.

Any hope of many of the incoming men that the attack would be a surprise was rudely dispelled when "a loudspeaker voice on the shore roared out in English 'Come on in and give up. You're covered.'"**

The majority of the CIC men wading ashore through the chill water, torn bodies, and disabled vehicles, were already combat veterans having participated in both the North African and Sicilian invasions. At this moment the apprehension of spies and the interrogation of suspects became of decidedly secondary importance. Like any of the other "Willy's and Joe's" around them, their first concern was self-preservation.

The intensive training in amphibious landings and infiltration work proved its value as there were no CIC casualties. Amid the shot and shell, chaos and confusion, Captain John Hammond, Commanding Officer of the 36th CIC Detachment, gathered his group of four agents*** together, and they rushed for the semi-protective covering bordering the beach.

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*Italy in the Second World War, by Pietro Badoglio, Oxford University Press, London, 1946, p. 75

**Clark, Mark W., "Calculated Risk" (Harper & Brothers - New York 1950 page 186)

***Rosters of Detachments which participated in Italian campaign attached as Appendix I.

A similar experience was shared by VI Corps CIC under the command of Major Kenneth G. Crowell. In a military sense, a Corps is not supposed to land until a Division has established a beachhead; but this situation found them as part of the initial attack.

Both CIC units reached a point several hundred yards from the water and attempted to camouflage themselves as protection against the small arms and artillery fire. Fortunately, the Allied heavy weapons were in position at 0600 "just in time to beat off a dangerous German tank assault on the Beachhead."*

With the arrival of the Allied artillery, the accomplishment of the CIC mission became possible and each man started on his own particular task. CIC teams spread out over the area. They filtered back to Allied rear area to insure that no force, enemy or civilian, could be mustered there. They questioned and searched all captured enemy soldiers and civilians and sent all combat intelligence disclosed to G2 for interpretation and evaluation. In a number of cases, reports of Germans being in rear areas were investigated and, if the number of Germans was small, CIC went after them instead of waiting for a combat patrol.

By the evening of D-Day, the CIC Detachments of the 36th Division and VI Corps made contact and established a joint CP at a farmhouse near Paestum. For ten days following the landing, the CP was maintained and the assignments of agents of both detachments were well coordinated to avoid duplication in their efforts.**

One thing these CIC men had in common with the men of the Division and Corps to which they were attached: they were among the first Americans in the war to put foot on Hitler-held Continental Europe.

Beachhead Operations

The detachments participating in the original landings continued to push ahead with their assigned divisions and corps. Agents of the VI Corps Detachment often found themselves to be the first troops to enter small Italian towns and villages. Their operations while searching abondoned German CPs, bivouac areas and billets brought them under enemy shell fire almost daily, and occasionally the shifting tide of battle left the agents behind enemy lines. Despite these hazards, hundreds of civilians that crowded the highways were interrogated for tactical and counterintelligence information, German soldiers in civilian clothes were apprehended, cases of lights flashing in the pre-dawn gloom were

*Mark W Clark, Calculated Risk, page 190

**Ltr to Major Ray, Chief, CIC, AFHQ, from Maj. Kenneth G. Crowell, 206th CIC Section, Hq VI Corps, Subj., "Informal Activities Report of the 206th CIC Section in Operation AVALANCHE, dtd 29 Sep 43 (SECRET) (KCD 7-6-42)

investigated, and "unfinished business" left by Division CIC Detachments was completed.

A significant event in these early days of the Italian campaign was the establishment of contact with General Guiseppe Pavone, the recognized leader of the Anti-Fascist movement in Southern Italy. General Pavone immediately proved valuable to CIC in its operations. He revealed the names of Italians, friendly and unfriendly, who would be of interest to CIC, and he volunteered, together with his chain of associates, to notify CIC of any enemy agents or unidentified individuals in the Salerno area. At a time when CIC activities were hampered by a lack of trained linguist personnel, the aid received from General Pavone and cooperative local Carabinieri was particularly welcome to the busy agents of VI Corps CIC. Within two weeks after D Day, these agents had managed to institute counterintelligence measures in more than fifty cities and towns along the beachhead.*

On 10 September, the 45th CIC Detachment, under command of 1st Lieutenant Rupert W. Guenther landed on the Salerno beachhead, to be joined the following day by Fifth Army CIC led by Major Stephen J. Spingarn. One week later, the 3d CIC Detachment, commanded by Lt. Bertram R. Russell, landed and immediately went into action.

The demand for combat intelligence often outstripped the counter-intelligence requirements in these first weeks after the invasion. To meet this demand, CIC agents entered towns with the first wave of Infantry troops. Although frontline dangers were faced time and again by the agents, no casualties were incurred during the beachhead operations.

All CIC units engaged in the battle to secure the beachhead were continually plagued by the shortage of two vitally needed items; interpreters and transportation. Enlisted OSS personnel serving with CIC detachments were often utilized as linguists and accompanied CIC teams on their missions. Their services were not sufficient. Major Spingarn, in an informal report to Major Ray, claimed, "I continue to press my urgent request to you for that Italian speaking group <u>with</u> jeeps . . . I honestly believe that if we can get them we can really put CIC on the map over here. OSS is bringing in Italian agents by the droves and, frankly, the competition is pretty tough. I <u>NEED</u> those Italian agents."**

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*Ibid

**Memo for Major Ray from Major Stephen J. Spingarn, dtd 17 Sep 43 (SECRET) (KCD 6-8-148)

By the 20th of September, a bridgehead had been secured at Salerno and from Taranto the Allies were forming a firm base which was rapidly growing in strength.*

On 21 September, the 34th CIC Detachment, with Captain John L. Rubsam as Commanding Officer, arrived at Salerno with the 34th Infantry Division and began combat operations. The early days in Italy were days of experimentation. This was a new CIC unit, in combat for the first time. On the 30 mile journey from Salerno to Naples, this CIC Detachment gathered its experience -- experience that was to make it one of the most effective detachments in the Italian campaign.

CIC's Duties Varied

Meanwhile, the 45th CIC Detachment, under command of 1st Lt Rupert W. Guenther was occupied with its primary mission, affording security to all towns occupied by American troops.

A systematic procedure was followed similar to that of most of the detachments. At the earliest possible moment, a CIC section would enter a town and contact the Mayor. He was interviewed for "information on the town, its social, political and religious factions; its officials and their trustworthiness."** The Mayor was instructed that the town would operate as normally as possible, that its officials would retain their positions, and that law and order must be maintained.

The next official in importance within the city government was the Maraschello of the Carabinieri, or Chief of Police. With his help, the following action was initiated:

"a) Curfew established.

b) Arms ordered collected.

c) Gatherings or meetings prohibited.

d) Dead burned or buried by sunset.

e) Public office holders still hiding in the mountains were ordered to report immediately.

f) All communications closed down and guards posted.

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*Field Marshall The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, El Alamein to the River Sangro, E. P. Dutton & Co, Inc, New York 1949, page 161

**Guenther, Rupert W., Ltr. to AC of S, G-2, 45th Inf Div, Subject - Counter Intelligence with a Division in Combat, dated 29 Oct 43 - T-17 (0)

g) Banks, post office, provincial and municipal offices which contain records guarded.

h) All Carabinieri uniformed immediately.

i) Houses of prostitution closed.

j) No movement in or out of town by the people.

k) All quarters and offices occupied by the Germans checked.

l) All offices containing provincial and municipal records checked."*

Unfortunately this procedure was not always accomplished in so simple a manner. To begin with, the Mayor was not always in the good graces of his townspeople. For the most part, he had been appointed by the Fascist system and while he often was not a strong Fascist, he still had not dared challenge their authority. CIC agents learned that the European petty officials were adept at changing their politics overnight and as a result, the Mayor was blamed for everything.

The mayor was not the only person thus honored. Other Fascist-appointed officials, of whom there were many in every town, were accused of being devout Fascists, helping the Germans, being German spies, hoarding grain, and improperly administering the city. All such reports had to be investigated to separate "useful" public officials from dangerous subversives.

Soon after landing, both CIC and the American Military Government (AMGOT) discovered that at times they had to deal with distasteful people. As in North Africa, there now were times when unwanted officials were left in office, at least temporarily, simply because there were none to replace them. These officials knew the citizens of the town, knew the rationing and allocating procedures and in general, knew the mechanics of city government. Unless they either were incapable or appeared sympathetic to the enemy, they generally were left in charge. CIC, acting at this time for AMGOT, had the prerogative of removal.

An interesting sidelight when CIC took over a village, was the search for the town Fascist secretary. In the great majority of cases, he had already destroyed his papers and either had hidden in the mountains or had turned to a civilian occupation for sustenance - always proclaiming to be a loyal Badoglio follower.

*Judson, Clarence H., Jr., Memorandum for the Officer in Charge - 20th CIC Section - IIq. VI Corps, Subject, "Activities Report for 1, 2, 3 October 1943." (T-57, page 67 (a))

On the road to Naples, the CIC detachment attached to the 45th Infantry Division, entered many small towns and gave each a complete security coverage. At this early period of the campaign and while still far south on the "boot", CIC was not plagued with enemy line crossers or stay-behind agents as the battle line was continually fluctuating. Instead, the main objectives were the complete screening of civil officials to be left in charge of the towns once CIC moved on, and the rounding up of all enemy soldiers and all pro-German civilians for the purpose of extracting any intelligence of use to the G2.

A good example of the security afforded one of these small towns occurred on 20 September, when Agents George T. Moseley, Frank A. Messina and Walter Joy of the 45th CIC Detachment, entered the town of Campagna. This town was a rural trading center with a normal population of 11,000 and with no industries. The three CIC Agents reported they found the Vice-Mayor, Roberto Rocca, as the Mayor himself was "indisposed." From Rocco they found that there were 15 Carabinieri available for duty; no military installations in town, and the electricity and postal service were out of commission. The Vice Mayor told the agents that the Fascist Party had been completely dissolved and there were no suspects except one, Dr. Bortichelli, who had acted as an informer for the Germans.

After this initial information had been extracted, the agents reported that: "A German Regimental Command Post was formerly located at a crossroads about 6 kilometers south of town. The Commander was named Schultz. There were two German Divisions in the vicinity, one heavy armored and the other light armored. Both had retreated to the east.

"170 Austrian Jews have been interned for more than a year in the town, guarded by 12 special Italian police. Were released when the Germans retreated and they fled to the hills . . . . . anxious to serve with our Armed Forces."

The CIC report continued: "Vice Mayor instructed to have population turn in all arms to Chief of Police. Carabinieri to be armed with these and sent out to round up and arrest any Germans in vicinity dressed in civilian clothes. Two of these were taken yesterday and turned over to the troops.

"Dr. Bortichelli, above named suspect, had fled to the hills, was still there, and not available for questioning.

"Questioning of Italian civilians on the road east from Eboli to Contursi, led to a former German ammunition dump . . . . . The dump was found to be under guard by our troops."*

*Ltr., Subject, "Report on Town Security of Campagna", by Agents Moseley, Messina, Joy, to AC of S, G-2, from Guenther, Rupert W., 1st Lt., Commanding Officer, 145th CIC Section, dtd 20 Sep 43; "Situation Summary", file 345 - 59.2 (9699) (Departmental Records Branch - Alexandria, Virginia) (u)

This story was repeated many times on that journey from Salerno to Naples. It was like a well acted and well directed play; the plot and action were the same - the characters and names the only difference.

Naples Found in Ruins

Naples, according to the many pre-war travel folders, was a city combining both old world and new world charm, from the ancient and staid Place Garibaldi to the ultra-modern apartments overlooking the beautiful bay. On the 1st of October, when the British X Corps, the American 82nd Airborne Division and the CIC Detachment for the fifth Army entered the city, it was found that this charm, like so many others, was a thing of the past.

Debris and wreckage were everywhere, a grim reminder of the 120 bombings by the Allied Air Force and destruction by the Germans before leaving. Through the misty rain that fell on Naples that day, agents of the Fifth Army CIC viewed the burned-out houses, the sunken ships and - everywhere - the stench of the dead and dying.

It wasn't until the afternoon of the 1st of October that the Italian inhabitants of this grim city emerged to search for food, hoping against hope that these "allies" were of a different breed than the hated Germans.

These first Italian citizens were a pitiful lot - ill clad and dirty. The years spent under Fascist rule had so broken them that they had ceased to care for anyone save themselves and their families. It was not until they had suffered the indignities and burtalities commensurate with German rule, that the Italian Underground became their salvation and started each individual citizen on the road to freedom. General Eisenhower summarized Italy's tragedy in his report on that campaign. "For three years we strained to break their spirit," he wrote. "We . . . . . succeeded only too well."*

Fifth Army CIC Enters Naples After a Rugged Month

The Fifth Army CIC Detachment, later called the 305th CIC Section, had an illustrious and battle-torn career. As the men of this Detachment drove through the debris littered streets on 1 October 1943, they realized that their first objective had been reached. For the next three weeks the Fifth Army CIC was in charge of counterintelligence in Naples. This city of a million was the largest city up to that time that had ever been handled by a CIC Detachment. But the agents of the 305th CIC had looked forward to these labors for almost a month.

The bulk of the Detachment had embarked for Italy at Oran on 1 September 1943, under the command of Major Spingarn.

*A Soldier's Story, Gen. Bradley, Omar N. (Henry Holt & Co. - New York 1951) page 169

As a security precaution, they were divided between the U.S.S. Charles Picz and the U.S.S. Scott. A small rear echelon of four agents was left behind to bring on transportation and other equipment which could not be taken in early convoys.

After suffering a number of air attacks en route and watching a German radio-controlled bomb strike the U. S. Cruiser Savannah within a few hundred yards of their ship, the men landed near Paestum on the Salerno beachhead on 11 September 1943 (D plus 2).

Since the beachhead was still under heavy fire and aerial attack, the Fifth Army CIC made foxholes their base of operations.

The intense fighting of this period can perhaps be best judged by the fact that on one occasion a German attack almost captured the Army Advance CP which at the time was forward of the Division and Corps CP's, and Army CIC personnel were placed in the line to defend it. On another occasion, Major Spingarn and two agents found themselves momentarily trapped outside the town of Battipaglia after they had driven their jeep in advance of the combat troops. A terse account of their predicament reveals the nearness of disaster. "The Infantry had not yet come up. German tanks were discernable just ahead. At this point two German tanks came forward, reaching a point about 400 yards from us, one on the road, the other on the left. They had spotted us and opened fire on us with machine guns and 88 mm. cannon. A slight hummock, perhaps a foot high, saved us from the machine gunning, but the bullets were only eight or ten inches over us as we flattened out, and we did our best to bite our way into the ground." Escaping and ultimately reaching the town, the agents found it completely destroyed and evacuated.*

When the critical period passed and the Allied beachhead was secure, Fifth Army CIC Agents were able to pursue their primary mission without wondering whether they would be in the front lines that day, or providing security for the Allied troops on the beachhead and in the towns.

During these few days before the entry into Naples, CIC Fifth Army interrogated many escaped, wounded, and AWOL Italian and German prisoners and many Italian civilians. Statements obtained from refugees threw a great deal of light upon German activities and made the subsequent push into Naples easier for both the front line GI and the intelligence man as well.

One individual stated that at Castellammare, the Carabinieri was 100 percent pro-German and that there was no water or light in the town. Agent Merle V. Ploghoft interrogated a group of former Italian soldiers, who had passed through the German lines and from them extracted the

* Memo for Major Ray from Major Stephen J. Spingarn, dtd 21 Sep 43 (CONF) (KCD G-8-148)

information that the "Germans plan a determined stand at Bologna: they are moving out of Benevento certain named Italians have been helping the Germans; and civilians doing war work on the border have damaged German installations effectively."*

Plans Made for CIC in the Islands

On 26 September, Major Spingarn left on a four day trip to the Isles of Capri, Ischia and Procida. The purpose of the trip was to make a CIC survey of these islands and to establish Agent Donald M. Funk there. In the course of the survey, he contacted all the principal Allied officers on the three islands and in addition, spent a night with Senator Benedetto Croce at his villa at Capri, discussing the Italian political situation and anti-Fascist groups. Senator Croce was regarded as Italy's greatest living philosopher and writer. Unquestionably accepted as the leading spirit of the anti-Fascist group, he was a key figure in Italy's fortunes after the Armistice with the Allies. Marshal Badoglio appointed him a minister without portfolio when reorganizing his cabinet, for his "name was known and honoured by everyone."** Major Spingarn also had a conference with Colonel Tito Zanibona, the great Italian hero of World War I, who had spent 16 years in prison, the result of an attempted assassination of Mussolini on 4 November 1925.

On 30 September, Major Spingarn returned to the town of Maiori with instructions from Colonel Edwin B. Howard, AC of S, G2, Fifth Army, to get into Naples as quickly as possible after its capture. Along with the main body of the Fifth Army CIC scheduled to enter Naples were the attached British 312th and 97th Field Security Sections under Captain Cartwright.

Upon contacting Major Ketterson, G2 of the 82nd Airborne Division, and learning of the expected fall of Naples that afternoon, Major Spingarn and his group left immediately after lunch. A convoy of eight jeeps, four trucks and 14 motorcycles, containing 16 CIC Agents and 19 Field Security Police, wound their way over side roads and railroad tracks as the main highway was mined.

The group arrived in Naples at approximately 1630 hours with the advance elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. There were still small pockets of enemy resistance on the far side of town and occasional machine gun and rifle fire. Major Spingarn reported, "The reception by the residents of the city was tumultuous. At every stop the group was virtually mobbed by people with flowers, fruit, cheers and kisses."***

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*"War Diary of Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps" (305th CIC Section) 1 September 43 to 6 January 44 (L-19) entry of 29 Sep 43. (S)

**"Italy in the Second World War", Pietro Badoglio (Oxford University Press, London, 1948) Page 149.

***"War Diary of Fifth Army CIC" (305th CIC Section) 1 Sep 43 to 6 Jan 44 (L-19), Entry of 1 Oct 43 (Secret).

After a short tour through the city surveying the damage and destruction, the group proceeded to search for a building for quarters and office space. Such a place was found at 207 Riviera and along with the British FSP sections, the Fifth Army CIC moved in.

The problem of transportation for CIC agents was also met in short order. Immediately after its arrival in Naples, the 305th CIC Section began to requisition civilian automobiles and accessories. Care was taken to properly acknowledge receipt of the vehicles, and a log of all civilian cars listing model, engine number, license number, name and address of owner was prepared at CIC headquarters.*

With the capture of Naples, a major objective had been accomplished. Salerno and Naples were of the past; Rome, the "Eternal City" lay ahead.

Fifth Army CIC Assumes Static Role

For the Fifth Army CIC Detachment, the push towards Rome was delayed. From the 1st of October and the fall of Naples, until the 24th of October, this Detachment was in charge of counterintelligence in the Naples region. This 24 day period played an important role in the work of CIC during the Italian campaign.

In the 22 days that had passed since the Salerno landings, CIC work had consisted mainly of moving ahead with the advancing armies and affording security to all captured towns. Naples offered the first chance for definite static counterintelligence work. Instead of pushing into a village, interviewing officials, setting up systems and then moving swiftly on, the 305th CIC Detachment could now give complete coverage. Informant nets could be initiated and the leads derived from these nets could be looked into with, in most cases, definite results.

On 2 October, the groundwork for the stay in Naples was laid. In the morning, Major Spingarn sent the attached 97th FSS to the port to make a security check. Agents Arthur J. Vincent and Bernard J. Grennan with four men from the attached 312th FSS, went to the Axis consulates to gather documents. In the afternoon a meeting was held for all Allied intelligence sections and all related sections then in Naples. These included the G2 of the 82nd Airborne, AMG, the Carabinieri and the Office of Strategic Services, and these representative organizations were given specified missions. Agent Gerald J. Weber interviewed one Niccolo Theodoli, journalist of Rome, and obtained an account of the events surrounding the German occupation of Rome.

On 4 October the names of liberal anti-Fascist group leaders and others who could be contacted for information were obtained. On the

*Ltr to Commanding General, Fifth Army, Attn: G-4 (Through AC of S, G2), from Major Stephen J. Spingarn, Hq 305th CIC Section, Subject: Requistion of Civilian Vehicles and Accessories, dated 17 Nov 43 (Conf) (KCD) 6-8-137)

basis of such simple leads as these, a good informant net was constructed.

By the 5th Of October, the original CIC functions had been completed and all that remained was to contact the Italian civilian officials and explain what was expected of them. The leaders of the Comitato de Liberazione, a leading anti-Fascist group, met at the office of the 303th CIC at the invitation of Major Spingarn. Major Spingarn read a memorandum addressed to them, "requesting specifically their opinion on military and political officials; a list of persons dangerous because of their closeness to the German and Mussolini regime; a list and opinions of anti-Fascist in the region; information on foreign consuls in Naples and on enemy aliens."*

With the combat phase of counterintelligence completed, the static situation now began. This meant the inevitable but all important paper work and filing; the interrogations and investigations; the searches and arrests.

At the Hotel Parco, Agents Vincent and Grennan found and seized a number of German and Italian documents. They also found - but did not seize - 1500 pounds of toluene (an explosive) in separate 100 pound blocks, in the hotel basement. All the blocks had been inter-connected and booby trapped in such a way that anyone tampering with one block would have detonated the entire 1500 pounds.

The "Axis file" at the Fifth Army CIC headquarters was visibly increased on October 6th as a result of a talk Agent Weber had with of the German consulate. gave the names of several individuals who worked for the Germans and also the names of German intelligence officers and espionage agents.

The Detachment rose in strength in early October by the arrival of three more agents who reported to the Detachment's new quarters at 2 Piazza Nicola Amore. The city of Naples had been divided into zones for the various military units, and the old location at 287 Via Riviera was within North Africa Air Force (NAAF) territory.

Bomb Explosion Gives CIC Additional Work

The first seven days of October had passed with nothing untoward occurring. Naples was slowly returning to a state of semi-normalcy. On the 7th of October, this state was rudely shattered when a demagnetization bomb, presumably laid by the Germans, exploded in the post office, killing 25 people, two-thirds of whom were Allied soldiers. Major Spingarn, Lt. Miles A. Tonini and Agents James P. Furniss, Alba B. Warren

*"War Diary of the Fifth Army CIC", (303th CIC Section) 1 Sep 43 to 6 Jan 44 (L-19) entry of 5 Oct 43 (s)

Julius R. Sagi and Gordon M. Messing met with the leading civil and police officials of the town and Province of Naples.

The CIC agents explained to them that "the work of the CIC is also countersabotage, and although these delayed bombs were probably not the work of saboteurs, it will be considered sabotage if anyone knows the presence of such devices and does not report them." The officials were told to send men all over the city for information concerning the bombs and to "put in a full day's work instead of the half-day many of them were working."*

Searches were organized and the bomb squads uncovered a number of explosives planted by the Germans before they withdrew from Naples. Unfortunately, they failed to uncover them all. On 10 October, there occurred an explosion in the barracks of the 307th Engineers, formerly the barracks of the Italian 31st Infantry, that produced 65 casualties, an estimated 30 of these being fatal. The explosives had been secreted in the cellar, so well hidden that two checks of the whole building had disclosed nothing. Sabotage was ruled out as the building had been under constant guard. These explosives, planted by the Germans before they withdrew, were a major headache for CIC in all the large Italian cities captured during the campaign.

On the day of the explosion, a notice from Fifth Army CIC appeared in "Risorgimento", the only newspaper that was functioning in the battletorn city. Civilians were urged to bring "information concerning the possible presence of spies or enemy agents of the occupied territory" to the CIC office. As an incentive, a reward of two thousand Italian lire was held out to potential informants. Fifth Army CIC was determined to leave no stones unturned in its search for remnants of the Fascist regime.

One of the highspots of the stay in Naples occurred with the arrest on 11 October of General Ettore Del Tetto, Italian Territorial commander of Naples, 19th Corps. CIC had received numerous reports concerning General Del Tetto, claiming that he had turned Naples over to the Germans around September 11 and 12, despite the desire of many Italians to hold out, and also that he was responsible for much of the damage and deaths besides releasing certain German officers captured by the civilian populace.

Acting on a report that a box with his name had been brought into the Vomero district, Army CIC men investigated and found the General's orderly. Questioning of the orderly in the CIC office brought to light the fact that Del Tetto was hiding in the Convenito della Palma, a slum district. Quick dispatch of agents, before the news of the orderly's capture reached Del Tetto, led to his arrest.

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*"War Diary of the Fifth Army CIC" (305th CIC Section) 1 Sep 43 to 6 Jan 44 (L-19) (s)

Questioning of the General brought forth the information that he was extremely familiar with the terrain already won by the Allies, but that he had only sketchy information on the Pontine Marshes, the territory which lay ahead of Allied troops on the march to Rome. The arrest of Del Tetto received praise from the majority of the civilian population and from the newspaper "Risorgimento".

Liaison and Conflict

On the 12th of October, liaison was arranged with the Peninsular Base Section CIC, under command of Major Maxwell W. Papurt. This Base Section was entrusted with handling all security concerning installations in the Naples area, although the Army CIC Detachment continued to handle all counterintelligence work. Two agents were scheduled to be sent to Army CIC headquarters to familiarize themselves with operations so that when the Base Section relieved the Army CIC Detachment, no preventable stoppages would occur.

This early period saw the "growing pains" of OSS - a later period saw it develop into an efficient espionage agency. Major Spingarn, perhaps the greatest critic of the early OSS activities in Italy later reached a good working agreement with them.**

Fifth Army CIC Prepares To Leave Naples

In the last few days before the Army CIC Detachment turned over counterintelligence control to the Base Section in Naples, Major Spingarn's organization attempted to complete the security of the city.

*Memorandum for Major Ray, CO, CIC Det, AFHQ, from Hq 305th CIC Section, dtd 10 Oct 43 (Secret)

**History of the 305th CIC Detachment, Page 5 (u), (NOTE: Further discussion of this situation is included in Chapter 3, "Critique: North Africa, Sicily," and Chapter 5, "Preparation for OVERLORD."

A major headache was the issuing of civilian passes, signed sometimes in almost illegible handwriting by unauthorized local officials. In a memorandum to the Chief AMG officer, Spingarn requested that local officials be advised as to what authority, if any, they had in issuing these passes and that a clarification of authority be published in newspapers and by handbills.

The morale of the civilian population was immeasurably increased with the arrest of some of the major Fascists who associated with the Germans during the occupation of Naples. Renato and Carlo Guggenheim were two such eminent Fascists. Earlier in the month, Renato had offered his services to the CIC, but investigation of his car resulted in the discovery of an order from Colonel Scholl, German counterintelligence officer, exempting the car from requisition, and a search of a photographer's shop uncovered pictures of Guggenheim in the company of German officers.

After Renato's arrest, an informant said that "Marchesa Patrizi had come to her house . . . . . very distressed, and said that Colonel Kraege (AMG) had been very sympathetic to her request to intercede for the Guggenheims, but that the matter depended upon a third person (Major Spingarn)."* The Guggenheim brothers were interned for the duration of the war.

Investigation of wire cutting incidents was a leading CIC function during the campaign. Sometimes the wire was cut by the enemy; sometimes by ardent Fascists, and sometimes by civilians who did not understand the importance of such acts. The investigations of these acts were called for to such an extent that eventually the 305th CIC published handbills announcing that the penalty for wire cutting was death and assigning plain clothes Carabinieri to investigate any cases that occurred.

The middle of October marked the return of Count Sforza to the Italian mainland. Since Sforza had spent the previous 22 years abroad, uncorrupted in any way by the Fascists, political circles were of the opinion that he would be supported by the leaders of almost all parties if an election were held immediately. Most Italians believed that he was the man who could dispel the feeling of inertia and helplessness. For this reason, Major Spingarn arranged for a series of conferences between Sforza, the Italian political leaders and the CIC, sometime in November.

Base Section CIC Arrives in Naples

On the 23rd of October, Spingarn called a meeting of the heads of all the local and provincial offices at which time he introduced Major

*"War Diary of the Fifth Army CIC" (305th CIC Section) 1 Sep 43 to 6 Jan 44 (L-19) (s)

Papurt and Captain Lucien L. Picard of the Base Section CIC to whose jurisdiction the security of Naples was being given.

Major Spingarn did not hesitate to lay the situation on line before the Italian officials at this meeting. "I have gotten varying degrees of cooperation from you gentlemen, some good and some not so good," he stated, and then he added an important remark, "One thing I wish to make note of at this moment is that while I have received fairly good information from you gentlemen regarding less important people in the city, there has been a tendency on your part to 'whitewash' or exculpate the more important persons." No question could remain in the officials' minds that the American security officers were content only with the complete fulfillment of their mission. Within the first two weeks of its operations in Naples, the Base Section CIC backed up words with deeds, embarking on 137 new cases that ranged from espionage and sabotage to security checks.

By 7 November, Captain Picard, Executive Officer of the Detachment, was able to report on the basis of interviews with civilians of varied political opinions that sentiment among the natives of Naples was generally favorable toward the American troops garrisoned in the city. But the civilian attitude was less kindly disposed toward Allied occupation policies. Complaints that Fascists still remained in power and even held leading positions were voiced, and charges of British and American toleration of Black Market activities were lodged. This gauging of civilian morale had been requested by the CIC detachment at AFHQ as an appendix to regular counterintelligence functions of the Base Section.*

Army CIC Moves to Caserta

At 0930 on the 24th of October, the main body of the Fifth Army Detachment left Naples to take over their new headquarters at Caserta. Their stay in Naples had produced many important end results in this first instance of static CIC work in Italy. The performance of the Fifth Army CIC received "commendation from the Army G2 and from a British representative of AFHQ."**

Important lessons had been learned during the 24 day period; lessons that would be used in all captured Italian cities up until the end of the campaign.

Stiffening Resistance Slows the Allied Advance

The push toward Rome did not halt after the fall of Naples. The divisional CIC detachments and the VI Corps CIC Detachment followed in the wake of the advancing armies and gave security to the great number

*Ltr and Exhibits to Chief, CIC Det, AFHQ, from Capt Lucien L. Picard PBS CIC Hq, dtd 7 Nov 43 (Secret) (KCD 7-7-119 & 120)
**History of the 305th CIC Detachment, p. 5 (C)

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of towns that fell before the Allied advance. As in the early days, officials were interviewed, buildings searched and informant nets established. The names and faces were different - the work and results were the same.

Then occurred the inevitable slowdown. The Fifth Army under General Mark Clark had pushed forward after the retreating Germans and by mid-October had crossed the twisting Volturno River. Defeated at this point, the Germans pulled back and formed what was referred to as their "Winter Line," a line that guarded the Liri and Rapido Valleys from the South. Mid-October to mid-November brought the first bad weather; the sleet and snow, the rain and hail, and as General Clark wrote in his book, "Calculated Risk", "The tired and muddy freezing men of the Fifth Army felt they were going up against a major defense position every day as they inched their way over the rugged terrain toward the Winter Line."*

Corps and Division Detachments Begin Static Coverage

With this slowdown of the Allied advance, the stage was set for the first static counterintelligence work to be performed by the CIC Detachments at Corps and Division level. In one respect, this slowdown was good for the CIC Detachments as it afforded them the opportunity to give long, complete coverage to the various towns and cities they reached, in this way gathering experience later put to use in such cities as Rome, Florence, and Milan.

To the average GI wading through the mud and icy sleet, the slowdown didn't make much difference. There was good reason for this, for before him lay such places as Mount Camino, Mount La Difensa, Mount Maggiore, the city of San Pietro Infine and a little town called Cassino.

During the last days of October, the VI Corps Detachment, commanded by Major Kenneth G. Crowell and consisting of 12 men, began to place more emphasis on static counterintelligence work. Landing at the Salerno beachhead on D-day, the Detachment had followed the advance, affording security in all captured towns and cities. This detachment having jurisdiction over the 45th, 36th, 34th, and 3d Division CIC Detachments, had up to this time, performed the same duties and missions as the divisional Detachments and yet did not have a systematic reporting procedure or very close liaison with them.

With the slowdown of the Allied advance in October, the divisional Detachments began sending certain suspects to the Corps Detachment for interrogation.** These divisional CIC Detachments, working for the most part at the front lines with their respective divisions, were in a superior position to apprehend suspected enemy agents and saboteurs.

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*"Calculated Risk", Gen. Mark W. Clark, Pages 228 and 231

**Memorandum, Subj: Mercaldi, Angelina, Alife, Alleged Collaborator with Germans; from Maj K. G. Crowell, 206th CIC Section, dtd 24 Oct 43 (c)

Although the first actual enemy line-crossing agent was not captured until December 1943, the original system of sending certain suspected persons from Divisional to Corps level was thus set up in October and gave practice in the procedure that paid big dividends when the enemy later attempted a mass onslaught of agents.

One of the important cases investigated by the VI Corps CIC Detachment during these early days after the fall of Naples concerned certain people in the town of Montfalcione who were alleged to have informed the Germans as to the whereabouts of American parachutists.

Upon entering the town, special agents Arthur J. Ruston and Gabriel J. Paolozzi contacted Brigadier Ficarra of the Carabinieri. According to Ficarra, rumor was strong that Antonio Polcari and Antonio DeMagistris, both avid Fascists, had been the two persons guilty of the informing. Subsequent investigations brought forth information that Italia Nargi, a young prostitute of the town, had carried certain mysterious sealed letters between the two men. As Nargi reported during her interrogation, Polcari had asked her to carry those letters to DeMagistris and in return as payment, "I will give you a kilo of macaroni."* All three persons were arrested and interned for the duration of the war.

A certain feeling of distrust is inevitable between the troops occupying a nation and the people of that nation. This was especially true in Italy. Some changed from Fascists and Pro-Nazi adherents to Badoglio followers and pro-Allied adherents overnight. Therefore when Agents Warren R. Anderson and William N. Bower of the VI Corps CIC Detachment were instructed to investigate the delay of military traffic to the front due to bogged down civilian vehicles on the main roads, it was only natural that they should wonder if perhaps "the leopard hadn't really changed his spots."

Travelling on the main road from Montesarchio to Benevento, the two CIC Agents encountered several Italian civilian cars and carts which had broken down in by-passes, resulting in long delays of 105mm guns and other Allied heavy equipment moving to the front. In most cases, the Allied vehicles had to pull out the disabled Italian cars and carts and in one case, a 3/4-ton truck became stuck in attempting to pull out a wagon.

Agents Anderson and Bower questioned the occupants of these cars to ascertain whether their movement represented a casual one or a concerted attempt by enemy agents to clog the roads with civilian traffic. Deciding that the traffic jams did not appear to be enemy inspired, they called the matter to the attention of Major F. J. Armstrong, A.M.G. officer, Benevento Province, who stated that immediate steps would be taken to

*Memorandum to OIC, Subject, "Allegation that certain persons in Montefalcione had informed Germans as to whereabouts of American parachutists", from 206th CIC Section (U)

correct the situation.*

This was only one of the many non-glamorous, little known duties performed by the CIC Detachments in Italy, which constituted nothing more than the daily grind of behind-the-scenes counterintelligence. These investigations would never get the publicity nor acclaim that the larger cases later got, but in reality they were equally as important as they formed the foundation upon which the later structures of CIC investigations were built.

Base Section CIC Scores a Victory

Although assigned a static rather than a tactical role, the Peninsular Base Section CIC detachment was not without its individual victories. On 21 November, Agents William M. Lucaire and Carl F. Fiebig were dispatched to conduct a security survey of a Quartermaster Dump in the Aversa section of Naples. Among the many security deficiencies at this dump, the agents noted an absolute lack of anti-aircraft protection. On the day previous to the inspection, the dump had been strafed and bombed at will by German aircraft, and the raid had crippled the work of the installation for four hours. The morale of the civilian personnel was utterly shattered, and fewer than 5% of these workers returned to resume their duties. The agents stated in their reports that the area around the dump afforded excellent positions for anti-aircraft emplacements and recommended that at least six .50 caliber machine guns be placed to provide a crossfire against low flying enemy aircraft. Their recommendations were hastily carried out.

On the following day, enemy planes diving low over the depot for strafing never had a chance to open fire. A steady stream of .50 caliber rounds from the machine gun emplacements met the planes head on and riddled them. Several of the planes were blasted from the skies; the remainder, seeking refuge in higher attitudes, came into the range of 40 mm Bofors that had been trained on the area as part of the trap. A grand total of twelve enemy aircraft were destroyed, the depot was saved from attack, and most of the Italian laborers came back to the Aversa dump confident that they could work in safety. The strategy of CIC agents Lucaire and Fiebig had met with astounding success.**

Additional Detachments Arrive

During the latter part of 1943, other CIC Detachments made their appearance in Italy.

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*Memorandum to OIC, Subject, "Delay of Military Traffic to the Front by Civilian Vehicles", dated 16 Oct 43, from 206th CIC Detachment (u)

**Memo for the OIC from agents William M. Lucaire and Carl F. Fiebig, Subject: Quartermaster Dump No. 560, dtd 21 Nov 43, (Conf) (KCD 7-7-126) Rpt. to Chief, CIC, AFHQ from Hqs PBS CIC Detachment, Subject: Incident at Aversa Quartermaster Depot, dtd 25 Nov 43, (Secret) (KCD 7-7-126)

On 9 October 1943, the CIC Section II Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Crosby Lewis landed at Paestum in the vicinity of Salerno. The Detachment proceeded immediately to Naples where they contacted the CIC Section of the Fifth Army and then spent the following six weeks in the area around Naples.

Up until the 27th of November, when II Corps assumed a tactical responsibility in the Cassino sector, the men of the Detachment performed the usual routine investigations and security surveys in their sector. Their findings however were not always routine. Lax blackout discipline, inadequate challenging by posted sentries, and mess gear and other bright objects exposed during daylight hours presented threats to individual unit security which agents of the II Corps CIC were quick to note.*

During December, the unit pioneered among the American forces in establishing effective civilian controls in the Minturno area.** It is generally believed that this was the first instance of such controls initiated and maintained by a CIC Section in Italy. Daily surveys of populated areas were conducted and contact with town officials, Carabinieri, and local inhabitants, often led to the disclosure of strangers in the Corps area of occupation. These surveys were backed up by the instituting of civilian road blocks and other front line control measures. Civilians of doubtful identity were passed immediately to PW collection points with a note stating their name and the area in which they had been picked up, along with the designation of the capturing unit. The prisoners and their identifying notes were then sent to Divisional PW cages where the suspects were screened and interrogated by CIC agents.

One group of three such suspects who confessed to being enemy agents had an interesting account to relate. All three men were Italians who had been selected by the Germans to serve as agents on a local tactical level. Their mission was to penetrate Allied lines and secure information concerning Allied order of battle, artillery installations in front line areas, and the location and approximate size of armored forces. The agents had been trained to recognize and identify Allied shoulder patches, and they were advised that a unit's kitchen could be a safe and effective place to gather information. The Germans completed the briefing of these agents by issuing them up to 8,000 lire and by giving them a password to be used in returning to German lines. Methodical interrogation drew considerable data from the three men about the nature and extent of the enemy espionage efforts on a tactical level, and the II Corps CIC agents were quick to use this data in constructing counter measures.***

*Ltr. to AC of S, G2, II Corps from 202nd CIC Section, Subj: Security of CP, Hqs. II Corps, and Attached Units, dtd 26 Oct 43, (Conf) (KCD 6-10-266).

**History of the 202d CIC Detachment, p. 4 (K-26)

***Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, from Hqs II Corps CIC, Subject: General Security Report, December 1943, dtd 2 Jan 44, (Conf) (KCD 1-25-176)

The II Corps CIC also instituted a careful check system to weed out ex-soldiers of the Italian Army whose presence in the Corps area constituted a security threat. On 14 December, Agents Princi and Stevens discovered a former Italian Major huddled in a shack five miles from the front. On-the-spot interrogation revealed that the ex-officer was awaiting the start of an offensive that would allow him to cross into German lines during the confusion of battle. He had gathered a number of documents to present to the Germans as proof of his loyalty to the Fascist cause. In the hands of the CIC agents, these documents became the tools for extracting a confession from a man who might well have become an espionage agent for the German Intelligence Service.*

The establishment of rigid controls was only one of the innovations made by the II Corps CIC Detachment which was to become a leader in the campaign ahead. When the campaign ended in May 1945, this unit had been in combat against the enemy a total of 620 days, thus making it the senior CIC combat detachment in the US Army.**

CIC with the 1st Armored Division.

By the end of October 1943, Army, Corps and Infantry Division CIC Detachments were represented in Italy. However, it was not until 28 October 1943, when the 151st CIC Detachment commanded by Captain John C. Crystal debarked at Bagnoli, province of Naples, that an Armored Division arrived with its own CIC Detachment.

This 151st CIC Detachment, which later became the 501st CIC Detachment, was attached to the 1st Armored Division; it had been activated on 17 August 1943, at Oran, North Africa, as part of the 2678th Headquarters Company, AFHQ.***

From its arrival until 30 November 1943, counterintelligence coverage was given the Division area, which at that time comprised several communes near Naples. During this period, the Detachment headquarters was located at Caivano, and the detachment commander lost no time in spelling out the role of CIC to the civil and police officials of the town. In a speech to these officials on 2 November, Captain Crystal stated, "We have come here as friends of the Italian people. We do not intend to interfere with your lives or affairs in any manner except in the suppression of Fascism and the protection of our troops

*Memo to the OIC from Agents Peter W. Princi and Harold Stevens, Subject: Interrogation of Bona, Vittorio Angelo fu: Ercole, dtd 14 Dec 43 (Conf)

**History of the 202d CIC Detachment, p. 4 (K-26) (R)

***History of the 501st CIC Detachment, page 1 (M-10) (C)

from enemy activity." But he went on to add that "any propaganda, rumor mongering or the placing of any obstacle in the way of Allied military operations will be severly dealt with."*

Near the end of November, the Detachment moved to Camigliano and set up its headquarters there. In their monthly situation summary, the Detachment reported that "The area assigned to this Detachment is quiet. A network of informants is operating smoothly."**

In this same summary they reported that, "This Detachment has received excellent cooperation from both local and regional AMG officers . . . . . .

". . . Several cases of breaking of telephone wires have been investigated. No indications of enemy activity have been discovered."

". . . The civilian pass system within the Division bivouac area is functioning."***

During their brief stay in Camigliano, an Italian Colonel, who had been a member of the Special Tribunal for trying anti-Fascists, was arrested and interned by Special Agent Keirn C. Brown. Also, one Nicola Leonardi, an important Fascist official, was arrested and confined. These preliminary arrests gave the men in the Detachment good practice for the part they would play during the Anzio landings on 22 January 1944.

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* Ltr to AC of S, G2, 1st Armored Division, from Hqs CIC Detachment, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps Activities in Caivano, Annex "A", dtd 3 Nov 43, (Conf) (KCD 6-1-7)

** Monthly situation Summary to Commanding Officer..CIC, AFHQ, dated 26 Dec 43 (Thru G-2 channels) (C)

*** Ibid

SECTION 2

FORCES REGROUPED FOR PUSH TO CASSINO

The situation in Italy during the middle of November was alternately static and fluid as the Allied forces regrouped their forces, preparing for the push through the German "Winter Line" and on to Cassino. The front line troops were constantly moving from sector to sector and the Italian terrain at times aggravated this condition.

General Eisenhower in his book, Crusade in Europe, tells a pointed story of the inconsistencies of the Italian countryside. The forward route of the 34th Division took it across the Volturno River three times, and one night when the assistant commander, Brigadier General B. F. Caffey was returning from the front, his jeep driver remarked" . . . that he simply could not understand such a 'crazy' country. Caffey asked him why he felt that way about Italy. The soldier's reply was a classic: 'Why, every durn river in the fool country is named Volturno."*

For the men of the 34th, 3rd and 45th CIC Detachments. this period just before the landings at Anzio became one of weary repetition with their main counterintelligence work the screening of loiterers and suspicious characters picked up in the Division area. Much of the work was dull but it gave needed training to the men. There was always the hope that one of these characters might turn out to be the suspect of the week, but it usually turned out to be an illiterate peasant soliciting laundry for his wife.

For about a month the Command Post of the 34th CIC Detachment was a tent perched in an olive grove on the side of a hill facing Cassino. Days were relatively calm, but the nights were one continuous artillery bombardment. During this period a large amount of combat intelligence was uncovered.

Vito Antonio Radogna was apprehended on 23 December 1943, and interrogated by Lieutenant LeMoine, French Liaison Officer with the 34th Division. The interrogation revealed that, "the Germans during the period 4 October to 17 October, forced 1200 Italian prisoners held by them in Cassino, to clear the trees and growth along the side of the ...Garigliano River, so as to give them a clear view ....they forced the Italians to dig holes for mines for both vehicular and anti-personnel types.**

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*Crusade in Europe, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Doubleday & Co., Inc, Garden City, New York, 1948, p. 203

**From CIC Detachment, 34th Inf Div., to AC of S, G-2, 34th Inf Div., Subject, "Civilian Report on Enemy Location near Cassino." (C)

Further interrogation also disclosed that the heavily wooded area nearest Cassino on the South side of the river contained numerous gun emplacements and that the Germans had an Observation Post on Monte Cassino which gave them a clear view of the entire valley. Radogna reported that while the Allies had bombed Monte Cassino many times, they had never, to his knowledge, bombed the strip of woods along the River which concealed so much German artillery.*

This material was supplemented on 30 December when Sara Lido was apprehended at a point between San Pietro and San Vittore and upon interrogation, gave the following information:

"There was a German CP in San Vittore ... a place where the townspeople used to get water has been mined...the Germans have nothing to eat, and have stolen bread and lard for sustenance...in November the Germans were fortifying a rock stronghold hill that lies between Cassino and Mt. Cassino."**

These reports were sent to the G-2 of the 34th Infantry Division and were used in the campaign to capture Cassino.

CIC Suffers First Fatality in Italy

On 5 November 1943, CIC suffered its first fatality in the Italian campaign. At approximately 1000 hours that morning, Agents Robert L. Pingley and Anthony F. Giordano of the 34th Division Detachment were driving a jeep about one mile northwest of Capriata enroute to Rocaravindola on a security assignment.

Suddenly enemy artillery shells started landing and almost immediately, their jeep was hit and overturned. Agent Pingley was thrown from the jeep and injured. Although the shelling had not stopped, he returned to help Agent Giordano, but Giordano was dead. Pingley removed Giordano's credentials, codes and personal effects and returned to the Division CP. For his gallantry and coolness under fire, Agent Pingley was awarded the Silver Star.

The 34th suffered its second death in February when the Commanding officer of the Detachment, Captain John L. Rubsam and his driver and interpreter, Joseph Musumeci, disappeared while on a mission.

These two men left the Detachment in a jeep at 0930 hours on 2 February to perform initial CIC coverage of the recently taken town of Cairo. When neither man had returned by 2400 hours, 3 February, an investigation was carried out by Agent Donald M. Funk of the Detachment.

*Ibid

**From CIC Detachment, 34th Inf Div., to AC of S, G-2, 34th Inf Div., Subject: Section Activities 29-30 December 1943 (C)

Funk learned that Captain Rubsam had stopped at the advance C. P. of the 135th Regiment on 2 February and had stated his intention of proceeding on to Cairo. Shortly thereafter, the town suffered an extremely heavy enemy bombardment; however, when Agent Funk made an extensive search of the town, no trace of the men could be found. Agent Funk searched all nearby roads over which the Captain and his driver might have travelled and finally found a tank Lieutenant who remembered talking with the Captain about some German Barracks near Cairo.

As Agent Funk reported in his casualty report to Major Spingarn, "It is the firm conviction of this Agent...that Captain Rubsam, solely in the interests of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and at great risk to himself, proceeded to the German Barracks...at which point he and Musumeci were either captured or shot by enemy patrols."*

Three months later Rubsam's body was found under a bridge near the town where he had evidently attempted to take cover from enemy fire. The body of the driver was never found.**

Two months prior to leaving for Anzio, the 34th CIC Detachment was situated just outside of Cassino in what later became known as the "Rome Corridor." The C.O. at this time was 2nd Lieutenant Leo O. Forkey who took over immediately after Captain Rubsam's disappearance. When the Division went back for rest and reorganization near Benevento, the Detachment went with it. On 26 March the detachment went to Naples and on 8 April, took the boat to Anzio.***

CIC's Problems Studied

To coordinate the operations of CIC Detachments in Italy and solve some of their individual problems, Major Edward L. Ray, Jr., Chief of the CIC, Allied Force Headquarters, made a trip to Italy in November 1943. He planned to contact each of the tactical sections from Division to Army and from them receive the overall picture of their part of the campaign.

One of Major Ray's first stops upon arrival was with the Fifth Army CIC which maintained headquarters at Caserta under Major Spingarn. He found that this section assumed security responsibility throughout the area to the rear of VI Corps and forward of the Peninsular Base Section. Security coverage was afforded towns by Army CIC teams that worked from their headquarters, an apartment in Caserta.

He also found that a sub-section of this Detachment, commanded by Lieutenant Harry L. Amerman, was billeted and messed with Fifth Army Headquarters, also in Caserta, and that this sub-section was charged

*Casualty Report to Maj S. J. Spingarn., C.O. CIC Det., Fifth Army, dtd 4 Feb 44 (C)
**History of the 34th CIC Detachment (K-1) (C)
***History of the 34th CIC Detachment Page 1 (K-1) (C)

with Army Headquarters security only, thus leaving the remainder of the Section to engage in general investigation work. Because of the work of this sub-section, Major Ray found that the Detachment enjoyed excellent relations with both Col. Howard and Major Blom, G2's (CI) of the Fifth Army.

Major Ray discussed a problem of immediate concern to both the Section and to AFHQ. This was the insufficiency of Italian speaking personnel; a problem that CIC ran up against many times during the campaign. Major Ray was cognizant of this problem because Major Spingarn had written him shortly before he left for Italy. Spingarn said, "I have at this minute received a phone call from Lieutenant Forkey who has arrived at Hq, CIC, PBS with eight agents. He tells me that only one of these men is fluent in Italian. I am frankly at my wits' end. I have absolutely no use for the men who don't speak Italian or aren't clerk-typists.....and none of the other Fifth Army CIC Sections want them either."*

The pressing demand for effective interpreters was occasionally broken, though not relieved, by humorous incidents. Captain Picard, Executive Officer of the Peninsular Base Section Detachment, received a note from an Italian citizen whose potential as a translator spoke for itself:

"I, Alfred de Gennaro, son of American Citizen, born in 1924, expose you as follows:

From four years ago I fight against Germany and Fascimo.

From four years ago I have organized any men, I have throwed messages to Italian people, I have pushed the Naples people against the Germany and Fascismo.

Now, after your arrive in Naples and as I have already given to you some information of value, I ask you of lend my work in the Allied Services.

"Moreover, I inform you what a my brother, american citizen, is officer of American Army.

With regards,

s/A. D. Gennaro"

This note underscored the difficulty that faced PBS CIC in locating civilians who were both willing and able to serve CIC in linguistic capacities at a time when investigations could be slowed down or stymied by language barriers.

*October CIC Situation Summary from AFHQ to Chief, CIC Branch, CIC, MIS, War Department, dtd 12 Nov 43, (Secret)

Major Ray found this linguistic problem to be acute with all other Sections as well, and especially with the VI Corps CIC Section where the unit had to rely entirely on attached IPW personnel for its interrogation work.* This problem was never completely solved during the campaign and was a major concern as late as April 1945, just before the final surrender.

CIC and the Division G2's

Another of the ever recurring problems faced by CIC from the landings in North Africa in 1942, until the final surrender in 1945, was uncovered by Major Ray during his visit. This problem concerned the apparent lack of interest in or knowledge of the importance of counter-intelligence work by the Division G2's.

In Italy, the CIC Sections of the 3rd and 34th Infantry Divisions were severly hampered by this lack of interest and an estimated 90 to 95 percent of their work was devoted to combat intelligence. In the CIC Section of the 3rd Division, Lieutenant Bertram Russell was directed to spend his time relaying G2 instructions to the OSS Agents with the division; seeing that they passed unmolested through the Allied lines; interviewing them on their return and preparing reports on what was learned.

As Major Ray wrote in his report, "The G2 has even asked for an additional CIC officer to help direct the infiltration of the OSS Agents."**

These unfortunate circumstances were balanced to a degree by the willingness of the G2's of the VI Corps and 45th Infantry Division, to "let the Section operate anywhere within division area and even behind where there is a CIC job to be done."***

The VI Corps especially was allowed to work freely and at its own discretion; and in this way it was able to maintain the closest liaison with division CIC sections and to be able to support them or replace them at a moment's notice.

The G2's who realized the value of CIC work were praised by Major Ray and conferences were arranged with those who did not. From these conferences, in most cases, a workable agreement was reached.

Major Ray found that little experience was available from the CIC Sections of II Corps or 1st Armored Division as they had just recently

*Memorandum to Lt Col Nichols regarding Tactical CIC Sections from AFHQ, Subj: Trip to Italy, dated 19 Nov 43 (T-57) (Conf)
**Ibid
***Ibid

arrived in Italy. Since the 36th Infantry Division had been in a rest area since ten days after the Salerno landings, little positive observation could be made.

In observing the Army, Corps, and Division CIC Sections, Major Ray gained first hand experience as to how a CIC Section was organized and the role they played in relation to their assigned Army unit. Before leaving Italy, he spent considerable time with the CIC unit at Peninsular Base Section, commanded by Major Maxwell J. Papurt.

The Organization of the CIC Unit at PBS

The mission of this Section varied quite noticeably from that of the other CIC Sections in Italy as its role dealt primarily with static counterintelligence. For this reason, it was organized into sub-sections or squads - each having a separate function. These main squads were:

Security Squad - A squad composed of three Agents who made investigations of and submitted reports on the safeguarding of military installations.

Liaison Squad - A squad composed of two Italian-speaking Agents who conducted liaison work with such Italian agencies as the Civil Police, Carabinieri, Questura, and the Directors of Prisons, and who checked their records for possible leads.

AMG Squad - A squad who worked exclusively on investigations requested by the Office of the Chief, AMG, for the district of Naples. This district included not only the city itself but also the province of Naples.

General Investigative Squad - This squad consisting of eleven agents, besides conducting the usual investigations in connection with espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and disaffection, was charged with the imprisonment, interrogation, and release of persons interned for security reasons. In the first week of its deployment, this squad began to construct a system of confidential informants drawn from various sectors of Naples and varied business, political and social levels.

Naples Port Squad - A squad of four agents who worked under the direction of the Port Intelligence Officer and whose work consisted of security checks within the Port Area, control of merchant seaman,

passenger control, investigation of Port laborers, investigations of underwater harbor defenses, and all incidents within the Port.*

Because of the proper use of these squads, Major Ray found that CIC relations with AMG and S2, PBS, were excellent. The relations with AMG were so excellent that no one was appointed to office by AMG unless cleared by CIC. "In fact," according to Major Ray's report, "Captain Picard of Major Papurt's Section is a member of a five-man board which passes on all appointments."**

Observations and Conclusions.

Major Ray's visit to Italy was extremely fruitful as far as CIC was concerned, for it gave the higher echelons some idea of the problem faced not only by the Section commanders, but by the Agent in the field as well. Perhaps for the first time, the "upstairs" was aware that morale was suffering because enlisted men who had done and were doing an excellent job, were denied promotion and that, in some Sections, an outstanding job could not be done because certain uninformed individuals would not allow CIC to be used for counterintelligence.

One very interesting observation was formed during the trip, concerning a subject that became a point for discussion every time CIC men gathered. This observation, which was brought forth by all section commanders who participated in the Salerno landings, was to the effect that CIC personnel have no place in the early waves of an amphibious assault; can accomplish no useful counterintelligence purpose at this time, and are actually in the way.

In reporting on his trip to Italy, Major Ray said, "There is simply no CIC work to be done in the midst of the heavy fighting .....it is not until after the actual battle phase is approaching its end, or is completely over, that the CIC can do its own counterintelligence mopping up."***

Subsequent CIC history has shown that these words did not carry the weight that they were intended to carry. Up until the end of the

*Report to Chief, CIC Detachment, AFHQ, from CIC Section, PBS, Subj: Activities of CIC Section, PBS, for period 7 Nov 43 to 20 Nov 43,dtd 22 Nov 43 (D-5) (Secret) and Memo to OIC from Agent Martin J. Grennan, Subject: Activities of General Investigative Squad, October 23-31 1943, dtd 9 Nov 43 (KCD7-7-123) (Confidential)
Memo to OIC from Agent Charles H. Kellogg, Subject: Activities of the Port Squad for the period 17 Oct 43 to 31 Oct 43 incl., dtd 10 Nov 43 (Conf). (KCD7-7-121)

**Memorandum to Lt Col Nichols regarding Tactical CIC Sections - from AFHQ Subj: Trip to Italy - 19 Nov 43 (T-57) 54 (C)

***Memorandum to Lt Col Nichols - Trip to Italy - T-57 (C)

war, CIC men waded ashore, parachuted in and fought their way ahead, along with the front line troops.

Major Ray's visit to Italy came at a time when counterintelligence work was largely counter-subversive and directed against post-occupational enemy agents. Salerno, Caserta and Naples had fallen and little by little, key Fascist figures were uncovered, convicted and interned, thereby removing points of support around whom subversive groups might be expected to form.

Spy Catching Proves Difficult

From the standpoint of capturing enemy agents, however, there was varying success during the early stages of the Italian campaign. This may be attributed in part to the fact that the German Intelligence Services had been so taken by surprise by the rapidity of the Allied landings that they had not established post occupational networks; nor did they send any considerable number of agents into Allied territory for some time afterwards.* In part, also, this may be attributed to the fact that CIC had not yet widely established the system of controls which later were marked with such success in disclosing agents.

Major Spingarn reported in his History of the Fifth Army CIC Detachment,".....We had not yet learned that it is the stranger rather than the local resident who is most likely to be an enemy agent, and that systems of control for screening strangers must therefore be devised and perfected."

December marked the birth of an organization which helped CIC initiate these much needed controls. Establishment of the Fifth Army Refugee Interrogation Post (RIP), under the command of Lieutenant Melio A. Tonini of the Army CIC Detachment, provided an interrogation unit that was unsurpassed in "breaking" extremely difficult suspects. Located at the Fifth Army PW Cage, its principal task was the interrogation of civilian suspects picked up by forward security units (CIC or other Allied counterintelligence units) because they had crossed into Allied territory from enemy territory. For the most part, these suspects had not as yet been identified as enemy agents by the arresting units although there was a veil of suspicion surrounding them. From its inception in December 1943 until the end of the war, RIP, under the operational direction of G2, Fifth Army, interrogated thousands of suspects and held the enviable record of securing confessions from some 40 enemy agents previously undetected and unconfessed.

*History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) page 5, (u)

Rumors and an Explosive Suitcase

The "Winter Line" stalemate nourished an unwholesome flock of rumors among the American troops. The II Corps CIC Detachment found that the most prevalent accounts dealt with the possibility of an armistice with the Germans on 15 December resulting from the Teheran conference of the Big Three Powers. When 15 December came and went without any end of conflict, the rumor died a natural death. New pieces of gossip soon sprung up in its place, and CIC agents were kept busy tracing to their source false reports of a VI Corps withdrawal.*

A flurry of excitement arose in the II Corps area on 21 January when a saboteur's suitcase replete with plastic explosives, explosive powder, detonators, time fuses, and other sabotage devices was unearthed. CIC agents Langford Baldwin, Bernard H. Golden and Harold J. Stevens who were dispatched to the scene identified the equipment as British-made, although the suitcase was of Italian manufacture. Through interrogation of civilians in the area, the agents learned that a large munitions dump had been maintained by the Germans near the place where the suitcase was found. The civilians also revealed that a group of German engineers engaged in destroying a railroad had camped at this place. Unable to develop further leads, the agents surmised that the suitcase had been buried by Germans with the intention of returning after the Allied occupation and using the equipment for sabotage purposes. But the agents did not rule out the possibility that the suitcase had been hidden by a clandestine British agent at a time when the German munitions dump was a prime sabotage target. The discovery of this suitcase was an exciting interval among the more routine investigations of alleged sabotage of telephone wires which frequently turned out to be cases of negligence on the part of truck drivers who cut the wires while turning their vehicles around.**

Liaison Brings 45th Division CIC a Plan

The fairly static situation in the winter of 1943-1944 gave CIC detachments in Italy a long-awaited opportunity to strengthen liaison with other Allied intelligence agencies.*** Contact with the Securite Militaire, a French Army counterpart of the CIC, showed agents of the 45th Division CIC an effective working plan for civilian controls. Securite Militaire agents of the 2d Moroccan Division, in cooperation with Regimental commanders cleared all civilians from the front line zone, an area that was extended from the line of battle back to the Regimental CP. Any civilians apprehended in this zone were regarded with suspicion and detained for interrogation by the Securite Militaire. A second zone was established that stretched rearward to a point well

*Ltr to Chief, AFHQ, from Hqs II Corps CIC, Subject: General Security Report, December 1943, dtd 2 Jan 44, (Conf) (KCD 1-25-176)

**Msgs to OIC from agents Bernard H. Golden, Harold J. Stevens, Langford Baldwin, dtd 24 Jan 44, (Confidential) (KCD 6-10-261)

***Rpt to Chief, CIC, War Department, Washington, D. C. from Hq 45th Division CIC, Subject: War Diary, dtd 2 Jan 44 (U) (KCD1-29-213)

behind the Division CP. Inhabitants of all towns within this area were prohibited from traveling without a written pass from the military government. Military police were authorized to stop any civilians on the roads or in the country and demand them to present their passes. If a civilian failed to produce his pass, he was immediately sent to the Securite Militaire for questioning. When interrogation revealed that the civilian was an established resident of a town within the French lines, he was taken there for identification by local officials and left by the SM on probation. But if the civilian was not properly identified or the investigation was incomplete, he was evacuated through regular IW channels. The CIC agents reported that the complete absence of civilians on the roads in the French division area strongly attested to the effectiveness of the Securite Militaire's control system.

Another important occurrence during this period of the seige on the "Winter Line," was the attachment to the Fifth Army CIC of the Italian counter-espionage organization known as Servigio Informazion Militaire SIM (CS). This unit, commanded by Major Cesare Faccio, proved itself invaluable. At first there was a natural distrust; this almost immediately disappeared when the Army CIC saw the efficiency of the Italian intelligence organization at work. Naturally the personnel of SIM(CS) could perform undercover missions much more easily since they had a knowledge of the details of the Italian national and local scene which only a native Italian could be expected to have. Due to his excellent work in commanding this unit, Major Faccio was awarded a Bronze Star Medal by General Mark Clark in November 1944.

Anzio Landing Planned to Speed Rome Advance

By mid-January the occupation of Rome seemed a forlorn and slight possibility -- at least in the near future. Although the Allied Armies were advancing, it was a step by step process with a battle at each step. On the 35 mile front, Fifth Army had forced the enemy back into his Gustav Line and reached the edge of the Liri Valley, the main corridor for the advance to Rome. Progress from this point was almost nil as the enemy defended the town of Cassino and the mountains surrounding it with his very finest troops. Something was needed.

This something had been discussed at the Christmas Day conference at Tunis. It concerned an amphibious landing at the seacoast town of Anzio, from which it was hoped a rapid advance could be made on Rome while the Germans were engaged in preventing Allied Forces from crossing the Rapido River and advancing beyond Cassino.*

On 21 January 1944, men and machines of VI Corps were loaded into landing craft, ammunition and rations were doled out, and each man received the last encouraging slap on the back and hopeful word, as the landing boats pulled out of Naples harbor and started for Anzio.

*Mark W. Clark - "Calculated Risk", pages 270-286.

Salerno and Anzio were like night and day. Where the waves of troops landing in the early morning light on the beaches at Salerno four and one-half months before had met intense resistance, the troops at Anzio landed virtually unopposed. This peaceful situation lasted for only a few days, however. While the Anzio landings were still in the planning stage, the major portion of the Fifth Army and British Eighth Army was scheduled to launch an attack on Cassino, thereby preventing the enemy from withdrawing his troops in that area and shipping them to the coast to oppose the Allied landings. This attack, launched all along the 35 mile front around Cassino, caused many casualties but also saved many lives at Anzio.

1st Armored Division CIC Hits the Anzio Beach

Regardless of Major Ray's early statements concerning the advisability of keeping CIC away from any landings until"...CIC can do its own counter-intelligence mopping up,"* the 151st CIC Detachment (later the 501st CIC) was ever present. This Detachment, which was attached to the 1st Armored Division, moved on 19 January 1944 to a staging area near Naples preparatory to going to the Anzio Beachhead. At this staging area a strict pass system was established to prevent leakage of information concerning the Division's future operations.

Major John Crystal, Commanding Officer of the Detachment, reported in a memorandum to Major Spingarn, "We boarded out LST with the rest of the Forward Echelon, Division Headquarters, on 24 January and landed in Anzio after a quiet voyage except for the inevitable air raids in Anzio harbor.

"We arrived at our bivouac area in the late afternoon and pitched camp in a magnificent forest park. A violent wind and hail storm made the first night miserable. The next few days we occupied by digging ourselves in and checking over the Division assembly area...."**

The Detachment found a complex refugee problem awaiting them. The Germans had evacuated all civilians from the towns of Anzio and Nettuno three months prior to the Allied landings, and these Italians, 12,000 strong, were crowded into the area surrounding the Division Bivouac. AMG had been operating to a limited extent before the arrival of CIC, and together they appointed overseers from the more reliable appearing civilians and gave these overseers certain elemental instructions relative to blackouts, travel, entry into camp areas, and other security problems. Major Crystal reported in his memorandum to Major Spingarn, "The usual crop of accusations were investigated and several notorious Fascists were turned over to VI Corps, CIC."***

*Memorandum to Lt Col Nichols - Trip to Italy - T-57 (C)
**Memorandum for Major Spingarn, CO, CIC Det., Fifth Army from 151st CIC Det. - 22 Feb 44. (c)
***Ibid (c)

On 29 January the three men who had comprised the Detachment during its landings on 25 January, Major Crystal, S/A John G. McDonough and the interpreter, Gino J. Mominni, moved to the PW collection point at the overpass at Campo di Carne. Three days were spent there before returning to the old bivouac area; three days in which jumping in and out of foxholes to escape the enemy artillery fire and interrogating harmless and confused characters were the main activities.

By 30 January, the 45th Division had landed on the Anzio Beachhead as part of the follow-up force to the initial invasion. Agents of the CIC Detachment concentrated on interrogating civilians in the beachhead area. Sizable lists of suspected Fascists and Fascist sympathizers were compiled from the questioning of voluntary informants in the Anzio-Nettuno vicinity. While the tactical troops fought inch by inch to secure the beachhead, the agents of the 45th CIC Detachment made certain that the enemy did not carry on espionage within the narrow strip of land held by the Allied forces.

The concentrated German counterattack which began on February 10th and which came close to pushing the Allied armies back into the sea failed to disrupt seriously the CIC operations. Up until the time they pushed forward and on up the "boot", the 1st Armored Division CIC Detachment kept at work expanding its list of informants, establishing liaison with the other detachments at Anzio, supervising security (a major problem because of the 12,000 homeless civilians) and like any of the other thousands of soldiers, trying to stay alive. Similar efforts were being carried forth by CIC units that ranged the length of the beachhead.

Anzio Called "One Continual Explosion"

Anzio, as everyone who was there agreed, was one continual explosion. The Germans introduced the "Anzio Express," a large cannon mounted on a railroad car and able to move swiftly from one sector to another; and there was the always dangerous "88". S/A Alfred A. Coppola was on the Anzio Beachhead with the 3rd Division CIC (replacing S/A Tony Panard who had been killed) when the Germans were daily bombarding the Allies.

There was little humor among the men at this time, but Coppola, in an interview, recalled one time when both humor and relief from the shelling were combined. For weeks the constant barrage had forced the men to remain in their bunkers and foxholes. The one satisfaction that the CIC men looked forward to was that Major Spingarn, the Fifth Army CIC Commander, was scheduled to arrive for an inspection tour and then "he could see what conditions they had to work under."

The day finally arrived and with it a bright warm sun that glistened in the Tyrrhenian Sea and a profound silence, unbroken by a single enemy plane or a single shell burst. When Spingarn arrived, most of the men were taking sun baths or pitching horseshoes in a setting not too different from that often seen at Hampton Beach, New Hampshire or Malibu

Beach, California. Spingarn's comment was, "So this is the living hell you were all talking about."* Many men wondered about the inconsistencies of war in the weeks that followed as they lay in their foxholes listening to the shells burst around them.

The whole of Major Spingarn's visit to the Anzio Beachhead was not graced with such favorable weather and lack of combat activity. Shelling and bombing by the Germans continued at a brisk rate, and the VI Corps CIC Detachment was forced to maintain its offices and billets underground in cellars. Before he left the beachhead, Major Spingarn gained a first hand awareness of the extreme hazards under which the CIC units were carrying out their operations.

CIC was well represented on the Anzio Beachhead for many months after the initial landings. At various periods, the CIC Detachments for the VI Corps, and the 3rd, 45th, 36th and 34th Divisions and the 1st Armored Divisions shared operations in the meagre territory claimed by the Allies.

After serving with the 36th Division for 100 days on the tactical line, Captain John G. Hammond, commanding the CIC Detachment attached to the Division, made some startling observations on the role of CIC in the beachhead battle. In the course of the 100 days' activity, the detachment had searched only one enemy headquarters, and this search was in vain; the commanding officer of the combat troops had gone through the headquarters thoroughly almost twelve hours before CIC arrived on the scene. Public utilities, enemy supply depots, and all other installations of counter intelligence value that were examined by the CIC agents totaled merely three. All had been completely demolished. This same picture was reflected wherever the agents turned since the intense fighting had left little more than a pile of rubble in the wake of the battle. As a result, ninety percent of the activity carried on by the tactical unit dealt with civilian controls, a mission generally assigned to CIC detachments at Corps level. During this period of short advances and small gains by the Allied combat forces, the 36th CIC Detachment spent almost half its time planning for coming events, and Captain Hammond summarized his report by stating that from his experience , "a CIC Detachment with a Division is not the most economical use of time and personnel."**

By the time the 34th CIC Detachment arrived, early in April, most of the civilians had been evacuated from the beachhead and the counter-intelligence work was further lightened. But problems did not vanish with the easing of the CIC workload; two major issues persisted

*Interview with Alfred A. Coppola - 134 Catherine Street, Wooster, Ohio at the Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. NCICA Convention - August 7, 8 and 9.

**Memo for the Chief, CIC, AFHQ, from Captain John G. Hammond, 36th Division CIC, dtd 20 March 1944 (CONFIDENTIAL). (KCD 7-1-17)

throughout the Anzio operation. The first was that due to the large number of CIC personnel in a relatively small area, detachments found themselves investigating each others' informants. The second concerned personal safety, as the Germans situated on the mountain tops surrounding the beachhead could look down the muzzles of their guns and observe every Allied movement. It was a disconcerting thought to realize that as though playing a game of cat and mouse, the Germans could pick the Allied movements they wished to disrupt.

The 34th CIC Detachment combined ingeniuty and hard labor for their protection. Upon their arrival at Anzio, they built three dug-outs on the right side of a wadi, halfway between Anzio and the German lines. During the whole period, no shell came within a radius of a mile from the dug-outs. The feeling of semi-security that these dug-outs lent served as an advantage and an incentive during the next month as the personnel of the Detachment handled Divisional security controls and investigations.

Throughout this period the Allied forces were unable to break out of Anzio. The Fifth Army, reinforced by the 88th and 85th Infantry Divisions which had entered the lines in March and April, still attempted to capture Cassino and still faced fanatical resistance by crack German units -- notably the 1st Parachute Division, which "General Alexander termed the best German division on any front."*

The Round-Up of Enemy Agents Begins

Counterintelligence during this period of intense fighting was undergoing a decided and dramatic change. From the earliest landings at Salerno, CIC had excelled at such varied phases as affording town security and setting up civilian road blocks; however, because no enemy agents of any magnitude had been captured, there was still a question in the minds of some of the older intelligence outfits whether CIC was really a mature and capable counterintelligence agency.

In March and April 1944, the 88th CIC Detachment under the command of 1st Lieutenant Harry W. Riback answered the question and established a reputation for CIC as a top-flight counterintelligence organization.

The 88th CIC Detachment had moved into Italy in cary March 1944 and, as their first assignment, took over the sector held by the British 5th Division. Responsibility for 15 miles of coastline, plus rear and front line security, fell into the Detachment's lap. A system of soldier-manned Observation Posts along the coast was immediately set up, and patrols of soldiers on foot were arranged for inter-communication of OP's during the hours of darkness. The interior roads around the town of Mondragone were patrolled by a small force of Finance guards, SIM personnel and Carabinieri.

*Marshall, G. C., "War Report" - J. B. Lippincott Co. page 170

These security arrangements were established just in time. Within a few days, large numbers of civilians began arriving by boat from the town of Gaeta, then under enemy control. Among these civilians were the first bona-fide German espionage agents.

The initial group of seven agents landed on a stretch of coastline not yet patrolled by security forces on the morning of March 8, carrying handbags and other luggage including three complete radio transmitting sets. The Detachment first learned of their arrival when one of their number was stopped as a suspicious looking person by the Finance Guards on one of the inland roads around Mondragone. Taken immediately to the CIC office, he admitted under interrogation that he had been sent from Rome to carry out a specific espionage mission in Naples.

From this questioning it was possible to learn the anticipated movements of his six companions who were still at large. Four had escaped the area but within an hour were apprehended. The entire force of CIC agents, Carabinieri and Finance Guards were dispersed throughout the town of Mondragone and within a short time flushed the remaining two agents from their hiding place.

The capture of these agents revealed two additional radio sets and interrogation produced the exact codes, key frequencies and specific missions assigned as well as dates for transmitting the uncovered information to the German authorities. About $15,000 in Allied currency was found on the men.

During the eight week period in which the 88th CIC Detachment was active in this sector, more than 600 civilians who had escaped from German-held Gaeta were received and processed. These refugees came in large numbers along the coastline of the gulf of Gaeta by row boats, and CIC agents exercised great care in screening the civilians, probing their statements in order to turn up "cover stories" of enemy espionage agents. CIC thoroughness paid dividends to the very end of the operation. Just before relinquishing the Mondragone sector, the 88th CIC Detachment received a final group of refugees for screening. Lookouts posted along the sea coast had spotted a boat coming from the Gaeta area. As the boat neared to within 1400 yards of the land, it was caught and held in an offshore current. Two American soldiers set out to intercept the refugee craft in a rowboat, and led it to shore. Once the refugees had landed safely, they were taken directly to the Caserma in Mondragone where the 88th CIC Detachment had established its headquarters. Preliminary questioning revealed that of the 16 refugees apprehended, 12 were natives of Gaeta. The remaing four were labeled as strangers and immediately separated from the main body of refugees. A thorough search of the four men revealed about $5,000 in Allied currency. Suspicion increased when the interrogation of the Gaeta civilians disclosed that the four strangers had thrown two large haversacks and one package into the sea when the American patrol set out from shore. Agents from II Corps CIC arrived at Mondragone in short

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order to begin the interrogation of the suspects. Without cross questioning, the first suspect handled by the CIC agents revealed that he was a spy, trained at the German intelligence school in Florence and dispatched with the other three men on an espionage mission. All four agents had been assigned to different cities in Allied-held Italy where they were to transmit and receive radio messages and serve as contacts for German-stay-behind agents.*

These agents, along with the seven previously captured and a pair of short-range spies who had attempted to penetrate Allied forward lines, were the principal figures in this organized enemy effort to accomplish espionage missions in Allied territory. The experience at Mondragone taught CIC agents that the guise of a refugee was a likely cover for an enemy agent; from this time until the end of hostilities, refugee control took on an added importance that was justified many times.

This stay in Mondragone was also valuable for another reason as it gave an air of maturity to CIC and established the organization in the eyes of the other intelligence agencies. General Malcolm Smith of the British SCI personally commended the men of the 88th CIC for the action and said that at last CIC had proved itself a major intelligence organization.**

*Ltr to AC of S, G2, Fifth Army, from Hq II Corps CIC, Subject: Preliminary Facts Concerning Apprehension and Interrogation of Four Enemy Agents, dtd 8 April 1944 (Secret) (KCD 6-10-260)

**Interview with Harry W. Riback - NCICA Convention - Hotel Warwick, Philadelphia, Pa. - Aug 7, 8, 9

SECTION 3

ALLIES CAPTURE ROME AND DRIVE NORTH

The race to Rome began on 11 May 1944 when the US Fifth and the British Eighth Armies launched a coordinated offensive. Twelve days later, the VI Corps, under Major General L. K. Truscott, struck out from Anzio with the 3rd, 34th and 45th Divisions, the 1st Armored, 1st Special Service Force, 100th Nisei Infantry Battalion, and two British Divisions. A junction of the forces occurred on 25 May and ten days later the Italian capital fell to the Fifth Army, just two days before the Allied forces began the invasion of France.

CIC units in Italy had been primed throughout the long winter months for the drive to Rome. The Fifth Army CIC Detachment, under the command of Major Spingarn, had moved forward with each Army advance. Beginning in April, a system of control started to emerge by which civil movement was given complete coverage. Besides the strengthening of Carabinieri road blocks and coastwatching posts, new controls were initiated. Persons registering at hotels or boarding houses were subjected to security scrutiny as were persons obtaining new identity or ration cards. Spot checks were frequent and roving patrols of CIC personnel often supplemented the stationary Carabinieri check-posts along the highways.

During the push to Rome, a CIC administrative development of major importance occurred with the issuing of a new T/O & E for CIC. Fifth Army CIC was reorganized into three separate Provisional detachments with Major Spingarn in command of one and Lieutenants Melio A. Tonini and Harry Lee Amerman in charge of the other two. Spingarn, as senior Detachment Commander, exercised operational and administrative supervision over all three units. Although this new set-up was bulky and cumbersome (and was later remedied), it was a blessing in that it provided commission vacancies and opportunities for grade promotions that had long been neglected.

On 24 May, the bulk of the 305th CIC Detachment arrived at a concentration area near Naples, leaving behind only a skeleton force to cover the Army area. In Naples, the CIC agents joined a group of about 1,000 persons who had been drawn from nearly all the Allied intelligence, counterintelligence and related agencies. This group was designated as the Rome "S" Force, and its initial mission was to enter the city with the first troops in order to provide immediate intelligence and counterintelligence exploitation of personality and building targets. All of the "S" Force security personnel, British and American, were placed under Fifth Army CIC direction. At the end of May, this Force was moved by boat to Anzio where it was divided into sub-Task forces alerted to cover different sectors of Rome as soon as they entered.

While plans for the "S" Force were being drafted, the combat divisions pressed forward. Since the earliest landings at Salerno, the major goal

had been the Eternal City; the question was, who was going to enter first? The Texas rancher with the 85th Division and the Maine fisherman with the 88th, both knew the history of the City and to them as to all the weather-beaten, front line soldiers, it held the promise of untold pleasure. The CIC detachments serving with these divisions were faced with the problem of instituting security measures on the run. By restoring some semblance of order to the areas and towns captured and left behind in the forward sweep, the CIC units fulfilled their missions during these days of acceleration.

The 88th Division CIC under the command of 1st Lieutenant Harry W. Riback took the lead toward the final stretch in the dash to Rome. On 2 June, the detachment moved to Anzio, by 3 June it had worked up the coast line as far as Artena, and early in the morning of 4 June, it arrived in Breda. A few hours later, Lt Riback received orders from G2 to send one CIC team with an armored striking column, composed chiefly of troops from the 1st Battalion of the 350th Infantry Regiment. This column hastened into Rome on a secondary road to the east of strong enemy entrenchments on the main highway. By 2000 hours on the evening of 4 June, this force had swept through the environs of the city and penetrated to the heart of Rome. Among the leading vehicles in the entering column was the jeep carrying the CIC team, the first Agents to arrive in the Eternal City.* Several hours later, the Rome "S" Force, accompanying the leading elements of the Allied Armies moved into the city and began it operations**.

The "S" Force Missions.

Among the many missions performed by CIC personnel with the "S" Force during the 10 days or so of its operational existence in Rome were the arrest of some enemy agents and numerous suspects, the securing of valuable documents and technical material and the maintenance of a screening and interrogation compound and a detention center.*** On 17 June 1944, Fifth Army left the "S" Force and moved to Tuscania, where the Army CP was located, to resume its normal functions.

For its part in the Rome "S" Force, CIC received a letter of commendation from Colonel George S. Smith, Commander: "I add my commendation for the superior performance of duty by the CIC attached to "S" Force in spite of many difficult circumstances which had to be overcome. Individually and collectively the work of C.I.C. contributed greatly to the success of the command."****

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*Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, from Hq 88th Division CIC, Subject: Correction of Report, dtd 17 July 1944 (Secret) (KCD 7-2-10)
**History of the 305th CIC Detachment - (L-1) p. 8 (U)
***Ltr to AC of S, Ge (CI) Fifth Army from CIC Fifth Army, dtd 25 July 1944 (Conf)
****Subj: Commendation, TO: CO, CIC Det. V Army, dtd. 14 July 44 (c)

CIC also received commendations from the various sub-task Force commanders. One of these, Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Pumpelly, Commanding "D" Group said, "The C.I.C. was excellent. The men were everywhere, into everything, and provided most of the reliable data coming into my headquarters."*

While the Fifth Army CIC Detachment was participating in the "S" Force attack on Rome, Division and Corps Detachments were on the outskirts of the city with their respective units. Perhaps a greater appreciation of the capture was felt by these men as they had watched the preliminary battles at first hand. Never far behind the front lines, these Divisional Detachments entertained a comradeship with the men of their division, knew and sympathized with their problems and extended themselves to provide security for Divisional rear areas. The knowledge that there were no Germans to their rear spurred the Divisions forward and hastened the capture of Rome.

The 85th CIC Detachment, under the command of 1st Lieutenant Maurice M. Morton, was one of these Divisional Detachments in the march to Rome. The Detachment had landed at Naples on 27 March and went into action on 10 April at Cellole. Its area included ten miles of open coastline south of Minturno which proved to be a favorite place for refugees attempting to land by boat from Gaeta. In one three-day period, more than 90 refugees were apprehended and questioned by the Detachment, revealing persons of both counterintelligence and tactical value.

When the entire Italian front began moving forward on 11 May 1944, the 85th CIC Detachment moved with it and setup headquarters at Minturno. In conjunction with the CIC Detachments from the 88th Division and II Corps, it screened the countless refugees streaming down from the hills and apprehended many enemy soldiers attempting to escape in civilian clothing.

Following the rapid and successful advance of the Division, the Detachment performed similar work in the towns of Scauri, Formia, Gaeta, Fondi, Terracina, Monte San Biago, Sonnino, and Sabaudia. Agents of the Detachment entered each town and began setting up road blocks and screening refugees to determine those of a suspicious nature. Many escaping German soldiers were apprehended, and in one instance, a large group of Fascist terrorists and fanatics was uncovered, and its leaders arrested.**

Rapid Advance Meant Rapid CIC Operations

Due to the rapidity of the advance, it was often necessary for the Agents to cover as many as three towns in one day, a fact which made

*Subj: Commendation, TO: CO, CIC Det. V Army, dtd. 14 July 44 (c)
**History of the 85th CIC Detachment (K-14) page 4 (c)

it extremely difficult to determine the extent of any Fascist movement in a given locality. However, through the use of Allied sympathizers plus information previously gathered concerning the area, it was possible to establish a temporary government to be expanded by higher echelons of CIC and AMG at a later date.

This activity was intensively continued as the troops moved nearer Rome, and with its capture, an advance team from the 85th CIC Detachment entered the city in the early morning of 6 June 1944. Pausing briefly with the Division, the Detachment participated in the chase that ensued because of the hasty retreat of the enemy north of Rome.

In the first days after the fall of Rome, members of the CIC Detachment of the 85th Division often found themselves in the position of a small dog nipping at the heels of a thoroughly frightened but much larger dog. In one instance the Detachment found itself 42 miles ahead of the Division Command Post and three miles north of the nearest Divisional troops, which had been ordered to stand fast because of the movement of British troops across the front of the Division Sector. In many instances during those days of progress amid confusion, CIC personnel found that they were the only Allied soldiers to have entered a town since the flight of the Germans, only hours before.

Having participated in the advance well past Rome, the Division was ordered into a rest area near Rome, and on 10 June 1944, CIC Headquarters was established at Ostia Antica.

II Corps CIC Follows the Leaders

Following up the work of the 85th CIC during the race to Rome were the agents of II Corps CIC. The advance of divisional units was so rapid that the measures instituted by the tactical CIC detachments were provisional at best. In the city of Formia, II Corps agents established headquarters in an abandoned apartment and then contacted the 85th Division detachment which was still in town. Failing to receive any information from this detachment, the agents began to install road blocks, utilizing local Carabinieri, at each end of the city. The office of the Podesta was contacted as the first step in forming a list of all persons still in the vicinity. Leading anti-Fascists in Formia provided agents with denunciations of enemy sympathizers, many whom were still lodged in official positions. But the II Corps agents could not remain in Formia long enough to develop all the material submitted by informants, and much work had to be left for the next CIC detachment to enter the town. This transfer of investigations from detachment to detachment was not a wholly satisfactory procedure; but the speed of advance by tactical troops gave the CIC units little choice in the matter.*

*Ltr to Commanding Officer, 6780th CIC Detachment, Subject: CIC Coverage of Formia, Italy between 22 May and 24 May 1944 inclusive, dtd 24 May 44, (Conf) (KCD 6-10-257)

A Period of Reassignments

With the capture of Rome, Allied hopes were high for the shortening of hostilities. The German Army was retreating to the North and the Allied Army was close behind. As General Mark Clark claimed, "The Fifth Army.....had at last become a tremendous fighting machine and its horizons were unlimited."* In the excitement that surrounded this victory, no one surmised that it would be almost a year before the war ended.

The month of June brought many changes to the CIC Detachments in Italy. IV Corps CIC under the new command of Captain John C. Crystal, formerly Commanding Officer of the 501st CIC, replaced VI Corps CIC on the line. VI Corps after its masterful work at Anzio and later at Rome was ordered to Naples with the CIC Detachments of the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Divisions to prepare for the August 1944 attack on Southern France.

The withdrawal of these Division CIC units from the line caused a marked change in the security problem facing the agents. Interrogation of escapees from German PW camps had revealed evidence that American soldiers were carrying to the front lines letters, diaries and other personal documents that could be utilized by the Germans for intelligence purposes. The CIC agents recognized the fact that the rapid influx of replacements in a combat situation made thorough security indoctrination virtually impossible, but they also noted that previous training of tactical troops in counterintelligence measures had been highly inadequate. As a result, the CIC Detachment gave first priority to the security indoctrination program after the 45th Division had been established in the Naples training area.

Activities of the 45th Divisions CIC Detachment occasionally strayed from the stated mission of the CIC during this period of static duty. Reports were received from the Carabinieri station in Battipaglia about soldier-civilian incidents in the town. Cases of intoxicated soldiers assaulting civilians, searching for girls, looting houses, and robbing townspeople all were referred to the detachment. These reports were passed on through channels to the G2 as CIC tried to concentrate on its security role.

The 36th Division CIC also found a large security mission facing them during their stay in the staging area. Reports that the division had just returned from Rome and was engaged in amphibious training for an assault on the coast of southern France filtered out to the civilians in the area. The prostitutes, peddlers and other vagrants who wandered about the Division territory represented a serious security hazard which led the CIC agents to recommend the barring of all civilians from military installations and training sites.

*Clark, Mark W., Calculated Risk p. 360

Loose Talk Threatens Security

In July a host of rumors circulated among the troops of the Seventh Army stationed in the Naples region. The soldiers realized that the invasion of Sourthern France for which they were training could not be far off. Every night during the week of July 14-10, Special Agents Robert G. Caldwell and George A. Lefebvre of the Seventh Army CIC Detachment made the rounds of the Officers' Clubs in Naples to gather stray information. From the talk they overheard, the agents compiled the following summary:

"1. Composition of Task Force: The 3rd, 45th, and 36th Divisions are now engaged in amphibious training on the beaches near Naples and the French Foreign Legion troops recently arrived by LCI boats from North Africa to take part in the coming operation with the above divisions of the Seventh Army.....

2. Target Area: Southern France is the most current rumor among nurses who apparently learn a good deal of information from their dates with officers and from patients.

3. D-Day: Speculation on the landing centers around what is considered the normal period of the refresher course in amphibious training now being taken by the 3rd Division. About three weeks is said to be used for this training and embarkation supposedly takes place shortly thereafter." Picked up by unfriendly ears, these speculations could have formed the prelude to disaster, and CIC was emphatic in its recommendation to G2 for wide security instruction of all the units engaged in training.*

A New CIC Detachment Joins the Northward Drive

Shortly after the fall of Rome, the 91st CIC Detachment, under command of 1st Lieutenant William M. Dennis, arrived and joined the Fifth Army. This Detachment, along with the detachments of the 85th and 88th Divisions formed a counterintelligence groundwork for the push northward.

Target reduction in small towns in the provinces of Rome, Viterbo and Grosseto continued during the month of June. Agent deployment in the town of Grosseto was typical of the standard operating procedure of the 36th Division Detachment in the days before it was withdrawn to Naples. Two operational teams designated as "A" and "B" composed of two agents each, approached the town simultaneously. Intelligence reports warned that a stretch of several hundred yards on the usable approach to the town was under direct enemy observation and artillery fire. Driving their jeep slowly along the dirt road, the agents were able to proceed without raising clouds of dust that would have pinpointed

*Memo for OIC from Agents Robert G. Caldwell and George A. Lefebvre, dtd 18 July 44 (Secret) (CIC [illegible]-269)

their movements in the German field glasses. They passed the forward Regimental CP and reached the Battalion CP where they were briefed on the local situation by the Battalion Commander. The agents decided to make a quick dash over the last leg of the road into town. A lull in the enemy artillery barrage provided the required break, and the two jeeps sped into Grosseto. Once in the town, the two teams split up immediately. Team "A" went directly to the local Municipio where the agents discovered that control of the town was in the hands of the pro-Allied Committee of Liberation and this regime had the active support of local Partisan leaders. A conference with the Committee members and Partisans was called and the agents explicitly outlined CIC objectives and intentions to the assembled officials.

Meanwhile, Team "B" undertook its mission of locating and searching all former enemy CP's in the vicinity. Main German headquarters had been situated in the Hotel Bastiani where the agents found numerous documents and considerable pieces of equipment scattered about in complete havoc. The search was conducted slowly and methodically, since the possibility of booby traps was a constant danger. After completing their coverage of the hotel, Team "B" moved on to other targets. At the edge of Grosseto, they uncovered the central switchboard for the abondoned German telephone system in the area buried in a deep bombproof shelter. Documents at this communications center indicated the location of subordinate CP's and the agents extended their search to these places. When the agents had completed their investigations of these former military installations they had filled a large box with documents to be forwarded to the G2.

The next mission of Team "B" was to insure the suspension of all civil communications by telephone and telegraph. The local bank and post office were ordered closed and all mail was impounded for censorship. By the end of the first day's activities, a temporary local government had been established by the AMG consisting of local officials approved pending further investigation by the CIC teams.

On the following day, the agent teams investigated and interrogated political prisoners apprehended by the Partisan group. Among these prisoners, they discovered Republican Fascists, German collaborators and German, Polish and Russian soldiers. After completing the preliminary investigations, the Division CIC agents were reinforced by Corps agents who eventually assumed charge as the 36th Division moved on to other towns.*

II Corps CIC is Lauded

The CIC accomplishments during the drive on Rome, while in the Eternal City, and during these post-Rome operations did not pass unnoticed. On 20 June, II Corps CIC received a commendation from II

*36th Division CIC, Monthly Security Annex, dtd 10 July 1944 (Conf) (KCD 1-25-175)

Corps Commander, Major General Geoffrey Keyes, that typified the feelings of commanders to the work of CIC during this period. It read:

> "I hereby commend you and your men for the quiet, efficient and thorough manner in which you carried out counter-intelligence activities within II Corps. Particularly gratifying was the competent manner in which you and your men trained and coordinated the CIC Detachments of our new division. "I am in receipt of a recent letter from the Allied Armies in Italy that points out how effective the Allied security measures have been and consequently how little the enemy knew of our actual strength prior to our attack on 11 May. The nature of the duties of the CIC is such that most military personnel know little of their activities. I realize however, that a good share of the credit for the effective security of the Corps belongs to you and the other members of your detachment. "Please convey my congratulations to all your men and express to them my confidence in their ability to continue their excellent work."*

These were warm words of praise for Lieutenant Crosby Lewis and his agents, but the II Corps CIC record showed that they were warmly deserved.

PBS Issues a Timely Political Report

Back at Peninsular Base Section, a report on the political parties in Italy was drafted at the end of June by Special Agent Wendell C. Gordon. This report was designed for dissemination to CIC Detachments operating in the Italian Campaign as an aid to individual agents in evaluating the political views of their subjects. A complete listing and description of parties ranging from the ultra-conservative Partito Fascista Republicana to the radical Partito Communist Party "is sincerely assisting the Allies in order to finish the war as soon as possible." But he went on to warn that "once the war is over, there may be violent disturbances involving perhaps street fighting between the Communists and Socialists on the one hand and the Demo-Cristiano and monarchist parties on the other." Measured in the light of future history, Agent Gordon's observations and predictions proved amazingly accurate. This political reporting was an important phase of the PBS detachment activities in keeping the other CIC detachments informed of the "big picture" which faced Allied forces in the occupation of Italy.**

Fifth Army CIC Detachments on the Move Again

The Allied advance northward from Rome was rapid, and CIC detachments kept pace with the daily progress. On 19 July, the bulk of the Fifth Army CIC entered Leghorn (Livorno) with the 100th Battalion, the

*History of the 202nd CIC Detachment (K-26) p. 6. (Restricted)
**Memo for the OIC from Special Agent Wendell C. Gordon, Subject: Political Parties, dtd 4 July 43, (Conf) (KCD 6-6-79)

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famous Japanese-American Battalion. These CIC personnel were part of an "S" Force with a mission duplicating that assigned the Rome "S" Force. Because of the difference in the size of the two cities, the Leghorn "S" Force was smaller although compact and completely staffed.

As a source of counterintelligence information, Leghorn was a dismal failure. The town was a virtual ghost city, largely evacuated and heavily mined by the retreating Germans. Leaving a sub-detachment behind to handle the security of Leghorn until PBS could assume control, Fifth Army CIC moved briefly back to Grosseto and in August to Rosignano Solvey.

During the middle of August, another administrative re-organization took place. The three Detachments which comprised Fifth Army CIC were inactivated and a new Detachment, the 305th CIC Detachment, was activated. All personnel and equipment were transferred to this new Detachment and Major Spingarn was placed in command. Like its predecessors, the 305th CIC Detachment was assigned to Headquarters MTOUSA and attached to Headquarters Fifth Army.*

A temporary re-organization also was effected in the IV Corps CIC detachment. A small sub-section of the Detachment was formed during the summer of 1944 to provide security for the command headquarters of the 45th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade. This Brigade had been moved on line to discharge the role of an Infantry division since there was a limited need for anti-aircraft artillery during the Italian campaign. The decision to attach the CIC sub-section to the Brigade was based on the fact that the Brigade had no security unit of its own. Although the front line sector assigned to the Brigade was not a main axis of attack, the counterintelligence duties were heavy, the lines of least combat activity proving to be main channels for the flow of clandestine enemy intelligence agents.

Brigadier General P.W. Rutledge, the commander of the AAA Brigade, was emphatic in his praise for the manner in which the agents evacuated thousands of civilians from the forward areas, after screening them for possible enemy saboteurs. In his letter of commendation for the work accomplished by the CIC men, General Rutledge concluded by stating that "the splendid work and cooperative spirit of the CIC Detachment has earned for them the respect and confidence of all members of my command."**

Early in September, Fifth Army CIC sub-detachments entered Pisa and later Lucca with the assault troops which took these cities. Neither town was considered large enough for a regular "S" Force but Army CIC undertook the same functions as an "S" Force in addition to providing regular security coverage of the area.

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*History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1). P. 9

**Ltr to Commanding General IV Corps from Brigadier General P.W. Rutledge; Subject: Commendation, dtd 23 Sep 44, (Confidential) (KCD 7-3-34)

Divisional and Corps CIC detachment operations in the month of September centered largely about town surveys as agents methodically installed security measures in the villages and communes of the province of Pisa. In the search for local Fascists, one pattern began to unfold as the agents moved from town to town; the Fascists were tagging along with the German retreat to the North. Afraid of capture by Allied Armies or reprisals by their own townspeople, former leaders and their underlings found refuge only in continual flight.

Section 4

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE IS THWARTED

The Allied advance which forged across the Arno River and into the towns of Pisa and Lucca, met the first concentrated German resistance in September. By that time the Allies were going up against the Gothic Line defenses, hidden high in the Apennines and almost 20 miles north of the Arno. Throughout September and the early part of October, short gains were made each day until portions of the Allied Army were a scant five miles from the coveted Po Valley.

General Clark in his book Calculated Risk said, "It is difficult now to explain the agonizing hope we then felt that 'just another mile' or 'just a few miles' would do the job."*

Unfortunately these "few more miles" did not come into Allied hands for six months.

The offensive did not stop with any definite setback or on any specific date. It merely ground slowly to a halt because men could not fight any longer against the weather and steadily increasing enemy reinforcements. Considering these hardships, General Clark ordered the men to "dig in" and, in his book, says, "I had to face my most difficult decision of the war: we could not get into the Po Valley before winter."**

Fifth Army had now reached what was to be its winter line and a new counterintelligence era began. From Salerno to Rome, CIC had been handicapped in attaining the goal of all operational counterintelligence agencies -- the capture of enemy agents -- partly due to inexperience in tactical procedures and partly by an actual lack of activity on the part of the German espionage and sabotage services.

Rome had offered the first opportunity to capture enemy agents; however, it was described as somewhat like shooting fish in a barrel as most of the agents apprehended had every intention of surrendering. The subsequent drive to the Arno had been too rapid to permit effective counterintelligence. The net result was that there was a great dearth of information regarding the German Intelligence services in Italy, their units and personalities, agents and recruiters, and methods and techniques.

*Clark, Mark W., Calculated Risk, page 398
**Ibid, page 402

The Mass Assault

In October 1944, there began a mass assault of German espionage and sabotage agents on the Allied lines which was perhaps unequaled in the history of the war.* Some of these were parachuted in and some landed by boat, but the overwhelming majority were line crossers. In addition, there were a number of post-occupational agents in cities and towns captured by Allied troops.

Fortunately, by the time this mass assault began, CIC had learned the importance of a control system. The road blocks and roving patrols, by now second nature to all CIC personnel, were again put into effect and extensively used until some of the more effective systems were devised. There was a constant need for keeping all troops informed about the danger represented by German and Italian agents passing through Allied lines and circulating throughout Allied occupied territory. In November 1944 a memorandum issued to all units of the 91st Division paid tribute to the work of the CIC, at the same time indicating that the responsibility for covering the front and actually picking up suspects lay with the forward elements and each individual soldier. Troops were advised to pay attention to the dress and appearance of all civilians in forward areas, to be skeptical of the statements made by these civilians, and to place in custody anyone not bearing a pass authenticated by the AMG officer. The crux of the message was contained in a paragraph that could serve as a capsule summary of the lessons learned by the CIC agents in Italy:

> "Be wary of everyone in your area. Remember this is not Brooklyn, or Topeka, or Oakland, but a foreign country where espionage, intrigue and deception are ingrained in the people and where it is looked upon as another way of earning a living."**

The six months from October 1944 to April 1945 will be remembered as one of the most productive periods in the history of CIC. A total of almost 200 trained enemy espionage and sabotage agents were captured in all Fifth Army areas, an average of over one a day. Almost three fourths of these were caught by the various CIC detachments under Fifth Army, although for a large portion of the whole period, CIC represented less than half of the operational counterintelligence personnel under Fifth Army.***

The effectiveness of CIC work during that period was realized in 1945 during the interrogation of "Dr. Kora," the German officer in

*History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) page 9 (U)
**Hq 91st Infantry Division, Memorandum, dtd 22 Nov 44 (C) (KCD 7-6-61)
***History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) page 10 (U)

charge of Abwehr Kommando 190, which ran large numbers of espionage agents into Fifth Army area, principally from Milan. Dr. Kora related that not a single one of his agents had returned between October 1944 and January 1945.*

This success was the result of coordinated action and cooperation, not only by Corps, Division and Army CIC, but also by British and Dominion FSS and Brazilian CIC personnel. Of the agents captured by US Detachments, however, the great majority were caught by either the 92d Division CIC, IV Corps CIC or Fifth Army CIC.

This was true of the apex of the concentrated enemy agent assault centered on the thinly-held areas assigned the 92nd Division and IV Corps. The excellent controls set-up by the CIC Detachments with these units led to the capture of a great many of these agents. Those who filtered through were frequently caught by the Army CIC either en route to or from their missions. In addition, the Army CIC was able to ferret out a number of post-occupational espionage agents in the towns directly behind the front lines.

Formation of a New Detachment

In contrast to the majority of Divisions then in Italy, the 92d Division arrived minus a CIC Detachment. This necessitated the handling of Divisional counterintelligence problems by segments of IV Corps CIC. In mid-October 1944, AFHQ decided that IV Corps CIC had too many other commitments and therefore decided to form the 92d Division CIC Detachment.

Special Agent Ramon Arrizabalaga, Jr., newly commissioned by Fifth Army, was chosen to command this Detachment. On 21 October he arrived at Viareggio where the Division had already settled down in a static situation. Excellent groundwork had been laid by IV Corps CIC personnel, enabling Arrizabalaga to start his counterintelligence work immediately.

The new Commanding Officer did not have long to wait before action began. On the day after his arrival at Viareggio, a suspect by the name of Santo Santagati was picked up by a British unit and turned over to the 92d PW Cage. After intensive interrogation, Santagati confessed to being an Agent of the Germans, recruited in Sicily. Before he was apprehended, he had reported to his contact at Pisa and had received instructions regarding his mission.

On the night of 26 October, Marino and Arrizabalaga, together with CIC men from IV Corps and Fifth Army, proceeded to Pisa where, after

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*History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) page 9 (U)

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breaking down the doors of two houses on false leads, they finally apprehended Marcello Bicchierini, who confessed a month later in Florence to being the German stay-behind agent whom Santagati had been sent to contact.*

Soon after arriving, Arrizabalaga became cognizant of the refugee problem that lay ahead. A problem was imminent as the part of the line held by the Division was greater in width than that held by II Corps. Because of the static situation and the thinness of Division troops, it quickly became the route through the lines for the majority of Northern refugees who wished to go South.

Through the cooperation of Colonel MacWillie, the Division G2, an educational program was started with frontline troops in an attempt to teach them that every civilian who crossed the lines was a potential enemy agent and should be shipped back to the Division PW Cage.

Figures bear testimony to the success of this program. From 25 October until 25 November, approximately 2,750 people were channelled from the frontlines to the PW Cage where they were screened by CIC. In addition, the Division had decided that 10 towns near the front should be evacuated, which necessitated the screening of an additional 2,000 people.

In a civilian nocturnal movement survey during the week ending 25 November 1944, an additional 1,414 persons were detained, making the astounding total of 6,160 persons screened from 25 October to 30 November.**

A Case of Misunderstanding

Throughout these busy days, the 92d CIC Detachment existed in name only; no official authorization had been received from the War Department formally activating the unit, and the personnel of this Detachment were technically on "detached service" from other CIC units. The explanation for this apparent oversight rested in an exchange of cables between AFHQ and the War Department. On 23 October, AFHQ had requested the allotment of personnel to form a CIC detachment for the 92d Division. The War Department reply indicated that approval would not be granted for a detachment composed of white personnel to serve with the colored division. Favorable consideration to the request would be given providing colored personnel already in the theater were utilized. What AFHQ had failed to convince the War Department was the fact that the CIC mission in Italy could not be

*History of the 92nd CIC Detachment (K-17) page 2 (S)
**Ibid, page 2 and 3

adequately performed by Negro CIC personnel: refugee control, interrogation of civilians, and other counterintelligence duties required agents who could be inconspicuous in the civilian groups among which they moved. The actual work performed with the Division did not demand colored personnel, and there never was any question about a CIC agent going undercover with the Division. To allow the detachment operating with the 92d Division to be removed because of the administrative wrangling would have been foolhardy, and AFHQ chose rather to allot the unit full detachment prerogatives, rights and responsibilities without official detachment designation.*

92d CIC Blocks the Mt Altissimo Pass

Soon after taking over their area, the 92d CIC Detachment had established contact with AMG for the use of Carabinieri to staff the road blocks in the locale. Approximately 38 such road blocks were set up, manned by a force of 250 Carabinieri. Additional personnel came from the MP's of the Division who helped maintain certain posts for 24 hour periods.**

In January, CIC made initial contact with the Partisans in the area. From interrogation of refugees it was learned that 90 percent crossed at the Mt Altissimo pass and filtered down into the Valley. The path these refugees inevitably followed was also the "spy trail" for enemy agents. After a survey of the situation in conjunction with OSS, it was determined that road blocks could be set up in enemy occupied territory (EOT) at the head of this trail, which at that time was controlled by Partisans.

The Partisan leader, "Pietro," was called through the lines and a plan was formulated whereby anyone coming down the trail would be held up by Partisans until there was a group of 25 or 30 people. Each person's name would then be taken from his identity card and the list given to a Partisan guide who would lead the group through the lines. The groups would then be given to OSS Partisans in Allied Occupied Territory (AOT) who would in turn give them to front line elements of the Division who would pass them on to the CIC Detention Cage at Viareggio.

This plan was very successful until the Germans learned of it and began sending their agents over another trail which ran down Mt Carchio; and eventually the Detachment had to establish an infantry road block at the bottom of the mountain.

*Hq, CIC, AFHQ, Ltr to AC of S, G2, AFHQ, Subject: CIC Detachment for the 92d Inf Div, dtd 22 Nov 44, (C) (KCD 6-1-62)
**History of the 92nd CIC Detachment (K-17) page 3 (S)

The "Patterns Report"

During the latter months of 1944, the 305th CIC Detachment, under Spingarn, instituted a device which contributed to a large degree in the capturing of German Agents. This device was called a "Patterns Report" and involved collating and summarizing all the information obtained from captured enemy Agents which might throw light on the identification of other unknown Agents. It was in brief an attempt to determine what an average enemy Agent would look like and how he would act.

This included such items as what clothes and shoes he might wear; what pocket accessories, what documents and food he might carry; what his personal, educational and military background might be; what cover stories he might tell; how he might be expected to conduct himself under interrogation; and what identification devices he might have.*

Such a report was impossible to produce prior to the November 1944 mass onslaught as any report composed on the basis of a few captures would be of doubtful value. After November, however, when 50 Agents were apprehended in Fifth Army areas, such conclusions had real value. The Germans who were customarily systematic were likely to follow the same patterns in recruiting, indoctrinating and equipping Agents, who were likely to wear the same or similar types of clothes, tell similar cover stories and have similar documents and identification devices.**

Pardini Wears a Brown Suit

In January 1945, this descriptive record from Fifth Army CIC led to the capture of an important German Agent by the 92d CIC Detachment. The record had been received on 10 January, describing a suit material which was furnished by the Germans to certain of their agents as a Christmas present. On 15 January an individual named Ferdinando Pardini walked into the Detachment office wearing a suit which looked as if it had been made from the described material.

He had applied for a pass to Pisa from the AMG officer at Camaiori but had been sent to the CIC office as he had crossed the lines. Once in the Detachment office, he dropped his pretense of wanting a pass and stated that he had information regarding the German Intelligence Services. The information which he volunteered was vague and unimportant; upon further interrogation, he admitted that he had been sent into AOT as an espionage agent.

*History of the 305th CIC Detachment (L-1) page 11 (U)
**Ibid, page 11

Pardini's mission was that of organizing Fascist cells in the Pisa, Livorno and Viareggio areas and arranging for the receipt of arms and ammunition by water from EOT. Unlike the majority of Agents apprehended by the Detachment during the German onslaught, Pardini was untrained, inexperienced, frightened, and poorly chosen for the job.

Gabriele Sorrentino was a German Agent, the exact opposite of Pardini. Sorrentino was found loitering around a gun position and when picked up, pretended to be very stupid. Time was precious and since he was using an obvious cover story, it was decided to place him in the corner with his face to the wall. Twenty four hours later he confessed to being a short-range Agent of KDO - 150 on his third mission into AOT. Numerous German Intelligence teams, designated as Abwehr Kommando (KDO) units and Abwehr Truppe units were operating under the jurisdiction of the German Intelligence Service (G.I.S.)* Sorrentino's interrogation contained a wealth of details which were put to good use by SCI Unit Z, a high-level US Army Intelligence section. This "standing in the corner" which occurred as a spur of the moment idea, proved so successful that it was used many times in the ensuing months, always with great success.

On 10 March 1945, the 92d CIC Detachment received two German Agents who had been apprehended by OSS Partisans in the area between AOT and EOT. Bruno Bordogni, after several hours of interrogation, confessed to being an Agent of KDO-190 and Leonia Celli admitted being one of "Colonel David's girls," dispatched through KDO-190. It wasn't until later that CIC agents were able to learn of the significance of Colonel David's organization.

As reported by the 92d CIC Detachment, "Celli was made up to look as unattractive as possible, including red ankle-length drawers and horn rimmed glasses."** The interrogation brought forth the information that she was an actress of some renown and recently had been assisting her husband in Milan in writing Fascist propaganda. Prior to her departure, she had called on Mussolini and received his blessing.

Her mission, primarily one of her own undertaking, consisted of going to Florence, Siena and Rome to gather information to use in propaganda work on her return to Milan.

The Detachment found that she was one of the few Agents they had captured who was such an ardent Fascist that she refused to give any information about other agents who might be expected to enter AOT.

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*Ltr, Subj: "13 Corps Security Refresher Course," TO: Chief, CIC, AFHQ, dtd 10 Jan 45 (S)

**History of the 92d CIC Detachment (K-17) page 9 (S)

The static situation during which the 92d CIC Detachment apprehended and interrogated so many German agents ended on 5 April 1945. But before this static period was completed, the Detachment received a letter of commendation from Major General Almond, the commanding general of the Division, expressing his praise for the unit that had captured more than twenty-five confirmed agents, screened 17,012 civilians, and instituted thorough counterintelligence measures in the 92d Division, a division that had undertaken its combat role in Italy without the aid of any security force.

In April, the 92d Division, reinforced by the famous Japanese-American 442d Infantry Regiment and also aided by the 473rd Infantry Regiment, moved forward. The extensive roadblock system of the Carabinieri was abandoned by the CIC and the then-renowed Mount Altissimo "spy trail" was captured on the second day. The Detachment moved after several days to Pietrasanta.*

IV Corps CIC Spreads its Net for a Big Catch

The winter freeze on the Allied advance meant a temporary end of forward motion; it never meant the end of all activity. No CIC unit was more aware of the multitude of daily tasks glossed over by the phrase "Static situation" than the Detachment serving with IV Corps. The thinly-held western sector of the Allied line was the security responsibility of this detachment. From October 1944 until the Spring offensive in April 1945, the German Intelligence Service dispatched agent after agent into the IV Corps area, intending by means of this mass infiltration to develop complete coverage of the forward regions of Allied occupied territory.

In the face of this onslaught of enemy espionage and sabotage agents, the 204th CIC Detachment managed to rush in many directions at once. In the month extending from 25 October to 25 November, agents of this detachment captured or participated in the capture of 28 enemy espionage and sabotage agents and unearthed five complete enemy sabotage kits that were buried behind Allied lines prior to the withdrawal of the Germans. The information that CIC discovered from the enemy agents apprehended late in October alerted the Detachment to expect the greatest enemy espionage drive in the month of November. Further details of the forthcoming GIS operation were furnished by a well-informed and highly reliable source, an American citizen from enemy occupied territory.

An American from EOT

On 23 October AMG officials in Lucca brought to the 204th CIC Detachment a man who claimed to be an American from Camden, New Jersey. He gave his name as Anthony Saponaro and quickly informed his interrogators that he had tricked the GIS into employing him as a member of

*History of the 92d CIC Detachment (K-17) pages 10 and 13 (S)

Officer stopped civilian traffic in the area; the Corps Provost Marshal assigned Military Police to road blocks; CIC road patrols were instituted and CIC Sections were established as far forward as the tactical situation permitted.

Agents of all sizes, shapes and descriptions were captured and interrogated. Some had been trained at the espionage school in Verona or at the sabotage school in Milan. Some were without training. German agents of Polish extraction were sent to obtain military intelligence relative to the Polish Army, and some Russians were sent to inflame Communist groups in the captured cities and towns.

Frederico Ponti was apprehended on 11 November and confessed to having been sent from the Sender Command Magnus Sabotage School in Erba to perform sabotage along the Autostrada from Pistoia to Livorno. Ponti's sabotage kit was later uncovered by the Detachment from the place where he had buried it before his trip across the lines.

Major Crystal, CO of the IV Corps Detachment, in a report to the CI Officer, Headquarters, Fifth Army, regarding Ponti's capture, said, "The explosives, . . .have been turned over to the IV Corps Engineers and a dummy substituted in the same spot. The dummy is booby trapped with two sticks of dynamite and under surveillance of two Pubblica Sicurezza agents from Pistoia. It is hoped that other enemy saboteurs will be so kind as to dig for the same box. If this happy event should occur, the remains will be shipped to you by wooden envelope. Attention is invited to the fact that the nearest military unit is a Fifth Army Graves Registration Service which has offered its services in any capacity."*

On the afternoon of 16 November "A" Troop, 110th Battery, 39th Regiment (English) apprehended Natale Racagni and Anna Maria Dei Brenti as they attempted to cross the Allied front lines. They were immediately taken to the CIC office at San Marcello and interrogated by IV Corps CIC agents, Fremont F. Lemler, Emil J. Rohner and Clarence B. Gangnes. Within a short time, both confessed to being enemy agents of Abwehr Truppe 152, Luftwaffe.

Personnel of the IV Corps CIC Detachment found during this "month of madness" that German agents, once they confessed, were prone to give very detailed excuses as to why they entered the German Intelligence Service. Racagni's excuse was one of the best.

According to Racagni's story, he had owned a pharmacist supply warehouse in Bologna. One night in July 1944, the Germans smashed the door of his warehouse and demanded to know why the hospital supplies

*Report to CI Officer, C/O AC of S, G2, Hq V Army from Hq IV Corps, dtd 14 Nov 44 (S)

the German Sicherheitsdienst, Headquarters Verona. His one intention was to use the guise of this service to enable him to cross over the lines and reach Allied authorities. The story of his recent life gave a picture of the fate of an individual caught by the tides of war in an enemy country.

After his elementary schooling in America, Saponaro went to Italy to attend the Royal Academy of Art in Carorra. Until 1941 he led an easy life, studying when he pleased and doing odd jobs. When America entered the war, Saponaro attempted to return to the United States; however, he was sent to a forced-labor factory in Germany. There followed a series of events during which he escaped from the factory and made his way to the German-held portion of Italy. In Verona, he contacted the German Intelligence Service and began his career as a double agent.

The mission Saponaro received was to accompany a certain Leonardodo Navasquez to Rome, remain there for a period of two weeks and then return through the lines to German-held territory. In Rome, the two men were to collect such information as the locations of "AMGOT"; British Secret Service; Italian SIM and the American G2. They were to get the names of Chiefs, agents, operation methods, spots at which agents were sent through lines into German territory and methods of communication. They were also to collect information on social and political development in Rome.*

On 22 October both men crossed from EOT into AOT and went immediately to Lucca, the home of Navasquez's parents. On 23 October they reported to AMG and then were forwarded to IV Corps CIC.

Saponaro was able to reveal considerable information of tactical intelligence use; he indicated the location of German CPs, mined roads, ammunition dumps, and furnished the names of important German leaders. The counterintelligence information that he gave on enemy intelligence personalities and operational techniques was a prime aid in the capture of line crossers the following month.

The San Marcello Operation

The desperate attempt of the German Intelligence Service to overwhelm the Allied counterintelligence defenses in November reached such large proportions that it was dubbed the "San Marcello Operation." But CIC was ready and waiting for the enemy agents. Information they had obtained caused one of the tightest controls of civilian movement in the history of the entire Italian campaign to be established in the IV Corps area. Military and police personnel were instructed to apprehend all strangers and suspicious persons; the Senior Civil Affairs

*Report from Hq IV Corps CIC, Subject: Saponaro, Anthony, dtd 23 Oct 44 (S)

contained therein were not being used. This angered Racagni and several nights later, in the bar of the Hotel Baglioni, he made several derogatory remarks about the Germans. He was informed that it might be wise if he held his tongue.

This same evening Racagni met a bar acquaintance named "Carlo," who told him not to worry about the loss of money; that if he were interested in making "plenty of money," he should come back the next day. Through a series of events Racagni was taken to Florence where he met a German in civilian clothes named Bauer, who informed him that he might have to risk his life, gave him 5,000 lire and sent him back to Bologna for three days to think over the proposition.

Deciding to refuse the proposition, Racagni told the CIC agents, he remained in Bologna. About five or six days later a man came to the house and, accusing Racagni of doing nothing to earn the 5,000 lire the Germans had given him, ordered Racagni to accompany him to Milan. During his interrogation Racagni based his entire explanation of his work as a German agent on this "forced journey" to Milan.

During August, September, and October Racagni was shifted from one city to another, attended a school for the identification of Allied units, and met the famed Dr. Kora.

The first part of his mission was to deliver 50,000 lire to a man who was operating a clandestine radio in Florence. Racagni was to enter this man's shop and inquire of the owner, "Have you got 17 tubes?" Upon this man's affirmative answer, Racagni was to turn over the money.

The second part of the mission was to go to Rome and observe all Allied movements in the city. Every day between the hours of 1300 and 1400, he was to go to the Trattoria Bolognese, Piazza del Popolo, a small restaurant in Rome, and wait to be contacted. Eventually, two men would come to him and say, "Haven't we met in Milan?". After this contact was made, Racagni would divulge all his information in return for his pay.*

On 8 November, he left Milan accompanied by Anna Maria Dei Brenti. They drove to Reggio Emilia where they spent two nights and then drove on through Modena, Fiumalbo, finally arriving at Abetone on 12 November. They started through the woods on foot but were apprehended by a German patrol and brought to the command post, where they were released after identification. On 16 November, after spending three days in an abandoned farmhouse because of inclement weather, they were apprehended by partisans who took them to the Carabinieri and then turned them over to the English unit.

*Report to CI Officer, C/O AC of S, G2, Hq Fifth Army from IV Corps CIC, dtd 18 November 1944 (S)

CIC believed that Racagni had made more than the one trip through the lines to which he admitted; it was not credible that he would have been paid by the Germans for three months of inactivity unless he had done something in return. Also it was hard to believe that the Germans would have entrusted such a large sum of money to an untried, inexperienced agent.

These feelings were substantiated during the interrogation of of Dei Brenti for she declared that Racagni had told her that he had already been through the lines on a previous mission. Both suspects were found to be definitely pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist and were treated as such.

German Intelligence Errors

Once the assault got underway, the agents in the San Marcello office were often able to identify suspects as soon as they entered the room. It amazed these CIC men that the Germans were so naive as to dress many of their agents in the same type of suit or furnish them the same type of shoes. Added to this were mistakes such as money in numerical sequence, identity cards which were stamped on the wrong page and, in one case, an agent who carried his identity card from the GIS.

Hunches often paid off. One of the most prevalent was when a person who claimed to have worked in Northern Italy only a short time was able to give the names of all the small towns he had passed through while crossing back into Allied occupied territory. Such a person was usually separated from the group and nine times out of ten, confessed to being a German agent.

A Bashful Suspect

Emil J. Rohner, who was in the San Marcello office during the assault and who won the Bronze Start for his work there, found one day that even in the midst of this tedious, intense and yet sometimes monotonous work, there could still be periods of humor.

Two suspect peasants were brought in who had been apprehended crossing a field near the front lines. One peasant talked freely of how he was simply looking for some strayed sheep, but the other peasant appeared bashful. Rohner thought he was "too bashful." This sense of embarrassment was visibly increased when the CIC agents in the office opened the peasant's wallet and found a series of pornographic pictures.

Not understanding the peasant's embarrassment and suspecting that he knew more than he was telling, Rohner decided to try to capitalize on this bashfulness. As it was raining outside, they made the peasant hold an umbrella over his head while still in the room

and start singing anything that came into mind. In the final analysis, the peasant was not an enemy agent, but the incident struck both the CIC agents and the peasant as being humorous and such a relief from the tension that gripped them, that they all had a laughing spell and the day suddenly became brighter for all.*

A Black Marketeer Turned Spy

The vigil for enemy agents during the winter months was never-ending. For every German Intelligence Service operative captured, there always seemed to be another taking his place. The tentacles of the German SS, IDA organization reached out over Northern Italy; Italian civilians in enemy-held territory seemed to be recruited into espionage work with ease. The account recited by one captured agent, while dubious in part, gave CIC an insight into the effective methods of the IDA.

In the middle of December, Guido Castelli, a citizen of Milan engaged in petty black market dealings, chanced to enter the Caffe Grande Italia in his native city. While Castelli was seated at a table, a stranger approached him and quietly asked for a match. His request was granted and was followed by an invitation from Castelli to have a glass of wine. Soon the two men struck up an intimate conversation. Castelli revealed that he was beset by financial and family troubles, and the stranger was quick to offer an easy solution. His name, the stranger claimed, was Ferrara, and he could be contacted at the Albergo Fontana, a nearby hotel. Without further explanation, the man excused himself and left the cafe.

The following day, Castelli sought out Ferrara at the address he had given. The deal awaiting him was simple but lucrative. Castelli would be given a German passport, an initial payment of 15,000 lire, and the address of the IDA organization in Parma. In exchange, he had to enlist his services as a political espionage agent for the Germans. It was not hard for Castelli to arrive at a decision. On 20 December he left for Parma.

IDA required three days to turn the black marketeer into a full fledged spy. But the Germans would not let Castelli start on his mission until weather conditions improved at the front. Meanwhile, Castelli went back to Milan to spend the Christmas holidays with his family. He returned to Parma in early January to thoroughly acquaint himself with his mission. IDA had ordered him to proceed directly to Rome after crossing the lines and contact three families who would help him acquire a room and other necessities. Once established in Rome, Castelli was to gather all the information available concerning the history of the various political parties, leading political figures,

*Interview with Emil J. Rohner - NCICA Convention at Philadelphia, Pa.

the attitude of the people concerning the loss of the Italian colonies, the public attitude toward the King, and similar matters. Castelli's two and one-half week stay in Rome was to be marked twice by contact with a courier from IDA. Between 1400 and 1430 hours on the 10th and 20th of February, Castelli was to go to the Piazza Colonna and look for a man who was juggling a ring in his hand. The exchange of a simple greeting would serve as a mutual identification, and Castelli would then impart his findings to the courier for transmittal back to Parma. On his return at the end of February, Castelli was expected to report in person to the IDA for debriefing and payment for his services commensurate with the value of the information he delivered.

Just prior to leaving Parma, Castelli was given some last-minute advice by the German Lieutenant who was handling him. He was cautioned to avoid all road blocks, to make friends with all Allied soldiers who stopped him by offering them a drink of cognac, to travel as far as Lucca by secondary roads and make contact there with a restaurant owner who would secure transportation for him to Rome. Castelli was warned above all that, in the event of capture, he was never to reveal his true mission to the Allies, for the punishment would be two-fold: his execution by the Allies and his family's internment in Germany by the IDA.

On 28 January, with 10,000 lire and two gold pieces in his pocket, Castelli crossed the front lines in the midst of a heavy Allied artillery barrage. By the evening of the following day, he arrived in Lucca where he remained for a week before going to Pistoia to "visit relatives." Shortly after his return, a week later, to Lucca, Castelli was arrested by Agents Myron G. Hoffman and Vito Rotunno of the 204th CIC Detachment after having been identified by the previously captured Fascist restaurant owner who had served as Castelli's contact in Lucca.

Interrogation by the two CIC agents cast some doubt on the authenticity of Castelli's stated mission. It seemed unlikely that Castelli would have wandered about the Pistoia-Lucca region in defiance of his orders from the IDA, and the agents surmised that he actually had been assigned to gather information about the political situation in the towns near the front lines. But the rest of his story appeared to ring true. German intelligence had not been napping in the fact of the Wehrmacht's repeated defeats.*

Traces of a German Counterintelligence Unit

Prior to the winter stalemate, agents of the 204th CIC Detachment had uncovered scraps of information about a German counterintelligence unit that had been active in the Pistoia province. During the course of his investigations, Agent Gangnes was directed to two citizens who had been involved with the German forces that had occupied the town

*Hq IV Corps CIC Detachment, Rpt, Confessed Enemy Agent, dtd 18 Feb 45 (S) (KCD 7--3--36)

of Pistoia, had served as an for the German Presidio Commander and was able to reveal a considerable amount of information about the military and economic administration of German forces within the province. had been of a German lieutenant who commands a counter-espionage unit designated as Abwehr Trupp 371. The reports of both these informants gave a preliminary outline of the counterintelligence efforts of the Germans as they retreated to the North.

An agent network had been established by the Abwehr Trupp 371 with the prime mission of apprehending persons attempting to get out of German occupied territory into Corsica and persons attempting to enter German occupied territory from Corsica. The counter espionage unit itself was highly mobile and did not remain stationed in one town for any long period of time. The names of several enlisted men serving with the Abwehr Trupp 371 and two Italian agents were furnished, and the 204th CIC Detachment maintained a careful watch for these agents as it progressed through the Pistoia province.*

During the winter of 1944, this vigilance was partially rewarded. In the town of San Marcello, Agent Gangnes uncovered some important leads to other personalities operating with the Abwehr Trupp 371 by interrogating civilians who had served as chambermaids and waiters in the villas occupied by the German unit. But the security of the Abwehr Trupp 371 had been highly effective, and the informants were able to reveal virtually nothing about the operations of the counter-intelligence group while in San Marcello. The 204th CIC Detachment had to be content to follow the trail of its German adversary.

Civilian Morale Wavers during the Winter Months

The static winter situation produced several new problems for CIC agents along the Northern front. After the dramatic advances of the Allied forces during the Fall, this period of temporary stalemate had a bad effect on the morale of the Italian civilians. Pessimistic rumors about Allied reverses were spawned and nurtured by remnants of the Fascist party, great attention was given to the German offensive in Northern Europe, and the husky voice of Mussolini barked in Milan that the population of Allied-occupied Italy should remain calm, for the day of liberation was near. The morale problem was further aggravated by the deterioration of relations between troops and civilians. The first jubilant days of freedom had ended. Now the Italians looked towards the Allies as their providers rather than their protectors. Inscriptions in crayon and coal were scrawled on walls around the town: "Roosevelt, I tre etti di pane" (Roosevelt, where are the three hundred grams of bread) and "Basta cogli Americani" (Down with the Americans) were among the phrases that greeted American

*Memo for the OIC from Agent C. B. Gangnes, Subject: Abwehr Trupp 371, dtd 21 Sep 44 (C) (RCD 2-14-241)

soldiers. Fuel was added to the fire of resentment by American troops who succumbed to the provocations of lower class Italian women. The civilians began to disclaim these relationships with slogans such as "Women, do not lend yourselves to the game," and "Women, we repudiate you." Agents of the IV Corps CIC Detachment often found it difficult to determine whether these anti-American sentiments were politically inspired or the spontaneous mutterings of a discontented segment of the populace. The problem of ferreting out Fascist elements in the face of these rumor and propaganda campaigns became all the more complex.*

Teamwork is the Lesson of the Winter Campaign

By February 1945 the frontline security measures of the CIC agents in the field and supporting research and intelligence furnished by the Fifth Army and the 15th Army Group CI were effectively linked. This coordination resulted in the capture of many stay-behind agents and line crossers who might otherwise have slipped through the IV Corps net.

One case which was concluded by IV Corps CIC Detachment during a 24 hour period serves to illustrate the wide range of planning and education which must precede a successful CIC operation. The balance of activities between forward CIC teams and higher echelon counter-intelligence units especially in the dissemination of background information, the importance of security indoctrination of front-line troops, the necessity for a firm instructional policy among the native population, and the thorough training of CIC agents in investigative procedures -- all are illustrated.

Twenty-four Hours in the Bagni di Lucca CIC Office

On the evening of 30 March 1945, four young men stopped a peasant on the road to Bagni di Lucca, Allied Territory, and asked for information about the roads to the south. The peasant told them that a rigid curfew law was being strictly enforced throughout the area and advised them to seek quarters for the night. The men heeded this advice and requested food and lodging from the peasant, for which they paid 2000 lire. At 0700 hours the following morning, the peasant took the four men to an American CP in Montefegatesi, some two miles away. This was done in compliance with the well publicized CIC regulations for the area; the CP's guard detail immediately escorted the four men to the Bagni di Lucca CIC office, Sub-Section 2, IV Corps CIC located about five miles from the front.**

*Hq 204th CIC Detachment, Memo for AC of S, G2, IV Corps, Subject: Lucca Civilian Morale and Reactions, dtd 1 Jan 45 (C) (KCD 2-14-250)

**Memo to OIC, No. 3 SCI, Florence, Subj: BILLI Lotario, SELMI Nerino, PICCHETTI Sergio, PEDROTTA Pedro, Confessed Enemy Sabotage Agents, 4 Apr 45, fr CIC Hq IV Corps (S), CIC Rpts of Captured Enemy Agents 8/44-4/45, KCRC No: BX 25096.

At 1100 hours that morning, Agents Rene R. Francazzi and Edwin M. Held began interrogations thich were not to end until noon of 1 April. Upon receipt of the four men, Francazzi and Held secured each man in a separate room, confiscated all their personal effects and traced their names through the CI Bulletins, which listed both their true names and t. e false ones which they were using. It now remained for CIC to obtain confessions from these men which could be used in their trial and which would fulfill existing requests for counterintelligence information.

The first man to be interrogated was Sergio Picchetti. The two agents let Picchetti tell his cover story and made no attempt to contradict him. After he finished his story, Picchetti wrote it down, giving his previous occupations, routes of travel into Allied Occupied Territory and his destination. As it became apparent that Picchetti was well-trained and would not confess readily, Francazzi and Held turned to the next man, Pedro Pedrotta, a twenty-two year old former student from Milan.

When Pedrotta entered the CIC office he had in his possession 32,700 lire, numbered in series, and false identity documentation. These incriminating pieces of evidence, plus the CI Bulletin background data and the cover story of Picchetti brightened the prospects for a quick confession from Pedrotta. At 1130 hours, Pedrotta related his cover story which the two CIC agents accepted without question. Pedrotta was encouraged to tell his story in great detail and once he had finished he wrote it in his own hand. Before he signed his statement, Pedrotta was told that he was in a counterintelligence office and he was given the chance to change his story. Pedrotta replied that he had told the truth and thereupon signed the document.

(U) Immediately, Held and Francazzi changed their manner. In rapid succession, they threw damaging questions at Pedrotta. They pressed him in the discrepancies between his story and Picchetti's concerning their activities before arriving in Allied Territory and the routes traveled from Enemy Territory. They told him that his identity card was false and that the ink was not then three days old; that his money was in series and that he had among his possessions two bordello receipts, which privileges were only allowed German personnel or persons in the German service. Pedrotta was then called by his aliases and was told where he was dispatched from, schools he had attended, personalities he knew, routes traveled from Enemy Territory -- all data from CI Bulletins. Intensive interrogation for an hour and a half keyed from every psychological angle completely unnerved Pedrotta. He suddenly blurted out that he was an espionage and sabotage agent in the employ of the German Intelligende Service (GIS), Eins (c)* and FIDE units. He then executed and signed a confession.

*This organization was also referred to in reports as I (c).

Eins (c) was a German organization interested primarily in Allied order of battle intelligence, while FIDE was an Abwehr sabotage section interested in military sabotage targets. Pedrotta and his three companions had attended a GIS topography school at Albergo Dolomite in Fai. There were about sixty students in the schools and the courses, map reading and topography, lasted for about three weeks during December 1944. From January to 4 March 1945, they attended courses in order of battle intelligence, espionage, and sabotage. These courses were conducted at GIS schools in Corredo. Upon graduating from the schools, the four men were sent to Reggio Emilia for a few weeks of relaxation before being dispatched into allied territory. From Pedrotta they learned that on the night of 29 March the four men had been taken to within a few miles of the German front. Upon arriving at the designated field post, the German intelligence officer in charge of their dispatching briefed them on their missions. Pedrotta and Picchetti were assigned sabotage and espionage missions in the area south of San Marcello. They were given the location of an explosives cache near the town of Pontepetri. They were to select military targets of opportunity. When the cache was empty, they were to return to German Territory, gathering political, economic and military intelligence on the way. Their mission was expected to take about seven weeks. The other two men had similar missions in the Piastre area.

After studying maps of the terrain in front of the German field post, the four men were dispatched toward Bagni di Lucca. CIC knew the rest of the story from the Italian peasant and the officer in charge of the American CP which had apprehended the men.

Within four hours of the arrival of the four suspects, Agents Francazzi and Held had obtained the first confession in detail. The remainder of the afternoon was spent in listening to the cover stories of the other two suspects and preparing for the intensive interrogation of the one most likely to break down. Nerino Selmi was chosen as the next subject of interrogation.

Selmi, alias Carlo Paradisi, was an uneducated, backward nineteen year old youth from Bologna. Under interrogation, he at first maintained a cover story. Selmi had a false identity card and 23,000 lire numbered in series when he was taken into custody. After several hours of aggressive interrogation by the two CIC agents, Selmi's confidence was shaken. The CIC agents overwhelmed him with the information they had concerning him and his fellow saboteurs, as well as with the contradictions between his story and those of his companions. At midnight, 31 March, Selmi confessed to being an agent of the GIS on a sabotage mission in the Piastre area.

Selmi had served in the Nembo Division which fought for the Germans in Italy. In December 1944, his father was wounded in an American air raid on Bologna. As a result, Selmi became quite embittered toward the

Allies and accepted an offer to work for the GIS. Selmi was the partner of Lotario Billi and they had both taken an oath to carry out their mission and return to German Territory. They had been given the location of an explosives cache just outside of Piastre which was to serve as the source of their sabotage devices. Having now told the truth as confirmed by independent material, Selmi wrote and signed a confession.

Agents Francazzi and Held went immediately to Picchetti's room and resumed his interrogation. It was 0100 hours on 1 April when they questioned Picchetti for what was to be the last time. Using the information provided by the CI Bulletins and the confession of Pedrotta, the CIC agents quickly outwitted Picchetti, and he confessed to being a saboteur and espionage agent. Picchetti proved to be strongly pro-Fascist and admitted that he would have returned to the Germans had he successfully completed his mission. After they obtained a signed confession from Picchetti, the two CIC agents assembled their material for the final interrogation, that of Lotario Billi.

Billi proved to be the most difficult subject of the four. He would not deviate from his original story and would not admit to any inconsistencies. After lengthy and intensive questioning, he was confronted with his companions' confessions, the large amounts of money in series which he had at the time of his capture, his routes and dates of travel, and the fact that he had destroyed his identity card. In the face of this stockpile of evidence, there was no way out for the reluctant Italian. Billi confessed that he was an agent on a mission for the GIS.

On 2 April 1945, Maj John C. Crystal, IV Corps CIC, directed the search for the sabotage caches of the four enemy agents. The explosives were successfully located and turned over to the Engineers. Subsequently, the four confessed enemy agents were forwarded to higher echelon interrogation centers.*

The Struggle to Survive

Members of the CIC Detachments in Italy during the winter of 1944-45 have stated that their primary purpose was not to capture enemy spies but rather to stay alive. This uncertainty of staying alive

*Interrogation Report on PEDROTTA Pedro, undtd, CSDIC/200/MU/15/Z 21; Interrogation Report on BILLI Lotario, SELMI Nerino, PICCHETTI Sergio, undtd, CSDIC/200/MU/15Z 22: 204 CIC Det Reports, SCI/Z and SCI #3, 2/45-4/45 (S), KCRC No. BX25096. Memo to OIC, No. 3 SCI, Florence, re: BILLI Lotario, SELMI Nerino, PICCHETTI Sergio, PEDROTTA Pedro, Confessed Enemy Sabotage Agents, 4 Apr 45, fr CIC Hq, IV Corps: 204 CIC Det Reports of Captured Enemy Agents, 8/44-4/45 (S), KCRC No. BX25096.

stemmed as much from the intense cold and snow as it did from enemy action. Any old farmhouse would do as a base of operations and the men took delight in "winterizing" them. The men of the 91st CIC Detachment were no exception.

In the latter part of 1944, the 91st Division was located high in the Apennines outside the town of Lioano and approximately 26 miles from the enemy-held town of Rimini. Agent Sampson W. Freestone and other members of the Detachment finally found an abandoned farmhouse, located on the side of a mountain overlooking a wide valley. It became their pride and joy.

Many long hours were spent in fixing it up. Windows were boarded-over, ceilings were braced, bricks were replaced with almost loving care, for this farmhouse held the prospect of a warm sanctuary during the icy winter months ahead. One member of the Detachment went so far as to partially prune the trees outside so that the branches would not splinter and injure anyone in case of a direct hit during an air raid.

One day after their labors were finished, they noticed a British artillery unit bringing a huge cannon into the valley below. Day by day they watched while the British soldiers with infinite pains, poured the cement for the foundation, aligned the gun and inserted the iron railing around the catwalk. Freestone and the rest of the Agents felt proud that such good warriors and noble craftsman were on their side. Finally they saw the lorries move slowly away and they knew the gun was ready.

At approximately 0300 hours the next morning, they were awakened by a British Sergeant who informed them that for safety's sake, it would be advisable to leave the house as the cannon was about to commence firing. "Good grief," shouted Freestone, "the damn thing's about two miles down the valley." The Sergeant was adamant and, primarily to humor him, the Agents filed out into the snow and ice.

Within minutes a roar was heard and slowly at first but with increasing rapidity, their "home" disintegrated. The boards fell from the windows, the side of the building cracked open and the chimney fell. Transfixed, the Agents watched and then as one, turned to the British Sergeant.

In the light of inter-Allied harmony, Freestone explained, it was just as well that the Sergeant was on his way back to his unit and was therefore unable to hear the endearments pointedly thrown in his direction. "Rimini was 26 miles away," stated Freestone, "and we had to pick a house directly in its path."*

*As per conversation with Sam Freestone at NCICA Convention, Hotel Warwick, Philadelphia, Pa., August 7, 8, and 9, 1953

Utilization of the Chain of Command

From October until December 1944, the 305th CIC Detachment was located at Tavernelle. Sub-sections of the Detachment were in operation at Rosignano Solvey, Pisa, Montelupo, Ponte a Egola, Pistoia, Prato, Scarperia and Florence. Units of the CIC Headquarters Security Section remained at the Army Headquarters (Traversa) and Rear Echelon Headquarters (Florence). In addition, personnel from the 305th CIC Detachment continued to operate the RIP at the Fifth Army PW Stockade near Florence.*

The chain of command during these winter months became apparent to the various Detachments and was given its rightful place. During the preceding months, the action had been swift, and Detachments often found themselves out of contact with their immediate superior. This necessitated the using of individual initiative, and Detachment Commanders ran their respective units with few orders from above. Naturally, few reports were sent "upstairs" while this separation of units existed.**

The mass assault of the German Agents necessitated the utilization of the chain of command. While it never was overbearing, the Army CIC Detachment acted in a supervisory capacity in that it collated reports from the various units under its command and was thus able to send Pattern Reports and other descriptive material to them that eventually aided in the capture of enemy Agents. The sending of reports to Army Headquarters also facilitated the capture of Agents, since it enabled Army CIC personnel to learn how many enemy suspects slipped through Allied lines and where in all probability they were.

That the Army CIC Detachment acted in a strictly supervisory capacity can be gleaned from a report Spingarn (then Lieutenant Colonel) sent to the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces in January 1945. In this report he said, "From an administrative standpoint, the most important lesson which has been learned during this period is that tactical CIC detachments must be able to operate as self-sufficient units."***

The Problems

One of the many problems that had to be solved to facilitate the captures of enemy agents was the education of Allied military personnel

*General Security Report - TO: ACofS, G-2 (CI) Fifth Army, dtd 3 Nov 44 (S)
**Interview with James Kelly and Harry Riback at NCICA Convention in Philadelphia, Pa., August 7, 8, and 9, 1953.
***Monthly Information Report - TO: CG, ASF from 305th CIC, page 9 (S)

who afforded these agents on mission the best means of crossing the Army area in either direction, through their friendly though misguided practice of picking up hitch-hiking civilians.* Security lectures by CIC personnel had to be given to the troops at short intervals and the importance of the talks impressed upon them.

Partisans were among the worst offenders in violating restrictions in civilian travel. They seemed to believe that membership in certain groups or possession of travel permits from Partisan leaders rendered them immune to security detention and investigation. One enemy agent captured by the 305th CIC Detachment had previously introduced himself to the inhabitants of San Miniato as a Partisan Lieutenant and, despite the fact that he was almost completely unknown there, he was, when arrested, carrying a letter given him by the CLN (Committee of National Liberation) stating that he was a member of the Comitato, and requesting that help be given him in reaching Rome.**

One of the largest problems was the lack of qualified CIC personnel to counter the German thrust. Witness: a Secret Priority Wire sent by Major Spingarn to Major Ralph Powers, Chief, CIC, AFHQ on 21 November 1944, stating:

> "URGENT SECURITY SITUATION HERE TEN SABOTAGE AGENTS CAPTURED WITHIN PAST FOUR DAYS THREE HUNDRED MORE REPORTED ENROUTE OR SOON TO COME SEVERAL CACHES OF ENEMY SABOTAGE EXPLOSIVES DISCOVERED....SECURITY SITUATION MOST SERIOUS SINCE BEGINNING OF ITALIAN OPERATION....ADDITIONAL AGENTS URGENTLY NEEDED."***

Spingarn reported on 28 October 1944 that another underlying factor actually of more long-range importance than the urgent need for additional CIC personnel with the Divisions was the defect in the tactical CIC setup whereby the areas of most counterintelligence interest were almost invariably the most thinly covered by CIC Agents, and the areas of least interest, the ones most strongly covered.

IV Corps CIC was covering a sector at least five times as large as II Corps; yet, because the major axis of military attack was through the II Corps Sector, all the American Divisions but one (the 92d) of Fifth Army were there and consequently, almost all of the CIC. This meant that IV Corps, including the 92d Division, had a total of about 18 CIC Agents, while II Corps and its Division had almost 45.

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*General Security Report TO: AC of S, G-2 (CI) Fifth Army, dtd 3 Nov 44 (S)
**Ibid, page 10
***Secret Priority Wire from Spingarn to Powers, Chief, CIC, AFHQ dtd 21Nov 44

The anomaly of this situation was two-fold. Since the German attack was directed against the Sector occupied by II Corps, the soldiers were so closely spaced that it was virtually impossible for an enemy Agent to cross into AOT without being detected. The Germans realized this and consequently sent their Agents across at the thinly-held IV Corps Sector. So many Agents entered here that one road was nicknamed "Spy Highway No. 1, Italy."

Spingarn felt that in tactical counterintelligence, counterintelligence interest and activity is likely to be exactly in reverse emphasis to tactical interest and activity. At that time, the tactical CIC setup was based on the assumption that CIC should be in the area of the most troops and the hardest fighting.

The subsequent plan which Spingarn offered to correct the situation was often discussed but never adopted. Its basic premise was that if the single vacancy already existing in each of the six Division Detachments could be filled, the six additional men should be attached to Corps CIC or Army CIC, to be sent where they were most needed.* Unfortunately this plan never had its try-out period.

An example of the cooperation that existed among the various Detachments during the last months of 1944 can be gained by looking at the Lucca CIC Operations. This city fell to the Allied Forces on 8 September 1944 and the first CIC unit to enter was headed by S/A James Furniss of the 305th CIC Detachment. Control was maintained by this unit until 8 October when it was turned over to IV Corps CIC.

On 8 November 1944, IV Corps CIC pointed out that the area was too large to be handled by any one Detachment and as it was the apex point of the enemy Agent assault, and the "Spy Highway No. 1," passed through it, they asked for assistance. A coordinated plan placed the area by sections under the responsibility of Fifth Army, IV Corps and II Corps CIC, plus Italian SIM (CS) Agents.** This plan was successful and many enemy line-crossers were captured during the ensuing months.

An Impressive Record

Despite the success of this system of deployment, CIC agents serving in the Italian campaign had carried out their multiple activities as unsung heroes. Publicity accorded to the CIC units had been scant, and in January, Major Spingarn set about to correct this situation by compiling a three month record of the detachments serving

*Memorandum for Major Powers, Chief, CIC, AFHQ, dtd 28 Oct 44 from 305th CIC Detachment (S)

**Memorandum for Major Staudt - Subject: Tactical CIC Coordination, dtd 25 Nov 44 (S)

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under Fifth Army command. The list was impressive. From 10 October to 31 December, 110 espionage and sabotage agents sent on missions by the German Abwehr or SD were captured in Fifth Army areas with more than 75 of the apprehensions made by CIC personnel. Information divulged by these prisoners led to the discovery of eight caches of explosives left behind by the Germans for use by saboteurs. Other preventive counterintelligence by Fifth Army CIC units was equally effective. No consequential act of sabotage had occurred during the entire Italian campaign in areas occupied by the Fifth Army. Constituting less than fifty percent of all Allied counterintelligence personnel operating under Fifth Army, the CIC agents had accomplished the major share of security work.*

The Most Colorful Case

On 21 September 1944 a report from Colonel S. S. Hill-Dillon at AFHQ laid the groundwork for a case which, while probably not the most important, was unquestionably the most colorful in the history of the 305th CIC Detachment. This report stated that there was reason to believe that a woman crossed into AOT on 14 August 1944 and that "....details of her mission are unknown except that she was to carry back copies of extremist left wing newspapers." Her description:

> "Carla — Age 18, height 5'1½", thick set, black hair, dark complexion, Roman accent, claims to be skating champion."**

All Fifth Army Detachments were alerted as were the Carabinieri check points and the Military Police. On 19 October 1944, Mario Martinelli was apprehended at a civilian movement control post and turned over to Fifth Army CIC as he was without proper permission to travel and had no Florence identity card. Preliminary investigation revealed nothing, but serious suspicion was aroused when a letter was intercepted which he had smuggled out of the Carabinieri prison, asking certain persons in Florence to support his false story as to his recent whereabouts.

A check at the residence of Countess Barbieri, to whom the letter was addressed, disclosed that not only had Martinelli been there on 8 September and 15 October, but that on 22 October 44, a girl named Carla Costa had visited the residence and asked for Martinelli under the names of "Monello" and "Righi." Confronted with this information, Martinelli confessed that he and the girl were enemy agents. Detailed

*Hq 305th CIC Det, Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, Subject: Enemy Espionage and Sabotage in the United States during 1944 as reported by FBI, dtd 3 Jan 45 (S) (KCD 6-8-115)

**Report from S.S. Hill-Dillon, Col. GS at AFHQ to AC of S, G-2, RAAC, dtd Sep 44 (In G-2 File) (S) (C)

interrogation of Martinelli over a period of several days by S/A's John H. Richardson and Gordon M. Messing of the Army Detachment, revealed a large store of information of the GIS, Abwehr Kommando 190 which had trained and dispatched him, and other enemy agents sitting in or due in AOT. During the confession, Martinelli also implicated Carla Costa as his companion on his last journey into Allied territory and indicated that she was the No. 1 enemy female espionage agent.

From this detailed description and from leads picked up by agents in Florence, the route of her planned return to German territory was learned and all check-posts were alerted. Agents of the Detachment began combing the area and on 23 October, S/A Gordon B. Mason apprehended Costa near Pontepetri, making her way to a thinly held sector of the lines. Within minutes, S/A Alba H. Warren arrived at the same spot, after sweeping the road from the opposite direction.

The CIC Agents were amazed. It was hard to imagine that the pretty young girl they held could be the No. 1 woman agent. During the following days, when Costa proved to be the most stubborn and tenacious agent captured, they came to appreciate her high standing.

Costa at first refused to talk even after a white handkerchief which she carried had been heated over a candle to reveal the words - "ANHOERIGER DER ARMEE - LUFTFLOTTE ZU LEITEN" (Member of the Army - Lead to Air Force Headquarters), the identity documents of an Abwehr Kommando 190 Agent.*

Spingarn reported, "Various....devices have been employed without success, including confronting her with Martinelli....who crossed the lines with her.

".....I have virtually arrived at the conclusion that no short-term psychological treatment will persuade the girl to talk, which is a great pity since she is undoubtedly a walking gold mine of information of important CI value."**

It wasn't until 28 October, after about 60 hours of persistent interrogation, that Carla Costa proudly admitted that she was an enemy agent who had completed two successful missions. She steadfastly refused, despite several days of intense interrogation by S/A Messing, Major Cesare Faccio (Chief, SIM) and Major Spingarn, to disclose any information about her employers, her contacts or other agents.

Costa made one "slip" at this time when she admitted that her home was in Rome. At once, a priority call was made to the CIC Detachment, AAF/MTO, Section "M" in Rome, which provided at short notice

*Monthly Info Report TO: CG, ASF dtd 5 Dec 44, page 2 (S)
**Memorandum for the files - from 305th CIC Detachment dtd 26 Oct 44 (G-2 Files)

an extensive report on her background and on members of her group. This information could have been gathered before; the description of Costa which was previously circulated had mentioned her "Roman accent."

But the speed of the Air Force Detachment in following up the lead was extraordinary. Spingarn, in a later report, said that within 60 hours of receipt of the request by the 305th CIC, the Air Force CIC had investigated, collated, audited, typed, and returned a 20 page report on Costa without which it would have been impossible to "break" her.

Carla Costa was "broken" and the information she gave concerning both herself and Colonel David's group of woman Agents did much to aid CIC in capturing future line-crossers.

Costa's personal history was fantastic when one realized that she was only 17 years old. She had joined Colonel David's group on 2 June 44, just before the city fell to the Allies, because of her fervent faith in the Fascist cause and much against her parent's desires. She left Rome for Milan on 4 June with the rest of the group and through a series of events, met Bauer, Reimer, and finally Kora of Abwehr Kommando 190.

On 10 August she crossed into AOT and went to Florence to gain information on Allied troops in the area. She returned to EOT on 15 August and two days later left for Rome. She stopped at Florence again on the way to Rome for more information and finally reached the "Eternal City" through refugee channels. While in Rome she contacted Nella David, daughter-in-law of the German espionage agent, Colonel David, and also two stay-behind Agents who were subsequently apprehended by CIC personnel.

After her return from this second mission, she went to Gardone on Lake Garla where she had a private audience with Mussolini. He informed her that he wished all Italian women were like her and that she was to be awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd class. Upon her return from the interview, she was told that she was to be recommended for the Medaglia d' Argento (the Italian Silver Star), the second highest Italian military award.

On 14 October, Costa along with Mario Martinelli, crossed into AOT in what was to be their "swan song," although at the time neither knew it. Martinelli went to Florence and Costa went to Rome, where she again saw Nella David and picked up information on Allied movements in that city. It was on her return that she was apprehended.*

*Report from Hq of Allied Armies in Italy, dtd 12 Nov 44 (G-2 Files)

indicating that one Aldo Nieri was working for the GIS. Later investigation by the two CIC Agents in Pistoia (after they had been transferred to that city) revealed that Nieri had not been seen since the German evacuation.

On 22 December 1944 Nieri was apprehended in Pistoia in the uniform of a Captain in the Royal Italian Army. He confessed during interrogation that he had been recruited in June 1944 by Abwehr Truppe 152 and given the mission of remaining in Lucca after the Allied occupation. He had been arrested by the Partisans on 28 August and sent to a PW camp at Casoria. Eventually he was turned over to Italian authorities and after a cursory screening, was taken into the Italian Royal Army with the rank of Captain because of his previous rank of tenente di vascello in the X Flottiglia MAS. This "cover" was perfect and only the apprehension by CIC prevented him from doing great damage to the Allies.*

Winged Agents

In January 1945, CIC agents of the Fifth Army detachments had to deal with a new type of high-level collaborationist; carrier pigeons under German control. Attention of the CIC to the presence of these pigeons was brought by an Italian civilian in the town of Montecarelli who discovered a bird with a message in German attached to his leg. The pigeongram indicated that the pigeon had been released from San Donino and was being dispatched to Modena along with a forward echelon of eight other birds. Some concern was voiced at CIC Headquarters as to the designation of the solitary captive. Since he had crossed Allied lines, he was technically an enemy agent but having wandered off his course, he seemed entitled to the rights and privileges of a prisoner of war. Although the apprehension of this pigeon provided a moment of comic relief, CIC agents were mindful of future attempts to transmit messages by these airborne carriers and all Fifth Army detachments were alerted to investigate cases of captured pigeons.**

A New Detachment Receives a Hasty Education

CIC in the Fifth Army area was strengthened on 24 January 1945 by the arrival of the 10th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Franklin Cave, and attached to the 10th Mountain Division. The Detachment had arrived at Naples on 18 January and five days later proceeded to Livorno by boat.*** Fifth Army CIC had a hastily improved indoctrination course awaiting this newly-formed detachment in Livorno. CIC detachment commanders and agents as well as officials from OSS,

*Monthly Information Report, TO: CG, ASF, dtd December 1944, page 3 (S)
**Memorandum, Subject: "Carrier Pigeons as a Possible Means of Communication Between Enemy Agents in AOT and the GIS" to: SAIC, Each Section, CIC Fifth Army, dtd 19 Jan 45 (C)
***History of the 10th CIC Detachment (J-116) page 1 (C)

Because of her age and sex, Fifth Army CIC took especial interest in her. After she had divulged all the information she knew concerning her companions and employers, an effort was made to make her see her error and the harm she had perpetrated both on herself and on her family.

This effort failed, although one poem she wrote while in the prison awaiting trial showed that her conscience had been touched, at least to a minor extent. She wrote:

"Fascist Carla Costa
Was born and died a sinner
Betrayed God, her country, her family...
O Pilgrim, you may dispense with your prayers!"*

On 18 December she was brought to trial and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Mario Martinelli was given the death penalty.

On 20 December 1944, after her trial ended, S/A Gordon M. Messing of the Army Detachment visited Costa in her cell, perhaps for one last try to make her "see the light," although ostensibly it was to gather any remaining intelligence information she wished to give. Costa said that she could not understand why people were so interested in her. She observed that the nuns had visited her and smiled as she related the episode. Messing asked her if she were not a little ashamed to laugh at these women who treated her kindly and were genuinely sorry for her. To this, Costa replied that she was not mocking the nuns, but that somehow, laughter was the only response of which she was capable in a situation where another person would perhaps find an occasion for tears.

Once during the interview, when told she was arguing like a little girl, Costa replied, "Well I am a little girl."

In his report, Messing summed up his feelings by saying that Costa was, "....emotionally immature and incapable of appreciating the emotion of others. She is able to immune herself within the tight walls of her impervious fanaticism, caring nothing for other values and indeed despising them."**

Thus the colorful case of the No. 1 enemy woman espionage agent ended and Fifth Army CIC returned to the less colorful but equally important task of capturing other agents.

Another case actually began in September when S/A's Furniss and Warren entered Lucca with front line troops and uncovered information

*Report to AC of S, G-2, (CI) Fifth Army, dtd 10 Nov 44 (In G-2 Files)
**306th CIC Detachment Report on Final Interview, dtd 20 Dec 44 (G-2 Files)
***History of the 10th CIC Detachment, Fifth Army,

AMG and British Security units served as "visiting professors" at this CIC "university," and gave the fledgling agents a forecast of things to come. Included in the twenty-two hours of lecturers and discussions were a brief account of CIC activities from the beachhead landing at Salerno, a review of detachments, static and tactical, employed in the campaign, and detailed summaries of civilian control, road blocks, refugee screening, town arrests, report writing, and the many other activities that CIC had been engaged in during the Italian campaign. By the close of this concentrated course, the new agents were filled with information which they were soon to put to practical test during their active training with the IV Corps CIC Detachment and its sub-sections.*

Since the Detachment was still inexperienced in CIC operations, they remained with IV Corps sub-sections at San Marcello and Bagni di Lucca until 17 February when they were relieved and officially attached to the 10th Mountain Division which at that time was holding the sector around Lizzano. On 19 February, the Detachment moved its office there and began operating as a separate unit.

The command of the Detachment shifted on 1 March to 1st Lieutenant James P. Furniss, formerly with CIC, Fifth Army, Lieutenant Cave moving to CIC, PBS.**

As the front was static at this period, most attention was focused on the control of movement. The usual combined MP-Carabinieri roving patrol and checkpoint system was established and was augmented by CIC spot checks. Lieutenant Furniss emphasized the need for acquainting the troops of the 10th Mountain Division with some of the ruses that enemy agents might employ to worm through Allied lines. In a training memorandum issued several days after he had taken charge of the 10th CIC Detachment, Lt Furniss recommended that all tactical troops develop a skeptical attitude toward the civilians they encountered near the battle line:

"A good practice for men on the front is to consider all persons suspect until they are able to prove their innocence....Spies have crossed the lines dressed as priests or nuns or leading flocks of sheep. No matter how innocent their appearance, all persons who have crossed the front, who wish to cross into enemy-held territory, or who in any way are suspicious in a front area should be escorted to the Divisional PW enclosure where they will be interrogated by CIC counter intelligence agents." The lessons of CIC in Italy had not been learned in vain. As a result of this coverage, an average of from 15 to 20 persons were arrested and convicted weekly.

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*Hq 305th CIC Detachment, Ltr to AC of S, G2, Hq Fifth Army, Subject: CIC Indoctrination Course for Newly Arrived CIC Detachment, dtd 29 Jan 45 (S) (KCD 6-8-113)

**History of the 10th CIC Detachment (J-116), page 2 (C)

One of the most interesting enemy agents, Ivo Zanardi, was apprehended in late March by the Detachment. Upon interrogation, he admitted being on his twelfth mission into AOT. His assignment was to collect any information on the Division's preparations for the spring offensive and from him, CIC was able to learn the status of German preparations. The information Zanardi gave also led to the arrest of Arriano Righi who had been acting as a double Agent within the Division area.

This operation to secure the area prior to the offensive was the main task of the Detachment. All civilians in the area were screened and those considered dangerous were moved. On 10 April 1945, four days before the offensive began, the Detachment moved its offices to Campidello.*

CIC and the New Political Scene

The Fascists had been barely rooted out of the province of Bologna late in March 1945, when trouble arose from another corner. In spite of AMG proclamations that emphatically prohibited political meetings in recently-liberated communes, reports were received by agents of the 501st CIC Detachment that civilians and partisans in Camugnano and Riola de Vergato were participating in organized gatherings. Under the guise of a social affair, each meeting was in actuality a call for membership in the Communist party. There was nothing spontaneous about these meetings; strangers to the communists such as refugees and "visiting dignitaries" were prime movers in the organization of a recruitment campaign. Heavily infiltrated Partisan groups used the prestige and power they had gained in the liberation to the Communists' advantage. The principal targets of the organizers were the poor farmers who owned little, if any, of the war-ravaged lands. Prevalent rumors were seized upon and embellished. Citizens were supported in their fear that when the Allied troops left, Italy would be thrown into a turmoil similar to the confusion that followed on the heels of World War I.

The Communist power of persuasion extended in another direction as well. One family which refused to enroll in the party was threatened by denunciation to the Allied forces as Republican Fascists. Physical violence was considered an expression of party zeal, and unmarried girls of the communes were warned that if they refused to become Communists or were seen in the company of Allied soldiers, their hair would be cut. The girls who enrolled were offered a gold pin with hammer and sickle on a red background as a symbol of their new allegiance. Weapons used by partisans in their guerrilla efforts against the Germans were stored and only old, useless and rusty weapons were turned in at the demand of AMG.

*History of the 10th CIC Detachment (J-116) (C)

In the face of this Communist activity, the American Forces realized that their hands were tied. Informants were hard to recruit since they were reluctant to risk recognition. The morale of the Carabinieri and pro-Ally civilians was seriously stricken by fear of reprisals once the protection of the Allied Armies was removed. But the CIC agents realized that the arrest of a few ringleaders would be a warning for the Communist movement to burrow underground, and the prisoners would become martyrs of the cause. If allowed to continue without any Allied interference, the situation was liable to swell to the point where it would be impossible to counteract any possible subversion.

The only solution lay in a middle course. A reliable informant net-work protected by complete anonymity could be set up to help compile individual case histories. Persons who were clearly attempting to subvert Allied interests would be categorized as security threats. Beyond these measures, the CIC agents could make no recommendations. The security of Allied troops would be insured by constant surveillance of Communist activities; future control of the Communists was a matter for legislative chambers and conference tables.*

*Hq 501st CIC Detachment, Memo for the OIC, Subject: Political Activities and Possible Subversion in Camugnano and Riola di Vergato Areas, dtd 29 Mar 45, (S) (KCD 6-1-3)

Section 5

STATIC DETACHMENTS BUSY ON CLEAN-UP WORK

While the CIC Detachments along the front were busily engaged in thwarting the onslaught of the German Intelligence Service, the detachments located in the large cities already captured by the Allies were engaged in cleaning out German post-occupational agents. The 426th CIC Detachment in Rome was perhaps the busiest of all.

This detachment, commanded by Major Floyd C. Snowden and attached to the Rome Area Allied Command, had entered the city soon after it fell to the Allies. Segments of the detachment had participated in the "S" Force attack on the city and although much counterintelligence work was accomplished by that group, the majority of the work remained to be done by the detachment after the "S" Force withdrew.

When the Allied lines were only a short distance from Rome, a number of line corssers were able to infiltrate into the city and contact the post-occupational agents. During these months, the total number of arrests was high, with 55 in June; 88 in July; 64 in August; 51 in September and 78 in October.* During the winter months of 1944-45, arrests were fewer and centered mainly on those enemy agents who had successfully made their way through the line. The success of this Detachment was widespread and its end results important. By capturing infiltrating and stay-behind enemy agents, the Detachment kept the rear areas of the Allied Army clear - a definite morale lifter for the men "up front."

The Germans attempted to infiltrate agents into Rome by wagon, car, truck, footpower and even by boat. On 16 July 1944, when Lino Masin was approached, a new way was discovered. Masin, a member of the SA group of the German Espionage system, had been assigned a mission on 12 July, to be dropped by parachute, completely equipped with radio (w/t) and codes. He was ordered to assume the personality of a newswriter and to infiltrate the political party which appeared to be most popular and from this to penetrate an Allied organization.

Masin had succeeded in penetrating a political party at the time of his apprehension. He was brought to trial before an AMG General Military Court on charges of being an espionage agent, was found guilty and was sentenced to be shot.**

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*Subject: Statistical Report of CIC, 426th CIC Detachment, Rome Area MTOUSA, dtd 22 Jan 45 TO: AC of S, G2, Rome Area MTOUSA (S)

**Subject: CIC Situation Summary Report TO: AC of S, G2, AFHQ, dtd 1 Sep 44, (I-22) page 25 (C)

Mass Arrests Made in Rome

At the time of Masin's arrest, CIC realized that Rome was virtually "loaded" with either suspected collaborators or actual enemy agents. In an attempt to apprehend them a surprise raid was made on 20 places simultaneously at 2300 hours on 27 July with more than 125 Allied personnel participating, including CIC, British FSS and the American Provost Marshal. This raid netted 33 suspects. A coordinated system was initiated during the raid whereby telephones were tapped and the conversations immediately relayed to CIC Headqunrters, where they were digested and instructions sent to the raiding parties by messengers.* Although German SS official Dollman, the prize target, was not found, many important arrests were included in the 33.

A similar raid of 27 places at 0600 hours on 10 October 1944 resulted in arrests of 24 persons who were considered most dangerous to Allied security from the study of their past actions, as contained in the Italian Police (Questura) questionnaire.**

A constant thorn in the side of the Rome CIC Detachment during its jurisdiction over the "Eternal City" was the presence of an espionage ring called the German SD Unit IDA. This ring maintained stay-behind agents in Rome and was constantly sending other agents into the city to contact them and receive espionage information.

On 10 October 1944, CIC agents arrested and by means of interrogation found that he had been instructed as to the details of his mission by Major Hass and Lieutenant Schubening, who were attached to German SD, Section 6, with Headquarters at Via Tassa, Rome, prior to the Allied occupation.

Major Hass had instructed to obtain information concerning 19 questions, 12 of which are listed here. They were:

"(1) Return with copies of newspaper circulated in Rome.
(2) Location of Allied Headquarters.
(3) Allied troops in Rome and name of units.
(4) Political parties, their strength and leaders.
(5) Conduct of Allied troops and specific cases of misconduct.
(6) Italian views of the occupation in Rome.
(9) Fascists who can be trusted by the Germans.
(10) Opinion of Allies regarding German espionage system.
(12) Procurement of labels and wrappers used by the Allies, viz., chewing gum and chocolate wrappers, cigarette

*Statistical Report of the CIC, 426th CIC Detachment, Rome Area MTOUSA, dtd 22 Jan 45 TO: AC of S, G-2, Rome Area MTOUSA, page 3 (S)
**Ibid

package, etc., in order that Germans can cause poisoning of troops.

(14) The arrest of German SS Agents and disposition.

(17) Location of Allied Intelligence Units and billets.

(19) Fascists who have been executed."

When captured, carried a cigarette with the letters "ADI" printed on the wrapper and containing a small piece of paper, written in German and signed by Hass, which was to be used for passage through the German lines on the return trip.

proved a useful agent - but not for the Germans. In addition to giving the information already listed, he admitted that he was to be a contact man for other agents soon to follow him. On the 1st, 10th, 20th and 30th of each month, was to appear in , by which action he was to identify himself to any enemy agents seeking contact.*

The 426th CIC Detachment ordered him to follow these instructions. On 20 October, 30 October and 1 November, he was removed from and placed in position, No agents attempted to make contact on these three occasions. On 1944, while standing at the column, a young man appeared and, calling him by his cover name of stated. " Together they crossed and entered a cafe in the

and the young man then appeared in front of the cafe and were greeted by a woman. Immediately, Special Agents Bruno A. Francazzi, Thomas R. McCabe, Rene Francazzi, George Terry, Anthony Scalora and Paul DeMare placed the two under arrest.

The two captured proved to be Armando Bianchi and Silene Badio, both affiliated with German SD Unit IDA, who had been sent to collect any political, economic, military, or general information. Each had received 20,000 lire, an English Sterling piece, and a "Serraglio" brand cigarette, which would guarantee safe access through German lines on the completion of their mission. Bianchi stated that Lieutenant Schubenig had ordered him to smoke the cigarette containing the German document if apprehended by Allied authorities.

The interrogation of these Agents revealed an important intelligence disclosure: the Germans had recently opened a sabotage school at Longone, just outside of Erba, and for it were recruiting members of the Italian parachute divisions and the Italian Republican Navy.**

*Monthly Information Report TO: CG, ASF dtd 1 Dec 44 (C)
**Memo for the OIC, Subject: German SS Hq IDA, dtd 15 Nov 44 (S)

[illegible] was important since CIC personnel could be alerted to watch for certain characteristics inherent in Italian military men as opposed to the average Italian civilian. Information such as this formed the basis for the "Patterns Report" distributed by the Fifth Army CIC Detachment in November.

At this time, the German SD Unit IDA was a powerful organization, requiring much attention by the 426th CIC Detachment. That fact that it was visibly disintegrating was forceably brought to the attention of the Detachment when Gianpiero Minerva was apprehended.

Minerva was arrested while contacting an individual planted by CIC in place of the original contact who had been arrested four months earlier. Some doubt as to the over-all competency of the German organization was aroused by the fact that they were evidently still attempting to contact a man arrested four months previously. Minerva's arrest led, on 16 February 1945, to the arrest of his partner.*

Rome Radio Ring Broken

The plan whereby a captured German agent was used to apprehend other agents sent to contact him was put into effect successfully many times by the 426th CIC Detachment. In one case it led to the "breaking" of a radio ring in Rome which was sending important military information to the Germans.

Early in December 1944, through devices used by Road Calls Signal Company, SCU Unit No. 4, radio transmission frequencies were detected very strongly in an area within a radius of two hundred yards from Piazza San Pantaleo. On 14 December, surveillance teams began a sound detecting and surveilling operation in the neighborhood, with the ultimate aim of raiding and searching the building indicated as containing a transmission radio. Two days later, the area from which the transmission could be originating was limited to a specified block.

During the process of this operation, an enemy courier agent, named Leonida Dell'Arte, alias "Giorgi," was dropped by parachute in the Sienna area on 10 December 1944. Dell'Arte made his way to Rome and, fortunately, surrendered himself to Allied authorities. Subsequent interrogation of Dell'Arte revealed that he had been assigned the mission of contacting one of two post-occupational agents in Rome, and of turning over to him the sum of 500,000 lire and two radio crystals. This contact was to be made at the Italfaro on the Gianicolo, near a white tower structure, where he was to go every Wednesday and Saturday at 1200 hours until contact was made. The post-occupational Agent was to recognize Dell'Arte by a black cigarette holder which he was to place in his mouth, and by the password "porco" to be said by the Agent, with the answer, "miseria," by Dell'Arte.

*Monthly Information Report TO: CG, ASF, dtd 1 Mar 45 (S)

The Detachment decided to allow the contact to be made with an immediate surveillance of the contact man to determine where he lived and his operational point and accomplice. Dell'Arte was instructed to inform the contact Agent that he had not brought the money or the crystals as he was not sure what he would find, and to ask for another appointment.

Although the crystals were of a frequency range different from that in use by the enemy radio agents, the Detachment knew that these agents were experiencing difficulty in broadcasting on their frequency range and hoped that they were attempting to change the range.

On 16 December the scheduled plan was put into operation. At 1200 hours, contact was made with Dell'Arte by an unknown person, who was "tailed" immediately after he left Dell'Arte. This person succeeded in losing the tailing agents of the Detachment; however, hope was restored when Dell'Arte disclosed that he had made another appointment for the following day at 1210 hours, under the clock in the main entrance of the Stazione Termini.

On 17 December at 1250 hours, a different person made contact with Dell'Arte, who this time carried the money and radio crystals. Dell'Arte, following instructions, guided the enemy agent to a spot around the corner of the railroad station, at which point the surveilling agents of the Detachment closed in and arrested him.

An immediate interrogation was conducted in the rear of the station and after a few minutes, the contacting person admitted to being one Ernst Riegler, alias "Riga." Riegler admitted he was to return with the money and crystals to his partner, Heinrich Gallmetzer, alias "Heine," at Piazza del Biscione #90. A surveillance team was sent to the address indicated to await the appearance of "Heine," who, according to his partner, was not expected to return home until 1700 hours. The time element was urgent as it appeared that Riegler was lying about his partner and was attempting to stall in order to give him time. After the surveillance team left, Riegler was interrogated once more by Captain Spears of CSDIC.

During the ensuing interrogation, it was learned that the radio used by "Riga" and "Heine" was hidden in a gas meter cubby-hole, to the right of the entrance at Piazza del Biscione #90. A raid and search party was dispatched and discovered the radio transmission set at 1450 hours. They also discovered that Gallmetzer, alias "Heine," had been arrested by the previously dispatched surveillance team at 1350 hours. Although never officially confirmed, it was fortunate that the surveillance team that apprehended "Heine" was dispatched immediately, as there was probably some plan between the agents whereby "Heine" would leave at a certain hour if "Riga" failed to return.

Both enemy agents were from Abwehr Group 150. Of the team, "Riga" was the radio operator and "Heine" was the informer. It was further learned that Riegler was an Unteroffizier (non-commissioned officer) of the Luftwaffe and Gallmetzer was a Lanzer (Private) in the Panzer Regiment of the German Army. Both men had been trained in an Abwehr espionage school at Innsbruck, Austria, prior to December 1943 and were brought to Bologna and then to Rome, arriving there in December. In February 1944, they began to operate as espionage agents.

The Germans considered this radio operation very important. When the Nazis withdrew from Rome in June 1944, "Riga" and "Heine" were given 100,000 lire to last until they were contacted, false identity cards, excellent cover stories and an apartment stocked with food. Their mission was to observe and report by radio all military movements noted by them, with direct reference to size, type, direction, time and date of these movements.

Their actual cover in the apartment was excellent. The transmission set was concealed in a small suitcase which to all appearances looked too small and innocent to be of any harm. In addition, they had strung the antenna wire on the terrace of their apartment, in between several clothes line wires, and covered the egg-shaped white insulators with black tape for concealment. The position of their apartment and the camouflage of the antenna and insulators made it practically impossible to detect the presence of the antenna unless looked directly down upon. This was impossible since the terrace was the highest point of the building.

With the capture of these enemy agents, a radio which had been transmitting from February 1944, and as late as 15 December 1944, was stopped. In the aftermath, it was interesting to note that the building indicated by the detection crew that had been sent out on 1 December was the immediate building to the south of the one in which "Riga" and "Heine" had lived, transmitted, and frustrated the Allies for eleven months.*

A Continuous Political Survey

Capturing enemy agents was not the only forte of the Detachment. Agents of the 426th CIC also kept a close survey of the stirrings of revised political parties. In March 1945, a four party coalition was in control of the government as a makeshift arrangement pending the complete liberation of the country. Weighed down by such basic problems as inflation, food shortage and unemployment, the government's early days in power were marked more by fits than starts. A persistent rumor that hindered the government's progress represented the Assembly

*Monthly Information Report TO: CG, ASF, dtd 1 Jan 45 (S)

as a puppet regime with the Allied forces manipulating the strings. But the need for a strong Allied position on the future of Italy was evident if a solid political center was to be formed. The bewildered masses of the country were searching aimlessly for leaders to rely on, and a situation ripe for the artists of subversion on the extreme Right and extreme Left was developing. The Rome press was not above suspicion. CIC agents investigated and halted a clandestine Fascist movement that had distributed a virulently anti-Allied newspaper. A close watch was maintained on the editorial comments of other newspapers as CIC heeded the warning of a confidential informant on one of the journals who claimed that "freedom of the press has become license in Italy."*

Detachment Protects Congressional Party

The security mission of the 246th CIC Detachment extended in several directions. In December 1944, Special Agent Harry J. Murphy and Agent Louis Eliopulos were sent to the Grand Hotel in Rome to make all necessary security precautions for the stay of a Congressional Party from the United States.

Military Police were organized into a roving patrol to cover the first floor of the Congressmen's hotel, and arrangements were made to block the street during arrival and departure times. The only incident occurred when the CIC agents had "...to reprimand the civilian waiter for permitting the switchboard operator to go up to the second floor to have a cup of coffee."**

This was only one sidelight in the everyday routine of CIC work, and the success of this operation bears testimony to the over-all success this Detachment experienced during its stay in Rome.

428th Acts as Theater Headquarters

The 428th CIC Detachment was an outgrowth of the CIC organization that accompanied the first American troops to the shores of North Africa. The first CIC organization in Africa was an overhead theater unit assigned to the North African Theater of Operations. With the publication of T/OSE 30-500, all Detachments were reorganized under War Department authority: the 428th being established as the MTOUSA Headquarters Detachment.***

*Hq 426th CIC Detachment, Memo for CIC, Subject: Political Situation in Rome, dtd 1 April 1945, (Confidential) (KCD 7-3-27)
**Memorandum for the OIC; Subj: Security of Congressional Party, 19 Dec 44 (C)
***Memorandum for the OIC; Subj: Observations and Comments Concerning the 428th CIC Detachment, dtd 2 Feb 48 (C)

In May 1944 Major Ralph W. Powers replaced Major Edward L. Ray as commander of this Detachment.* MTOUSA Headquarters moved to Italy in June 1944, its personnel with it.**

In Italy, the major function of the 428th CIC Detachment was to operate as the theater headquarters for CIC. All personnel were assigned to this unit and placed on detached service with CIC sub-detachments attached to Armies, Corps, Air Forces, Divisions, and Base Sections.*** Although it had its own staff of agents who did routine investigative work, the supervising of the other Detachments had priority over all other work.

One of the first foreign decorations was awarded Major Powers on 17 June 1944 when he was named to the grade of honorary Legionnaire 1st class for exceptional service rendered the Foreign Legion. The award was made by Colonel Lambert, commanding the Common Depot of the Foreign Legion.****

PBS Reorganized

The Peninsular Base Section with Headquarters at Naples was undergoing changes. The first occurred on 25 August 1944 when the 6784th, 6785th, 6786th, and 6787th CIC Detachments (overhead) were disbanded in the vicinity of Naples. On 26 August 1944, pursuant to authority contained in Paragraph II, General Order 184, Hq, Peninsular Base Section, the 430th CIC Detachment was activated, with Captain Jack B. Cameron as commander. Major Papurt had previously left PBS CIC for OSS, with which organization he later was killed.

The second change was effected by the rapid advance of the Allied Armies. As Cameron reported in his August Situation Summary, "...the expansion of territory is beginning to stretch C.I.C., P.B.S. like an accordian without any decrease of activity or responsibility in the Naples Area. Sooner or later one or the other must give; that is, C.I.C., P.B.S. will be stretched to such a point that adequate coverage will be impossible, or as we progress northward, less security emphasis must be placed on the territory to the rear. As long, however, as Naples remains the chief Allied port in Italy, security will be largely centered in its immediate area."

The establishment of two new sections by PBS alleviated the situation to a large degree as through use of these sections, wider coverage could be afforded. The first section was formed in June 1944 and was called the Transient Control Section. In reality, it was divided into

*Monthly Information Report TO: CG, ASF, dtd 1 Feb 45 (C)
**Memorandum for the OIC; Subj: Observations and Comments Concerning the 428th CIC Detachment, dtd 2 Feb 45 (C)
***Memo for OIC - Observations and Comments about 428th, dtd 2 Feb 45(C)
****Subj: Award of Foreign Decoration TO: CO, 428th dtd, 1 Dec 44 (C)

two sections, one section operating in the Naples area and extending its control as far north as the Gargliano River, and the other section handling travel control north and immediately south of Rome.

The second section was established in August 1944 and was called the Research Section. This section studied reports from the various security agencies, covering every aspect of value to security work. The advantage of this occurred when CIC, PBS moved into territory relinquished by, for example, Fifth Army and was able to send Agents into various towns, armed with definite facts as to conditions, names of partisans, lists of suspects who fled arrest, and such other data as would be necessary for CIC sub-sections to possess for intelligence operation. It also provided a continuous flow of pertinent information to sub-sections after they were established.*

CIC, PBS continued expanding as the Allied Armies moved northward. When the Allies finally set-up their winter line in the Apennines, the 430th CIC covered the largest amount of territory of any Detachment in Italy. Territorial jurisdiction extended from Naples to Pisa with the exclusion of the City of Rome, and a sub-section was even maintained in that city to handle PBS territory immediately north and south of Rome Province. Although the area extended inland only to an average of 25 miles, there were 300 miles of coast line to cover, which presented a constant security threat.

Adequate coverage was established by the coordination and utilization of CIC Agents of both Fifth Army and PBS. Either Detachment was ready to provide assistance during any problem that confronted them, and in this way, almost completely defeated all German attempts to infiltrate the area and cause damage.**

U.S. Citizen Apprehended by PBS

On 1 November 1944, when was apprehended, the Agents of the 430th CIC Detachment again proved an age-old adage, i.e., a citizen is not necessarily a patriot.

was born in the United States at Pennsylvania, on 15 July 1914, of Italian-born parents. He left American in 1932 to study engineering and architecture at the The activities in which he took part during the 12 years before his apprehension in 1944 were important enough to produce 12 charges on which he could be tried.

*Monthly CIC Situation Summary - August: TO: AC of S, G-2, AFHQ - 31 Aug 44 (S)

**Organization and Operation of CIC, PBS TO: CO, 305th CIC Detachment from 430th CIC Detachment, dtd 6 Jan 45 (S)

He was a confirmed liar. When something he previously said was disproved, he would simply substitute another falsehood. In the last analysis, when he was confronted by the evidence proving he lied, he would declare, "I am being persecuted. You don't understand me. I came to Italy to obtain classical culture."* Agents of the Detachment realized that his tactics were to substitute one lie for another, all information about his activities would have to be proved from outside sources. It was not difficult.

During the many interrogations that followed, reported that he had taken 25 examinations at the University between 1932 and 1943; that he was never a member of the Fascist party; that after the outbreak of war between the United States and Italy, he disseminated anti-Fascist propaganda; that he had worked at times for both CIC, Fifth Army and OSS and had been discharged, in one case by the officers' dislike for him and in the other because he [illegible] advances of an officer who was a homosexual.

He also reported that he was brought to trial by AMG and acquitted, as his story on the homosexual was proved correct, and that from June 1944 until his apprehension, he had not been employed.

claimed that his possession of American clothes, food, cigarettes, and his boarding of ships was due to his association with American officers, purely on a social basis. This last admission was the only one resembling the truth. Because he had lived in Italy for so long and could speak English and Italian so fluently, was very popular with Allied personnel who wished female companionship. The favors he received for arranging these meetings were evidenced when agents of the detachment raided his apartment and found everything from American butter to expensive cameras.**

While held in Poggioreale Prison during his interrogation, succeeded in smuggling out letters to American Army officers socially associated with him, asking them to intervene in his behalf. How well had been able to sell himself to the Allied personnel can be illustrated by the Detachment's report which related that "....intervention was attempted in Subject's behalf by American Army Officers at the United States Consulate and at this office. Such intervention even went so far as to have one Officer question the authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, PBS, and CIC to hold Subject

reports were proved incorrect, one by one. It was learned that he had not attended the University since 1936 and yet had

*Sub: TO: AC of S, G-2, Hq, PBS, dtd 19 Jan 45 (C)
**Search and Seizure Report, dtd 3 November 1944 and 19 January 1945 (C)
***Subj: AC of S, G-2, Hq, P.B.S., dtd 19 Jan 1945 (C)

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refused repatriation in 1942, declaring to U.S. Consulate officials that he wished to remain and finish school and receive his degree the next term. It was also proved that he had joined the GUF, University Group of the Fascist Party.

Since there was no mention of on the Fascist reprisal records, agents knew he had not been an active anti-Fascist as he claimed. based his arrest by the SIM on 22 June 1943 as being indicative of his anti-Fascist record; however, it was proved that he was apprehended for forging an identity card and having illegal possession of four ration cards for clothing. Since he had escaped from Regina Coeli prison on 26 July 1943, he was still wanted by the Italian authorities.

had worked for Allied Intelligence. In September, after escaping from Italian authorities, he passed through Italian and German lines and reached Capri where he made contact with U.S. Army representatives who took him to Fifth Army Headquarters, Salerno, for interrogation. There he managed to convince Army authorities of his citizenship and subsequently was used by CIC, Fifth Army, as an interpreter. He was employed for one month and was discharged because of unsuitability and because Spingarn, Commanding Officer of the Detachment, felt he had all the earmarks of a petty criminal.

After his discharge, worked for one month for OSS, but he was discharged again for the same reasons observed by CIC, Fifth Army. He was tried by AMG on various counts ranging from illegal requisitions to possession of Army equipment, but was acquitted

The fact that he had worked for Allied Intelligence was not damaging except to the extent that after his discharge, he continued to represent himself as a "....U.S. Army employee, a Secret Agent of the U.S. Government and as a C.I.C. Agent."* Also among his personal papers when apprehended was an address book containing the names, home addresses, APO's and unit assignment of CIC personnel he originally contacted at Fifth Army. As Cameron reported, "The names of CIC personnel also would be welcome by the enemy and would endanger the life of every CIC man so listed in Subject's address book."**

Spingarn reported in a memorandum to Major Cameron, "My analysis of ...., is that he is a sharp-shooter and petty thief who has lived by his wits...for a long time. I am sure that many criminal charges could be preferred against him, and it is by no means impossible that a charge of treason for adhering to the enemy in time of war might also lie. Despite his corruptness, however, I should be

*Subject: TO: AC of S, G-2, Hq, PBS, dtd 28 Nov 44 (C)
**Subject: TO: AC of S, G-2, Hq, PBS, dtd 19 Jan 45 (C)

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inclined to doubt that he has been in contact with the enemy since he reached AOT."*

Because of freedom and penetration into Allied resources and because of his apparent lack of any feeling for the United States, the 430th CIC Detachment felt that he might just as easily turn to the Germans for monetary reasons. For this reason, Cameron recommended that, "(c) When Allied authorities have disposed of Subject's case, Subject should be turned over to the Italian authorities, Rome, for trial under the charges....of the attached memorandum.

"(d) If Subject's release is effected before the end of the war, Subject should be interned for the duration of the war as a security threat."**

Island Detachments Provide Security

In the overall picture, the mission and responsibility of some detachments were more important than the enemy agents caught. The 427th CIC Detachment, Northern Base Section, located on the island of Corsica, was such a detachment.

In the middle of January 1944, the Northern Base Section was assigned a CIC Detachment under the temporary command of Captain Lucien Picard who was transferred from the Peninsular Base Section to set up this new unit. In an informal letter of instructions, Major Ray advised Captain Picard that "Corsica is virgin territory from the counterintelligence point of view...take care not to get mixed up in black market and other type of activities that have no bearing on CI work."*** The arrival of the CIC had been anxiously awaited by the G2 of the Northern Base Section and also by the OSS men on the island who had been performing some counterintelligence missions.

By 15 March the Detachment had established office space and living quarters for its personnel in Ajaccio and Bastia, the two principal cities on Corsica. Supply problems were paramount. The almost universal CIC dilemma of transportation had a crippling effect on the 427th CIC Detachment. Agents required to make on-the-spot investigations had secured no means of dependable transportation. Requisitions for Army jeeps were tied up in administrative delays and attempts to procure civilian vehicles proved to be of no avail in the early days of the Detachment.

*Memorandum for Major Cameron, Chief, CIC, PBS, Subj: from 305th CIC, dtd 2 Dec 44 (C)
TO::AC of S, G-2, Hq, PBS, dtd 19 Jan 45 (C).
***Ltr to Captain Lucien L. Picard from Major Edward L. Ray, dtd 22 Jan 44 (S) (KCD 7-7-97)

SECRET

The woes of Captain Picard did not begin and end with the Detachment's lack of mobility. He soon discovered that despite the widely stated need for a CIC detachment on Corsica, no authoritative voice would outline the scope of activities to be covered by American counterintelligence on the island. Liaison with the French Securite Militarire was inadequate and basic counterintelligence matters were beset by confusion and contradiction. Failure to appreciate the role of CIC extended up to the Commanding Officer of the Northern Base Section who objected to the wearing of civilian clothes by the agents.

Understanding of the CIC's functions came only after the earnest efforts of Captain Picard and the passage of enough time for the Northern Base Section Command to become familiarized with the Detachment. By April, the 427th CIC was in full swing, and Captain Picard, his mission of establishing the new Detachment accomplished, was replaced by Captain Clarence E. Read.

Under Captain Read, the Detachment became actively engaged in installation, port and airport security in addition to bearing a heavy work load of incident investigations and travel control. An unexpected extra responsibility was the watch for German agents landing from the island of Elba. A request for five additional agents to supplement the nine agents already assigned to the Detachment was a clear indication to the officers back at AFHQ that the island detachment was thriving in the Spring of 1944.

A new major mission developed for the Detachment in May; the reporting of public opinion on Corsica regarding the average Allied soldier. CIC findings were summed up in the monthly report:

"The usual old complaints viz a viz the Americans are repeated in civilian mail censored by the French. Such are lack of 'correctness' in contrast to the British, fondness for liquor, too much interest in women,....being too friendly with the Italian.... By contrast these are interspersed with some approval of American equipment, methods, food, generosity, and gaiety. The above are unusual in base areas.... whenever the civilian population feels the inconvenience of a military occupation removed from the combat zone."*

The importance of these reports on civilian public opinion grew during the summer months as the island took on new strategic significance: Corsica was to be one of the embarkation points for the invasion of Southern France.

The greatest percentage of CIC activity was immediately directed at providing adequate security. In conjunction with the U.S. Military Police and French Agencies, a system of security adapted to the

*Rpt to AC of S, G2 SOS, MTOUSA, Subj: Counter Intelligence Report, dtd 4 May 44 (C)

individual conditions and necessities was instituted for each port, staging area and embarkation point.

During the critical period immediately prior to "D-day," all civilian telephone communication was curtailed, bars were closed in certain sections, travel was not permitted in restricted areas without special passes, and road blocks were established to check all personnel. In addition, civilian travel from Corsica to North Africa was prohibited.

There were incidents of security violations. Contrary to the security measures expected to be imposed upon the incoming troops, the first group to debark had not been previously briefed and, instead of remaining in their various staging areas, were in some cases, given passes to visit the town of Ajaccio. Unfortunately, some officers and enlisted men who had been "briefed" also entered the city or outlying districts.

CIC immediately went into action and by use of force and threats, succeeded in rounding up the stray personnel and shepherding them back to their areas. While in town, the personnel had attempted to spend "invasion money" printed especially for use in France. This money would have given away the destination of the landings; consequently, CIC immediately proceeded to collect and exchange it under various pretexts. A similar situation at Propriano involving French troops was concluded in the same fashion.

Repeated security violations were also committed by Air Force units which, from time to time, brought Italian nationals to Corsica as servants, without proper military or civilian clearance. Not only was it in direct violation of MTOUSA directives but also tended to aggravate an already delicate set of circumstances by placing the Americans in the position of violating French law and "protecting" Italians from French justice. Remedial action was instituted through regular G2 channels and also by the Commanding General, NORBS.*

With the landings in Southern France, all ports and embarkation areas in Corsica were exceptionally busy handling the large numbers of men and ships involved. The 427th CIC Detachment provided strict security but also observed the decline in intelligence activity. They attributed this to the inevitable "let-down" after a period of heavy activity and to the diminished importance of Corsica from an intelligence point of view.

Read reported in the September Intelligence Summary, "With the diminution of Corsica as a factor in the war and the resultant reduction in NORBS strength and activity, counterintelligence activities

*Monthly Intelligence Summary TO: AC of S, G-2, NORBS dtd 31 Aug 44 (S)

have been reduced to a negligible amount. Security activity on a joint French-American basis continues but in skeletonized form."

The Northern Base Section CIC discovered that counterintelligence operations on the island were at an even lower ebb in October. Removal of Headquarters NORBS from Ajaccio to Bastia necessitated the shifting of the 427th CIC Detachment as well. Major Read urged that the Detachment be reassigned in view of its limited functions and suggested that an Air Corps detachment could adequately handle all counterintelligence activities on Corsica.*

On 2 November a cable from MTOUSA set the stage for the transfer of the entire 427th CIC Detachment to Marseilles, France. The next day, the agents boarded a boat bound for the Southern France port. Ten months after its activation, the 427th CIC Detachment had completed its Corsica mission.**

431st CIC on Island of Sardinia

Under command of Lt Nicholas A. Fortunato, the 431st CIC Detachment provided security for the Island of Sardinia. Arriving on 26 April from Naples where it had been activated as part of the City Administration and known as the 6790th CIC Detachment (Provisional), it was renamed the 431st CIC Detachment on 16 August 1944.

Upon arrival in Sardinia, the detachment opened its main office in Cagliari where it was attached to the Allied Garrison Sardinia: later sub-sections were opened in Sassari and Olbia. The Port Security system subsequently developed resulted in a high standard of security in the Port of Cagliari.

Among the outstanding accomplishments of the detachment was the apprehension of a group of enemy agents under the leadership of a priest, Father Luciano Usai. He was apprehended by the detachment on 29 June 1944 after he had been parachuted from a German plane. Later eight other enemy agents were apprehended, and information was obtained that led to the apprehension of a ninth after the Detachment left Sardinia. These enemy Agents, on a mission for the Republican Fascist Minister of the Interior, were equipped with wireless transmitters and large amounts of currency.

On 10 October 1944, the Detachment left Sardinia and proceeded to Naples where it was attached to the Peninsular Base Section and placed under the operational control of the AC of S, G-2. Although it

*Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ from 427th CIC Detachment, Subj: Change in Location of Headquarters, 427th CIC Detachment, dtd 4 Oct 44 (S) (RCD 7-7-112)
**Orders from Hq NORBS, AG-370.5, to Commanding Officer 427th CIC Det, Subj: "Movement of Troops, dtd 3 Nov 44 (S) (RCD 7-7-113)

operated with the 430th CIC Detachment as a single unit known as CIC, PBS, it retained its identity for administrative matters and continued to function as such until 26 June 1945, when it was disbanded per paragraph 1, AG 322/160 C-O, Headquarters MTOUSA, dated 18 June 1945.

As evidence of the outstanding work performed by this Detachment, a commendation received from Allied Garrison Sardinia on 11 October 1944, can be cited:

> "1. This headquarters desires to commend the services rendered by the 431st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment which has been in Sardinia since April 1944.
>
> 2. This unit, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Nicholas A. Fortunato...performed its duties in a superior manner and won the respect and cooperation of both Allied and Italian Commanders and Intelligence Personnel with whom it was associated.
>
> 3. In all matters referred to this Detachment, it demonstrated high efficiency and resourcefulness, particularly where the apprehension of enemy agents was concerned.
>
> 4. The accomplishments of this unit were a definite contribution to the security of Sardinia during the past six months."*

*History of the 431st CIC Detachment TO: Chief, CIC, AFHQ, dtd 27 Jul 45 (C)

Section 6

PO VALLEY CAMPAIGN BRINGS VICTORY

With the arrival of spring, the long awaited attack began. On 5 April 1945, General Truscott ordered the Fifth Army to begin execution of the plan of Battle: a diversionary attack on the west coast. The objectives were Massa, Carrara, the La Spezia naval base and eventually the great port of Genoa. It was hoped that this attack would keep the enemy occupied on the left while bigger game was sought to the east.* On 9 April, General McCreery's Eighth Army launched a powerful, stunning blow from the east coast to open the main attack.

At 0030 hours on 14 April 1945 the last great battle of the Fifth Army in Italy began.

The 10th Mountain Division moved forward from Castel D'Aiano across a valley and up a strongly defended and heavily mined enemy hillside. They were followed in hours and days by II Corps and IV Corps and the divisions under them. General Clark relates that "advancement was measured by inches and feet."**

The attack gained momentum as they advanced from peak to peak and on 20 April the 10th Mountain Division broke out of the Apennines. By dawn on 21 April, Allied troops had entered Bologna, and the end was in sight.

As General Clark reported, "Everywhere the enemy was in disorder as the Allied armies, penned up for bitter months in the mountains, stretched their legs in magnificent strides across the plains."***

The Allies no longer nipped at the heels of the retreating Germans as they had done after the fall of Rome; instead they caught up and devoured them. On the right flank, the 91st Division and others swung in a huge semi-circle across the Po and Adige Rivers and headed toward Treviso and Trieste, with the South Africans sweeping farther northward toward Bolzano.

On the Fifth Army front the 85th and 88th Divisions drove straight north toward Verona and then on into the Alps. The 10th Mountain Division dashed along Lake Garda to Trento, deep in the Alpine ridges. The 1st Armored slashed past Modena and carved a huge circle across the Po Valley in a final dash to Brescia and Milan. The Brazilians

*19 Days from the Apennines to the Alps - The Story of the Po Valley Campaign
**Calculated Risk, by Mark Clark, pp. 431 and 432
***Ibid, page 430

skirted the southern edge of the Valley in a push to Alessandria. On 30 April the city of Turin fell to the Nisei 442nd Infantry Regiment. General Clark reported, "Even the Germans knew that it was all over, and Hitler's suicide in his underground bunker in Berlin merely made it official."*

On 2 May, Fifth Army Headquarters intercepted the enemy's instructions to the German troops stating that they should lay down their arms at two o'clock that afternoon. General Clark noted that, "It was the first time during the war that a German Army group had surrendered unconditionally."**

Nineteen Busy Days for CIC

A period of 19 days had elapsed from the initial assault on the German Gothic Line to the unconditional surrender of the German Armies. These were nineteen very busy days for the United States Counter Intelligence Corps.

The 305th CIC Detachment, under the command of Lt Colonel Spingarn, was ready to participate in all "S" Force operations. They formed the counterintelligence personnel of the Bologna "S" Force on 21 April, the day the city fell. In the four days they remained in the city, more than 20 enemy espionage and sabotage agents were captured plus German Intelligence Service officials, four clandestine radio transmitting sets and certain valuable intelligence documents.

After the fall of Bologna, the Detachment moved forward with advancing troops and formed a segment of the Verona "S" Force. On 26 April, Verona (the headquarters of the German SD in Italy) fell to the Allies and a large number of sabotage agents were apprehended. During the same period, the 305th CIC Detachment performed many small "S" Force operations in such cities as Mantova, Trento, and Vicenza.

The Summing Up

Spingarn summarized the accomplishments of the 305th CIC Detachment during the Italian campaign with a report that it had "captured over 200 German espionage and sabotage agents and German Intelligence Service officials...seized large numbers of clandestine radio transmitters...dug up numerous caches of enemy sabotage explosives, and... arrested and interned hundreds of subversive Italians."***

The impressive work of the 305th CIC Detachment had not passed unnoticed by the Fifth Army High Command. At an awards ceremony at the Fifth Army CP on 15 December 1944, Lieutenant General Mark Clark,

*Clark, Mark W., Calculated Risk, page 435
**Ibid, page 437
***History of the 305th CIC Detachment, page 13 (L-1) (U)

who was leaving Fifth Army to assume command of the Fifteenth Army Group, turned to their Commanding Officer and said: "Spingarn, the CIC has done a grand job--outstanding. It has been a great help to the Fifth Army."*

IV Corps CIC Follows a Fast Pace

The 204th CIC Detachment hastened along with the IV Corps in the final drive. As town after town fell into Allied control, the CIC agents surveyed the areas for personalities and information about the fast-retreating German forces. The agents discovered that in most of these towns food was plentiful, water and electric supplies were intact, and transportation was adequate. Pillaging, looting and devestation - the usual aftermath of battle - were rarely encountered. But there were still problems for the CIC.

In the town of Mantova, as in many communes and villages, the Partisans appeared to be strongly Communist. Political activity had started with a vengeance after the liberation and all political parties were engaged in membership drives. The CIC agents who entered the town unwittingly became figures of great importance to the citizens. Soon the cause of this unsought prominence became clear. The metal "U.S." buttons on the collars of their fatigues had been interpreted by the Italians to stand for "Unione Sovieticae," and the agents were hailed as Russian soldiers.

Few agents were caught during these days of high-speed mobility. Aware that the end of the campaign was near, local Fascists had fled from small towns hoping to gain anonymity in large cities. German soldiers, often dressed in civilian clothes and heavily armed with weapons, roamed about the countryside equally afraid to surrender to Allied authorities as to return to their own forces and face charges of desertion. Partisan units were able to round up many of these strays from the once-feared Wehrmacht and turn them over to the Allied forces.**

CIC Casualties Near the End of Battle

On 29 April Agents Paul A. DeMare and Crispin C. Hernandez of the IV Corps CIC left their Detachment in order to join the 10th Mountain Division CIC on the front line. Traveling north in their jeep, the two agents encountered and joined a group of 1st American Division vehicles that were heading toward the front. Several hours later, four unidentified planes dived down from the sky and attacked the convoy. The agents hastily abandoned their jeep and tore for the ditches along the side of the road. A bomb fell and cascaded its fragments over the roadbed. DeMare and Hernandez, both uninjured, made

*Ltr to SAIC, All Sections CIC, Fifth Army, Subj: "Commendation (305th CIC Detachment), dtd 17 Dec 44 (C) (L-22)

**Memorandum for the OIC, Subj: Town Survey of MANTOVA, dtd 28 Apr 45, (C) (KCD 2-14-252A)

dashes in opposite directions away from the road. A second bomb landed in the road and a flying piece of shrapnel from the explosion lodged in DeMare's thigh. Despite this wound, he was able to run beyond the range of the third bomb. Hernandez was not so fortunate. Shell fragments from the third bomb scattered in his direction, and the agent was struck in the chest and right forearm. Both agents were evacuated after the raid to hospitals for treatment and recuperation.*

The following night, 23 April, Agents Robert L. Campbell and Paul Halloran of the 204th CIC Detachment, who had been working in the Apennine Mountains with the 10th Mountain Division, started to return to the main headquarters of the Detachment in the small town of Bazzano. A few miles north of Bazzano, their jeep struck a mine. Halloran was killed instantly, and Campbell died twenty-four hours later without ever regaining consciousness. Although the German surrender in Italy was only ten days away, the battle for the Po Valley was still raging. Casualties could not be prevented by hints of a cease fire.**

92d CIC Detachment Moves Rapidly

The 92d CIC Detachment, commanded by Lt Ramon Arrizabalaga, Jr., had moved to Pietrasanta during the first days of the Spring offensive. But before they had left their headquarters at Viareggio, the agents of this Detachment had managed to deal with a number of defiant Fascist captives. One such captive, a twenty-three year old native of Messina named Francesco Mattei, scrawled his bitter thoughts across a wooden panel in his cell:

"On this night I have written on six sheets of paper my statement concerning my confession, which was extorted from me by torture, lynching, hunger, lack of sleep; a true expression of the 20th Century civilization. These are the usual vicissitudes occuring to a defeated people. I too am a man defeated but not tamed. A lion that still roars until his last breath and I feel death still far, perhaps because I do not fear it...."*** The unbridled lies and outright defamation in this statement were attributed partly to Mattei's immaturity and partly to the adamant spirit that the Fascists had instilled in some of their supporters. This defiance was indicative of the obstacles that lay before the CIC interrogators.

*Memo for OIC from Hq IV Corps CIC, Injuries received by Special Agents Paul A. DeMare and Crispin C. Hernandez, dtd 29 Apr 45 (C) (KCD 7-3-57)
**Ltrs of Condolence to the Parents of Robert L. Campbell and Paul Halloran, dtd 10 May 1945 (U) (KCD 2-14-214)
***Rpt to AC of S, G2, 92d Inf Div from Hq CIC Det, Subj: "Mattei, Francesco, dtd 8 April 1945 (S) (KCD 6-4-59)

By 20 April the speed of the Allied advance necessitated moving the 92d CIC Detachment headquarters to the city of Carrara. While at Carrara, the agents made major preparations for the forthcoming move into La Spezia, the second city to Genoa in the Region of Liguria. The Detachment, supplemented by five FSS Agents and Captain Henry Nigrelli of SCI Unit Z, together with his staff, were to comprise the "S" Force entering the city.*

This Force entered La Spezia on 24 April 1945, directly behind the advancing Recon Troop. The following morning the whole Detachment moved in and the "S" Force phase was concluded. Because of oversight on the part of the advance Detachment, a billet had not been secured, and the search for one became the immediate concern. The story of how one was found and the subsequent apprehension of the finder, developed into the most important case experienced by the Detachment.

A "British Intelligence Agent"

On 26 April Agent McKee reported to 92nd Division Headquarters and found that an Austrian corporal in civilian clothes had turned himself in to the G2 Section, with a report that a large amount of SD documents could be found in a nearby villa. Subsequent investigation failed to uncover them, but did uncover an English intelligence agent named Theodore Schurch who was attempting to requisition the villa for a British naval unit. Because there were no British Intelligence agencies operating in the area, McKee took the Englishman to Detachment Headquarters.

In the confusion that followed, Schurch located a billet for the Detachment, treated McKee to lunch on steaks he had taken from the SD villa, and finally had McKee drive him to La Spezia to see friends. As the day passed, his story became less credible. Driving along the coast road, Schurch finally admitted that he was not a British Intelligence agent but had penetrated the SD on his own. To emphasize the point, he carefully threw away, one at a time, 50 gold pieces which he contended had been given him by the SD.

By early evening of 26 April, Schurch's story was so confused and unsubstantiated that he was placed in the La Spezia jail. The following morning he confessed to being an SD Agent.

His background and mission were equally amazing. He had been recruited in London in 1935 by the British Fascists and he could speak Italian as his father was Italian-Swiss. Starting in 1936, he spent the majority of his time in Egypt and North Africa attempting to penetrate the British Army. With the fall of Fascism he entered the CIS and in June 1944, began operating with the SD.

*History of the 92d CIC Detachment (K-17) page 14 (S)

Schurch confessed that his mission was to reach Rome and penetrate the Vatican where he was to observe and report on American Archbishop Spellman's activities both in Rome and the Vatican and in the Russian occupied countries. After he confessed, Schurch was dispatched to Florence and later to Rome where he gave valuable information to SCI Unit Z in the "Eternal City."

On 30 April the Detachment left La Spezia and proceeded as the advance party into Genoa. This city provided the setting and the 92d CIC the agent, for one of the quickest and most fruitful enemy stay-behind roundups in Corps history.

30 Spies in 30 Days

SCI Unit Z supplied the Detachment rather vague information concerning an unnamed and undescribed Italian who occasionally frequented a certain local bar. Special Agent Henry Feldman, who had joined the Detachment in March, set out to find him.

At 1000 hours, Feldman found him attending a funeral and learned that his named was Arnaldo Varini. Immediate interrogation followed and by 1900 hours the same night and with the help of Varini, Feldman picked up ten other enemy Agents. By noon the next day, Feldman had apprehended a total of 15 enemy agents. It was an exceptional job considering the lack of information concerning the original suspect, and it resulted in the complete defeat of a KDO-150 stay-behind net.

Feldman continued his masterful work and in one month's time had apprehended and obtained confessions from over 30 stay-behind agents.* It was his initiative and perserverance that greatly contributed to the success of the 92d CIC Detachment in Genoa.

A Well-known American Poet

The case that proved the most memorable to the agents of the 92d CIC Detachment began on the day after the official cessation of hostilities. On the morning of 3 May, an agent was ordered to proceed to the home of a prominent American poet turned expatriate and pro-Fascist. From the summer of 1940 until shortly before the surrender in Italy, Pound had written anti-American tracts for broadcast by the Italian Ministry of Popular Culture to England and the United States. At times, the poet's own voice had been heard following the introduction, "Europe Calling--Ezra Pound speaking" and condemning the "International Financiers of New York" for having plotted to "drag" the United States into war.

*History of the 92d CIC Detachment (K-17) page 16 (S)

The agent discovered in Rapallo that had been taken away by the Partisans earlier in the day and turned over to an Infantry Battalion Commander of the US Army. On instructions from the G2, 92d Division, the captured poet was delivered to the CIC.

Interrogation was delayed until the following day when an FBI agent from Rome who had been gathering material on for 18 months, arrived at the Detachment headquarters. and Lt Arrizabalaga jointly obtained a signed statement from the poet which disclosed his activities on behalf of Mussolini, the man he had idolized, and the Fascist cause.

his mistress, and his wife, had formed a happy marital triangle throughout the war in the villa at . After completing the initial interrogation, CIC allowed wife and mistress to return to the villa. But was detained at the Detachment until he was placed under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Army Provost Marshal prior to shipment back to the United States on charges of high treason.*

The Record of the 92d CIC Detachment

In the summing up of its part in the Italian campaign, the 92d CIC Detachment recorded a total of 23,000 interrogations, of which 17,000 dealt with line crossers. From these interrogations, 102 enemy agents had been uncovered and convicted.** These accomplishments were made by a Detachment that never had been activated by the War Department and that never found a place in official Army files.

501st CIC in the Final Chase

While the 92d CIC carried out operations along the coast line, the 501st CIC Detachment followed the 1st Armored Division deep into the Italian Alps. Under the command of Lieutenant Richard W. Lindsay who had relieved Captain Richard R. Ray in January, the agents forged ahead despite battle hazards that included the entry by the CIC into towns where there were no American troops. On one occasion, a German plane swooped low, barely missing the house in which the Detachment was billeted and hitting and burning to the ground a barn about forty feet distant. As the Detachment entered the Aosta province near to the Great Saint Bernard Pass where the boundaries of Italy, France and Switzerland joined, border control problems assumed added importance in the daily routine of the agents. A system of road blocks, supplementing the running patrols of the tactical troops, served as a barrier to potential border crossers.***

*Ltr to AC of S. G-2. 92d Inf Division from Hq CIC Det, Subj: Apprehensions of dtd 20 May 45 (S) (KCD 6-4-57)
**History of the 92d CIC Detachment (S) (K-17) page 18
***Ltr to Chief, CIC, AFHQ, from Hq CIC 1st Armored Division, Subj: "Attached Inclosures," dtd 18 May 45 (C) (KCD 6-1-1)

The assistance of a C/S (Italian Counteresnionage) Agent to the 501st CIC Detachment was invaluable throughout this final phase of the campaign. On 29 April the Agent, remained in a small town in the province of Bergamo to interrogate jailed suspects while the rest of the Detachment moved forward. Late in the evening, his interrogations still not completed, decided to catch a few hours sleep. Shortly before dawn broke the next morning, was roused by the local head of the Committee of National Liberation who claimed excitedly that a column of 4,000 Germans was approaching the town. A force of 200 Partisans formed the first and only line of defense. Shots being fired near the town confirmed the official's report, and hastened to the town square where he discovered the populace preparing for a frenzied flight. Mistaken for an Allied officer since he was clothed in an American uniform, succeeded in allaying the fears of the townspeople. Then he joined the Partisan leader at the front lines and ordered an Italian who spoke German to shout to the massed enemy forces that an "American officer" was leading the Partisans and that there was no sensible alternative to surrender. fired two shots in the direction of the Germans to punctuate his demand. An officer came forward cautiously from among the German troops and saw standing in an American uniform with his pistol upraised. The German's reaction was immediate. He called to his men to advance towards the Partisans with their hands high. Quickly, 150 German troops were disarmed and led off in confinement. bold venture had paid off, for the greater portion of the German column had been deployed in another sector and never approached in town. For this action, Lt Lindsay recommended that be awarded the Bronze Star.*

CIC Misses "Il Duce"

The 501st CIC Detachment's most exciting case began when S/A McDonough who was operating with Combat Command "A" arrived at the Partisan Headquarters in Brivio, to learn that Benito Mussolini was being detained by Partisans near the city of Como. He immediately sent a runner to Como with written orders that Mussolini be brought to Partisan Headquarters at Brivio for further disposition by the CIC.

McDonough followed the runner and arrived at approximately 1000 hours, 28 April 1945, at the joint Partisan and Committee of National Liberation Headquarters in Como.

McDonough was joined by S/A Lindsay at 1830 hours the same day and the Agents found that the CLN (Committee of National Liberation) had orders from their Headquarters in Milan to turn "Il Duce" over to that office.

*Ltr to Commanding General, 1st Armored Division from Hq 501st CIC Detachment, Subj: , dtd 5 May 45 (C) (KCD 6-1-1)

The situation was tense as Giovanni Dessy, Captain of the Intelligence Service, Italian Royal Navy, and Salvatore Guastoni had just been instrumental in disarming the 3,000 "last ditch" defenders of Mussolini by promising them safe passage from the city of Como. There were so many factions in operation that the CIC Agents feared an immediate uprising would ensue thereby killing many people who could be of help to the CIC.

The same evening, Lindsay interviewed Major Cosimo De Angelis, Partisan Commander of the town of Como, and Oscar Sforni, representative of the Republican Party for the CLN at Como. They related that early that morning, a certain Colonel Valerio from the Milan CLN had arrived with 15 armed partisans to capture Mussolini whom they believed to be hidden 30 miles from Como in the village of Dongo. Valerio emphasized that only Sforni and De Angelis could accompany him in the search for Mussolini.

They arrived in Dongo at 1330 hours and immediately found Captain Pietro who was supposed to be hiding Mussolini. Valerio and Pietro went to another room, leaving Sforni and De Angelis to themselves.

The two men revealed that they were subsequently arrested and thrown in prison and to their surprise, found that they had been arrested under Valerio's orders.

Later De Angelis and Sforni told that at about 1700-1800 hours, they saw a file of approximately 14 men lined up and shot before the city hall building of Dongo. These men included such Fascist personalities as Barraccu, under-secretary of State, and Petacci, brother of Mussolini's mistress. Petacci was removed from the group just before execution but was shot later when he attempted to escape.

After the completion of the executions, De Angelis and Sforni were released and they immediately questioned Pietro concerning Mussolini's disposition. De Angelis said that Pietro had told him that there had been fifteen persons killed, "and had added, rather significantly, one other."* Sforni also said that Pietro had related that it had been against his will to have Mussolini killed like the others, about three-quarters of an hour earlier. To Sforni's demand as to whether Mussolini had died in good spirit, Pietro had responded that, "he had not died 'too well.'"**

On 29 April 1945, Lindsay encountered eye witnesses at Como who said that they had seen the dead body of Mussolini at Milan, hanging by his feet in the Piazza of the Fifteen Martyrs. Acting on this information, Lindsay ordered the Como Questore to pick up Mussolini's wife, Rachele Guidi, and his son and daughter, Romano and Anna Maria. These three were brought to the Detachment's billet in the Villa Crespi at Como and eventually sent to the rear through CIC channels for their own safety and re-interrogation.***

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*Mon. Info. Rpt. TO: CG, ASF, from 501st CIC, dtd 30 Apr 45, page 5 (S)
**Ibid. page 5 (S)
***Ibid., page 6 (S)

Although the capture of Mussolini was not successful, the apprehension of his wife and children and their subsequent interrogation provided the names of many Fascist personalities that were captured during the following weeks.

On 4 May 1945, after the cessation of hostilities, S/A's Kelly and McDonough went with a task force of the 01st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to Aosta, called Val d' Osta or the Valley of Aosta. A rather bizarre situation was found in that this Italian community had created a separate flag, formed a separate government and wanted complete independence from Italy. Noting the discontent, the French started a propaganda campaign with the ultimate aim of annexing the community to France. Kelly and McDonough, besides handling security in the community, had to make sure that no outbreaks of violence occurred between the Italian and French troops stationed there. The community eventually remained Italian and on 5 June 1945, the two Agents returned to their Detachment at Biella.*

On 26 June 1945, the 501st CIC Detachment was disbanded in the vicinity of Biella. From its original landing in Italy on 28 October 1943 until its disbandment, the Detachment had been a measuring rod for a CIC Detachment assigned to an Armored Division. The success of the Detachment in keeping pace with its fast-striking Division bore testimony to the efficiency and thoroughness of the 501st CIC agents.

10th CIC in the Sprint to Victory

During the month prior to the Allied Spring offensive, agents of the 10th Mountain Division CIC established a system of refugee controls in the Division area that resulted in the screening of about 50 to 300 persons daily who had crossed from EOT to Allied lines. This close control was initiated to ward off a last-desperate attempt by the German Intelligence Service to gather information on the mounting of the offensive.

On the move with the Division in April, the agents managed to capture five enemy agents and saboteurs and to intern 150 Fascists considered dangerous to ordered peace in Italy. Twelve hours before any other Allied troops entered the city of Mantova, 10th Mountain Division CIC agents had secured targets that otherwise might have been destroyed. From their daring action, the agents were able to provide tactical commanders with information which showed that a contemplated bombing attack on the town was not needed.**

On 30 April members of the Detachment participated in an amphibious maneuver on Lake Garda that landed tactical troops in the town of Gargnano where Mussolini's former villa and office were located.

*Interview with James Kelly at NCICA Convention, Philadelphia, Pa.
History of the 501st CIC Detachment (M-10) page 6 (C)
**Ltr to AC of S, G-2, 10th Mountain Division from 10th CIC Det., Subj: 10th CIC Detachment Operations, Spring 1945, dtd 17 May 45, (C) (KCD 1-6-15)

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CONFIDENTIAL

In "Il Duce's" hastily evacuated studio, Agent Peter Gordon discovered an amazing collection of the dictator's correspondence. Included in the cache of papers were letters exchanged between Mussolini and Hitler; reports by Mussolini on Italian-German relations; papers disclosing the formation of the Republican-Fascist government; dispositions and orders regarding the Fascist Army; activity reports of the SID and its chief together with results of investigations of noted anti-Fascists. The files, which contained enough material to form a clear profile of the Mussolini regime, had been carefully arranged, and an extensive card index provided the key to systematic study of the letters.

The file chief was located in the town, and he obligingly revealed that only two suitcases of papers of military importance had been removed along with the letters that related to Mussolini's private love affair. The remainder of the files had not been [illegible] agent Gordon had come across the most significant find of the Italian campaign.*

The "Italian Story"

The prodigious number of enemy agents captured and the overall success of each CIC Detachment in breaking them, the highly effective troop security measures, the road blocks and the town surveys were only segments of the "Italian story." Etched deeply in the memory of each CIC agent were the little unimportant incidents which assumed such stature during the elapsed time between the Salerno landings and the Spring victory in the foothills of the Alps. Histories could tell, but never recreate, the hell of Salerno and Anzio; the beauty of Rome; the bitterness of an Apennine winter; the sight of thousands of barefoot, dirt encrusted children; the brief glints of comedy that sometimes spotted the tragic gloom of war. But in the minds of each agent were thoughts that no official record contain and that no history can accurately relate.

The war was over and home seemed immeasurably nearer. The feelings of the CIC men can best be summarized by a remark attributed to a soldier with the 88th Infantry Division. He said simply, "We made it."**

CIC In Italy Re-organized after the War

The Germans' unconditional surrender on 2 May 1945 marked the end of the combat mission of CIC in Italy. As tactical divisions were rotated back to the United States or assigned occupation duties, the

*Ltr to Col Blom from Hq 10th CIC Detachment, dtd 30 Apr 45 (U) (KCD 1-5-8)
**19 Days from the Appenines to the Alps - The Story of the Po Valley Campaign (Printed by Pizzi and Pizio, Milan, Italy....1945) page 90

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CIC units attached to them were disbanded. CIC agents who remained in Italy were divided between two detachments; the 430th which was sent to Austria and the 428th which continued counter intelligence operations in Italy until 14 December 1947.

APPENDIX I

ROSTER FOR ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Note: Detachments listed are those to which individuals were assigned on permanent duty.

Name	Detachment
Abruzzese, William	305th
Adams, Robert T.	AAF/MTO
Amerman, Harry L.	305th
Amols, Seth G.	10th
Anderson, James L.	427th
Anderson, Warren R.	206th, 307th
Archon, Dion J. J.	427th
Arrizabalaga, Ramon, Jr.	92d (CO), 204th
Aylett, Orgill W.	428th
Baglio, Michael J.	88th, 305th
Bailey, James B.	429th
Bai Rossi, Philip J.	88th
Baldwin, Langford	202d, 427th
Baraty, Edward	307th
Barker, Harold O., Jr.	307th
Barnett, Lynn	88th
Barr, Harry S., Jr.	206th
Barrasso, Nedio E.	204th
Bartoulucci, Enzo	426th
Bates, William M.	428th
Battin, Thaddeus G.	426th, 428th
Beadle, Edward S.	206th
Beaudette, Francis B.	85th, 307th
Beck, Emmerich J.	425th
Belt, George L.	426th
Berg, John W.	430th
Bergman, Harold E.	425th
Bergman, Victor C., Jr.	307th
Birsner, John H.	45th
Bistritzky, Sam	428th
Blake, Emmet R.	206th, 307th
Blomquist, Edwin R.	428th
Blumner, Lester A.	206th, 427th
Bower, William N.	206th
Braafladt, James T.O.	428th
Braly, James O.	10th
Bridgham, Jesse F.	425th
Briel, Alfred W.	427th
Brockmeier, Robert	307th
Brod, Mario E.	426th
Brown, Jarvis J.	426th
Brown, Keirn C.	307th, 501st
Bruccoli, Matthew L.	430th
Brussell, Abraham W.	307th
Buckley, William P.	430th
Buckner, James F.	34th
Bullock, Loren J.	10th
Burkel, John B.	305th
Burns, Joseph A.	427th
Caldwell, Robert G., Jr.	307th
Cameron, Jack B.	430th (CO)
Campbell, Robert L.	204th
Caniglia, Louis S.	34th
Carlson, Elwood W.	428th
Carr, Donald J.	429th
Carranza, Ignacio	307th
Carrellas, Arthur A.	428th
Castelli, Ralph	426th
Cate, James G.	430th
Cave, Franklin	10th (CO), 420t
Celetta, Gabriel B.	425th
Cerame, Ralph T.	427th
Chamberlin, Wells F.	307th
Clark, Norman A.	3d, 91st
Cleland, Delmar L.	305th
Cokenias, Nicholas T.	36th, 425th
Cole, James E.	427th
Colgate, Craig, Jr.	425th
Cooper, Charles E.	430th
Coppola, Alfred A.	91st
Cortes, Louis J.	206th
Costello, Harry G., Jr.	206th (CO)
Cowan, Edwin F.	305th, 430th
Cowles, Leonard R.	3d

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Cox, Joe B.	420th
Coyle, Peter A.	430th
Crane, Rufus S.	430th
Crane, Winthrop M., III	206th
Cron, Millard W.	420th
Crosby, Robert T.	427th
Crowell, C. Kenneth	206th (CO), 307th (CO)
Crystal, John C.	204th (CO), 501st (CO)
Cunningham, Robert J.	305th
Cuomo, Anthony	425th
Daguerre, Raymond P.	429th
Daly, Walter J.	425th
Davis, Hugh H.	425th
DeMare, Paul A.	305th, 426th
Dennis, William M., Jr.	91st (CO)
DePourtales, Alex W.G.	427th
DeRubeis, Victor E.	305th
DeSimone, Jack A.	305th
Devere, Perry A.	427th
DiDona, Louis G.	501st
Dinehart, Alan F., Jr.	307th
Divilio, Francis M.	591st
Dobrowolski, Joseph L.	428th
Doran, Edward F., Jr.	206th
Dorsey, John J.	91st
Duvardo, Joe	204th, 305th
Eliopulos, Louis	428th
Ellison, Herbert T.A., Jr.	204th
Emmet, Thomas A.	307th
Fangel, Lloyd	202d, 305th, 426th
Fell, Leonard W.	305th
Fitzgerald, James C.	426th
Fletcher, Charles S.	85th
Flynn, Francis P.	92d, 426th
Foote, George W.	426th
Ford, Quintin U.	206th
Forkey, Leo O.	34th (CO)
Forte, Saverio	425th
Fortunato, Nicholas A.	431st (CO)
Fox, Raymond J.	206th
Francazzi, Bruno A.	426th
Francazzi, Raniero	305th, 426th
Frankenfield, William M.	426th
Freestone, Sampson W.	91st
French, Vernon M.	428th
French, Woodrow W.	206th, 307th
Friebolin, Brookes	427th
Fuller, Marvin E.	428th
Fulsher, Remy W.	427th
Funk, Donald M.	305th, 425th
Furniss, James P.	10th (CO), 305th
Gangnes, Clarence B.	204th
Gardner, James R.	426th
Garo, Raymond	36th
Gatsos, John P.	425th
Gearheart, Ernest T., Jr.	45th
Geiger, Frederick H.	431st
Gendron, Honorat R.	427th
Gentithes, George H.	425th
Giacobbe, Wadie	426th
Giambrone, James	420th
Giordano, Anthony F.	34th
Goesswein, Stanley J.	428th
Goldberg, Morton W.	10th, 430th
Golden, Bernard H.	202d
Gordon, Peter	10th, 431st
Gordon, Wendell C.	307th, 430th
Gray, Jesse G.	36th, 88th
Greco, Joseph C.	204th, 428th
Green, James F.	34th
Green, Norman	430th
Greene, Walter E.	3d (CO)
Grennan, Bernard J.	305th, 428th, 430th
Gretchyn, Paul G.	430th
Guenther, Rupert W.	45th (CO)
Guinzbourg, Victor S.	206th, 307th
Hall, Thomas W.	34th, 427th
Halliwell, Thomas D.	85th
Halloran, Paul L.	204th, 428th
Hamilton, John F.	3d
Hammond, John G.	36th (CO)
Hardage, John M.	427th
Haseltine, Marshall	307th
Hasenjaeger, William R.	426th
Hasse, Karl H.	501st
Hegyi, Herman E.	426th
Henry, Andrew A.	305th
Hernandez, Crispin C.	204th
Heyn, John G.	305th
Hibbard, Arthur P.	426th, 428th
Hickey, William B.	202d, 426th

Higgins, Edward L., Jr.	428th	Lewis, Crosby	202d (CO)
Hofamann, Albert G., Jr.	206th	Lindsay, Richard W.	501st (CO)
Hoffman, Myron G.	204th, 425th	Lipper, Milton W.	427th
Hogan, John P.	204th, 426th	Longe, Leo J.	430th
Horner, David S.	307th	Looney, Francis B.	425th
Hoylen, Paul J.	427th	Lucaire, William M.	80th, 430th
Hughes, Vincent W.	425th	Lucas, John H.	305th, 430th
Humphreys, John R.	426th	Lucchesi, Mario J.	202d
Hutchinson, Joseph C.	307th, 501st	Lucid, Thomas A.	80th
		Lunt, Horace G., II	430th
Iash, Gabriel	426th	Luongo, Joseph P.	80th
Ingargiola, Henry B.	305th	Lyon, Paul E.	426th
Jackson, William K.	425th	McCabe, Thomas R.	426th
Jackson, William M.	3d	McClive, Robert D.	427th
Jackson, William R., Jr.	428th	McCormick, Francis X.	427th
Jacovine, Anthony F.	430th		
Jacques, Phillippe G.	307th	McCoy, Scott D.	45th, 307th
Jensen, Milo M.	3d	McDonald, Monroe E.	426th
Joseph, James S.	428th	McDonough, John G.	501st
Joy, Walter S.	427th, 45th	McDuff, Alvie L.	307th
Judson, Clarence H., Jr.	206th	McGettigan, Edward W.	3d, 91st
		McGuire, James L.	3d, 428th
Kandt, William C.	307th	McIntosh, Ashleigh D.	429th
Kaufmann, Walter Jr., Jr.	425th (CO)	McKee, Claude M.	206th
Keeler, Clark B.	202nd	McKee, Floyd E.	204th, 428th
Keir, Edwin M.	305th	McKeown, John F.	431st
Kellogg, Charles H.	430th	McOwen, William R.	36th
Kelly, James W.	501st	MacDonald, John D.	425th
Kennedy, Thomas R.	428th	MacGruer, John A., Jr.	305th, 426th
Kern, Robert B.	305th	Magarity, Joseph L.	425th
Kimball, Harvey L.	427th, 429th	Manley, James T.	427th
Kincaid, J. Donald	425th	Mann, David	428th
Kirkland, Ira B., Jr.	429th	Marcotte, Edmund J.	428th, 428th
Knowles, Bertram G.	428th	Marino, John	204th
Koelling, Elmer E.	305th, 430th	Mark, William R.	36th
Kolenberg, Joseph F.	204th	Markham, Chester A.	428th
Kruse, Donald F.	206th	Martin, John L.	430th
Kubicek, Robert A.	204th	Martin, Joseph H.	305th
Kurtze, Robert P.	425th	Martin, Paul J.	206th
		Martowski, Patrick S.	3d, 91st
La Chance, Herve R.	307th	Mason, Gordon B.	305th
Landes, George N.	428th	Mastrolillo, Antonio J.	425th
Lapurke, John V.	426th	Mayer, George H.	425th
Laughland, Emerson V.	431st	Medaglia, John D.	206th
Leahy, Daniel A.	426th	Meldrum, Gilbert S.	430th
Le Febvre, George A.	307th	Merriman, George T.	204th, 430th
Lemler, Fremont F.	204th	Merriman, Paul H.	204th
Lenard Thaddeus	426th	Mess, Charles W.	430th
Leslie, John D., Jr.	430th	Messina, Frank A.	305th

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Messing, Gordon M.	305th	Papurt, Maxwell J.	PIS (CO)
Metestazio, Arthur P.	206th	Paquette, Origene J. Jr.	307th
Metzler, George	10th	Pascucci, Dominic A.	204th, 428th
Meurin, Erwin E.	425th	Pawson, Joseph E.	426th
Mickey, Carroll M.	427th	Penn, Robert M.	426th, 428th
Middleton, William L.	85th	Perper, George A.	307th
Mills, Jack W.	206th	Petty, John F.	425th
Milovanovitch, George	430th	Picard, Lucien L.	427th (CO), PIS
Miritello, Frank J.	430th	Pierce, Edward R.	92nd, 305th, 428th
Mitchell, Joseph M.	426th, 430th	Pingley, Robert L.	34th, 206th, 430th
Molinet, Fausto E.	45th	Piscitelli, Clement N.	34th
Mooney, John T.	426th	Ploghoft, Merl V.	305th, 427th
Morena, Gono	426th	Pogue, Earl G.	430th
Mormile, James F.	430th	Porter, Marion E.	307th
Morrison, Douglas J.	88th	Powell, Francis E.	206th, 307th
Morton, Maurice M.	85th (CO)	Powers, Ralph W.	428th (CO)
Morze, Gabriel G.	428th	Powers, Thomas J., Jr.	428th
Moseley, Frank A.	429th	Princi, Eugene M.	426th
Moseley, George T.	45th, 307th	Princi, Peter W.	202d, 420th
Murphy, Harry J.	426th		
Murphy, Vincent L.	425th	Qualters, Thomas J.	425th
Musengo, Ralph J.	3d, 91st		
Mussman, Albert P.	36th, 202nd	Ragon, Paul H.	426th, 428th
		Raine, Sidney	305th, 428th
Nadir, Nubar	425th	Ray, Edward L.	420th (CO)
Natasios, Nicholas A.	428th	Ray, Richard R.	501st (CO)
Neagoy, George	429th	Raynor, William J.	305th
Nelson, Wilmer G.	425th	Read, Clarence E.	427th (CO)
NeSmith, Albert N.	34d	Regan, John F.	85th
Newman, Paul J.	206th, 431st	Regis, Peter	307th
Nicholson, Carl H.	430th	Reid, Thomas P.	202nd
Nickson, Albert N.	427th	Ribaok Harry W.	88th (CO)
Nitti, Joseph A.	426th	Richards, Robert R.	206th, 307th
Nocc, Hannibal S.	425th	Richardson, John H.	305th
		Rodenhiser, Edward F.	204th
O'Brien, John J.	34th	Rohner, Emil J.	204th, 305th
O'Brien, Philip A.	305th, 307th	Roth, Rex	305th
O'Connell, Charles W.	427th	Rotunno, Vito	305th
O'Connor, Rhea T.	305th	Roy, Joseph H.	429th
Oltean, Charles, Jr.	431st	Rubsam, John L.	34th (CO)
O'Neill, Harvey J.	429th	Ruminoff, Leonid	45th
Osborne, Harry K.	501st	Russell, Bertram R.	3d (CO)
Osenbaught, Watson P.	36th	Russo, Edward J.	425th
		Ruston, Arthur J.	206th, 425th
Pack, Roger A.	425th	Ryan, George J.	305th, 430th, 501st
Pagnotta, Leo J.	426th		
Palombo, Thomas R.	425th		
Panard, Anthony G.	3d		
Palozzi, Gabriel J.	206th, 431st		
Pappas, Luke G.	425th		

Sagi, Julius R.	305th
Saloom, Kaliste J.	427th
Sayles, Allen E.	425th
Scalora, Anthony J.	305th, 426th
Scanlon, John E.	202nd
Schmidt, Jack C.	425th
Schneider, Robert G.	425th
Schumacher, Joseph H.	420th
Schutt, Willard A.	45th
Schwarzwalder, John C.	429th (CO)
Seminara, Philip C.	305th
Sevier, Lewis V.	202d, 307th
Seymour, Emery W.	430th
Siler, James H.	420th
Sims, Nathaniel G.	420th
Skelton, Joseph S.	425th
Smith, Gregory B.	427th, 429th
Smith, Herbert W., Jr.	426th
Smith, Lawrence I.	305th
Smith, Richard J.	3d
Smith, Richard L.	305th, 426th
Snowden, Floyd C.	426th (CO)
Somers, George B.	426th
Sparks, Bertel M.	307th
Spina, John P.	3d
Spingarn, Stephen J.	305th (CO)
Starr, Joseph R.	427th
Stasaitis, Stanley J.	427th
Stefanik, Thadeus J.	430th
Stein, Jay J.	10th
Stephens, Thomas G.	202d
Stevens, Harold L.	202d, 425th
Stradinger, Oscar	202d
Sullivan, Daniel J.	202d, 307th
Suszan, Michael J.	430th
Taradash, Edwin R.	425th, 427th
Taylor, Mark N.	202d
Terry, George V., Jr.	426th
Theriault, Adrian C.	425th
Theurer, John P.	430th
Thomas, Helal A.	206th
Thompson, Earle C.	85th
Tippen, William K.	305th
Tipton, Thomas L., Jr.	426th
Tonino, Melio A.	305th, 426th
Tousignant, Edmond J.	307th
Tozier, Roy G.	202d, 420th
True, Ralph O., Jr.	206th, 425th
Tucker, Robert W.	427th
Turner, Clarence E.	430th
Tyng, William W.	430th
Union, Wilbur M.	36th
VanKirk, Arthur H.	427th
Vannet, Leonard O.	426th
Vasse, Louis L.	427th
Vaughan, Bradley W.	427th
Vengrouskie, Victor J.	426th
Verticchio, Paul C.	426th
Vidal, Joseph	3d (CO)
	427th
Vincent, Arthur T.	305th, 427th
Voitle, Robert F.	206th, 430th
Volpe, Julius A.	34th, 305th
Walcott, John C.	305th
Warren, Alba H., Jr.	305th
Watkinson, Edwin H.	305th, 420th
Watt, Robert J.	430th
Weber, Gerald J.	305th
Werrenrath, George H.	427th
White, Robert E.	202d
Williams, Donald H.	431st
Williams, Harold B.	429th
Williams, Richard J.	3d
Williams, Tony R.	430th
Wilson, Paul	34th, 305th
Wittrock, Norbert B.	202d
Wolfe, Havard A., Jr.	305th, 428th
Wood, Kenneth I.	427th
Woollett, Leroy A., Jr.	427th

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XIII

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US ARMY

PREPARATION FOR OVERLORD

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CHAPTER 5

PREPARATION FOR OVERLORD

CIC's Mission Grown Beyond Its Numbers

Between early November 1942, when Center Task Force commitments reduced CIC's numbers in England to seven persons,* and 1 May 1944, the eve of the jump-off on the biggest invasion in history, the ETOUSA CIC Detachment in England grew to 110 officers and 831 enlisted men,** a number considered far too small for the task which was assigned to CIC in the invasion of the continent. For the growth of CIC's mission had been far out of proportion to its growth in numbers. In vivid contrast to the vague last-minute plans for CIC's employment with the Western and the Center Task Forces in the invasion of North Africa,*** CIC's mission was now definite, with plans for its employment included in special annexes to invasion plans for all units down through Division.

Through trial and error in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, and through the courage, initiative, and special abilities of its agents, CIC actually had written its own mission. Three men high in the planning circles had intimate knowledge of what CIC could do. Lt Col Gordon Sheen had returned from North Africa to become chief of the CI Branch at SHAEF. Colonel Oscar W. Koch, G2 of Patton's Third Army, had known CIC with the Western Task Force and again in Sicily as G2 of Seventh Army. Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson, G2 of First Army, had been even more closely associated with CIC. As G2 of II Corps, he had observed -- and directed -- CIC in the invasion at Oran and through CIC's first prolonged combat experience in Tunisia. At the end of the Sicilian campaign, when he was chosen by General Bradley for his role with First Army, he took along with him as his CIC chief Major Horace Miner, the Michigan college professor who had led II Corps CIC through the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns, and 2d Lt Charles B. Conick, who, as a Staff Sergeant, had been one of the four CIC agents to go in on the invasion at Oran. What these men had learned in North Africa and Sicily, plus reports of what was happening in Italy, furnished the basis for CIC's assigned part in the invasion and occupation of Europe.

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*There is a discrepancy in this figure. Radiogram No 3717, London to AGWAR, 10 Oct 42, signed "Eisenhower" listed all CIC personnel then in England and stated that all but three officers were to be used in the North African invasion; however, a special report written by Lt Col H.C. Sheen, CIB Chief in England at the time of the North African invasion, entitled "United States Counterintelligence in the European and North African Theater, August 1942-September 1943," stated that the transfer of CIC personnel to the North African invasion forces left only three officers and four enlisted men in England.

**ETO roster, 1 May 1944 (The latest roster now available). It is known, however, that several persons were added before 6 Jun 44. Also, 7 officers and 83 enlisted men belonging to ETO were in Iceland, but could not be considered in continental needs.

***See Chapter 1, "North African Campaign"

But an unbelievable amount of planning and training had taken place during this period of approximately 18 months, plus a profound increase in respect on the part of ranking Army officers for this hitherto little-known organization. CIC's early anomalous position is illustrated by a memorandum written at ETO Headquarters in March 1942, less than two months after the arrival of T/Sgt Gilbert S. Meldrum and S/Sgt John P. Ryan with U.S. troops in Northern Ireland in a semi-undercover capacity:

"It has come to the attention of this headquarters that military personnel may be investigating civilian espionage or subversive elements. Such action on the part of the armed forces of the United States may cause grave complications with North Ireland authorities."*

Further illustration is found in a letter from the AC of S, G-2, ETOUSA, to Washington on 31 March 1942:

"How secret is the presence of these members of the command to be? . . . The subject of purchasing civilian clothes is not clear to this office. . . This office recently received a shipment of special equipment which suggests that members of The Counter Intelligence Corps are intended to act in the role of authorized police. . ."**

Discussing this incident many years later Colonel (Reserve) Hugh D. Wise, Jr, recalled that General Headquarters in Washington had requested two CIC agents who "although they did not have to object to the English, must not be too fond of them." Wise, who at that time was Assistant Chief of CIC, said that CIC was not given any information as to how the men were to be used, and, except through calculated guess, did not know where they would be sent. Consequently they were not briefed or given any cover by CIC.***

Inspection Reveals Lack of Direction

Neither these problems nor the many more serious ones that developed as the numbers of CIC agents grew and the atmosphere of planning became more tense were to be solved easily. When Wise, then a Lieutenant Colonel, made an inspection of CIC Detachments in England in the fall of 1943, he found an appalling lack of direction of CIC efforts low morale among the agents, an inadequate number of linguists, and ignorance of the mission of CIC at practically all echelons.****

*Memorandum No. 44, Headquarters ETO, dated 6 Mar 42, from Operational History of Theaters (L-17) NOTE: No documents are available to indicate any incidents which may have precipitated the above memorandum.
**Operational History of Theaters (L-17) (RESTRICTED) (S & F LIBRARY FILES)
***Interview with Colonel (Reserve) Hugh D.Wise, Jr, August 1954
****Memorandum for the Chief, CIC, subject, "Visit to ETO and certain CIC Detachments in that Theater," signed Hugh D. Wise, Jr, Lt Col, GSC, Ass't Chief, CIC, dated 25 Oct 43 (SECRET) (S & F Library)

"The CIC organization in this Theater has been neglected for some time," Col Wise wrote. ". . . The Office of the Detachment Commander is not current on the CIC directives which have been issued and does not know. . .what the various detachments are doing. Each detachment has been left to shift for itself without coordination. The various detachments working in the same areas have not been coordinated, the detachment commanders did not know each other or where the men of overlapping detachments were located. The trip made by this officer constituted the first visit by a higher echelon to any one of the detachments except the SOS. . . .The Office of the Chief, CIC, ETO, did not know where the detachments were. No planning for future use or training except Lieutenant Copeland's work in reference to a training program instituted by 2d Lt Miles Copeland , . . ."

. . . This rudderless situation was not entirely the fault of any one individual, Colonel Wise pointed out. Even at the highest planning levels, no one knew what the ultimate organizational framework of the invasion forces would be, or who would command the various echelons. "It is believed that the Chief of CIC should be with the highest American Command which has under it tactical and static organizations both in the United Kingdom and on the continent," Colonel Wise stated. "However, . . . some difficulty has been experienced in determining what this organization is." Colonel Wise paved the way for the elimination of this particular difficulty through a conference with Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, AC of S, G-2, ETO, in which it was decided that for the present ETO should be considered the highest echelon, but that CIC's Chief and its personnel would be transferred without objection if another echelon became the appropriate one.

CIC Hampered by Lack of Direction

Another difficulty had been the instability in Counter Intelligence Corps organization and in the assignment of personnel. On 1 September 1942, soon after the arrival in England of a CIC detachment of five officers and 15 agents, Captain Kirby M. Gillette was named CIC Chief, ETOUSA, with additional duty as G2 staff officer in charge of Counterintelligence Branch (CIB) planning. On 10 September, Lt Col H.G. Sheen, former War Department CIC Chief, arrived and was named CIB Chief, thus relieving Gillette, by now a major, and his CIC Detachment, of staff responsibilities. With the depletion of CIC's numbers in England for the North African invasion, the CIB and CIC staffs again were merged, this time with Colonel C.R. Abraham as chief and Sheen as his executive. Late in February, Colonel Abraham was reassigned, Sheen was sent to North Africa as Chief of the Counterintelligence Branch at AFHQ in response to an urgent plea for a man capable of reorganizing CIC there, and Gillette again took over the combined CIB, CIC job. Another upheaval occurred in April, when Gillette was returned to the United States to join the staff of the Chicago school and was replaced by Major P.A. Calvert, newly arrived from MIS, War Department. Captain Claude Goza, who was designated Acting Chief, CIC, was replaced in August by

Lt Col Richard D. Stevens, who had just arrived from Iceland and held the position only while awaiting transfer to another assignment.*

CIC's organization was not alone in its instability. In an almost plaintive letter to CIC Chief Colonel Kibler on 31 May 1943, Major Calvert stated: "Counterintelligence and G2, itself, in this Theater have been seriously handicapped for a year due to the constant changeover in G2's, there having been five. The last four months have been particularly hective, with no permanent organization in G2 and with Colonel Sheen in Africa since February with no word from him. . . "**

Stable Organization Finally Achieved

On 20 October 1943, Major Howard E. Wilson, who had been commanding the CIC Detachment at Headquarters (COS), became Chief, CIC, ETO, and, with the promise of General Sibert that CIC would be permitted to remain intact regardless of changes in echelon, it was possible for the first time to form a stable organization. Wilson reorganized his headquarters, appointing Major Oliver L. Rapp as his executive; Captain Robert E. Doyle as officer-in-charge of all administration and the rapidly growing personnel problem; and Lt Frank E. Kearns as CO of the London Detachment. He also directed Lt Copeland to continue his training program upon an expanded basis.***

Colonel Wise's observation that CIC was hampered by the ignorance of its mission on the part of other Army personnel certainly was not new. This problem had been encountered in CIC's first combat experiences in North Africa.**** In January 1943, Major Gillette, in a letter to all CIC Detachments in the ETO and to MID, Washington, giving a brief summation of information received from North Africa, concluded with the following: "It is recommended that CIC detachment commanders take steps to acquaint their respective organizations with the mission and functions of CIC. Lack of knowledge of these facts has resulted in considerable misunderstanding in the field. The existence of the organization, its mission, and its functions should be well known throughout the Army, and every opportunity should be used to make known to proper authority the fact that this organization is prepared to render valuable service to our forces. It may be noted that a proper understanding of our mission can be conveyed without divulging that information which should be

*"CIC in ETOUSA, Jan 42 to 6 Jun 44," from "CIC Operational History of Theaters." (L-17) (RESTRICTED) (S & S Library)

**Ltr Hq ETO to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, MIS WD, Washington, D.C., Subj, "Counterintelligence Branch and CIC Detachment, ETO Hq," dtd 31 May 43 (R-27), (p 274) (S & S Library) (CONFIDENTIAL)

***Operational History of Theaters (L-17) and Wise Report, "Visit to ETO, etc."

****See Chapter 1, "North African Campaign".

treated as secret: namely, the identity of CIC personnel."*

This same thesis was expounded many times during the preparations for the Normandy invasion, but perhaps nowhere more lucidly than in a paper prepared by 1st Lieutenant Edward L. Saxe, of the ETO Detachment in March 1943 and sent along by Major Gillette to the CIC Chief in Washington with the comment,". . . has interested appropriate authorities in this Theater."**

In this paper, Saxe discussed the "erroneous assumption" that the functions of counterintelligence are entirely separate from the functions of operational and positive intelligence. Saxe pointed out that the German Abwehr and the British Intelligence agencies, both of which had long been active in the field, recognized the importance of the coordination of all intelligence agencies, either through the device of a single administrative unit, as in the Abwehr, or constant and thorough cooperation, as with the British.

"Each intelligence agency and each sub-section thereof possesses information of value to the next, Saxe wrote. ". . . The need for unity throughout the field of counterintelligence is, unfortunately, perceived only by those few who appreciate fully the activities of each one of the agencies involved in the general field of intelligence. Knowledge is often limited because of the need for secrecy, and secrecy sometimes becomes a fetish. There are few people in the U.S. Army who are fully aware of the contribution which can be made by the several U.S. Intelligence agencies and related bodies to a pool of information and experience available for counterintelligence purposes. . ." Saxe went on to give numerous examples of the lack of coordination of intelligence agencies, one of which was the fact that, although censorship of communication facilities had been established within the U.S. Army, little thought had been given to the positive function of censorship. "Overseas operations will provide many opportunities for obtaining valuable information from our routine mail, telephone and other communication checks, and personnel must be indoctrinated with the positive value of what is usually considered negative censorship," he wrote.

"The minimum essential is that all of the agencies and organizations which may possibly contribute something be informed of their possible contribution to Counterintelligence, that key personnel in each of these agencies and organizations be informed as to the very many facets which have to be exploited in this field and that someone in a position of authority coordinates all effort. Even though all counterintelligence functions are placed under the command of a Theater commander, this task will not be accomplished unless an authority who realizes the broad

*Ltr, Hq, ETO, subj, "CIC Training," to: All CIC Detachments, ETOUSA; CIC MID, Washington, dtd 6 Jan 43, signed Kirby M. Gillette, Major (R-27) (CONFIDENTIAL).
**Ltr, Hq, ETO, subj, "Memorandum, 'Counterintelligence,'" dtd 23 Mar 43 (R-27) (CONFIDENTIAL)

aspects of the picture, the parties who can contribute to it, and what they may contribute, insists upon the close coordination and cooperation of all concerned," Saxe concluded.

Training Program Broadened

One of the main features of the training program which Colonel Wise in his report said had been initiated by Lt Copeland, assisted by seven agents, was a one month's "Orientation Course on Continental Europe," launched on 1 August 1943 with 22 students. Short courses in "Static Security" and "Laws of Occupation and European Politics" were given to numerous persons, and a month-long "CIC Field Training" course was given at the American School Center at Shrivenham to 180 agents, assigned to divisions and corps, whose field training was considered inadequate. Several CIC agents were sent to the British "Other Ranks Security Course" at Matlock, and men from the British Field Security Service (FSS) attended the Orientation course as guests.

Various other short courses were attended by CIC agents, including a nine-day "Order of Battle Course" and a three-day German documents course at the Military Intelligence School in London. In addition, CIC agents participated in various problems and maneuvers of the tactical units to which they were attached, and three officers and ten agents took part in Exercise Harlequin, an amphibious maneuver in the English Channel, to gain practical experience in the mounting of such operations.

All this training was considered necessary since it had been learned in North Africa that the training at the Chicago School, with its specialization upon such investigative subjects as laws of arrest, the taking of latent fingerprints and American court procedures would be of little benefit to the agents in the work they would have to do. Changes were made in the Chicago School curriculum, but these changes came too late to benefit greatly the men who would go to the continent with combat outfits.

Every CIC unit launched a program for training French and German linguists. This brief language training was, of course, insufficient for CIC's needs, and the lack of linguists continued to be CIC's principal weakness throughout the war. As late as January 1945, only 26.9 percent of the Corps' members in Europe could be classified as having a working knowledge of the German language. As our forces moved into Europe it was necessary to recruit men from other branches of service. There was not time to give these recruits formal training; they learned principally by working with other agents.*

* Wise Report, "Visit to ETO, etc."; "Training in England" from CIC Operational History of Theaters (L-17); Report of the General Board, USFET; Opns Rpts, 322.999 (CIC) ETO 7/1/43 through 7/30/43, No. A7 (612242) (SECRET), 101st Abn and same for 5th Inf Div and Hq ETOUSA (SECRET) (ALEXANDRIA Depot)

A flow of Training Bulletins sent out to all CIC units by Lt Copeland's section discussed such subjects as French political parties under Vichy; the Counterintelligence estimate in France; the followers of Laval; underground movements and German countermeasures; DeGaulle and the Fighting French; counter-sabotage; CIC tactical experiences in North Africa, Sicily and Italy; British and U.S. agencies related to the CIC; German military administration in France; and the French police system. During the immediate pre-invasion period, the Training Section sent lecturers on request to the Intelligence sections of lower echelon headquarters and to Civil Affairs detachments.

The last project achieved by the Training Section before the invasion was the publication of a 400-page bound volume entitled "CIC Handbook on Europe," compiled from documents from the files of British and U.S. Intelligence agencies and numerous other sources and containing, as detailed in the preface, ". . . facts on the countries, people and circumstances that will have any bearing on our operations on the continent. . ."*

Wise Reports on Morale

Colonel Wise in his report was critical of the factors which had caused the extremely low morale situation, which he attributed to "the promises of promotion and glamor made to the men before they came over and the falsehoods told them with respect to their selection and their mission." He cited a case where three men going out as sergeants were asked in the Office of the Chief, "How would you like to come home a Major?" and told of a Technical Sergeant who, upon being sent from Fourth Service Command to Iceland was told that he was to have been made a Master Sergeant but that the Office of the Chief had called for him by name and insisted that he be sent to Iceland. This, Colonel Wise stated, was not true. Similar "information" was reported to have been given to others in the Service Command. One Private First Class, sent to a division, was told at Fifth Service Command Headquarters that he had been carefully selected and chosen for a very special important mission.

"This type of thing is repeated as often as the men are talked to, and Third, Eighth and Seventh Service Commands seem to be the only ones which have not repeatedly been guilty," Colonel Wise wrote.

Colonel Wise repeated numerous similar examples, including the fact that men from the Fourth and Sixth Service Commands had been led to believe that if they joined CIC they could expect to be commissioned within two months. In addition, in the Fourth Service Command, men who expressed a desire for transfer from CIC were given to understand that if they pressed the matter, they would be sent overseas immediately in grade.

* Wise Report, "Visit to ETO, etc."; and "Training in England," from CIC Operational History of Theaters." (L-17)

CONFIDENTIAL

"The disappointments that have come to these men, naturally, had their effect. They feel that they have been duped and lied to by The Counter Intelligence Corps, and they resent that much more than they do the fact that there has been little or no promotion for them."

Even more serious than the low morale of the men, Colonel Wise pointed out, was the fact that these men were hampered both in their work and in their training by their enlisted status, although prerequisites for admission to CIC were as high, and in some respects higher, than those required for officers. Some of the British courses were closed to them; they could not be permitted to see certain CI publications, including the Counter-Sabotage Manual; and COSSAC (Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander), the planning group for the invasion, was at that time planning a course in counterintelligence, open only to officers.*

CIC's Mission Threatened by OSS

Colonel Wise reported another development which threatened to wreck CIC's assigned mission, carefully worked out on the basis of experiences in North Africa and Sicily and published by ETO Headquarters on 17 August 1943. This directive stated CIC's mission to be: ". . to provide effective counter-espionage, counter-sabotage, counter-subversive and other necessary forms of security for all military and civilian organizations within the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, ETOUSA . . . . Their mission is directed against the enemy's efforts to gain information about, or do damage to, the Allied forces, their installations, personnel and equipment. . . . "**

Colonel Wise learned that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had moved into London "with a large staff of officers rather than enlisted men, unlimited money and with the complete backing of the Joint Chiefs," and had issued a directive in which the following was given as the function of the Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) unit within their organization: "To maintain a counter-espionage unit for the purpose of training and reporting upon the activity of enemy agents throughout the world (except the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire); also to make available to the Theater Commander, Staff Officers trained in counter-espionage duties; to furnish names and information concerning enemy agents, provocateurs, sympathizers and subjects."

According to Colonel Wise, Lieutenant General Devers, ETO Commanding General, over whose command line the 17 August directive had been published, on 24 August wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he said that he intended to use OSS personnel, among other things,

*Wise Report, "Visit to ETO, etc."
**Ltr AG 322, Hq ETOUSA, subj, "The Counter Intelligence Corps, ETOUSA," dtd 17 Aug 43. (RESTRICTED) (SCS Library)

to do "counter-espionage in the zone of the Allied Armies or territory occupied by them."*

Colonel Wise continued by explaining that when CIC first arrived in England the British had accepted them as the U.S. Army counterintelligence organization, but after the arrival of OSS with the apparent backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British had accepted them instead, and viewed the CIC as merely the American Field Security Personnel (FSP).

Colonel Wise conceded that this change in attitude had been facilitated by the fact that the Counterintelligence Branch in ETO Headquarters had become absorbed with the field security mission to the relative exclusion of the real counter-espionage problem. The whole situation, he feared, would result in CIC's being relegated to a field security mission, to be followed, in static situations, by routine military counterintelligence functions and the "leg-work" for OSS. Colonel Wise attached to his report a letter which had been received in ETO from AFHQ dealing with the friction which had developed in the North African Theater of Operations because of the overlapping in mission of the two organizations.**

CIC and SCI Missions Delineated by SHAEF Directive No. 7

That Colonel Wise's apprehensions, although well founded, did not eventuate will be seen as the story of the final planning for CIC's role in the European campaign and CIC's actual accomplishments is told; it also can be seen in the following brief paragraph from the report of the General Board on the "Organization and Operation of The Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations," prepared shortly after the end of hostilities in Europe: "In operations, personnel of Special Counter Intelligence and of The Counter Intelligence Corps were in direct contact for the exchange of information. Office of Strategic Services made available to The Counter Intelligence Corps its extremely efficient communications network for the rapid transmission of important classified information."***

No documents are now available to show how this problem was resolved and how the missions of the two organizations were categorized into their separate spheres so that a minimum of friction and a maximum

*Wise Report, "CIC in the ETO, etc."

**This letter, listed as an inclosure to Col Wise' report as follows: "Ltr dtd 7 Oct 43 recd by ETO from AFHQ dealing with relationships between OSS and CIC in Sicily," has not been located; however, other reports dealing with the same subjects are discussed and documented in Chapter 4. "The Italian Campaign," and Chapter 3, "Critique-North Africa, Sicily"

***Report of the General Board, USFET, "Organization and Operation of the CIC in the ETO," Study Number 13. (RESTRICTED)

of efficiency could be achieved by both, but it seems undeniable that the same decision was made at a very high level, as will be discussed later.

112 CIC Men in England in October 1943

At the time of Colonel Wise's visit in October 1943, there were 16 officers and 96 enlisted men assigned to CIC in England, and distributed among the following organizations: Headquarters ETO, SOS, Eighth Air Force, V Corps, 29th Infantry Division, 3d Armored Division, and 101st Airborne Division. Units then due to arrive were believed to be bringing their own CIC Detachments, although few of them were at full strength.* The correspondence files for 1943 are full of requests from the Theater for an increase in the T/O allocations for CIC units, and even for personnel to fulfill the T/O already adopted. A letter published by ETO Headquarters on 17 August 1943,** based on War Department allocations*** had designated that the following would be placed on detached service by the Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, in sections with field forces: Division Section, one officer and five enlisted men; Corps Section, two officers and 11 enlisted men; Field Army Section, five officers and 45 enlisted men; Air Force Section, five officers and 17 enlisted men, plus such expansion as might be necessary based on the increase in size of the Air Force; and SOS Base Section, as required, according to the size of the Base Section.

Actual numbers were far short of these requirements. It was already recognized by the ETO planners, as they studied the mission and accomplishments of CIC in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, that a full complement, in accordance with the published T/O, would be completely inadequate. The TBA, especially as it related to transportation, which had been published by the War Department on 17 July 1943,**** was felt to be so inadequate as to make even the small contingents of agents of little use to their tactical organizations. A letter from Major Edward L. Ray, Chief of CIC at AFHQ Headquarters to the ETO CIC on 31 August 1943 said, in part:*****

*Ltr, Hq ETOUSA Counter Intelligence Corps, Subj, "Consolidated CIC Monthly Situation Summary," to Chief, CIC, dtd 11 Oct 43, File AG 322-MGB (T-112 S & S Library) (RESTRICTED)

**Ltr, Hq ETOUSA, subj, "The Counter Intelligence Corps, ETOUSA," dtd 17 Aug 43 (R-27-S & S Library)

***Field Manual (Tentative), War Department, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 15 Feb 43

****Ltr, File AG 400 (16 July 43) OB-S-B-M, War Dept, The Adj Gen's Office, subj, "Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 17 Jul 43 (Found in Appendix to History of CIC, SOS Library)

*****Ltr from Hq AFHQ, APO 512, dtd 31 Aug 43, subj, "Counter Intelligence Corps, to Chief, CIB, G-2 Hq, ETO." (CONFIDENTIAL) (File 367 M.I.D. 322.999, European Theater, Alexandria Depot).

". . . The War Department TBA for the CIC is considered ludicrous by everyone in this Headquarters concerned with the CIC. It was obviously drawn up by someone with no knowledge of the tactical operations of the Corps. Transportation allowed virtually immobilizes CIC personnel who must be highly mobile in teams of two, regardless of the size of the sectors or detachment. Furthermore, very little of the great mass of other equipment is needed or desired. . . . In the meantime, it is strongly recommended that you reconsider your equipment needs before accepting the War Department's TBA at face value. It has absolutely no practical merit and if not revised, will practically destroy the value of the CIC with tactical units."

The TBA of which Major Ray was so bitterly critical permitted for each division CIC Section of six men and for each Corps Section of 13 men one jeep and one 3/4 ton weapons carrier; and for each Army Section of 50 men, two jeeps and four 3/4 ton weapons carriers. For other tactical sections it allocated one jeep for each 10 persons and one 3/4 ton weapons carrier for each 12 persons.*

New TO & E Authorized for CIC

The letters, staff studies and critiques which were pouring into the War Department from both AFHQ and ETO evidently bore fruit, for, on 29 November 1943, two letters, prepared by the Office of the Chief, CIC, were approved and published by the War Department, one concerned with special investigative equipment and supplies to be issued by the CIC Supply Depot in Baltimore, and the other with equipment and supplies to be issued by the Technical Services upon requisition of the Commanding Generals of tactical units to which CIC Detachments were attached. Numerous changes were incorporated in allocations to CIC Detachments, but the change that gladdened the hearts of CIC and literally put CIC "on wheels" was the allocation of one jeep for each two persons and one cargo trailer for each two jeeps in the tactical units.**

On 24 January 1944 the War Department published Table of Organization and Equipment No. 30-500, "Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment," which incorporated the two supply and equipment letters of 29 November 1943 and also set up a Table of Organization which gave to CIC for the first time a flexible organization made up of teams of various types and sizes which could be shifted about as they were needed, with a minimum

*Ltr, File Ag 400 (16 July 43), "Special List of Equipment, etc.," dtd 17 Jul 43

**Ltr, AG (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, War Department, Subj, "Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the CIC, dtd 29 Nov 43; and Ltr, file and date same as above, subj, "Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the CIC." (CONFIDENTIAL) (Found in Appendix to History of Counter Intelligence Corps, S & F Library)

of administrative confusion. Four sizes of "A" or administrative teams and four sizes of "B" or operational teams were authorized. Tables of organization, the directive stated, would be composed of at least one "A" team and at least one "B" team, but the two kinds of teams "are so designed that any combination will provide a well-balanced Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment."*

By February 1944, CIC's numbers in England had grown to a total of 37 officers and 317 enlisted men, distributed among the following organizations: ETOUSA, SOS, 8th Air Force, 9th Air Force, First Army; V, VII, XV, and XIX Corps; 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 28th, and 29th Infantry Divisions; 2d, 3d, and 4th Armored Divisions; 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, and the European Wing, Air Transport Command.**

SHAEF Directive No. 7 Defines CIC's Mission

On 5 February 1944, SHAEF Directive No. 7 was published, marking a milestone in CIC's history*** Its significance can be seen when it is realized that, for the first time, planning for CIC in combat was done from the top down rather than from the bottom up.

SHAEF Directive No. 7 set forth the general counterintelligence policies for all units operating under the Supreme Commander, with the explicit definition of the responsibilities of Counter Intelligence Staffs (defined as The Counter Intelligence Branches of G2); Counter Intelligence Personnel (defined as CIC and British FSP); SCI (Special Counter Intelligence units of OSS) and Civil Affairs staffs and detachment).

Within the positive framework of this directive, 12th Army Group, First and Third Armies and the corps and divisions under them drew up their own SOP's and directives. Most of the harassing difficulties which had beset CIC in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, brought on by either lack of understanding of CIC's mission or deliberate misinterpretation of that mission, ceased to exist when the planning was done at the top by men who knew intimately the needs of counterintelligence in a combat situation.

Past history now was the situation where the CIC Detachment had to battle up through channels on a thousand and one issues in order to be able to accomplish their mission as Major Edward L. Ray and his CIC Detachment at AFHQ had had to do.**** This time the Counterintelligence Branch at SHAEF was settling the problems before they arose.

*TO and E 30-500, 24 Jan 44.
**Opns Rpt 322.999 (CIC)(ETO 7/1/43 through 7/30/43, No A7 612242 (SECRET) (Alexandria Depot)
***See Appendix 1, "SHAEF Directive No 7."
****See Chapter 3, "Critique-North Africa, Sicily"

Colonel Sheen as Chief CI Officer at SHAEF and Colonel Wise as his Executive Officer obviously had the backing of General Bradley, whose praise of CIC in North Africa and Sicily had been so lavish,* and of Colonels Koch and Dickson, who, as previously mentioned had had opportunity to observe CIC at close range and who were finally responsible for the intelligence planning for the First and Third Armies.

This directive gave to SHAEF Counter Intelligence Coordination Section the responsibility for the "general coordination of policy regarding the handling of Counter-Intelligence information in, from and to, the field, and the allocation of responsibilities and priorities." Aside from the general mission of policy and coordination, SHAEF delegated to the various echelons all counterintelligence operations, with the exception of Travel Control. Although administratively under ETO, and operationally under ADSEC and Base Sections, ComZ, for most of their operations, the Port Detachments and certain Border Control Detachments remained operationally under SHAEF Travel Control Section throughout the war, for Travel Control functions.

Prior to the invasion, CIC was directed to: "devote themselves to the training in military security of all formations and units," but commanders were reminded that, once the invasion had been launched, other responsibilities would be so great that CIC agents would not be available to check and advise on routine military security measures to the same extent as during the preparatory phases.

The three foremost targets given to CIC during the assault were: "known and suspect enemy agents"; "known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the Allied forces"; and "buildings, billets and installations known or suspected to contain documents of Counter-Intelligence value."

Other general duties assigned to CIC in the forward areas included the securing of communications and post offices until they could be turned over to proper authorities; advising on plans for security against sabotage of installations needed by the Allied forces and of captured ordnance and ammunition dumps; contacting local authorities friendly to the Allies; co-operating with Military Police in marshalling refugees; assisting in the discovery and collection of hidden armaments and equipment; checking upon the observance of security regulations promulgated by Civil Affairs staffs and detachments; and interrogating all released or escaped Allied PW's and civilian internees.

In other than the forward combat areas, including lines and zones of communications, CIC's duties were defined to include: the investigation of cases of espionage, sabotage, and, among the armed forces of disaffection; the detection and investigation of all cases involving subversive influences likely to affect adversely the Allied forces; the

*See Chapter 1, "North African Campaign"

institution of necessary checks on security controls imposed on the civilian population; and advising and assisting in all other general security matters. In any area about to be evacuated, CIC was to be responsible for taking necessary measures to prevent valuable information from falling into the hands of the enemy.

"CIC personnel attached to Corps and Divisions will not be diverted to duties which may retard or interfere with their proper employment," the directive stated,"and authorized CIC to call upon other troops for assistance in seizing suspect premises and in the execution of other Counterintelligence duties."

The responsibility for the disposition of CIC units and the allocation of areas in which they were to operate was given the Army Group Commanders, with the provision that SHAEF G2 could designate targets inside or outside the areas assigned to Army Groups.

Enemy Agents -- CIC's First Responsibility

Not only did this directive establish the framework for counter-intelligence policies in the ETO, but it made especial provision for those areas of responsibility in which possible friction could be foreseen. Chief among these was the settlement, once and for all, of the question of the attempt by SCI/OSS to usurp CIC's mission in counter espionage which Colonel Wise had learned in October 1943 was being planned for the ETO campaign, and which Colonel Sheen and others at AFHQ had recognized early in the North African campaign as a paralyzing force in the mission of counterintelligence.

There are no available documents to show how the problem was solved so that both CIC and OSS were assigned the missions previously allocated them by the War Department, but it can only be assumed that this was accomplished because planning was being done from the top. The directive speaks for itself:

"The first responsibility of Counter Intelligence. . . is the detection and apprehension of enemy agents. Detailed planning of measures. . . must be undertaken well in advance. Such plans will be based upon information supplied by SCI units and will be formulated in consultation with officers of these units. While SCI units will render advice and furnish information, executive action is the responsibility of CI Staffs and Personnel (CIC)."

With these words, SHAEF Directive No. 7 removed all doubt as to the mission of CIC in counter-espionage and set the pattern for the successful collaboration of the two units throughout the war. During the planning stage, SCI units were charged with the preparation of all available information about enemy intelligence services and with advising CI staffs in the selection of the immediate counterintelligence targets and in methods of dealing with them to ensure maximum intelligence results.

During the combat phase, SCI units were to act as the channel for counterintelligence information between OSS Headquarters in London and the CI staffs in the field and "to advise" in the selection of counter-espionage targets and "to assist" in the examination of captured enemy documents and in the interrogation of captured enemy agents.

This same directive outlined the area in which CIC could be of the greatest assistance to OSS in the performance of their mission -- through close cooperation in the handling of all captured enemy espionage agents. SCI staffs were to be notified immediately of the arrest of any enemy agent and be given the opportunity to interrogate him and collaborate in plans for his disposal, while the fact of his capture was kept in strictest secrecy. "It is only by making the fullest use in this way of SCI units that the maximum information can be obtained and the detection and arrest of other agents secured."

Later directives published by Group and Army reflect the same intentions, and throughout the war SCI and CIC units worked in the closest cooperation, as will be shown in succeeding chapters.

While SHAEF, through Directive No. 7, retained the responsibility for deciding general questions of counterintelligence policy and coordinating activities and disseminating information among the Army Groups, the responsibility for the organization and operation of counter-intelligence and the disposition of counterintelligence personnel was passed down to the Army Groups. Each Army Group Commander was also charged with the responsibility of ensuring that:

"All commanders and staffs within their commands are fully informed with respect to the proper employment of Counter Intelligence Personnel (defined in the directive as CIC)."

General Order 36 Reorganizes CIC in April 1944

On 27 April 1944, General Order 36, Headquarters ETOUSA, reorganized CIC and officially established it in the ETO. Under its provisions, all Counter Intelligence Corps officers and enlisted men on duty in the ETO, with the exception of those assigned with the European Wing, Air Transport Service, were relieved of assignment to Military Intelligence Service, WD, and assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, for duty with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Section.*

All administrative functions were delegated to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, ETO, including the authority to transfer individuals into, within, and out of the CIC and to deploy personnel and detachments as needed. Operationally all detachments were under the G2's of the combat units and Communication Zone echelons during such time as they were attached. This permitted the flexibility which had been discovered

*GO 36, Hq ETOUSA, 27 Apr 44 (Confidential)(Alexandria Depot)

in North Africa, Sicily and Italy to be absolutely necessary if CIC were to perform its mission.*

General Order 36 also set up 40 Provisional Detachments, organized under the authority of TO & E 30-500, and was followed on 21 May 1944 by a directive attaching these detachments to First and Third Armies, SOS, ADSEC and USAF and sub-attaching them as follows:**

a. Infantry and Armored Divisions, one each of Types A-1, B-1 and B-2 teams,*** total, four officers, 13 men, attached as follows: Provisional Detachment 1, 82d Airborne; 2, 101st Airborne; 3, 2d Armored, 4, 3d Armored; 5, 4th Armored; 6, 5th Armored; 7, 6th Armored; 8, 1st Infantry; 9, 2d Infantry; 10, 4th Infantry; 11, 5th Infantry; 12, 8th Infantry; 13, 9th Infantry; 14, 28th Infantry; 15, 29th Infantry; 16, 30th Infantry; 17, 79th Infantry; 18, 83d Infantry; 19, 90th Infantry.

b. Corps, one A-2 and two B-2 teams, total, five officers, 14 men, attached as follows: Provisional Detachment 23, V Corps; 24, VII Corps; 25, VIII Corps; 26, XV Corps; 27, XIX Corps; 28, XX Corps.

c. Army Headquarters, one A-3 and one B-4 team, total six officers, 15 men attached as follows; Provisional Detachment 29, First Army; 30, Third Army.

d. Twelfth U.S. Army Group (called at that time First U.S. Army Group). Provisional Detachment 31, one A-3, one B-4 and eight B-3 teams, total, 30 officers, 103 men.

e. Advance Section Communications Zone (ADSEC), Provisional Detachments 32, 33, 34, and 35, one A-2, two B-2 and one B-3 team each, total eight officers and 30 men per detachment.

f. Western Base Section, SOS, Detachments 20, 21, and 22, one A-1, one B-1, and two B-2 teams, total four officers, 13 men in each detachment; Detachment 36, (SHAEF Detachment) nine officers, 25 men; and Detachment 37, one A-2, seven B-2, two B-3 and two B-4 teams, total 29 officers, 103 men.

g. Eighth Air Force, Detachment 38 and Ninth Air Force, Detachment 39, one A-2, three B-1 and one B-4, total eight officers and 26 men each.

h. Headquarters, ETOUSA, Detachment 40, one A-3, one A-4 and one B-1 team, total, seven officers, 14 men.

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*Report of the General Board USFET "Organization and Operation of the CIC in the ETO."

**GO 36, 27 Apr 44; and Ltr AG 322 OpGC, Hq ETOUSA, subj, "Troop Assignment (70), dtd 21 May 44 (KC Depot, 25097(3-21-11)

***For composition of teams, see SO 36, attached as Appendix 2 .

h. Headquarters; ETOUSA, Detachment 40, one A-3, one A-3, one A-4 and one B-1 team, total, seven officers, 14 men.

The Theater was short 144 officers to meet the above authorizations, and the creation of three additional detachments before the end of June made the shortage more acute, a shortage that was partially overcome during the war by means of battlefield commissions. By the end of June 1944, CIC ETOUSA had a total of 111 officers and 877 enlisted men, which meant that a number of detachments went to the Continent without their full complement either of officers or enlisted men. There were also in England one officer and 11 enlisted men assigned to European Wing, Air Transport Command.*

Few of the Divisions and Corps which came to the ETO after the invasion had their full complements, and by December 1944 the situation had become so acute that local recruitment was authorized by 12th Army Group, and all commanders were directed to screen their troops for suitable personnel. The necessary background investigations of all applicants placed a heavy burden on all CIC detachments at a time when they could ill afford to spare agents for this work.**

Confusion resulting from the arbitrary numbering system of units brought about a change, in July 1944, whereby CIC Detachments were named according to the unit to which they were attached. Detachments operating with Infantry Divisions were to carry the number of the Division: e.g., the 8th CIC Detachment (Prov), attached to the 1st Infantry Division, became the 1st CIC Detachment. Detachments with Armored Divisions carried the Division numeral, preceded by 5 (or 50): e.g., CIC Detachment 3, with the 2d Armored Division became the 502d CIC Detachment; Corps Detachments were indicated by the figure 2 (or 20); e.g., 205 for V Corps Detachment, 219 for XIX Corps Detachment; and Army Detachments were indicated by the figure 3 (or 30): e.g., First Army Detachment became the 301st CIC Detachment and Third Army the 303d.***

As the campaign in Europe moved on and Divisions and Corps were shifted about among the various Armies, all Corps and Division Detachments were relieved from their primary attachment to Army and attached directly to the units to which they were previously sub-detached.****

*See Appendix 3 for rosters of these units, compiled from ETO roster, 1 May 1944; SO 131, Hq ETOUSA, 10 May 44; SO 180, 29 Jun 44; and SO 181, 29 Jun 44.

**Ltr File 200.3 (G-2), Hq 12th Army Group, Subj, "Enlisted Personnel for CIC Detachment," dtd 9 Dec 44. (Kansas City Depot, 3-21-12 (1) (CONFIDENTIAL)

***Ltr, File 320 (C), Hq First US Army, subj, "Activation and Disbandment of Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments," dtd 6 Aug 44. (KC Depot 1-17-65) (SECRET)

****Ltr File 322 (AG-0), Hq 12th Army Group, subj, "Troop Assignment No. 128," 20 Dec 44. (KC Depot 4-23-39(SECRET)

Framework for CIC in the ETO

Administration of all CIC Detachments in the ETO was centralized in the Office of the Chief, ETOUSA, who had the sole power to assign detachments to Ground Forces and Air Forces units and Base Sections, and to transfer individuals from one detachment to another; however, great flexibility was attained by liberal use of temporary duty or detached service transfers within all echelons.* Provision was made for promotion of enlisted agents, within Table of Organization limitations, by the commander of the unit to which they were attached, and for the commissioning of qualified CIC agents to fill officer vacancies in CIC Detachments, these recommendations to be processed "in the same manner as are those for personnel of assigned units."**

CIC Detachments were attached to all combat units down to Division levels, to Advance Sections, Communications Zone (ADSEC or ASCZ) and to Base Sections, Communication Zone (ComZ) and to all large Air Force units. In other words, each echelon having a general staff had its own CIC detachment, which operated under the G2 of the unit.

Another milestone in the "battle of civilian clothes" was reached on 12 March 1944, when CIC officers and agents were authorized to wear civilian clothes "at the discretion of the Detachment Commander, CIC ETOUSA," with the warning that "Insofar as possible, authorization to wear civilian clothes granted and identification cards issued . . . . will be only for such specific times as required, and such authorization and cards will be renewable six months from the date of issue."***

12th Army Group SOP

With its mission firmly established by SHAEF Directive No. 7, and its organization set under General Order 36, CIC was ready to make its operational plans. As the first U.S. Army Group to become operational on the continent, the 12th Army Group set up its SOP for CIC, incorporating the general principles set forth in the SHAEF Directive, with added details as to CIC employment, organization, operations and procedures.****

The dual necessity of maintaining counterintelligence operations during the advance into Germany and of establishing a static counterintelligence organization to cover progressively conquered areas in

*Annex 4 to ETO CIC Administrative SOP (SCS Library Files)

**Ltr, Hq ETO, File AG 210.3/2 MPGB, subj, "Assignment, Promotion and Appointment of CIC Personnel," dtd 2 Aug 44; this ltr makes reference to authority provided in "Sec I, Cir 47, this hq, 26 Apr 44," and "Cir 59, this hq, 1 Jan 44."

***Ltr, AG 322 MPGB, Hq, ETO, US Army, subj, "Authorization for Certain Officers and Enlisted Men to Wear Civilian Clothing," dtd 12 Mar 44 (IC Depot 4-13-7) (CONFIDENTIAL)

****See Appendix 4, FUSAG CIC SOP, taken from First United States Army Group Standing Operating Procedure, Short title FUSAG SOP. (For deception purposes, the 12th AG was called the 1st AG during the planning period).

Germany formed the basis for planning for 12th Army Group. With this dual necessity in mind, 12th Army Group set up its own detachment, the 410th, consisting of two separate elements. One element, of two officers and four enlisted men, was responsible for administration of all CIC personnel attached to 12th Army Group Headquarters and acted as the channel for all CIC matters between higher and subordinate commands. The other element, one headquarters team and seven reserve teams, comprised the operational arm. Actually these teams operated both at combat and ADSEC (Advanced Section Communications Zone) level most of the time, being shifted about as needed.*

Under 12th Army Group's SOP, the G2 and the CI Staff of each unit to which a CIC Detachment was attached would be responsible for supervision of the employment of the detachment, but the actual employment was to be "a function of command to be exercised through the commanding officer of the detachment."**

The directive left no doubt as to the acceptance, at a very high level, of the belief that the standards used in the selection of CIC agents had produced a group of men capable of performing the missions assigned, and capable of being entrusted with a great deal of individual responsibility, as the following quotation will show:

"CIC personnel will be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties, they will be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement. They will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard customs or prohibitions (such as speed limits, access to places "off limits", etc.) nor by the military police or other military agencies. CIC badges and credentials will be honored at all times."

The directive prohibited the use of CIC on tasks not connected with counterintelligence, such as combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, or other work which might interfere with the performance of CI duties. Specifically prohibited also was assignment to kitchen police, fatigue, and guard duties. No record has been found that CIC agents were employed on KP or routine guard duty, but the tendency of commanders to employ the most capable person near at hand for specialized tasks continued throughout the war and resulted in the use of CIC agents upon numerous occasions in work not of CI interest.

As an example, the 5th Infantry Division Detachment, in its Situation Summary for January 1944 listed seven cases handled: the theft of a carbine from an Army camp; theft of personal property from a soldier;

*Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), 12th Army Group, Vol IV, pp 109-110.

**See Appendix 4, FUSAG CIC SOP

alleged misappropriation of Medical Corps drugs by two soldiers at Langford Lodge; suspected doping of a soldier in a Belfast pub; firing by guards at U.S. Army installations on two unidentified persons; landing of unidentified plane near Castlewellan; and the attempted sale of eight Army rifles by two enlisted men to two civilians.*

CIC agents were not authorized to take civilian clothing to the continent, but were directed to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces with, normally, a CIC brassard supplied by ETOUSA.

The directive set up a uniform file system whereby information concerning suspect individuals and organizations and various security controls instituted in the area would be kept on 5x8" cards in such a way that all information which could be of value would be left by a detachment when it moved on. The type of information and the means of cross-indexing it was outlined in detail.

According to the "relay system," planned in order that an uninterrupted counterintelligence coverage would be attained, the Division Detachment would turn its records over to Corps, Corps to Army, Army to ADSEC, and ADSEC to the static detachments of the Base Sections, ComZ, as the final recipients.**

It was planned by Twelfth Army Group that a small group of the CIC Detachment having jurisdiction over a certain area should remain until the next detachment arrived in order to turn over any unfinished local business and advise the incoming group on their activities.*** This system did not always work smoothly, especially during the early phases of the campaign. A generally better plan was found to be that of keeping several members of Corps CIC forward with Division, and several from Army forward with Corps, so that when Division and Corps moved forward, these members would remain to orient their own detachments on the situation before moving forward again.****

By the time Twelfth Army Group was ready to move into Germany, an attempt was made to arrange counterintelligence coverage so that an area would remain under the control of the unit which instituted the original coverage.***** This difficulty had been forseen by Third U.S.

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*CIC Monthly Situation Summary, 5th Inf Div, 2 Feb 44, from Opns Rpts 322.999 (CIC) ETO No. A7 612242 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Alexandria Depot)

**Report of the General Board, USFET, "Organization and Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater of Operations;" and Twelfth Army Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Reports.

***FUSAG CIC SOP

****Twelfth Army Grp Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany; and Twelfth Army Group Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Summaries (SGS Library)

*****Ibid

Army which worked out certain modifications in the Twelfth Army Group relay system, since, according to their After Action Report, "The Sicilian operation had proved that only confusion and needless repetition of effort resulted when Division Counter Intelligence Corps turned over to Corps and thence to Army, without coordination to effect continuous coverage."*

Third Army's pre-invasion plans called for the withdrawal of four enlisted men from each Division and one officer and seven enlisted men from each Corps, with full field equipment and transportation, to form a Reserve Pool for each Corps. Personnel from the Reserve Pool were to be assigned by the Corps CIC officer to reinforce Division Detachments and then remain in the area throughout Division, Corps and Army control, until relieved by ComZ Detachments. The Chief CIC officer, Third Army, was to be responsible for arranging for turn-over to ADSEC Detachments and for dispatching personnel back to the Pools as well as being custodian of the Service Records and administration. The plan also provided for great flexibility in the reinforcement of Corps Reserve Pools by transfer of personnel from other Corps Pools or from Army Reserve Teams.**

The records do not indicate whether these Reserve Pools actually were formed; if so, they were not referred to as separate entities. However, Third Army's reports do indicate that Division Detachments were reinforced by both Corps and Army CIC personnel so that "coverage was continuous from the time an area was first taken over by the Division until it passed from Army control . . . . CIC personnel familiar with the territorial problems maintained continuous coverage from the time an enemy area was taken."***

On one known occasion, just before the Third Army advanced into Germany, ADSEC Teams were attached to Third Army, two for work on the counterintelligence control line and a third in Army rear areas. On 16 December, when the Ardennes Breakthrough caused a complete regrouping of tactical units, an ADSEC team which had been attached for operations to XII Corps was retained in the area although responsibility passed to XV Corps, an example of the use of a lateral relay system.****

First Army attempted to overcome the weaknesses of the relay system by Pool Detachments who were to provide security in larger cities and towns on the lines of communication in liberated areas until the areas passed out of Army Group Control. Pool Personnel were to be requested

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*Third U.S. Army After Action Report, 1944-45

**Third U.S. Army Instructions for the CIC, attached as Appendix 5.

***Third U.S. Army After Action Report; and Monthly Information Report. No. 1, Hq Third U.S. Army, CIC Detachment, dtd 20 Feb 45 (SECRET) (S & F Library)

****Third Army After Action Report

as needed by Corps and, when deemed advisable, some were to be sent with the Division Detachment on their entry into a town or city, but were to be concerned with such long-range problems as contact with local police, investigation of local administrators and the establishment of an informant system, rather than the search for documents, arrest of enemy agents and other activities of an immediate nature.*

However, the USFET Board in its report pointed out weaknesses in the relay system as planned by Twelfth Army Group, without making any official recognition of the modifications made by First and Third Armies. The Board report stated:** "In a fast moving situation, forward commands were unable to maintain adequate records, or were unable to wait for a detachment to relieve them, which resulted in considerable confusion and loss of effort. There were countless cases of individuals having been jailed by the detachments of divisions and corps without adequate case histories being placed in the hands of succeeding detachments. These detachments would then have to reinvestigate the prisoners in order to dispose of them. Another weakness of the relay system was that local authorities soon wearied of finding a new Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in the area every 10 or 20 days, and became confused by the changes in policy. Informants were reluctant to be passed from one agent to another because they sensed danger in becoming known as informants, and because, being called upon to repeat their entire story to a new counterintelligence representative a few days later, they lost confidence that their information would lead to action."

In order to facilitate CIC's task of apprehending espionage agents who would attempt to infiltrate our lines in the guise of refugees, 12th Army Group included in its refugee control plan*** provisions that would require that all civilian refugees who could not immediately prove that they had been made homeless by operations be screened by CIC at several points. CIC agents, aided by civil police, were to man the Security Control Post, which was to operate with the Traffic Control Post in the immediate rear of forward divisional boundaries or with the Civil Affairs Collecting Point or between the two. Here CIC was to make a rapid screening of refugees with as complete coverage as possible. All suspect refugees culled at this point were to be sent direct to the Civilian Annex to the Mobile PW Collecting Point, from which those cleared were to be turned over to Civil Affairs for disposition through refugee channels. Those who were obviously enemy agents were to be sent under CI escort direct to Army level where CIC agents would complete their interrogation and turn over to SCI any persons who could be of use to them; those who were merely suspect were to be sent to the

*See Appendix 6: First United States Standing Operating Procedure for The Counter Intelligence Corps, dtd 12 May 44 (KC Depot Records 3-8-63)
**Report of the General Board, USFET, etc.
***See Appendix 7, FUSAG CICSOP, "Exhibit 'A' Channels for Evacuation of Refugees and Suspects," and "Exhibit 'B', functional Chart," taken from Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, Vol IV.

Civilian Annex to the Mobile PW Interrogation Post.

At this Civilian Annex suspects again were to be screened and given more thorough, although not prolonged, interrogation. Obvious agents were to be removed and sent to Army; those still suspect were sent to the Civilian Interrogation Center which operated as an annex to the Army PW cage; and those cleared were turned over to Civil Affairs Transit Area. After final and prolonged interrogation by CIC agents at the Army Civilian Interrogation Center, disposition was to be made by Army officials. It was stated that not all these stages in refugee evacuation would have to be followed in all cases, but the general process would remain as outlined.

In addition to the above, CIC was instructed to escort all civilians who were believed to have been organizers or key members of resistance groups or allied underground organizations to the Special Force liaison officer at Corps, who would be responsible for taking them to Army. Interrogation of these persons was to be limited to tactical information of CI interest, such as location of target buildings and possible saboteurs, agents and collaborators, while questions of political consideration were to be avoided.

MII Teams and CIC were instructed to maintain very close liaison and to exchange information freely. MII Teams were to interrogate refugees and displaced persons only for tactical and strategic information and to inform CIC immediately of any suspicious persons; CIC was to pass on to MII any persons deemed suitable for their interrogation.

Each unit operating under 12th Army Group was directed to work out its own detailed plans for CIC operations.*

First U.S. Army Has Initial Control

Since First U.S. Army was to be in control of all U.S. units during the assault on the continent and during the build-up in the lodgement area, all CIC detachments which took part in the mounting operations and the assault came initially under First Army control. This included ADSEC units, which later were to revert to ComZ, and Pool CIC Detachments which later were to revert to 12th Army Group and be organized into Tactical Reserve Teams under the 418th CIC Detachment.

With this in mind, First U.S. Army published, on 12 May 1944, its plan for CIC employment in Operation NEPTUNE.** This plan specified that tactical CIC Detachments consisting of two officers and 14 enlisted men, permanently attached to division, corps, and army would go on the invasion with their units and that three Army Pool detachments of the

*Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, Vol IV (G-2 Section)
**See Appendix 0, "Operation of The Counter Intelligence Corps, Annex 4f to First United States Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE," extracted from L-7, First U.S. Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE (Alexandria Depot)

same size would be sub-allocated as needed. All of these detachments, both permanently and temporarily attached, would be responsible to the AC of S, G-2, of their tactical unit. Each unit was authorized to ask for assistance from the next higher echelon: Division from Corps and Corps from Army. Port and Interior Detachments were to be attached to Headquarters, ADSEC, but until the areas in which they were to operate should be placed under ComZ, were to work under the G2 of the tactical unit in control of the area.

In addition to the three Pool Detachments made available to Army and its lower echelons, one officer and eight enlisted men from Pool Detachments, along with their own transportation, were placed on duty with the Headquarters Engineer Special Brigade Group on Y-day minus 15 to remain until after D plus 15; and three enlisted men were placed with First Engineer Brigade for the same period.*

A "Refugee Interrogation Post," consisting of one officer and three enlisted men from Army Pool personnel, equipped with three jeeps, were to land on D plus three on Omaha Beach and operate initially under the VII Corps CIC Detachment.

Six U.S. Navy Intelligence Officers also were attached to VII Corps Headquarters to be assigned "appropriate missions by the AC of S, G-2, VII Corps, and coordinate their work with the CIC."

A Port Detachment of ADSEC, consisting of two officers and 16 enlisted men, with five jeeps, were to land on Utah Beach on D plus five and operate initially under the VII Corps Detachment. They were assigned to work in the port area around Cherbourg, to include all installations in the Arsenal, and the warehouses and port offices in the area. One half of another Port Detachment, one officer and eight enlisted men with three jeeps, would land on Omaha Beach on D plus six and operate initially under V Corps Detachment.

One half of one First Army CIC Detachment was to land on Omaha Beach on D-Day, with the other half coming in on D plus three; another First Army Detachment was to land on D plus 15, and two Pool Detachments, destined for allocation to augment Corps Detachments, was scheduled for D plus 30.

First Army CIC Detachments were made "responsible for the security of Army troops and of the various echelons of Army Headquarters, interrogation of civilians sent back to First Army PW cage and Counter Intelligence measures requested by lower echelons." Until Corps rear boundaries could be established, Army CIC was to be responsible for security in all towns between Corps rear boundary and Army rear boundary.

*Roster of men attached to Engineer Brigade Group and Engineer Brigade attached as Appendix 9 (KC Depot 4-1-45)

The CIC Detachment for each headquarters was charged with CIC coverage in the zone under immediate control of that headquarters, with the Commanding Officer of Army and Corps CIC Detachments responsible for coordination of plans and activities of the detachments of the next lower echelons. The NEPTUNE Plan directed that each CIC Division and Corps Detachment "prepare detailed plans for the fulfillment" of a list of 20 objectives and duties, which were listed in order of priority. The first three objectives listed were: (1) arresting known and suspected enemy agents; (2) arresting known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers and others whose presence menaces the security of the Allied Forces; and (3) searching buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of counterintelligence value. Documents of combat intelligence value found during the search of such installations were to be transmitted immediately to the AC of S, G-2 or the S2 of the unit in control of the area.

Other important missions included the impounding of civilian mail; seizure of various installations which might be of value to the Allied Forces; advising other units in the establishment of guards at critical points; assisting the Provost Marshal in plans for marshalling refugees; and assisting Civil Affairs in the establishment of a reliable civil administration. CIC was charged with the responsibility of recommending to Civil Affairs the removal of unreliable civil officials; in fact, CIC's authority under the First Army plan was greater than that of merely "recommending," but an attempt to avoid possible friction is seen in the admonition that "civil officials will be arrested by CIC without consulting Civil Affairs only when the continued liberty of such officials represents a threat to security."

Also in the realm of civilian movement control, a Civil Affairs function, CIC was given the final authority for the issuance of travel permits, supervision of control points established outside the towns and the decision as to which illegal travelers were to be held for further investigation and which were to be judged by Civil Affairs for breach of travel regulations.

Another important mission for CIC was that of contacting local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause to procure all possible information. According to the First Army Plan, "Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) Teams will be used under CIC direction to obtain Combat Intelligence as well as Counter Intelligence information."* This is the only definite statement found that as teams they were to work under CIC direction in obtaining Combat Intelligence information. The MII Teams, made up of French-speaking persons, mainly French Nationals, worked very closely with CIC throughout the campaigns in France and Belgium, and from time to time members of these teams were attached operationally to CIC Detachments. According to the First Army

*Ibid, para 3a(14)

Plan, these teams, consisting of two officers and four enlisted men each, were to be available to armies, corps, and divisions on the basis of three per army, two per corps, and one per division.*

Third Army, in addition to following the procedures established by First Army generally, assigned an officer and four CIC agents to a Research Group to study and disseminate information to units attached to Third Army. By the end of January 1945 the team was handling 70,000 SHAEF personality cards and 200,000 Third Army CI personality cards. In the early stages the Research Team prepared Town CI Plans for dissemination to each detachment going into a town, but when the speed of movement across France made this plan impracticable, the Team substituted Counterintelligence Briefs for each of the Wehrkreises of Germany for distribution not only to Third Army Detachments, but to the Detachments of adjacent Armies. As their work increased, the Team was assisted at various times by CIC personnel from other units and by Civil Affairs and Military Government personnel.**

Records seem to indicate that, throughout the war, Third Army, in an attempt to overcome the shortage of CIC linguists, made frequent use of linguists from other G2 Sections to augment CIC Detachments. Third Army also, later in the war, created Security Detachments of two officers and ten enlisted men each and assigned one of these to each CIC team under Third Army to free CIC agents of considerable administrative and housekeeping duties to pursue their primary mission of apprehending enemy agents and personalities of CIC interest. Near the end of the war, all agencies interested in counterintelligence, technical intelligence, and personality and organization targets were organized into the Third U.S. Army Intelligence Center, which served further to coordinate intelligence activities and to relieve specialists from administrative duties.

In conjunction with its plan for NEPTUNE, First Army also published its plan for "Security in Zone of Operations" under First Army control, in which were outlined CIC's responsibilities following the initial assault, handling of prisoners and relationship with Civil Affairs and other agencies.***

V Corps Plan for CIC Operations

The V Corps operational plan, which may be used as typical of Corps planning, specified that normally two agents from Corps would be placed on duty with each divisional detachment having an operational

*Para 4, Annex 4a(1), to First Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE, L-7, Alexandria Depot

**Monthly Information Report #1, Hq Third U.S. Army CIC Det., dtd 20 Feb 45 (SECRET) (SCF Library)

***Attached as Appendix 10, Annex 4c to First United States Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE, Pre-Invasion File 251 A, Alexandria Depot (UNCLASSIFIED)

area so that, when the division moved forward, these men could remain and revert to corps control; at the same time two more men would be sent forward to join division in its new operational area.* In addition to duties as prescribed by First Army, V Corps gave to CIC the responsibility for checking the security observance in all Corps units, and the collection of tactical and strategic information "whenever such duties can be performed without serious interference with its normal mission."

V Corps organized its G2 Section into the following sub-sections: Administration; Counterintelligence, under which CIC operated; Military Intelligence Interpretation; Combat Intelligence, with responsibility for Order of Battle and PW interrogation; and G2 Air, with responsibility for Photo Interpretation Teams.

Probably a more accurate interpretation of the use of the MII teams than that contained in the First Army Plan is to be found in the Standing Operating Procedure for V Corps, contained in V Corps Report of Intelligence Operations. According to this SOP, both MII teams assigned to Corps Headquarters were to operate directly under G2 with the primary function of interrogating French civilians for tactical and strategic information of the enemy and the following secondary functions: (1) to act as interpreters for the Commanding General and Staff; (2) to assist the CIC Detachment in securing counterintelligence information from French civilians; (3) to assist the Civil Affairs Officer in securing the information required from French civilians; and (4) to assist the G2 section in an emergency in processing information and in the dissemination of combat intelligence information.

The MII teams began operations almost as soon as they landed on the Normandy shores, with one team working closely with CIC in the corps service area, and the other well forward in the divisional areas. "The best sources of information," the V Corps Report states, "were loyal Frenchmen who, upon hearing that we had landed, worked their way through the German lines to reach our forces . . . . In the first few days of the operation, it was found that one of the best contacts was through the CIC, since all line-crossers were screened by them before being cleared."

Since the screening of all civilians residing in operational areas and all refugees and evacuees was a CIC responsibility, it was obviously necessary that CIC and the MII Teams work in the closest cooperation.

1st Infantry Division CIC SOP

The SOP for the 1st Infantry Division CIC Detachment, as one of

*For V Corps CIC SOP, see Appendix 11, which has been extracted from 205-2 (12110) Intelligence Operations V Corps - European Campaign 10 May 42 - 10 May 45, Appendix I

the first ones prepared, may serve as an example of the mission assigned CIC at this echelon.* The CIC Detachment, which was expected to enter a town on the heels of the forward combat troops, was directed to accomplish the following: arrest all known or suspected agents and war criminals; contact the mayor, the chief of police, the leading priest and the town secretary; locate, shut down, and guard or seal all telegraph and cable offices, all telephone exchanges and private lines, radio stations, post offices, mail boxes and banks; search and guard or seal all enemy headquarters and CP's, depots, dumps, warehouses, installations and billets; inspect and guard, if necessary, all utilities such as gas, water and electric power; and check regularly on blackout and curfew regulations.

All German documents found were to be delivered to the Order of Battle unit at Division Headquarters. If the quantity was too large for immediate removal, a sampling was to be sent back and the rest placed under guard until removal could be arranged by Division. All civilian mail and telegrams written prior to D-Day and ten percent of the remainder were to be sent immediately to the War Office at 23-27 Brook Street, London, via message center.

Since it was expected that the CIC Detachment would usually arrive before the Civil Affairs team, certain CA functions were assigned initially to the CIC Detachment. Chief among these were instructions to be given the town mayor in connection with the proclamations he was expected to post and enforce. Severe restrictions in regard to civilian travel, blackout hours, collection of wireless sets and German arms were included. The mayor was to be instructed that all Germans must be turned over to CIC immediately, under severe penalty threat, and to be reminded that the "State of Siege" as proclaimed in 1939 had not been withdrawn, under which the crime of looting was punishable by death. The mayor was to be expected to provide billets for CIC, to be paid for at the regular CA rate, from Confidential Funds.

CIC was instructed to set up an office immediately in the Town Hall with someone on duty at all times who would know the location of all detachment members and visit the S2 of the Regiment in control of the area to see that he was familiar with CIC's mission and to offer him all possible assistance.

CIC was allocated Confidential Funds to be used in obtaining information concerning collaborationists, Nazi sympathizers, and French civilians harboring German soldiers, with a provision of a 1,000 franc reward to any French civilian who delivered a German soldier hiding in the area.

*See Appendix 12, "SOP for CIC Det," Appendix A to Annex 7, taken from 3-1-2 (7934), Intelligence Activities of 1st Inf Div (ETO), Jun, Aug, Sep 44.

Although certain details of organization and operational methods varied with the different divisional detachments, and experience as the war progressed brought about certain adjustments, the plan set up by 1st Division Detachment was generally followed throughout 12th Army Group.*

Shortly before D-Day three agents from V Corps Detachment were added temporarily to 1st Division Detachment, thereby bringing the strength of the detachment to two officers and 17 enlisted men, who were divided into four teams. "A" Team, consisting of one officer and six enlisted men with two jeeps, went ashore with the leading combat team, and "B" Team, four enlisted men with one jeep, with the second combat team, both on D-Day. "C" Team, one officer and three enlisted men, with one jeep, came in with Division Headquarters on D plus one. All of these teams carried only personal equipment and arms, while remaining equipment was brought in by "D" Team, consisting of four enlisted men with four jeeps with trailers.

On 20 June the teams were regrouped as follows: "A", "B", and "C" Teams, four enlisted men each; and "D" Team, two officers and three enlisted men. The first three were operational, while "D" Team handled administration, liaison and special missions, sending a member each day to each of the other teams to disseminate and collect information.

CIC Plans for Communications Zone

Early in the planning it was recognized that the Communications Zone on the continent, extending from the coastline to the rear boundary of Army, and constituting the life-line to our combat troops, would be a particularly fertile field for enemy espionage and sabotage agents and as such would require special CIC coverage.**

Abwehr-trained "stay behind" agents, French and Belgian citizens who had been corrupted during the long stay of the Nazis in their countries, and agents slipping in by sea and air were expected to menace our supply lines as well as attempt to provide the enemy with information concerning our reserves and our plans.

> "Targets for sabotage within the ComZ are so many and of such importance that it is probable that the enemy will make his major sabotage threat within this zone."
>
> "The ComZ will contain some of the most important targets for espionage on the continent."

*301-2 (7934) Intelligence Activities 1st Inf Div (ETO) Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep 44, Annex 7, CIC Activities 1 Jun to 30 Jun 44 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Alexandria Depot)

**Appendix II to Communications Zone Plan, Fwd Ech ComZ, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (Adm 376, Alexandria Depot)(U)

The above two statements are contained in the Communications Zone Plan for the European Theater campaign, finally completed with all changes, additions and amendments on 4 June 1944, two days before the invasion. Coupled with the statement, "CIC Detachments are the principal means available to Hq Ad ComZ," they left no doubt in the minds of CIC agents assigned to ComZ units that, even though they were not to be in the front line of combat, they had some busy months ahead.

CIC Detachments were assigned to the Advance Section Communications Zone (ADSEC), which would operate directly to the rear of Army boundaries, and to Base Sections, ComZ, which would control the remainder of the liberated and conquered territory. As the ADSEC CIC Detachments would move forward to cover territory released from Army control, Base Section Detachments would take over as the permanent static Detachments. The USFET Board, in its study of CIC in the ETO, reached the conclusion that CIC could have operated more successfully in the ComZ if coverage had been organized on a territorial basis under the direct operational control of the ComZ G2, rather than by the attachment of the CIC units to Advance and Base Sections.*

The Communications Zone Plan defined the scope of counterintelligence work as the establishment of "counterintelligence personnel into a network through the U.S. controlled area on the continent from, and including, the coastline up to rear boundary of the army . . . . for the purpose of assisting local commanders in preserving military security and of preventing, detecting, investigating, reporting and taking any other action with regard to suspected subversive activities, either civil or military, and to prevent the passage into or out of, and the circulation within, the prescribed area, of suspected subversive persons, material or information."**

Except for the omission of work to be performed with the forward combat troops, the CIC mission as outlined in the ComZ Plan was similar to that for Armies, Corps and Divisions. In addition, greater stress was laid upon the necessity for cooperation between Civil Affairs and CIC Detachments. CIC was directed to supply CA Detachments with all available information which would assist in the efficient control of the civil population, and CA was directed to secure the compliance of local officials with Counter Intelligence and Security policies and to confer with CIC in the making of all civil appointments. CIC was authorized to deal directly with the French Security Police, but dealings with local civil police were generally to be accomplished through Civil Affairs.***

*Report of the General Board, USFET, etc.
**Communications Zone Plan, Hq Fwd Ech ComZ, ETO, US Army, Sec V, para 2 (Alexandria Depot, Admin File 370) (U)
***Ibid, Sec XVII, para 10c.

Evidently recognizing that the setting up of an efficient civil government, the mission of Civil Affairs, and the clearing of all potential security threats from the area, CIC's mission would at times involve opposite concepts, the Intelligence Plan for the Communications Zone included certain specific warnings and areas of authority for each organization. Perhaps the most important of these, from a CIC viewpoint at least, was that: "Civilians arrested by CIC personnel will not be released by Civil Affairs or Provost Marshal without agreement of the CI officer."

In the handling of political suspects, CIC Detachments were warned that they "must be guided by the general consideration that it is not desirable for military forces to intervene in purely internal political disputes and that their responsibility does not extend beyond the task of securing the allied forces against attack by enemy agents or subversive elements. Except when individual political suspects are considered to be capable of actually assisting the enemy, or are needed for interrogation, they will be left for Allied governments to dispose of later."

It was pointed out that, in the earlier stages, CIC might have to "assist in the physical deposition (sic) of untrustworthy officials," but they were instructed that they should be concerned in the detention of these officials only when it was thought that these officials "would continue to assist the enemy or that they might posses information of counterintelligence value."*

Between D plus five and D plus 30, five Port and Interior Detachments, with a total of 166 men with 110 vehicles were scheduled to go to the continent. Until the establishment of a rear Army boundary they were to operate under control of First U.S. Army; after that they would revert to ComZ control.** These ADSEC Teams would then move forward behind the armies, releasing permanent control to Base Section Detachments.***

CIC in Base Sections, ComZ

Directives for CIC's operations with Base Sections were similar to those for ADSEC with provision for the special situations to be found in port areas. In addition, since all ports and airfields which furnished the principal means of entry and egress to the operational zone came under control of Base Sections, Base Section CIC Detachments were responsible for the enforcement of travel control regulations, which,

*See Appendix 13, Annex 2c to Operational Plan, Adv Sec ComZ, NEPTUNE, taken from Hq Adv Section Communications Zone, NEPTUNE operation Plan (Admin 377, Alexandria Depot) (SECRET)

**Annex 2 and 2a, Operational Plan, Adv Sec ComZ NEPTUNE (Alex Depot 377) (S)

***ADSEC History (Adm 533c, Alexandria Depot) (UNCLASSIFIED)

prior to D-Day, had been recognized as of such importance that a special section was established in SHAEF for their promulgation. Base Section CIC Detachments operated under Base Command authority in all matters pertaining to military and civil security, but in matters pertaining to travel control they operated directly under the Travel Control Section of SHAEF.* These operations will be the subject of a special section in this history.**

Security was CIC's Job

From the arrival of the very first CIC agents in England until the invasion, CIC's first responsibility was security of military information. Security campaigns, security lectures, and coverage of Service clubs, bars and restaurants both in uniform and in civilian clothes as a deterrent to "loose talk" were routine activities for CIC agents.

The first intensive coordinated coverage of approximately 450 clubs and restaurants in more than 100 cities and towns throughout the British Isles was performed during the last two weeks in May 1943 for the dual purpose of ascertaining the extent of "loose talk" and of gaining knowledge to be used in formulating plans for controlling security as its importance grew during the build-up for the coming invasion.*** Reports indicated that U.S. soldiers were much more close-mouthed than the British; in fact, security discipline was regarded as excellent. Officers were believed to pose a greater security problem than enlisted men, partly because they were in possession of more security information and partly because they were financially able to move about more freely.

Except for isolated cases, the only outstanding weaknesses seemed to be among civilian technicians employed by Lockheed Overseas Corporation in Northern Ireland and among the merchant seamen, neither of which groups seemed to have a proper appreciation of the importance of security discipline. The generally excellent condition among U.S. troops was believed to be due largely to a greatly exaggerated idea on the part of enlisted personnel as to the constant presence of CIC agents in public places, and it was suggested that such exaggeration should be encouraged.

Using security experience gained in the TORCH operation in North Africa, the invasion of Sicily and various excercises in the English Channel, a Security Sub-Committee began its formal planning for Counter-intelligence coverage of mounting operations for OVERLORD in September 1943. Each CIC team in the British Isles took part in a security exercise

*Ltr, AG 350.09-4 GBI-AGM, Hq SHAEF, subj, (Port Counter Intelligence", (S & S Library)

**See Chapter_____, "Travel Control"

***Memorandum for General Crockett, subj, "Security Survey of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom," dtd 16 Jun 43, signed by F.A. Calvert, Jr., Major, FA, Chief, CIB (CONFIDENTIAL) (S & S Library - 009279)

embodying all phases of security which would be encountered in OVERLORD and sent in its report on the success of the exercise, with recommendations for changes.*

The First Army NEPTUNE Plan, published on 12 May 1944, gave to Services of Supply (SOS) CIC Detachments, augmented by two Army Intel Detachments, who were to work with them until D plus 15, the basic responsibility for security during the mounting operations, with the provision that these agents were to be "freed from normal restrictions in the marshalling area."** The AC of S, G-2, arranged with Third Army for the temporary release of nearly 100 officers and agents to supplement the CIC Detachments with the Southern and Western Base Sections, to whom fell the main responsibility for security from the time the troops left for the marshalling areas until after the tactical troops had jumped off for the invasion and their areas had been searched for documents left behind. The CIC teams which arrived in the marshalling areas with tactical troops joined the SOS Detachments in maintaining security during their stay, and additional assistance was given by local civilian police and by the Military Police.***

The approximately 31 officers and 250 agents assigned to this task received their instructions on 15 April and moved to the camp sites, commonly called "sausages," to make their preliminary surveys and recommendations before the arrival of the troops. Because of geographic peculiarities and the presence of civilian homes and business establishments in the areas, and the necessity of separating "briefed" troops from "unbriefed" ones, unique problems presented themselves. CIC agents made recommendations as to the points where security guards would be necessary and where wire should be strung. In most cases the Engineers strung the wire, but, in the case where Engineers were not available, CIC agents strung it themselves.****

As the static troops who were to perform the housekeeping duties during the mounting operations arrived, CIC agents began giving them security lectures, explaining why they would be forbidden even to talk with briefed troops. When the tactical troops arrived, they also were given lectures, both before and after their briefing.

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*Pre-Invasion Planning, from Operational History of Theaters (L-17); and Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, CIC Det., Hq First U.S. Army Subj, "Exercise Duck," dtd 8 Jan 44 (KC Depot 4-2-46) (SECRET)

**L-7 - VII Corps (2) Part 1, 1st Army NEPTUNE PLAN (Restricted) (12 May 44) (Alexandria Depot)

***Annex 2b, "Security Measures for Mounting," Hq Adv Sec ComZ NEPTUNE Operation Plan (Admin 377, Alexandria Depot) (SECRET); and "Pre Invasion Planning," from Operational History of Theaters (L-17)

****Pre Invasion Planning, etc.

CIC agents frequented [illegible] and Red Cross clubs in the area to check on loose talk [illegible] personnel were not outside their areas. After the [illegible] of loose talk of Red Cross personnel, the Red Cross was excluded from the briefed troops' areas.

In the tense atmosphere in the months preceding the invasion, [illegible] day brought a new batch of rumors, some indicating possible breaches of security, others of possible danger to morale, both of U.S. troops and British civilians, and still others -- of the "flashing light" variety -- indicating possible enemy espionage. All of these had to be investigated and carefully reported by CIC. A few of these led to civil or military action, but most of them indicated the need, and furnished information for, more security education, security lectures and security posters.**

It was impossible to keep from the enemy the knowledge that an attack was coming -- all the Allies hoped to do was to confuse him as to the place and the time of the attack and the strength of our forces. With each passing day, as many thousands of soldiers were added to the lists of those in possession of this information, the task of CIC, official guardians of the secret, became greater. How well the secret was guarded can be seen in the fact that the Germans were taken completely by surprise -- our forces had been fighting on the continent for six weeks before their strategists realized how completely they had been misled.***

"Although our commands were carefully seeded with CIC agents who rifled desks nightly and rattled safes in search of security violations," General Bradley wrote, "only one serious breach was uncovered during the life of the Big Secret."**** General Bradley was referring to the well-publicized story of the Major General who, at a dinner and cocktail party late in April 1944 talked too explicitly about the date of the invasion. He was reduced to the rank of colonel and banished from the Theater within 24 hours, and all those who had heard his indiscreet remarks, General Bradley explained, "were visited by CIC agents and cautioned to forget the conversation. The prompting was probably unnecessary; by that time all of them had been badly frightened."

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*Ibid

**Consolidated Weekly Counterintelligence Summaries, Hq ETO, for April and May 1944. (SGF Library 013506 & 013500)

***A Soldier's Story, by General Bradley, p. 207

****Ibid, p. 223

APPENDIX I

SHAEF Directive No. 7, 8 February 1944

1849

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SHAEF/96X/INT 8th February, 1944

SUBJECT: SHAEF (Int) Directive No. 7 (Counter-Intelligence)

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.
Commanding General, First US Army Group.

1. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Counter-Intelligence Directive No. 7 (less Sections V, X, XI and XII, which are to be issued later) is forwarded herewith.

2. This directive applies to counter-intelligence policy in the UK and in liberated territory overseas, under Operations 'OVERLORD' and 'RANKIN - Case C'. You are directed to implement the policies contained therein in the preparation of your detailed plans for these operations. A separate directive will be issued in due course on counter-intelligence in occupied enemy territory.

3. Although this directive has been written specifically for the Continental operations, it contains many policy items for general application to the 'RANKIN - Case C' Operations in the CHANNEL ISLANDS and NORWAY. Copies of the Directive are, therefore, being forwarded to the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, Southern and Scottish Commands, who are requested to ensure that their detailed plans do not conflict with the general policies mentioned above.

(sgd) F. E. MORGAN
Ext 100 (typed) F. E. MORGAN
NMD/PM Lieutenant-General
Deputy Chief of Staff

COPIES TO:
Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force.
Air C-in-C, Allied Expeditionary Air Force
Commanding General, SOS, ETO
GOC - in - C, Scottish Command
GOC - in - C, Southern Command
War Department, A C of S, G-2
War Office, DDMI (S)
MI 5
MI 6
SHAEF, G-3 (Operations) Division
G-4 (Administration) Division
Civil Affairs Division
European Allied Contact Section

Certified true copy.

H. G. SIBEN
Lt-Col GSC

1850

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9SX/INT 20 March 1944

SUBJECT: SHAEF (Intelligence) Directive No. 7 (Counter-Intelligence). Sections V, X, XII, Appendix 'D'.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.
Commanding General, First US Army Group.

Reference SHAEF/9SX/INT of 8 Feb 1944, Subject: SHAEF (Int) Directive No. 7 (Counter Intelligence). Forwarded herewith are Sections V, X, XII and Appendix 'D' of this directive. Section XI, Channels of Communication, will be issued separately.

2. This directive applies to Counter-Intelligence policy in the United Kingdom and in liberated territory overseas, under Operations 'OVERLORD' and 'RANKIN - Case 'C'. You are directed to implement the policies contained therein in the preparation of your detailed plans for these operations. A separate directive will be issued on Counter-Intelligence in occupied enemy territory.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Staff

Copies to: Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force.
Air C-in-C, Allied Expeditionary Air Force.
Commanding General, SOS, ETC.
GOC-in-C, Scottish Command.
GOC-in-C, Southern Command.
War Dept, A C of S, G-2.
War Office, DDMI (S).
MI 5
MI 6
SHAEF G-3 (Operations) Division
G-4 (Administration) Division
G-5 (Civil Affairs) Division
European Allied Contact Section.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/96X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (Int) DIRECTIVE NO 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/96X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION I - DEFINITIONS

The following are definitions of terms used in this directive:

1. Counter-Intelligence

The collection, collation, evaluation and distribution of information as well as all executive action, including civil and military security measures, to counter enemy intelligence or subversive activities.

2. Counter-Intelligence Information

All information relating to counter-intelligence work.

3. Counter-Intelligence Staffs

British I (b) Staffs and US Counter-Intelligence Branches of G-2.

4. Chief Counter-Intelligence Officer

The officer in charge of any counter-intelligence staff.

5. Counter-Intelligence Personnel

Field Security and Counter-Intelligence Corps personnel.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence Division

SHAEF/96X/INT. 5th February 1944.

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE No. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION II - SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. In the Planning Stage

(a) Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force will be responsible for:

(i) formulating counter-intelligence policy,

(ii) co-ordinating counter-intelligence policy with ANCXF and C-inC, AEAF,

(iii)co-ordinating the collection, collation and distribution of counter-intelligence information as between the producer agencies in LONDON and subordinate headquarters,

(iv) the security of the mounting of the operation. Co-ordination between forces under the Supreme Commander and static agencies in the UK will be effected through the Sub-Committee of the Inter-Services Security Board.

(b) Headquarters Army Groups will be responsible for:

(i) detailed counter-intelligence planning, including the selection of counter-intelligence targets within their respective spheres,

(ii) the dissemination of counter-intelligence information to subordinate headquarters,

(iii)maintaining liaison on counter-intelligence measures with AEAF and with ANCXF,

(iv) all normal security measures within their commands.

2. In the field

(a) Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force will be responsible for:

(i) deciding general questions of counter-intelligence policy,

SECTION II (continued)

(ii) co-ordinating the counter-intelligence activities of the Army Groups,

(iii)maintaining close liaison with the producer agencies in LONDON to ensure that the Army Groups receive all the information they require,

(iv) maintaining liaison on counter-intelligence policy with AEAF and ANCXF.

/(b). . . . . .

(b) Headquarters Army Groups will be responsible for:

(i) the organization and operation of counter-intelligence within their respective zones,

(ii) collating and distributing counter-intelligence information from all sources relating to their respective zones,

(iii)maintaining close liaison with each other to ensure co-ordination of their activities, and the fullest interchange of counter-intelligence information,

(iv) rendering to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force such reports as may be called for,

(v) maintaining liaison on counter-intelligence matters with TAF and 9th Air Force, and with the appropriate naval authorities.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9SX/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE No. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION III - MILITARY SECURITY

PART I - IN THE UK

General

1. Military Security is at all times the responsibility of formation and unit commanders who will ensure that all ranks are cognizant of, and well trained in, all normal Military Security procedure. Operational success is vitally dependent on the strict observance of the basic principles of Military Security.

In the UNITED KINGDOM formations and units will concentrate, move and embark within the security framework set up by the existing static security organizations and with which formations and units will not need to concern themselves, except where liaison is necessary.

Existing Security Framework in the UK

2. It is important however, that formation and unit commanders should be aware, in broad outline of the component parts of this framework in order that they may be reassured and may confine their security activities to military matters only. To this end, commanders should be informed of whatever points are considered necessary concerning:

(a) The functions of the Inter-Services Security Board - 'OVERLORD' Sub-Committee

(b) The Coastal Belt Security Committees

(c) The existence and operation of the Regulated Areas and Visitors' Ban,

(d) Civil security activities of MI 5.

(e) The existence and functions of Regional Security Liaison Officers.

(f) The military and civil censorship plan.

(g) Security responsibilities of GHQ, Home Forces.

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SECTION III (continued)

(h) Division of security responsibilities at ports.

Detailed information concerning the above headings can be supplied on request to G-2 (Intelligence) Division. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Security Points requiring special attention

3. Experience has shown that in the training and preparation for an operation the following points of military security require special attention:

(a) The safeguarding of all information relating to the objective and date of the operation, together with the strength of the force and the methods to be employed

(b) The observance of strict security discipline in offices and with maps and documents.

(c) The proper security of telephone conversations.

(d) The restriction of knowledge of a cover plan to the minimum number of personnel.

(e) The proper observance of all censorship regulations.

(f) The importance of selecting a diligent and painstaking unit security officer who will, helped by CI personnel, properly train his men in the basic principles of security.

(g) The security discipline of troop movements.

(h) The complete segregation of all combat troops once briefing has taken place, and the rigid enforcement of all security regulations.

(i) The denial to unauthorized pressmen and photographers of access to troops.

(j) The safeguarding of all information and the discouraging of speculation about any special devices to be used for the operation.

(k) The importance of publicising any punishment allotted for security infringements.

Regulated Areas

4. The power to impose restrictions in regulated areas rests with the GOC-in-C of the Command concerned, and it is his responsibility to impose the necessary restrictions. If further restrictions are considered

SECTION III (continued)

necessary, the GOC-inC of the command concerned should be approached, but this should not be done lower than on an Army level.

5. For the information of First US Army Group, a short note on areas subject to special restrictions is attached at Appendix 'A'

Coordination

6. Certain security activities connected with the operation are undertaken through the co-operation of service and civilian authorities. These activities are co-ordinated by the Inter-Services Security Board - 'OVERLORD' Sub-Committee, and on a lower level, the Coastal Belt Security Committees. These committees will assign, in cases of doubt, responsibility for the co-ordination of any necessary security measures. The Coastal Belt Security Committees are convened under the chairmanship of the CSO 1 (I) of the command concerned, and any cases of doubt or difficulty should be referred to him.

7. All action taken by the Coastal Belt Security Committee is reported to the ISSB 'OVERLORD' Sub-Committee whose responsibility it is to ensure that all service and civilian authorities affected are duly informed.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

8. CI personnel in the UK, relieved by the existing security framework of the responsibility for civil security, devote themselves to the training in military security of all formations and units. It must be realized, however, that CI personnel operating overseas will have heavy civil security responsibilities, and that good military security will largely depend on the effectiveness of the individual measures taken by each unit, which in turn depend on efficient training prior to going overseas.

Security reports

9. It is essential that any major breach of security which might endanger the success of Operation 'OVERLORD' should be reported immediately to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

10. Any general tendencies affecting military security, or the prevalence of any minor form of security breach, should also be reported to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force in case it may be necessary to issue a supplementary security instruction or take any necessary counter-acting measures.

Liaison

11. All formation commanders are responsible for ensuring that their CI staffs establish liaison, on their own level, with the CI staff of the static formation in whose area they are situated, or to whose area they move.

SECTION III (continued)

Cessation of Leave

12. Normal privilege leave will cease some time before D-day. The impression should be conveyed that this cessation differs in no way from previous cessations that will have occurred for the purpose of intensive training or exercises.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/93X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION III - MILITARY SECURITY

PART II - IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

General.

13. Military security overseas will continue to be the responsibility of command. The primary danger to the security of Allied forces will arise from civil sources, and as a result, Counter-Intelligence Personnel will be largely occupied with Civil Security duties. Commanders therefore must realize that Counter-Intelligence Personnel will not be available to check and advise on routine military security measures to the same extent as in the UNITED KINGDOM. (See para 8 above).

Duties of Counter-Intelligence Personnel.

In Forward Combat Areas.

14. Counter-Intelligence Personnel will in general be employed in accordance with the provisions of War Office letter 20/Misc/2450 (MI 11), 24th November, 1943, and War Department TM 30-215, 22nd September 1943. CI personnel attached to Corps and Divisions will not be diverted to duties which may retard or interfere with their proper employment.

15. In the assault, the primary duty of Counter-Intelligence Personnel is to secure Counter-Intelligence targets in the area of the objective. The selection of such targets will be the task of the appropriate Counter-Intelligence staff. Foremost among those targets will be:

(a) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(b) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the Allied forces.

(c) Buildings, billets and installations known or suspected to contain documents of Counter-Intelligence value.

16. Other duties of counter-intelligence personnel in forward areas will include:

(a) Co-operating with Military Police in marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory and directing them to interrogation posts as outlined in Section VIII.

(b) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause, to secure all possible Counter-Intelligence information.

(c) Advising and assisting in security against sabotage all public and private installations whose continued operation is essential to the Allied forces.

(d) Checking upon the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs staffs and detachments.

(e) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with proclamations.

(f) The Seizure of civil communications until taken over by other authorities.

(g) Seizing and impounding civilian mail until it is taken over by censorship personnel.

(h) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

17. It must be realized that Counter-Intelligence Personnel, if limited to their own resources, may be unable to carry out all necessary security measures under adverse circumstances. Consequently, they may require the assistance of other troops in seizing suspect premises and in the execution of other Counter Intelligence duties where necessary and practicable.

18. The seizure of enemy documents which may contain information of Counter-Intelligence value is a primary Counter-Intelligence target. Often, however, such documents will contain information of value to combat intelligence, or documents desired by document sections will be found with other documents of Counter-Intelligence value. In such cases Counter-Intelligence personnel will co-operate with and assist document sections and combat intelligence staffs in the procurement of such material.

19. Certain documents containing statistical data will be of primary interest to Civil Affairs. Every effort should be made to preserve them intact and in place.

SECTION III, PART II (continued).

In Other Areas.

20. In other areas (including lines/zones of communications) under jurisdiction of the Allied forces, the duties of Counter-Intelligence Personnel will include:

(a) The investigation of cases of espionage and sabotage, and of dissaffection among the armed forces.

(b) The detection and investigation of all cases of subversive influences emanating from the civilian population and likely to affect adversely the Allied forces.

(c) The institution of necessary checks on security controls imposed on the civilian population.

(d) Advising and assisting in all other general security matters.

In an Evacuation or Withdrawal.

21. In the event that Allied forces are forced to evacuate any position, Counter-Intelligence Personnel will perform the necessary measures to prevent valuable information from falling into the hands of the enemy, (checking evacuated headquarters, etc.).

Liaison.

22. Liaison between Counter-Intelligence Personnel and all other Allied intelligence agencies is the responsibility of Security Staffs. It is essential that there be the closest co-operation, both in planning and in operation with:

(a) Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachment.

(b) Naval and Air Force Security Officers.

(c) Military Police (Provost personnel).

(d) SOI and SF personnel.

(e) W/T detection units.

(f) Document collection and evaluation units.

(g) Political Survey Officers.

(h) Attached Allied Counter-Intelligence Staffs and personnel.

SECTION III, PART II (continued)

Disposition of Counter-Intelligence Personnel.

23. The disposition of Counter-Intelligence Personnel units and the allocation of areas in which they will operate is the responsibility of the commanders of the Army Groups.

24. Subject to operational necessity, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the Supreme Allied Command may designate Counter-Intelligence targets inside or outside the areas assigned to the respective Army Groups.

Implementing Instructions.

25. It is the responsibility of the Commanding General, First US Army Group, and the C-in-C 21 Army Group, to ensure that:

(a) All commanders and staffs within their commands are fully informed with respect to the proper employment of Counter-Intelligence Personnel.

(b) The necessary liaison between security staffs and those agencies mentioned in paragraph 22 are established and maintained in all phases of operation.

(c) The necessary detailed counter-intelligence directives and plans are issued to the Counter-Intelligence Personnel within their commands.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 350.09-4 GBI-AGH 22 July 1944

SUBJECT: Port Counter-Intelligence.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.
Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force.
Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force.
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations.

1. Port Counter-Intelligence. This instruction replaces Supreme Headquarters, AEF (INT) Directive Number 7 (Counter-Intelligence) Section IV - Port Counter-Intelligence issued under reference SHAEF/9SX/INT dated 5 February 1944, which is cancelled.

a. For the purpose of this directive the term "Port Counter-Intelligence officer" will include all officers in charge of Counter-Intelligence personnel stationed at sea-ports, airports and frontier posts who had to deal with travel control.

2. Organization. General. Port Counter-Intelligence operations are of two kinds:

a. Military and civil security in the local military area.
b. Travel control.

3. Military and Civil Security in the local military area. On all matters of:

a. Military security, including the security of military installations.

b. Civil security concerning local static population, including all necessary investigations into cases of espionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be the responsibility of the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer, who, in turn, will be responsible to the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander.

4. Travel Control. As regards Travel Control, and all ancillary matters, the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will work under the direction of A.C. of S, G-2, Supreme Headquarters, AEF. The Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will keep his Port Commandant/Commander informed on travel control matters concerning which he deals directly with Supreme Headquarters, AEF.

5. Geographical responsibility of Port Counter-Intelligence Officers. The normal areas of responsibility of the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer is that of the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander. A.C. of S., G-2, Supreme Headquarters, AEF with the advice of Counter-Intelligence Staff responsible for military and civil security in the zone, may, however, increase the area of responsibility of any Port Counter-Intelligence Officer beyond the limits of the base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) if deemed necessary.

6. a. Army. The security of the dock area, including control of exit and entry is the responsibility of the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander.

b. Navy. The security of all naval installations and stores ashore, and the Counter-Intelligence precautions for all RN, U.S. and Allied Naval ships and craft in the port is the responsibility of the Naval Officer in charge. The Naval Officer in charge, with the advice of the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will issue instructions governing harbor craft, fishing vessels, etc. manned by local civilian crews. The superintendent Sea Transport Officer is responsible that masters of merchant vessels conform to security regulations of the port and mount adequate sentries and guards. The U. S. Naval Port Security Officer (Commerce and Travel Officer) under the direction of the Naval Officer in Charge will be responsible for the internal security of U.S. Merchant Ships.

c. Royal Air Force. Dock sections of Royal Air Force Security Personnel will be available for supervising the disembarkation of Royal Air Force Personnel and Stores. In Counter-Intelligence matters they will operate under the direction of the Army Port Counter-Intelligence Officer.

d. Co-ordination. All security measures will be co-ordinated by the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer. While attached to the staff of the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander, the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will act as advisor on Counter-Intelligence matters to naval and other authorities in the Port.

7. Duties of Port Counter-Intelligence Officers. Port Control. With-in the port the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will be responsible for:

a. Planning and supervising the control of entry to and exit from the dock area, from the landward side and from ship to shore.

b. Recommending measures for the protection of installations and ships from sabotage.

c. Establishing the necessary security check and control of civilian labor and personnel, and persons with business in the port, to whom passes are issued for entry into the dock area.

d. Checking crew lists of merchant ships and advising on security measures relating to crews, including shore leave.

e. Searching any small craft for Counter-Intelligence purposes.

f. The security control of all civilian travel through the port.

8. Civil Security. The civil security responsibility of the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will include:

a. The investigation of and reporting upon all suspected cases of espionage, and sabotage or leakage of information.

b. Such immediate action in regard to suspects, including arrest as may seem expedient or, after reference, may be ordered by Counter-Intelligence Staffs.

c. Advising the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander on security measures to be imposed on the civilian population in the area.

d. Liaison with the local police, and any civilian Port authority on Counter-Intelligence matters.

e. In all matters relating to civil security, the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will maintain close liaison with the appropriate Civil Affairs Detachment. Civil Affairs Staffs will be responsible for the preparation of passes for issue to civilians allowed to enter port areas. Regulations governing their issue will be formulated by the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer.

9. Coastline Security. Within the sector assigned to the Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander, the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer will be responsible for the establishment and co-ordination of measures to prevent illicit communication between sea and shore, and illegal entry or exit by sea along the coastline. Measures ashore relating to the security of the coastline will be co-ordinated with any security measures taken by naval authorities.

10. Travel Control. The duties of the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer in regard to travel control is dealt with in Supreme Headquarters, AEF letter AG 350.09-4 GBI-AGM dated 10 June 1944, subject: "Control of Travel between UNITED KINGDOM and NORTHWEST EUROPE".

11. Records and Intelligence. Port Counter-Intelligence Officers will be provided by A.C. of S., G-2 Supreme Headquarters, AEF and Counter Intelligence Staff responsible for military and civil security in the zone with all necessary intelligence that is available, including lists of known and suspect enemy agents, suspect officials in the district and suspect seamen.

12. Reports as required, will be made as follows:

a. Military and Civil Security in Area.

(1) Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander.

b. Travel Control Matters.

(1) Direct to A.C. of S., G-2, Supreme Headquarters, AEF with copy to Base Sub-Area (British)/Port (U.S.) Commander where desired.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

E. C. BOEHNKE,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - A.C. of S.; G-2, War Dept. General Staff War Office:
1 - DDMI (S)
1 - MI 5
1 - MI 6
1 - MI 11
1 - GO C-in-C, Scottish Command
1 - GO C-in-C, Southern Command
Supreme Hq., AEF:
50 - A.C. of S., G-2
1 - A.C. of S., G-3
1 - A.C. of S., G-4
1 - A.C. of S., G-5
1 - European Allied Contact Section
2 - AG Records
6 - Addressees

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 350.09-4 GBI-AGM 10 June 1944

SUBJECT: Control of Travel between UNITED KINGDOM and NORTHWEST EUROPE.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group
Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force
Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations

CONTROL OF TRAVEL BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHWEST EUROPE

I. GENERAL

1. This instruction replaces SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE Section V, Security Control of Civilian Travel between UK and Northwest Europe, issued under reference SHAEF/9SX/INT dated 16 March 1944, which is cancelled. This instruction should be read in conjunction with Administrative Memorandum Number 17 this headquarters, as.

2. The control of travel between the UK and Northwest Europe will be a responsibility of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. Travel will be restricted to the minimum which is essential for the war effort. Every application will be considered individually.

3. For the purposes of this paper the term "civilian" will apply to any person not authorized to hold a recognized British or U.S. military, naval or air force identity card (e.g., AF.B 2606, AB 64, WD AGO Form No. 65 series, ETOUSA Enlisted Man's Identification Card). It will not, however, apply to any secret agent brought to the UK by one of the recognized British or U.S. agencies by means of operational air or sea craft provided for the use of such agencies. These agencies will be prepared to vouch for and will supply the name and particulars of any such agent to the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the Army Group from whose zone he is taken. Arrangements have been made with the appropriate departments in the UK for the passage of such agents through the controls on arrival.

II. CIVILIAN TRAVEL TO THE UK FROM NORTHWEST EUROPE

4. Travel to the UK is to be considered under three headings:

(a) In the initial stage of 'OVERLORD'.
(b) After the initial stage of 'OVERLORD' when an effective system of travel control has been established in the theater.
(c) Under 'RANKIN' - 'C'.

IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF 'OVERLORD'

5. Until an effective system of travel control has been established in the theater, notification of which will be given later, and except where it becomes necessary to undertake civilian evacuation for operational reasons, no civilians will be brought to the UK other than those required for intelligence or security purposes. These will be of the following three categories:

(a) Known and suspect enemy agents, who will be sent to the MI 5 Camp 020.
(b) Persons required for detailed interrogation, and who come to the UK voluntarily. These will be sent to the LONDON Reception Center.
(c) Leaders of resistance groups and Allied agents. These will be handed over to the appropriate British or U.S. Reception Center.

It is estimated that the number of civilians of these categories brought to the UK from the theater of operations up to D plus 30 will not exceed 100 - 150.

6. Individuals of these categories will only be brought to the UK on the authority of the Counter-Intelligence Staff (I(b)/CIB) of HQ Army Groups, or before an Army Group HQ is established overseas, of the senior headquarters ashore. This authority will be given in writing in the form shown at Appendix 'A' and will be carried by the escort right through to the ultimate destination in the UK. The category to which the civilians belong will be shown on the authorization. A copy of the authorization will be kept by the Counter-Intelligence Staffs at HQ Army Groups for record purposes. Lower headquarters who issue authorizations in the early stages will forward the copies to the HQ of the Army Group which is first established in the field.

7. Civilians of these categories will be brought to the UK in the LSTs carrying Prisoners of War.

The headquarters authorizing the dispatch of civilians to the UK will arrange for them to be escorted to the appropriate PW cage in the Beach or rear Maintenance area from which they are to be embarked. They will then be transported together with PWs in LSTs to ports in the UK, where they will be handed over to the Security Control Officer. PW escorts will be instructed to insure that no communication or contact is allowed between PWs and civilians being returned to the UK. On board LSTs, civilians will, if possible, be placed in one of the compartments on the troop deck.

8. The Security Control Officers at the ports in the UK will arrange for such civilians to be handed over to the civil authorities at the request of the appropriate department (e.g. MI 5, MI 6, SOE, OSS) after examination by the medical authorities.

AFTER INITIAL STAGE 'OVERLORD'

9. After an effective system of travel control has been established in the theater, certain civilians may be brought to the UK in addition to those required for intelligence and security purposes. These additional cases will be limited to key individuals whose presence in the UK is requested by British, U.S. or Allied Government Agencies. All such official requests will be made to the Passport Control Department in LONDON, who, if the request is approved, will communicate it through the Military Permit Office to the appropriate Army Group HQ in the Field. The armies in the field will not entertain any private applications from the civil population for permits to travel to the UK. This fact will be publicized by Civil Affairs. Agencies in the field wishing to bring civilians to the UK other than for intelligence purposes will refer the request to their parent agency in LONDON, who will make an official application as prescribed above.

10. All civilians travelling from the theater to the UK will continue to require written authorization from the Counter-Intelligence Staff at the appropriate Army Group HQ in the form shown at Appendix 'A'.

11. In the case of civilians travelling by sea, Counter-Intelligence Staffs at Army Group will notify the Port Counter-Intelligence Officer at the port at which they are to embark of the names and particulars of persons for whom such authorizations have been given. Port Counter-Intelligence Officers will be instructed that in no circumstances are they to allow any civilian to embark unless the civilian or his escort (if any) is in possession of a written authorization in the form shown at Appendix 'A'. Counter-Intelligence Staffs at each Army Group HQ will keep a copy for record purposes of all written authorizations which they issue.

12. For civilians travelling to the UK by air a similar procedure will be adopted. Counter-Intelligence Staffs at HQ of Army Groups will give prior notification to Air Force Station Commanders through the Air Force Staffs of the name and particulars of civilians authorized to be brought from an airfield under their control to the UK. Air Force Station Commanders will be instructed that they are not to allow any civilians to be brought to the UK by air unless they or their escorts are in possession of a written authorization in the form shown as Appendix 'A'. Counter-Intelligence Staffs will arrange with Air Force Staffs that civilians travelling by air to the UK are routed only to the following airfields which have been agreed to by AEAF, Home Office and MI 5:

HARROWBEER, HURN, BEAULIEU, HAWKINGE.

13. When the stage is reached at which it is decided to allow civilians in the theater to make application for permission to travel from the theater to the UK, representatives of Passport Control Department

in the theater will deal with such applications. Counter-Intelligence Staffs will maintain liaison with these representatives for Counter-Intelligence purposes.

UNDER RANKIN - 'C'

14. Under RANKIN - 'C' a similar procedure will be adopted as for OVERLORD. In the first phase the civilians who will be brought to the UK for intelligence purposes will, it is estimated, still be very few in number. Inasmuch as no DJ will be returned to the UK under RANKIN 'C', the headquarters authorizing the return of civilians will arrange necessary escort to the port of debarkation in the UK, where they will be handed over to the Security Control Officer for disposal. Agencies in the field wishing to bring civilians to the UK, other than for intelligence purposes, will refer the request to their parent agency in LONDON. Applications by agencies in LONDON for civilians to be brought to the UK will be made to the Passport Control Department in LONDON, who, if the request is approved, will communicate it through the Military Permit Office to the Army Group or Force Headquarters in the field.

15. Under RANKIN - 'C' Passport Control will establish offices at an early stage in liberated territories and in due course, in occupied GERMANY, and all applications by civilians for permission to travel to the UK will then be dealt with through them. No private application for permission to travel to the UK will be entertained before Passport Control Offices are established.

III. CIVILIAN AND SERVICE TRAVEL FROM THE UK TO NORTHWEST EUROPE

16. No civilian or Services personnel other than members of the AEF or personnel travelling as part of a formed unit requested by ANCXF, HQ AEAF, or HQ of Army Groups will be allowed to travel from the UK without a permit issued by the Military Permit Office, LONDON, who for this purpose will be acting as agents of the Supreme Commander, AEF. American representation will be provided at the Military Permit Office for the handling of American applications. Permits will, where necessary, be valid for a return journey. Paragraphs 3 - 13 above therefore will not apply to the return to the UK of civilians to whom permits have been issued to visit the theater. Every civilian entering the theater must also be in possession of an identity document bearing a photograph. British civilians will use either a passport, a National Registration Identity Card with photograph, or a BR form 12 for this purpose. American civilians will use a passport.

17. Permits will not be issued to persons travelling for private reasons. Subject to the usual security check, permits may be issued by the Military Permit Office without reference to ANCXF, HQ, AEAF, or Headquarters of Army Groups, only to persons in the following categories:

(a) Distinguished persons nominated by SCAEF.

(b) Service or civilian personnel of categories requested for the theater by ANCXF, IFQ, AEAF, or HQ of Army Groups

10. (a) Members of SHAEF.
All applications for visits to the Continent will be forwarded to A C of S, G-3, SHAEF, for co-ordination.

(b) Services personnel other than AEF.
Except for personnel covered by 17(a) and (b) above, the sponsoring agency in the UK will secure the approval of the appropriate Headquarters in the field for the visit before sending the application to the Military Permit Office.

(c) Civilians.
Applications for travel by civilians (other than those covered by 17(a) and (b) above) will be made by the sponsoring agency to the Military Permit Office which will refer them to ANCXF, IFQ AEAF, or to Headquarters of Army Groups, according to the destination. The Headquarters in question will be responsible for deciding whether a permit may be granted, and for informing the Military Permit Office, LONDON, of their decision.

(d) The MPO will forward to AC of S, G-3 Division, this headquarters, weekly a list showing names, destination, object of journey and length of visit of all persons to whom permits have been granted during the period. The permit will include, under the heading "Destination", the headquarters which the holder is authorized to visit. Further instructions will be issued as to the procedure to be followed when SHAEF moves overseas.

See Attached
Amendment - 9 July.

19. Headquarters of Army Groups, AEAF, and ANCXF will be responsible for the supervision and facilities of visitors to their respective headquarters or areas. Port Counter-Intelligence officers will forward to SHAEF Travel Control Section (G-2 Div) the names and destinations of all civilians arriving at their port.

20. SHAEF Travel Control Section will be responsible for determining the necessity for special supervision of visitors on security grounds. When information available to the Military Permit Office, LONDON, indicates the need for supervision, that office will notify SHAEF Travel Control Section as soon as the permit has been issued, to enable it to plan the supervision of the visitor.

21. Port Counter-Intelligence Officers will be responsible for indorsing the permits of all visitors at the port of entry and at the port of exit with a note of the date and place of entry or exit. In cases where visitors enter or leave by air, the Air Force Commander of the airfield of entry or exit will be responsible for insuring that the permit is so indorsed.

22. TRAVEL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE THEATER. Further instructions will be issued.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

E. C. BOEHNKE
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

1 Incl.
Appendix "A"

DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

1 - TAG, War Department
1 - A C of S, G-2, War Department
War Office:
1 - Director of Military Operations
1 - Director of Personal Services
1 - DQMG (Movements)
1 - DDMI (S)
1 - MI 5
1 - MI 6
1 - MI 11
3 - Military Permit Office
2 - Admiralty
2 - Air Ministry
1 - GHQ, Home Forces
1 - GOC-in-C, Scottish Command
1 - GOC-in-C, Southern Command

APPENDIX 'A'

AUTHORIZATION TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

WHEN THE PERSON(S) TO WHOM THIS DOCUMENT REFERS IS (ARE) PROCEEDING UNDER ESCORT, IT MUST BE KEPT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ESCORT THROUGHOUT THE JOURNEY AND DELIVERED AT DESTINATION TO THE AUTHORITY INTO WHOSE CARE THE PERSON(S) CONCERNED IS (ARE) DELIVERED.

Date.....

Authority has been granted for the passage of the under-mentioned (number) ..... person(s) from the Theatre of Operations to the United Kingdom, subject to the following conditions.

(Delete and initial where inapplicable)

1. Port of Embarkation in the Theatre shall be.....

2. Service escort shall be maintained until the person(s) concerned is/are handed over to the care of.....

   at.....

3. The person(s) concerned will remain segregated from the public throughout the journey.

4. The person(s) concerned fall(s) within category.....

Signature of I(b)/CIB Staff Officer

Stamp .....

Headquarters.....

Surname	Christian Names	Nationality	Date & Place of Birth	Identity documents held.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 350.09-4 GBI-AGM 9 July 1944

SUBJECT: Control of Travel Between UNITED KINGDOM and NORTHWEST EUROPE.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group
Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force
Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations

1. Reference is made to letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 10 June 1944.

2. Paragraphs 19 to 22, inclusive, of letter referred to in paragraph 1, above, are renumbered 22 to 25, inclusive, and the following added as paragraphs 19, 20 and 21:

19. Issue of AEF Travel Permits. a. Civilians and service personnel other than members of the AEF or of a formed unit requested by ANCXF, Headquarters AEAF or Headquarters Army Groups.

(1) Included in AEF "priority build-up tables." These will be regarded as coming under paragraph 17 (b) above. Such persons will apply direct to the Military Permit Office, and permits will be issued, subject to the usual security check without reference to the theater. Applications, which must give surname, full Christian names, date and place of birth, Type and serial number of identity document held, must be endorsed by a service authority confirming that the applicant is included in the AEF priority build-up table.

(2) Dealt with under SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 17. AEF Travel Permits will be issued, after the appropriate security check, by the Military Permit Office at the time of the approval of the movement authority (see paragraphs 2 and 3, Section II, Administrative Memorandum No. 17, this headquarters, cs.)

b. Personnel employed by MI 6, SOE and OSS. The Military Permit Office is authorized to issue AEF Travel Permits for single or return journeys from U.K. to NORTHWEST EUROPE to these individuals without reference, provided applications are made through the Passport Control Office (Captain JEFFES).

20. Military Permit Office. a. The following details are given for information.

b. The postal address of the Military Permit Office is

Military Permit Office
Passport Office
Dartmouth Street
LONDON, S.W. 1.

c. The telephone number of the Military Permit Office from 0930 until 1900 hours daily is

WHITEHALL 9060

After 1900 hours, the officer on duty can be reached through the War Office at the following extensions:

Colonel Steward	)	Ext 1991
Captain Watson	)	
Lieutenant	)	Ext 1990

21. Civilian Travellers. a. The attention of civilian travellers to NORTHWEST EUROPE should be drawn to the following requirements under the laws of the UNITED KINGDOM.

(1) Except in certain cases, details of which can be obtained from the Passport Office, no person may leave the U.K. without first having obtained an Exit Permit. Applications for Exit Permits should be addressed to:

Passport Office
Dartmouth Street
LONDON, S.W. 1

The form of application for Exit Permit (Form P) can be obtained from either the Military Permit Office or the Passport Office - both offices are in the same building.

(2) No civilian may depart from the U.K. without the leave of an Immigration Officer. Immigration officers are posted at all principal passenger, air and sea ports.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

E.C. BOEHNKE
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

SHAEF Ltr AG 250.09-4 GDI-AGM
dtd 9 July 1944 con't

DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

1 - TAG, War Department
1 - AC of S, G-2, War Department
War Office:
1 - Director of Military Operations
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1 - DQMG (movements)
1 - DDMI (S)
1 - MI 5
1 - MI 6
1 - MI 11
3 - Military Permit Office
2 - Admiralty
2 - Air Ministry
1 - GHQ, Home Forces
1 - GOC-in-C, Scottish Command
1 - GOC-in-C, Southern Command

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9SX/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION VI-RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES.

Naval and Air Force Security Authorities.

1. Counter-Intelligence staffs and Counter-Intelligence personnel will maintain close liaison with all Naval and Air Force security authorities in their area.

2. The co-ordination between Naval and Military Counter-Intelligence authorities in regard to Port Security is dealt with in Section IV.

3. The security of airfields and control of entry thereto is an Air Force responsibility, but Counter-Intelligence personnel will be available to assist Air Force security authorities in carrying out investigations. The question of travel control at airfields is dealt with in Section V (to be issued later).

4. Counter-Intelligence staffs and personnel will, in discharging their responsibility for the security control of the civilian population safeguard the interests of the Naval and Air Forces. The following are the main duties which will be performed on behalf of the Navy and Air Force where desired:

(a) Liaison with representatives of Civil Affairs on counter-intelligence.

(b) Liaison with local civil authorities, including the civil police.

(c) Security control of the civilian population, in conjunction with Civil Affairs.

(d) Investigation (outside airfields) of incidents involving civilians, reported by Naval and Air Force personnel.

5. Whilst the Army is responsible for Civil Security in the theatre of operations, RAF security will, generally speaking, be ensured by RAF security personnel who will co-ordinate their activities at all levels with the Army and keep them fully informed on all matters relating to civil security.

SECTION VI (continued)

Special Intelligence Agencies Represented in the Field.
MI 6(v) / OSS (X2)

6. MI 6(v) and OSS (X2) will provide Special Counter-Intelligence (SCI) units for attachment to the CI staffs of British and US Army Groups and Army Headquarters. These units will work as an integral part of the CI staff of the Headquarters to which they are attached. A memorandum on their duties is at Appendix "B".

SOE/OSS(SO)

7. Special Force (SF) Staffs will be attached to headquarters of Army Groups and Armies. Their counter-intelligence functions consist in:

(a) Providing the CI staff with counter-intelligence information obtained from Resistance Groups, together with an estimate, based on previous knowledge, of the reliability of the source.

(b) Assisting CI staffs and personnel in matters where their specialized knowledge of Resistance Groups would be of help. This will include assisting in establishing the bonafides of persons claiming to have been working for allied underground organizations or Resistance Groups. It is emphasized that while the SF staffs will be able to provide assistance in such cases, the responsibility for determining the bonafides and for recommending as to disposal rests with the CI staffs.

Mobile W/T Detection Units

8. Mobile units for locating illicit wireless transmitters will be supplied by the Radio Security Service and US Signal Corps. A memorandum on their function and employment is attached at Appendix 'C'.

Allied Intelligence Services

9. Allied Intelligence Missions will be attached to Army Groups and will contain a counter-intelligence element. Detailed directions on the relationship between CI staffs and Allied Counter-Intelligence Services will be issued in due course. During the planning stage, no operational plans will be discussed with Allied Intelligence Services, except under direction of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

10. It is envisaged that the role of allied CI personnel will include:

(a) Assisting CI personnel in the examination and disposal of miscellaneous suspects and suspect refugees.

SECTION VI (continued)

(b) Assisting in the collection of counter-intelligence information in the field.

Political Survey Officers

11. Political Survey Officers are officers of the Psychological Warfare Branch engaged in the collection of information for propaganda purposes. They will be attached to Army Groups and certain lower headquarters.

12. Their duties will include the collection in the field by overt methods (e.g. direct observation, interrogation of civilians and refugees, examination of documents, etc.) of:

(a) All forms of civil intelligence required by PWB units and staffs, ONI, PWE and OSS for the purpose of propaganda output and guidance of propaganda policy.

(b) Information required by Civil Affairs and other interested bodies, relating to conditions of life in the countries concerned and the attitude of the people to these conditions which is not otherwise provided.

13. Political Survey Officers and CI staffs will make available to each other such information of interest as they may acquire from their own sources.

Censorship Staffs.

14. The army censorship organization will undertake the censorship of certain civilian communications. This will include the examination of captured mails in combat area. Close liaison should be maintained with the censorship staffs to ensure that the maximum CI information is obtained from such censorship. CI staffs will provide the censorship staffs with "Watch Lists" containing the names and addresses of persons and organizations over whom censorship supervision is desired in the area concerned.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/96X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE).

SECTION VII - SECURITY CONTROL OF CIVILIAN POPULATION.

Spheres of Responsibility.

1. The security control of the civilian population will be a joint responsibility of Counter-Intelligence and Civil Affairs Staffs. As a general rule, CI staffs will be responsible for formulating security policies but they will co-ordinate with and consult with Civil Affairs Staffs when these policies affect the civil population. Civil Affairs staffs will be responsible for implementing security policies through Civil Affairs Detachments and the indigenous authorities.

Relation between CI personnel and Civil Affairs Detachments.

2. CI personnel and Civil Affairs Detachments will maintain close liaison in the field to ensure co-ordination of action and avoid duplication of effort. When the entry into a town in which Civil Affairs Detachments are to operate is contemplated, the closest co-ordination must be maintained in the planning and execution of their respective roles. CI Staffs may establish in any locality a Security Committee to review and co-ordinate all matters of security interest. This committee may consist of representatives of military, naval and Air Force CI staffs, Provost Marshal Staff, CA Detachments and, when desired, indigenous police.

Proclamations:

3. Proclamations imposing restrictions upon the civil population of liberated territory will be promulgated by the Supreme Allied Commander. These will include the usual wartime security restrictions. The drafting of these proclamations will be the responsibility of Civil Affairs Staffs who will determine the necessary restrictions in conjunction with CI Staffs. Such regulations as may be issued by subordinate commanders within the framework of these proclamations will also be prepared by Civil Affairs Staffs in consultation with CI staffs.

Security Regulations.

4. CI Staffs will be responsible for recommending to Civil Affairs Staffs security regulations affecting the civil population. Civil Affairs Detachments will be responsible for implementing such regulations through the local civil administration. CI personnel will initiate checks to ensure that such regulations are carried out and will

report any infractions to CI Staffs and to Civil Affairs Detachments.

Relations with Indigenous Police

5. It is the responsibility of Civil Affairs Detachments to supervise, and where necessary, reactivate all police forces in liberated territory. Supervision of the security branches of the indigenous police forces will be carried out in accordance with policies laid down by the CI Staffs.

6. Wherever possible CI personnel will make their initial contact with indigenous police in conjunction with Civil Affairs Detachments. Thereafter CI personnel will maintain direct contact with the indigenous police at all levels on day to day routine matters.

7. Civil Affairs Detachments will ensure that CI personnel have at all time free access to the records of the local police. If it is found necessary to seize any records, the Civil Affairs Detachments will be informed and the records returned as early as practicable.

Relations with other Civilian Authorities.

8. Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments will, whenever possible, be the channel for dealing with other civil authorities. After the initial contact has been made in conjunction with Civil Affairs, CI Staffs may make direct contact on day to day routine matters.

Officials.

9. The suspension and appointment of civilian officials will be a Civil Affairs responsibility. CI personnel will furnish Civil Affairs Detachments with any information they possess on the reliability of officials and Civil Affairs Detachments will consult with CI personnel in cases where the reliability of an official is doubtful from the security aspect. CI personnel will only arrest these officials who might continue to assist the enemy or be required for interrogation, and in such cases they will keep Civil Affairs Detachments informed of any action they take.

Suspect Political Organizations.

10. If there is evidence that any political organization is subversive in character and that its activities constitute a menace to the security of our forces, CI staffs will be responsible for recommending action to be taken, e.g. whether its activities are to be suspended, the members arrested, or the records seized. Where the activities of such an organization do not endanger the security of our forces, but tend to promote unrest among the civil population or to be politically disruptive, Civil Affairs Staffs, in consultation with CI Staffs, will be responsible for recommending action to be taken.

SECTION VII (continued)

Denunciations.

11. Where denunciations of individuals are received by CI personnel, the cases will first be examined to determine whether suspicion is based upon political, personal or security grounds. If it is clearly established that no violation or danger to security exists, the names of such persons will be given to Civil Affairs Detachments for any further investigation or action. Where convenient Civil Affairs Detachments and CI personnel may establish a joint system for the preliminary examination of denunciations. Security grounds will be the only justification for the detention of denounced persons by CI personnel. Mere membership in a particular organization will not necessarily provide sufficient grounds for detention.

Black and White Lists

12. CI staffs will receive detailed information prior to D day designed to assist in the security control of the civilian population. This will include:

(a) Black lists of officials and other individuals known to have assisted the enemy, and lists of European political organizations in which membership is sufficient to present a prima facie case against an individual.

(b) White lists of officials and other individuals believed to be reliable.

13. CI Staffs and personnel will bear in mind the fact that this information is primarily intended to serve as a guide only and that in most cases the information should be verified by local investigation before action is taken.

Security check of civilian labour.

14. Thorough security checking of mass labour is impracticable. Such precautions, however, as are feasible, such as checking by Civil Affairs Detachments with local police, care in selection of foremen, and the establishment by CI personnel of a system of informants, will be instituted wherever such labour may be in a position to endanger security. In the employment of individuals within headquarters or other places where they may have access to confidential information or vulnerable points, Civil Affairs Detachments will be responsible for preliminary checking with local police. No such individuals will be employed, however, until their names have been checked against the suspect lists and cleared by the CI staff.

SECTION VII (continued)

Passes and Permits.

15. Civil Affairs Staffs will be responsible for, but will work in close co-ordination with CI Staffs in the preparation and issue of civilian passes and permits and of plans for their use.

16. Civil Affairs Detachments will supply CI personnel with forms to enable them to issue passes and permits to civilians in special circumstances. Civil Affairs Detachments, not CI personnel, however, will be primarily responsible for issuing such passes and permits, and they may use the indigenous police for this purpose.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/G2X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION VIII - PROCEDURE FOR INTERROGATING REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN SUSPECTS IN THE OPERATIONAL ZONE

General

1. In the operational zone the following classes of persons must be regarded as suspects and will require examination and interrogation for counter-intelligence purposes:

(a) Refugees reaching our lines from enemy territory.
(b) Civilians who have aroused suspicion and failed to establish their bona fides.
(c) Released or escaped allied prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The object of such interrogation is to provide an effective screen to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents.

2. In addition interrogation will be conducted with the aim of collecting counter-intelligence information, as well as intelligence of value for operational, propaganda, and other purposes.

3. The evacuation of civilians from the forward areas for relief purposes or for operational reasons will be a responsibility of Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs Staffs. For this purpose, refugee clearing stations will be established in the forward areas, where refugees will be marshalled and directed to the Refugee Camps which will be established, as required, by the Civil Affairs Staffs of Army Headquarters.

Security Control Posts

4. Counter-Intelligence personnel in the forward areas will be responsible for establishing security control posts to divert from the main stream of refugees these who will be required for interrogation (see paras 1 and 2 above), and for directing them to the Refugee Interrogation Posts. The security control posts may often be conveniently established at the refugee clearing stations. It must be made clear to all concerned in handling refugees in forward areas that security interests must have priority over welfare.

SECTION VIII (continued)

Refugee Interrogation Posts

5. It will be the responsibility of CI staffs to determine where to establish the Refugee Interrogation Posts. It may be found convenient to establish them as annexes to the Corps P/W cages, since civilian suspects may then be attached to parties of P/W and escorted with them from the forward areas, and, if necessary, evacuated with them to the Army P/W cage.

6. Refugee Interrogation Posts will provide the principal machinery for "screening" suspect persons and it will be at this stage that the bulk of the information of intelligence value will be obtained. The interrogation staff at the refugee interrogation post may be provided from the central reserves of CI personnel at the disposal of CI Staffs of Army Groups, and from CI personnel of the Allied National Intelligence Service operating with the CI Staffs. Combat Intelligence and Political Survey Officers should be given facilities for interrogating persons passing through the Refugee Interrogation Post.

Civilian Interrogation Centres

7. Persons whose cases clearly require detailed examination will be passed back from refugee interrogation posts to the Civilian Annex to the Army Prisoners of War cage. Civilian Interrogation Centers will be established at these Annexes and suspects will here be interrogated and investigated at length, and reports furnished to the Counter-Intelligence Staffs for decision as to final disposal.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9SX/INT 5th February 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION IX - THE HANDLING AND DISPOSAL OF KNOWN AND SUSPECT

ENEMY AGENTS

1. The first responsibility of Counter-Intelligence staffs in the theatre of operation is the detection and apprehension of enemy agents. Detailed planning of measures against the German Intelligence Services (GIS) must be undertaken well in advance. Such plans will be based upon information supplied by SCI units and will be formulated in consultation with officers of these units. While SCI units will render advice and furnish information, executive action is the responsibility of CI Staffs and personnel.

2. GIS Targets having been designated by the CI Staff, success will depend upon the speed and thoroughness of initial action. Plans should therefore include attacks on GIS targets by CI personnel operating in many cases with advance units.

3. Whenever GIS personnel are captured, SCI officers must be notified and afforded the earliest opportunity to interrogate them. All documents, records, or equipment of GIS personnel captured will be turned over to SCI units for examination. SCI units will be consulted as to the disposal of each individual case. It is only by making the fullest use in this way of SCI units that the maximum information can be obtained and the detection and arrest of other agents secured.

4. It is important to conceal from the enemy the amount of knowledge concerning the organization and activities of the GIS which we have acquired through captured agents. The arrest and disposal of known and suspect enemy agents must therefore, be attended with the maximum degree of secrecy. No mention should be made in the press of the capture of or action taken against an enemy agent without the express authority of the AC of S, G-2/DGSI Army Group.

5. In order to ensure secrecy, CI staffs should arrange for the provision of suitably guarded secret premises in which captured enemy agents may be segregated and detained.

6. CI staffs should arrange to be kept informed of the arrest of enemy agents by indigenous authorities whether military or civil. The powers of CI Staffs to demand that any such agent be handed over to them for examination or disposal will be the subject of agreements to be reached with the Allied National Authorities.

SECTION IX (continued)

7. The ultimate disposal of a captured enemy agent should be decided by the CI Staffs after consultation with the SCI unit.

8. The field interrogation of arrested enemy agents should be carried out immediately. The more important cases should, upon advice of SCI officers, be returned to the U.K. for further and more specialized interrogation at the MI 5 Interrogation Centre in LONDON.

9. Where evidence is available and military necessity demands, prosecutions can be instituted against captured enemy agents of any nationality in US and British military courts. Counter-Intelligence Staffs should constantly bear this possibility in mind in all cases of sufficient importance. Captured enemy agents may in some cases be tried in the Civil or Military courts of the indigenous authorities in liberated territories when these are reconstituted. Advice as to legal procedure should be obtained from Civil Affairs legal officers.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9SX/INT 16 March 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

SECTION X - COUNTER-SABOTAGE

Prevention.

1. The protection of all stores, equipment, installations, etc. against sabotage will be the responsibility of Command. CI Staffs will be responsible for advising commanders in regard to measures for the prevention of sabotage. For this purpose Counter-Intelligence Personnel will conduct surveys and inspections of vital points and will recommend protective measures.

Investigation.

2. The investigation of all cases of suspected sabotage will be a responsibility of Counter-Intelligence Staffs, and all suspected cases will be reported to them without delay.

3. Investigations will normally be undertaken by Counter-Intelligence Personnel, but in special cases an expert investigator may be obtained from MI 5, LONDON, at the request of the Chief Counter-Intelligence Staff Officer at Army Group Headquarters.

4. Liaison will be maintained with bomb disposal units for assistance in connection with sabotage equipment.

Enemy Sabotage Agents

5. Information from special sources covering the sabotage activities of enemy agents will be made available to CI Staffs by SCI units, who will advise on the action to be taken in request to such agents.

6. Any captured saboteur known or believed to be an enemy agent will be handled in the same manner as other enemy agents (see Section IX).

Liaison with MI 5.

7. Counter-Intelligence Staffs at Headquarters, Army Groups, will maintain direct liaison with the counter-sabotage section of MI 5. MI 5 will furnish the CI staffs with all available information of enemy sabotage methods and equipment, and with advice as to measures for the prevention and detection of sabotage and interrogation of saboteurs.

SECTION X (continued)

CI Staffs will similarly notify MI 5 of sabotage developments discovered in the field. Where necessary such information will be passed through I 6(v), LONDON, and the SCI units in the field.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 350.09-4/GBI-AGM
(SHAEF/9SK/INT)

26 May 1944

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE)
:
Number 7)

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

SECTION XI - CHANNELS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

1. Responsibility.

(a) The Counter-Intelligence Staff, SHAEF, will undertake the general coordination of policy regarding the handling of Counter-Intelligence information in, from and to, the field, and the allocation of responsibilities and priorities. The detailed work in connection with the collation and distribution of Counter-Intelligence information will be the responsibility of the Coordination Section, SHAEF, and the CounterIntelligence Staffs at Army Groups and Army Headquarters as indicated below.

(b) The Coordination Section, SHAEF, will be responsible for the collation and distribution of Counter-Intelligence information covering the whole theatre, and with special reference to territories not yet liberated

(c) Army Headquarters will be responsible for the collation and study of Counter-Intelligence information required for the planning of immediate operations, or affecting the day to day security of their own particular area.

(d) Army Groups will be responsible for the collation and study of information relating to territories already liberated, or to areas still occupied by the enemy which may become a theatre of operations.

2. Procedure for handling information collected in the field.

(a) Counter-Intelligence information derived from captured documents, interrogation, reports, etc., and collected in the field will be studied by the Counter-Intelligence staffs at Army Headquarters, and the SCI Unit attached thereto for the purpose of extracting such information as is required for immediate tactical planning or the security of their own particular areas.

(b) Army Headquarters will pass back to Army Groups information required for planning or for the collation and study of Counter-Intelligence records covering the Army Groups area as a whole.

SECTION XI (continued)

(c) SCI Units at Army and Army Groups will pass back direct through their special communications channels to MI 6(v)/OSS(X2) unsuitable for transmission by Army signals. MI 6(v)/OSS(X2) will undertake the collation and the further distribution of this information where necessary, to other departments in LONDON or WASHINGTON and will pass to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, such detailed routine information as will be necessary for maintaining the personality cards up to date, and any summaries which will be required by SHAEF.

(d) Army Groups will pass back to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, all information of general interest or having special reference to territories not yet occupied by Allied forces, and such other reports as the Counter-Intelligence Staff, SHAEF, may direct.

(e) Detailed instructions will be issued separately regarding reports to be furnished by Army Groups to SHAEF when their Armies take the field.

3. Procedure for the distribution of information in the field.

(a) The Coordination Section, SHAEF, will be responsible for supplying Army Groups with amendments and additions to the existing Counter-Intelligence Brief, and any additional information relating to territories already liberated or not yet occupied by our forces. For this purpose, the Coordination Section will be supplied by departments in LONDON and WASHINGTON with the necessary collated information.

(b) All further information or requests for information addressed from departments in LONDON and WASHINGTON to formations in the field, and which are suitable for transmission by normal Army channels, will be routed through the Coordination Section, SHAEF. Information concerning the operation of SCI Units or which is not suitable for transmission by normal means, will be routed through MI 6(v)/OSS(X2).

(c) Departments in LONDON or WASHINGTON will, from time to time, supply the Coordination Section, SHAEF, with information necessary for the preparation of any general reports or appreciations required by the Counter-Intelligence Staff, SHAEF.

4. Exchange of Counter-Intelligence Information between Army Groups

Except as stated in paragraph 5 below, the flow of information in the field will normally follow the chain of command. Lateral communication between Headquarters below Army Group level will only be needed for detailed information requiring immediate action by neighboring Headquarters. Each Army Group will pass direct to the other Army Group any Counter-Intelligence information which may be of interest to them, and, similarly will supply to the other a copy of any routine reports submitted to SHAEF.

SECTION XI (continued)

5. Travel Control.

The Travel Control Section, SHAEF, will coordinate the flow of Counter Intelligence information in the theatre relating to its own particular sphere of activities. For this purpose, information and requests for information concerning travellers and travel control regulations will be passed direct to the Travel Control Section, SHAEF, by C.I. staffs at Sea and Air Ports and eventually at Frontiers. Similarly, information and instructions concerning travellers will be passed by the Travel Control Section, SHAEF, direct to Port and Frontier C.I. staffs.

6. Documents Sections.

Documents sections of Intelligence staffs at Army Groups and Army Headquarters will give Counter-Intelligence staffs an opportunity to study any documents containing information of Counter-Intelligence interest. Original documents that are only of Counter-Intelligence interest will be passed to Counter-Intelligence staffs for disposal. Purely Counter-Intelligence documents which Counter-Intelligence staffs are to pass to a higher headquarters in accordance with paragraph 2 above, may be handed to the documents sections for transmission and labelled "For attention Counter-Intelligence Staffs". Documents of purely Counter-Intelligence interest received by the SHAEF Documents Section will be passed to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, for action.

7. Channels of Counter-Intelligence Information.

The channles of information as between Army Groups, SHAEF, and producer departments are shown on the attached chart at Appendix 'A'. The colored lines may represent a flow in either direction.

(a) MI 6(v)/OSS(X2) pass information relating to hostile secret intelligence services direct to SCI Units attached to Army Groups in the field through their own special communications (solid red line). Lateral communication between Army Groups is similarly provided as shown. Other producer departments MI 5, War Office, MI Sections, SOE/OSS(SP), and PWE/OSS(R & A) feed any information relating to hostile secret intelligence services, which they may obtain from their own sources, to MI 6(v)/OSS(X2).

(b) SOE/OSS(SO) are in direct communication with their own SF Staffs attached to Army Groups (dotted red line). Lateral communications between SF Staffs at Army Groups are similarly shown.

(c) All producer departments pass information to the Coordination Section, SHAEF, (green lines) where it is collated and passed on to Army Groups in suitable form (purple line). The Coordination Section, SHAEF, distributes such information to other departments as may be

SECTION XI (continued)

concerned (green line) and feeds back to Army Groups the results of work done on such information.

By Command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH
Lieutenant-General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ K.W. D. Strong
/t/ K.W. D. STRONG
Major-General
A C of S, G-2

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MI 6
MI 11
SHAEF G-3 (Operations) Division
G-4 (Administration) Division
G-5 (Civil Affairs) Division
European Allied Contact Section

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

AG 383.6-1 GBI-AGM

APO 757 (Forward)
28 April 1945

SECTION XII

SUBJECT: Suspect British Indian Nationals

TO: Headquarters, 21 Army Group
Commanding General, 12th Army Group
Commanding General, 6th Army Group

1. Supreme Headquarters, AEF Intelligence Directive Number 7 (Counter-Intelligence), Section XII, subject as above, dated 16 March 1944, is rescinded.

2. Arrangements have been made with the India Office as set out below regarding the discovery and disposal of suspect British Indian Nationals in Europe. In order to assist in dealing with suspect British Indians, the India Office has provided for attachment to G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, a number of officers with the necessary linguistic qualifications and background knowledge. These officers will constitute the British Indian Security Unit (BISU) and will be available for attachment to Army Groups as required.

3. British Indian Nationals may be regarded as falling within two categories:

a. Indian Prisoners of War (including captured seamen), subdivided into:

(1) Suborned Prisoners of War.
(2) Loyal Prisoners of War.

b. Indian civilians:

(1) Suborned civilians.
(2) Loyal civilians.

4. Prisoners of War. Attempts have been made by the enemy to suborn certain British Indian Prisoners of War. In this connection some have been induced to join an organization called the Indian Legion, and some to work in civilian roles, e.g. as radio announcers.

5. Indian Prisoners of War recovered from recognized Prisoner of War camps will, in the first instance, be dealt with by Indian Army officers attached to G-1 Division (FWX). A list of suspect Indian Prisoners of War is being distributed to G-1 Division (FWX) and to

Counter-Intelligence Staffs (see paragraph 11 below). When any such suspect Prisoners of War are discovered in recognized Prisoner of War camps, G-1 Division (PWX) officers, or the officers administering the camps, will request the assistance of officers from the British Indian Security Unit. The assistance of such officers will also be requested whenever the loyalty of Indian Prisoners of War in a recognized Prisoner of War Camp is in doubt. All suspect Indian Prisoners of War will, so far as is practicable, be segregated from other Prisoners of War.

6. When Indians are received singly or in groups (i.e. not as members of recognized Prisoner of War camps) the responsibility for deciding whether they are Prisoners of War or civilians will rest with the British Indian Security Unit who will be immediately consulted. If it is established that they are Prisoners of War the British Indian Security Unit will arrange for their disposal after such brief interrogation as may be necessary to determine whether there has been any degree of collaboration with the enemy. If it is established that they are civilians, the British Indian Security Unit will take action as outlined in paragraphs 10 or 11 below.

7. All British Indian Prisoners of War will be evacuated to the United Kingdom where the detailed examination of their bona fides will be undertaken. A preliminary examination by officers from G-1 Division (PWX) or from the British Indian Security Unit (as outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 above) will be necessary in order tht those who are known or believed to have been suborned may be sent to the United Kingdom under escort.

8. Close liaison will be maintained by G-1 Division (PWX) and the British Indian Security Unit with IS9 (WEA) regarding any Indians claiming to be escaped Prisoners of War.

9. Civilians. The primary function of the British Indian Security Unit will be in connection with Indian civilians. All Indian civilians will be detained, and a report submitted to Supreme Headquarters, AEF or to the appropriate British Indian Security Unit officer, if available, who will then make the necessary arrangements for interrogation.

10. Those Indian civilians who, it is decided after interrogation and consultation with the appropriate authorities, may be considered cleared from a security point of view, will be permitted either to remain in Europe or to return to India on release, under arrangements which will be initiated by the British Indian Security Unit.

11. Revised lists of Indian (collaborators) are in the course of preparation and will be forwarded to Counter-Intelligence Staffs and to G-1 Division (PWX). Persons named in these lists will be detained after interrogation and ultimately repatriated to India under escort. On no

SECTION XII (continued)

account should they be sent to the United Kingdom. There is no objection to British Indian civilians detained as collaborators being kept in the same detention camps as German civilian suspects. They should, however, be kept separate from Indian Prisoners of War.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

/s/ T. J. Davis
/t/ T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

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2 - The War Office, MI 11
2 - G-1 Division
2 - G-3 Division
2 - G-5 Division
2 - European Allied Contact Section
2 - Air Staff
2 - AG Records.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/G2X/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

APPENDIX "A" - AREAS SUBJECT TO SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS.

1. Under Defense Regulations and Aliens Orders, restrictions of various types are imposed on the activities of civilians for the purpose of ensuring the maximum security control of the population in areas of special importance.

Regulated Areas.

2. The Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for Air are empowered by DR 13A to declare by order that any district in which there are naval, military, or air force activities, shall be a Regulated Area. The effect of such a declaration is that in the areas concerned, the service authority specified in the order may impose restrictions on the movements of persons within that area by prohibiting or regulating the use, by members of the public, of highways and other places to which the public have access. Regulated areas have been created in SCOTLAND and on the EAST and SOUTH Coasts of ENGLAND. The GOC in C of the Command concerned has been given authority to apply the restrictions.

Protected Areas.

3. Four protected areas have been declared in SCOTLAND. The effect of the declaration is that a pass or permit is required for entry into or residence in the area concerned. Those persons (not being enemy aliens) who were residents in the Protected Areas at the time of the declaration creating it, are exempt from this requirement.

Defense Areas and Restricted Areas.

4. Under DR 16A, the Regional Commissioner may, subject to the control and direction of the Minister of Home Security, regulate movement within any Defense Areas within his region for the purpose of meeting, or hindering actual or apprehended attack. The whole of the UK has been split up into twelve Defense Areas, co-extensive with the twelve Regions. The exercise of these powers is illustrated by the bans which have been placed from time to time on visits for pleasure to coastal areas. Areas so banned to holiday-makers have been known as 'Restricted Areas'.

5. Premises and places which by their nature are vulnerable to espionage or sabotage, such as docks, factories, depots, etc. are frequently declared to be Protected Places under DR 12. It is an offense to be upon a Protected Place without the permission of the authority specified in the order declaring a Protected Place.

Aliens Protected Areas.

6. No alien may without permission of the police, enter an area scheduled as an Alien's Protected Area. These comprise a coastal strip on the EAST and SOUTH coasts, the principal harbour areas, and a few inland areas.

Service Premises.

7. Trespass upon premises used by His Majesty's Service is an offence under Dr 15, and trespassers may, without prejudice to proceedings which may be taken against them, be removed. It is also an offence to continue to loiter in the vicinity of such premises after having been requested by the appropriate authorities to leave.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/9GX/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

APPENDIX "B" - SPECIAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE UNITS

General

1. Information relating to enemy secret intelligence services in enemy, enemy-occupied and neutral territory is available in LONDON, mainly in Section V of MI 6, X2 Branch of OSS, but also, in other departments such as MI 5 and MI 14(d), War Office, owing to the special nature of this information and the great discretion required in its use, it is not suitable for passing to the CI Staffs through normal intelligence channels. Special CI Units will therefore be supplied by Section V of MI 6 for attachment to British Army Group and Army Headquarters and by X2 Branch of OSS for attachment to US Army Group and Army Headquarters. These units will act as a channel for passing information to CI Staffs about enemy secret intelligence services and will advise them as to its use.

2. All producer departments of information of this type in LONDON will work in the closest collaboration and will pass their information to MI 6/OSS for transmission, if necessary, to SCI units.

Organization

3. (a) British

SCI units are of two types:

Type "A" (4 officers and 6 O.R's) suitable for attachment to an Army Group HQ.

Type "B" (2 officers and 2 O.R's) suitable for attachment to an Army HQ or a smaller force engaged in a specific operation of limited scope.

(b) U.S.

Officers	Army Group	Army
Majors	1	1
Captains	2	1
First Lieutenants	1	1
Total	4	3

1900

APPENDIX "B" (continued)

Enlisted Men	Army Group	Army
First Sergeants	1	1
Staff Sergeants	1	1
Technicians 4th	5	3
Pfc's	4	2
Total	11	7

Administration

4. SCI units will be administered for all purposes by the headquarters to which they are attached (British, by the Camp Commandant: US by the headquarters company).

Duties

5. The duties of SCI units in the planning stage are:

(a) To assist in the preparation of all available information about enemy secret intelligence services in the form required by the CI Staffs.

(b) To advise CI Staffs in the selection of the immediate counter-intelligence targets and in the method of dealing with them to ensure the maximum intelligence results.

6. The duties of SCI units in the field are:

(a) To distribute and interpret to the CI Staffs all counter-espionage information received by them from LONDON and from other SCI units, and advise as to its most effective and secure use.

(b) To afford the maximum protection to special sources of secret counter-espionage information.

(c) To advise CI Staffs in the selection of counter-espionage targets whose capture is likely to yield material of value.

(d) To assist CI Staffs in the examination of captured enemy documents or material of special counter-espionage interest.

(e) To assist CI Staffs in the interrogation of captured enemy agents.

(f) To pass to LONDON all information on enemy secret intelligence services collected in the field, including such captured documents and other material as is no longer required in the field.

(g) To serve as a direct channel between each Army Group HQ for information on enemy secret intelligence services collected in the field.

(h) To serve as a channel between the Army Groups and from the Army Groups to LONDON for any other counter-intelligence information which cannot be passed through normal service channels.

Employment of SCI units

7. SCI units are normally attached to the CI Staffs of a headquarters and are directly responsible to the Chief CI Staff Officers.

8. Although not technically forming part of the CI Staff, the officers of SCI units will work in closest liaison with the component sub-sections of the staff. The functions of the SCI units are advisory and not executive. Executive action on information supplied by SCI units is the province of the CI Staffs and CI personnel.

9. SCI units will normally pass their information direct to the appropriate sub-section of the CI Staff. However, in furtherance of their responsibility to safeguard special sources (see para 6(b) above), they will have the right to withhold any particular item of information derived from such sources from any but the Chief CI Officer, and to represent to him the necessity for prohibiting or limiting action upon it, where action or unrestricted action might prejudice the security of these sources. The ultimate decision as to whether action is or is not to be taken in the field will rest with the A C of S (G-2) or the DCS (I) of the Army Group, except when an express prohibition to take action is issued by MI 6 or OSS in LONDON.

10. Personnel of SCI units should not be employed in any area where there is danger of capture and therefore of interrogation by the enemy. They should normally move with the HQ to which they are attached.

11. It may often be profitable to attach CI personnel to SCI units for short periods of training for special tasks, e.g., seizure and inspection of CI documents. Personnel of SCI units may also accompany CI personnel on such tasks subject to the proviso in the preceding paragraph.

APPENDIX "B" (continued)

12. Personnel of SCI units are specially qualified and must not be employed on any other than counter-intelligence duties.

Communications

13. SCI units are furnished with special communications and codes and are not normally dependent on Army Signals.

14. Each SCI unit will be in direct communication with its LONDON Headquarters, and all units within the same Army Group Zone will be in direct communication with each other. In addition, each unit with an Army Group Headquarters will be in direct communication with the unit at the other Army Group Headquarters.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SHAEF/96K/INT 5th February, 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

APPENDIX "C" MOBILE W/T DETECTION UNITS

1. Function.

The detection of illicit wireless transmitters is carried out in two phases; first, the recognition of a wireless signal as originally from an enemy agent and its rough location by long range direction-finding, and second, the accurate location of the illicit transmitter by local direction-finding. The first stage includes the large scale analysis of wireless signals based on a fixed DF system which in this theatre is carried out in the UNITED KINGDOM. The second stage, in the field, is carried out by a team of mobile DF vans, operating under the direction of the central control in ENGLAND with its attendant analysis and fixed DF. Six vans each are provided at 21 Army Group and First US Army Group respectively, linked by special W/T to the common central control. The function of these vans is to locate from comparatively short range, the source of a radio signal on to which they are directed in terms of frequency, rough location, etc., by the central control. They are not suitable for the initial detection of an agent's signal, a task which for technical reasons can hardly ever be accomplished successfully by local action.

2. Organization

The personnel and vans at HQ 21 Army Group will form part of the Special Communication Unit supplied by MI 6. Those at First US Army Group will be supplied by the US Signal Corps. While these units will be technically controlled from the UNITED KINGDOM, they will be under the operational command of the Chief Counter-Intelligence Staff Officer at Army Group Headquarters. The officer in charge of the mobile vans will be responsible for their technical employment. They will at all times work in close liaison with SCI units and counter-intelligence personnel.

3. Local Intelligence

Experience has shown that CI staffs may expect to receive numerous reports alleging illicit use of wireless behind our lines. Many of those reports will be obviously absurd or the result of ulterior motives on the part of local inhabitants, but all reports that are not obviously ridiculous must be investigated. An officer experienced in investigating such cases will be available at each Army Group Headquarters and any reports which appear to merit investigation will be referred to him. He will be able to call on any further technical help necessary.

APPENDIX "C" (continued)

Mobile DF vans will not normally be employed in investigating cases arising from local intelligence without prior reference to the central station in the UNITED KINGDOM.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS.
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-2 (INTELLIGENCE) DIVISION

SHAEF/9SX/INT 16 March 1944

SHAEF (INT) DIRECTIVE NO. 7 (COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

APPENDIX "D" - THE SECURITY CHECKING OF SECRET AGENTS

1. All agencies who recruit secret agents in the field will submit the names of such agents, before employment, to the CI Staffs of Army Group or Army Headquarters. Where necessary the names will be submitted direct to the Chief Counter-Intelligence Officer who will institute the required security check without disclosing the purpose for which it is being made.

2. The CI Staffs will check the names of such persons against their records, and may, if they and the agency concerned consider it necessary or desirable, check the names with the civil police or make other local enquiries to establish their bona fides.

3. The above procedure will also be adopted for the security checking of any agents recruited in the field to operate behind our own lines as confidential informants.

APPENDIX II

General Order 36, ETO, 27 April 1944

1907

Assignment of CIC personnel ---------- I
Provisional organization of CIC detachments ---------- II

I--ASSIGNMENT OF CIC PERSONNEL. Effective immediately, all Counter Intelligence Corps officers and enlisted personnel on duty in the European Theater of Operations, exclusive of such personnel on duty with European Wing Air Transport Command, and now assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be relieved from such assignment and assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, for duty with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Section. (AG 210.3/2 x 220.3 OPGB)

II--PROVISIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CIC DETACHMENTS. 1. Effective this date, the following units are provisionally organized in accordance with the appropriate column of T/O & E 30-500, 24 January 1944, and each with an authorized strength, as indicated:

Unit	Teams		Strength Off	Strength EM
CIC Detachments #1 thru #22 (Provisional)	1-Type A-1		1	1
	1- " B-1		1	4
	1- " B-2		2	8
		Total	4	13
CIC Detachments #23 thru #28 (Provisional)	1-Type A-2		1	3
	1- " B-4		4	11
		Total	5	14
CIC Detachments #29 thru #30 (Provisional)	1-Type A-3		2	4
	1- " B-4		4	11
		Total	6	15
CIC Detachment #31 (Provisional)	1-Type A-3		2	4
	1- " B-4		4	11
	8- " B-3		24	88
		Total	30	103
CIC Detachments #32 thru #35 (Provisional)	1-Type A-2		1	3
	2- " B-2		4	16
	1- " B-3		3	11
		Total	8	30
CIC Detachment #36 (Provisional)	1-Type A-2		1	3
	2- " B-4		8	22
		Total	9	25

(GO 36, ETOUSA, 27 Apr 1944, continued)

Unit	Teams		Strength Off	Strength EM
CIC Detachment #37 (Provisional)	1-Type A-2		1	3
	7- " B-2		14	56
	2- " B-3		6	22
	2- " B-4		8	22
		Total	29	103
CIC Detachments #30 and #39 (Provisional)	1-Type A-2		1	3
	3- " B-1		3	12
	1- " B-4		4	11
		Total	8	26
CIC Detachment #40 (Provisional)	1-Type A-3		2	4
	1- " A-4		4	6
	1- " B-1		1	4
		Total	7	14

2. Necessary personnel for these detachments will be provided by this headquarters.

3. Units will be equipped in accordance with T/O & E 30-500, 24 January 1944.

a. Special equipment required for these units will be requisitioned in accordance with War Department letter, AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, subject: "Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter-Intelligence Corps," 29 November 1943.

4. The provisions of AR 345-800 and AR 345-900, as amended, will be complied with where applicable.

5. Units will be assigned to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and attached to field and air force commands as required. (AG 322 OPGB)

By command of General EISENHOWER:

R. B. LORD,
Brigadier General, GSC, Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

R. B. LOVETT,
Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: F

APPENDIX III

Probable Rosters of CIC Detachments in England 10 May 1944

1910

DETACHMENT #1
82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
WALLACE, William H., Jr.	Capt
SALSTROM, Edward D.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
WHALEN, Joseph R.	T/Sgt
ALLEN, Eldon L.	S/Sgt
DAVIS, Thomas C.	S/Sgt
O'NEILL, James P.	S/Sgt
BOTH, Edwin O.	Sgt
GLADNEY, Graves	Sgt
MCRAE, Leonard K.	Sgt
WALDREN, Taylor	Sgt
DANIEL, Russel	Cpl
FERDINAND, Howard R.	Cpl
FULLER, Francis J.	Cpl
GEORGE, George A.	Cpl
LOWANCE, Carter O.	Cpl
WHEELER, Donald L.	Cpl
OSTERMAN, Victor C.	Pfc

DETACHMENT #2
101st AIRBORNE DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
McKENNAN, Bradley	2nd Lt.
McGUIRE, Martin E	1st Lt.
ENLISTED MEN	
GANNON, William F.	S/Sgt
MOTOPOULOS, Alexander A.	S/Sgt
STEMPLE, Max L.	S/Sgt
TOFANT, William J.	S/Sgt
FOSTER, Curtis M.	Sgt
BENSON, Frank E., Jr.	Cpl
CLARK, William E.	Cpl
GIAMBALVO, Nunzio A.	Cpl
KOPEC, Roman F.	Cpl
MARTIN, George E.	Cpl
REED, William P.	Cpl
ROBINSON, Frank L.	Cpl
RYAN, Thomas E.	Cpl
SYMMES, Howard W.	Cpl
PARSONS, Bernard R.	Pfc

1911

DETACHMENT #3
2nd ARMORED DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
BEEDE, Richard W.	2nd Lt
GROSS, Philip	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

COULTER, Philemon B.	T/Sgt
ANDERSON, Alexander A.	S/Sgt
DERMODY, James A.	S/Sgt
DOWNING, Frederic E.	S/Sgt
HALLEN, Norman R.	S/Sgt
BRIGHAM, Morrison	Sgt
DAVIS, Caleb W.	Sgt
FOYT, Anton	Sgt
HANNA, Elias	Sgt
ARMSTRONG, Robert F.	Cpl
FILLEY, Walter O.	Cpl
MADSON, John N.	Cpl
MERTENS, Arthur R.	Cpl
MOSTECAK, John	Pfc
ZAJAC, Peter	Pfc

DETACHMENT #4
3rd ARMORED DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
BLACK, Theodore W.	1st Lt
PARKER, Olan, Jr.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

DENTON, James G.	S/Sgt
KILEY, George L.	S/Sgt
TRAVIS, Porter M., Jr.	S/Sgt
COLLINS, Ulysses S.	Sgt
DIETZ, Ralph E.	Sgt
DOW, Laurence E.	Sgt
UDOFF, Philip S.	Sgt
ANDERSON, Hilding A.	Cpl
DUNCAN, Thomas N.	Cpl
MENDENHALL, George M.	Cpl
MONFERRATO, Albert C.	Cpl
ROBINSON, Harold H.	Cpl
ROMEY, John H.	Cpl
BOGOTAY, George W.	Pfc
STRAMEL, Bruno F.	Pfc

1912

DETACHMENT #5
4th ARMORED DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
FLINN, Thomas E.	2nd Lt.
ROOD, Wilson A.	2nd Lt.
ENLISTED MEN	
BRAY, James F.	S/Sgt
MIKSIS, Joseph D.	S/Sgt
WALL, Merill C.	S/Sgt
BOYD, William S., Jr.	Sgt
JANURA, Arthur L.	Sgt
WATKINS, James E., Jr.	Sgt
CLARK, Arthur S., Jr.	Cpl
KIME, Otho G.	Cpl
OBERT, Norbert B.	Cpl
PETERS, Jack H.	Cpl
SHAW, Andre M.P.	Cpl
SKRIGAN, Paul S.	Cpl
WIENCKOWSKI, Louis	Cpl
DITO, Frank E.	Pfc
HAWES, Kenneth E.	Pfc

DETACHMENT #6
5th ARMORED DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
McKENNA, John P.	1st Lt
HUGHES, Kenneth T.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
ELLIOTT, Hugh F.	S/Sgt
GALLAGHER, Thomas P.	S/Sgt
HIGGINS, George L.	S/Sgt
NEWHOUSE, Joseph F.	Sgt
PENDER, William E.	Sgt
BARTON, Victor	Cpl
BARTNETT, Edmond J.	Cpl
BROOKENS, John W.	Cpl
ROE, Rexford K.	Cpl
CAMBRIA, Frank J.	Pfc

1913

DETACHMENT # 7
6th ARMORED DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
DeLOACH, Judson B.	Capt
LYMAN, Samuel K.	2nd Lt.

ENLISTED MEN

DOLPH, Robert E.	S/Sgt
FIELDS, Robert E.	Sgt
MULKEEN, William J.G.	Sgt
MURPHY, Francis J.	Sgt
GINGHER, Thomas R.	Cpl
TAIMOUGH, Albert J.	Cpl
EMBLEY, Richard O.	Pfc
LISTON Raymond J.	Pfc

DETACHMENT #0
1st INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
STEINWAY, Charles G.	2nd Lt
WEIMER, Robert M.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

MEADOWS, Charles D.	T/Sgt
BEESLEY, Charles H.	S/Sgt
FARLEY, Eugene E.	S/Sgt
CALIFF, John W.	Sgt
LOVETT, Edward C.	Sgt
DANYAR, Frank G.	Cpl
BIRON, Henry A.	Cpl
ELLERT, Arthur R.	Cpl
FINCH, Richard F.	Cpl
HULL, Allan F.	Cpl
LaFRANIERE, Victor H.	Cpl
LANG, Richard C.	Cpl
PINSINCE, Adrian J., Jr.	Cpl
ROTHWELL, Robert G.	Cpl

1914

DETACHMENT #9
2nd INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
JENKINS, Arthur D	1st Lt
McLAUGHLIN, Thomas D.	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

KENNELL, Christian R.	S/Sgt
WALKER, George H.	S/Sgt
WEEMS, Julian T.	S/Sgt
BEACH, George L.	Sgt
HOWARD, William C.	Sgt
MAY, Robert S., Jr.	Sgt
RAE, Nelson S.	Sgt
SHOCKLEY, Marvel E.	Sgt
WELLS, Gordon S.	Sgt
ANTHONY, William A.	Cpl
GROGAN, Alvin C.	Cpl
MEISETZ, Fred E.	Cpl
OMODT, Hollis W.	Cpl
LINN, Wayne E.	Pfc

DETACHMENT # 10
4th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
APPLETON, Oliver D	1st Lt
BOYCE, Bernard F., Jr.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

GUTIERREZ, Robert A	S/Sgt
WEST, Thomas J.	S/Sgt
WILLIAMS, Robert H.	S/Sgt
CORCORAN, John S.	Sgt
MAHER, William A.	Sgt
McGRAIL, Myles F.	Sgt
ALTARAS, Jack C.	Cpl
COLOMBO, Frank C.	Cpl
FILLPPU, Kaarlo	Cpl
KADLAC, Joseph H.	Cpl
KEENAN, John L.	Cpl
SALINGER, Jerome D.	Cpl
FITZGERALD, Paul J.	Pfc
HAYNES, Alexander G.	Pfc
LEAHY, Richard D.	Cpl

DETACHMENT #11
5th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
ALLEN, Lyndon B.	Capt
DUMM, Paul J.	1st Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
HANSON, August W.	T/Sgt
BARRON, Thomas J.	S/Sgt
YOUNG, Stuart A., Jr.	S/Sgt
BRANSON, Arthur F.	Sgt
SHIELDS, James P.	Sgt
WILLIAMS, George F.	Sgt
DINEEN, William P.	Cpl
DINNING, Woodford W.	Cpl
ELINE, Alton J.	Cpl
KENNEDY, Roger D.	Cpl
KLEITSCH, Robert J.	Cpl
LYTLE, Scott H.	Cpl
PEDIGO, Walter S., Jr.	Cpl
WYPER, David	Cpl
BURNS, Kenneth M.	Pfc

DETACHMENT # 12
8th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
McQUADE, John C.	1st Lt
APPEL, Charles S., Jr.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
COX, James G.	S/Sgt
MILLER, Robert C.	S/Sgt
NEWTON, Arthur J.	S/Sgt
DOYLE, John P.	Sgt
SHINN, John S.	Sgt
WEMPLE, Richard I.	Sgt
ZIMMERMAN, Richard G.	Sgt
CIUREJ, Frank S.	Cpl
COLE, Ibzen W.	Cpl
FAREY, John A.	Cpl
FRIELINGHAUS, Henry	Cpl
McQUIGG, William G.	Cpl
WILLEY, Arthur K., Jr.	Cpl
PELLETIER, Edward C.	Pfc
CARNANOS, Paul	Cpl

1918

DETACHMENT # 13
9th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
MUSICK, Joseph W.	1st Lt
WHEELER, Richard W.	1st Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
FERGUSON, Joseph H.	T/Sgt
KLUNDER, John H.	Sgt
MANGAM, Charles R.	Sgt
NORTHROP, Richard M.	Sgt
CLANCY, Frank B.	Cpl
FENNELL, Fred F.	Cpl
HILL, Ralph N., Jr.	Cpl
KLUNDER, Willard C.	Cpl
LADD, Edward T.	Cpl
LUNDGREN, Allen H.	Cpl
MORRIS, George W.	Cpl
NOVAK, George J.	Cpl
ROST, Hugh S.	Cpl
SOVA, Edward B.	Cpl
TAUB, Kurt L.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 14
20th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
MILLER, Albert B.	1st Lt
McMANUS, Neil C.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
FLOOD, Thomas W.	S/Sgt
McBEE, John	S/Sgt
GUTIERREZ, Emeterio, Jr.	Sgt
HOFFMAN, William S.	Sgt
TOOMEY, Cornelius H.	Sgt
WELSH, Jay Y.	Sgt
BRADON, Paul R.	Cpl
BRUNJES, John W.	Cpl
CONSTANT, Napoleon A.	Cpl
D'AMBROSIO, Michael V.	Cpl
HOLLORAN, William J.	Cpl
McCOY, John A.	Cpl
SMITH, Leroy H.	Cpl
HOUG, Elmer J.	Pfc

1917

DETACHMENT # 15
29th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
MAYFIELD, Ellis O.	2nd Lt
GRIPENSTRAW, Louie L.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

NEUENSCHWANDER, Lynn E.	S/Sgt
PALMER, Hugh J.	S/Sgt
VAN OTTEN, Andrew C.	Sgt
HARWELL, David J.	Sgt
MITCHELL, Allen R.	Sgt
ANDERSON, Gordon M.	Cpl
BEALL, Sam D.	Cpl
CHOEVER, Roger W.	Cpl
DE WALT, Clarence W.	Cpl
GILLESPIE, Bryant W.	Cpl
HITCHCOCK, Rex W.	Cpl
POWERS, Daniel M.	Cpl
WARNER, Jack R.	Cpl
WHALEY, Byron A.	Cpl

DETACHMENT #16
30th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
HANDVILLE, Melvin	1st Lt
ROBERTS, John W.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

ENLINGER, Richard G.	S/Sgt
SEARS, George F.	S/Sgt
STALEY, Jack P.	S/Sgt
MACKEY, James E., Jr.	Sgt
FRISBY, John C.	Sgt
MONSON, Paul J.	Sgt
OLSEN, Erling C.	Sgt
BELKIN, Paul N.	Cpl
GRANBERRY, Billy B.	Cpl
KUEHNER, Junior W.	Cpl
NEVIUS, Blake	Cpl
OWSWALD, William B.	Cpl
VOGEL, Charles C.	Cpl
COLMAN, Daniel A.	Pfc

DETACHMENT #17
79th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
BOGATIN, Irvin	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

ELSBERRY, William G.	S/Sgt
BURTON, Alfred G.	Sgt
KEGGINS, Algred G.	Sgt
STRONG, William B.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 18
83rd INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICER	RANK
VICTORY, Oliver A.	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

SWEENEY, John P.	S/Sgt
HOVEL, Roy B.	Sgt
HORTON, Harry H., Jr.	Cpl
JANSZEN, William A.	Cpl
DAVENPORT, Basil	Cpl
DeWITT, Erville D.	Pfc

1919

DETACHMENT # 19
90th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICERS	RANK
OSBORNE, Walter D.	1st Lt
MILLER, Edgar R.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

ASH, William J.	S/Sgt
DINWIDDIE, Harry E., Jr.	S/Sgt
McGEE, Leo C.	S/Sgt
EYANES, Francis D.	Sgt
BLANTON, Charles K.	Cpl
BOUDREAU, Amadee R.	Cpl
DAVIS, Joseph A.	Cpl
EISENSHAFT, Harry	Cpl
GOWAN, Ralph L.	Cpl
LUSTIG, Raymond W.	Cpl
MORTON, William M., Jr.	Cpl
McGEE, Harold	Cpl
NUSINOW, Jack	Cpl
STANSELL, Theodore L.	Cpl
BALKCON, Robert A.	Pfc

DETACHMENT # 20
35th INFANTRY DIVISION

OFFICER	RANK
FOSTER, John S.	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

ESTENSON, Lyle O.	Sgt
TOLLI, Joseph P.	Sgt
CASS, Donald L.	Cpl
FITZWILLIAM, Leo M.	Cpl
FREESE, Theodore L.	Cpl
GORDON, Augustus L.	Cpl
KELCH, Thelford E.	Cpl
KIRSTEIN, William A.	Cpl
MURPHY, Robert E.	Cpl
OLSON, Donald A.	Cpl
O'NEAL, Melvin M.	Cpl
PETERSON, Ralph J.	Cpl
DAMM, Norman A.	Pfc
MONTGOMERY, Charles	Pfc

1920

DETACHMENT # 21
SOS

OFFICERS	RANK

ENLISTED MEN

KUUSISTO, Wayne V.	Cpl
BRADFORD, Kermit	Cpl
GUBELLINI, Charles	Cpl
JORGENSON, Charles	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 22
SOS

OFFICERS	RANK

ENLISTED MEN

MARKS, Peter B.	Cpl
WHITSETT, John D.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 23
V CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
PETTUS, Erle, Jr.	Major
RIDDLE, Daniel M., Jr.	1st Lt
GRIER, Harry D.M.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

DALY, Philip J.	Sgt
IELLAND, Maurice O.	Sgt
KEARNS, Thomas E.	Sgt
LESLIE, Robert J.	Sgt
MARCUM, Herbert C.	Sgt
NIEMI, Raymond	Sgt
THIELE, Joseph C.	Sgt
WILLIAMS, Richard J.	Sgt
BACON, Leonard L.	Cpl
DEMERS, Armand A.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 23 (contd)

OFFICERS	RANK
OLSEN, Holden W.	Cpl
REYNOLDS, Floyd L.	Cpl
STEGMAIER, Arthur G.	Cpl
FURNISS, Robert D.	Pfc
BOOSEL, Harry X.	Sgt
ALLEN, Roland G.	Cpl
McCARTHY, Donnell B.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 24
VII CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
DORSETT, James K.	Capt
HEMINWAY, John H.	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

REBER, John H.	T/Sgt
BADGER, Daniel B.	S/Sgt
SCHILLER, John	Sgt
SCHROEDER, Charles J.	Sgt
VARENICK, Michael I.	Sgt
VARGAS, Frank A.	Sgt
ZIELASKO, Gustave W.	T/4
BALLSRUD, Wesley E.	Cpl
BRADY, William T.	Cpl
JAUDON, Elbert W.	Cpl
NEVILLE, Stephen J., Jr.	Cpl
NORVISH, Franklin	Cpl
PERRY, Albert L.	Cpl
ROUBTREE, Charles A.	Cpl
WRIGHT, David	Cpl
HOFFMAN, Paul L.	Pfc

1922

DETACHMENT # 25
VIII CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
BOWEN, Albert R., Jr.	1st Lt
ERMIS, Leo L.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
RAND, Harvey H.	S/Sgt
EBERLY, Donald A.	Sgt
LEACH, James H.	Sgt
ROONEY, Julian R.	Sgt
SPOONER, Jack A.	Sgt
WALKER, Dewey S.	Sgt
ZINTZ, David	Sgt
BLOCK, Joseph D.	Cpl
BRADLEY, Harry L.	Cpl
BRAUNE, Edward L.	Cpl
BROWN, George P.	Cpl
KUTZLO, Steve	Cpl
WALLENHORST, Harry H.	Cpl
FINNELL, Albert	Pfc
MELO, Richard J.	Pfc
TIGNOR, Patrick H.	

DETACHMENT # 26
XV CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
FOSSIECK, Theodore R.	Capt
BELL, Edward P.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
McREOGH, Francis M.	S/Sgt
WILGUS, Sidney D.	S/Sgt
BABILYA, Peter J., Jr.	Sgt
CORNISH, Lorenzo E.	Sgt
FINEGAN, Eugene E.	Sgt
GLEASON, Thomas J.	Sgt
JURY, William H.	Sgt
OGG, Lyman	Sgt
SLATER, Russell R.	Sgt
DILLES, Stanley E.	Cpl
JONES, Carroll E.	Cpl
McNIECE, Harry W.	Cpl
MOONEY, Elmons N.	Cpl
SABULSKI, Alvin A.	Cpl
SIFFIN, John J.	Cpl
SIES, Harry B.	Cpl

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DETACHMENT # 27
XIX CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
BAKER, Ernest S.	Capt
HOLTZNER, Francis, J.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
JENKINS, William L.	S/Sgt
STANTON, Francis W.	S/Sgt
CADDEN, Francis L.	Sgt
THOMPSON, William G.	Sgt
TRUTON, Hallam W., Jr	Sgt
FOSSUM, Norman H.	Cpl
HOTCHKISS, David H.	Cpl
JEKA, Ralph J.	Cpl
McMANUS, Alfred B.	Cpl
MEYERS, Lawrence A.	Cpl
ROUNDLESS, Samuel J.	
VANDENBULCKE, Charles E.	Cpl
WILKINS, Ernest J.	Cpl
BURGESS, Eugene B.	Pfc
CLARK, Philip T.	Pfc
LEAR, Darvin E.	Pvt

DETACHMENT # 28
XX CORPS

OFFICERS	RANK
LOBB, Anthony W.	Capt
PRESTON, Nathan R.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
EDINGTON, Thomas A.	S/Sgt
HAHN, Ross B.	Sgt
SMITH, James E.	Sgt
STAFFORD, Gerald	Sgt
GREGORY, George D., Jr.	Cpl
HINKLE, Wayne W.	Cpl
MEHOE, Richard O.	Cpl
MAHANEY, Dennis H.	Cpl
MARZ, Roy W.	Cpl
McLEROY, Thomas R.	Cpl
OYLER, Robert B.	Cpl
PIERCE, Elwood W.	Cpl
ROSEN, Joseph E.	Cpl
CURLEY, Frederick M.	Cpl
DAVISON, Russell C.	Pfc
SCHAEFFER, Harry T.	Pfc

DETACHMENT # 29
FIRST U.S. ARMY

OFFICERS	RANK
MINER, Horace M.	Major
CONICK, Charles B.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
BULKLEY, Charles C.	T/Sgt
HARTUNG, Peter H.	T/Sgt
HILBRUNER, William J.	T/Sgt
HAYES, Virgil E.	S/Sgt
DUGGAN, James M	Sgt
HAMILTON, Hal A.	Sgt
MORAN, Fenton	Sgt
BURGESS, Robert M.	Cpl
CARTIER, Normond J.	Cpl
DeBORDES, Arnaud J.	Cpl
DeCLERQ, Albert	Cpl
FAGAN, James G.	Cpl
KEIRIG, Francis A.	Cpl
PHAIR, James A.	Cpl
POWELL, Ward H., Jr.	Cpl
WALKER, Kenneth O.	Cpl
WOODALL, John B.	Cpl
BARLOCK, Joseph A.	Pfc
BRODEUR, Wilfred J.	Pfc

1925

DETACHMENT # 30
THIRD U.S. ARMY

OFFICERS	RANK
RAPP, Oliver L.	Major
HALLETT, James B.	1st Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
BEISSENHERZ, Lloyd H.	S/Sgt
KOENIG, Wirth H.	S/Sgt
VAIVADA, Anthony S.	S/Sgt
CODY, Charles J.	Sgt
CRAPS, John Ellis	Sgt
LAWLESS, Mark J.	Sgt
STANTON, John M.	Sgt
ATKINSON, Harry G.	Cpl
BURGLUND, Oliver O.	Cpl
FORSBERG, William H.	Cpl
BERNAZIAN, Stephen	Cpl
MEEHAN, John F.	Cpl
PARK, Andrew J.	Cpl
PROSSER, Everett	Cpl
SHOEMAKER, Alfred L.	Cpl
TARMON, Thomas W.	Cpl
VOERTMAN, Russel	Cpl
WIRTH, Otto	Cpl
HARDISON, Robert F.	Pfc

DETACHMENT # 31
12th ARMY GROUP
(1st US ARMY RESERVE TEAMS OF 1
MAY ROSTER ARE ON THIS LIST)

CAPT	GAGAN, Thomas A.	SGT	SMITH, George E.
	McINERNEY, Maurice F.		ZEEMER, John K.
1st Lt	CALLAN, Albert S., Jr.		
	GONZALES, Richard M.	CPL	BIEDENBARN, Albert M.
	HANCOCK, Harold, H.		BLACKBURN, Duane A.
	KAY, James E.		BUTLER, Milton
2nd Lt	HALL, Frank B.		CARLSON, George A.
	HARDIN, Kenneth E.		CAROLAN, Edwin J.
	HENAHAN, James S.		CLEARY, Vincent W.
	KSIENIEWICZ, Casimir A.		CONN, Robert L.
	SAYERS, Sam R., Jr.		DENTON, Clark W.
	SCHLUTER, Claymer		DOMERGHT, [illegible] E.
	SHELDON, George C.		FAIRLIE, Paul J.
	STROUD, Donald R.		FARRIS, Ralph W.
	YARNEVICH, Ernest N.		GALLAGHER, William J.
			GIKAS, Christos S.
T/SGT	FINCH, Heber		GOETZ, Ferd G.
	KRAFT, Richard P., Jr.		GRAINGER, Charles W.
	McCARTHY, Claire F.		GREEN, William B.
	McCARTHY, Edward J.		HEITNER, Robert R.
	PRESTON, Stuart D.		HOGAN, Vincent P.
S/SGT	BENEDICT, Coleman H.		HOLLAND, Alvin E.
	COYNE, Martin J.		HUDSON, Raymond E.
	DeGROOT, Henry J.		JENSIN, Edward A.
	GAUDRAULT, Robert J.		KELLY, Donald A.
	GEISELHART, Richard E.		KENNARD, Claude L.
	HAGGARD, John D.		MENDOZA, Frank
	JENSEN, Garth H.		MERRICK, Edward J.
	KELLEY, Homer F.		MURGIA, Joseph
	McWILLIAMS, Walter E.		O'BRIEN, Thomas M.
	PEINE, Gilbert S.		PARK, Harry L.
	THOUSIN, Servious F.		SEAMAN, James O.
	YOUNG, Wesley I.		SHORT, Charles N.
SGT	BEARCE, Roger M.		STEWART, Charles L.
	CONOHAN, Robert J.		WOLKOMIR, Maurice N.
	DEAN, Howard E.	PFC	BAKER, William C.
	EGAN, William P.		DUNBAR, Lawrence L.
	FITZGERALD, Vincent P.		FAIN, Douglas W.
	HAGEN, Arnold J.		HANNIGAN, John J.
	HANSON, Leonard E.		KELLER, Alvin J.
	HAVIGHURST, Alfred F.		KINCH, Robert Y.
	KEGEL, Kenneth K.		LISTON, Raymond J.
	LEVINE, Robert H.		MacNAMARA, Richard C.
	MILLER, William F.		MASON, Will E.
	MURPHY, Thomas I.		MERRICK, James J.
	MURRAY, Winslow H.		SAZAMA, Robert J.

DETACHMENT # 31 continued

OBERLE, Norman W.
OLIVER, Alfred R.
PRINTZ, Robert G.
PROCTOR, George P.
PROCTOR, David G.

DETACHMENT # 32
ADSEC

OFFICERS	RANK
LARIOS, Ernest E.	Major
JOHNSON, Alvin	Capt
BEATTY, Walcott H.	1st Lt
WILSON, Meredith R.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

CHRISTOPHERSON, Kjarten	M/Sgt
RYAN, John J.	M/Sgt
FAHEY, Gregory J.	T/Sgt
JARSTED, Gordon K.	T/Sgt
BENHAM, Charles C.	S/Sgt
McINTOSH, James D.	S/Sgt
MORRISON, William A.	S/Sgt
SWANTEK, Andrew H.	S/Sgt
TRACY, Richard L.	S/Sgt
BURNS, Cecil	Sgt
CULLINAN, Henry J.	Sgt
GOSTISHA, John R.	Sgt
GREY, Alfred E.	Sgt
HOLMEGARD, Henry C.	Sgt
MacGREGOR, Paul C.	Sgt
NUNEZ, Peter	Sgt
PARISEAU, Theodore	Sgt
RADOULOVITCH, Vladmir	Sgt
SLOAN, Paul G., Jr.	Sgt
STUART, George B.	Sgt
ABELLA, Luis	Cpl
ALSDORF, James R.	Cpl
KAVANAUGH, George F.	Cpl
KELLY, John J.	Cpl
LINDHOLM, Richard W.	Cpl
MUHLEMAN, Harry N.	Cpl
PHILLIPS, Dayton E.	Cpl
POIRIER, Philip P.	Cpl
SCHULTZ, Walter J.	Cpl
FEINDT, Lawrence R.	Cpl
DeNARDO, Bernard J.	Cpl

1928

DETACHMENT # 33
ADSEC

OFFICERS	RANK
BENNETT, Edwin	Major
GRAHAM, Donald M.	Capt
RUNGE, Joseph P.	Capt
DOYD, Thomas	2nd Lt
RYAN, Thomas A.	1st Lt
SCHANTZ, Grover A.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

HAY, John R.	M/Sgt
JONATHAN, Virgil	M/Sgt
KLEIN, Keith B.	S/Sgt
POITRAS, Warren E.	S/Sgt
BARLABAS, George	Sgt
CASEY, John P.	Sgt
FERNHOLZ, Emil F.	Sgt
JEFFERSON, Phillip L.	Sgt
KENNINGTON, Robert J.	Sgt
LEMAR, Clarence E.	Sgt
MYERS, Elmer C.	Sgt
SWOOK, John E.	Sgt
BARDUSCH, William E., Jr	Cpl
BARRETT, Raymond F.	Cpl
BRILEY, Francis X.	Cpl
CANFIELD, Daniel E.	Cpl
CONDON, Gerald T.	Cpl
CROTTY, Joseph P.	Cpl
DRIVER, Frank S.	Cpl
HARTNETT, Robert B.	Cpl
HARTSELL, John S.	Cpl
HUGHES, John A.	Cpl
McINTYRE, James W.	Cpl
McMURRAY, Jonathan H.	Cpl
MEEDAUGH, Leonard S.	Cpl
MORIARTY, James F.	Cpl
MORRISSEY, William F.	Cpl
NIELSON, Earl A.	Cpl
URRY, Donald C.	Cpl

1929

DETACHMENT # 34
ADSEC

OFFICERS	RANK
MILLIGAN, Leonard	Major
PRESCOTT, Julian P.	Capt
ENLISTED MEN	
TAYLOR, Frank D.	M/Sgt
VINSON, John B.	M/Sgt
LESTER, Calvin D.	T/Sgt
BAUMANN, Lester H.	S/Sgt
DONNELLY, Andrew J.	S/Sgt
HICKS, Mason A.	S/Sgt
ROSS, Lester H.	S/Sgt
PERRY, Robert J.	S/Sgt
BLANKENSHIP, Lonnie R.	Sgt
CONNOLLY, Edward P.	Sgt
GARTLEY, Herbert B., Jr.	Sgt
GREGG, Robert E.	Sgt
KENNEDY, Edward J.	Sgt
LUNDQUIST, Donald C.	Sgt
MINAN, Donald E.	Sgt
MUNOZ, Anthony	Sgt
PUPANEK, Michael R.	Sgt
WALLACE, Lew	Sgt
HAYES, Thomas J.	Cpl
HERRERO, Charles	Cpl
HOWARD, Clinton A.	Cpl
IRETON, Henry H.	Cpl
JACKSON, Thomas S.	Cpl
KAISER, Stanley R.	Cpl
KLINCK, Herbert G.	Cpl
KOENIG, Ira N.	Cpl
MacKEITH, James A.	Cpl
MARTINCO, John P.	Cpl
McCORMACK, John C.	Cpl
PICKETT, Charles A.	Cpl
RALSTON, David P.	Cpl
ROLLER, Otto J.	Cpl
SHEA, Daniel A., Jr.	Cpl
TORPHY, Francis X.	Cpl
WESTON, Payson G.	Cpl
WHITE, Robert S.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 35
AIRSEC

OFFICERS	RANK
FOOTHORAP, James F.	Major
LINDJORD, Haakon	Capt
RYAN, Elbert M.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

DORSEY, Cam D.	T/Sgt
EDWARDS, Frank	T/Sgt
LONG, Fred H.	T/Sgt
BIEGERT, William A.	S/Sgt
CARTER, Ernest R.	S/Sgt
STEVENSON, Alfred B.	S/Sgt
TRAICOFF, George	S/Sgt
AGNETTS, Frederick N.	Sgt
ALEXANDER, Harry E.	Sgt
ANDERSON, William L.	Sgt
BURKHEAD, B. W.	Sgt
KEENA, Joseph W.	Sgt
LYNCH, Robert J.	Sgt
McALEER, Frank H.	Sgt
O'NEILL, Robert E.	Sgt
RICE, William M.	Sgt
ANDERSON, Elmer F.	Cpl
AVANCE, James D.	Cpl
BRETT, James	Cpl
GRAF, Ellsworth E.	Cpl
ISSAEFF, Rostislav G.	Cpl
LITTLE, John W.	Cpl
LYON, Francis E.	Cpl
McCANN, Bernard T.	Cpl
McKAY, Robert L.	Cpl
NOONAN, Edward J.	Cpl
RINEHART, Lowell S.	Cpl
SHEARER, Joseph C.	Cpl
SNYDER, Richard A.	Cpl
STEIN, Gerhold S.	Cpl
STICKNEY, Melvin J.	Cpl
TAYLOR, Job	Cpl
TOTH, Geza	Cpl
TYSON, Kenneth S.	Cpl
WOLTZ, Robert K.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 36
SHAEF

OFFICERS	RANK
GORDON, Jesse F	Capt
FRANCIS, William H., Jr	1st Lt
ABRAMS, Gordon C.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
JACKSON, Brent C.	M/Sgt
FARRAN, Robert C.	S/Sgt
SMITH, Edward P.	S/Sgt
CANNON, Joseph D.	Sgt
HARMS, John F.	Sgt
BASKO, James L.	Sgt
DUNGAN, Nelson V. N.	Sgt
KUROSKI, Steven A.	Sgt
VERITY, Felix S.	Sgt
ELLIOTT, James T.	S/Sgt
FINLEY, John C.	Cpl
HADGIS, Michael W.	Cpl
HILSZ, August W.	Cpl
HOGBERG, Rudolph L.	Cpl
KLIPA, Edmund X.	Cpl
LARSON, George F.	Cpl
SEAWELL, Donald R.	Cpl
MECKES, Lewis J.	Pfc
O'HARA, William P.	Pfc

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DETACHMENT # 37
SOS

MAJOR	MICHELMANN, Oswald C.	SGT	VALK, Joseph E.
CAPT	BROWNING, Earl S.		YOH, Franklin C.
	SWEENEY, Thomas P.		YOUNG, William G.
1st Lt	GALLAGHER, George R.	CPL	ABBOTT, Lyman, Jr.
	SEXTON, William J.		ALTER, Richard J.
2nd Lt	FRIZZELL, Russell B.		BALLARD, George H.
	LONEY, Theodore R.		BITTMAN, Lyman W.
	MEDINA, Marcells		BOWLUS, Thomas N.
T/SGT	HIMES, Canfield M.		BRAY, Archie J.
	LANGFORD, Berry F.		BRYSON, Arthur R.
	MAGUIRE, John N.		BYERLY, Milton R.
	MARANDA, Walter F.		CAIN, Wilfred W.
	MOORE, James M.		CANOFF, James I.
	PETERSON, John H.		CLAUSEN, Theodore T.
	REEVES, Delmore E.		CUSICK, Charles A.
	WALKER, George D.		DALTON, Charles C.
S/SGT	COAD, Francis E.		DENTON, William E.
	DONOVAN, Edward P.		DONEHOWER, Wilford J.
	ENS, William A.		FRANKLIN, Arthur H.
	FINGERSON, Robert F.		FRAZIER, Alfred
	FUNDERBURK, Harold W.		FRITSCHE, Noble S.
	HOLMES, Frederick L.		FUNK, Paul J.
	JOHNSON, Dan W.		GAUGHAN, John R.
	JONES, Edward C.		GEARY, Robert X.
	JOVAN, George		GILLESPIE, Henry
	MURRAY, William R.		GORDON, Jay E.
	ORLIANICH, Nicholas		HALEY, Sanford E
	REEDER, Joseph C. Jr.		HEINE, Edward
	SAVAGE, Jack E.		HENDERSON, George W.
Sgt	ARMIJO, Enrique M.		HENDERSON, Oliver S.
	BAER, David		HIGGINS, James B.
	BAGGS, Walter M.		HYDE, Upshur H., Jr.
	BECHTEL, John G.		JURDZIL, Stanley J.
	BECKER, Max J.		JURCO, Stephen
	CHURCH, Hudson R.		KEANE, James M.
	DUNLAP, Joseph D.		KEASTER, Leonard W.
	FERGUSON, Howard M.		KENNEDY, Edward H.
	GOLDBECK, Herman G.		KING, John W.
	GORGIE, Frank J.		KOVACIK, Andrew H.
	HAEGER, Robert A.		KRITSKY, Andrew N.
	HENIGAN, Joseph W.		LANG, James W., Jr.
	JOHNSON, Clayton L.		LENNON, Ernest J.
	KING, William H.		LOFTUS, Frank
	KOUDELKA, Edward R.		MANSOUR, Farris
	KRAMER, Charles E.		McCORMICK, Edgar T.
	LANDRY, Donald H.		McCOY, Raymond E.
	McBRIDE, George B.		McDONOUGH, Joseph T.
	NEWMAN, Frank A.		MEYERS, Charles F.

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DETACHMENT # 37 continued

	RAKOW, William J.	MORRISSEY, William F.
	REIDER, Robert W.	NILAN, William F.
	RENDLER, John C.	O'CONNOR, Herbert
	SMITH, Homer F.	PETZ, Henry Z.
	STEINBERG, Harry C.	QUATMAN, Joseph B.
	SWEENEY, Jay P.	RISSINGER, Marvin L.
CPL	RUSSELL, Ralph R.	
	SCHODT, Eddie W.	
	SHERFY, Raphael	
	SIDDENS, J. G.	
	THOMPSON, John H.	
	TIERNEY, John J.	
	UNDERWOOD, Claxton H.	
	VAN NUYS, Harvey A.	
	WARD, Andrew L.	
	WELCH, Ernest G.	
	WOOD, James L.	
	ZANZUCCKI, Albert A.	
	ZIFF, Bertram A.	
PFC	BUCKO, Stephan A.	
	FRAZEE, Claude J.	
	HEWISON, Donald J.	
	HEWISON, Donald A.	
	SCHRADER, Marcin J.	
PVT	KELLMAN, Rudolph G.	

DETACHMENT # 38
EIGHTH AIR FORCE

OFFICERS	RANK
OWSLEY, Charles H.	Capt
CLAY, William R.	1st Lt
ST. JOHN, Robert L.	1st Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
RAINEY, Birt J.	T/Sgt
WAGNER, John J.	T/Sgt
BOWER, Malcolm B.	S/Sgt
COMFORT, Robert H.	S/Sgt
DAVISON, William E.	S/Sgt
DONAHOE, John T.	S/Sgt
EDGAR, William R.	S/Sgt
FAGALY, Joseph J.	S/Sgt
HALL, Joseph W.	S/Sgt
HARNS, Robert E.	S/Sgt
LORD, Richard G.	S/Sgt
McGOUGH, William P.	S/Sgt
PULLER, James B.	S/Sgt
KAMINSKY, Andrew G.	Sgt
STANKEWICZ, Joseph P.	Sgt
ZELLER, Theodore R.	Sgt
DALEY, James L.	Cpl
DOBSON, Joseph D.	Cpl
GRABNER, Francis W.	Cpl
GRAHAM, Ellis C.	Cpl
GREGORY, Stewart E.	Cpl
GRUBBS, Kenneth R.	Cpl
HELCH, Carl E.	Cpl
LAMB, Henry M.	Cpl
LOUGHRY, Daniel F.	Cpl
RILEY, Francis X.	Cpl

DETACHMENT # 39
NINTH AIR FORCE

OFFICERS	RANK
LAMET, Leon L.	Major
LANTZ, Clarence T.	1st Lt
LaBRANCHE, Robert R.	1st Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
HOPPER, Marvin C.	M/Sgt
MOSS, Dalton	T/Sgt
STEWART, Robert H.	T/Sgt
WHITWORTH, Milton T.	T/Sgt
BONE, John H.	S/Sgt
COLEMAN, Clair H.	S/Sgt
KELLY, William R.	S/Sgt
LARSEN, Marvin N.	S/Sgt
McCANDLESS, Paul D.	S/Sgt
SMITH, Robert F.	
SOMERS, Louis M.	S/Sgt
TIDRICK, Don L.	S/Sgt
ZUSPANN, Eugene P.	S/Sgt
DANIEL, Guy S.	Sgt
DesAUTELS, Roland E.	Sgt
ERDOES, Frank F.	Sgt
FREEDMAN, Mark O.	Sgt
HALAL, Charles E.	Sgt
LICALZI, Laurence A.	Sgt
VANCE, John C.	Sgt
ANTHONY, Samuel C.	Cpl
BERG, Arthur W.	Cpl
BERNITZ, Samuel I.	Cpl
BUFFAN, James E.	Cpl
HIGBIE, Traynor W.	Cpl
LLOYD, Charles N.	Cpl
SNYDER, Jack P.	Cpl
WALLER, John W.	Cpl

1936

DETACHMENT # 40
HQ ETOUSA

OFFICERS	RANK
LEARN, Norman J.	Major
WILSON, Howard E.	Major
DOYLE, Robert H.	Capt
KEARNS, Frank M.	1st Lt
COPELAND, Miles	

ENLISTED MEN

NOLIN, Jules A.	M/Sgt
BOOKER, Charles L.	S/Sgt
CANOSA, James M.	Sgt
JULIN, George A.	Sgt
PORRECA, Albert C.	Sgt
RAGO, Henry A.	Sgt
SAMUEL, Nathaniel	Sgt
SWEENEY, John R.	Sgt
ARONSON, Zola A.	Cpl
CARROLL, Joseph F.	Cpl
EDWARDS, Marvin L.	Cpl
GILLEN, Edward J.	Cpl
KLOCZAK, Walter J.	Cpl
PARISH, John E.	Cpl
POOLE, Albert E.	Cpl
BAUDER, Harry P.	Pfc
McCAFFREY, Albert J.	

DETACHMENT # 41

OFFICERS	RANK
KINSEY, Benjamin T.	1st Lt

ENLISTED MEN

HICK, William G.	T/Sgt
ADAMS, John J.	S/Sgt
HART, Gale M.	S/Sgt
PROUDFOOT, Harold B.	S/Sgt
SMITH, Charles D.	S/Sgt
AVERY, Donald C.	Sgt
DARDAS, Leon R.	Sgt
FULMER, Burton E.	Sgt
PALMER, Ralph D.	Sgt
FLANAGAN, Joseph	Cpl
SYRING, William J.	Cpl

1937

DETACHMENT # 43

OFFICERS	RANK
TEMPLETON, William B.	Capt
FOSTER, John S.	1st Lt
NICHOLS, Richard H.	1st Lt
AMBERG, Walter A.	2nd Lt

ENLISTED MEN

BLEESMA, Eugene P.	T/Sgt
CZAJKOWSKI, Anthony F.	T/Sgt
HOPKINS, Sam C.	T/Sgt
SMITH, Guy T.	T/Sgt
SMITH, Robert L.	T/Sgt
ARNOLD, Thomas D.	S/Sgt
LATHAM, James S.	S/Sgt
WRIGHT, George B.	S/Sgt
CONOVER, John A.	Sgt
FLYNN, Charles F.	Sgt
HARRIS, John R.	Sgt
MacINTYRE, Gould O.	Sgt
PENTECOST, Hal W.	Sgt
SCHAFFNER, Montford H.	Sgt
SMITH, James E.	Sgt
BURKE, Thomas J.	Cpl
COWLES, William W.	Cpl
KUPISZEWSKI, Michael L.	Cpl
LLOYD, Charles M.	Cpl
MARTIN, Juane L.	Cpl
PECK, David W.	Cpl
STOCKBRIDGE, William D.	Cpl
WALLER, John W.	Cpl
DAVISON, Russell C., Jr.	Pfc

FOLLOWING WHO WERE ON 1 MAY
ROSTER UNACCOUNTED FOR

OFFICERS	RANK
GOZA, Claude L.	Capt
HEEGAARD-JENSEN, Paul A.	Capt
COLGAN, Charles W.	2nd Lt
LONTIER, Joseph A.	2nd Lt
ENLISTED MEN	
BRIGHAM, Lindsey R.	T/Sgt
COLEMAN, Ernest T.	T/Sgt
McGRATH, Donald J.	T/Sgt
BRUNO, John V.	S/Sgt
HEIM, Earl D.	S/Sgt
MULCIROME, David F.	S/Sgt
STEUSSY, Fred K.	S/Sgt
DUNWORTH, Gerald J.	Sgt
FUREY, John B.	Sgt
PENTECOST, Hal W.	Sgt
YAEGER, Edwin R.	Sgt
TEPLY, Elmer	Cpl
TAYLOR, Vernon	Pfc
DONNELLY, Andrew J., Jr.	Pvt

APPENDIX IV

FUSAG CI SOP

1940

CIC

1. GENERAL.

The organization, training, administration, and operations of FUSAG CIC personnel will be in general accordance with the provisions of TM 30-215, WD dated 22 Sep 43, subject: "THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS."

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. Based upon T/O and E 30-500, dated 24 Jan 44, the CIC detachments in the European Theater of Operations are organized in accordance with the provision of Section II, GO 36, Hq ETOUSA, dated 27 Apr 44.

b. Reinforcements or replacements to subordinate headquarters normally will be made from CIC reserve teams attached to this headquarters. However, a higher headquarters may withdraw personnel from one or more of its lower echelons to reinforce temporarily another of its headquarters.

3. TRAINING.

All CIC personnel have completed, under WD supervision, certain training courses designed to qualify them in general, for CI work. Personnel in this theater have completed or will complete under ETOUSA supervision certain other training programs intended to qualify them for CI work in the ETO. In addition to this training, commanders of headquarters to which detachments have been attached are responsible for insuring that:

a. Each CIC member maintains a high standard of physical condition and a high state of training as a soldier (emphasis to be placed on training in self-defense, defense against booby traps, etc.), that he is trained in vehicle maintenance, and that he gains a useful knowledge in one or both of the French and German languages.

b. The detachment participates in unit training exercises, and that it develops and engages in exercises designed to simulate forthcoming operations.

4. OPERATIONS.

In commands to which CIC personnel are attached, the AC of S, G-2, assisted by his CI staff officers, is responsible to his commander for general supervision of, and advice pertaining to, the employment of such personnel. Actual employment, however, is a function of command to be exercised through the commanding officer of the CIC detachment.

a. The commanding officer of the detachment is responsible for detailed planning regarding the employment of his detachment personnel. Necessary CI information upon which such planning is to be based will be provided by the G-2 (CI) staff concerned.

b. CIC personnel will be operated in teams of two men or larger groups whenever practicable.

c. It is of the utmost importance that effective CI coverage be maintained continuously in large or important towns and areas. In establishing CI coverage initially for such locations, individual CIC members will develop informant systems, begin investigations of suspect persons, and will become acquainted with and gain confidence of influential local persons whose cooperation is helpful. For these and many other reasons, it is highly desirable that certain of these members continue the maintenance of coverage in the area until relieved by other personnel who have become sufficiently acquainted with the local situation to permit their efficient assumption of control. When such conditions prevail, a small group of the CIC detachment of original jurisdiction should remain in the location in order to turn over to relieving personnel any unfinished local business and to advise in their activities. Only when it becomes apparent that control can be relinquished without jeopardy to the CI coverage will the original group join its detachment.

(1) The above will be considered in planning, and when necessary the temporary attachment of one or more CIC personnel to be left in charge of a specific town or area may be requested from a higher headquarters.

(a) Whenever practicable ComZ and air force CIC personnel specifically trained in port and airport CI duties, will be made available to tactical demands required to establish initial CI coverage for ports and airports.

(2) Under unforeseen circumstances which may occur during operations and when it becomes apparent that it will be necessary to relieve lower echelon CIC personnel of responsibility for CI coverage in an area to be vacated by their headquarters, the higher headquarters will make possible the early relief of such personnel by detailing relieving personnel to the area prior to or immediately after movement of the lower headquarters.

d. When the situation demands, detachment commanders by oral orders may place personnel under their command on temporary duty with other detachments upon approval in each case by the appropriate G-2.

Annex "P" continued

e. CIC personnel have full power and authority to arrest or detain any person who violates military security or whose detention is otherwise deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the CI mission.

f. Members of the CIC are authorized to call upon any member of this command for such assistance as may be required in the performance of their assigned duties.

g. Liaison between CI personnel and all other allied intelligence agencies is the responsibility of CI staffs. However, members of the CIC will work in closest cooperation with:

(1) G-5 and CA detachments.
(2) Naval, air forces, and ComZ CI personnel.
(3) Military police and personnel of the office of the provost marshal.
(4) SCI and SF personnel.
(5) Radio DF personnel.
(6) Document collection and evaluation teams.
(7) P & PW Officers.
(8) Attached allied CI staffs and personnel.

h. CIC personnel will be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties, they will be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement. They will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard customs or prohibitions (such as speed limits, access to places "off limits" etc.) nor by the military police or other military agencies. CIC badges and credentials will be honored at all times.

i. CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a CI interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of CI duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of comparable nature.

5. DUTIES.

Included among the operational duties of CIC personnel are the following:

a. Primary Duties in Forward Combat Areas: The primary duty of CIC personnel is to secure CI targets in the area of the objective. Foremost among these targets are:

(1) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(2) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the allied forces.

(3) Offices formerly occupied by the enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.

(4) Offices of local para-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.

(5) Centers of communications.

(6) Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of CI value.

NOTE: Army CI staffs will receive from this headquarters all information on these subjects which is available from special sources and will be responsible for distributing it to CI staffs and CIC of lower organizations as required.

b. Seconday Duties in Forward Combat Areas:

(1) Making security checks in cooperation with the military police who are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory.

(2) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the allied cause in order to secure all possible CI information.

(3) Advising upon and assisting in security against sabotage all public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the allied forces.

(4) Checking upon the observance by civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by G-5 and CA detachments.

(5) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with ordnances.

(6) The seizure of civil communications and arranging for their protection against sabotage until taken over by authorized signal communications personnel as provided in operational orders. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, guarded, and turned over to the proper authorities.

(7) Seizing and impounding all civilian and captured enemy mail.

(8) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

(9) Stopping publication of newspapers and other periodicals.

(10) Taking measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and material by our own troops.

(11) Transmitting to G-5, PM, or MP officers all information on matters within their purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civil police, and the extent of disorder, looting, and sabotage.

c. Investigative Duties. The CIC will be employed in investigations of:

(1) Espionage.
(2) Sabotage.
(3) Subversive activity, including rumor mongering and surreptitious issue of enemy propaganda.
(4) Disaffection, treason, and sedition within the US forces.
(5) Violations of security regulations.
(6) (In certain instances involving a CI interest) Personnel of government of occupied territory who are retained in their official capacities.
(7) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the US government (See para 6, Annex "F").

d. Miscellaneous Duties:

(1) Cooperating with the corps of military police and other military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of US armed forces. This action will include the recommending of the establishment and the assisting in the maintenance of controls and control systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into territory occupied by this command.

(2) Assisting port CI officers in the discharge of their duties.

(3) Performance of security surveys to determine the safety of communications, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, and other US installations and offices.

(4) Delivery of security lectures to the troops and other provisions for general indoctrination of all US military personnel in security principles.

(5) Surveillance of hotels, bars, restaurants, and other places frequented by US military personnel, and located within or near the area occupied by US troops.

(6) Establishing informant networks.

(7) Keeping the assistant chief of staff, G-2, of their respective commands informed of internal politics, political parties, or subversive groups which may be inimical to the counter intelligence interests of the allied forces.

e. Duties in the Event of Evacuation or Withdrawal:

(1) Searching evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, supply depots, and other installations to insure that documents or any material that might be of intelligence value to the enemy have been completely destroyed or removed.

(2) Checking the control of refugees along the routes used by troops to prevent the possibility of enemy infiltration.

f. Duties of Special Groups. Duties of special groups will be in accordance with the needs of their particular assignment in addition to the duties enumerated above.

6. UNIFORM.

CIC personnel are authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces. Normally, they will wear the civilian uniform and the CIC brassard as supplied by ETOUSA. Civilian clothing will not be taken to nor worn on the Continent. CIC credentials and badges will be carried as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agent or the successful accomplishment of his mission.

7. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

Normal intelligence channels will be used for all CIC purposes. Lateral communication between detachments is authorized.

8. RECORDS.

In order to facilitate the taking over of areas by relieving CIC detachment, it is essential that the records kept by CIC detachments be uniform and arranged so that they are easily intelligible to persons other than their compilers.

a. For the above purpose:

(1) All detachments will use cards measuring 5" by 8".

(2) Both cards and files will be kept in such a way that a detachment leaving an area can conveniently leave behind the cards and files referring to the area while taking with it only those files relating to general CI policy and administration.

(3) Particulars noted on the cards should enable an incoming detachment to find readily all relevant information, whether on the card itself or in the files.

b. Files.

(1) Separate files will be kept for:

(a) Suspect individuals.
(b) Suspect organizations.
(c) Security controls.
(d) Investigations.
(e) Periodic reports of agents.
(f) Periodic security reports.
(g) Security policy.
(h) Administrative subjects.

(2) Categories numbered (a) to (e) above will be sub-divided by towns or districts.

(3) In general files, each individual case or organization will be allotted a separate number; e.g. BERNARD Andre -- 1, HERMANT Abel -- 2. All further correspondence on BERNARD Andre will then be marked with the same initial number followed by a letter: e.g. 1a, 1b, 1c, etc. This will enable correspondence in general files to be kept either chronologically or separately by subjects, so that documents on any one subject can quickly be found or extracted.

(4) Where papers relating to an individual or organization are included in several files, cross reference will be made either in the files or on the relative cards.

(5) When documents relating to a particular case become numerous, they should be removed from the general file and a new individual file should be opened.

c. Card Index.

(1) Particulars of all suspects, informants, suspects

organizations, and addresses will be carded and the same territorial division will be made of the card index as is made of the filing system. (See b. (2)).

(2) Cards relating to individual suspects will record:

(a) Full name, address, and occupation, with any aliases.

(b) Any details of the case and of action taken which will assist in identification.

(c) Reference to file containing documents of the case, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(d) Cross-reference to names of any associates (unless this is already cross-referred in the relevant files).

(3) Cards relating to informants will record:

(a) Full name, address, and occupation.

(b) Reference to files containing any related documents, with numbers of relevant inclosures.

(c) How first contacted.*
(d) Estimated reliability.*
(e) Cross-reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.*

(4) Cards dealing with parties, organizations, suspect establishments (cafes, etc.) will record:-

(a) Name and addresses.
(b) Brief case history.
(c) Reference to any files dealing with it, with numbers of relevant inclosures.
(d) Cross-reference to individuals connected with it.
(e) Action taken.

* Unless these particulars are already noted in the files.

1948

APPENDIX V

Third Army Instructions for CIC

1949

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

I. MISSION:

1. The primary mission of The Counter Intelligence Corps is the security of the combat troops.

2. CIC will not be concerned with local politics, excepting situations which might affect tactical plans or the security of combat troops.

II. ORGANIZATION:

1. To provide continuous and complete CIC coverage during operations, at the direction of AC of S, G-2, TUSA, four (4) EM from each division Detachment will be withdrawn and transferred to Corps Reserve Pool with full-field equipment and two (2) ¼ ton trucks with one (1) trailer. One (1) officer and seven (7) EM from Corps CIC Detachment will be similarly transferred with same equipment and four (4) ¼ ton trucks to Corps Reserve Pool. Service Records and allied papers of all EM transferred to Corps Reserve Pools will be forwarded to Chief CIC Officer, Headquarters, TUSA, for administration.

2. Personnel from the Corps Reserve Pool will be used specifically:

a. To reinforce Division Teams for city and town coverage.

b. To provide static CIC personnel who will remain in the town or city until relieved by Zone of Communications CIC Detachments, at which time they will report to Chief CIC Officer, Headquarters, TUSA, for dispatch back to the Corps Reserve Pool. Chief CIC Officer, TUSA, is responsible for arranging transfer of control to Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, CIC Detachments.

3. The Corps CIC Officer under the direction of the Corps AC of S, G-2 will be in charge of the Corps Reserve Pool. It will be his responsibility to assign these Corps Reserve CIC personnel to Divisions as the operation develops. Chief CIC Officer, Headquarters, TUSA, will be kept currently advised regarding the disposition of Corps Pool reserves, and current requirements of the Corps. Corps Reserve Pool will be reinforced when necessary, either from the Reserve Pool of another Corps, or from Army Reserve Teams. It is recommended that the Corps Reserve Pool be located in or near the Corps rear echelon.

4. The Reserve Pool personnel will be employed by the Division Detachment Commander to the fullest extent possible in all aspects of security work which will be of significance in the long-term security of the town, and will revert to the command of the CIC Detachment Commander of each succeeding echelon as the operation progresses.

5. The CIC Commanders of Division, Corps and Army, acting under the appropriate AC of S, G-2 are responsible for the allotment of zones of responsibility to various CIC elements located within their areas. (They are further responsible that, prior to the assignment of CIC to a given area, this personnel is briefed and trained, as far as possible, in the economics, politics, and personalitites of that area). Emphasis will be placed on specific missions for each Agent. If Corps' allotments of zones of responsibility, as reported to Army, are inconsistent with projected plans, Army will direct such modification by Corps as is consistent with proposed needs.

III. DUTIES

1. The primary duty of CIC to secure CI targets in the area of the objective, i.e., to seize such information, personalities, material, documents, headquarters and offices and enemy-controlled and para-military organizations as countering the activities of enemy intelligence services and subversive bodies, and of applying full security measures to the civil population.

2. Special CIC Targets:

a. Known and suspect enemy agents.
b. Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers.
c. Centers of communications (telephone, telegraph, radio).
d. Offices formerly occupied by enemy intelligence services, or enemy police organizations, and any documents contained therein.
e. Offices of para-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.
f. Enemy military headquarters and command posts:

(1) CIC personnel will examine premises, documents and material of captured enemy headquarters and command posts for documents and information of Counter Intelligence value.

(2) CIC personnel will make the inspection directed above after the captured headquarters or command post has been cleared of mines and/or booby traps by the Engineers or trained reconnaissance personnel. They will request assistance from nearest troops as required.

3. Other duties:

a. Cooperate with Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs, and the local police in marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from the enemy lines, and arranging for their preliminary interrogation and segregation of suspect individuals, and for the imposition of appropriate control and security measures.

b. Contact local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause, in order to obtain all possible Counter Intelligence information.

c. Advise upon the protection against sabotage of public utilities, bridges, depots, rail centers, locks, etc., the continued operation of which are essential to the Allied Forces. They will suppress looting.

d. Seize and impound all civilian mail and insure that it is available to field censor teams for examination. CIC itself will not censor such mail. All mail of enemy origin will be forwarded immediately through Intelligence channels to AC of S, G-2, Third U.S. Army, Attention: Documents Section, for further disposition.

e. Insure, in conjunction with Signal Corps personnel, that telephone, telegraph, and radio communications with territory still occupied by the enemy are severed.

f. Assist CA and MP personnel in restoring law and order, reforming local police and administrative bodies, and recommend to CA the imposition of essential security measures.

g. Check the observance of security measures by the civil population.

h. Assist in discovering and collecting any hidden armaments, radios or equipment not surrendered in accordance with proclamations.

i. Assure the safety, and make complete use for CI purposes of all records held by local police authorities, post offices, (including boxes of individuals and organizations), administrative bodies, banks, hotels, and the like.

j. Question, for CI purposes, individuals found imprisoned in former enemy controlled prisons and camps.

k. Investigate all cases of espionage, sabotage, violations of security regulations and subversion affecting the Armed Forces.

l. The investigation of civilian labor employed by the Allied forces when so directed.

m. Advising CA on the retention of local officials working under supervision of Civil Affairs, and investigating all matters of security interest pertaining to them.

4. CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a CI interest. They will not be employed on Combat Intelligence Missions, routine P/W interrogations, black market investigations or other work

which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of CI duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard or other duties of comparable nature.

IV. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:

1. Counter-Intelligence Staff, Headquarters, TUSA, will forward through intelligence channels information regarding:

a. Personality Targets.

(1) Lists of personalities and organizations in areas of interest will be forwarded to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Corps and Divisions at the earliest practicable date.

b. All other counter-intelligence information will be forwarded immediately through intelligence channels.

2. CIC personnel, obtaining counter-intelligence information of value to higher headquarters will report same immediately to the appropriate AC of S, G-2.

V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE:

1. CIC personnel encountering information of tactical value in the pursuit of their CI mission will forward it immediately to the AC of S, G-2 of the nearest unit.

2. All records or devices of combat intelligence value will be evacuated to the nearest G-2 or S-2 immediately.

VI. HANDLING OF KNOWN AND SUSPECT ENEMY AGENTS:

1. Apprehension:

a. When a known or suspect enemy agent is apprehended, he will be thoroughly searched immediately, and all articles, of whatever nature, will be removed from him. Effects not on his person will be collected, but kept separate. Tangible evidence in all cases will be handled by as few persons as possible. The first holder will tag all tangible evidence. Receipts for such evidence will be taken each time possession passes from one person to another. A complete record of the chain of custody will be kept with the evidence at all times.

2. Interrogation:

a. Immediate interrogation of the arrested person by the CIC will be limited to questions directed to the following objectives:

(1) To ascertain the identity or description of associates in the locality.

(2) To ascertain their objectives, instructions, methods of operation and communication.

(3) To obtain a brief statement from the Agent which will assist subsequent interrogation.

(4) To clarify points which can only be verified at points of capture, e.g. identifying premises or persons, locating hidden wireless equipment, etc.

3. Evacuation:

a. Agents arrested will be reported immediately to the AC of S, G-2, Third-U.S. Army through channels, by the quickest available means. CIC will escort the prisoner to such place as may be directed, or turn the prisoner over to such authorities as may be directed by the AC of S, G-2, Third U. S. Army. Whenever the prisoner is moved, all of his effects will be moved with him, together with an arrest form containing information about the circumstances of the arrest, a copy of the report of initial interrogation, and any statement made by the prisoner.

b. Information regarding the apprehension of known or suspect enemy agents will be classified "SECRET" and made known to as few individuals as possible. Apprehended agents will be kept separate from all other personnel. No information concerning their apprehension will be given to the press.

VII. HANDLING OF CIVILIAN SUSPECTS:

1. Such civilians will come under CIC investigation as a result of:

a. Having been apprehended passing through our lines.
b. Having been selected out of groups of refugees.
c. Having been denounced.
d. Having violated security ordinances.

2. Arrest, interrogation and search of such suspects, is a CIC responsibility. Once an individual's identity as an agent has been established, he will be handled as a known agent. If the individual cannot be determined to be an agent, but further investigation is believed desirable, the person will be sent to the civilian section of the Army Prisoner-of-War cage.

3. The CIC of each Division will take appropriate steps to see that the front line troops apprehend and deliver to Military Police

1954

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Members of resistance groups can be of great assistance to CIC Detachments. However, many people are expected to claim participation in such groups who were not, in fact, members. Persons who can give the name of their group leader may be verified by requesting such identification through the AC of S, G-2, Third U.S. Army.

IX REPORTS, FILES AND RECORDS:

1. CIC Detachments will submit the following reports:

a. Spot reports of emergency cases will be forwarded through intelligence channels by the most expeditious means available to the AC of S, G-2, Third United States Army.

b. CIC Tactical Work Sheets, completed and forwarded within 24 hours (see Appendix) one copy to team making report, one copy to Corps, one copy direct to AC of S, G-2, TUSA.

c. Monthly CIC Situation Report to Chief, CIC ETOUSA, through channels as required by para 22f, TM 30-215.

d. Daily Morning Report to MRU as required by ltr, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 18 May 1944, AG 370.5 (Cent. MRU), Subject: Servicing of CIC Detachments.

e. Monthly Report of Badges and Credentials are required by paragraph 38a TM 30-215.

2. Files:

a. All CIC elements of this Command will establish and maintain a CI file based on a standard method as shown below. Every effort will be made to keep filed material to a minimum consistent with efficient operations.

b. Separate files will be kept by card indices if possible for:

(1) Individual suspects.
(2) Suspect organizations and parties.
(3) Security and controls.
(4) Passes and permits.
(5) Names of informants and coded list of confidential informants.
(6) Records of denunciations.
(7) Copies of completed SHAEF detention forms, and CA Arrest Forms.

c. Indigenous Records:

(1) All records of purely civil administrative or cultural interest will be placed in the custody of Civil Affairs.

(2) CIC personnel will see that civil records of Counter Intelligence interests are protected. These will not normally be removed from a town but will be left in the custody of Civil Affairs, if the CIC personnel remains in the town.

(3) Records of purely Counter Intelligence interest, such as those of German espionage and counter-espionage organizations and secret police, will be exploited locally, without delay, and forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, Third U.S. Army

1956

[redacted]

APPENDIX VI

First Army SOP for CIC

1957

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

1. OPERATION OF DETACHMENTS.

a. The purpose of Pool Detachments is to provide static security personnel in liberated areas. Inasmuch as these Pool Detachments are to be employed statically and allowed to remain in the cities to which they are detailed as long as such cities remain under Army Group control, this reserve must not be entirely committed in the initial areas captured. They can only be detailed to larger cities or important towns on the lines of communication. Short-term requirements for CIC personnel in emergencies will be met by requesting assistance from Corps and Army Detachments.

b. To avoid problems of "take-over," some members of the Pool Detachment which is detailed for long-term occupancy of a town will enter the town while it is still under the jurisdiction of Division CIC Detachments. Such advanced Pool Personnel will be under the command of the Commanding Officer, Division CIC Detachments, as long as the town remains under Division control. The Pool personnel will be employed by the Division Detachment Commander to the fullest extent possible in all aspects of security work which will be of significance in the long-term security of the town. Members of the Division Detachment will be most concerned with the search of enemy headquarters and installations for documents of Counter Intelligence or Combat Intelligence value, for arranging the guard on critical points, the arrest of known enemy agents, the seizure of civil mail and stopping of local civil communication. Members of the Pool Detachment operating with the Division Detachment will be most concerned with contacts with the local police, liaison with the Civil Affairs Field Detachment, investigation of native local administrators, the study of such captured documents as relate to the local population, and the establishment of an informer system.

c. Corps will request Pool personnel from AC of S, G-2, First US Army, to meet envisaged needs in large and important towns. Depending upon the rate of advance representives from the Pool Detachment to be permanently allocated to a city will enter that city at such time as may be determined by the Commanding Officer of the Division Detachment. It will be the responsibility of CIC personnel in a town to request "take-over" personnel sufficiently in advance to permit continuous cover. During rapid advances it will be desirable to have some Pool personnel make the initial entry with the Division Detachment. Under more static conditions Pool Detachment representatives will be made available to Divisions early enough for the Pool Detachment members to become thoroughly familiar with the situation before the withdrawal of the Division Detachment. Upon this withdrawal, the remainder of the Pool Detachment allocated to the town will be sent in.

d. In smaller, or less important towns where permanent CIC coverage is not contemplated, personnel from Corps or Army CIC Detachments will take over from the CIC personnel already in such towns in a like manner to that described for the taking over by Pool personnel.

e. When Civil Affairs Officers enter a town before, or simultaneously with, CIC personnel, CIC will contact the civil authorities with the Civil Affairs Officer, if practicable. Any difficulties encountered in securing the cooperation of civilian authorities will be adjusted with the assistance of the Civil Affairs Officer.

2. HANDLING OF KNOWN AND SUSPECT ENEMY AGENTS.

a. Persons of this category will come to the attention of the CIC in one of the following ways:

(1) Listed on Counter Intelligence information sheets provided by the Office of the AC of S, G-2, First US Army. All names on these sheets, derived from Pink file cards, and indicated on the sheets by the coded letter (P), are of this category.

(2) Persons identified as agents by captured agents during interrogation by CIC or OSS/SCI.

(3) Persons detected in acts of sabotage or espionage.

(4) Persons giving themselves up voluntarily as spies.

(5) Persons found in possession of materials indicating the possesser to be an agent or saboteur.

b. As far as possible, known and suspect enemy agents will be taken into custody by CIC at such times and under such conditions that the fact of their capture will be concealed from the public and the local police. No information regarding the capture of an agent will be released to the press. CIC will be responsible for the secret custody of such agents and for their escort to the rear.

c. When a known or suspect enemy agent is arrested, he will immediately be thoroughly searched and all articles, of whatever nature, will be removed from him. Insofar as possible all of his effects, not on his person, will be collected, but kept separate from these taken off his person.

d. Immediate interrogation of the arrested person by the CIC will be limited to questions directed to the following objectives:

(1) To ascertain the identity or description of associates in the locality.

(2) To ascertain their objectives, instructions, methods of operation and communication.

(3) To obtain a brief statement from the agent which will assist subsequent interrogation.

(4) To clarify points which can only be verified at points of capture, e.g. identifying premises or persons locating hidden wireless equipment, etc.

e. Agents arrested will be reported immediately to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army by the quickest available means. CIC personnel will escort the prisoner to such place as may be directed, or turn the prisoner over to such authorities as may be directed by the AC of S, G-2, First US Army. Whenever the prisoner is moved, all of his effects will be moved with him, together with an arrest form containing information about the circumstances of the arrest, a copy of the report of initial interrogation and any statement made by the prisoner.

3. EXAMINATION OF CIVILIANS SUSPECTED OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY.

a. Such civilians will come under CIC investigation as a result of:

(1) Having been apprehended passing through our lines.
(2) Having been selected out of groups of refugees.
(3) Having been denounced.
(4) Having violated security ordnances.

b. Arrest, interrogation and search of such suspects, is a CIC responsibility. Once an individual's identity as an agent has been established, he will be handled as a known agent. If the individual cannot be determined to be an agent, but further investigation is believed desirable, the person will be sent to the civilian section of the Army Prisoner-of-War cage.

c. The CIC of each Division will take appropriate steps to see that the front line troops apprehend and deliver to Military Police custody any individuals crossing our lines. A short, signed statement of related facts will be sent with the prisoner by the combat troops apprehending him. CIC will coordinate with Civil Affairs and Provost Marshal in the routing of such individuals to refugee camps and the detention, for further investigation, of such of them as may appear suspicious.

d. CIC Detachments will coordinate with the Provost Marshal and local police so that civilians found moving during hours of curfew, without proper travel permits or in forbidden areas, will be reported to the CIC for investigation. Strangers in the area should be brought to the attention of CIC by local police.

4. CIVILIAN INFORMANTS.

a. There are two categories of civilian informants: Overt

denouncers and Covert Informers.

(1) CIC personnel in each town will maintain a publicly known office to which civilians desiring to give information may be directed. The minimum record of denunciations will consist of name and address of denouncer and denounced, a short synopsis of the information given, and the interrogator's evaluation of the source of the information. These denunciations will be dealt with methodically, culling out rumors and hearsay information and pursuing specific leads.

(2) A system of informants will be developed within the population. These informants should be remunerated by rewards for valuable information rather than by regular pay. A CONFIDENTIAL roster will be maintained showing the names and addresses of these informants and the operative number assigned to each. This number will consist of the numerical designation of the CIC Detachment followed by any number or letter series which may be selected and sub-allocated to the various towns under the jurisdiction of the Commanding Officer of the CIC detachment concerned. All records of information provided by such confidential informants will indicate the source by operative number only. This will include reports rendered to higher Headquarters.

b. Members of resistance groups can be of great assistance to CIC Detachments. However, many people are expected to claim participation in such groups who were not, in fact, members of organized resistance groups. Some of these can be eliminated from those presenting themselves as members of the resistance by asking if they actually belonged to a group and, secondly, who the leader was. Persons who can give the name of their group leader can be verified by direct contact with Officers of G5/SO or by requesting such identification through AC of S, G-2, First US Army.

5. REPORTS AND RECORDS.

a. A weekly Counter Intelligence Report will be rendered by each Army, Corps, and Division Detachment under First US Army serving outside the United Kingdom. This CONFIDENTIAL periodic report will be rendered as of 2400 hours each Sunday and the original copy will be sent direct to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army. In cases where Pool or Port Detachments or "takeover" personnel from higher echelons are operating in the territory under the security jurisdiction of the Commanding Officer, Tactical CIC Detachment, the Commanding Officer of the Tactical Detachment is responsible for reporting all CIC activities within his area. He may request reports from Pool and Port Detachments sufficiently in advance to formulate his own report.

b. The Counter Intelligence Report will be rendered in the following form:

1. Summary of Situation.

a. General military security situation within the area of jursidiction.

b. General civil security situation.

c. Recommendations.

2. Military Security.

a. Special measures taken to prevent leakage of information, sabotage, unauthorized access to military installations, etc.

b. Breaches of security of information; investigations made and action taken.

c. Cases of unauthorized entry into military installations, attempted sabotage, etc.

d. Security of personnel (propaganda attempts by the enemy and any reactions).

3. Civil Security.

a. No cases of individual suspects with full details where no special report has been submitted. These details will include the name and residence of the suspect and a brief synopsis of the investigation. All investigations will be reported in full, upon completion, to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army. When a suspect is sent to the First Army civilian cage, a copy of the investigation of the individual will accompany the copy of arrest form sent to Headquarters, First US Army.

b. Progress of cases under investigation and disposition of cases already reported.

c. Information concerning subversive organizations. This information will be arranged by towns or areas.

d. Security controls placed on civil population reported by towns or areas to include:

(1) Movement, communication, demonstrations, etc.
(2) Any restrictions imposed upon subversive organizations, collaborationists, elements, etc.

e. Relations between:

(1) Troops and civil population.
(2) CIC and local authorities.

f. Rumors -- particularly defeatist and those which indicate breaches of security.

4. Counter Intelligence Information.

a. Personalities.

(1) In areas under control of other Allied units.
(2) In areas still under enemy control.

b. Information concerning Counter Intelligence target data in areas still under enemy control.

5. Dispositions of CIC Personnel, Indicating Number Located in Each Town.

c. Files

(1) Separate files will be kept for:

(a) Individual suspects.
(b) Suspect organizations and parties.
(c) Security controls.
(d) Passes and permits.
(e) Names of informants and coded list of confidential informants.
(f) Records of denunciations.
(g) Copies of completed arrest forms.
(h) CIC agents' periodic reports (if any).
(i) Weekly Counter Intelligence Reports.
(j) Security policy.
(k) Administration.

(2) In files containing correspondence on a number of individual cases or organizations, each individual case or organization will be allotted a separate number: e.g. John Jones, 1; Mary Smith, 2. All further correspondence on John Jones will then be marked with the same initial number followed by the letter: e.g. 1a, 1b, etc.

(3) Where papers relating to an individual or organization are scattered throughout several files, the information will be cross-referred by notes made either, in the files or on the relative cards. When documents relating to a particular case becomes numerous, they should be removed from the general file and a new individual file should be opened.

d. Card Index.

(1) Particulars of all suspects, informants, suspect organizations and addresses, will be carded on 5"x0" cards.

1963

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Cards relating to individual suspects will record:

(a) Full name, address and occupation, with any aliases.

(b) Any details of case and of action taken which will assist in identification.

(c) Reference to files on the case.

(d) Cross-reference to names of any associates (unless this is already cross-referred in the relevant files).

(3) Cards relating to informants will record:

(a) Full name, address and occupation.

(b) Reference to files containing any documents relating to him.

(c) Unless already noted in files:

(i) How first contacted.
(ii) Estimated reliability.
(iii) Cross-reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.

(4) Cards dealing with parties, organization, suspect establishment (cafes, etc.) will record:

(a) Name and address (addresses).
(b) Brief case history.
(c) Reference to any files dealing with it.
(d) Cross-reference to individuals connected with it, if not in files.
(e) Action taken.

e. Arrest Reports.

Forms for the report of arrest of civilians will be provided. One copy of this form will accompany the prisoner; one copy will be forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army; and one copy will be held for local file.

f. Because of the transitory nature of the occupation of any town by any particular CIC personnel, the following records must be turned over to the CIC personnel relieving the withdrawing Detachment, or, if continued CIC coverage of the town is not planned, the records will be turned over to the CIC in the closest large town where there will be continuous coverage:

(1) All files listed in 5.c. (1) (a) through 5.c. (1) (g), pertaining to the town.

(2) All index cards relating to Counter Intelligence matters in the particular town.

g. Captured Records and Archives.

(1) All records or devices of Combat Intelligence value will be evacuated through G-2 channels, immediately. In this regard, particular attention will be paid to extract any files of German Intelligence offices, as material of Counter Intelligence value is usually present therein.

(2) All records of purely civil administrative or cultural interest will be placed in the custody of Civil Affairs.

(3) CIC personnel will see that civil records of Counter Intelligence interest are protected. These will not normally be removed from a town but will be left in the custody of Civil Affairs, if no CIC personnel remains in the town.

(4) Records of purely Counter Intelligence interest, such as those of German espionage and counter-espionage organizations and secret police, will be exploited locally, without delay, and forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army.

Reproduced Hq VIII Corps, CIC Det No 25 (Prov) 5 July 44.

APPENDIX VII

FUSAG CI SOP, Evacuation Channels for Refugees and Suspects

1966

FUSAG CI SOP

EXHIBIT "A": CHANNELS FOR EVACUATION OF REFUGEES AND SUSPECTS



_____ Refugees and displaced persons of no CI interest.

_ _ _ _ Suspects, enemy nationals, internees, security offenders, etc.

- - - - - - - - Enemy agents.

1967

EXHIBIT "B" FUNCTIONAL CHART

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
1. TRAFFIC CONTROL POST In rear of forward divisional boundaries at bridges, crossroads, etc.	Military police. 1-3 civil police if available.	1. Control military traffic. 2. Keep military routes free of refugees directing these to CA collecting point. 3. Send suspect persons to security control post.	Security control post may be attached to TCP where appropriate.
2. SECURITY CONTROL POST With TCP, with CA collecting point, or between these two.	1-2 CIC agents, 1-3 civil police	1. Conduct snap checks (as near to 100% coverage as appropriate to number of refugees and tactical situation). 2. Segregate refugees from enemy lines from those rendered homeless by operations. The former will be sent back to div. PW collect. Pt. (civilian annex) the latter to CA collecting Pt. 3. In the case of suspects, arrest report form will be completed and forwarded by escort to div. PW collecting Pt. (civilian annex)	Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location of security control post and extent of snap check.
3. CA COLLECTING POINT In rear of forward divisional boundaries behind TCP's, along refugee evacuation routes.	Civil police and/or civilians under CA supervision	1. Refugees will be organized into parties, instructed where to go and told what rodds to use. 2. Refugees will not be held at these points, but sent to nearest transit area (or advanced transit area).	Terrain, tactical situation, and number of refugees will determine location and number of collecting points.

1958

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
4. PW COLLECTING POINT (Civilian Annex) Division and corps (PW enclosure).	CIC agent available at each at all times.	1. If mobile interrogation post is not available CIC agent will interrogate civilian suspects or enemy nationals (IPW team may help if not busy with military prisoners). 2. Known or obvious enemy agents will be sent back under CI escort (who takes with him all articles removed from agent) to army CI staff, which must be notified immediately. 3. Suspects will be interrogated for further details to determine their status and, if not released, sent back to PW enclosure of the next higher echelon. At army level, refugees who are still suspect will be sent to the army civilian interrogation center.	1. Prolonged interrogation of enemy agents will not be made below Hq FUSAG level. 2. Refugees cleared of suspicion will be turned over to CA.
5. MOBILE INTERROGATION POST (optional) At civilian annex to PW enclosure	Mobile interrogators from Army or FUSAG, CIC.	1. Provide specialist interrogation to determine true status of suspects.	These establishments are optional, but the desirability of properly classifying suspects and obtaining CI information at the earliest moment is self-evident.

1966

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
6. ADVANCED TRANSIT AREA (optional) Approximately div. level, not more than 20 miles from collecting points, off the main military routes.	Civil organization, refugees, and CA basic det. (relief officer and 1 medical officer) from transit area	1. Provide food, shelter, and urgent medical attention. 2. Expedite organized evacuation of refugees to transit area.	Optional: established if distance between collecting point and transit area exceeds 20 miles; also in heavily populated area with damaged bldgs, when front is reasonably stable.
7. TRANSIT AREA At corps level, off the main military routes, not more than 20 miles from collecting points or advanced transit areas. Co-ordinated by CA with G-1, G-2, (CI), G-3, G-4 (Traffic) Engineers, and PM at corps.	Civil organizations, refugees, and CA basic det. (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer).	1. Provide food, shelter, and emergency medical care. 2. Expedite return of refugees to their homes or those of other civilians if they are local residents, or organize evacuation to assembly center.	If distance between transit area assembly center exceeds 20 miles, additional transit areas will be established at 20 mile intervals.
8. ASSEMBLY CENTER In rear areas, (approx army level) off main military routes.	Civil organizations, refugees themselves, and 2-3 CA basic detachments (1 relief officer and 1 medical officer).	1. Provide food, shelter, and medical care. 2. Dispose of refugees as appropriate.	

LOCATION	STAFF	FUNCTION	REMARKS
9. CIVILIAN INTERROGATION CENTER Adjacent to, or as annex to, army PW enclosure.	1. Specialist interrogators from army & FUSAG CIC res. dets. 2. Allied intelligence services (optional) 3. Civil police (obtained through CA).	1. Only security suspects will be held here, and only while case is under investigation. a. Passed to Hq FUSAG (enemy agents only). b. Handed to civil authorities for prosecution in civil. c. Handed to CA for prosecution. d. Handed to civil authorities for internment. e. Released.	1. Not a place of permanent detention; army CIB must issue written authority for detention exceeding 3 days. 2. Except in case of release confirmation of chief, CIB, army, must be obtained before order is carried out. 3. Enemy nationals (not normally passed thru civilian interrogation center) will be sent to internment camp.
10. INTERNMENT CAMP Rear areas, normally behind army in Communications zone.	Staffed by civil authorities, supervised by CA.	Provide facilities for indefinite detention of enemy nationals and internees, to include food, shelter, and medical care.	Permanent establishment.

1671

APPENDIX VIII

Annex 4f to First Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE

1972

ANNEX 4f
TO
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE PLAN
NEPTUNE

OPERATION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

1. POLICY. Reference is made to Sub-Annex 4c and First US Army Standing Operation Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps for the statement of general policy matters affecting employment of CIC personnel.

2. TYPES AND JURISDICTION OF CIC DETACHMENTS.

a. Tactical CIC Detachments, permanently attached to Army, Corps and Division Headquarters, will consist of 2 Officers and 14 enlisted men. Detachment Commanders of these Detachments are responsible to the AC of S, G-2 of the Headquarters to which they are attached.

b. Pool CIC Detachments, of the same size, from Army Group Pool, will be sub-allocated to Army, Corps and Divisions and will be responsible to the AC of S, G-2 of the unit which they temporarily accompany. Three Pool Detachments will be available for such allocation.

c. Port and Interior CIC Detachments will be attached to Headquarters, Advance Section Communications Zone and will be responsible to the AC of S, G-2, Advance Section Communications Zone. They will operate within areas placed under the control of Headquarters, Advance Section Communications Zone, or areas to be placed under such control. In the latter instances, the CIC Detachment will be responsible to the AC of S, G-2 of the unit controlling the area.

d. The CIC Detachment attached to each Headquarters will be responsible for providing CIC coverage in the zone designated as being under immediate control of that Headquarters. Corps will be responsible for the area between Division and Corps rear-boundaries. Each echelon may request assistance from the next higher echelon. If Corps cannot meet such requests from Divisions, the request will be forwarded to Army.

e. The Commanding Officer of Army and of Corps CIC Detachments will be responsible for the coordination of plans and activities of CIC Detachments of the next lower echelons to their own Headquarters.

3. CIC MISSIONS.

a. The primary duty of CIC personnel in combat areas is to prepare and execute Counter Intelligence plans in the area. CIC objectives and duties will be, in order of priority:

1973

(1) Arresting known and suspected enemy agents.

(2) Arresting known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and others whose presence menaces the security of the Allied Forces.

(3) Searching buildings, billets and installations known or suspected to contain documents of Counter Intelligence value. Documents of Combat Intelligence value found during the search of such installations will be transmitted immediately to the AC of S, G-2 or to the S-2 of the unit in control of the area.

(4) Searching enemy communication centers for codes, cipher devices, directories and records.

(5) Advising on the timely establishment of guards at all critical points such as captured engineer, ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local civil population.

(6) The seizure and/or stoppage of civil electrical communications until taken over by the appropriate authorities.

(7) Seizing and impounding civilian mail, copies of telegrams and associated records and funds until they are taken over by Civil Affairs or censorship personnel. Such material will be guarded locally and not evacuated.

(8) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments, radios, or equipment which have not been surrended or reported in accordance with proclamations.

(9) Seizing enemy films in motion picture houses, enemy films in private photographic establishments and evacuating such films through G-2 channels.

(10) Advising and assisting in the protection against sabotage of all public and private installations whose continued operation is essential to the Allied Forces.

(11) Investigating cases of suspected espionage and sabotage.

(12) Directing and coordinating the activities of representatives of such indigenous Counter Intelligence agencies as may accompany the First US Army or be contacted locally.

(13) Checking upon the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs staffs and detachments.

(14) Contacting local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information. Military Intelligence

1974

Interpreter Teams will be used under CIC direction to obtain Combat Intelligence as well as Counter Intelligence information.

(15) Cooperating with Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs with respect to security requirements involved in marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory and directing them to interrogation posts.

(16) The institution of the necessary checks on security controls imposed on the civil population through Civil Affairs and Provost Marshal.

(17) Assisting Civil Affairs detachments in the establishment of a reliable civil administration. Recommendations for the removal of unreliable officials will be made by CIC to Civil Affairs. Civil officials will be arrested by CIC without consulting Civil Affairs only when the continued liberty of such officials represents a threat to security.

(18) The investigation of civilians employed by the Army in capacities which might endanger highly classified information or equipment.

(19) Investigating all cases involving subversive influences emanating from the civilian population and likely to affect adversely the Allied Forces.

(20) Coordinating with Air Raid Warning Service to secure information of possible parachute agents.

b. Port Detachments and Tactical and Mobile Detachments engaged in port security will:

(1) Plan and supervise the control of entry to and exit from the dock area from the landward side and from ship to shore.

(2) Recommend measures for the protection of installations and ships from sabotage.

(3) Make recommendations to the appropriate authority for the establishment of a pass and permit system and the security control of civilian labor and persons with business in the port to whom passes for entry into the dock area are issued.

(4) Advise on security measures relating to crews, including shore leave. Initially, shore leave should not be permitted.

(5) Search any small craft for security purposes, coordinated with the Naval Port Security officer.

(6) Control, from a security aspect, all civilian travel through the port.

(7) Prevent attempts to evade censorship by military personnel proceeding by sea on duty or leave, and forward to the Deputy Chief Censor all illicitly carried correspondence, together with a circumstantial report.

(8) Investigate and report on suspected cases of espionage, sabotage or leakage of information.

(9) Take immediate action, including arrest, if expedient, in regard to suspects.

(10) Advise the Port Commander on security measures to be imposed on the civilian population in the area.

(11) Establish and coordinate with Naval authorities measures to prevent illegal entry or exit by sea and illicit communications between sea and shore. Measures ashore relating to the security of the coastline will be coordinated with any security measures taken by the Naval authorities.

(12) Organize, where possible, among the civilian population, a system of "Coast Watchers" upon the stretch of coast for which responsible.

(13) Coordinate Counter Intelligence activities with the Naval Port Security Officer (Commerce and Travel Officer) who is charged with security of all Naval installations and stores ashore, the Counter Intelligence precautions and internal security of all Allied Naval and Merchant ships and craft in the port. The Naval Officer-in-Charge, with advice of the Commerce and Travel Officer, is charged with the issue of instructions governing harbor craft, fishing vessels, etc., manned by local civilian crews.

c. During the mounting of the operation CIC Detachments will be made available to check security in and around the concentration and marshalling areas as follows:

(1) SOS CIC Detachments will have the basic responsibility.

(2) Two Army Pool CIC Detachments will work under SOS control until D plus 15.

(3) Such portions of Tactical CIC Detachments as are to be lifted with later echelons of the Headquarters to which they are attached will pay particular attention to the search of concentration areas vacated by embarking troops in order to ascertain that no papers are left behind.

(4) CIC personnel will be freed from the normal restrictions in the marshalling area as long as possible and will check the observance of security regulations by tactical units in the marshalling area. Breaches by the combat troops will be handled directly with the Commanding Officers of the troops concerned and all other problems referred to the SOS Marshalling Area Security Officer.

4. ALLOCATION OF CIC PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BEACH-HEAD.

a. CIC personnel will be allocated on the following basis:

(1) Full Corps and Division Detachments for which the allocation of lift will be made by the Headquarters concerned.

(2) First US Army CIC Pool personnel will be attached to Engineer Special Brigades as follows:

(a) 1 Officer and 8 enlisted men with 4 trucks, ¼ ton and 2 trailers, 1/4 ton, will be attached to Headquarters Engineer Special Brigade Group by Y-15 to remain on duty with that Headquarters until recalled after D/15.

(b) 3 enlisted men with 2 trucks, ¼ ton and 1 trailer, ¼ ton, will be attached to Headquarters, First Engineer Special Brigade by Y-15 to remain on duty with that Headquarters until recalled after D +15.

(3) A Port Detachment, attached to the Headquarters, Advance Section Communications Zone, and consisting of 2 Officers and 16 enlisted men with 5 ¼ ton trucks, will land on UTAH on D plus 5 and will operate initially under the direction of the Commanding Officer, VII Corps CIC Detachment.

(4) CIC Pool personnel constituting a "Refugee Interrogation Post," and consisting of 1 Officer and 3 enlisted men with 2, ¼ ton trucks, will be attached to Headquarters, VII Corps, and will land at UTAH on D plus 3, and operate initially under the direction of the Commanding Officer, VII Corps CIC Detachment.

(5) One-half of one Port Detachment of the Headquarters, Advance Section Communications Zone will consist of 1 Officer and 8 enlisted men with 3 one-quarter ton trucks, and will land at OMAHA on D plus 6 and operate initially under the direction of the Commanding Officer, V Corps CIC Detachment.

1977

(6) One-half of one Army CIC Detachment will land at OMAHA on D Day, the other half will land on D plus 3. Another First US Army Detachment will land on D plus 15.

(7) 2 Pool Detachments for allocation to Corps will land on D plus 30.

(8) Lift for the Detachments enumerated in (3), (4), (5) and (6), above, has been allocated in Annex 2a of the First US Army Operations Plan NEPTUNE.

b. (1) Corps and Division CIC Detachments will prepare detailed plans for the fulfillment of those missions outlined in paragraph 3, above, as directed in paragraph 12 of Annex 4e of the First US Army Operations Plan NEPTUNE.

(2) Port Detachments of the Headquarters, Advance Section Communications Zone will be employed under the jurisdiction of the appropriate Corps AC of S, G-2 for Port Security work in port and harbor areas which will eventually come under control of the Headquarters, Advance Communications Zone. The Port Detachment landing at UTAH on D plus 5 will be employed from the outset for Counter Intelligence work in the port area of CHERBOURG to include all installations in the ARSENAL and warehouses, port offices and installations around the BASSINS a FLOT and DE RETENUE, AVANT PORT DE COMMERCE, the DARSE TRANS-ATLANTIQUE, and the PORT des FLAMANDS.

(3) Army CIC Detachment will be responsible for security of Army troops and of the various echelons of the Army Headquarters, interrogation of civilians sent back to the First US Army cage and Counter Intelligence measures requested by lower echelons. Before a Corps rear-boundary is established, the Army CIC Detachment will take over responsibility for security in the towns which are in closest proximity to the various echelons of the Headquarters, First US Army. This Headquarters will occupy, successively, GRANDCAMP, CARENTIN and ST LO. CIC responsibility in the first named town will be assumed on D Day. After a Corps rear-boundary is set, security in all towns between Corps and Army rear-boundaries will be a First US Army CIC responsibility.

(4) (a) Six United States Navy Intelligence Officers attached to Headquarters, VII Corps, and landing on D plus 3, will be assigned appropriate missions by the AC of S, G-2, VII Corps, and coordinate their work with the CIC.

(b) Documents of Naval interest will be examined by Naval personnel attached to units of the First US Army and transmitted to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army for delivery to the Navy.

1978

5. CIVILIAN MOVEMENT CONTROL.

a. Each CIC Detachment will cooperate with Civil Affairs and local police in putting the following system of Civilian Movement into effect at the earliest possible moment.

b. There will be regulation of civilian movement in the area under control of First US Army. Civilians will be forbidden to move more than twelve kilometers without securing a permit to travel from Civil Affairs.

c. Civil Affairs will make this movement restriction known by proclamation or order to the civilian population, such proclamation or order to be posted in towns under First US Army control. The proclamation will further state where applicants are to report to apply for travel permits. The restrictions will likewise be made known in all Civil Affairs refugee collecting points and camps and persons will be warned not to leave the camp without a proper permit.

d. In each town where there is a Civil Affairs Detachment, Civil Affairs will establish a permit-issuing office. While Civil Affairs will make the actual issue of permits with CIC approval, applicants will be dealt with by local officials, preferably police, under Civil Affairs control.

e. The policy on travel permit issue will be that such permits will be given only to those persons who have local residence and a reasonable excuse for travel, or persons trying to reach their permanent homes which lie elsewhere in the zone of control of the American Army. These latter will be given travel permits only when their claimed residence has been established, and the permits will be surrendered to the local police upon arrival. Civil Affairs channels of communications will be used to establish the validity of residence if there is a Civil Affairs Detachment in the town where residence is claimed. If there is no Civil Affairs Detachment, CIC channels will be employed.

f. Local police will be charged with the responsibility of determining, from examination of documents and interrogation of applicants, whether these applicants are actually local residents, or proceeding to their permanent residences, and if they should be allowed to move. Local CIC personnel will be given the names of all persons applying for travel permits, which will be issued only upon consent of CIC. Consent or refusal will be given by CIC within 24 hours of the receipt of the names of applicants. CIC will give consent after checking the names against their lists of persons wanted for arrest. If doubt exists, the permit should be withheld pending check against First US Army card files.

g. All cases of persons desiring to move from one locality to another, and not falling into the categories established above, will be turned over to CIC Detachments for investigation. If any such cases arise, which give indication of possible subversive activity, the person

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will be sent to the Army civilian cage or refugee interrogation center for thorough interrogation.

h. Civil Affairs, in coordination with the CIC, will arrange to have the local police establish control points outside the town, on its principal roads, such control points to be operated during the hours when the curfew is not effective. Police on these local control points will permit civilian entry or exit from the town only when the civilian is known to be a resident of the country-side about the town, or if he has a permit issued by Civil Affairs. Persons not in these categories, trying to leave town, will be turned back, and strangers to the area, arriving in the town without proper permit, will be taken into custody and investigated by the CIC. Those for whom more detailed interrogation is desired will be evacuated to the First US Army civilian cage. Others will be judged by Civil Affairs for breach of travel regulations.

i. If it becomes necessary for Civil Affairs to establish refugee camps in forward areas, from which refugees will be moved to the rear in groups, these refugees will be subject to interrogation at CIC Refugee Interrogation Posts at the points where most advanced refugee camps are established. Interrogation will be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit evacuation of the refugees.

j. In areas behind Division rear-boundary, CIC personnel will be withdrawn from the less important towns. Where this is done, the vetting and police control posts will be continued by Civil Affairs without submitting applicants' names to CIC, as required in paragraph 5f. Civilians who are strangers to the area and who arrive in such towns without proper travel permits, or civilians attempting to leave the town serreptitiously, without travel permits, will be taken into custody by Military Police, or local police, and evacuated by the Provost Marshal, with a statement of the circumstances, to the First US Army civilian cage, for interrogation. The name and disposition of the civilian will be reported to Army CIC by Civil Affairs.

6. REFUGEES, IMPRESSED WORKERS, EVADERS AND ESCAPERS.

a. CIC Detachments will arrange to have persons in these categories reported to them by Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal and local police.

b. Persons of these categories may be apprehended individually:

(1) While crossing into our lines from those of the enemy.

(2) Through the operation of the Movement Control System.

(3) Through the operation of the Coast Watchers and Port Control Systems.

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c. Groups of persons in these categories may be overrun by our advance forces.

d. Action to be taken in the case of individuals:

(1) Civilian refugees of enemy nationality, or from enemy-dominated countries, with the exception of FRANCE, will be sent to the First US Army civilian cage for further investigation.

(2) FRENCH civilian refugees will only be permitted to move when their identity and locality of residence has been established under functioning of the Civilian Movement Control System. Civilians claiming to be members of resistance organizations will be reported expeditiously to the AC of S, G-2, First US Army, for identification. Until such identification has been accomplished, these civilians will be given no special prerogatives. All others will be required to remain in their locality, or go to a refugee camp. Any of them trying to circumvent these restrictions will be sent to the First US Army civilian cage.

(3) (a) Captured enemy escapers and evaders are Prisoner-of-War, unless apprehended in civilian clothes, committing subversive acts.

(b) Allied escapers and evaders, after interrogation by appropriate G-2's, will be escorted to the rear by the Provost Marshal for disposition, after interrogation by IS9(MEA). After interrogation of escapers and evaders claiming to belong to units of the First US Army, the CIC will determine their identity before they are released to return to their units.

(4) TODT workers apprehended individually will be turned over to the Provost Marshal.

e. Action to be taken in the case of groups of civilian refugees or impressed workers:

(1) Provisions for the handling of such groups will be made by Civil Affairs and the Provost Marshal. CIC will check such handling to assure themselves that these individuals are not allowed to move about in rear areas without control. See paragraph 5c, above.

(2) CIC will form Refugee Interrogation Posts which will be sent to refugee camps to interrogate the refugees.

(a) To select such of them as may be of Counter Intelligence interest for detailed interrogation at the Army civilian cage.

(b) To clear such of them whose residence is behind our lines, so that permits to travel may be issued them.

(c) To select out TODT workers to be turned over to the Provost Marshal.

f. Evacuation of detained civilians taken into custody by CIC will be made along with Prisoners-of-War to the Army civilian cage where they will be segregated and where intensive interrogation facilities will be available.

7. ACTION WITH REGARD TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS.

a. The following parties, para-military organizations and youth movements are suspect:

(1) Parti Populaire Francais

(a) Jeunesse Populaire Francaise
(b) Service d'Ordre and Gardos Francaises
(c) Cercles Populaires Francais and Amis de l'Emancipation Nationale.
(d) Groupe Paysan

(2) Rassemblement National Populaire

(a) Le Front Social du Travail
(b) Centre Syndicaliste de Propagande
(c) Centre Social Franco-Europeen
(d) Le Centre Paysan
(e) Jeunesse Nationale Populaire
(f) Legion Nationale Populaire

(3) Milice Francaise
(4) Francisme
(5) Mouvement Social Revolutionnaire
(6) Ligue Francaise
(7) Groupe "Collaboration"
(8) Small Paris Formations

(a) National Collectivisme

(b) Le Parti National Socialiste Francais; La Croisade Francaise, Mouvement National Communautaire; Le Front Franc

(c) Les Energies Francaises

The Feu Movement

(d) Groups Patronized by de Chateaubriant

(e) La Ligue de la Pensee Francaise

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(9) Breton Separatists

b. No general suspicion attaches to the members of the Legion des Combattants or of pro-Vichy parties and organizations organized from the South Zone. Individuals from these organizations will be treated on the basis of their past record.

c. With respect to the parties and organizations itemized in paragraph 7a, the following action will be taken:

(1) All party and organization officials will be arrested.

(2) All members found wearing uniform or bearing arms will be arrested.

(3) All members known to have collaborated actively with German police or Security organizations will be arrested.

(4) Party and organization records will be seized.

(5) The rank and file of members of these organizations will be strictly controlled by limiting their movements and requiring them to report frequently to the local police. If deemed advisable and practicable, all members of the suspect organizations may be arrested.

(6) Lists of party members are likely to be found at Headquarters of the Service des Renseignements Generaux in the principal towns of regions, as well as in local party offices.

8. INDIGENOUS OFFICIALS AND POLICE.

a. Indigenous Officials.

(1) All officials who are also members of the collaborationist parties or organizations mentioned in paragraph 7a should normally be deposed and arrested.

(2) The Regional divisions are post-Armistice creations. For this reason, and also because they are the normal links between the French administration and the SIPO and SD, officials at Regional level are more suspect than department and local authorities.

(3) Ex-officials who have been imprisoned for political reasons, are not necessarily suitable candidates to fill administrative posts from which undesirable officials have been removed. Former collaborationists who have turned their coats in the expectation of an Allied victory, have recently been imprisoned in considerable number.

b. Police.

(1) In general, the lower ranks, sergeants and under, of the Gendarmerie, Police Municipale and Police Urbaine d'Etat can be relied on to maintain law and order and to enforce security restrictions.

(2) All ranks of the specially created Anti-Communist and Anti-Jewish Police are suspect.

(3) Higher ranks of the Service des Renseignements Generaux, (Police Speciale), the Police de Surete, (Police Judiciaire), and G.M.R. (Groupes Mobiles de Reserve) are suspect.

(4) Any higher police officials appointed or promoted since the beginning of 1944, i.e. under the Darnard regime, are suspect.

(5) Any police left in possession of their arms and actively employed immediately prior to our reoccupation of an area, are suspect.

APPENDIX IX

Roster of CIC men with Engineers for Invasion

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Roster of CIC Men with Engineers for Invasion

Headquarters Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group

Gagan, Thomas A., Captain
Butler, Milton
Fitzgerald, Vincent
Hannigan, Jota
Hudson, Raymond
Jensen, Carth
Jersin, Edward
Kelly, Donald
Mortens, Arthur

Headquarters 1st Engineer Special Brigade

Biedenharm, Albert
McWilliams, Walter
Murgia, Joseph

File 356 s(4) (B-CIC) Hq 1st US Army. CIC Det 29 (Prov); Subject: CIC Monthly Situation Report, Hq 1st US Army, May 1944. KCD BX 25104 (8-21-45). (SECRET).

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APPENDIX X

Annex 4e to First Army Intelligence Plan NEPTUNE

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ANNEX 4e
TO
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE PLAN
NEPTUNE

SECURITY IN ZONE OF OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES. (See Paragraph 7h, Section II, "Intelligence," First United States Army Standing Operating Procedure).

a. Authority over Civil Population. In the First United States Army Zone of Operations, the Military Commander is the sole authority over Civil population.

b. Relationship with Civil Affairs. The AC of S, G-2, makes recommendations pertaining to security measures. CIC, Civil Affairs and Provost Marshal operate in their respective spheres under policies of First United States Army, or higher commander. Closest liaison between Civil Affairs, CIC, AC of S, G-2, and Provost Marshal is essential.

c. Civilian Communications.

(1) Civilian mail service and telephone, telegraph, cable and radio traffic in occupied territory will be stopped without delay. Mail will be held under guard in post offices. No communication services for civilians will be resumed until ordered by First United States Army.

(2) Captured mails in combat areas will be examined by Mobile Censor Teams operating under higher authority. AC of S, G-2's and CIC will maintain close liaison with these teams to obtain all information of counterintelligence interest. Prior to arrival of Mobile Censor Teams, CIC may open and search mail for information of counterintelligence value.

d. Press and Radio Censorship. (See Paragraph 27, Annex 14, Signal Communications Plan).

Censorship of press and radio will be the responsibility of field censors furnished by higher authority.

e. Civilian Identity Documents, Passes and Permits.

(1) Existing system of civilian Identity Documents will remain in force. When necessary, new Identity Documents will be issued by indigenous authorities under the direction of Civil Affairs.

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(2) Preparation and issue of civilian identity documents, passes and permits is a Civil Affairs responsibility. In doubtful cases, Civil Affairs will request CIC for recommendation.

(3) AC of S, G-2 of the Division, or higher headquarters, will recommend any security conditions to be imposed upon local issue of passes and permits.

(4) CIC will be furnished with passes and permits by Civil Affairs for issue in special situations.

f. Proclamations.

(1) Civil Affairs will prepare, in advance, proclamations to be issued in occupied territory, giving directions to civil population. These will include the usual war-time security restrictions on such matters as assisting the enemy, possession of arms, radio transmitters, cameras, binoculars, carrier pigeons, curfews, prohibited areas, etc.

(2) G-2's will make known to Civil Affairs any additions or modifications to these proclamations which are necessitated by local circumstances.

2. CIVILIAN LABOR.

a. Normally, investigation will not be possible prior to employment. Where practicable, however, it is desirable that lists of employees shall be checked against suspect lists by CIC.

b. Where civilians are to be engaged on work which presents marked opportunities for espionage and sabotage the CIC should be informed in order that the bona fides of all such persons can be checked, so far as possible.

3. SECURITY CONTROL OF REFUGEES.

a. Security Control Posts will be established in forward areas by CIC for the purpose of interrogating refugees in order to segregate suspicious civilians and released or escaped allied PW's. Security Control Posts should be established at Civil Affairs refugee clearing stations or MP check points.

b. Refugee Interrogation Posts will be established at points on main routes probably in Corps areas. Although staffed by CIC agents other personnel such as Counterintelligence officers from Army Group, military intelligence interpretors, PW interrogators and representatives of the French Intelligence Service may be employed in the sifting of civilian [illegible] and the recording of [illegible] intelligence and counterintelli-

c. Civilian cages (British Civilian Interrogation Centres) will be established at Army level for the detention and interrogation of individuals passed back from Refugee Interrogation Points or Division PW cages. Suspects will here be interrogated and investigated at length by special interrogators. Further disposition will be determined by the AC of S, G-2, First U.S. Army.

d. If after interrogation numerous civilians remain whose continued detention is necessary for security, they will whenever possible be handed over to the indigenous authorities, coordinated with Civil Affairs.

4. HANDLING OF SUSPECTS - GENERAL.

a. Denunciations. Local denunciations should be dealt with methodically, not only in order to apprehend dangerous persons, but also to satisfy local civilians that action will be taken where justified. Prompt handling will prevent action by local populations to take the law into their own hands. Except when the denounced individuals's name appears on a suspect list, arrests will not normally be made by CIC until the denunciation is confirmed by a person of known reliability. Security grounds alone will justify the detention of denounced persons by CIC. If it is clearly established that no violation or danger to security exists, the names of persons denounced will be given to Civil Affairs detachment for further action.

b. Detention and Evacuation. In the forward areas, civilians arrested as suspects, will be handed over to the Provost Marshal for detention and evacuation through Division and Army prisoner-of-war cages, unless considered important enough for special handling. If local conditions permit, suspects will be processed through a Refugee Interrogation Post before detention. Preliminary sifting should be carried out as early as possible to relieve the Provost Marshal of the burden of evacuating and accommodating harmless civilians.

5. HANDLING OF POLITICAL SUSPECTS.

a. The CIC, under the direction of the AC of S, G-2, is responsible for action in respect to subversive or hostile political organizations.

b. Intelligence officers and CIC Detachments must be guided by the general consideration that it is not desirable for Allied military forces to intervene in purely internal political disputes and that their responsibility does not extend beyond the task of security the allied forces against attack by enemy agents or subversive elements. Where the activities of a political organization do not endanger the security of our forces, but tend to be politically disruptive, Civil Affairs staffs in consultation with Counterintelligence staffs will be responsible for deciding upon the action to the taken.

c. G-2's will receive, prior to D-Day, specific information on the treatment of members of particular political organizations, including a list of suspects known to have assisted the enemy. An OSS/SCI unit attached to First United States Army will supply additional information on suspects. Such information will be disseminated through G-2 channels.

d. Civilians arrested by CIC personnel will not be released by Civil Affairs or Provost Marshal without agreement of the CIC.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

a. Initial contact with civil authorities, including police, will normally be made in conjunction with Civil Affairs. CIC personnel will make direct contact on day to day routine matters.

b. The suspension and appointment of civilian officials is a Civil Affairs responsibility. CIC personnel will furnish Civil Affairs Detachments with any information they possess on the reliability of officials and Civil Affairs Detachments will consult CIC personnel in cases where the reliability of an official is in doubt from the security aspect. CIC personnel will only arrest those officials who might continue to assist the enemy or be required for interrogation, and in such cases they will keep Civil Affairs Detachments informed of any action taken.

7. RELATIONS WITH INDIGENOUS POLICE.

a. Civil Affairs staffs and Detachments will supervise all indigenous police forces in liberated territory. Supervision of the security branches of the indigenous police forces such as Service de la Surveillance du Territoire, Renseignments Generaux and Police Judiciaire will be carried out in accordance with policies laid down by the appropriate commanders.

b. Civil Affairs Detachments will insure that CIC have at all times free access to the records of the local police. If it is found necessary to seize records, the Civil Affairs Detachment will be informed. The records will be returned as soon as practicable.

8. ALLIED SYMPATHIZERS.

a. AC of S, G-2's will check names of persons representing themselves as members of resistance groups before reliance is placed on these individuals by other staff members. The sources of information for G-2's and CIC will be:

(1) Black Lists of officials and others known to have assisted the enemy, and lists of European political organizations in which membership is sufficient to present a prima facie case against an individual.

(2) White Lists of officials and others believed to be reliable.

b. Information from the above sources, which will be supplied prior to "Y" Day, is primarily a guide and in most cases information should be verified by local investigation.

c. The assistance of OSS/SCI, OSS/SO and representatives of French intelligence organizations will be available to CIC in identifying members of resistance groups.

9. COUNTERESPIONAGE.

a. Information about enemy intelligence activities will be supplied AC of S, G-2's of Corps shortly before Y-Day and subsequently in the field to an OSS/SCI unit attached to First United States Army. Special targets for CIC will be indicated to Corps and Divisions by the AC of S, G-2, First United States Army.

b. Arrests of enemy agents or suspected enemy agents will be reported immediately through intelligence channels to the AC of S, G-2, First United States Army, who will notify the OSS/SCI unit. Officers of this unit will be given an opportunity to participate in interrogations and advise on disposal of such prisoners.

c. A report of interrogation and statement made by the prisoner will be sent to the AC of S, G-2, First United States Army. A copy of the report should accompany the prisoner. Documents found in his possession will be taken from him, but will accompany the prisoner wherever he is sent for interrogation.

d. CIC will segregate from other civil detainees or PW's, any prisoner known, or strongly believed, to be an agent and will not allow him to communicate with anyone. Special arrangements will be made for escorting them to the rear for further interrogation.

10. PORT AND COASTAL SECURITY. (Refer to Annex 17 to Operation Plan NEPTUNE - Advance Section, Communications Zone).

a. Division of Responsibility.

(1) Army.

(a) The Port Commander is responsible for security of the dock area, including control of exit and entry.

(b) Initially Port Security will be the responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the unit which seizes the port. CIC Port Detachments attached to Advanced Section, CZ will operate under control of Division or Corps ACofS, G-2 in those ports which are to be put into operation. These Port Detachments will take over all port security

duties when responsibility for the port is transferred to the Commander, Advance Section, CZ. Whenever possible, personnel from these Port Detachments will enter the port with the first CIC Detachment to arrive and will operate initially under supervision of the tactical detachment Commanding Officer.

(2) Navy.

Local security of Naval installations and stores ashore, those parts of the dock area allocated to the Navy and the security of all naval and merchant ships and fishing and other craft in the port. U. S. Navy counterintelligence officers from Task Force 122 will be attached to U. S. Army units in order to enter major ports with CIC Detachments.

(3) Coordination.

All security measures will be coordinated by the AC of S, G-2 of the First U. S. Army unit controlling the Port. When the Port Commander takes over, the Port Security Officer will be responsible for coordination of security measures. Close liaison will be maintained with Naval and other authorities in the Port.

b. Coastal Security.

Security measures for the coastline and ports not in operation will be initiated by the AC of S, G-2 of all echelons for the area under control of their respective commander. Measures to prevent illegal entry and exit by sea and illicit communication between sea and shore will be put into effect in coordination with Naval authorities. A system of civilian "Coast-watchers" may be necessary. All persons entering or attempting to leave the area, except through operational ports, will be turned over to the CIC for interrogation.

11. CIVILIAN TRAVEL CONTROL.

a. Responsibility.

(1) Security Control of civilian travel between the U.K. and theatre will be a responsibility of S. H. A. E. F.

(2) The term civilian will apply to any person not holding a British or U. S. Naval, Military, or Air Force identity card, and any restrictions on civilian travel will apply to all Allied service personnel (other than British and U. S.) who are not part of a formation or body of troops.

b. Initial Stages.

(1) Until an effective system of control has been established

in the theatre no civilians will be brought to the U.K. other than those required for intelligence or security purposes.

(2) Personnel in these categories will be evacuated to the U.K. on authority of AC of S, G-2 of the highest headquarters established on the Continent.

(3) The headquarters authorizing the dispatch of civilians to the U.K. will arrange for them to be escorted to the appropriate PW cage from which they are to be embarked. They will be transported together with PW's to ports in the U.K. where they will be handed over to the Security Control Officer. No contacts will be permitted between civilians and PW's during the journey. Written authorization will accompany these civilians.

c. Later Stages.

(1) When an effective system of travel control has been established in the theatre certain civilians may be brought to the U.K. in addition to those required for intelligence and security purposes. Such civilians will be limited to key individuals and those persons as required by British, U. S. or Allied agencies.

(2) All such official requests will be made to the Passport Control Department in London, who, if the request is approved, will communicate it through the military permit office to H.Q. Army Group in the field.

(3) No application from the civilian population for permits to travel to the U.K. will be entertained by First U. S. Army. Agencies wishing to bring civilians to the U.K. will refer the request to the parent agency in London, who will make official application through the Passport Control Department.

(4) Counterintelligence staffs will notify the Port Security Officer of the port at which they are to embark, of the name and particulars of civilians to whom travel authorization has been given. Port Security Officers will not allow any civilian to embark unless the civilian or his escort is in possession of a written authorization.

12. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS - DETAILED.

Detailed plans for individual towns and cities will be prepared by Corps or Division CIC detachment commanders under the direction of the AC of S, G-2. For large cities, planning material indicating sensitive points will be furnished by the AC of S, G-2, First United States Army.

APPENDIX XI

Specialist Teams, Operation CIC Detachment, V Corps

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ANNEX XI TO SECTION SOP

SPECIALIST TEAMS, OPERATION CIC DETACHMENT, CORPS

1. Assignment.

a. One detachment assigned to each Corps.

b. Operates directly under the counterintelligence officer, G-2 Section.

2. Functions.

a. See TM 30-215. In addition to the functions prescribed therein, the Section will check upon security discipline in all units of the Corps and will actively assist in the collection of tactical and strategical information whenever such duties can be performed without serious interference with its normal mission.

b. Members of the Section will from time to time make detailed checks of the observance of security measures in all Corps units. When the Corps CP is moved, the Section will make a detailed check of the vacated CP to determine whether any classified papers or documents have been left behind.

c. In processing refugees or in contacts with civilians who have recently come through the line, the Section will record and report any enemy information readily obtainable from such civilians and will report names of all persons who should be questioned in detail by MII Teams.

d. Documents having intelligence value obtained from civilians will be transmitted promptly to Corps G-2.

3. Operational Area.

a. The normal area of operations of the team will be the Corps administrative area. The detachment headquarters will normally be in the principal town in the Corps area and the members of the detachment will normally be billeted in their respective duty areas.

b. As a general rule, two men from the detachment will be attached to each division having an operational area. These men will be employed by the division throughout its operational area and insofar as practicable will be permitted to become thoroughly acquainted with the counterintelligence situation in this area. When the division moves forward and the Corps takes over the divisional area, these two men will remain therein, reverting to Corps control. At the same time, two more men will be attached to the division concerned for operation with it in its new area.

4. Reports.

a. Weekly CIC Summary.
b. Special CIC Summaries as required.
c. Daily report by each detachment for 24-hours ending at 0800, the report to reach Corps CI Officer not later than 0800 of the following day. These reports will form the basis for a consolidated report prepared by the counterintelligence officer and forwarded daily to Army. It will be in the following form:

HEADQUARTERS
_____DIVISION

From: 0800B Hours
To : 0800B Hours

Date:

DAILY CIC DETACHMENT REPORT

1. Area of Responsibility. (Include in first report. Thereafter, "No change until change in area").

2. Disposition of Personnel. (Include in first report. Thereafter, "No change until some redistribution").

3. Activities during Period. (For example, snap travel controls or other activity not covered under particular heading).

4. Cases Investigated.

5. Cases Pending.

6. Arrests and Disposition of Prisoners.

7. Miscellaneous.

a. Tactical information.
b. Rumors.
c. Breaches of security.
d. Information concerning anti-Allied organizations.
e. Other CI information.

_____
CO, CIC Det.

1st Ind.

Hq. ----Division, A. C. of S., G-2, ------July 1944.

To: A.C. of S., G-2, Hq. V Corps, APO 305, U. S. Army

Inclosed Daily CIC Detachment Report for period _____.

_____
A.C. of S., G--2, (or)
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2

INSTRUCTIONS

1. The Daily CIC Report is intended to cover the matters called for during the 24-hour period from 0800 hours to 0800 hours day by day.

2. The report should be prepared daily and submitted in time to reach the A.C. of S., G-2, V Corps, by 0800B hours of the day following the day for which submitted.

3. Example: The Daily CIC Detachment Report for 10 July 1944 covering the period 090800 hours - 100800 hours should be sent in time to reach the A.C. of S., G-2, V Corps, by 110800B hours.

4. Classification of report is "confidential" or higher depending on contents.

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APPENDIX II

The Corps did not issue a standing operating procedure, but each section issued instructions to subordinate units in separate memorandums. The following SOP for intelligence was issued by this headquarters on 16 January 1945, which was a revision of the SOP issued early in the operation:

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR INTELLIGENCE

I - INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. Ground Reconnaissance and Observation.

a. Zones or objectives for Corps and divisions are specified in Corps orders.

b. Infantry, cavalry, and armored forces inform supporting artillery of essential elements of information, and of indications to be observed. Artillery maintains continuous observation within its zone of operations, and keeps supported units constantly informed of enemy activities.

c. Service units remain constantly alert to detect hostile agents and forces operating in supply and service areas. Medical units record and report to next higher headquarters, through intelligence channels, all military information obtained from wounded prisoners of war.

d. Units and commands search all command posts and message centers lately occupied by the enemy for situation maps, tactical orders, and documents.

e. The evaluation of information is included with the dissemination when appropriate, but is distinguished from the information received.

2. Collection and Transmission of Information.

a. Reports of hostile movements include time observed, location, strength, composition, and direction of movement.

b. Reconnaissance of defensive dispositions, searches for and reports of location of main line of resistance, flanks, mass of artillery, reserves, antitank guns, obstacles, and mine fields.

c. When contact is imminent, positive information is reported promptly as obtained; negative reports are made to Corps at least every two hours.

d. If contact is broken by the enemy with a friendly unit of battalion or larger size, an immediate report is rendered by most expeditious means available, and an hourly report is rendered thereafter until contact is regained.

e. Geographical locations referred to in reports are further identified by map references and coordinates.

f. The following is always considered URGENT, and is transmitted by the most expeditious means:

(1) First contact with hostile units by ground forces.
(2) First artillery fire, and marked changes in amounts.
(3) Major changes in hostile dispositions, such as movement of a battalion or larger, counterattack by a battalion or larger unit, assumption of the defensive, withdrawal, loss of contact, etc.
(4) Initiation of attack by hostile infantry or armored elements.
(5) Presence of hostile armored units.
(6) Hostile parachute and airborne activities.
(7) Identification of a new enemy regiment or division.
(8) Use of toxic chemicals.

g. In transmitting intelligence by phone or radio, reference is made to the coordinates at which the action took place, but <u>not</u> to the proximity of friendly units.

h. Channels of Communication.

(1) Enemy information transmitted to Corps is addressed to G-2.

(2) Divisions and Corps Cavalry report all pertinent information directly to similar adjacent units, as well as to Corps.

(3) Corps Cavalry reports urgent enemy information to leading and adjacent division, and to Corps.

(4) Ground reconnaissance elements report movements of hostile forces to the nearest threatened unit and to Corps.

(5) Tank destroyer units attached to Corps maintain direct communication with Corps Cavalry.

(6) Corps Cavalry, when employed in an anti-airborne role in rear areas, establishes direct communication with the Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service.

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3. Prisoners of War, Documents, and Captured Materiel.

a. Echelons below division limit the examination of prisoners of war to matters of immediate importance to the unit concerned, and to identifications.

b. Examination of prisoners of war is conducted within divisions by prisoner of war interrogating teams attached from the Theater MIS. Division Intelligence Officers keep these teams constantly informed of essential elements of information to be obtained from prisoners of war.

c. German military personnel are permitted to retain the paybook (Soldbuch), but any attempt to mutilate by tearing out Pages 3 and 4 is prevented.

d. Prisoners of high rank (colonel and above) and other prisoners of especial interest, including well-informed foreigners, are reported immediately through intelligence channels to Corps G-2.

e. Prisoners are evacuated direct from division to Army unless desired by Corps for further interrogation. Prisoners are evacuated to Corps when specified by the Corps G-2 or his representative, or when obviously of especial interest.

f. The Corps IPW Officer, as the representative of the Corps G-2, may observe interrogation in lower echelons, direct that particular items of information be obtained, and select special prisoners for further interrogation at Corps.

g. Enemy air force flying personnel are taken to the nearest division cage, including all documents and papers taken from them and their plane. The air force interrogation unit is notified through division or Corps ASP Officer. Air force flying personnel will not be interrogated by ground force IPW personnel.

h. Captured documents are marked (using rubber stamps if available) with the time and place of capture and with the name of the capturing unit (division or separate unit).

i. Situation maps and copies of tactical orders obtained from prisoners of war and enemy dead are transmitted to Corps by special messenger; the time, place, and circumstances of capture will be noted on the document. Other documents are transmitted to prisoner of war collecting points by the prisoner escorts.

j. Codes and ciphers are turned over to signal intelligence officers at Corps as soon as practicable; they are forwarded to Corps G-2 by the capturing unit by special messenger.

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k. The location and brief description of new or unique captured materiel is transmitted to Corps G-2 as soon as practicable.

l. Documents captured at radar installations are not to be removed or separated from the equipment with which they are captured. The equipment is placed under guard by the nearest unit, and the radar officer with AAA at Corps is notified through intelligence channels. The report includes the exact location of the equipment and documents.

4. Reports.

a. Divisions, separate units (cavalry, engineers) in contact with the enemy, and Corps Artillery transmit intelligence summaries (Isums), by telephone or other rapid means as follows:

(1) At 0600, 1200 and 1800 hours, giving changes in the enemy front lines, new identifications, enemy attacks, and other enemy action during the six-hour period.

(2) At 2400 hours, giving enemy front lines at close of period; all identifications; enemy attacks; approximate amount of enemy artillery fire; enemy armor observed or in action; enemy material captured, disabled, and destroyed; prisoners of war taken; number and time of enemy air attacks; extent of enemy patrolling; and movement observed behind the enemy lines; all covering the twenty-four hour period.

b. G-2 or S-2 Periodic Reports are submitted to Corps G-2 as of 2400 hours, to reach Corps not later than 0300 hours.

5. Liaison.

a. Corps Cavalry provides continuous liaison to Corps G-2, to each leading division when cavalry precedes the division and when appropriate, to adjacent divisions. Liaison officers maintain radio communication with their unit.

b. All liaison officers, whether intelligence or operations, are briefed on the enemy situation in the respective zones of action prior to their departure from their parent units, and report all available information to Corps G-2 upon arrival.

c. During failure of communications, units in contact with the enemy send an Isum to the Corps G-2 at least twice daily.

6. Air Reconnaissance.

a. An officer assigned to the Corps G-2 Section is designated as G-2 Air. He coordinates all requests for tactical and photo reconnaissance other than armed reconnaissance.

b. Tactical Reconnaissance.

(1) Tactical reconnaissance includes visual observation of areas, roads, pin-point locations, and pin-point or short strip photographs.

(2) The Corps is allotted five planned missions and a lesser (variable) number of impromptu missions daily. Requests for planned missions are consolidated and submitted by Corps G-2 Air so as to arrive at Army prior to 1000 hours of the day preceding the one on which the missions are to be flown. Requests for impromptu missions may be submitted at any time.

c. Photo Reconnaissance.

(1) Photo reconnaissance includes basic cover of the area of operations (verticals), front-line cover (verticals), pin-point or strip photographs (verticals or oblique), merton gridded obliques, and ungridded obliques.

(2) Basic cover of the area of operations is furnished on the basis of one copy per division, one copy for Corps Artillery, and one copy for Corps Headquarters. Additional copies on the basis of 25 copies per division and 20 for Corps Artillery may be obtained through Corps G-2. Front-line cover is flown daily to a depth of ten miles when the front is stabilized (weather permitting). One copy is furnished to each division concerned immediately upon receipt; normally, this will be 12 to 24 hours after the flight.

d. Requests for both tactical and photo reconnaissance is submitted to Corps G-2

7. Maps.

a. Reference: Letter of 20 July 1944 from Headquarters, First U.S. Army, file 061.05/44 (ENGR), Subject: Map Supply and Distribution.

b. Maps are issued on the basis of requisitions submitted, which may be informally prepared, but must be signed by an officer. Allowances are shown in the Map Allowance Table, which is appended to the letter cited above. Requisitions for maps are automatically approved at the map issue point if within the prescribed allowances and within limits of maps available. Otherwise, approval of the Army Engineer is required.

c. Requisitions for maps are submitted to the Army Map Liaison Officer at Engineer Section, Corps Headquarters. This liaison officer draws the maps from the Army Map Depot and arranges for issue, in the case of Corps Headquarters and Corps troops, or arranges for direct issue from depot to division.

d. Maps no longer required for use because of obsolete area coverage or for other reasons are returned to the Army Map Depot through normal map distribution channels.

e. Copies of all maps prepared by subordinate units, and supplemental or corrective information which increases the usefulness of available maps, if forwarded to the Army Engineer for appropriate action. All new maps to scale of 1:10,000 or smaller, are coordinated with and approved by the Army Engineer prior to publication.

8. Enemy Use of Toxic Chemicals.

a. Upon the first use or suspected use of toxic chemicals, the unit subjected to or in the vicinity of the attack reports the incident to the next higher headquarters giving the following information:

(1) Type and name of chemical used.
(2) Time and place of attack.
(3) Area affected.
(4) Means employed (bomb, high level spray, low level spray, mortar fire, artillery fire, cylinders, or other means).
(5) Amount of chemical used, as indicated by number and size of bombs, shells or other means.
(6) Number, severity, and disposition of casualties.
(7) Protective measures taken.

b. Until the enemy's use of toxic chemicals has once been confirmed, information concerning a suspected enemy gas attack is not disseminated to units other than those affected until confirmation from Corps has been received.

9. Crashed Enemy Aircraft.

a. A guard is immediately established around crashed aircraft, and all other than authorized personnel are denied access. The air interrogation unit is notified through division or Corps ASP Officer, who will send a representative to take charge of the wreckage and remove it. The guard will not be removed until the arrival of air personnel bearing proper credentials or until ordered by Corps.

b. Enemy aircraft falling between division rear boundaries and the Corps rear boundary will be placed under guard consisting of one officer and two enlisted men by the commander of the unit nearest the crashed aircraft. Unauthorized personnel will not be permitted to approach the aircraft closer than 25 yards. Any person authorized to inspect the crashed enemy aircraft before the guard is relieved will have a pass issued by the Corps AAA Officer, and a record will be maintained by the guard of all persons visiting the crashed aircraft. Division commanders will be responsible for taking effective measures to guard enemy aircraft falling within their respective areas.

II - INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST TEAMS

10. Intelligence specialist teams are attached on the following basis:

	Total number of teams or detachments attached		Composition of each team or det.	
	Corps Hq	Each Div	Off	EM
Order of Battle	1	1	1	2
Interrogation of Prisoners of War (German)	3	2	2	4
German Military Intelligence Interpreters	1	1	2	4
Photo Interpretation	4	1	2	4
Counterintelligence Corps	1	1	5	14

a. One of the Photo Interpretation Teams assigned to Corps Headquarters is attached to Corps Artillery, and two teams operate at the Army Photo Interpretation Center.

b. Two of the Interrogation Prisoner of War Teams assigned to Corps are attached to divisons, depending upon the need for such teams.

11. All intelligence specialist teams operate under the direct supervision of the A.C. of S., G-2, (or S-2) of the unit to which assigned or attached.

12. Reports are submitted by the specialist teams through the A.C. of S., G-2, as follows:

a. Order of Battle report, to be prepared daily (when appropriate) by the Order of Battle Officer and appended to the G-2 Periodic Report as Annex No. 1.

b. Prisoner of War Interrogation Report, to be prepared daily (when appropriate) by the senior IPW officer, and appended to the G-2 Periodic Report as Annex No. 2. The report is prepared for the 24-hour period ending at 2100 hours.

c. MII Teams submit reports of interrogation of civilians as follows:

(1) Information of tactical or strategic military value is disseminated through intelligence channels to appropriate subordinate and adjacent units. Four copies of each such report are forwarded to Corps G-2.

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(2) Information of counterintelligence value is disseminated through counterintelligence channels.

(3) All reports that include the identity of informants are classified as SECRET.

d. Photo Interpretation reports are prepared for all photos interpreted by PI Teams of Corps or divisions. These reports are prepared for both first phase and second phase interpretation, and are appended to the G-2 Periodic Report as an Annex. Four extra copies of all such reports are forwarded to Corps G-2.

e. Counterintelligence reports are submitted as set forth in Section V.

III - SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

13. Weather Detachment.

a. A Weather Detachment is attached to the Corps Field Artillery Observation Battalion, which provides the following forecasts:

(1) A daily forecast at 2000 hours, covering the period 2000 hours the following day, which is disseminated by the detachment to Corps and divisions G-2's by teletype.

(2) Long-range forecasts (covering a period of 40 to 72 hours) when requested by Corps G-2.

b. All weather forecasts are included in the Corps G-2 Periodic Report.

IV - MISCELLANEOUS

14. Psychological Warfare.

a. A Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section in Army Headquarters is prepared to furnish the following services:

(1) Leaflets, either of a standard variety or especially printed to meet particular needs, to be fired into enemy territory by artillery or dropped from planes.

(2) Loudspeakers, for broadcasts to enemy troops in order to urge surrender. (One set of this equipment is available at Corps Headquarters).

b. All requests for such services are made to Corps G-2.

2006

c. All psychological warfare activities within a divisional area are conducted only with the concurrence of the G-2 of the division concerned.

d. All psychological warfare activities within the Corps are coordinated by the Corps G-2.

15. Intelligence Funds.

a. Confidential intelligence funds are furnished by higher headquarters to Corps and divisions for the purchase of information concerning the enemy.

b. Confidential funds are held under the custody of the A.C. of S., G-2, of Corps and division.

c. Confidential funds may be expended to reimburse non-military personnel when specifically employed to gain enemy information, but are not used to reward civilians who have voluntarily given information.

16. Civilians.

All civilian personnel coming through the lines is interviewed by MII personnel of divisions, and those who give indications of having knowledge of enemy forces or installations are carefully questioned. Reports of information gained are submitted as provided in Para 13 c, above. Personnel having special military knowledge is evacuated or reported to Corps for further questioning. Civilians coming through the lines are carefully screened by CIC. (See Para 21)

V - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

17. Censorship of Mail.

a. Military censorship will be in accordance with Cir. 33, ETOUSA, 21 March 1944, as amended, and as amplified by the following: First US Army Circular No. 17, 5 February 1944; First US Army Intelligence Instructions No. 30, 16 November 1944; and First US Army Amendment to Intelligence Instructions No. 30, 8 January 1945.

b. Unit censors will carefully examine all photographs included in personal mail and will deny transmission of those of military significance. For policy on local processing of film, see Letter Hq ETOUSA, 6 October 1944 (AG 062 OpGB), as amended by letter Hq ETOUSA 22 November 1944 AG 062 OpGB. All other amateur film will be developed through facilities of the Army Exchange Service, see Circular 111, 25 August 1944, Hq First US Army and Memorandum No. 2, 7 January 1945, Hq First US Army.

18. Security of Command Posts and Bivouac Areas.

a. Civilians will not be permitted to enter any command post or bivouac. Except when properly escorted, military personnel will not be permitted to enter any command post or bivouac area before being positively identified.

b. Guard systems of command posts and bivouac areas will be tested from time to time to make certain that no unauthorized persons can gain access thereto.

c. Signs giving unit locations will not show actual unit designations. The use of unit code names for this purpose is authorized.

19. Security of Information.

a. Each individual will be reminded that in case of capture he will give the enemy only his name, rank, and serial number.

b. Military operations will not be discussed with civilians or with any unidentified person. No individual will be given any more information than is necessary for the proper performance of his official duties.

c. Insofar as practicable, field orders, overlays or other documents giving the dispositions or contemplated movements of friendly forces will be transmitted by messenger or liaison officer only in daylight. If transmittal at night becomes necessary, special precautions will be taken.

d. Marked maps giving the location of command posts of regiments or higher headquarters, or the dispositions of units of corresponding size, will not be taken beyond regimental command posts. In no case will the operational plans of a unit larger than a regiment be carried further forward than a regimental command post. Necessary precautions will be taken to see that visiting officers comply with this procedure.

e. A search will be made of evacuated CP areas to insure that no classified or identifying material has been left.

f. No friendly agent will be permitted to pass out of our lines who has not reached forward troops through proper intelligence channels.

20. Signal Security

a. (1) Such secret information as unit designations, coordinates giving locations of friendly command posts or units, names of

specific places or areas occupied by friendly units, the dispositions of friendly troops or operations plans will not be transmitted in the clear over the telephone or radio except in case of operational necessity.

(2) Under operational conditions where only short-term security is necessary, the Slidex and Maplay codes will be used for the transmittal of classified information over the telephone or radio; however, these codes must be used with discretion.

(3) Whenever operating conditions permit, classified information should be transmitted through message center channels in order to take advantage of the cryptographic devices and systems available to those agencies for the security of communications.

b. No message with a classification higher than confidential will be sent in the clear by wire-line teletypewriter channels. No message will be sent by teletypewriter over radio channels unless specifically authorized as provided in AR 380-5.

21. Civilian Controls.

a. Civilians infiltrating through our lines from enemy occupied territory will be arrested and turned over to the CIC for interrogation before they are evacuated to the rear.

b. Civilians attempting to move through our lines into enemy territory will be arrested and turned over to the CIC for interrogation.

c. All civilians residing in operational areas of tactical units and all refugees and evacuees who pass through the operational areas of tactical units will be screened by the CIC. All known or suspected enemy agents and saboteurs will be arrested and evacuated to First Army Interrogation Center.

d. Whenever a new area is over-run by our forces, notices will be posted in public places ordering all deserters from the German Army to surrender to our military forces without delay and informing them that failure to do so will cause all such persons found in civilian clothes thereafter to be apprehended and tried before a Military Government Court. The notice will also order all civilians to report the presence of German soldiers in hiding and will warn them that failure to make such report or the harboring of any German soldier by a civilian will cause such civilian to be arrested and tried before a Military Government Court.

e. For detailed list of party officials, civil police, civil officials and para-military organizations to be arrested and held for interrogation by CIC see Intelligence Instructions No. 32, Hq First U.S. Army, 14 December 1944, and letter Counterintelligence Operations in Germany, Hq V Corps 9 January 1945.

f. The offices of all German intelligence agencies, all party organizations, para-military organizations, and military organizations will be searched and all intelligence documents found therein will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the A.C. of S., G-2.

g. Civilian mail, telephone, telegraph, cable, newspaper and radio service will be stopped immediately upon occupation of enemy territory and will not be reopened except by authority of the Commanding General, First U. S. Army. Radio transmitters will be impounded.

h. Photography is forbidden. The use of field glasses or telescopes is forbidden. Field glasses and telescopes will be impounded. The use of cameras is prohibited.

i. Civilians will not be transported in military vehicles except where necessary in official military business.

22. Reports.

a. Each CIC detachment will submit a daily report to the A.C. of S, G-2, V Corps, through intelligence channels, for the 24-hour period ending at 0000 hours, to reach Corps not later than 0000 hours of the following day, giving the following information: (1) Area of responsibility; (2) disposition of detachment personnel; (3) Activities during period; (4) cases investigated; (5) cases pending; (6) arrests, including name, address, reason, and disposition; (7) miscellaneous, including tactical information, rumors, breaches of security, subversive organizations, and other CI information.

b. A weekly Counterintelligence Report is required by First U. S. Army from each corps and division CIC detachment. This weekly periodic report will be rendered as of 2400 hours each Sunday. The original report and one copy will be sent through channels to the A.C. of S., G-2, First U.S. Army. The weekly Counterintelligence Report will be in the same form as that shown in Appendix D of letter Counterintelligence Operations in Germany, Hq V Corps, 9 January 1945.

c. A report of arrest of all civilians evacuated rearward will be made on CI Arrest Report Form (SHAEF AGO Form No. 7) in duplicate to accompany such prisoners rearward.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HUEBNER:

S. D. MASON,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS J. FORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION: Special.

2010

APPENDIX XII

SOP for CIC Detachment, 1st Infantry Division

2011

[redacted]

APPENDIX "A" TO ANNEX #7, TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REPORT.

SOP FOR CIC DETACHMENT

1. UPON ENTERING A TOWN.

a. Arrest all known or suspected enemy agents or war criminals.

b. Contact Mayor, Chief of Police, leading Priest, or town Secretary.

c. Locate, shut down, search, and guard (if possible) or seal all:

(1) Telegraph offices (also cable).
(2) Telephone exchanges and private lines.
(3) Radio stations.
(4) Post offices and mail boxes. All mail to remain under guard or lock and key.
(5) Banks. All money found in banks or post offices to be locked in a safe place on the premises and the keys turned over to the Mayor.

d. Search and guard (if necessary) or seal all enemy:

(1) Headquarters or CPs.
(2) Depots, dumps or warehouses.
(3) Positions or installations.
(4) Billets.

e. Inspect and guard (if necessary) all utilities, such as gas, water, electric power and light.

f. Investigate all collaborationists, pro-Nazis and suspicious incidents or individuals.

g. Check blackout and curfew regularly.

2. GENERAL.

a. Visit the Regimental S-2 of the area as soon as possible and keep him informed.

b. When visiting any Regimental area, contact the S-2, explain mission, and offer him any assistance desired.

c. Set up an office at the Town Hall and have a man on duty there who knows the location of other team members.

d. Obtain billets nearby and pay Mayor for them as per Civil Affairs price list before leaving town (get a receipt).

2012

[redacted]

[redacted]

e. Arrange troop communications through Division Signal Officer.

3. INSTRUCTIONS TO MAYOR UNLESS THERE IS A CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT IN TOWN.

a. Curfew: 2300-0500.

b. Blackout hours; sunset to sunrise.

c. Bury all civilian and animal dead.

d. Report but do not molest all U.S. and German dead.

e. All civilians must be off streets when troops are passing through.

f. Restrict all civilians to town.

g. Report all strange civilians or unknown refugees to CIC for investigation.

h. All civilians are forbidden to enter without permission any place which has been locked or put under guard.

i. All U.S. and German equipment not to be molested if in large quantity. If in small lots to be collected in a designated place. All German equipment to be turned in to CIC.

j. All arms and sending sets (w/t) to be turned in to police.

k. All Germans to be captured or reported immediately to CIC. Severe penalties for harboring, feeding or aiding Germans.

l. The Mayor to run the town honestly, efficiently and quietly. He sets prices, distributes food, provides for refugees.

m. Radio sets (receiving) may be kept and used. If radios have been collected previously and stored, they may be returned to their owners.

n. Cameras may be kept, but may not be used near U.S. troops, equipment or installations.

o. Report to CIC all unexploded bombs, shells and other types of explosives but do not touch.

4. GERMAN DOCUMENTS.

If in small lots collect and deliver to Division Hq., O.B. Unit. If too large, make a selection to take back, guard remainder, and report their location. Mark documents' location and date taken and by whom.

5. CIVILIAN MAIL AND TELEGRAMS.

Lock or guard in Post Office. Select all written prior to D-Day and 10% in general, and mail to: 23-27 Brook Street, War Office, London, via Message Center. Be on lookout for any German mail.

6. LOOTING BY MILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS.

Strictly forbidden. Report to Military Police, Civil Affairs, or any officer. Arrest looters if possible. Mayor should be advised that the "State of Siege" as proclaimed in 1939 has never been withdrawn and that looting by civilians is punishable by death.

7. TODT WORKERS.

Interview them. If cleared, they will be evacuated in accordance with provisions of Security Plan - Civilian, Hq V Corps, 26 June 1944. Those not cleared will be given to Division P.W. cage as war criminals. Make out arrest form in triplicate and a statement of subject's status.

8. SUSPECTS.

They will be investigated and (1) cleared, if possible, or (2) classified as war criminals, or (3) if in doubt have subject interrogated by one of the French officers attached to Division Hq. During the investigation the subject may be arrested and placed in a civilian jail. Before taking this action secure approval of AC of S, G-2. Two copies of the Civil Affairs arrest report will be filed out on any civilian so held (1 to the Gendarme and 1 to the local Civil Affairs Detachment).

9. WAR CRIMINALS.

Will be turned into the Division P.W. cage accompanied by the Civilian Arrest Form in triplicate, and a statement (memo) of the prisoner's status. The third copy of the C.A. form will be receipted by the senior M.P. and returned to the CIC.

10. PASSES.

Will be issued only by C.A.O.'s. These should show the following:

a. Name.
b. Address.
c. Reason for travel.
d. Route of travel.
e. Information identifying traveler with his identity papers.
f. Time for travel.
g. Final disposition of pass.
h. Signature of C.A.O. issuing pass.
i. Date of issue.

2014

11. FINANCE.

Confidential funds are used for the purchase of information concerning collaborationists, Nazi-sympathizers, French civilians harboring German soldiers, rewards of 1000 fr. for the capture of German soldiers by French civilians, and payment of billets for CIC personnel when quartered in towns or villages.

12. RECORDS AND REPORTS.

Journals are kept by all teams. Summaries of these journals are obtained daily by a member of the CP team. A situation summary as of 0000 daily concerning the activities of the entire detachment is submitted to C/S, G-2, C.A.O. and Security Group.

A weekly C.I. report, based on the daily situation summary, is submitted through V Corps to First U.S. Army.

A monthly report of CIC operations is attached as an Appendix to the G-2 Operation Plan.

Lists of informants, resistance personnel, cases and suspects is maintained, covering the Division and adjacent area.

13. LIAISON.

Liaison is made with C.A.O. at Regts either when the S-2 is contacted or by direct telephone communication with the Div. Hq. team.

C. G. STEINWAY,
2d Lt., Cavalry,
CO., CIC Det #0 (Prov)
Attached 1st U.S. Inf. Div.

2015

APPENDIX XIII

Annex 2c to Operational Plan, ADSEC, NEPTUNE Intelligence Plan

2016

ANNEX 2c
TO
OPERATIONAL PLAN - ADV SEC COM Z

NEPTUNE

Intelligence Plan

SECURITY IN COM ZONE

1. GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES AFFECTING CIVILIANS

(This annex is written to conform with existing directives. SHAEF is considering new policy concerning civil administration in liberated territory which may be at wide variance with policy as set forth herein).

a. Authority over Civil Population. The sole authority over the civil population is the Military Commander of the area.

(1) Civilians entering territory controlled by Advance Section Com Z in a manner not in compliance with rules and proclamations will be turned over to the CIC with a signed statement of the circumstances. After interrogation, the prisoners will be turned over to the Provost Marshal.

(2) Civilians attempting to move out of territory controlled by Adv Sec Com Z in a manner not in compliance with rules and proclamations will be thoroughly searched and handled as in para (1) above. If they try to evade arrest they may be brought under fire.

(3) Any civilian taken into custody will be accompanied by a statement giving the circumstances and bearing the signature of the persons making the arrest. Military Police will refuse custody of civilian prisoners unaccompanied by such a statement.

(4) Civilian employees who are to have access to confidential information or to places presenting opportunity for important sabotage, will first be checked by the CIC.

b. Relationship with Civil Affairs. The ACofS, G-2 makes recommendations pertaining to security measures only. CIC of the ACofS, G-2, Civil Affairs, and Provost Marshal operate in their respective spheres under policies of the Advance Section Com Z, or higher commander. Closest liaison between Civil Affairs, the CI officer, and Provost Marshal is essential.

c. Civilian Communications. Civilian mail service and telephone, telegraph, cable and radio traffic in occupied territory will have been stopped and will remain so. Any mail remaining will be held under guard in post offices. No communication services will be resumed until ordered by higher headquarters.

d. Civilian Identity Documents, Passes and Permits.

(1) Existing system of civilian Identity Documents will remain in force. When necessary, new identity documents will be issued by indigenous authorities under the direction of Civil Affairs.

(2) Preparation and issue of civilian identity documents, passes, and permits as a Civil Affairs responsibility. In doubtful cases, Civil Affairs may request the CI officer for recommendation.

(3) ACofS, G-2 will recommend any security conditions to be impounded upon local issues of passes and permits.

e. Proclamations.

(1) Civil Affairs will prepare, in advance, proclamations to be issued in occupied territory, giving directions to Civil population. These will include the usual war-time security restrictions on such matters as assisting the enemy, possession of arms, radio transmitters, cameras, binoculars, carrier pigeons, curfews, prohibited areas, etc.

(2) The ACofS, G-2 will make known to Civil Affairs any additions or modifications to these proclamations which are necessitated by local circumstances.

2. CIVILIAN LABOR

a. Normally, investigations will not be possible prior to employment. Where practicable, however, it is desirable that lists of employees shall be checked against suspect lists by CIC.

b. Where civilians are to be engaged on work which presents marked opportunities for espionage and sabotage, the CIC should be informed in order that bona fides of all such persons can be checked, so far as possible.

3. REFUGEE INTERROGATION POINTS. Mobile Refugee Interrogation Points under the operational control of Headquarters, AS COM Z, may be set up at key points on main routes along which civilians are passing. These posts will be manned by CIC personnel supplied from Advance Section Com Z pool. Refugee Interrogation Points will normally be in the forward area of AS COM Z.

4. HANDLING OF SUSPECTS--GENERAL

a. Local denunciations should be dealt with methodically, not only in order to apprehend dangerous persons, but also to satisfy local civilians that action will be taken where justified. Prompt handling will prevent action by local populations to take the law into their own hands. Except when the denounced individuals name appears on a

suspect list, arrests will not normally be made by CIC until the denunciation is confirmed.

b. Detention and Evacuation. Civilians arrested as suspects will be handed over to the Provost Marshal for detention and evacuation through prisoner of war cages unless considered important enough for special handling. If local conditions permit, suspects will be processed through a Refugee Interrogation Post before detention. Preliminary sifting will be carried out as early as possible to relieve the Provost Marshal of the burden of evacuating and accommodating harmless civilians.

c. Civilian Cages. These will be established where civilian suspects will be segregated from prisoners of war and held for final disposition.

5. HANDLING OF POLITICAL SUSPECTS

a. The CI Officer, under the direction of the ACofS, G-2, is responsible for action in respect to subversive or hostile organizations.

b. The CI Officer and CIC Detachments must be guided by the general consideration that it is not desirable for allied military forces to intervene in purely internal political disputes and that their responsibility does not extend beyond the task of securing the allied forces against attack by enemy agents or subversive elements. Except when individual political suspects are considered to be capable of actually assisting the enemy, or are needed for interrogation, they will be left for allied governments to dispose of later.

c. The ACofS, G-2 will receive, prior to assumption of territorial jurisdiction for counter-intelligence purposes, specific information on the treatment of members of particular political organizations, including information of suspects known to have assisted the enemy. OSS/SCI units attached to the first United States Army and Communications Zone will supply additional information on suspects. Such information will be disseminated through G-2 channels.

d. Civilians arrested by CIC personnel will not be released by Civil Affairs or Provost Marshal without agreement of the CI Officer.

6. DEPOSITION OF POLITICALLY UNTRUSTWORTHY OFFICIALS

a. The deposition of politically untrustworthy officials will be a Civil Affairs responsibility. As a general principle, no person will be retained in office or employment who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy, or who has deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause. Information on civilian officials will be available to ACofS, G-2 and the CI Officer will provide Civil Affairs with all assistance in determining the reliability of key officials. Black and

white lists are not certain proof of unreliability or otherwise. They are merely intended to serve as guides. Local inquiries will, in most cases, have to be made before action is taken. Civil Affairs Officers will make such inquiries through, or in consultation with, the CIC.

b. In the earlier stages, the CIC may assist in the physical deposition of untrustworthy officials, but they will only be concerned with their detention in those cases where it is thought that they would continue to assist the enemy, or that they might possess information of counterintelligence value.

7. RELATIONS WITH INDIGENOUS POLICE

a. Civil Police. CIC personnel will have at all times direct access to indigenous police forces but will keep the Civil Affairs Police Officer informed. Whenever possible, the initial contact will be made in conjunction with the Civil Affairs Police Officer.

b. Security Police. Day to day contact with indigenous Security Police, such as Central de la Surveillance du Territoire, Renseignments Generaux, and Police Judiciarie will be maintained by CIC personnel. Although the Civil Affairs Police Officer is responsible for administrative supervision of these police forces, he will carry out the policy of the ACofS, G-2.

8. ALLIED SYMPATHIZERS

a. ACofS, G-2 will check names of persons representing themselves as members of resistance groups before reliance is placed on these individuals by other staff members. The sources of information for the ACofS, G-2 and the CI Officer will be:

(1) "White List" of individuals believed to be reliable (other than agents of allied organization) will be available.

(2) Special Force Staff (OSS) attached to First United States Army and Communications Zone.

9. COUNTERESPIONAGE

a. Information about enemy intelligence activities will be supplied to the ACofS, G-2 prior to the 'Take-Over' of territorial jurisdiction for counterintelligence purposes by Advance Section Com Z from First United States Army. Additional information of enemy intelligence activities will be available through OSS/SCI units attached to First United States Army and Communications Zone.

b. Arrests of enemy agents or suspected enemy agents will be reported immediately through intelligence channels to higher headquarters where OSS/SCI will be notified. Officers of OSS/SCI will be given an opportunity to participate in interrogations and advise disposal of such prisoners.

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[redacted]

c. Interrogation of suspected agents by CIC in Advance Section Com Z will normally be directed to establishing guilt or innocence, the existence or otherwise, of accomplices in the locality, and means of communications; or in the case of important suspects, obtaining an immediate statement which will assist subsequent interrogators in higher headquarters.

d. A report of interrogation and statement made by the prisoner will be sent through intelligence channels to higher headquarters. A copy of the report should accompany the prisoner. Documents found in his possession will be taken from him, but will accompany the prisoner wherever he is sent for interrogation.

e. CIC will keep any prisoner known, or strongly believed to be an agent, segregated from other civil detainees or prisoners-of-war and will not allow him to communicate with anyone. Special arrangements will be made for escorting them to higher headquarters for further interrogation.

f. The capture of German Intelligence Service documents and records will be reported at once through intelligence channels to higher headquarters and will be made available to OSS/SCI Officers upon request.

g. The ACofS, G-2, will keep informed of arrests of enemy agents by indigenous authorities. Agreements on the subject of handling these prisoners will be published at a later date.

10. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS - DETAILED

a. A CIC plan will be prepared. Detailed plans for individual towns and cities will not be prepared. The general problem of CIC, Advance Section Com Z is one of 'Take-Over' from established networks. First United States Army will by agreement give ample warning to the CI Officer to allow the CIC Advance Section to become indoctrinated prior to 'Take-Over'.

[redacted]

BOX NUMBER: 110

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XIV

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THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE

Part I - Normandy (6 June 1944 - 24 July 1944)

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March 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Part I - Normandy (6 June 1944 - 24 July 1944)

Chapter 1

CIC AGENTS IN FIRST ASSAULT WAVES

Few events in world history can rival in magnitude the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944. Within twenty-five days after the initial assault on 6 June, one million men and more than 560,000 tons of supply were landed on the northern coast of France in the most gigantic amphibious assault ever attempted.

For the Counter Intelligence Corps, the events of 6 June 1944 marked the beginning of a vital assignment that thrust its agents into every phase of the 336-day drive across Europe. CIC detachments were with sixty-five divisions, fourteen corps, six armies and two army groups, besides SHAEF and ETO Headquarters staffs and numerous Communications Zone units.

Gone were the uncertainties that preceded the invasion of North Africa and, to a slightly lesser degree, the invasions of Sicily and Italy. This time the Counter Intelligence Corps' mission was well defined in instructions issued by commands from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) down to divisions, and every detachment was firmly established by the Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 even though in many instances the actual numbers of men available fell short of the T/O. The need for CIC was recognized at every echelon, despite the shortage of agents to fill that need.*

CIC Protects Security of Invasion

In the final tense hours before the assault was launched, thousands of briefed troops boarded their landing craft along the English Channel and thousands more in Southern England waited inside their "sausages," assembly areas enclosed by barbed wire cordon.

Across the choppy Channel, German troops guarded vast fortifications, waiting and wondering when and where the attack would come.

CIC agents stationed in the assembly areas and adjacent towns kept constant vigil in a final effort to see that no hint of the impending invasion reached enemy ears.

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* Reference Chapter entitled "Preparation for OVERLORD."

The Landing

H Hour for the amphibious assault was 0630, but when the first waves of infantry swept ashore, after skirting or blasting a path through hundreds of treacherous underwater obstacles, airborne troops had been fighting the battle of Normandy for five hours.

The United States 101st Airborne Division had begun dropping southeast of the town of Ste. Mere-Eglise, behind UTAH Beach, at about 0130; the British 6th Airborne Division on the eastern flank of the NEPTUNE area at about 0200; and the U. S. 82d Airborne Division in an area northwest of the 101st at about 0230. CIC agents with both U. S. Airborne divisions jumped with the first wave of paratroopers.*

The 4th CIC Detachment went in with the 4th Infantry Division when it stormed UTAH Beach at 0645, and CIC detachments with the 1st and 29th Divisions, who invaded OMAHA Beach on the Calvados coast, were hard on the heels of the first assault troops to wade onto French soil.

The 90th Division CIC Detachment and half of the CIC detachment with VII Corps accompanied their parent units onto UTAH Beach on D Day, and the V Corps Detachment landed on OMAHA. The remainder of VII Corps CIC came in on D Day plus 2.

Other detachments followed shortly thereafter. The 2d Infantry Division CIC reached OMAHA on D Day plus 1, followed by the 2d Armored CIC on 9 June; and the 9th Infantry Division's detachment landed on UTAH the following day.

First Army's CIC detachment, commanded by Captain Horace Miner, a veteran of the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns, landed with Headquarters when it moved ashore on D plus 3, and three "pool detachments" of divisional size were split among the various tactical detachments during the first week. One officer and eight agents from "pool detachments" were assigned to work with Headquarters Engineer Special Brigade Group, and three agents with the First Engineer Brigade for the assault and until D plus 15.

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* Operation Overlord, by Albert Norman, Phd (The Military Service Publishing Company, 1952); A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt and Company, 1951); and (Draft copy) "Capture of Cherbourg and Cotentin Peninsula by VII Corps, U. S. Army (6 June to 1 July 1944," Red Vault, VII Corps, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The first two CIC detachments with the Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC), arrived at OMAHA on 11 June. One, Port Detachment "B," immediately began operations on the beach under the direct control of G2, First Army; the other, Port Detachment "A," was attached by First Army to VII Corps.

By the end of the first week, approximately two hundred CIC agents had landed at Normandy and were engaged in the beachhead activities.*

Corps Detachments Attempt to Coordinate CIC Work on Beaches

Few documents or reports have survived the first week of the invasion period. Doubtless few were compiled in those early days of activity because CIC agents, like the thousands of tactical troops dug in on the thin sliver of coast line, were too busy to write reports.

The 207th CIC Detachment, under command of Major Edwin Bennett,** was attempting to coordinate the work of the detachments with the divisions under VII Corps on UTAH Beach, while the 205th CIC Detachment, under Major Erle Pettus, Jr., was doing the same among units in the V Corps area on OMAHA Beach.

Before the 207th arrived at 1600 hours on D Day, agents of the 101st CIC Detachment, under Captain Martin E. McGuire; the 82d Detachment, under 1st Lt. William F. Jacobi; and the 4th CIC Detachment, under 1st Lt. Oliver D. Appleton, were working at their targets and desperately trying to establish contact with each other. Before the week was over, the 90th CIC Detachment, under 1st Lt. Walter D. Osborne, and the 9th, under 1st Lt. Joseph W. Musick, had reached the area. Two ADSEC teams, commanded by Captain Alvin Johnson and 2d Lt. Meredith Wilson, which had accompanied the 207th Detachment, also were in the area.

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* Although available records from the above units do not reflect all the above information, plans for Operation NEPTUNE (code name for OVERLORD during planning phases) indicated this distribution of CIC personnel. The actual composition of the Pool Detachments is not known, but it is believed that they were from the Twelfth Army Group Tactical Reserve Teams, since a notation in the VII Corps G2 Journal of 16 June 1944 mentions the names of two persons who are known to have belonged to one of the TRT's.

** Information given by James F. Foothorap (Lt. Col., MI, Res.) in interview September 1955.

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CIC detachments operating in the V Corp area before the arrival of the 205th were the 1st, with 2d Lt. Charles G. Steinway as CO, and the 29th, led by 2d Lt. Ellis O. Mayfield. The 2d CIC Detachment under 1st Lt. Arthur Jenkins and the 502d (2d Armored Division) CIC Detachment, commanded by 2d Lt. Richard W. Beebe, arrived within a few days.*

101st Agents First on Normandy Soil

The 101st CIC Detachment, which was the first to be thrown into the confusion that prevailed for the forty-eight hours following the invasion, suffered the heaviest casualties of any detachment during the ETO campaign.

Three days before the invasion, Captain Martin McGuire, who was to command the 101st throughout the ETO campaign, joined the detachment. He had little time to brief his men and no time for a practice jump. This was to be his first.

Seven men were selected to accompany him: 2d Lt. Bradley McKennon and Agents William F. Gannon, Max L. Stemple, Frank E. Benson, Jr., Frank I. Robinson, Thomas E. Ryan, and Howard W. Summes. The remaining agents of the seventeen-man detachment were to come in later that day by landing craft.

Each of the eight men was assigned to a different plane in the hope of minimizing casualties since it was felt that men of their specialized training could not be easily replaced. In spite of this precaution, upon landing the group was reduced to three when Stemple, Benson and Robinson were killed, Gannon seriously wounded, and McKennon wounded and captured when he landed directly atop a German Command Post.**

Like the other troops of the 101st Airborne Infantry Division, these eight men watched the dusk fall slowly on the evening of 5 June 1944, as, joined with with small groups at a half-dozen air fields in southern England, they made final checks on their weapons and attended to other last minute preparations.

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* Information re the Detachment commanders has been obtained mainly from rosters as of 10 May 44; several have been confirmed by interview. Names of the ADSEC Co's were obtained from Major Francis W. Carpenter (MI Res). The time of arrival on the continent of the various Divisions has been taken from The Army Almanac; A Soldier's Story, by General Bradley; and Crusade in Europe, by General Eisenhower; and from interviews.

** Two months later, with the rapid advance through Normandy, McKennon was freed from a German military hospital in Rennes by U. S. troops.

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The tension was broken once by an unexpected visit by General Eisenhower. The Supreme Allied Commander, fully aware of the dangers which lay ahead for the paratroopers, visited each airdrome, talking with the men and offering a few words of encouragement.

After what seemed like an eternity the men boarded the DC-6's, their faces blackened and their bodies burdened under eighty pounds of equipment. One by one the planes wheeled into position and within an hour all the troop carriers were air-borne and formed into groups. Accompanied by heavy fighter escort, they at last moved out across the Channel in the direction of Normandy. During the ensuing minutes, the jumpers had little to do except smoke and try to catch a brief glimpse of the vast sea armada below them through an occasional break in the dense clouds. As the first wave of planes neared the coast, German flak soon caused the air fleet to scatter in all directions. The flak, combined with heavy cloud banks, made it impossible for many planes to locate the drop zones, lighted previously with flares set by small bands of British and American pathfinders.

At approximately 0200 the first American paratroopers jumped, landing over an area twenty-five by fifteen miles square. By dawn, Major General Maxwell Taylor had rallied only 1,100 of his 6,000 men at the appointed rendezvous to begin the desperate fight to contact beachhead forces.

CIC agents of the 101st had been provided with so-called "Grey-Lists," names of persons who might be expected to be valuable as informants, but these lists proved in most instances to be inaccurate and outdated. However, there was little time for CIC work, as such, during the first hours, as CIC agents, like the combat troops, were trying to stay alive and fighting desperately to establish contact with other U. S. units.*

82d CIC Begins Operations

The 82d CIC Detachment was not as hard hit as the 101st in its landing, but one agent, Leonard K. McRae, was seriously wounded and later evacuated to the United States.**

The only report of 82d CIC activities on D Day is a handwritten document signed by Lieutenant Jacobi, who had become the commanding officer just

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* Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire, 24 August 1954; and "CIC in ETOUSA, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945," from "Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters," (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library - J-23).

** "CIC in ETOUSA, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945," from "Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters," (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library - J-23).

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before the invasion. The report stated that after arrival in Ste. Mere-Eglise, the Detachment impounded mail in the post office, found classified documents in a former German headquarters, and contacted two members of the underground resistance movement and the mayor. All documents were turned over to the Civil Affairs Officer.

The report also mentioned that Lt. Edward D. Salstrom and Agent Joseph R. Whalen gave assistance at the 3d Battalion, 505th Regiment Command Post, and that a radio receiving set belonging to a "Dutchman," who claimed to be an Allied sympathizer, was seized and turned over to the Civil Affairs Officer to be held or disposed of at his discretion.*

Three members of the 82d CIC Detachment were credited with performing outstanding services on D Day. Lieutenant Salstrom and Agent Whalen who, after jumping into enemy territory, ". . . seized the post office in Ste. Mere-Eglise, cut communications, and impounded all mail, while under extremely heavy enemy shell fire," and Agent Graves Gladney, who was ". . . sent on numerous hazardous missions outside of his regular duties, such as manning observation posts under heavy shell fire, and has shown an untiring devotion to duty."**

Airborne Detachments Hard Hit in Normandy Jump

The casualties suffered by CIC with the airborne divisions were cause for re-examining the wisdom of CIC's participation in assault operations. CIC men who had jumped with the airborne divisions later debated the advisability of sending CIC teams on D Day airborne operations. Some stressed the value of having agents on the spot during a surprise landing, but other CIC veterans felt that the benefits of having agents join the attack were not commensurate with the risk of losing highly trained personnel whose most important work was to come after the landings had succeeded.***

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* Memo, "CIC Activities - Ste. Mere-Eglise," dated 8 June 1944, /s/ W.F. Jacobi, 82d Abn Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Memo, subj, "Awards," dated 26 June 1944, in 382-2.2 (Master 28522), 82d Abn Div G2 Jnl & Message File, Operation NEPTUNE, 26-28 Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** "CIC in ETOUSA," 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, from "Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters," (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library - J-23).

VII Corps CIC Coordinates Work on Utah Beach

A daily commentary kept by the 207th CIC Detachment, attached to VII Corps, has revealed some of the work done by this detachment as well as the work and disposition of the detachments operating under its general direction during the beachhead period: the 4th, 9th and 90th Infantry Division CIC Detachments; the 82d and 101st Airborne Division CIC Detachments; and the ADSEC and Port detachments.

Half of the 207th CIC Detachment landed on D Day; the other half remained on ships in the harbor off UTAH Beach until D plus 2, when they came ashore to join the advance segment at corps headquarters.

The corps detachment immediately began operating in teams or "groups," as they were called, and by D plus 5 were functioning in five groups. They continued in this fashion throughout the Normandy campaign, operating in from five to seven groups, the composition of which was changed as the occasion demanded.

Immediately after landing at 1600 hours on D Day, one group proceeded to the 4th Infantry Division Command Post, where they contacted members of the 4th CIC Detachment. Scattered bits of information, principally concerned with German morale, were obtained from civilians.

Few Documents of CI Value Found

On the following day, in coordination with the 4th Detachment, 207th agents covered the towns of Le Grand Chemin, Ste. Marie du Mont, St. Martin de Varville, St. Germain de Varville and Foucarville, all in the immediate beachhead area, where they interviewed city officials, sealed Post Offices, searched hastily-abandoned German headquarters and billets and checked the reliability of local police. A few documents were found, but none of particular CI importance.

By the third day, 207th CIC Detachment agents were beginning to produce results. In an abandoned enemy underground headquarters they found German Order of Battle maps covering both the V and VII Corps areas, and in other evacuated headquarters found a divisional signal code; a map showing vital utilities in V Corps area; and an artillery map of the zones of fire in the eastern part of the peninsula. All of these documents were forwarded to army.

In a meeting with Corps Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal and G1 officials, agents helped set curfew regulations. Since Civil Affairs teams were not yet operating, CIC agents then turned over the responsibility for publicizing these

regulations to the town mayors in the area. They also directed the mayors to search for arms caches and for German PW's hiding within their towns. On the same day, agents also interrogated and ordered released the whole population of Revenoville, forty-three persons, who had been rounded up into the PW cage; they also established liaison with the 82d Airborne CIC Detachment.

Importance of Liaison Recognized

On D plus 4, the 207th CIC Detachment established liaison with the 101st Airborne CIC Detachment, and within the next few days contacted the 90th and the 9th CIC Detachments. This liaison was considered particularly important in order that work would not be duplicated and time wasted by more than one detachment entering the same town. Various detachments exchanged information informally, including newly developed techniques.

For example, on 11 June, agents from the 207th CIC's Team #3 interviewed officials in Ste. Marie du Mont concerning a list of suspects obtained from the 101st CIC Detachment, and on the next day, another team from the detachment instructed agents from the 82d CIC Detachment on the handling of civilian and Organization Todt workers.*

Although operational plans set up by 12th Army Group prior to the invasion had clearly defined the various channels to be used in the evacuation of civilian suspects, civilian refugees, and prisoners of war, the confusion of the first few days on the beachhead evidently had delayed the execution of these plans. Regardless of the cause, 207th CIC's daily commentary reported that on D plus 6, arrangements were made with the Provost Marshal for "funnelling civilians out of PW channels." Also, on D plus 6, a map of mine fields and fortifications north of Monteburg and two radio transmitter sets were found by a 207th CIC Detachment team in the home of a woman who was reported to have harbored Germans after the invasion. By this time, the 207th had contacted underground resistance leaders who possessed valuable information and had reported their names to London so that Office of Strategic Services' representatives could

* Organization Todt, popularly called OT, was a semi-military German organization, formed by Dr. Todt in 1938 to build the German Westwall and later utilized by the Army Engineers for construction work both in Germany and in occupied countries. After Dr. Todt's death in 1942, the Organization Todt came under control of Prof. Albert Speer. It was organized into battalions with a nucleus of specialist German personnel and a large amount of hired or impressed foreign labor. (Unclassified) (CIC Handbook on Europe, AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

come to interview them. The detachment had also arranged for MII (Military Intelligence Interpreter) personnel to work with CIC, a practice which continued throughout most of the European campaign.

During the first week, the 207th also began a card file of counterintelligence personalities which they kept throughout the ETO campaign.*

German Resistance Delays V Corps on OMAHA

Underwater obstacles, heavily mined beaches and intense artillery fire from the cliffs above brought heavy casualties to V Corps assault waves at OMAHA Beach, and slowed down their advance. However, by afternoon of D Day, troops of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions had driven inland more than a mile and opened the beaches to traffic.**

Agents of the 1st and the 29th CIC Detachments were considerably handicapped in their early operations by the heavy enemy fire. As a result of this, one casualty occurred. Agent Rex W. Hitchcock of the 29th was wounded and evacuated through England to the United States.***

Less is known of V Corps operations during the first days of the assualt than of VII Corps, but it is believed that Major Pettus brought his first agents ashore when V Corps headquarters moved in early in the evening on D Day and set up in a ditch atop the bluffs scaled earlier by the combat troops.****

A later summing-up of V Corps activities lays stress upon the help received by the CIC detachment from the Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) Team that worked with them from the moment of landing. Through the Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) CIC agents were able to obtain information from loyal Frenchmen who, upon hearing that the Allied forces had landed, worked their way through the German lines to reach them. A considerable number of these Frenchmen proved to be members of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), one of the more important French underground organizations.

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* 207th CIC Detachment Log, 6 Jun 44 to 28 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25097).

** Operation Overlord, by Albert Norman, Phd (The Military Service Publishing Company, 1952) pp. 160, 162-4; and A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt and Company, 1951) pp. 270-4.

*** "CIC in ETOUSA, 6 Jun 44 to 8 May 45," from "Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters," (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty, Library - J-23).

**** A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt and Company, 1951) p. 170. NOTE: It is hoped that by personal interviews more can be learned of V Corps CIC initial landing.

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In the confusion of the first few days of operations, V Corps personnel interested in positive intelligence discovered that one of their best contacts was through CIC, since all line crossers were screened by CIC before they were cleared. Mayors, school teachers and priests proved to be the most valuable contributors of tactical information, and their reports were appreciated and fully exploited by Allied higher headquarters.*

Divisional Detachment Work Begun

Few documents are available from the divisional detachments operating under V and VII Corps during the beachhead period--probably few were written--but scattered reports indicate that CIC agents assumed their previously assigned tasks of sealing post offices, severing communications lines, searching former German headquarters and billets, and contacting resistance workers for information concerning collaborators and possible stay-behind agents. There seems to have been little difference between the work of division detachments from that of corps detachments; the first to reach an area took care of it. Upon several occasions, one detachment would enter a town to find that another detachment had already entered and had everything under control.**

29th CIC Reduces Targets in Isigny

The first complete target reduction report on file is that of the 29th CIC Detachment in the town of Isigny, which the 29th Infantry Division occupied on 9 June. Procedures utilized by agents in entering and exploiting this town--the establishment of a curfew, cooperation with resistance leaders, and seizure of enemy documents--followed a pattern that was to be tried and tested by many CIC detachments before the Normandy fighting had ended.

The agents who came right behind the first combat troops found the residents confused and restless, their homes destroyed by bombardment, street fighting and fire. The civilians were particularly fearful about a group of German soldiers dug in just beyond the town on the road to Grandcamp.

Through Andre Farin, a resistance leader from Grandcamp, CIC made contact with Isigny's resistance leader, a M. Charles, who was also a director of the local bank. Utilizing Charles' aid, they immediately arranged a meeting

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* Intelligence Operation V Corps, European Campaign, 18 May 1942 - 10 May 1945 (Booklet), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 82d Abn Div CIC Det Weekly Rpt, 6-11 June 1944, in 82d Abn Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified); and 4th Inf Div CIC Det Periodic Rpt, 8 June 1944, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), G2 Jnl File, 4th Inf Div, 2-9 June 1944 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

with several resistance leaders to learn the counterintelligence situation, to determine the reliability of the town officials, to check White and Black lists, and to set up plans for an interim government.

They established a temporary office in the town hall that had served as a District German Naval Headquarters. A search of the hall produced several secret documents of tactical interest, which were turned over to Lt. Charles B. Conick of the 301st (First Army) CIC Detachment for transmission to the proper authorities.*

Travel Control Is A Major Problem

Nearly every detachment was faced with numerous problems in the control of civilian traffic and the handling of refugees coming through the lines, operations which were complicated by the congestion in the beachhead area and by the lack of an over-all plan.

In the first town they entered, Ste. Mere-Eglise, the 82d CIC Detachment received assurance from the mayor that he would encourage civilians to return to their homes and that the local five-man police force would set up necessary road controls to halt the civilian movement in and out of the town. The detachment also assisted Civil Affairs and Military Police in selection of their control posts. In his report at the end of the first week, Lieutenant Jacobi recommended that refugee points for the collection of wanderers and strays be set up in the main towns in the occupied area, and that identification be provided for each refugee cleared through such stations.**

At about the same time, Lieutenant Appleton, 4th CIC Detachment CO, suggested that front line soldiers be instructed to challenge all civilians and to require that they show their French identification. He further recommended that any person who was not thoroughly identifiable from his photograph should be turned over to a fluent French linguist for interrogation, since a large percentage of German soldiers spoke poor French and could be trapped by their shortcomings in the language.***

The 1st CIC Detachment, in a later summary of activities of this period, also reported much confusion in the handling of French civilians until after the

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* Rpt of 29th Inf Div CIC Activities in Isigny, 11 Jun 44, Correspondence File, 29th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096).

** 82d Abn CIC Det Weekly Rpt, 6-11 Jun 44, in 82d Abn Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Periodic Rpt, 4th Inf Div CIC Det, 13 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File, 8-19 Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

division reached Caumont on 13 June. At this time, it was possible to establish a forward security line behind which all civilians could be placed, both for their own safety and to neutralize them as security threats.*

Generally, the reception accorded the U. S. troops by French civilians was enthusiastic. It was reported that the residents were almost 100 percent pro-Allied. Numerous denunciations were made, but upon investigation it usually appeared that the accused had worked for the Germans because he had been forced to do so or had traded with them for profit. In questioning the denunciators, CIC agents found that few of them were able to distinguish between the ideological collaborators and those who had dealt with the Germans for mercenary reasons. The distinction was important because the latter cases were considered of French interest.**

In some areas, especially that covered by the 4th Infantry Division, CIC agents found that, although the civilians were cooperative, they seemed reluctant to divulge information because they did not yet feel "secure enough to reveal themselves."***

Todt Workers Present Special Problem

Todt workers, members of a para-military labor force recruited by the Germans, also presented a problem, since there was no clearly defined policy for handling them. They always claimed to have been conscripted but most of them were believed to have been willing recruits. Usually, these persons were turned over to corps headquarters for disposition.****

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* "Intelligence Activities, 1st Inf Div," Jun-Sep 44 (ETO), (30-2), (Master 7934), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.). NOTE: Records do not indicate whether this suggestion was adopted; however, it seems that such suggestions usually were put into effect at the same time the suggestion was written into a report.

** 29th Inf Div CIC Det Situation Rpt, 11 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096). NOTE: Although no documents are available as proof, it is probable that a "hands off" policy was followed in these cases because it was felt that the French would deal with them expeditiously.

*** 82d Abn CIC Det Weekly Rpt, 6-11 Jun 44, in 82d Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 4th Inf Div, /s/ Appleton, 12 Jun to 23 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

CIC Produces Tactical Information

Throughout this beachhead period, much of CIC's contribution was in the collection of tactical information. Agents of the 82d CIC Detachment were credited with finding, on the body of a German officer, a document indicating the Order of Battle of units opposing their division.* The 1st CIC Detachment obtained from a French resistance leader the location of a German ammunition dump, names of key resistance figures throughout the area, and facts regarding enemy troop movements in the vicinity of Berginy.**

Questioning of civilians by 29th CIC Detachment agents produced two important pieces of tactical information: they learned of a subterranean tunnel, wide enough for the passage of vehicles, which ran for several miles along the coast in the area of Criqueville-Englesqueville, and they found a man who knew the exact location of underground telephone cables from Cherbourg to Caen.***

Some of the most important document caches were found in organization Todt headquarters. In a search of these headquarters in Ste. Mere-Eglise, Lieutenant Salstrom and Agent George A. George of the 82d Detachment, found several boxes of documents containing detailed construction plans for defensive installations, pill-boxes, road obstacles, military camps, supply dumps and heavy gun emplacements on the Cotentin Peninsula. Names of employees and their pay records were included. All these documents, along with five captured Todt engineers, were sent along to headquarters of VII Corps, which was already planning its advance up the peninsula to Cherbourg.****

By 2000 hours on D plus 1, 4th CIC Detachment agents had found numerous documents in enemy headquarters throughout the area, from which the Germans had fled in surprise, but by the end of the week they found that searches became less profitable because the enemy was destroying or removing most of the items of intelligence value before retreating.*****

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* 82d Abn Div CIC Det Weekly Rpt, 6-11 Jun 44, in 82d Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Memo dtd 12 Jun 44, /s/ Steinway, in 301.2.2 (Master 22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 29th Inf Div CIC Det Situation Rpt, 11 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

**** Memo, subj, "CIC Investigated Todt Hq at Ste. Mere-Eglise," dtd 9 Jun 44, /s/ Sgt Tainer (Not CIC) to G2, Memo, subj, "Seizure of Enemy Documents," /s/ George A. George, dtd 10 Jun 44; and 82d Abn Div CIC Det Weekly Rpt, /s/ Jacobi, dtd 6-11 Jun 44, all in 82d Abn Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

***** CIC Periodic Rpt, 13 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File, 8-13 Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

No Espionage, Sabotage Activity Found

No reports have been found of sabotage or espionage activity, although all detachments remained alert to the possibility of stay behind agents and German agents infiltrating the lines in civilian clothes. The only personality target arrest reported was a woman apprehended by the 101st CIC Detachment in the "hub" city of Carentan. On arrival there, on D plus 4, Captain McGuire and his men found personality files and German black lists in the local Gestapo office. A study of these files revealed that a business man, had willingly aided the Germans as an interpreter. She was arrested and sent to England for internment.*

Rear Area Security Considered Satisfactory

By the end of the first week, as Allied Forces were preparing for the breakout from the beachhead area, several detachments reported that security in their rear areas was satisfactory and that the civilian traffic problem was less acute, due partly to established controls and partly to realization by the civilians that such controls were necessary.**

In the first few days after the landing, CIC detachments were expected to perform security checks of the areas selected to be division or regimental command posts. The 4th CIC Detachment was particularly efficient, reporting the completion of their surveys on the evening of D plus 1.***

2d and 502 CIC Detachments Join V Corps Area

On the V Corps Front, the 1st Infantry Division had steadily shoved the enemy southward until, on 13 June, they were 20 miles inland at Caumont. In the meantime the 29th had driven west to contact VII Corps and the 2d Infantry Division, and the 2d Armored Division had moved in to lend support at potential danger points all along the front.****

By the time NEPTUNE was a week old, the beachheads were firmly established, consolidated and broadened into an area extending up to twenty miles inland at one point and stretching forty-two miles across. Nine U. S. and seven British divisions

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* Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire, 24 August 1954, Fort Holabird.

** CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 7-13 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div, G2 Jnl File, 8-13 Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

*** CIC Det Periodic Rpt, Subj, "CIC Detachment, 24 hours, ending 2000, 7 Jun 44," to G2, 4th Inf Div, /s/ O. D. Appleton, CO, CIC Det, 304-2.3, (Master 28588) G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** A Soldier's Story by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951), pp 25

had landed, tons of supplies had been funnelled through the beaches, and the U.S. VII Corps was set for its first breakout.

During June, four more divisions came in and two more corps became operational, to join the forces rushing up the Cotentin Peninsula towards Cherbourg, or to join those protecting the base of the peninsula and preparing for the bigger breakout that would follow the reduction of Cherbourg. The 79th Infantry Division landed during the three day period 12-14 June, the 30th Infantry Division on 15 June, the 83d Infantry Division on 18 June, and the 3d Armored Division on 29 June. The VIII and XIX Corps became operational on 15 June.

The 79th CIC Detachment was commanded by 1st Lt. Irvin Bogatin; the 30th by 1st Lt. Melvin Handville; the 83d by 1st Lt. Oliver A. Vietor; the 218th (VIII Corps) by 1st Lt. Albert R. Bowen; the 503d (3d Armored) by 1st Lt. Theodore M. Black; and the 219th (XIX Corps) by Capt. Ernest S. Baker.

Before ten days had passed, more than three hundred CIC agents had taken part in the invasion. In spite of all the confusion of these first days, they had, with intelligence and enthusiasm, gone about their assigned missions of guarding against threats to military security, searching for enemy documents and establishing liaison with local citizens. They had firmly established themselves as part of the combat team.*

* Dates of landings taken from the Army Almanac; and A Soldier's Story by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951): names of Detachment CO's from 10 May roster and reports dated subsequent to this period.

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Chapter 2

CONQUEST OF THE COTENTIN

The second phase of NEPTUNE began on 14 June when VII Corps started to cut across the Cotentin Peninsula. This was the prelude to a northward push on Cherbourg. Already one-third of the way across the Peninsula, the 82d Airborne entered on the westward drive along with the 9th Infantry Division.

As the 9th neared the coast, the 82d pivoted south to form a defensive line across the Cotentin neck. On the morning of 18 June the 9th Division captured its final objective on the west coast, and twenty-four hours later began its race toward Cherbourg. The 4th Division, which had been expanding the beachhead north and west, and the newly arrived 79th Infantry Division joined in a three-pronged attack on this seaport.

The 90th Division was transferred from the VII Corps front, shifting south to the Cotentin neck. Cherbourg was encircled 21 June, and after a desperate fight, surrendered on 27 June. The 4th, 9th and 79th Divisions quickly wiped out remaining resistance on the Peninsula.*

VII Corps CIC Detachment Operates on Peninsula

Ranging up and down the Cotentin Peninsula, sometimes with the forward combat troops and sometimes in the rear areas, agents of the 207th CIC Detachment and their attached ADSEC agents had a busy time, as evidenced by brief comments in their daily log. It is apparent that agents from the Twelfth Army Group CIC Detachment were also attached to the 207th CIC, since names of some of these agents appear frequently in the daily commentary kept by the detachment from 6 June to 28 June 1944. Obviously some members of the Air Corps CIC detachments based in England also had been sent to the continent since the following statement appears in the log for 23 June 1944: "Two CIC men of Ninth Air Corps [evidently Air Force is intended] are now stationed at Ste. Mere-Eglise."**

Again there seems to have been little difference between work of the VII Corps Detachment from that of the division detachments, except that the 207th CIC Detachment was attempting to coordinate the work of the different divisional detachments and to set a take-over system into operation, as planned by directives published before the invasion. But the take-over system often worked in reverse, with the corps detachment first entering a town and then turning over its records to a divisional detachment.

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* A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951) pp 298-314

** 207th CIC log, 6-28 Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097). (NOTE: Available NEPTUNE plans do not include mention of these units).

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On the rapid move up the Peninsula, VII Corps CIC Agents frequently seemed to be with forward troop elements in areas which, according to plan, were to be covered by divisional detachments. On one occasion, after searching what was reported to have been the former quarters of the German General Rommel near Pont L'Abbe and two chateaus north of Orglandes, former billets for German officers and Organization Todt workers, 1st Lt. John H. Heminway and Agents John H. Reber and Charles K. Schroeder, of the 207th's Group #4 turned their document haul over to the 90th CIC Detachment. Again, on 26 June, the day before the final capitulation of Cherbourg, the 207th passed information on the Barneville area to the 90th.*

Only two incidents in which a divisional detachment turned over records to corps have been found, although doubtless there were others, since the 207th was trying to get the take-over system into operation. One occured on 21 June, when the 4th CIC Detachment transferred to the 207th records on the Valognes and Montebourg area which it had been working for three days, and the second on 29 June, when the 4th CIC Detachment closed its Cherbourg office, delivered its records to the 207th and moved with its division to a new position at the southern end of the Contentin Peninsula.**

The first complaint about the inadequacies of the take-over system was expressed in a summary by 9th Division's G2 at the close of the Cotentin Campaign:

"CIC: The same problem confronted Divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula as in Tunisia and Sicily, in that the Division CIC personnel were spread over a wide area in the rear, and were unable to keep pace with the Division advance. It is recommended that higher headquarters take over towns behind the lines more promptly. There is much for CIC to do with the front line troops."***

This was only the first of many such official comments to be made over a situation that plagued CIC's operations throughout the European campaign and was listed as one of the chief deficiencies in counterintelligence by the USFET General Board in their report at the end of the war.****

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* 207 CIC Log, 6-28 June 1944 (unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center Box 25097).

** Periodic Rpt, 4th Inf Div CIC Det, 29-30 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File (unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.

*** Ltr, subj, "Rpt of Opns, G2," Dtd 5 Jul 44, from Lt Col Robert W. Robbs, G2, 9th Inf Div, to G2 of VII Corps, in 309-2.2 (unclassified),(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Report of the General Board, USFET, "Organization and Operation of the CIC in the ETO," Study Number 13 (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

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207th Agents Scout for Corps CP Sites

A possible explanation of the preponderance of work done by the 207th in forward areas was attributed by a member of the detachment to General Collins' habit of moving his Corps Headquarters forward of his divisions when he wished to press those divisions forward during the move toward Cherbourg. On these occasions he sent corps CIC agents scouting in front of the lines for a suitable location, a rather unusual mission for CIC. That may have contributed to the tendency of the VII Corps Detachment to stay up front.

At various times during the Cotentin Peninsula battle, the 207th CIC Detachment assisted tactical troops in clearing out pockets of German soldiers. Although French resistance groups proved helpful, CIC agents often were alarmed over their irresponsibility. On one such occasion some resistance members had reported, evidently without sufficient investigation, that a certain pocket of German soldiers, located four or five miles below Carteret had requested permission to surrender. As the agents, accompanied by tactical troops, advanced to accept the surrender, the Germans opened fire and the Corps G2, who had decided to go along on the mission, was killed.

Throughout the European Theater of Operations Campaign, CIC agents were often the first Allied representatives to enter a recently evacuated town. This was the case in Carteret, on the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula, in which Agents Varenick and Charles Schroeder received a "hero's welcome" upon arrival on 22 June. They immediately contacted the mayor, who was in session with the town's aldermen, and organized the town's firemen into a police force, a procedure which became a standard practice throughout the campaign in France. The considerations behind this practice included the following: the firemen were natives of the town and knew the inhabitants; they were an organized group, accustomed to taking orders; and they were less likely to have been infiltrated by pro-Nazis than the existing police forces.*

Disposition of Organization Todt Workers

The handling of Organization Todt workers remained a problem, since clear-cut policy was established. Reports from 4th CIC Detachment reveal that on 12 June, five were referred to VII Corps headquarters; on 14 June several were turned over to Civil Affairs; on 16 June seven were interrogated by 4th CIC Agents aided by 207th CIC Detachment Agents, but were allowed to remain where they were since they were believed not to be subversive. Again on 18 and 19 June, Organization Todt workers were turned over to Civil Affairs, but on 23 June three

* Interview with Michael E. Varenick, former VII Corps CIC Detachment Agent 6-8 Aug 54, Chicago; and 207 CIC Det log. 6-28 Jun 44 (unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

were sent by First Army to a "civilian workers collection point."* This problem became more acute near the end of the Peninsular campaign when, during a two-day period, the 4th CIC Detachment found more than one hundred Organization Todt workers.**

Conflicting directives applying to the Russians among the Organization Todt workers created a situation of special concern to CIC. When VII Corps agents went to the 9th Infantry Division PW enclosure at St. Jacques de Nehou on 20 June, to interview thirty such Russians, they learned that twelve of them had been sent to the beach the night before for transfer to England as Prisoners of War. They proceeded to interrogate the remainder, but had screened only eight when the Major in charge of the enclosure ordered all of them loaded on trucks for the transfer. Although the agents protested that Organization Todt workers were to be separated from Prisoners of War and sent to civilian detention camps, the Major brushed them off with the explanation that he had orders that all Russians were to be treated as Prisoners of War. The whole group was shipped to England.*** Confusion may have arisen from the fact that, in addition to the Russians who had been recruited both voluntarily and involuntarily as laborers, a number of Cossack troops were known to have volunteered as soldiers in the German Army. Evidently both CIC agents and the Major had been insufficiently briefed as to these differing categories. That officials at higher echelons were aware of the presence of Russian soldiers among the Germans is evident from one unusual assignment given to a CIC agent. On 21 June, while Allied soldiers waited outside the garrison at Cherbourg, Agent Michael Varenick, of VII Corps CIC Detachment, broadcast in Russian an appeal for the surrender of the garrison.****

Corps Detachment Develops Coordination Methods

As more small villages and towns came within VII Corps control, refugee problems became more pressing, and agents of the 207th often conferred with divisional detachments on methods of refugee handling and civilian movement control.***** Available documents indicate that, in spite of the rapid advance,

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* CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 4th Inf Div. /s/ Appleton, 12 Jun through 23 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588) 4th Inf Div, G2 Jnl and file (unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

** CIC Det Periodic Rpt, 4th Inf Div CIC Det, 21-26 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File (unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 207th CIC Det Log, 20 June 44, (unclassified) (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25097).

**** 207th Corps Det Log, 21 Jun 44, Ibid; and Interview with Michael Varenick, August 1954, Chicago, Ill.

***** 207th CIC Det Log, 23 June 1944, Ibid.

the 207th CIC Detachment was accomplishing a considerable amount of coordination with the divisional detachments in other matters as well. This liaison was important, not only in the Normandy campaign, but as experience for future action on the continent. With the assistance of an OSS representative, corps agents obtained from resistance leaders complete "Black and White" lists for the Peninsula, which they passed on to all the CIC detachments in operation there.* Lists of collaborators compiled by divisional detachments were also processed by the 207th and distributed to units throughout the areas concerned.**

Busy 207th CIC Detachment agents found time to contact the newly arrived 79th CIC Detachment, and brief them on techniques which had been developed for mail handling, daily reports and refugee control. And on the 23d, Agents Varenick and Stephen J. Neville visited Brix and procured four resistance leaders, who were to lead forward units into Cherbourg. These natives were delivered to 79th Division Headquarters.***

VII Corps CIC agents also received from the division detachments several suspects whom they interrogated further before referring them to army for final disposition. Among these were who had been arrested by the 4th CIC Detachment after being denounced by citizens of Valognes. was accused of having reported three American parachutists to the Germans on D Day. He claimed that, peering through a slot in his door at about 0400 hours, he saw three "masked men" with guns and, believing them to be bandits or terrorists, fled through a side window to report them to the Germans. As soon as he had made the report, continued, it abruptly occurred to him that these men were in fact Allied parachutists. He then rushed back to persuade his neighbor to hide them, but they had disappeared. Questioned by CIC agents, the neighbor confirmed that had asked him to hide the parachutists. But the findings were considered inconclusive and was sent further to the rear.

The case against was also weak. was accused by five Frenchmen of having written and disseminated anti-Allied literature, for which express purpose he purportedly had been released from a German prison camp. The accusers, however, were unable to produce any of the literature, insisting that it had been lost or destroyed. When interrogated by CIC, denied all charges. He claimed to have been a French soldier, captured at Dunkirk. The Germans released him, he said, in April 1943, because his wife had died, leaving his children uncared for. He maintained that it was not unusual

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* 207 CIC Det Log 6-28 Jun 44, Ibid.

** 4th Inf Div Periodic Rpts, 21-26 Jun 44, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588) 4th Inf Div Jnl File (unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 207th CIC Det Log, 23 Jun 44 (unclassified) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097).

for the Germans to release prisoners for similar humanitarian reasons. He also was sent to the rear.*

Several persons regarded as security threats also were arrested by 207th agents, among them a Interviews with six informants had indicated that these had been responsible for capture of two American parachutists who were hidden in a villager's home and the seizure of seven villagers as hostages.**

4th CIC Detachment Operates in Front Lines

As the 4th Infantry Division inched its way up the peninsula in preparation for the final big push on Cherbourg, 4th CIC Detachment agents were operating largely in front line areas, searching abandoned enemy positions and conducting routine questionings of civilians, who by now were beginning to volunteer information on enemy activities and local collaborators.*** On 27 June, as the last German defenders of Cherbourg were surrendering, the entire detachment, except for three agents who remained at the Division CP, moved into the city and initiated their major operation of the campaign. Here, the agents arrested a number of collaborators, checked control posts, made sure that local police were cooperating with the Military Police in the checking of identification papers, and searched German installations. In these installations the great bulk of documents uncovered prompted CIC to call in the corps Order of Battle Team to look over the haul on the spot, reversing the usual procedure of moving documents elsewhere for study.

CIC men were less successful in their searches after the tactical troops had a chance to move into Cherbourg. When agents inspected an underground communications system at the request of the 8th Infantry Regiment's S2, they discovered that it had been looted by the troops. All documents of intelligence interest had been destroyed.

One 4th CIC Detachment agent went to the Pasteur Hospital in Cherbourg to inspect identity cards of employees. He found all papers in order except those of who had Red Cross identification papers, but wore a Hitler Jugend uniform, complete with swastika armbands and medals. The agent arrested her and turned her over to the civilian collecting point for disposition.****

* 4th Inf Div CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 21-23 June 1944, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588) 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File (U)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 207th CIC Det Log, 20 June 44, (unclassified) (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25097).

*** 4th Inf Div CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 12 June 1944 through 23 June 1944, in 304-2.3 (Master 28588), 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl File (unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** 4th Inf Div Periodic Rpts, 27-29 June 1944, Ibid.

4th Detachment Activities Believed Typical

Few reports are available on the 4th CIC Detachment, and only scattered reports on the 9th. These reports indicate that the 9th was collecting and sending back to the G2 a considerable amount of tactical information.*

However, a daily log kept by the 79th CIC Detachment has, through its brief entries, furnished what is believed to be a typical survey of the work of a divisional detachment in this rapidly changing situation.

In the conquest of the Cotentin, the 79th Infantry Division had a major role. After landing on UTAH Beach on 12-14 June and entering combat five days later, the division attacked on the high ground west and northwest of Valognes and the high ground south of Cherbourg.

After taking Fort du Roule, division troops entered Cherbourg on 27 June. After Cherbourg, the 79th held a defensive line at the Ollonde River until 2 July, when it returned to the offensive to take La Haye du Puits on 8 July.

Three members of the CIC detachment with the 79th Infantry Division--1st Lt. Irvin Bogatin, Detachment Commander and agents William C. Burton and J. A. Forsyth--landed in France on 14 June with Division Headquarters, and the remaining members of the detachment joined them several days later.**

Agents Arrest Two Inquisitive Frenchmen

On 19 June, the day after the division entered combat, the first CIC report disclosed that the 79th CIC was searching the highway between Negreville and Valognes for a German Headquarters reported to be near this main avenue of travel.

Numerous suspects were encountered by CIC in these first days. Two Frenchmen, found loitering near American ammunition dumps, were arrested, and the activities of a young French girl who reportedly collaborated with the Germans were investigated because she was suspected of attempting to communicate with the departed Nazis.

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* 9th Inf Div CIC Det Rpts in G2 Jnl, 309-2.2 (Master 15163), Cotentin Peninsula Operations, 11 June - 2 July 1944, and MII Rpt, 28 June 1944, in same Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Interview with J. A. Forsyth, former agent, 79th Inf Div CIC Det, 28 October 1954, Baltimore, Maryland.

Agents, besides questioning numerous civilians and checking curfew enforcement, also reported to tactical troops the presence of a group of German soldiers in a chateau near Negreville.*

Belgian Informers Puzzle Agents

By 22 June, 79th CIC was processing its first group of dangerous CI personalities in Brix. A German soldier, a volunteer Organization Todt worker, a collaborator, and two anti-Allied Belgian informers comprised this group.

The two Belgian informers proved to be the most puzzling suspects. Fluent in several languages, the two men had first attracted CIC's attention when they were picked up for suspicious conduct on the main highway to Cherbourg. Released after preliminary questioning, they were apprehended again when they were observed carrying small packages in and out of their homes in Brix. Informants added that the two Belgians, who were later arrested and sent to the rear, had also revealed to the Germans the identity of two resistance movement saboteurs.

While in Brix, 79th CIC Detachment members secured the names of several people known to be decidedly hostile to the Allied cause and investigated the suspicious behavior of a the was arrested and taken to the rear for possessing possibly to the Germans. CIC recommended that he be released "... with strong warning to stay away from Army installations."**

Safe-Opening Creates Furor

Shortly after 79th CIC entered Brix, detachment members had an unprofitable but significant experience with an abandoned safe found in one of the headquarters of the Todt organization.

First discovered by agents of the corps detachment, the safe had weathered efforts by agents to blast it open with hand grenades. But the 79th CIC Detachment attempt was more successful--at least in getting it open!

A master sergeant, an amateur blasting "expert" borrowed from Division Headquarters, used five pounds of dynamite to open the safe--a safe-opening that had far-reaching repercussions.

The resulting blast was momentous. It completely demolished the safe and the eight-room house containing it, scattered money and documents all over the

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* 79th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 20 June 1944, in 79th CIC Det Jnl, 20 June 1944 to 27 April 1945, (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

** 79th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 22 June 1944, in CIC Jnl, 79th CIC Det, Ibid.

Normandy country-side, and started numerous small fires. The blast also brought an entire battalion from a nearby infantry regiment, who thought that the Germans might be launching a new offensive in the rear area.*

G2 Outlines Safe-Opening Procedure

This blast may have influenced Colonel Benhamin A. Dickson, First Army G2, in his decision to prepare an SOP for safe-opening. Such an SOP was outlined in a letter issued on 25 July, with a notation that the letter should be made "available to all CIC personnel."

The letter pointed out that "Safes and strong boxes belonging to the PTT, French Governmental agencies, or civilians should not be blown open or forced in the search for tactical intelligence or counterintelligence."

It directed that such safes and strong boxes be placed under guard when necessary and an effort made through Civil Affairs to locate the owner or responsible person who might be able to give access to the contents without using destructive means.

An added note explained that if immediate action was necessary and the owner could not be found, authority should be obtained through the G2 of the appropriate corps or division for use of destructive means.**

Agents ask: Can Frenchmen Enlist in U.S. Army?

During this period, agents encountered an unexpected problem: What was the procedure a Frenchman should follow in enlisting in the U.S. Army? Was this even possible? An excerpt from one daily report read: "Request that information be supplied this Detachment on the possibility of Frenchmen enlisting in the Army of U.S. Numerous questions have been asked members of this Detachment regarding this widespread desire."***

As June drew to a close, agents were spending a great deal of time processing civilians seeking haven south of Cherbourg. One such civilian considered suspicious by agents was Georgette Beck, found in a pillbox with German soldiers where, she alleged, she had taken refuge to escape the bombardment of Cherbourg.

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* Interview with James A. Forsyth, former Agent with the 79th CIC Det, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Ltr, Hq First Army, subj, "Opening of Safes and Strong Boxes," to AC of S G2, V, VII, VIII, and XII Corps, /s/ Col B. A. Dickson, dtd 25 July 1944 in 305-2.2 (Master 47623) G2, Jnl and File, 5th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 79th CIC Det Daily Report, 24 June 1944, in CIC Journal, 79th CIC Detachment.

Believing her story, agents gave her a pass and instructed her to continue her southward movement. Evidently Mlle. Beck did not heed CIC's advice for on 26 June she was again picked up, this time near La Glacerite. This time she was not released.

79th CIC Enters Cherbourg

On 27 June, the 79th CIC entered Cherbourg to initiate counterintelligence coverage. Immediately the agents called a meeting with the mayor and other town officials to discuss security measures. While recommending that police be placed around all former German-used buildings, telephone buildings and the post offices, CIC also made preliminary arrangements for temporary jail facilities.

"The other various steps necessary for occupation by CIC and Civil Affairs were taken, and a report thereof submitted to Captain Dorsett (VII Corps CIC CO)," one daily report explained.*

The last two days of June were eventful ones for agents of the 79th CIC. On 29 June, agents established liaison with VIII Corps CIC, overhauled a detachment vehicle, directed division troops to the hiding place of six German soldiers, prepared a tentative road control plan, and obtained information on informers and suspects in the area.

One line crosser, apprehended on 30 June as he attempted to pass through American lines in the area of the 313th Regiment, declared that he had been given a mission by an American soldier to get tactical information. He added that he had been given a hand grenade and promised 500 francs upon successful completion of his mission. When a check with VII and VIII Corps CIC and the OSS failed to corroborate the story, he was evacuated through POW channels.**

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* 79th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 27th June 1944, in CIC Journal, 79th CIC Det, Ibid.
** 79th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 3 Jul 1944, in CIC Journal, 79th CIC Det, Ibid.

Chapter 3

STALEMATE IN THE SOUTH

While VII Corps was busy liberating the Cotentin Peninsula, V Corps and the newly formed VIII and XIX Corps were assigned to hold the line across the base of the Peninsula joining the British forces east of Caumont, about twenty miles inland.

V Corps, consisting of the 1st and 2d Infantry and the 2d Armored Divisions, held the line nearest the British and on west to a spot about four miles northeast of St. Lo. At the center of the line, XIX Corps was given the 29th Infantry Division and, a day or two later, the newly arrived 30th. Before the end of June, the 3d Armored Division was added. VII Corps, which, along with XIX Corps became operational on 15 June, took over the front toward the west coast. At first it included only the 101st Airborne Division, but, as VII Corps shifted toward the north, the 82d Airborne and the 90th Infantry Division were left with VIII Corps, and, before, the end of June, the newly arrived 83d Infantry Division was added.

With First Army's principal attack steered toward Cherbourg, and with ammunition rationing necessitated by supply shortages, the offensive in the south rumbled to a halt, the fronts ". . . half drowned in the rivers and marshlands of the Cotentin neck. And everywhere the battleground was boxed in by hedgerows.*"

Stalemate Helps CIC Consolidate Operations

This stalemate period with its lack of movement provided CIC the first opportunity for systematic counterintelligence coverage. For all detachments in the area, it also was a period for developing coverage techniques and for setting up liaison with interdependent organizations and with other CIC detachments.

Most of the detachments for which documents are available had by this time adopted the plan of splitting into several teams for better coverage. The 219th CIC Detachment (XIX Corps), which had begun operations on 15 June, divided the corps area into three sectors with a team of two agents operating from the largest village in the sector. The remaining agents were based at the Corps Command Post as a reserve to handle "spot incidents" and to maintain liaison with other CIC units. Captain Baker reported that ". . . this system of coverage has worked efficiently from the viewpoint of detailed knowledge of the area and quick awareness of all matters of counterintelligence interest occurring therein.**"

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* A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley, (Henry Holt and Company, 1951), pp. 284-316.

** "After Action Report, Section II -- Intelligence, CIC Det 27," dtd 30 Jun 44, in Opns Rpts, L13 (L), XIX Corps, June 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

A similar procedure was adopted by the 208th CIC in order to provide security coverage for its rapidly expanding area, which soon grew to an eighteen-mile front. When the detachment started its work on 18 June, only six agents were available, but a few days later, the remainder of the detachment joined the advance party.* Soon after beginning operations, Lieutenant Bowen divided his detachment into a number of teams which he sent into neighboring towns to set up field offices, a practice which was followed throughout the campaign across France.

After determining what major towns in the area immediately behind the division's rear boundary merited security coverage, Lieutenant Bowen would dispatch two-agent teams to these towns. In many instances, only one agent was available, and Lieutenant Bowen would, in his own words have to, "beg, borrow, or steal" additional personnel to assist in initiating counterintelligence work in a town. Quite often, he would borrow an interpreter from the Military Intelligence Interpreter Team, a driver from the motor pool, another man from the Order of Battle Team, and perhaps some other unoccupied soldier wandering around the detachment area. These "recruited" assistants, along with the agent, would speed for the town by jeep.

On arrival, the agent and his three or four helpers would pick out the most accessible building for their center of operations. These quarters often turned out to be the former headquarters of the Gestapo or a similarly privileged organization. Actual CIC work would then begin.

Interpreter Handles Interrogations

At the outset, the lone agent had to handle almost all of the interrogations, a task that usually kept him occupied for eighteen or more hours every day.

However, once the agent's assistants caught the drift of CIC procedures, the burden of the agent's shoulders was greatly lessened. The interpreter, after working with the agent for many hours, assumed the responsibility of handling almost all of the interrogations, and the other helpers were of great aid in receiving and processing the suspects and informants and recording the information that had been obtained.

Freed from many of his initial duties, the agent was able to recruit and satisfactorily clear indigenous personnel to augment his staff. Resistance group

* VIII Corps G2 Jnl and File, 20 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
NOTE: Probably ten men.

members, ex-town policemen and the former mayor or other reliable city officials were usually the people selected because they possessed detailed knowledge of the town, its environs and inhabitants.

In the course of their stay in Normandy, the VII Corps CIC agents developed an expeditious and thorough procedure, arrived at mainly through trial and error, for screening the hundreds of constantly shifting civilians. A variety of civilians would be assembled by the agent and his staff. These groups often reached 200 individuals per day. Using reliable indigenous help, the CIC agent could usually reduce this total to approximately fifteen suspects. Further detailed interrogation would cut this number to perhaps half a dozen and these individuals would be evacuated through Prisoner-of-War channels to the First Army Interrogation Center.*

Division Detachments Work in Teams

Division detachments, like the corps detachments, also found that the team method was the most effective way of providing area coverage. During the latter half of June, the 1st CIC Detachment was split first into three and then into four teams. The agents were stationed in the towns of Foulognes, Planquery and Cormolain, from three to five miles behind the lines, and at the Division Command Post, southeast of Balleroy, about six miles behind the front. Remaining throughout the period, the CIC teams were able to cover these towns and the surrounding areas thoroughly. In addition to their regular duties of impounding mail, searching former German positions for documents, and checking enforcement of security measures, they were also able to obtain much information of tactical value from refugees fleeing the combat area.**

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* Interview with Mr. Albert Bowen, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland attorney, 26 November 1954. Mr. Bowen added the following commentary on the information given above: "The success of this system reflects on the calibre of men with VIII Corps CIC. The average enlisted man in the U.S. Army -- and most of these men were corporals or sergeants -- would have been totally incapable of initiating and supervising an operation of this nature. Diplomacy, imagination, sound judgment, and the ability to make decisions rapidly were qualities that the lone agent had to have in abundance when he set up his office in a town of several thousand inhabitants. VIII Corps CIC was able to provide fairly thorough coverage of the corps zone only because the detachment had agents who could combine a professional background and sound judgment with practical experience. Coordination of the efforts of these separate field offices was attained by constant daily supervision by the CO."

** 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Situation Summaries and other rpts, 15-30 Jun 44, in. 301-2.2 (Master 22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnls, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Even before its first day of operations, the 30th CIC Detachment was divided into teams, with one assigned to each of the regimental areas and one held in reserve at the Division Command Post. Since there were no towns of more than 100 population in the 30th CIC's area, no town headquarters were established.* Members of the reserve team were sent out as needed to augment regimental teams.**

Teams from the 30th CIC Detachment and Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams worked in close coordination, and the G2 often combined the two agencies, sending out units comprised of both CIC and MII personnel to handle investigations, falling within either's jurisdiction.***

Other division detachments, notably the 503d (3d Armored Division), manipulated teams freely. On some occasions 503d CIC teams joined with teams from other divisions for town coverage when their areas were contiguous or when the other division was expected to move into the town after the 3d Armored left.****

Corps Detachments Work Out Coordination Procedures

This period of comparative quiet gave Corps CIC detachments the opportunity for developing procedures for coordinating the activities of the divisional detachments within their areas and for planning orderly take-over procedures. For example, the 219th CIC Detachment daily sent a team to the headquarters of the 30th, 29th and 503d CIC Detachments where names of contacts and suspects and other counterintelligence information were exchanged.*****

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* 30th Inf Div CIC Periodic Counterintelligence Rpt #1, 18 Jun 44, /s/ Handville, in General Jnl and File, 30th Inf Div, 24 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Memo, subj, "Security Situation at St. Sauveur le Vicomte," dtd 21 Jun 44, /s/ Bowen, in VIII Corps G2 Jnl, 20-22 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Extracts from XIX Corps G2 Jnls, Jun 44, re 30th Div; MII Team #420, Rpt #4, 15 Jun 44; "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, in rg 207: 03, L-39(5), 30th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Memo for AC of S, G2, 3d Armored Division, from 2d Armored Division CIC Det, /s/ T.M. Black, CO, CIC Det #4, subj, "Summary of CIC Activities 26-30 Jun," dtd 29 Jun 44, in 503d Det File Rpts (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

***** 30th Inf Div, "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, /s/ Handville, in rg 207.03, L-39 (5), 30th Inf Div, G2 Jnl & File, 5-6 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

To encourage the divisional detachments to prepare records to leave with the next incoming detachment, the 708th kept all the divisional detachments supplied with five by eight inch slips of paper, on which they were to record notes on every investigative activity. Experience had already proved that, in a fast moving situation, much of the work performed by the first detachment was lost when the detachment moved on. These notes also facilitated the compilation of the comprehensive monthly report which the corps detachment submitted to First Army.

On one occasion, Lieutenant Bowen had cause for regretting his zeal for maintaining close contact with all the divisional detachments in the Corps. He went to visit the headquarters of the 90th CIC Detachment which, under command of 1st Lt. Walter D. Osborne, was situated in a spacious chateau high on a hill near St. Sauveur le Vicomte. Evidently the activity attendant upon Lieutenant Bowen's arrival focused the attention of a German artillery unit. The resultant fire from their 88's leveled the chateau, destroyed several jeeps, and gave everyone first-hand experience in practicing cover and concealment.*

Several divisional detachments developed innovations to assist in orderly takeover, perhaps the most notable of which was 1st CIC detachment's "town plans" that contained a summary of all pertinent information and recommendations for future handling of an area. Similar "town plans" were used on many later occasions by other detachments.**

Liaison Considered Paramount

Perhaps the most important lesson learned by all CIC detachments during this period was the absolute necessity of liaison, as CIC interdependence with other organizations was clearly demonstrated. Most essential was close cooperation with Civil Affairs (CA), whose work in reinstating governments had to be surveyed from a security standpoint by CIC. Several CIC detachments went through irritating experiences in their dealings with Civil Affairs before it was clear that the two organizations had to cooperate. When CIC agents entered a town ahead of Civil Affairs, as they usually did, they were forced to begin preliminary organization of the town's government, later relinquishing its supervision to Civil Affairs officials.

Although well versed in theory, many of these Civil Affairs officials had little practical experience, Lieutenant Bowen said, and, at first, could not understand CIC's insistence upon travel restrictions and other security measures. To add to the difficulty, Civil Affairs sent a new team into each liberated town which

* Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Jr., Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.
** 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Summaries and other rpts, 15-30 Jun 44, in 301-2.2 (Master 22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnls, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

resulted in ". . . experienced CIC officials running into these green Civil Affairs officials in every town. The ritual of educating Civil Affairs personnel in proper security measures continued throughout Normandy."*

Difficult as the "ritual of education" may have been, records indicate that, by the close of the Normandy campaign, Civil Affairs and CIC were working generally in close collaboration. Before the end of June, Civil Affairs teams in the VIII Corps area were referring strangers and other suspicious persons to CIC for investigation and, whenever possible, were turning transients over to CIC to screen for use locally as labor.**

The 30th CIC Detachment also reported numerous instances that indicated close cooperation with Civil Affairs. In mid-June, curfew regulations were established by Civil Affairs in Les Veys and Montmartin-en Graignes at CIC's request,*** and, later in June, when the refugee problem became pressing, CIC, Civil Affairs and other interested agencies held several conferences which resulted in tightened travel controls. The new directives prohibited civilians from travelling more than six kilometers from their homes without Civil Affairs permits and from entering any area within two kilometers of the front lines. When dissemination of the order became difficult, Lieutenant Handville volunteered CIC's aid in distributing the notices and in enlisting the assistance of mayors and village priests to inform the inhabitants.****

CIC, Civil Affairs Collaborate in Civilian Control Plans

In the 29th Division area, while the Division was slowly pushing its way toward St. Lo, CIC and Civil Affairs collaborated in plans for the control of the civilian population, which was by then posing a security threat. Front line troops had discovered that when civilians were permitted to remain in their homes close to the battleground, good cover was provided for enemy snipers and artillery and mortar fire. Movement of refugees in the areas of heavy fighting, particularly along the Lison-Isigny road, also offered excellent cover for enemy agents or German soldiers in civilian clothes.

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* Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

** Memo, subj, "Security Situation at St. Sauveur le Vicomte," dtd 21 Jun 44, /s/ Bowen, in VIII Corps G2 Jnl, 20-22 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 30th Inf Div CIC Periodic Counterintelligence Rpt #1, 18 Jun 44, /s/ Handville, in General Jnl and File, 30th Inf Div, 24 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** 30th Inf Div, "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, /s/ Handville, in rg 207.03, L-39(5), 30th Inf Div, G2 Jnl & File, 5-6 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

To remedy this situation it was decided all civilians in the immediate vicinity of the lines were to be evacuated to varied locations according to personal classifications. Voluntary evacuees and those who had to be evacuated because of military necessity were to be moved back to a civilian collection point in the rear of the regimental command post, there to be handled by Civil Affairs. Persons considered suspicious by CIC were to be removed to the Prisoner-of-War collection points. If further investigation proved a suspect harmless, he was to be turned over to Civil Affairs, but if still considered dangerous, he was to be taken rearward and sent to the civilian cage at First Army.

Civilians from points far in the German lines who had voluntarily evacuated were to be taken to the Division civilian assembly area where they could be housed and fed by Civil Affairs. Spies and suspected spies were to be handled in accordance with SOP for CIC, First Army, 12 May 1944.*

An additional provision of this new security policy stated that in all cases civilians who had been evacuated rearward would not be permitted to go forward except to recover personal belongings or cattle, and then only under guard. With the adoption of this new policy, civil security in the Division was greatly improved.

Continuous spot checks on civilian identification cards were made by CIC agents and by Civil Affairs personnel and, although there were rumors of Germans in civilian clothes, no such persons were actually found.**

CIC agents spot-checked and, in some instances, assisted Civil Affairs in manning control posts in the forward areas. In a single day, the 83d CIC Detachment, which had come in with the Division southeast of Carentan on 27 June, reported the screening of six hundred civilians.***

Liaison Maintained With Other Organizations

Among the organizations with which CIC found liaison to be of great benefit, in addition to Civil Affairs, were Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), French Securite Militarire (SM), Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams, Censorship Teams and the Provost Marshal.

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* Contained in App 6, attached to chapter entitled, "Preparation for OVERLORD."

** 29th Inf Div CIC CI Rpt for week ending 25 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, 29th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Kansas Records Center, Bx 25096); and 29th Inf Div CIC Rpt on Region South of Inundated Area to St. Jean de Savigny, 16 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, 29th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

*** A/A Rpt, CIC Det 83d Inf Div, /s/ Vieter, for Jun 44, in 382-CIC-0.3 (Master 11786), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The Detachment Commander of the 208th CIC was in a unique position to accomplish liaison, since he served also as the Counterintelligence Officer on the VIII Corps G2 Staff. Although his dual capacity prevented him from devoting full time to his detachment, Lieutenant Bowen found that this disadvantage was outweighed by his personal daily contact with the Corps G2 and the Chief of Staff which made it possible for him to map out his policies and then execute them. This liaison helped Bowen to simplify administration matters. Finance, personnel and supply for the detachment were all handled by the Corps Headquarters Company. The only administrative duty left to the detachment was filling out the Morning Report.*

One of the first handicaps encountered -- the acute shortage of French-speaking personnel -- was quickly overcome by borrowing two French linguists from a Military Intelligence Interpreter team which operated under direction of an VIII Corps G2 Officer. These two men were replaced by French civilians at CIC's earliest opportunity. One such civilian, a student at a French Academy who was fluent in several languages, was easily cleared because an officer in VIII Corps had known the young man's parents when they were active in diplomatic circles. This man, who stayed with the 208th CIC throughout France, was able to recruit and clear other students to work with the agents and to develop valuable contacts. In addition, a major and a lieutenant from the Free French Forces "joined" the Detachment soon after the landing in France.

A heterogenous group of individuals could usually be found working or conducting business in the CIC tent since, throughout the Normandy campaign, the CIC detachment remained close to Corps Headquarters. Elements of the OSS, the ONI, the US Censorship Staff and the Free French Forces were at one time or another working out of the CIC tents, and CIC received help from all of them and, in turn, assisted them.

The ONI representatives with CIC included several Naval Intelligence Officers who were interested in the coastal areas, the major ports, and some coastline towns which VIII Corps might overrun. Since they had little to do during the early days of activity in Normandy, they "attached" themselves to CIC. Among the "extras" who stayed with CIC most of the time and lent a hand when needed was a censorhsip official who had no particular reason for being there, the Commanding Officer recalled in an interview ten years later, but "probably went along because he enjoyed CIC fellowship and food, particularly the latter."

When the Office of Strategic Services representatives first came in, Bowen said, "with just about everything" -- linguists, radio men, interpreters -- they adopted a rather mysterious attitude, and seemed to "look down" on VIII Corps

* Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

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CIC. But after CIC had caught several of the agents that OSS had sent through the line, their attitude changed and OSS men became extremely cooperative. A code word system was set up so that CIC would not interfere with OSS agents and OSS personnel assisted CIC by contributing their language and technical skills to counterintelligence operations. This assistance did not prevent OSS from concentrating on its own mission of obtaining positive intelligence.*

The 30th CIC Detachment reported close cooperation with Office of Strategic Services, but whether this had existed from the beginning of the Normandy Campaign is not indicated in the records. This cooperation may have stemmed from CIC's capture of an Office of Strategic Services civilian who, equipped with both CIC and Civil Affairs passes, was attempting to cross into German-held territory near St. Lo. Office of Strategic Services took over responsibility for the man and agreed upon plans to avoid such a situation in the future.**

Other detachments reported finding, and turning over to Office of Strategic Services informants who had knowledge of resistance personnel in areas still under enemy control. One such informant who could give information on St. Lo and Torigni-sur Wire was found during this period by the 1st CIC Detachment.***

3d Armored CIC Broadens Its Liaison

Divisional CIC detachments were as keenly aware as Corps CIC of the importance of liaison during this period. Reports from the 503d CIC Detachment indicate that agreements had been made whereby teams from the 29th CIC Detachment would enter towns with teams from the 503d, since the 29th Infantry Division was assigned to hold towns after the 3d Armored had moved on. The 503d CIC also established liaison with the 219th CIC Detachment (XIX Corps) and the 30th Detachment. A daily messenger service was maintained between the 503d and the 219th CIC Detachments and the practice was set up of sending teams from the 503d to Corps headquarters for a few days at a time in order to broaden their understanding of the work being accomplished at corps.

Agents from the 503d CIC met with Agents John J. Kenny and George F. Kavanaugh of the Port CIC Detachment and Agent Leonard E. Hanson of one of

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* Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

** 30th Inf Div, "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, /s/ Handville, in rg 207.03, L-39(5), 30th Inf Div, G2 Jnl and File, 5-6 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Situation Summaries and other reports, 15-30 Jun 44, in 301-2.2 (Master 22292) 1st Inf Div G2 Jnls (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

the 12th Army Group teams then stationed at Isigny, and exchanged information on the area. The Isigny office, unable to get maps of the area, were furnished a full set by the agents of the 503d.

30th CIC Disseminates Card File Data

The 30th CIC Detachment began the compilation of a card file of information received from civilians, who by this time had become much more willing to talk. By 25 June this file contained data on seventy informants and thirty-five suspects. Information on persons outside division boundaries was disseminated to other CIC units; information on members of the French underground was given to the Office of Strategic Services; and a representative from Psychological Warfare was briefed on available information.*

The 30th also maintained a mutual advisory arrangement with Civil Affairs and Military Intelligence Interpreter exchanging with both organizations information of interest.**

503d CIC Makes Troop Movement Security Plan

At the end of June, while the 3d Armored was situated near Oubeaux, the 503d CIC Detachment had an opportunity to make use of all it had learned about security, both military and civil, and to draw upon the sources of liaison which it had so painstakingly developed. The agents received from Lt. Col. A. Barr, Division G2, their first large-scale assignment in security planning.

Colonel Barr, in anticipation of the possibility of a concealed withdrawal, directed the Detachment to prepare a security plan covering their present bivouac area and the one to which the move was contemplated.

Lieutenant Black, Commanding Officer and Agent Anderson first visited Maj. W. H. Taylor, Assistant G3, who indicated on the XIX Corps Assembly Area map the sub-sections of Area "A" then occupied by the Division units and those to be occupied after the move.

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* 30th Inf Div CIC Periodic Counterintelligence Rpt #2, 25 Jun 44, /s/ Handville, in Opns Rots rg 207.03, L-39, 30th Inf Div, 1-2 Jul 44, G2 Jnl & File. (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 30th Inf Div, "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, /s/ Handville, in rg 207.03, L-39(5), 30th Inf Div, G2 Jnl & File, 5-6 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Following this briefing, the CIC men prepared an overlay showing the perimeter of the Division area as it would be, the dividing line between the jurisdictions of 30th Infantry and XIX Corps CIC, and the points on the Division perimeter where roads or trails entered the area. This overlay revealed that there were thirty-eight points on the perimeter where roads entered the area. If three-man reliefs were used at each point, a total of 114 guards, furnished by Civil Affairs, would be needed to cover every entry.

According to the CIC plan, each guard was to inform civilians entering the area that they must pass through without stopping. The only exceptions would be those civilians who had residence or legitimate business within the area. Guards of division units, posted at the bivouac area entrances, would be ordered to prevent loitering along roads within the prohibited zone. Furthermore, each bivouacked unit was to be responsible for preventing access to their area to civilians without legitimate business.

At all junctions where two roads entered the area at a single point, two guard posts were marked, but it was recommended that if traffic proved light enough to enable one man to handle both roads at once, these junctions could be combined into single post points.

CIC detachments of the 30th Infantry Division and the XIX Corps were to furnish security clearance on civilians living within the designated area; and a CIC team from the 3d Armored Division Detachment was to be stationed at Neuilly-la-Foret, Le Neufbourg, and Les Oubeaus-la Croix, to be available immediately for interrogation of suspicious civilians and to perform spot identity checks.*

Instructions Given to S2's

CIC also drew up a set of instructions for unit S2's regarding the tightening of civilian controls, the placing of guard posts, the location of CIC posts, and other security measures that were deemed necessary. These instructions would be disseminated at the same time units were notified of movement plans.

According to these instructions, the 30th and 219th CIC Detachments would be responsible for counterintelligence and civilian security matters in the area then occupied by the 3d Armored Division, with general coverage assistance from the 503d CIC Detachment, whose teams were then situated as follows:

* 3d Armored Div CIC Memo for G2, subj, "Movement Security," 29 Jun 44, /s/ T.M. Black, CO, CIC Det #4, 503d Det File Rpts, (C), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

Team "A" Agents George L. Kiley and U.S. Collins at Louis Andre farm, Le Neufbourg.
Team "B" Agents Albert C. Monteferrato and George W. Bogotay, at old German Headquarters, Neuilly-la-Foret.
Team "C" Agents Lawrence E. Dow and John H. Romey, at schoolhouse, Les Oubeaux.

Since these CIC teams had contact with local police authorities, and with reliable persons who could identify individuals claiming to be local residents, unit commanders were told that they could refer civilian suspects to the nearest town team for check of identity and preliminary interrogation.

This summary notified unit commanding officers that Civil Affairs' regulations provided, in general, that civilians could travel six kilometers from their homes without special permits other than local identity cards, issued by the French.

However, civilians travelling further than six kilometers from their homes would be required to have travel permits issued by local authorities under Civil Affairs supervision, specifying details of permitted travel. Although enforcement of travel and curfew restrictions was a local police function (under Civil Affairs supervision), civilian violators found under circumstances warranting suspicion of espionage were to be reported to CIC for interrogation.

Upon receipt of notice that the division was about to move its location, unit commanding officers were reminded to take all precautions to insure that guards at points of entry to their areas were preventing circulation of civilians without legitimate business. Guards were also to prevent civilians from loitering at entries and to keep civilian traffic, on foot or by vehicle, moving along the roads.*

3d Armored CIC Teams Dispersed

A memorandum to the G2 summarizing CIC's activities for the period 26-30 June indicated that the security plan made by Lt. Black and Agent Anderson was carried out. Teams from the 503d CIC Detachment were sent to Neuilly-la-Foret, Les Oubeaux and Le Neufbourg, where they arranged with local authorities for office and living space, and made their purposes known to local and American officials in the towns. They questioned suspicious civilians reported by division units and civil authorities, and cases and incidents were brought to the attention of the CIC 30th Detachment (for Neuilly and Le Neufbourg) and 219th CIC Detachment

* 3d Armd Div CIC Memo for G2, subj "CIC Information Sheet for Unit Commanders," 1 Jul 44, /s/ T.M. Black, CO, CIC Det #4, 503d Det Case Rpts File, (C), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

(for Les Oubeaux). As soon as these branch headquarters were established and the necessary contacts made, other teams were sent into the adjoining areas.

With Civil Affairs handling the routine controls of civilian movement, as set forth in CIC's plan, CIC agents had the opportunity to set up "snap control" stations and thereby gain experience of future value in recognizing French identity documents, in speaking French, and in performing interrogations.

A team consisting of Lt. Olan Parker and Agent Ralph E. Dietz went forward with Combat Command A to cover the expected capture of Villers-Fossare and la Luzerne.*

82d CIC Captures First Established Espionage Agents

Although CIC arrested a number of suspected short-term espionage agents and collaborators and investigated many rumors concerning additional ones during the first weeks in Normandy, records indicate that the first positively identified German Intelligence Service (GIS) agents -- Jean George Tournu and Roger Victory Leroy -- were captured by 82d CIC Detachment agents on 26 June, about ten miles southeast of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte.

The details of their capture and disposition are sketchy, but their background -- as pieced together from their confessions -- was significant although not too different from that of other low-level agents who were to be apprehended in later months.

Two weeks prior to his capture, Leroy was roaming the alleys of Paris without work or money. Then he met Tournu, a student, small-time opportunist, member of a pro-German political group, and not one to spurn a few francs. Over a bottle of wine along the Boulevard St. Michel, Tournu persuaded his new friend to accompany him the next day to the German Intelligence Service in Paris. There, approved by a Herr Eckermann, "le Grand-Pere," as he was called, briefed by a M. Leger and coaxed by 2,000 francs, Leroy became a German spy. The next morning, he and Tournu, accompained by a guide, were on their way to Normandy, with instructions to note insignia, tanks, air fields, and supply routes.

At Le Mans, six more young men joined them. Of the six, Leroy could name only two: "Jean Goerges and a quiet young one, Bernard." With 4,000 francs as added encouragement, they moved to the battle zone.

* Memo for AC of S, G2, 3rd Armored Div, from 3d Armored Div CIC Det, /s/T.M. Black, CO, CIC Det #4, subj, "Summary of CIC Activities 26-30 Jun," dtd 29 Jun 44 (Confidential) in 503d Det File Rpts (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

Leroy and Tournu were driven to a field near St. Jores and pointed along a road to Baupte, but lost their way and turned back. Then they were sent off on another road, to Coigny.

A three-day itinerary had been set up, but they did not follow it. Leroy's enthusiam had waned; as he later said, "We did not follow these instructions because I had the intention to give myself up to the Americans as I did not want to do that kind of a job."

Nevertheless, the two flitted freely behind U.S. lines, then headed back to the front. Leroy explained that he had "consented" to let Tournu return, but for himself, he was going back to U.S.-held Ste, Mere-Eglise ". . . to volunteer in the recruiting office." As they neared the German lines they were spotted and arrested by CIC.

The would-be espionage agents admitted their assignments and were hustled off to the Division G2. Leroy pleaded a change of heart. Tournu offered a variety of information on German troop movements he had observed. But his CIC and Prisoner-of-War interrogators saw exaggerations in his statements, as Tournu made an attempt to prolong his life by seeming cooperation.

Tournu and Leroy were ultimately tried by a French Military Tribunal in Cherbourg on 8 July, convicted of treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. However, the results of this trial were not considered satisfactory as a deterrent to others considering an espionage mission for the Germans. A First Army G2 report mentioned that " . . . it is understood that a new Military Tribunal is to be appointed for future trials."

This trial brought to attention the difficulties involved in convicting a self-confessed agent of espionage, and the G2 report added that: "Intent to transmit information to the enemy is a point which has to be established.*"

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* Translation of confession by Leroy, G2, 82d Div, 26 Jun 44; Memo, entitled, "Military Information Obtained from Two Enemy Agents," annex 1 to G2 Periodic Rpt #78, 82d Abn Div, 27 Jun 44; Arrest Rpt, /s/ Salstrom, 26 Jun 44; and G2 Estimate #8, Counterintelligence, 3 Jul 44, G2, FUSA, /s/ Dickson, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 5-6 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and ADSEC CIC Information Bulletin #1, 29 Jul 44, (SECRET), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

sent back to Master Interrogation Center. Among these were two women, and her daughter, of Besneville, investigated by the 208th CIC Detachment because they reportedly harbored German soldiers. Search of their premises revealed some German documents and even a German army uniform.

Denunciations by gendarmes who had worked for the French underground and by residents of Besneville also led to the arrest and internment of three possible enemy agents, one of whom was distinctly anti-American in sentiment.*

* VIII Corps Weekly CI Rpt #3, 26 Jun to 2 Jul 44, in L-28, G2 Jnl & File, 4-7 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 82d Abn Div Daily Rpt of CIC Activities, 23 Jun 44, /s/ Salstrom, in G2 Jnl & File, 23-25 Jun 44, 82d Abn Div, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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By the end of June, the 219th CIC reported that six persons had been taken into custody: a young woman who was being interrogated as a suspected enemy agent; one suspect who had been determined to be a member of the pro-German "Group Collaboration"; and four people with backgrounds of collaboration who seemed to be active threats to security.*

One case which pin-pointed the need for greater security education of front line troops was encountered by the 29th CIC Detachment, after it was too late for action. A man wearing a Canadian officer's uniform and riding a British motorcycle was stopped by an officer of the division in the area of one of the regiments. When questioned as to where he was from and why he was there, he stated that he was from the "Caen sector" and, since it was quiet, he thought he would tour the front.

When asked for identification papers, he produced a card showing his name as " and a 21st Army Group card, adding that he was from "C-Ops." Upon this identification he was released, but when the matter was reported to CIC, all units were called immediately to arrest this person. However, he did not present himself to any headquarters from army down to battalion and was never apprehended.**

Arrested

During the last week in June, members of the 503d CIC Detachment arrested and sent to the rear for further interrogation a who had no identity card and who reportedly had worked for the Germans.

who was picked up while wandering around the town of Neuilly-la-Foret and interrogated initially by Lieutenants Theodore M. Black and Olan Parker and Agent Albert Monferrato, was hazy in recalling his experiences while working for the Germans in a naval watch and dial establishment in Hamburg and likewise was vague in giving his reasons for being in Normandy. But rumors in Neuilly concerning indicated that wherever he had gone in his wanderings, German artillery fire had followed shortly thereafter, especially in American-occupied towns.

* "After Action Report, Section II -- Intelligence, CIC Detachment 27," dtd 30 Jun 44, in Opns Rpts L13(L), XIX Corps, Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 29th Inf Div CIC CI Rpt for week ending 25 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, 29th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

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Because the CIC interrogators' knowledge of German was inadequate and time was insufficient to digest the multitude of documents carried by he was turned over to the Army Civilian Cage in Isigny for further questioning.*

The 30th CIC Detachment reported a variety of investigations for the period, most of which turned out to have been based upon false rumors. Among the alleged suspects was a woman reported to be harboring German soldiers; a farmer cutting his hayfield in such a manner as to leave an arrow pointing to a command post; and numerous "spies" and "line crossers." Other cases concerned carrier pigeons, blackout violations, Frenchmen with German relatives, military security violations, overly inquisitive citizens, and a farmer who worked after curfew in his garden.

One case, typical of those pending at the end of June, concerned had engaged in commercial relations with Germans and "appeared to have some definite connection with the military units in the area." Since the Germans had appeared to be protecting and had authorized his presence even though he did not qualify for a French identity card, French authorities considered him to be "of doubtful loyalty and an unscrupulous merchant."

Many informants considered as intelligent and capable of espionage, but since no evidence of an overt act of collaboration had been developed, CIC reported that the investigation was being suspended until the bank in Isigny could be cleared of debris and safety deposit box examined.**

Suspects Released by Higher Authorities

An unsatisfactory situation was disclosed near the end of June when it was learned that numerous persons who had been sent to the rear by lower echelon CIC units under suspicion of espionage, or at least as serious security threats, were being released by higher authorities without explanation to the arresting unit. These persons often reappeared in the area where first apprehended. When the original arrest had been made on the basis of informed local denunciation, a particularly difficult situation was likely to arise.

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* 3d Armored Div Rpt of Arrest and Interrogation of /s/ T.M. Black, CO, 3d Armored Div CIC Det #4, dtd 28 Jun 44, in 503d Det File Rpt, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

** 30th Inf Div, "Weekly Recapitulation of CIC Activities," 2 Jul 44, /s/ Handville, in rg 207.03, L-39(5), 30th Inf Div, G2 Jnl & File, 5-6 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
Note: Nothing further on this case is revealed from available records.

[redacted], encountered by the 29th CIC Detachment, was covered in a long, hotly-worded report. It is evident that the CIC agents found the case of [redacted] a most irritating one, not only because she had reappeared in the area when they thought her properly restrained, but because she proved to be the most incredible liar they had encountered. Her original arrest had been predicated on denunciations by numerous local townspeople and the request of the S2 of the 115th Infantry, who felt that "her activities in riding around the area on a bicycle in the midst of the fighting" gave cause for suspicion. The arrest had been accomplished on 16 June by French authorities, who turned [redacted] and a few possessions, including torn pieces of a ration book, over to CIC. Preliminary questioning produced "an incredible story" to explain the ration book, and a succession of stories concerning German acquaintances, each account considerably different from the last. A report of this preliminary interrogation and of interviews with her denunciators was sent along with the prisoner to the First Army Civilian Cage.

A search of [redacted] residence on the day following her internment revealed 21,000 francs, two silver fox furs with a receipt showing that they had been purchased in Paris on 26 June 1943 for 30,000 francs, several ration books, a small notebook containing highly complicated formulas which appeared to pertain to electrical, radio and chemical matters, and certain personal papers. These were sent along immediately to Army Cage.

When the St. Clair Chief of Police reported to CIC on 24 June that [redacted] was again free in the area, Lieutenant Mayfield, Detachment Commanding officer, went to the First Army Civilian Cage where he learned "that none of the witnesses listed had been interviewed; that Subject had not been questioned regarding the notebook with electrical and radio formulas; that Subject's story about the ration book had been accepted; that none of Subject's personal papers were used in the interrogation. Subject had been released upon the strength of her own story against the word of known and reliable informants who had been on the ground and who had Subject under observation for more than a year. . . ."

Upon his return, Lieutenant Mayfield and Agents Lynn E. Neuenschwander and Sam D. Beall went to [redacted] home where they discovered that she had a visitor, a woman whom they had arrested on 14 June and sent on to the Cage. She also had been released without investigation and without notice to the arresting detachment.

Another search of the house revealed a note which indicated that a hunted German officer had visited [redacted] since her return. Agents found a radio, a pair of ten-power binoculars, a map showing German installations in Paris and numerous miscellaneous papers.

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After many hours of interrogation, during which changed her story again and again without ever giving a credible answer to anything, the agents gave up. Her final attempt at bulldozing the agents was to throw a case of hysterics, exclaiming that she would admit anything which was required of her and demanding that she be shot as a spy. They again sent her to the civilian Cage with the strong recommendation that she be held until all tactical troops and installations had been advanced past St. Clair. Since had been arrested by French authorities, CIC suggested that once the Allied troops left she be turned over to these local authorities. This was as strong a recommendation as CIC could make. It was impossible to prove that had committed any overt act of espionage although "the very unusual circumstances of this case render this woman highly suspect of being an enemy agent.*"

Other Units Also Object to Releases

During this period numerous other lower echelon CIC detachments voiced similar complaints about releases from civilian cages. Some had found that the French were also freeing persons with what CIC considered insufficient investigation.

The V Corps log for 1 July reported that Agents Philip J. Daily and Thomas E. Kearns had learned from the 2d Armored CIC Detachment that they had found two released suspects back in their area.** The First Army Counterintelligence Branch promised that in the future the arresting detachment would be notified immediately upon the release of any person from Master (First Army) Interrogation Center and also obtained assurances that French authorities would follow the same procedure.***

CIC Agents Venture Outside Their Mission

During this period, as throughout the war, CIC agents often were called upon, or took it upon themselves, to perform tasks outside their mission. On 16 June, one team of the 1st CIC Detachment organized a "soup kitchen" for refugees moving to the rear and, two days later, reported that they were serving 250 to 300 persons a day. The 1st CIC also set up a "listening post" to attempt to locate a clandestine radio transmitter that apparently was operating near Cormolain near the end of June.

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* 29th Inf Div CIC Rpt on 29 Jun 44, in Correspondence File, 29th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

** V Corps CIC Det Log Entries, 1 Jul 44, in L-38, V Corps G2 Jnl & Messages, 2-3 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** CIC Information Bulletin #2, 1 Aug 44, ADSEC (SECRET), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

Several detachments reported the capture of German soldiers in hiding. Three of these were apprehended when 1st CIC Detachment agents searched a woods behind American lines.*

But perhaps the most unusual of the special CIC activities was a kidnapping, performed by agents of the 101st CIC Detachment under the very noses of the Germans. During the last week of June, Captain McGuire and his men learned that the wife of a Nazi-murdered Normandy underground leader was hiding in a villa just inside German lines. Realizing that she would have much valuable counterintelligence information, McGuire organized an expedition to rescue her. The detachment had no vehicle but after confiscating an old French truck, Captain McGuire, Agent Curtis M. Foster and an unidentified French woman who had provided the tip, started out for the villa.

The party was under constant German observation and received the attention of various German 88's as the truck bounced and weaved across no-man's land. Once it became mired in the mud, but with the aid of some nearby GI's, the agents were able to push it out.

Shortly before nightfall, the group reached the woman and then brought her back safely to the American lines. She proved to be a valuable informant, giving the names and addresses of numerous blacklist personalities.**

Sabotage Always a Problem

Although in fulfilling its missions CIC encountered many rumors of sabotage, CIC actually found few real cases during this period. Only two incidents in which an attempt at sabotage was evident are shown in available records. In both of these, the evidence was removed before the cases were reported to the 208th CIC. A wireman of the 79th FA Group found a telephone wire shortcircuited by two phonograph needles which had been inserted into the wire. He removed the needles and gave them to a FA officer. On the same day, about two miles from the scene of the first incident another 79th wireman discovered a German rifle grenade attached to a telephone wire. About sixteen inches long, the grenade had been tied to the wire with a piece of cloth and covered with a bundle of sticks. The

* 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Situation Summaries, 15 Jun 44, in 301-2.2 (Master 22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified). (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire, 24 August 1954, Fort Holabird.

wireman reported that he removed the grenade and tossed it into a nearby field, but subsequent search by CIC failed to locate it.

A thorough check of all persons in the vicinity failed to produce any further evidence. All signal units were alerted to report such incidents to CIC before destroying the evidence. *

Agents Collect Tactical Information

The collection of tactical information, both from line informants and from documents found in searches of former German buildings, constituted one of CIC's important contributions in Normandy. The 2d CIC Detachment, working in the front line area immediately west of the 1st CIC Detachment, was regularly sending back tactical information, obtained by observation, interrogations, and seizure of documents. On one day, the detachment reported the new location of a large ammunition dump which had been moved by a company of North Africans; a chateau which the Germans had made into a stronghold with deep cement dugouts, trenches and gun emplacements; the location of road block houses and gun emplacements on the roads into St. Lo; an underground installation in St. Lo and a gasoline dump near St. Germaine D'Elle. **

On 16 June, the day after the 219th CIC began operations, Agents Lawrence A. Meyers, Ralph J. Jeka and Samuel J. Roundless obtained and forwarded to the Corps G2 numerous bits of tactical information. This data included descriptions of two German observation posts; location of a nearby German headquarters; mine emplacements at a road junction; and the information that, six days before, there had been 200 German troops in a village close by. Although this information was forwarded as "believed to be reliable," the report carried a request that, as troops overran these locations, the detachment be informed as to its accuracy. Agents evidently were trying to set up for themselves a pattern for evaluating the type of information which they expected to continue to receive. ***

Tactical information concerning enemy gun emplacements, fortified positions and troop concentrations were obtained by the 219th CIC from civilian informants,

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* VIII Corps CIC SOI, subj, "Sabotage of Telephone Wires," 16 Jul 44, in VIII Corps CIC Det Rpts File, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

** 2d Inf Div G2 Jnl, 14 Jun 44, 3-2-2.2 (48501), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Memo to AC of S, G2, XIX Corps, Catilly, from CIC Det #27, 16 Jun 44, /s/ Meyers, Jeka and Roundless, and attached Memo from White, G2 to Master 2, 17 Jun 44, in Opns Rpts, L-13 (47), 17-19 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

and searches of abandoned German headquarters revealed, among other things, "a most secret Navy code book on recognition of signals." Materials including mines, shells, "Molotov cocktails", small arms ammunition and a field kitchen were located and turned over to Corps Ordnance, Chemical and Quartermaster officers.*

The 30th CIC Detachment collected much information on enemy order of battle, consisting of overlays and other documents which they turned over to the G2. On 18 June, the agents reported to Ordnance the location of unguarded enemy munitions dumps within Allied territory, a source of danger because of their accessibility both to children and saboteurs.**

One of the first investigations conducted by the 503d CIC Detachment after it began operations in the XIX Corps area late in June, was concerned with a buried German cable south of Isigny. Agents Hilding A. Anderson and Thomas N. Duncan, following an informant's tip, traced the cable by depressions across some fields, although the area had been sodded after the excavations. They passed this information on to the 30th Detachment, since they were leaving the area.***

CIC Conducts Troop Security Education Program

During the initial weeks, all CIC detachments were buried under an avalanche of reports concerning alleged German parachutists, enemy blinking signal lights and numerous other incidents which could have been cleared by on-the-spot investigation by the observing troops.

Security lectures to the tactical units helped curb these reports. Agents of the 208th CIC Detachment visited every troop unit with corps and discussed with them the issues of civilian control, flashing lights and German parachutists, pointing out simple means whereby they could establish immediately the validity of their suspicions. For example, the agents pointed out that a man who had jumped from a plane would have red welts under his arms for at least two or three hours. As a result of the indoctrination program, the volume of false reports sent in to CIC by tactical units dropped off considerably.

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* "After Action Rpt, Section II -- Intelligence, CIC Detachment 27," dtd 30 Jun 44, in Opns Rpts L-13(L), XIX Corps, Jun 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 30th Inf Div CIC Periodic CI Rpt #1, 18 Jun 44, /s/ Handville, in General Jnl & File, 30th Inf Div 24 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 3d Armored Div CIC Memo for OIC, 29 Jun 44, in 503d Det File Case Tpts, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

CIC Accomplishments Studied

As June drew to a close, and the Allies began concentrating on the build-up for the COBRA breakout, most CIC detachments who had been held in the stalemate around the base of the Cotentin Peninsula studied their accomplishments for the period and reorganized their future plans in the light of what they had learned.

Certain equipment was lacking and several detachments were short on transportation. One detachment, the 208th, had discovered that a portable electric generator was a necessity, since many of their reports had to be written at night. By "scrounging," the agents located one which they hauled about in a trailer.*

Effective control of civilians had turned out to be CIC's biggest problem. The handling of refugees alone was a monumental task and required the utmost cooperation between CIC, Civil Affairs, Military Police and line Intelligence Officers. Added to this was the task of investigating a flood of denunciations; most of the accused turned out to be black marketeers, prostitutes, and others who had collaborated with the Germans for profit, and, as such, should have been handled by French authorities.**

One recommendation, submitted by Lieutenant Handville of the 30th CIC Detachment, requested that higher authorities give to indigenous authorities instructions on the handling of persons "not of security interest," evidently in an attempt to relieve CIC of part of this burden.***

The long coast line on VIII Corps' right flank posed a special problem in that persons were constantly slipping ashore from small craft and hiding in sand dunes. Tactical troops were alerted to observe activity along this coast line, and artillery liaison planes flew reconnaissance missions. These measures, combined with regular patrol work under CIC direction, were believed to have alleviated the situation.****

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* Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

** V Corps Annex #1 to G2 Weekly Periodic Rpt #2, 28 Jun 44, in V Corps Jnl & Messages, 28-29 Jun 44, L-20, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Situation Summaries and Other Rpts, 15-30 Jul 44, in 301-2.2 (Master 22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnls, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 30th Inf Div CIC Periodic CI Rpt #2, 25 Jun 44, /s/ Handville, in Opns Rpt rg 207103, L-39, 30th Inf Div, 1-2 Jul 44, G2 Jnl & File, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

Agents of the 503d CIC felt that they had learned much about operations in a combat zone and came up with several recommendations. The principal suggestion dealt with the use of agents during temporary lulls in fighting. It was recommended that, during such periods, agents be distributed among the towns in the area, with sufficient personnel retained at a central headquarters to meet calls on a twenty-four basis and provide an adequate pool for unexpected combat operations. The 503d Agents also emphasized that the practice of setting up city offices for questioning civilians should be continued so that civilians would never be brought into command posts or unit areas.*

In commenting upon various factors which had affected the 208th CIC's operations in Normandy, the Detachment Commander felt that security consciousness among the tactical troops was enhanced because they were never permitted to know exactly how many agents were in the CIC unit. Some soldiers thought that the 208th CIC had as many as two hundred men, while others thought that the CIC men were civilian FBI agents with the Army. These conjectures and rumors may have been of some benefit to CIC's effectiveness because unit commanders, hearing that there were two hundred agents planted throughout the Corps area, undoubtedly became, and caused their troops to become, more security conscious.**

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* Memo for AC of S, G2, 3d Armored Div, from 3d Armored Div CIC Det, /s/ T.M. Black, CO, CIC Det #4, subj, "Summary of CIC Activities 26-30 June," dtd 29 Jun 44, 503d Det File Rpts, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

** Interview with Mr. Albert R. Bowen, Baltimore, Md., 26 November 1954.

Chapter 4

PREPARATION FOR OPERATION COBRA

By the end of June, VII Corps had captured Cherbourg and was moving south to take up positions between VIII Corps at its right and XIX Corps at its left, with V Corps at the extreme left, along the eighty-mile Allied front.

U. S. soldiers faced the Germans along a line that still stretched across the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula, through the Carentan marshes and behind St. Lo, to the bulge at Caumont. The British front fell off steeply from Caumont beyond Bayeux, bulged out just west of besieged Caen, and included a bridgehead east of the Orne River. The four U. S. corps with thirteen divisions and the four British corps with sixteen divisions, a total of more than one million troops, was already a greater force than the Allies had in Italy. The lodgement was near completion, and First Army readied itself for the offensive move from Normandy to the Seine.

One step remained prior to First Army's breakout from Normandy, codenamed COBRA. VIII Corps was to push down the west coast through La Haye du Puits and Lessay to Coutances. As German units to the east retreated from the threatened encirclement, the road from Coutances to St. Lo would provide a sound line of departure for the move across France.

However, VIII Corps' offensive, which began on 3 July, harried by marshes, minefields and heavy German resistance, bogged down. After a gain of only seven miles in twelve days, the objective was recognized as too costly. In the meantime other forces maintained pressure along the front; the British mopped up Caen, and the U. S. 29th Infantry Division took St. Lo on the 18th. The road from St. Lo to Perriers was then recognized as a more accessible springboard and by mid-July American strength was being reassembled for Operation COBRA, finally set for 25 July, which was to be the most decisive battle of the war in Western Europe.*

During this period the 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions were returned to England for overdue refitting and preparation for their next operation. Four new Infantry Divisions, the 5th, 8th, 35th and 28th, and three Armored Divisions, the 4th, 5th, and the 6th, came in to join the other Divisions on the line during this build up period. CIC detachments came in with each division, and there is

* Bradley, op cit, p. 315-331.

evidence that the first weeks proved a period of perfecting techniques, strenghtening liaison, and planning future operations, but the 506th CIC (6th Armored Division), arriving on 18 July, the 28th CIC, on 22 July, and the 505th CIC (5th Armored) on 24 July, had little time for studying the lessons learned by other detachments or even in effecting liaison with them.

Commanders of the new units were: 5th CIC Detachment, Capt. Lyndon B. Allen; 8th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. John C. Mcquade; 35th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. Allenby H. Ayr; 28th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. Albert B. Miller; 506th CIC Detachment, Capt. Judson B. Deloach; 505th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. John P. McKenna, and the 504th CIC Detachment, 2d Lt. Wilson A. Rood.

The 303d (Third Army) CIC Detachment under Maj James F. Foothorap, who had arrived from the office of the Chief, CIC, shortly before the invasion, and the 215th (XV Corps) under Capt. Theodore R. Fossieck became operational during the COBRA buildup period.

There was considerable shifting of divisions from one corps to another as the line-up for the breakout was being organized. To VII Corps, which was to bear the brunt of the attack, were assigned the 1st, 30th, 4th, and 9th Infantry and the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions.

To VIII Corps on its right were assigned the 79th, 90th, 83d and 8th Infantry and the 4th Armored Divisions, and, just on the eve of the break-out, the 5th and 6th Armored Divisions. To XIX Corps, on the VII's right, went the 29th, the 35th and the 28th Infantry Divisions, while to V Corps, on the extreme left, went the 2d and 5th Infantry Divisions.

Except for some bitter fighting in the V Corps area near Caumont and the capture of St. Lo by the 29th Division, the whole area was comparatively quiet.*

Team Method of Operation Continued

All detachments continued their team method of operation with rapid shifting about as the occasion demanded. For example, the 79th CIC Detachment reported that just prior to the capture of La Haye du Puits on 8 July, one officer and four agents were operating in the town of Barneville sur Mer, two agents were at the division prisoner-of-war cage, and one agent was with each of the regiments of the division. The following week, agents were still operating at the division CP and the PW cage, a six-man team was in Portball and a two-man team was at a refugee clearing point in St. Sauveur de Pierre-Pont.**

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* The Army Almanac and Bradley, A Soldier's Story.

** VII Corps CIC Rpts, 3-24 Jul 44, in VIII Corps G2 Jnl & File, L-28 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

Inter-CIC Liaison Maintained

Liaison with other CIC detachments was by this time the accepted order of the day. As an example, when the 4th Armored Division came onto Utah beach on 12 July, the first activity of the 504th CIC Detachment was to contact as many other detachments as possible. During the five days before the division entered combat, Lieutenant Rood and 2d Lt. Thomas E. Flinn and Agents James F. Bray and Jack H. Peters had made liaison with CIC detachments at First Army, XIX Corps, 3d Armored Division and the newly arrived Third Army and XV Corps. Within a few more days they had met with CIC detachments of the 4th, 8th and 83d Divisions.* Records also indicate that, during a three-day period in mid-July, the 79th CIC Detachment was visited by representatives from the 301st, 90th, 8th and 504th CIC Detachments, who came to discuss the handling of enemy agents and collaborators and CIC duties at PW cages and CPs.**

Security Techniques Developed

Perhaps the most important techniques developed by CIC detachments during this period concerned methods for tightening up security. Almost every detachment reported newer, more explicit rules for handling refugees, instructions to tactical troops on methods of recognizing and handling suspects, and methods for disseminating travel and curfew regulations to civilians in the area.

But behind this improved situation lay a high degree of coordination with other organizations -- with Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal local French authorities, and adjacent British military units. It had become obvious that counter-intelligence weakness in the control lines in any sector of the front would endanger every other sector.

Early in July several CIC detachments found "...certain civil officials to be reluctant to put into effect security regulations recommended by U. S. military authorities without a mandate from French authorities who are now recognized as the responsible government." This situation was partially remedied by the addition of Securite Militaire liaison officers to army and corps G2 staffs.***

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* 4th Armored Div CIC Jnl, 17-12 Jul 44. (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

** 79th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 14, 15, 16 Jul 44, in CIC Jnl, 79th CIC Det, (Historical Project Files).

*** 1st Army Periodical CI Rpt #3, from Office of AC of S, G2, 26 Jun - 10 Jul 44, in L-38, V Corps G2 Jnl & Messages, 16-17 Jul 44, (Unclassified); (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Records indicate that on 9 July, one day after the arrival of the 8th CIC Detachment, an officer from the detachment and the French liaison officer met with Civil Affairs and approved the appointment of a mayor in La Haye du Puits. As the front moved forward, Civil Affairs set up a new refugee collecting point at Milliers where, "in conjunction with CIC, several hundred refugees were screened and fed emergency rations."*

"In conjunction with Civil Affairs," and "In cooperation with Civil Affairs," were two characteristic comments during this period. One CIC report tells of a meeting held in Caumont in mid-July attended by the agents from the 5th and 502d CIC Detachments, 5th and 1st Division Civil Affairs Officer and the Civil Affairs Officer at Caumont.**

In the latter part of June, Lieutenant Steinway, CO of the 1st CIC Detachment, reported frequent contacts with the Corps G2, Civil Affairs, OSS, corps unit commanders, and the Field Security Section of the adjacent British 7th Armored Division, as well as with other CIC detachments in the area.***

After evacuation of all civilians from the forward area of 1st Division's sector early in July, two interrogation points were set up; one manned by a Civil Affairs detachment, the other by French gendarmes. CIC investigated suspects netted by both.****

CIC worked with Civil Affairs in screening civilians and checking traffic, according to a 219th CIC Detachment report at the end of July, and, during one twenty-four hour stretch, the CIC agents interrogated 402 civilians.*****

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* 8th Inf Div A/A Rpt, 8 Jul 44 in 308-0.3 (8730) (Master) undated, 8th Inf Div Rpts (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 5th Inf CIC Det Rpt, 16-17 Jul 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623) 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl /s/ Lyndon B. Allen, Det CO (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Counterintelligence Rpt for Period 26 Jun to 2 Jul 44, /s/ Steinway and CIC situation Summaries (daily) in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** 1st CIC Det Counterintelligence Rpt for Period 26 Jun to 2 Jul 44, /s/ Steinway; and CIC Situation Summaries in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

***** XIX Army Corps A/A Rpt Jnl Jul 44L-45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The above reports were typical; similar coordinated activities with Civil Affairs were carried out by nearly every detachment. Through this constant liaison and integration of effort, newer, firmer policies were promulgated and enforced throughout the front.

Liaison with Other Agencies

CIC also found that, among its many liaison activities, one of the most important was its contact with the Military Police, especially since they often had to call upon the MP's to furnish additional men when reinforcements were required and also for evacuating arrested persons.*

The 170-mile coast line along the west side of the Cotentin Peninsula caused official concern, offering as it did opportunity for the entry of German infiltration agents. To counter this threat, a coordinated system of naval and air patrols, French customs officials, volunteer fisherman and watchers and patrols by ADSEC CIC detachments was set up. Fishing fleets were subjected to strict security measures and were required to report to CIC any suspicious activity. OMAHA and UTAH Beach regions were made restricted areas, with special passes required, even of military personnel, for entry. All ships arriving at Cherbourg were carefully checked, since it had been learned that some merchant seamen were entering the city.**

Detachments Prepare for Action

The 4th CIC Detachment, under Lieutenant Appleton, reported on 4 July, shortly after the division had moved from Cherbourg to the battle area southeast of Carentan, that eight security measures had been put into effect in the division's forward area, and the Civil Affairs Officer had agreed to disseminate these restrictions to all civilians in the area. Under no circumstances were they to be permitted to cross over the front lines, and all were to remain at home, except those who were engaged in the pursuit of livelihood in the immediate vicinity of their homes.

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* Intelligence operations V Corps, European Campaign 18 May 42- 10 May 45 (booklet) (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** G2 estimate No. 8, Counterintelligence, 3 Jul 44, Office of G2, First Army, /s/ Dickson, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 5-6 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Record Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va); and ADESC CIC Information Bulletins 1&2, Ibid.

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All troops were instructed to watch for and take into custody all civilians circulating in the forward area. Road control posts were to be established at all road intersections leading from Allied lines, and mobile patrols were to search all roads, lanes and field for civilians out of their homes without legitimate cause.

All civilians found at large after curfew were to be brought to a spot near a Regimental Combat Team Command Post for screening by CIC, and those who could not be identified as living in the immediate area, and having a sound excuse for being outside their homes, were to be declared suspect and to be evacuated to the rear through prisoner of war channels.

Lieutenant Appleton pointed out that, although few civilians were being encountered in the forward areas, it was anticipated that, when the fighting started again and the Germans began retreating, large numbers of refugees would pass through American lines, thereby furnishing cover for enemy agents. CIC was then working out plans for orderly methods of screening these anticipated civilians and moving them to the rear without interfering with military traffic.

After commenting on the frequently-noted use of parts of the German uniform by French civilians, Appleton recommended that such apparel be prohibited, since there was a possibility that American soldiers might mistake these Frenchman for Nazis.*

As division lines moved several miles forward in early July, CIC enlisted the help of mayors in the control of local traffic and, with detachment funds, hired reliable citizens to man control posts. CIC checked these posts regularly and, during one three-day period, arrested six strangers detained by the guards. When the division again shifted on 16 July, CIC recommended to the 83d CIC Detachment that they continue to employ these guards.**

The 4th CIC Detachment also obtained approval for an additional plan for splitting the division area into two parts, forward and rear areas, but this system's implementation was delayed when the division was shifted for a few days to the VIII Corps sector. Under this plan, French civilians operating the control posts were to be enlisted in the French Army for administration, discipline

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* Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt for period ending 9 Jul 44, 4th Inf Div, /s/ Appleton, in G2 Jnl File, 4th Inf Div 1-15 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Periodic Rpts, 4th Inf Div CIC, 13-16 Jul 44, G2 Jnl and File, 4th Inf Div, Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO Alexandria, Va.).

and pay, and special care was to be taken that corps was notified of the location of each post so that operations would not be disrupted when division moved forward.*

The 83d CIC Detachment, which, with its division, was concerned with the hedgerow struggles just beyond Carentan in early July, maintained three control posts which had originally been established by the 101st CIC Detachment, and were attempting to enforce a six kilometer travel restriction. However, in spite of these controls, they apprehended approximately seventy-five civilians circulating in the division area without proper pass forms during the first half of July.**

The 29th Division CIC Detachment found that the congestion created by civilians wandering throughout the sector was so great that it was hindering operations at regimental level. Consequently it was recommended that a cage be set up in each corps area for the internment of these individuals deemed to be security threats until the tactical situation permitted their release.***

Early in July, the 1st CIC Detachment made a similar recommendation. They had discovered the need for an enclosure in the forward corps area for the control of civilians pending CIC investigation. The civilian jails were totally inadequate. Besides being too small, they were unsanitary, inconveniently located, and afforded poor security. Later, Lieutenant Steinway arranged with the S2 of the 26th Infantry Regiment for a civilian detention area within the division's prisoner of war enclosure. However, he continued to argue for a more permanent arrangement.****

Not only did the careful screening of refugees coming through the lines serve to prevent infiltration by enemy agents, but this questioning often revealed

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* 4th Inf Div weekly Counterintelligence Rpt for period ending 16 Jul 44, /s/ Appleton, in G2 Jnl File, 4th Inf Div, 15-31 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Record Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 83d Inf Div CIC After Action Report for July, dtd 1 Aug 44, /s/ Victor, in (Master 11786) in 83d Inf Div CIC A/A Rpt, Jun-Jul and Oct-Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 29th Inf Div CIC Rpt for week ending 16 Jul 44, in 29th Div correspondence File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25096)

**** 1st CIC Counterintelligence Rpt for period 26 Jun to 2 Jul 44, /s/ Steinway and CIC Daily Situation Summaries, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

valuable counterintelligence information. Refugees coming through from St. Lo were able to give the 35th Detachment, which had arrived during the first week of July, information on the activities of subversive organizations in that city and the names of citizens who might be able to assist CIC there.*

Numerous Espionage Suspects Investigated

The increased rigidity of civilian controls plus the developement of informant nets resulted in the capture of numerous suspects as well as a few bona fide spies. Two German Intelligence Service (GIS) agents, Henri Mathieu and Michel Scognamillo, were arrested by the 83d CIC Detachment at the end of June. Under interrogation, Scognamillo gave detailed information concerning German intelligence procedures. Both were sent to First Army cage.

Two collaborators, who had led German patrols to where American parachutists were bivouacked, and had possibly given other information to the Nazis, were also apprehended by CIC agents close to enemy lines. They too were sent to the cage.**

The 83d CIC also handled the case of apprehended in one of the regimental areas, who was believed to have engaged in some sort of communication across the lines. He was turned over to a CIC Port Detachment for further investigation.

Careful screening of refugees being evacuated from the front paid off when the 83d CIC apprehended two women who were alleged to have told the Germans about French civilians who had tried to hide Allied aviators and parachutists. The women's informing had led to the execution of the loyal Frenchmen.***

In another case, two young Frenchmen who claimed to have entered liberated territory to join the French Army were arrested and sent on to First Army Interrogation Center by the 219th CIC, since their story was one known to be used by German espionage agents.****

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* 35th Inf Div CIC Weekly CI Rpt, week ending 2400 Hrs 16 Jul 44, /s/ Ayr, 35th Div CO, in opns rpt 207.03, 1-46 (9), 35th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 83d CIC Weekly CI Rpt, 26 Jun-2 Jul 44, in 83d CIC Periodic Intelligence Rpt File, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

*** 83d Inf Div CIC A/A Rpt for Jul 44, dtd 1 Aug 44, /s/ Victor, (Master 11786), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Rpt from CIC Det #27, /s/ Raker, in IX A/A Rpt, L-45, 30 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Reports that two men, nicknamed "The Gentlemen," had been riding around in an American jeep in a suspicious manner resulted in alert notices to surrounding units, including the British.*

Agents of the 503d CIC Detachment spent much time hunting for a Frenchman, who, accompanied by a small boy, had wandered through the 32d Regiment area asking many questions about the uniform worn by the Free French, the date that the regiment expected to leave and its destination. When his visit was followed by German artillery fire, they became suspicious. Agent Denton contacted the French police in the nearest town and soon learned that the mysterious Frenchman was , former German prisoner and a trusted local citizen. The police vouched for him, and the whole episode was labeled as one of curiosity.**

Another inquisitive farmer wandered into the 35th Division area, where he was observed watching the signal company for some time. The man was arrested and turned over to CIC. When interrogated, he explained that he was curious to see the new kind of machines being used. He was vouched for by enough trusted informants to verify his harmlessness, but the incident pointed up the need for even tighter control of civilians.

About this time, the 35th CIC also investigated a at the request of Civil Affairs, who had received word that she was a collaborator. When it was learned that the 29th CIC had previously investigated her and determined her to be merely a prostitute, she was evacuated from the area.***

Two small French boys, alert for spies, reported seeing a German parachutist in a British uniform, but investigation by the 5th CIC Detachment indicated that they probably had seen a British officer.

No such simple solution could dismiss the report by two Frenchmen that they had been approached by a man dressed in American combat uniform, carrying a German helmet who, with the aid of a French phrase book, had asked them for directions. They became suspicious when they realized there were numerous

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* 5th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 19-20 Jul 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623), 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl and File, /s/ Lyndon B. Allen, Det Co (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 3d Armored Div CIC Memo To OIC, subj, 6 Jul 44, /s/ James G. Denton, Agent, in 503d Det Case Reports File (C), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

*** 35th Inf Div CIC Weekly CI Rpt, week ending 2400 hours 16 Jul 44, /s/ Ayr, CIC Co, In opns Rpt 207-03, 1-46(9), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

British and Americans in the area from whom he could have sought help. CIC could merely advise them to report the man immediately if he should reappear.

Every detachment had its share of fruitless investigations -- fruitless because they were based upon incorrect or biased information, or because someone bungled. In the latter category was the case of four Frenchmen who were picked up as they were coming from enemy occupied territory. Agents of the 5th CIC Detachment, which had arrived on 9 July, and members of the Military Intelligence Interpreter Team interrogated them and, considering them suspect, turned them over to French authorities, who turned them loose after obtaining their promise to register for ration cards and enlist in the French Army. The men promptly disappeared. CIC then launched an investigation and, through informants, learned that they were in Coulton, a village near Bayeux. Since this was in British territory, CIC turned over the information with the request that they report to corps the final outcome.*

Information from a biased source - or at best an alarmest - led 4th CIC Detachment Agents to investigate a priest who had remained in his village near the front after it had been otherwise evacuated. He was suspected of directing enemy artillery fire, one informant maintaining that every time the priest left his house, a nearby bridge was shelled. However, many informants declared him to be loyal, and he claimed that he had remained to protect church property from looting soldiers.**

Agents of the 29th CIC Detachment, on one occasion at least, failed to catch their suspect. The who lived was outspoken in her denunciation of . The claimed that had traded with and done favors for the Germans. When, on 15 July, the agents went to the refugee center where had lived since July, they discovered that he had that morning departed in haste rather than take the bath with which Civil Affairs authorities had been threatening him.***

Acting on the tip from an informant that a man in a near-by town was behaving in a suspicious manner, 79th CIC agents sped there by jeep, expecting to find an

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* 5th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 29-30 Jul 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623), 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Weekly Counterintelligence Report, for Period ending 9 Jul 44, 4th Inf Div, /s/ Appleton in G2 Jnl File, 1-15 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 29th Inf Div CIC Supplemental Rpt on Moon Sur Elle, 14 Jul 44, in 29th Inf Div Misc Rpts File (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25096).

In St. Jean de Savigny, for instance, American soldiers looted the home of the mayor, a reliable CIC informant, carrying away approximately 150 bottles of wine, three of which were later recovered by Agents Lynn E. Neuenschwander, Sam D. Beall and Bryant W. Gillespie. These three agents, while in St. jean de Savigny, also observed a group of fifteen American soldiers breaking into stores, homes and other buildings, sometimes by shooting off the locks. These incidents were reported to the Civil Affairs officer at St. Claire. In Couvains, the office of the mayor had been completely wrecked by U. S. troops, an action that prevented members of the 29th CIC Detachment from securing several desired documents. The rest of the town had fared little better. An inspection by agents of the 29th CIC showed that almost every house in town had been completely searched for wine, money and other valuables.

That this behavior by American forces was causing an ever-increasing amount of concern is evidenced by a letter written by Lt. Ellis O. Mayfield, Commanding Officer of the 29th CIC Detachment, to the AC of S, G2, which observed:

"This [the looting] is considered a very serious matter, not only from the standpoint of friendly relations between the French and the Americans, but from the standpoint of the continued success in the operation of this Detachment and MII. In the past, all civilians have been more than willing to give information, and their cooperation left nothing to be desired. If the troops continue to loot as in the instances mentioned, it would not be at all surprising if the civilian populace turned against us entirely."*

This situation as it applied to the forward areas was brought partially under control, but in mid-July it was reported by 4th CIC Detachment as "again" reaching a state that could end established friendly relations. Enforcement of an order prohibiting U. S. soldiers from entering any house except on official business and from being in possession of any articles of French origin helped the situation considerably.**

In the rear areas, however, the brash and objectionable behavior of American troops, continued. Numerous cases of attempted pillage and house-breaking in Periers, and in the Carentilly, Coutances, Cherbourg and St. Vaast areas were reported late in July. ADSEC CIC teams investigated many of these cases and recognized their effect upon the attitude of the French toward the U. S. troops in

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* Ltr to AC of S, G2, 29th Inf Div, subj, "Behavior of American Troops" 18 Jun 44, s/ E.O. Mayfield, CO CIC Det 29, in 29th Inf Div Correspondence File (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096 -1-17-85).

** 4th Inf Div weekly Counterintelligence Report, 16 Jul 44, in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Up to this time radio agent activity had been considered slight. One transmitter had been seized in Carentan, the British had captured one agent with radio in Bayeux, and evidence pointed to a similar agent working in Isigny.* It was anticipated that increasing numbers of these agents would be left behind with the principal mission of collecting military information.**

Espionage Techniques and Counterintelligence

Numerous intelligence publications issued by First Army and 21st Army Group as final plans for COBRA were being made contained additional warnings of the threat of espionage and outlined means for countering it. A First Army periodic CI report issued one week after the G2 Estimate mentioned above, stated that six agents captured during the period 26 June to 2 July had supplied descriptions of eight other agents known to be on missions of infiltrating Allied lines.*** This report warned that "Information available from shoulder patches, bumper markings, road signs and C P markings makes employment of numerous low-grade agents a profitable enterprise even though some are captured.****

Much thought was given to the various cover devices which the enemy might use in infiltrating Allied lines. Anticipating a situation which later reached large-scale proportions; V Corps CIC recommended that an attempt be made to collect from local French people any articles of U. S. military clothing which they possessed and that soldiers be warned against discarding or giving away any of their uniform.

Germans who appeared in civilian clothing, presenting U. S. propaganda leaflets to show they had surrendered voluntarily, were to be viewed with suspicion. Colonel Dickson, First Army G2, directed that these soldiers were to be classified

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* G2 Weekly Periodic Report #1, Annex #2, Subversive Annex, in VIII Corps G2 Jnl, 20-22 Jun 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Annex #1 to ADSEC Information Bulletin #2, 1 Aug 44, "Handling of Enemy Agents", taken from the 21st Army Group Security Notes #6 (Secret), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library Files).

*** It is not known to which cases this reference applies, but it is believed that some of them were ones previously mentioned in this chapter.

**** First Army Periodical CI Rpt fr G2 26 Jun-10 Jul 44, in L38V Corps Jnl and Messages, 16-17 Jul 44, s/ Dickson, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

as suspected war criminals* until interrogation established that they were entitled to Prisoner of War status.**

The Germans who came through the lines claiming to have information for Allied Intelligence were to be viewed with still greater skepticism, even when the information they gave could be verified. This technique had been recognized as a probable ruse of the espionage agent who hoped to be "doubled" and thus assured safe passage back through the lines. Another device was to pretend to turn informant after being caught. This had already occurred in the British sector. One Abwehr agent, when apprehended by front line troops, had immediately given information about mine fields in German territory. However, by bluffing him with the story that his companions had been caught, interrogators were able to learn the descriptions of his two companions and obtain a full confession as to his intentions. The other two were quickly caught.

Interrogators were directed to give especial care to the questioning of persons who claimed knowledge of the Gestape or other German intelligence or security units, since the chance was great that such persons were "plants."***

Resistance groups were recognized as ideal infiltration targets for the enemy. A few days before the COBRA breakout, Colonel Dickson pointed out that the Germans were known to have recruited persons from collaborationist parties, especially the Milice, to infiltrate resistance groups for the purpose of disclosing their membership and activities to the Germans. Since these infiltration agents would unquestionably serve also as stay-behind agents for the Germans, CIC and all other U. S. personnel were warned to remain aware of this danger in all their dealings with resistance personnel. In the Caen area, the British had already apprehended one German agent wearing a resistance group armband.

It was anticipated that the cover of Red Cross doctors and nurses would be used by agents infiltrating from enemy occupied territory as would the pretense of being escaped Allied soldiers. One such impersonator had been captured in the

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* This term was not explained in the text but is presumed to have been used with general meaning, ie; violation of the accepted laws and customs of war.

** Ltr, s/ Dickson, G2 FUSA, to G2's Corps and ADSEC, subj, "German Soldiers in Civilian Clothes," dtd 24 Jun 44, in 382-2.2 (Master 28522) 82d Abd Div G2 Jnl Opn NEPTUNE, 23-25 June 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Annex 1 to ADSEC CIC Information Bulletin No. 2 1 Aug 44, "Handling of Enemy Agents," taken from 21st Army Group Security Notes #6 (Secret), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

British sector and had fooled lower echelon Intelligence officers for a time. He had bluffed his way by mentioning the name of a British officer in I.S. [illegible] (V Gp), the section which handled their penetration agents.

These fears of a concerted espionage drive were not based upon idle speculation. A captured order from the German 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division alerted lower echelon commanders to be prepared to receive French civilians coming through the lines on German espionage missions. First Army had also come into possession of a forged Office of Strategic Services pass, printed in both French and English, the English being particularly poor. Information was received that large numbers of the passes had been printed for use by German agents. Since no official OSS passes or identity cards had been issued, all echelons were warned that anyone presenting such a pass should be handled immediately as a suspect enemy agent.*

At the end of July, 21st Army Group, in a summary of enemy intelligence activities, pointed out that the number of enemy agents captured had run into "double figures." Practically all of the prisoners were French, and almost half had had recent connections with collaborationist groups. Few of these had worked for ideological reasons; the desire to avoid labor service in Germany or to obtain money were the principal motivating factors.

21st Army Group intelligence officials stressed that the fact an individual had been in recent trouble with German police or labor authorities was not to be accepted as an indubitable recommendation. Often enemy agents were drafted from these people who had come to German attention.**

Before the COBRA outbreak, it had been discovered that, in addition to security information about Allied military strength and dispositions and the activities of resistance and underground groups, enemy agents were collecting information on political developments and public opinion in Allied-occupied France for use by propaganda agencies. Relations between troops and civilians, dismissal and appointment of French officials, food prices and new laws published by allies were among the targets. Enemy propaganda broadcasts reflected that some of this information was getting through.

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* Ltr, subj, "Enemy Espionage Activity" dtd 22 Jul 44, from B. A. Dickson, G2, FUSA in Opns Rpt rg 207.03 L-39 (15), 30th Inf Div Jnl & File, 25-44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Annex 1 to ADSEC CIC Information Bulletin #2, 1 Aug 44, "Handling of Enemy Agents," taken from 21st Army Group Security Notes #6 (SECRET); (Staff and Faculty Library).

Still greater tightening of control lines in the forward areas and the development of stronger ties with local people were seen as the best means of countering the expected build-up of enemy espionage activity.*

First Army Publishes Arrest Policy

In an attempt to overcome the confusion which had existed from the first day of the invasion as to the handling of various types of security threats and to meet the anticipated influx of espionage agents, First Army published an arrest policy on 1 July. This policy made no changes in the handling of suspected espionage or sabotage agents, but dealt principally with local collaborationists, specifying that in those cases where activities appeared to have been political rather than actual, CIC should confine itself to advising Civil Affairs detachments. All members of German para-military organizations found in uniform were to be considered prisoners of war; if not in uniform, as "war Criminals." Members of collaborationist parties and persons against whom denunciations had been made were to be investigated locally and to be arrested only if their guilt was rather firmly established.

Stress was made upon the preparation of detailed arrest forms, which were to include, in addition to the scope of information obtained against the person, leads for further investigation. Publication of this arrest policy, however, did not solve all the problems concerning arrests. Throughout the war, it was all too common that an incoming detachment would find arrestees in the local jails, with no records to show the reason for the arrests.**

Behavior of U. S. Troops Endangers Security

By the middle of June, the behavior of U. S. troops became a matter of concern to officials throughout First Army, since it threatened to affect adversely the excellent relations that had existed with the French. This situation was of particular concern to CIC since, if it could not be curbed, the whole civil security system might collapse and CIC's chief sources of information might be lost.

Several sectors reported disgraceful behavior of U. S. soldiers, but one of the worst was 29th Division area where, in the towns of Grandcamps, St. Jean de Savigny and Coucains, numerous cases of looting, burglary and one attempted rape caused fears that the entire population might turn against the Allied Forces.

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* Annex 1 to ADSEC CIC Information Bulletin No 2, 1 Aug 44, Ibid; and Ltr, subj, "Enemy Espionage Activities," dtd 22 July 44, Ibid.

** 1st U. S. Army Report of Intelligence Instructions: Arrest Policy, 1 Jul 44 in V Corps Correspondence File (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25097 Attached as Appendix 1).

That this behavior by American forces was causing an ever-increasing amount of concern is evidenced by a letter written by Lt. Ellis O. Mayfield, Commanding Officer of the 29th CIC Detachment, to the AC of S, G2, which observed:

"This [the looting] is considered a very serious matter, not only from the standpoint of friendly relations between the French and the Americans, but from the standpoint of the continued success in the operation of this Detachment and MII. In the past, all civilians have been more than willing to give information, and their cooperation left nothing to be desired. If the troops continue to loot as in the instances mentioned, it would not be at all surprising if the civilian populace turned against us entirely."*

This situation as it applied to the forward areas was brought partially under control, but in mid-July it was reported by 4th CIC Detachment as "again" reaching a state that could end established friendly relations. Enforcement of an order prohibiting U. S. soldiers from entering any house except on official business and from being in possession of any articles of French origin helped the situation considerably.**

In the rear areas, however, the brash and objectionable behavior of American troops, continued. Numerous cases of attempted pillage and house-breaking in Periers, and in the Carentilly, Coutances, Cherbourg and St. Vaast areas were reported late in July. ADSEC CIC teams investigated many of these cases and recognized their effect upon the attitude of the French toward the U. S. troops in

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* Ltr to AC of S, G2, 29th Inf Div, subj, "Behavior of American Troops" 18 Jun 44, s/ E.O. Mayfield, CO CIC Det 29, in 29th Inf Div Correspondence File (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096 -1-17-85).

** 4th Inf Div weekly Counterintelligence Report, 16 Jul 44, in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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general. CIC in these areas also discovered that, once the battle had swept on, the French began to show their resentment for the previous bombings of some of their towns which, they claimed, had never been military objectives and actually had contained few Germans.*

Rumors of CIC Interest

Because of their effect upon morale and also the possibility of subversive origin, rumors of all sorts had to be tracked down and dispelled by CIC agents. A fast-spreading report that the Allies were using gas was punctured by the 83d CIC Detachment; investigation revealed that the report had originated when a large volume of toxic smoke settled over the area of a U. S. engineer combat battalion following the explosion of 11,000 tons of TNT during enemy shelling.**

In mid-July the 35th CIC Detachment looked into a rumor based upon a speech made by Goering to all German troops, which affirmed that the Germans still had three secret weapons and that on 20 July, "all people would see a new world." This rumor had been widely repeated but seemingly had evoked little reaction from U. S. troops.***

Two of the most far fetched rumors widely circulated in the VIII Corps area concerned a speedy ending of the war. According to one oft-repeated story, Walter Winchell had offered $1,000 to the Red Cross for each day the war with Germany continued beyond 27 July, while another version had Winston Churchill making the same offer to an unidentified person, setting the date at 29 July. ADSEC CIC detachments had to trace the origin of these rumors.

Troops Lacking in Security Consciousness

During this period it also became apparent that the attitude of the troops toward security left much to be desired. There were some red faces and undoubtedly some serious discussion of security measures by personnel of the 217th AA Batallion located in the vicinity of St. Clair following a breach of security report made by agents of the 29th CIC Detachment on 22 July.

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* Bi-weekly Counterintelligence Report #1, For period 28 Jul 44, to 12 Aug 44, Hqs ADSEC, in ADSEC COM Z (45) (Confidential), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 83d Inf Div CIC A/A Rpt for July, dtd 1 Aug 44, /s/ Victor, (Master 11786), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 35th Inf Div weekly CI Report, Week ending 2400 hrs, 16 Jul 44, /s/ Ayr, 35th Div CO, in opns report 207.03, 1-46 (9), 35th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Two 29th CIC Detachment agents had walked through an antiaircraft area in the rear of a farm approximately one and one-half miles southwest of St. Clair. Although the agents did not identify themselves, the men of the unit had talked freely with them and had revealed among other data, information concerning their parent unit, their previous attachment, the date of their arrival and the number and range of their guns. They also had spoken about a new type of radar-controlled AA shell which would explode upon passing within sixty yards of an airplane. The missile was so secret that it was being used only over water to keep it from falling into enemy hands. The equipment, the gunners explained, was to be tested to see whether enemy mortar and artillery locations could be determined with its use.*

The 83d CIC Detachment also had cause to worry about military security when it was learned that officers of the division were carrying classified documents into the front lines, and these documents in the hands of captured officers had revealed to the Germans the division's complete order of battle.**

Civilians Menace 29th Division Security

During a security check conducted in the 29th Division area the second week of July, it became apparent that local inhabitants had too much knowledge of the units which were operating in the section. It was reported, for example, that a column of 3d Armored Division vehicles, located in the vicinity of St. Clair sur L'Dile, was shelled as it passed through the town. Furthermore, the Civil Affairs officer stated that several hours before the movement civilians had informed him of the time the unit was to advance. The shelling coincided with the time mentioned.***

S2's Briefed on Security, Past and Future

After St. Lo had been overrun by American troops and before the units of the 29th Infantry Division returned to the line for the forthcoming drive toward Vire, the S2's of the divisional units met to discuss military security of past as well as future operations.

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* 29th Inf Div CIC Security Breach Report to ACofS, G2, XIX Corps, 22 Jul 44 In 29th Div Misc Rpts File 22 Jul 44 (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096).

** 83d Inf Div A/A Rpt for Jul, dtd 1 Aug 44, /s/ Victor, (Master 11786), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 29th Inf Div CIC CI Rpt for week ending 9 Jul 44, in 29th Inf Div Correspondence File, (SECRET), (Kansas City Record Center, Bx 25096).

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Almost every one agreed that the security in the first phase of operations had been excellent, but with few exceptions, and representatives of each unit were urged to point out to all troops the fact that American soldiers had been extremely close-mouthed when taken prisoner.

It was agreed that troops had been talking too much to civilians near bivouac areas, and it was further conceded that replacements were not as security-conscious as men who had been with the division throughout the training period and the invasion.*

The meeting helped considerably to clarify in the minds of the S2's the problems which confronted the division from a counterintelligence viewpoint. It also brought home to several officers the actual function of CIC.

Continued vigilance regarding loose talk, telephone security, security of installations, safeguarding of classified documents, and proper instruction of replacements were considered. The officers discussed the past civilian evacuation problems and the possibility of active sabotage in the liberated area of the division.

The probability that civilians evacuated by the Germans from the forward areas would be herded into Allied lines en masse was considered, and Battalion S2's were advised to round these people up and place them under guard to be taken to regiment where they would be escorted on to rear areas and screened by CIC.

All S2's were told to be wary of refugees, especially when a Schutz Staffeln (SS) unit was faced.** They were warned about persons claiming to be resistance group members; persons in Allied uniform claiming to be escaped PW's; and officers who had come to forward units "for the purpose of seeing what is going

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* 29th Inf Div CIC CI Rpt for week ending 30 Jul 44, 29th Inf Div Correspondence File, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096).

** The Schutz Staffeln (Protective Guard), commonly called SS, was considered the most important of all Nazi formations. Its original function was to guard Party leaders; by the time of World War II, its task was officially defined as that of ensuring the internal security of the Reich. The SS was organized into three main divisions: the General (Allegemeine) SS; the Armed (Waffen) SS; and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) of the SS. The Waffen SS acted as part of the normal armed forces of Germany, but because of their fanatical devotion to the "cause," greater field intelligence activity was to be expected of them.

on," without clearance through proper channels. G2 clearance would be required for such persons, and for civilians claiming to be Red Cross doctors or nurses or presenting Office of Strategic Services credentials.*

1st CIC Detachment Reports Security Violations

In mid-July, 1st CIC Detachment agents learned that both officers and soldiers of the division had committed a serious security breach when local laundresses were told that their services would no longer be needed since the division was moving out. The news had spread rapidly in the town, and the entire civilian population knew of the impending move. This incident furnished the basis for further warnings to tactical troops.**

CIC Plagued by Sniper Reports

While the 3d Armored Division Headquarters was situated near Les Obeaux, the problem of suspected enemy sniper activity caused some degree of consternation in the ranks of U. S. Engineers, tactical troops and, in the end, the CIC detachment.

First knowledge of sniper activity came in connection with a message received from the Assistant S2 of Combat Command B, requesting the investigation of the occupants of a house along a railroad near Les Obeaux from which shots were believed to have been fired at an Engineer Company sentry stationed on a nearby bridge. Agents Udoff, Robinson and Travis, after questioning several members of the Engineer Company, reported that a shot probably was fired from the house along the hedge toward the sentry post; that German coveralls were hanging on a laundry line near the house; and that after four railroad workers, source of employment unknown, had come to the bridge on bicycles, artillery fire had been directed at the bridge for a period of eight to nine days.

After this preliminary investigation by the three agents, the case was turned over to the Isigny CIC office because the incident had occurred in the XIX Corps area.***

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* 29th Inf Div Memo to G2, subj, "Counterintelligence Meetings with S2s," dtd 27 Jul 44, in 29th Inf Div Misc Rpts File (CONF) (Kansas City Records Ctr)

** 1st Inf Div CIC Det Daily Rpt, 13 Jul 44, in 302-2.2 (Master 22292), G2 Jnl 1st Inf Div, 13-14 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Memo to ACofS, G2, 2d Armored Div, from 3d Armd Div CIC, signed by T. M. Black, CO, subj, "Snipers," 6 Jul 44, contained in 503d Detachment Case Reports File, (CONF), (Kansas City Records Center Bx 25104)

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Assuming that the sniper problem would be a recurrent one, Lt. Black, Commanding Officer of the 503d CIC Detachment, requested the 3d Armored Division G2 to remind the tactical units that they were authorized to return sniper fire and make an immediate investigation, with the further assurance that CIC would also check names of persons living in the locality against their suspect lists and through their informants.*

Advertising Campaign Suggested

In the midst of a variety of activities that included checking on reports of enemy sniper activity, security violations, denunciations and suspicious French civilians, CIC found time to consider an advertising campaign. The campaign, as suggested by Philip S. Udoff, agent with the 503d CIC Detachment, was offered as a possible aid in the apprehension of persons giving information to the enemy, especially in the areas such as Neuilly-la-Foret, only a short distance from enemy lines.

According to Udoff's plan, notices would be posted offering a reward to anyone who would bring to the CIC office enough conclusive evidence to warrant the conviction of a person who had given information to the enemy. Agent Udoff believed that a monetary reward would supplement the patriotic feelings of a great many individuals who otherwise would be hesitant to come forward and give information against a fellow countryman.

The provision that the reward would be paid only if the evidence were definite enough to support a conviction would serve, Agent Udoff argued, "... to discourage those who have 'spite stories' and rumors."

Although many believed that the reward system would prove valuable in rooting out persons who continued to aid the enemy by slipping across the lines at night, officials at higher echelons disapproved the suggestion in the belief that it would encourage a profusion of false reports of no counterintelligence interest.**

Take-Over System Developed

Early in July, all the corps CIC detachments were working at coordinating the efforts of the divisional CIC detachments and attempting to set up orderly take-over

*Memo to ACofS, G2 2d Armd Div, from 3d Armd Div CIC, signed by T. M. Black, CO, subj, "Snipers," 6 Jul 44, contained in 503d Det Case Rpts File, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

**3d Armd Div CIC Memo to CO CIC Det, XIX Corps, subj, "Apprehension of enemy Agents," 7 Jul 44, s/T. M. Black, CO 503d Det Case Rpts File, (Conf), (Kansas City Record Center, Bx 25104).

systems. The 219th CIC Detachment continued to assign its teams to sub-areas, often to work with divisional teams. After the fall of St. Lo, six agents were sent to work with the 29th CIC Detachment there. The 219th CIC Detachment also maintained close relations with the 205th CIC and, late in July, turned over to this detachment the town reports and other records for six towns which XIX Corps was vacating, as it prepared to move out on Operation COBRA.*

The 205th CIC Detachment also used this period to strengthen liaison with detachments under V Corps as well as those in adjoining sectors. Through personal contact, town turn-over reports and daily reports of activities, the detachment was attempting to set a pattern in anticipation of the time when rapid movement would make coordination much more difficult.**

Before the 1st CIC Detachment transferred with the division to a rest area prior to the breakout, it briefed members of the 5th CIC Detachment, that had arrived on 9 July, on completed operations and turned over its files on suspects, informants, resistance personnel, and uncompleted cases.***

Nor was this turn-over system restricted to exchange between U. S. units. When, later in July, the 5th Division was changing its area of operations, two CIC teams which had been operating in Cormolain turned over their records to the Field Security Section of the 15th Scottish Division.****

An interesting variation of the take-over system within a division detachment was practiced by the 35th CIC Detachment. This variation was described as a "leap frog" technique. The detachment was divided into two sections, one commanded by Lieutenant Ayr, Detachment Commanding Officer, and the other by 2d Lt. Charles W. Colgan. Colgan would take his section in, right behind a

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* Excerpt from Daily CI Summary, Hq V Corps, 31 Jul 44, In IX Corps A/A Rpt L-45, 31 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** V Corps G2 History of Intelligence Operations, V Corps European Campaign, 18 May 42 O 10 May 45 (booklet), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Weekly Counterintelligence Rpts and Daily Situation Summaries, 1st Inf Div CIC, 1 through 17 Jul 44, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** 5th Inf Div CIC Det rpt, 23-24 Jul 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623) 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

regiment, and occasionally even ahead of it. The agents would immediately contact resistance leaders, interview informants, apprehend collaborators, and reduce specific intelligence targets such as radio stations, post offices, police departments and German officers headquarters and billets. Later, possibly two or three days at the most, Lieutenant Ayr's section would enter and receive from Lieutenant Colgan's section all pertinent information, enabling the second group of agents to begin developing informant nets and setting up routine security measures. In this manner, continuity of coverage was achieved, and the incoming section could accomplish surprisingly effective counterintelligence work based upon an already-established CI foundation.

The reduction of St. Lo was an example. Although the 29th CIC Detachment entered St. Lo first, Colgan's section of the 35th CIC followed shortly thereafter. In fact, the agents entered one section before the Germans had evacuated it and, evading detection by a German patrol, were the first to inform the dazed inhabitants that the Allied Forces were coming.

From a list obtained previously, they located a contact, a worker in an ice plant, from whom they received a list of all women collaborators in St. Lo. They searched desperately for a well known spy and collaborator named DeGroote, but finally had to assume he had fled with the Germans. Later, when Lieutenant Ayr and his team arrived, Lieutenant Colgan was able to hand over lists of reliable persons, suspects, collaborators, and a report concerning an Abwehr agent alleged to be in the area.*

Reinforcements

Teams from the Twelfth Army Group Detachment, known as the 418th CIC Detachment, began arriving early in July and assuming their places in the take-over system. Team #3 came in over UTAH Beach on D plus 28 and by 12 July had become responsible for coverage of Trevieres and ten surrounding towns. Central office and living quarters for the team were located in a chateau in the middle of a large replacement depot, a depot which drew at least three air raids nightly for six weeks.

After a branch office had been established at La Mine and two men sent to Balleroy on liaison with V Corps, hundreds of refugees were screened, and, as a highlight to the numerous cases investigated, a two-week surveillance of an espionage suspect was conducted mostly at night in open fields under air attack.

* Interview with Charles W. Colgan, Baltimore, 28 Nov 54.

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A system of case records was instituted that provided the foundation of the team's procedures thereafter and furnished teams that followed with orderly records and useful procedures which were not available to Team #3 when it landed in France.*

ADSEC Teams Join Take-over System

By the end of July, eighteen ADSEC CIC Teams with 246 members were in Normandy operating throughout First Army's rear area, covering much of the territory north of a line running from Barneville through Carentan to OMAHA Beach.** In theory, these teams, operating initially under army control, were to take over from Army Reserve teams that had moved in behind the division and corps tactical teams. They would then revert to ADSEC control until ADSEC moved on, turning control over to Base Sections. As needed, new ADSEC CIC teams would be formed from the Com Z Pool. It also had been anticipated that the bulk of counterintelligence work could be turned over to indigenous authorities at an early date, with only small liaison detachments of CIC personnel remaining.***

Although there is ample documentary evidence to show that ADSEC teams continued to operate close behind the army's rear and, in some instances, well to the front of this area, there is a dearth of information concerning the activities of the Base Sections, and little evidence of their work in an orderly take-over system.

Excerpts from a history of the Normandy Base Section disclose that, during the early existence of this Section, five ADSEC CIC units were attached to the Base, but as the front moved forward, the CIC detachments also moved, leaving the base with only one detachment which had headquarters in Cherbourg. Later, another detachment was attached to the Base Section with headquarters in Granville, and was supplemented by a Military Intelligence Interpreter team. When the Allies established the Brittany Base Section and part of the Channel Base Section, one CIC detachment and two MII teams were attached. But, this history related, lack of adequate personnel and the continued recalling of intelligence personnel by higher headquarters for new assignments made it impossible to cover the additional territory properly.****

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* Unit History of CIC Detachment no 418, Tactical Reserve Team No 3; Monthly Information Rpt, 12th AG, CIC Det No 418, 6 Mar 45, s/ Lt Col Norman J Hearn, CO (Note: Little information is available on the other Tactical Reserve Teams of 418th), (AIS Staff and Faculty Lib File).

** CIC Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Aug 44, Hq ADSEC, Ibid.

*** Adm 583C, ADSEC History (Departmental Record Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** History of Normandy Base Section, D Day to VE Day, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.).

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The eighteen "lettered" ADSEC detachments, with commanders as indicated, which had arrived by the end of July, had settled in the following locations just before the COBRA Breakout: "A", Captain Alvin Johnson, Cherbourg; "B", 2d Lt. Meredith Wilson, St. Honorine; "C", Capt. T. Rungee, Cherbourg; "D", (Headquarters Team) Capt Thomas P. Sweeney, Catz; "E", 2d Lt Grover Schantz, Beaumont Hague; "F", 2d Lt Thomas Dowd, Valognes; "G", 2d Lt. Elbert M. Ryan, Carentan; "H", Capt. Donald M. Graham, Cherbourg; "I", Maj. Leonard Millman, Carentan; "K", Capt. Julian P. Prescott, Pouppeville; "L", Capt. L. C. Hill, Bricquebec; "M", 2d Lt. R. C. Cahoon, Negreville; "S", 2d Lt. William J. Sexton, St Vaast; "T", 2d Lt Joseph A. Lowther, Carteret; "W", Capt. William J. Wallace, Les Pieux; and "X", 2d Lt. K. T. McCarthy, St Pierre Eglise. Maj. Ernest E. Larios was in charge of the CIC Headquarters at Cherbourg and Maj. Oswald C. Michelmann was chief of the CIC section in the CI Branch, ADSEC.*

These eighteen detachments operated numerous sub-offices and their 246 agents were distributed over thirty-one towns. These agents were occupied with the same type of activity as the other CIC men: investigations involving denunciations of local inhabitants and alleged collaborationist activities, checking of proposed employees, sabotage and espionage investigations, and the enforcement of travel controls. But travel control consumed most of their time. They found that enforcement of the six kilometer rule by French authorities was spotty and required close CIC supervision. In some areas, local officials had not received the French Government's official travel control restrictions and were therefore hesitant to enforce the CIC rulings, and in other areas the travel regulations had not been supervised because of shortage of personnel. The situation was further aggravated by the lack of sufficient Civil Affairs sections operating in forward territory to take care of issuance of passes and the fact that, in several instances, the Civil Affairs detachment moved from towns without giving notice to the mayor of the territory or to CIC.

Additional burdens were placed upon the CIC agents by the widespread habit of U. S. troops, in spite of regulations to the contrary, of transporting civilians in military vehicles, and also by the reprehensible behavior of some troops toward the local inhabitants. Well enforced off-limits restrictions in towns helped alleviate both situations.**

One particular mission of the ADSEC detachment in Normandy was to guard the sparsely populated west coast of the Cotentin Peninsula, a problem that was mentioned earlier in the plans for countering the increased threat of espionage.***

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* CIC Info Bulletin #2, Hq ADSEC, dtd 1 Aug 44 (SECRET), (Staff & Faculty Lib).

** Bi-weekly Counterintelligence Report #1, Hqs, ADSEC for period 28 Jul to 12 Aug 44, in ADSEC COMZ (45) (Confidential), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** CIC Info Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Aug 44 Hq ADSEC, Office of ACofS, G2, and Bulletin #1 dtd 29 Jul 44, (SECRET), (AIS Staff & Faculty Lib Files).

ADSEC CIC Agents Act As Paymaster

The main task of the Headquarters CIC Team in the ADSEC Zone was to guarantee the security of the Headquarters against spies and saboteurs and direct the CIC agents in the ADSEC area in France, then Belgium and later Germany. Lieutenant Francis Carpenter had a major role in one maneuver that boosted the morale of these agents. During the days when an apple orchard in Normandy served as ADSEC Headquarters, Lieutenant Carpenter was ordered to serve as Finance Officer for ADSEC CIC and pay the agents, many of whom had not drawn pay for a considerable time. Equipped with one million francs in new currency -- a sum equal to $20,000 in U. S. money -- he toured the area and, naturally enough, received a welcome wherever he went. According to Lieutenant Carpenter, the Headquarters ADSEC team acted as "Father Confessor" to the other teams throughout the war, as well as a security force for Headquarters.*

CIC Gathers Tactical Information

As in the previous period, CIC was able to contribute a great deal of tactical information, obtained from informants, resistance workers and captured documents. One of the most productive hauls, made by the 35th CIC Detachment their first day in St. Lo, was labeled by the detachment as "The case of the Fabulous Fountain Pen."

An old Frenchman, disheveled and destitute, his feet bruised and bleeding, hobbled into the CIC office and offered to give CIC some information in exchange for a pair of shoes. It was evident he needed the shoes, but it seemed unlikely that he could furnish much information of value. However, the bargain was concluded, and the old man brought from his pocket a fountain pen. Slowly taking it apart, he finally reached the plunger, which proved to be hollow. From this hollow plunger he took a piece of tissue paper which, when unrolled, was about one foot long and four inches wide.

In tiny script, there was recorded on this piece of paper the position and deployment of almost every German unit for approximately 200 miles in front of the Allied forces and the location of numerous enemy road blocks, observation posts, mine fields, ammunition dumps, radio stations and other pertinent data. The observant little Frenchman had even jotted down reports concerning an alleged woman spy, the size of the resistance groups and their key men in the major towns of the area and the location of air fields in the path of the Allied advance. A pair of GI shoes was probably never exchanged for anything more valuable.**

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* Interview with Major Francis W. Carpenter (Reserve) former Hq ADSEC Team CO, 23 Jul 54.

** Interview with Mr. Charles W. Colgan, Baltimore, 28 Nov 54.

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Numerous instances of CIC's collection of tactical information are included in the records of the various detachments. Early in July, 2d CIC Detachment agents captured a map showing the disposition of the German 9th Parachute Regiment,* and about the same time, 29th CIC Detachment agents learned from an informant that for about a year the Germans had been making underground excavations in the quarries near Esglandes and Rampan, and that similar excavations had been prepared in two towns near Ma Mesuffe.**

Other routine search of former German headquarters continued to net valuable documents. In St. Lo the 219th CIC seized documents from offices of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and the Parti-Populaire Francais, (PPF), the most active French Fascist organ.*** And in Neuilly-la-Foret, on 4 July, Agent Albert C. Monferrato of the 503d CIC Detachment, while searching the billets of the paymaster of the 914th Grenadier Regiment, found nineteen lists of French workers impressed by the Germans for labor in the Spring of 1944.****

CIC Agents Interrogate Liberated Americans

During this period CIC agents also began an operation that was to be more and more time-consuming as the war progressed: the interrogation of all U. S. soldiers escaped or liberated from German prison camps. On 22 July, agents of the 79th CIC Detachment interviewed an American fighter pilot who had been shot down on 4 July behind German lines and an American paratrooper who had been a prisoner since D Day plus two.*****

Following the capture of St. Lo, agents of the 29th CIC Detachment had opportunity to learn, from an American soldier who had escaped from a German

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* 2d CIC Detachment entries in 3-2-2.2 (Master 48501) in 2d Inf Div G2 Jnl June 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 29th Inf Div CIC Supplemental Rpt on Moon Sur Elle, 14 Jul 44, in 29th Inf Div Misc Reports File (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096). No further information was found concerning these excavations.

*** Rpt from CIC Det #27, s/ Baker, in XIX A/A Rpt, L-45, 30 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Ltr, subj, "Lists of Impressed Workers," from 3d Armd Div CIC s/ Black to CO 1st Army CIC Det, dtd 4 Jul 44 in 503d Det Case Rpts File, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

***** 79th CIC Daily Detachment Rpt, 22 Jul 44 in CIC Jnl (Unclassified) (Historical Project Files) NOTE: Interrogation of escapees was included in CIC's mission during the preparation for OVERLORD.

Prisoner-of-War camp and made his way back to friendly lines, how American soldiers were conducting themselves after capture. According to this soldier, the Germans had little success in questioning five selected from a group of twenty American Prisoners of War. Dismayed and disgruntled over their inability to extract information from American troops, the Germans shortly thereafter officially stated that "... no time should be lost in attempts to question American prisoners, as they will not talk."*

Promotion for CIC Agents Needed

By mid-July, there was official concern over the "provisional"** nature of CIC detachments, since this status prohibited promotions of CIC agents in accordance with the CIC Table of Organization. Lt Col Harry F. Hansen, G2 of the 4th Division, pointed out that the detachment had successfully carried out its mission in combat and had demonstrated that it was a necessary adjunct to the division. He recommended that the "provisional" status be eliminated.***

On the same day, Col. Dickson, 1st Army G2, in a letter to Colonel Bryan Conrad of the Theater G2 office, stressed the inequities in promotion of CIC officers. "CIC officers in the normal performance of their duties do not have the opportunity to participate in battle field promotions ...it appears that special consideration should be given recommendations from combat units in combat for the normal promotion of CIC officers who serve their unit well."****

CIC Readies for COBRA

In mid-July, various CIC detachments in Normandy began to draw up specific plans for their activities in Operation COBRA. The most explicit of these plans found in the records were made by the 503d CIC Detachment. These plans called for the detachment to set up liaison with 1st CIC Detachment, Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence Interpreter teams and for the assignment of specific missions to the detachment's various teams.

Lieutenant Olan Parker and Agents Laurence Dow, Albert Monferrato and Ralph E. Dietz were to proceed with Headquarters, Combat Command A, and

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* 29th Inf Div CIC Rpt for week ending 23 Jul 44, in 29th Div Correspondence File, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25096).

** See Chapter entitled "Preparation for OVERLORD".

*** Ltr 14 Jul 44 s/ CO Hansen, subj, "CIC Detachment # LO (Prov)" in G2 Jnl & File, 1-15 Jul 44, 4th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Ltr, 14 Jul 44 from Col B.A. Dickson, G2 FUSA to Col Bryan Conrad, Office of ACofS G2, ETOUSA, in G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 1-15 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

search for documents and other items of counterintelligence interest in enemy headquarters in the town of Cerisy-la-Salle and the Cerisy-la-Salle-Mortpinchon area. This group was also responsible for establishing liaison with Civil Affairs and Military Intelligence Interpreters officers for the screening of refugees in Civil Affairs clearing stations enroute.

Another group led by Lt. Theodore Black was to go with the G2 section, Advance Division CP, to provide CIC coverage in the areas of Cametours, Savigny Belval and Couroy.

Agents George L. Kiley and Ulysses S. Collins were to work at the division prisoner-of-war cage, screening civilian suspects turned up in rear areas, who were evacuated through prisoner-of-war channels.

CIC coverage for the northern column, including Combat Command B, was the responsibility of the 1st Infantry Division CIC. After the occupation of Coutances by U.S. troops, members of 3rd Armored CIC were to share coverage of the town with personnel of the 1st CIC.*

Poised for COBRA Breakout

On the eve of the COBRA breakout, finally scheduled for 25 July 1944, twenty divisional CIC detachments, five corps detachments and two army detachments were poised on the crowded Peninsula, waiting to accompany their tactical units; and group, ADSEC and ComZ units were organizing themselves to fall in behind.

* 3rd Armd Div CIC Memo to G2, subj, "CIC Coverage, Operation X", 18 Jul 44, s/ T.M. Black, CO, 503d Det Case Rpts, (C), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25104).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XV

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THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE

Parts II and III (25 July 1944 - 14 September 1944)

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March 1959

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

AGSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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(From 25 July 1944 to 14 December 1944)

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Part II - Northern France (25 July 1944 - 14 September 1944)

Chapter 1

ON THE MOVE TO PARIS

The Northern France campaign, which began with the COBRA breakout on 25 July 1944, officially ended on 14 September, three days after the Seventh Army, coming up from the south, established liaison with elements of Patton's Third Army near Dijon in central France. During these seven weeks, the Allied Armies broke out of the Normandy lodgement, cut off and reduced the Brittany Peninsula, annihilated a German army in the Falaise Pocket, captured Paris, crossed the Seine River, moved across the remainder of France, and penetrated into Belgium and Luxembourg and even into the Reich.

The official dates for the campaign were set by War Department order as 25 July to 14 September, but for the millions of Allied soldiers racing across France, and even for the rest of the world, it actually fell into two campaigns, "Before Paris," and "After Paris." The liberation of Paris had become of tremendous psychological, although not tactical, importance. As General Bradley phrased it: "To a generation raised on fanciful tales of their fathers in the AEF, Paris beckoned with a greater allure than any other objective in Europe. Yet tactically the city had become meaningless. For all its past glories, Paris represented nothing more than an inkspot on our maps to be by-passed as we headed toward the Rhine. Logistically it could cause untold trouble, for behind its handsome facades there lived four million hungry Frenchman. The diversion of so much tonnage to Paris would only strain further our already taut supply lines. Food for the people of Paris meant less gasoline for the front."*

30 Days From Normandy to Paris

The thirty days from the COBRA breakout to the liberation of Paris were eventful ones for CIC agents as they learned for the first time in the ETO to operate under a rapidly changing situation. Two more corps were committed to the campaign during this period and with them their CIC detachments: the 212th CIC Detachment (XII Corps);** and the 220th CIC Detachment (XX Corps), with Captain Anthony Lobb as CO. The 418th CIC Detachment, under command of Lt Col. Norman J. Hearn moved to the Continent when 12th Army Group became operational, on or about 1 August, although at least one of its teams had been operating on the Continent for some time. Two more division detachments came in: the 507th (7th

* A Soldier's Story, by General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951), p 384.

** The CO of 212th is not known. Major Edwin Bennett later become CO, exact date unknown.

Armored Division) CIC Detachment, and the 80th CIC Detachment, the latter commanded by Captain Thomas R. McMillen.* The SHAEF CIC Detachment, with Capt. Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen in command, and the ETO Detachment, with Major Howard E. Wilson in command, also moved to the Continent.**

Allied Line-up on Eve of COBRA

As First Army girded itself for the breakout, the forty-mile U.S. front was divided into four corps sectors: V Corps occupied the "quiet" left flank; XIX Corps held the depression behind St. Lo; VII Corps was entrenched in half of the Cotentin neck after having moved down from Cherbourg; and VIII Corps was stretched across that neck to the west shore.

The basic strategy for the attack out of the Normandy lodgment, which had been written into the OVERLORD Plan, called for the British Second Army to hold the pivot at Caen while the U. S. line wheeled eastward. The First U.S. Army was to generate the momentum with an assault on the western end of the line, and American troops were to sweep south of Cotentin past Avranches and there cut off the Brittany Peninsula at its base. The remainder of the Allied line was to pivot with the advance and roll east to the Seine between Paris and the English Channel. VIII Corps was dispatched to capture Brittany; XV Corps to drive south to Laval, then to turn north on Argentan; XII Corps to advance on Orleans along Third Army's southern flank, and XX Corps to attack towards Chartres.***

Germans Had Fallen for Allied Hoax

When British and U.S. Forces linked at Chambois, fifteen miles southeast of Falaise on 19 August, the German Seventh Army was trapped. In this Falaise Pocket, nineteen enemy divisions were chewed up, and approximately one hundred thousand German soldiers were killed. The degree to which the Germans were fooled as to Allied intentions surprised even the planners who had arranged the hoax. A cover tactic, evolved during the planning for OVERLORD, had been built around phony radio nets and a mock invasion fleet. Misleading information had been fed to known German agents. All these measures had been taken in the hope of tieing down German defensive forces at Pas de Calais only until enough divisions could be moved ashore to secure the Normandy landing. None had counted upon the possibility that the Germans might believe that even the Normandy invasion was a diversionary move. But this they did believe, and accordingly, for seven decisive weeks, held nineteen divisions in reserve, waiting for the invasion that never came.****

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* Records do not indicate the name of the CO of the 507th CIC Detachment; and it is not certain that Capt. McMillen was the original commander of the 80th CIC Detachment, although by early in 1945, he was the CO.

** Interview with James F. Foothorap (Lt Col. MI, Res) September 1955.

*** Bradley, op. cit., p 319.

**** Ibid, p 379; pp 344-5.

In April 1945, interrogation of a German prisoner of war, who had served in the G3 branch of the German Commander-in-Chief West, revealed why the German High Command had been so thoroughly duped. Because of insufficient air reconnaissance, the Nazis were forced to depend largely upon information supplied by their agents in England, "who were evidently liberally supplied with counterintelligence plants." CIC agents in England had had a share in this "greatest hoax of the war."*

Rapid Advances Hamper CIC Work

As the Allied offensive gained momentum and registered gains of fifty miles in some sectors during a single day, First and Third Army CIC detachments at corps and divisional level were confronted with serious problems.

Not only was the front moving forward rapidly, but often the direction of advance for the armies would be changed with a consequent altering of the respective areas of responsibility behind the front lines. One example cited was the time Third Army's direction of attack was turned southward, leaving almost half of its CIC personnel operating in towns of First Army's responsibility. It was at least forty-eight hours before Third Army could get in touch with First Army and have its agents released for operations in its own area. This situation also caused difficulty in the distribution of area and town counterintelligence plans. In many instances these plans, including the black and white cards had to be exchanged hastily and often did not arrive in time to be of help. In one instance, when there was a shift in areas a town plan was sent to First Army. The areas shifted back again and Third Army had no data to send to its division which entered the town.**

One of the more serious problems caused by the rapid advance and the shifting of areas--and certainly a frustration to agents involved--was the lack of time available to complete investigations. A detachment would no more than initiate an investigation than the division would receive orders to race ahead to the next town or objective. Prior to leaving Gorron, for example, the 1st CIC was so rushed that it had to entrust to the Civil Affairs detachment the report of counterintelligence activities for transmission to VII Corps CIC.*** Agents of 1st CIC were not the only ones moving too fast. The 79th CIC Detachment was forced to refer many incomplete cases and many promising leads to VIII Corps CIC. One entry in the detachment journal for 30 July stated: "Three persons who were alleged to be members of the Gestapo were turned over to the gendarmerie to be detained for Monarch (VIII Corps) CIC."****

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* First Army Report, 23 Apr 1945, in G2 Jnl & File, FUSA, L-558 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.). Note: See Chapter entitled "Preparation for OVERLORD."

** Interview with James F. Foothorap (Lt Col,MI Res.), at Ft Holabird, Sep 1955.

*** 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Rpt, 23 Aug 44, G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div. 23-26 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** 79th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 30 Jul 44, CIC Jnl, 79th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

When a division received orders to move out, two or three agents, sorely needed up the road, usually had to be left behind until the corps detachment or part of it arrived. Once it did, the division team briefed the corps agents on all pending cases and then struck out in the general direction of their parent organization. Sometimes it took agents several days to find their detachment, so rapid were the advances.*

Occasionally a division detachment would leave behind several agents, only to have them stranded when the division was reassigned to another corps. The varying tactical situation during and following the breakout dictated this constant shifting of divisions and corps.

This practice worked a decided hardship on tactical CIC detachments because the former parent CIC organization usually refused to send a relief team into a town once the area no longer was a responsibility. To complicate matters, the new parent CIC organization many times had previous commitments for its agents and could not immediately spare the men for a relief team. Thus, there was nothing left for the stranded agents to do but pursue what investigations they could until finally relieved.

The lack of coordination in the field between corps and divisions detachments constituted a main CIC difficulty during the initial phase of the breakout. For a while agents were borrowed by neighboring detachments until a particular investigation was completed, but this did not prove to be the answer.**

Two-man Teams Attached to Divisions

Finally, a system was arranged whereby two-man teams of agents from the corps detachment were attached to each division detachment for operational purposes. When the corps detachment arrived to relieve a division detachment of counterintelligence responsibilities, the team was in an advantageous situation to brief corps on all pending cases in the area.

The first team's place was taken by another two-man team which went on ahead with the division unit. This technique worked out more smoothly than the original system of leaving agents behind, and soon the First and Third Army CIC detachments were forwarding agents to corps detachments in the same manner.

At the same time, division detachments made every effort to save valuable time when relinquishing a town to corps by submitting town turn-over reports, which covered in detail the counterintelligence situation in the area.

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* 1st Inf Div CIC Det Daily Rpt, 28 Aug 44. in G2 Jnl, 301-2.2 (22292 Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 1st Inf Div CI Rpt, 31 Jul - 7 Aug 44, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 7-9 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Various corps detachments continually attempted to improve the coordination and continuity of coverage by the division detachments in their areas. In mid-August, Captain Fossieck, Commanding Officer of the 215th CIC Detachment (XV Corps) requested that the divisional detachments under XV Corps forward tactical work sheets on each town twenty-four to forty-eight hours after reduction.*

Teams from 418th CIC Detachment Join Take-over System

Early during this period the bulk of the 418th (Twelfth Army Group) CIC Detachment arrived and its teams began to fall in behind army detachments to carry on CIC work until the arrival of ADSEC detachments. Actually the "falling in behind" process often was more than counterintelligence mopping up because much of the area the 418th CIC teams covered had not previously been touched by a CIC detachment. A resume of the activities of one of these teams illustrates the variety of duties that fell to them. The 418th's Tactical Reserve Team (TRT) #3, had many hazardous experiences after it moved from Normandy into the American offensive on the Brittany Peninsula. On 5 August, early in the COBRA breakout, TRT #3 was transferred to Third Army and attached to VIII Corps.

Shortly thereafter, the team received orders to proceed across the front towards Rennes. Unescorted during the entire journey, the team made the last leg of the trip, from Fougeres to Rennes, through German-controlled territory over a road which was not deemed safe until more than a week later.

In this period TRT #3 consisted of 2nd Lt. Kenneth E. Hardin as CO, 2nd Lt. Donald C. Stroud as executive officer, and twelve agents.

TRT #3 Splits into Four Groups

After reaching Rennes on 10 August, TRT #3 split up into four groups. Group 1, consisting of three agents, accompanied by four VIII Corps agents left for Morlaix in Western Brittany, a journey of 100 miles, most of which was through enemy-held territory. On one occasion, the group narrowly missed being ambushed when they passed through an area where, only five minutes before, a German patrol had been wiped out.

Later, when the team entered Morlaix, they discovered that the city was held by only 300 U.S. cavalrymen and that several battalions, the only other U.S. troops in all of Western Brittany, were containing approximately 40,000 Germans at Brest, twenty-eight kilometers away.

Until the surrounding countryside was liberated, the agents were forced to confine their operations to the city limits. Several espionage cases were initiated, one

* 79th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 17 Aug 44 in CIC Journal 79th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

of which resulted in the execution of a leading French Milicien of Western Brittany. Later, agents visited the nearby villages, arresting collaborators and alleged German agents. Numerous former German headquarters, most of which were still mined, were searched.

CIC Agents Work under Constant Fire

After most of the counterintelligence targets in and around Morlaix had been reduced, Group 1 moved to Landerneau to join in the battle for Brest. For the next five weeks, until the fortress fell, the group was under constant shell and small arms fire. During the siege, agents made a search of a naval arsenal only 150 yards from the advance German positions, a search which eventually had to be abandoned because of several time-fused 88 shells. However, the following day these same agents were able to search for enemy agents in a heavily-mined German strong point and in a series of caves in the forward areas.

CIC Group 2 Moves Toward Pontivy

While Group 1 agents were assisting in counterintelligence work before the port city of Brest, Group 2, consisting of two officers and three agents, departed from Rennes for Pontivy, which was expected to fall within a day or two. Enroute, the group stopped briefly at Locmine to assist prisoner-of-war interrogation teams in the questioning of German captives. While in Locmine, these agents were cautioned against driving on to Pontivy because scattered bands of Germans were believed still to be quartered along the main roads; however, the urgency of the situation demanded that CIC operate in Pontivy, and the journey was made without incident.

Lieutenant Hardin and his men learned, shortly after entering Pontivy, that with the exception of two U.S. paratroopers and some civil affairs officers, there were no other Americans present. After establishing a road block system, the agents searched former Nazi installations and buildings. Refugees were screened, deserters apprehended, and a basic counterintelligence plan developed.

CIC Operates in Advance of Infantry

From Pontivy, Group 2 moved to Hennebat, approximately 500 yards in front of American infantry positions before Lorient. CIC operations were carried on despite intense shelling which eventually destroyed the town. Strong German patrols frequently passed through Hennebat at night while Lieutenant Hardin and his men lay hidden in the cellars of ruined buildings, but the Germans evidently believed the town to be deserted except for the civil population. This situation continued until a German patrol fired on a French Forces of the Interior (FFI) band near the CIC office, prompting the local U.S. infantry commander to order the town temporarily evacuated.

Group 2 next moved to near Pont Scorff, where they made numerous forays in the vicinity of Auray, obtaining information that led to the destruction of a German ammunition ship off the southern coast of Brittany.

FFI Assists Group 3 Agents

Meanwhile, agents of Group 3 had shifted from Rennes to Dinan. Here, with the aid of FFI volunteers, they apprehended numerous German soldiers in civilian clothing who were attempting to reach their own lines.

From Dinan, agents of Group 3 journeyed to Chateaulin, situated across the bay from the German-held Crozon Peninsula. FFI personnel, who were the only other pro-Allied force present, guarded the shore line for traces of infiltrating German agents, while the CIC agents made several night trips across the bay to collect counterintelligence information.

Group 4 Agents Work Near German Lines

After leaving Rennes, Group 4 drove to Vannes, near the German lines, a journey which took them through territory still populated with scattered German units. After completing their mission in Vannes, they moved on to Nantes, then held by a small reconnaissance party with the Germans just across the river. Although the city was shelled sporadically by the enemy, the agents completed the reduction of a number of local counterintelligence targets.*

Liaison Proves Vital

In addition to solving problems arising from the extremely swift Allied advance, CIC agents expended considerable efforts establishing liaison with other Allied army units. Although time-consuming, this liaison was absolutely necessary for the efficient accomplishment of CIC's mission in the European Theater of Operations. Constant contact with civil affairs staffs and detachments was required to dispose of mutual problems such as handling of evacuees and the selection of loyal and trustworthy town officials.

Among the most important contacts were the military police, who, in addition to their regular duties in connection with the evacuation of refugees and the detention of arrested persons, furnished men to CIC for special details when needed.**

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* Unit History of CIC Detachment No. 418, Tactical Reserve Team No. 3, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Intelligence Operations of V Corps, Chapter III - Operations G2 Section, undated (Restricted), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Detachments Accomplish Much in One Working Day

The varied activities of all CIC detachments operating in Northern France made every day a busy one. Daily reports from the period revealed the great amount of counterintelligence work which could be crammed into a single day.

Entries in the 79th CIC Detachment Journal for 2 August, for example, disclosed that on that day the detachment, while working in Granville, screened 260 civilians and informed civil affairs there was no objection to issuing them passes. The agents turned over to Third Army CIC Detachment several leads on places where Germans were reported to be hiding and signaling to German planes; numerous denunciations; membership lists of collaborationist parties; a complete list of all trustworthy informants in the city; information concerning the location of numerous ammunition dumps, four American bodies, and the hiding places of 20 Organization Todt workers; and one alleged spy whom they had arrested.

These same agents arrested and lodged with the French police eight alleged collaborationists and a Frenchman charged with stealing American equipment, and apprehended two Organization Todt workers and two German prisoners of war who were sent to the rear through channels. But still more was accomplished during the day. The agents completely searched all German headquarters, including the Normandy Hotel, from which papers of intelligence interest were forwarded to the division order of battle team, and they maintained routine liaison contacts with Civil Affairs, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the local police. Agent David Zintz, who was on detached service with the 6th Armored Division CIC Detachment then operating on the outskirts of Pontorson, captured five German soldiers from the 753d German Infantry Regiment.*

Another detachment's daily account revealed equally impressive accomplishments. On 19 August, teams of Lieutenant Steinway's 1st CIC Detachment were working in the towns of Counterne, LaFerte Mae, La Chapelle Moche, Bagnoles de l'Orne, and Periers. Among other numerous duties, the agents issued passes to seventeen electric company employees to permit the repair of damaged electric lines. In one town they screened fifty refugees for Civil Affairs and arranged for evacuation of forty-five Sengalese and North Africans, former French Army soldiers who had been German prisoners. In another town, the 1st CIC Detachment agents evacuated fourteen French African soldiers who had been held as prisoners by the Germans. Agents also tried to explain America's position in France, without much success, to Cure Francois Modeste of Periers, who was disturbed and angry because American bombing raids were killing large numbers of French civilians.**

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* 79th CIC Det Rpt, 2 Aug 44, in 79th CIC Journal (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

** 1st Inf Div CIC Det Daily Rpt, 19 Aug 44, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 19-22 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 2

ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES INCREASE

In the initial days of the COBRA offensive, few German espionage agents were apprehended, due probably to the speed of the Allied advance and the disorganization of the German retreat which allowed the enemy little time to plant stay-behind agents. However, as Allied armies moved relentlessly through France and nearer to the Siegfried Line, enemy intelligence activity increased.

The Germans made extensive use of untrained line crossers, recruited for the most part from French collaborationist parties and French persons who wished to evade forced labor service.* Informants stated that there were many cases of involuntary membership in collaborationist parties since frequently the Germans gave a Frenchman who had been apprehended in a crime the choice of joining a collaborationist party or of facing a death sentence or long imprisonment. Typical was the case of line crosser M. Jouslt, baker of St. Hilaire, who, as a condition of his release from prison for a fake ration ticket offense, had joined Parti Populaire Francaise (PPF). Another St. Hilaire man, named Rougeray, apprehended as a line crosser, had been reportedly forced to join La Volonte Francasise (LVF) or face a firing squad as punishment for killing a German in a fight over a girl.**

The German Intelligence Service (GIS) had only limited success with these short-range agents. Most of them were poorly trained, had inadequate cover, and generally lacked the incentive to accomplish their missions. Although the GIS had two months after D-Day in which to recruit and train personnel for low-level missions, it failed to anticipate the rapid penetration into the heart of France by the Allies. Moreover, in the fluid situation which characterized the early weeks of the offensive, it was almost impossible for the line crosser to return with information because, with a few days, he found himself deep in the Allied rear area.***

In addition to the short-range agents, the German Intelligence Service began sending through agents of two different types: specially selected and trained personnel, both French and German, and German soldiers who, without training, were disguised as civilians. It was easy for German soldiers to don civilian clothing and, if apprehended, state that they were deserting. The matter was a delicate one for Allied authorities. No announcement could be made that German soldiers in

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* G2 Estimate No. 19, First U.S. Army, 20 Aug 44; in G2 Jnl & File, 30th Inf Div, 22-23 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br. AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 3d Armd Div CIC Memo to VII Corps CIC, subj. "Agents and Collaborators," 3 Aug 44 in 503d CIC Det Arrest & Investigation Rpts, 5 Aug 44 (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

*** G2 Estimate No. 19, 1st U.S. Army, 20 Aug 44; in G2 Jnl & File, 30th Inf Div, 22-23 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

civilian clothes would be treated as spies, because such an announcement would have lowered the number of desertions. As a rule the problem had to be resolved in each individual case. CIC, through interrogations and other methods of investigation, attempted to determine the exact status of the case. When an individual surrendered immediately, he was automatically treated as a deserter, whereas suspicion increased in proportion to the distance he was found from the front.*

German Intelligence Service Schools

From six espionage agents captured by three different CIC detachments early in August, CIC was able to obtain much information concerning German Intelligence Service recruiting and training methods and the location of training schools, as well as detailed descriptions of other agents who had trained with them. Three of these agents, Henri Mathieu, Henri Roger, and Michel Scognamillo, were captured by Lieutenant Victor's 83d CIC Detachment; two, Roland Bell and Claude Lombart, by Captain Dorsett's 207th CIC Detachment; and one, Bernard Seys, by Lieutenant Beebe's 502d CIC Detachment.

From these men CIC learned that the work of recruiting German agents was closely supervised by higher level agents of the Abwehr or of the Sicherheitsdienst. Potential agents from among the French for both low-level and high-level missions were recruited by other young agents who usually approached them on the basis of mutual interest in collaborationist youth movements, all of which were affiliated with German intelligence agencies.

The location of three espionage and sabotage centers from which agents were being sent to operate behind British and American lines also was disclosed. One of these was at La Montagnette, a school originally designed to train countersaboteurs to be used against French Resistance groups. After the invasion, the training was quickly turned to sabotage. Another center was at Chateau Antoignet, near Le Mans, which appeared to be an Abwehr headquarters. One of the duties of the German personnel at this center was the dispatching of agents to the Chateau de Maulny, another center about two kilometers away, and on through the front lines.

Maulny Briefing Point and Sabotage Training School

Maulny, a training center for low-level agents, was also used as a briefing point for other agents being sent through Allied lines. Both La Montagnette and Maulny were thought to be under the direct control of the Waffen Schutz Staffeln (S.S.), although they were camouflaged as "Organization Todt" training camps. The Maulny training course, while varied, was often accomplished in much haste. Instruction in the use of maps, radios, explosives, small arms, night reconnaissance, ambushes, and sentry killing comprised the course of study for most of the inexperienced agents.

* Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report), 12th Army Group, Vol IV, (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library), p. 206.

After graduation, Maulny-trained agents were paid 3,000 francs [$60.00] per month, plus rations and quarters. When sent out on missions they received extra pay and were promised bonuses on their return. One of the captured agents had received 15,000 francs. Agents usually were sent out in pairs, sometimes in larger groups, although their missions were assigned individually.

In general, these agents were given one of several broad missions: to observe Allied troop and vehicle identifications; the location of airfields, ammunition dumps and tactical headquarters; the reception given Allied troops by the civilians; and the degree of cooperation offered by French officials and resistance groups; or to perform small-scale sabotage.

A Todt Worker Cover Story

All the six agents interrogated said that, if caught, they were to claim to be Organization Todt workers from Paris who had come through the line to get food or other provisions. However, in a report prepared for dissemination throughout the area it was pointed out that this story could not be expected to be used in the future, since the German Intelligence Service would soon realize that the Organization Todt cover story had become well known behind U.S. lines. A "volunteer informer" or "resistance member" story would be more likely to be encountered, according to the report which warned that either "cover" demanded careful cross examination because they would probably be used extensively by young French agents in the German Intelligence Service.

Thumbnail Sketch of Typical Agent

From the interrogation of the six agents, CIC compiled a composite "thumbnail sketch" of the typical low-level agent:

> "Age 20, height 5'7", curly brown hair tortoise shell glasses, slender to medium build, student type, member of Jeunesse de l'Europe Nouvelle, aliases beginning with the same letter as real initials, carte d'identite issued from the Paris area, student dress--light trousers, darker coat or sport jacket."*

22 Enemy Agents Thought to be Behind Allied Lines

From information obtained from captured spies and from voluntary informants, CIC estimated, early in August, that there were only twenty-two German agents--

* CIC Rpt, subj, "German Short-Range Espionage", undated, in 503d CIC Det Arrest & Investigation Rpts, Aug-Sept 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center) (Box 25104).

possibly a few more--as yet unapprehended, operating in Allied-occupied territory. By mid-September German Intelligence Service activity was at a virtual standstill, prompting some overly optimistic Allied intelligence authorities to forecast a quick end to the organization.

One counterintelligence report for 4 August disclosed the names and descriptions of eleven enemy agents;* another from the First Army G2 for 20 August mentioned: "The four agents listed...operated out of an espionage organization situated in Angers the beginning of August. They were brought to the lines in the vicinity of Le Mans on 4 August by an Abwehr noncommissioned officer. These men are now believed to be behind our lines."**

Three days later additional information on seven more enemy agents thought to be behind Allied lines was sent out to CIC detachments in Northern France by VII Corps and FUSA CIC. Names and outstanding characteristics of five of the seven were obtained from the gendarmerie chief of Mayenne.***

Many of these agents, equipped with radio transmitters and carefully constructed cover stories, attempted to plant themselves near the main communication lines over which U.S. troops and supplies were flowing. The First Army CIC Detachment, commanded by Major Horace M. Miner, found that the most effective defense against these wireless transmitter agents was the large scale evacuation of civilians from critical areas.

In one important way, the speed of the advance operated in favor of the Allied counterintelligence services. Enemy long-range agents usually planned to remain inactive during the initial phase of the Allied occupation. However, by the time an agent was ready to swing into action, the swift-moving Allies had made the prospect of a quick German defeat often great enough to convince the agent to abandon his mission entirely.****

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* Rpt, subj "Enemy Agents," From: First Army G2, dtd 4 Aug 44, in 503d CIC Det Arrest & Investigation Rpts, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104, 8-31-25).

** Ltr, subj "Enemy Agents Behind Our Lines," To: ACofS, G2, Corps & Div From: Col B.A. Dickson, G2, First Army, 20 Aug 44, in 503d CIC Det Arrest & Investigation Rpts, 20 Aug 44, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

*** VII Corps CIC Rpt, subj, "Enemy Agents," 23 Aug 44, in 503d CIC Det Arrest and Investigation Rpts, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

**** G2 Estimate No 19, Counterintelligence, First US Army, 20 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 30th Inf Div, 22-23 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Case Histories

According to the Twelfth Army Group Report of Operations, the first bona fide German spy to be tried by the U.S. Military Commission in the European Theater of Operations was who was captured by CIC on 14 August while he was making a reconnaissance of U.S. Army military positions. Dressed in civilian clothes, carried a note which authorized him to pass through German lines. He was taken to First Army Interrogation Center, was tried by a U.S. Military Commission and sentenced to death by hanging. The sentence was executed by Seine Base Section, Communications Zone, on 7 October 1944.

A short time later the 220th CIC Detachment (XX Corps) apprehended two German espionage agents who also had entered U.S. lines in civilian clothes to obtain military information. They were taken to Third Army Interrogation Center at Toul and later after trial, were shot.*

Numerous Other Agents Encountered

During the four-day period from 7 to 11 August, 83d CIC Detachment made a haul of five probable espionage agents. Three of these came from one family: his wife, and his wife's sister. Arrested on 9 August, all were denounced as German spies. A search of their home revealed many incriminating documents, and they were sent to the Third Army Civilian Interrogation Cage for further action.

Just one day after the apprehension of the family, 83d Detachment agents took into custody one of the most experienced spies in the employ of the Germans. Arrested in the company of a German officer, was first taken to the division prisoner-of-war cage where she came to the attention of CIC during screening. After a search of her home revealed a quantity of documents, she was taken to the Third Army Civilian Interrogation Cage. Considered a highly dangerous and adroit woman, had handled many significant assignments for the German Intelligence Service (GIS).**

The other enemy agent taken into custody by 83d CIC was less impressive who was arrested in Chateauneuf after she had been denounced as a spy by the resistance and the mayor of She was turned over to VIII Corps CIC Detachment.***

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* Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, p. 207.

** 83d Inf Div CIC Bi-Weekly Intelligence Rpt, 8-11 Aug 44, in 83d CIC Periodic Intelligence Reports (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

*** Ibid., 5-7 Aug 44 (2-38-109).

CONFIDENTIAL

Gestapo-Hired Woman Lured Frenchman to Death

Another woman suspected of crossing the American lines to seek intelligence information for the Germans was first apprehended by the 29th CIC Detachment agents as she was travelling toward the American lines with three female companions, from Guilers. Informants in Guilers suspected her of dealings with the Germans.

Interrogation of companions, two of whom had first met her in a hospital in Brest, indicated that had long been the mistress of a Gestapo officer. told her companions that she could not afford to live with her husband because he was just a lowly clerk with an income of only 2,500 francs a month. Her activities were believed to have been as follows: accompanied by a Gestapo officer, frequented certain cafes where, using her personal charms, she obtained from the cafe owners information on Frenchmen who were wanted by the Germans. She also had sought the companionship of anti-German Frenchmen, who, in the course of their association with her, would be coaxed into revealing their true identity and work. Within a short time after dates with these men mysteriously disappeared.

After compiling a detailed picture of background, the agents brought her in for interrogation. At first she adopted the pose of a poor, bewildered woman, who had managed to obtain work as a maid for the Germans at the Place Chateau in Brest after her husband had deserted her early in 1944. She said she had entered a hospital in Brest for treatment of a nervous disorder but had to leave by German evacuation order. From there, travelling with three other ex-patients, she had proceeded on foot to St. Renan, and on to Guilers. Shortly thereafter she was apprehended as she approached the American lines. She did not deny knowing the Gestapo officer, but she refused to disclose any additional information on her former associations, although she added that she "... expected to be shot for her past activities."

Later in the interrogation, when confronted with the accusations of her companions and photos of the Gestapo officer, personality suddenly changed and she became obdurate and haughty. She refused to give a complete account of her activities, but she did not deny the accusations. Because agents could find no tangible evidence that she had obtained information for the Germans, and because there was a lack of sources from which conclusive facts could be obtained, the best CIC could do was to see that she was interned at the French Forces of the Interior concentration camp at St Pabu.*

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* Memo for OIC, subj Hqs, 29th Inf Div, 1 Sep 44, s/Byron A. Whaley & Daniel M. Powers, CIC Agents, Hqs, Correspondence File, June 1944-May 1945, 29th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

4th CIC Apprehends Potential Subversive

Two days after the COBRA offensive had begun, the 4th Division CIC Detachment processed its first potential subversive, a who claiming to be an evacuee from Marigny, was apprehended in a farmhouse in the division area. He could produce no identification and fellow evacuees could not vouch for his loyalty. Because he did not look like a Normandy Frenchman and because a slight German accent was detected in his speech, agents turned him over to the prisoner of war cage for disposition.*

Another potential subversive apprehended by 4th CIC on a much-travelled highway was a who told agents that she was on a vacation for her health, and that she could not return to Paris because of the high cost of living there. This story apparently did not satisfy the investigating agents because they held her at the 12th Regiment for further interrogation and disposition.**

Frenchman With Field Glasses Apprehended

Later, when 4th CIC Detachment agents were working in Hambye and Le Guislain, they picked up two collaborators and a possible low-level German agent who evidently lacked the intelligence and finesse to carry out even a simple espionage mission. One of the collaborators, a former resident of St. Lo, admitted working for the Germans, but argued that she did so only to gain money to support her husband and child. Although no security threat, she was told to remain in her home until American troops had departed from the area.

The second collaborator, a was arrested on 30 July. Strongly anti-Allied in actions and sentiment, according to three informants, had revealed American gun positions to the Germans when American forces were attacking Hambye. He was turned over to VII Corps CIC. Another possible enemy agent was first encountered near the 42nd Field Artillery Battalion command post (CP). Accompanied by a small child, he had field glasses and a forged identification card. Other Frenchmen, found in the immediate area, could not identify him. Since he had "... no logical story," he appeared to be a remarkably stupid agent. CIC referred him to the prisoner of war enclosure for disposition.***

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* 4th Inf Div CIC Periodic Rpt, 27 Jul 44, G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 15-31 Jul 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Ibid., 29 Jul 44.

*** Ibid., 31 Jul 44.

Suspected Espionage Case Investigated

Agents of the 4th CIC Detachment were told by a French woman living near the 8th Regimental CP that an American officer and a sergeant had visited her, asking the locations of American fuel dumps and names of American troop commanders. The officer, according to the woman, spoke good French but with a slightly noticeable German accent. Since it was unlikely that an American officer and sergeant would be questioning French peasants for detailed tactical information, agents thoroughly searched the area, but no trace of the two men could be found.*

Boastful Gestapo Informant Interned

Besides agents, potential subversives and collaborators, people who had served as informants for the Germans often attracted CIC's attention. One such person, an alleged Gestapo informant who was reported to have boasted that he had earned 10,000 francs [$200.00] for information sold to the Germans after D-Day, was investigated by the 9th Division CIC Detachment on 18 August.

The suspected informant, a had been consistently pro-German and a member of the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP), an organization with a long history of collaboration with the Germans. He made frequent trips to RNP meetings in Paris and regular calls at the Kommandateur at La Ferte Mace. He admitted having told a Gestapo agent about the resistance group in Ligniere La-Doncelle, an act that resulted in thirteen people being killed by the Germans in a surprise raid on 13 June 1944. and his wife, who was considered equally dangerous, were later evacuated to the civilian interrogation center, along with all papers, including their signed confessions.**

False Alarm

In mid-August a verbal order from the 4th Division G2 prompted CIC to investigate one case of alleged subversive activity. The occupants of a chateau were suspected of sending messages to the Germans via a transmitting set. Agents did uncover one signal generator used to power radio receivers and one small receiving set with a possible range of five miles, but the owners, after lengthy interrogation, were cleared of any suspicion of espionage. The confiscated equipment was turned over to a division signal company.***

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* 4th Inf Div CIC Periodic Rpt, 1 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 1-4 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

** 9th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 18 Aug 44, in L-35 G2 Jnl & File, 9th Inf Div, 2-31 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 4th Inf Div Periodic CIC Rpt, 13 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 12-18 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Agents Reprimand Young Girl

A young French girl proved to be the security violator in one case solved by 4th Division agents in late August. As reported by the Inspector General, 4th Division, lights in a house in the division area were thought to be used to communicate with the enemy. In the course of this investigation agents interviewed a young French girl who admitted responsibility for the incident. She maintained that she had struck the matches in order to look at her wrist watch. She was warned that if it happened again, she would be taken into custody. This flickering light case was one of many inconsequential cases that had to be investigated.*

CIC Discovers Enemy Agent While Impounding Mail

Impounding all mail in a newly-overrun town, although tedious, was often rewarding. One such incident occurred in late July when agents of the 503d CIC Detachment were busy in the villages of Va Baleine and Le Parce. From letters addressed to two collaborators who had retreated with the Germans, agents were able to determine that a had been a collaborator and spy for the Germans. She was arrested.** Records do not reveal her disposition.

Suspects Refuse to Admit Guilt

When the advance of the 3rd Armored Division slowed down during the first week of August, the CIC Detachment with the division had time to consolidate its operations in Ambrieres. While in Ambrieres, agents attempted to obtain confessions from two possible enemy agents, who had been brought to the CIC office by local resistance members. The two men, of Polish origin, were denounced as being decidedly pro-German.

was the more suspicious of the two. Although he denied any connections with the Germans, had been observed selling black market rubber goods to the farmers; wandering around sometimes in ragged, sometimes in neat clothing; and frequenting various railway stations.

companion, proved to be a much more garrulous person, and after considerable interrogation, admitted that was a Nazi and an informant for the Gestapo. Despite these statements and other evidence that tended to prove that the two were agents, CIC could not get them to admit their guilt.

The disposition of the two men was noted in a memorandum to the division G2 which read: "... it was decided that was a dangerous enemy alien,

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* 4th Inf Div Periodic CIC Rpts, 15 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 12-18 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Report of Activities of 503d CIC Det Team #2, 3 Aug 44, in 503d CIC Det Rpts, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

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almost certainly an agent of the Germans, and that as his accomplice, was equally dangerous. They were conducted to Corps Interrogation Center for further interrogation."*

Red Cross "Cases"

a Frenchman recruited as an enemy agent, was arrested near Chateau Maulny by Lieutenant Steinway's 1st CIC Detachment agents on 8 August. After having crossed the lines on a bicycle, was posing as a Red Cross worker and a refugee from Paris. He was transferred to England for further interrogation.**

Use of U.S. Uniforms by German Spies Anticipated

The probability that German agents would infiltrate the lines in U.S. uniforms caused numerous warnings to be issued.*** One case which pointed up the dangers in American personnel unthinkingly giving or loaning uniforms to unauthorized persons occurred in the 6th Armored Division sector in mid-August. While working in Plouavy, agents Albert J. Tahmough and William J. Mulkeen, of the 506th CIC Detachment, spied a teen-age French boy wearing a U.S. uniform, complete with shirt, trousers, leggings, helmet, and web belt. The agents halted the youth and asked for his identification card, which he could not produce. He gave his name as and his nationality as Canadian. He had been given the uniform by Americans at Third Army's 53d Field Hospital where, later investigation disclosed, he had been allowed to eat, sleep, and serve as KP for several days without any check on his identification or loyalty.

Disturbed at this casual "adoption," CIC agents explained to the hospital commanding officer the security procedure to be followed in such cases. Satisfied that their security lecture had convinced the commanding officer that hiring uncleared civilians was risky business, the agents transported Daniel to Plouavy where he was relieved of his uniform and handed over to the gendarmerie.

One result of this case was a memorandum sent forward recommending that all units be reminded again of the proper procedure to be used in employing civilians.****

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* Memo to G2, subj "CIC Situation, Ambrieres, 7-8 Aug 44," in 503d CIC Det Rpts, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

** Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report), 12th Army Group, Vol IV, p. 203 (Restricted), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

*** NOTE: That these warnings were not amiss became clear during "The Battle of the Bulge," when the enemy made widespread use of U.S. uniforms for their espionage agents. See Chapter "Last German Offensive: Ardennes Campaign."

**** 6th Armd Div CIC Rpt, 23-24 Aug, in G2 Jnl & File, L-214 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

The German Agents Who Couldn't Surrender

The difficulties that original bungling of an investigation could cause were brought home emphatically to the 503d CIC Detachment. This case, which no doubt became known as "The Case of the German Agents Who Couldn't Surrender," began on the morning of 13 August when Combat Command A of the 3rd Armored Division attacked through the town of Pre-en-Pail. Accompanying the attacking force were agents Laurence E. Dow and John H. Romey, and a Lt. Edward Tresca, French Intelligence Liaison Officer attached to the division G2.

These three men, after entering the town, set up operations in the city hall where they were besieged by civilians with questions and denunciations. While thus occupied, Lieutenant Tresca was interrupted by a man who identified himself as Martial Durand, who had "... very valuable information of great importance to offer." Tresca, busy and faced with the immediate prospect of moving up with a column, instructed Durand to call back later and speak to Lieutenant Black, who was apparently expected to arrive with the main body of the CIC detachment in a matter of hours.

The same afternoon a woman reported to the Division's 3d Armored Regiment that there were two suspicious-looking men in her hotel. She had seen them with a German officer, they had a large amount of money, and, she thought, they had a radio in their room. A lieutenant and an enlisted man accompanied the woman back to her hotel where they found the two men, one of whom was M. Durand. Before speaking to them, the Americans went upstairs to search their room. The lieutenant was called away at that moment, but instructed the other soldier to continue the search. When he returned and learned that a radio transmitter had been discovered beneath a pile of clothing in a cabinet, he ordered Durand searched, but not his companion. When the search revealed a large sum of money and French identity papers, the lieutenant questioned Durand, who claimed to be a British intelligence employee. The lieutenant then directed two of his men to escort the suspects, along with the radio, back to division G2.

After several hours of wandering, the group, unable to find G2, ended up in the Division's 83d Armored Reconnaissance Company. The escort told the company commander the situation and gave him the radio. By this time, however, the corporal, who spoke some French, had apparently accepted the two men's story that they were intelligence workers, although it was French intelligence they were working for now. The gullible corporal then drove the two men back to Pre-en-Pail and released them. The company commander, despite a G2 directive that all units turn in captured or recently confiscated radios, kept the radio because he thought it was not a transmitter.

The following morning, Durand appeared outside the 3rd Armored Division CP, affirming that he had valuable information regarding the Gestapo, and that this

information concerned a "post box" setup for delivery and collection of agents' information. CIC was immediately called in to check on Durand's story.

When questioned, Durand admitted that he and Robert Charrier, his companion, had been working for the Germans. Further interrogation brought out many details in the espionage career of these two agents. Durand admitted that he had been first introduced into the German espionage system by a Robert Rosseau, who had since been arrested by the Germans for reasons Durand did not know. Durand had worked in a German espionage unit which had posed as a part of Organization Todt, and had received 61,000 francs [$1220.00] from the Germans for espionage work in July and August. He had been dispatched to Pre-en-Pail to observe and report American troop movements after the city had fallen to the Allies.

Durand's companion, Charrier, had a similar record. He had worked with the Germans since 1943, and was a skilled radio operator, having completed a three-month course under German supervision. His first assignment had been in St. Lo, his second in Le Mans, and his third in Pre-en-Pail. He, too, had been assigned to watch and convey information on Allied troop movements and was paid 6,000 francs [$120.00] a month.

The radio was finally obtained and sent to VII Corps CIC. The 503d CIC Detachment also arranged with the resistance to keep a twenty-four hour guard over Durand's "post box," a hidden location in which unknown agents were to leave messages for Durand's transmission to German intelligence. The capture of Durand and Charrier "... eliminated the central channel of enemy agents' radio communication in this area," one CIC report noted.*

A packet of papers, previously neglected, was forwarded to VII CIC, where it was found to contain complete details on Paul Maurice Elebert, the German agent in charge of Durand and Charrier and other agents in the area. The delay in blocking off the espionage system of which Durand was a central figure proved the sole harmful effect of the blunder in this case. But matters could have been far worse if M. Durand had not been such an obliging enemy agent.**

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* Memo to G2, subj "503d CIC Detachment Activities, Operations 13-16 Aug 44, 16 Aug 44," 503d CIC Det, France & Belgium, Jul-Aug, (Box 25104, Kansas City Records Center), (C) and Ltr from Office of the A.C. of S., G2, 503d CIC Det, 21 Aug 44, subj "DURAND, Martial," To: CO, CIC Det, First US Army, 503d CIC Det Rpts, France & Belgium, Jul-Aug 44, (Box 25104, Kansas City Records Center), (C).

** Ltr, To: CO, VII Corps CIC, subj "Paul Maurice Elebert," 16 Aug 44, 503d CIC Det, France & Belgium, Jul-Aug 44, (C), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104, 8-9-11).

Hundreds of Minor Suspects Encountered

Besides investigating the comparatively few major counterintelligence personalities encountered, CIC agents spent much time in dealing with German soldiers in civilian clothing, collaborators, refugees, and sundry other minor security risks. For example, in mid-August, 1st CIC agents took charge of sixty German soldiers apprehended by French Forces of the Interior members and arranged for their transportation to the division prisoner-of-war cage, arrested and evacuated fifteen Organization Todt workers; supervised the evacuation of approximately eighty-five French soldiers who had escaped from German prisoner-of-war camps, and processed eleven other minor cases.* Other detachments were performing similar tasks.

* 1st Inf Div CIC Periodic Rpt, 21 Aug - 4 Sept 44, G2 Jnl & File, 1st Inf Div, 301-2.2 (22292 Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 3

NEW PROBLEMS, TECHNIQUES AND TASKS

During the rapid push across Northern France, the control of refugees became CIC's most serious concern, and agents were taxed to the limit of their ingenuity to find means of handling the problem. Each detachment developed new techniques as new situations arose. In the VII Corps area, each town mayor was required to compile a list of all refugees in his town and its environs for submission to the CIC team operating there and to turn over to the team all unidentified civilians. Mayors and resistance workers, particularly in the 4th Infantry Division sector, were also asked to appoint reliable Frenchmen to direct and inform refugees regarding travel and curfew regulations and to help spot suspicious individuals.*

Near the end of August, while 4th CIC Detachment agents were operating in Notre-Dame-le-Cenilly, town officials, priests, and resistance leaders were assisting CIC by vouching for the loyalty of local residents, but due to the unsettled conditions, many strangers were still moving through without being halted. CIC set up civilian check points which quickly brought results. Near Soulles, three civilians with names similar to those on the First Army's "potentially subversive" list were picked up and held for interrogation.**

In the V Corps sector, Lieutenant Riddle of the 205th CIC Detachment made arrangements with Captain Uff, Field Security Officer for the 15th Scottish Division, for coordinated patrolling of roads parallel to the front in their adjoining sectors. Agents of both the 205th and the 5th CIC Detachments participated in these patrols.***

Refugees Crowd Roads

Early in August, CIC detachments with VIII Corps down on the Brittany Peninsula were finding the refugee problem particularly serious, as a steadily increasing number of civilians from the St. Malo area came streaming through the line. Civil Affairs had not yet set up a collecting point and was permitting refugees, once they had come through the lines, to go any place they pleased as long as they did not hinder orderly movement of traffic. With the help of resistance leaders who, in this area, were well organized, the 83d CIC Detachment established three

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* 4th Inf Div CIC Periodic Report, 12 Aug 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 12-18 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 4th Inf Div CIC Periodic Rpt, 29 Jul 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 15-31 Jul 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** V Corps Daily CI Summary, 31 Aug 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 5th Inf Div, 1-7 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

screening posts at the most critical road junction in the St. Malo area. These posts, plus the cooperation of Civil Affairs in publicizing curfew and travel regulations, improved the situation.*

As the Allied forces converged on Brest, which the Germans did not surrender until 19 September, CIC was confronted with the problem of dealing with 35,000 refugees who had been displaced "by agreement with the opposing forces before the siege began."** The possibility for infiltration of enemy agents among these refugees called for a rapid, practical solution, and the 29th CIC Detachment came up with one that was considered unusually effective. This plan established an arbitrary line behind the front past which civilians could not travel and arranged, with the help of Civil Affairs, for the distribution of notices and maps designating the restricted areas to all town mayors in the zone. The aid of resistance forces was obtained to man CIC control points at all intersections. One area which was considered particularly critical, the sector along the south coast directly across from the enemy-held Crozon Peninsula, was turned over entirely to a French Forces of the Interior commander and his group, which maintained a continuous patrol, checked residents in the area and restricted travel to one kilometer. All offenders against restrictions were confined for at least one day and their names posted on town bulletin boards, a practice which CIC found effective.

The unsettled condition of the area, however, made complete investigations of individuals impossible, since fellow workers, neighbors, and their local civil authorities were not available. CIC had to handle suspects on the basis of information gained through interrogation, suspicious actions, papers and personal effects carried, and local denunciations. Recognizing this inadequacy, a CIC report stated: "It is entirely possible that a number of persons who were checked by this detachment and subsequently released were collaborators of the highest order. In addition, there are doubtless hundreds of others not apprehended among the refugees throughout the area."***

Lessening of subversives and security threats was not the only result of careful refugee screening. During the period when the 6th Armored Division was halted before Brest, 506th CIC Detachment agents were able to produce, out of the fragmentary bits of information obtained from refugees, an overlay map of prime counter-intelligence targets, which later proved invaluable during the CIC operations in the

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* 83d CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 7 Aug 44, covering period 5-7 Aug 44, in 83d CIC Det Periodic Rpt File (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 250951).

** Available records do not indicate the nature of this agreement.

*** 29th Inf Div CIC Rpt for period 5-20 Sep 44, dtd 21 Sep 44, in 29th CIC Det File (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

Brest area. They also gained information concerning a high-ranking Organization Todt member who was wanted for questioning by French Forces of the Interior, and two agents traveled more than 100 miles to arrest him.*

Resistance Personnel Sometimes Unreliable

Although CIC had to place great dependence upon resistance personnel throughout the campaign in France, occasional mishaps reminded agents that they had to deal cautiously with these persons.

One incident in mid-August, which easily could have resulted in needless American casualties through faulty tactical deployment, involved a so-called "captain" in the Brittany Resistance, and caused grave concern among members of the 506th CIC Detachment.

Information obtained by the French Forces of the Interior through a wire tap of a German telephone line was passed on to CIC by a French naval lieutenant who had directed the wire-tapping operation. His report disclosed the point of an impending German attack, the disposition of the troops involved, and their probable methods of attack. However, before the French naval lieutenant passed this tactical data on to CIC, he knowingly and willingly allowed an unscrupulous "captain" in the resistance to insert the false data that the forthcoming attack was scheduled for a water point near Landernau. CIC, in checking on the report, discovered that this false information had been added. The agents, infuriated by this double-dealing, immediately confronted the French naval officer who readily admitted that he had allowed the addition of false information, but claimed that he did it only because "... he wanted more American troops to defend the Landernau area...." Determined to see that some form of disciplinary action was taken against the lieutenant, but puzzled about where to send him, agents finally closed the case and disposed of the lieutenant by handing him over to the naval liaison officers of the 6th Armored Division's Combat Command A. The resistance "captain" could not be located.**

Brest Area FFI Chief Aids CIC

The majority of the members in the Brittany resistance were believed to be motivated by patriotism and a desire to see the Germans get their just dues. Typical was one Brest area resistance chief who assisted agents of the 506th CIC Detachment

* Hqs 6th Armored Div, CIC Jnl covering 23 Jul 44 - 21 Aug 44 incl, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 6th Armd Div CIC Jnl Entry, 18 Aug 44, CIC Journal, 6th Armd Div, 23 Jul - 21 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.). (NOTE: Records do not indicate how the Agents learned of this "double dealing.")

in their investigation of two men, who were first picked up in mid-August when they came through the front lines from Brest. When apprehended, the two men had passes authorizing them to circulate freely in and out of the German lines. The suspects contended that these passes had been issued to them so that they might travel about the countryside in search of food for the German soldiers besieged in Brest.

Agents were not satisfied with the story, but because they lacked concrete evidence they could not disprove it, until the chief of the resistance groups in the Brest area appeared and volunteered the information that the two men in question had been collaborators in the city of Brest. On the basis of this information, the pair were sent to the prisoner-of-war enclosure.*

Investigative "Spadework" Delegated to Resistance

As the Allied armies continued their race toward the Siegfried Line, it became apparent that the majority of suspects were economic and social collaborators, not dangerous security risks. So, to reduce the number of persons being processed and to cut down on the number of hours that agents were spending in countless futile investigations, various detachments began to delegate more of the preliminary investigative "spadework" to the resistance. For example, upon entering a town, the 79th CIC Detachment would direct the resistance leaders to prepare a list of all suspects in the area, broken down into three categories: Frenchmen who had denounced their countrymen and acted as informers to the Germans; members of the PPF, RNP, the Milice and similar collaborationist organizations; and Organization Todt workers and other minor suspects. In this way, CIC agents were able to concentrate their attention on the prime counterintelligence targets.**

Special Post Office Technique Developed

Various other phases of CIC work required the development of new techniques. Notable was the handling of post offices as worked out by 79th CIC Detachment. After sorting and scanning approximately 5,000 pieces of mail in the Le Mans Post Office early in July, agents of the 79th CIC at the suggestion of Agent Sidney D. Wilgus, 215th CIC Detachment representative who was working with them, set up a procedure that relieved them of a great deal of laborious work and freed them to continue with other target reductions. According to this plan, the first step was a screening of all postal employees, with the assistance of police and resistance

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* 6th Armd Div CIC Jnl Entry, 13 Aug 44, CIC Journal, 6th Armd Div, 23 Jul - 21 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 79th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 31 Aug 44, in CIC Journal, 79th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

sources. From among those screened, a capable, reliable man, experienced in postal affairs, was selected to supervise the operation. This man then was thoroughly briefed by CIC agents, who maintained close observation of all employees and of the operation.*

Military Security Situation Considered Good

In the first weeks of the COBRA offensive, the First Army G2 could claim that the military security situation, in general, had been good. The language differences and the ban on troops circulating in towns had reduced to a minimum the possibility of leakage of military information, and although military personnel had a tendency to discuss plans and operations rather freely, there was no indication that this practice had led to disclosures of information to the enemy. However, it was believed that security weaknesses in sending some radio communications in the clear had given the enemy valuable tactical information.

First Army G2 could also report, after scanning interrogations of enemy prisoners and information given by friendly escapees and evaders, that the security discipline of American troops, following capture by the Germans, had been excellent.** However, incidents of U.S. officers carrying classified information too far forward continued to occur. Late in August, after the 29th Division had turned west to take part in the siege of Brest, two incidents occurred which were first thought to be the result of enemy espionage: the shelling of the Division Command Post and the bombardment of a bridge in St. Renan. The espionage theory was dispelled when 29th CIC learned that the actual cause of the shelling had been the German capture of an American officer carrying a map showing the exact location of the vital points. To prevent such occurrences, at 29th CIC Detachment's recommendation, all documents and maps with general information regarding the Division were ordered marked "not to be taken below regimental headquarters." To insure compliance with this directive, points were established where CIC agents checked the possessions of occupants of all vehicles moving toward the front.***

Maquis, Communists Pose New Problems

During this period, CIC officials had cause to worry about two new elements which loomed as potential disrupters of civil security: the Maquis and the

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* Memo for OIC, subj, "Search of Mails, Post Office, Le Mans," 11 Aug 44, in CIC Jnl, 79th CIC Det (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

** G2 Estimate No 19, Counterintelligence, First U.S. Army, 20 Aug 44, in L-111, 30th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 22-23 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** CIC Rpt for period 5-20 Sept 44, in 29th CIC Det File (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

Communist Party. The Maquis consisted of armed civilians who were recognized as the combat section of the French Forces of the Interior. CIC believed, however, careful identification of members of Maquis groups and the responsibility of their leaders were such as to minimize any activities which might be subversive or disrupt civil security.

The Communist Party, determined to achieve its aims regardless of consequences, presented an entirely different, more threatening problem. As large cities were liberated by Allied armies with their populations and political machinery largely intact, CIC expected increased political activity by the Communists. Apparently planning to come more into the open and to attempt to secure strong political positions shortly after departure of the Germans, the Communists were expected to demand immediate trial of all "traitors," agitate for the early withdrawal of all U.S. and British forces, seize French and German governmental facilities, and insist upon government operation of all industry.

Although the Communist Party and its objectives were political matters not of direct concern to CIC personnel with and under First Army, these agents were warned that "... a rapid rebirth of Communist political activity may make for civil disturbances and disorders."*

CIC Agents Operate "Up Front"

In their efforts to contact resistance leaders and informants, to search buildings for important counterintelligence documents, and to screen or apprehend refugees, CIC agents often found themselves well up in the forward areas, at times even in advance of the assault troops. Lieutenant Gonzales and four agents of the 79th CIC Detachment were the first to enter Le Mans, one of the key cities overrun in the southern swing made by XV Corps. Their reception was anything but friendly. As the daily log entry cryptically stated, 79th CIC Agents "... entered Le Mans at 1700, 8 August 1944. Had meeting with Chief of Resistance, Police, etc. at 1900. Were driven out by Germans."**

This "up front" position of CIC often meant that agents had to perform many tasks which could not be considered a part of CIC's mission. Such was the case in Landernau where, for three days, men from the 506th CIC Detachment were the only U.S. soldiers within considerable distance. On the third day, rumors flooded the city that German troops, variably reported as ranging in number from 300 to

* G2 Estimate No. 19, Counterintelligence, First U.S. Army, 20 Aug 44, in L-111 30th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 22-23 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 79th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 8 Aug 44 in CIC Jnl 79th Inf Div (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

3,000, were converging upon the city from the direction of Brest. As the panic increased, all flags and decorations, which had been displayed to welcome the Americans, disappeared. Many citizens began leaving the city and even the French Forces of the Interior organized to meet the expected attack. The Germans were rumored to be only three kilometers from the city, and the mayor frantically appealed to Captain DeLoach, the 506th CIC's Commanding Officer, to contact higher echelons for help.

Realizing that the nearest U.S. units was several hours away, Captain DeLoach directed several of his agents to make a motor reconnaissance up to eleven kilometers outside the city. Within a few hours the team returned with the report that they had encountered no Germans and that a French Forces of the Interior patrol had assured them that there were no Germans within twenty kilometers.

With this information, Captain DeLoach was able to convince the mayor, his incredulous staff, and the jittery townspeople that the city was safe from German counterattack.*

CIC Agents Quell Riots

One team of the 506th CIC, working with resistance personnel at St. Fair, near Granville, was called upon to quell a riot of approximately 500 persons. The disturbance was brought on by friction between resistance leaders and civilians who were neither pro-Nazi, nor affiliated with the resistance movement. A flood of rumors that a pocket of Germans still in the area would become active again and return to gain revenge on the community swelled the rioting, and, in the melee, several persons were seriously injured.

CIC immediately placed a curfew on the town and ordered all persons to their homes. The remainder of the detachment was called to the town and, by splitting into teams and reconnoitering the area where the Germans supposedly were hiding, the agents were able to convince the anxious residents that there was no danger.**

Other CIC detachments, on the few occasions when the civilian population got out of control, also had to act to restore order as quickly as possible. Such was the case in the village of Chartres during the last week of August. Reports had reached the 9th Infantry Division G2 that a demonstration had taken place in Chartres between French patriots and alleged Nazi collaborators. Agents Joseph H. Thompson, George W. Morris, and Charles R. Managam of the 9th CIC were ordered to investigate the situation.

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* Ltr, 13 Oct 44, subj, "Observer Report, ETO, 11 Aug - 10 Oct 44." To: CG, AGF, AWC, Wash. D. C., from: Joseph M. Kirchheimer, Major, GSC, 13-1. 1310/44 (7887) (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Ibid.

Upon arrival at Chartres, they contacted the mayor who reported that a Madame Rough, her fourteen year old daughter, and a Mlle Ligauls were the targets of the rioters. Several residents of Chartres, embittered at the women for having slept with numerous German soldiers, had beat them and shaved their heads.

After stressing to members of the local resistance group that it was their responsibility to preserve law and order in Chartres until Civil Affairs personnel arrived, the agents, with the three women in custody, returned to 9th CIC Detachment headquarters.*

Varied Duties Fall to CIC

Acting as traffic coordinators, temporary town officials and virtual "father confessors" became routine activities to many CIC agents during the sweep across France. Many of the duties normally belonging to Civil Affairs often fell to CIC, since they usually were in advance of the Civil Affairs teams. As an example, one day in August, Team "A" of the 1st CIC Detachment had their normal counterintelligence duties interrupted when they had to spend most of the day "... refusing passes for civilian travel, answering questions for civilians on problems of wheat thrashing, reparations, enlistment in the French Army, etc."**

Agents William J. Mulkeen and Albert J. Tahmouh of the 506th CIC Detachment, found themselves in an unusual situation on 3 August while they were doing road patrol work on the outskirts of Combourg. They stopped to talk with officers of the 15th Tank Battalion who were disturbed because the reconnaissance unit responsible for clearing the main avenues of travel in Combourg had failed to do so. The two agents, in their jeep, sped toward the center of the city, where they found that the officers' anxieties were well founded, because the town was in an extremely unsettled condition. They ordered the mayor and resistance leaders to clear the principal avenues and to station gendarmarie to keep them open for the 6th Armored Division column which was rapidly approaching the city.

The orders were complied with and the convoy passed through the town without noticeably reducing speed, and without having to dodge French automobiles and pedestrians.***

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* Memo for the OIC (Agent Report), 28 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 9th Inf Div, Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.). Available records do not show the eventual disposition of this case.

** 1st Inf Div Daily CIC Rpt, 16 Aug 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 1st Inf Div, 16-18 Aug 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 6th Armd Div CIC Jnl entry, 3 Aug 44, in CIC Jnl, 6th Armd Div, 23 Jul-21 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

CIC Agent on Surrender Mission

Second Lt. Charles W. Colgan, of 35th CIC Detachment, was called upon to perform an unusual mission while he was working with an advance group of the detachment in Orleans in mid-August. Crossing a river near Orleans under a white flag, Lieutenant Colgan talked with a German Corps Commander in an effort to persuade him to surrender all the troops under his command. Although obviously unsure of what course he should pursue, the commander declined the surrender offer. About one week later, however, an unknown American lieutenant succeeded in arranging the surrender of the German commander with approximately 14,000 men. This was one of the times when a CIC agent arrived too early, rather than too late.*

Valuable Discoveries Made by Agents

While ransacking former German billets, headquarters and sundry other buildings in their never-ceasing quest for intelligence information, agents often made valuable discoveries. In searching the German supply depot at a castle in Bazainville, 79th CIC Detachment agents found 8,000 litres of petrol, 12,000 litres of oil, and a sizeable stock of automobile tires. In the village of Vetheuil, they made another valuable "find," discovering a supply cache of approximately twenty tons of flour. Civil Affairs, always hard pressed to obtain enough food for the hungry French populace, was given the cache location.**

Deserted German command posts often proved to be most productive sources of counterintelligence information and other data. The 80th CIC Detachment early in the breakout discovered a hugh German depot near Argentan which contained approximately ten thousand maps, many of which were used in later Allied operations.***

9th CIC Obtains Tactical Data

The 9th CIC Detachment was performing similar duties in this period. Then operating in the town of La Pallu, agents obtained tactical information believed to be credible from thirty-seven refugees from La Ferte-Mace, Potigny and Caen during the second week of August. Furthermore, in nearby St. Patrice du Desert, two collaborators and some German documents were picked up.

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* Interview with Mr. Charles W. Colgan, Baltimore,Md., 28 Nov 54.

** 79th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 21 Aug 44, CIC Jnl, 79th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

*** G2 A/A Rpt, 80th Inf Div, 3-31 Aug 44, (Master 380-0.3) (9782), Section VII Comments, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Information obtained from the resistance members disclosed that thirty-five Senegalese, hiding in a forest near St. Patrice du Desert, had sabotaged over sixty German vehicles with equipment dropped to them by British and American planes. CIC notified French military authorities of the Senegalese's activities, asking the French to "take care of them."*

Rumors Occupy Agents' Time

Locating or attempting to locate the origin and motive behind rumors often consumed much of the agents' time. During the first week of August, while 29th Division agents were checking on the security of the various divisional units, they heard a rumor that an American officer had shot five civilians who had failed to give correct military information. This report was causing alarm among both military and civilian officials.

CIC established that the rumor, which had originated with soldiers who did not understand French, was untrue. Five civilians were shot, but by the Germans, not by an American officer. They were shot after the Germans had caught them passing through the lines and accused them of giving information to the Americans.**

Interpreter Jailed for Spreading False Propaganda

On 17 August, after pausing only briefly in Mamors and Nogent, an advance group of 79th Division agents entered Dreux, where they opened an office in the Hotel de la Paradis. After learning that the 5th Armored CIC Detachment had already searched all buildings of counterintelligence interest, agents began screening suspects. Shortly thereafter, they made their first arrest. An interpreter for the U.S. 106th Cavalry was arrested for spreading fear propaganda. The garrulous interpreter had been meandering from town to town, advising the French people to take down their flags as the Germans were returning. He was jailed in Nogent Le Roi for several days, then released, after being warned to stop disseminating false information.***

Excited French Mayor Provides Comic Relief

Few humorous incidents were included in the CIC reports for northern France, but one which occurred in Passais on 12 August undoubtedly amused the investigating

* 9th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 15 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 9th Inf Div, 15 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
** 29th Inf Div CI Rpt for Week Ending 6 Aug 44, in 29th CIC File, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
*** 79th Inf Div, 17 Aug 44, CIC Journal, 79th Inf Div, (Unclassified), (Historical Project Files).

agents of the 4th Division CIC Detachment. Shortly after CIC entered Passais, the excited mayor made an appearance, demanding that agents investigate the mysterious ringing of a church bell, which he was sure was being used to send signals to the recently departed Germans. Complying with the agitated mayor's request, CIC investigated and found that the bell was rigged to ring automatically every evening at approximately 2115 hours. The red-faced mayor departed in silence.*

* 4th Inf Div Periodic Rpt, 12 Aug 44, G2 Jnl & File, 4th Inf Div, 12-18 Aug 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 4

"T" FORCE IN PARIS

As the Allied armies rumbled on toward Paris, special planning for the reduction of counterintelligence targets, which had been begun in June, at the very outset of the continental campaign, was accelerated. It had been recognized that organic army intelligence units would be inadequate to reduce rapidly all the targets to be found in the largest cities of Europe, the first of which was Paris. Basing their plans upon experiences of the "S" (security) Force in Rome,* planners at SHAEF decided to organize intelligence collecting units known as "Target" or "T" forces, with the mission of "seizing, safeguarding and facilitating the exploitation of important intelligence and counterintelligence targets in the larger cities." A SHAEF intelligence directive published on 7 July 1944 outlined the major organization and objectives.** As organized they became the first army intelligence task forces.

On 2 August 1944, Colonel Francis P. Tompkins of the G2 section of 12th Army Group was named as head of "T" Force. He proceeded to Italy to study the experiences of the Rome "S" Force, returning to France on 15 August, just ten days before the liberation of Paris. In the meantime, lists of principal targets in Paris were being compiled under the supervision of G2, 12th Army Group.

Colonel Tompkins gathered the nucleus of his staff, principally from the G2 section of 12th Army Group Headquarters, at Periers, France. Three days later, on 18 August, the 31st Chemical Decontaminating Company was designated as Headquarters Company for the force, and from then on until they moved into Paris on 25 August, other units were added rapidly. Since the "T" Force was to move into the city within a matter of hours after enemy resistance had ceased, it was necessary that it be a self-contained mobile force with sufficient combat troops to guard building targets, remove mines, booby traps and stores of explosives, man a detention center, and supply physical security for intelligence personnel. A total of 1,805 persons, of whom 200 served as Headquarters and Headquarters Company and 1,057 as tactical troops, comprised the force. Aside from a bomb disposal squad and a small medical detachment, practically all the remaining 548 persons were representing some branch of Allied Intelligence.

For the Paris mission three units were provided: a cavalry squadron of 900, a Naval Assault force of 77 men, and a French Special Services unit of 80 men.

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* Reference Chapter entitled "Italian Campaign."

** Intelligence Directive No. 17, SHAEF, dtd 7 Jul 44, subj, "T" Forces," in Vol IV, Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Group.

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When the intelligence units were all assembled, CIC was spearheading a combined effort representing ten major agencies as follows:*

1.	CIC, including CIC antisabotage teams	114
2.	Propaganda and Psychological Warfare specialists	108
3.	Scientific & Economic specialists (CIPC)	63a
4.	OSS: Espionage & Special Counter Intelligence (SCI)	62
5.	Escape and Evasion Interrogators. (I.S.9 WEA)	47
6.	Air Intelligence: Strategic, Tactical & Technical	43
7.	Army & Navy Technical Intelligence Teams	35b
8.	M.I: Interpreters, Interrogators, PW; Document Section	34
9.	French Army Intelligence Service (SSM)	24
10.	Atomic Research and Development (ALSOS)	18
	Total Investigators & Analysts	548

a Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee.
b Included: Bomb Disposal Squad, 7; Medical Det., 7; Signal Intelligence, 6; Chemical Warfare, 5; Engineers, 2; ONI, 8.

Of the 114 CIC personnel, 26 were from ETOUSA, Counter Intelligence Branch, Communications Zone (Forward) and the balance from various units under 12th Army Group. On later missions most the CIC personnel were drawn from the 418th CIC Detachment of 12th Army Group.

These CIC personnel composed the bulk of the Target Assessment teams which surveyed targets upon arrival and made the initial estimate of their value. The variety of headquarters and types of personnel with which CIC worked is revealed by the composition of the Paris "T" Force:

#	Headquarters Represented:	T'tl	Off	Ems	Civ
1.	12th Army Group intelligence personnel	265	81	159	25
2.	Supreme Headquarters AEF, specialists	114	61	16	37
3.	ETOUSA, Communications Zone, (Forward)	45	15	30	0
4.	Air Force: USTAF; Ninth & Technical	43	27	14	2
5.	British War Office: Specialists	31	8	23	0
6.	French Intelligence SSM unit	24	7	4	13
7.	U.S. War Department (ALSOS) Mission	18	11	3	4
8.	U.S. Navy ONI (CTG 125.8)	8	6	2	0
	Totals	548	216	251	81

* Appendix 2, Annex B, Twelfth Army Group, History of Operations, Vol IV (Restricted)

These intelligence specialists were organized into small mobile teams whose first duty was to proceed to a target, inspect it and if the quantity of documents was too great for immediate removal, submit an estimate of the materials of intelligence or counterintelligence value. They were then to arrange for necessary guarding until such time as the target could be completely reduced by specialist teams which were to follow.

On 21 August, "T" Force moved from Periers to MeMans and on to Rambouillet, where organization and briefings were completed. At about 2200 hours on 25 August, traveling in 216 vehicles, the force moved into Paris and established headquarters in the Petit Palace. Mobility was stressed and as organized provided an average of one vehicle for each three intelligence personnel. Between that date and 6 September, when "T" Force offically closed its Paris headquarters and turned over its responsibilities to Seine Base Section and personnel of G2 Section, Communications Zone, the force had reduced 382 building targets and 514 personality targets. Sixty-four personality targets were arrested and processed through the "T" Force Interrogation Center, and an additional 181 cases were handled for detention purposes. All but fifty-four of the assigned building targets were covered before the "T" Force withdrawal.

Among the important items of intelligence derived from the operation were: the key to a rare cipher system obtained from a prisoner; a German map disclosing the plans of mining, demolitions and booby trapping in Dunkirk; and a great quantity of operational maps of eastern France.*

The report of Team 4, commanded by Captain Charles W. Hostler, an SCI officer (Special Counter Intelligence unit of OSS) gave a summary view of a "T" Force unit in action. Besides the commanding officer, this team consisted of CIC Agents Michael Varenick and Franklin Norvish of VII Corps CIC; one French Bureau Securite Militaire (BSM) and one Service Securite Militaire (SSM) officer; three enlisted men from the Special Counter Intelligence (SCI); two enlisted men from Chemical Warfare; and two French Interpreter Corps enlisted men. This team, which arrived at 0100 on the morning of 26 September, handled forty-five building and personality targets, arrested twelve persons, and obtained leads which formed the basis of seven supplementary reports. A large volume of documents was collected and forwarded to "T" Force headquarters. Of special interest among those found was a careful drawing of the V-1 rocket bomb.**

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* Target Branch Report from Vol IV, Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Group.

** Ltr, subj, "Report for War Diary on Activities of Team 4, T Force," to CO Paris "T" Force, s/ Charles W. Hostler, Capt AC, CO Team #3, T Force, Paris, dtd 3 Sept 44, obtained from Michael Varenick.

No records are available to indicate the 12th Army Group units from which the CIC agents for the "T" Force were drawn, but one report indicates that all the agents of VII Corps Detachment were assigned to "T" Force teams. There was still some fighting between remnants of the German Army and the French Forces of the Interior when Team 4 arrived in Paris, and in a few places their convoy had to take cover until the snipers could be routed. In one instance a captured German officer was brought out to order a sniper to cease firing and surrender. There was general restlessness among members of the French Forces of Interior (FFI), augmented by the heavy drinking they had done to celebrate the liberation, and at times they would fire at each other by mistake. At one time one of General LeClerc's tanks opened fire on the Petit Palace when a gunner mistook a CIC agent looking out a window for a sniper.* Two members of the force were wounded during one of these riots.

Immediately upon arrival of the "T" Force, a detention center was opened at the Petit Palace to house arrestees of CIC, SCI, and, in some cases, French Forces of Interior. After the first week of liberation, the Communications Zone Counter Intelligence Branch (CIB) arrived, took over the prison and moved it to the Rothschild Mansion on Avenue Foch and renamed it the Paris Interrogation Center. Counter Intelligence Branch maintained control of the prison until after the Bureau Securite Militaire (BSM) of the newly-arrived French government had passed through its uncertain trial stage and was able to take over. Almost from the beginning, however, most of the interrogations had been conducted by French inspectors and, after a few days, guarding was done by the Elite Republicaine de Paris. A motley crew of suspects was held in the prison: German military men in civilian clothes, miscellaneous German nationals, Gestapo agents, French collaborators, and even British and U.S. citizens who were subjects of suspicion because they had survived the German occupation without being interned. Although not a surprise, the biggest disappointment to CIC and Special Counter Intelligence agents was the fact that few ranking Nazis were caught, most of them having fled the city before its liberation.

Experiences with the Paris "T" Force convinced planners that this type of organization provided the most effective method for rapid reduction of targets in highly concentrated areas and, based upon reports and recommendations, plans were immediately set up for a more permanent type of organization for the reduction of cities yet to be entered. Since most of the personnel had been "borrowed," it was necessary for them to return to their parent organizations. For future operations most of the CIC agents were taken from 12th Army Group's 418th CIC Detachment instead of being drawn from the tactical CIC detachments as was done for the Paris force.**

CIC agents with the Paris "T" Force returned to their units and again resumed the forward march.

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* Ltr from Michael Varenick, Alma, Wisconsin.

** Target Branch Report from Vol IV, Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Group.

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Chapter 5

OPERATIONS CHANGE AS FORCES NEAR GERMANY

Except for the fewer then 2,000 Allied soldiers who stopped off in Paris with the "T" Force, the reduction of that city was only a headline in Stars and Stripes. The others rushed on, with the Siegfried Line now as their goal. During the twenty-two days remaining of the period that was to be known officially as the Northern France Campaign, the Seventh Army and the Third Army joined below Troyes, thereby setting up a continuous Allied Line from the Mediterranean to the English Channel; Allied Forces pushed over into the Lowland countries and even, at a spot south of Aachen, broke over into Germany itself. But then the whole forward movement was jarred to a halt. The supply line emanating from Cherbourg had been lengthened to such a degree by the Allied advance, that many of the essentials of battle--gasoline, ammunition and bridging materials--became scarce enough to prevent further ground gains. The long supply route had accomplished what the German divisions had been unable to do.*

Several new CIC detachments joined the forward push during this period. Ninth Army became operational and with it its CIC detachment commanded by Major Donovan J. Ault, and III Corps with Major H. P. Wardwell as CIC Detachment Commander. Three new divisions arrived with CIC Detachment Commanders as follows: 26th CIC Detachment, Captain Noah A. Pennewell; 94th CIC, 1st Lt Carl K. Goodson; and 104th CIC, Capt Brooks P. Julian.**

Rapid Movement Curtails Investigations

The rapid advance during these weeks allowed division and corps CIC detachments only to scratch the surface of counterintelligence targets. More complete investigations had to be left for Army and Com Z detachments. For example, XIX Corps crossed the Seine on 1 September, the Somme on 2 September, and the Franco-Belgian border on 3 September, a distance of 170 miles in three days.

Even when large cities were captured, corps and division detachments paused only two or three days for rudimentary counterintelligence operations. Coverage admittedly suffered from this rapid movement. Lack of communications facilities often made liaison with other Allied intelligence agencies and even with other CIC detachments impossible. Detachments were forced to displace forward before effective informant networks could be developed and even before adequate liaison could be established with resistance leaders and local civil officials. CIC agents

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* The Army Almanac and A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951).

** Unit Administrative Files, (Kansas City Records Center).

could only concentrate on reduction of routine targets and the handling of a few outstanding suspect cases, and attempt to aid local officials on major problems. The disposition of minor collaborators had to be left for local officials and the long-range investigations for the Com Z detachments who were to come in later.*

Civil security suffered from this rapid movement. There was not time to educate local officials sufficiently in their responsibility for the prosecution of travel restriction offenders. Some officials felt that, since these restrictions were in the form of military ordinances the U. S. military authorities should deal out the punishment. Finally the Regional Commissioner, appointed by General DeGaulle, promulgated the restrictions as civil laws. This helped only a little, however, due to the lack of mail or telephone service between the Regional Commissioner and local officials and a general disorganization in the chain of command. CIC spent much valuable time attempting to enforce rules which, by their very nature, could not be enforced during a disorganized situation.**

Resistance Groups Prove Less Helpful

Added to the civil security problem was the decline in the quality of the performance of resistance groups. These groups, once the good right arm of CIC, became in some instances more of a nuisance than a help. As the certainty of Allied victory became apparent, the Resistance developed into a haven for adventurous and criminal elements, furnishing a convenient background for the activities of young hijackers and self-styled Robin Hoods. In some cases, CIC found the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) intimidating duly constituted police authorities.

There were cases of counterintelligence target personalities penetrating "wildcat" resistance organizations and posing as "good patriots", of counterintelligence targets being killed by the Resistance before interrogation by CIC agents; of German agents being hastily arrested when their controlled freedom would have been more to CIC's advantage; of hundreds of persons being detained without records so that important counterintelligence targets were occasionally sheltered under false names as minor collaborators; and of undisciplined bands of armed "patriots" who were a greater menace than isolated groups of German soldiers.***

The usefulness of resistance groups was further lessened by the knowledge that many of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) leaders were Communist and

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* Bi-Weekly Rpt No 1, Hqs ADSEC, Office of the AC of S G2, for period 2400 hrs 28 July to 2400 hrs 12 Aug 44, dtd 12 Aug 44 (Confidential), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** ADSEC G2 Section Operations, undated (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Group, Volume IV, p. 197-8 (Restricted).

that there was considerable antagonism between the many factions in the organization. CIC agents continued to encourage resistance workers to furnish information but were forced to adopt a "show me" attitude and to double check all information instead of accepting it as they formerly had been able to do.*

Resistance Workers Still of Tremendous Value

In spite of these difficulties, there were still many patriotic resistance workers who were of inestimable value to CIC. Resistance members continued to man road control points, guard buildings, and round up large numbers of collaborators and other minor suspects. One case, handled by the 83d CIC Detachment early in September, was particularly noteworthy. CIC's investigation revealed that the first picked up by the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) because she was asking numerous questions about the strength and disposition of American troops in her home town, had given every possible assistance to the Germans while they occupied Angers. Her personal papers contained names and addresses of many prominent Organization Todt officials in Germany. Unable to prove that the Countess had actually given intelligence information to the Germans, CIC turned her over to French authorities as a collaborator.

When the 83d CIC Detachment entered Tours, they found that much of their initial counterintelligence work had already been completed by the resistance, possibly because both the mayor and the prefect of police were resistance leaders. The officials handed over to CIC the records of the most dangerous persons, already lodged in jail, and a town plan showing the location of every German office and billet so that prompt searches could be made. They explained that resistance members were already at work in the former Gestapo headquarters, searching the files for information of interest to CIC.**

In the many areas where the resistance groups and civil officials were reliable, the civil security situation was satisfactorily handled in spite of the rapidity of movement. The 220th (XX Corps) CIC Detachment reported their area well under control during the latter half of August, due to the cooperation received from British and French Intelligence services, local police, gendarmerie, and resistance groups. CIC directives pertaining to curfew and travel restrictions were promulgated through the mayor's office, and road control points leading into the towns were manned by French Forces of the Interior (FFI) personnel under CIC supervision. "In all cases the public has reacted favorably," CIC reported.***

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* Bi-Weekly CI Rpt No 3, Hq ADSEC, Office of AC of S G2, for period 26 Aug to 10 Sep 44, dtd 10 Sep 44, (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.).

** 83d CIC Det Bi-Weekly Rpt, 2-4 Sep, dtd 5 Sep 44, in 83d CIC Det Periodic Intelligence Rpts (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

*** XX Corps CIC Bi-Weekly Rpt, for period 15-31 Aug 44, dtd 4 Sep 44, in XX Corps CIC Periodic Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

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With the help of resistance workers and civil authorities, the 220th CIC Detachment was even able to cope with the deliberate maneuver, launched by the Germans early in September, of releasing hundreds of forced laborers in the path of the Allied onrush in a desperate attempt to stall the advance by cluttering up the supply routes.*

In the VIII Corps area early in September, the 83d CIC Detachment reported valuable aid given by resistance personnel in screening Organization Todt workers and French civilians who were being evacuated from St. Nazaire through arrangements made by the division at the request of the Germans. Security control points were manned mainly by resistance workers and French civil authorities who reported any suspicious activities or persons to the two ADSEC CIC agents in the office in Angers.**

The 5th CIC Detachment reported excellent cooperation of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) in maintaining control posts for the screening of refugees coming from east of the Moselle River early in September. Civilian traffic in this area consisted mainly of refugees from front-line homes and evacuees attempting to return to their homes to retrieve possessions left there. Not all the travelers were refugees and simple peasants, however. One Gestapo agent, one member of the German Workers Front (DAF), and a Nazi Party member were filtered out of the refugee crowd by 5th CIC Detachment. The detachment also sent sixteen persons to the prisoner-of-war enclosure and thirty-six to Civil Affairs for evacuation; and turned over seventy-three to local authorities, including the French Forces of the Interior (FFI).***

When four teams of the 1st CIC Detachment went into Liege on 9 September, they were told by one French Forces of the Interior (FFI) leader that he had 4,000 members willing to submit names of collaborationists and other dangerous persons and were informed by the Chief of the Army of Liberation that he had 67,000 members under his control ready to cooperate with the Allies. Whether these claims were exaggerated was not stated in reports that indicated that CIC received complete cooperation in this city. The Commissioner of Police loaned a lieutenant to CIC, and the governor of the Province of Liege placed all available facilities at CIC's disposal.****

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* XX Corps CIC Bi-Weekly Rpt, for period 1-15 Sep 44, dtd 19 Sep 44, in Corps CIC Periodic Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

** 83d CIC Det Bi-Weekly Rpt, 5-8 Sep 44, dtd 9 Sep 44, in 83d CIC Det Periodic Intelligence Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

*** 5th Inf Div G2 Rpt dtd 3 Sep 44, in 5th Inf Div A/A Rpt 1-30 Sep 44, 305-2 (Master 6610) (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and 5th Inf Div CIC Rpt, dtd 15 Sep 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 5th Inf Div, 13-15 Sep 44, 305-2.2 (Master 47623), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria. Va.).

**** 1st Inf Div Daily CIC Rpt, 9 Sep 44, in 301-2.2 (22292 Master), 1st Inf Div G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va).

CIC During Rapid Advance

A resume of three days' CIC activity with Patton's rapidly moving Third Army indicated the vital help given by members of the resistance, without whom little counterintelligence work could have been accomplished.

On the morning of 31 August, members of the 5th Infantry and 7th Armored Division CIC Detachments entered Reims, one of the first major objectives to fall to Patton east of the Seine. Within twenty-four hours, the majority of counter-intelligence targets had been reduced. French Forces of the Interior leaders gave preliminary information on suspects and explained that most of the prominent Nazis had fled. Search of abandoned German installations netted many documents, including 10,000 German maps in an old school house.*

Early the next morning, both detachments pulled out of Reims, leaving all pending cases with an advance team of the 220th (XX Corps) CIC Detachment. By nightfall, 5th and 507th CIC Detachment agents were in Verdun where they conferred with the 7th Armored Division Civil Affairs Officer, who had already made arrangements for curfew and travel restrictions. From a M. Martin, local French Forces of the Interior (FFI) Chief, the agents learned that all known Gestapo agents had fled, but probably had left behind some women accomplices. Martin furnished a list of all arrested collaborators, with brief statements of the charges against them, and all available information on Organization Todt workers and the chief of the local Parti-Populaire Francais (PPF), collaborationist party.**

From the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) and the Secretary-General, CIC obtained a list of thirty-three former German installations, and CIC agents from the 5th, the 507th, and the 220th CIC Detachments divided into five teams to search the buildings. This proved to be a laborious task. By the end of the next day, all but eight of the searches had been completed, and documents found had been forwarded to the 5th Infantry Division's Order of Battle team. Search of the remaining buildings was left for the 220th CIC, as were uncompleted investigations, when the 5th Infantry and the 7th Armored Divisions moved on at the end of the second day.

While in Verdun, CIC agents also arrested eighty suspects, based upon information obtained from the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) and other local informants. After preliminary screening, all but nineteen were released. Among those retained were one Legion Voluntaire Francais(LVF) member, four or five members

* 5th Inf Div CIC Daily Rpt, 31 Aug 44, in 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 5th Inf Div CIC Daily Rpt, 1 Sep 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623), 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO Alexandria, Va.)

of the Milice, the local Parti-Populaire Francais (PPF) Chief, and several German and Italian nationals who were Organization Todt workers.*

From an informant, CIC agents learned that plans had been made to blow up the Citadel, a building being used as an air raid shelter. With the aid of French Forces of the Interior (FFI) members, agents searched the building and found approximately twenty-five thousand 105 MM. shells and a large quantity of dynamite, wired for instant detonation. French Forces of the Interior members were directed to neutralize the charges and place a guard about the structure. The former Commanding Officer of the local arsenal, who reportedly had been assigned the task of setting off the charge, was said to be hiding in Verdun, but could not be located.**

Increased Numbers of Collaborationists Found

Even before the Normandy Breakout, it had become obvious that one of CIC's major objectives during the sweep across France would be the apprehension of thousands of collaborators. In fact, endless numbers of these persons were arrested. Their offenses ranged from social relations with Germans to denouncing patriots and assisting in their apprehension and interrogation, often involving brutal torture and killings. These persons usually were turned over to French authorities for handling.***

As the Allied Armies swept past Paris and neared the German border, members of subversive organizations were being encountered in ever-increasing numbers. A survey of the Milice in Fontainbleau by the 220th CIC Detachment early in September resulted in the arrest of approximately fifty members, all of whom were turned over to French civil authorities for disposition.**** More than 100 members of the Sturm Abteilung (Brown Shirts) were arrested in Hayange by 220th CIC Detachment agents, who evacuated those above the grade of Sturm Fuehrer through prisoner-of-war channels and turned the remainder over to the French Forces of the Interior (FFI). A search of the Sturm Abteilung and the Hitler Jugend Headquarters netted many propaganda documents.*****

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* 5th Inf Div G2 A/A Rpt, 3 Sep 44 in 305-2(6610 Master). 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 1-30 Sep 44, (Restricted), (Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.).

** 5th Inf Div CIC Daily Rpt, 2 Sep 44, in 305-2.2 (Master 47623), 5th Inf Div G2 Jnl, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

*** Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Group, Vol IV pp 197-8 (Restricted).

**** XX Corps Bi-Weekly CIC Rpt 15-31 Aug 44, dtd 4 Sep 44, in XX Corps CIC Reports (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

***** XX Corps Bi-Weekly CIC Rpt, 1-15 Sep 44, dtd 19 Sep 44, in XX Corps CIC Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098)

Most Espionage Suspects Minor Security Risks

During this period CIC was not yet encountering many trained German espionage agents but a number of low-level agents, line-crossers of limited ability, whom the German Intelligence Service (GIS) evidently considered expendable, were captured.*

A few seemingly bona fide espionage agents were captured, but even these seemed to be mainly of the collaborationist variety. Two individuals, picked up by the 83d Infantry Division CIC Detachment during the second week of September, had allegedly been Gestapo agents. arrested on 14 September, confessed that she had been an interpreter for the Sicherheitspolizei at Elois and mistress to the chief of the same office. After interrogation by 83d CIC agents, she was turned over to the civilian interrogation cage at LeMans with her confession and accompanying papers. who was arrested by the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) and denounced by a number of French citizens in Chatellerault as a Gestapo informant, was also released to the interrogation cage with signed denunciations and supporting documents.**

About the same time, the 220th CIC Detachment was processing two espionage suspects, arrested in Hayango on 14 September. was evacuated to the rear through 90th Infantry Division channels, but a blockleiter considered dangerous by the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) was held for further investigation.***

Minor Suspects

CIC agents doing road patrol work to intercept suspicious individuals often made unexpected discoveries. When agents of the 5th CIC entered the town of Vionville, they found a colony of thirty-one Russians who had worked for the Germans at a factory in Ars. Their location was reported to the division Civil Affairs officer and arrangements were made for evacuating them to Verdun, where they were to be screened by the Third Army CIC Detachment.****

6th Armored CIC in Montargis

As 506th CIC agents first moved into Montargis, which served as their center of operations for early September, they were handed lists of informants and suspects

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* Intelligence Operations of V Corps, Chapter III, undated (Restricted), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 83d Inf Div Bi-Weekly CI Rpt. 12-15 Sep 44. dtd 16 Sep 44, in 83d CIC Det Periodic Intel Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

*** XX Corps Bi-Weekly CI Rpt, 1-15 Sep 44, dtd 19 Sep 44, in XX Corps CIC Rpts (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

**** 5th Inf Div CIC Rpt 15 Sep 44, G2 Jnl & File, 13-15 Sep 44, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

and other pertinent counterintelligence data by the departing 35th CIC Detachment. After sending a former interpreter for the Germans to the Master Interrogation Center for further processing, agents began investigating a surly Frenchman and his daughter, who alledgedly had been voluntary informants for the Germans. The father, decidedly pro-German in his sentiments, had, it was alleged, threatened to shoot Allied parachutists, and his daughter had willingly served as the mistress of the German commander in Gien. Both were placed in the Gien Prison to await trial by a French court.*

Later, five political collaborators and twenty-eight prisoners of war, and a Polish national, charged by the French Forces of the Interior with espionage, were delivered to the Montargis Prison by the 506th agents.** At a point near Gien where boats shuttled back and forth across the Loire River, 506th CIC agents made arrangements for the establishment of a control point to check for possible enemy agents and line-crossers.***

Radio Transmitters Sought

Agents spent some time during the Northern France campaign searching for radio transmitters, hidden firearms and caches of sabotage materials. Agents of the 5th CIC Detachment, while looking through the home of a suspect in Thiaucourt, discovered a French-made short wave sending and receiving set. Investigation indicated, however, that the set had not been used to transmit information to the enemy.**** Another radio transmitter, belonging to a Captain Miltat, French Forces of the Interior (FFI) official, was found when agents searched a building in Les Baraques, but the captain declared that he had used the transmitter only to send messages to the FFI in Metz.***** One Alfred Py of Montargis was the principal figure in a transmitting set case handled by 506th agents in early September. Suspected of operating the set for the recently departed Germans, Py was investigated and his home searched, but the evidence found served only to link him with the black market.******

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* 6th Armd Div CIC Rpt, 8 Sep 44, G2 Jnl & File, 6th Armd Div, 7-8 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 6th Armd Div CIC Rpt, 12-13 Sept 44, G2 Jnl & File 6th Armd Div, 12-13 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 6th Armd Div CIC Rpt, 15-16 Sep 44, G2 Jnl & File, 6th Armd Div, 13-17 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandira, Va.).

**** 5th Inf Div G2 A/A Rpt, 1-30 Sep 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 5th Inf Div, 305-2 (Master 6610), (Restricted), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

***** 5th Inf Div CIC Rpt, 15 Sep 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 5th Inf Div, 13-15 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

****** 6th Armd Div CIC Rpt, 11-12 Sep 44, in G2 Jnl & File, 6th Armd Div, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 6

"T" FORCES REDUCE LARGER CITIES

The weaknesses in counterintelligence coverage caused by the rapidity of movement were partially alleviated by continuation of the policy of using "T" Forces for the reduction of targets in the larger cities. With the personnel who remained following the Paris mission, "T" Force moved its headquarters to Verdun and prepared for future operations. Luxembourg City, Nancy and Metz were selected as future targets. In order to accomplish the three missions simultaneously, "T" Force was divided into three groups. The main party, under command of Colonel Tompkins, proceeded to Luxembourg City, while Captain William E. Johns led a group into Nancy and Lt. William L. Bell and his force struck out towards Metz.

Reconnaissance Made of Counterintelligence Targets in Luxembourg

On 11 September, on a reconnaissance of Luxembourg City to determine the status of target exploitation there, it was found that the only intelligence agency in the city was the 505th CIC Detachment. Two days later, the main body of "T" Force moved into the city, establishing its Command Post in the Reichsbahn Building.

Due to the speed of advance of American forces in Eastern France and through Luxembourg, target information had not been compiled or dispatched to members of the "T" Force for use in reducing Luxemburg City. Consequently, the bulk of target exploitation was based on targets of opportunity developed after the beginning of counterintelligence operations in the city. In all, 109 buildings and sixty-six personality targets were selected and exploited. A total of 572 persons and 128 vehicles were employed in the Luxembourg counterintelligence operation.

Perhaps the most outstanding single physical target in the Luxembourg area was Radio Station Luxembourg, captured by the 5th CIC Detachment in a condition which permitted its restoration and early use by Psychological Warfare personnel of Headquarters, 12th Army Group. "T" Force personnel assisted in repairing and subsequently in safeguarding the damaged station after it had been repaired.

After completing preliminary counterintelligence work in Luxembourg on 10 October, Colonel Tompkins' "T" Force group moved to Spa, Belgium, leaving responsibility for remaining targets with ADSEC CIC detachments with whom liaison had been maintained throughout.

CIC Sub-Force Enters Nancy

Meanwhile, a sub-force, headed by Captain Johns, entered Nancy on 15 September, where they met 35th CIC agents. Combining their activities, the two groups

reduced thirty-one buildings and fifty-four personality targets within seventy-two hours. Strength of this "T" Force was sixty-eight persons and eighteen vehicles.

Captain Johns' sub-force completed operations on 18 September and withdrew, rejoining the main "T" Force in Luxembourg City the same day. Since the Nancy operation had been designed only to assist 35th CIC, normal "T" Force files were not maintained and the division CIC unit was responsible for targets in the city.

The remaining sub-force arrived outside Metz on 12 September. While in a bivouac area, the force was subjected to a severe artillery bombardment, that caused casualties and vehicle damage. It soon became apparent that Metz was not going to fall as soon as had been expected. Therefore Colonel Tompkins ordered the sub-force to join the main force in Luxembourg City. Later, the mission of exploiting counterintelligence targets in Metz was withdrawn from the "T" Force. Following these French missions, "T" Branch of 12th Army Group began advance planning for "T" Force missions in Germany.*

* Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report), 12th Army Group, Volume IV, (Restricted), p. 10-12.

Chapter 7

LOWLANDS CITIZENS LESS SYMPATHETIC

When American troops crossed the Franco-Belgian border and penetrated into Luxembourg and the Netherlands, they entered areas where the people were less sympathetic toward the Allied cause than were the French. Although the majority of the citizens sincerly welcomed liberation from Nazi tyranny, large segments of the population were either pro-German or apathetic toward the Allies.*

Of the three Lowland countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the first undoubtedly posed the most serious threat to security. Situated between two traditional foes, Germany and France, and having been compelled to deal with both, Belgium trusted neither until her independence and future security were guaranteed.

It was only natural, then, for many Belgians to have a double agent mentality. This situation required that CIC, as well as other Allied intelligence agencies, check and recheck the credibility, political tendencies and loyalty of Belgian officials, informants and employees.**

Belgium in Throes of Political Conflict

An additional hazard to counterintelligence operations was the fact that Belgium was in the throes of a severe political conflict, with the eventual outcome uncertain. Wide divergence of views between the Flemish and the French-speaking groups made even the final preservation of national unity doubtful. King Leopold was the source of much irritation, with the French-speaking people blaming him for having "sold out" to the Germans.

During their four years of occupation, the Germans had expertly widened the breach by showing strong favoritism to the Flemish. Germanophiles even before the war, the Flemish people were bribed and cajoled by Hitler to support the Fatherland. Flemish prisoners of war were returned, and Flemish officials were given pecuniary and political preferences as well as better food and other recommendations. All this naturally aroused the resentment of the French-favoring population.

By the time CIC arrived, several political parties were contending for the control of Belgium. On the extreme right were the Rexists, who, although quickly

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* G2 Estimate No 25, "Counterintelligence in Belgium," FUSA, dtd 11 Sep 44, in L-552 (16A), FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 10-12 Sep 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** FUSA G2 Estimate, Sep 44, in L-379, FUSA G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

arrested or driven underground, constituted the major sabotage and espionage threat. The Catholic Party, which had been the next most reactionary group in 1940, now appeared to be a middle-of-the-road party. The Socialist party had a pinkish tint, and the Communist party had reached such serious proportions that it was regarded as one of the most successful branches of the Third Internationale.

CIC To Observe "Hands Off" Policy

In recognition of this highly unstable political situation, CIC agents were instructed to take extreme precautions against expressing political opinions. No assurances, promises or prognostications were to be made by CIC or any other military agency while dealing with the civilian population. In fact, the subject of the future government of Belgium was to be avoided by First Army personnel at all costs.*

Since Belgium had to be regarded officially as liberated, not conquered, territory, and security regulations were tempered accordingly,** CIC had to base security plans upon the presumption that they would meet greater hostility than they had in France, due to both German sympathies and the unstable political situation. Travel controls were tightened and new efforts were made to apprehend collaborators and enemy agents.

Belgian Underground Composed of Four Groups

As was true in France, CIC soon became dependent upon local resistance groups for aid in seizing fugitives. Although armed belatedly, the resistance movement in Belgium, particularly in the French-speaking provinces, earned the respect of First Army intelligence personnel.

The underground, commonly referred to as the White Army, consisted of four groups. Major Emil Demey was the head of the White Army, but there was official doubt that he ever received the cooperation of more than half the organization at one time. Of the four groups, the Belgian Secret Army was the largest, consisting of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, but it suffered from a lack of weapons and a specific mission. The next largest, the Army of Liberation, was the one most commonly utilized by CIC as a civilian agency to deal with local political administration and police officials. The other two groups, the Front de L'Independence and the Belgian National Movement, contained many radical elements and were communistic in their

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* G2 Estimate No 25, "Counterintelligence in Belgium," dtd 11 Sep 44, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 10-12 Sep 44, L-552 (16A), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) 12th Army Gp, Vol II, p. 198.

allegiance. Prior to the arrival of the Allied troops, however, both of these leftist groups had done some excellent sabotage work.*

Nazi Collaborators Active

Typical of the Nazi collaborators whom CIC had expected to find in Belgium was Valentin Vandoorne, arrested by Agents Richard C. Lang and Adrian J. Pinsince of 1st CIC Detachment two days after their arrival in Mons, Belgium, on 4 September. Investigation revealed that Vandoorne was the leader of a ruthlessly pro-German unit, the Rexist Party. Local citizens accused him of sending information to Germany via radio transmitter at the time of the French retreat in 1940.

A search of Vandoorne's home revealed much Rexist literature and papers relative to the Waffen Schutz Staffeln. After preliminary interrogation, he was taken to the VII Corps Civilian Collecting Point for further questioning and disposition.**

Rexist Party Information Obtained

Marcel Dosweld, a patriotic Belgian who had penetrated the Rexist party, gave CIC agents vital information concerning the party's membership and activities. Dosweld reported that Leon Degrelle, national party leader, had agreed to recruit a quarter of a million persons for labor inside Germany in return for a promised generalship in the German Army. As a result, ruthless methods were used by the Rexists to obtain forced laborers.

During July 1944, the Rexists had organized a special group within their party called "Service B," with the mission of staying behind as German agents when the Allies liberated Belgium. The majority were recruited from the Hillsfeldgendarmerie, an auxiliary German military police organization. Dosweld gave CIC an extensive list of the personnel of "Service B," which later aided in the apprehension of many members of this special group.***

Carrier Pigeon Menace Becomes Serious

The danger of carrier pigeons as espionage couriers, which had been encountered throughout France, received renewed impetus in Belgium where pigeon raising was a national sport. It was estimated that there were at least eighteen

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* 1st Inf Div G2 Jnl, 11 Sep 44, 301-2.2 (22292 Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 1st Inf Div CIC Daily Rpt, 6 Sep 44 in 301-2.2 (22292 Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Ibid., 7 Sep 44.

thousand registered birds. Although the Germans had ordered all carrier pigeon lofts padlocked, it was common knowledge that the birds had been used to carry intelligence information between Belgium and England during the Nazi occupation.

CIC attempted to control this possible avenue of espionage by also ordering that pigeon lofts be locked. Violators were fined and sometimes imprisoned. Although numerous front line American units reported seeing pigeons flying toward enemy lines, it was never ascertained whether German Intelligence profited by the use of the birds.*

The Battle Moves to the Reich

On the afternoon of 13 September, on the 100th day after the invasion of Normandy, the lead tanks of the Third Armored Division broke across the German border through a soft spot in the Siegfried Line, just ten miles south of Aachen. After three successive invasions of Western Europe in 74 years, the German Army for the first time had to fight in its homeland.

The following day, 14 September, marked the end of the Northern France Campaign and also the end, for several months, of any rapid forward movement. The Allied Armies had run far ahead of their supply lines and had to wait until the long line from Cherbourg was replaced by another from Antwerp.**

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* FUSA G2 Estimate, September 1944, in L-379, FUSA G2 Jnl & File (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Bradley, op cit., pp. 412.

Part III - Southern France (15 August - 14 September 1944)

Chapter 1

PREPARATION FOR INVASION

"Where are the Allied divisions being sent?"* This was the question of Kesselring's agents during the time plans were being made for the invasion of Southern France. But they did not find out in time. Official Seventh Army Reports say, "The shock and surprise of the landings in Southern France so disorganized the (German) Nineteenth Army that its commander, General Friedrich Wiese, never succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces to attempt to contain the beachhead."** Not until 17 August, D plus two of the invasion of Southern France, did Colonel Meinhausen, Chief of Staff of the German LXII Corps, learn even the nationalities of the invaders, whom he had assumed would, for psychological reasons, be French. But Colonel Meinhausen and his entire staff were captured several hours after learning this information. Colonel Meinhausen further admitted that when the invasion convoy was seen to set sail, the German forces along the entire coast of Southern France and the north coast of Italy had to be alerted. But none of the forces could be moved to meet the brunt of the invasion. The Germans just did not know where the Allies were going to land.***

A Good Job!

Clearly those responsible for the pre-invasion security had performed an excellent job: five-hundred ships had carried 155,419 troops, 20,031 vehicles, and virtual mountains of materiel more than four-hundred miles into an almost undefended area in Operation DRAGOON.****

Serious planning for Operation DRAGOON, then called ANVIL, began on 12 January 1944, when the Planning Group under Command of Brigadier General G. H. Davidson arrived in Algiers from Sicily. Planning Headquarters, designated "Force 163," was located in the Ecole Normale, in the suburb of Bouzareah, high above Algiers.*****

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* Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York, 1950), p. 368.

** G2 History, Seventh Army Operation in Europe, 15 Aug 44 - 8 May 45, Part I (15-31 Aug 44), (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

*** Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 1, for period 15-31 Aug 44, dtd 6 Sept 44 (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France & Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 99, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

***** Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France & Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 11.

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Major Kenneth Crowell was appointed commanding officer of the all-important Force 163 Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Under him were Technical Sergeants Alan Dinehart and Bertel Sparks, Sergeants Woodrow French and Marshall Haseltine, and Corporal George Perper.*

Force 163 security planners faced one problem which was possible unique to this operation. Algiers was then the heart of the Free French movement, the true seat of the Comitè de la Liberation. To local exiles, if not to German intelligence, an invasion of Southern France would seem the most obvious of moves. A slight slip here could easily develop a wide-spread rumor more quickly than anywhere else in the world at that time.

In the name of security, Major Crowell recommended that a very minimum of persons be allowed access to the planning. Sponge rubber maps in the War Room were zealously guarded, as were the thousands of air photographs, tourist reports, post cards, and old Baedekers, most of which pertained to the South Coast of France. Personnel working at Bouzareah told friends only that they were with AFHQ; no mention was made of Force 163.**

On 19 March 1944, its work over, Force 163 was officially discontinued and its CIC personnel were transferred to Seventh Army CIC.***

Major Crowell, Commanding Officer of the Seventh Army CIC Detachment, kept his efforts directed toward maintaining the security of the proposed landings. He placed agents under cover in a variety of spots; hitch-hiking officers and enlisted men were questioned by Seventh Army CIC; agents were scattered among the officers and nurses of the 45th General Hospital; agents were placed in the Naples Officers' Transient Mess and in a variety of clubs frequented by military personnel.

The results of such undercover and quasi-undercover operations were discouraging. It seemed common knowledge that a Task Force was forming. Worse, the 3d, 45th, and 36th Infantry Divisions were those chiefly, and correctly, named as constituting this Force. Rumors circulating the nurses' headquarters correctly named Southern France as the target area--with Yugoslavia running a distant second. The time of D-Day was well estimated; it was common knowledge that by 18 July the 3d Division had begun a three-week period of amphibious training so the landings were correctly expected to fall within 30 days of that date.

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* CIC, AFHQ, Ltr. Subject: February CIC Situation Summary, to ACofS, G2, AFHQ, 21 Mar 44, Appendix "B", CIC, AFHQ Roster dtd 29 Feb 44, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France & Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 27, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

*** 2678th Hqs Co., CIC (Prov) AFHQ, Order No. 26, dtd 19 Mar 44. (Conf), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25102).

Apparently little attempt had ever been made to keep secret identities of the component units; shoulder-patches were worn openly, and Seventh Army Headquarters was clearly marked as such.

On the other hand, it was reported that little talk was heard concerning the presence of French troops in this operation. Similarly encouraging was the conclusion that much of the gossip had been set in motion by a German propaganda broadcast of 16 July, obviously a wild shot in the dark, which warned American forces of a grim welcome prepared for them in France.

The conclusion was inescapable, however, that within Seventh Army, military security was not what it should be. It was suggested that a vigorous security program be initiated by CIC in cooperation with unit commanders.*

CIC Prepares for Its Part in the Invasion

While part of Seventh Army CIC's efforts were directed at security of the final staging area in Naples, the rest of the time was spent on clerical work. From material received from occupied France, CIC spent long hours compiling a personality card index and files on various areas and specific targets. However, the whole operation proved futile because the cards failed to arrive until long after the invasion and, more important, long after CIC had ceased to operate in the areas dealt with in the files.**

Seventh Army CIC established liaison with other Allied intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. In addition, they investigated personnel engaged in confidential duties for the military.

Since Seventh Army CIC was running few of its own investigations, agents with Army were usually loaned to CIC of the lower units charged with active investigations. Seventh Army CIC did, however, run security surveys on all Army and Peninsula Base Section installations, and it continued to place undercover agents in establishments frequented by Allied troops.***

With activity now concentrated in the Naples area, corps and division detachments assumed the bulk of the investigative operations. Agents of the 206th CIC Detachment (VI Corps), commanded by Major Harry G. Costello, reported close liaison with local Peninsula Base and Port Security agents as well as with Naples

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* Seventh Army Memo dtd 18 Jul 44; subj: Rumors and Talk Concerning Future Seventh Army Movements. (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

** Interview with Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y., 8 Aug 55.

*** 307th CIC Det Aug 44 Situation Summary; dtd 31 Aug 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

Servizio Informazione Militaire officials. Within the Corps area, communications were all but suspended during the final weeks before the embarkation. Mail was censored and all telephone calls were subject to monitoring. Travel control regulations were strictly enforced. During the last few days civilians found within restricted areas were apprehended and temporarily incarcerated.

A well-developed informant net was employed to determine evidence of enemy espionage activity. Undercover agents observed civilians who worked in establishments frequented by troops, while other agents spent much time among the troops, listening for promiscuous talk concerning military matters.

Within the CIC units, provisions of AR 380-5 were strictly followed, and attempts were made to obtain similarly faithful adherence elsewhere.*

Division detachments were no less occupied. The 36th CIC Detachment reported that "loose talk in the 36th Infantry Division has been brought to a standstill through the educational program instituted by the CIC Detachment of the Division." It was reported, however, that "units which have been attached to this Division for the first time have, in the past, been very lax in their security measures."**

A security check run by the 36th CIC Detachment of their new division area disclosed that the previous occupants there, an unidentified Air Force unit, had left behind pay records which included the name, rank, and serial number of every man in the unit. These documents were turned over to Peninsula Base Section CIC.

Another investigation disclosed the fact that a private of the 36th Infantry Division had managed to have two prostitutes follow him to the new division area. He admitted to CIC agents that he had given the girls a slip of paper telling his name, rank, and serial number, as well as his new address. CIC suggested that he be court martialed for this violation of AR 380-5.

The 36th CIC Detachment arrested 47 civilians for a variety of reasons. Of more importance was the capture of Alfonso Manzione, a man who was several times warned to stay away from military areas, but who, apprehended again trespassing a restricted zone, was unable plausibly to account for his presence.***

CIC School Operates in Naples

During the last two weeks of July many CIC agents within Seventh Army area attended CIC School at Naples to receive a comprehensive briefing in the problems

* 206th CIC Det, Monthly Situation Summary for Aug 44; dtd 31 Aug 44. (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Annex to 36th CIC Det Situation Summary for July 1944; dtd 31 Jul 44. (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

*** Ibid.

which they were soon to encounter. The first day of instruction, 17 July 1944, covered the history of the Corps in past campaigns and such general administrative matters as the relationship of CIC to G2. On the next day the mission of the Army and that of CIC were treated. Subsequent days covered: reading of American and foreign maps, care of firearms and jeeps, and field trips. Other classes were devoted to extensive training on France and the French. Police, resistance groups, and civilian agencies were explained in detail as were such American agencies as Office of Strategic Services, Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal, and Psychological Warfare Branch. Detailed review was given in the tools of CIC operations: the techniques of interrogation, office procedure, port security coverage, travel control, and a variety of others. Difficult problems of coordination between U.S. and French intelligence agencies at army, corps, and division level were discussed. Interspersed throughout the course were periods of weapons practice. Instructors were recruited from among agents of all ranks; all had experience in the specialized fields they were called upon to discuss.*

On D minus 1 (14 August), the four provisional detachments, the 6795th, 6796th, 6797th, and 6798th which had served as the Seventh Army Detachment, were deactivated and the 307th was activated with a strength of seventeen officers and fifty enlisted agents.** Other CIC detachments ready to go forward with invading forces were: 206th (VI Corps), commanded by Maj. Harry G. Costello, Jr.; 3d, Capt. Walter E. Greene; 45th, Capt. Rupert W. Guenther; 36th, Capt. John G. Hammond; 427th (Delta Base Section), Maj. Clarence E. Read; and the 429th (Continental Advance Section), Maj. John C. Schwarzwalder.

CIC Helps Fool the Germans

The attackers of Southern France employed deceptive feints of equal complexity with those of the Normandy invasion with the same overpowering success. To dupe the Nazis successfully demanded complete cooperation from CIC, which until the invasion proper played generally a passive role against the enemy.

Since preparations for a three-division landing could hardly pass unnoticed, a variety of measures were employed to confuse the enemy. CIC was in on the ground floor of such work. Enemy agents sent down by Kesselring, chiefly into Northern Italy, were captured with regularity. CIC placed these men at the disposition of Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) who managed to double most of them, and send them north with detailed and consistent misinformation concerning the next Allied move.***

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* Seventh Army, Briefing and Training Schedule, CIC Det; dtd 14 Jul 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

** Hqs, Seventh Army, General Order No. 28, dtd 14 Aug 44 (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

*** Condensed from Schwarzwalder, We Caught Spies, and Clark, Calculated Risk.

At 1800 hours on 14 August two diversion forces set sail from Naples. Accompanied by warships, they sailed north, the one headed west of Marseille, the other steaming toward North Italy. That night five aircraft left Corsica--equipped to appear as five times that number to enemy radar.

During that same eventful night of 14-15 August the First Special Service Force (English) ran commando assaults on the left flank of the target beaches, against the islands of Levant and Port Cros. So complete was the Germans' surprise that by the end of 15 August all resistance had ceased on Levant, while the 80-odd enemy left on Port Cros were huddled together in an old fort at one end of the island.*

In all, ten routes were used by the ships which carried troops and materiel into the landings. Some sailings were made from as far away as Oran, North Africa, or Brindisi on the east coast of Italy. The 3d, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions all sailed from the Naples area on 11, 12, and 13 August--timed so that the slower ships set out first. Generally the convoys followed closely the ten prearranged paths, for these were the areas which had been swept clear of mines, but sufficient deviations were employed to confuse the enemy as to the eventual destination.**

As the invasion fleet sailed away to the north, CIC agents who remained behind attempted to evaluate results of their work in order to make such operations in the future the more secure. Several serious breaches of security were discovered. For instance, in Corsica, when the fleet had stopped briefly, investigation disclosed that the roster for the officers' mess was missing. CIC believed that this roster, though it contained names of many officers enroute to France, would be of little aid to the enemy, and that fact, coupled with a complete lack of clues in the case, made them decide to consider the matter closed. Sufficient security measures were instituted, however, to prevent repetitions of such an occurrence.***

The 428th CIC Detachment discovered that several enlisted men of the 6654th Signal Message Company, who through normal duties had access to Top Secret information concerning the landing, had indulged in an appreciable amount of loose talk.

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* Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 107, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

** Condensed from Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, Chap 6.

*** 427th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Summary, Northern Base Section, dtd 31 Aug 44, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

CIC concluded that carelessness, rather than subversive intent, underlaid the breach of security.*

CIC Plans Operations In France

Having completed their vital work of contributing to the complete security of the invasion, or, at least of the invasion's destination, Seventh Army CIC agents looked forward to several of the more important aspects of their future work.

Preparations had been made to deal with friendly French forces as soon as possible after establishment ashore. CIC believed that there were between 15,000 and 20,000 armed members of the Maquis, or French Forces of the Interior, and upward of 30,000 members mobilized, but unarmed, in Southern France. Several areas of France were believed already to be under French Forces of the Interior control.

Already radio contact with the French Forces of the Interior was being carried on at a high rate of efficiency, and had developed much valuable information concerning the target area. General Cochet, appointed by General DeGaulle, had assumed command of the French Forces of the Interior several days before the landings. He had assigned the Forces the task of hampering the Germans in Southern France from the rear, with special emphasis given to the destruction of bridges, cutting of roads, blocking of railroads, and the seizing of telegraph and telephone lines.**

CIC agents maintained close contact with these French Forces of the Interior throughout the campaign in France. They were to prove both a boon and a bother. The existence of this often fanatically revengeful army helped to provide CIC with a reputation of being just and charitable, if only by comparison. And since the French Forces of the Interior were quick and willing to assume punitive powers, CIC would easily be able to avoid the stigma which would necessarily follow even the fairest punishment of Frenchmen by Americans, were they to assume the role themselves.

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* AFHQ Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rept; dtd 4 Sept 44, (Secret). (AIS Staff and Faculty Library). (NOTE: It now seems that CIC did not have to go so far afield to discover breaches of security. CIC letter files are replete with examples, as the following, written to a detachment commander in Africa six days before the invasion: "Your present Detachment, subject to some adjustments, is scheduled for duty at a new Base Section to be formed in the near future. . . .Please don't discuss this with any of your men," ltr dtd 9 Aug 1944, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

** Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol. I, pp.68-9, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

which they were soon to encounter. The first day of instruction, 17 July 1944, covered the history of the Corps in past campaigns and such general administrative matters as the relationship of CIC to G2. On the next day the mission of the Army and that of CIC were treated. Subsequent days covered: reading of American and foreign maps, care of firearms and jeeps, and field trips. Other classes were devoted to extensive training on France and the French. Police, resistance groups, and civilian agencies were explained in detail as were such American agencies as Office of Strategic Services, Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal, and Psychological Warfare Branch. Detailed review was given in the tools of CIC operations: the techniques of interrogation, office procedure, port security coverage, travel control, and a variety of others. Difficult problems of coordination between U.S. and French intelligence agencies at army, corps, and division level were discussed. Interspersed throughout the course were periods of weapons practice. Instructors were recruited from among agents of all ranks; all had experience in the specialized fields they were called upon to discuss.*

On D minus 1 (14 August), the four provisional detachments, the 6795th, 6796th, 6797th, and 6798th which had served as the Seventh Army Detachment, were deactivated and the 307th was activated with a strength of seventeen officers and fifty enlisted agents.** Other CIC detachments ready to go forward with invading forces were: 206th (VI Corps), commanded by Maj. Harry G. Costello, Jr.; 3d, Capt. Walter E. Greene; 45th, Capt. Rupert W. Guenther; 36th, Capt. John G. Hammond; 427th (Delta Base Section), Maj. Clarence E. Read; and the 429th (Continental Advance Section), Maj. John C. Schwarzwalder.

CIC Helps Fool the Germans

The attackers of Southern France employed deceptive feints of equal complexity with those of the Normandy invasion with the same overpowering success. To dupe the Nazis successfully demanded complete cooperation from CIC, which until the invasion proper played generally a passive role against the enemy.

Since preparations for a three-division landing could hardly pass unnoticed, a variety of measures were employed to confuse the enemy. CIC was in on the ground floor of such work. Enemy agents sent down by Kesselring, chiefly into Northern Italy, were captured with regularity. CIC placed these men at the disposition of Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) who managed to double most of them, and send them north with detailed and consistent misinformation concerning the next Allied move.***

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* Seventh Army, Briefing and Training Schedule, CIC Det; dtd 14 Jul 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

** Hqs, Seventh Army, General Order No. 28, dtd 14 Aug 44 (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

*** Condensed from Schwarzwalder, We Caught Spies, and Clark, Calculated Risk.

At 1800 hours on 14 August two diversion forces set sail from Naples. Accompanied by warships, they sailed north, the one headed west of Marseille, the other steaming toward North Italy. That night five aircraft left Corsica--equipped to appear as five times that number to enemy radar.

During that same eventful night of 14-15 August the First Special Service Force (English) ran commando assaults on the left flank of the target beaches, against the islands of Levant and Port Cros. So complete was the Germans' surprise that by the end of 15 August all resistance had ceased on Levant, while the 80-odd enemy left on Port Cros were huddled together in an old fort at one end of the island.*

In all, ten routes were used by the ships which carried troops and materiel into the landings. Some sailings were made from as far away as Oran, North Africa, or Brindisi on the east coast of Italy. The 3d, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions all sailed from the Naples area on 11, 12, and 13 August--timed so that the slower ships set out first. Generally the convoys followed closely the ten prearranged paths, for these were the areas which had been swept clear of mines, but sufficient deviations were employed to confuse the enemy as to the eventual destination.**

As the invasion fleet sailed away to the north, CIC agents who remained behind attempted to evaluate results of their work in order to make such operations in the future the more secure. Several serious breaches of security were discovered. For instance, in Corsica, when the fleet had stopped briefly, investigation disclosed that the roster for the officers' mess was missing. CIC believed that this roster, though it contained names of many officers enroute to France, would be of little aid to the enemy, and that fact, coupled with a complete lack of clues in the case, made them decide to consider the matter closed. Sufficient security measures were instituted, however, to prevent repetitions of such an occurrence.***

The 428th CIC Detachment discovered that several enlisted men of the 6654th Signal Message Company, who through normal duties had access to Top Secret information concerning the landing, had indulged in an appreciable amount of loose talk.

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* Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 107, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

** Condensed from Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, Chap 6.

*** 427th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Summary, Northern Base Section, dtd 31 Aug 44, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

CIC concluded that carelessness, rather than subversive intent, underlaid the breach of security.*

CIC Plans Operations In France

Having completed their vital work of contributing to the complete security of the invasion, or, at least of the invasion's destination, Seventh Army CIC agents looked forward to several of the more important aspects of their future work.

Preparations had been made to deal with friendly French forces as soon as possible after establishment ashore. CIC believed that there were between 15,000 and 20,000 armed members of the Maquis, or French Forces of the Interior, and upward of 30,000 members mobilized, but unarmed, in Southern France. Several areas of France were believed already to be under French Forces of the Interior control.

Already radio contact with the French Forces of the Interior was being carried on at a high rate of efficiency, and had developed much valuable information concerning the target area. General Cochet, appointed by General DeGaulle, had assumed command of the French Forces of the Interior several days before the landings. He had assigned the Forces the task of hampering the Germans in Southern France from the rear, with special emphasis given to the destruction of bridges, cutting of roads, blocking of railroads, and the seizing of telegraph and telephone lines.**

CIC agents maintained close contact with these French Forces of the Interior throughout the campaign in France. They were to prove both a boon and a bother. The existence of this often fanatically revengeful army helped to provide CIC with a reputation of being just and charitable, if only by comparison. And since the French Forces of the Interior were quick and willing to assume punitive powers, CIC would easily be able to avoid the stigma which would necessarily follow even the fairest punishment of Frenchmen by Americans, were they to assume the role themselves.

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* AFHQ Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rept; dtd 4 Sept 44, (Secret). (AIS Staff and Faculty Library). (NOTE: It now seems that CIC did not have to go so far afield to discover breaches of security. CIC letter files are replete with examples, as the following, written to a detachment commander in Africa six days before the invasion: "Your present Detachment, subject to some adjustments, is scheduled for duty at a new Base Section to be formed in the near future. . . .Please don't discuss this with any of your men," ltr dtd 9 Aug 1944, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

** Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and Germany, 1944-1945, Vol. I, pp.68-9, (Unclassified), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

On the other hand, it was a force to be watched; it was powerful, and, for various reasons, many of its members were excessively vengeful. Public opinion would undoubtedly allow them a great amount of authority. Extremists within this organization would have a clear path toward positions of great personal power. Then again, by the nature of its militant anti-Fascism, the French Forces of the Interior would be a natural and ready home for French Communists.

Lastly, it was expected that traitors and collaborationists would be quick to dress themselves with French Forces of the Interior armbands, and offer their services to the Allied liberators.*

CIC advance planners realized that the drastic limitations on numbers of their personnel would make it impossible for them to cover the territory alone. Often they would require help from their French counterpart, Securite Militaire (SM).

One Seventh Army Memorandum stated the official policy: "The maintenance of French sovereignty, a principle subscribed to, in all confidence, by the Allied Forces must be assured."** CIC agents were studying, without complete understanding, the complex of administrative detail involved in the new patterns of liaison. CIC noted: "It must be well understood that bilingual reports are distinct from those prepared within the service itself, whenever an arrest on charges of actual espionage is made," and "In the event that any element of the CIC is not in permanent liaison with some French Securite Militaire, it must make up its bilingual arrest reports, not in one, but in three copies and submit them to Securite Militaire 163 through channels."***

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* Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France and German, 1944-1945. Vol. I, Chap 6. (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Seventh Army Memorandum, subject: "SSM 163;" dated 5 Aug 1944. (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

*** Ibid.

Chapter 2

ENEMY TAKEN BY SURPRISE

In its attempt to discover Allied intentions for the invasion of Southern France, German intelligence had failed miserably; Seventh Army concluded that: "The disposition of German forces, including their espionage agents, was based more on Weltanschauung [overall world-view] than on facts discovered by the German Intelligence Service." Last minute Allied feints had led the German Command to anticipate landings near either Marseilles or Genoa, Italy, and to the very end they had supposed that only French troops would be employed in any assault.*

CIC Lands with the Troops

Some CIC agents attached to division units went ashore on D Day, 15 August. Agents with the first waves of troops went ashore at three points--Agay, St. Raphael, and Cannes. The principal duty of these agents was the establishment of FFI-manned road blocks and interrogation centers.

The 307th CIC Detachment followed on D Day plus 1. The initial command post for the 307th was established at St. Tropez. Kenneth Crowell, the 307th's commanding officer, recalled that in the early stages of the operations in Southern France combat intelligence was of much more importance than counterintelligence. The latter, for the time being, consisted primarily of control of the civil population. Crowell felt that, although FFI members were numerous enough to man any number of posts, the situation was altogether too fluid to allow any travel control system to be effective. In the initial landing, there was little inkling of what direction the Americans were going to take or how fast they were going to be able to move.

In spite of the fluid aspects of the campaign at this point, CIC was able to make some valuable contacts in the first few hours--contacts that would not have been made had CIC not come ashore with the tactical units.**

Nazis Leave Trained Agents In Southern France

In Southern France, however, waited a carefully organized network of well-paid and conscientiously-trained espionage agents--men who proved themselves

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* Seventh Army Counterintelligence Summary, 15-31 Aug 44, Annex IV, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Interviews with G. Kenneth Crowell, Chigago, Ill., at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y. 6 Aug 55; Philip O'Brian, Worcester, Mass., at the NCICA Convention Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 5 Aug 44; Victor de Guinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., at Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y., Aug 55.

far better prepared for the Allied landings than their uniformed compatriots. The Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) had scattered many agents about Marseille, and in the attractive Riviera cities of Cannes, Nice, and Monte Carlo. Allied conquest of this area, in itself, did not disturb this espionage net, since its effectiveness began only when operating in other than German-held territory.

Most of the agents proved to be natives of France, men who had received their military training in the French Army. They were educated in espionage, and all had access to radio transmitters. For the most part comfortably and inconspicuously established, they lived with their families, and, since they had been instructed to steer clear of collaborationist activity and other overt manifestations of their ultimate loyalty, they were not to be easily spotted by either the French or the American counterespionage specialist. They were generally well paid so as not to be under the sort of serious economic pressure which would drive them to sell their services elsewhere. Few held employment of any sort. One of the few who did work was a commercial radio operator; his neighbors, naturally enough, took for granted his interest in radio transmission.

German intelligence had, in addition, placed along the Riviera long-range espionage agents, men who were intended to be a part of the German espionage system after the war.

Few Agents Captured

All German agents were instructed to refrain from any professional activity until the front line of the Allied advance had left their immediate areas. Under such circumstances it is understandable that arrests came slowly at first. By 1 September, 15 days after the landings, CIC had arrested only four espionage agents.*

Sixth Corps CIC reported, "It has been possible to hinder the operation of subversive elements and enemy agents to the extent that instead of operating they must hide out in the hills."** Faced with the same problem of explaining the paucity of arrest reports, 36th Infantry CIC presented a more detailed analysis of the affair: "The French Forces of the Interior, in their efforts to eliminate all the occupying forces as well as all the collaborators and would-be collaborators, are providing excellent counterintelligence security for Allied Forces. . . local patriots collect all and sundry persons suspected of German sympathies in the local jail." Furthermore, "A minimum of radio sets were used in this section of France, since

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* There is a discrepancy here. Annex IV of the Seventh Army CI Summary, 15-31 Aug 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.); the document which has been most closely followed throughout this account claims only two agents. The Seventh Army Monthly Rpt No. 1, 15-31 Aug 1944, (written on the spot) claims four. It is possible that two of the arrests turned out to be duds.

** 206th CIC Det, Monthly Situation Summary, Aug 1944. (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Southern France had a low priority rating for such equipment." And even if all the agents were not being caught, the report explained, "so long as the front continues to move so rapidly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for enemy agents to communicate with German forces."*

One of the VI Corps arrests indicated a pattern which German intelligence agents were to follow for many months. The arrest was of an agent who had hunted up CIC headquarters on his own volition, ostensibly wishing to serve the Americans as an informant and interpreter. Interrogation revealed that he owned a transmitter, and that his primary loyalties were to the Abwehr Einz Luft.**

Apparently the Abwehr and CIC fought to an uneasy standoff during the first days of the invasion. Though the German net remained well intact during these two weeks, most of the information which it wired northward was of little use to its employers, who were fast finding themselves in no position to take positive action based on such data. Then again, the information obtained and transmitted was often basic order-of-battle information, which, had it not been for the abnormally proficient security of the invasion, the Germans would have already had at the time of the landings.

The Germans had prepared for sabotage as well as espionage operations against the invading Allies. The sabotage machinery, however, was less easily concealed than their espionage equipage, and was soon located by Allied counterintelligence. At Avignon was found a sabotage school, run by the Sonderkommando organization (a Waffen Schutz Staffeln unit). The students were young Frenchmen, apparently involuntarily recruited and unenthusiastic over their lot. There was no evidence of any American installation's being sabotaged during the first two weeks after the landings.

A Big Haul

In Draguignan, a small city on the banks of the Le Muy river, 20 miles north of the coast, CIC agents captured the Gestapo headquarters with all records intact. Lists of informers were discovered, and numerous arrests followed easily.*** On 21 August 1944, agents of the 36th CIC Detachment discovered a deserted enemy command post at L'Ermitage. Among the important documents found there were mine field overlays, personality dossiers, an espionage and sabotage report on Germany and occupied countries for 1941-2, a manual of espionage and sabotage

* 36th Inf Div, CIC Situation Summary, 31 Jul - 20 Aug 44. (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)
** 206th CIC Det, Monthly Situation Summary, Aug 44. (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
*** G2 History, Seventh Army Report of Operations in Europe, 15 Aug 44 - 8 May 45, Part II (1-30 Sep 44), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library).

[illegible] German intelligence situation summary dated 15 August 1944 [illegible] transmitter, and numerous codes.*

Such good fortune was exceptional, however. More typically, the file room [illegible] Gestapo headquarters in Marseilles was found completely burned. [illegible] learned that the Germans had shipped out 300 cases of documents before the arrival there of Allied forces. Throughout the campaign, even in the heat of their [illegible], the Germans carefully destroyed or removed all but very few of their non-operational intelligence documents.**

Nazi Propaganda Aimed at French

Seventh Army CIC reported that there was little danger of the Germans attempting to subvert Allied military personnel: "No efforts have been found to subvert Allied military personnel by propaganda or other activity; none is likely." However, there were concerted German attempts to alter the thinking of French civilians. During early September, a leaflet bearing a remarkably accurate reproduction of French currency appeared, with text suggesting that money equally well counterfeited had been circulated in France by Jewish interests. Another leaflet, apparently designed to upset American-French-Russian friendship, bore a counterfeited seal of the Communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Francais, and asked Frenchmen to oppose the "bourgeois Anglo-Americans," and participate in a civil war which would lead to the Communization of France.

FFI Often Injudicious

The French Forces of the Interior was charged with rounding up all known and suspected collaborators, Gestapo informers, Milice, Parti Populaire Francaise, and a variety of other miscellaneous categories of subjects. They acted with enthusiasm; Securite Militaire estimated that during the period 15-31 August the French Forces of the Interior took over 6,000 civilians into custody.*** CIC had the arrestees scanned for potential espionage agents, but, during these first two weeks, none were discovered. CIC and Securite Militaire turned 150 of their own arrestees over to the French Forces of Interior for punishment, since the nature of their [illegible] was not such as to warrant full scale investigation by either of the former agencies. Both CIC and Securite Militaire agents made numerous efforts to explain to French Forces of the Interior leaders just what manner of person was a genuine threat to security. Such indoctrination, it was hoped, would keep genuine

* G2 History, Seventh Army Rpt of Operations in Europe, 15 Aug 44 - 8 May 45, Part II (1-30 Sep 44), (AIS Staff and Faculty Library)

** Ibid.

*** Seventh Army, Monthly Counterintelligence, Rpt No. 1, 13-31 Aug 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

threats secured, and would, in addition, prevent injustices from being committed against those who were not really dangerous.

Even in cases of certain guilt, CIC felt that French Forces of the Interior often acted injudiciously. In several instances Schutz Staffeln (SS) and Gestapo agents were executed before CIC arrived in the town and much information was thereby lost. The fact that these officers were usually the first to be shot made the situation more unfortunate.

Except to request a prisoner for additional interrogation, neither CIC nor Securite Militaire made any effort to influence the fate of persons held by French Forces of the Interior. Having given French Forces of the Interior whatever information was available on all suspects, CIC and Securite Militaire withdrew completely from the picture.

The existence of French Forces of the Interior, an armed group of near fanatics, could well have posed a serious problem to American security forces. Fortunately, however, a growing annoyance on the part of the generally conservative French populace simplified CIC's handling of the organization. Gradually French Forces of the Interior was disarmed, though never by direct order from any American military authority. General Cochet, Commander of the French Divisions, directed that all men in the French Forces of the Interior who were under 18 or over 45 be demobilized. Thanking this group for their loyal service, he suggested that all who wished to continue their patriotic work could place themselves at the service of the French Army. The remainder were to be reserve police auxiliaries. In one city all French Forces of the Interior arms were collected and stored at the prefecture; were the police ever to need French Forces of the Interior assistance, these arms would be redistributed.

General Cochet sent the following directive to Securite Militaire: "The Securite Militaire officers would do me a service if they informed the mayors of their personal responsibilities for every prisoner arrested, and of their obligations to make sure that everyone was humanely interrogated, lodged, fed, and where necessary, cared for. A detailed and signed report must be made out for every person arrested, who will be judged at some later date."*

The French Forces of the Interior problem in Marseille was complicated by a staunch rivalry between this group and the Communist France Tireurs et Partisans Francais, both of which were active in battling for the liberation of that city. In Nice, too, after a series of illegal executions threatened to result in street fighting and demonstrations, Seventh Army CIC was forced to act. They maintained the

* Seventh Army CounterIntelligence Rpt No. 1, 15-31 Aug 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

position that though they had no say on the subject of French politics, they did claim the right to protect the security of any area to the rear of Seventh Army. Thus they managed to quiet the situation without any resort to force.

As the advance opened larger areas to Allied jurisdiction, CIC agents found themselves spread farther and farther apart. The personnel shortage was further complicated because "Seventh Army was required to effect security and furnish personnel to the entire zone of advance."*

Travel Control Impossible

Although most of their assignments could be completed, at a reduced efficiency, CIC agents found the task of travel control quite impossible. 36th Division CIC reported optimistically, "Control of the movement of civilians is maintained by Patriot Police in each town entered under instructions from CIC agents. All strangers are stopped and questioned, and detained if there is any doubt of their identity and business."**

However, during August, travel control was not a serious problem, since the Germans had left few vehicles and little gasoline behind them, and there was, as yet, no real influx of refugees. The matter was further simplified by German intelligence who, so far as can be determined, sent not a single line crosser into Seventh Army territory during August 1944.

Moderate Policies Vindicated

As the first violence subsequent to the landings subsided, it was apparent that the moderate CIC policies had been well selected. On the one hand, French Forces of the Interior had done a more complete job of rounding up potential and actual subversives than the handful of CIC agents could ever have done. On the other hand, it was this very freedom which had been allowed the French Forces of the Interior that eventually led them into the excesses which demonstrated to the French that the French Forces of the Interior was not the organization which should permanently handle the problems of French security. As a result, resentment for abuses of all sorts fell upon the French Forces of the Interior, rather than upon either CIC or Securite Militaire. The French were left liberated, purged of subversives, and now in a real position to settle their political problems by themselves.

There was a variety of small problems. Sixth Corps suddenly found itself charged with supervising counterintelligence work along two-hundred kilometers

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* Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2, 1-30 Sep 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 36th CIC Det CIC Situation Summary, 31 Jul - 20 Aug 44. (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

of the Franco-Swiss border, up to Gex, France. It was expected that French Forces of the Interior and the French Border Police would handle most of the footwork.

In regard to civilian mail within the areas of occupation, CIC recommended that postcards be authorized throughout all three division areas. Letter mail, under [illegible] censorship, had already been authorized in the army area.

CIC on numerous occasions noted the rifling of enemy headquarters before agents could have them searched. Civilians and Allied front-line soldiers seemed equally culpable. The solution, CIC decided, lay in the hands of unit commanders, whom they informed that all such headquarters should be sealed immediately upon capture, and that either G2 or CIC should be informed of their locations.

Generally speaking, fraternization between soldiers and civilians in France was not the problem that it had been in Italy. A self reliant people, the French were less likely to beg from the invaders, and, though they welcomed American soldiers with enthusiasm, 36th Division CIC reported that the French "did not permit the liberties common in Italy."* On the other hand, it seemed that the average soldier was likely to talk more freely of military matters to the Frenchman, whom he considered to be an Ally, than he might have to the suspect Italian. 36th Division CIC concluded glumly, "There is little doubt that many soldiers reveal what they know of army dispositions and progress."

CIC agents were charged with two additional missions. They were to discover whether there seemed to be any enemy-inspired rumors in circulation, and they were to report on the state of civilian morale in occupied areas. The first task was simple; there were no rumors in evidence which seemed to be of enemy origin. The other was a bit more demanding. CIC reports indicate that civilian morale was almost universally excellent. There seemed to be little or no bitterness felt over the isolated cases of looting or misbehavior by American soldiers. According to 36th Division CIC, "No cases has yet been reported which would indicate hostility or an attitude of indifference."**

The populace of Southern France, strongly anti-Nazi, was particularly violent in its actions against collaborators. Generally the French were not patient enough to bring collaborators to CIC, preferring to deal with them personally. Kenneth Crowell related one instance where a mob of civilians chased down an alley a nude woman with a swastika branded on her forehead, beating her violently as she attempted to escape.***

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* 36th CIC Det CIC Situation Summary, 31 Jul - 20 Aug 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095.

** Ibid.

*** Interview with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill., at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 Aug 1955.

45th CIC Covers Grenoble

The 45th CIC Detachment met its first big job on 25 August upon following their division into the major French city of Grenoble. Before initiating any independent action, Captain Guenthner, Commanding Officer, immediately hunted agencies who would assist agents of his detachment in their work. Conferences were held with M. Renier, a departmental prefect of police, and Col. Collignon, Chef (Chief) of the local Securite Militaire office. Representatives of Seventh Army CIC also attended the conferences.

When the 45th CIC Detachment arrived in Grenoble, there were already 400 civilians under arrest by the French Forces of the Interior. Interrogation of these prisoners was begun by agents of the 45th CIC Detachment, by the few agents of the 307th CIC Detachment who had preceded their detachment to Grenoble, and by whatever civilian Inspecteurs could be found.

All documents found by the French Forces of the Interior in the Grenoble office were given by the French Forces of the Interior to 45th Division CIC agents. They, in turn, handed the documents to the 307th CIC Detachment team in Grenoble after making only cursory examination of the contents.

Although there was little disorder in the city, thanks to generally strong action by the occupying forces, 45th CIC Detachment agents reported one serious situation. Among the prisoners being held were several former members of the Milice and Waffen Schutz Staffeln who had been guilty of particularly serious offenses against citizens of the city. In louder and louder mutterings, residents of Grenoble were demanding that severe action be taken against these criminals. CIC policy was to treat such men as prisoners of war. Seventh Army policy was to try prisoners of war only when full cases had been prepared, and sufficiently after their capture that they could be tried away from the white heat of irrational feeling that accompanied the first days of any liberation. The Prefect of Police advised immediate trials of several of the worst offenders to appease the populace but, 45th Detachment CIC agents insisted that the prisoners all be carefully interrogated, and protected until they could be tried in a more humane manner. The CIC recommendation was decided upon favorably.

This difference of opinion led to another similar quarrel. The French Prefect of Police asked that he be allowed to examine additional Waffen Schutz Staffeln troops who were being captured by the Americans and held by CIC. Because of an S2 directive to the contrary, he was refused permission. CIC suggested, through G2 channels, that since the French police were interested in having all Schutz Staffeln men impounded, and since they were making conscientious efforts toward this end, the prefect should at least be given lists of the names of those captured by the Americans.

And there were, of course, the endless number of small-scale investigations. had presented herself to the 45th Division CI with the story that she was a French agent serving a resistance organization direct from London. Naturally suspicious of such a fanciful tale, agents of the 45th CIC Detachment checked her papers back against their alleged sources. Her story proved true in every detail.

Less true, however, was the story of who had been for some time representing himself, while working with regimental S2, as a member of the very organization to which was discovered to belong. His account of their work and organization differed from her story. Subsequent investigation revealed that this man was known to local resistance leaders only through his own recent introduction to them. He had requested permission from French military officials to wear the uniform of a French officer, and though denied this right, wore the uniform while working with the Americans. CIC ordered him out of his uniform, and sent him back to Seventh Army for disposition.*

By the end of August, Grenoble had been quieted. Teams from the 45th Detachment were already moving north into Villard, Tulins, and Voiron, and other smaller hamlets up along the Isere. By 31 August the detachment was established in Bourgoin.

Rapid Advance Hampers CIC

During the first fast weeks after the landings, CIC had been greatly hampered by the almost unbelievable speed of the rush northward. Sixth Corps reported that CIC agents were unable to remain in any town long enough to finish investigations. Instead, they passed a disproportionate amount of work on to the French Forces of the Interior or Seventh Army CIC.** Securite Militaire agents, assigned to establish offices at the front, found that these were transformed almost immediately into regional offices.*** In short, a tremendous amount of detailed advance planning had to be junked as worthless.

By the end of August, Seventh Army troops had driven 165 miles northward into France--to the outskirts of Lyon and to the foothills of the Vosges. The German Nineteenth Army had lost four of its nine divisions; nearly 60,000 of its soldiers had been captured. But now to Seventh Army commanders, problems of

* 45th CIC Det Rpt, subj: "Activities of Detachment in Grenoble, France." dtd 30 Aug 44, (Conf), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

** VI Corps, Monthly Situation Summary, (Aug 44), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 7th Army, Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 1, 15-31 Aug 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

supply had become increasingly important. There was an overabundance of ammunition, but both food and gasoline were running dangerously short.*

But both Seventh Army in general, and CIC in particular, were still waging a dream-like war in which the enemy always retreats, and in which little mistakes do not really matter much--the only real problem is to keep within snapping distance of his flying heels. The Vosges were being approached, however, and the situation was soon to change.

* Report of Operations, The Seventh Army in France & Germany, 1944-1945, Vol I, p. 317.

Chapter 3

SEVENTH ARMY MOVES ON LINE BESIDE THIRD

Because of the rapid advance up through Southern France, efficient CIC work was extremely difficult throughout August. In early September, however, it was impossible. As Seventh Army wrote, "The rapidity of advance prevented comprehensive coverage, and routine cases were turned over to Territorial offices."*

CIC: Way Up Or Way Back

CIC, during all of early September, was theoretically charged with maintaining security in the entire area of the advance--in both French and American areas of occupation. Unfortunately during these weeks Securite Militaire established numerous regional offices according to no overall plan. Generally speaking, CIC concentrated efforts at the extreme front and in the extreme rear. Securite Militaire was left jurisdiction over much of the intermediate area.

Far to the rear, large areas were settling slowly into the long period of waiting between liberation and eventual victory. Yet in these liberated areas, particularly in politically restless Marseilles, the need for CIC's vigilance was as great as ever.

A Little Too Early

Three or four days after the Southern France landings, a team from the 307th Detachment had been dispatched in a cavalcade of twelve jeeps to the critical port of Marseilles. Upon entering the town, the agents found that they had been somewhat hasty, for the area was still solidly in German hands. The team vacated the region immediately, leaving Agent Victor deGuinzbourg behind to reconnoiter the area and contact certain white-list personalities. Wearing nondescript pieces of the U.S. Army uniform, like scores of French civilians, deGuinzbourg was technically undercover in enemy territory.

Agent deGuinzbourg was able to inspect the Gestapo Headquarters and prepare for a later raid on its facilities. However, in the two days before the town's liberation, deGuinzbourg, because of the great number of Nazi troops in the city, was unable to contact any white-list individuals.

While the Allied troops were taking Marseilles in late August, the team from the 307th arrived and immediately raided the Gestapo Headquarters. Records were impounded and personality lists were drawn up from these documents. Several arrests were made immediately, based on these lists.

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* Seventh Army, Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2; period 1-30 Sept 44, dtd 30 Sept 44, (L-1136), (Conf), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Informants Volunteer Services

French civilians rapidly learned where to bring information of intelligence value. They appeared in droves at the CIC office which displayed a sign identifying it as intelligence headquarters. So eager were many of the French civilians to help that deGuinzbourg has stated that "We couldn't help getting an informant network.

The CIC team from the 307th moved on to join the main body of the detachment a few days after Marseilles was liberated. Captain John Schwarzwalder and deGuinzbourg were left behind in the port city to handle intelligence problems, mainly those concerned with the uncertain political situation. A special team of CIC agents was moved in to take over port security and travel control.

Pass System Established at Docks

Original port security measures had been instituted while portions of the docks were still in Nazi hands. Before long, CIC had established an efficient pass system for the post. Common laborers, though hired by interview only, were eventually issued passes. They, and other applicants, were issued ten-day temporary passes without question. During the ten days, all names were checked against files of the Police d'Etat, Fichier Centralo Maritime, and Securite Militaire. Permanent passes were issued persons against whom no derogatory information could be developed.

The port team reported that small boat control was inadequate: CIC had available only a single motorboat properly outfitted with the radio equipment necessary for this type of activity.**

Shortage of CIC personnel made it virtually impossible to institute effective travel control measures. Throughout the campaign, persons of all types could leave or enter the city at will.

CIC Reports on Political Unrest

Captain Schwarzwalder and agent deGunizbourg operated in Marseilles until 13 October when deGuinzbourg rejoined the 307th CIC Detachment in Luneville, and Schwarzwalder drew another assignment in Southern France.

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* Interview with Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., at Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y., 8 August 1955.

** "We Caught Spies", by John Schwarzwalder, Duell, Slone and Pearce, New York, 1946, p. 179-182, and Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt. No. 2, 1-30 Sep 44, dtd 30 Sep 44, (Conf), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

DeGuinzbourg recalls that gathering information on the political turmoil in Marseilles was enough to keep the two men busy without leaving time for a search for Nazi stay-behind agents. The gasoline, ammunition, and other supplies that came through Marseilles were vitally needed by the swiftly-moving Seventh Army if the weaknesses of the Nazis in Southern France were to be properly exploited. The boiling political situation in Marseilles had reached such a state that it was the major threat to this supply line to the north.

CIC Averts a Revolution in Marseilles

In the first week of September, the strong core of Communists, mostly dock workers, were openly organizing a strike of such proportions that it easily could have developed into a revolution, the destruction of the present government, and more important to the Americans, the crippling of the fuel and ammunition life line of the Seventh Army.

With the attitudes of intelligence officers at Base Section Headquarters ranging from "Its none of our business" to "Let's stop it right now and quickly," the two CIC agents in Marseilles decided to take immediate action.

Bivouacked about ten miles outside of Marseilles were 10,000 superbly disciplined fighters of the French Foreign Legion. DeGuinzbourg, who was the holder of the rank of "Honorary Private First Class" in the Legion, had maintained liaison with this unit. On the day before the strike was scheduled, deGuinzbourg presented himself to the Legion's commander and suggested that it might be nice to celebrate some French military victory with a big parade in Marseilles on the next day. It was decided that it would be fitting to celebrate the Liberation of Southern France. Fortunately the troops had been polishing up their weapons for a big inspection and were nearly ready to perform at their best.

When the day of the strike arrived, the Legion marched to a wildly cheering throng before an imposing galaxy of French and American generals. As a parade for a parade's sake, it was a great success. More important, those who were organizing the strike evidently noted that the Legionaires were marching with fixed bayonets and loaded weapons.

When the parade was over, the Legion bivouacked in town. There was no strike that day nor in the days that followed. The source of supplies for the advancing forces of the Seventh Army remained intact.

In reference to this incident and generally to the strong Communist movement in Southern France, deGuinzbourg recalled that while the rest of France's political factions were still primarily concerned with defeating the Germans, the Reds had

already begun to put into operation plans for eventual assumption of power in Southern France.*

The Story Goes Round 'N Round

Every so often in the day-to-day doings of any Army unit there is need for comic relief. The Marseilles CIC Team was no exception.

The FFI and other French organizations were allowed to draw freely upon the American supply depots, their only source of materials. There had been frequent reports that a slight Frenchman, a captain in the FFI, had been drawing vast quantities of supplies from all the American depots in the Marseilles area. CIC had warned him to stop his over-zealous requisitioning, but Agent "Woody" French reported that the captain's activities were continuing on as large a scale as ever. Agent French announced to his superiors that he had ordered the man to report to CIC for punishment. Everyone with the detachment had a good laugh and teased French for being naive enough to suppose the little captain would ever show up.

Yet that night, through a heavy rain storm, the Frenchman came to CIC to receive his punishment. Victor deGuinzbourg, deciding to frighten the captain, told him that he would surely be shot for hindering the Allied operations. The Frenchman protested. "After all," he said, "I am a friend of the Americans."

The Agent replied that he certainly did not show it by his actions. To prove his point, the Frenchman recounted how he had helped an American major during the landings in Southern France. DeGuinzbourg scowled. "You helped a man we have discovered to have been a spy," he shouted.

The FFI Captain, apparently not dismayed, told of an American colonel he had aided during the landings. He was informed that he had helped another man convicted by the Americans of spying. The Frenchman, going higher in the chain of command, named a general and claimed to have assisted him. Of course, the general too was a spy. Three strikes and the captain was out.

DeGuinzbourg took the unfortunate requisitioner to the French Securite Militaire and asked them to "take care of this nuisance." This was the last CIC ever saw of the little captain.

Apparently the Securite Militaire, desiring to get his whole story, questioned him extensively and added their own brand of rough treatment for good measure.

* Interview with Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., at Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y., 8 Aug 55. Also, "We Caught Spies," by John Schwarzwalder, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1946, p. 179-190

Anyway, about two months later, while deGuinzbourg was with CIC in Alsace, there came from higher headquarters a report, based on Securite Militaire information, of wide-spread treason in the American Army during the invasion of Southern France. The Securite Militaire report, recounting the captain's testimony, had gone around the various headquarters channels until it finally came to rest at its rather red-faced source.*

CIC Discovers One-Man Subs

The First Special Service Task Force reported that on 9 September two operators of one-man submarines were captured at Menton. Under interrogation these men said that there was another pair of such submarines in the area. CIC turned results of their investigation over to the U. S. Navy.

In an attempt to control fishing, fishermen were required to obtain clearance from French Naval Authority, and then to confine their efforts to narrow strips of ocean usually within two miles of the French Coast.**

Few Refugees

During August there had been no refugee problem to any great degree. In September, Seventh Army CIC reported: "At present the problem of internal movement is simplified by lack of transportation and gasoline." However Civil Affairs reported 274,500 refugees to be on the roads in the ten southern departments out of a total population of 3,795,000. No coordinated travel control system had been established by mid-October, although at the front, travel control was fast becoming more efficient.

During the retreat, German intelligence contented itself with the stay-behind espionage net that had been placed on the French Mediterranean coast. In the early weeks of September, however, as the front stabilized along the Vosges, German intelligence tried new methods. They dispatched a line crosser, who was ordered to gather tactical information and then return to the German side of the lines. Dressed as a priest, he was instructed to ingratiate himself with the Americans by giving them a certain amount of tactical information concerning German emplacements. The French apprehended and executed him.

Proximity to Switzerland increased the enemy's opportunity to infiltrate agents posing as refugees. Conversely, because of Allied use of Switzerland as a point of

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* Interview with Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., At Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y., 8 Aug 55.

** Seventh Army, Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2; Period 1-30 Sept 1944, dtd 30 Sept 1944, (L-1136), (Conf), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

entry for agents, the Germans tightened their own screening methods. All Swiss nationals entering Germany were subjected to thorough checking and subsequent observation.*

Seventh Army organized control measures on the Franco-Swiss border, but passed authority for control here to Securite Militaire during early September. When Securite Militaire took over the border 5,200 French Forces of the Interior had been organized as guards. Despite numerous jurisdictional squabbles--some strips were under military control, some under civil control--Seventh Army reported that Securite Militaire was handling the job efficiently.**

During the early months of September, CIC found front-line counterespionage work becoming both harder and easier. On the one hand, they were now working against a lower class of agent, men recently recruited from the class of collaborators, black market dealers, people subject to blackmail, and liberated criminals--the class that exists in any society, and whose members usually can be spotted by indigent or foreigner. Similarly, CIC had discovered that these inexperienced agents were prone to follow similar patterns: radio sets were carried in standard, recognizable suitcases, and the agents were usually paid in new currency, conveniently numbered in sequence. But, on the other hand, this new stability of the front made espionage operations more valuable to the enemy; they began large-scale activity in dead earnest. Though arrests were becoming more frequent, CIC could be certain that the struggle against German espionage was just beginning.***

The Meeting Of The Armies

On 9 September a patrol of the French Second Armored Division 320 miles up from their Mediterranean landing point, made contact with elements of General Patton's Third Army at Chatillon-sur-Seine. A few hours later American soldiers of the 36th Infantry Division encountered other Third Army troops at Somberon, just to the South of the point of initial contact.

As the three great forces sealed themselves together, close to 100,000 German troops were left isolated in Southern France. Never again were they a serious military factor, and, on 15 September 1944, the Southern France Campaign was officially over.

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* Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2, for the period 1-30 Sep 44, dtd 30 Sep 44, (L-1136), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Annex No. 8 to Seventh Army Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2, 1-30 Sep 44, (L-1136) (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Br., AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 2, for the period 1-30 Sep 44, dtd 30 Sep 44, (L-1136), (U), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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AUTH: CG, FIRST US ARMY
INIT :
DATE: 1 July 44

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 230

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER) 1 July 1944

ARREST POLICY

1. All known and suspect enemy agents, persons detected in acts of sabotage or espionage, and persons found in possession of sabotage equipment, secret writing materials, codes, etc., will be arrested without delay and turned over to CIC.

2. Action to be taken regarding local French officials:

a. All officials who are active members of dangerous collaborationist parties and organizations will be suspended and arrested. (See paragraph 4 for suspect parties).

b. All officials reliably reported either voluntarily to have assisted the enemy, or to be a danger to security for other reasons will normally be suspended and arrested. Cases of this kind, based on information in central records or on local denunciations, will in every case be checked by observation and local inquiry before action is taken.

c. In all cases where officials are reported to be unreliable on what appear to be political rather than definite security grounds, CIC personnel will confine themselves to advising Civil Affairs Detachments.

3. Action to be taken regarding local French police organizations:

a. All police who have been active members of collaborationist parties will be arrested.

b. All members of the Milice will be arrested.

c. All members of the police who are reported voluntarily to have assisted the German Intelligence and Police Services will be arrested only after local investigation.

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4. The following are suspect or collaborationist organizations: Parti Populaire Francais (PPF), Rassemblement National Populaire (RNF), Francisse, Ligue Francaise, Groupe "Collaboration", and all their subsidiary groups.

a. All members of uniformed para-military or auxiliary police organizations formed by collaborationist parties will be arrested.

(1) Members of the above groups, if found in uniform, will be treated initially as Prisoners of War.

(2) Members of the above groups not in uniform and who have taken action against the Allied forces, will be arrested as civilian "war criminals."

b. All officials of collaborationist parties will be arrested.

c. All recently active or outstanding members of collaborationist parties will be arrested and interned where it is practicable to do so. If not practicable they should be subject to special security restrictions.

d. Youth movements of collaborationist parties will be treated on the same basis as their parent organizations.

e. All members of German Army organizations recruited from the civil population in occupied territory will be treated as Prisoners of War. These organizations are: The uniformed Legion des Volontaires Francais (LVF). 1st Regiment of "France" (if fighting for the Germans), the French Waffen SS, the uniformed members of the National Socialistiche Kraftfuhrer Korps (NSKK) but not its civilian drivers, and uniformed members of the TODT organization.

5. All civilian nationals of an enemy country will be initially arrested and interned.

6. The following policy is established for the arrest of individual civilians:

a. Civilians who are subject of denunciations will be arrested only after observation and local investigation of the case. This also applies to individuals who arouse the suspicion of CIC personnel. In exceptional cases the immediate detention of suspected may be necessary for tactical reasons; a full investigation will be conducted by the arresting detachment as soon as possible.

b. Civilians caught infiltrating into our lines from enemy occupied territory will be interrogated by CIC personnel before they are evacuated to the rear by Civil Affairs. Suspect among them will be arrested.

c. Civilians committing serious offenses against security regulations will be arrested.

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7. Arrest Forms and reports will be submitted by the arresting CIC Detachment as specified in the Standing Operating Procedure for the Counterintelligence Corps, this Headquarters, dated 12 May 1944. Every effort will be made to investigate each case and prepare a report prior to delivery of the suspect to the Master Interrogation Center.

8. The Arrest Report will be fully completed by the arresting CIC Detachment, and the charges against the subject will be clearly stated. Suspect's identity papers and effects will be delivered to the Military Police, Master Interrogation Center.

9. The CIC report of investigation on each person arrested, together with supporting documents, dispositions, etc., will be forwarded to the AC of S, G-2, this Headquarters, as soon as possible. This report will contain possible leads for further investigation, and will conclude with a statement regarding the status of the case as regards the arresting CIC Detachments, e.g., "case closed", "pending", "investigation continuing", or "additional reports will be submitted".

BY COMMAND OF THE ARMY COMMANDER:

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APPENDIX 2

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

FOR

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

NOTE: The following rosters of CIC Detachments who served in the ETO campaign are incomplete and, in many cases, unverified. Some have been obtained from official rosters; others have been compiled from signatures on reports; and others from personal files of former members of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

1st CIC Detachment (1st Infantry Division)

Steinway, Charles G.	Biron, Henry A.	Kellman, William
Weimer, Robert M.	Ellert, Arthur R.	Jenkins, William L.
Ray, James E.	Finch, Richard E.	[illegible]
[illegible]ado /s, Charles D.	Hul[illegible], Allan F.	Cody, Chas[illegible] J.
Beesley, Charles H.	LaFraniere, Victor H.	Menendez, Warren F.
Farley, Eugene E.	Lang, Richard C.	Little, John W.
Califf, John W.	Pinsince, Adrian J., Jr.	Diron, Henri
Lovett, Edward C.	Rothwell, Robert G.	Knutowicz, Frank
Banyar, Frank G.	Neuss, Henry	Frankl, Frederic L.

2nd CIC Detachment (2nd Infantry Division)

Jenkins, Arthur D.	Beach, George L.	Grogan, Alvin C.
McLaughlin, Thomas D.	Howard, William C.	Meisetz, Fred E.
Walker, George H.	Rae, Nelson S.	Omodt, Hollis W.
May, Robert S. Jr	Shockley, Marvel E.	Linn, Wayne E.
Kennell, Christian R.	Wells, Gordon S.	Drucker, Ernest
Walker, George H.	Anthony, William A.	Lachmann, John W.
Weems, Julian T.		

3rd CIC Detachment (3rd Infantry Division)

Greene, Walter E.	Cowles, Leonard R.	Martowski, Patrick S.
Clark, Norman A.	Hamilton, John F.	Nesmith, Albert N.

4th CIC Detachment (4th Infantry Division)

Appleton, Oliver D.	Fillppu, Kaarlo	Fitzgerald, Paul J.
Boyce, Bernard F., Jr.	McGrail, Myles F.	Haynes, Alexander G.
Maher, William A.	Altaras, Jack C.	Leahy, Richard D.
Williams Robert H.	Colombo, Frank C.	Schindler, Herbert
Gutierrez, Robert A.	Kadlac, Joseph H.	Speer, Claus
West, Thomas J.	Keenan, John L.	Roetter, Jurgen H.
Corcoran, John S.	Salinger, Jerome D.	

5th CIC Detachment (5th Infantry Division)

Allen, Lyndon B.	Branson, Arthur F.	Kleitsch, Robert J.
Dumm, Paul J.	Shields, James P.	Lytle, Scott H.

5th CIC Detachment (5th Infantry Division) (Cont'd)

McKenna, John P.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Salstrom, Edward
Hanson, August W.
Barron, Thomas J.
Young, Stuart A., Jr.
Williams, George F.
Dineen, William P.
Dinning, Woodford W.
Eline, Alton J.
Kennedy, Roger D.
Pedigo, Walter S., Jr.
Wyper, David
Burns, Kenneth M.
Ma[illegible]
Kandel, Paul

8th CIC Detachment (8th Infantry Division)

McQuade, John C.
Appel, Charles S., Jr.
Cox, James C.
Miller, Robert C.
Newton, Arthur J.
Doyle, John P.
Shinn, John S.
Wemple, Richard I.
Ciurej, Frank S.
Cole, Hazen W.
Fahey, John A.
Frielinghaus, Henry
McQuigg, William G.
Willey, Arthur K., Jr.
Carnanos, Paul
Pelletier, Edward C.
Dreyfuss, Erich

9th CIC Detachment (9th Infantry Division)

Musick, Joseph W.
Wheeler, Richard W.
Lueck, William O.
Grice, Luther E.
Gallagher, George R.
Ferguson, Joseph H.
Klunder, John H.
Mangam, Charles R.
Northrop, Richard M.
Clancy, Frank B.
Fennell, Fred F.
Hill, Ralph N., Jr.
Klunder, Willard C.
Ladd, Edward T.
Lundgren, Allen H.
Morris, George W.
Novak, George J.
Rose, Hugh S.
Sowa, Edward V.
Lamb, Kurt L.
Katzenstein, Alfred
Weil, Joseph
Conick, Charles B.
Ingargiola, Henry B.
Hanson, Leonard E.
Zielasko, Gustave W.
Parker, Jerry J.

13th CIC Detachment (13th Airborne Division)

McGeoch, Charles H.
Fenderson, William H.
Howe, John R.
Pospisil, Frank
Benedict, George H.
Burnham, George
Bruder, Charles W.
Schanek, John C.

17th CIC Detachment (17th Airborne Division)

Stalker, Ian F.
Briggs, Erny W.
Burke, Kevin
Antler, Gunther
Gabel, Kurt
Gardner, John E.
Bouchard, Ernest M.
Whelan, Patrick J.
Fischoff, Louis
Dannahey, Joseph F.
Allen, Eldon B. (KIA)
Tornetta, Anthony J. (KIA)
Resnick, David
Lagemann, Joseph B.
Cournaud, FN unknown
Cameron, Gerard G.
Ranner, FN unknown
Chodoski, Edward J.

26th CIC Detachment (26th Infantry Division)

Pennewell, Noah A.	Wyles, Paul V.	Nahas, Albert G.
Goergen, Joseph H.	Maxwell, Drummond F.	Lederman, Harry M.
Farrell, Martin P.	Fourness, John C.	Sava, Anthony J.
Zeller, Jan B.	Stern, Siggi	[illegible]
Morgan, Charles R.		

28th CIC Detachment (28th Infantry Division)

Miller, Albert B.	Toomey, Cornelius H.	Holloran, William J.
McManus, Neil C.	Welsh, Jay Y.	McCoy, John A.
Flood, Thomas W.	Bradon, Paul R.	Smith, Leroy H.
McBee, John	Brunjes, John W.	Houg, Elmer J.
Gutierrez, Emeterio, Jr.	Constant, Napoleon A.	Weissglas, Simon
Hoffman, William S.	D'Ambrosio, Michael V.	Stingl, Fred

29th CIC Detachment (29th Infantry Division)

Mayfield, Ellis O.	Mitchell, Allen R.	Hitchcock, Rex W.
Neuenschwander, Lynn E.	Anderson, Gordon M.	Powers, Daniel M.
Gripenstraw, Louie L.	Beall, Sam D.	Warner, Jack R.
Van Otten, Andrew C.	Choever, Roger W.	Whaley, Byron A.
Palmer, Hugh J.	DeWalt, Clarence W.	Braude, Emanuel
Harwell, David J.	Gillespie, Bryant W.	Hepner, Sevens J.

30th CIC Detachment (30th Infantry Division)

Handville, Melvin	Monson, Paul J.	Vogel, Charles C.
Roberts, John W.	Olsen, Erling C.	Colman, Daniel A.
Denlinger, Richard G.	Belkin, Paul N.	Seligmann, Herman
Sears, George F.	Granberry, Billy B.	Fraenkel, George K.
Staley, Jack	Kuehner, Junior W.	Meuller, Robert
Mackey, James E., Jr.	Nevius, Blake R.	Spear, Hans N.
Frisby, John C.	Owswald, William B.	

35th CIC Detachment (35th Infantry Division)

Foster, John S.	Lyon, Fendall G.	Welborn, Charles
Medina, Marcello	McGrane, Henry M.	Woods, John T.
Ayr, Allenby B.	Murphy, Robert E.	Dudarri, Antoun H.
Colgan, Charles	Tolli, Joseph P.	Cass, Donald L.
Schrager, Howard	Damm, Norman A.	Rohleder, Alfred H.
Unger, Sam M.	Kelch, Thelford E.	Kornfield, Ralph E.
Drolsum, Darrel D.	Bertsche, William I.	

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36th CIC Detachment (36th Infantry Division)

Hammond, John G.	Gray, Jesse G.	Mark, William R.
Garo, Raymond	McOwen, William R.	

42nd CIC Detachment

Donnell, Newman R.	Nimovitz, Morris	Grootmann, Paul G.
Chamberlin, Wells F.	Golding, George M.	Jacoby, Hans F.
Burwasser, Joseph	Winter, Samuel	

44th CIC Detachment

DeCindis, Edward A.	Bernabei, Anthony A.	Raack, Walter E.
Husted, Stanley N.	Serlin, Henry	Balles, John J.
Kincher, Harold W.	Herney, John R.	Stewart, Charles L.
Hoffstot, Henry P. Jr.		

45th CIC Detachment (45th Infantry Division)

Guenthner, Rupert W.	Gearheart, Ernest T. Jr.	Ruminoff, Leonid
Birsner, John H.	Molinet, Fausto E.	Schutt, Willard A.

63rd CIC Detachment (63rd Infantry Division)

Weidner, Clinton R.	Phaneuf, Bernard G.	Fuld, Arthur J.
Linnane, William F.	Brucato, Albert V.	Chrapciak, Martin Jr.
Champagne, R. B.	Beck, Ernst A.	Clifford, Joseph W.
Apatsky, Joseph	Chrapiak, Martin	Seegers, Martin P.
Regis, Peter	Seitz, John H.	

65th CIC Detachment (65th Infantry Division)

Rich, Albert H.	Wheeler, Arthur D.	Shutt, Robert H.
Friedenberg, Stanley	Meyer, Anton F.	Houston, Henry W.
Vekich, John D.	Pawlosky, Edward	Ognanovich, John
Falchek, Walter K.	Zolna, Walter J.	Glodis, Frank J.
Tomasic, Steve E.	Cates, William H.	

66th CIC Detachment (66th Infantry Division)

Ansbacher, Edgar A.	Falk, Fred	Swan, Charles K.
Amson, Gaston	Aronoff, William R.	Scelba, Anthony P.
Hess, Walter	Hoge, William J. J.	Nowlan, Donald L.
Barnes, Alfred S.	Dawson, James F.	

69th CIC Detachment (69th Infantry Division)

Duvall, Andrew H.	Applegate, Arthur H.	Hoffman, Abraham
Stokes, Albert G.	Kulikowski, Charles J.	Rosenthal, Kenneth L.
Doyle, William A.	Galicki, Edmund	Knudsen, Henning A.
Hahn, John H.	Littell, Duane O.	[illegible]
Shay, Morris J.	Gregg, Robert E.	Newstetter, Wilber I.
Bellis, Sydney W.	Thomas, Edgar V.	Weiskopf, William J.
Titman, Paul W.	Jacobs, Joseph S.	

70th CIC Detachment (70th Infantry Division)

Kalish, Jacob	Denton, James G.	Milner, Robert S.
Lasater, Roy A.	Kiley, George L.	Henley, Albert T.
Olsen, James M.	Collins, Ulysses S.	Gagan, Joseph
Colombo, Primitivo M.L.	Lanier, Ward P.	Cowles, Leonard R.
Fuhr, Walter E.	Canfield, Daniel C.	Bissell, Harry Jr.
Iskin, Arnold J.	Ehrenshaft, Harry	Zoller, Alvin
Gutman, Harvey E.	Neville, Stephen J.	Brown, Keirn C.
Hoebel, Henry L.	McDonald, G. H.	Lipper, William

71st CIC Detachment (71st Infantry Division)

Zabaldeno, Frank C.	Kelly, Floyd M.	Schlosser, Robert
Ricciardelli, Albert A.	Zeman, George	Kula, Clement J.
Teller, Gustav	LaFramboise, Ernest J.	Peepcke, Eric
Jackson, Merrill R.		

75th CIC Detachment (75th Infantry Division)

Gassinger, Henry A.	Kauffeld, John H.	Doda, John P.
Misuraco, Joseph V.	O'Neil, James F.	Gakemeier, Norman H.
Turkowski, Leonard S.	Del Guercio, Mario C.	

76th CIC Detachment (76th Infantry Division)

Zernicke, George A.	Filppula, Taistc C.	Krauss, Marvin D.
Barnaby, William F.	Bezek, Dan J.	Madel, Melvin R.
Achin, Roland M.	Edstrom, Albert K.	Posner, Samuel
Manning, Jack C.	Koch, Harold S.	

78th CIC Detachment (78th Infantry Division)

Ruge, Neil M.	Anderson, Arthur E.	Hellriegel, Walter
Vogt, Albert D.	Jung, Richard H.	Popper, Felix A.
Merbach, Robert H.	Steinharter, Fred P.	Romney, Henry J.
Bettershell, Harold R.	Stracke, Emil H.	Gilbert [illegible]
Farnaw, Frederick Z.	Blau, Jack Z.	

79th CIC Detachment (79th Infantry Division)

Bogatin, Irvin	Strong, William B.	Gillen, Edward J.
Gonzales, Richard M.	Birt, Francis M.	Forsyth, James A.
Keggins, Alfred G.	Bullock, Thomas B.	Potter, David M.
Burton, William C.	Conyers, Ben J.	Beissinger, Harvy
Tittle, Clarence S.	Nelson, Edward J.	Boksen, Herbert
Zintz, David	Selms, Gordon	Markusiewicz, Anthony
Ellsberry, William G.	Sojet, Frank A.	

80th CIC Detachment (80th Infantry Division)

McMillen, Thomas R.	Axtell, Clayton M.	Vance, John C.
Motell, Curt	Matterson, Robert E.	Rothschild, Robert G.
Camtner, Jack A.	Klimek, John	Sussemann, Karl
O'Neal, Carl F.		

82nd CIC Detachment (82nd Infantry Division)

Wallace, William H., Jr.	Both, Edwin O.	Osterman, Victor C.
Salstrom, Edward D.	Gladney, Graves	Stevens, Harold L.
Kummer, Albert J.	McRae, Leonard K.	Sloan, Paul G.
Jacobi, fnu	Waldren, Taylor C.	Scanlon, John E.
Pearce, John C.	Daniel, Russell	Goldenfeld, Ernest A.
Goldstein, Sidney L.	Fredinand, Howard R.	Perper, George A.
Whalen, Joseph R.	Fuller, Francis J.	Charlton, John R.
Allen, Eldon L.	George, George J.	Ralston, Robert J.
Davis, Thomas C.	Lowance, Carter O.	Stollak, Jules
O'Neill, James P.	Wheeler, Donald L.	

83rd CIC Detachment (83rd Infantry Division)

Victor, Oliver A.	Horton, Harry H., Jr.	Florsheim, George [illegible]
Kerns, Lawrence A.	Janazen, William A.	Lammert, Paul E.
O'Donnell, John B.	DeWitt, Erville D.	Meingast, [illegible]
Sweeney, John F.	Davenport, Basil	[illegible]
Hovel, Roy B.	Salsinger, William L.	Steiermann, Gordon [illegible]

84th CIC Detachment (84th Infantry Division)

Murray, W. R.	Welborn, Charles	Wanner, Maximilian R.
Lunstedt, Carl A.	Gleason, Thomas J.	Kissinger, Henry A.
Toscano, Frank V.	Germazian, Stephen	Bellack, Robert O.
Miller, Robert C.	Weir, Alfred	Levitch, Frank R.
Rountree, Charles A.		

87th CIC Detachment (87th Infantry Division)

Arnold, Frank S.	Niklas, Robert J.	Strul, Edmund S.
Crawford, John J.	Davis, Charles R.	Gunderson, Robert W.
Schnepel, Herman H.	Perry, Albert L.	Beatty, Richard H.
Bamberger, Werner	Harwell, Sam E.	Berger, Fred
Klaus, Walter	Mondelli, Joseph A.	Eisenberg, Max
Reineke, Kurt	Nathans, David	Sharpe, Lawrence A.
Hirechstein, Ralph	Cobb, Ward R.	Bauer, Paul
Brook, Kurt D.		

89th CIC Detachment (89th Infantry Division)

Geers, John P.	Signa, Louis M.	Belak, Frank E.
Cordella, Robert H.	Keating, Joseph P.	Gillespie, William L.
Russi, David P.	Kogut, Henry J.	May, Ralph E.
Toombs, Harry B.	Skubik, Stephen J.	Poulin, Joseph A. L. P.
Morace, John J.		

90th CIC Detachment (90th Infantry Division)

Osborne, Walter D.	Boudreau, Amadee R.	Stansell, Theodore L.
Miller, Edgar R.	Davis, Joseph A.	McGee, Harold
Sims, John E.	Ehrenshaft, Harry	Balkcan, Robert A.
Ash, William J.	Gowan, Ralph L.	Weitzenkorn, Paul
Dinwiddie, Harry E., Jr.	Lustig, Raymond W.	Bauer, Albert
McGee, Leo C.	Morton, William M., Jr.	Eckmann, Alexander J.
Fyanes, Francis D.	Misonow, Jack	Haberman, Joseph
Blanton, Charles K.		

94th CIC Detachment (94th Infantry Division)

Goodson, Carl K.	Phillips, Daniel T.	Schwarz, Herbert
West, Bill C.	Willer, James F.	Deininger, Richard
Bishop, Robert F.	Zuk, Peter	Lee, Francis
Gober, Anthony	Ireland, Fred H.	[illegible] in
Greer, Rudy	Akers, Buford L.	Jacobs, Welton M.
Stern, Kurt	Sender, Henry	

95th CIC Detachment

Castle, James C.	Davey, Floyd B.	Allen, Thomas B.
Barnes, Everard G.	Shellan, Gerard M.	Kieffer, Pierre G.
Veach, John L.	Waugh, Sanford A.	Pohlen, Kurt R.
Fischl, Stephen T.		

97th CIC Detachment (97th Infantry Division)

Grimes, Oscar
Seaton, Charles T.

99th CIC Detachment (99th Infantry Division)

Young, George D.	Sloan, Charles	Short, Stannard K.
Cody, Francis T.	Gardin, Vic	Goure, Leon
Stephens, Howard V.	Brooks, Roy W.	Holt, Frederick
Provenzano, John D.	Gordon, Victor M.	Landa, Daniel
La Crosse, Louis T.	Stautner, Joseph F.	Mercier, Alfred J.

100th CIC Detachment (100th Infantry Division)

Mattos, Anthony R.	Langford, Berry F.	Jacobi, Carl H.
Smith, Guthrie J.	Brannon, Louis T.	Johnson, Lawrence M.
Wilson, Alvin M.	Neiman, Joseph	Suder, Robert W.
Connor, Thomas J.	Scharzchild, Henry	Valente, Frank J.
Schueler, Arthur M.	Scully, Leo F.	Anderson, Warren R.

101st CIC Detachment (101st Airborne Division)

McGuire, Martin E.	Giambalvo, Nunzio A.	Bowers, William E.
McKennan, Bradley	Kapic, Roman F.	Freedman, Abraham A.
Notopoulos, Alexander A.	Martin, George E.	Fraund, William
Whalen, FNU	Reed, William P.	
Gannon, William F.	Robinson, Frank L.	

101st CIC Detachment (101st Airborne Division) (Cont'd)

Stemple, Max L.
Tofant, William J.
Foster, Curtis M.
Benson, Frank E., Jr.
Clark, William E.
Ryan, Thomas E.
Symmes, Howard W.
Parsons, Bernard R.

102nd CIC Detachment (102nd Infantry Division)

Sutton, Horace A.
Reisner, David J.
Tait, Charles W.
Lydon, John J.
Suman, John G.
O'Toole, Joseph V.
Hugo, Eugene F.
Flynn, Thomas F.
Hoffer, Wolfgand E.
Ronis, Fred
Wever, John J.
Erdman, Alexander E.

103rd CIC Detachment (103rd Infantry Division)

Hudson, Dugald W.
Elms, Grady
Gowdy, Charles M.
Friestedt, Herman F.
Fedder, Walter F.
Macganwell, John E.
Evans, Albert E.
Lins, Milton K.
Hansen, Ernst F.
Garner, Gerard
Sandel, Leo

104th CIC Detachment (104th Infantry Division)

Julian, Brooks P.
Casserly, John P.
Evans, Townsend
Hanna, David L.
Motroni, Ralph J.
Fial, Allen I.
Gellatly, Robert N.
McCabe, Harold E.
Schurpf, Paul T.
Matusik, Mieczyslaus T.
Robertson, Robert S.
Keiffer, Reinhardt J.

106th CIC Detachment (106th Infantry Division)

Coad, Francis E.
Jordan, Edward J.
Kleinman, Abraham
Jensen, Leslie A.
Barlabas, George
Urry, Donald C.
Brilty, Francis X.
McIntyre, James W.
Wendt, William F.
Yaeger, Edwin R.
Garner, Doniphan M.
Jacobson, Milford E.
Rakestraw, George F.
Bamberth, Peter H.
Underwood, (FNU)
St Germain, Jules B.
Sullivan, Richard M.
Moore, William J.
Czajkowski, Casimir J.

207th CIC Detachment (VII Corps)

Dorsett, James K.	Zielasko, Gustave W.	Hall, Joseph H.
Hemmingway, John H.	Ballsrud, Wesley E.	Meyer, Fred A.
Bennett, Edwin	Brady, William T.	Schluter, Claymer
Kinsey, Benjamin T	Jaudon, Elbert W.	Stolen[illegible] C.
Reber, John H.	Neville, Stephen J. Jr.	Moran, Fenton
Badger, Daniel B.	Norvish, Franklin	Cartier, Normand R.
Schiller, John	Perry, Albert L.	DeClercq, Albert
Schroeder, Charles J.	Rountree, Charles A.	Barr, Nobert G.
Varenick, Michael I.	Wright, David	Kent, Henry
Vargas, Frank A.	Hoffman, Paul L.	

208th CIC Detachment (VIII Corps)

Bowen, Albert R., Jr.
Ermis, Leo L.
Rand, Harvey H.
Eberly, Donald A.
Leach, James H.
Rooney, Julian R.
Spooner, Jack A.
Walker, Dewey S.
Zintz, David
Block, Joseph D.
Bradley, Harry L.
Braune, Edward L.
Brown, George P.
Kutzlo, Steve
Wallenhorst, Harry H.
Finnell, Albert T.
Pelo, Richard J.
Tignor, Patrick H.
Wilson, Meredith R.

Note: Following named men First Names Unknown.

Long	Michel	
Slifer	Hoffman	
Wolfe	Levine	
Strauss	Bennigson	
Finnel	Kubikowski	
Weinstein	Titman	
Tober	Bellis	
Wayne	Newsstatter	
Sample	DeWitt	
Knudsen	Weisskopf	
Doyle	Rosenthal	
Schwartzkopf	Applegate	

212th CIC Detachment (XII Corps)

Bogin, Issac	Adams, John J.	Avery, Donald C.
Shire, Joseph	Syring, William J.	Fulmer, Burton E.
Smith, Carlos D.	Proudfoot, Harold B.	

213th CIC Detachment (XIII Corps)

Huntington, Clarence

215th CIC Detachment (XV Corps)

Fossieck, Theodore R.	Cornish, Lorenzo E.	Jones, Carroll E.
Bell, Edward P.	Finegan, Eugene E.	McNiece, Harry W.
Segal, Hans E.	Gleason, Thomas J.	Mowrey, Elmous N.
Kocem, Felix H.	Jury, William H.	[illegible]
McKeogh, Francis M.	Ogg, Lyman	Siffin, John J.
Wilgus, Sidney D.	Slater, Russell R.	Sims, Harry B.
Babilya, Peter J., Jr.	Dilles, Stanley E.	

216th CIC Detachment (XVI Corps)

Frederick, William W.	Gross, Eric M.	Rafaeli, Alexander
Goldbeck, Herman G.	Clarke, Herbert W.	Howell, Dillard W.

218th CIC Det (XVIII Corps (Airborne))

Dearing, Albin P.	Burrill, Leon M.	Marwick, Lawrence
Gordon, Lewis F.	Rockwood, Joe S.	Collyer, Charles H.
Whalen, Joseph R.	Eckhardt, Henri E.	Lagemann, Joseph B.
Dobson, Kenneth W.	Kennedy, George B.	Dibblee, Albert
Gundersen, Ernest C.	Pendergast, John F.	Briefs, Henry W.
Kuziv, Michael	Rehnberg, James B.	Leon, Henry
Pearce, John C.	Walzer, Howard B.	Brunswick, Edmund J.
Stalker, Ian F.	Davine, Edward J.	Heuvelhorst, Herman
Tracy, Richard L.	Smith, Frederick M.	Bauman, Jack M.
Schepsis, Anthony A.	Anderson, Edmund O.	Donohue, Joseph T.
Heavey, Robert W.	Dohrn, William J.	Walker, K. O.
Follansbee, Harvey O.	Kertell, Arthur C.	Dunbar, L. L.
Daley, John W.		

219th CIC Detachment (XIX Corps)

Gagan, Thomas A.	Truton, Hallam W., Jr.	Vandenbulcke, Charles E.
Baker, Ernest S.	Fossum, Norman H.	Wilkins, Ernest J.
Holtzner, Francis J.	Hotchkiss, David H.	Burgess, Eugene B.
Jenkins, William L.	Jeka, Ralph J.	Clark, Philip T.
Stanton, Francis W.	McManus, Alfred B.	Kayser, Ernest
Cadden, Francis L.	Myers, Lawrence A.	Lear, Darvin E.
Thompson, William G.	Roumeles, Samuel J.	Hannes, Max R.

220th CIC Detachment (XX Corps)

Lobb, Anthony W.	Gregory, George D., Jr.	Oyler, Robert B.
Preston, Nathan R.	Hinkle, Wayne W.	Pierce, Elwood W.
Stafford, Gerald	Kehoe, Richard O.	Rosen, Joseph B.
Edington, Thomas A.	Mahoney, Dennis H.	Curley, Frederick M.
Hahn, Rose B.	Marz, Roy W.	Davison, Russell C.
Smith, James E.	McLeroy, Thomas P.	Schaeffer, Harry T.

221st CIC Detachment (XXI Corps)

Somerville, John F.	Holmes, Harry	Graham, William J.
Lane, Dan R.	Mitchell, Charles M.	Rooney, Joseph W.
McKee, Howard A.	Kennedy, James H.	Shughart, Dale F.
Engel, Martin	Smith, Lucius S.	

222nd CIC Detachment (XXII Corps)

Rutledge, Frederick R.	Mahlab, Salim S.	Bock, Alexander P.
Curry, Patrick F.	Ohlin, Lloyd E.	Keilty, Joseph J.
Mihan, Donald E.	Chrisholm, Douglas T.	Lukas, Peter P.
Bready, James H.	Levine, Theordore	Knapp, Harold F.

223rd CIC Detachment (XXIII Corps)

Elliott, Loran L.	McBurney, W. H.	Keefe, William E.
Harrigan, Richard J.	Neri, John G.	Frary, Jerry P.
Knight, Jack W.	Smith, Robert O.	Powers, FNU
Haring, James J.	Korpela, Elton P.	
Kivimaki, Elmer N.	Pickett, Anthony V.	

301st CIC Detachment (1st US Army)

Miner, Horace M.	Conick, Charles B.	Bulkley, Charles C.
Finch, Heber	Hartung, Peter H.	Hilbruner, William J.
Kraft, Richard P.	McCarthy, Edward J.	Benedict, Coleman H.
Hayes, Virgil E.	Jensen, Garth N.	McWilliams, Walter E.
Peine, Gilbert S.	Thoumsin, Servious F.	Young, Wesley I.
Conohan, Robert J.	Dean, Howard E.	Duggan, James M.
Fitzgerald, Vincent P.	Hamilton, Hal A.	Hanson, Leonard E.
Miller, William F.	Moran, Fenton	Murphy, Thomas I.
Murray, Winslow H.	Printz, Robert G.	Proctor, David G.

301st CIC Detachment (1st US Army) (Cont'd)

Ratliff, James H.
Brodeur, Wilfrid J.
Hannigan, John J.
Biedenharn, Albert M.
Butler, Milton
Cartier, Normand J.
Declercq, Albert
Farris, Ralph W.
Grainger, Charles W.
Jersin, Edward A.
Kennard, Claude L.
Mendoza, Frank
Park, Andrew
Short, Charles N.
Walker, Kenneth O.
Gagan, FNU
Ksienwicz, FNU
Zeender, John K.
Dunbar, Lawrence L.
Kinch, Robert T.
Blackburn, Duane A.
Carlson, George A.
Cleary, Vincent W.
Dombrowski, Henry E.
Gikas, Christos S.
Green, William B.
Kehrig, Francis A.
Kopec, Roman F.
Mertens, Arthur R.
Phair, James A.
Skrigan, Paul S.
Wolkomir, Maurice N.
McInerney, FNU
Stroud, FNU
Barlock, Joseph A.
Fain, Douglas W.
Sazama, Robert J.
Burgess, Robert M.
Carolan, Edwin J.
DeBordes, Arnaud J.
Fagan, James G.
Goetz, Ferd G.
Hudson, Raymond E.
Kelly, Donald A.
Mendenhall, George M.
Murgia, Joseph
Powell, Ward H.
Stewart, Charles L.
Woodall, John B.
Schluter, FNU
Hancock, FNU

303rd CIC Detachment (3rd US Army)

Foothorap, James F.
Holton, Edgar H.
Ray, James E.
Callan, Albert S., Jr.
Valvada, Anthony S.
Lawless, Mark J.
Atkinson, Harry G.
Burglund, Oliver O.
Prosser, Everett
Voertman, Russell
Coyne, Martin J.
Levine, Robert H.
Conn, Robert L.
Merrick, Edward J.
McCarthy, Claire F.
Oberle, Norman W.
Denton, Clark W.
Mason, Will E.
Kelley, Homer F.
McClure, Donald V.
Rafferty, John M.
Taylor, Eugene S.
Rapp, Oliver L.
Sims, John E.
Sayers, Sam R. Jr.
Beissenherz, Lloyd H.
Cody, Charles J.
Stanton, John M.
Forsberg, William H.
Meehan, John F.
Shoemaker, Alfred L.
Wirth, Otto
Haggard, John D.
Smith, George E.
Fairley, Paul J.
Seaman, James O.
Geiselhart, Richard F.
Proctor, George F.
Holland, Alvin E.
Merrick, James J.
Knight, John B.
O'Gara, James A.
Seaton, John E.
MacNamara, Richard C.
Hallett, James B.
Henahan, James S.
Yarnevich, Ernest N.
Koenig, Wirth H.
Craps, John E.
Ulmer, Max
Gernazian, Stephen
Park, Andrew J.
Tarman, Thomas W.
Hardison, Robert F.
Kegel, Kenneth K.
Aronson, Zola A.
Gallagher, William J.
Baker, William C.
Oliver, Paul E.
Vargas, Frank A.
Keller, Alvin E.
Fanning, Julius N.
O'Neill, Timothy J.
Pfotenhauer, Jay A.
Shea, Eugene D.

307th CIC Detachment (7th US Army)

Crowell, G. Kenneth	McDuff, Alvie L.	Porter, Marion E.
Bower, William N.	Brussell, Abraham W.	Caldwell, Robert G. Jr.
Guinzbourg, Victor S.	Haseltine, Marshall	Moseley, George T.
Richards, Robert R.	Anderson, Warren R.	Baraty, Edward
Bergman, Victor C., Jr.	Barker, Harold O., Jr.	Beaudette, Francis B.
Brown, Keirn C.	Blake, Emmet R.	Brockmeier, Robert
Emmet, Thomas A.	Chamberlin, Wells F.	Dinehart, Alan F., Jr.
Horner, David S.	French, Woodrow W.	Gordon, Wendell C.
Kandt, William C.	Hutchinson, Joseph C.	Jacques, Phillippe G.
McCoy, Scott D.	LaChance, Herve R.	LeFebvre, George A.
Perper, George A.	O'Brien, Philip A.	Paquette, Origene J., Jr.
Sevier, Lewis V.	Powell, Francis E.	Regis, Peter
Tousignant, Edmond J.	Sparks, Bertel M.	Sullivan, Daniel J.

309th CIC Detachment (9th Army)

Guinan, Richard C.	Bellocchio, Paul L.	Behr, John L.
Conley, Francis E.	Madd, Francis E.	Dale, J. Thomas

315th CIC Detachment (15th Army)

Brennecke, Francis C.	Williams, David S.	Boren, Robert D.
Dreshler, Harold F.	Hickman, Glen H.	Knapp, Todd B.
Shafton, Edward	Crutcher, Marshall B.	Honig, Robert S.
Johnson, Darrel L.	Underwood, Donald E.	Blaser, Glenn F.
Cook, Herman F.	Holden, William P.	Kurzon, Raymond
McVey, William L.	Ensign, Robert	Hurt, Wesley R.
Hwass, Edward R.	Kelm, Edwin H.	Kirehnert, Carl
Beach, George	Kroh, Herman (just for a while)	

418th CIC Detachment (12th Army Group)

Gagan, Thomas A.	McInerney, Maurice F.	Callan, Albert S., Jr.
Hancock, Harold H.	Ray, James E.	Hall, Frank B.
Hardin, Kenneth E.	Henahan, James S.	Ksieniewicz, Casimir A.
Sayers, Sam R., Jr.	Schluter, Claymer	Sheldon, George C.
Stroud, Donald R.	Yarnevich, Ernest N.	Finch, Heber
Kraft, Richard P., Jr.	McCarthy, Claire F.	McCarthy, Edward J.
Preston, Stuart D.	Benedict, Coleman H.	Coyne, Martin J.
Gaudrault, Robert J.	Geiselhart, Richard F.	Haggard, John D.
Jensen, Garth H.	Kelley, Homer F.	McWilliams, Walter E.

418th CIC Detachment (12th Army Group) (Cont'd)

Peine, Gilbert S.
Bearce, Roger M.
DeGroot, Henry J.
Hagen, Arnold J.
Kegel, Kenneth K.
Murphy, Thomas I.
Oliver, Alfred R.
Proctor, George P.
Zeender, John K.
Butler, Milton
Cleary, Vincent W.
Dombrowski, Henry E.
Gallagher, William J.
Grainger, Charles W.
Hogan, Vincent P.
Jersin, Edward A.
Memdoza, Frank
O'Brien, Thomas M.
Short, Charles N.
Baker, William C.
Hannigan, John J.
Liston, Raymond J.
Merrick, James J.
Ayr, Allenby H.
Musick, Joseph W.
Locke, Harry F.
Mertens, Arthur R.
Amberg, Walter A. Jr.
Boyd, William S., Jr.
Clark, William E.
Finch, Richard F.
McGrail, Myles F.
Oliver, Alfred R.
Poole, Albert E.
Stern, Frederick S., Jr.
Bray, James F.
Hanna, Elias
Jaudon, Elbert W.
Landry, Donald H.
McKeogh, Francis M.
Murphy, Francis J.

Thoumsin, Servious F.
Conohan, Robert J.
Egan, William P.
Hanson, Leonard E.
Levine, Robert H.
Murray, Winslow H.
Printz, Robert G.
Ratliff, James H.
Biedenharn, Albert M.
Carlson, George A.
Conn, Robert L.
Fairley, Paul J.
Gikas, Christos S.
Green, William B.
Holland, Alvin E.
Kelly, Donald A.
Merrick, Edward J.
Park, Harry L.
Stewart, Charles L.
Dunbar, Lawrence L.
Keller, Alvin J.
MacNamara, Richard C.
Sazama, Robert J.
Dunn, William B.
Hahn, John H.
Marshall, Richard A.
Sweeney, John R.
Bauer, Philip Jr.
Braden, Paul R.
Duncan, Thomas N.
Foster, Curtis M.
Miksis, Joseph D.
Oliver, Paul E.
Stuart, Malcolm R.
Allen, Robert R.
Dermody, James A.
Helland, Maurice O.
Johnson, Clayton L.
Langer, Walter C.
Monferrato, Albert C.
O'Neill, Timothy J.

Young, Wesley I.
Dean, Howard E.
Fitzgerald, Vincent P.
Havighurst, Alfred F.
Miller, William F.
Oberle, Norman W.
Proctor, David G.
Smith, George E.
Blackburn, Duane A.
Carolan, Edwin J.
Denton, Clark W.
Farris, Ralph W.
Goetz, Ferd G.
Heitner, Robert R.
Hudson, Raymond E.
Kennard, Claude L.
Murgia, Joseph
Seaman, James O.
Wolkomir, Maurice N.
Fain, Douglas W.
Kinch, Robert T.
Mason, Will E.
Hearn, Norman J.
McKenna, John P.
Heyrman, John H.
McManus, Neil C.
Altaras, Jack C.
Boudreau, Amedee R.
Brunjes, John W.
Fanning, Julius N., Jr.
Keenan, John L.
Moran, Fenton
Pinsince, Adrian J.
Walker, George D.
Anderson, Walter J., Jr.
Dow, Laurance E.
Holman, Frank A.
Koontz, Vance H.
McBee, John
Moruza, Tito G.
Oswald, William B.

418th CIC Detachment (12th Army Group)(Cont'd)

Rendler, John C., Jr.
Wall, Merrill C.
Beissinger, Henry
Clancy, Frank B.
Feltenstein, Paul I.
Gallagher, Thomas P.
Hotchkiss, David H.
Lewis, Austin A.
O'Gara, James A.
Pfotenhauer, Jay A.
Prosser, Everett
Rubin, Carl F.
Shea, Eugene D.
Taylor, Eugene S.
Vargas, Frank A., Jr.
Wienckowski, Louis
Blanton, Charles K.
Breitenbach, Gustave
Dulaney, Thomas E.
Frank, Walter
Hawes, Kenneth E.
Kaufman, Harry S.
Mayer, William F.
Nester, Raymond J.
Park, Andrew J.
Regis, John G.
Smith, Leroy H.
Tomke, Richard A.
Hallowell, Robert E.
David, Kurt D.
Goldenberg, Paul H.
Koprowski, Joseph S.
Ortman, Erik J.
Swant, Raymond H.
Golz, Paul
Pollack, Fred
Mulkeen, William J.

Reynolds, Floyd J.
West, Thomas J.
Belkin, Paul M.
Cole, David J.
Fields, Robert E.
Hardison, Robert F.
Kehrig, Francis A.
McClure, Donald V.
Paris, John
Phair, James A.
Rafferty, John M.
Seaton, John E.
Tahmouse, Albert J.
Tittle, Clarence S.
Watkins, James E., Jr.
Aktsinov, Waldemar
Boniecki, Conrad B.
DiGioja, Roger
Ehrlich, Max
Goldsmith, Albert
Jansen, Marvin W.
Lytle, Scott H.
McKinley, Ambrose A.
Nielsem, Paul H.
Popper, Alfred
Richter, Bruno C.
Spitzer, Robert W.
Weasher, Warren K.
Borter, Howard
Eisenberg, Jack W.
Grohs, Lothar
Lane, Denzil L.
Randall, Earle S.
Hellman, Robert J.
Laughlin, Glen W.
Wittenberger, Park
Zweig, Michael H. W.

Schilke, Carl R.
Whaley, Byron A.
Branson, Arthur F.
Ellsberry, William G.
Forsberg, William H.
Hill, Clyde C.
Ladd, Edward T.
Meyersberg, Charles H.
Peters, Jack H.
Pierce, Elwood M.
Rosen, Joseph E.
Shaw, Andre M. P.
Tatge, Paul M.
Vandenbulcke, Charles E.
Wechsler, Henry C.
Biel, Fred W.
Boyce, Ralph J., Jr.
Dito, Frank E.
Dusseault, Henry J.
Gross, Paul P.
Katz, Walter J.
May, Leo C.
Mower, Harold
Osterman, Victor C.
Ratzersdorfer, Marc L.
Rodell, Jerome W.
Steiner, Leopold
Wirtshafter, Robert J.
Couture, Remi A.
Freed, Fred P.
Jacobson, Henry
Meyer, Andre O.
Stanko, Michael B.
Forel, Bruno
Malin, Morton V.
Knoll, Eberhard F.

427th CIC Detachment (Continental Advance Section)

Read, Clarence E.	Picard, Lucien L.	Tucker, Robert W.
Van Kirk, Arthur H.	DePourtales, Alex W. G.	Hardage, John M.
Carranza, Ignacio	Vidal, Joseph	Vincent, Arthur T.
Anderson, James L.	Archon, Dion J. J.	Baldwin, Langford
Blumner, Lester A.	Briel, Alfred W.	Burns, Joseph A.
Cerame, Ralph T.	Cole, James E.	Crosby, Robert T.
Devere, Perry A.	Friebolin, Brookes	Fulsher, Remy W.
Gendron, Honorat R.	Hall, Thomas W.	Hoylen, Paul J.
Joy, Walter S.	Liper, Milton W.	McClive, Robert D.
McCormick, Francis X.	Manley, James T.	Mickey, Carrol M.
Nickson, Albert N.	O'Connell, Charles W.	Ploghoft, Merl V.
Saloom, Kaliste J.	Starr, Joseph R.	Stasaitis, Stanley J.
Vasse, Louis L.	Vaughn, Bradley W.	Werrenrath, George H.
Wood, Kenneth I.	Woollett, Leroy A., Jr.	Zocca, Rouis R.

429th CIC Detachment (Continental Advance Section)

Schwarzwalder, John C.	Kirkland, Ira B., Jr.	Smith, Gregory B.
Bailey, James B.	Carr, Donald J.	Daguerre, Raymond P.
Kimball, Harvey L.	McIntosh, Ashleigh D.	Moseley, Frank A.
Neagoy, George	O'Neill, Harvey J.	Roy, Joseph H.
Williams, Harold B.		

502d CIC Detachment (2nd Armored Division)

Beebe, Richard W.	Gross, Philip	LaBranche, Robert R.
Meldrum, Gilbert S.	Coulter, Philemon B.	Anderson, Alexander A.
Dermody, James A.	Downing, Frederic E.	Hallen, Norman R.
Brigham, Morrison	Davis, Caleb W.	Foyt, Anton
Armstrong, Robert F.	Filley, Walter O.	Madson, John N.
Mostecak, John	Zajac, Peter	Mertens, Arthur R.
Leahy, Daniel A.	Mitchell, Joseph M.	Myers, Lawrence A.
Houser, George J.	Mess, Charles W.	

503rd CIC Detachment (3rd Armored Division)

Black, Theodore W.
Duncan, Thomas N.
Travis, Porter M., Jr.
Dow, Laurence E.
Monferrato, Albert C.
Bogotay, George W.
Alter, John E.
Higgins, Timothy
Park, Edwin C.
Parker, Olan, Jr.
Denton, James G.
Collins, Ulysses S.
Udoff, Philip S.
Robinson, Harold H.
Stramel, Bruno F.
Hiller, Hans A.
Kiehl, Marvin E.
DeMers, Roy G.
O'Neil, James F.
Kiley, George L.
Dietz, Ralph E.
Anderson, Hilding A.
Romey, John H.
Mendenhall, George M.
Berger, Fred
Lynch, Henry W.

504th CIC Detachment (4th Armored Division)

Flinn, Thomas E.
Miksis, Joseph D.
Janura, Arthur L.
Kime, Otho G.
Shaw, Andre M. P.
Dito, Frank E.
Schrenzel, Eugene P.
Rood, Wilson A.
Wall, Merrill C.
Watkins, James E., Jr.
Obert, Norbert B.
Skrigan, Paul S.
Hawes, Kenneth E.
James, Harold W.
Bray, James F.
Boyd, William S., Jr.
Clark, Arthur S., Jr.
Peters, Jack H.
Wienckowski, Louis
Rogers, Martin

505th CIC Detachment (5th Armored Division)

McKenna, John P.
Elliott, Hugh F.
Newhouse, Joseph F.
Barton, Victor
Cambria, Frank J.
Maucher, Andrew G.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Gallagher, Thomas P.
Pender, William E.
Brookens, John W.
Herrnstadt, Gerald E.
Farmer, Sam C.
Thaxter, John H.
Higgins, George L.
Bartnett, Edmond J.
Roe, Rexford K.
Mainczyk, Steven
Treitel, Henry D.

506th CIC Detachment (6th Armored Division)

DeLoach, Judson B.
Weaston, Robert Q.
Gingher, Thomas R.
Tahmoush, Albert J.
Elmer, Fred
Hagnauer, Maximilian W.
Jordan, Dale M.
Lyman, Samuel K.
Dolph, Robert E.
Mulkeen, William J. G.
Embley, Richard O.
Howard, Jack J.
Tobler, Frederick C.
Travis, Porter M.
Fields, Robert E.
Murphy, Francis J.
Liston, Raymond J
Diehl, Fred A.
Cox, Clarence C.

507th CIC Detachment (7th Armored Division)

Brambach, Walter	Horwitz, Ralph E.	Roberts, Lloyd D.
Downs, Frederick H.	Soucy, Roy J.	Jorgensen, Charles A.
Kuusiste, Wayne V.		

508th CIC Detachment (8th Armored Division)

Gillet, Louis E.	Opp, Raymond H.	Deldebbio, Bernard P.
Roesch, Paul C.	Feist, Herbert B.	Marquit, Harold
Feguson, Albert C.	Graham, Earl C.	Huebner, Arnold G.
Silberman, Albert G.	McLaughlin, Robert V.	Lee, Joseph F.
Kemph, Eugene F.		

509th CIC Detachment (9th Armored Division)

Donohue, Edward G.	Ott, Andrew D.	Lueck, William O.
Douglas, Edwin L.	Lloyd, Robert S.	Lichtblau, John H.
Shauck, Hewitt A.	Sheridan, Edward P.	

510th CIC Detachment

Schroeter, Karl G.	Hendricks, Alford C.	Humphrey, William C.
Gumpel, Henry J.	Dickman, Bentley	Robiczek, Fred F.
Pollack, Peter I.	Baker, Edgar E.	

511th CIC Detachment

Galbraith, Robert C.	Buckley, Thomas H.	Powell, Norman R.
Hart, Leo J., Jr.	Hayes, Charles R.	

512th CIC Detachment

Criqui, Francis B.	Meade, Paul J.	Hutchinson, Joseph C.
McCoy, Scott D.	Munson, Boardman	Overholser, John D.
Ewing, William S.	Meyer, Joseph G.	

513th CIC Detachment

Parker, Olan, Jr.	Winkler, Mark	Stevenson, Douglas F.
Sluizer, Hans V.	McBurney, Clark M.	Mueller, Ernst J.

514th CIC Detachment (14th Armored Division of 12th Army Group)

Hahn, Horace L.	Blalock, John H.	Braun, Berthold R.
Dinehart, Alan	Giese, Otto C.	Hall, Frank W.
Huber, Frank	Hurley, William F.	Jacques, Philippe J.
Maskrey, Robert M.	Norton, Arthur H.	Pfeiffer, John W.
Schnakenberg, Henry J.	Schwabe, Milton F.	Shannon, Jay
Spiegler, John L.	Stevie, Robert J.	Trabant, Warren E.
Weight, Harold H.	Pentecost, Hal W.	Sheridan, Edward P.
Lane, Denzil L.	Guenthner, Rupert W.	England, Chester B.
Evans, James	Forrest, Gerald	Harnish, Carroll
Mott, William	Pappas, James Louis	Rosen, Irving
Finch, Richard R.	Oswald, William B.	Heitner, Robert R.
Ellsberry, William G.	Tomke, Richard A.	Beebe, Richard W.
Brigham, Morison	Downing, Frederick G.	Armstrong, Robert F.
Madson, John N.	Mostecak, John	Bernard, Charles A.
Gordon, Louis A.	Maguire, Charles J.	O'Grady, James M.
Halpern, Joseph B.	Tumino, Ralph	Altschuler, Franz
Tomich, Alex	Kline, Robert J.	Schwarzbrott, Louis

516th CIC Detachment (16th Armored Division)

Richardson, John E.	Molloy, Edwin T.	Carter, Henry S.
Graht, Robert H.	Beguelin, Dayton	Baker, Marion F.
Bennett, Charles R.	Krchniak, John	

520th CIC Detachment (20th Armored Division)

Pinneo, Dee W.	Davenport, Philip B.	Behm, Carl M.

ADSEC COMZ

Larios, Ernest E.	Johnson, Alvin	Beatty, Walcott H.
Wilson, Meredith R.	Christopherson, Kjarten	Ryan, John J.
Fahey, Gregory J.	Jarsted, Gordon K.	Benham, Charles C.
McIntosh, James D.	Morrison, William A.	Swantek, Andrew H.
Tracy, Richard L.	Burns, Cecil	Cullinan, Henry J.
Gostisha, Jaohn R.	Grey, Alfred E., Jr.	Holmegard, Henry C.
MacGregor, Paul C.	Nunez, Peter	Pariseau, Theodore
Radoulovitch, Vladimir	Sloan, Paul G., Jr.	Stuart, George B.
Abella, Luis	Alsdorf, James R.	Kavanaugh, George F.
Kelly, John J.	Lindholm, Richard W.	Muhleman, Harry N.
Phillips, Dayton E.	Poirier, Philip P.	Schultz, Walter J.

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Feindt, Lawrence R.
Graham, Donald M.
Schantz, Grover A.
Klein, Keith B.
Casey, John P.
Kennington, Robert J.
Swock, John E.
Canfield, Daniel C.
Driver, Frank S.
Hartsell, John S.
McMurray, Jonathan H.
Morrissey, William F.
Bardusch, William E., Jr.
Prescott, Julian P.
Lester, Calvin D.
Hicks, Mason A.
Blankenship, Lonnie R.
Gregg, Robert E.
Mihan, Donald E.
Wallace, Lew
Howard, Clinton A.
Kaiser, Stanley R.
MacKeith, James A.
Pickett, Charles A.
Shea, Daniel A., Jr.
White, Robert S.
Ryan, Elbert M.
Long, Fred H.
Stevenson, Alfred B.
Alexander, Harry E.
Keena, Joseph W.
O'Neill, Robert E.
Avance, James D.
Issaeff, Rostislav G.
McCann, Bernard T.
Rinehart, Lowell S.
Stein, Gerhold S.
Toth, Geza
Michelmann, Oswald C.
Gallagher, George R.
Loney, Theodore R.

DeNardo, Bernard J.
Dowd, Thomas
Hay, John R.
Poitras, Warren E.
Fernholz, Emil F.
Lemar, Clarence E.
Barrett, Raymond F.
Condon, Gerald T.
Garner, Doniphan M.
Hughes, John A.
Meddaugh, Leonard S.
Nielson, Earl A.
Millman, Leonard
Taylor, Frank D.
Baumann, Lester H.
Kroll, Lester H.
Connolly, Edward P.
Kennedy, Edward J. H.
Munoz, Anthony
Hayes, Thomas J.
Ireton, Henry H.
Klinck, Herbert G.
Martinco, John P.
Ralston, David P.
Torphy, Francis X.
Foothorap, James F.
Dorsey, Cam D.
Biegert, William A.
Traicoff, George
Anderson, William L.
Lynch, Robert J.
Rice, William M.
Brett, James
Little, John W.
McKay, Robert L.
Shearer, Joseph C.
Stickney, Melvin J.
Tyson, Kenneth S.
Browning, Earl S.
Sexton, William J.
Medina, Marcells

Bennett, Edwin
Ryan, Thomas A.
Jonathan, Virgil
Barlabas, George
Jefferson, Philip L.
Myers, Elmer C.
Brilty, Francis X.
Crotty, Joseph P.
Hartnett, Robert B.
McIntyre, James W.
Moriarty, James F.
Urry, Donald C.
Rungee, Joseph P.
Vinson, John B.
Donnelly, Andrew J.
Perry, Robert J.
Gartley, Herbert B., Jr.
Lundquist, Donald C.
Pupanek, Michael R.
Herrero, Charles
Jackson, Thomas S.
Koenig, Ira
McCormack, John G.
Roller, Otto J.
Weston, Payson G.
Lindjord, Haakon
Edwards, Frank
Carter, Ernest R.
Agnetta, Frederick N.
Burkhead, B. W.
McAleer, Frank H.
Anderson, Elmer F.
Graf, Ellsworth E.
Lyon, Francis E.
Noonan, Edward J.
Snyder, Richard A.
Taylor, Job
Woltz, Robert K.
Sweeney, Thomas P.
Frizzell, Russell B.
Hines, Canfield M.

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Langford, Berry F.
Moore, James M.
Walker, George D.
Ens, William A.
Holmes, Frederick L.
Jovan, George
Reeder, Joseph C., Jr.
Baer, David
Becker, Max J.
Ferguson, Howard M.
Haeger, Robert A.
King, William H.
Landry, Donald H.
Rakow, William J.
Smith, Homer F.
Valk, Joseph E.
Young, William G.
Ballard, George H.
Bray, Archie J.
Cain, Wilfred, W.
Cusick, Charles A.
Donehower, Wilford J.
Fritsche, Noble S.
Geary, Robert X.
Haley, Sanford E.
Henderson, Oliver S.
Jundzil, Stanley J.
Keaster, Leonard W.
Kovacik, Andrew H.
Lennon, Ernest J.
McCormick, Edgar T.
Meyers, Charles F.
Petz, Henry
Rissinger, Marvin L.
Sherfy, Raphael
Tierney, John J.
Ward, Andrew L.
Wood, James L.
Bucko, Stephan A.
Schrader, Marvin J.
Hick, William G.

Maguire, John N.
Peterson, John H.
Coad, Francis E.
Fingerson, Robert F.
Johnson, Dan W.
Murray, William R.
Savage, Jack E.
Baggs, Walter M.
Church, Hudson R.
Goldbeck, Herman C.
Henigan, Joseph W.
Koudlka, Edward R.
McBride, George B.
Reider, Robert W.
Steinberg, Harry C.
Yoh, Franklin C.
Abbott, Lyman, Jr.
Bittman, Lyman W.
Bryson, Arthur R.
Canoff, James I.
Dalton, Charles C.
Franklin, Arthur H.
Funk, Paul J.
Gillespie, Henry
Heine, Edward
Higgins, James B.
Jurco, Stephen
Kennedy, Edward H.
Kritsky, Andrew N.
Loftus, Frank
McCoy, Raymond E.
Nilan, William F.
Quatman, Joseph B.
Russell, Ralph R.
Siddens, J. G.
Underwood, Clayton H.
Welch, Ernest G.
Zanzuccki, Albert A.
Frazee, Claude J.
Kellman, Rudolph G.
Adams, John J.

Maranda, Walter F.
Reeves, Delmore E.
Donovan, Edward P.
Funderburk, Harold W.
Jones, Edward C.
Obuhanich, Nicholas
Armijo, Enrique M.
Bechtel, John G.
Dunlap, Joseph R.
Gorgie, Frank J.
Johnson, Clayton L.
Kramer, Charles E.
Newman, Frank A.
Rendler, John C.
Sweeney, Jay P.
Young, Jon L.
Alter, Richard J.
Bowlus, Thomas N.
Byerly, Milton R.
Clausen, Theodore T.
Denton, William E.
Frazier, Alfred
Gaughn, John R.
Gordon, Jay E.
Henderson, George W.
Hyde, Upshur H., Jr.
Keane, James M.
King, John W.
Lang, James W., Jr.
Mansour, Farris
McDonough, Joseph T.
O'Conner, Herbert W.
Reagan, Frank T.
Schedt, Eddie W.
Thompson, John H.
VanNuys, Hervey A.
Welch, Leo E.
Ziff, Bertram A.
Hewisen, Donald A.
Kinsey, Benjamin T.
Hart, Gale M.

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Proudfoot, Harold B.
Dardas, Leon R.
Flanagan, Joseph M.
Foster, John S.
Smith, Robert L.
Hopkins, Sam C.
Harris, John R.
Smith, James E.
Kupiszewski, Michael L.
Stockbridge, William D.
Arnold, Thomas D.
Lloyd, Charles N.
Yaeger, Edwin R.
Pappas, Thomas
Pfeferblum, Max
McCarty, Kenneth T.
Nevius, Blake R.
Munguia, Oscar A.
Federici, Anthony G.
Ellert, Arthur R.
Triumpho, James B.
Cahoon, Richard C.
Levi, Jack
Morel, Edward L.
Perellman, Charles
Tignor, Patrick H.
Roberts, John W.
Baray, Albert A.
Senn, Milton A.
Coleman, Ernest T.
Miller, George J.
Udoff, Philip S.
Moore, James M.
Aiken, John N.
Estenson, Lyle O.
Oakes, Benjamin F.
Dewan, James T.
Miller, Purviance
Newirth, Samuel A.
Quaranta, Francesco S.
Sladky, Eugene J.

Smith, Carlos D.
Fulmer, Burton E.
Syring, William J.
Nichols, Richard H.
Bloemsna, Eugene P.
Conover, John A.
Pentecost, Hal W.
Burke, Thomas J.
Martin, Duane L.
Smith, Guy T.
Wright, George B.
Waller, John W.
Deahl, Warren A.
Sorensen, Emil S., Jr.
Cimino, Eugene L.
Hales, Delbert R.
Sledge, Wayne D.
Meyerhoff, Fred R.
Romano, Salvator S.
Robinson, Harold H.
Angel, August D.
Carr, William L.
Wagner, Walter W.
Gilbert, Reginald E.
Edwards, Marvin L.
Vines, William
Abrams, Gordon C.
Ewing, Charles G.
Wyman, Paul H.
Ehlers, Kenneth H.
Plankenhorn, William F.
Adams, Edward G.
Mulchrone, David F.
Blum, Walter H.
Cargiulo, Vincent A.
Pezzati, Albert
Hull, Addis E. III
Montgomery, Charles O.
Obright, William J.
Senigallia, Silvio
Thompson, Matthew C., Jr.

Avery, Donald G.
Palmer, Ralph D.
Templeton, William B.
Amberg, Walter A.
Czajkowski, Anthony F.
Flynn, Charles F.
Schaffner, Montford H.
Cowles, William W.
Peck, David W.
Lathan, James S.
MacIntyre, Gould O.
Davison, Russell C., Jr.
Naylor, Ralph V.
Szarvas, Alexander J.
Hill, Roy C.
Monson, Paul J.
Cain, Albert P.
Schilling, Albert J.
Emberling, Lloyd E.
Burgess, Eugene B.
Cordts, Gover W.
LaPrice, Marcel R.
Peterson, Ralph J.
Lewis, Irving J.
Bradford, Kermit C.
Hale, Kenneth B.
Alcotte, Chauncey G.
Henrich, Carl A.
Cohen, Victor D.
Haskell, George D.
Scott, Wallace P.
Kaiser, Samuel J.
Rowley, Joseph G.
Cincotta, Jack
Leahy, Richard D.
Carney, Edwin S.
Kristeller, Herman W.
Morison, Absalom K.
Pasek, Henry
Schwedel, Dorian
Voight, Erich J.

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Vyth, Arnold
Bruschi, Peter J.
Frechette, Rheo J.
Godden, Laurence A.
Hazard, Jeffrey
Monasch, Walter J.
Raine, Philip
Ethier, Raymond T.
Prisbeck, Stanley J.
Wallace, William H., Jr.
Carlson, Clifford W.
Mitchell, Allen R.
Welsh, Paul E.
Fitzwilliam, Leo M.
Cheever, Roger W.
Glennon, John J.
Klinck, Herbert G.
White, Frederick J.
Rohlfes, Bruno O.
Daguerre, Raymond P.
Neagoy, George
Kimball, Harvey L.
Seawell, Donald R.
Goza, Claude L.
Cole, Francis K.
Ahrold, Robert W.
Hauser, Max A.
O'Neill, James P.
Stanchion, Andrew J.
Carroll, Joseph F.
Dunworth, Gerald J.
Gutierrez, Robert A.
Kirkland, Ira B., Jr.
McKee, Claude M.
Murphy, Robert E.
Turner, Emery D.
Zimmerman, Richard G.
Beatson, Gerald L.
Dungan, Nelson Van N.
Goss, Thomas T.
Lieberman, James J.

Wimer, Walter
Carey, Francis W.
Fronauer, Henry J.
Guarnieri, Fred R.
Kraut, Samuel
Nusinow, Jack
Fleetwood, Harry B.
Gross, William F.
Young, Oscar
Dumm, Paul J.
Fennell, Fred F.
Palmer, Hugh J.
Brady, William T.
Freese, Leslie T.
Davenport, Basil
Gubellini, Charles L.
Kopec, Roman F.
Kirstein, William A.
Skrigan, Paul S.
Moseley, Frank A.
Williams, Harold B.
Cannon, Joseph D.
Harms, John F.
Cambere, Edgar
Kearns, Frank M.
Booker, Charles L.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Schodt, Eddie W.
Teague, Charles C.
Cepane, Ralph T.
Fiebig, Carl F.
Horton, Harry H., Jr.
Lovett, Edward C.
McQuigg, William G
O'Brien, Phillip A.
Vreeland, George H.
Armbrust, Robert H.
Bonissol, Maurice
Elliott, James T.
John, Herman Jr.
Morden, Max B.

Bruschi, Dominic P.
Carey, John P.
Gernand, Carl F.
Guarnieri, George T.
MacPherson, Gordon B.
Peterson, Ernest O.
Davis, Robert L.
Knoop, Raymond R.
Gordon, Jesse F.
Julin, George A., Jr.
Hill, Ralph N., Jr.
Staley, Jack
Buck, David F.
Kennedy, Edward J.
Dilles, Stanley E.
Jones, Edgar C., Jr.
Landry, Joseph A.
Mankin, Paul A.
Dubofsky, Jack
McIntosh, Ashleigh D.
O'Neill, Harvey J.
Kuroski, Steven A.
Klipa, Edmund X.
Carpenter, Francis M.
Stacy, John T.
Hahn, Bela A.
Ingalls, William L.
Spitzel, Herbert S. G.
Burgess, Robert M.
DeBordes, Arnaud J.
Filppu, Kaarlo
Kelch, Thelford E.
Maguire, John N.
Meadows, Charles D.
Pierce, Gerald J.
Zielasko, Gustave W.
Basko, James L.
Bumball, Stephen W.
Furey, John B.
Keim, Karl D.
Paul, Alfred

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Vyth, Arnold
Bruschi, Peter J.
Frechette, Rheo J.
Godden, Laurence A.
Hazard, Jeffrey
Monasch, Walter J.
Raine, Philip
Ethier, Raymond T.
Prisbeck, Stanley J.
Wallace, William H., Jr.
Carlson, Clifford W.
Mitchell, Allen R.
Welsh, Paul E.
Fitzwilliam, Leo M.
Cheever, Roger W.
Glennon, John J.
Klinck, Herbert G.
White, Frederick J.
Rohlfes, Bruno O.
Daguerre, Raymond P.
Neagoy, George
Kimball, Harvey L.
Seawell, Donald R.
Goza, Claude L.
Cole, Francis K.
Ahrold, Robert W.
Hauser, Max A.
O'Neill, James P.
Stanchion, Andrew J.
Carroll, Joseph F.
Dunworth, Gerald J.
Gutierrez, Robert A.
Kirkland, Ira B., Jr.
McKee, Claude M.
Murphy, Robert E.
Turner, Emery D.
Zimmerman, Richard G.
Beatson, Gerald L.
Dungan, Nelson Van N.
Goss, Thomas T.
Lieberman, James J.

Wimer, Walter
Carey, Francis W.
Fronauer, Henry J.
Guarnieri, Fred R.
Kraut, Samuel
Nusinow, Jack
Fleetwood, Harry B.
Gross, William F.
Young, Oscar
Dumm, Paul J.
Fennell, Fred F.
Palmer, Hugh J.
Brady, William T.
Freese, Leslie T.
Davenport, Basil
Gubellini, Charles L.
Kopec, Roman F.
Kirstein, William A.
Skrigan, Paul S.
Moseley, Frank A.
Williams, Harold B.
Cannon, Joseph D.
Harms, John F.
Cambere, Edgar
Kearns, Frank M.
Booker, Charles L.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Schodt, Eddie W.
Teague, Charles C.
Cepane, Ralph T.
Fiebig, Carl F.
Horton, Harry H., Jr.
Lovett, Edward C.
McQuigg, William G
O'Brien, Phillip A.
Vreeland, George H.
Armbrust, Robert H.
Bonissol, Maurice
Elliott, James T.
John, Herman Jr.
Morden, Max B.

Bruschi, Dominic P.
Carey, John P.
Gernand, Carl F.
Guarnieri, George T.
MacPherson, Gordon B.
Peterson, Ernest O.
Davis, Robert L.
Knoop, Raymond R.
Gordon, Jesse F.
Julin, George A., Jr.
Hill, Ralph N., Jr.
Staley, Jack
Buck, David F.
Kennedy, Edward J.
Dilles, Stanley E.
Jones, Edgar C., Jr.
Landry, Joseph A.
Mankin, Paul A.
Dubofsky, Jack
McIntosh, Ashleigh D.
O'Neill, Harvey J.
Kuroski, Steven A.
Klipa, Edmund X.
Carpenter, Francis M.
Stacy, John T.
Hahn, Bela A.
Ingalls, William L.
Spitzel, Herbert S. G.
Burgess, Robert M.
DeBordes, Arnaud J.
Filppu, Kaarlo
Kelch, Thelford E.
Maguire, John N.
Meadows, Charles D.
Pierce, Gerald J.
Zielasko, Gustave W.
Basko, James L.
Bumball, Stephen W.
Furey, John B.
Keim, Karl D.
Paul, Alfred

ADSEC COMZ (Cont'd)

Robichaud, Joseph E.
Teply, Elmer
Bailey, James B.
Dermer, John H.
Gordon, Augustus F.
Heuman, Stephan
Kaspar, Oldrich C.
Pattullo, Ambrose D.
Smalhout, John J.
Wiebe, Austin R.
Albera, Rudolph C.
Clark, Frederick M.
Fagan, James G.
Hogberg, Rudolph L.
King, Timothy R.
Larson, George F.
Marks, Peter B.
McGuire, William F.
Mitzel, Raymond C.
O'Neill, John T.
Roy, Joseph H. R.
Silberstein, Mendel
Smoot, Frank L
Williams, George P.
Althan, Warner F.
Blanck, Karl H.
Constant, Jerry I.
Fishalon, Nathan
Harvey, Eldon Jr.
King, Andrew, M.
Mulhauser, John F.
Quinn, Joseph R.
Waltens, Sumner
Madeira, Nicholas J.
Weil, Frank E. G.
Price, Marlon J.
Hilbrummer, William J.
Carnel, Henri R.
Gillespie, James J.
Semchyseyn, Michael
Spaeth, Walter P., Jr.

Ruwe, Edward A.
Wright, Robert P.
Castille, Harry S.
Diskin, Maurice J.
Hadgis, Michael W.
Hilsz, August W.
Morrissey, George J.
Porreca, Albert C.
Thomas, Joe E.
Wolf, Edwin II
Brohan, William K.
Denardo, Bernard J.
Gelvin, Bernard L.
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Simon, Helmut A.
Youmans, David R.

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Zicka, Ralph L.
Conkin, George S.
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Jackson, Arthur J.
Owens, Walter R.
Slater, John F.
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Christiansen, Kenneth F.
DiIorio, Emil A.
Golec, John R.
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Kuyper, William F.
Marek, Walter F.
McCarthy, Donnell B.
Meddaugh, Leonard S.
Neville, Francis M.
Richards, Tom
Silber, Robert L.
Taschler, Felix L.
Weitz, John H.
Albrecht, Eric M.
Behr, Frank J.
Bums, Peter A.
Dennis, David
Grey, Leo
Kaufman, Walter
Leonard, Nathaniel W.
Oldeman, Howard D.
Schulman, Bernard
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Previti, Marte
Powell, Ward H.
Schulz, Thomas F.
Cartier, Normand J.
Zahn, Richard T.
Donlon, Thomas M.

ETOUSA

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Kearns, Frank M.
Booker, Charles L.
Porreca, Albert C.
Sweeney, John R.
Gillen, Edward J.
Parish, John E.
McCaffrey, Albert J.
Wilson, Howard E.
Copeland, Miles A., Jr.
Canoga, James M.
Rago, Henry A.
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Edwards, Marvin L.
Poole, Albert E.
Doyle, Robert H.
Nolin, Jules A.
Julin, George A.
Samuel, Nathaniel
Carroll, Joseph F.
Kloczak, Walter J.
Bauder, Harry P.

SHAEF

Jensen, Heegaard Paul A.
Abrams, Gordon C.
Smith, Edward P.
Kuroski, Steven A.
Dungan, Nelson V. N.
Seawell, Donald R.
Hilsz, August W.
Meckes, Lewis J.
Gordon, Jesse F.
Jackson, Brent C.
Cannon, Joseph D.
Elliott, James T.
Verity, Felix S.
Finley, John C.
Hogberg, Rudolph L.
O'Hara, William P.
Francis, William H., Jr.
Farran, Robert C.
Harms, John F.
Basko, James L.
Klipa, Edmund X.
Hadgis, Michael W.
Larson, George F.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

Owsley, Charles H.
Rainey, Birt J.
Comfort, Robert H.
Edgar, William R.
Karns, Robert E.
Puller, James B.
Stankewicz, Joseph P.
Dobson, Joseph D.
Gregory, Stewart E.
Lamb, Henry M.
Clay, William R.
Wagner, John J.
Davison, William E.
Fagaly, Joseph J.
Lord, Richard G.
Kaminsky, Andrew G.
Zeller, Theodore R.
Grabner, Francis W.
Grubbs, Kenneth R.
Loughry, Daniel F.
St. John, Robert L.
Bower, Malcolm B.
Donahoe, John T.
Hall, Joseph W.
McGough, William P.
Oberlin, Jerry V.
Daley, James L.
Graham, Ellis C.
Holch, Carl E.
Riley, Francis X.

NINTH AIR FORCE

Lamet, Leon L.
Hopper, Marvin C.
Whitworth, Milton T.
Kelly, William R.
Smith, Robert F.
Lantz, Clarence T.
Moss, Dalton
Bone, John H.
Larsen, Marvin N.
Somers, Louis M.
LaBranche, Robert R.
Stewart, Robert H.
Coleman, Clair H.
McCandless, Paul D.
Tidrick, Don L.

NINTH AIR FORCE (Cont'd)

Zuspann, Eugene P.
Erdoes, Frank F.
Licalzi, Laurence A.
Berg, Arthur W.
Higbie, Traynor W.
Waller, John W.
Daniel, Guy S.
Freedman, Mark O.
Vance, John C.
Bernitz, Samuel I.
Lloyd, Charles N.
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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XVI

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SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Chapter 1

SUPPLY LINE TROUBLES SLOW ADVANCE

By the middle of September, the rapid rush of the Allied armies across France had come to a sudden halt. For the next few months, American and British forces waited uneasily on the Siegfried Line while the long supply route that reached back to Cherbourg was replaced by another, shorter route emanating from Antwerp.

On 15 September, CIC units with the Twelfth Army Group were operating on a front that stretched from Heerleen and Maastricht in Holland to Nancy and Luneville in France. At this time there were five U.S. Army Corps on line with the Twelfth Army Group - XIX, VII and V Corps with the First U.S. Army and XX and XII Corps with the Third U. S. Army.*

CIC units assigned to XIX Corps covered the area around Maastricht, while VII Corps CIC operated in the area of Spa and Verviers, Belgium, and V Corps CIC around Clervaux, Luxembourg, and Malmedy, Belgium. The XX and XII Corps CIC covered the regions of Conflans and Nancy, France, respectively.**

New Units Brought Up On Line

Before 15 December, the numerical strength of the Twelfth Army Group was considerably increased. One new army, two corps and nine divisions were brought up on line during the three months period.

The newly-arrived Ninth Army was inserted in the line north of the First Army in the small area of Holland under Twelfth Army Group jurisdiction. The Ninth U.S. Army received control of the XIX Corps from First Army and took over one of the recently arrived corps, the XIII, still in Great Britain when the period opened.

The other corps brought up on line was VIII Corps, moved from mopping-up operations in Brittany, assigned to the First Army, and placed as the southern-most of its corps.

Six of the new divisions arrived relatively early in the period. To the Ninth Army and XIII Corps went the 84th and 102d Infantry Divisions. Commanding CIC

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* Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1951, p. 417.

** Historical Data Cards of the 219th, 207th, 205th, 220th, and 212th CIC Dets, Historical Project, and various documents emanating from the above dets.

with the 84th was 1st Lt. Arthur D. Jenkins while 1st Lt. John G. Suman was Commanding Officer of the 102d CIC Detachment.

Assigned to VIII Corps, First Army, was the 9th Armored Division with a CIC Detachment commanded by Capt. William O. Lueck. The 99th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt. George D. Young, was placed under V Corps, First Army.

The Third U.S. Army received the 510th CIC Detachment and the 95th CIC Detachment.* Both operated with XX Corps in the northern area of the Third Army sector.

In early December, three more divisions were moved up on line. Under Ninth Army CIC was the 78th CIC Detachment, whose Commanding Officer was Capt. Neil M. Ruge. The 106th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt. Francis E. Coad, was under First Army CIC, and the 87th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. Sam E. Harwell, Commanding Officer, was under Third Army CIC jurisdiction.**

Shortage of Supplies Blamed

One of the major reasons advanced for the slowdown in ETO after 15 September was that Field Marshall Montgomery's British forces did not clear the Scheldt Estuary and the Dutch port of Antwerp, a maneuver which would have released the Allied forces from total dependence on the lengthy supply route from Cherbourg. Montgomery spent the early part of the period concentrating on OPERATION MARKET GARDEN, an attempt to skirt the Siegfried Line and take the shortest route to Berlin by dropping airborne troops into Holland.

It was 8 November before the 21st Army Group opened the Scheldt and 26 November before the first convoy unloaded at Antwerp.***

According to General Patton, impatient from the standstill, the acute shortages of ammunition, gasoline and bridging materials were holding back the advance.****

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* Research has failed to uncover the names of the Commanding Officers of the 510th and 95th CIC Detachments.

** Historical Data Cards of the 208th, 213th, 84th, 102d, 509th, 99th, 510th, 95th, 78th, 106th and 87th CIC Detachments, Historical Project, and various documents emanating from the above detachments.

*** Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Co., N.Y., 1951, p.425-6.

**** George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1947, p. 150.

3d Armored First In Germany

In the Twelfth Army Group sector, troops of the 3d Armored Division were the first to pierce the German border. On 14 September, Rotgen, just over the border east of Eupen, Belgium, fell into American hands. The only major German city captured prior to 15 December was Aachen which was reduced by troops of the 1st Infantry Division on 21 October after a prolonged siege.

But advance was slow. By 15 December, few American troops were more than ten miles from the border. The dent in the Siegfried Line extended in a north-south direction from the northern limits of Twelfth Army Group jurisdiction south to Lösheim, Germany.*

The major accomplishment of the Third U.S. Army during the period was the capture by the 95th Infantry Division of the ancient walled city of Metz on 20 November.** By 15 December, scattered combat elements of the Third Army had made penetrations into the Saar, but an over-abundance of mud and a great shortage of replacements***prevented clearance of enough area for Third Army CIC units to get their first taste of operations in Germany.****

CIC Operations Change in Static Situation

With the previously swift Allied advance brought to a virtual standstill, corps and division CIC units found their operations somewhat changed. A great majority of the detachments spent as long as two months in one area and some were located in the same region for the whole period. Such a situation meant that combat unit detachments now found that they had time to become concerned with local affairs and political tangles of the towns and villages in their areas.

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9, from the period 1-15 December 1944, dtd 15 December 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (Unclass), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, VA.); and Historical Data Cards of all CIC Detachments in ETO, Historical Project.

** George S. Patton, Jr, War As I Knew It, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1947, p. 175.

*** Ibid, pp. 180-192.

**** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9, from the period 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 15 Dec 44, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

In clearing personalities for municipal government positions for Military Government and attempting to prevent the rise of Fascist or other totalitaria elements, detachments placed as low as division level spent more time looking into the local political scene.*

The static situation also afforded division and corps detachments, (freed from spending time planning and executing movements to new regions), a chance to experiment with various counterintelligence techniques and develop new ones.

For example, elements within each of the three Armies tested out independently devised plans for coordinated, quickly executed raids and searches of towns and areas already covered once by a CIC unit. These raids, given different names by each of the three detachments using them, served primarily to recheck the security of an area, but also were used to train personnel, both of CIC and of related units whose cooperation in a raid was deemed essential.**

Particularly illustrative of the development of new activities were the ingenious "public opinion polls" of the 29th CIC Detachment. When time permitted, teams of Agents toured the Division, asking questions about troop education, morale and security indoctrination. By getting to the "grass roots" of these matters, CIC was better able to supply answers to security questions raised by higher headquarters.***

Time was available for several units to put into writing the various steps of the civilian screening procedures that they had developed in the field. The 212th CIC Detachment's method was best adapted to a situation demanding speed and efficiency,**** while the thorough technique offered by the 29th CIC Detachment seemed ideally suited to the standstill but hardly practicable for a mobile situation.*****

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* Illustrative of this change are CIC's activities in Aachen and Stolberg, Germany. See the section titled "First Army CIC In Germany."

** For discussion on the "CI Alert," used by the 29th CIC Detachment, see the section entitled "Ninth Army CIC In Holland & Germany." For discussion on the "Blitz Search," used by the 205th CIC Det, see the section entitled "CIC In Belgium & Luxembourg." For discussion on the "Snap Control Check," used by the 212th CIC Detachment, see the section entitled "Third Army CIC In France."

*** For a discussion on the "public opinion polls," used by the 29th CIC Det, see the section entitled "Ninth Army CIC In Holland & Germany."

**** For a discussion of the 212th CIC Det's screening procedure, see the section titled" 'Third Army CIC In France."

***** For a discussion of the 29th CIC Det's screening procedure, see the section titled "Ninth Army In Holland & Germany.

The supply shortage, an important cause for the slowdown of the Allied advance, affected CIC operations in only one respect. The inadequate supply of gasoline prevented quick evacuation of suspects from the forward areas to the rear, hampering CIC's efforts to maintain security.*

CIC Authorized To Recruit Personnel

During the period, CIC in ETO began a program of personnel recruitment in an effort to build up detachments to their authorized Table of Organization strength.** Authorization for recruitment of individuals for CIC detachments came from War Department Circular Number 379, dated 19 September 1944.

The War Department Circular set forth certain qualifications for officers and enlisted men. The officers had to be 25 to 38 years old, physically fit for full overseas duty, college graduates, U.S. citizens and cleared by a CIC background investigation. It was desired that the officers be fluent in one or more foreign language and have previous military service in the field.

For enlisted men there was a 24 to 38 age limit. The enlisted man had to be physically fit for full overseas duty, a U.S. citizen, possess an Army Classification Test score of at least 110, and be a college or a high school graduate with either linguistic ability or investigative experience. His character, discretion, integrity and loyalty to the United States must have also been established by a background investigation.***

The War Department Circular was backed up, in regard to the instructions covering enlisted men, by a letter from European Theater of Operations Headquarters to each Army Group headquarters, but this letter made no mention of possible recruitment of officers. It was stressed that the personnel selected should be fluent German linguists. The letter noted that compliance with the War Department Circular was essential, but conceded that the age and educational requirements might be waived in exceptional cases. It was further noted that while individual detachments might recruit personnel and place them

* Hq, 83d Inf Div, 83d CIC Det, Weekly CI Rpt, To: AC of S, G2, 1st Army (U.S.), dtd 6 October 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

** The abolishment of the CIC Center and CIC School in the ZI had resulted in a shortage of qualified agents in ETO. The chapter on CIC activities in the ZI during this period contains an account of this matter.

*** War Department, Washington 25, D.C., 19 Sep 44, Circular #379, p. 1, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

on detached service as investigators, final approval and assignment would come from ETO Headquarters.*

The War Department Circular was further disseminated through Twelfth Army Group Headquarters to the various Armies. This order was almost entirely a quote from the European Theater of Operations document with an additional reference to the fact that a limited number of CIC clerks were needed. It was desired that personnel with satisfactory typing and shorthand ability also be recruited by each detachment.**

In laying stress on German linguists, the European Theater of Operations letter hit on a vital need for the detachments with combat units. As the American forces rapidly pushed near Germany, the lack of linguists became a matter of great concern to the local commanders. A letter from the Commanding Officer, 208th CIC Detachment, to the AC of S, G2, VIII Corps, explained that Detachment's plight. Of the five officers and fourteen enlisted men with the unit, two spoke German. An enlisted man from the Corps Military Intelligence Interpreter Team, farmed out to CIC, also spoke German. The 208th noted that efforts to alleviate the situation by borrowing men from Corps or Army Interrogation Prisoner of War Teams had been unsatisfactory, since the men usually were called back to their previous organizations within a few days. Requests for CIC linguists from higher headquarters had been without success. Attempts to use civilian interpreters, paid out of confidential funds, proved unsatisfactory, because high type individuals would not work at the prescribed pay rate nor at the odd hours required. Furthermore, each time the Detachment moved, new German civilian linguists had to be found. It was estimated that the 208th CIC Detachment would require seven additional fluent German linguists on a reasonably permanent basis to carry out their mission inside Nazi Germany.***

Implementing the orders from the War Department, ETO and 12th Army Group, CIC Detachments set out to recruit men for their unit, hoping to acquire suitable German linguists in addition to just filling Table of Organization slots.

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* Hq, ETO, U.S. Army, Subj: Enlisted Personnel for CIC Dets, To: CGs, Each Army Group, First Allied Airborne Army, 30 Nov 44, /s/ For The Commanding General: R. B. Lovett, Brig Gen, Adj Gen, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Hq, 12th Army Group, Subj: Enlisted Personnel For CIC Dets, To: CGs, First, Third and Ninth U.S. Armies, 9 Dec 44, /s/ By Command of Lieutenant General Bradley: E. C. Davies, Capt, Asst Adj Gen, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

*** Hq, VIII Corps, 208th CIC Det, Subject: Linguists for CIC Detachments, To: AC of S, G2, Hq VIII Corps, 7 Nov 44, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr, Capt, Commanding, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

Background Investigations Inadequate

There proved to be two unfortunate aspects to the procurement program: recruitment was hasty and background investigations were inadequate. The urgent need for German linguist Agents, as expressed by the 208th CIC Detachment, had apparently overruled some security considerations.

Records indicate that many German linguists operated as Agents, usually on detached service, prior to even a request for a ZI background investigation. In some instances as few as four interviews with officers and men of the subject's unit was sufficient for clearance.*

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* There seems to have been no uniform procedure for either the ETO or ZI phases of the background investigations of these men.

The Subject of CRF dossier X8374620 was listed as "attached from other organizations" in a roster of the 29th CIC Detachment dated 26 Feb 45. It is recorded that on numerous occasions he performed Agent's duties, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094). There is no record that he was ever transferred on ETO orders to CIC. The only records of ZI investigations of the Subject are dated in 1948.

Records of the 207th CIC Detachment contain the complete investigation of a Master Sergeant being considered for CIC. He was recommended for CIC assignment after interviews with four of his acquaintances in ETO and a personal interview by the Commanding Officer of the 207th CIC. The investigation was completed on 7 April 1945, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094). ETO rejected the Subject in a letter dated 28 July 1945 because no vacancies existed in the Subject's grade, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

The subject of CRF dossier X2118408 applied for transfer to the 104th CIC Det. Records indicate that that Det completed its investigation of the Subject on 16 Jan 45. An ETO order dated 22 Feb 45 (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094) transferred the subject to CIC, but a letter from Army Service Forces in Washington dtd 2 Apr 45 held up the final transfer pending a ZI investigation, CIC, Hq 5th Service Command ran an investigation from 13 April - 21 Apr 45 and Army Service Forces rpted that the subj was "favorably considered" for CIC in correspondence dtd 11 May 45.

German Intelligence Service Activities: Decreasing

By mid-September 1944, there was some optimism that Allied operations against the German Intelligence Service(GIS) had achieved a great measure of success. Perhaps unduly encouraging was the following statement in a memorandum from a Special Counter Intelligence Liaison Officer to Colonel A. B. Dickson, the G2 of First U.S. Army. The memo read in part:
"...the GIS (German Intelligence Service) left a network of stay-behind agents along the so-called Atlantic Wall. This network has been a complete and miserable failure in the First Army area as three of these agents are now working as double agents for the U.S. Army and are feeding the Germans false information. Some agents have surrendered; some have tried to remain unknown, but never working or sending reports to the German Intelligence Service."

The memorandum further labeled the German Intelligence Service as more a myth than a menace and noted that it was the first official German agency to recognize Hitler's hopeless situation.*

A closer analysis was presented by Headquarters, ETO, in its Counterintelligence Report for 16 September to 1 October 1944. Although the many accounts that Nazi agents were still operating in liberated territory were not ignored, the counterintelligence report predicted that the most important operatives had fled the area. The great aggressive zeal of the French resistance groups in rounding up persons who had operated for the enemy was commended, and the feeling was expressed that many potential enemy collaborators had temporarily ceased to function, refusing to risk their necks for what at that time looked so much like a losing cause. The report concluded prophetically: "This ostrich-like action might well be reversed if the tactical situation becomes stale-mated, or if efforts of the Allies such as the airborne landing failed to achieve initially sought success."**

Increasing

When the combat situation had reached what was obviously going to be a lengthy stand-still and OPERATION MARKET GARDEN had failed, the German Intelligence Service came alive again. By mid-October, there was a considerable increase in short term line crossers operating for the Abwehr. In running scores of hastily-trained low level agents, the German high command must have been "playing the percentages." They certainly recognized that the majority of these

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* Memorandum from SCI Liaison Officer to AC of S, G2, First U.S. Army; G2 Journal, First U.S. Army, 19-21 September 1944. (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Hq ETO, U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, CI Rpt for the period 16 Sep to 1 Oct 44, dtd 31 Oct 44, /s/ F.A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

men would be captured by Allied counterintelligence. Apparently the return of a small number of these low-grade agents with limited, local, tactical information was considered a satisfactory dividend. *

CIC soon learned the general instructions given these short-term agents. After crossing the Allied lines, the agents were to approach openly the first soldier or Military Policeman they spotted. The German was to say that he had escaped from Nazi territory with valuable tactical information to give the Allies and to request transportation to the nearest Command Post to report this data. At the Command Post the interrogators were to be given plausible but general information, enough to convince them that the agent was not to be regarded as suspicious.

The German was then to request to go to the Allied rear areas to visit friends and relatives. With permission to travel outside the combat zone, he would circulate instead in the combat area, obtaining Order of Battle intelligence. After several days, the agent was to recross the lines with his information. **

An unusual but apparently wide-spread German intelligence operation involved "convict agents" - Frenchmen released by the Nazi from long prison terms given them prior to the war by French authorities. Feeling that these men would not risk turning themselves over to the Allies, the Germans assigned them rudimentary espionage missions. ***

There was some evidence, according to Operational Histories, by mid-November, after the low-grade "guinea pigs" had tested travel routes and controls in the Allied zones, that the German Intelligence Service was beginning to send out more experienced agents. ****

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #5, 1-15 Oct 44, dtd 15 Oct 44 -- from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO Alexandria, Va.); and Operational History of Theaters, "Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Holland."

** Master (First U.S. Army) G2, CI Bulletin #6, 11 Nov 44, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

*** For a discussion of CIC's operations against "convict agents," see the Chapter 6, titled "Third Army CIC in France."

**** Operational History of Theaters, "Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Holland."

These line-crossing-agents were supplemented by those stay-behind agents who had managed to evade capture. For instance, one German agent apprehended in Liege stated that he knew of about twenty Belgians and two Germans left behind in the city by the Abwehr to operate a radio transmitter service and engage in sabotage.*

Right up to 15 December, German Intelligence Service activities seemed to accelerate. German soldiers in civilian clothes performing two to four day missions continued to enter American zones. German agents equipped with American uniforms and jeeps began to infiltrate the U.S. lines in ever increasing numbers.

To counter German Intelligence Service operations, in December, a coordinated counterintelligence control line running north-to-south along the Twelfth Army Group sector was established at division rear. Long under consideration as an essential move, this control line proved an important factor in frustrating German Intelligence Service activities.**

Security Service (SD): Threatening

In spite of all the encouragement derived from CIC's capture of numerous low-level line crossers, "convict agents," German soldiers in mufti, and German Intelligence Service agents in U.S. uniform during this period and in the months to come, one heavy cloud of doubt hung over high-level American counterintelligence authorities: There was the threat of the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Secret Service of the Schutz Staffeln (SS). A report from Third Army G2 in September discussed at some length the capabilities of this organization.

Pointing out that the Sicherheitsdienst unit, although not numerically large, was by far the most dangerous agency in Germany at that time, the report stated that Sicherheitsdienst personnel would probably be used in espionage and sabotage for which they were thoroughly trained and experienced.

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #6, 16-31 Oct 44, dtd 31 Oct 44, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9, 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 15 Dec 44, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Exec, for the AC of S, G2, (Unclass), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.). NOTE: Full discussions of the activities of German agents in U.S. uniforms and the workings of the American CI control line are contained in the chapter concerning the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

The report covered the inception and subsequent history of the Sicherheitsdienst. Prior to the war, the Sicherheitsdienst had served as the highest political intelligence unit in Germany with agents distributed all over the world reporting on the political currents of all nations.

The Sicherheitsdienst employed the most highly skilled German intelligence operatives who usually appeared to be inoffensive civilians or legitimate business representatives. Functioning most often in large cities, agents hired sub-agents and, utilizing this network, received, processed and disseminated information.

The agents took extreme pains to protect their cover. Rarely did the agent himself engage in espionage. He acted as the "brains" of his own intelligence network and was often known to the sub-agents only by a code identification.

At the outbreak of the war, the Germans had espionage networks operating in most of the principal countries, and only a few minor changes were needed to gear the Sicherheitsdienst to war time policy. More stress was placed upon obtaining military intelligence, but there was no let up in the search for valuable political information. New agents, better trained to report on military activities, were added to the organization.

Aside from the threat the Sicherheitsdienst posed in the liberated areas, CIC also was concerned about what it might be able to accomplish inside Germany after the Allies entered. The G2 report concluded: "The SS Sicherheitsdienst can be expected to hamper and harass all Allied forces in Germany. This will be done not on the surface but through underground means. Should there be extensive underground armed resistance to the Allies in Germany, the SD, with its background of many years experience, well-established agents and fanatically pro-Nazi personnel, will probably be the directing agency."*

Another Threat

In bringing up a possible underground resistance movement in Germany, the report referred to another matter that kept CIC from becoming complacent about its future task.

Since the beginning of 1944, various reports, from sources believed to be reliable, indicated that the Nazi regime in Germany was preparing to go underground after the defeat of the Wehrmacht and thereby cause the Allies the maximum of difficulty, and the German who accepted the presence of the Allies the maximum of discomfort.

* Hq, 3rd U.S. Army, G2 Periodic Intelligence Rpt #102, 21 September 1944, in G2 File & Jnl of the 6th Armored Div, 19-21 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Himmler was thought to be the Nazi official in charge of these underground preparations. The first step involved setting up so-called "Vehme (revenge) organizations, consisting of carefully chosen political fanatics who belonged to various uniform party organizations, and politically sound members of the Hitler Jugend. These Vehme organizations were reported to be composed of cells of five members, which each cell's activity coordinated by contact men. The Vehme units were to prepare to engage in partisan activity against the occupying forces. Stores of weapons were being built up on both an individual and a regional basis. All Nazi party members were reportedly encouraged to hide some kind of weapon in their homes.

Funds for this underground movement were supposed to be already concealed in neutral nations' banks. Two methods of placement of these funds were in use. Quantities of medical and pharmaceutical products were being sent to Sweden and Switzerland, with the payments for these goods being left in the neutral country as camouflaged bank accounts.

The other scheme called for young Nazi women to marry wealthy neutral nationals, so that they might be given large dowries which then went to neutral banks and were accessible to the underground.

Reports of such schemes were enough to keep even the most optimistic of Allied intelligence officers wary of their German adversaries.*

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* First U.S. Army, Annex #2 to G2 Periodic Rpt #97, 15 Sep 44, Subject: Underground Resistance In Germany, from First U.S. Army, G2 Jnl and File, 12-15 Sep 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 2

CIC WITH OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN

While the American forces waited on the Siegfried Line, preparations were being completed at SHAEF for one of the most daring maneuvers of World War II. Under urging from Field Marshal Montgomery, General Eisenhower had given the "green light" for the largest airborne operation ever attempted.

Code-named MARKET GARDEN, the plan called for a sixty-mile salient to be driven up a side alley route to the heart of the Reich. If successful, it would outflank the Siegfried defenses and carry Montgomery across the lower Rhine to the shortest route to Berlin. The major obstacles to advance were to be the five major waterways between Antwerp and Montgomery's objective at Arnhem.

Three airborne divisions were selected to unroll the carpet across these waterways. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division was to jump near Eindhoven, the American 82d Airborne Division at Nijmegen, and the British 1st Airborne Division at the peninsula near Arnhem. The paratroopers were to seize the bridges spanning these waterways and hold them until Montgomery's ground troops could break through. The British Field Marshal was confident that the link-up would not take longer than 72 hours.

On 17 September, the skies over Holland darkened with aircraft as the First Allied Airborne Army roared toward its destination.*

Three CIC Men With 101st Airborne Division

Near Zon, just north of Eindhoven, the 101st tumbled into the sky for its second operation of the war.**

Making the jump on the first day were three members of the 101st CIC Detachment. The group consisted of Captain Martin E. McGuire,*** the commanding officer, and Agents Howard W. Symmes and Thomas E. Ryan. These three men were the only members of the 101st Detachment who had survived the Normandy jumps without serious injury. Shortly after touching Dutch soil, they were met,

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* The Struggle For Europe, by Chester Wilmot, New York, 1952, p. 498.

** Ibid, p. 506.

*** Captain McGuire received two stars on parachute wings for combat jumps, the Bronze Star, the Belgian Croiz de Forraguere and the Presidential Citation with one cluster; (Holabird Herald, Vol 2, #51, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Maryland, 14 December 1945).

in accord with a pre-arranged signal, by a leader of the Dutch underground - an anonymous figure who went under the alias of "Peter." This fabulous individual had circulated among the Germans all during the occupation, concealing his real identity only by undergoing plastic surgery.*

During the first night in Holland, the four men, along with members of the 506th Regiment to which the CIC Detachment was attached, scrambled across the Wilhelmina Canal. At dawn the next morning, they entered Eindhoven unopposed.

Their entry into the city was discovered almost immediately by the Dutch citizens. At first the Americans were surrounded by forty to fifty people and then from everywhere flags and bunting broke out. Citizens put on native costumes and a wild two-day celebration began.

However, the American troops had little time for such gaiety. While the combat elements of the 101st attempted to push south in order to effect a meeting with Montgomery's forces, Captain McGuire and his two Agents, with the invaluable aid of "Peter" and some other loyal Dutchmen, rounded up three hundred suspected Nazi collaborators. Preliminary screening revealed that the suspects knew little in the way of counterintelligence information. Consequently, they were released to the custody of the local Dutch authorities.

Agents Seize Phillips Radio Plant

Agents seized all communication centers in Eindhoven as well as the Phillips Radio Plant, a vast storehouse of scientific information. It took British scientists, who later assumed control of the plant, until the end of the war to finish studying everything of value. When Captain McGuire's group first entered the grounds, they discovered that the entire network of buildings was wired for demolition. A heavy guard was thrown around the area and the wires pulled. "Peter" meanwhile, showed the CIC Agents the cellar of the main building where he and his compatriots had held numerous clandestine meetings directly beneath the unsuspecting Germans. In this factory right under the noses of the Germans, Dutch resistance personnel had manufactured radio sets for the underground.**

Later in the day, while searching a wrecked German bunker, Captain McGuire was amazed to discover that the field telephone was still working. A monitor was immediately placed on the phone. Although no important information was received before the connection was severed by the Germans several hours later, the Agent was surprised to find that the phone had a tie-in with a trunk line leading back to Berlin. From the tone of the overheard conversations, the airborne operation had been a complete surprise to the Germans.

* Interview with Captain Martin E. McGuire reported in (Holabird Herald, Vol 2, #51, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Maryland, 14 December 1945.)

** Sets may be seen at the Netherlands War Museum, Overloon, Holland.

101st CIC Detachment Acquires Seven New Members

By early evening on 18 September, the 101st CIC Detachment was bolstered by the arrival of seven more Agents who had arrived with other reinforcements that afternoon by glider.*

For the next several days, the Detachment split into three-man teams and established control points and screened refugees. However, no important black list personalities were arrested, all of them having fled previously into Germany. Meanwhile, the 101st Division had contacted the British Second Army to the south and now turned its attention to linking up with the 82d and the British 1st Airborne Division to the north.**

MARKET GARDEN Proves To Be "Briar Patch"

Contacting the other two divisions engaged in MARKET GARDEN proved to be no easy task, for German resistance suddenly stiffened. Although the 82d was relieved in time, the British 1st, which had landed the farthest behind the German lines, was not so fortunate. Surrounded at Arnhem, the red-bereted British paratrooper Division was cut to pieces by repeated armored attacks. Montgomery ruefully conceded later, "The easy path concealed a briar patch."***

Early in October, the 101st Division moved north into new positions between the Waal and Neder Rijn Rivers. By this time it was apparent that any quick thrust across the Rhine was impossible.

In this area for the next thirty days, the 101st engaged in some of the bitterest fighting of the war. Heavy casualties were suffered by the Division, the list including Agent Ryan who was wounded while near the front lines.

McGuire's Men Screen Civilians In The Division Area

Although under constant artillery fire, Captain McGuire and his men undertook the strenuous task of screening all civilians within the division area. In order to accomplish the mission, Captain McGuire utilized the mayors and municipal officials of the nearby villages. Three control points were selected. At each were stationed two CIC Agents and several of the local authorities. Because the only good road was already clogged with military traffic, the control

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* The Agents were: Alexander A. Notopoulos, William J. Tofant, William E. Clark, William P. Reed, Curtis M. Foster, Nunzio A. Giambalvo and George E. Martin.

** Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire, 24 August 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

*** A Soldier's Story, by Omar N. Bradley, New York, 1951, p. 414-19.

points were set up beside the canals. As barges filled with refugees drew up alongside, the officials were asked to identify all the persons in the group. Those not known to the local authorities were sent to the other two points to see if someone there could identify them. If no one at the three points knew the refugee, he was considered a suspect and sent to the rear where he was released to the custody of British Field Security, which by this time had established close liaison with the 101st Detachment and had operational control over the area.

With this method, Captain McGuire's detachment was able to screen approximately 8,000 persons, thirty to forty being sent to the rear as suspects.

(U) Liaison with British intelligence was close and in almost all cases favorable. According to Captain McGuire, the only source of antagonism which arose on either side was the degree of responsibility delegated to the American enlisted men. British intelligence officers took a dim view of this, holding to the opinion that contact with the Dutch and Germans should be made by officer personnel and that enlisted men should perform housekeeping chores, act as runners, and carry out other lesser duties. After a series of minor clashes over this point, Captain McGuire politely, but firmly, told the British officers that his men were especially trained to perform all counterintelligence missions and that he would continue to direct that they do so. He also stressed that he was the only officer in his detachment and it was impossible to handle all matters personally.

CIC Hears A Man With Important Information

During November, an unidentified individual walked into the headquarters of the 101st CIC Detachment and announced that he had some important information for the Americans. As a matter of routine, the man was investigated by checking with reliable informants. Agents were startled to learn that the individual was the most sought Nazi collaborator in the vicinity.

CIC informants revealed that the man had been responsible for the massacre of 100 Dutch civilians some weeks previously. Shortly after the Allied airborne drop, the German garrison at an unidentified Dutch village heard over the radio that American paratroopers were approaching. The panic-stricken Germans immediately evacuated the town. The townspeople, overjoyed at being freed of their Nazi masters after four years, began a wild celebration. They broke into the German storehouses and helped themselves to quantities of food and clothing. Others wrecked Nazi offices and the German Commandant's home.

The celebration proved premature however, for soon the Germans returned. They had realized that the radio announcer had been speaking of another village by the same name in Belgium. Incensed at the damage inflicted on their installations, the Nazis began retaliation at once. With the aid of the man who was later to enter the CIC offices, the Germans rounded up the leaders of the ill-fated

celebration and herded them into a barn. While the remainder of the townspeople watched in horror, the Germans set fire to the building.

Interrogation of the collaborator by Agents of the 101st Detachment failed to reveal why he had entered the American lines. Once confronted with his crimes, he refused to speak. He no longer had any vital information to give CIC.

There was no evidence that the former collaborator had been on an espionage mission or was in any way working for the Germans when he visited CIC. The man was released to the custody of the Dutch. Although Captain McGuire was invited to the man's execution the next morning, he declined.

Shortly after this episode, on 29 November, the 101st Airborne Division pulled out of Holland, after seventy-two days in the line, and was sent to a rest camp in Northern France.*

Six Agents of 82d CIC Detachment Jump Into Holland

Six Agents of the 82d CIC Detachment made the jump at Nijmegen. The first phase of their mission consisted of searching targets and arresting known counter-intelligence suspects in the Nijmegen area. Because of the small number of Agents available, many suspects escaped. After the capture of the Nijmegen bridge by the 82d Airborne Division, the main task of the detachment became the supervision of civilian controls. This operation was hardly routine because, hampered by the closeness of combat, local authorities were unable to put into effect no-travel orders for approximately ten days. Agents of the 82d Detachment found that their best informants were priests, doctors, and captured Abwehr and Sicherheitspolizei agents who seemed only too willing to implicate their associates.

SHAEF personality lists were too out of date to be of help, but SHAEF target lists were found most useful and on the whole accurate.**

* Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire, 24 August 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

** Allied Airborne Operations in Holland, September-October 1944, (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 3

FIRST ARMY CIC IN GERMANY

During the third week of September, while the Germans were still reeling from the Allied onslaught across Northern France, the U.S. VII Corps made a quick breach in the main defenses of the Siegfried Line and entered Germany south of Aachen. But shortage of troops and ammunition, along with stiff German resistance, brought the American advance to a halt. Eventually Aachen was completely encircled by the U.S. First Army and taken by the 1st Infantry Division in bitter house-to-house combat. The final surrender of Aachen came on 21 October.*

Although CIC recognized that its operations would be radically changed when Allied troops entered Germany, the sweep across France had been too swift to allow any specific orientation on the unusual problems to be encountered.** Fortunately the several VII Corps CIC units that operated in Germany during the battle for Aachen kept track of how they overcame their major difficulties and passed their knowledge on to the other ETO CIC units.***

These first CIC units to enter enemy territory found that the Germans, habitually obedient to those over them, were best controlled by rigid enforcement of orders. It was found that ordering a German to do something brought results, while a request for action was considered a sign of weakness and was ignored. CIC units were cautioned to take extra pains to be fair to the Germans, since the Nazis had spread stories about American brutality. The German people would cooperate more readily if the Americans quickly indicated by their actions that such stories were not true.

VII Corps CIC found that a German questioned about his political beliefs usually spoke of his party affiliations before Hitler's rise. Often those who admitted Nazi party membership claimed that they had been forced to join to keep their businesses alive. Since it was well-known that the German Catholics, predominant around Aachen, were generally anti-Nazi, many people claimed that they could not be Nazis because of their strong Catholic beliefs. It was found that local priests were helpful in indicating which men were strong Catholics,

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* The Struggle for Europe, by Chester Wilmot, New York, 1952, p. 566-569.

** Hqs, Military Intelligence Service, ETO, "Counterintelligence Screening by Interrogation Teams In The Aachen Area," p. 1, 10 March 1945. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** See Appendix 1 for "Counter Intelligence Screening by Interrogation Teams in the Aachen Area," prepared in March 1945, presumably to be used in training new personnel.

but the priests, after ten years of fighting the appeal of the Nazis, tended to build up the virtues of their strongest parishioners and unduly criticize the backsliders. However, religious affiliation alone was not enough to clear an individual. The final judgement of a man's political beliefs had to be his political record.

CIC found that the eagerness of an informant varied directly with the distance from the front lines. Potential informants tended to sit tight until it was certain that the Wehrmacht would not return. It was also discovered that informants often waited until CIC convictions of some top Nazis indicated that something would be done if they spoke up.

CIC units were reminded that informants in Germany had to be kept under cover as much as possible. In France and Belgium, men had rushed forward to denounce collaborators and were proud to have their neighbors know of their actions. In enemy territory the exact opposite was found to be true. CIC informants in Germany were collaborators in the eyes of most of their neighbors and, as a result, feared retaliation. CIC units were told that their informants expected and should get some special privileges, but that these advantages should be cut off at the first sign of abuse.*

Hints For Interrogating Germans Passed On

(U) The first CIC Detachment in Germany had some helpful hints for Agents interrogating German suspects. Captain George Gallagher, CO of the 9th CIC Detachment, reported, "The main thing in interrogating German civilians or soldiers is to adopt the same attitude toward them that the German military would adopt." The Germans, whom Gallagher said he found to be more accomplished liars that other Europeans, would immediately have the upper hand if the interrogating Agent treated them with deference, or addressed them as if they were American civilians. When the interrogator felt that he had found something out of line, it was recommended that he become "very loud, glaring and forceful and directly accuse the German of lying." Captain Gallagher felt that no harm would be done by such an accusation even if the suspect were telling the truth.

* Hq VII Corps, AC of S, G2, "CIC vs. Naziism", 24 November 1944, /s/ for the AC of S, G2: James K. Dorsett, Jr, Maj, Inf, CI Officer, CONFIDENTIAL, Staff and Faculty Library.

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It was noted that a German without the proper credentials to back up his claimed status should be immediately suspect, since Europeans were universally careful not to lose their papers. Suspicion was placed on any German civilian male between 18 and 50 until the individual could produce Army discharge papers or a record of physical disability.*

Agents of the 503d CIC Detachment found in interrogating Germans that best results were obtained if hints were dropped that the Americans were in possession of a detailed file card and could quickly spot a lie. Agents were urged to indicate to a German under interrogation the penalty for not telling the complete truth. When convinced that lying would be useless, many individuals supplied a wealth of information concerning activities of others. 503d CIC Agents reported that most Germans had built up, for purposes of self-defense during the Nazi regime, considerable information about their neighbors.

Suspects who could not be convicted immediately were put under "house arrest," meaning that they were ordered to remain in their homes at all times with CIC checking at irregular intervals. Under a threat of sterner penalties for violation, the usually suspects obeyed the house arrest order.

In enemy territory the necessity for complete cooperation between Military Government and CIC became of supreme importance. MG had to set up a government quickly when a town was taken, and CIC had to act just as quickly to insure that appointed officials were not Nazis. Unfortunately, the best men for official positions, those with long experience as civil servants, were most often Nazis. Although the appointments were ultimately up to MG, complete cooperation from CIC was an absolute necessity.

CIC discovered that no matter what men were put in official positions, there were likely to be complaints from the appointee's enemies. Because every official in the course of his work had to do things distasteful to many citizens, complaints often stemmed from a desire to replace the incumbent with someone more easy-going.

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* "What Occurs When The Division Moves Into New Territory", written by George Gallagher, Capt, CO, 9th CIC Detachment, Undated, CONFIDENTIAL Staff and Faculty Library.

Combat Troops Pose Two New Problems for CIC

The first few CIC units operating in German territory also ran into two new problems involving their relations with tactical troops.

Prior to the entrance into Germany, American troops had been ordered not to fraternize* with the German people. CIC recognized this as a sound security measure, but found that military personnel were often reluctant to give information or testify in cases involving local Germans for fear of becoming suspected of fraternization. CIC Agents were advised to concentrate on their major objective, subversive civilians, and leave fraternization cases strictly in the hands of the unit commanders.

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* Hqs, First US Army, Subject: Relations of Troops with Civil Populace, To: Corps, Division, and Separate Unit Commanders, 15 September 1944, (RESTRICTED), (KCD BX25097)

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CIC found that front line troops and their commanders were so eager in their desire to arrest Nazis that CIC was accused by them of coddling war criminals when a German under the mildest suspicion was not immediately apprehended. In some cases it was impossible to convey to combat commanders the necessity of a policy of fairness toward all Germans. In an effort to be as just as possible and yet contain the front line troops, CIC units urged to keep all possible suspects under house arrest.*

Majority of Germans Evacuated From Aachen

When American troops entered Aachen, all but about 10,000 of the 163,000 inhabitants had been evacuated, either voluntarily or forcefully, by the German Army. Most of the refugees moved eastward into Germany, but about one thousand drifted through the lines to settle in eastern Belgium.** As early as 18 September, the 1st CIC Detachment had picked up refugees fleeing from Aachen to the west.***

The 1st CIC Detachment, under 2d Lt. Charles G. Steinway, drew the responsibility of exploiting immediate counterintelligence targets and screening the residents who had not been evacuated. The VII Corps CIC, commanded by Maj. James K. Dorsett, took responsibility from the outset for the screening of Germans to be used in civil government.

After a preliminary screening soon after the Americans arrived, the citizens of Aachen were rescreened by CIC before they were issued passes allowing them to circulate within the city. According to the 1st CIC Detachment, the majority of the civilians encountered were cooperative and seemed to be relieved at the release from Nazi pressure.

A team of four Agents from the 1st CIC searched approximately 100 building targets arranged according to priority on a list provided by First Army headquarters. A member of the division Order of Battle team accompanied the searching parties so that an immediate evaluation could be made of all intelligence data uncovered.

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* Hq, VII Corps, AC of S, G2, "CIC vs Naziism," 24 November 1944, /s/ for AC of S, G2: James K. Dorsett, Jr., Maj., Inf., CI Officer. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Hq, Military Intelligence Service, ETO, "Counterintelligence Screening By Interrogation Teams In The Aachen Area," p.1, 10 March 1945, CONFIDENTIAL, Staff and Faculty Library.

*** 1st Infantry Division, CIC Detachment Daily Report, 18 September 1944, UNCLASSIFIED, /s/ C.G.Steinway, 2d Lt., Commanding, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.

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Another team of four Agents was responsible for locating and closing down all means of communication in the city. Using a 1942 telephone directory, the Agents plotted on a map of Aachen the locations of all telephone and telegraph exchanges, both public and private. Most such places were found to be bombed out, but wherever telephone facilities were undamaged, the Agents notified the Division Signal Corps unit.*

Military Government-Appointed Officials Choose Their Own Subordinates

Military Government officials in Aachen appointed a lawyer and business executive named Oppenhoff to the position of Oberburgermeister and allowed him to select nine Burgermeisters. CIC subsequently investigated and cleared these men. The nine Burgermeisters were then allowed by Military Government to choose their own subordinates. In effect this meant that Oppenhoff had been given a virtual free rein in the selection of the government for the city. While most of the men, as individuals, were perfectly suitable from a security standpoint, they naturally tended to hold similar political views, and Military Government had inadvertently created a political machine, in this case one of men that were predominately conservative industrialists. The liberal element of the population was almost completely excluded from participation in government.

When Military Government representatives allowed the power that should have remained with the Allied Occupation to fall to Oppenhoff's group, they greatly hindered any American attempts to oust security risks from the government. CIC found that when investigation of an individual indicated that a clearance should not be granted, the individual's superior would claim the man to be indispensible, and Oppenhoff would personally appeal the matter to Military Government. As a result, some security threats were permitted to remain in the Aachen municipal government.

CIC felt that security would be greatly improved in the future if Military Government chose not only the top man but his subordinates as well. With leaders appointed separately, it would be possible to avoid another clique that could successfully resist CIC efforts to remove undesirables.

CIC also felt that in a government of conflicting viewpoints and interests, the normal jealousies of the individual leaders would make them more likely to inform on each other to CIC. The common interests of the Oppenhoff group made a solid front which hindered CIC efforts to develop informants.** Military Government also recognized the dangers of allowing one man to choose the municipal

* Operational History of Theaters, "Germany Before V-E Day."

** Hqs, VII Corps, Office of the AC of S, G2, "CIC and MG Exterminators, Inc.", 14 January 1944, /s/ for the AC of S, G2 by James K. Dorsett, Major, Infantry, Chief CI Section, CONFIDENTIAL, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

government, and in subsequent operations tended to hold tighter control over the appointments of officials.*

As for the clique, it was February before the Americans could make much of a dent in their solid front. Ten percent of the public officials in Aachen resigned under pressure or were dismissed after investigation during that month.**

The CIC investigation of a newly-appointed municipal official was divided into three phases. The appointee was thoroughly interrogated with special emphasis placed on his attitude toward the Nazi party. Interrogators were instructed to require any person who admitted to having been a member of the Nazi Party to sign a sworn statement to that effect. CIC also conducted a records investigation and questioned the subject's acquaintances. The official was then observed in his new position, largely by informants, since CIC did not have the necessary personnel to accomplish this task.***

A representative example of a proposed municipal official rejected by CIC was chosen by the organization to be an assistant Burgermeister. was a former member of the board of the a sincere Catholic, and an extremely capable executive. CIC investigation revealed that had been for over two years in occupied Russia, holding a directly-appointed rank of in the German Army. admitted that, although he had never been a member of the Nazi Party, the Nazis had placed complete confidence in him. voiced his opinion that the biggest mistake of the Treaty of Versailles was that Germany had not been given equal rights with the other countries, and further stated that he wished to work to build a strong Germany to forestall another such "mistake." Under the provisions of SHAEF directives, was arrested for collaboration. Since was not merely ousted from his official position as a threat to security, the clique was prevented from interposing on his behalf.

When there were insufficient grounds for arrest, CIC could recommend that an official deemed undesirable be removed from his position and no further action taken. Such was the case with proposed head of the told CIC that he had joined the Nazi party in 1933 when told to do so by the leading men of Aachen industry. During the war,

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* See Chapter 9: "The Rhine Breached," sections on CIC in Cologne.

** First U.S. Army, After Action Report for 1-28 February 1945, L-548, UNCLASSIFIED (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

*** Operational History of Theaters, "Germany Before V-E Day." RESTRICTED (Staff and Faculty Library).

did not suffer financially and worked hard to further the German war effort. Many leading liberals in Aachen denounced as a dangerous partisan of Nazism. However, CIC could not uncover sufficient proof of subversive intentions to make arrest possible, and was simply turned down as a potential civil servant. CIC also rejected individuals who, while not dangerous to American security, had poor reputations.

In extreme cases, CIC had to grant temporary clearances to questionable men because of the need for the experience and special skills of these individuals. A calculated risk of this order was who for years had been the manager of the Aachen branch of what was believed to have been the in Germany. claimed he joined the party in 1933 at the request of his in Berlin. On 3 October 1944, under orders from his employers, Zinnecke evacuated the stocks and records of the On 4 October, he returned to Aachen to CIC recognized that might well have been a Nazi plant in Aachen left with orders to report on the Allied handling of monetary problems. But because of the complete lack of native financial experts, had to be given a temporary clearance by CIC to work under the Military Government fiscal officer. This officer was made fully aware of questionable reliability and replaced him as soon as a competent could be found.*

503d CIC: First Detachment To Enter Germany

While the 1st Infantry Division pushed toward Aachen, the 3d Armored Division was moving up in a northeasterly direction, to complete the encirclement of the city. The first German town to fall into American hands, Rotgen, just over the border, 10 miles south of Aachen, was taken by advance elements of the 3d Armored Division on 14 September.

On the same day, the Commanding Officer of the 503d CIC Detachment, Captain Theodore M. Black, and two of his Agents began the first counterintelligence coverage of a German town. The Agents found Rotgen almost devoid of counterintelligence personalities and data. The Nazi Burgermeister and all the Sicherheitsdienst men had fled, and no Gestapo representatives or informants could be found in the town.

, who had been forced to work for the Germans but had refused to retreat with them, was of great assistance to the three Agents in the initial stages of their work in Rotgen. He briefed CIC on the events

* Hqs, VII Corps, Office of the A C of S, G2, "CIC and MG-Exterminators, Inc.", 14 January 1944, /s/ for the A C of S, G2 by James K. Dorsett, Major, Infantry, Chief CI Section, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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that occured just prior to the city's capture; he gave the names of the people in town suspected of having Nazi leanings; he pointed out the buildings which had formerly served as German headquarters; and he filled the Agents in on the backgrounds of the individuals that Military Government had placed in the reconstructed municipal government.

was ordered, as a by Military Government, to report to CIC the presence or rumored presence of Nazi party and Gestapo members in civilian clothing.

The absence of counterintelligence targets in Rotgen caused the 503d CIC Agents to advance an obvious conclusion: the Germans were ordering all pro-Nazi officials and key Nazi party members to evacuate from towns in the direct path of the Allied sweep to prevent their apprehension and subsequent interrogation by Allied intelligence operatives.

This evacuation policy, which was expected to be strictly enforced now that Allied forces were inside the Reich, did not, in the eyes of the Agents of the 503d CIC, "...preclude the possibility or probability that pro-Nazi persons have been or would be left purposely behind..."*

After 14 September, the 503d CIC Detachment moved on with the 3d Armored Division, and counterintelligence activity in Rotgen was left to the 9th Infantry Division CIC.

On 22 September, a month before Aachen was to fall, the industrial town of Stolberg, six miles east of Aachen, fell to the forces of the 3d Armored. The 503d CIC Agents spent the remainder of the period engaged in operations in Stolberg. Near the middle of December, they were joined by the CIC Detachment of the 104th Infantry Division.**

The Case Of The Spanlose Formung

During the fast-changing combat situation, CIC often received cases outside the scope of counterintelligence when the proper investigative agency was not represented in an area and immediate action was required. To intelligence officers at First Army Headquarters, the prime target in Stolberg was Prym Enterprises,

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* 3d Armored Division, 503d CIC Detachment, Memorandum For The AC of S. G2, Subject: Rotgen, Germany (Counterintelligence) 14 September 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt. Inf. Commanding, CONFIDENTIAL, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

** Numerous documents dated from 15 Sept. to 15 Dec. 44 from the 503d CIC Det. (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

believed to be the source of turbine blades for a new German Jet aircraft.* While this investigation would normally have been handled by Technical Intelligence teams, Agents of the 503d CIC Detachment were in Stolberg immediately after its capture and the case was assigned to them.

On the morning of 22 September, as the 3d Armored Division fought to occupy the town, CIC began to hunt for information concerning Prym Enterprises and their products. On the outskirts of town, Agents searched the estate of Hans Prym, an official of the company, and confiscated the records found there. Hans Wagermann, Prym's chauffeur and the only man on the estate, knew nothing of the affairs of the factory. Attempts to locate Hans Prym and his son, Axel Prym, who was the active head of Prym Enterprises, were unsuccessful. Interviews in the town of Busbach, outside Stolberg, where many Prym employees lived, indicated that work had stopped at the factory on 12 September. The workers spoke of a "Secret Department," staffed exclusively by about 50 military personnel. This department and its employees had been evacuated to Langenburg in Thuringia.**

That afternoon the town of Stolberg was completely captured by the 3d Armored Division and Agents of the 503d CIC Detachment immediately entered the Prym factory. There they found and interrogated Herr T. Tooran, Personnel Manager of the plant. Tooran called the secret instrument the "Spanlose Formung" (rough translation: Chipless Form) and stated that production of this instrument was in the hands of Herman Kohl, plant General Manager, who had left when production facilities were evacuated. Tooran stated that the part had been tested for about a year but had been in full-scale manufacture for only a few weeks. Tooran conducted CIC Agents through the "Secret Department" and aided the Agents in locating several aluminum objects which Tooran believed might have been the "Spanlose Formung."***

When the 503d CIC learned on 26 September that Hans Prym had returned to his home near Stolberg, Lt Olan Parker was dispatched to interview him. The

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* This jet aircraft was probably the Messerschmidt 262 known to have been in limited production at this time. According to Chester Wilmot, only 283 of the planes were completed by February 1945. Allied bombing of the easily-spotted long runways required by these aircraft neutralized the effectiveness of the few produced. (Wilmot, p. 660)

** AC of S, G2, 3d Armored Division, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Prym Enterprises (Turbine Blades for New ME Plane), To: AC of S, G2, Hq. First U.S.Army, 22 Sept. 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Inf, Commanding, 503d CIC Detachment, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center Bx 25104)

*** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subj: Prym Enterprises (Second Report) (Turbine Blades for New ME Plane) To: AC of S, G2, First U.S.Army, 26 Sept. 1944, /s/ Theodore M.Black, Capt, Inf, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104)

sixty-nine (69) year old Prym stated that production of the "Spanlose Formung" had been handled entirely by military personnel. Security measures were so strict, Prym said, that practically the only information he had came from the foreman of the plant's ammunition section, a Mathias Bach.* On the same day, Bach was located and interviewed by Special Agent George T. Bailey. Bach also stressed the strict security and said that those persons with more than hearsay knowledge of the secret item had left Stolberg. Bach felt that Axel Prym, who undoubtedly knew more about the "Spanlose Formung" than anyone outside of the "Secret Department," would soon reappear if he were still alive.**

Axel Prym Located

Later that day, CIC learned that Axel Prym had returned to Stolberg. Prym was able to give Lieutenant Parker and Agent Bailey more detailed technical information than the persons previously interrogated. When Lieutenant Parker showed Prym the objects confiscated in the search of the plant, the German industrialist stated that they were examples of the "Spanlose Formung" which were defective and not completely finished.

CIC Seeks Workers From "Secret Department"

On 1 October, CIC Agents located a list of persons who had worked on the "Spanlose Formung." These names were checked against the Military Government list of registered civilians in Stolberg to see if any of the workers, through some Nazi slip-up, were still in the area.***

As a result of this check, CIC Agents apprehended Hans Dahman, a tool maker in the "Secret Department." Dahman, a member of the Wehrmacht on labor furlough, did not know the purpose of the parts he made, since he was given only the information necessary to perform his job. He felt that the other workers were also kept in the dark as to exactly what they were making. Dahman was in possession of a written order directing his evacuation to Langenburg.

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* 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Prym Enterprises (Third Report), Report of Interrogation of Hans Prym, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 26 September 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Captain, Infantry, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Prym Enterprises (Fifth Report), Report of Interrogation of Mathias Bach, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 26 September 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Captain, Infantry, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Letter of Transmittal (Prym Enterprises), To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 1 October 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Captain, Infantry (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

Dahman was the only worker from the "Secret Department" list that investigation yielded, and the 503d CIC Detachment was forced to conclude that persons with additional knowledge of the "Spanlose Formung" had been evacuated from Stolberg. Nevertheless, an investigation which had begun on the basis of hearsay and unconfirmed information had produced positive intelligence of significance.*

Socialist Denounces Nazis - And Some who Aren't

Individuals with left wing political ideologies were among the most ardent anti-Nazis in Germany and consequently among the most eager to be CIC informants. Soon after arriving in Stolberg, the 503d CIC accepted the services of one of the town's

On 6 October, sent CIC a bulky letter filled with vindictiveness and hatred. Military Government was accused of appointing Nazis to municipal government positions in Busbach and Stolberg. wrote: "Our friends, and therefore your friends, say with justification: 'It took Hitler 14 years to build his party of criminals; they, the Americans, have done the same thing in little more than 14 days."

denounced many Military Government appointees to municipal offices. To fill the vacancies that would be created by their removal, he suggested the names of some of his left wing comrades. claimed the appointment of Socialists to a majority of public offices was a natural and logical step for the Americans.

Much of letter was based on misinformation. Herr was named by as Military Government's appointment for Chief of Police in Stolberg and denounced as a Nazi, but had not been appointed to any office. Several others denounced by had already been investigated and arrested by CIC.**

also took the opportunity to denounce several of his longtime enemies who proved, under CIC investigation, to have had no apparent sympathy with Naziism. A typical victim of these grudge denunciations by

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* 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Prym Enterprises, Interrogation of Hans Dahman, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 1 October 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Inf, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Busbach, Rhineland, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 11 October 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Infantry, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

was who had been appointed of Busbach.
were to lengthy detail on his political battles with which dated back to 1907.

Despite his marked prejudices, the opinionated supplied the 503d CIC with several leads for investigation. working in the Office of Housing Distribution in Stolberg, was denounced as an "Enthusiastic party member, inclined toward petty terrorism." statement seemed like another fit of passion against an old enemy, because he went to great lengths to tell CIC of the time, in 1934, threw a rock through his bedroom window.* Other CIC informants, however, seconded opinion, and was eventually arrested by CIC.**

was also able to indicate to American authorities that a former German army lieutenant, then a Prisoner of War, had been the Nazi youth leader in the area. Further investigation also confirmed this information.***

Meanwhile, CIC conducted an investigation of . People in Stolberg and Busbach vouched for sincere opposition to the Nazis and his strong belief in Socialism and perhaps Communism. However, his neighbors called him harsh and brutal in support of his views, a fact made evident to CIC by his varied denunciations.

The 503d CIC continued to employ as an informant although a careful check was made on all information he supplied.****

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* Written statement by (for the 503d CIC Detachment), 6 October 1944, /s/ a translation from German, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Consolidation of Arrests since our Arrival in this Area (Stolberg and Busbach), 15 Nov 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Inf, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** 503d CIC Detachment, CC "A" Team, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Stolberg, Rhineland, Re: Interview with Busbach, 9 October 1944, /s/ George L. Kiley, Special Agent, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

**** 503d CIC Detachment, CC "A" Team, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: 9 October 1944, /s/ George L. Kiley, Special Agent, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center Bx 25104).

Labor Camp Leader Named As A Key Nazi

Later in October, wrote another letter to the 503d CIC, dwelling solely on the history of at the Prym factory in Stolberg.* CIC had arrested on October as a suspected contact for the Gestapo after he had been denounced by the French Liaison Officer with the VII Corps.**

Actually account of inhuman deeds only corroborated the words of other informants. Unlike the previous informants, however, placed considerable blame on the Prym family, writing: "Hans and Axel Prym tolerated all these conditions and undertook nothing to relieve them. They are therefore guilty as accessories."***

Relative to denunciation of the Pryms, CIC investigators felt that it was significant that Axel Prym, who had defended some of the factory's workers when they had been accused of party membership, made no move to defend . CIC Agents felt that had probably been too closely linked with the Gestapo for Prym ever to act against him.****

...But The 503d Is Not Finished With Axel Prym

As the territory around Aachen was cleared of German forces, Military Government was faced with choosing a man for the position of Landrat of Landkreis Aachen (Governor of the Rural County of Aachen). The first name submitted to CIC for investigation was Axel Prym. On 20 November, CIC began a re-investigation of the man who had directly and indirectly been involved in the 503d CIC Detachment's important investigations in Stolberg.*****

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* Written statement of (for the 503d CIC Det), 27 Oct 1944, /s/ a translation from German (U) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Det, Subj: Stolberg-Busbach, Rhineland, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 27 Oct 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** Written statement of (for the 503d CIC Det), 27 Oct 1944, /s/ a translation from German, (U) (K.C.R.C., Bx 25104).

**** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Det, Subj: Stolberg-Busbach, Rhineland, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, 27 Oct 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Inf, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

***** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Det, Subj: Investigation of Axel Prym, Stolberg, Rhld., To: Commanding Officer 207th CIC Det, Hq VII Corps, 24 Nov 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt, Inf, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

On 21 November, CIC received a letter concerning Prym from the described by CIC Agents as a leftist "anti-Nazi" * and an old "comrade" of .** echoed the words of when he wrote: "Axel Prym is also responsible for the terror prevailing in his own plant; everything pertaining to this either went through him or was approved by him." charged that Prym, by approving the evacuation of machinery from his plant, had destroyed the economy of the Stolberg-Busbach area.***

Special Agent Ralph E. Dietz continued the investigation on 21 October with a series of eight interviews in and around Stolberg. First interviewed was Dr. Engelbert Regh, the mayor of Stolbert under the Nazis. Regh remained a controversial figure because of repeated assertions from townspeople and important outside sources that he had effectively resisted the Nazis whenever possible and had been proud that his regime had been "less Nazi" than the government in the neighboring towns.**** CIC felt that Regh would certainly know whatever connections Axel Prym had with the Nazis. Regh stated that Prym had never been interested in political parties, preferring to concentrate on business. Prym had not, to Regh's knowledge, been a Nazi Party member. Prym, because of his conflicts with organized labor, was disliked by the workers in his factory. In general, Regh felt that Prym, at 35, was too young and politically inexperienced for the job.*****

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* From paragraph 4. (i) of the above document. is not referred to by name in this document, but as "

** Written statement by (for the 503d CIC Detachment), 5 October 1944, /s/ a translation from German, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** Written statement by and of Stolberg (for the 503d CIC Detachment), 21 November 1944, /s/ Ludwig Lude, a translation from German, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

**** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Dr. Engelbert Regh, Stolberg, Rhld, To: Commanding Officer, 207th CIC Detachment, Hq VII Corps, 8 December 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Captain, Infantry, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

***** CIC Detachment, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Axel Prym, Stolberg, Re: Interview with Dr. Engelbert Regh former Mayor of Stolberg, 21 November 1944, /s/ Ralph E. Dietz, SA, 503d CIC Detachment, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

Agent Dietz then interviewed the Military Government-appointed mayor of Stolberg, Dr. Fritz Deutzmann, "a liberal anti-Nazi,"* and former school teacher, and city historian. Deutzmann considered Prym an opportunist willing to cooperate with anyone if it furthered his own ends. According to Deutzmann, Prym's sentiments were with the National-Junker faction.**

Among the others interrogated, August Meurer, an Auxiliary Policeman, felt that Prym always favored the German militarists for his own selfish interest as a manufacturer. Although Meurer was certain Prym had not been a Nazi, he was just as sure that Prym could have prevented the mistreatment of foreign workers at his factory.***

Bruno Klaus, owner of a small factory in Stolberg, felt that Prym, while never a Nazi, was not a "balanced personality."**** Christine Schafer, a former worker at the factory, whose account of her employment pointed up her resentment of the management, claimed that she was certain that Prym was not only a party member but a Blockleiter as well.*****

CIC recommended to Military Government that Prym not be appointed to any official position. It was felt that he had been "too strong a protagonist for the conservative, nationalistic, militaristic viewpoint represented by the large industrialists, Junker landowners, and the Army." CIC concluded that Prym was

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* 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Investigation of Axel Prym, Stolberg, Rhld, To: Commanding Officer, 207th CIC Detachment, Hq VII Corps, 24 November 1944, /s/ Theodore M.Black, Capt, Inf, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104). From para 4. (i) of this document. Deutzmann is not referred to by name in this document, but as "the present mayor of Stolberg."

** CIC Detachment, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Axel Prym, Stolberg, Re: Interview with Dr. Fritz Deutzmann, Mayor of Stolberg, 21 November 1944,(CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** CIC Detachment, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Axel Prym, Stolberg, Re: Interview with Mr. August Meurer, Auxiliary Police, 21 November 1944, /s/ Ralph E. Dietz, Special Agent, 503d CIC Detachment, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

**** CIC Detachment, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subj: Axel Prym, Stolberg, Re: Interview with Mr.Bruno Klaus, factory owner, 21 Nov 44, /s/ Ralph E.Dietz, SA, 503d CIC Detachment, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

***** CIC Detachment, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subj: Axel Prym, Stolberg, Re: Interview with Christine Schafer, former factory worker at Prym Factory, Stolberg, 21 Nov 44, /s/ Ralph E. Dietz, SA, 503d CIC Det., (CONF) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

youthfulness, his unpopularity in Stolberg, and the possibility that he might later be tried as a war criminal for the maltreatment of the foreign

were also factors that made him unsuitable for an official Military Government position.*

A Review of the Stolberg Operations

(V) In Stolberg, the Americans had their first experience in juggling personalities and political ideologies in order to set up a government in enemy territory. CIC, in this new situation, admitted that too much reliance may have been placed on strong leftists, particularly Both the had been recommended for official position by although it was not on his word alone that CIC cleared them. Although it would have been impossible to install the former Nazi there were strong indications that should a popular vote have been taken, the allegedly might have been elected

Agents Interrogate 57-Year Old "Draftee"

On 22 October, the 503d Detachment learned that elderly a small community near Stolberg, had served with the German Army from 1940 to 1942. Captain Black and Special Agent George L. Kiley, interrogators, learned that he had been forced to "volunteer" in 1940 at the age of 53. In the Army had served as a French translator and later as an instructor in English and in the techniques of memory. The Nazis discharged on 17 March 1942. The German claimed that he had not been a party member, a fact which he felt had cost him a decoration for his services to the Reich.***

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* 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: To: Commanding Officer 207th CIC Detachment, Hq VII Corps, 24 November 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, To: Commanding Officer, 207th CIC Detachment, Hq VII Corps, 8 December 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Capt. Inf, Commanding (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** 503d CIC Detachment, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Re: Interview re: Army Career, 25 October 1944, /s/ George L. Kiley, SA, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

claimed to have had no connection with German intelligence agencies, although he admitted that he served in France as an interrogator of persons requesting travel permits. It was also noted that Wehrpass was stamped to the effect that he had received espionage and sabotage training. He retorted that these courses were the usual anti-espionage and anti-sabotage instructions given all German soldiers as a part of the normal security program. However, the CIC Agents on the case had, in their experience, never seen a Wehrpass so stamped and were sure had connections with German Intelligence Service which he had not divulged.*

was sent to the First Army Interrogation Center where he was found to be on the "favorable side of the borderline," but it was recommended that he be replaced as **

9th CIC Detachment Moves Into Zweifall

While the tactical troops of the 9th Infantry Division were bogged down just over the German border, the 9th CIC Detachment, in late September, moved from Rotgen to cover counterintelligence targets in the town of Zweifall, five miles south of Stolberg. Careful searches were made of all places used by Nazi Officials, with the result that numerous valuable documents were uncovered. The Agents found a document listing all the citizens of Zweifall with notations made to indicate Nazis and anti-Nazis. This list led directly to several arrests. Twenty of the people categorized as strong anti-Nazis were interrogated for tactical information. CIC organized the local police to enforce Military Government regulations and look for enemy deserters.***

The 9th CIC Detachment arrested of Zweifall when a search of his home and property revealed a German rifle with ammunition, shotgun ammunition, a Nazi dagger and uniforms. During his interrogation signed

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* 3d Armored Division, AC of S, G2, 503d CIC Detachment, Subject: Rhld, To: Commanding Officer, 207th CIC Detachment, Hq VII Corps, 27 October 1944, /s/ Theodore M. Black, Captain, Infantry, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

** 3d Armored Division, List of Civil Officials for Breinig, (CONFIDENTIAL). This document has notes by CIC concerning the results of the investigations run on each official. (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25104).

*** 9th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 25 September 1944, from First U.S. Army, G2 Journal, 28 - 30 September 1944. (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

a statement to the effect that he was still a member of the Nazi Party and a loyal follower of Hitler. stated that the only reason that he had never committed espionage or sabotage was because Hitler never told him to do so. Brandt was tried by Military Government Court and sentenced to four years in prison.*

The 9th CIC also found a German soldier who had become ill with pneumonia while on leave to visit his parents in Zweifall and had not returned to his unit. After the Americans took Zweifall, the presence of the soldier was not reported to CIC. When he finally was discovered, the soldier was evacuated for hospitalization and subsequent Prisoner of War internment. The parents of the soldier were turned over to Military Government. Due to mitigating circumstances, they were fined only 100 marks for their violation.

The Americans were not so clement in another case that involved a civilian resident who was discovered to have harbored a German soldier wearing civilian clothes and to have deceived the American authorities as to the soldier's identity. The civilian was delivered to Military Government and later sentenced to five years in prison.**

In late October, the 9th Infantry Division was moved south to take up defensive positions from Monschau to Losheim, towns just within the border of Germany. Counterintelligence coverage of Zweifall was handled briefly by the 28th CIC Detachment. On 7 November, the task was turned over to the 4th CIC Detachment.***

Although the possibility of uncovering additional information was slight, because the town had been worked over by two preceding detachments, the 4th CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Oliver D. Appleton, began a four-day screening of residents of Zweifall. Among the 1,040 persons screened, 30 former party members and 15 German Soldiers discharged for medical reasons, all relatively unimportant men, were found. Because these men were not leaders, the 4th CIC Detachment did not arrest them, preferring to watch them closely and apprehend them at the first sign of suspicious activity.****

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Rpt No. 9, for the period 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 14 Dec 44, from the office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Exec., for the AC of S, G2 (U)(Dept Reds Br, Va.)

** Master (First US Army) G2, Counterintelligence Bulletin No. 7, 13 November 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

*** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 8 November 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 8-11 November 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

**** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 11 November 1944, First US Army, G2 Journal, 8-11 November 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Interrogators Find Loopholes in Young Man's Story

For the remainder of the month, the 4th CIC Detachment ran day-to-day security checks in the Zweifall area, but investigated only one case of great importance.

On 2 December, troops of the 22d Infantry Regiment picked up Christoph Stecher crossing the American lines near Zweifall. Stecher was turned over to the 4th CIC and interrogated by 2d Lt Robert H. Williams and Special Agent Herbert Schindler. Although Stecher was a dirty 16-year-old youth with long, shaggy blond hair, he seemed alert and willingly answered all questions. On every occasion, he attempted to steer the interrogation toward tactical information which he offered without hesitation. He seemed somewhat upset that CIC considered him a possible enemy agent.

During the initial interrogation, Stecher told CIC that he had journeyed from Cologne in search of blankets for his home. Later he changed his story, claiming that he had left Cologne to escape the Schutz Staffeln evacuation and to move into American occupied territory. Stecher claimed he was a Communist and that his father was a Communist party member of long standing. He repeatedly denied charges that he had crossed American lines to gain information for the Nazis.

Subsequent interrogations aroused considerable suspicion about the youth. Dates concerning his travel and the reasons for his crossing the lines changed each time the Agent questioned Stecher. Stecher's map reading ability and his persistent attempts to discuss tactical information rather than his own travels and activities increased the CIC doubts. He was forwarded to Master Interrogation Center for further interrogation.*

The 4th CIC Detachment handled several unusual cases in Zweifall. A regimental S2 turned over to the unit on 16 November a 78 year-old woman who had been found wandering in the vicinity of gun emplacements. The investigating Agents found that the woman owned the land on which she was apprehended and was checking to see if it was suitable pasture for her cows. CIC's interrogation of the old lady revealed only that she was so foggy minded that she was totally unaware that a war was in progress a few miles from her home. The woman was placed in the custody of her son and daughter-in-law who were told that another violation would lead to her arrest.**

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* 4th Infantry Division, G2 Journal of 2-6 December 1944, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Christoph Stecher, Suspect linecrosser, Re: Interrogation of Subject, 4 December 1944, /s/ Robert H. Williams, 2d Lt, Inf, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 16 November 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 15-18 November 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

On 30 November, CIC agents picked up a stray American soldier on a highway leading away from the front. The soldier, a recent replacement, had been separated from his unit during a German attack. He could not give the name of his Commanding Officer or the code name of his regiment. He did have his "dog tags" and pay book for identification. After interrogation, the soldier was turned over to the Provost Marshal's office for final disposition.*

An unusual feature of the 4th CIC's security measures was a canvassing of the two churches in Zweifall on 27 November. Agents attended Catholic mass at 0800 and 1000, and Protestant services at 1000 to see if the pulpit was being used as a cover for anti-American propaganda. Sermons were found to be confined to religious topics.**

In early December, Agents of the 4th CIC Detachment reported a rumor current among the troops that the Division was soon to be moved to Luxembourg.*** On 8 December, the rumor materialized and the Division left for the City of Luxembourg with the CIC Detachment taking over the security of responsibilities from the 83d CIC Detachment.**** Zweifall was left in the hands of the Agents from the 505th CIC Detachment.

CIC Seeks Resistance Groups

In France and the Lowland Countries, counterintelligence operations were made easier by the assistance CIC received from resistance groups. Prior to American entry into Germany, a prime target for all intelligence agencies was information on possible resistance groups operating within Germany itself. The only significant organization uncovered was the Edelweiss Piraten, a rather mysterious youth organization whose only objective was the harassment of the Hitler Jugend. There appeared to be no political or ideological motivation behind this organization. No central control was readily apparent although there

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* 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 30 November 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 27-30 November 1944 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 27 November 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 24-27 November 1944 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

*** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 3 December 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 3-6 December 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

**** 4th Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 8 December 1944, from First US Army, G2 Journal, 8-11 December 1944 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

were Edelweiss members reported in all major cities. It was felt that probably the leaders of the Edelweiss had taken great care to keep themselves obscured lest they be discovered by the Gestapo.

Contact with the Edelweiss was a major objective of the first CIC Detachments that entered Germany, but it was soon evident that CIC was in for a disappointment. The few members discovered were extremely young and tended to be impulsive informants. According to Captain Theodore M. Black, Commanding Officer of the 503d CIC Detachment, ten days of experimentation with two young Edelweiss members, planted as informants by his Detachment, were not productive. Members of the Edelweiss, perhaps unaware of the value they could be to the Americans, failed to come forward and offer their assistance to CIC. CIC was particularly unsuccessful in locating the organization's leaders. Nevertheless, CIC continued to search for factions of the Edelweiss in hopes of exploiting the organization's avowed pro-Allied intentions.

There were also numerous reports of Catholic organizations that might have been helpful to CIC, but no immediate contact was established with such organizations in the first months in enemy territory.*

A major bloc of opposition to Nazi rule had come from the members of the Communist party. Some of the problems encountered when great reliance was placed on extreme leftists were exemplified in the previously mentioned case of [redacted]f Stolberg. However, at this time, CIC still held out hope for possible use of Communists as informants in Germany. An Agent of the 1st CIC Detachment, after contact with German Communists, stated: "We can have confidence in recognized high-ranking Communist Party members insofar as they can help us militarily and in apprehending the members of the NSDAP /Nazi Party/. For the most part, the Communists are in the upper age brackets and have not been tainted with the Hitlerism type of Facism; it is reasonable to assume that they have detailed dossiers and organizational knowledge of the NSDAP; they are well versed in underground activity which the Nazis will have recourse to now and later; their intimate knowledge of local areas, militarily and politically, could give CIC reliable information on physical as well as personality targets;

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* Hqs, Military Intelligence Service, ETO, "Counterintelligence Screening by Interrogation Teams In The Aachen Area," p. 9-10, 10 March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff & Faculty) and Hq VII Corps, AC of S, G2, "CIC vs Naziism," 24 November 1944, /s/ for the AC of S, G2, James K. Dorsett, Jr., Maj, Inf, CI Officer. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty) and Hq First US Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Subject: Edelweiss (Edelweiss Piraten), To: Commanding Officers of the 205th, 207th and 208th CIC Detachments, 16 November 1944, /s/ M. R. Sibley, Col, GSC, for R. A. Dickson, Col, GSC, AC of S, G2,(SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

and regardless of their Comintern inspiration, we are Allies, and they, like we, are interested in the same objective - the complete eradication of Naziism."

A Prophesy

Reflecting upon the first two months of CIC activity within the German border, Major James K. Dorsett, Jr., Commanding Officer of the 207th CIC Detachment, wrote of past accomplishments and future potentialities. "When /the VII/ Corps crossed the border into Germany on 15 September, the CIC came armed with few directives, no precedents, uncertainty as to its potentialities, and uneasy expectation of partisan warfare. Thus far pessimistic apprehensions have scarcely materialized. Instead, counterintelligence has come into its own more tangibly and satisfyingly than before in Belgium and France. The role of CIC looms increasingly more significant, and with intelligent readjustment its contribution to the occupying forces in Germany can exceed any past achievement."*

* Hq VII Corps, AC of S, G2, "CIC vs Naziism," 24 November 1944, /s/ for the AC of S, G2: James K. Dorsett, Major, Infantry, CI Officer, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 4

NINTH ARMY CIC IN HOLLAND AND GERMANY

The northernmost region under the jurisdiction of the 12th Army Group consisted of the province of Limburg, a narrow strip of Dutch territory that separated Belgium and Germany, and that portion of Germany directly east of Limburg which had been taken by the Americans. This area was covered as part of the lengthy front of the First U.S. Army until 22 October when the newly-constituted Ninth U.S. Army was moved up on line. The territory from Sittard, Holland, to an area slightly north of Aachen, a total of fifteen miles, constituted the front line of the Ninth Army during the September-October operations.

By mid-December, the Ninth had two corps and six divisions under its control. Army CIC operations were based in Maastricht, Holland; XIX Corps CIC, with Agents in Heerlen and Kerkrade, Holland, and Alsdorf, Germany, covered the southern part of the front; and XIII Corps CIC, operating in Hoensbroek, Holland, and Ubach, Germany, handled the area to the north.

Under the XIX Corps, the 29th CIC Detachment operated around Alsdorf, the 30th CIC Detachment in Wurselen, Herzogenrath, and Bardenburg, Germany, and the 502d CIC Detachment in Basweiler and Merkstein, Germany. For the XIII Corps, the 507th CIC Detachment operated around the Corps area with the 84th CIC Detachment in Eygelshoven, Holland, and the 102d CIC Detachment in Ubach and Brunssum, Holland.

The divisions of the XIX Corps were all battle-tested veterans from the First Army, but the XIII Corps divisions were all new to the front lines. As might be expected, the greater burden of counterintelligence duties fell to the men under the command of XIX Corps.*

Two Prominent Resistance Groups Found In Holland

In the Netherlands, CIC found two major anti-Nazi resistance groups, the Orde Dienst and the Koninkluke Patrouille. Generally, the Orde Dienst, the larger of the two groups, was composed of substantial middle-class elements which tended to be conservative. The Orde Dienst had remained more or less passive during the German Occupation, assuming an active role only after the Allied

* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, for the period 1-15 December 1944, dated 15 December 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive for the AC of S, G2, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

liberation. In contrast, the well-organized, capably led Koninkluke Patrouille had conducted active sabotage and other resistance operations against the Germans.*

CIC found that Orde Dienst and Koninkluke Patrouille members were generally willing to cooperate. For example, the 84th CIC Detachment reported that its Agents had held a lengthy conference with local Orde Dienst members. The ex-underground personnel agreed to cooperate with CIC by taking action against potentially subversive civilians where sufficient evidence for an arrest by CIC was lacking. The Orde Dienst agreed to post on all houses a notice listing completely the acts which represented threats to the security of American forces. Arrangements were made whereby CIC would receive periodic reports on all persons under investigation by Dutch authorities.**

By December, Ninth Army CIC was utilizing 364 members of the Orde Dienst, Koninkluke Patrouille, and Netherlands Internal Revenue Bureau on 38 stationary posts and 31 roving patrols along the German border.*** In October, resistance group members, manning control posts established by the 502d CIC Detachment, had apprehended two short-range Sicherheitsdienst line-crossers, Nijssen and Thomassen, two hours after they left the German lines. At First Army Interrogation Center, the two men confessed that they had entered Holland on an espionage mission. The Germans were interested in the civilian attitude toward American troops, the general disposition and approximate strength of U.S. troops in the area around Heerlen, and in determining the accuracy of rumors that the Americans had an armored division near Heksenberg. The Agents had been instructed to memorize all the information they gathered and return after three days. Since the men made a complete confession, interrogation at a higher level was unnecessary. These two espionage agents were turned over to Dutch authorities in Maastricht for further investigation and trial under the supervision of the SHAEF Netherlands Mission.

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period 1-15 October 1944, dated 15 October 1944, from the Office of the AC of S G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 84th Infantry Division, 84th CIC Detachment, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 22 November 1944, /s/ Stephen Gernazian, S/A, CIC, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, for the period 1-15 December 1944, dated 14 December 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

This case was mentioned in a 12th Army Group report as a "typical example of the type of (enemy) operation to be expected in a relatively stabilized situation." The German Intelligence Service dispatched many low-grade, short term agents with the expectation that a few would evade Allied controls and return with valuable information. Although the apprehension of all these espionage agents was practically impossible, the aid of Dutch resistance members in conscientiously manning control posts gave CIC an efficient counterespionage net.

Germans Forcibly Evacuate 45,000 Refugees Into US Lines

On 25 September, while the province of Limburg was still under First Army control, the Germans forcibly evacuated 45,000 refugees into the American lines near Kerkrade, Holland. CIC personnel of the XIX Corps and the 30th Infantry Division, aided by known reliable persons from Kerkrade, screened all the refugees by sorting them into community and family groups. Individuals who evoked suspicion or did not seem to fit into any group were transported to the First Army Interrogation Center. Many questionable individuals were turned over to the Orde Dienst to be housed and cared for in towns removed from the front lines. Burgermeisters of the towns receiving these refugees were given lists of the individuals moved into their area. Local police were ordered to confine the movement of these persons within the city limits. As soon as the military situation permitted, the refugees were to be returned to their homes.

Although several minor informers were uncovered in the group, no bonafide enemy agents were turned up. However, the CIC report of the operation concluded with the following remark: "It is obvious that the introduction by the German Intelligence Service of, say, 15 agents in such a group (1 agent for every 3,000 refugees) would have considerable likelihood of success, and, if five of these short term agents reported back, the German Intelligence Service might consider the operation to be profitable."*

Friendly Dutch Pose a Problem For CIC

CIC found that the Dutch, like the French people, felt that once the Americans arrived to liberate their home area, all travel restrictions would be cancelled

* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period 1-15 October 1944, dated 15 October 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

automatically. People flocked on the highways and travelled to neighboring villages, seeming to the Americans to congregate at strategic road intersections and around American military installations. Furthermore, the American soldiers, as might be expected, welcomed the presence of friendly civilians with pleasure. Harried agents of CIC felt that this situation made control difficult and espionage all too easy. Resistance members on the many check points were called upon to enforce strictly the curfew regulations and to deny civilian entrance into restricted areas.*

Typical measures taken to control the Dutch civilian population was constant patrol under 29th CIC supervision of the main roads to check all travel permits and identification papers of civilians. Those found traveling beyond the prescribed limits were taken to the towns where they claimed residence, were identified, and confined in the local jail for 24 hours.**

A "Twenty-Three Percenter"

On 25 September 1944, resistance group personnel, manning a post on the German-Dutch border, arrested Charles Emile Rene Schmitt, who had crossed the border without a pass. He was placed in the custody of XIX Corps CIC, then maintaining headquarters in Maastricht. Schmitt, who claimed to be an Alsatian, was interrogated by Agents of the 219th and 29th CIC Detachments without the discovery of any major discrepancies in his story. However, the story in itself was enough to place Schmitt in a class with the more unusual collaborators.

Schmitt told his interrogators that he was one of the three owners of the Societe Cabrillac of Paris, a firm which supplied labor for the German-owned May Company of Lille. Schmitt's company chose for hire men whose lack of proper papers made them subject to arrest and deportation to Germany. In payment for helping these "voluntary" workers, Schmitt collected 23% of their salaries. Attempting to justify his lucrative business, Schmitt claimed that the 23% in reality did not come from the workers, but rather from the over-stuffed coffers of the May Company as a kind of monthly bonus to the Societe for supplying such industrious laborers.

* CIC Detachment #29, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report, week ending 2400 hours 8 October 1944, dtd 9 October 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Inf, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Ibid., week ending 2400 hours 3 November 1944, dtd 4 November 1944.

But Schmitt still had to explain his presence in Germany. He claimed that the Germans had forced him to drive to Aachen with a carload of German soldiers. When apprehended, he was attempting to return to his native France.

CIC felt that Schmitt was not an enemy agent, although a rather successful collaborator. He was turned over to the Police in Maastricht with instructions to contact French authorities as soon as possible. A note attached to Schmitt's arrest form contained a masterpiece of understatement: "It is thought that the French Authorities would be interested in seeing this man."*

You Again

Civilians who continually wandered in the area of the front lines constituted a threat to the security of the troops and were dealt with as enemies even when espionage intent could not be established. Such a person was Froninek Rabenda, first picked up by American troops on 14 November 1944 near Eygelshoven. Rabenda stated that he had been transported as a forced laborer from Holland to a farm in Oidtweiler, Germany. With Rabenda when he was apprehended were the farmer and his family; and during the interrogation, Rabenda denounced the farmer as a Nazi. Rabenda was turned over to the 29th Division Military Government for disposition as a displaced person.

But CIC had not seen the last of this man. A week later, Rabenda, was picked up again in the forward area and this time turned over to CIC in Basweiler, Germany. Since there were no means for positive identification and no way to verify his story, Rabenda was sent back to Ninth Army Interrogation Center. CIC felt that Rabenda's persistent movements in the forward areas constituted a threat to the security of American forces.**

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* Headquarters XIX Corps, Office of the AC of S, G2, CIC Detachment, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Charles Emile Rene Schmitt; French National, Re: Interrogation of Subject, /s/ Philip T. Clark, S/A, CIC, Unclassified, and Attachment to "Arrest Form" (SHAEF AGO Form No. 7) on Charles Emile Rene Schmitt, dtd 22 October 1944, Military or Civil Authority Taking Custody of Prisoner: CIC Detachment #29, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt. (Unclassified) (BOTH: Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Typewritten statement on the reverse of "Arrest Form" (SHAEF AGO Form No. 7) on Froninek Rabenda, dtd 21 November 1944, /s/ Louie L. Gripenstraw, 1st Lt, Unclassified, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

Another familiar face for CIC was a female linecrosser, Maria Helena Adams, of Jabeek, Holland, who was told by Agents of the 29th CIC Detachment on 3 October not to cross the German-Dutch border again.

On 7 October, CIC received information that she had left Jabeek headed for Schwesters, Germany. Investigation revealed that the townspeople of Jabeek thought Adams untrustworthy. She was arrested and turned over to Dutch civil authorities in Trubeen for internment.*

A Successful Counterintelligence Alert

On 18 October, at the direction of the 29th Infantry Division G2 and without previous publicity, a counterintelligence alert was put into effect in the division area. In addition to CIC, the alert force included the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons of the Regiments, the Military Police, Headquarters Combat Platoon, Dutch resistance groups and civil police. Under CIC supervision, a great many road blocks were established and manned by the Orde Dienst and Koninkluke Patrouille members. Military Police checked the identification of all persons riding in Army vehicles. Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoons patrolled roads in the regimental areas, checking on both civilians and military personnel. CIC formed roving patrols to apprehend civilans traveling without authority and to check on persons in American uniform who were on the roads.

CIC Agents went through the "chow" lines of most of the Division mess halls to see that positive identification was being made of each individual served. The 29th CIC Detachment operated an interrogation center at Schinveld, Holland, and XIX Corps CIC set up a similar center at Sittard. During the day, thirty persons who could not be positively identified were brought to these points for questioning. Representatives of the local police from all neighboring towns were present at the centers and were able to identify all thirty individuals.

Individuals caught violating travel restrictions were placed in jail for 24 hours, and their names posted on the local bulletin boards with the notation that they had violated military regulations.

* 29th CIC Detachment, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report, week ending 2400 hours 8 October 1944, dtd 9 October 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Inf, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094) and Hq, 29th CIC Detachment, Personality Index (29th CIC Detachment's Activities in ETO All In One Volume), p. 67, undated, Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

After this first alert, the 29th CIC Detachment made plans for future counterintelligence alerts in an effort to keep constantly aware of all illegal movement in the Division area. It was believed that coverage was virtually 100% complete under the plan used in the first alert.*

Breaches of Security: What Outfit Are You With?

The change-over from First to Ninth Army control was common knowledge among Dutch civilians in the Limburg sector. CIC Agents found that in discussions with American soldiers, the Dutch invariably asked, "Are you from the First or the Ninth?" The change of Armies was so well-known that CIC made no attempt to discover how the information had spread to civilians. Experience had taught CIC Agents that Army troops prevented from revealing the name of their division or corps, had the habit of informing the local inhabitants of the Army to which they were assigned. Such loose talk had probably tipped the local populace off about the presence of Ninth Army.**

There were also some indications that captured American troops were not always tight-lipped. A captured German Prisoner of War interrogation report indicated that nine members of the 29th Infantry Division, captured on 26 October, had talked freely concerning their personal military history, routes of transportation to the front, deployment of units, the replacement system, and other military data that their interrogators wished to know. As soon as the contents of this captured report reached the 29th CIC Detachment, teams of agents were dispatched to the three regiments of the Division to survey the extent and effectiveness of troop security indoctrination.***

The agents first interviewed the S2 of the regiment they had been assigned to canvass. Then they went to the "grass-roots" of the regiment, selecting at random one enlisted man from each of the three battalions to interview. Judging from results of the CIC inquiry, lectures and instruction given the troops seemed to have been adequate. Instruction was usually presented twice a month, although two men of the 115th Infantry Regiment did not remember having heard a security lecture for two months. In all cases, the proper conduct

* 29th CIC Detachment, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report, week ending 2400 hours 22 October 1944, dtd 25 October 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Inf, Commanding (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Ibid., for the period 4-20 November 1944, undated.

*** Ibid., for the period 20 November - 4 December 1944, dtd 4 December 1944.

for a soldier when captured had been stressed in the lectures. When this survey was completed, the question of why the nine captured soldiers had given the enemy more than the required "name, rank and serial number" still remained unanswered.*

Troops Canvassed on Other Matters

When seeking the answer to an important question, the 29th CIC Detachment made frequent use of polls similar to the one on security indoctrination. On 14 November, agents had 40 enlisted men of all ranks from the three regiments and the 29th Signal Company fill out questionnaires designed to indicate the individual soldier's knowledge of the war situation in Europe. Generally, the CIC poll indicated that the men, although already well-informed, earnestly desired any news concerning the progress of the war on all fronts. Briefings and lectures from their officers and copies of Stars and Stripes seemed to be the main source of information for the troops. The chief complaint voiced to the agents was that not enough copies of Stars and Stripes were available.**

A secondary purpose of this poll was to determine indirectly what effect enemy propaganda had produced on American troops. If these forty men were typical, the answer was: "None whatever."***

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* Three documents from CIC Detachment #29, Hq, 29th Infantry Division, all Memoranda For The Officer In Charge, Re: Check with Regimental S-2 and a representative of each battalion in regard to the security lectures given to the troops, all dtd 12 December 1944; document concerning 175th Regiment /s/ Gordon R. Anderson and Allen R. Mitchell; document concerning 115th Regiment /s/ Byron A. Whaley and C. W. Dewalt; document concerning 116th Regiment /s/ Hugh J. Palmer and Sam D. Beall; all Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Four documents from CIC Detachment #29, Hq 29th Infantry Division, all Memoranda For The Officer In Charge, Re: Survey of Troops Knowledge of General Military Information, all dtd 14 November 1944, document conerning 29th Signal Company /s/ Jack R. Warner; document concerning 116th Regiment /s/ Gordon M. Anderson and Daniel M. Powers; document concerning 175th Regiment /s/ Sam D. Beall and B. W. Gillespie; and document concerning 115th Regiment /s/ Louie L. Gripenstraw, 1st Lt, and C. W. Dewalt, all Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

*** CIC Detachment #29, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report, for the period 4 November-20 November 1944, undated, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

When the G2, 29th Infantry Division, desired information concerning the low morale of the 115th Infantry, the 29th CIC Detachment, on 23 October, promptly organized another poll. Nine Agents canvassed various units of the 115th, asking officers and men the question: "What's wrong with the 115th?" The Agents heard such typical complaints of men from a unit with lengthy front line service as; "When there is a tough job to do, we get it!"; "Men who have seen much combat aren't getting the proper breaks!"; "We didn't get a promised rest period!" Less typically, members of the 115th Infantry seemed to sense that they were part of an outfit which was not too highly regarded by their superiors at Division headquarters and soldiers of the other two regiments. A more immediate cause for the low morale was a recent skirmish with the enemy in which K Company had been almost wiped out.

1st Lt Ellis O. Mayfield, Commanding Officer of the 29th CIC Detachment, summed up the findings of his agents. "It appears that the outfit has built up a pressure within itself. Its commanders and staff have always appeared on the defensive and too tense. They seem to be unable to relax. It is felt that this is caused primarily by the fact that the outfit has become self-conscious of past mistakes and of ridicule from all sides. The 115th has all the qualities of a great outfit, but the officers and men are acutely aware of the fact that it is considered a second rate unit. If this pressure could be relieved by wide spread praise for the 115th, it is felt that confidence and a renewed spirit would pervade the entire regiment."

The technique of polling the troops provided answers to some vital questions. Just as important, it made the troops aware of the existence and mission of CIC. They could see that CIC was actively interested in troop morale and security, an important factor to counteract the belief that CIC Agents were a "bunch of snoopers" trying to get soldiers in trouble.*

29th Division Gasoline Dumps Checked

The static situation that permitted the 29th Division CIC Detachment time for concern with troop education, morale, and security consciousness, also allowed for extensive security surveys. With the troops in more or less permanent stations, the necessity for security surveys increased considerably.

* Seven documents from CIC Detachment #29, Hq, 29th Infantry Division, all Memoranda For The Officer In Charge, all Subject: Check of 115th Infantry Regiment, all dtd 23 October 1944, all to: AC of S, G2, Hq, 29th Infantry Division, documents signed as follows: two by Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding; one each by Lynn Nuenschwander, 2d Lt; C.W. Dewalt; Allen R. Mitchall and Gordon M. Anderson; Paul Beauchesne and Jean Gayout; and Hugh J. Palmer and Sam D. Beall, all Unclassified, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

The seventeen gasoline dumps in the area of the 29th Infantry Division were extremely vulnerable points for enemy sabotage. Not only did the dumps contain the elements for great destruction, but the short supply of gasoline all along the European front meant that any loss would hinder Allied efforts to renew the assault. With this in mind, five teams of agents from the 29th CIC Detachment were dispatched on 16 November to inspect the dumps and report on those most vulnerable to sabotage.

The agents on the survey made particular note of the number of guards and their instructions, the location of the fuel in relation to the motor park, and the potential points of civilian entry.*

Only one of the seventeen gasoline dumps was considered insecure by the inspecting Agents. The main Division Headquarters dump was deemed too close to a main route of Civilian travel, and had to be moved 300 yards away from this route. This distance and the 24-hour guard previously posted were considered sufficient security measures.**

In almost all instances CIC discovered that the officers in charge of the gasoline dumps had received direct orders to maintain strict security measures over all their valuable supplies of fuel.***

Wire Cutting Investigation Proves Futile

On 10 October, the 29th CIC Detachment received a report from the Division Signal Officer of a typical case near the town of Orsbeek, Holland, where approximately one quarter of a mile of a telephone wire running from the forward Command Post to Division rear had been cut and removed. Investigation of this complaint for possible sabotage consumed many hours and resulted only in the compilation of a long list of possibilities, there being little concrete evidence.

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* CIC Detachment #29, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report for the period from 4 November-20 November 1944, undated, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Inf, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094),

** CIC Detachment #29, Hq 29th Infantry Division, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Physical Check Of All Gasoline Dumps: 29th Cav Recon, Divarty, Div Hqs, Sig Bn, 16 November 1944, /s/ Hugh J. Palmer, S/A, CIC Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

*** Five documents from CIC Detachment #29, Hq, 29th Infantry Division, all Memoranda For The Officer In Charge, all Subject: Physical Check of Gasoline Dumps (of various units), all dtd 16 Nov 1944, /s/ by Agents of the 29th CIC Det, all uncl., (KCD BX 25094).

CIC agents A. Van Otten and Daniel M. Powers learned that the wire had been severed at a point where it ran through an open field. Parallel to the cut wire ran three other telephone wires, all untouched. These four wires had been intentionally strung in an out-of-the-way area in order that they would not be readily noticed. Both cuts in the damaged wire were sharp and clear, indicating that they had been made deliberately with a sharp instrument.

CIC immediately called for the aid of the Orde Dienst officials at Amstendrade who had authority over the Orsbeek area. These men were taken to the field and allowed to make their own inspection of the cutting. The Dutch authorities then questioned some fifty residents of the area but received no information concerning possible suspects. All nearby houses were searched for telephone wires without success.

CIC agents spoke to members of adjacent AAA units and learned that one of these batteries might possibly have rolled up a piece of wire, assuming that it belonged to them.* The Agents also learned that one of the AAA units had recently been short of telephone wire. It was plausible that the AAA unit might have inadvertently taken wire thought to be dead -- or solved their shortage by the not uncommon practice of "moonlight requisitioning."**

There was also the possibility that some Dutch farmer, thinking the Americans had abandoned the area and left the communication line behind, might have picked up the wire for his own use.

The case had become a free-for-all guessing game after the preliminary investigations, and the various individuals working on the case were able to think of countless other possibilities. Mainly because the other three wires running closely parallel to the cut wire had been undamaged, the investigators decided against intentional sabotage.***

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* CIC Detachment #29, Hq, 29th Infantry Division, Memorandum For the Officer In Charge, Subject: Suspected sabotage of telephone lines 12 October 1944, /s/ A. Van Otten and Daniel M. Powers, S/A, CIC Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Ibid., Subject: Investigation Of Suspected Sabotage Of Telephone Wires, 11 October 1944, /s/ Sam D. Beall and Daniel M. Powers, Special Agents.

*** Ibid., Subject: Suspected Sabotage of Telephone Wires, to: AC of S, G2, Hq 29th Inf Div, 14 October 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding.

Evacuate Area Eight Miles West of Roer River

By December, the 29th CIC was able to report that military security in the forward division area was excellent, mainly due to the total evacuation of civilians from an area at least eight miles west of the Roer River.

The move created a virtual population vacuum between the front lines and the rear, and all persons apprehended in the evacuated area were under immediate suspicion.*

Throughout the Division area, residents of extremely small villages were evacuated to larger towns until such time as the region was out of the combat zone. CIC hoped to keep the civilian population in several central areas, cutting down the chance for innocent individuals to wander into combat zones and making more suspicious any persons apprehended near the front.**

In the first two days after the evacuation of the area west of the Roer, CIC interrogated one particularly suspicious individual. Near midnight on 8 December, a soldier of the 115th Regiment apprehended as he crossed the American lines and entered into the evacuated area.

On the next day who claimed to be from Paris, was interrogated by Agents of the 29th CIC Detachment. stated that he had been a Sergeant in the French artillery prior to his capture by the Germans on 22 June 1940 at La Bourgonie in the Vosges Mountains.*** The Frenchman related his

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* CIC Detachment #29, 29th Inf Div, Counter Intelligence Report, for the period 20 November-4 December 1944, dtd 4 December 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Ibid., for the period 4-20 December 1944, undated.

*** seemed to possess an extraordinary memory for detail. The report of his interrogation continued as follows: "Subject was taken to Strassburg 1 July 1940 and remained there until 26 July. On 26 July 1940, Subject was taken to Stalag 5A near Stuttgart where he stayed for three or four days and was then sent to work on a farm nearby at Leutenbach. After working there for a month, he was sent to work as a carpenter at Winnerden. Subject worked there for a month and a half and then, at the same place, worked for three months in a brick factory. Subject remained at the brick factory from 1 December 1940 to 4 March 1941." statement covered three pages and all events were noted with the exact date and place as in the examples above.

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experiences as a Prisoner of War, claiming to have escaped several times from his confinement only to be reapprehended by the Nazis. last escape, he said, has been on 26 November 1944. Bicycling from the labor camp at Hamburg, said he arrived in Julich, Germany, near the Roer, 13 miles from the Dutch border, on 7 December, where he abandoned his bicycle on the outskirts of the town and proceeded on foot through the town without being challenged. said he located a small foot bridge and crossed the river at this point. He spent the rest of the night in a brick hut and the next day, set out for the American lines. After going a short distance said he was captured by the Germans who returned him to their Command Post, twenty yards from the foot bridge that he had used to cross the river. When artillery fire was heavy and one shell landed close enough to occupy momentarily the interest of the Germans, said he managed to slip away. Several shots were fired into the dark at but he was not hit. It was shortly thereafter that the Frenchman was apprehended by the American soldier.

CIC felt that there were a number of odd things about story. Suspicion was first aroused by Campana's ability to rattle off, without hesitation the complete detail of events that had taken place four years previously. The interrogators felt that the Frenchman knew his past so well that he might possibly have told them a carefully planned and memorized cover story.

Further, the agents did not believe that a man could travel from Hamburg to Julich without being stopped by anyone. They knew that Julich had been evacuated and also doubted that a person could go through the town in civilian clothes without being picked up. CIC considered it unusual that was able to trace with great care his route through Julich even though he made the trip at night. Furthermore, claimed to have crossed a foot bridge without being challenged, and once on land again, to have apparently passed within 20 yards of a German Command post without being challenged. Finally, CIC felt that who admittedly knew French and German, also knew some English. Several times he inadvertently answered his interrogator in part before hearing the question repeated by the interpreters.*

Because of his unusual account, which he knew to such unbelievable perfection, was sent to the Ninth Army Interrogation Center for further questioning.**

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* "Statement of French Army, 24th Artillery Regiment", attached to "Arrest Form" (SHAEF AGO Form No. 7) on dtd 9 December 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding, 29th CIC Detachment, Unclassified. Kansas City Records Center Bx 25094.

** Hq, 29th CIC Detachment, Personality Index, p. 84, undated, Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center Bx 25094).

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Evacuees' Stories Cross-Checked

In the static situation, agents of the 29th CIC Detachment had considerable time to interrogate and cross-check the civilians evacuated from the combat zones. Civilians brought in for interrogation were asked questions pertaining to their personal histories, matters that would probably be common knowledge to their fellow townsmen. Each evacuee's story was then checked by questioning his neighbors about the individual's personal history.

The evacuees were asked about Nazi leaders, police and Gestapo personnel in their region. CIC found that one individual's denunciation of a local Nazi was likely to be confirmed by a great number of other evacuees.

If an evacuee's story could not be verified, because it did not tally with the accounts of other persons in his group or because these or other persons were unable to identify him, he was sent to XIX Corps Interrogation Center or through Displaced Persons channels to higher headquarters. Military Government was notified of the persons cleared by CIC and took the responsibility for adequately housing them in the rear.

The 29th CIC Detachment realized that their system was practicable only when evacuees were brought back in fairly small groups. The agents took advantage of the fact that most of the groups were well below one hundred in number and that time was not a matter of great importance to compile accurate lists of responsible persons and potential trouble-makers.

Security Situation In Alsdorf Deemed Unsatisfactory

While the 29th CIC felt that military security in the forward areas was excellent, security in Alsdorf, Germany, one of the easternmost towns still inhabitated by civilians, was generally unsatisfactory. Among the 6,000 to 8,000 persons in Alsdorf were many evacuees from Aachen and Wurselen. The presence of a large number of strangers in the area made the system of cross-checking an individual's personal history difficult and not particularly fruitful.*

* 29th CIC Detachment, 29th Infantry Division, Counter Intelligence Report for the period 20 November - 4 December 1944, dtd 4 December 1944, /s/ Ellis Mayfield, 1st Lt, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

Military Government in Alsdorf Found Uncooperative

Early in the month there were several indications that Military Government in Alsdorf was refusing to take CIC seriously, and the situation eventually erupted on 14 December in a letter from 1st Lt Mayfield to the Commanding General of the 29th Infantry Division.

Mayfield noted three occasions where Military Government's failure to accept CIC recommendations left the US Army open to ridicule from the German inhabitants. The most striking of these instances involved a German civilian apprehended by CIC for failure to obey a proclamation to turn in all firearms. The German had hidden a double-barreled shot gun and 51 rounds of buckshot in his home. So well hidden was the shot gun that agents, knowing that the German was in illegal possession of a weapon, had to force him to dig it out of its carefully concealed repository. The order to turn in weapons had been publicly issued two weeks prior to this man's arrest. The German stated that he meant to turn in the weapon but had never gotten around to it. Two weeks after CIC's arrest, Military Government held the trial and the German was pronounced guilty. Although the maximum penalty for this offense was death, Military Government decided to give the German a two weeks sentence, retroactive from the time of his arrest. The offender was set free.

Mayfield felt that actions such as this were hardly in line with the policy of "firm orders, fairly given but strictly enforced," outlined at higher headquarters. In Mayfield's opinion the Germans would be quick to take advantage of any "soft dealing" on the part of the Americans.*

The stage was set for a later and more serious argument begun when the 29th CIC Detachment recommended that the pro-Nazi Burgermeister of Alsdorf be ousted.**

A Buried Pistol

On 12 December, the 234th Engineers Combat Team, tracing faulty wiring in the Hotel Alsdorfer Hof in Alsdorf, found three Nazi flags, a National Socialist

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* 29th CIC Detachment, Hq, 29th Inf Div, Subject: Military Government Situation in Alsdorf, Germany, TO: Commanding General, 29th Inf Div, 14 December 1944, /s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt, Inf, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

** See Vol XVIII, "Last German Offensive", Part I, Ardennes Breakthrough, for the full details of this later Military Government-CIC Argument in Alsdorf.

Motor Corps uniform, a Soldbuch and a pistol permit hidden under the floor boards in the attic. The articles were turned over to the 29th Military Police Investigating Team who decided rightfully that the case would be more appropriately handled by CIC.

On the same day, CIC agents arrested and interrogated the owner of the incriminating articles, Ludwig Shornstein. At first Shornstein denied membership in the National Socialist Motor Corps, the motorized branch of the Nazi Party, but when confronted with the Soldbuch and the uniform, he readily admitted his membership. However, Shornstein denied that he owned a pistol, claiming it had been left in France. Further interrogation brought out the fact that Shornstein had actually buried the pistol in the hotel garden.

The suspect finally admitted that he had buried the pistol on or about 29 September, ten days before the Americans arrived in Alsdorf. Although he claimed to have no knowledge of the proclamation requiring civilians to turn in all firearms, Shornstein had assumed that such an order would be published*

CIC could have no complaint on the Military Government disposition of Shornstein. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment by the Military Government Court in Alsdorf on 4 January 1945.**

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* 29th CIC Detachment, Hq, 29th Inf Div, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Re; Ludwig Shornstein, Hotel Alsdorfer Hof, Alsdorf, Germany, 14 December 1944, /s/ Bryant W. Gillespie and Steve Braude, Special Agents, CIC, Unclassified. (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

** Hq, 29th CIC Detachment, Personality Index, p. 84, undated, Unclassified, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

Chapter 5

FIRST ARMY CIC IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

The liberation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by Allied Forces had come so quickly after the initial invasion of France that Luxembourgers were overawed by the swiftness of the Allied advance. American troops were back in the little Duchy just 26 years after their World War I entrance.

CIC had been informed that the Germans had attempted in every way possible to influence Luxembourgers to incorporate their nation into the Reich, but these efforts had been thwarted by the intense nationalism of the vast majority of its quarter of a million citizens. Nevertheless, American authorities recognized the distinct possibilities of the Germans having left behind espionage and sabotage networks among the native population. To neutralize such networks, CIC enlisted the aid of loyal Luxembourgers.*

Since the Duchy, which is smaller than the state of Rhode Island, had no formally organized Army, CIC sought assistance from the civilian resistance groups. The most powerful of these was the Lique Des Patriotes Luxembourgeois, but the Roeter Loewe, the Luxembourg Volksliga, and the Luxembourger Freiheitsbund were also important.

All four of these groups, in addition to hiding downed Allied airmen, had engaged in espionage, counterespionage and sabotage for the Allies. The organizations also aided citizens of Luxembourg who were oppressed by the Germans, helped Luxembourg men avoid compulsory German military service, and compiled dossiers on those citizens assisting or collaborating with the enemy.

These organizations had sprung up secretly in different areas of Luxembourg, and there had been little coordination between the groups. With the arrival of American forces, it became possible for the organizations to come out into the open and work toward unification. Soon the Union Fun de Letzeburger Freiheets-organisationen, known informally as the "Union," was formed to coordinate all resistance activities in Luxembourg.**

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* Hq VIII Corps, G2 Estimate No. 10, "Counterintelligence In the Grand Duchy Of Luxembourg", 8 October 1944, /s/ Ar. R. Reeves, Col, GSC, AC of S, G2, VIII Corps, (SECRET) Kansas City Records Center Bx25097.

** Hq VIII Corps, 208th CIC Detachment, Team No 2, Subject: Organization of Resistance in Luxembourg, To: CO, CIC Detachment No 208, Hq, VIII Corps, 7 October 1944, Ettelbruck, Luxembourg, /s/ Jack A Spooner, S/A CIC (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

Many CIC investigations began with the denunciation of an individual by a member of the "Union." The 83d CIC Detachment's investigation of of Walferdange revealed that he was, as had been reported, a member of the Nazi party. has served the party as and as secretary to allegedly had been responsible for the deportation of at least three Luxembourg families to Germany. It was discovered that had acquired considerable wealth through his collaboration with the Germans. When apprehended, did his best to ingratiate himself with the Americans and win their favor. But the evidence of collaboration was too strong. was turned over to Luxembourg authorities for final disposition.*

ADSEC Detachment No. 424, Section P, responsible for counterintelligence coverage in the city of Luxembourg, arrested in mid-November after receiving reports that he had been extremely pro-German during the occupation. apparently had a number of friends among the Nazi "brass." Since the Allied entry, had been working for the Service Defense Arienne in order to gain the opportunity to enter restricted zones where he could demolish partly destroyed buildings. CIC arrested and place him in the Grund prison in the city of Luxembourg.**

These specific cases were only two of many instances where tips from loyal Luxembourgers resulted in CIC's successful arrest of collaborators and potential German agents.

"Union" Organizes Police Force

The "Union" established a police force called the Miliz with a command structure paralleling that of the resistance organization itself. The duties of the Miliz were to operate road control posts, serve on patrols, and perform routine police functions until a permanent police force could be instituted.***

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* Hq, 83d Infantry Division, 83d CIC Detachment, Weekly Counterintelligence Report, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, dtd 6 November 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

** CIC Section P, CIC Detachment 424, Hq, Advance Section, CZ, Counterintelligence Report, 12 through 19 November 1944, dtd 20 November 1944, /s/ G.C. Abrams, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

*** Hq VIII Corps, CIC Detachment No. 208, Team No. 2, Subject: Organization of Resistance in Luxembourg, To: CO, CIC Detachment No. 208, Hq, VIII Corps, 7 Oct 1944, Ettelbruck, Luxembourg, /s/ Jack A. Spooner S/A, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx25097).

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Miliz personnel manned the roadblocks at critical junctions in and around the city of Luxembourg, and interrogated extensively all travelers that they did not personally know to be loyal. Those not readily identified as friendly were turned over to CIC Team No. 424, (ADSEC), covering the city of Luxembourg, or the 83d CIC Detachment, responsible for the outlying areas.*

In an attempt to avoid possible impersonation of Miliz personnel, members were cautioned by CIC not to issue a Miliz armband to a new member until he had complete and proper credentials.**

Map Out Two Restraint Lines

On 25 October, with the cooperation of the Civil Affairs Detachment of the 83d Infantry Division, CIC mapped out two parallel restraint lines through which no civilians were allowed to pass without a permit issued by Civil Affairs after screening by CIC. All other travel permits were to be issued by Luxembourg authorities.

The area from the easternmost restraint line to the Sauer and Moselle Rivers was evacuated almost entirely. A few persons were given special Civil Affairs permits, allowing them to remain behind to tend livestock in the area. All civilians picked up in the area without such a Civil Affairs permit were immediately turned over to CIC for investigation and then to Civil Affairs for final disposition.***

On 13 November, CIC arrested Nikolaus Seiler of Grevenmacher, Luxembourg, for failure to comply with the evacuation order. Seiler, a hermit and somewhat mentally deranged, pleaded that he was unaware of any such order.

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* 83d CIC Detachment, Hq 83d Inf Div, Bi- Weekly Report, for the Period 0001, 6 October 1944 through 2400, 9 October 1944, dtd 11 October 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25095).

** 83d Infantry Division, Daily CIC Detachment Report, 14 October 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center Box 25095).

*** Ibid, 25 October 1944, See also Hq 83d Infantry Division, 83d CIC Detachment, Weekly Counterintelligence Report, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, dtd 6 November 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL). Both documents from Kansas City Records Center BX25095.

according to CIC's investigation, was a loyal Luxembourger. He was turned over to the Civil Affairs detachment for final disposition.*

of Luxembourg City was arrested in the evacuation zone on 20 November at Alin, Luxembourg. Interrogation revealed that had been a member of the German Army, and had deserted and crossed the Moselle to give himself up to the American authorities. family and friends in the city of Luxembourg were all loyal, and the interrogation of indicated that he was strongly anti-German. He was evacuated with arrest forms and a detailed report to the Master (First US Army) Interrogation Center on 22 November.

(Four) In late November, CIC apprehended : of Gravenmacher and of Wasserbillig in the evacuated military zone. During their interrogation, the men claimed that they had been evacuated into Saarburg, Germany, by the retreating Germans. Their story was that when they were threatened with service in the Volkssturm, they deserted and were taken into custody by the Americans who, after interning them in a camp near Florence, France, released them and told them to return home. They claimed that in so doing, they had crossed into the evacuated zone.

(Four) Subsequent investigation by the 83d CIC Detachment revealed that had been a voluntary member of the Nazi party during the height of German power. In the light of this fact, the unlikely story told CIC by came to look like complete fabrication. CIC released the men to Luxembourg authorities for final disposition.**

Improper Handling of German Deserters

In general, the restraint lines and restricted zones worked effectively to provide the necessary civil and military security for the Duchy of Luxembourg although complete cooperation was not always received. The ADSEC Team in the city of Luxembourg reported that a number of deserters from the German Army, who, like Leo Probst, had been orginally conscripted from conquered territories, were issued certificates and travel passes by Luxembourg authorities without prior clearance from Civil Affairs. Many of these deserters were harbored in the

* Hq 83d Infantry Division, 83d CIC Detachment, Weekly Counterintelligence Report, To: AC of S, G2, First US Army, dtd 20 November 1944, /s/ Oliver A. Victor, 1st Lt, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), Kansas City Records Center, BX 25095.

** Ibid, dtd 4 Dec 1944, /s/ Lawrence A. Kerns, 1st Lt, Inf, Asst. Det, Commander).

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homes of loyal Luxembourgers. In some instances, deserters had been discovered by the Miliz and allowed to remain at large without any investigation at all. Steps were taken to enforce the standard procedure of placing deserters in regular Prisoner of War channels.*

Lagging Civil Security Measures

Another weakness of the security program for Luxembourg stemmed from the lack of any civil security measures in the city of Luxembourg, a situation that existed for more than two months after the Allied liberation. CIC Detachment No. 424 (ADSEC), and the detachments that had proceeded it, made vain attempts through the SHAEF mission to Luxembourg to institute the necessary security regulations.

In addition to the usual security measures, CIC hoped to institute a complete re-registration of all citizens of the Duchy. There had been such a variety of identification cards issued by Luxembourg and German authorities during the occupation that it was extremely difficult to prove an individual's true identity on the basis of his credentials. CIC also campaigned at higher levels for a registration of firearms in the Duchy.**

On 14 November, civil security measures for the city of Luxembourg were officially instituted by the local government, and comprise the six following regulations: a curfew for everyone from 2300 hours to 0600 hours, a six kilometer travel limit, an order prohibiting the carrying and use of binoculars and photographic equipment, certain blackout regulations, and a registration of all pigeon lofts. Despite CIC's request, no re-registration of citizens nor registration of firearms was ordered.***

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* CIC Section P, CIC Detachment 424, Hq, Advance Section, CZ, CI Report, 5-12 Nov 1944, dtd 13 Nov 1944, /s/ G.C. Abrams, 1st Lt, Commdg, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25095).

** Ibid.

*** Ibid, 13-19 Nov 1944, dtd 20 Nov 1944.

The ADSEC Team found that security in Luxembourg was greatly improved as a result of these regulations. There was still much to be desired, and CIC Agents continued to press for the two recommended measures that had not been instituted. Luxembourg officials stated in late November that new identification cards had been ordered from an English engraving firm but had not been received even at that late date.*

208th CIC Detachment Operates In Southeast Belgium

While the 83d CIC Detachment covered the area around the city of Luxembourg, the 208th CIC Detachment maintained security in the regions to the west. This Detachment, commanded by Captain Albert R. Bowen, Jr., had its main offices at VIII Corps Headquarters in Bastogne, Belgium, but agents were also located at Arlon and Houffalize, Belgium and Esch, Luxembourg.**

Belgian Resistance Groups Disbanded

The first CIC unit in this area had experienced many difficulties resulting from the fact that the resistance groups in Belgium had remained armed, while local police and gendarmes had been unarmed. Consequently the legitmately constituted authorities had lacked the means to control the areas under their jurisdiction.

In mid-November, the disbandment and complete disarmament of resistance groups was ordered by Allied authorities. Although the order was complied with by the majority of the resistance group members, general unrest and scattered demonstrations followed in the area under VIII Corps control. Agents of the 208th CIC Detachment indicated they felt some individuals had not complied with the order to turn in all weapons.***

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* CIC Section P, CIC Det 424, Hq, ADSEC, CZ, CI Report; 20-26 Nov 1944, dtd 27 Nov 1944, /s/ G. C. Abrams, 1st Lt, Commdg, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25095.)

** Hq, First US Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, CI Report No. 13, for the period 24 Nov to 8 Dec 1944, dtd 8 Dec 1944, /s/ B. A. Dickson, Col, GSC, AC of S, G2, (SECRET); (Kansas City Records Center Bx 25097).

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Report No. 5, for the period 1-15 Oct 1944, dtd, 15 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Exec, for the AC of S, G2; (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), and Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Weekly CI Report No. 4, for the period 19-25 Nov 1944, dtd 27 Nov 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr. (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

The 208th CIC Detachment reported that a public demonstration on 26 November by resistance members in Bastogne had met with unfavorable reaction from the local populace.* By early December, the agitation had subsided and no further demonstrations were reported by the 208th CIC.**

Inadvertent Prisoner Release Creates Problem

The transmittal and custody of men interned by Allied authorities was often a far from smooth operation. The mistakes that could occur before the final disposition of the individual suspect were many and varied. The 208th CIC encountered one of the most unusual errors. A complaint was received from the l'Auditorat Militarie of Arlon that American authorities at Prisoner of War enclosures and Military Interrogation Centers had released, without first notifying the Belgian authorities, prisoners taken from the Belgians for interrogation on intelligence matters. These prisoners, wanted by the Belgians for various offenses, had been set free by the Allies when they proved to be of no Counter Intelligence interest. This practice was stopped. Subsequently, the Belgian authorities were notified when Allied interrogation of one of their prisoners was complete, so that they could take him back into custody.***

Thus, when was arrested by the Arlon CIC unit, there was close cooperation with local Belgian authorities. had been reported as an associate of the Gestapo during the occupation. Subsequent interrogation revealed that her collaboration consisted solely of sexual relations with the Germans. She was not considered of Counterintelligence interest and was turned over immediately to Belgian authorities for final disposition.****.

The Tampered Water Supply

In late November, officials of the Arlon Water Works, which like all water works in Belgium was municipally operated, told Civil Affairs about a possible poisoning of the local water supply.

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* Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Detachment No. 208, Weekly CI Report #5 for the period 26 Nov-2 Dec 1944, dtd 6 Dec 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097).

** Ibid, Weekly CI Report #6 for the period 3-9 Dec 1944, dtd 12 Dec 1944.

*** Ibid, Weekly CI Report #5, for the period 26 Nov-2 Dec 1944, dtd 6 Dec 1944.

**** Ibid, Weekly CI Report #6, for the period 3-9 Dec 1944, dtd 12 Dec 1944, See also, Hq VIII Corps CIC Det No. 208, Weekly CI Report #7, for the period 10-16 Dec 1944, dtd 20 Dec 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097),

A camouflaged manhole cover which was to be removed only in extreme emergency by the officials, had been stolen from its position near the reservoir. Immediate investigation did not disclose whether any one had entered the reservoir area,* although on 26 October, the 208th CIC confined in the Arlon prison a close friend of as a possible suspect.**

CIC supervised bacteriological and contamination tests of the water. When these tests proved negative, the case was referred to Belgian authorities for further consideration.***

CIC Rejects Appointee For Chief of Steinfort Gendarmerie

In late October, VIII Corps Civil Affairs Detachment requested an investigation of Luxembourg. The 208th CIC inquiry disclosed that had been employed in police work in many German Cities between 1940 and 1944. In order to become a member of the German Gendarmerie, it had been necessary for him to take voluntarily an oath of allegiance to the Fuehrer. claimed that he deserted the Germans when he heard that his home town of Steinfort had fallen to the Americans. Local informants contradicted him by reporting to CIC that had been in Steinfort at the time of the town's liberation. Even without the revelation of this discrepancy in his story, the very fact that had volunteered his services to Hitler's regime was enough to deny him any government position under the allied Civil Affairs.****

Three Who Were Interned

Agents of the 208th in Steinfort detained upon receipt of word that he had been an informer for the Gestapo during the occupation. A thorough search of his home in Steinfort revealed the yellow uniform and complete insignia of a Blockleiter. His interrogation left the agents uncertain how to deal with since he appeared to be too stupid to endanger American military security.

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* Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Weekly CI Report #4, for the period 19-25 November 1944, dtd 27 Nov 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097).

** Ibid, Weekly CIC Report #6, for the period 3-9 Dec 1944, dtd 12 Dec 1944.

*** Ibid, Weekly CI Report #5, for the period 26 Nov-2 Dec 1944, dtd 6 Dec 1944.

**** Ibid, Weekly CI Report #2, for the period 6-11 Nov 1944, 15 Nov 1944.

A check with a trusted informant in Steinfort, corroborated CIC's impression of . The agents concluded that was of such inferior intelligence as to be incapable of performing espionage and sabotage on his own initiative, and he was released.*

Another of the many individuals investigated as possible espionage agents was at one time a performer for a German circus. came to the small town of Everlange, Luxembourg, on 25 September, apparently in the hope of fraternizing with American soldiers. Although seemed to be a typical "camp follower," her German birth and employment indicated that she possibly could be seeking military information from the soldiers she entertained. On this presumption, was arrested on 7 November and turned over to police authorities in Arlon.**

Early in December, a report from ASCZ CIC indicating that of Buttembourg, Luxembourg, had been a member of the Sturm Abteilungen started 208th CIC Agents on another case. CIC's preliminary inquiries verified membership in the Nazi group,*** and revealed that he had worn the Sturm Abteilungen uniform in Buttembourg. Investigation disclosed that had once quarrelled with his wife in a public cafe over his membership in the Sturm Abteilungen. His wife's anti-Nazi exclamations at this time had led to her internment for sixteen months in a German camp. told CIC that he had worn a Sturm Abteilungen uniform to further his business, a statement that CIC interrogators had heard time and again from former Nazi sympathizers.****

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* Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Weekly CI Report No. 3, for the period 12-18 Nov 1944, dtd 22 Nov 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097), and Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det. No. 208, Weekly CI Report No. 5, for the period 26 Nov-2 Dec, dtd 6 Dec 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097).

** Ibid, Weekly CI Report No. 2, for the period 6-11 Nov 1944, dtd 15 Nov 1944, See also, Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Team 2, Subject: Censorship Watch List, To: Commanding Officer, CIC Det No. 208, 21 Nov 1944, Arlon, Belgium /s/ Jack A. Spooner, 2d Lt, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

*** Ibid, Weekly CI Report No. 6, for the period 3-9 Dec 1944, dtd 12 Dec 1944.

**** Ibid, Weekly CI Report No. 7, for the period 10-16 Dec 1944, dtd 20 Dec 1944.

These three investigations conducted by the 208th CIC Detachment of pro-Germans and potential espionage agents were typical of a great number of cases handled by CIC in the Belgium-Luxembourg area. As the American forces came closer to German territory, the number of pro-Nazi individuals brought to CIC attention increased.

Agents Run Security Survey on Vital Steel Works

The Hadir Steel Works of Differdange, Luxembourg, the largest European producer of 100-foot "I" beams, had begun production for the U.S. Army soon after liberation, since the Engineers vitally needed the steel beam for bridge building. On 9 November, Agents of the 208th CIC ran an extensive security survey on the plant. The Agents found that the pre-war directors of the plant, who had been replaced during the war by Nazi sympathizers, had been restored by the American authorities. Investigation indicated that the plant's current directorate and management were composed of loyal Luxembourgers.

The Agents examined briefly the history of the factory's stock arrangement and production levels. The sources of materials needed for production were taken into consideration. The generator which furnished electric power was examined, and a recommendation made that an auxilliary generator be installed, since the breakdown of the single generator in the plant would cause a complete stoppage of production. The CIC agents suggested, as a temporary measure, that the area around the generator be rigidly patrolled by guards. They also examined the ten main blast furnaces, six Bessemer converters, and nine rolling mills for possible points of sabotage.

The agents then compiled a list of the 4,337 workers at Hadir, breaking the list down by nationalities. Among those employed were 77 Germans and 412 Italians, but all had been cleared previously by the labor office in Esch. CIC considered labor union organization and possible areas of friction between management and labor. It was discovered that the plant's fixed base pay rate was unpopular among the union men and that steps were being taken to adjust the rates in line with the workers' demands. The plant management expected no immediate trouble with the Union.

The agents carefully scrutinized the plant's guard system and discovered that the 22 civilian guards and 18 gatemen were all former Hadir factory hands who had been retired to less strenuous work. A platoon of the 731st Engineers Depot supplemented these guards and actually supervised most of the security measures. All persons and vehicles were checked before entering the plant area. For added safety, the CIC Agents recommended that a U.S. Army guard accompany all vehicles to their destination within the plant.

Blackout regulations were enforced by the company guards and checked by Army personnel. Air protection was supplied by the 129th AAA Battalion stationed nearby. A 50-man volunteer fire brigade, equipped with electric and gas pumps, provided fire protection. The water supply was found adequate to meet any emergency.

As a last step, Henri Roger, the managing director of the firm, was interviewed on the question of possible sabotage. Roger stated that the patriotic and pro-Allied sentiments of the workers insured that they would act to prevent any sabotage that might be attempted. Roger felt that the plant was organized so that no single act of sabotage would stop production. CIC agents agreed with him, except on the matter of the single generator which seemed to be the most vulnerable point in the plant's security.

Industrial plant security in an area relatively close to combat zones had a more urgent aspect than measures taken in regions far removed from the front lines, and the apathy of some industrial firms toward military security was not apparent at Hadir. The Luxembourg management of the steel works and the U.S. Army Engineers had anticipated most of the threat to plant security before the CIC agents surveyed the situation.*

Rest Area Security

The VIII Corps maintained from November to mid-December a huge troop rest center in Arlon. To the 208th CIC Detachment fell the task of maintaining security at this camp. All incoming troops were given lectures and printed instructions to make them more security conscious. Posters proclaiming the value of tight security were distributed in places frequented by the troops. Proprietors of establishments most patronized by U.S. personnel were investigated, and, when the owner of a cafe was of a questionable background, CIC recommended that his establishment be placed off limits. All other taverns were declared on limits until 2100 hours, with Military Police checking these establishments after that hour. CIC screened all civilian employees at the rest center and all local girls attending dances sponsored by military units at the camp. During the time the rest camp was in operation, no major security violations were noted by the 208th.**

* Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Subj: Hadir Steel Works, Differdange, Re: Security Survey and Recommendations, 10 Nov 1944, a supplement to VIII Corps Weekly CI Report No. 2, dtd 15 Nov 1944, /s/ George P. Brown, CIC Agent, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

** Ibid, Weekly CI Report No. 3, for the period 12-18 Nov 1944, dtd 22 Nov 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097), and subsequent VIII Corps Weekly CI Reports up to No 7, dtd 20 Dec 1944, (also Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

Please Explain!

The security checks conducted daily by the 208th CIC became almost too much a matter of routine. Each night agents of the detachment made a blackout check of the VIII Corps area, and the phrase "no violations noted" constituted the full report on most of these checks. On 27 November, the Agents making the check filed such a report. But, in longhand at the bottom of the report was appended a note from Captain Bowen, the Commanding Officer: "The Chief of Staff states that he was out on this night and saw many blackout violations. Please explain!" The phrase "no violations noted" was used less frequently after this incident.*

Europeans In the US Army Uniform Constitute Security Threat

A major obstruction to the enforcement of travel restrictions resulted when loyal French, Belgian, and Dutch boys, who had been utilized by American troops as scouts, guides, interpreters and housekeepers, were sent back home by their units, garbed in U.S. Army uniforms. Upon their release youths usually wandered around behind the lines in their American uniforms, complete with chevrons and shoulder patches. Eventually they were arrested and screened, a process which consumed a lot of CIC's time and made more difficult the detection of espionage agents posing as ex-U.S. Army employees. CIC units were requested to inform all American army forces that when these young patriots were released, they should be sent back as displaced persons through Civil Affairs channels.**

Another problem in enforcing travel restrictions involved civilians who had been given testimonials or letters of introduction by U.S. Army personnel, requesting that the individuals be granted all manner of privileges, most of which ran contrary to existing Army regulations. Almost all the notes included a request for freer movement than was granted by the travel restrictions.***

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* Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Subj: Report of Blackout Check, Thru: AC of S, G2, VIII Corps, To: Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, 28 Nov 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., Unclassified (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097).

** Master (First US Army) G2, CI Bulletin, No. 5, 29 Sept 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

*** Hq, VIII Corps, CIC Det No. 208, Weekly CI Report No. 5, for the period 26 Nov-2 Dec 1944, dtd 6 Dec 1944, /s/ Albert R. Bowen, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

Agents Become Bird-Watchers

In Luxembourg and Belgium, the breeding and raising of carrier pigeons w a large enough pastime to constitute a definite threat to Allied attempts to prev Nazi espionage. A British VIII Corps communication, distributed to American counterintelligence units in Belgium and Luxembourg, reported that the enemy was running an organized network of "stay-behind" pigeons in the liberated cou tries. Captured agents had claimed that Nazis communicating with Germany b means of pigeons were twice as numerous as those using wireless telegraph. Small clandestine lofts were reported to be established in all areas behind the lines. Pigeons were dispatched from these lofts to larger central lofts, some hind the lines and some in German-held territory. The Nazis then used wireles transmission to relay information from these central lofts to higher headquarte

In all areas in Belgium and Luxembourg, pigeon flights were prohibited, a lofts were to be locked at all times. Security regulations in many areas requir the registration of all pigeons.** First U.S. Army took steps to control the us of pigeons by enlisting the cooperation of the Pigeon Owners Association of Bel- gium. All pigeons found in Germany were to be killed.***

When a person under the remotest suspicion operated a pigeon loft, the bir were confiscated by the Americans. Such a case occurred in Luxembourg City when ADSEC Team No. 424 confiscated the pigeons owned by hairdresser under arrest for collaboration.****

Agents in the field were ordered to notify higher headquarters immediatel after discovering violations of regulations designed to prevent pigeon flights o after confiscating a loft of pigeons owned by a suspicious individual. Misunde standing the order, a 208th CIC Detachment agent sent some confiscated pigeo

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* VIII Corps, Incl 3 to G2 Periodic Report No. 140, dtd 23 Oct 1944, and extract from a British 8th Corps Report sent through the 7th Arm Div, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** For example the regulations of the city of Luxembourg; See: CIC Sect P CIC Det 424, Hq, ADSEC, CZ, CI Report, 13-19 Nov, 1944 dtd 20 Nov 1944, /s/ G.C. Abrams. 1st Lt, Commdg, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25095).

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Report No. 6, for the period 16-31 Octoi944, dtd 30 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Ar Group, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, V

**** CIC Sec P, CIC Det No. 424, Hq, ADSEC, CZ, CI Report, 5-15 Nov 194 dtd 13 Nov 1944, /s/ G.C. Abrams, 1st Lt, Cmdg, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25095).

on to the Detachment headquarters. Captain Bowen returned the birds with the following note: "Attached pigeons are returned herewith for your disposition. A copy of the memo regarding pigeons is coming down to you. In no sense of the word does this mean that VIII Corps is running a pigeon loft. If you have an espionage suspect who has pigeons, it is well to note in the investigation that such pigeons are there and forward the information along with the detailed reports when the prisoner is evacuated. If higher headquarters desires a pigeon, they will make a special request."*

Four Silent Detachments

No records have been found of the activities of the four division detachments of the VIII Corps during this period. The 2d CIC Detachment was located in St. Vith and Auw, Belgium, while the 9th Armored Division CIC, recently arrived in ETO, covered the area of Mersch, Luxembourg after mid-October. Three large cities in northern Luxembourg, Wiltz, Clervaux and Dierkirch, were covered by Agents from 8th CIC Detachment until mid-October when the 28th CIC Detachment took over.

At that time the 8th CIC Detachment was placed under the V Corps and sent with the 8th Infantry Division to the Rotgen bivouac area.

Pro-German Sentiment Found In Eupen-Malmedy Region

In the region of Eupen and Malmedy, Belgium, near the German border, CIC Agents encountered a deeply-rooted pro-German sentiment in an unusually large proportion of the population. Most of the people in the area had German cultural backgrounds, and estimated 80% of the population speaking German. The area had been incorporated into Belgium after World War I under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. CIC Agents discovered that, from the very first days of Belgian rule, there began strong pro-German underground movements. Liberal's and Socialists in the movement left when Hitler took power, but the organizations continued to gain in strength. Pro-Germanism, with Nazi encouragement, crystallized into the Heimatbund, a Belgian extension of the Nazi party. Membership in the organization was apparently completely voluntary, although "social pressure" often edged a number of lukewarm pro-Germans into the Heimatbund during the occupation.

* VIII Corps, 208th CIC Det, Memo For Lt Ermis, 26 Oct 1944, /s/ Bowen, Unclassified, Incls: 3 boxes of pigeons (uncounted), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25097).

Thus CIC faced the unusual problem of dealing with a supposedly friendly population which tended, in fact, to look with more favor upon the enemy.*

Until 24 October, counterintelligence coverage of Eupen was handled by the First U.S. Army CIC Detachment. All Nazi leaders right down to the Blockleiters fled the town before American authorities arrived. Also evacuated were the Nazi Burgermeister, the editorial staff of the local newspaper, and all of the Gestapo, Ordnungpolizei, and Kriminalpolizei.

In Eupen, party and police records, particularly recent ones, were partially destroyed, but a mass of valuable documents were still available to CIC. From these documents, considerable information on Nazi activities in Eupen was extracted.

CIC found that the population was both fearful and resentful of the Americans. During the early weeks of Allied occupation, civilians were afraid to show any signs of friendship toward the Allies. CIC expected little local assistance in rounding up what few party leaders might remain in Eupen.**

In mid-November, after two months of American control in Eupen, the 205th CIC Detachment took stock of the situation. It was estimated that 1,000 former Heimatbund members had remained behind when the Germans evacuated. Many of this group were still at large in spite of persistent attempts to apprehend them. The most significant arrestees were a Captain of the German Army, Otto Schmitz, caught in civilian clothes, and three Zellenleiters of the Nazi party in Eupen.***

CIC Agents had also discovered that attempts to enforce strict travel control in the area were hindered by the fact that Civil Affairs rather than Military Government operated in this so-called liberated area. There were no effective means of punishment of civilians other than internment through First Army Interrogation facilities, and action that was far from appropriate in many instances.****

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* "The Pro-German Movement in the Eupen-Malmedy Region of Belgium, 1920-1940," Annex II to First US Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, CI Report No. 13, for the period 24 Nov-8 Dec 1944, /s/ B.A. Dickson, Col, GSC, AC of S, G2, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

** First US Army, G2 Periodic Report No. 97, 15 Sep 1944, Unclassified, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

*** Hq, V Corps 205th CIC Det, "General Estimate of CIC Situation in Eupen, Belgium," 18 Nov 1944, /s/ Robert J. Leslie, S/A, 205th CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL, Staff & Faculty Library).

**** Hq, V Corps, Intelligence Operation of V Corps, ETO, 18 May 1942-10 May 1945, unclassified, Staff and Faculty Library.

Opportunists Fill Top Municipal Positions

Originally Civil Affairs had appointed Edward Schlembach to be Burgermeister, pending a permanent choice by Belgian authorities. The reconstructed Belgian government appointed as Burgermeister Hugo Zimmerman, pre-war Burgermeister, a notorious "fence-sitter" who had somehow managed to avoid controversies during his first term in office. Schlembach continued to do most of the actual work, as Zimmerman traveled to Brussels frequently to maintain his contacts in the capitol. A moderately successful administration was established, but CIC Agents felt that both men were opportunists taking advantage of an extremely confused situation to better their private interests. Although the Zimmerman government was not to be trusted to any great extent, it was felt that a wholesale attempt to clean up the city administration would result in complete chaos. Fortunately, most of the municipal business passed through the hands of a CIC informant, a prominent resistance member, who had been appointed

Belgians From Other Regions Do Police Work in Eupen

A major problem in Eupen for the Belgian government was the establishment of a permanent police force. It was necessary for the Belgians to send 16 members of the Gendarmerie Nationale (National Police) all from outside Eupen, to form the hard core of the new force. The work they did with the CIC Detachment showed a high degree of efficiency.

On the other hand, CIC agents had reason to mistrust the local Municipal police, organized under the pre-war Police Comissaire. There had been indications that members of this force had warned suspects under investigation by the 205th CIC Detachment.

In addition to the Gendarmerie Nationale, CIC Agents utilized members of the Corps de Renseignments Avances, an extremely active resistance group, to check persons under investigation. The 205th CIC Detachment felt that members of this Corps, although turning in accurate information, often passed on matters of a trifling nature as if trying to impress the agents with quantity rather than quality. The Corps de Renseignments Avances shared the reputation for irresponsibility acquired by the Armee Blanche and other Belgian resistance groups and for this reason was soon dissolved by the Belgian government.

During the war, the Armee Blanche in Eupen had operated with almost no direction from a higher headquarters. A local reorganization just prior to the coming of Allied forces made it difficult to tell whether individual members had actually fought the Germans, hidden in the organization to avoid labor camps or military service, or joined just at the end of the war to be sure of being on the right side of the Americans. Consequently, the Armee Blanche was of little use to CIC.

There were persistent rumors during November that the Nazi organizations in the Eupen area were meeting secretly, publishing an underground newspaper, and menacing people who were cooperating with the Americans. CIC units were constantly on the alert for indications of the truth of these reports. A group of clubs, consisting of former Hitler Jugend members, was uncovered, but no other confirming information was received. These youth organizations consisted of irresponsible vandals who had done little more than steal from the Americans. Nevertheless, they could easily have been converted into a militant underground organization by effective leadership. CIC agents arrested some of the youthful leaders of these organizations and infiltrated several loyal Belgian boys into the membership to report on the groups' activities.*

205th CIC Screens 10,000 In Two Weeks In Malmedy

Somewhat less pro-German than Eupen's citizens were the people of Malmedy, 15 miles south of Eupen. Malmedy was covered in October 1944 by the V Corps CIC Detachment, and 10,000 evacuees were screened in a period of two weeks. Many German soldiers in civilian clothes and several other suspicious personalities were apprehended during the operation.**

At another civilian processing point - this one at Verviers, Belgium, eight miles south of Eupen - agents screened about one hundred evacuees a day during October. The arrest of one enemy agent at this point resulted from checking the lists of individuals processed against the file of "wanted" personalities.***

The 205th CIC Detachment also operated in areas just over the German border, principally Monschau and Rotgen. The latter town had been originally covered by the 503d CIC Detachment on 13 September, the first CIC operation within the German border.****

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* Hq, V Corps, 205th CIC Det, "General Estimate of CIC Situation In Eupen, Belgium," 18 Nov 1944, /s/ Robert J. Leslie, S/A, 205th CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Hq, V Corps, Intelligence Operation of V Corps, ETO, 18 May 1942-10 May 1945, Unclassified, Staff and Faculty Library.

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly CI Report No. 6, for the period 16-31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

**** Details of the 503d's activities in Rotgen are contained in the Section on First Army in Germany.

V Corps Organizes Security Police Force

In an attempt to relieve counterintelligence personnel of their most routine activities and to supplement the Military Police in all security matters, V Corps created in October a special Military Government Security Police Force. This force was composed of men from various corps units and included a number of German linguists.* Unfortunately further details of how this force operated with CIC have not not been located.

CIC Develops "Blitz Search" Technique

Another counterintelligence innovation devised at this time was the technique of the "blitz search," a large scale, comprehensively planned raid designed to check areas already canvassed by CIC agents.

A typical blitz search was conducted in Monschau from 0500 to 1300 hours on 9 December 1944. Thirty-three CIC agents from the 205th CIC and the ADSEC CIC Detachments, twenty Military Policemen, seventeen Military Intelligence Interpreters, and ninety-four indigenous police from the Military Government section, a total of 164 persons, thoroughly scoured the town. Inhabitants were checked against the Military Government's Master Registration List. All houses and other buildings were searched.

The searching force was divided into ten groups, each with an area containing from twenty to fifty buildings. The courthouse was used as a headquarters for the searchers because of its location in the center of town.

The primary purpose of the raid was to provide experience for the participants; the theory being that few, if any, black-list Nazi would be found. The raid was expected to serve as a valuable sounding board for future similar operations deep inside Germany where many wanted personalities would be more likely to be found. Although of secondary importance, the apprehension of unregistered persons who might be spies, or the confiscation of tools which could possibly be used by enemy agents was not overlooked.

The results ran true to expectations. A few citizens of Monschau who had not been registered were found, although none were suspects, merely elderly or ill people who could not or would not make their presence known. Cameras, binoculars, radio repair materials, pigeon roosts, and illegally possessed U.S. Army rations were confiscated and their owners' names placed on a list for Military Government.

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* 12th Army Gp, Semi-Monthly CI Rep No. 5, 1-15 Oct 1944, dtd 15 Oct 1944 from AC of S, G2, 12th U.S. Army Group, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The major lesson learned by the searchers was that this type of raid could be accomplished most effectively if there was only one purpose - either the checking of inhabitants or the confiscation of contraband - because the time involved lessened the blitz effect when both were attempted in a single action. It was felt that two separate raids with individual aims would be better than one with the double purpose.

A similar blitz search was made by the agents of the 8th CIC Detachment, aided by personnel of the 205th CIC, in Rotgen shortly afterward.*

Area Southeast of Malmedy Covered by 4th and 99th CIC Detachments.

Counterintelligence coverage of the small towns to the southeast of Malmedy was provided by the 4th CIC Detachment until that unit was moved to Zweifall, Germany, on 7 November, after which the area was covered by the newly-formed 99th CIC Detachment.

The population of most of these small towns was temporarily evacuated to Malmedy after CIC screening. Several soldiers of the German Army and a few Nazi Party members were turned up during the screening.

On 31 October, when a small group of civilians was needed to return to Hunningen to care for livestock, the Office of Civil Affairs in Malmedy inadvertently allowed a former Blockleiter and definite pro-Nazi, Peter Christian, to choose ten fellow townsmen to return with him. Christian naturally selected men with pro-Nazi sympathies. When these men arrived in Hunningen, the 4th CIC Detachment sent a protest to the 205th CIC Detachment in Malmedy, stating that Civil Affairs in Malmedy had failed to consult them before chosing Christian.

The 4th Division Military Government detachment informed CIC that the eleven men were not needed in Hunningen anyway. Christian and his buddies were hustled back to Malmedy along with a suggestion to Civil Affairs in that city that it would be desirable to consult with CIC officials on all such matters in the future.**

On 31 October, tactical troops of the 4th Infantry Division arrested Edouard Collas who was attempting to infiltrate through the American lines. Collas claimed to have left Poland to go to Honsfeld, near Malmedy, to procure clothes. He told CIC that he had been employed as a railroad worker inside Germany and in Russia and Poland since August 1942. After lengthy interrogation, Collas admitted

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* 12th Army Gp, Semi-Monthly CI Rep No. 11, 1-15 Jan 1945, dtd 16 Jan 1945, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Gp, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** 4th Inf Div, Daily CIC Det Rep, 2 Nov 1944, from FUSA, G2 Journal, 1-4 Nov 1944, Unclassified, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

deserting the Belgian Army in December 1939. He had immediately joined the German Army, but claimed he was discharged later for refusing to sign a statement that he would obey all orders from his superiors regardless of the nature of the command. Collas eventually also admitted that he had joined the Heimatbund in 1936 and the Nazi Party in 1940. The 4th CIC Detachment evacuated Collas to First Army Interrogation Center through Prisoner of War channels. *

In addition to the 4th and 99th Division CIC Detachments, V Corps CIC had supervision of the 8th CIC Detachment, which moved on 20 October from VIII Corps jurisdiction, to Rotgen; and until late November, the 505th CIC Detachment which operated in Fammonville and the area around Eupen.

Arrests By Resistance Groups Muddle Liege Situation

It has been noted that the unarmed Belgian police, the legitimate law enforcement agency, had been unable to control fully the area under their jurisdiction because resistance groups remained intact and possessed arms.

In Liege, where counterintelligence activities were run by the 301st CIC Detachment, the situation got out of hand immediately after liberation on 7 September. Local resistance groups began wholesale arrests and, after ten days activity, had 3,000 persons under lock and key. The three prisons used for the detention were completely controlled by resistance groups.

No arrest records were kept, and when constituted authorities began to sort over the cases on 18 September, the situation appeared to be hopelessly muddled. A few individuals who were obviously innocent were released immediately, an act which led to friction between Liege authorities and the local resistance organization. Of the 2,500 persons still under arrest as of 1 October, 1,000 were being held for unknown reasons. The tension in Liege resulting from these wholesale arrests made counterintelligence activity in the area extremely difficult and demonstrated that the prestige of an investigative agency could suffer enormously when law enforcement organizations, legally constituted or not, become reckless with justice. **

* 4th Inf Div, Daily CIC Det Rep, 31 Oct 1944, from FUSA, G2 Journal, 29-31 Oct 1944, Unclassified, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria; Va.).

** 12th Army Group, Semi-monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for 1-15 Oct 1944, dtd 15 Oct 1944, from the office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va., and Operational History of Theaters, "Northeastern France, Belgium, Luxumbourg, Holland."

CIC Penetrates Prisoner Of War Escape Route

By late fall of 1944, the Allied Prisoner Of War Camps were overflowing with beaten, sullen members of the once proud Wehrmacht. As the number of prisoners mounted by the hundreds weekly, the problem of caring for them became increasingly difficult. Not only did tremendous quantities of food, clothing, and medicine have to be diverted for their use, but finding a practical way of containing them became a serious problem. Following a preliminary interrogation, prisoners were shuttled as quickly as possible to a rear area. There they were placed in temporary detention compounds which were often erected in open fields with only a barbed wire fence around the perimeter. Here Prisoners of War were held several weeks while being thoroughly processed. Later, they were shipped to permanent camps in Northern France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Escape from these temporary compounds, although difficult as well as dangerous, was not impossible. To a few die-hard Nazis, it was an ever-present opportunity. Yet, of the many thousands of German Prisoners held in these camps, only an infinitesimally small percentage ever attempted to escape. The vast majority were content to enjoy three good meals a day and sit out the remainder of the war.

However, the fact that a large proportion of those who escaped successfully made their way back to the German lines became a great concern to Allied intelligence. CIC suspected, and with good reason, that the prisoners, once outside the confines of their compound, made their way back to the Reich with the aid of an "Underground Railroad," operated by sympathetic civilians, strategically located along key routes who hid them, gave them food, and then led the way to the next station. Downed Allied flyers had been smuggled out of Europe in much the same manner by friendly partisans prior to the Normandy landings.

Confirmation that escape routes did exist behind the U.S. lines came in October 1944 when Tactical Reserve Team No. 3 of the 418th CIC Detachment penetrated a route in the Bastogne-Houffalize sector of Belgium.* Details on the operation are not available, but inconclusive reports from the Detachment indicate that, although several arrests were made, a number of isolated stations eliminated, and traffic temporarily disrupted, the overall structure of the route was not compromised.

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* Unit Hist of CIC Det No. 418, Tact Res Team No. 3, page 4, document undtd, Staff and Faculty Library.

Almost two months later, the 301st CIC Detachment, which was commanded by Lt. Col. Horace B. Miner, decided to attempt a penetration of an alleged escape route in the First Army area. Although there had been no factual basis for the belief that an escape route was active in the sector, the 301st began an operation that taught many lessons to the veteran CIC men supervising the investigation.

An Austrian, known by the alias of , was approached and recruited to act as an undercover agent for the CIC. had been recommended for the mission by "T" Force CIC, having joined that organization after serving with the Belgian Armee Secrete. CIC Captain Leonard Bessman, who had successfully escaped from a Prison camp in Italy a year previously, briefed the Austrian on his mission. A third CIC veteran, 1st Lt. Charles B. Conick, made arrangements for reception and interrogation at the Army Prisoner of War enclosure, where would receive a military cover story. From the enclosure, was to be evacuated as a "Prisoner of War" to an ADSEC prison camp in Liege where he would work in a quarry with captured German soldiers. Here he was to investigate the possibilities of escape and to find a real Prisoner of War who might be plotting such an attempt. If unsuccessful, was to feign illness, in accord with arrangements which had been made with the camp commandant, in order to be removed from the camp.

was infiltrated into the camp on December and, three days later, pretended illness and was removed to the camp's headquarters where he was contacted by agents of the 301st Detachment. revealed that, on the first day, he had been approached by several members of his "cover" unit, the 76th Eratz Grenadier Regiment, and had passed their superficial interrogation undetected. Later on the same day, a prisoner named : bluntly asked him if he wanted to escape. The undercover agent wisely demurred, giving the opportunity to convince him. Finally swayed, attended a meeting with and six others during which the escape was planned.

On the night of December , at a point where the shadow of a tent fell across the fence, the barbed wire was to be cut and all eight were to escape. They were to wear their fatigue uniforms (the letters "PW" having been washed off with stolen gasoline) and woolen knit caps. Two maps were produced which outlined the escape route: from Liege through the towns of - Herve, Dison, Pepinster, Palleur, Sart, Hockai, and Bernester to the woods south of Bougnez. In Bougnez, one of the prospective escapees would seek help from an inn or bakery. A number of men had already escaped via this route, intimated. To secure arms they would ambush individual American soldiers. They planned to travel only by night.

This information was turned over to the camp commandant by CIC along with the suggestion that the escape attempt be thwarted without taking obvious countermeasures.

on the night of December, dressed in U.S. Army clothing, including the woolen cap but excluding a helmet, was to penetrate the final charted link in the escape route. He entered the inn, which had been reconnoitered earlier, and explained his "plight" to the proprietress.

Returns With Information

Believing him to be a German escapee who was anxious to return to the Reich, she led across the road to a farm. The owner of the farm rushed the pair into the stable, questioned then gave him food and diagrammed a route to Losheim where there was a German outpost. left immediately and walked one mile toward Losheim before returning to the 301st CIC Detachment. He had not obtained any additional leads or new information concerning "safe houses."

A second agent, an anti-German Prisoner who had been selected for the mission by the First Army Interrogation Center, was inserted in the escape route in Bougnez on 12 December.

The proprietress at the inn and the farmer, , aided him as they had however, was able to secure the name and address of another contact: near Billingen. On the following evening, was taken to Billingen and he made his way to house. angry and suspicious at first, became satisfied with story and outlined the remainder of the escape route for the CIC-plant, providing three addresses along the way. had indicated that was the central figure in the chain. searched the home, after had left in the morning, but found nothing incriminating. He returned to the CIC office in Billingen. Further penetration of the route was frustrated by a German attack on 16 December. was arrested, however, trying to return to his home, which at that time was in German hands again.*

Another Mission For

meanwhile, was taken to Liege for another penetration attempt, to begin at the house of whose name had been secured from a

* 301st CIC Det, Hq, FUSA, Monthly Information Report for Dec 1944 and Jan 1945, dtd 15 Feb 1945; (SECRET), Staff & Faculty Library.

printed commercial card found on a recaptured German escapee. proved less trustworthy than he had on the previous trial, but since some time elapsed before his double-crossing was discovered, CIC was never able to establish definitely which parts of his reports were true and which were fabrications. According to his story, proceeded along thirty-five miles of the escape route on which started him. He reported almost daily to the CIC officer under whom he operated and gave lengthy detailed reports on the personalities and places involved in the system. On his own initiative, introduced his mistress into his operation, but she lasted only one stop. At CIC insistence, she discontinued her efforts.

ceased his penetration at the final stop before an alleged escapee collecting point, as it was believed, despite his cover story, that he would fail to pass more than a cursory interrogation. He had no German military experience and was vulnerable in that respect.

Later, two independent attempts were made to introduce more suitable agents into the same underground system. The German offensive had failed by then, however, and though cordial to the pseudo-escapees, appeared too frightened of his own position to help others to safety. From findings, the route appeared too well organized to permit infiltration at a midway point. It was decided to act immediately on the uncorroborated information.

A mass arrest was planned, but, on the day before the scheduled operation, Belgian authorities--who had not been informed of the CIC enterprise--arrested on a two-year-old charge. This increased the possibility of prepared stories of innocence on the part of other suspects whom CIC arrested the next day.

Twenty-five suspects, the results of descriptions, were caught in the round-up. Interrogation began immediately, and investigation of the places described produced a certain amount of concrete evidence substantiating his account, namely:

(1) In one cellar, in which said he had hidden, a secret opening into another cellar room was found. The other room contained pieces of U.S. Army clothing and Army rations.

(2) according to told him that the in Havelange would give him an ace of diamonds which he would lay on the table of . A raiding party found in the home two decks of playing cards from which various cards, including both aces of diamonds, were missing.

The ace of diamonds in a third deck was the single marked card, bearing the name "Dempsey" on it; an eight of clubs was found with the name and address of the cafe proprietor on it.

(3) A photographer, who was supposed to have taken identity photos for false identifications cards for the escapees, admitted photographing two men of military age who were unknown to him and spoke with Germanic accents.

(4) In the home of a garage owner in the escape route, a hole cut through the back of a closet gave entry to the courtyard.

(5) admitted his contact with and the other two agents, but denied any escape route knowledge.

(6) Three escaping German Prisoners were known locally to have been in the area and around the farm at the time said he had been assisted.

Information Points To Inconsistency In Story

Imposing as this wall of evidence seemed, after 24 hours of interrogation, none of the suspects had been broken and one proved to have an iron-clad alibi. Furthermore, certain information indicated inconsistencies in testimony.

Not wanting to alienate by showing lack of confidence in him, aggressive interrogation of the CIC informant had been deemed unwise up to this point. Now a new approach was required.

At the First Army Interrogation Center, was asked simply to recite his account once again. mistress was located and brought to a living room in CIC quarters which had been wired with a microphone. was taken to her after being informed that she was leaving soon for the Interrogation Center. The agents left them alone, ostensibly to arrange for transportation. searched the room and tested the walls for microphones, but failed to locate the one CIC had planted. Then he whispered instructions to his mistress, rehearsing her in the story she was to tell and bullying her during the conversation. When the CIC agents returned, the couple was separated, thinking his mistress was on her way to Interrogation Center. However, she was questioned immediately and her cover story quickly broken. Her admissions discredited some of account, and he was interrogated and later confessed to the hoax he had perpetrated for monetary gain.

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But as a result of the CIC efforts at penetrating the escape route, was arrested and confessed, as did . The proprietress of the inn was believed to have been killed in a bombardment.

In the second phase, only and those immediately connected with him were apprehended. The rest, due to fabrication, were freed. himself was arrested for giving fraudlent and malicious information during this phase of the operation.

Agents Pass On Advice

The Monthly Information Report of the 301st CIC Detachment, which contained the disappointing news of the second attempt to , advanced some sage advice for those who would conduct similar types of enterprises. The statement follows:

"In addition to the necessity for assiduously carrying out the checks which were applied in this case, the story of any agent provocateur must be checked in detail when he first gives it. He should be cross-examined as to physical detail, times and places. At some subsequent time, say a week later, he should be reinterrogated as to detail. If this process is routine from the beginning, the agent need feel no loss of confidence. Extremely detailed accounts of the agent's observations are required for later suspect interrogation in any case. The use of two agents, operating independently of one another, is essential, if at all possible...."*

ADSEC CIC Collects Information On Belgian Resistance Groups

The greater part of Belgium was covered for CIC by ADSEC Teams. An important operation for these units was the collection of all available information on the strength, disposition and armament of the Belgian resistance groups, principally the , an active aggressive organization with a hard core of Communists in control. This investigation proved to be difficult and delicate work, requiring the utmost in diplomacy and thoroughness.

ADSEC Teams felt that "the strongest single force in Belgian life was the resistance movement." Unlike the situation encountered by the 301st CIC Detachment in Liege, ADSEC CIC found that the resistance groups had done a fine job of rounding up collaborators immediately

* Hq, FUSA, 301st CIC Det, Monthly Information Report, 4 Mar 1945, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

after the liberation.

ranks of the
began to reach for political power by open recruiting even though the war was over in their area. Resistance members were frequently found guilty of extorting food, cigarettes, and money from unarmed civilians. Soon arrests were being made without discrimination and often without reason.

In late October and early November, the resistance groups prodded by the many Communists in their ranks, organized an armed force which not only threatened the Belgian National Government, but the security of the Allied rear areas as well. The national order to disband and disarm the groups resulted in public protests throughout the country. Various groups planned to march on the capitol building in Brussels to overthrow the government. For a short time, it looked as if the Supreme Commander would have to take action to disarm the trouble-makers, and there was a distinct possibility that Allied soldiers far from the fighting lines would soon be pressed into combat on the local scene. CIC worked to compile voluminous records on the groups so that target information would be on hand should American forces go into action against the resistance organizations.

When Allied authorities made it clear that they were issuing no idle threats, the obeyed their government's order and turn in their weapons.*

* ADSEC, CZ History, 1943-45, ADSEC G2 Sect Ops, udt, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Chapter 6

THIRD ARMY CIC IN FRANCE

Third Army Takes Metz

The main objective of the Third U.S. Army during the autumn of 1944 was the fortress city of Metz where the Nazis held out until mid-November, although troops of the XX Corps had been within sight of the city two months before.

Supply shortages proved to be only one of the many reasons for the long delay in taking Metz. Fortresses like the legendary Fort Driant, five-miles southwest of the city, manned by elite German troops, eventually had to be demolished by U.S. artillery and air bombardments. Further complications resulted when heavy autumn rains turned the Moselle River into a raging torrent.

Finally, on 20 November 1944, the newly-arrived 95th Infantry Division reduced the last remaining German resistance in Metz. Mean while, other elements of the Third Army worked toward the Saar River.*

A Quick Start For A New CIC Unit

The 95th Division which had landed in Normandy during mid-September moved onto the line in the bridgehead sector south of Metz on 1 November to relieve the 5th Infantry Division.**

The 95th CIC Detachment got off to an auspicious start by apprehending Roger Necru, a French short-range linecrosser, near Les Mesnils on 21 October. Interrogation revealed that Necru had been recruited to obtain unit identifications between Pont a Mousson and St. Avold and then return to the German lines. Necru was subsequently shot.***

Although the 95th CIC was the first American unit to enter Metz, it fell to the 5th CIC Detachment to exploit counterintelligence targets inside the city.

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* Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1951, p. 442 and The XX Corps - Its History and Service in World War II, prepared and written by XX Corps Personnel, Published by the XX Corps Association, p. 128-183.

** 95th Infantry Division, G2 Jnl, (G2 After-Action Report), October 1944, G2 Jnl & File, 395-2 (9919) Master, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia, UNCLASSIFIED.

*** 12th Army Group Report of Operations, (Final After-Action Report), Vol IV, G2 Section, (Part V through VII), p. 208, RESTRICTED.

To supplement the 5th CIC, two officers and eight agents of the Tactical Reserve Team #7 of the 418th CIC Detachment arrived in Metz on 21 November. One week later, the remaining eleven men of that team reported to Capt Lyndon B. Allen, Commanding Officer of the 5th CIC Detachment, for duty.*

CIC personnel in Metz had at their disposal four separate black lists, one of which appeared in the Counterintelligence Brief for Germany, Wehrkreis XII. The other lists were obtained from the T-Force originally scheduled to enter Metz, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Securite Militaire (SM).

During the first week in the city, 159 target personalities were sought, of which only four minor collaborators were apprehended. One of the four, a slaughter house foreman believed to have been a denunciator for the Gestapo, was deemed to have enough information of counterintelligence interest to be sent to a higher echelon for intensive interrogation.

At the end of November, the 5th CIC Detachment reported that their attempts to locate 37 target personalities had been completed with negative results, and 65 other cases remained pending. Both the Securite Militaire, charged with locating 47 target personalities, and , assigned approximately 25 individuals, reported negative results.

Establishments in Metz of counterintelligence interest were searched between 21 and 24 November. Agents found nothing except small quantities of blank paper and various office supplies.

The delay in taking Metz had apparently given the Germans time to evacuate important personalities and destroy or remove all documents and equipment of value. CIC received a report from the French Forces of the Interior that all buildings occupied by Germans have been searched by a special security squad after their abandonment.

On 22 November, a CIC Prison and Interrogation Center was established at the Metz civilian jail where all persons arrested for counterintelligence reasons by either the Americans or the French were to be registered and processed. By the end of November, eight persons had been processed through this center and evacuated to the Third Army Interrogation Center; thirty-four others had been completely processed at the Metz center.

In addition, security control posts and patrols were maintained in Metz with nine fixed posts located at strategic points on the south and east sides of the city.

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* 5th Infantry Division, G2 After-Action Report, 1-30 November 1944, G2 Jnl and File, 305-2 (6610), Master, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

Each post was manned by a non-commissioned officer and six men from the Gardes-Mobiles, with two men on duty at all times. Five two-man patrols roamed the city looking for offenders of the travel restrictions.

In performing their counterintelligence functions, the 5th CIC Detachment apprehended and placed in Prisoner of War channels 131 deserters from the German Army.*

The 220th CIC Detachment Operates Around Thionville

While the 5th CIC Detachment operated at Metz, the security of the areas north and west of the city was the responsibility of the 220th CIC Detachment. The main body of the Detachment operated out of Thionville, 17 miles north of Metz on the Moselle. Thionville, which the Germans had defended with the same tenacity as Metz, had fallen to troops of the 90th Infantry Division on 12 November.** XX Corps CIC agents were also located in Conflans, 15 miles west of Metz, and in Sierck and Bouzonville near Thionville.***

While Thionville was still in the combat zone, CIC's major concern was the speed with which the German garrison across the Moselle spotted American gun positions. It was discovered that pro-Germans in Thionville were signalling the Nazi forces every time U.S. gun positions were changed. A proclamation from the mayor urging citizens to stay in their houses at all times failed to stop this activity.

On 13 November, CIC suggested, and the mayor agreed, that the best solution was the confinement of the ninety-seven German aliens known to be in metropolitan Thionville.****

By 1200 hours on 14 November, French authorities had completed this operation. Later that day, the mayor issued a proclamation warning that if the

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* 5th Infantry Division, G2 After-Action Report, 1-30 November 1944, G2 Jnl and File, 305-2 (6610) Master, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia, (RESTRICTED).

** The XX Corps - Its History and Service in World War II, prepared and written by XX Corps Personnel, Published by the XX Corps Association, p. 161.

*** Hq,XX Corps, CIC Det, Bi-Weekly Report from 16 to 30 November 1944, dtd 2 December 1944, /s/ Anthony W. Lobb, Capt, Commanding, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

**** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, Memo: Security Threat in Thionville, To: AC of S, G2, Hq, XX Corps, 13 November 1944, /s/ Ross B. Hahn, T/Sgt, CIC, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

signalling of American gun positions continued, he would be forced to evacuate the town, and requesting that the loyal citizens be on the lookout for pro-Germans.*

Once Thionville was out of the range of enemy weapons, a major problem for CIC became control of the stream of refugees seeking to cross the Moselle at the Thionville bridge. Such travel was in direct violation of restrictions proclaimed for the area east of the Moselle by Civil Affairs on the recommendation of CIC. Nevertheless, from 24 November to 30 November, more than 1,600 civilians were processed at the control point that had been established at the bridge, manned by CIC personnel and civilian auxiliary police.** As the situation stabilized east of the Moselle, refugee traffic through this point dwindled to only 935 for the first two weeks of December.***

Although many complaints were registered concerning pillaging by American soldiers, relations between the liberating Americans and local French officials and civilians were generally excellent. The Thionville Commissioner of Police cooperated to the fullest with CIC, although the chief of the prison was reluctant to intern CIC's prisoners. Even when this reluctance was overcome, the jail facilities proved inadequate because the 220th CIC apprehended many collaborators and several espionage agents in the area around Thionville.****

Among those charged with collaboration was a pre-war who had been retained by the Nazis. Certain also that had contacts with the Nazis, the 220th CIC sent him to the Third Army Interrogation Center on 20 November.*****

At the Interrogation Center, stated that he had become a member of the Nazi Party so that he could remain in office. Although he admitted that he

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* Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #340, Memo: Security Proclamation Issued in Thionville, To: AC of S, G2, XX Corps, /s/ Ross B. Hahn, T/Sgt, CIC, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det, Bi-Weekly Rpt from 16 to 30 November 1944, dtd 2 December 1944, (SECRET) /s/ Anthony W. Lobb, Capt, Commanding, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

*** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det, Bi-Weekly Rpt from 1-15 Dec 1944, dtd 17 Dec 1944, (SECRET), /s/ Anthony W. Lobb, Capt, Commanding, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

**** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det, Bi-Weekly Rpt from 16-30 Nov 1944, dtd 2 Dec 1944, (SECRET), /s/ Anthony W. Lobb, Capt, Commanding, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

***** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, Memo: Arrest of To: AC of S, G2, Hq, XX Corps, 19 Nov 1944, /s/ Ross B. Hahn, T/Sgt, CIC, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

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reported on the political reliability of his neighbors, claimed that his accounts were so different from those of other informers that his word was not highly regarded. claimed that he had not complied with the German orders to evacuate Thionville because he strongly wished to remain in France.

The interrogators of felt that he was "a civil service man who considered his job and comfort higher than his loyalty to France," although not a threat to the security of American troops. was turned over to French authorities for final disposition.*

Acting upon reports from a confidential informant in nearby Mandern which indicated that the had been extremely pro-Nazi during the war, CIC arrested him on 26 November. admitted that three days after his return to Mandern in September 1940, the Germans had appointed him and that he took the job voluntarily. In February 1943, he became a member of the Nazi party. His wife had always been active in the Nazi Women's League. The family had contributed five children to the Nazis cause: one son was in the German Army, two others were members of the Hitler Jugend and two daughters were members of the Bund Deutcher Madel. With the consent of Civil Affairs, was removed from his position and turned over to the French gendarmes for further action.**

During his interrogation, stated that the real leader of the Nazis in Mandern had been As a result, was apprehended by Agent G. J. Hagen of the 220th CIC Detachment on 26 November. Although was apparently not a Party member, he readily admitted his pro-German sympathies and bragged that the Nazis had used his list of politically unreliable persons as a basis for wiping out resistance. With pride, told his interrogators that the report was the reason why a man named Niderkorn had been taken from Mandern by the Germans. admitted close contact with the German Commissar of Sierck and further claimed that he had been placed in charge of a detail that dug fortifications for the Wehrmacht in the Mandern area.

Because of his admitted Nazi connections, was sent to the Third Army Interrogation Center for further questioning.***

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* Hq, Third Army, CIC Interrogation Center, Memo For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Case No. 224, 25 November 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, Memo: Discharge of To: AC of S, G2, Hq, XX Corps, 26 Nov 1944, /s/ Ross W. Hahn, T/Sgt, CIC (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

*** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, Memo: To: AC of S, G2, Hq, XX Corps, 26 Nov 1944, /s/ Ross W. Hahn, T/Sgt, CIC (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

CIC investigation was also responsible for the removal of the When combat troops liberated the city, a French officer proceeded to appoint as temporary mayor. When agents of the 220th CIC arrived on the next day, they found that had refused to take the position because the townspeople were denouncing him as a collaborator and he feared their wrath. was removed and, with the assistance of French Civil Authorities, another mayor was selected. was found to have been a frequent informer for the Germans, amassing a large sum of money for his troubles. He was sent to the French internment camp at Metz.*

Two Espionage Agents Apprehended

On 7 November, French police arrested Hubert Albrecht and Hubert Rawe at Moyeuvre and turned them over to the 220th CIC Detachment. Intensive interrogation revealed that Albrecht was a non-commissioned officer and Rawe a private in the German Army and that they had crossed the line in civilian clothes with the specific mission of learning the number, disposition and future plans of Allied forces in Moyeuvre.

Albrecht, a career soldier, admitted that he had been chosen for the mission by his battalion commander who had instructed him to pose as an escapee from the forced labor camp in Metz if he were caught. Rawe was under the impression that the mission had been given to him as a disciplinary measure. He suspected that he had been in trouble with his superiors ever since the lieutenant for whom he was orderly had been arrested for his friendly relations with the French.

Albrecht and Rawe had left their units on 5 November and roamed the neighborhood of Moyeuvre observing military traffic. On 7 November they were to return with whatever information they had collected. The timely arrest by the French police thwarted these plans, and Albrecht and Rawe, considered enemy agents, were subsequently shot.**

Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, Memo: Summary of Information re To: Officer In Charge, 28 Dec 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098), and Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, CI Rpt No. 9 for the period 16 to 31 Dec 1944, dtd 2 Jan 1945, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098), and Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det #220, CI Rpt No. 8 for the period 1 to 15 Dec 1944, dtd 17 Dec 1944, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

** Third U.S.Army, CIC Interrogation Center, Memo For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Albrecht, Hubert, 12 Nov 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL), Case No. 209, and as above, Subject: Rawe, Hubert, Case No. 210, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

"We've Got Him Already"

On 25 November, Third Army Headquarters sent to the 220th CIC Detachment a copy of a report from a section of the 422d CIC Detachment operating in Commercy, thirty-seven miles southwest of Metz, indicating that a suspected agent of the Gestapo, was in the Thionville area. The report stated that was operating a that served as a cover for his espionage activity.*

Promptly CIC began a search that ended the next day when agent Robert B. Oyler found that was safely comfined in the prison in Hayange. Oyler wrote: "A check in Thionville discloses that Subject is in prison in Hayange. Was arrested about eight days ago - why and by whom no one seems to know."** When it was established definitely that had worked for the Nazis, he was left in the care of the French Gendarmes.***

90th CIC Detachment Operating East of Thionville

The 90th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt Walter D. Osborne, did not stop to exploit counterintelligence targets in Thionville, but moved eastward with the 90th Infantry Division in the Third Army push to the banks of the Saar. The 90th CIC, operating by December in the small villages of Veckring, Oberesch, and Laumfeld, found it necessary to place more rigid restrictions on the civilian population as they went deeper into Lorraine and came closer to the German border.

Even in October, before the fall of Thionville, the Detachment had reported numerous failures to observe security regulations, particularly the curfew and travel restrictions. In some critical areas near the front, troops had been ordered to fire immediately on all civilians moving about after curfew. Intense German patrol activity and alarm over the large number of German soldiers in civilian clothes recently captured in the area had caused this strict order.****

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* CIC Detachment 422, Section "L", G2 Section, Hq, ASCZ, Memo For The Officer In Charge, Subj: Thionville, Suspected Gestapo Agent, 22 Nov 44, (CONFIDENTIAL), /s/ Arthur B. Stevenson, Special Agent, CIC, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

** Handwritten note attached to report on from 422d CIC Det, dtd 26 Nov 44, Subj: /s/ Oyler, CIC Det #220, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

*** Hq, XX Corps, CIC Det, Bi-Weekly Rpt for 16-30 Nov 1944, dtd 2 Dec 1944, (SECRET), /s/ Anthony W. Lobb, Capt, Commanding, (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

**** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period 16 Oct - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 21 Oct 1944, from the office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET),(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

As the 90th Infantry Division pushed closer to the Saar River, the many small towns near the front lines were ordered sealed off by Military Police patrols, and all military highways were posted "off limits" to civilians. All persons found violating travel restrictions were detained at a new civilian annex to the Division Prisoner of War cage. Here the offenders were held for a minimum period of 48 hours and were thoroughly screened by CIC before release.

The tight controls apparently impressed the civilians, for the 90th CIC Detachment was able to report by early December that violations were decreasing.*

In mid-November, the 510th CIC Detachment of the newly-arrived 10th Armored Division moved into the combat area northeast of Metz, south of the region of operations of the 90th Infantry Division.

5th CIC Detachment Also Reports Travel Regulation Violations

Prior to entering Metz on 20 November, the 5th CIC Detachment operated in the area to the south of the fortress city, covering the towns of Pagny, Thiaucourt, and Chambley.

Like the 90th CIC Detachment to the north, the 5th CIC reported an alarming number of travel regulation violations. It was felt that the cause of these misdemeaners was insufficient travel control in the region of Pont-a-Mousson and Nancy, south of the area under 5th Infantry Division jurisdiction. Many civilians from these two towns had been apprehended in the Chambley area for traveling without passes. It was noted that while Civil Affairs permission was required to cross the Moselle River in the area of the 5th Infantry Division, the forces to the south allowed free and unregulated passage across the river. People who had, for instance, crossed to the east bank at Pont-a-Mousson and then tried to return to the west bank at Pagny were violating Civil Affairs regulations. The system was standardized by an order that travel passes would also be required in the Pont-a-Mousson-Nancy area.**

Agents of the Headquarters Team of the 5th CIC Detachment did find one area where there were absolutely no travel violators. Checking the village of Pournoy

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* Third U. S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Rpt No. 8, for the period 26 Nov - 10 Dec 1944, dtd 8 Dec 1944, (SECRET), Staff and Faculty Library, and 90th Infantry Division, G2 Periodic Report, 9 Dec 1944, /s/ James O. Boswell, Lt Col, AC of S, G2, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

** 5th Inf Div, G2 After-Action Rpt, 1-21 Oct 1944, G2 Jnl & File, 305-2 (6610), (RESTRICTED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

on 21 September, the agents found that all civilians in the town were off the streets and in their homes. But the citizens had good cause for their seclusion: The village was under heavy enemy artillery barrage, and a German infantry assault seemed imminent.*

On 3 October, Thiaucourt civilians wishing to travel more than the standard six kilometer limit were required to possess a pass issued by the newly appointed mayor and countersigned by CIC.** After several days, the mayor was authorized to issue civilian passes at his discretion with CIC from time to time reviewing the list of permits granted.***

MPs Refuse To Honor Passes Signed By CIC

An unfortunate misunderstanding was uncovered in the Chambley area when it was reported that XX Corps Military Police in that region were refusing to honor passes countersigned or vouched for by CIC. The Military Police claimed that they were instructed to honor only passes countersigned by SHAEF, Army, and Corps Headquarters, and Corps Provost Marshal or Civil Affairs. The 5th CIC Detachment reported the matter to the Division Civil Affairs Officer.

However, the Military Police in Chambley apparently did know where to send persons found traveling without passes. In mid-October, Corps Military Police turned in to CIC approximately sixty persons who had exceeded the six kilometer limit without permission.****

Another "snafu" involving passes arose in late September when two Frenchmen, apprehended near the front lines, produced a pass authorizing travel in the forward areas. The pass had been issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Military Intelligence Interpreter Team of the 7th Armored Division, but had not been signed. A hurried call to the G2 Section of the 7th Armored Division confirmed that the two men were working on intelligence missions for that division. The two Frenchmen were ordered to return to Verdun to have their passes properly signed.*****

(FOUO) Among the persons apprehended by the 5th CIC Detachment prior to their assignment in Metz was arrested in Wabille on 1 October 1944.

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* 5th Inf Div, Daily CIC Det Rpt, 23 Sept 1944, from 5th Inf Div G2 File & Jnl, 22-24 Sept 1944, /s/ Lyndon B. Allen, Capt, Commanding, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

** Ibid., 3 Oct 1944, from the 5th Inf Div G2 File & Jnl, 1-4 Oct 1944.

*** Ibid., 5 Oct, from the 5th Inf Div G2 File & Jnl, 5-7 Oct 1944.

**** Ibid., 15 Oct 1944, from the 5th Inf Div G2 File & Jnl, 14-16 Oct 1944.

***** Ibid., 23 Sept 1944, from the 5th Inf Div G2 File & Jnl, 22-24 Sept 1944.

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An informant had claimed that had been an armed and uniformed member of the Sturm Abteilung, had given aid and comfort to retreating Germans, and had shot (it was not reported with what) at an American Piper Club. acknowledged his German citizenship but claimed he had joined the Sturm Abteilung in order to be released from a concentration camp.* denied having ever fired at an American plane. He was evacuated through prisoner of war channels. The 5th CIC Detachment also nabbed two German soldiers in civilian clothes and sent them back through Prisoner of War channels.**

80th CIC Detachment Investigates Outbreak of Sabotage

As American forces opened up the area on the west bank of the Moselle, the 80th CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Thomas R. McMillen, moved up from near Pont-a-Mousson and took over counterintelligence coverage of the area east of Metz and just west of the combat zone. After 28 November, operations were centered in St. Avold, about twenty miles directly east of Metz, and Faulquement, about twenty miles southeast of Metz.

The 80th CIC Detachment spent much of its time in the region investigating sabotage cases.

In late November, agents investigated the destruction, by an internal charge, of the chimney of a building in use as an observation post by Division troops. It appeared that an enemy patrol or stay-behind group had performed the sabotage, although in a neighboring town several civilians possessing the necessary technical ability to accomplish the act were discovered.***

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* The chances are good that was speaking the truth. A Third Army report concerning the Sturm Abteilung in Lorraine stated as follows: "Many men joined the Sturm Abteilung because they feared punishment from the Nazis for their previous attitude or acts against the interest of the German Reich. Thus, men who had deserted the German Army during the last war, former German citizens who had become Frenchmen through naturalization, members of the Foreign Legion, and political refugees who had come to Lorraine after Hitler's rise to power in Germany bolstered the ranks of the Sturm Abteilung. As a whole, the Sturm Abteilung consisted of people of a low intellectual standard and, with few exceptions, of people of weak character easily terrorized and influenced."

** 5th Inf Div, G2 After-Action Rpt, 1-21 Oct 1944, G2 Jnl & File, 305-2 (6610). (RESTRICTED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, for the period 1-15 Dec 1944, dtd 15 Dec 1944, from the office of the AC of S, G2. 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

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In Faulquement, a quarter-ton truck was booby trapped by German field wire tied from the wheel of the vehicle to the pull-pin of a U.S. hand grenade in such a way that the grenade was detonated when the vehicle was moved. Agents felt that this was sabotage since booby-trapping by enemy troops was improbable in this heavily-occupied area.

Of more importance, CIC was informed that the retreating Germans had strategically placed a number of time bombs in St. Avold. A timed charge, consisting of four hundred pounds of explosives, was found by agents at the city gas works under a large fuel storage tank. Another bomb, containing 600 pounds of explosives, was uncovered in a former German barracks which the Nazis had assumed would be occupied by U.S. forces. No other explosives were found in this initial CIC search. As a result, CIC borrowed a loudspeaker from a psychological warfare unit and toured St. Avold attempting to enlist volunteers for a thorough search of the town, but not one citizen came forward to help.

On 3 December at 2230 hours, an exploding time bomb destroyed a house in St. Avold. The following day, five additional bombs detonated, demolishing buildings previously used by the Germans. In the barracks where one timed charge had been found previously, another exploded. Now residents of St. Avold willingly joined the CIC search, but no more bombs were uncovered. The report on the series of explosions concluded nervously: "Time devices are capable of running 21 days."

On the less urgent side, the 80th CIC Detachment reported the booby trapping of an outhouse near Farebersville. The device was detonated by a civilian on 5 December and as a result the exact nature of the trap was never learned. A few German hand grenades and a cake of explosives were found undetonated in the outhouse. Because American troops were in the immediate vicinity, CIC investigators decided that German soldiers had arranged the trap in hopes of catching some GI in an unguarded moment.

There was a remote possibility that some of these acts of sabotage were the work of one arrested by the 80th Infantry Division CIC on 6 December when he applied for a Civil Affairs pass to travel from Freyming to St. Avold. Agents interrogating learned that he had attended a sabotage school in Germany and had been parachuted into France to form a sabotage organization. tried to plead his case by claiming that he had entered the American lines in order to avoid his mission. He was sent to the Third Army Interrogation Center. Final disposition of the case is not recorded.*

* Third U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report No. 8, for the period 26 November - 10 December 1944, dtd 8 December 1944, (SECRET), Staff and Faculty Library.

JOINT DOCTRINE

"T" Force Covers Nancy

Troops from the 35th Infantry Division on 15 September moved into the large French city of Nancy, over 30 miles south of Metz on the Moselle. From 15 September, a "T" Force supplemented by agents of the 35th CIC Detachment reduced the many counterintelligence targets in Nancy. In the three days a total of fifty-four personality targets, all minor collaborators or individuals locally employed by the Gestapo, were arrested. Personalities of outstanding counter-intelligence importance, without exception, had fled to Germany prior to the arrival of the Americans.

The seizure of assigned building targets resulted in the acquisition of some maps of tactical value (quickly transmitted to the G2, 35th Infantry Division), local membership lists of collaborationist parties, and enemy and Vichy propaganda material (turned over to a psychological warfare unit). Of great counter-intelligence significance, the searchers found a directory, dated 1 June 1944, containing a list of individuals in France wanted by the German Security Service* on suspicion of espionage, terrorism, and sedition.

On 25 September, the 35th CIC Detachment left Nancy, and counterintelligence coverage of the city was turned over to the 506th CIC Detachment moving in from Commercy.

Ex-Convicts Performing Espionage For GIS

In October, CIC in Nancy arrested a German Intelligence Service agent named who told his interrogators that prior to the war he had been given a long prison sentence by French authorities, but with the arrival of the Germans, had been released and pressed into service with the German Intelligence Service. The Nazis guessed - and rightly - that he would not surrender to the Allies for fear of being returned to prison. Prior to his capture by the Americans, the Frenchman had successfully completed four espionage missions for the German Intelligence Service. stated that the German Intelligence Service's custom of enlisting former French convicts, many of whom were facing death sentences, was widespread. Approximately one hundred such "convict agents" had left Paris with in late August, headed for the area of the front lines. was able to remember twenty-six names of men in the group.

At the same time, reports of similiar activity were coming from the northermost area under 12th Army Group jurisdiction. Ninth Army CIC heard a man

* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period 16 Oct - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

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named [redacted] tell much the same story as [redacted] and the agents obtained a list of names that coincided with the list received by CIC in Nancy.

In an attempt to apprehend more of these "convict agents," 12th Army Group CIC recommended that suspects under interrogation be questioned at length concerning past arrests and convictions. All CIC units were informed that the usual German Intelligence Service procedure was to take the convicts immediately to Compiegne to question them and recruit those seeming to be suitable for espionage work. It was noted that the convicts were then sent to the Hotel Lutetia in Paris, headquarters for the operation, for preliminary training. It was recommended that suspects who admitted having been to those places and seemed to be familiar with the areas, be extensively questioned to ascertain the possibility of their falling into the "convict agent" category.*

In late November, CIC in Nancy apprehended [redacted] identified by [redacted] as a "convict agent." [redacted] admitted that the German Intelligence Service had released her from prison, but claimed that after one interview at the Paris headquarters in May 1944, she had been released. Experience had taught CIC that the original interviews of prospective "convict agents" did not take place in Paris. Equally damaging to [redacted] case, however, was the woman's statement that she had been paid by the German Intelligence Service for espionage work, but had failed to perform actual espionage.**

New Espionage Offensive Discovered

The capture of four newly-arrived agents in the Nancy area in mid-October indicated that the German Intelligence Service was operating a strong espionage offensive against the Allies from a headquarters in Nussdorf, near Landau, in the Palatinate. This headquarters was located centrally for activities against both the Twelfth Army Group and the Sixth Army Group. Of these first agents, two were run-of-the-mill linecrossers, but the other pair proved to be the first verified cases of German agents successfully parachuting into the 12th Army Group zone.***

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period 16 Oct - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET) Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

** Third U.S.Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report No.8, for the period 26 Nov - 10 Dec 1944, dtd 8 Dec 1944, (SECRET), Staff and Faculty Library.

*** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period 16 Oct - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET) Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Virginia, (AGO).

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35th CIC Detachment Apprehends Numerous Polish DPs

The 35th CIC Detachment, after its work in Nancy in September, centered its operations in Amance and later in Grille as the 35th Infantry Division drove northeast from Nancy to cross the German border on 8 December and capture the town of Sarreguemines, some ten miles south of Saarbrucken.

In the area of advance of the 35th Infantry Division, where the Germans had employed a large quantity of forced Polish farm laborers, CIC frequently picked up groups of these Poles wandering aimlessly in the combat zones. The high total for one day was ten displaced Polish nationals, but hardly a day went by that a few were not apprehended and screened.*

In late September, two Polish workers were found in the area of installations of the 134th Infantry Regiment. Investigation showed that they had been pressed into service as farm laborers and then left behind when the Nazis retreated. CIC decided that their failure to obey an order to "halt" by an American guard had been due to their low mental capacity. Since these men could not be evacuated through normal Civil Affairs channels, they were restricted to the area of the farm on which they had worked. Their former overseer was ordered to enforce the restriction.**

Raid Parties Operate Under Heavy Enemy Fire

On 12 October, Agent Darrel D. Drolsum of the 35th CIC Detachment, accompanied by Agents Sam M. Unger and Edouard Bras, and Lieutenant Paul Barbier of the French Army, entered the city of Fossieux, east of Nancy, to search vacated German offices for documents of intelligence value. An attempt on the previous day had failed because of intense German artillery fire. Although under constant enemy observation and heavy fire, the team made good their second attempt, searching buildings within one hundred yards of German positions. Although no civilians were left in town, many documents of intelligence value, including a list of Nazi Party members in the vicinity, complete with estimates of each member's reliability and functions, were captured.***

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* 35th CIC Det, Memo For The Officer In Charge, Subj: CIC Activities, Re: Daily Brief of the AC of S, G2, 35th Inf Div, 28 Sept 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

** 35th Inf Div, Daily CIC Det Rpt, 28 Sept 1944, from 35th Inf Div, G2 Jnl and File, 3-4 Oct 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

*** 35th Inf Div, 35th CIC Det, "Recommendation to Award The Bronze Star Medal," 17 Oct 1944, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

Two months later, Agent Drolsum organized a similiar patrol and led it across the Saar River and into the town of Sarreguemines. For his part in this action, Drolsum was awarded the Bronze Star Medal.

The citation told of Drolsum's activities in Sarreguemines: "...On 11 December, he organized and led a CIC patrol across the Saar River and into the town of Sarreguemines, under heavy sniper fire, to search the German Gestapo and Sturm Abteilungen headquarters and secured documents which proved invaluable in removing Gestapo agents and securing the city of Sarreguemines. On the return trip he found that the footbridge initially used to cross the river had been destroyed by enemy fire and at great personal risk searched along the waterfront until he found a boat in which he and his patrol made their way under sniper fire to the friendly shore."

Agent Drolsum's citation further noted that in Sarreguemines, from 12 to 21 December, his tireless efforts resulted in the compilation of a list of 250 local Volksstrum members, nine of which he personally arrested.*

506th CIC Detachment Covers Small Towns

The 506th CIC Detachment left counterintelligence coverage of Nancy in the hands of agents from XII Corps and Third Army CIC on 13 November and proceeded northeast with the 6th Armored Division, covering a series of small villages along the way. By 15 December, the 6th Armored Division was entrenched in defensive positions near Saarbrucken.

One of the more suspicious individuals arrested by the 506th CIC Detachment on the way to the Saar River was Stanislaw Pietrzoik, who claimed to be a Russian recently arrived in Bishwald to do farm work. Although caught in the act of cutting U.S. telephone lines, Pietrzoik steadfastly denied the charges. In another instance, the 506th CIC arrested Joseph Zimmerman after he was reported to have made derogatory remarks in public concerning U.S. troops. Both of these suspects were forwarded to the Third Army Interrogation Center for final disposition.**

In making secure the small villages in the path of the 6th Armored Division, an advance section of the 506th CIC Detachment operated with the lead elements of the Division. By getting into a town as soon after liberation as possible and

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* Headquarters, 35th Inf Div, Citation For A Bronze Star Medal, Special Order No. 5, 14 Jan 1945, from Monthly Information Report, Headquarters 2d Inf Div, dtd 12 Feb 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, for the period 1-15 December 1944, dtd 15 December 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (UNCLASSIFIED), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

immediately letting the local inhabitants know what was expected of them, the 506th CIC felt the number of civilian violations of security regulations was greatly decreased.

The cure-priest and the prewar Burgermeister were always the first men contacted. Normal security regulations were explained to them with a request to disseminate the restrictions to the townspeople. It was felt that in small towns in friendly territory, it was more effective to have the town leaders rather than a member of the liberating troops explain the regulations to the people.*

Two Silent Detachments

Two division CIC detachments, the 504th and the 26th, operating in the combat zone east of Nancy have left no records. The 504th CIC Detachment was with the 4th Armored Division when Luneville, nearly 20 miles southeast of Nancy, was taken on 16 December. CIC coverage of Luneville was left to the 79th CIC Detachment. The 504th CIC moved on, their Division heading northeast to capture Dieuze on 21 November and reaching German territory in mid-December.

The 26th CIC Detachment had passed through Dieuze with the 26th Infantry Division on the day following the town's capture. The Division then headed northeast to eventually take Saar Union on 2 December.

XII Corps CIC Utilizes "Snap Control Checks"

Divisions in the area around Nancy were under XII Corps, the southermost Corps of the 12th Army Group. XII Corps CIC operated in Nancy and the areas west of the city.

Just as First Army units developed the "blitz search technique" and the 29th CIC Detachment with the Ninth Army utilized the "CI Alert" to make a quick recheck of the security of an area already covered once by a CIC team, XII Corps CIC originated what they called the "snap control check." These checks run periodically at unannounced times, required the cooperation of Civil Affairs, Securite Militaire and the Provost Marshal. XII Corps and Third Army CIC personnel made the first of these checks in Nancy in late October. The city was divided into 96 districts with small teams assigned to cover each area, first priority being given to regions where CIC suspected the existence of wireless telegraph operators and enemy espionage agents.**

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* Third U.S.Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report No. 8, for the period 26 Nov - 10 Dec 1944, dtd 8 Dec 1944, (SECRET), Staff and Faculty Library.

** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period 16 Oct - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, (SECRET),(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Refugee Screening Procedure Explained

The 212th CIC Detachment, like many other Detachments, especially those to the rear of the combat zone, found that the greater quantity of their time was consumed in screening refugees. Surmising that screening refugees would take on additional importance in Germany, the 212th CIC, in a Third Army report, passed on their screening system to other detachments.

In the section, "Ninth Army CIC In Holland And Germany," the report mentioned that the 29th CIC had developed a system of screening that proved excellent when a small number of people had to be cleared and time was not a factor. The system used by the 212th CIC was geared for use with a large group when rapid screening was essential.

The refugees were first segregated into town groups, or, in the case of persons from large cities, into neighborhood units. The 212th Detachment recommended segregation into various nationality groups when further division seemed necessary to whittle the groups down to a manageable size.

Next, some person most likely to know all the persons in the group - the village priest, mayor or a city official - was selected by the agents. This individual was thoroughly questioned to establish his reliability and sincerity. Once the agents were satisfied that their man was sincere and trustworthy, he was questioned about the persons in his group. Standard questions included: "How long have you known the various people?"; "How long has each individual lived in the neighborhood?"; "Are there any strangers in the group?"; and "Do you consider anyone in the unit dangerous to the best interests of the U.S. forces?"

Identity papers of each individual were always checked and all names compared to the suspect lists. It was recommended that all the refugees be questioned if time permitted. To speed up the interrogations, agents were advised to interrogate together all the members of one family, attempting to "play off" various families against other households in the group.

All strangers, those who did not naturally fall into a group, were to be interrogated carefully and completely as possible enemy agents. In cases where there was doubt about an individual's favoring the Allied cause, agents were advised to begin the interrogation in a relaxed manner, letting the suspect tell his story all the way through and making no attempt to cross-examine him on the details. It was felt that an espionage agent telling his "cover" story would, in such a situation, tend to deviate from and embellish his story, making statements that might later be used to trip him up. When the suspect had finished his story, the agents were to go into action. The suspect was to be intensively searched, interrogated, and his identity papers checked. Whatever slips the suspect made when the interrogation had been relaxed and easy going were to be exploited as the agents forced the interrogation to become fast paced and incisive.

Former Sicherheitsdienst Man Talks Freely

Among the individuals apprehended by the 212th CIC Detachment was Francois Bier, alias Frang, in Francaltroff on 25 November, on reports that Bier had come to the village in a Sicherheitsdienst uniform and was hiding there. When agents interrogated him, Bier revealed that he was a member of the Staff of the German Embassy and the Sicherheitsdienst in Vichy. Bier gave the agents considerable information on the organization's personalities and operations, all of which were viewed with suspicion by CIC. Bier was cooperative to a suspicious degree during his interrogation, but CIC was unable to attribute any espionage activity to him. He was held at Third Army Interrogation Center pending instructions from higher headquarters.*

In December, the XII Corps picked up Alois Wallen in Bambiderstroff. Wallen claimed to have been an espionage agent for the French Forces of the Interior. Several inconsistencies in his story and the fact that he spoke German with a pronounced Prussian accent, although claiming never to have been in Germany, made Wallen suspected by CIC.**

79th CIC Detachment Active South of Nancy

Until 25 November, the 79th Infantry Division was assigned to the Third Army although attached to the Seventh Army and XV Corps. After that date, the Division was completely under the jurisdiction of the Seventh Army. During the period from 15 September to 25 November, the 79th CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Irvin Bogatin, operated in the towns of Mirecourt, Charmes, Bayon, and Luneville, in addition to numerous small villages, all in the area south of Nancy.

Agents Meet With Local Leaders In Luneville

The 79th CIC Detachment began coverage of Luneville, their main task during the period, on 20 September while the combat troops were still fighting just east of the city. Two CIC agents attended a meeting with the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Gendarmarie, and the head of the local resistance group. The agents requested membership lists of the police, the Gendarmarie

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* Third U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report No.8, for the period 26 Nov - 10 Dec 1944, dtd 8 Dec 1944 (SECRET), Staff and Faculty Library.

** 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, from the period 1-15 Dec 1944, dtd 15 Dec 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

and the French Forces of the Interior and asked the French Forces of the Interior representatives to prepare a black list for Luneville. The town leaders also furnished CIC with a list of buildings used by the Germans for barracks and, these buildings were searched for tactical information, as they were captured.

Because the fighting around Luneville was still intense, all travel passes were frozen and civilian movement out of and into the city had to be strictly forbidden. French Forces of the Interior members and Gendarmarie manned posts along all roads into the city to insure against violation of this regulation.*

By 8 October, the combat zone had advanced sufficiently to allow Civil Affairs and CIC to work together to reconstruct a government in Luneville. Civil Affairs chose a Major Blangenois, the Military Commander of the District of Luneville, to be town mayor. Captain Bogatin met with Blangenois to iron out problems relative to CIC. CIC was notified that on 15 October, a French Army Battalion was to occupy Luneville. A small number of French Forces of the Interior men, thoroughly screened and checked, were to remain on duty, but the remainder of the organization was to be demobilized. All searches of private homes were to be made by the Gendarmarie or the police. However, all suspicious persons were to be turned over to CIC.

Five Screening Points Established

In conjunction with the mayor, CIC set up five 24-hour travel control points to screen all civilians traveling in and out of the city, to arrest persons traveling without passes, to apprehend for interrogation all persons arousing suspicion, and to check all travelers for wireless sets.

Civil Affairs kept control of all "laissez passers," issued automatically to important city officials, and on a temporary basis to persons able to present valid reasons for travel. A CIC agent was kept on permanent duty at the Civil Affairs offices in Luneville to check on those applying for "laissez passers."

On 9 October, editors of all local newspapers were contacted and informed that CIC would maintain a temporary but direct censorship over the contents of their publications. The editors were requested to print the security regulations for Luneville and a notice to the effect that all strange and suspicious persons were to be brought to the CIC office.**

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* Bound Records of the 79th CIC Detachment, Report of the activities of 20 Sep 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Historical Project Files).

** Ibid., 8, 9, 10 October 1944.

Agents Watch Railroad Station

Because of the movement of American troops through Luneville by rail, CIC maintained a constant surveillance of the local railroad station. All civilians seen in the neighborhood of the station were screened and questioned. Those without sufficient reason for their presence in the area were brought to CIC headquarters for interrogation.

Through the Commissioner of Police, the 79th CIC Detachment was furnished daily with a complete list of all persons registered at hotels and boarding houses in Luneville. It was felt that this check would turn up visitors to Luneville who had not registered with the authorities as non-residents of the town.*

An unusual counterintelligence tactic was employed by an agent of the 79th CIC Detachment, on 19 October, when he requested that Red Cross girls on duty in the XV Corps day room observe the soldiers there, reporting to CIC everything that seemed suspicious. The girls then were given a security lecture by the agent.**

Coverage Of Small Villages Demands Efficiency

Small villages were just as likely to contain troublemakers as large cities, but could not be allotted the time of many CIC agents. Because the village would probably not be revisited by CIC and time was limited during the initial check, work had to be done quickly and efficiently.

Among the great number of small villages covered by the 79th CIC Detachment was Harbouey, checked on 17 and 18 November. Harbouey had a population of 250, increased to 500 due to an influx of refugees, mostly Poles, brought to the village in 1940 and then left behind by the Nazis. The regular inhabitants and the refugees were screened quickly, told that no travel was permitted, and informed of the curfew. Two suspects were uncovered during the screening, but neither was considered dangerous to military security. The next day, the S2 of a 79th Infantry Division regiment reported that civilians of Harbouey had been violating the curfew. CIC quickly instituted more rigid checks during the hours of darkness to apprehend violators. Later in the day, four individuals accused of harboring German wounded were arrested, but investigation failed to substantiate the charge. These men were restricted to their homes until the area was out of the combat zone.

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* Bound records of the 79th CIC Detachment, Rpt of activities of 11 Nov 1944, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Historical Project Files).

** Ibid., Rpt of unrelated activities of the detachment in Oct 1944.

After these two days of activity, CIC left the village in the hands of the French authorities.*

Absolutely Secure!

Agents of the 79th CIC Detachment covering another small village, Reithenthal, on 19 November were completely efficient. The only civilian in the town was an Italian named Giovanni Milette who, because he was a Todt worker, was placed in Prisoner of War channels. So much for Reithenthal!**

* 79th CIC Det, Subj: Road Blocks, Road Patrols, and Screening of Civilians, To: AC of S, G2, 79th Inf Div, 19 Nov 1944,/s/ Irvin Bogatin, Capt, Sig C, Commanding, (UNCLASSIFIED), from the bound records of the 79th CIC Det, (Historical Project Files).

** Ibid., 22 Nov 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL).

Chapter 7

CIC WITH BASE AND ADVANCE SECTIONS

326 Agents With Base And Advance Section Teams

To the rear of the detachment under the Twelfth Army Group were the many Advance Section And Base Section CIC Teams. At the start of October, 326 agents were distributed throughout the Communications Zone as follows: Normandy Base Section, 34; Brittany Base Section, 61; Loire Base Section, 32; Channel Base Section, 11; Seine Base Section, 32; Paris (ComZ), 52; and Advance Section, 104.* During October, the ComZ Team in Paris was dropped and a small Oise Base Section Team established.

Normandy Base Section operations were centered in the port of Cherbourg with Agents also in Granville to the south. Rennes, Brest, Vannes, and Nantes were the major towns covered by the Brittany Base Section while Paris, Versailles, and the surrounding area fell under the jurisdiction of the Seine Base Section. The Channel Base Section covered the Antwerp-La Harve-Lille area with the Oise Base Section Agents taking care of the region around St. Quentin and Sossions. The Loire Base Section teams covered the area around Angers and Tours.

Advance Section personnel operated as far east as the city of Luxembourg early in the period.** Liege in the north and Verdun and Bar-le-Duc in the south were among the more easterly of the towns covered by ADSEC teams before 15 December ***

Much Counterespionage Turned Over To Bureau de Securite Militaire (BSM)

Much of the counterespionage work in the liberated areas of France received its first thorough coverage from ADSEC Teams since the combat CIC detachments had passed through so rapidly. After the first few months, the American authorities began to delegate a preponderance of counterespionage activity to the Bureau de Securite Militaire (BSM), the French counterintelligence service. ADSEC CIC encouraged this well-organized group to assume authority and assisted them in obtaining supplies. A free and full exchange of information between CIC and the Bureau was established.

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* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period from 16 Sept 1944 to 1 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Jr., Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period from 16 Oct 1944 - 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944.

*** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period from 1 Dec - 15 Dec 1944, dtd 15 Dec 1944.

Soon the strength of the indigenous authorities allowed the Americans to thin out their security forces in the rear areas. Twelfth Army Group issued orders to ADSEC CIC Teams that all arrestees, except those possessing detailed information concerning German intelligence operations, armed forces, and the Nazi Party, be turned over to the Bureau de Securite Militaire. The ability of the French to take over their own security problems greatly lightened the burden of CIC in French areas away from the combat zone.

Takeover Problem Solved

During this period, a satisfactory standard operating procedure for ADSEC CIC Teams relieving CIC units of Army level was finally developed. In the earlier stages of the campaign, Army CIC units notified ADSEC headquarters that they were ready to turn a region over to ADSEC CIC and then immediately left the area. Before the rear area CIC team arrived, a week or two had elapsed.

Under the new arrangement, an ADSEC Team assigned to work in the Army zone was given an overlay of the exact territory to be covered and advised to begin preparations to move forward on Army order. A special agreement allowed Army to direct a team to take over an area without the consent of ADSEC headquarters. Army CIC was not allowed, however, to move either the rear boundry or the location of the Command Post of an ADSEC Team, assuring that no security vacuum would be left at ADSEC's rear. If it was felt that the inclusion of more territory would overtax a rear area unit, either Army CIC or the ADSEC Team notified ADSEC headquarters and a new team was made available.

Through this arrangement Army could relinquish a town with the minimum delay, and yet afford ADSEC teams sufficient notice to prepare for its displacement. ADSEC headquarters was able to retain all essential control of the CIC Teams without imparing these units' operational support of the Armies. The plan was employed throughout the remainder of the campaign with highly satisfactory results.*

Political Situation Interferes With Security

As soon as the combat zone had advanced to within striking distance of the Siegfried Line and the German border, CIC noticed the marked resumption of partisanship in the domestic French political scene and made plans to keep an eye on potentially subversive aspects of this situation.

Until about the end of September, the diverse elements in French politics had worked together to secure an Allied victory. As the enemy retreated to a

* Operational History of Theaters, "ADSEC G2 Section Operations," undated, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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safe distance, internal political conflicts began to arise. CIC found that the main political differences aligned the leftists, advocating various degrees of state socialism, against the more conservative elements of the population. CIC foresaw a possibility that the friction would break out into violence of some kind, especially if American and British troops moved eastward before the establishment of a strong French military garrison.*

Although the Americans would have preferred to remain apart from domestic French politics, evidence began to pile up that Nazi agents had infiltrated into key spots in the ranks of the French Forces of the Interior and were attempting to make the internal political situation hotter than it already was.**

Because of the probability of Nazi infiltration into the French Forces of the Interior and the certainty that countless other undesirables possessed membership in that organization, the moves to integrate its members into the Etat Majeur de l'Armee evoked a sigh of relief from American authorities. Late in October, a program was established to weed out the undesirable elements from the resistance organization, and training schools were started for the other, more acceptable, members. CIC reported, however, that the fruits of the program might not be apparent for some time.

Trouble Begins After Celebrations End

By the end of October, CIC reported that Army-civilian relationships had become definitely strained in certain regions, especially Normandy. The initial period of enthusiastic welcome had begun to wear off. To show how extreme anti-American sentiment might become so soon after the liberation, CIC reported several quotes from a Cherbourg newspaper. Some hot-headed editor had written: "Uncivilized and beastly scenes at the present time are grieving our country. They seize, rape, and assassinate! All security in the home as well as in the streets has disappeared...Never have we seen such lewdness and criminal attempts."***

Reports from the Normandy Base Section indicated that a month later the tension had subsided. The sporadic military offenders had been court-martialed, and good relations with the civilian population had been established.****

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* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period from 16 Sept 1944 to 1 Oct 1944, dtd 1 Oct 1944, /s/ F.A. Calvert, Jr., Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period from 1 Oct 1944 to 15 Oct 1944, dtd 15 Oct 1944.

*** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period from 16 Oct 1944 to 31 Oct 1944, dtd 31 Oct 1944.

**** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period 16 Nov to 30 Nov 1944, dtd 30 Nov 1944.

Although the problem may have been cleared up in Normandy, reports from Paris in mid-December indicated that, while relations were "generally cordial," the increasing frequency of brawls involving American soldiers of all ranks threatened to destroy harmony with the French civilian population.

"How You Gonna Keep 'Em Down On The Farm..."

Besides the probable alienation of many French citizens, there was a grave danger to the security of American troops inherent in the celebrations of soldiers stationed in the rear areas. Fun-seeking GI's sooner or later found the company of French girls. The soldier was not likely to be concerned whether the girl was loyal to the Allied cause or a Nazi sympathizer and collaborator working directly for German Intelligence Service headquarters. CIC had to maintain a constant search for women of questionable political affiliations seeking the company of American officers and men. Many investigations were summarized with the following remarks: "suspected of German espionage because she was friendly with German Gestapo officers and is now cultivating the friendship of American officers." In almost all such cases, there was not sufficient proof for arrest.

In one of the cases that did end in an arrest, CIC was able to accumulate enough evidence to apprehend a Parisian woman who had lived during the occupation in a hotel reserved exclusively for Germans and persons carrying German identity papers. She had been seen frequently with German officers and had stated in public that she would be glad to work for the Nazis. As soon as Paris was liberated, the woman began to make the acquaintance of American officers. CIC recommended her arrest after the investigation had turned up the complete facts of her interest in the Nazi cause.*

Petty Thievery By Civilians Investigated

Another area of trouble with the civilian population involved petty thievery of U.S. Army equipment, particularly telephone wire, by Frenchmen. The investigation of such cases, primarily the responsibility of the Provost Marshal's office, involved CIC, not only because sabotage was possible, but because the thefts gave warning that certain Frenchmen were not overly pleased to have American soldiers on their soil.

Thievery was frequent in the Conflans area where an officer from the Provost Marshal's office told CIC that he knew of thirteen instances of stolen wire. The

* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 1 Dec 1944 to 15 Dec 1944, dtd 15 Dec 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Jr., Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

estimated value of the stolen wire in these instances ran close to five thousand dollars. Arrangements were made to have such thefts immediately reported to CIC, and all French authorities in the Conflans area were asked for their cooperation. Appropriate notices were run regularly in French papers appealing to the local civilians to refrain from stealing telephone wire, so essential to the Allied effort.*

Use of False Identity Documents Increasing

By the beginning of October, CIC alarmingly noted the wide-spread increase in the use of false identity documents by French citizens. Constant vigilance had to be maintained against the appearance of purported military "laissez-passers."**

CIC was greatly concerned over the practice of some American officers of giving civilian friends "hastily-written notes of thanks, requests for favored treatment, of the 'To Whom It May Concern' variety." Many Frenchmen seemed to interpret these notes as authorizing access to - and even a right to - almost anything.***

One resident of Angers apparently decided that he could move freely if he dressed up in the uniform of a U. S. Army officer and told people he was an agent of CIC. Having presumed the right to do whatever he wished, Michel Gavriloff took to terrorizing civilians near Samur. On 25 September, some real CIC agents arrested him. CIC made a formal repudiation of Gavriloff to the citizens of Samur on 9 October. He stood trial before a Military Tribunal on 30 November on the charge of pillage and robbery in the time of war.

During his trial, Gavriloff claimed to have been engaged for investigative work by a "Lt Victor, Commanding Officer of the 83d CIC Detachment," when the 83d had been in Angers early in September.****

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* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S.Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, CI Rpt for the period 1 Nov 1944 to 15 Nov 1944, dtd 15 Nov 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Jr., Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period 16 Sept to 1 Oct 1944, dtd 1 Oct 1944.

*** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period 1 Oct to 15 Oct 1944, dtd 15 Oct 1944.

**** Ibid., CI Rpt for the period 1 Dec to 15 Dec 1944, dtd 15 Dec 1944.
NOTE: Gavriloff must have heard of the 83d CIC Detachment. The CO of the 83d was 2d Lt Oliver A. Victor and the Detachment was located in the Nantes-Angers region in September. Records of the 83d CIC Detachment for September contain no mention of Gavriloff.

Civil Security In The Rear Generally Good

The civil security situation to the rear of American lines was found to be generally satisfactory by ADSEC CIC Teams. One exception was the town of Valenciennes in Nord Province close to the Belgian border. Near this town, travel of civilians was not completely under control nor was the related problem of displaced persons. An unruly situation was attributed mainly to the thousands of foreign workers left by the retreating Germans. Near Valenciennes the displaced persons included 10,000 Poles who had migrated to France as early as 1922 to work in local industry. Although many supposedly held pro-German views, CIC had no evidence of acts against the Allied cause.*

Special Privileges

Good relations with the French people required that the Americans did not grant special favors to persons who in any way had aided the Germans. Consequently, when a complaint from a reliable source was registered against some individual given a privilege by American forces, CIC was quick to investigate.

On 15 October, the resistance leader in Bouillon reported to CIC Normandy Base Section that a local collaborator, Georges Gilbert, had been given permission to use barracks, fencing and other materials which had been left by the Allies on a then unused landing field near Gilbert's home. Gilbert had told the resistance leader that CIC in Granville had authorized him to use the equipment and buildings.

When CIC paid Gilbert a visit, he stated that the grant had come from Civil Affairs and that he had never mentioned CIC to the resistance leader. A check with Civil Affairs revealed that the former Collaborator had indeed been granted the authorization he claimed to have. CIC recommended to Civil Affairs that in view of Gilbert's record as a well-known collaborator, it would be unwise to allow him to keep the materials.**

In the rear areas it was necessary for the U. S. Army to employ local civilians in a great number of capacities. Although the majority of these Frenchmen were

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* 12th Army Group, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 9, for the period 1-15 December 1944, dtd 15 December 1944, from the Office of the AC of S, G2, 12th Army Group, /s/ Edwin C. Lee, Lt Col, GSC, Executive, for the AC of S, G2, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

** European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 16 October - 31 October 1944, dtd 31 October 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief CIB, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

loyal to the Allied cause, there were some questionable individuals who required investigation.

For example, in November, CIC Normandy Base Section began an investigation of at the Quartermaster Salvage Depot in Cherbourg, on the suspicion that they had exchanged written notes with German Prisoners of War at the depot. Agents searched the clothing of the girls and discovered a note written in German by The girl admitted during interrogation that she had several times tried to pass this message to a Prisoner of War named The were taken into custody and turned over to the Bureau Securite Militaire. Subsequently their apartment in Cherbourg was searched and the findings included four rolls of film, two letters in German, and a lid from a candy box on the inside of which was a note in German. The were tried by the French Tribunal.*

Careless Handling of Classified Documents

During October, CIC in the rear areas learned from divergent sources that considerable Order of Battle information had been compromised by classified documents falling into German hands.

In this respect, the most alarming information was received during the many interrogations of Oberst-Leutnant Karl Zuelch, a captured German intelligence officer. Zuelch stated that the American army security of documents was particularly careless. He claimed that frequently "Top Secret" documents were found in the pockets of American prisoners of war and in captured vehicles. Zuelch recalled one occasion where a search of the clothes of a captured American lieutenant revealed a "Top Secret" Order of Battle document giving the complete re-grouping of the American forces shortly before the break-through at Avranches. When the German interrogators had asked him about his carelessness with classified documents, this imprisoned Lieutenant had remarked, "Well, you cannot keep all this in your head." It was Zuelch's opinion that, had the Germans been able to move their troops at all (they could not owing to American air supremacy), this lack of security would have done the Allies great harm, for moves of Allied troops were always known well in advance.

According to Zuelch, a valuable source of information for the Germans had been the inter-Allied distribution lists appearing on nearly all documents. The German was greatly surprised that such lists were still being used in areas of combat operations.

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* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 1 November - 15 November 1944, dtd 15 November 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

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Zuelch, who had acquired considerable experience on the Russian front in intercepting wireless telegraph messages, stated that this form of intelligence gathering had completely failed in the West. The principal reasons given for the failure were the excellence of the British code system, the superiority of the Allied signal equipment, and badly trained German intelligence personnel.*

None Of Our Business!

Although cases which were not primarily CIC's concern often had an aspect involving counterintelligence, agents at the Paris Interrogation Center found that they were receiving persons to question who were obviously of no counterintelligence interest. These individuals served only to delay the interrogations of more valuable persons. For example, a Jewish French citizen was arrested because, during the German occupation, he had successfully managed to avoid certain restrictions that had been imposed on members of his race. Another Frenchman was handed over to CIC after a soldier staying at his home had heard him make ambiguous statements about President Roosevelt.**

Soldier's Communist Activities Investigated

During World War II, CIC in the European Theater of Operations ran occasional investigations of the Communist activities of individual soldiers. The only such case reported by units outside the combat zone during this period involved a soldier whose blatant disaffection would have made him a subject of CIC investigation regardless of his political philosophy.

On 16 November 1944, CIC agents from the Normandy Base Section, answering a call from the Commanding Officer of the 101st Port Marine Maintenance Company, interviewed the First Sergeant and heard from him that a private assigned to public relations work had recently begun working at night, claiming easier access to all facilities and a quieter atmosphere. This provided the private with two new listeners every night, the Company clerk and the Charge of Quarters, with whom he argued the principles of Communism as opposed to the capitalistic system. The private also made statements opposing Army administration, obedience to orders, and saluting of superiors. The First Sergeant charged that the soldier had managed to influence one of the other privates in the unit to his way of thinking.

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* It is not recorded how the Americans persuaded this German intelligence officer, so well versed in Allied security leaks, to forget his own security instructions and "spill" all.

** Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 15 October - 31 October 1944, dtd 31 October 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

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The supposedly "converted" soldier was called into the Commanding Officer's office for interrogation. He acknowledged a resentment towards Army discipline and towards the capitalistic class in general, but showed only an elementary understanding of Communist doctrines.

Next the subject himself was called in for interrogation. He readily admitted complete belief in the Communist form of government. He stated that when he lived in California prior to coming into the service, he had been converted by the teachings of Earl Browder. While in England, he had studied Communist literature and talked to many Communist party members. The private admitted that he had in his possession at the time a recent issue of "New Masses" and further confessed that he felt his real faith lay in the movement to establish Communism in the United States.

The CIC Agents on the case recommended immediate action against the subject, but felt that the zeal of his converted friend could be dissipated "with an expert tactful explanation of the undemocratic principles underlying Communism."

Nearly a month later, the Commanding Officer of the unit told the division G2 that the Communist private, who was still in the company, had refused to come to attention during the playing of the National Anthem at a company social function. The Commanding Officer felt the entire unit would violently protest the private's attendance at any future activity and stated that he desired to be relieved of the responsibility for the personal safety of the Communist.*

Regulations in effect at the time called for the transfer to the United States of all disaffected personnel. Records do not indicate whether or not such action was taken in this case. Records do indicate that the Army felt that it could not uphold a Court Martial on the basis of the evidence received.**

However, records show that the subject was discharged on 20 December 1945, a year after the completion of the investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was given the information collected by CIC on the case.***

Story-Hour At Normandy Base Section

In early November, an American Military Police patrol in Quineville picked up, in U.S. Army uniform, a man who gave the improbable name of Alfred John Buffettee-Catford and freely admitted he often used the alias, George Navarre.

Buffette-Catford unraveled his story for CIC Normandy Base Section. He claimed to have been inducted into the U.S. Army in Louisiana, but when agents informed him that his drawl was not thick enough, the suspect broke down and admitted that actually he had been born in Monte Carlo and was engaged in espionage activities for the Allies. In telling his personal history the third time, Buffette-Catford forgot all about Monte Carlo and decided he was English-born and a deserter from the British army. CIC checked with RAF officers at Cherbourg and discovered that Buffette-Catford was indeed a British citizen. CIC decided, without hesitation, that this man was clearly the responsibility of the English. The British Military Police were awarded the prize, interrogated him fully, and definitely established that Buffette-Catford was a deserter from the British Army.*

The Three-Month Period

Prior to 15 September, the Allied dash across France had kept CIC units with divisions and corps on the move. Only hasty investigations could be accomplished and records turnover had become a major problem. From 15 September to 15 December, a more or less static situation had existed and these detachments had spent several months- and in some cases the whole period - in one area. There had been ample time to investigate Civil Affairs and Military Government municipal government appointees, to supervise area security and to develop new counterintelligence techniques. But, on 16 December, CIC was on the move again as the Germans began a major thrust into the Ardennes forest where forces of the VIII Corps were thinly spread along the line.

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* Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S.Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 1 November - 15 November 1944, dtd 15 November 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB; (SECRET) Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia, and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, Counterintelligence Report for the period 16 November - 30 November 1944, dtd 30 November 1944, /s/ F. A. Calvert, Lt Col, GSC, Chief, CIB (SECRET) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XVII

PROPERTY OF
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TO THE GERMAN FRONTIER

PART II: SOUTHERN ARMIES

15 September - 15 December 1944

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

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[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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TO THE GERMAN FRONTIER

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Chapter 1

Spreading Over Southern France

In September, while the Twelfth Army Group to the north came to a standstill at the Siegfried Line, General Patch's Seventh Army, having completed its rapid advance up from the Riviera, pivoted to the right and drew up squarely in line with the remainder of Allied Forces. General de Lattre's First French Army held the fifty-mile front above Switzerland; the French First, in addition, was charged with supervision of the Franco-Swiss border. South of Switzerland to the Mediterranean there was but sporadic fighting. The First Allied Airborne Task Force had remained in the Cannes-Nice-Monaco area since their landings in August, but had not sufficient strength to extend the front across the Piedmont Mountains and into Italy.

Close to 40,000 enemy troops remained in Southern France. Contained in ever shrinking pockets by the French Forces of the Interior, they were never again a serious military factor.[1]

Sixth Army Group Becomes Operational

On 15 September 1944, the Sixth Army Group became operational and assumed command of the Seventh Army and the French First Army.[2] CIC with the Sixth Army Group, under the command of Major James Footorap, was concerned solely with Headquarters security and had no field mission. Consequently neither directives nor counterintelligence information came to the 307th CIC Detachment from this Unit.[3]

Difficult Month for 307th CIC

September 1944 was a difficult month for Seventh Army CIC. Advance planning proved worthless as vast areas were suddenly opened up by the rapid advance northward. Since the French Securite Militaire had been caught completely short, the 70-odd officers and enlisted men of CIC were charged with maintaining security in the entire area of advance, roughly 30,000 square miles, during most of the month.[4]

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1 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rept No 1, for the Period 15 Sept to 30 Sept 1944, Dated 9 Oct 1944; Extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Repts for Sep and Oct 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

2 "The Army Almanac," Chapter 6, p, 489, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

3 Interview with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill., at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 August 1955.

4 7th Army Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, Period 1-30 Sep 1944, dated 30 Sep; Extracted from L-1136, CIC Staff Section Repts, 15 Aug - 31 Dec Dec 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

German espionage seemed the greatest single threat to Allied security; it was therefore decided to investigate such cases fully, and, if necessary, leave other work to whatever regional office was handy, whether it be Securite Militaire, French Forces of the Interior, or the police. During the month, sixteen men and a woman were apprehended for espionage with ten of these agents in possession of radio transmitters.

CIC also spent valuable time tracking through reports of an all but non-existent German espionage ring reputedly operating in Limoges, Toulouse, Montpillier, and Perpignan (of these cities, only Montpillier was in Allied hands) under the direction of the Sicherheitsdienst.

These Sicherheitsdienst teams were said to be charged with obtaining and transmitting information of value to Germany, regrouping German nationals and sympathizers to facilitate their evacuation from Southern France; facilitating illegal traffic into Switzerland and Spain and committing sabotage and terrorist acts against Allied agents and installations.

Centers apparently were staffed with teams of about ten members; a chief, three espionage agents, the rest killers or liaison men. CIC believed that there had been three such teams in the city of Grenoble, which was overrun by Seventh Army on 9 September. Two of these teams were reported to have fled into Southern France; the third went off to Switzerland. The organizer of these teams, named Walthers, was killed in Grenoble shortly after the arrival there of American forces. Reports of subsequent months made no reference to any of these teams.[5]

Movement Hinders Travel Control

The rapidity of the advance in Southern France made travel control all but impossible. At the very front, French Forces of the Interior personnel were placed on roadblocks, but little or no control was attempted over civilians within areas of occupation. In no area, even at the front, were blocks sufficient to seal off a zone of any appreciable size. No screening of refugees was attempted. Travel was restricted, however, if not by the Allies by acute shortages of gasoline and vehicles which kept most of the population within walking distance of their homes.

Relations with French civilians, naturally, brought to CIC a variety of problems other than simple travel control.

5 L-1136, G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, Part Three, 1-30 Sep 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

On one end of the scale was the problem of actively subversive elements. CIC learned that Darnand was forming a French Legion in Saxony, the nucleus of which was some 4,000 Miliciens who had fled France. Now nearing division strength, this Legion was in training for possible action in Alsace and Lorraine.[6]

Such subversive organizations fortunately were not a serious problem in the areas actually overrun by Seventh Army in September; neither the Milice nor the Partie Populaire Francaise, subversive organizations reputedly potent in France, were functioning in the liberated zones. Members of these organizations were believed either to have been taken by the French Forces of the Interior immediately upon liberation of their homelands, or to have retreated with the Germans.[7]

The 307th CIC Detachment was also concerned with the activities of the Communist party, its leaders and aims. The fact that this party was the "strongest and best organized political body in a country disorganized by a lack of adequate communications and lack of strong central government" tended to give the Communists influence that they would not have enjoyed in normal times under a representative government. CIC was alert to indications that the public was accepting the Communist claim of being the only French party truly opposed to the Nazi war machine.[8]

Liaison With French Authorities Essential

Because of the drastically limited number of their own personnel, CIC Agents quickly decided that close and effective liaison with French authorities would have to be maintained if assigned missions were to be fulfilled. An officer and two enlisted men of Securite Militaire worked with each division under Seventh Army, and two officers of Surete sux Arm'ees were also attached to division detachments. Six French officers and three enlisted men worked with VI Corps, and ten officers and thirty-seven enlisted men with Seventh Army CIC.[9]

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6 6th Army Group, Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 1, for the period 15 September to 30 September 1944, dtd 9 October 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations Report for September and October 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

7 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No.3, for the period 1 October to 15 October 1944, dtd 15 October 1944, extracted from L-1136 G2 CIC Staff Section Reports for 15 August to 31 December 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

8 Appendix II to September Situation Summary of the 307th CIC Detachment, Headquarters, Seventh Army, dtd 30 September 1944, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)

9 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 3, Period 1 Oct to 15 Oct 1944, Dated 15 Oct 1944: Extracted from L-1136, G2 CIC Staff Section Repts, 15 August to 31 Dec 1944. Checked against Sixth Army Gp Rept No. 1. L-375 (both Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

As for the French Forces of the Interior, throughout the southern campaigns its members had been more willing to co-operate than CIC's French counterpart, Securite Militaire. At the end of September, Seventh Army reported, "The French Forces of the Interior have continued to arrest by far the majority of collaborators." All was not perfect in the relationship, however; Seventh Army continued, "In some cases their zeal for inflicting punishment has proved detrimental where potential informers have been executed." Elsewhere in the report is a more serious condemnation of the French actions: "Documentation of prisoners of the French Forces of the Interior is very poor. At Montluc Prison in Lyon on 13 September there were approximately 1,200 prisoners, and a complete list of names was not available.... In St. Joseph prison (Grenoble) there were 400 suspects, but records ...for only 250." French Forces of the Interior efficiency and fairness seem to have varied from town to town: "Avignon: French Forces of Interior prisoners were turned over in orderly fashion to the Securite Militaire of the 1st French Armored Division." "Orange: A truck with Germans in civilian clothes was captured. The French Forces of the Interior shot 19 of them as Gestapo Agents." [10]

But the French Forces of the Interior was fast becoming less effective. Many units disbanded. Many members joined the French Army; 6,000 joined together near Clermont-Ferrand, and another 6,000 were soon expected from the same region. General Cochet of the French Forces of the Interior approved such assimilation.

French Forces of the Interior were, however, still entrusted with much necessary work. Assigned to guard the Franco-Swiss border, they apparently performed the task conscientiously, [11] although their job was greatly complicated by the thousands of refugees who managed to by-pass the battle lines by entering Northern Switzerland, and returning to France south of the combat area. [12] In the south of France, French Forces of the Interior pecked into the few pockets of remaining German soldiers, and prevented them from ever again hampering the Allied effort in any manner.

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10 Seventh Army Monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, for the period 1-30 September 1944, dtd 30 September 1944, extracted from L-1136, CIC Staff Section Reports, 15 August - 31 December 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental) Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

11 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 1, for the period 15 September to 30 September 1944, dtd 9 October 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for September and October 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

12 Ibid., CI Report No. 3, for the period 15 Oct - 1 Nov 1944 dtd 4 Nov 1944.

However, the French Forces of the Interior as well as the Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais contained elements which, in the long view, had to be recognized as hostile to American interests. CIC investigated the rumor that the Russians and French, not really the Americans and English, had liberated France. The rumor could be traced back no further than to the Franc-Tireur et Partisans. Apparently from the same source was the rumor that upon the withdrawal of the Americans and English, the French would welcome a Revolution of the proletariat -- to take place with Russian blessing. And then, collaborationists were known to have infiltrated both organizations--being placed there with the dual purpose of impeding allied efforts and maintaining their own reputations and lives. Near Lyon illegally armed men, wearing French Forces of the Interior armbands, had driven about in "commandeered" automobiles. With the weeding out of extremists from the French Forces of the Interior, such unpleasant incidents were becoming less common.

Maintaining good relationships with French civilians was often more difficult than keeping profitable liaison with either French Intelligence or French Forces of the Interior. Food was short, as were all supplies during September, and the people, who had held such high hopes when the Americans rode into their areas, were sorely disappointed. Then again, German propaganda had left fretful expectations of American atrocities in the minds of Frenchmen, and the latter understandably exaggerated out of all proportion of the few instances of American soldiers participating in drunken brawls. In short, CIC reported little overt hostility on the part of the French--but it found scarcely more positive co-operation.

Securite Militaire, by and large, employed controls similar to those of CIC. when they took areas under their own control. A pair of regulations were enforced by the French, but not by the Americans: Securite Militaire ordered that within their area cameras should be neither carried nor serviced and the possession of carrier pigeons was deemed illegal. Securite Militaire was no more able than CIC to put travel regulations into effect.

Securite Militaire made up a series of posters designed to prevent sabotage of communications. No sabotage was reported within the French area. CIC had copies of the posters scattered throughout the American zone, and experienced equally good results in avoiding sabotage.

Germans Possess Seventh Army OB

CIC reported that military security was generally good--but not perfect. German prisoners of war reported that captured Americans were obviously security conscious--they watched their words carefully; however, they did allow a variety of vital documents to fall to the enemy. An American captain, in one instance,

was captured while carrying complete identification of Seventh Army units down to regimental size. German intelligence officers were instructed to concentrate on the capture of documents rather than attempts to obtain information through questioning. 13

Seventh Army summed up the entire situation pessimistically: "It must be assumed that the enemy has excellent knowledge of our order of battle." 14

Securite Militaire reported that a newspaper, in its post-liberation exuberance, published the number of the conquering division along with the names and histories of many of the officers. Securite Militaire decided that the false step was accidental; no action other than a reprimand was taken.

Of a more serious nature was the report of an American liaison officer, working with a French division, who was reputedly seen on 13 September in conversation with a Swiss watch salesman on the subject of the American order of battle. Several days later the same pair was again seen discussing the same matter. After the American left, the Swiss was observed in earnest conversation with his friends as they sat passing maps about in a cafe. None of the principals in this affair were ever further identified. 15

Seventh Army left a small sub-detachment behind in Marseille to supervise Port Security work there. Late in September, Seventh Army relinquished control of the southern ports to Delta Base Section, the 427th CIC Detachment. When Seventh Army pulled out, the following measures were in effect: Military Police and French police maintained the physical security of the port areas; port employees were screened by the Gendarmerie, Securite Militaire, and the

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13 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 1, for the period 15 Sep to 30 Sep 1944, dtd 9 Oct 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for Sep to Oct 1944 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

14 Seventh Army Monthly CI Rpt No. 2, for the period 1-30 Sep 1944, dtd 30 September 1944, extracted from L-1136, CIC Staff Section Rpts, 15 August - 31 December 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

15 Ibid., CI Rpt No. 2.

administrative police; a pass system was in operation; merchant seamen were controlled by CIC; operating fishermen were required to obtain clearance through French Naval authorities; the apprehending and interrogating of suspects was entrusted to the French.[16]

16 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 1, for the period 15 Sep to 30 Sep 1944, dtd 9 Oct 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for Sep and Oct 1944 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

Chapter 2

The German Intelligence Reaction

In September the German espionage services had shifted into second gear; in October they swung into high. Successful effort to counter the increased activity made October 1944 one of the great months in the history of Seventh Army CIC.

The first of CIC's four October victories actually began two days before the end of September when local police at Remiremont apprehended one and turned him over to VI Corps CIC there. The only charge against was that he was a "suspicious person."

was given twenty-four hours of "intensive interrogation" by VI Corps CIC. The early hours were fruitless. Born in 1914 in France, now lived in Remiremont with his wife and managed a there. His personal papers were in perfect order; he had documentation for a medical discharge from the French Army, received after being wounded by the Germans. He had, in addition, papers issued by local authorities which covered all periods of his life subsequent to that time. He had once been arrested by the Germans on a black market charge, but was released, ostensibly without penalty. He was not known to be a member of the Milice, Parti Populaire Francais, or other collaborationist organization, nor was he known ever to have associated with the Germans during the occupation.

How was it, asked his CIC interrogators, that he had been released without penalty for his Black Market operations against the German occupation? What were the strings attached to his future freedom? What were the charges? What had he actually done? Who had dealt with his case? What precisely had they said to him? Again and again was put through the same series of questions, and, as the hours passed, his thoughts became vaguer; his statements became confused.

Gradually VI Corps CIC worked his statements into a coherent pattern. had, indeed, fought against the Germans, been wounded in combat, and been honorably discharged in 1940. For four years he avoided trouble; he earnestly ran his and earned the reputation of being a good father and citizen. But he became greedy. In January 1944 contacted, then worked with, the Departmental Director of the Legion des Volontaires Francais (a German collaborationist organization) at Epinal, France, a man who was conducting a Black Market ring until his apprehension by the Feldgendarmerie (literally, "Field Police") in March 1944.

Apprehended in March along with his employer, was removed to the Feldgendarmerie headquarters, and there offered the opportunity to work off his punishment through service as an informer. He accepted, and was sent to radio school at Dijon, France, for a two months' course.

Upon completion of his studies, went to Belfort, France, where, under an alias, he was established as an informer. Specifically, he was to detect Allied secret agents, their contacts and their missions; to determine where more agents were to be dropped by parachute; and to learn the locations of Allied headquarters and ammunition dumps. For this work he was given 168,000 francs, half of which he was to pay the agents who would contact him after the occupation.

On 21 September he returned to Remiremont. Eight days later, before he was able to begin work on his new assignment, he was nabbed by alert French Police.

CIC did not stop the long interrogation here. Before they had finished with his interrogators had learned the names of thirty-odd members of the German espionage service.

One of the persons named by was a woman employed as a letter-drop for agents working through Switzerland.[17] Apprehended while using her radio transmitter, the woman confessed quickly, and identified numerous agents and contacts in and about Dijon. Through her the leading figure in the ring, was apprehended.

turned out to be a long-range German agent who had performed important missions in Belfort, France, and in Switzerland. He had been instructed to remain in Dijon after the arrival there of the Americans, and to penetrate the French War Ministry and various Resistance groups. He was intimate with details concerning the German Espionage Group at Dijon, most of whose members he had recruited, and, in addition, had numerous contacts in other areas. He confessed completely to CIC interrogators.

Seventh Army CIC, working in the Dijon area, assumed the bulk of the work. By mid-October an odd assortment had been impounded: former mistress of an Abwehr agent who was also the late until killed by the Maquis; proprietor of the who had 600,000 francs in his pocket, arrested along with his The sub-detachment in

17 VI Corps Counterintelligence Report No. 7, covering the period 9 Oct to 22 Oct 1944, Dated 22 Oct 1944. (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

produced respected comissioner of the renowned (he had been drawing information from the institution's credit files), and the arrested along with his wife. And in Bourg-en-Bresse, a pair of fallen Frenchmen were picked up, the one an informer against the Resistance groups with which he had once fought, and the other a specialist in counter-parachute activities (both had been blackmailed by from the Black Market into German espionage).

By 20 October 1944 the ring was completely extirpated. Twenty-one agents connected directly into the Dijon, Bourg-en-Bresse, Monaco ring had been apprehended. Many more leads concerning agents of other systems and in other areas were obtained during the round-up.

The Dijon victory, however, was but one of four major triumphs over the Abwehr. In the long view, the CIC victory most essential to Allied successes was the clean-up of many important stay-behind agents strung by German Intelligence along the Riviera. These men, charged with long term missions, were expected to play a major role in German espionage even after the War.

Many of the agents arrested had penetrated deeply into Allied organizations. Among those apprehended was an Abwehr stay-behind agent who was described as having penetrated "a military unit in a position of trust which would have enabled hir to provide the enemy with information of consequences serious to Seventh Army." Other arrestees included a who had maneuvered himself into the job of at Marseilles, and arrested at Cannes, who was to have become a German consular agent had not the Americans arrived. Twenty-two other agents were arrested in Cannes; arrests were made also all along the Riviera--in Monaco, Nice, Marseilles and Nimes.[18]

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18 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, for the period 1 Oct to 15 Oct 1944, Dated 18 Oct; extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Repts for Sep and Oct 1944 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rept No. 3, for the period 16 October to 31 October 1944, dtd 4 November 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for September and October 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.) (NOTE: These figures do not include line crossers, a good many of whom, mostly expendable young Italians, walked into captivity in and about Cannes.)

The third October victory of Seventh Army CIC over German Intelligence Service was of vital importance to area tactical commanders: an extraordinary number of line crossers were netted by CIC established roadblocks. The large number of arrests enabled CIC to form valid concepts concerning the type of person usually recruited for such missions, the places from which they would most likely be sent, and the customary patterns of their activity once turned loose. These valid concepts, in turn, made future arrests a far simpler matter.

For two months now the Milice Francaise, the Legion des Volontaires Francais, and Francisme Movement, as well as other collaborationist groups, had been sending members streaming across France before the Allied advances. The German Command had hesitated to allow such a motley group into Germany; many were detained at the border and put to work digging fortifications. CIC learned, however, that others were sent to the sabotage schools at Weisbach, Osnabruck, Hundsbach, Hubacker-Hof (in the Black Forest), Freiburgim-Breisgau, and Frankfurt. CIC also learned in October that the curricula of these schools stressed electronics and parachute training.

Not all the agents had once been collaborators: "Other methods employed by the enemy during October included freeing imprisoned patriots and mixing agents with them as partiots attempting to return to the Allied lines.... and Black Market operators and political and criminal prisoners found themselves confronted with a choice of prison or (of) becoming German agents." [19]

CIC learned further that St. Die, a resort town in the Vosges sixty-five miles south and slightly east of Luxembourg, was the center from which the Abwehr usually sent forth its agents. A central Abwehr office was located there, with smaller offices (Meldkopfs) just to the south in Fraize and, until the Americans moved in, in Remiremont. Falsified papers were usually printed and issued in St. Die. Once dispatched, the agents, hastily trained by mass methods, were prone to follow similar patterns. Seventh Army consolidated results of their arrests, and distributed the findings to other Armies:

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19 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, Part Three, 1-30 September 1944, L-1136 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

"Short-range enemy agents in combat areas: Typical enemy instructions to one of his short-range agents:

1) Cross lines into Allied territory.

2) Openly approach first soldier or Military Policeman you see.

3) Say that you have escaped from German territory, and wish to give valuable tactical information.

4) Ask to be taken to the nearest Command Post to report this information. Allied soldiers will then give you safe conduct past any civilian control points set up in forward areas.

5) At Command Post give enough plausible, but general, information to convince them of your good intentions, so that they will not regard you with suspicion.

6) Tell them that you will go back to the Allied rear area, where you have friends, but instead, circulate in Division area, obtain unit identifications and strength, gun positions, supply dump and Command Post locations, etc.

7) Return to German territory with this information, at which time you will be paid and given instructions for your next cross the line mission. (SUSA)"[20]

Seventh Army discovered a few additional techniques which were not universally used, but nevertheless worth noting: "Other methods employed by the enemy during the period (October) . . . confiscating French passports for use of agents passing through Switzerland; employing the guinea-pig technique of sending low-grade agents through the lines to reconnoiter for future agents."[21]

Reports of investigations indicate that CIC relied on concepts built through just such careful analyses of arrests as those made by Seventh Army CIC during October.

CIC roadblocks naturally turned up a great variety of subversives--not solely espionage agents. Seventh Army CIC discovered that numerous Gestapo informers, subversive French nationals, collaborators, and unclassifiable security hazards could be detected through such means.

Nazi Saboteur Confesses

During October, the Seventh Army CIC laid the groundwork for its fourth major victory over the Abwehr with the apprehension of Ludwig Nebel.

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20 95th Inf Div, G2 Periodic Rep No. 7, 26 October 1944; extracted from 5[illegible] Div, G2 Journal and File, 23-27 October 1944. (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

21 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 1-30 October 1944, (Unclassified) I-1130, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

Nebel began his journey through the battle lines on 31 October. Neatly dressed, although in the clothing of a farm worker, he proceeded along a road near Bruyeres in the Vosges Mountains. Once in American held territory, he attempted to give tactical information to an artillery officer of the 36th Infantry Division. He was arrested on the spot and brought to the 36th CIC Detachment where he was subjected to a two-hour interrogation. A body search, conducted by Agent Philip O'Brian, revealed French, British, American and German currency with the serial numbers of the French money running consecutively. His identification papers, all made out in the name of Karl Haas, an Alsatian, seemed in order, although the agents were not certain of the exact identification documents he should be carrying.

"Haas" claimed to have escaped from Berlin and to be returning to his native France to join the French Army. It was his contention that his varied collection of currency had come from successful black market ventures in Berlin. He was shipped off to Seventh Army CIC for further interrogation.

When Seventh Army CIC failed to crack his story, Nebel was placed in the hands of a team of questioners from Securite Militaire. The Frenchmen gave him a thorough going over physically. Nebel was draped over a log and unmercifully clubbed. Still he did not confess. At this point, three days after the original apprehension, interrogators from the 307th CIC Detachment took over the questioning with Agent George Perper in charge of the team.

"Haas" was asked where he had gotten the sturdy mackinaw he was wearing. The suspect answered that he had picked it up in Paris and then quickly realizing he had slipped, claimed to be extremely tired, and changed the purchase-point to Berlin. With this break to act upon, Perper left the interrogation room, returning with a file which contained photographs of the Paris Gestapo Headquarters. He placed the box in front of the suspect and dramatically picked at random one of the photographs on file. Perper claimed the picture he held in his hand showed the suspect leaving the Gestapo Headquarters in Paris. Nebel admitted defeat with the statement, "You've got me!"

Philip O'Brian, recalling the case, feels that the severe punishment given Nebel by the Securite Militaire had so worn the suspect out that his keen mind, able to parry off all previous questions, had lost its sharp edge, permitting the one slip his interrogators needed.

Nebel admitted that he was an Untersturmführer in the Sabotage Section of the Schutz Staffeln. He confessed to two missions. He was to have established in Paris an espionage office equipped with a radio transmitter. His other mission involved the contamination of three gasoline pipelines being used by the Allied forces in France. Information was to be acquired for the use of a team of saboteurs of which he was

the leader. Nebel stated that he had planned to return to Germany to pick up the explosives and the members of the team after the pipelines had been located. Cached in Germany for use in the operation were about 80 pounds of magnetic demolition charges prepared especially for pipelines.

In mid-October, Nebel had been introduced to two young saboteurs, Maurice Zeller and Ferdinand Vliegen, both fresh from a one month's course in sabotage and explosives given at Badenweiler. On 21 October, this trio had gone to Gerardmer for final briefing. The two young men, also scouting information on the pipelines, were to join their leader north of Paris for the return to Germany. All three men had headed for the area of the American 36th Infantry Division.

A rush alarm was sent out, and an hour and a half later, Maurice Zeller, who was traveling under the more romantic name of Jean Louis Fontanier of St. Die, was apprehended by the 36th CIC Detachment at a CIC-supervised roadblock.

Zeller admitted first to membership in the Communist Party, then to the Parti Populaire Francais, then the Milice, and finally to the trio of saboteurs who were pipeline-seekers. He made an easy and complete confession of the details of the plot.

Vliegen, now Franscoise Verneuil, managed to cross undetected through the lines as a refugee on 2 November. He was apprehended by Securite Militaire on 7 November while applying for a travel permit to Dijon. A search revealed that he possessed 50,000 francs with the serial numbers running consecutively and following the numbers on bills carried by Zeller. He maintained that he had been sent over by Zeller to gain information on civilian morale, troop movements, traffic density and such matters. He admitted that he had expected to meet Zeller north of Paris. The credibility of Vliegen's tale depended upon Zeller and Nebel keeping their knowledge to themselves. Vliegen held grimly to his story which was manifestly inadequate in the light of the testimony given by his comrades.

Nebel was expected back in Germany, and CIC determined not to let him lead disappointment. Agent Perper, in charge of doubling captured agents for counter-intelligence purposes in the Seventh Army area,[22] persuaded Nebel to work for CIC. Nebel returned to Germany where he was put in charge of a sabotage school, proceeding to send saboteurs toward the American lines provided. His cover must have been air-tight for eventually he won an Iron Cross from Hitler for his efforts on behalf of Nazism.

22 In the set-up of intelligence operations in the Twelfth Army Group, doubling of all captured agents was handled by Special Counter Intelligence (SCI), an agency of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In Seventh Army operations, CIC assumed responsibility, more or less unofficially, of handling men like Nebel, who were doubled to provide information of a counterintelligence nature

Meanwhile, armed with the necessary information, Agent George Mosely, in charge of travel control in the Seventh Army Area, supervised the apprehension of a series of unfortunate saboteurs as they crossed the lines into American territory.[23]

The Nebel sabotage case might well never have been broken, had the Germans sent the trio over the lines during September., For it was only in October that a stabilized front first enabled CIC to establish proper travel control measures. CIC immediately set a network of roadblocks as far forward as possible in Corps and Division areas. Seventh Army put their blocks and a straggler line further back. Control centers were dropped behind the Army's rear boundary.

No civilian traffic was allowed in combat areas which were defined as the zone forward of the Regimental rear lines. Roadblocks manned by CIC, Securite Militaire, and Military Police operated there in the forward areas, especially on bridges, as did roving patrols, which were usually under the control of a CIC Agent.[24]

By and large, as Seventh Army CIC reported, there were not sufficient French Forces of the Interior personnel to be of much assistance up front: "Travel restrictions, with roadblocks to check travellers, have been established. At first these roadblocks were maintained by local French Forces of the Interior. During the month the French Forces of the Interior were incorporated into the French Army and are no longer available. A satisfactory solution has not been found."

Residents of combat areas were not allowed more that six kilometers from their homes, with the following exceptions: "Cases of death, sickness, marriage, birth, etc.; for handling agricultural products; to deal in food, commerce, or industry for the benefit of the community; to handle financial matters; for medical personnel and purposes; for public officials in the performance of their duties." Seventh Army supplied the pass forms, which the resident obtained from the local police and had

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23 G-2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 1-30 Oct 1944, (Unclassified), L-1136, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va. and Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 4, for the period 1 November to 15 November 1944, dtd 20 November 1944; extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Rpt for November 1944 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.) and interview with Philip O'Brian, Worcester, Mass., at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, N.Y., N.Y., 5 Aug 1955, and interview with Victor de Grinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., in Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y.

24 Sixth Army Group Fornightly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, for the period 1 Oct to 15 Oct 1944, Dated 18 Oct; extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Rpts for Sep and Oct 1944 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records, Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

checked by CIC or Securite Militaire. He was required to supply his name, date and place of birth, profession, residence, destination, route, time required for trip, reason for trip, identity card and signature.[25]

Roadblocks back from the front were usually manned by French Forces of the Interior and indigenous police--men who could easily recognize a resident of their own area, and with similar ease detect those unfamiliar with the region. Local police, in addition, checked hotels and lodging houses daily.

At all roadblocks, operating personnel were left with instructions to apprehend all suspicious travellers. Several peculiar identifying points were exploited. It was known that there was a sabotage school which issued its graduates new brown leather jackets. Persons sporting such jackets were immediately suspect. Persons with consecutively numbered currency were always detained as were individuals with a clean skin, indicating a possibility of recent training in the plush atmosphere of a Nazi intelligence school. Once or twice daily CIC would tour the roadblocks and pick up the detained suspects.[26]

CIC soon discovered that the French Cart d'Identite, issued back during the German occupation, had been so widely counterfeited that it was now virtually worthless. Since the French had not yet put a more trustworthy card into circulation, CIC and Securite Militaire were forced to check all travel applications back against the town or area records of the applicant's domicile.

Intensive traffic control served a dual purpose: numerous suspect civilians were apprehended; and roads cleaned of civilian traffic enabled vitally needed supplies to be shipped forward without delay. So complete was travel control within the Seventh Army area that by November Germany Intelligence was instructing its important agents to avoid crossing the lines at points held by Seventh Army.[27]

VI Corps CIC reported that the newly stabilized front enabled them to carry through their assigned missions more smoothly than had been previously possible. By mid-October, VI Corps was able to report that informant nets, never attempted

25 Seventh Army CIC Report No. 3, dtd 15 October 1944, extracted from L-1024, 45th Infantry Division, G2 General Summary for October 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

26 Interviews with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill.; Robert Richards, Columbus, Ohio; William N. Bower, Swarthmore, Pa.; and Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 August 1955.

27 VI Corps Counterintelligence Report No. 7, covering the period 9 October to 22 October 1944, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

during the days of rapid advance, had been profitably established throughout the Corps area. Suspect investigations could now be made more thoroughly; no longer was it necessary to ship off all suspects, large and small intermixed, "back to Army." Civilians working for the Army were being checked. Curfew regulations took on new meaning as enforcement was finally possible. Civilian and military blackouts were similarly improved.

New Divisions Arrive

At the beginning of October Maj Gen Wade Haislip's XV Corps joined the Seventh Army, bringing to General Patch the 79th Infantry Division and the 2d French Armored Division. On 17 October the 44th Infantry Division joined this newly arrived XV Corps. Commanding the 44th CIC Detachment was 1st Lt. Peter Cummins. Then, on 20 October, the 100th Infantry Division landed at Marseille. It moved swiftly up the Rhone, and, early in November, relieved the veteran 45th Infantry Division. The 100th CIC Detachment was commanded by Captain Anthony R. Mattos.

The new Divisions, while moving into Seventh Army area, were instructed to maintain radio silence. Until the units had been in contact with the enemy for a week, all shoulder patches and unit markings on vehicles were prohibited. Additional personnel were requested from Securite Militaire to provide the new Divisions with the French agents who had already proved so beneficial to the Seventh Army units heretofore.

And once again the security conscious Seventh Army caught German Intelligence short. Eleven days after the arrival of the 44th Infantry, Germany loudspeakers beamed into its area an exhortation to the "boys of the 79th" to surrender. Three days later similar bombardments correctly identified the American unit.[28]

Sixth Corps CIC readied itself for one possible disadvantage which could well result from this new order of battle. The presence on the Corps' left flank of the 2d French Armored Division represented a potential security hazard. CIC knew well that adjacent troops could easily be fooled; an agent could claim to the Americans that he was a misplaced French soldier, and to the French that he was a lost Yankee. No such cases were reported, however. In this instance, German Intelligence apparently was slower than American CIC in spotting a situation ripe for easy exploitation.[29]

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28 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, for the period 1 October to 15 October 1944, dtd 18 October 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for September and October 1944, (Unclassified)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

29 VI Corps Counterintelligence Report No. 7, covering the period 9 October-22 October 1944, (Secret) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

With the approach of American troops to areas traditionally German, increased civilian hostility was anticipated. One example was published by CIC as an example which might prevent many more. On 27 September a French civilian, claiming to be a captain with Strategic Services, approached a lieutenant in the 45th Infantry Division to tell him that Tendon, France, was unoccupied. A twelve-man patrol was dispatched to verify this information; only one man returned alive.[30]

CIC Requests Additional Personnel

During October, Sixth Army Group CIC submitted a request for additional CIC personnel giving as a reason the fact that large areas to the rear necessitated redistribution of available Agents.[31] At the time of the request, Seventh Army had, in its seven Detachments, 23 Officers and 81 Enlisted Men. No additional men were assigned CIC as a result of this request; various Base Section detachments, however, were sent, entire, into the area rearward of Seventh Army, and the latter was thus able to concentrate Agents into the more limited forward areas. Before the arrival of the new units, Seventh Army Detachments had often resorted to quasi-official "requisitions" of qualified linguists from the unit combat forces. These men often stayed with the CIC Detachments throughout the War, and performed regular Counter-intelligence assignments.[32]

Sixth Corps, too, was short-handed. On 24 October Agent Paul J. Martin joined the 206th CIC Detachment, but more help was still needed: "In order to accomplish most effectively the counterintelligence functions of a Corps Detachment, it is necessary that the strength of CIC, VI Corps, be increased. The need for additional personnel is due mainly to the increasing espionage and sabotage activity on the part of the enemy."[33]

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30 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 2, for The Period 1 October-15 October 1944, dtd 18 October 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for September and October 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

31 Ibid, The Sixth Army Group summation of their request omits what seems here to be the strongest justification for additional personnel: Divisions joining Seventh Army from the north (such as the 79th Inf) were almost up to the T/O and E (24 Jan 1944) strength of 3 Offs and 14 EM. All Sixth Army Group Divs which had come up from the Riviera, however, had a total Detachment strength of only six. See Appendix 2 for strength report as of 31 October.

32 Interview of Maj Thomas Connors, G3 CIC, by Capt Irene Taylor on 9 Oct 44.

33 Sixth Corps Monthly Situation Summary for Oct 1944, Dated 31 Oct 44, Martin is not further identified. (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

"Commissioning With A Purpose"

The officers and Agents coming in with the new division detachments were all inexperienced in combat counterintelligence. The 307th CIC Detachment developed the policy of assigning the commander of these detachments to duty with the 307th and sending down experienced officers or, more often, newly-commissioned agents to take over the new units. This way the recently-arrived outfits had at least one man with the necessary experience to direct operations. A former member of the 307th, William Bower, has referred to this practice as "commissioning with a purpose." The 307th was allowed by General Patch to commission as many agents as necessary without reference to Table of Organization limitations.

When a new detachment joined the Seventh Army, the 307th sent down a representative to the new division's G-2 to instruct him on CIC operations and get permission for the new detachment to dress in civilian uniform.

307th Maintains Tight Control Over Its Units

The Seventh Army CIC maintained sufficiently tight control over its division and corps detachments that, in a sense, the 307th operated over the whole area encompassed by Seventh Army units. The highly-experienced VI Corps CIC was allowed to operate with less direction than the other units who were advised to shuttle suspects back to the 307th for interrogation as soon as possible. To maintain constant contact and liaison with Seventh Army Division and Corps detachments, the 307th utilized a liaison Agent, Robert Blake, to tour subordinate units and keep the 307th informed on their activities. Another agent of the 307th, George Moseley, was in charge of travel control throughout the Army area.

With this degree of supervision from Army level, there were no serious "take-over" or transition problems resulting when detachments moved from one area to another or divisions were replaced in a region by units from corps or Army level.[34]

An Eye On The Future

CIC, well aware of the ever-changing nature of their missions, always kept an eye toward the future. Careful reports were written and circulated concerning the difficulties anticipated once inside Germany. The German "Maquis" was expected to be one problem. CIC investigated reports of this organization, a de-Hitlerized Nazism as it were, throughout October. Blame for the atrocities was all to be shifted upon the "old Nazis" leaving a pure group able to carry through the finer aspects of the Nazi program untainted by the guilt of their elders. They were to disclaim any desire for world conquest, maintaining that these "old Nazis" had brought the last War upon Germany through their frantic search for world markets. These patriots

34 Interviews with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill.; Robert Richards, Columbus, Ohio; William N. Bower, Swarthmore, Pa.; and Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 August 1955.

in the Maquis were to have no goal other than the liberation and purification of their country.

CIC learned also of a German decision to form an extensive underground net, but to desist from any such activity for the first six months following the American occupation. The reasons for this hiatus were: after six months of occupation German civilians would be so disgruntled that they would be ready for stout action; and six months' inactivity would surely cause American security forces to lower their guards.

A third investigation disclosed the existence of a group whose sole raison d'etre was to spread anti-American rumors throughout occupied areas.

Consolidation of CIC investigations indicated that foreign workers trapped in Germany were united spiritually, and would be able to operate against the Nazis as a powerful and organized unit--even though they lacked a pattern of formal organization. A CIC informant reported seeing a Frenchman slapped by a Nazi official in a crowded streetcar. The fact that not a murmur of protest arose indicated to him that the other passengers thought in a single pattern--and would be able to act in a single pattern were the proper time for their revenge to materialize.[35]

VI Corps summed up its attitude as Germany was being approached: "Security of installations within VI Corps area has been satisfactory for the period. The marked increase in enemy espionage and sabotage activity has been countered with roadblocks. Informant nets and other security measures have been rarified and improved since the last period (September). . . . In order to maintain a security plan of maximum of effectiveness during the approach to and penetration into enemy territory an increase in the present strength of the Corps and Divisional CIC Detachments will be necessitated."[36]

At this time the Seventh Army CIC had no means of realizing the significance of one item buried in a large Army Report: "Information has been received from a deserter that the Germans are recruiting soldiers who have lived in the United States for sabotage missions behind the American lines. The German soldiers will be dressed in American uniforms, and will infiltrate through our forward positions."[37]

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35 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 3, for the period 16 October to 31 October 1944, dtd 4 November 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Repts for October and Nov 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

36 VI Corps Monthly Situation Summary for October 1944; Dated 31 Oct 1944. (Secret)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

37 Seventh Army CIC Rept No. 3, dtd 15 Oct 1944 extracted from L-1024, 45th Infantry Division, G2 Summary for Oct 1944. (Unclassified)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Experiments in this new type of warfare had been reported early in October: "A small Allied troop were engaged by three Germans dressed in American uniforms and driving an American jeep. . . . Two of the Germans wore enlisted uniforms, while the third wore an American Captain's uniform and helmet with markings."[38]

This report was to attain significance later.[39]

With the 45th Division at the Front

Excerpts from reports of activities of the 45th CIC Detachment for October furnish an illustration of the varied duties of detachments at division level.

On 1 October 1944, the 45th CIC Detachment counted two Officers and four Enlisted Men; in addition, an agent of Securite Militaire was attached to the Detachment. During October, however, Special Agent Fausto Molinet was wounded in the right leg by a mine exploding under his vehicle, and Agent Willard Schutt was hospitalized with pleurisy and bronchitis. Both were expected to be out of action roughly a month.

The remaining Agents of the 45th Detachment worked on a variety of cases.

On 7 October 1944 one Gustave Calippe approached a 45th Division Military Policeman and asked to be taken to the nearest Command Post; he had important information for the Americans. The alert Military Policeman arrested him, and took Calippe to 157th Infantry Regimental Headquarters where he was given a preliminary questioning. Transferred to the 45th CIC Detachment, Calippe was extensively interrogated. He finally admitted to being an Abwehr agent belonging to the Digon group, and that he had crossed into Allied territory on a mission assigned him by German Intelligence. CIC discovered some additional information on other personalities before having Calippe held in the civilian prison at Epinal.

Division Artillery reported a series of petty thefts in Deyvillers, and agents of the 45th were dispatched to run a security survey there. The guard system was strengthened; strict pass and identification systems were instituted for workers in an adjacent tile factory; civilians were excluded from the Div Arty area; the Mayor, under CIC instructions, announced to his people that they were to keep away from areas occupied by American troops.

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38 Seventh Army G2 Rept No. 58, 12 October 1944, Extracted from L-1136, Seventh Army Gw Staff Sect Daily Repts. (14), Annex 20, 1-15 Oct 1944, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

39 See Volume XVIII, on the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

Fourteen residents of the thirteen towns visited by the detachment were deemed sufficiently interesting to have dossiers on them opened; six of these persons were eventually incarcerated.[40] The most dangerous was quite possibly Jaques Thomas, found near Rambervillers with a variety of passes, requisition forms, letterheads, stamps and other assorted official printing devices. He maintained that these had been used in anti-German Black Market activities, and that he was off to join the French Army. Other arrestees included a Milice recruiter, a collaborationist chief, a stranger with a police record, several German soldiers, and several keepers of these German soldiers.

There were seven 45th Detachment roadblocks in operation during October. Road patrols, at intermittent times, covered almost all of the Division area. Civilian authorities spot checked traffic at Padoux, Sercoeur, Girecourt, Fontaney, and St. Gorgon. The blocks and patrols were first manned by civilian volunteers and the French Forces of the Interior. During October, however, French Forces of the Interior in many towns were mobilized into the French Army. The entire traffic control system all but collapsed. Only an abnormal number of civilian volunteers enabled normal operations to continue. Two of these French volunteers were killed near Aydoilles when they stepped on a German mine.

Coupled with this shortage in French personnel was a critical shortage of Military Policemen. Captain Guenthner, the Detachment Commander, pointed out, however, that Military Policemen, even in sufficient numbers, were unsatisfactory for road guarding and identification duties because of the language barrier. His suggestion was that an arrangement be put through command channels whereby mobilized French Forces of the Interior personnel might be assigned road patrol duties at critical points.

Captain Guenthner suggested further that he be assigned a group of French soldiers, preferably Alsatians, who spoke both French and German, for assistance in the coming operations on the German border.

Lastly, Captain Guenthner pointed out that advance documentation on important CIC targets (such as location of Gestapo Headquarters and white and black list personel) was not coming down to his Detachment. He suggested that, if available, such documentation should be disseminated sufficiently in advance of operations to be of some value thereto.

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40 During the month combat troops brought many "suspicious persons" to CIC Headquarters. For the sake of keeping forward elements alert, 45th CIC Det Agents carefully investigated such characters. With the exception of the Abwehr Agent. Gustave Calippe, however, none were deemed to be of any counterintelligence interest.

Agents of the 45th Detachment discovered no evidence of sabotage during October, nor were there reported any violations of AR 380-5 or cases of disaffection. There was no evidence of subversive activity against American troops unless one counted a somewhat garbled leaflet which suggested that the Americans might be homesick for the "French Follies" and "that crowd on Broadway" who are "now having (sic) a swell time." This leaflet was found in an abandoned German Command Post, but apparently was never distributed to its intended readers.

By the end of October the two overworked officers and the two agents on duty had moved their CIC Headquarters a few kilometers forward into Bult, France, and next month's operations were under way. [41]

41 45th CIC Detachment Monthly Situation Summary, 1-31 October 1944, dtd 31 October 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 3

Reaching the Rhine

During the early weeks of November, Seventh Army, with the American Third on its left flank, moved with painful slowness into the carefully defended Vosges Mountains. Then on 17-18 November German resistance weakened suddenly. The 2d French Armored Division had within the week led XV Corps across 50 miles of mountains and through Strasbourg. By the end of November, Third Army, on the left, and VI Corps, on the right, were on line with Major General Haislip's XV Corps, and, poised together on the banks of the Rhine, the Armies of Generals Patton and Patch readied themselves to cross the last barrier into Southern Germany.

During the first week of November, two new divisions were committed to action in Southern France. The 103d CIC Detachment, with the 103d Infantry Division, was commanded by 1st Lt. Dugald W. Hudson and the 514th CIC Detachment of the 14th Armored Division was commanded by 2d Lt. Edward F. Bierdron.[42]

October had seen new heights reached in CIC's battle with German espionage, and there was speculation on what course the increasingly desperate Germans would choose during November. Many new indications of subversive activity had appeared during late October, and, with each overrun town somewhat more Germanized than its predecessor, CIC was unsure of what next to expect. Further, the shortage of French Forces of the Interior had become critical, first, because most members had been mobilized into the French Army, and secondly, because local French Forces of the Interior would, obviously, be absent where most needed, in Germany proper. CIC's response to these three challenges tells the main story of Seventh Army Counterintelligence for November 1944.

German Intelligence Service (GIS) Avoids Seventh Army

Seventh Army CIC found their counter-espionage work greatly simplified by the GIS: "The (October) efficiency of Seventh Army travel control in apprehending German agents resulted in the GIS warning its agents to avoid roadblocks in the Seventh Army sector."[43] During all of November Seventh Army CIC apprehended only nine known espionage and two sabotage agents--a sharp let-down from the October collections.

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42 A Monthly Information Report dtd 17 Jan 45 is signed by Bierdron as CO, while a similar document dtd 31 Jan 45 is signed by 2d Lt Edward L. Hahn. It is not known whether the CO had been changed during this brief period or whether Bierdron had been "Acting" CO.

43 Seventh Army G2 After-Action Report, Annex No. 10 for the Period 1-30 November 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO Alexandria, Va.).

Some German agents still held to the formulas employed by the Abwehr for over a month. a 24 year-old Frenchman, crossed Allied ies on 17 November at Aux Tigres. He, like so many before him, had come aight from St. Die. Maintaining that he was a refugee with valuable tactical information, he asked to be taken to the American Military Police; instead, he was taken to 36th Division CIC. Interrogation by 36th CIC Detachment and later by Seventh Army, disclosed that was a skilled linguist and qualified radio operator. A Captain Cavallic had recruited him for a three-week mission in Paris, where was to analyze port facilities, V2 bomb damage, railroad and troop movements, and Communist and Frances Tieurs et Partisans potential. was turned over to Special Counter Intelligence in hope that he might be doubled.

The curious case of another would-be line-crosser, indicated desperation tactics of the once competent and complacent Abwehr. was what would have, at one time, been called a "high-level agent." On 10 September this 17 year-old boy started two months of classes at the German espionage school of Hubacker-Hof, 22 miles east of Strasbourg, where he was one of a score of youthful Frenchmen in training. selected the course in espionage, which dealt chiefly with the organization of the American Army in preference to the radio course, which would have necessitated his jumping by parachute into the Allied sector of France.

Then on 8 November, was selected for what turned out to be his sole ission. He exchanged his German uniform for a set of civilian clothes and was riven to within a mile of the American strongpoint at Acqueville. There he crossed the lines, and, claiming to be a loyal Frenchman, passed by the first soldier to challenge him. He reached a CIC roadblock, however, and was spotted immediately.

Amazingly enough had no identity papers with him. Interrogation quickly revealed that his papers had been taken from him when he entered school, and then never returned. CIC agents supposed that papers were denied possibly to blackmail him into returning--or possibly because any documents forged at St. Die would be too easily recognized--or possibly because the St. Die machinery had been destroyed. CIC never found the answer to this question.

For several weeks CIC Agents continued intermittent interrogations of He supplied information on over forty of the men whom he had known at Hubacker-Hof, most of whom were being trained to enter the Allied zones. Numerous Sixth Army Group reports of subsequent dates carry additional information supplied by on Gestapo informers and members of collaborationist organizations.

was assigned an old mission with a novel twist. He was to approach the front lines from the rear. established himself in Corcieux, France, while the Germans were yet in town. Then, 48 hours after the Allies had pulled through, was to approach the lines, spot artillery locations and note bumper markings and shoulder patches. While attempting to return to German territory, was apprehended by CIC.

But few agents tried to cross into Allied lines during November. CIC arrests were principally of stay-behind agents, or of agents who had crossed over previous to the strict crack-down on travel control.

for one example, had been working many months for the Germans about St. Die. While the city was yet held by the German Army, had been an informer for the Gestapo. Later, he installed a letterbox, which was successfully used to intercept incoming messages, beamed by radio to an Allied Office of Strategic Service (OSS) Agent who had been doubled after his capture by the Abwehr. hoped to retain his employers after the American occupation, and collect strategic intelligence information, but was quickly apprehended by CIC.

On 6 November, boasted to two of his Epinal lady friends that he was an officer in French Intelligence. Suspicious, they relayed their doubts to CIC. On the next day CIC interrogators learned that an accountant, had been supplying the Abwehr with long-range financial information, and that his sister in Nancy was a notorious informer for the Gestapo.

of Roan l'Etape, had attended a meeting of the Vichy Government's Service des Societes Secretes, and was there assigned the task of gathering information on all Freemasons in his region. Brajon-Francois gathered the information conscientiously, but then turned it over to the Sicherheitsdienst in Nancy. CIC presented him to Securite Militaire for trial.

Other arrestees included a nineteen year-old girl and a fifteen year-old boy--she forced into espionage by Black Market convictions; he trained in an espionage school, and then sent across the lines with the mission of enlisting in the French Army.

Less than a dozen such arrests actually constituted the total take of Seventh Army counter-espionage teams for all November--a vast let-down from rushed October activities. German Intelligence Service was not, however, wholly inert. Unable to breach CIC roadblocks, the Abwehr contemplated new devices: ". . . agents stated that the Germans were comtemplating sending high-grade agents to

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Spain by air and then across the border because so many of their agents have been apprehended by the Allies in the forward areas." [44]

Seventh Army CIC reported another dodge: "It is also known that the enemy's discouragement was so great that (he planned) to take advantage of a commercial treaty between Switzerland and Spain whereby food supplies would be exchanged between the two countries. The German Intelligence Service planned to install agents as truckers on the Spain-Switzerland run." [45]

the young Frenchman captured on 17 November at a CIC roadblock stated that at one time "he was considered for a mission whereby he would have been deposited on the shores of France near La Rochelle by midget submarine. All agents thus landed were to return to the same spot after a lapse of 10 days for a return to Germany."

the credential-less line-crosser schooled at Hubacker-Hof, told CIC interrogators much about the instruction in parachute operations: "According to parachute agents . . . were told to bury their parachutes directly after landing and to avoid all contact with military and civilian personnel (and) to find a cover to camouflage their activities. They were instructed to send messages after their day of work at about 1830 hours. Their messages were intercepted at the school. . . . Radio equipment was of inferior quality; apparatus was very small." There were no reports verified of agents thus hopping into Seventh Army territory. [46]

The static combat situation, subsequent to the breakthrough of 18 November, afforded CIC time to analyze Nazi espionage techniques which immensely aided counter-espionage work once the troops were again fast under way, and new towns were up for liberation. During the rush up from the Riviera, forward detachments had often complained that they were entering towns "cold," with no

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44 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, Period 16 Nov to 1 Dec 1944, dtd 7 Dec 1944; Extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Supp Docs, G2 Per Repts, 1-31 Dec 1944, (Unclassified).

45 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations In Europe, 1-30 November 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

46 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, period from 16 Nov to 1 Dec 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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information on either white and black list personalities or important targets, even though such information had often been unearthed by other units and was somewhere in CIC files. But in November, thanks both to the slowed advance and also to increased organizational efficiency, Sixth Army Group managed to disseminate carefully prepared suspect and target information quickly both to the front and to the rear. [47]

CIC Seeks Subversives

CIC had discovered that in France there were no important movements seeking to subvert either Allied military personnel or French citizens. When not enthusiastic to the Americans, the French were at least passive. German attempts at propagandizing American troops seemed to have caused more derision than desertions. [48]

It was believed that the situation would change markedly with the shift in American status from liberators to invaders. CIC, therefore, was sensitive to slight tokens of ill feeling.

Toward mid-November CIC learned of a Francist-staffed subversive espionage and sabotage group called "Griff." Members worked in units of five; the highest leader was one Bucarat, a man who was said to have boasted that the recent attempt on De Gaulle's life was by one of his men.

At the same time CIC learned of a smaller group named "Mission Marti." This fifteen-man clique had taken it upon themselves to organize "passeurs"-- the men who establish meeting places and hide-outs for line-crossers. They had it as a goal to place a passeur every 20 miles between Paris and the Vosges.

French Forces of the Interior was found often to suffer in reputation for the crimes of the Milice, by now usually referred to as the "Militia" in CIC reports. For instance, 140 Milice members caused havoc among civilians in St. Die. Again, the 141st Infantry Regiment reported hostile acts on the part of a band of

47 Breakdown of Sixth Army Group Rept No. 4, (L-375), discloses detailed information on: 29 new cases on individual suspects; 31 cases under investigation on which some progress has been reported; 54 personalities still under enemy control (many of whom were expected to cross the lines), and 1 case of information received on a carded personality.

48 "A VI Corps Summary of results of enemy leaflet and radio propaganda demonstrated that the enemy underestimated the intelligence of the American soldier and consequently produced more amusement than desired effects." L-375, Sixth Army Group Rept No. 5, 16 November to 1 December 1944 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Frenchmen. In both cases the bad actors wore French Forces of the Interior armbands and identifications; in neither case, however, were they French Forces of the Interior members.

If the problem of telling the hostile Milice from the usually amicable French Forces of the Interior was all but impossible for CIC, it was not much simpler for the French themselves. The Vosges French Forces of the Interior, late in October, discovered one key: Milice members often sewed a piece of white cloth (2 1/2" by 3 1/2", and stamped with the German Eagle) inside the lining of the lower left front corner on their coat or jacket.

Throughout November German propaganda services stepped up efforts to subvert American troops. Loudspeakers along the front blasted almost continuously into American ears. Newspapers and leaflets floated into American foxholes. Most often drummed out were two themes: the growing nostalgia of Americans, faced with an indefinitely long war; and Inter-Allied disagreements and the danger of Communism.

Intensive propaganda efforts were beamed toward some of the minority groups who were lending support to the Allied cause. "Our Special Correspondent" told Arabian troops that the Allies planned harsh colonization of Arab lands and enslavement of the people. Similarly, he said from Oran to Algerians fighting in France: " an old drunkard" of a French railroad inspector had needlessly allowed a trainload of soldiers to be derailed. Lastly, the German said that occupying forces in a small Algerian village, suspicious of sabotage attempts there, had the town "dynamited" without any investigation.

Personnel Problems Numerous

Meanwhile, Detachment CIC officials fought their never-ending job to obtain personnel in numbers sufficient to do the jobs which CIC had been assigned.

Detachment Commanders, all along the line, requested assignment to their units of German-speaking personnel. Captain Green, Commanding Officer of the 3d CIC Detachment, for instance, had only one agent who spoke any German. He suggested transfers from the combat troops of German-speaking personnel, if no agents were available. 49

49 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 4, for the period 1 - 15 November 1944, dtd 20 November 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for November 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Several months prior to entry into Germany, the 307th CIC Detachment had the services of only two German linguists. Fortunately CIC possessed excellent liaison with the Seventh Army G-1 and through him able to establish contact with the G-1 of the 44th Infantry Division. One of the battalions of the 44th was composed of ASTP-trained soldiers that the Army had lumped together into an unhappy infantry outfit. CIC was given a "carte blanch" to appropriate the needed German linguists from this unit. The recruitment program, instituted without directives or recommendations from higher authority resulted in the acquisition of twenty-five to thirty individuals. These linguists were transferred to Seventh Army Headquarters to attend a short course in CIC investigations.

Former members of the 307th recall that these men, who reported in "just hanging with grenades," were extremely grateful to be "picked out of the fox holes." Right from the beginning these linguists were outfitted with CIC credentials and were carried on morning reports as agents. Immediate unit surveys were run on the loyalty and discretion of the linguists and eventually a background investigation reached back to the United States.

It was the general oonsensus of the detachment that these men "turned out well" as agents. Kenneth Crowell, 307th Commanding Officer, felt that the presence of these men, extremely grateful for their CIC assignment, was good for detachment morale.[50]

And then, by the last week of November, the French First Army reported that all French Forces of the Interior members in their areas had been integrated completely into units of the Army. In the American zones the situation was scarcely more favorable. Sixth Army Group stated the problem succinctly; "Additional trained Gendarme personnel to assist in this (CIC) is much needed but difficult to secure. The ranks of the French Forces of the Interior who are helping in this work have been reduced by their inclusion in the regular French Army. Naturally the best are those who enlist, and the rest are none too reliable."[51] Detachment Commanders feared that the problem of obtaining

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50 Interviews with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill; Robert Richards, Columbus, Ohio; William N. Bower, Swarthmore, Pa.; and Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 August 1955. See Appendix 3 for strength report as of 15 December 1944. It is believed that this report reflects the additional numbers obtained through local recruitment.

51 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 4, for the period 1 - 15 November 1944, dtd 20 November 1944, extracted from, L-375, Sixth Army Group Operations' Reports for November 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

local personnel would grow critical once the Rhine was breached and no more local French forces were forthcoming.

While still in France, however, CIC managed to have as much work done by the French as was possible. Fortunately relations between CIC and French authorities continued to be excellent. French Forces of the Interior had always preferred CIC to its French counterpart, Securite Militaire, and the latter similarly proved most cooperative throughout. Case histories abound with instances of suspects and information being shuffled between CIC and Securite Militaire, and on matters demanding united action, such as travel control, they worked often as a single unit.

Seventh Army finally managed to obtain 100 Gendarmes, who were slated eventually to serve as Alsatian police. Until Alsace was overrun they were scattered throughout the Army area to augment personnel at travel control points.

With the entrance of new detachments into areas rearward of Seventh Army and with the front relatively stable, CIC was at last able to place personnel so as to use them most efficiently. No longer was there the wild race of Army keeping up with Corps, and Corps with Division. For the overall effect of the rapid advance of combat troops had been to impede CIC's forward movement; Division teams had to wait well behind the lines for Corps to catch up. Then, when Corps detachments did arrive, Division detachments often left a team of Agents, badly needed at the front, to orient the incoming detachment on local problems. The situation was repeated with the arrival of Army.

The overall effect of the static front, however, was to throw teams forward. By mid November, for example, three of the five Agents in the 3d CIC Detachment were up with Regiment. [52] Similarly, Corps CIC was now able to send an advance team up to Division Headquarters in order to receive briefing on work left undone. Division CIC was thus able to pull out all its Agents together, and arrive in strength at the next target. [53]

Thus Seventh Army CIC faced and attempted to answer the three big issues of November: German espionage, enemy attempts at subversion, and personnel

52 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period from 16 November to 1 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

53 3d Infantry Division, CIC Monthly Summary for the period ending 30 November 1944, dtd 3 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

shortages. There were, however, three smaller problems: travel control, counter-sabotage efforts, and military security.

German-Speaking Gendarmes Aid Travel Control

Travel control work was immeasurably simplified through the addition of the 100 German-speaking Gendarmes to Seventh Army Security forces. On 26 November, fifty of them were sent into Strasbourg to work there with the "T" force, and twenty more were attached to 100th Infantry Division, which was then up front with XV Corps, clearing Roan l'Etape and St. Blaise. The earnest request of Captain Guenthner, commander of the 45th CIC Detachment, was heeded: he was given fifteen of the Gendarmes, whom he used to supervise roadblocks throughout the Division sector. Each Gendarme was provided with a notebook containing names and descriptions of persons on the CIC wanted lists who might to be expected in his area.

At the end of November, over 100 travel control points were scattered throughout the VI and XV Corps area. In addition, numerous roving patrols covered the roads. Gendarme officers checked the entire system, which was also supervised directly by Corps CIC in collaboration with Seventh Army CIC.

By now CIC was able, themselves, to screen all refugees. To facilitate this task--at least to make it possible--residents of newly liberated towns were ordered to stand fast for the first few days. Actually, there was little long-range refugee migration. Most of these, wishing only to avoid the areas of actual combat, withdrew 10-20 miles from the front, and returned with the cessation there of hostilities. Daily more than 600 such refugees were channeled into Seventh Army refugee reception centers. Seldom did anyone there wish further evacuation.

Scattered Sabotage Attempts

During November, there were scattered reports of German sabotage efforts. When a munitions train exploded in the station at Baume les Dames, Securite Militaire undertook the investigation. Also within the French sector were numerous cases of wire clipping. French Forces of the Interior organized night patrols to check communication security.

Some German sabotage was of a more unusual type. On 18 November, for instance, took place one of the most thorough jobs of road sabotage of the

war. An estimated 1,500 pounds of explosives, painstakingly hidden in a concealed culvert, blew a crater 75 feet long and 25 feet deep into the road between Rambervillers and Baccarat.[54]

Available reports do not indicate the apprehension of any of these saboteurs, nor, for that matter, the capture of any important saboteurs after their strike--during the entire period from August landings through November, for all of Seventh Army.

The most effective counter-sabotage weapon was a thorough knowledge of the enemy's sabotage capabilities and techniques. Seventh Army CIC, with this in mind, consolidated reports on Nipolite, a type of plastic explosive which could be molded into articles of wearing apparel or luggage. First mention of this new material was by enemy agents captured by Seventh Army CIC.[55]

Seventh Army Reports Good Military Security.

Like most of their work, maintaining military security was a constant struggle for Seventh Army CIC. In November Seventh Army was again able to report good, but not perfect, military security.

There was much on the credit side. VI Corps reported that increasingly security conscious troops were supplying substantial amounts of important data to CIC.[56] A Seventh Army security survey of the important railroad yards in and about St. Loup, France, disclosed that no sabotage had been detected there, nor could any probably occur. Security measures were excellent, and the Commanding Officer there appeared sympathetic to and cooperative with the CIC mission. Seventh Army CIC found that the actual demonstration of a low-grade agent during their security lectures made a deep impression on both officers and enlisted men of the audience.

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54 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period from 16 November to 1 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

55 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period from 1 December to 15 December 1944, dtd 25 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

56 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rept No. 5, 1-15 Nov 1944, dtd 15 Nov; extracted from L-1136, G2 CIC Staff Section Repts, 15 Aug - 31 Dec 1944., (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

There was also much on the debit side, however, in a telephone booth was found a secret document which contained a list of Corps and Divisions en route to the Western Front. Careful CIC investigation disclosed a variety of security violations, among them failure to classify the document properly, failure to register it, and allowing it to be carried about, unguarded, by a typist. CIC submitted names and evidence for purposes of courts martial.

According to a Prisoner of War, German Infantry units regularly listened in on Allied telephone calls. CIC learned of the compromise of several Allied attacks by this means.[57]

Seventh Army CIC maintained a file on documents and equipment dealing with establishing identification which had been compromised or forged. During November it was reported that the Germans facing Seventh Army were using a round stamp with the letters "CIC" and had also captured roughly 70 French passports, whose numbers were known and recorded.[58]

Sixth Army Group CIC recorded an attack made by 70 enemy dressed in U.S. raincoats and helmets against a Company of the 15th Engineers. The report states that as the Germans attacked they yelled, "G.I.!" Throughout the war German Prisoners of War had, from time to time, maintained that they had been forced into the German Army. As Allied forces approached Alsace more and more prisoners of war attempted this dodge. Two French officers, skilled in interrogating Alsacians, were supplied Seventh Army CIC by Securite Militaire..

Then, as all manner of German expatriates more and more poured their life stories out to interrogators, CIC found itself assuming a new mission: the gathering and disseminating of strategic intelligence. Information, often peripheral to a case proper, possibly spaded out only as an aid in understanding the background or motives of an individual, took on separate importance as it was checked, then rechecked, against other reports on similar subjects. CIC disseminated such compilations of information on intelligence targets, often extremely accurate and complete, simply because the matter was interesting, or because it just might prove of some indirect value to someone in the field, but not, at first, because CIC Agents interpreted such an undertaking to be central to their mission.

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57 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rept No. 5, for the period from 16 November to 1 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

58 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rept No. 5, 15 November 1944, Annex 2 to L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

With a mysterious Germany lying close behind the next few hills, Sixth Army Group CIC units devoted more and more of their reports to these briefs, which, however, they invariably tacked on as "Appendices" to the "real" report.[59]

From division reports came information on the political situations and problems as seen directly by observers on the very front. When played together such reports permitted the interpolation of accurate predictions: if a change had been progressing for a month, one could assume continued progress for the next period, or, if increased proximity to Germany had caused more and more of a certain sentiment, one could assume a larger amount once Germany proper was reached.

Sixth Army Group reports of November include material concerning the status of foreign workers kept in Germany, the possibility for partisan activity (especially sniping) in Germany, the French "Journalists" who were stranded, friendless and homeless, in Germany, flights of leading Nazis, revolts of Poles within Germany, personnel shortages, and strangely, abundances[60] in Germany, effects on the Austrians of Russian brutality, status and morale of Waffen Schutz Staffeln members, and Japanese feeling over the German defeats.

By the end of November 1944, CIC had therefore, without stating or realizing that they were doing so, assumed the mission of unearthing, compiling, and propagating certain types of strategic intelligence. As for the type of information which CIC thus handled, it can best be summed up as follows: it had no immediate tactical value; there was no one agency which had requested the information, or to which it would be of exclusive value; it all emanated from regular CIC sources; and it usually was a compilation of extracts from several sources--often what had become "common knowledge" to the detachment, but what was probably unknown in offices more removed from contact with numerous indigenous persons.

The ultra-secret Office of Strategic Service (OSS) reports seldom served the important purpose of educating unit commanders in a general way about overall conditions in Germany. Yet "know thy enemy" has been a cardinal rule of warfare throughout the battles of mankind. By default, CIC assumed the bulk of this work.[61]

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59 L-375, Sixth Army Group Repts 5-8 form a valid basis for these generalizations.

60 L-375, Sixth Army Group Rept No. 5 states that workers within Germany were kept at their desks even when no materials were available - simply to keep them out of trouble.

61 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period from 16 November to 1 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Records 1-30 December. (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Sarrebourg and Strasbourg

For division detachments the screening of freshly liberated towns was probably the most time-consuming job. As such teams traversed France they found the same problems reappearing in each city. The detachments soon developed efficient modus operandi.

Activities of one two-agent team in a single small town, Sarrebourg, France, contrasted strongly with the activities, thirty-five miles off, of a large "T" force unit in the major French city of Strasbourg.

On 20 November "light resistance was being encountered by 44th Division in Sarrebourg and small towns to the north."[62] At 0930 hours on the next morning, 1st Lt. Peter Cummins, Commanding Officer of the 44th CIC Detachment, and Agent Ulysses S. Grant entered Sarrebourg and established CIC headquarters there at the office of the Burgermeister.

French Forces of the Interior had prepared in advance for the arrival of the Americans. Local leaders had drawn up a list of 61 local suspects, which, when checked against a Seventh Army Black List, proved accurate. Lieutenant Cummings immediately organized a synchronized apprehension team of 75 French Forces of the Interior troops. Within two days, forty-five of the wanted individuals were apprehended--along with an additional twenty whom the French Forces of the Interior picked up on their own volition. All were incarcerated in the former Gestapo headquarters and political prison.[63]

On the morning of their arrival the two CIC Agents met with the local leader of the passive resistance group, who assisted them in choosing a Mayor and Assistant Mayor who would serve at least until arrival of XV Corps CIC and Civil Affairs Detachments. At this meeting members of a Town Council and Gendarmerie were also selected. These newly-selected provisional authorities were immediately given a variety of assignments over and above routine administration. They were to impound all mail, restrict the telephone service to the limits of Sarrebourg, and attempt to re-establish the water, gas, and electrical facilities.

In addition, the Mayor was given personal charge of all belongings confiscated from newly arrested prisoners, as well as of substantial amounts of German ordnance material which was captured with the city.

62 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 1-30 November, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

63 44th CIC Detachment, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report from 9 November 1944 to 24 November 1944, dtd 24 November 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The two Agents immediately put into effect the customary regulations intended to restrict the civilian activity which would injure the Allied cause. Residents were instructed to stay within six kilometers of their homes. Laissez-Passer would be issued to those deserving them on arrival of Corps CIC -- but not before. Curfew hours were set: 2000 to 0600 hours. Blackout regulations were to be maintained strictly. Weapons were not to be carried concealed. Lastly, the powers of the provisional government were carefully explained.

Certain categories of citizens received special instructions. Refugees and strangers to the locale were told to register with the Mayor. German deserters had their names taken. They were strictly warned to stay in town, and then to report to XV corps CIC immediately upon its arrival.

The newly-formed Gendarmerie was put to immediate work guarding the rapidly expanding prison and maintaining roadblocks about Sarrebourg.

Lieutenant Cummins and Agent Grant contacted the local printer and arranged to have hand-bills printed and distributed explaining the American regulations. They also contacted the town crier to have him transmit the information, and at a mass meeting, had the newly-appointed Mayor explain the regulations to the entire city population.[64]

By the morning of 24 November, seventy-two hours after their arrival, Cummins and Grant were ready to catch up with the Division front-runners. Before leaving Sarrebourg, however, they wrote careful reports which were left with the Mayor until XV Corps CIC arrived.[65] Information transmitted included the names of all suspects and evidence against them, names of probable suspects, and names of reliable persons.

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64 Information has been taken from 44th CIC Det Rept of 24 Nov 1944, and checked against 344-CIC-0.3 (24815) 44th CIC Det, Historical Rept (Oct-Nov 1944). Several minor details have been taken from the account of the liberation of Lorquin, Fr., found in the same reports, when such details were missing from the Sarrebourg record.

65 44th CIC Det Rept of 24 Nov 1944. Lt Cummins, more so than most Div Det CO's, held his Agents forward with regimental troops. Therefore his Agents seldom contacted Corps Agents personally. Instead, he arranged with XV Corps to use specific channels to ship back suspects and information. Three weeks prior to V-E Day Lt (then Capt) Cummins was killed in action. Source: Interview with Grant of 14 Aug 1945.

At 1030 hours on 23 November the Command Post of the 2d French Armored Division received the message "Tissue est Dans Iode" (Cloth is in iodine) which, when decoded, informed General Le Clerc that his Task Force Rouvillois had carried through Strasbourg to the Rhine banks. By the end of the day other French forces had secured the city.[66]

CIC, however, had been working out the problems of Strasbourg long before 23 November. For many weeks target sheets had been growing, and the organization of the entering party had received advance attention.

CIC was most interested in notorious recruiter for the Abwehr, who was known to hold Room #1 of the Hotel Metro Pole in Strasbourg. had served in Spain, then fought in the Cavalry for his native France; but when captured he worked equally faithfully for the Germans. He had performed high-level missions in Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, and now France. A variety of line-crossers apprehended by Seventh Army claimed to have been recruited by the persuasive whom they described as 46-68 years old, a man with receding wavy hair and heavy drinker with a accent.

Sixth Army Group also put roommate, the Roumanian Abwehr agent, on their wanted lists. He was described as a tall man with a strong build and a He had large hands and a double chin.

CIC roadblocks had not proved 100 percent efficient. Seventh Army CIC learned of an agent who had twice crossed Allied lines--the first time to go to Paris, the second time on a short-range mission about St. Die. Now living in Strasbourg, this carefully trained agent would be able to furnish valuable information on how he avoided roadblocks, and how more of his kind could then be apprehended.

Many more agents were advertised. One, whose radio, concealed in a brown suit-case, was never out of his reach or that of his stout, now-blond wife. Or founder of the folding who was not connected simultaneously with both Communist and Fascist organizations. There were, of course, many more names on this evergrowing list.[67]

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66 U.S. Seventh Army Report of Operations, Vol II, p 436, (Restricted), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

67 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period from 16 November to 1 December 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

CONFIDENTIAL

A Little Time For Training

The slow-moving combat situation, which gave CIC an opportunity to perform counterespionage operations, also afforded some time for training. The 307th CIC Detachment put in operation in Luneville, France, a school of a few days duration designed for newly-arrived agents of Seventh Army CIC units, but also attended by many of the more experienced men of the command.

The program consisted of classroom lectures and informal discussion groups, and generally involved preparations for operations inside Germany. Much information for the courses was extracted from material in the Seventh Army mobile library. Means for getting along with the civil populace in enemy territory, interrogation methods and roadblock operations were stressed. The men were allowed to view first hand the complete operation of the 307th CIC Detachment.[68]

How To Investigate A General

Perhaps the most extraordinary occurrence in this period of Seventh Army CIC activity involved Agent Victor deGuinzbourg, an operative held in the highest trust by his superiors. While deGuinzbourg was with the 307th in Luneville, he was called in for a private conference with General Alexander Patch, Commander of the Seventh Army. The General had a ticklish assignment for the agent: to investigate, completely on his own, a report of the subversion of an American General. General Patch warned that any repercussions resulting from a slip-up in this investigation would be the sole responsibility of the agent.

According to the report that Patch had received but did not let deGuinzbourg see, the American General, a liaison officer with the First French Army, in charge of getting supplies for the French, was acting against the best interests of the United States.

In regard to leads, deGuinzbourg recalls that "he had nothing to hang on to." He could not run a regular series of interviews without blowing the investigation and leaving himself open to the consequences. Wearing a civilian uniform and supposedly on leave from active duty, deGuinzbourg went to the area where the French Headquarters was located. He put up in a French inn and then ambled over to the Headquarters building, where he called on the General informally and then proceeded to the Officers' Club. For five days, he talked to old acquaintances and many new ones, never approaching the problem directly, but always open to any comments which he could piece together into some kind of conclusion.

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68 Interviews with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill.; Robert Richards, Columbus, Ohio; William N. Bower, Swarthmore, Pa.; and Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, N.Y., N.Y., 6 Aug 55

At the end of five days, deGuinzbourg returned to Luneville feeling that there "was not a word of truth" in the allegations. The accused General was doing exactly as he had been instructed. He had achieved good terms with the French authorities just as a liaison officer should. DeGuinzbourg later saw the report of the original accusation. Generally there had been charges of "being nice to the French" and specifically of favoring them in the allocation of supplies. DeGuinzbourg looked upon this document as a "spite report" and after seeing it was more than ever sure of his original conclusions about the General.

DeGuinzbourg recalls that General Patch was "very happy" about the results of the investigation and the manner in which it was handled. [69]

In late November the Seventh Army boundary (on their right flank) was moved several miles northward to permit the First French Army to participate in the capture of Strasbourg. [70]

"T" Force Planned

It was decided that reduction of the city should be accomplished by a "T" (Target) Force -- such as the "S" Forces which had helped secure Rome and Florence, and the other "T" Forces which had operated in Paris, Luxembourg, and Nancy. "T" Forces were created by SHAEF to operate at Army Group Level in its Directive No. 17, dated 7 July 1944. They were formed from personnel of G2, who were in turn assigned additional units and troops from combat forces, and CIC Personnel from as many local detachments as possible. They were charged with seizing, safeguarding, and facilitating the exploitation of important intelligence and counter-intelligence targets in the larger cities. [71]

Strasbourg "T" Force took its personnel where it could. The 100th Infantry Division released twenty Gendarmes to this organization; fifty more were sent across France from Dijon. [72] XV Corps contributed an Infantry Battalion

69 Interview with Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, New York, in Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y.

70 Seventh Army FO No. 5, (1944), dated 0001A, 29 Sep 1944; Extracted from The United States Seventh Army, Report of Operations (Heidelberg, Ger., 1946), Vol III, Annex C, p 937.

71 See Volume XV, this history.

72 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 5, for the period from 16 Nov to 1 Dec 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December, 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

(1st Bn of the 313th Inf Regt) and a Company of Combat Engineers (A Co of the 165th Eng Com Bn). [73] CIC Agents were drawn from VI Corps (206th CIC Det) and 7th Army (307th CIC Det) Personnel. [74]

This "T" Force entered Strasbourg on 25 November 1944, several hours ahead of the 3d Infantry Division forces, who were the first American combat troops scheduled to penetrate the city. [75] CIC immediately began the immense problem of screening buildings. Communication buildings were all given top priority; once checked, they were put under constant guard. The Power Plant was checked, and a system of passes was instituted immediately for workers there. Such passes were all countersigned by CIC.

On 28 November the French Majors le Tallec and Pavard, Gendarme leaders, VI Corps CIC, 3d Infantry Division CIC, "T" Force representatives, and Strasbourg officials met together to discuss security problems current in the city. It was there pointed out that 40,000 German citizens then lived in Strasbourg. Immediate steps were decided upon: first, CIC, French Forces of the Interior, and municipal officials would together attempt to classify all such people; secondly, these German nationals, once classified, would be put under a loose "house arrest" until further action could be taken. Those so detained would be free to walk the streets from 0900 to 1600 hours, but only for the purpose of obtaining food. They would be required to report daily to French Police. Eventually all these nationals were to be sent back to a camp, and from there to the rear.

CIC work was greatly complicated by the complete lack of a local Police force (which, having been Pro-Nazi, had skipped into cover or into Germany). By now 164 gendarmes were serving in Strasbourg, and they, along with numerous French Forces of the Interior Personnel, were substituted. These men were also put on roadblocks throughout Strasbourg and its environs--with one gendarme to a point.

With German forces, including an active artillery, just across the Rhine, Strasbourg was for many weeks very much a military zone. Curfew was set at 1950 hours, and black-out regulations were enforced to the letter. Troops were not allowed within the city unless assigned work there.

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73 These two units are mentioned in operations Instructions No. 25, (Seventh Army), dated 28 Nov 1944; Extracted from Annex D to the Seventh Army Rept of Operations, p 965, Vol III.

74 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rept No. 8, Period 16 Dec to 31 Dec 1944, dated 7 Jan 1945; Extracted from L-462, Sixth Army Group G2 Repts, Jan 1945, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

75 The Seventh Army Report of Operations, Vol II, p 436.

French Forces of the Interior estimated that 6,000 arrests would eventually be made within the city. CIC found that lists of German soldiers in hiding, their close associates, Gestapo informers, Nazi Party members and officials, and miscellaneous collaborationists and security risks were growing ten times as fast as the arrest list. With all agencies funneling their findings into CIC files, CIC, itself was losing ground. Since there was little time for individual cases during the early days in Strasbourg, CIC made few important arrests during this period.

General Le Clerc appointed a town manager and governing committee, which took office fairly smoothly, despite some protests of the working class.[76]

Political feelings in Strasbourg during the early days of its liberation presented a curious picture. Citizens were suspicious of the French soldiers; American troops, on their part, distrusted the civilians. For beside the 30,000 to 40,000 German nationals in the city, there were many Frenchmen who spoke German. The Americans seemed at last to have breached the enemy's homeland. During the early days in town American suspicions seemed corroborated by the scanty pro-Allied feeling evidenced in town. French and American flags, customarily displayed immediately upon capture of a city, failed to appear.

It now seems, however, that uncertainties of the combat situation were responsible for this passivity. Citizens were not at all certain that Strasbourg would long remain in Allied hands. Indeed, toward the end of November, all combat troops in town were alerted for evacuation. Refugees clogged the roads immediately; citizens openly jeered the Allies as cowards; some, truly loyal to Germany, attempted to reinstate themselves with pro-German elements. The immediate effect was a drop in American prestige, and some retardation of the work of occupying forces.

When the evacuation alert was withdrawn, Seventh Army units of all sorts were put to work spreading the news. Now, at last, French and American flags blossomed over the streets. Arrests were simplified, since many men had shown their true colors during the short period of uncertainty.[77]

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76 3d CIC Det Monthly Situation Summary for Period ending 30 Nov 1944; dated 3 Dec 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

77 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Rept No. 8, from the period 16 Dec - 31 Dec 1944, dtd 7 Jan 1945, extracted from L-462, Sixth Army Group G2 reports for Jan 1945, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The 3d CIC Detachment looked confidently into the future: "The Alsatians are generally a hard-working, clean, altogether intriguing people, who will be content when this sector is again working smoothly." [78]

And then on 2 December the bulk of "T" Force personnel were sent back to their own units, [79] and CIC Agents there settled into their customary patterns of activity. [80]

Early in December personnel of the 307th CIC Detachment received a pleasant surprise, a letter which is here quoted in full: [81]

6 December 1944

AG 330.13-B

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO: Commanding Officer, 307th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, APO 758, U.S. Army.

1. The 307th C. I. C. Detachment has shown the highest of professional standards during the planning and operational phases of the DRAGOON (ANVIL) Operation. For the successful carrying out of all assigned tasks, and for the protection of Seventh Army forces from the insidious attacks of espionage and sabotage agents, I wish to express my appreciation and commendation.

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78 3d CIC Detachment, Monthly Situation Summary, from the period ending 30 Nov 1944, dtd 3 Dec 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

79 Operating Instructions No. 26 (Seventh Army); Seventh Army Report of Operations, Vo. III, p 965.

80 The T Force operation in Strasbourg was, from its inception, closely coordinated with the work of the ALSOS mission, a group of scientists, technical specialists and intelligence representatives (including CIC Agents). The Army Intelligence commander directed his T Force head to give first priority to ALSOS targets. As a result of early intelligence planning and target exploitation, key areas were secured and placed under guard during the first two days of the operation. Seven University of Strasbourg physicists and chemists were apprehended, and other German scientists who had managed to flee left behind them documents which proved of extreme value in determining the scientific progress in aid of the Reich war effort. The Strasbourg ALSOS operation proved "about the most important: of the Mission's accomplishments during the War. (For further information on ALSOS activities in Strasbourg see Chapter on CIC in Special Missions).

81 Headquarters, Seventh Army; Letter from Gen A.M. Patch to CO 307th CIC Det; Subject: Commendation. Extracted from "CIC Monthly Information Report," (Kansas City Reoords Center, Box 55099).

2. Displaying outstanding initiative, resourcefulness, and leadership, the members of this detachment have caused the development of a splendid system of road-blocks throughout the Seventh Army area, which has led to the apprehension of numerous dangerous enemy agents, thereby defeating enemy plans and efforts to obstruct the progress and injure troops of Seventh Army. This splendid achievement reflects great credit not only on the 307th Detachment but also on the entire Counter Intelligence Corps.

A. M. PATCH
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

The Two-Way Street

Former members of the 307th CIC Detachment have praised General Patch's knowledge of the proper use of CIC. The excellent relations between CIC and the Seventh Army Commander had been established prior to the staging operations in Naples. The process of education of all tactical commanders in the mission and value of CIC had begun long ago in North Africa.

According to Kenneth Crowell, former Commanding Officer of the 307th CIC Detachment, the biggest aid that a troop commander can give CIC is to maintain a policy of not interfering with counterintelligence operations. Such a policy can stem only from a complete realization of the uniqueness of the counterintelligence mission and the means by which this mission is accomplished.

On the other hand, the specialized counterintelligence mission and operations tend to obscure CIC's awareness of belonging to a specific military tactical unit. Mr. Crowell said he felt that much of CIC's troubles in North Africa stemmed from a failure by CIC personnel to recognize that they were, after all, an integral part of the Army establishment. By the time of the Southern France campaign, this basic fact had been instilled in the minds of all 307th CIC personnel.

CIC's operations in Southern France ran more smoothly than in previous campaigns as a result of the better understanding established between the various tactical commanders and the 307th CIC Detachment. [82]

82 Interview with C. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Illinois, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 Aug 55; and interview with Victor de Guinzbourg, Brooklyn, N.Y., at Room 620, Library Building, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 8 Aug 55.

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Chapter 4

The First Weeks in Alsace

Now in Alsace, Seventh Army CIC Agents faced the early weeks of December with strong, but mixed, emotions.

Tri-colored French flags fluttering an overhead welcome were of the past; for combat troops were entering an area where most of the population spoke German and a high percentage might be expected to harbor pro-Nazi sentiments. The result was a genuine feeling of extreme uneasiness. [83]

But counter to this wariness came the exhilaration of near victory. CIC agents saw signs which indicated to them that the war was all but over. During November, Seventh Army alone had captured over 23,500 German soldiers, [84] and early December seemed to be bringing no modulation of this figure. Similarly, it was well known that Schutz Staffeln troops were slipping into Switzerland by a variety of means limited only by their imaginations and abilities. [85] And then the Japanese government had ordered Domei, its government-controlled news bureau, to be moved from Berlin to Switzerland. On a smaller scale, one case of defection seemed to CIC as representative of the entire German attitude: the Mayor and Party leaders of Weil am Rein (Rhine) one night requisitioned automobiles, surreptitiously packed their chattel, and, according to a Sixth Army Group report, "went." A leaderless population was left, huddled in discouraged expectation of immediate capture by the Allies.

One new division, the 12th Armored, was added to the Seventh Army in early December. The commanding officer of the 512th CIC Detachment was 1st Lt. Francis B. Criqui.

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83 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Rept No. 6, for the period from 1 Dec-15 Dec 1944, dtd, 25 Dec 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group Records, 1-31 Dec 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

84 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 1-30 November 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

85 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Rept No. 6, for the period from 1 Dec - 15 Dec 1944, dtd 25 Dec 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Gp Records, 1-31 Dec 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Early in December, Seventh Army CIC Agents faced a change of emphasis in their work: counter-sabotage efforts suddenly took on a new importance.

During the most of the German occupation of Alsace, described by CIC interrogators as "a laborer . . . stupid, easily led, and the only villager the Nazis could influence," was a member of the Nazi Party in But his status was to change suddenly. In mid June 1944 one Mayor of a near-by hamlet, informed that he was "politically unstable" and that he was shortly to be dropped from the Nazi Party. a choice of two alternatives: he could present himself to a local concentration camp; or, he could receive 10,000 francs for a simple mission and maintain his freedom in the process. chose the latter.

introduced to a German "lieutenant" named gave 10,000 francs on the spot, and gave him also 16 pieces of explosive coal,[86] "in large lumps consisting of a plastic explosive coated with black lacquer, and a camouflaged detonator inserted into the explosive."[87] task was suited to his abilities; he was simply to await the arrival of the Americans, and then place explosive lumps into whatever coal piles along the railroad seemed to be used for stroking locomotives.

With arrival of the Americans a half year later, however, came the rumor that had been apprehended. now feeling himself free of pressures from his former employer, turned himself in to the French Forces of the Interior. On 4 December French Forces of the Interior presented him to XV Corps CIC, who turned him over to Seventh Army CIC.

admitted having been given the money, but maintained that he had passed it to his fiancee. Surprisingly enough, CIC agents located her and the money, totally unspent. They decided that she had no knowledge of its tainted source. Interrogation was conducted by Capt Marion E. Porter and Special Agent Wells Chamberlin, both of the 307th CIC Detachment. After interrogation, was turned over to the Bureaux Securite Militaire Territoriale for trial.[88]

arrest was the first of many. Securite Militaire Agents with the 2d French Armored Division in Strasbourg apprehended the pseudo-lieutenant who had briefed admitted under interrogation that he was in charge of this entire project to sabotage locomotives throughout the Allied holdings

86 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rept (Dec), dtd 20 Jan 1945, (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

87 Seventh Army G2 History of Operations in Europe, Part Five (Dec), L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

88 307th CIC Det Monthly Info Rept for Dec 1944, dtd 21 January 1945; (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

in France. He was authorized to recruit agents by himself. He hinted that the number of saboteurs whom he had signed was large.

Two of them were Monsieur and Madame Mme apprehended because of her Nazi affiliations, admitted to CIC agents that she knew of her husband's having received explosive coal and 10,000 francs. She had thrown the coal (but not the money) in a water-filled bomb crater. CIC located the money under a wardrobe and turned her over to the Bureaux Securite Militaire Territoriale for trial. Several kilometers away her husband was apprehended trying to escape through a CIC roadblock.

a railroad foreman, confessed that he had received forty pieces of coal during a latter part of October 1944. Seventh Army CIC recovered twenty-eight pieces--the rest mysteriously described as "believed to be at the bottom of a well."[89]

The most tragic case was possibly that of a fifty-eight year-old Alsatian who had once received the But he had become a Nazi Party member, then a Gestapo informer against his own employer. Apparently the Nazis turned against him, and took two eight-lump boxes of coal to escape punishment.

By mid December Seventh Army CIC had broken the back of ring. Eight potential saboteurs were under arrest, and forty-four blocks of coal had been impounded. None of the coal had found its way into a boiler; Seventh Army offers two reasons for the saboteurs' failures: "either fear or lack of information from their recruiter."[90]

There was one other sabotage effort discovered during early December. On the second of the month a 31 year-old Alsatian, was arrested by agents of the 3d CIC Detachment as a deserter from the German Army. Interrogations by Capt Walter Greene, Commanding Officer of the 3d CIC Detachment, disclosed one of the greatest potential hazards that Seventh Army CIC had yet been called upon to counter. For described three mammoth time bombs, in all containing 1,100 pounds of explosives, which had been placed about St. Die by the retreating Germans. They were set to explode shortly. Corps Engineers were rushed to the spots named; the charges were located and neutralized.

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89 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly CIC Rept No. 7, 15 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

90 Seventh Army G2 History of Operations In Europe, Part V, December, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Schuler sincerely believed that these were but three of thousands of such charges--which were placed at key spots throughout France. Agents were then being recruited by the Abwehr to penetrate Allied areas and detonate them.

Captain Greene recognized the threat of such a plan. The Germans had managed to overcome four of the difficulties usually present in sabotage attempts: large amounts of high explosives could be employed, since the saboteur did not carry the charges about on his person; the bombs could be placed safely by sabotage experts; although the time clock (which apparently was to be left, but unstarted, with the charges) was somewhat cumbersome, it was a dependable piece of equipment, and, once planted, would not be subject to the vicissitudes of flimsier mechanisms; and, the saboteur had no need to carry any sort of incriminating matter about--he was identifiable only at the exact moment that he started the clock.[91]

Seventh Army grimly concluded: "This type of sabotage by post-occupational agents is expected to increase."[92]

Though much CIC effort during early December was diverted into counter-sabotage work, counter-espionage remained the most time-consuming single task. It is now apparent that the espionage agents sent east into Seventh Army territory in early December were entrusted with a most important assignment: they were discovered operating in the very spots hit by the German attack of late December.[93] "We can still lose this war," [94] wrote none other than the generally optimistic General George S. Patton shortly after the German winter offensive had reached its peak; but the counter-espionage efforts of Seventh Army CIC were one of the factors in limiting the success of this powerful drive.

In all, Seventh Army CIC captured twenty-one espionage agents during the month--the last real flurry of the Germans. This section, however, will treat only those apprehended before 15 December.[95]

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91 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly CIC Rept No. 7, 15 Dec 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

92 307th CIC Det Monthly Info Rept for Dec 1944, dtd 20 Jan 1945, (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

93 "Espionage missions were predominately tactical and coincided with the areas against which the Germans were massing their troops for the subsequent attack.", L-1136, Seventh Army G2 History (Dec 1944).

94 Gen George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (Cambridge 1947), p 213.

95 See Appendix 4 for chart showing expionage and sabotage agents captured by Seventh Army CIC between August 15 and Dec 31, 1944.

When the French Second Armored Division moved into Strasbourg one was suspected and denounced by a loyal Frenchman who heard him say that he had lived in town for several months prior to the Allied arrival. In point of fact, had arrived with the troops--but from the opposite direction. On 2 December, s case still pending, he was turned over to the 3d CIC Detachment. Their interrogation disclosed that suspected to be a member of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and SRA (German Information Service), had been assigned a long-range espionage mission. In theory he was to: install an information service in and about Paris; create a chain of agents from the German frontier to Paris; install receiving and transmitting sets; and recruiting radio operators and have them placed in Allied military installations. On 5 December was turned over to Seventh Army.[96]

Seventh Army reports present a quite different picture of the case. now admitted that he was an agent optimistically intended to establish a net in and around Paris, but presented a new picture of the remainder of his mission, maintaining that his was to: prepare a place suitable for parachute drops of agents and equipment; infiltrate Parti Populaire Francaise radio technicians into Allied installations; and obtain from a French engineer microfilmed plans for an anti-aircraft gun which could quickly be manufactured in Germany.

In any event, was turned over to Special Counter Intelligence.

On 1 December a Swiss national, whose last name was probably but had been and the familiar stand-by, was arrested by French Forces of the Interior following a denunciation by his neighbors. A check of Seventh Army les quickly disclosed that was very much wanted, in connection with the espionage ring discovered in Dijon.

A man of good family, had been a professional in espionage work since 1938, at which time he was employed by the French. Six times he had been sent into Germany, returning with valuable air, naval, and industrial intelligence information. In 1939 he switched to the Polish espionage service, a mistake because he was arrested in January of the following year. His German captors convinced him to become a Gestapo "interpreter." Shortly thereafter was inducted into the German Army, but in 1944 he managed to return to his chosen vocation, having himself assigned command of an Abwehr field office. He sent a number of agents into Seventh Army territory, and himself screened and interrogated a number of Allied agents.

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96 3d CIC Det, Monthly Information Rept (December), dtd 31 Dec 1944, (confidential) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

maintained that he had come to Strasbourg only to visit his wife, and then to reclaim some personal belongings which included 700,000 francs. 2d Lt George Perper of the 307th CIC Detachment, who discovered identity and then carried through the profitable interrogation, suggested that he be turned over to Securite Militaire, which he was.

One of the most valuable arrestees was captured in Selestat by G Company, 143d Infantry Regiment "while intoxicated and trying to entice unwilling soldiers."[97] Her radio transmitter was produced; her confession followed. For herself, she was but a single low-grade agent who was to establish her transmitter and send back local tactical information. But she had had contacts of various sorts with a number of other agents, and through her easy confession, CIC was able to initiate a string of important arrests.

First caught was her comrade Following a hint unwillingly dropped by G Company arrested this man as he attempted to enter Allied lines. Recruited at the famous Cafe Trocadero in Strasbourg, this man had been carefully trained in espionage and radio transmitting at Freibourg. By the nature of his training, had contacts with a large number of other agents, all of whom he described fully to his interrogators.

Both voluntarily offered information on a 29 year-old Frenchman for whom the Germans held high hope. By now a veteran, this man had joined the Abwehr in 1942 and had been sent into the Pyrenees to establish a messenger system between France and Spain. Next he went to Calais, in an unsuccessful effort to find cover employment there with a construction firm. Prior to the Allied invasion, had been selected for a mission to Bologne-sur-Mer, which was cancelled after the landings. Along with his practical experience, had been given extensive schooling in espionage--with special attention paid to radio transmission and repair, cryptography, and secret writing. He was located in Strasbourg and arrested.

By early December, Seventh Army CIC Agents realized that German Intelligence was throwing the heavy artillery of their espionage services into the American positions. Other arrests corroborated this belief.

was another example of a professional agent being employed on a short-range mission by the Abwehr. He was arrested at a CIC roadblock while attempting to give tactical information to American soldiers there. Under interrogation he admitted to five years' espionage experience in Belgium, Strasbourg, Paris, Arras, Senlis, Dworpp, Applecdorn, and Deventer. Eventually he admitted also that

97 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly CI Rept No. 7, 15 December 1944, (Unclassified), L-1136, (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

he had caused the death of a pair of English aviators. He said little of his present mission; however, CIC interrogators found a Belgian identity card in his shoes and 100,000 francs (most of which was in new bills in series) in his wallet. He suggested that CIC was fortunate to have located a man with his talent and experience, and offered, if they would give him a radio transmitter, to return to Germany on an espionage mission. He was held for further interrogation.[98]

Many important cases turned out favorably for CIC because of the close liaison that they had painstakingly developed with French authorities and other American units. In early December, Seventh Army concluded that liaison was "excellent in all areas"[99] and, for example, pointed to the daily conferences which were then being held in Strasbourg, and which were attended by representatives of CIC, Securite Militaire, Bureaux Securite Militaire Territoriale, French Forces of the Interior, the Gendarmerie, Civil Affairs, and 3d Division. The meetings were presided over by Lieutenant Colonel Carre, apparently a Frenchman, who was Secretary General of Police for Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin (Lower and Upper Rhine).

Possibly the single greatest obstacle to good relations with both French civilians and French officials was the presence of anti-American rumors. CIC agents diligently tracked back such rumors as might upset the rapport. One such was the report picked up and publicized by a war correspondent that the Germans had recaptured a town and promptly arrested several hundred civilians who had dared previously to welcome American soldiers. CIC discovered that there was no factual basis for this rumor, and attempted to propagate such findings.[100]

Sixth Army Group reported two more rumors, equally untrue: that the city of Nice was bombed by the Germans; and that French women were violently mistreated by troops of "some other" unit. The same report concluded that "a careful check indicates that some people are starting the above mentioned rumors for ulterior purposes."[101]

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98 These cases are all taken from L-1136, Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rept. No. 7; Checked against shorter accounts in L-375, Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Rept. No. 6.

99 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly CI Rept No. 6, for the period from 1 Dec-15 Dec 1944, dtd 25 Dec 1944, extracted from L-375, Sixth Army Group records, 1-31 December 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

100 Seventh Army Semi-Monthly CI Report No. 7, 15 December 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

101 Sixth Army Group Fortnightly Counterintelligence Report No. 6, for the period from 1 December-15 December 1944, dtd 25 December 1944, extracted from L-375 Sixth Army Group records 1-31 Dec 1944, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The report suggested two possible types of action: have local newspapers attempt to bring about better feeling toward American soldiers, and thus make the population less receptive to such reports; and maintain close liaison with the incoming Delta Base Section CIC Detachment to inform them of the dangers inherent in the situation.

Despite extreme Germanization of Alsace, CIC found remarkably scant evidence of any genuine subversive activity in the region. VI Corps did find, however, among the mail impounded at Schirmect, a letter containing strong hints of an assassination group organized to exterminate leading French and Communist officials. It was also reported that the rapidity of the Allied rush through Alsace had cut off the flight of an assortment of former Nazi officials. Several hundred town officials, policemen, and ex-soldiers now in civilian clothes were nabbed at CIC roadblocks.

At first American combat forces had little confidence in the strange type of Frenchman who inhabited Alsace. Seventh Army reported "a few isolated instances of misconduct. . . especially where sniping was prevalent." It now seems that these Germanized civilians were mistrusted much as had been the Normans during the early days after the landings of a half year back. In either case the initial reaction of the troops, faced with a people new to them, was doubt.

Seventh Army reported, however, that the relationship was becoming more cordial, and that the Alsatians were winning themselves the reputation of being a clean and honest people.

Military security attentions brought forth all the usual problems plus a few new considerations.

A captured enemy map indicated that the Germans were not yet aware of the arrival of a division which had been on line for nearly a week. On the other hand, units which had been on the front for a longer period were neatly pin-pointed.

Seventh Army established a line of communications' command, and dispatched four Agents back with the overall purpose of protecting supply dumps.

American soldiers, liberated from Prisoner of War camps, reported that German interrogators seemed to indicate a strong interest in sabotage--particularly of Allied pipe lines. All reported being asked the questions, "Do you have a gasoline pipe line from the south? Where is it?" 102

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102 Seventh Army Semi-monthly Counterintelligence Report No. 7, 15 December 1944, L-1136, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Agents of the 100th CIC Detachment were called upon to investigate the case of a [illegible] Company. CIC discovered that on 3 December 1944 Company "A" (120 men [illegible]) of the 398th Infantry Regiment entered the town of Wingen for the night. They lived in several houses--all quite close together. Investigation disclosed that: their arrival and placement was noted by some German soldiers nearby; the owner of the largest house occupied by the troops ran straight to the Germans with detailed information concerning the locations of the billets; and there were insufficient guards posted. All of this resulted in the capture of the entire Company by a mere fifteen enemy soldiers.

The informer was arrested; interrogation showed him to be an ardent Nazi. One [illegible] was held on suspicion; he was unable to account for his movements during the time of the company's capture.[103]

103. 100th CIC Det, Monthly Information Rept, December 1944, Dated 7 Jan 1945, (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Chapter 5

Delta Base Command

As the French First and American Seventh Armies ground northward during the fall of 1944, and then swung toward the east during that winter, large areas of Southern and Western France were left vacated. Division, Corps, and eventually Army teams moved forward with the front; special teams were soon needed to fill the ever-growing rearward areas. The 427th CIC Detachment, named the Delta Base Section (DBS) CIC Detachment, was the first such unit to follow combat CIC Detachments into Southern France.

Planners at SHAEF had anticipated this need:

> "It was arranged that a special Counter Intelligence Detachment should be set up in Marseille for the purpose of supervising travel control personnel at ports and airports in Southern France and on the Franco-Spanish border... Personnel for this Detachment were to be furnished by Allied Force Headquarters and later transferred to SHAEF control. It was further arranged that Counter Intelligence personnel would be sent in by Allied Force Headquarters... and that a specially trained Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment would be sent in to cover the Franco-Spanish frontier."[104]

427th CIC Detachment Ordered to Delta Base Section

On 1 October 1944, Delta Base Section requested the 427th CIC Detachment, and orders relieving it from attachment to Northern Base Section (Corsica) were issued on 17 October 1944. Almost immediately, however, the first of many administrative difficulties struck the unit: "The orders did not include authority for travel from Northern Base Section to Delta Base Section (Marseille) and G3, Northern Base Section, would not approve shipment of the Detachment."

The nucleus of the Detachment, therefore, remained at Northern Base Section for several weeks after the transfer was to have been effected.

Major Clarence Read, Commanding Officer of the 427th, managed to get himself and three agents across the Ligurian Sea and into Marseilles. While officially on only temporary duty there, they established the new CIC Headquarters at the Delta Base Section.

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104 Outline History of the Travel Security Section, Counter Intelligence Subdivision, G2 Division, SHAEF, from May 1944 to July 1945. (Restricted), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Additional personnel came from various sources. Both the 428th and the 42[illegible] CIC Detachments sent agents to Major Read's 427th. Included in this transfer, however, were one officer and six agents already earmarked for Port Security work, and four officers and eleven agents who, although attached to the 427th for administrative purposes, were ordered to operate in Southern France as the "Pyrenees Travel Control Detachment," under operational control of G-2, AFHQ. Nine additional agents of the 427th CIC Detachment were not present for duty. They had been attached to Basler units during the relatively calm days when the 427th was in Corsica, and, though scheduled to rejoin their basic unit, had not yet done so.

In all, nine officers and forty enlisted men were assigned the 427th CIC Detachment. By 1 November 1944, however, only eight officers and twenty-three enlisted men were in France. And of this number fifteen men were assigned to sub-Detachment "A" in the Pyrenees, three were with the Administrative Section, seven with the Port Security Section, and three with the Airport Travel Control Section. The section that was intended to perform the bulk of CIC work in Southern France, the Investigative Section, was left only four agents.

Investigative Section Faces Many Tasks

These four agents of the Investigative Section were faced with tasks impossible for a group of their limited size to accomplish. Some 1,200 Italian Prisoners of War were slated for repatriation, and CIC had been ordered to screen these men before their withdrawal. The prisoners, having been together but a few days, were yet unacquainted with each other, and it was therefore decided that for the time being a preliminary screening would be sufficient. A recommendation that the investigation be continued upon arrival of the prisoners in Italy was forwarded along with them.

Secondly, reports indicated an appreciable amount of espionage taking place in Lyon, Nice, and Cannes, and possibly in Grenoble. Many important investigations had to be classified "pending" until investigators destined for duty in these areas had arrived from North Africa and Corsica.

Thirdly, there were several cases of espionage in the area of Marseilles which were investigated, but at only half speed. During October, eleven espionage cases were opened and only one case was closed. French Securite Militaire had found a Strategic Service Section rubber stamp (German), United States gasoline, and Army clothing in a Marseilles hotel room. CIC investigation revealed the occupant of the room to have been a careless agent of the German Schutz Staffeln.

Among the pending espionage cases were several that indicate crucial work was being left undone because of the personnel shortages. For an example: "Case [illegible]: Subject volunteered information that he was assigned by a special office in the French Forces of the Interior headquarters to obtain information on the movement of the United States troops and equipment through the Port of Marseille, but that

he was not carrying out his assignment. An effort is being made to determine whether or not there is such an office in the French Forces of the Interior." Or, "A-1-9: British Consul, et al., Surveillance of--A surveillance, at the request of the Special Counter Intelligence, is being conducted upon three individuals suspected of espionage."

During October no sabotage or attempted sabotage was reported against installations being protected by the Investigative Section of the Delta Base Detachment. However, this Section was unable to make the security surveys which could well prevent future disturbances.

Port Control work was progressing at a better rate, since the Port Control Section was working with a full staff. During October, Marseilles, Toulon, and Port-du-Bouck were all open for shipping, with Marseilles gradually assuming the entire load of Allied shipping as the installations there were cleared and repaired. The Marseilles Port Security team kept up the system of regulations as left there by the departing Seventh Army team. In addition, they increased the scope of the pass system. Personnel security remained the stiffest problem for there were far from enough guards available. Secondly, virtually unwatched German Prisoners of War were used as stevedores. There was the additional problem of liaison bottlenecks between French and American officials. Agents of the 427th reported that accounts of potential cases often reached them much too slowly to have any worthwhile action taken.

Much Sabotage In Marseilles

Although there was no sabotage reported in either Toulon or Port-du-Bouck, there were many cases in Marseilles, CIC in Naples was informed that on a 12-ton truck loaded there, and unloaded in Marseilles, a detonating cap was found placed in the ammunition box, and wired into the ignition system. In another case, at Lenz Beach, Marseilles, three sticks of dynamite were found under a Command Post. There a French truck burst into flame in the SS Goodyear's hold, and, on the same day, pieces of steel were found to have been dropped into the winch gears of the ship. Pier N of Marseilles was thrown into darkness one October night; investigation disclosed sugar in the motor of the pier's generator. A twelve-inch bomb fuse was discovered under a car of an ammunition train in the Marseilles yards. It was assumed that the fuse had tumbled from a box broken open in transit. In the same yards was discovered the lethal gear intended for a British barrage ballon, instead attached to the coupling of a box car. No arrests were made in any of these cases.[105]

105 Headquarters, 427th CIC Detachment, Delta Base Section, Subject: CIC Information Summary for October 1944, To: AC of S, G2, Delta Base Section, [illegible] ber 1944, (Confidential), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO), Alexandria, Va.

Screen Incoming Sailors

In all three ports incoming sailors were closely checked. CIC advised the War Shipping Administration and all Ship Masters that only 25 percent of a ship's complement were to be allowed ashore each day.

During December, the Port Security Section at Marseilles issued 6,850 merchant seaman passes, interrogated 15 persons desirous of signing on Allied vessels and, in conjunction with French port authorities, cleared 1,501 civilian passengers for ships leaving Marseilles.

CIC's Duties Mostly Routine

For the remainder of CIC's operation with the Delta Base Section, investigative activities were mostly routine. The detachment, in conjunction with the State Department, was given the mission of screening 806 Allied civilians returning to their native countries from Germany in a repatriation program. In January, the apprehension of five enemy parachutists near Gignac resulted in a tightening of CIC's road block network. Aside from these two operations, much time was given to conferences with local French authorities in an effort to establish mutual security policies. 106

The Case Of The Mysterious Major

The 427th CIC Detachment did develop one investigation that served to break the routine of normal duties. In March, a Military Police incident report which was passed to CIC revealed that a French girl had claimed to recognize in a Marseilles cafe a former Gestapo officer in the uniform of a Major in the Russian Army. The girl had stated that while she had been imprisoned in Munich in February 1943, this officer had beaten her and forced her to undress in front of him. The Military Police had made a check of the papers of the Russian Major and verified his identity.

Realizing that papers were easily forged, CIC Agents called on the Russian Headquarters in Marseilles. Once again the Major seemed perfectly authentic. Records indicated that during most of the war he had been a German prisoner. The Nazis had freed him at the time of the Allied landings in Southern France

Two weeks afterward, the Major presented himself at the CIC offices in Marseilles, demanding to know why he had been investigated by the Americans. The major claimed that CIC had told his superiors that he had been seen in Marseilles riding in a car with

106 History of the Delta Base Section, Volume II, Part I (ADM 950 A) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

a German agent. The Russian requested an official letter exonerating him of such an action. This, he was told, would take some time, but could be accomplished. In the meantime, the Russian was invited by an officer from the G2 Section for a drink at a hotel cocktail lounge in Marseilles. The American officer had orders to socialize with the Russian until further notice.

Meanwhile, a CIC agent hunted up the girl who had made the original accusations and asked her to accompany him to the cocktail lounge. Again the girl, out of view of the Major, identified him as the man who had beaten her. Considering the extremely short stature and unusual facial characteristics of the Russian, it seemed improbable that the girl could be mistaken. Nevertheless, to be more certain, the agent asked her if she could remember any particular scars which might definitely establish the Major as the former Gestapo man. The girl thought for a minute and then recalled a circular scar on the left wrist which she had noticed when he rolled up his sleeves.

Later in the G2 office, the agents told the Russian that it would be impossible to give him the letter he desired unless there was not the slightest possibility that he was the man they sought. The Russian was asked to remove his shirt. On his left wrist was a circular scar.

For all their investigation, CIC had not, however, established the reliability of the French girl who had brought the matter up in the first place. There was still the possibility that the accused was a bonafide Russian Major who had somehow become a target of revenge. The Major was given an extremely non-committal letter and sent on his way.

Informants in Nimes, where the Major's unit was located, were contacted and asked to make discreet inquiries into his activities during the occupation. The reports from Nimes indicated that the Russian had indeed had some connection with the Gestapo although the exact nature of his activities could not be obtained without "blowing" the investigation. Meanwhile an informant in Marseilles, who was thoroughly acquainted with Russian affairs and had many contacts equally well-informed, was asked to learn the identity of Russian officers who might have worked with the Nazis during the occupation. No specific names were mentioned to the informant.

He returned the next day with the information that the Major and two other Russian officers who were still in Southern France had been nominal prisoners of war, granted by the Nazis free circulation, German uniforms, arms and plenty of money - all for purposes unknown. The Major had been in Marseilles since the Spring of 1944.

Since CIC had established that he was definitely a Russian citizen, any further investigation of the Major was the jurisdiction of Russian authorities. It was decided to take the information to the Colonel commanding the Major's unit. Before doing so, however, CIC checked into the background of the Colonel on the possibility that he too

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might have been a "Prisoner of War." When the Colonel checked out satisfactorily, CIC drew up a carefully worded report for his personal consideration. All information, except the names of CIC informants, was included.

The Colonel was greatly interested in the report. He stated that he was aware that three of his officers had collaborated with the Germans, but their excellent work for the Allies since the Southern France landings was considered to more than off-set their previous transgressions. However, it was evident that the report contained details which were new to the Colonel. Without authority to take action on his own, the Colonel transmitted the report to Russian Headquarters in Paris.

So there developed an unusual situation. The final action on the findings of a CIC investigation was left in the hands of Russian authorities. [107]

The Pyrenees Border: A Distressing Situation

Five weeks before the Pyrenees Border Control Detachment was to be established in France, Special Agent Victor de Guinzbourg of the 307th CIC Detachment was sent into this region to seek information on the situation there. Agent de Guinzbourg reported that there seemed to be no communication between local Pyrenees military and civil authorities and the policy making agencies in Marseilles and Paris. For example, the last instructions to local authorities consisting of orders that the border was to be closed, had arrived on 10 August, five days before the landings in Southern France. During the four week period since then no further instructions had been received. Now, though there had been no orders to open the border, a train-load of food was scheduled to come through from Spain.

Agent de Guinzbourg reported some serious situations along the mountains which merited future investigation. Captain Riviere, of Securite Militaire, told Agent de Guinzbourg that there were three parachutists, French, British, and American Captains, who were gathering information for "Allied General Headquarters." Though this trip was accepted at face value by the local French, no one knew anything of the past of the three. Agent de Guinzbourg presented this as an instance which demonstrated how simply power and authority could be assumed in this area where one regime was crumbling, but no other had yet been built to replace it.

107 Headquarters, 427th CIC Detachment, Delta Base Section, Subject: Monthly Information Report for March 1945, To: Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attn: Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., dtd 31 March 1945, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

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Agent de Guinzbourg also noted that numerous Spanish Republican troops were hiding in France, posing as loyal members of the French Forces of the Interior or, more commonly, the Communist Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Francais. They awaited only the German withdrawal before they were to return to fight against Franco. Their compatriots within Spain, often Communists or Anarchists, had great strength near the border. Several armed clashes had occurred already between these Spaniards and soldiers sent up by Franco to dislodge them from their border positions. The Royalists often retreated to shelter in France, and, until the French government would send troops south to dislodge them, it was assumed that they would continue their raids from France into Spain.

As for the border itself, it was all but unguarded. Colonel Baggio, Chief of the local Gendarmerie, was in a position to assume leadership of the border patrol work, but seemed unwilling to undertake the responsibility. At each end of the border there was a small French Naval Detachment standing by, able to take whatever action was ordered them, but they had as yet been given neither permission nor instructions to operate.[108]

Agents "Liberate" Toulouse

At 0845 hours, on 23 September 1944, Major Ralph Tucker led a convoy of six Class-B[109] jeeps and three civilian cars out of Marseilles toward Toulouse, France, 200 miles away. Major Tucker later wrote back that the trip went smoothly "except that it was found that all bridges leading westward across the Rhone were destroyed." Fifty miles upstream was discovered a ferry, which was to be put to frequent use by CIC during the next few months, although it could handle no vehicle larger than two and one half tons.

Once in Toulouse, "our reception was overwhelming." The few Americans (Office of Strategic Service operators, grounded aviators, etc.) who had previously been in the area seemed to have made a good impression, and, except for the handful of super-patriots who seemed to think that French Forces of the Interior had won the war single-handedly, the Frenchmen concentrated all of their goodwill toward the American liberators upon this eleven-man crew. These people had been kept in all but total ignorance throughout the sway of the Petain regime. Even Resistance leaders were ignorant of the fact that Anglo-Americans had to fight their way through French North Africa in 1942.

Rather optimistically, Major Tucker mailed back his intended address and telephone number. The Communist Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais refused to vacate this house, though ordered to do so by the French government, and CIC was forced to look

108 307th CIC Detachment, Headquarters, Seventh Army, Summary of Information, 8 September 1944, /s/ Victor S. de Guinzbourg, Special Agent, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

109 Presumably reconditioned.

elsewhere. As for telephone service, no contact could be made with Spain more than a few kilometers from Toulouse. Realizing that he would have to depend upon his own resources for communication, Major Tucker established an elaborate courier system between the four points on the border where CIC Agents would be located and Toulouse Headquarters, and between Toulouse and Marseille. He reported that, jeeps willing, the problem was solved.

During these first few days, the Pyrenees Border Control Detachment was still part of Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) CIC -- still Sub-Detachment "A" of the 428th CIC Detachment; the 427th was not to be formed until 17 October. In the meantime, this 15-man crew was hard at work.[110]

Who's Our Boss?

The Counterintelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters records that the Pyrenees Border Control Detachment (sub-Detachment "A" of the 427th CIC Detachment) "had been preparing over a period of nearly two years for this particular assignment."[111] It was unfortunate that the administrative details of this operation were not similarly well prepared. Members were unsure of their position. The Commander wrote: "The exact status of this Detachment is extremely doubtful at present . . . . Although the Detachment is by verbal order attached to G2 (CI) SHAEF for duty, no written orders have been received, and even our exact title is unknown." Nor, apparently, was more immediate control yet determined. "No order has been received attaching us to Delta Base Section for supply and administration only."

Such problems might have been overcome had the Detachment been well manned and equipped at the outset of its operations. Lieutenant Colonel Stepanovich, G2 (CI), AFHQ, apparently had promised a minimum of five officers and fifteen enlisted men. Inventory revealed, however, a strength of four and eleven. Although the enlisted men were allowed maintenance on a per diem status, the officers were refused such an arrangement. Their expenses, for the time being, were being covered through confidential funds. Understandably, more such funds were requested: "Good use can be made of an allotment of $500 to $1000 per month for hire of confidential informants in particular. This figure is not excessive considering previous lavish payments by the Office of Strategic Services."

Supply was equally a problem. 427th Headquarters at Marseille was 300-odd miles away, and then reached only after entrusting one's fate to the "ricketty ferry" over the Rhone at Arles. This distance made hospitalization and even routine medical attention out of the question. It also made obtaining food, gasoline, PX supplies, and pay a dubious matter.

110 428th CIC Det, AFHQ, Sub-Detachment "A"; Progress Report dated 1 Oct 1944, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

111 CIC Operational History of Theaters, Chapter titled "Southern France." p.234, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

Had the vehicles of Detachment "A" been up to par, the supply problem would have been eased, but to operate in the mountainous area Major Tucker reported that he had only "six once-reconditioned and superannuated jeeps and three civilian cars, model '36, '37, and '38." He hoped to obtain other vehicles through the French Forces of the Interior.

Relations with the French posed a problem: "Our authority (or even our right to exist in this region) has never been formally established with the French. On higher levels, this has resulted in some difficulty in dealing with French officials, but at the lower echelons cooperation is still excellent." Cooperation might have yet been improved further had the Americans been able to explain why they were stationed in the area. Major Tucker reported, however, "No definite directive has been received as to our duties from either AFHQ or SHAEF. Meanwhile we are attempting to do a job varying from border 'control' to border surveillance, to general counterintelligence in the border region. More specific orders from G2 (CI) SHAEF would be helpful."[112]

More Than Border Watching

Though charged, in theory, with few of the usual Counterintelligence missions--such work was to be left to the French Securite Militaire--the Pyrenees Border Control Detachment almost immediately undertook numerous investigations over and above routine border watching.

On 1 October 1944, Major Tucker wrote back that the Communist dominated Franc Tireur et Partisans Francais was the best armed and disciplined of the various pressure groups grappling for political control, and accordingly had assumed undue power. As previously stated, the Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais in Toulouse was sufficiently powerful and obstinate to hang on to a house requisitioned by the French for CIC. Local residents were unwilling to admit to Major Tucker that the Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais and even the French Forces of the Interior were composed of men whose ambition was to overthrow Franco. Local newspapers, however, often discussed this prospect openly.

Relative to the area, CIC reported:

"The spirit of the population in this area is excellent"; and, "Apparently all German forces have been wiped out or captured or left the area (from the Pyrenees to Bordeaux)."

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112 427th CIC Detachment (Pyrenees Border Control), Allied Forces Headquarters, Subject: monthly CIC Situation Summary for October 1944, To: AC of S G2 (CI) AFHQ; Chief, CIC, AFHQ; AC of S, G2 (CI), SHAEF, 1 Nov 1944, (Secret), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Major Tucker reported that the communication problem was unsolved. There was neither telephone contact between Toulouse and Marseilles, nor indication of any for the near future. Because it was impossible for Major Tucker in his Toulouse Headquarters to contact his men directly, he asked for six radio sets.

Major Tucker asked also that a directive be issued jointly by French and American authorities outlining the powers of his American group, which, placed as it was in an area of French jurisdiction, had at the time no official authority. Lastly, he suggested that a battalion of American or British troops would give authority and backing to his future pronouncements. [113]

CIC Reports Nazi "Pocket"

On 6 October 1944 Major Tucker sent back to Marseilles a Top Secret, Immediate Action report on the status of German troops in the Bordeaux area. There seemed to be more German activity there than he had at first realized.

Reports had been received that an estimated 50,000 German troops were distributed in three pockets in the Bordeaux region. Specifically, there were 30,000 at La Rochelle, about 13,000 at Royal, and 7,000 at Le Verdon. Though these soldiers had come from many units, and had lost their original organization, they seemed to be united now by a proud "come and get me" spirit. They considered themselves the best of soldiers, and were eagerly awaiting any chance to further demonstrate this ability. They had artillery enough to give them some offensive potential and sufficient supplies to withstand at least a six months' siege. Occupying large agricultural areas, they held over 11,000 head of cattle.

Resistance to this group was hardly effective. The Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais, apparently, was the best organized and armed group, but it was contenting itself with staying in the rear and waging vigorous propaganda appeals for its particular causes--all quite openly Communistic. The French Forces of the Interior, less well armed and organized, was left to carry on what little fighting there was.

Colonel Durand, commander of the local French troops, suggested that a group of Senegalese and Moroccan troops, already serving under him, be armed and marched into the combat. There were many French renegades among the Germans, and the Colonel thought it to be in bad taste to have Frenchmen fighting Frenchmen.

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113 Detachment "A", 428th CIC Detachment, AFHQ, Subject: General Conditions in Southern France and Pyrenees Border Area, To: AC of S, G2 (CI), AFHQ; CO, Forward Counterintelligence (Marseille); Chief, CIC, AFHQ; 1 Oct 1944, /s/ R. W. Tucker, Major, Commanding, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102.).

For his part, Major Tucker supported Colonel Durand's suggestion. He asked, in addition, permission to dispatch an agent to Bordeaux.

As a final suggestion, Major Tucker asked that "since people in Southern France, where Allied troops never reached, are still in a daze, still suffering from an overdose of distorted truth. . . . they are very receptive to any form of news and information regardless of its veracity." The Franc-Tireur et Partisans Francais was fast exploiting just this situation by spreading the rumor that it had been the chief force in the liberation of France. Major Tucker asked that the Psychological Warfare Branch rush representatives armed with magazines, movies, and radio scripts into Southern France.[114]

Liaison Developed With U.S. Embassy in Madrid

Late in September one of the agents of the Detachment by chance met a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid who was greatly impressed by the work being done. When La Verne Baldwin, the Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, who was in charge of counter espionage work, was informed of the presence of CIC on the Pyrenees border, he came north to Toulouse for a brief visit on 4-5 October.

Baldwin told Major Tucker of 120 trucks which the Spanish government had placed at the disposal of the Belgian Red Cross to transport food and clothing to the Belgian needy. Senora Franco, herself, had given 50,000 pesetas to this cause. The head of the Belgian Red Cross was an odd individual, a hotel owner whose political sentiments had been variously reported as anti-Nazi to arch-Collaborationist. Accompanying this convoy there were to be 210 "minor Spanish Army officials." Baldwin stated that the Embassy could not classify this convoy as "safe" from an Allied point of view.

He told also of a convoy of trucks from Switzerland, which had come into Spain loaded with manufactured goods destined for the United States. Accompanying the convoy were four or five "minor diplomats."

Mr. Baldwin offered the service of the American Embassy at Madrid to the Pyrenees Border Control Detachment. He had a substantial file on Spanish personalities against which pass applicants could be checked. His offer was accepted with enthusiasm.[115]

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114 Detachment "A", 428th CIC Detachment, Subject: Conditions in Bordeaux and vicinity, 6 Oct 1944, To: Hq, DBS, AC of S, G2, AFHQ; Chief, CIC, AFHQ; /s/ For the Commanding Officer: Joseph Vidal, 2d Lt, Executive Officer, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102.).

115 Detachment "A", 428th CIC Detachment, AFHQ, Subject: La Verne Baldwin, 3d Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, 7 Oct 1944, To: AC of S, G2 (CI), AFHQ; CO, Forward Counterintelligence (Marseille); Chief, CIC, AFHQ; (Confidential), /s/ R.W. Tucker, Major, Commanding and a similar document with the same distribution, Subject: Proposed Red Cross Convoy to Belgium, (both Kansas City Records Center, Box 25102).

OSS Located

In early October Office of Strategic Services agents were located, and found to be most cooperative. Agreements were reached, and from that time there was a generous exchange of information between the two agencies.

Office of Strategic Services profited greatly from this arrangement. Special Counterintelligence, branch of OSS, sent agents into Southwest France in late October to observe and report the situation there. They relied heavily upon information given them by members of the 427th Sub-Detachment. Their report, distributed throughout the Sixth Army Group area, sounded much like a condensation of previous reports of the Pyrenees Border Control Group.[116]

Border Offices Established

The progress report for the Pyrenees Border Control Group dated 7 October 1944 was generally encouraging. Offices were being opened in areas where the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) had operated in 1918. By this date both the Hendaye and St Hean Pied de Port Sections had been established for a week, and the Cerbere Section had begun operations. The Bourg Madame Section, though immobilized at Perpignan because of motor trouble, was expected to commence activity shortly. There was telephone contact between Toulouse Headquarters and St. Jean Pied de Port, but the courier system remained the only certain means of reaching the other Sections.

Although the Americans had been received with almost universal enthusiasm, much trouble was expected at Hendaye. There the officer in charge of Securite Militaire was, according to Major Tucker, "well and unfavorably known to us. His anti-American, if not anti-Allied, attitude was conclusively demonstrated." The officer apparently had written that he hoped never again to see American intelligence personnel--especially agents of CIC.

The sub-detachment had managed to close the border effectively. A few American and French diplomats were allowed to cross, and some international trains carrying only merchandise and food crossed at Cerbere. The trainmen were known and vouched for by trustworthy Resistance leaders.[117]

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116 Sixth Army Group, Fortnightly CI Rept No. 3, Dated 4 Nov 1944 and covering the period 15 Oct-1 Nov 1944. (L-375), (Confidential), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

117 Detachment "A", 428th CIC Det, AFHQ, Subj: Progress Report, 7 Oct 44, To: AC of S, G2 (CI), AFHQ; CO, Forward Counterintelligence, (Marseille); Chief, CIC, AFHQ; /s/ R.W. Tucker, Major, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25102).

On 18 October, Major Tucker reported a conversation with two high-ranking American Army Officers who had just come up from Andorra, the tiny democracy near the eastern tip of the Franco-Spanish border. While in Andorra, these two officers had met General Fernandez, of the Spanish Maquis, a man who told them that 25,000 members of his organization had recently come to Spain from France, and that another 25,000 were expected shortly. At the moment, these men were presumably with the French Forces of the Interior or the Franc-Tiereur et Partisans Francais. Fernandez stated that arms were regularly smuggled from France to his organization, and, further, that undercover agents placed by him in Franco's Army had disaffected large numbers of the latter's soldiers.

Major Tucker suggested that the General's figures be reduced fifty to 90 percent, but said that there was definitely some movement into Spain of Royalist troops.[118]

On 19 October 1944, Sub- Detachment "A" of the 428th CIC Detachment officially became Sub-Detachment "A" of the 427th CIC Detachment--to be known as "The Pyrenees Border Control Detachment." There was some confusion as to whether Major Tucker was authorized to initial such a change on the pay records of his personnel.[119] There was further confusion as to whether or not this change meant that the group was now working for SHAEF, rather than AFHQ. The change to SHAEF had been expected, but apparently it was delayed until 1 November 1944 when the entire Delta Base Section CIC Detachment, as well as all detachments within the Sixth Army Group, were transferred from NATOUSA to ETOUSA.[120]

From the start of operations, the Pyrennes Border Control Group had sent most of its information directly to SHAEF. There had been a special SHAEF Radio Detachment assigned to the Headquarters at Toulouse to facilitate such direct communication.[121]

By mid November, with at least some of their administrative problems now under control, the Pyrenees Border Detachment was ready to settle into the pattern of work which they were to follow for the next six months.

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118 Detachment "A", 428th CIC Det, AFHQ, Subj: Movement of Spanish Maquis, 18 Oct 1944, To: Forward Counterintelligence (Marseille), /s/ R.W. Tucker, Major, Commanding, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25102).

119 3d Ind. to a mission memorandum from 427th CIC Det (Travel Control), SHAEF, to: CO, 428th CIC Det, AFHQ, 22 Nov 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25102).

120 Headquarters, 427th CIC Det, Delta Base Section, Subj: CIC situation summary for Oct 1944, To: AC of S, G2, Delta Base Section, 1 Nov 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

121 CIC Operational History of Theaters, Chapter titled "Southern France", p. 234, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Official Duties

On 21 December 1944, 2d Lt James Bradfield wrote to Major Tucker to ask for advice pertinent to his new assignment of forming a small Counterintelligence Detachment on the Swiss-Italian border. "Do you have any suggestions you care to pass on that might facilitate development of a control on the . . . frontier?" he asked.[12]

Major Tucker's reply covers a multitude of problems met in such a situation:

Lt James T O Bradfield
Headquarters CIC, AFHQ
APO 512, US Army

14 January 1945

Dear Jim:

Your secret letter of 21 December 1944 did not arrive until yesterday. We had considerable mail trouble because the title "CIC Pyrenees Travel Control Detachment" is no longer valid under ETOUSA. . . .

As to the problems we have had--they have been terrific and still are to a considerable extent unsolved --most of them have been caused by the shift from NATOUSA to ETOUSA with the resultant change in chiefs, policies, etc. This could not have been foreseen, but there are problems which our experience will help you solve. At the outset let me emphasize, insist on certain minimum terms with your G2 before you move out on your assignment. After you get on the ground in an isolated region it is infinitely more difficult to obtain action on supply and administration than before you set out. Suppose we dispose the problems under logical headings.

12. Headquarters, CIC, AFHQ, Ltr to Major Robert W. Tucker, CIC Pyrenees Travel Control Detachment, 21 December 1944, /s/ James T.O. Bradfield, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 20161.).

VEHICLES

Demand the maximum number of jeeps and trailers (the latter are invaluable for hauling food and supplies to outlying sections) authorized by your T/O&E, and if possible insist on new equipment . . . . Try to get additional civilian cars to the extent of 50% of your total jeeps. This will serve two purposes: first, it will allow you to keep operating when other vehicles are out of action . . . , and second, in certain cases such as hauling agents, informants, or suspects, it will reduce the amount of attention, which will be plenty, directed at your activities by the local civilian population.

PER DIEM

Your agents must have a reasonable per diem, and, if obtainable, the officers also. There will be no Army messes, and you will have to do plenty of foraging. . .

COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY

When we first arrived in Toulouse in September last, we were substantially cut off from the rest of the Army and practically the rest of the world. Telephone and telegraph lines were out, railroads were not running, and our only route to Marseilles, our supply base 300 miles away, was by crossing the Rhone River by a rickety ferry (and once that was washed away by high water leaving us stranded for two weeks). I at once requested a Signal Corps Detachment to put us in touch with the outside world. This request was granted, and we have had for about three months a Signal Corps outfit (one 2d Lt and 5 non-coms) attached to us for duty using a SCR-399 radio unit. This has proved invaluable for sending and receiving "hot" reports to and from SHAEF (at Versailles) and SHAEF Southern G2 (Cp) (. . . at Marseille). However, no long[illegible] our own couriers could be used, that is to, for landing clandestine [illegible], [illegible], and off, etc., from Marseille, to Toulouse (Detachment HQ), to the border sections and vice-versa. As a practical matter, this is how we work it. First, I have insisted that each border section must have a minimum of two agents, so that

when one is serving as courier, the other will always be present at the border. . . . You can see that the timing and arrangement of this schedule is such that the minimum number of personnel and vehicles are employed in courier work at any one time. You can also visualize the nightmarish problems we have had with our six Class-B jeeps and three antiquated civilian cars. "A word to the wise is sufficient."

I trust the foregoing will be of some real help to you, and stand ready to do anything further in my power to furnish you with anything from advice up to -- but not including -- cigarettes. The latter are too hard to get. Best regards from all the old "MTCD" gang.

Sincerely,

R. W. Tucker (S)
R. W. TUCKER (T)
Major, MI. [123]

CIC continued to report on conditions along the French-Spanish border until March 1945 when Major Tucker's detachment was shifted to the French-Swiss border for several weeks. In April, the unit joined the CIC detachment at Sixth Army Group Headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. [124]

123 Det "A", 427th CIC Det, Ltr to Lt James T.O. Braafladt. Hdqs. CIC, AFHQ, 14 Jan 45, /s/ R.W. Tucker, Major, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records, Center, Box 25101.).

124 CIC Operational History of Theaters, Chapter titled "Southern France," p. 234, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

APPENDIX 1

"Counter-Intelligence Screening By Interrogation Teams In The Aachen Area"

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

APO 887
10 March 1945

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SCREENING BY INTERROGATION

TEAMS IN THE AACHEN AREA

INTRODUCTION

This report was made by members of interrogation teams detailed to work with the Counter Intelligence Corps in the screening of civilians in Aachen. The suggestions made in this report are based on the activities of this personnel between the period of 1 November to 31 December 1944, during which time they "screened" approximately 11,000 people in Aachen area. Although the IPW personnel was at first handicapped by inexperience and the lack of sufficient training in counter-intelligence work, their familiarity with the German Army, people and language and their knowledge of SHAEF directives was in their favor. In view of the lack of precedent and the incompleteness of directives available for orientation on the problems to be encountered in Germany, most of the experiences were challenging to the Counter Intelligence Corps as to the interrogators.

1. In the eight week period the IPW personnel worked with the 1st Inf Div which was relieved by the VII Corps, which was in turn relieved by the XIX Corps, which was in turn relieved by the Ninth Army. Due to this constant reshuffling of CIC personnel, the experience and knowledge gained by these representatives who had had the opportunity to observe the "big picture" in Aachen from shortly after its capture up to the end of December, was of great value in orienting the relieving CIC teams.

2. It is apparent that the previous experience of Counter Intelligence Corps teams in the field have been of such a nature, that record-keeping was found to be of secondary importance. There was a carry-over of this tendency in the operations in Aachen despite the fact that Counter Intelligence Corps activities in Germany must be planned on a semi-permanent basis. The deficiency of records has in some cases acted as a limitation to the early effectiveness of a relieving CIC team.

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3. In evaluating the suggestions included in this report, it must be remembered that the experience is not based upon a true sampling of the German population and, therefore, procedure which may have been perfectly valid and suitable for Aachen may not apply to other areas. There are at least three factors which make the Aachen experience typical.

a. The population of this area is predominatly Catholic and was therefore never wholeheartedly in favor of the Nazi Regime.

b. The individuals who remained in Aachen despite the exhortations and threats of the SS troops cannot be described as typical German citizens. High-ranking Nazis and persons holding positions in the Government fled the City fearing capture and punishment by the Allies. Concerning the individuals who did remain in Aachen, the following overlapping categories may be devised.

(1) Those who remained due to war-weariness, i.e. they remained as a consequence of inertia and a fear of leaving their homes - a fear so deep-rooted as to exceed their dread of the occupation forces. (Approximately 40-50% of the population.)

(2) Those who refused to leave fearing that to move deeper into Germany would be to risk a repetition of the horrors of our bombings and shelling. (Approximately 20-30%)

(3) Those who wished to leave but missed the bus or were unable to leave due to ill health, personal or in the family. (Approximately 15-20%)

(4) Those who remained because they are genuine anti-Nazis, and therefore anxious for an Allied victory. (About 2%)

(5) Deserters from the German army. (About 1/2-1 %)

(6) Agents and line-crossers placed here by the Gestapo, SD, or other German security agencies. (? %)

c. The fall of Aachen took place before the plan to organize the Volkssturm could get underway. The Volkssturm may play a more significant role in future operations in Germany.

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

1. Definition of Terms

It has been found that the significance of the terms "screening" and "cleared" are misinterpreted by non-CIC personnel (MG, MP). For purposes of clarity it became, therefore, necessary to adopt the following working definitions.

A. Screening

Screening is a term applied to those procedures and techniques which are intended to aid in determing whether the individuals studied present a threat potential or active, to the security of the Allied troops. This process, by its very nature, is necessarily a continuous one. The mere fact that the individual has once been "cleared" does not place him above further investigation.

B. Cleared

The statement that an individual has been "cleared" indicates merely that he was examined by CIC and that the evidence at hand at the time failed to indicate that the subject was a security menace.

2. Purposes of Screening

Based upon our experience the following five purposes are suggested as goals of each screening attempt.

A. The detection of individuals who may be enemy agents.

B. The detection of individuals who are covered by the detention policy of SHAEF.

C. The detection of soldiers and deserters from the German army.

D. Determination of the fitness of civilian applicants (solely from the security point of view) for positions with the civil administration and MG.

E. The detection of individuals who are in possession of tactical or strategic information which may be of CIC or OI value.

Persons falling into the first three categories are arrested. All others are eligible to receive an MG "Temporary Registration" certificate which permits them to take up or continue residence in the town. (See exhibit A.) Information on persons in category D and recommendations for employment or non-employment are forwarded to MG for disposition. The names of persons in category E are forwarded to the headquarters of the local CIC detachment or to Military Intelligence Interpreter teams, as the case may be.

SECTION II: PROCEDURE

1. Physical Set-up

An ample waiting-room with reasonable seating facilities should be provided. Even under the best practicable operating conditions long periods of waiting are unavoidable, as the flow of pass-applicants is subject to unpredictable variations. A sign should be prominently displayed in the waiting-room informing undischarged German soldiers of their obligation to report themselves as such, failure to do so rendering them liable to treatment as spies. Slips bearing consecutive numbers should be handed out to the persons in the order in which they enter the waiting-room to avoid unnecessary confusion and disputes. As the German public is not accustomed to American office-procedure, notices should be posted directing them step by step. To keep order and discourage communication between waiting people and those already processed, a guard is needed whose function is also the distribution of the numbers and the calling-up of the candidates by number for interrogation. The MG pass-issuing unit should be located in an adjoining room.

2. Interrogation Conditions

Arrangements should be such as to give the interrogator the appearance of absolute authority in the eyes of the civilians. All consultations with the officer in charge should be made unobserved. Privacy for interrogation is also essential. This is best provided by individual rooms for each interrogator. If, however, several interrogations must be conducted simultaneously in a single room, then at least the desks should be sufficiently spaced so that conversations cannot be overheard.

3. Limitations of Functions

One of the functions of CIC screening is to clear individuals prior to the issuance of the MG pass. All questions relative to pass procedure should, however be handled by MG personnel and not be the interrogators. After screening, the pass-applicant is sent to the MG section with an O.K. slip indicating clearance. Such slips should identify individuals by name and age and bear the date and the interrogator's initials.

4. Interrogation Proper

A. Prior to the interrogation the German civilian expects the following:

(1) That he will have to show identification papers and military papers.

(2) That he will be treated arbitrarily and discourteously. He expects to be shoved around and consequently his responses are inhibited.

(3) That the interrogator will have only have a superficial knowledge of German institutions.

(4) That he will be questioned mainly as to his political reliability.

(5) That he will be asked certain questions about which he had been briefed by his neighbors. The result --ready-made answers.

B. The preliminary aim of interrogation is to throw the subject off balance so that answers will be genuine.

(1) The sequence of questions must be varied, not always beginning with the examination of documents.

(2) The interrogator must be very firm, always dominating, and never permitting the subject to tell his story in the manner in which he had prepared it.

(3) It is an advantage for the interrogator to show on small details his knowledge of German official procedure, etc.

(4) A good point is sometimes to disclaim any interest in political beliefs of the subject. (This helps to avoid hard-luck stories). It is not denied that the political approach, including lectures, had validity in certain cases, but generally speaking indoctrination should not be attempted, as it prompts false answers. Although questions concerning a civilian's ideological and political beliefs will seldom meet with a candid reply, questions regarding the individual's activities in the past years (organizational membership, occupation, education, etc.) will more often than not be answered truthfully. Skillful interpretation of such answers will give much insight into the problem of the individual's reliability.

(5) Subject should be kept in the dark as to what the interrogator is really after so that briefing is useless to him.

(6) People may be divided mentally into those worth only minimum questioning, and those worth perhaps 10-15 minutes.

C. Tools of Interrogation.

(1) Personal documents carried by the individual provide the most important leads (see appendix III), as they provide a good part of his history, perhaps disproving his story or at least pointing the interrogation in a definite direction. Discovery of most individuals found to constitute a threat to security has been aided by the lack of condition of their documents:

(a) Complete absence of important documents, usually explained as the result of bombing or fire.

(b) Irregularities in documents, as for example the presence of unusual entries and stamps, or the absence of usual entries and stamps.

(c) False papers, either prepared by the person himself or by the German authorities. No cases of the latter have been discovered by us thus far, but they may well be expected in future operations.

(d) By the use of leading questions an interrogator can trick the subject into statements which are patently false, thus establishing that the latter has lied. For example, an undischarged soldier in civilian clothes (after glibly explaining the loss of his identification papers) may claim that he has been "ausgemustert" (i.e. "4F"), whereupon the interrogator asks: "Was your Ausmusterungscheinsschein blue or yellow?" In case the man's answer is either "Blue" or "Yellow" it proves him a liar, as the document in question, if issued recently, is always pink.

(e) Frequently persons carry incriminating papers which they do not intend to show. These papers might be discovered by an unexpected search of their wallets or even a complete search of their persons.

(2) The registration card includes certain questions which are put to all persons. The value of the card lies in the fact that Germans are far more reluctant to sign an untrue statement in writing than to give false facts orally. Reactions to these questions are also likely to give valuable hints to the interrogator. The profession or job of the individual allows pretty accurate conclusions, as to his likely party-affiliations, and interrogation in this direction is suggested. Inherent dangers to be watched are these: (a) that by constantly asking the same questions one encourages the above mentioned "canned" answers, and (b) that the interrogator might consider as a measure of his work the volume of cards produced, rather than more objective results.

(3) The blacklist can be used as a psychological tool. In only two cases have persons actually included on this list been discovered by us, however, interrogators have frequently obtained admissions of Party affiliation by pretending to find a person on the list, and then asking abruptly. "How long have you been in the Party?" or, "What was your function in the Party?" Often the individual, assuming his association with the organization in question to be a known fact, confirms what was previously but a suspicion.

(4) A member of the suspect's family may be exploited in interrogation. In some cases where interrogation of a subject fails to gain an admission, voluntary or involuntary aid may be obtained from members of his family. One familiar technique is to make them believe that the person has admitted the fact and that only added details are needed. In cases of suspected soldiers in civilian clothes, family members have been used to great advantage. They must be told, for example, that their father, brother, or husband (as the case may be) had admitted to being a soldier and that his life depends on his ability to prove himself a deserter and not a spy. As proof the Soldbuch or uniform is usually asked for and is sometime hurriedly produced, thus making the man a PW.

(5) The Police Director's Certificate can be used if necessary. In cases where claimed loss of all documents appears reasonable and has to be accepted at face value, the subject is ordered to appear with two witnesses before the civilian Police Director to obtain an affidavit, sworn to by himself and the confirming witnesses (eidesstattliche Erklarung). This certificate attests to (a) identity, (b) military status. It is usually rather reliable as the witnesses are liable to punishment in case of false testimony. Should it be false, however, the subject's persistence in his lie will be stiffened and he will be harder to "break".

(6) The City Directory and Telephone Book are useful in checking claimed residence and address.

(7) The OB book may be used in cases of suspected enemy agents. Agents might try to escape detection, when apprehended, by posing as deserted soldiers. The actual knowledge of the units in which they claim to have served can be checked by use of the OB book.

(8) Posters have been found to facilitate interrogation. A prominent sign in German, "False statements will be severely punished" (with reference to the applicable MG law), has been found effective.

D. Use of Stamp.

(1) The stamping of documents as a sign of clearance has been tried, however the practice has been discontinued. It was found that further investigation by MP's or MG may be neglected on the strength of this O.K. in the first screening. Also it is possible that other army agencies may assume persons so screened to be reliable for all types of employment, whereas for this purpose a more thorough investigation is necessary. It has been found useful, however, to enter Party affiliations with accompanying stamp on the person's main identification document, thereby helping rather than confusing the next interrogator.

(2) Stamping the MG "Temporary Registration" document was adopted merely to indicate that the individual was duly registered by CIC. The CIC portion of the stamp was omitted lest other agencies misconstrue it as a sign of approval.

SECTION III: USE OF INFORMANTS

1. One of the greatest surprises in the interrogation of German civilians, has been the quantity if not the quality of information volunteered to the conqueror by the conquered. Such information, however, seldom results from a geninue desire to help us, and it is essential for the interrogator to determine the interrogator's motives, as the informant's reliability is never above question.

2. Often the explanation lies merely in the fact that Germans are accustomed to answering all questions asked by anyone in authority. This convenient German habit of submission enables the interrogator to pick up many small items of interest, such as husband's Party membership, names and descriptions of former Party bosses, or admission that subject has information of operational intelligence value.

3. More often Germans give information in order to distract from certain delicate points in their own history, and frequently they go so far as to prepare this information in advance against such possible misadventures as, for example, being picked up for violation of MP orders. As the main interest of the suspect is to ingratiate himself, his stories are usually designed to please: he has been called before the Gestapo, he has helped certain Jews (who, of course, are never available, in case the matter of confirmation arises), or he knows that so-and-so was a Party member.

4. Other informants are hoping to obtain special privileges or advantages, although most of them hesitate to use such subterfuges, in fear of the consequences should they be discovered. One man, for example, twice requested permission to enter some empty houses, explaining that he might find three SS men whom he had recognized in the street. The real quest was obviously loot.

5. Another case, which turned out more profitably, was that of a whom MG had hired as an auxiliary policeman. He felt himself slighted in this inferior position and proceeded forthwith to denounce all former Party members and unreliable characters in the police force. So accurate was the information that

6. Germans, however, usually inform because of hatred. They try to hide the personal motive in such cases, commonly playing the part of the long-suffering anti-Nazi. A good share of the false and worthless information comes from this type of informant. Hundreds of Germans do have excellent reasons to hate the Party and its authorities, but chiefly on grounds other than ideological--such as loss of the family-business, or having run afoul of the Gestapo, or similar personal reasons. In the case of Aachen the population became especially enraged at the Party and SS because the evacuation was crudely handled and the people were mistreated as a result, almost any Aachener will give information pertaining to the Party.

7. Informants who desire to help the Allies, or as they usually put it, help the "true" Germany are extremely rare, although they do exist. Many Germans in the occupied areas are so eager to see the war ended quickly that they are willing to aid the Allies. Informants of this type commonly preface their statements with the careful rationalization that they are giving information as "good" Germans because they want to shorten the war. Occasionally true idealists can be found among informants, however, and they should be cultivated carefully.

8. The main difficulty with informants is not that they hesitate to give information, but that they do not know what the interrogator is seeking. It may be necessary to brief the informant and then send him home to think it over. Steady contact with some of the more promising informants pays well. In general an informant should be handled only by the interrogator who first contacted him.

SECTION IV: PRISONERS OF WAR

1. German soldiers dressed in civilian clothes who deny their military status fall into the following categories: A. soldiers who deserted while on furlough, B. deserters from fighting units, and C. stragglers, i.e. soldiers cut off from their units who intend to cross the line into German-held territory.

2. Soldiers on furlough have great difficulty in explaining the fact that they have none of the papers which a German civilian of draft age must carry. They will either declare that the papers in question have been burned or have been handed in, in order to obtain deferment for essential war work. They know the city well and have friends who are often willing to cover them. Frequently, however, they have not experienced certain recent events in the city's life (bombings, evacuations, etc.) and it can easily be determined by men as of such details that the suspects have not been at home continuously.

3. As it is usually difficult to establish the subject's intentions, soldiers falling into categories B and C cannot be distinguished from each other. In addition to the embarrassing lack of papers, they have to explain their presence in an area of which they are usually not natives or previous residents. They invariably tell an exact tale of their wanderings, but they can rarely explain why they undertook a trip into the front lines. They may claim they wanted to join the Americans because they knew the war was lost, or, perhaps, they came to rescue a sick uncle from the ruins of some bombed house, etc. Many claim to have been sent from far away for "Schanzarbeit" (compulsory digging of defenses); in no case, however, has it been determined that the Germans impressed other than local people for this work. Often the soldier commits the mistake of telling that he had arrived by train. Rarely does he know that a special permission is needed for civilian travel of more than 100 km. In general, he knows very little of the current civilian restrictions. Moreover, he is equally ignorant as to when and how it was still possible to enter the area as he claims. It appears that the German control of railroads, roads, and cities was so efficient that practically no civilian of military age could have gotten through to us without proper papers. Thus far it has been found that virtually all persons telling such travel stories are soldiers.

4. Experience has tended to show that under existing conditions undischarged soldiers of the first category (i.e. those who deserted while on furlough) will, more often than not, be broken without much difficulty as their neighbors and acquaintances will confirm their status. Most of them have no intent to sacrifice their comfort or endanger their lives any further.

5. Soldiers in groups B and C, however, present a more complex problem. As strangers in the area and without the restraining influence of home, they represent a greater security menace, even though actual deserters would be no less reluctant to return to the vigors of a soldier's life.

6. Measures to detect and intern German soldiers in civilian clothes have been vigorously pursued. It has been pointed out that this policy would operate to discourage desertion. Nevertheless, this consideration has to be ignored if weighed against the necessity for military security.

7. At times the screening teams have been confronted by borderline cases for which no provision was made in arrest directives. They fall into the following categories.

A. Persons who were furloughed out of the army during 1943 under the so-called "Ru-Funk" program. Under its provisions soldiers with certain technical qualifications were returned to armament industries. They would live at home, wear civilian clothes, and would receive their pay solely from their civilian employers. Yet they have retained their Soldbuch and were not issued their Wehrpass.

B. Soldiers who deserted from the German army a long time before our forces arrived, and lived in hiding until then.

C. Soldiers who are obviously physically unfit. They were released by the army recently, returned home, but did not receive their discharge papers because of the great confusion caused by the evaucation.

D. OT-workers, especially those who used to carry arms.

E. Railroad-workers who wore the "Deutsche Wehrmacht" armband in occupied areas and carried arms.

F. Full-time NSKK men who performed duties for the German army which are carried out by ordinary soldiers on our side. They would carry arms if stationed in occupied areas. Usually their status as good Nazis enabled them to get into the NSKK instead of the army.

SECTION V: POLITICS

1. Political Questioning. The reaction of the people of Aachen to questions pertaining to their political views and activities proved to be so stereotyped that it was not at all difficult to draw up some generalizations in this field.

2. The "Un-political". Questioned on their political beliefs as evidenced by their pro-1933 voting habits, a majority of the people replied with blank stares. The word "vote" ("gewahlt") would frequently have to be repeated a number of times before it was comprehended; as it had apparently become foreign to them. The registrant often had to be reminded of the fact that there had been free elections at one time in which the

voter could case his ballot for a party. As soon as the word "party" ("Partei") was heard, the majority of the registrants would immediately disclaim all party affiliations and insist that they were "non-political" ("unpolitisch")! Upon further prodding they would seemingly concentrate their thoughts upon that forgotten democratic era and, in most cases, finally declare that they voted "Zentrum", adding that they were born as Catholics and would always stand by the church.

3. The Centrists. About 60% of the population of Aachen labeled their political inclinations "Centrist", but more than half of this group seems to belong to the non-political section described above, the remainder is made up of individuals who were able to give cogent reasons for their dislike of the Nazis, basing their attitude chiefly on the anti-clerical teachings of the NSDAP, but in some cases also on the restrictions on individual liberty.

4. The Social Democrats. Followers of the Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) seemed to constitute the largest politically conscious group in Aachen. They formed about 20% of the people questioned. Quite a number of them, when interrogated on their political affiliations, would proudly produce their SPD membership booklets which they had preserved since 1933. Others would refer to their many years of membership in the "Freie Gewerkschaften", the Socialist labor unions. A few, however, would furtively look around them before stating their political preference, apparently still afraid of the possible consequences of this admission. On the whole, Social Democrats seem to recruit their adherents from the class of skilled laborers and, to some extent, the small shopkeepers.

5. The Communists. About 10% of the population of Aachen claim to be Communists. Their reactions to political questioning varied from one man who solemnly proclaimed that he always had been and always would be a Marxist workingman, to the little woman who timidly whispered that she used to vote for Thalmann. When told that there was no need for whispering, the latter replied that the Gestapo may have left, but the attitudes of fear harbored during twelve long years linger on. This evidence of a feeling of insecurity could be noticed in many who would prefer to call themselves "Anti-Fascists". A number of Communists were able to present proof of having been imprisoned for anti-Nazi activities.

6. The Conservatives. Less than 5% of the people interrogated claimed to support the conservative parties (Deutsche Volkspartei, Deutschnationale Volkspartei, Wirtschaftspartei). Those who consider themselves in this group are usually well-to-do, merchants, manufacturers, higher civil servants, noblemen, etc. On the whole they had been willing to go along with the Nazi but are quite disappointed that Hitler has not fulfilled his promises to them. Typical answers to the question "Why wouldn't you join the Nazi party?" are those of a Countess von Spee who declared that members of her family would not

mingle with the common people. Another woman, who claimed to be "Deutschnational", exclaimed when asked why she wasn't in the Nazi party, "Oh, we would never have anything to do with Socialistic things!" One man who had switched from the Wirtschaftspartei to the NSDAP explained that Hitler had promised to abolish the property taxes to which he objected. People in this group expressed their eagerness to renew their American business connections, but are frequently unwilling to act as full-fledged collaborators, protesting that they do not wish to become traitors.

7. The Nazis. Only one man among the more than 10,000 interrogated admitted that he still considered himself a National Socialist. A former major in the German army, member of the NSDAP and SA since 1934, he declared that his honor as a German officer prevented him from "changing his shirt that quickly". The Nazis constitute about 5% of the population and most of them protest that they were forced into the Party, and had always been opposed to Nazi ideology. Economic necessity was even claimed by the few "Alte Kampfer", members of the NSDAP before 1933, who have chosen to remain in Aachen. The fact that some of these people were lying was evidenced by informants' reports according to which Aachen Nazis become more cocky as the news of German counter-attacks spread.

8. "Forced Membership". Questioning revealed the following facts about the so-called "forced members": Membership in the Nazi party was never compulsory, at best it could be considered economically advantageous. A number of non-Nazi civil servants had to sacrifice their jobs or found that their names were skipped when they were scheduled for promotions. Businessmen found that government and Party contracts went to the members of the NSDAP. In spite of this fact these people were able to continue to exist without associating themselves with the Hitler movement.

9. "Subversive" Activities. No evidence was found in Aachen of the existence of an active anti-Nazi movement. Communists say that their organization, which was the last to cease operations, was smashed in 1935. Some Germans claim that they intentionally engaged in slow-down strikes against war production, yet such statements could not be authenticated. Foreign workers employed at the Veltrup armament plant, however, seemed to have been actively engaged in sabotage. Two Germans, aged 67 and 77 respectively, both former Social Democrats and trade unionists, claimed to have been imprisoned in 1941 for distributing leaflets dropped by British planes. They said they were the only survivors of a group of twelve which had begun this activity spontaneously.

10. "Underground" Movements. The interest of American interrogators in underground activities has not been slow to reach the attention of certain imaginative Germans--particularly teen-aged boys and girls, as well as the usual "cranks" -- and fantastic claims and stories of all kinds have been obligingly forthcoming. It may be mentioned quite aside, that a considerable precentage of such claimants were previously internees to refugee centers (notably Hombourg), where the American thirst for underground-stories must have been a daily topic of conversation. As far as has been determined, the following represent the Aachen "Underground":

A. The nearest approach to an organized underground thus far identified is the small, rather mysterious youth movement bearing the name of "Edelweiss Piraten". While stories and rumors about the "Piraten" are widely current in Germany, only two bona-fide members have been identified in Aachen. They seem to have been formed in small secret gangs (ages about 14-17), including some girls, which engaged in the hazardous sport of beating up Hitler Jugend members and occasional older Nazis. Beyond this pre-occupation they appear to have had no clear objectives of any sort. Most of the children were from lower-class homes, some of formerly Communist families; however, not the faintest trace of political or even idealistic motives behind their acts has been brought to light thus far. Moreover, although like-minded gangs apparently exist under the same name in other German cities, no evidence of central organization and direction, or of more than chance contact between them, has been found.

B. Although organized opposition to the Nazis by the Communist Party ceased in 1935, one informant reports that two Communist organizations had continued existence: the "Bund der Sowjetfreunde" (Friends of the Soviet Union), and "Kommittee fur ein freies Deutachland" (Committee for a free Germany.)

C. Catholic organizations as such have been nearly dissolved but many have continued to exist as closed social gatherings and are frequently anti-Nazi. The old student-fraternities have been re-constituted in reduced form with an active anti-Nazi tendency. The leader of a former Catholic girls' organization in Aachen, now a woman of about 45, has kept in contact and held meetings with many members of her age group. Although youth movements other than the Hitler Jugend are forbidden in Germany, several organizations of that character have existed in Aachen and nearby cities under the name of "Deutscher Alpenverein" (German Alpine Club). The founder of the club, a priest named Karl Lowen, was arrested in September 1944 by the Gestapo. Although the organization engaged in no political activity or discussions, its leader was a known anti-Nazi.

11. Attitudes under the Occupation.

A. The "Liberators." There is little doubt that the SS evacuation terror in mind, and after suffering under heavy Allied bombardment, a majority of the population of Aachen welcomed the arrival of our troops. The courteous behavior of the Americans quickly dispelled the doubts of those who had believed some of the Nazi horror stories. Many people have asserted that the Party was generally blamed for the destruction wrought in Aachen, especially for not surrendering the city when the situation became hopeless.

B. "Non-fraternization". After the transition weeks had passed and the new community began to take shape, the Germans were rather shocked to notice that their new rulers still treated them as enemies. Not having been asked by their leaders to take a hand in guiding their country, they do not consider themselves responsible for the actions of their government. Furthermore, they thought, the positive act of defying the

evacuation order put them unequivocally on the Allied side. They therefore refer to the Allied policy as a "psychological mistake". Their specific grievances are (1) the soldiers' unfriendliness, (2) lack of material aid, (3) indiscriminate eviction of civilians to make room for soldiers. On the other hand a large number of people believe that the American authorities are too soft in their dealings with Nazis. The statement, "You are much too humane!" was heard frequently.

C. The Counter-Offensive. The German counter-offensive caused great consternation among the civilians. Many expected that the Nazis, upon re-entering the town, would shoot everyone. A good number of people packed their belongings and prepared to flee if the Americans abandoned Aachen. Hardly anyone, however, doubted an ultimate Allied victory.

D. The Newly-gained Freedoms. Most people agreed that now, for the first time in twelve years, they felt the absence of governmental force and complusion. Germans in responsible positions observed, however, that the people lack sufficient self-discipline and independence to take their fate into their own hands. When it was necessary to do certain types of work for the benefit of the community, many people drafted for the jobs didn't appear because they did not really have to. The need for a prolonged American occupation is assumed by the Germans because they do not consider themselves mature and strong enough to prevent a return of the Nazis.

SECTION VI: LIAISON

1. General. As in any military operation, liaison with adjacent as well as higher and lower echelons and other interested agencies is of cardinal importance. While the relative importance of the operations insofar as those agencies are concerned may vary, it may be assumed that screening of the nature performed in the Aachen operation will concern at the minimum CIC, Military Government, Military Police, and other operational intelligence agencies.

2. Other CIC Agencies. CIC operations in the city will normally be carried on simultaneously from at least three bases, namely, the local prison or detention center, a centrally located headquarters, and an interrogation center where screening and detailed interrogation can be performed. Information is gathered and disseminated through the central office. All the information obtained by either the screening teams or other operational detachments can thus be assembled at this headquarters, assuring co-ordination of efforts as well as easy access to information. This necessarily calls for close liaison and co-ordination between the screening personnel and any other CIC unit that may be established. Periodic reports from each of the sub-units to the central headquarters are an excellent medium by which all agencies can be kept posted on the activities of other units operating in that area. Moreover, telephone communications over private lines should be established as quickly as possible.

3. Military Government. Inasmuch as Military Government may be expected to remain in the area under its jurisdiction, all MG branches should be kept posted on CIC screening policy, and close liaison should be established on pass control. Moreover, MG should be informed as to persons who, because of their past records, constitute a real or potential threat to the security of the military or civil governments, or that of the armed forces. These persons should be excluded from positions of importance, particularly those which may be considered policy-forming. If possible, all civilians, including those employed by the reconstituted civil government should be screened thoroughly before hiring. Military Government must, however, understand that clearing the individual screened does not constitute an irrevocable endorsement of that person, and is not to be interpreted as a carte blanche. Should evidence against such persons later be unearthed, the original opinion of CIC as to that person's reliability will be changed unhesitatingly. Screening does not end with the close of the interview, but is a continual never-ending process.

4. Civilian Clearing Centers. Civilian clearing establishments and evacuation centers, which, under MG, control the flow of civilians prior to their re-entry into the city and their subsequent screening, must be informed as to screening policy. All individuals must be screened by CIC prior to their release from such evacuation points. If possible, a reliable informant should be found among the clearing center personnel, to furnish advance information on persons who may constitute a security threat or possess information of CI value.

5. Military Government versus CIC. The need for constant close co-operation between MG and CIC cannot be too strongly emphasized. It is necessary for both organizations to understand each other's objectives and to aid in their achievement. MG is charged with the task of setting up and supervising local governments in as short a time as possible. CIC is ordered to provide for the security of the troops. These aims must be co-ordinated and reconciled. As is the case in most aspects of human experience, the basic problem resolves itself into one of personalities.

6. Military Police. Being primarily a security agency, Military Police is interested in information concerning persons who constitute potential threats to security, and who would be most likely to participate in uprising, sabotage, or underground activity. Generally, all men of military age, and all men, regardless of age, who were at any time members of the Nazi Party (NSDAP), the Sturmabteilungen (SA), the Schutzstaffeln (SS), or the National Social Motor Corps (NSKK) are to be kept under close observation. List of such persons should be furnished the Military Police, who will assist in checking passes and bringing in delinquents and suspects. To perform this task efficiently, they must be kept posted as to current pass and screening policy, arrest policy, and informed as to what types of passes and identity papers are valid. As a general rule, they should be requested to bring in for questioning all males of military age not possessing adequate identification papers, inasmuch as it is in this group that all German soldiers and deserters are found.

7. Military Intelligence Information. During any large-scale screening operation, persons possessing information of OI value will be encountered by the screeners. The value of their information will generally vary inversely with the length of time between occupation of the area by our forces and the interrogation. For this reason, liaison should be quickly established with MII teams within the zone of operations and maintained throughout the screening period. All persons believed to possess information of interest to MII should be earmarked as such and immediately forwarded to MII interrogators. This activity does not burden the CIC interrogators but actually relieves him of the time-consuming task of taking the information himself. In no G-2 agency is information ever refused. In the Aachen operation it was found of value to have MII interrogators adjacent to the screening section.

8. Publicity and Psychological Warfare. While it is admittedly difficult to determine what the population of enemy areas occupied by us feels and thinks, co-operation between PPW and CIC, which has the opportunity to speak not merely to a cross-section, but rather to all the inhabitants, will pay large dividends to both agencies. Persons with apparently sound views on the trends of thought in the occupied areas, and other intelligent persons of firm convictions should be forwarded to PPW, in order that personnel of that agency keep a sensitive finger on the pulse of public opinion. Moreover, PPW, by means of newspapers, posters, loudspeakers, and other means of dissemination can play a large part in the molding of public opinion in such a manner as to be beneficial to all agencies interested in security. A concrete case worthy of note is the manner in which rumors concerning the enemy counter-attack 16 December 1944 swept the city of Aachen, causing considerable unrest and anxiety on the part of the civil population. Such rumors as "Aachen will be German again by Christmas" died a sudden death upon issue of PPW newspapers which quite frankly but assuringly gave the details of the enemy counter-attack.

9. Dissemination of Documents. Regardless of how thorough the enemy may have been prior to his evacuation of the area occupied by us, and despite all the conscientious efforts of building target teams, documents of intelligence value will turn up weeks and even months after occupation. Documents of value to CIC should be turned into the central headquarters, and all others forwarded through G-2 channels to higher headquarters.

APPENDIX I

OPERATIONS AT BRAND REFUGEE CAMP

Screening operations at Brand Refugee Camp were unique in that the camp offered nearly ideal facilities for detailed interrogation. The camp, formerly a Wehrmacht post, was self-contained and consisted of several large barracks with a housing capacity of over 4,000 persons, messing facilities, a hospital and a jail, in which detailed interrogations could be carried on in absolute privacy. All persons entering the camp were assigned to a specific "block" and their whereabouts known at all times. When

ready for screening they were brought into the waiting-room on the second floor of the building which housed the jail, and then interrogated in detail in one of the small rooms on this floor. Interrogation in privacy, a real boon toward obtaining the desired results, was thus assured, and informants could be easily cultivated, inasmuch as they showed little or no reluctance in giving their information while out of sight and hearing of the others. Guards posted at the fence and gates of the camp insured that no person who once entered the camp could leave without being screened. The MP's handled all persons to be screened, in addition to operating the jail. Persons needing repeated screenings could be easily recalled, and informants played one against the other, actively assisting in the screening by denouncing any potentially dangerous persons. In this manner large-scale screening was carried on in the minimum of time with a maximum of effectiveness. It must be emphasized, however, that the existence and availability of these ideal screening facilities was most unique and is hardly to be anticipated in forthcoming operations.

APPENDIX II

SOP ON THE USE OF CIVILIAN REGISTRATION CARD 94

Exhibit A

TEMPORARY REGISTRATION — ZEITWEILIGE REGISTRIERUNGSKARTE

(Name) Age Sex
(Name). . . . . Alter . . . . . Geschlecht . . . . . .
Present Address)
Jetzige Address). . . . . .
Permanent Address)
Standige Address) . . . . . .

The holder of this card is duly registered as a resident of the Stadtkreis Aachen and is prohibited from leaving the place designated. Violation of this restriction will lead to immediate arrest.

Der Inhaber von dieser Karte ist als Einwohner von dem Stadtkreis Aachen verschriftsmassig registriert und ist es ihm oder ihr strengstens verbeten sich von diesem Platz zu entfernen. Zuwiderhandlung dieser Massnahme fuhrt zu sofortigem Arrest.

. . . . . .

Identity card number
Legitimations Number

Name and Rank Mil Gov Officer US Army

. . . . . .

Signature of holder
Unterschrift des Inhabers

Date of Issue
Datum der Ausstellung

Exhibit B

_____

Date _____

1. Name _____ (Maiden Name) _____

2. Present Address _____

_____

_____

3. Previous Address (31 Aug 1944) _____

4. Date of Birth _____ 6. Marital Status SMWD

5. Place of Birth _____ 7. Occupation _____

_____ 8. Nationality _____

9. Identity doc _____ Number _____

10. Military history

a) Military doc _____ Number _____

b) Classification _____ c) Reason for Deferment _____

d) Period of Service _____ e) Rand attained _____

f) Date of Discharge _____ g) Reason _____

_____

I. The Registration Card is to be considered merely as one of the tools available to the interrogator in accomplishing the objectives in screening. It contains the minimum of information which CIC should have available on every resident of the occupied area; therefore it is to serve as an outline for questioning, but should not act to limit the interrogation. It is recommended that in the interrogation the items entered on the card by the typist be studied first, but that the card be set aside during the questioning and completed only when all the information has been gathered.

The interrogation must not be stereotyped, but should be a free and spontaneous conversation directed by the interrogator and adapted by him to the individual case.

II. Prior to the interrogation, it is necessary to press for the presentation of satisfactory identification papers. In the case of women or of men below or above the military age bracket, semi-official papers may be accepted if the registrant is not in possession of any official ones. If the papers were left at home, a penciled mark to that effect should be entered on the card and the registrant should be told that he has to return with his papers.

For the purposes of interrogation, cases may be divided into two categories, 1) men between the ages of 17 and 60, 2) all others.

Persons in category 1 must present proof that they are not soldiers. They can do that by showing us 1) a Wehrpass, 2) an Ausmusterungsschein, 3) an Entlassungsschein issued between the dates of 1 March 1944 and 1 September 1944 (If the man was discharged before 1 March 1944, there has been enough time for his Wehrpass to be returned to him. If the man was discharged after 1 September 1944; it may have been one of the doubtful last-minute discharges.), 4)an Ausschliessungsschein, issued after 1 January 1943, (The bearer of an Ausschliessungsschein, dated 1938 admitted to us to have served in the army subsequently.) 5) OT Dienstbuch, indicating service up to the time of desertion. If they cannot prove that they are not soldiers by presenting any of these documents, they warrant a more careful examination. If the interrogator is satisfied by their explanations, he can permit them to clear through the Police Director. (See Appendix III.) Otherwise they are to be arrested.

Persons in category 2 should present official documents like the Kennkarte, Fuehrerschein, Postausweiskarte, a passport, Grenzausweis, Dienstausweis, RAD Ausweis, and various other identity papers issued by the German authorities. In the absence of any of these the Familien-Stamabuch, or, as a last resort, the Haushalts-Pass can be accepted. Persons who have no papers whatsoever should be sent to the Police Director (See Appendix III.).

III. When the card reaches the interrogator, items 1-8 will have been filled out by the typists. He will proceed as follows, information in black letters:

(1) The name as entered on the card is to be checked against the identification paper as it should be spelled the same way throughout. Unofficial abbreviations of the first name are not to be permitted. In the case of married women the first name of the husband is added in parentheses. The maiden name of married women is added in the space provided for it.

(2) The present address is to be entered as stated by the registrant. Changes of address have to be reported to the Police Director who is to notify CIC. At a future date the Police Director can be required to check on all addresses.

(3) The registrant's work is to be accepted for previous legal address. After the completion of registration it can be checked against the address-book or a pre-occupation police file. If the person's actual residence as of 31 August 1944 differed from the legal address, it is to be entered also. The names of persons who arrived recently from German-occupied areas should be noted down and submitted to MII.

(4) Date of birth should be entered as it appears in the document. No protestations of "errors" should be accepted.

(5) Enter the community in which the person is born, adding the county or state ("Land") in the case of smaller places. Also enter the country of birth if it is not Germany. This should be done on the basis of the boundary lines as of 31 December 1937.

(6) Enter marital status as claimed by individual.

(7) Occupation should be entered in German as an English translation can only be considered an approximation and would not serve as an item of identification. If the present occupation differs from the main one, enter the latter.

(8) Up to this point all entries will have been made by the typist. Item 8 will also be filled out by the typist if the registrant considers himself a German citizen. No proof of German citizenship will be required. The admission suffices.

Adequate proof of their nationality must be presented by non-Germans. Thus far we have found such proof only in valid passports such as Italian passports, and Dutch ones which were extended by the Swedish Embassy in Berlin to a date after 10 September 1944. In all other cases, including persons who present a

Fremdenpass indicating non-German nationality, enter this nationality preceded by the word "claimed". In the case of persons from the Eupen-Malmedy sector who claim Belgian citizenship enter "claimed New-Belgian". This is necessary as men in this area were drafted into the German army.

(9) Enter title of identity document in German. Add number or, in its absence, the date of issue. In the case of persons presenting only military papers enter "see 10a)."

(10) In the case of women write "none" next to Military history. In the case of boys under 17 enter "under age". In the case of men over 60 write "over age". In all these cases leave the space under 10 blank except for filling in 10 d) in the case of men over 60 who have previously served in the army, but fill in all items if these men are Reserve Officers.

Write OT next to Military History if the man belonged to the Organization Todt, RAD if he was in the Labor Service but not in the army. Treat the other items just as you do in army service.

NOTE: Whether women or boys under 17 have a military history is a debatable point it is believed that any information on membership on the various paramilitary and political organizations should be of special interest and proper notations made on the registration card.

In the case of men who served in an army other than the German, write "Dutch army, Belgian army, etc." next to Military history and fill in 10 d) and, in the case of Reserve Officers, 10 e). In case of non-Germans without military service, enter a brief explanation of the situation next to Military history.

(a) Enter the military document (s) presented. Add the Wehrnummer which is found on top of p. 1 in the Wehrpass or on top of one of the other certificates.

(b) Check p. 5 in the Wehrpass of any addition for the last classification, adding the date of the latest physical examination in parentheses.

The following are the abbreviations and terms used in respect to classifications. Only these marked with an asterisk are being used at the present time. The others can be found as results of examinations of previous years. (The abbreviations for "ausgemustert" and "ausgeschlossen" are our inventions.)

*k.v.	kriegsverwendungsfaehig)	
tgl.	tauglich)	"1A"
*bed.k.v.	bedingt k.v.)	
beschr. tgl.	beschraenkt tauglich)	limited service

In the case of the classification bed. k.v. one of the following terms is sometimes added:

frontbrauchbar	fit for combat service
nicht frontbrauchbar	unfit for combat service

g.v.F.	garnisonsverwendungsfaehig Feld	fit for rear echelon duty in the field
g.v.H.	garnisonsverwendungsfaehig Heimat	fit for rear echelon duty at home

*zeitl.untgl. zeitlich untauglich — temporarily unfit

The classification zeitlich untauglich is used in conjunction with a definite time limit.

*a.v.	arbeitsverwendungsfahig	fit for labor draft
*d.u.	dienstuntauglich	unfit for active duty with the armed forces
*w.u.	wehruntauglich	unfit for service with the armed forces

The classifications d.u. and w.u. are used only in the cases of soldiers discharged from the army.

*am.	ausgemustert	completely unfit
*as.	ausgeschlossen	excluded from service with the armed forces.

"Excluded" from the army are persons with prison records for criminal or anti-Nazi activities.

*n.z.v.	nicht zu verwenden	not to be used

The classification n.z.v. is applied to half-Jews.

(c) In the case of persons deferred for physical reasons, enter the specific ailment (heart-disease, stomach ulcers, one glass-eye, skull-fracture, etc.). In the case of persons who were "reklamiert" (occupationally deferred), enter occup followed by the qualifications which kept the man out of the army or caused him to be discharged. (e.g. miner, aircraft-engineer, skilled mechanic, Nazi Gauleiter, etc.). If the man was "UK" (unabkoemmlich, indispensable) for any other reason, enter it as stated (e.g. last surviving son, father of ten children, etc.).

It is to be remembered that persons who are classified k.v., tgl., bed. k.v., beschr. tgl., or g.v.F. could not be deferred because of a physical or mental ailment. In receiving an occupational deferment a man classified k.v. would be required to bring better proof of his indispensability than a man classified g.v.F.

(d) Enter years of service if prior to 1939, months and years since then (e.g. 1914-18, Sept 1939 - Aug 1942).

(e) Enter in German highest rank attained.

(f) Enter date of last discharge.

(g) Enter reason for discharge. If same as 10 c), write "see 10c)".

(11) Remember that the Political History should give a picture of the man's political affiliations, not the clubs and organizations to which he belonged, perhaps after actually being forced into them. Note membership in the NSDAP and its formation regardless of whether membership was active or passive.

(a) If the registrant did not belong to the NSDAP write "no" in the "Entered" column. If he belonged to the Party write the year in which he joined under "Entered", and the year in which he withdrew under "Left". If he was a member until the occupation write "1944" under "Left". If he was a functionary of the Party, enter his rank and position under "Rank". If he left the NSDAP prior to the occupation, enter the reason under "Remarks". If the registrant was "Parteianwaerter" (Party candidate), give him credit for his intentions and enter "candidate" next to NSDAP, treating the other columns as if he had been a member.

(b) The following organizations are classified as formations of the Nazi party.

SA	Sturmabteilungen	Stormtroopers
SS	Schutzstaffeln	Elite Guards
NSKK	NS Kraftfahrkorps	NS Motor Corps
NSFK	NS Fliegerkorps	NS Flying Corps
HJ	Hitler Jugend	Hitler Youth

NSF	NS Frauenschaft	NS Women's Organization
NSD Doz	NSD Dozentenbund	NS German University Teachers' Organization
NSD Stud	NSD Studentenbund	NS German University Students' Organization

In this respect it should be noted that the NS Frauenschaft which was designed primarily to create a female leaders' corps for the Nazi party, is not to be confused with the NS Frauenwerk, which though Nazi-inspired, was chiefly concerned with educating housewives. Furthermore the NSD Studentenbund, a Nazi organization, must not be confused with the Deutsche Studentenschaft, to which every university student had to belong. It is well to remember that the HJ, in its broader sense, includes the Bund deutscher Maedchen, (BdM), Jungmaedel (JM), and the Deutsches Jungvolk (DJV).

Under "Organization" circle the formation in which the registrant held membership or enter the appropriate abbreviation. Treat the other columns as in "11a)". In the case of ordinary members of the HJ write "no" under "Entered", except if the registrant belonged to the HJ prior to 1937 or to the Stamm-HJ since then, in which case you register them as usual. (The Stamm-HJ was organized as the NAZI-ELITE of the Hitler Youth since the introduction of compulsory service in the HJ for all German children.) Register all leaders of the HJ, from Rottenfuehrer, Hordenfuehrer, or its BdM-equivalent up to Reichsjugendfuehrer.

(c) Under "Associated Organizations" write "no" under "Entered", if the person was an ordinary paying member, just as if he hadn't been in any organization at all. However, all persons who held any kind of position in these organizations are to be listed as prescribed under section "11 a)" on the Registration Card.

The following Nazi organizations are classified as "Assoc Org":

DAF, KdF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront Kraft durch Freude	German Labor Front Strength through Joy
NSV	NS Volkswohlfahrt	NS Welfare Org.
NSKOV	NS Kriegsopferversorgung	NS War Victims' Org.
NSD A	NSD Aerztebund	NS Physicians' Org.
NSL	NS Lehrerbund	NS Teachers' Org.
NSR	NS Rechtswahrerbund	NS Lawyers' and Judges' Org.
RDB	Reichsbund deutscher Beamten	Org. of Government Officials
NSBDT	NS Bund Deutscher Technik	NS Engineers' Org.

Although officially not a Nazi party organization, the Reichsnaehrstand or Reich Food Estate, to which all farmers must belong, is to be included under this classification.

(d) In order to complete the picture, the individual's political activity and inclinations should be touched upon in the interrogation. This question is of special significance in the screening of individuals who wish to act as informants, for their political convictions may help give us some bases for evaluating their reliability and to determine not only the fact that the man is anti-Nazi, but the degree to which he may be pro-Allied.

If the registrant claims political inclination without actual affiliation enter the following under "Organization":

K	for	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
S	for	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
DS	for	Deutsche Staatspartei
Z	for	Zentrum
DV	for	Deutsche Volkspartei
W	for	Wirtschaftspartei
DN	for	Deutschnationale Volkspartei

Add years of membership only if actual affiliation is claimed.

The importance of the registrant's party affiliation prior to the Nazis is not to be overestimated, for it is his behavior since then which is of greater significance. Recognizing this fact, it may not be necessary to determine the individuals' political background in every case.

(12) Make certain that the registrant signs his first and last name in the proper space. The signature is to correspond to the name appearing under (1)(e.g. not Frau Schmitz, or Frau Johann Schmitz, or Kathi Schmitz, but Katharina Schmitz). Nuns are to use their secular names ("Weltname").

Persons over 65 years of age may be registered by others if they are infirm and cannot appear themselves. Proper papers must, however, be presented. The signature appearing under (12) must be that of the person appearing at the Registration Office. The word fur and the registrant's name are to be added to it.

(13) Further entries can be made under (13). It is to be remembered that this space should also serve for additional entries to be made whenever the registrant comes into contact with American authorities (arrest, MG employment, etc.).

APPENDIX III

GERMAN IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS

Having lived under a rigid system of police supervision, every German is accustomed to carrying some kind of identification paper with him at all times. Even a major catastrope like the destruction of Aachen will not bring about a substantial change in his habit.

Male Germans between the ages of 16 and 60 are subject to military service. If men are not actually in the armed forces, they will possess some papers indicating their relation to the military. It should be noted, however, that among the extremes of this group, boys of 16 and men close to 60, there will be some who have not as yet reported for the draft.

The documents discussed in detail below are those commonly found on German civilians. Brief mention is made of other identifications papers found less frequently.

(1) The Wehrpass.

The most common document carried by Germans of draft age is the Wehrpass, which corresponds to our service record. It is issued to them at the time of their registration for service in the armed forces, taken from them if and when they are discharged. (There is some administrative lag in respect to the returning of the Wehrpass to a discharged soldier.) The Wehrpass is bound in grey cardboard. It contains the following information: p. 1: name; p.2: photograph and signature; p. 3: name, date and place of birth, nationality, religion, marital status, occupation, and names of parents; p. 4: education, knowledge of foreign languages, other special qualifications (such as ability to drive a motor vehicle); p. 5-7: record of physical examinations and classification; p. 8-10: service in the RAD; p. 11-19: record of service on active duty; p. 20-21: notes on type of military training received; p. 22-23: promotions and decorations; p. 24-25: records of discharge; pp. 26, 27, 35: further additions; p. 28-31: temporary recall while on inactive status; p. 32-33: combat experience; p. 34: injuries and illnesses; p. 36-45: relationship to armed forces while on inactive status (class of reserves to which the individual belongs). On p. 47 we of CIC Aachen have recorded the years of membership in the NSDAP if the bearer of the Wehrpass belonged to the Nazi Party.

Among men close to 60 one will find a Behelfs-Musterungsausweis. It consists of one sheet of white paper with a green over-print. It is issued at the time the prospective draftee undergoes his physical examination. It is a temporary document to be replaced by the Wehrpass as soon as the latter is prepared. On the Behelfs-Musterungsausweis one can find the person's name, date and place of birth, citizenship, religion, marital status, occupation, and military classification.

Reserve officers possess Wehrpaesse regardless of their age. Soldiers of the last war may carry a Militaerpass.

Any man carrying a Soldbuch is a soldier.

(2) The Ausmusterungsschein.

The Ausmusterungsschein or Certificate of Rejection is issued to men who are exempted from military service because of severe physical defects. They are printed on pink paper although some, dated up to 1938, are white. The document consists of one page, giving the man's name, date and place of birth, and declares that the man is completely incapable of service in the armed forces. Attached to it is a photograph of the bearer.

(3) The Ausschliessungsschein.

The Ausschliessungsschein or Certificate of Exclusion is issued to men who are rejected from military service because they have served a prison sentence for ordinary crimes or for anti-Nazi activity. The document itself does not indicate the reason for which the man had been imprisoned. Consequently every petty thief will describe himself as a victim of Nazi persecution. The truth, however, can usually be determined after a brief examination.

The document is printed on blue paper, consists of one page which gives the man's name, his date and place of birth, and states that the man has been excluded from service in the armed forces in peacetime. It also has a photograph attached to it. In spite of its text this paper has also been issued since 1939, sometimes with the words "in peacetime" ("im Frieden") crossed out. The Nazis have, however, been inducting ordinary criminals and as we have had a bearer of the Ausschliessungsschein admit that he served in the army at a later date, we only accept an Ausschliessungsschein if it was issued after 1 January 1943. All others have to clear through the Police Director (see below).

(4) The Entlassungsschein.

The Entlassungsschein or Certificate of Discharge is issued at the time the man leaves the service. If of recent date, it can be accepted as proof of the person's civilian status. However, the possibility exists that the man was re-inducted at a later date. We have therefore arrived at the following conclusion. If the man was discharged before 1 March 1944, there has been enough time for his Wehrpass to be returned to him. If the man was discharged after 1 Sep 1944, it may have been one of the doubtful last-minute discharges. Consequently we only accept discharge papers issued between 1 March 1944 and 1 Sept 1944. All others have to clear through the Police Director. The document is printed on white paper and contains the man's name, rank, date and place of birth, and his time of services in the Wehrmacht.

(5) The OT-Dienstbuch.

Deserters from the Organization Todt will carry an OT-Dienstbuch, indicating membership in that force. Current membership in the OT can be considered satisfactory proof that a man is not in the armed forces. The recent method of indicating discharges has been to perforate the whole booklet with the word "ausgeschieden" (dropped out).

Thus far we have found two types of these documents, differing slightly in the information they cover. One is apparently issued to uniformed, direct employees of OT while the other is given to men employed by firms engaged in OT work. Both booklets have a purplish cardboard cover. The major items of interest contained in the first type are: p. 1: name, photograph; p. 2: date and place of birth, nationality, marital status, home address, p. 3: duty in combat area, p. 4: decorations, p. 5: record of physical examinations, p. 6: inoculations, p. 7: military training, p. 8-9: record of hospitalization, p. 10-13: places of work, p. 14-18: record of equipment issued, p. 26: record of membership in the Nazi party or the DAF, p. 33-35: furloughs. The following information is contained in the second type: p. 1: name, p. 2: personal description, p. 3: date and place of birth, nationality, marital status, address, name of nearest relative, p. 12-15: places of work, p. 24: record of arms issued.

Pending the clarification of their status, OT workers are liable to arrest.

(6) Police Director's Affidavit.

A large number of men of military age in Aachen claim to have lost their papers through bombings, during their temporary evacuation, or by turning them in to have their deferment renewed. In many cases this is true. As it would not be practicable to evacuate all these people through PW channels, the following system was devised: the individual testifies to his civilian status before the Police Director and has his statement corroborated by two witnesses. The affidavit is type-written in the German as well as the English language and signed by the Police Director.

(7) The Kennkarte and Similar Documents.

The Kennkarte is the standard identification paper issued to Germans who did not have any other papers. It is a four-page document on a grey, cloth-like material. On page 2 it contains the person's name, date and place of birth, occupation, and distinguishing marks, on page 3 there are the person's photograph, signature, and fingerprints.

In so-called New Belgium a Vorlaeufiger Ausweis or Temporary Identification Paper was issued instead of the Kennkarte. It is printed on white manila paper but resembles the Kennkarte otherwise.

(8) Passports and Similar Documents

German nationals travelling or intending to travel in foreign countries were issued a passport. This document contains the following: p. 1: name, p. 2: photograph and signature, p. 3: occupation, date and place of birth, place of residence, personal description, p. 4: areas in which and times during which passport is valid, issuing authority, p. 5: extensions of passport, p. 6-32: miscellaneous entries on travels in foreign countries including visas. The document has a brown manila-paper cover and is entitled Reisepass.

Most non-Germans living in the Reich seem to have had their passports taken from them. In Aachen we have only found Dutch and a few Italian passports. The Dutch passport, bound in a blue, cloth-like cover and printed on blue paper is entitled Paspoort. It contains the following: p. 3: name, occupation, nationality (Nederland), signature, p. 6: area in which and time during which passport is valid. Visas and other notes are entered in the remaining pages. A Dutch passport can be considered valid proof of Dutch citizenship if it was extended by the Swedish Embassy in Berlin to a date after 10 Sept 1944.

Persons who are stateless or who are non-German and could not obtain a passport from their own national authorities were issued a Fremdenpass. The document is bound in grey cloth and contains the following: p. 1: name, p. 2: nationality, occupation, date and place of birth, residence, personal description, p. 3: photograph, signature, visas and other notations. As a Fremdenpass is issued by the German police authorities, it cannot be considered proof of non-German nationality.

Persons living in the Dutch or Belgian border regions of Germany who were required to cross the frontier almost daily carried a Grenzausweis or Frontier Identity Paper. The identity paper issued for the Netherlands is printed on blue manila paper and has four pages. Its title is Deutsch-Niederlaendischer Grenzverkehr, Grenzausweis. The Belgian paper is printed on green manila paper and has four pages. Its title is Deutsch-Niederlaendischer Grenzverkehr, Grenzausweis. These documents contain a picture of the bearer and cover about the same information as the Kennkarte.

(9) The Fuehrerschein.

A Fuehrerschein or Drivers' License is accepted in Germany as an official identification paper. Its owners do not need a Kennkarte. It has a purplish color and is printed on the same material as the Kennkarte. It contains the bearer's name, date and place of birth, and Photograph.

(10) The Arbeitsbuch

As all Germans were subject to the labor draft, it was necessary for these not exempted from work to have documentary evidence that they were holding their jobs with the approval of the governmental employment office. They were therefore issued the Arbeitsbuch or workbook. It contains the following: p. 1: name and signature, p. 2: date and place of birth, nationality, marital status, number of children, address, p. 2a: changes of address, p. 2b: labor and military service, p. 3: occupational training, p. 6-29: firm by which bearer is employed. The booklet is bound in a grey and brown cardboard cover. The print is brown. The booklet is usually kept by the employer.

(11) Other Official Documents.

In addition to the documents listed under 1-10, we can accept other identity cards issued by German authorities. They usually contain the bearer's photograph and have the stamp of the issuing office. In this category belong the Postauswelskarte, a small purplish card issued by the post offices, originally to enable people to identify themselves when claiming registered letters, cashing money orders etc., various Dienstauswerse, issued by governmental institutions (including the Reichsbahn, reichspost etc.) to its employees, and the Reichsarbeitsdienstausweis, issued to persons who have been in the labor service.

(12) Semi-official Identity Papers.

In the case of persons who cannot ordinarily be considered security threats (old men and women, children under 16), semi-official documents can be accepted. The most important of these is the Familien-Stammbuch. It is issued by the governmental marriage bureau or by the priest who performs the ceremony. The first entries into this booklet constitute the marriage certificate. Further entries register the birth of children and the death of any person covered by the document (parents and children). The Stammbuch contains the person's name and the date and place of birth. There are no photographs in it.

Another document falling into this category is the blue Haushalts-Pass. Certain rationed items were issued only upon the presentation of this card. It contains the names and year of birth of persons living in a given household.

(13) Police Directory's Certificate of Identity.

Any person unable to present any identification paper or who presents papers which cannot be considered satisfactory are to be sent to the Police Director of the city. There they will be issued an identity certificate provided that two witnesses have identified the subject. The certificate shows the bearer's fingerprint, the testimony of the witnesses, and the signature of the Police Director.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

APPENDIX 2

"Strength of Sixth Army Group CIC Units as of 31 October 1944"

	Officers	Agents	SM
Sixth Army Group CIC Detachment	2	0	1
307th CIC Det (Seventh Army)	12	29	4
206th CIC Det (VI Corps)	3	9	2
36th CIC Det (36th Inf Div)	1	5	1
3d CIC Det (3d Inf Div)	1	5	1
45th CIC Det (45th Inf Div)	2	4	1
215th CIC Det (XV Corps)	2	14	1
79th CIC Det (79th Inf Div)	2	14	1
2d French Armored Div	0	0	2
44th CIC Det (44th Inf Div)	2	5	0
Strength as of 31 October 1944	27	85	14

Note: The nine divisions of the First French Army serving under the Sixth Army Group had 23 Agents of SM serving with them. The 100th Infantry Division, with two officers and five Agents in its CIC Detachment, had landed at Marseilles, but was not yet on the line.

APPENDIX 3

"Strength of Sixth Army Group CIC Units as of 15 December 1944"

	Officers	Agents	SM
Sixth Army Group CIC Det	6	26	0
307th CIC Det (Seventh Army)	12	27	0
206th CIC Det (Sixth Corps)	3	8	0
215th CIC Det (Fifteenth Corps)	5	14	1
3d CIC Det (3d Inf Div)	3	2	1
512th CIC Det (12th Armd Div)	1	5	3
514th CIC Det (14th Armd Div)	2	4	0
36th CIC Det (36th Inf Div)	2	3	1
44th CIC Det (44th Inf Div)	2	5	1
45th CIC Det (45th Inf Div)	2	4	1
79th CIC Det (79th Inf Div)	2	11	1
100th CIC Det (100th Inf Div)	2	5	1
103d CIC Det (103d Inf Div)	2	5	1
44th AAA Brigade	1	4	1
Strength as of 15 December 1944	45	123	12

Note: There were 25 additional Agents of SM serving with the various French components of Sixth Army Group. The American 36th Infantry Division was, at this time, with the French First Army, but its strength report is here considered with the American units.

Appendix 4

Chart showing Espionage and Sabotage Agents Captured by Seventh Army CIC Detachments between 15 August and 31 December 1944

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Period	W/T Agent					Stay Behind W/Out W/T										Line Passers					Saboteurs						Adm.	Male	Female	Total	GrandTotal		Average Per Day
1944	French	Luxembourg	Dane	Abw.	S.D.	French	German	White Russian	Dane	Swiss	Dutch	Canadian	Abw.	S.D.		French	German	Abw.	S.D.		French	Swiss	German	Abw.	S.D.	N.D.	Abw.						
15-31 Aug				0	0								0	0				0	0					0	0	0		0	0	0	0		.0
1-30 Sept	8	2		10	0	(2) 6		1					(2) 4	2	1			0	0	0				0	0	0		15	2	17	17		.57
1-15 Oct	3			3	0	(3) 11	(1) 2						(3) 10	(1) 3		1		0	1					0	0	0		13	4	17	34		1.13
15-31 Oct			1	1	0	(1) 4			(1) 1	1	1		(1) 2	(1) 5		1		1	0					0	0	0		7	2	9	43		.56
1-15 Nov				0	0	0							0	0		1		0	1		2	1		0	3	0		4	0	4	47		.27
15-30 Nov				0	0	(1) 7							2	3	(1) 2	1		1	0					0	0	0		7	1	8	55		.53
1-15 Dec	(1) 3			(1) 3	0	3							1	2		2	1	1	1	1	(1) 8		1	1		(1) 8	1	17	2	19	74		1.27
15-31 Dec				0	0	(1) 6				1		1	(1) 8	0		4		4										11	1	12	86		.75

NOTE: Number in parentheses is female, included in other number (i.e.)(2)

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XVIII

PROPERTY OF
US ARMY

THE LAST GERMAN OFFENSIVE

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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THE LAST GERMAN OFFENSIVE

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Part I

Ardennes Breakthrough

Chapter 1

THE GERMAN ATTACK

As the Kaiser's Army, in 1914, had sped through the Ardennes en route to Paris;[1] as Hitler's Army, in 1940, had attacked through the same forest on its way to the conquest of France;[2] so, on 16 December 1944, four German Armies, two of them Panzers, attacked U.S. VIII Corps, in a desperate push toward Antwerp and the North Sea. Inclement weather had permitted von Runstedt to assemble this huge force and to surprise the Allies.[3]

German Intelligence Service Plan Uncovered

In planning for the surprise attack through the Ardennes, the Nazis had counted heavily upon a brigade, designated as the 150th Panzer Brigade, organized by the German Intelligence Service (GIS), dressed in U.S. uniforms and equipped with captured U.S. weapons and jeeps. One segment, named the Einheit Stielau after the Lieutenant who commanded it, was to be the espionage, sabotage and "confusion" arm. This whole plan was authored by Otto Skorzeny, who had attained a reputation of omniscience among the German High Command by his rescue of Mussolini in November 1943.[4] However, a series of events robbed this maneuver of much of its surprise value.

For several months, U.S. troops had been made increasingly aware of the danger posed by German soldiers in U.S. uniform. From about the middle of August, individual German soldiers had dressed themselves in parts of U.S. uniforms taken from the dead or captured, and had stolen jeeps to add mobility to their ruse. These practices were largely the products of individual initiative and, as such, were carried out on a small scale. Since the incidents were scattered and were few in number (although both the Sixth Army Group and the Twelfth Army Group did experience similar occurrences), not much importance had been attached to them.[5]

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1 World Wars and Revolution, Walter Phelps Hall, 2d Edition, Appleton-Century-Crofts, N.Y., 1947, pp. 41-43.

2 Ibid, p. 335.

3 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Co., N.Y., 1951, Chapter 21, "Counter Offensive."

4 An account of the organization and work of the 150th Panzer Brigade is attached as Appendix 1, entitled, "Agents in the Ardennes."

5 7th U.S. Army Staff Section Daily Rpts (DR), 1-15 Oct 44, in L-1136 (14) Annex 20, G2 CIC Staff Section Rpts, 15 Aug 59 31 Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), and, ADSEC COM Z, CIC Information Bulletin #7, dtd 20 Oct 44, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

About twice a week, during November, the Intelligence Officer of the 37th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had sent English-speaking Germans on long-range reconnaissance patrols to gain U.S. order of battle information. Late in November, a four-man German patrol, captured by troops of the 83d Infantry Division, stated their mission was to remain behind Allied lines for four days, tapping telephone wires. Components of the First, Third and Ninth U.S. Armies suspected they had been the victims of German wire-tapping efforts. On two occasions, investigation revealed, the Germans had tried unsuccessfully to secure specific information by identifying themselves as "the switchboard chief from 'Conquer'," and "a Staff Sergeant from 'Justice'."[6]

In mid-November, a prisoner of war had stated, under interrogation, that he had seen a secret order for all English-speaking personnel and all captured U.S. uniforms to be sent to Osnabrueck, Germany. According to the order, these personnel would be trained in reconnaissance, sabotage, and espionage.

Two German military documents captured at about the same time substantiated the prisoner's revelations. They indicated that a call for volunteers had been issued early in November which outlined the necessary qualifications. In addition to the knowledge of English, "including the American dialect," volunteers were to be physically fit, mentally alert, competent in close combat fighting, and suitable for special assignments. They were to have a knowledge of military terminology. Significantly, they could not be retained by their units for military reasons. From these volunteers, the documents revealed, a special unit would be formed, about two battalions in strength, for deployment on the Western Front.

Prior to acceptance by this new unit, each volunteer would be tested "for suitability at Friedenthal, near Orianienburg (Headquarters Skorzeny)...." This information was disclosed in a letter from the Headquarters of the LXXXVI Corps to their Paratroop Regiment Hubner. The letter stated further that "Captured clothing, equipment, weapons, and vehicles will be utilized for the equipment of these special troops."

The only discrepancy between the prisoner's statement and the documents was in the destination of the volunteers and articles. Clearly, the destination was not Osnabrueck, but "...Headquarters Skorzeny."[7]

Finally, early on the day of the attack, 16 December 1944, secret orders outlining the plans for Operation Greif (English translation: Grab) were found by

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6. NOTE:- Conquer was a code name for Ninth U.S. Army; Justice is believed to have been the code name for XIII Corps.
7. Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, pp. 7-8, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library).

troops of the 106th Infantry Division on the body of a German officer of the 116th Panzer Division, who had carried them into the front lines, despite a directive that, below division level, they were to be transmitted only verbally. These orders were dated the previous day.

Now all doubts as to the German plans for deception were erased. Before the end of the first day of the attack, the word could be flashed to all subordinate units that the Germans planned to operate, in the strength of two battalions, an organization of English-speaking German soldiers, dressed and equipped as U.S. troops. Even the roads they would take and their means of identifying their comrades were known. The following partial translation of the order was carried in First Army's widely distributed Periodic Report:

"Undertaking Greif will be made by our forces with American equipment, American weapons, American vehicles, American insignias -- especially the five-pointed white or yellow star may be painted on the vehicles.

"To avoid confusion with enemy troops, the forces employed in the Undertaking Greif will identify themselves to our troops:

During the day -- by taking off their helmets
By night -- by red-blue light signals with flashlights.

"Forces of the Undertaking Greif will also identify themselves to friendly troops by painting white dots on houses, trees and roads used by them."[8]

Increased Security Measures

Although higher echelons of U.S. Intelligence had been skeptical of the enemy's capability to summon a force of the size and scope indicated by the prisoner and documents captured in mid-November, First Army's G2 Estimate had warned: "...Their potential threat as infiltration units needs no stressing,"[9] and CIC had used this potential threat as a basis for improving the security of installations and towns in the forward areas.

CIC had given widespread publicity to each uncovered case of enemy troops in U.S. Army uniforms and civilian disguises through counterintelligence publications

8 1st U.S. Army G2 Periodical Rpt #190, dtd 17 Dec 44 in 12th Army Group G2 Periodical Rpts, L-320.0 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, Annex 4, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

9 G2 Estimates and Periodic Rpts, FUSA, for Dec 44 in L-496 (1A), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

and during security lectures, providing a background of knowledge for U.S. troops which ultimately proved its worth.

Informal phases of security education were being exploited also. Ninth Army CIC, for example, conducted a poster campaign in the XIX Corps rest area. This proved a valuable method for alerting troops to their security responsibilities.

Much CIC effort had been expended on various types of security checks. Front line divisions, growing increasingly wary of the authenticity that a U.S. uniform loaned its wearer, initiated spot checks of all vehicles forward of regimental command posts and of personnel in the mess-lines.[10]

Some divisions had anticipated the problem of the counterfeit uniform. Particularly prudent was the counterintelligence alert negotiated by the 29th Infantry Division on 5 December in which the 29th CIC cooperated.

Created expressly to guard against an invasion by U.S. - uniformed enemy troops, this alert lasted long enough for recurrent checks to be made. As a result, troops of the Division became highly security conscious and, even after the alert was over, a uniformed straggler, finding himself in 29th Division area, would be detained and turned over to the authorities.[11]

Travel and Frontier Control

By early December, travel and frontier control systems had improved throughout the 12th Army Group area. A complicated network of roadblocks, check points and control points, supplemented with roving patrols between the stationary posts "...seriously affected...the German Intelligence Service line-crossing operations."[12]

The mainstays of the frontier control line were the ADSEC CIC Sections assigned to First Army and employed on the Counter Intelligence Control Line which functioned along the German frontier.

Behind this line and assisting it were the other CIC teams which had been assigned definite territories to the rear of the Armies. These teams, too, were under ADSEC supervision. Shortly before the enemy offensive began, these teams were directed to establish, in conjunction with Belgian and French authorities, an

10 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9 for period 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 15 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

11 29th CIC Det CI Rpt for period 4 Dec - 20 Dec 44, dtd 20 Dec 44 in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

12 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9 for 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 15 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

"Identity control line" in the ADSEC territory. Frequent checks of identification at crossroads, bridges, cafes, and hotels tightened security.[13]

In the Ninth Army area, 364 indigenous guards from several pre-war Netherland's governmental agencies and from resistance groups formed during the German occupation were used to man posts and patrols.

In the Third Army area, frontier control was relatively porous, for the situation had been less stable than in other sectors. Three captured Abwehr agents had told their Seventh Army captors that long-term agents going to the interior of France were being instructed to advance via Nancy and Toul, rather than risk apprehension in places where traffic was controlled more severely.

Reinforcement of the security produced by the Counter Intelligence Control Line was effected through the strict regulation of travel for the civilian population. In most territories, local civilians were permitted limited travel during specific hours. Farmers could harvest their crops by daylight. Special passes were provided by Military Government and Civil Affairs officials. Persons caught moving about after curfew or wandering along unauthorized routes were held suspect of subversive activity and detained until investigation proved their innocence. Initial violators of travel restrictions were punished harshly so that their cases might serve "...as a deterrent to others." CIC aided Military Government in the prosecution of these cases.

This web of restriction and interlacing checks often entangled German soldiers who wore civilian clothing behind the lines. These German soldiers in civilian clothes could have been sentenced as spies, but policy dictated otherwise. To encourage the desertion of German soldiers, Twelfth Army Group had established a procedure by which German soldiers in civilian clothes were to be treated individually, the disposition of each suspect depending on his behavior during interrogation and on his distance behind the lines at the time of his arrest.

Thirty-one German soldiers in civilian clothes who had been arrested in the first fifteen days of December by CIC units of the Ninth Army were handled in accordance with this policy, and all were evacuated through prisoner of war channels.[14]

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13 ADSEC COM Z Operational History (G2 Operations) 1943-1945, ADM583c (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

14 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #9 for period 1-15 Dec 44, dtd 15 Dec 44, L-320, p. 1, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

CIC Agents Fight for Their Lives

Although the gradual discovery of the German Intelligence Service plan of deception, climaxed by the capture of the plans for Operation Greif on the first day of the German offensive, destroyed the effectiveness of this maneuver, the actual offensive which came to be known as the Battle of the Bulge, did catch the Allies by surprise.

In the resultant situation, many CIC Agents bearing the double burden of counterintelligence duties and combat, fought shoulder-to-shoulder with other U. S. soldiers. For example, half of Tractical Reserve Team No. 3 (TRT #3) of the 418th CIC Detachment, under command of 2d Lt. Kenneth Hardin, fought an invading force of German parachutists that descended on Bardenburg, in the Ninth U.S. Army area, on the first night of the German offensive, and by daylight, began attacking installations in the town itself and firing on traffic on the road. Lieutenant Hardin and Agents Edward E. McCarthy, Charles N. Short, Vincent Cleary, James H. Ratliff and Ferdinand Goetz directed and participated in skirmishing that resulted in rounding up twenty-four enemy paratroops. One paratrooper was captured by a TRT #3 Agent. Thirty-one German soldiers in civilian clothes also were rounded up.[15]

Some Detachments Overrun

Other CIC Detachments were less fortunate, for the swift German advance caused some to be overrun. In these instances, counterintelligence was of lesser importance than self-preservation.

Among the less fortunate units was the 99th CIC Detachment. Eight Agents of this Detachment were awakened on the morning of 17 December by the sound of fire from "burp" guns. Lt. Howard V. Stephens, in charge, issued an order for everyone to obtain weapons and to prepare to defend the house in which they were quartered. A seemingly endless line of German tanks appeared on the road, and an interpreter, who had been a scout for one of the regiments before joining CIC, volunteered to seek a way out for the group. By the time he returned with the news that the rear was open, German tanks were in front of the house, and CIC Agents held their breaths when one of the tank leaders poked the muzzle of his "88" into a window. The Agents, with the scout in the lead, scampered out the back way, dodging from shell hole to gun emplacement hole. In the dash toward freedom, the group split, and four went ahead with the scout while four others were pinned down in one hole by small arms fire. In the latter group, Lieutenant

15 Unit History of CIC Det #418, Tactical Reserve Team #3, p. 4, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library); and 12th Army Group Rpt of Operations, Vol. IV, p. 114, (Restricted), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Stephens and Agents Charles Sloan, Francis Cody, and Vic Gardin each took a corner of the gun emplacement hole.

Sloan cried out as mortar fire shattered tree branches over-hanging the ditch. Gardin crawled over to him, while Cody checked Lt. Stephens, who had not made a sound for some time. Stephens appeared to be dead. Cody, also wounded, then crawled over to Gardin and Sloan, whose back and one leg had been hit.

Cody and Gardin decided to leave Lieutenant Stephens and Sloan, who could not be moved, and try to get help from headquarters. They made Sloan as comfortable as possible, and left. Not far from the spot, they noticed a group of soldiers coming toward them. Convinced they were caught, Gardin waved part of his clothing on a twig in a gesture of surrender.

The group turned out to be U.S. soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division which was moving up. Medics with them gave Cody first aid and sent him to the First Aid Tent. Gardin and the medics returned to Lieutenant Stephens and Sloan, but found them dead.[16]

16 Interview with Francis J. Cody, NCICA Convention, Chicago, Ill., 8 Aug 54.

Chapter 2

CI CONTROL LINE THWARTS GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

After the discovery, on the first day of the German offensive, that the Nazis planned to send large numbers of agents in U.S. uniform through the line as a part of this same maneuver, increased security consciousness and intensified counterintelligence efforts were experienced all along the American front. Before the German attack, military security had been uniformly satisfactory, but the German push made it better than ever.[17]

Immediately, Third Army After-Action Report noted "...the Counter Intelligence Control Line assumed an even more important role, for it represented the only existing cohesive means of preventing mass infiltration by enemy agents."

Third Army's travel control had been less effective than that of the other Armies on the line, but now tighter restrictions were enforced. "By the end of December, a well-organized and coordinated Counter Intelligence Control Line was functioning in all four Corps..."[18]

The ADSEC Counter Intelligence Control Line in the First Army area at Division straggler level was severed in the initial stages of the German thrust, but smaller, supporting networks of counterintelligence checkpoints and control posts remained fairly effective.

The aggressive intelligence and sabotage activities of the enemy called for the quick mobilizing of all available counterintelligence resources to meet the situation. Intensive checking of identity documents at bridges and defiles; reinforced guards for vital installations; the posting of a Counter Intelligence Control Line along all roads on the east side of the Meuse River which led to bridges; screening of refugees and displaced persons before allowing them to proceed--these were among the immediate counterintelligence measures that were instituted.[19]

ADSEC CIC Sections, even in areas not effected by the German advance, were recalled from frontier control positions to aid in the patrolling of the Meuse from Givet, France to Vise, Belgium.[20] They discovered that, even

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17 Bi-weekly CI Rpt #10, Hq ADSEC, dtd 9 Jan 45, p. 10, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

18 3d Army After-Action Rpts, 1944-45, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

19 Bi-weekly CI Rpt #10, Hq ADSEC, dtd 9 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

20 Monthly Information Rpt, Det #421, Sec B, CIC Hqs ADSEC, dtd 20 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library); and ADSEC COM Z Operational History (G2 Operations) 1943-45, ADM583c, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

as the German Army was pouring into the Ardennes, 250 Liege Communists held a meeting at Cinema Carrefour, Boulevard de la Sauveniere. Speakers indicated they would make another attempt to overthrow the provisional Pierlot Government and soon would begin a propaganda campaign by means of printed literature. ADSEC CIC made note of this continuance of Communist subversion.[21]

The Second Day: CIC Work Increases

By the afternoon of 17 December, the enemy had committed fourteen divisions into battle, half of them Panzers. U.S. units from reserve areas and the Third Army maneuvered to stem the drive and to bolster weakened forces. The main thrust of the German drive, on the northern flank, was blocked by the First Army. The attack on the center of the line was more successful, and the enemy had inflicted heavy losses on the 28th Infantry Division and the 106th Infantry Division by the end of the second day.

The tempo of counterintelligence work increased. For the first time in the European conflict, CIC was carrying out its mission in a withdrawal situation.

The 82d CIC summed up its counterintelligence tasks as follows in its Monthly Intelligence Report:

"The detachment resumed work in the combat area.... The enemy push.... created again a major civilian problem.... CIC Agents were attached to regiments and established at strategic road control points.... Initially, the organized evacuation of civilians could not be undertaken because of the fluid front....

"Enemy use of American uniforms, vehicles and other equipment resulted in redoubled security efforts, including the interrogation of....all men in American uniforms who could not produce positive identification.

"The questioning of civilians fleeing the front lines resulted in the collection of positive intelligence which was passed on to G2...."[22]

The Third Day: First Einheit Stielau Men Captured

The third day, 18 December, was highlighted for CIC by the first capture of members of Skorzeny's U.S. - uniformed and equipped Einheit Stielau. Three

21 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #12, for period 16-31 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

22 Hqs, 82d Airborne Division, Monthly Intelligence Rpt, AC of S, G2, dtd 31 Dec 44, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

men in an American jeep, detained by a Military Policeman at Aywaille when they were unable to give the password, turned out to be Officer Candidate Gunther Billing, Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, and Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt. Interrogation revealed that they had been operating in the First Army area for just thirty minutes, having crossed the front lines at Stumont.

They were dressed in the costume of the 150th Panzer Brigade: U.S. Army uniforms. They were without field jackets and leggings, and only one wore the regulation belt. Their military-type identification papers were fairly complete; yet they had no personal documents. They carried German soldbuchs. Each had a U. S. .45-calibre pistol, and their jeep's equipment included two portable radios, two machine pistols of the British "Stenn" type, a German Walter pistol, and six German egg-shaped hand grenades, in addition to U.S. rations and ammunition.

Further querying at the First Army Interrogation Center, to which the group was rushed by Agents of the 301st CIC Detachment, produced information concerning the strength of the German Intelligence Service in uniform. The prisoners estimated the strength of the brigade to be 700 to 1,000. Subsequent reports, however, indicate that 3,000 to 3,300 men, with a combat strength of 2,400 would be a more accurate estimate of the brigade's strength. The captives said that there were 150 linguists in the brigade, whose specific mission was to spearhead the German armored attack and cause confusion among retreating American troops.

The Einheit Stielau, as they described it, was not a closely knit group. It consisted of jeep teams of three or four Germans disguised as American officers and enlisted men. In addition to those who worked in conjunction with the armored units, other teams were specialists in demolitions and in communications sabotage. Still other teams had long range reconnaissance and sabotage missions.

While SS Lt. Col. Hardieck was the nominal leader of the Brigade, the prisoners named SS Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny as the true leader of the operation. Later reports indicate that Hardieck was killed on the first day of the battle and Skorzeny assumed nominal as well as actual leadership of the brigade.

Their account of their training and outfitting showed they had undergone intensive preparation for their task, one which the German Intelligence Service evidently considered of the utmost importance to the success of the entire counteroffensive.

Of the three, Officer Candidate Billing was the most disaffected. He said, "I did not have any other choice. I had to obey orders or they would have shot me."

Unteroffizier Pernass, the driver and the poorest linguist, claimed, "I could have avoided our capture by the MP's but I wanted to sabotage our sabotage mission because I want the Americans to conquer."

Most laconic and most honest was Obergefreiter Schmidt's statement: "I admit that what I did was unfair."

The three were tried by a Military Court and found guilty. They were executed on 23 December 1944.[23]

The news of the capture of the first team from the Einheit Stielau was publicized widely. Any slight irregularity became reason for suspicion. The 301st CIC, which officially had arrested Billing's team, rounded up three Belgians who were in possession of articles of U.S. military clothing and a German soldier who claimed to be a deserter. All four were considered "potential enemy agents" until later investigations proved that none were of counterintelligence interest.[24]

CIC, of course, could not be concerned if four or, as happened at CIC Frontier Control Station No. 5 near Wintringen, forty-eight persons were inconvenienced by detention until they were cleared ultimately of counterintelligence suspicions.[25]

The Fourth Day: Assassination Plot Revealed

At 2310 on 19 December, an American jeep was stopped at a control point near a large bridge over the Meuse River. A Military Policeman from the 769th MP Battalion, in the presence of Agents from the 301st CIC Detachment, challenged the occupants and asked for the pass word. "Stamp," replied the officer seated to the right of the driver.

Although the correct answer had been supplied, the MP continued to investigate the authenticity of the passengers. He asked for the vehicle's trip ticket. Several were offered, all blank. Warily, he watched the passengers while he and the CIC Agents searched the vehicle. Their curiosity reaped dividends. German

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23 Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library), p. 4, 11 & 26; 12th Army Group CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), p. 21, 23; 1st U.S. Army Periodical G2 Rpt #192, Annex 2, dtd 19 Dec 44, in 1st U.S. Army IPW Rpt, 19 Dec 44, in FUSA G2 Journal & File, 17 - 18 Dec 44, L-999 (9), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and Skorzeny's Secret Missions, by Otto Skorzeny, translated by Jacques Le Clerq, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1950, p.227. NOTE: Details of the 150th Panzer Brigade and the Einheit Stielau are contained in "Agents in the Ardennes," attached as Appendix 1.

24 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

25 4th CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 17 Dec 44, in 4th Inf Div G2 Journal, dtd 16 - 19 Dec 44, 304-23 (28588), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

weapons and explosives were discovered, and the CIC Agents arrested the four occupants, all members of the Einheit Stielau. They were searched immediately. Beneath their jackets, they wore swastika armbands -- their method of identifying themselves to their German cohorts. The vehicle's markings, although correct, were freshly painted and roughly done. The name of the leader was Lt. Gunther Schulz. His co-riders included Lt. Karl Heinz Weisenfeld, Stabsgefreiter Hans Reich, and Feldwebel Manfred Browny.

The four were taken to the First Army Interrogation Center where CIC Agents and other interrogation specialists, questioned them further.[26]

Schulz proved a talkative fellow. He declared that the main effort of the German drive was toward the Meuse between Namur and Liege, and that U.S. troops could expect the dropping of a paratroop regiment at a critical time, in Leige, when SS[27] columns were advancing on that city. He named bridges to be reconnoitered by his team and later seized. Approximately seventy tanks, some captured American models as well as German tanks camouflaged to resemble U. S. armor, had the mission, according to Schulz, of exploiting a break-through, moving at night, going into the woods during the day while English-speaking soldiers reconnoitered American positions for an attack the following afternoon.

While outlining the objectives and tactics of the Einheit Stielau, Schulz made a startling statement. The prisoner said he had learned from the late SS Lt. Col. Hardieck that at an officer meeting in early December, Skorzeny had been given the mission of entering SHAEF headquarters in Paris to assassinate the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and other high ranking officials. Schulz said Skorzeny was to pass through France with fifty to sixty men, most of them attired in U.S. uniforms. Some, however, would be in German uniforms, pretending to be captured high-ranking German officers. Schulz named those who would be in the party and said that the group would rendezvous at the Cafe de la Paix or at the Cafe de L'Epee in Paris, where collaborators would join them and supply pertinent information.[28]

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26 Bi-Weekly CI Rpt #11, Hq ADSEC, dtd 9 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff & Faculty Lib.); 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff & Faculty Library); 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); 1st U.S. Army G2 Periodical Rpt #193, dtd 20 Dec 44, in Incl 2 to VII Corps G2 Periodical Rpt #299, L-555 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and CI Newssheet #12, Part II, dtd 26 Dec 44 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

27 The Schutz Staffeln, popularly called SS, was the "Protective Guard" of the Nazi Party.

28 1st U.S. Army G2 Periodical Rpt #193, dtd 20 Dec 44, in Incl 2 to VII Corps G2 Periodical Report #299, L-555, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10 for peric 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Skorzeny: A synopsis

To those who had heard the name Skorzeny before -- and, by December 1944, everyone in counterintelligence must have -- this fantastically bold plan seemed wholly believable.

For every war plant destroyed by the resistance groups in France and Denmark, Skorzeny's saboteurs had destroyed one factory devoted to the production of civilian commodities in those countries. He had engineered the rescue of Mussolini and the kidnapping of Admiral Horthy of Hungary. His successes (of which there were few) and his blunderings (of which there were many) were all spectacular. The tall scar-faced Austrian had risen quickly among Nazi leaders until, by December 1944, he could by-pass Schellenberger and report only to Himmler and Kaltenbrunner, head of the Reich Office of State Security (RHSA). Skorzeny was believed capable of any action, no matter how unethical, and counterintelligence experts looked upon the allegations of Lt. Gunther Schulz as highly credible.[29]

Schulz' information was passed on immediately, with the warning that the assassination party "...may carry concealed capsules of acid to facilitate escape..." and that they "...may be in staff cars, civilian cars, Command and Reconnaissance cars, as well as jeeps."[30]

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29 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10 for period 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and Skorzeny's Secret Missions, by Otto Skorzeny, translated by Jacques Le Clerq, E.P.Dutton & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1950, pp. 238-250. NOTE: Although this was the "first substantial report of the Skorzeny assassination plan, an earlier hint may have been given by one of the captives of the day before (Billing's team) since Omar N. Bradley reports in A Soldier's Story that Eisenhower "...drove into the chilly caserne from Versailles in a heavy bulletproof car. CIC had insisted on the precaution after reports reached SHAEF that Skorzeny had dispatched a squad of assassins to hunt down the Supreme Allied Commander." Bradley, Patton, and Eisenhower -- in their books -- verify that this meeting occurred on the morning of 19 Dec 44, some 13 hours before Schulz's capture at Liege. However, Eisenhower, in Crusade in Europe, states: 'The story of the assassination attempt was brought to me on December 20 by a very agitated American Colonel who was certain that he had complete and positive proof..." The reports available and used by this history indicate the 20th as the date SHAEF was notified.

30 Record of telephone call from 1st Army to SHAEF, dtd 20 Dec 44, in FUSA G2 Journal, L-555, 19-20 Feb 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Paris Dons the CI Cloak

Reports from the front lines to SHAEF Headquarters in Paris travelled fast; probably few reports produced such instantaneous repercussions as the news of an impending attempt on the lives of high Allied military commanders. Forty-three roadblocks were set up to obstruct mobile traffic. Innumerable checkpoints and identity check raids made the civilian population wary and limited their movement to necessities. The alleged meeting-places of the assassins, the Cafe de la Paix and the Cafe de l'Epee, were placed under continuous surveillance by CIC Agents.

For some time Lt. Col. Baldwin B. Smith, who bore a remarkable resemblance to the Supreme Allied Commander, impersonated General Eisenhower, riding from the General's residence in St. Germaine to SHAEF Headquarters in Paris each morning and returning each evening.

From this time on until after the reduction of the Bulge, one of CIC's major worries was that an assassination attempt would be made. There was never any reason to believe that the plan was not "...an enemy capability,"[31] and CIC continued to gather additional information on the plot from captured agents.

Hitler Jugend: Problem Children

With the arrest of line crossers Albrecht Heck and Karl Limburg by 2d CIC Detachment, also on the fourth day, the problem of the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth), previously only suspected, became a real one. These youths related much about this fanatical para-military organization of adolescents and pre-adolescents.

Both boys were from Butenbach, members of the Hitler Youth movement for several years. Through one Walter Dennis, a Stammfuehrer[32] of Malmedy for several years, they said they had received instructions: to throw nails upon the highways to harrass Allied motor traffic; to save small arms and ammunition and keep the supplies in hiding until they could attack American soldiers; and to gather and forward information about American troops and equipment.

Stammfuehrer Dennis, the boys said, gave his orders to the Scharfuehrer[33] in Butenbach to pass on to certain trusted members of his Schar. Information was to be returned through the same persons, if possible.

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31 Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library); and The Washington Post, Tuesday, May 22, 1945.

32 Stammfuehrer: Leader of a specific geographical area of the Hitler Jugend movement.

33 Scharfuehrer: Leader of a smaller geographical area, a neighborhood or district.

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Counterintelligence investigators wondered "...whether Dennis received orders from a higher authority...? Further, whether he had any system of communication with the Germans...and...how widespread would be the use of the Hitler Jugend organization?"

The 2d CIC Detachment had trapped in its travel control net two youths, and had uncovered "the first positive indication that subversive activities are encouraged by the Hitler Youth, and that the former organizational structure is being employed in part to give leadership to these activities."[34]

The First Army still held the northern flank of the salient, but the German drive through the center of the forest persisted. Civilians from the forward areas were on the roads and in the woods, evacuating the battle zones. As they moved rearward, civilians in that area became apprehensive about the German advance. In Sourbrodt, Belgium, members of the 1st CIC Detachment were on 24-hour duty checking identifications of all persons entering the region. Agents attended a conference with Civil Affairs and Military Government representatives, at which Gendarmerie Chief Eugene Bourton reported that a number of civilians, fearing an advance by the enemy into their locale, were preparing to evacuate. Bourton was instructed by CIC to calm the people and order them to remain.[35]

The fears of the civilians were based on the belief "that the Germans, remembering the activities of the resistance groups during their retreat in August and September, would impose drastic measures of revenge..." on the territories they re-conquered.[36]

All CIC units remained alert to the various types of security threats, turning over petty violators to local authorities.[37]

The Fifth Day: Einheit Stielau Increases Activity

Little changed in the tactical situation on the fifth day except that VII Corps of First Army had been regrouped and was capable of counterattacking. At noon on 20 December, however, the First and Ninth Armies came under control of the British 21st Group, headed by Montgomery, and offensive plans were postponed.[38]

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34 1st Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

35 1st CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 20 Dec 44 in 301-2.2 (22292), 1st Inf Div G2 Journal, 21-23 Dec 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

36 Bi-Weekly CI Rpt #10, Hq ADSEC, dtd 25 Dec 44, (SECRET), (Staff & Faculty Lib).

37 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

38 A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951) Chapter 21.

ADSEC Com Z CIC personnel, whose control line had been disrupted in the first day of the German counteroffensive, had been regrouped, stationed at control points, and assigned to roving patrols. As of noon, 20 December, the ADSEC teams in First Army area had become part of the British 21st Army Group. This did not hamper CIC operations in progress. It worked well for ADSEC for, in addition to forty-five Military Intelligence Interpreter personnel from 12th Army Group, these Agents were permitted control of seven British Field Security Sections.

The main tasks of the Meuse River Control Line included: screening refugees and permitting none but frontaliers to cross the river; halting all civilian traffic crossing the river, with a few vital exceptions; complete checking of identifications of all civilians and military personnel; suspension of ferry and boat service; maintenance of 24-hour security posts by CIC, Military Police, and tactical troops; and questioning suspects and persons of questionable identity at small interrogation centers at each bridge post. [39]

Twelfth Army Group had received numerous reports by this time of suspicious telephone calls which possibly were made over tapped lines by enemy personnel.[40] As a result, all communication at Liege and Namur was suspended at the request of ADSEC, the Allied Censorship Group, and the SHAEF mission to Belgium. Reports of paratroop invasions were investigated with negative results. Guards were doubled at vital installations as a sabotage precaution.[41]

Security control of civilians after the beginning of the German push was difficult due to the increasing droves of refugees who had come westward from Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. These refugees were held along the Meuse River Line until screened, then sent southward out of the tactical zone to avoid jamming military roads. CIC, together with Military Police and Civil Affairs personnel, handled the situation as it developed.[42]

Many persons foreign to the tactical area who were found in these refugee streams, required special interrogation. For example, according to an ADSEC report, "Displaced Polish nationals arriving at the Civil Affairs Displaced Persons'

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39 ADSEC COM Z Operational History (G2 Operations) 1943-1945, ADM583c, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia)

40 Annex 1 to G2 Periodical Rpt #43, Hq XIII Corps, dtd 20 Dec 44, in FUSA G2 Journal and File, 21-22 Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

41 ADSEC COM Z Operational History (G2 Operations) 1943-1945, ADM583c, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

42 BiWeekly CI Rpt #11, Hq ADSEC, dtd 9 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Camps in the Namur.../ were /...screened by the Namur CIC Detachment. During the screening, three German soldiers and one German national were discovered, arrested and sent to a prisoner of war enclosure."[43]

In addition to their security control and screening duties at the Meuse River Control Line, ADSEC CIC personnel later operated a travel control line which extended from Huy, on the eastern bank of the river, to Tienen (or Thienen), which guarded the approach to Brussels, the Belgian capital, and Antwerp, the seaport. This travel control line was approximately perpendicular to the Meuse River at the middle of the Namur-Liege base line.

CIC supervised Belgian police and Military Police who were making identity spot checks on highways, in cafes and in hotels. This travel control line added several miles to the depth of the Meuse River Control Line.[44]

Einheit Stielau Increases Activity

Another sign of the increased activity of the Einheit Stielau appeared at the end of the fifth day. Two German jeep teams, spotted on the enemy side of the line by troops of the 99th Infantry Battalion near Stavelot, were destroyed by fire from 75mm guns. One of the bodies was recovered by U.S. troops for verification.[45]

Further indications that the 150th Panzer Brigade was in the forward areas were added when three other Germans from the 5th Company, Special Parchute Regiment of the 2d Combat Group, were captured in the Heppenbach area. Wounded when taken prisoner, they were sent to the Field Hospital and later to a General Hospital.

Only one, Alfred Franz, alias American Corporal Ted Darland, was wearing a U.S. uniform. Ralph Jesch and Henry Pepetz, captured with him, however, wore German uniforms, and after being cared for medically, were tried by a U.S. Military Commission, acquitted, and evacuated as prisoners of war.

Franz was also tried, and found guilty.[46]

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43 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library), p. 63.

44 Bi-Weekly CI Rpt #11, Hq ADSEC, dtd 9 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff & Faculty Lib.).

45 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), p. 25; and Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library), p. 63.

46 Annex 4, Ibid; and 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), pp. 15, 16.

A Scharfuehrer Netted

The campaign against the Belgian Hitler Youth went on, Josef Sonnet, a Hitler Jugend Scharfuehrer from Butgenbach, was arrested by 2d CIC Detachment and charged with espionage and sabotage. Sonnet had informed Stammfuehrer Walter Dennis[47] of artillery positions and numbers of American troops and trucks in the area. Dennis, the leader of the whole Hitler Jugend organization in Butgenbach, was safe from the 2d CIC's vigilance because he was in German-held territory.[48]

Reports of German Intelligence Service Activity Circulated

As one countermeasure to the German Intelligence Service deception, a constant flow of information, aimed at uncloaking the disguised enemy, was fully circulated throughout the American sector. Some of the information, like the following excerpt from an Army Group report, discussed mannerisms:

"Prisoners have stated that the enemy has established certain methods of identifying German troops in American uniform. Germans will wear pink or blue scarfs and the top button of the blouse or overcoat will be left unbuttoned. To identify themselves...they...will knock twice on their helmets, and their vehicles will have the letter "C" or "D" on the left side of the hood. ...Enemy troops have been found to carry a small vial of sulphuric acid. These containers might well be overlooked in a cursory search, thus leaving the enemy with a valuable weapon for throwing in the face of his captor to facilitate escape or to commit further sabotage on the way to the PW Cages."[49]

Advice was given to those who would have contact with the invading force. Types of questions to ask suspected persons were suggested. Some of the suggestions included: "What is the password and the reply?" "What staging area did you pass through in the States?" "What is the price of an air mail stamp? Of a V-mail stamp?" "What is Sinatra's first name?"[50]

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47 Previously mentioned in this Chapter.

48 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

49 12th Army Group G2 Periodic Rpt, 22 Dec 44, L-320.0 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia), NOTE: According to one report, the vials contained hydrocyanic acid.

50 G2 Periodical Rpt #188, Hq XIX Corps, dtd 21 Dec 44, in FUSA G2 Journal and File, L-555, 21-22 Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

The Sixth Day: 150 Panzer Brigade Makes Try

The enemy continued to push westward in the Ardennes forest, but on the sixth day, 21 December, Patton's Third Army arrived to attack the bulging salient, toward Bastogne.[51] On this day also, the 150th Panzer Brigade made its first and last attack as an entity. CIC could justifiably claim a vital role in the defeat of this brigade, through wide-apread publicity given to the probabilities of such a plan and to the security education of troops which they had carried out.

Elaborate plans had been made for the mission of the 150 Panzer Brigade, which was to strike in the Malmedy area with jeep teams at their head. Only the Second and Third Combat Groups were designated to take part, as the First Combat Group was in another area to the rear.

The Second Combat Group was to attack from the southeast; the Third, from the southwest. Jeep teams of the Second were assigned to approach a roadblock at a bridge leading to the town, simulating part of a U.S. unit which had been cut off. These teams were to neutralize the roadblock and thereby permit the rest of the group to take the objective.

They had proceeded only about three miles from Lignueville when they crossed into a mine field. The column halted, and American small arms fire and artillery zeroed in on them. The fire was devastating, and most of their highly prized, captured U.S. vehicles were destroyed. A few succeeded in withdrawing.

The Third Combat Group in the southwest, three miles from Malmedy, was forced into combat by alert American forces. Finding themselves savagely opposed, unable to practice their deception, this enemy group also suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment, including all their tanks. The commander, Captain von Foelkersam, was wounded.

Captured in the aftermath of the Second Combat Group's action was Gefreiter Otto Struller, one of the Einheit Stielau of the jeep lead teams. Struller, posing as Capt. Cecil Dryer or Pvt. Richard Bumgardner -- his AGO card had the first name and his "dog tags," the other -- was captured by troops of the 30th Infantry Division. He was immediately relinquished to 30th CIC.

A former ballet dancer, Struller chose to discuss his successes on the New York stage, but his interrogators were more interested in his failure in the Ardennes. He denied membership in Einheit Stielau or any organized band of English-speaking German soldiers, reiterating several times that he did not know with

51 A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt and Co., 1951) Chapter 21.

which unit he had served prior to his capture and disclaiming knowledge that there was any organized deception practiced by Germans masquerading as American soldiers with U.S. equipment. He explained that his mission was merely one of reconnaissance, not sabotage or espionage. He said he had heard of Skorzeny's assassination mission, adding that it was already under way. He was tried, convicted and executed.

Einheit Stielau member Josef Kania was captured, along with two soldiers of the Third Combat Group. These men also said they had knowledge of the Skorzeny assassination plan.

While most of these reports placed Skorzeny enroute to his objective, a later report established his presence in front of the Hotel du Moulin in Lingueville on 21 December. He had been wounded slightly by shrapnel near the right eye.[52]

1st CIC's First Hitler Jugend Arrest

While 2d CIC Detachment had learned, two days before, that Hitler Jugend members had been directed to collect arms and ammunition, it remained for the 1st CIC Detachment to establish that some, at least, had carried out the order. Members of the Battery with the 32d Field Artillery had questioned a small boy in the vicinity when a carbine which had been leaning against a barn suddenly disappeared. When he reacted suspiciously, they searched his home and found a small cache of miscellaneous military equipment; a search of the barn revealed the missing carbine and ammunition for it.

When they turned the boy, Klemmens Esser, over to CIC, he implicated his brother, Peter, and a friend, Kornell Cuepper. At about this time, Peter Esser had been wounded by German artillery fire and was in a U.S. Army Field Hospital. Eventually, the story developed that the three boys had been instructed by a German non-commissioned officer to aid Germany by stealing American supplies and equipment to give the Germans on their return.

An informant later accused Klemmens Esser of cutting American telephone wires, and the youth admitted it, saying, "I did it for Germany."

Before CIC turned the trio over to the Belgian authorities for re-education, Klemmens Esser led them to the main cache of ammunition. The young lad had

52 Periodic CI Rpt, Hq 30th Inf Div, dtd 27 Dec 44, in 218th CIC Detachment Periodic Rpts, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098); and 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia), pp. 17, 25; and Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library), pp. 66-68; and Skorzeny, op. cit. p. 247.

collected bayonets, .30 calibre ammunition, sixty-five hand grenades, and an assortment of other equipment.[53]

Civil Affairs and CIC

In Sarreguemines on 21 December, the sixth day of the attack, the combined efforts of Civil Affairs and the 303d CIC Detachment led to the capture of ninety-six deserters and the arrest of forty-six local Nazis and collaborators. A sound truck was sent about the city, broadcasting an appeal to the citizens to turn in deserters and to report mine locations.[54]

Some other CIC Detachments were not as fortunate in their relations with Civil Affairs. The problem of Civil Affairs lagging behind CIC units, which had begun in Sicily and by this time had become the rule rather than the exception, particularly plagued the 87th CIC Detachment. A recent arrival on the continent, the 87th CIC Detachment included in their first Counter Intelligence Report this statement:

"Despite the absence of Civil Affairs personnel in the area in which the detachment has operated, the civilian populace has remained under control.... Many of the functions that would have been performed by Civil Affairs officials have of necessity been performed by CIC Detachment personnel."

Each moment spent in the execution of Civil Affair's mission by CIC meant a proportionate decrease in the accomplishment of CIC's own task.[55]

The Seventh Day: Deceivers Are Deceived

Just as the announced plan of deception, widely publicized by CIC, had U.S. troops gazing warily at everything in olive drab, the same caution was exercised by German units who did not want to fire on their own men. The 1st Battalion of the 183d German Regiment, marching toward St. Vith on 22 December, shared this indecisive feeling. At a point where American forces ordinarily would have fired, five Sherman tanks in position along the side of the road remained silent. Breathing more easily in the belief that the tanks were manned by members of the 105th Panzer Brigade, the German Battalion resumed marching. When the column was

53 1st Inf Div CIC Rpt, dtd 24-25 Dec 44, in 1st Inf Div G2 Journal, 301-2.2 (22892) 30-31 Dec 44 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

54 Civil Affairs Weekly Bulletin, #28, dtd 21 Dec 44, Hq Third Army (CONFIDENTIAL), in 103d CIC Det History, Jun 43-Jan 45, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

55 Counter Intelligence Rpt #1, 87th CIC Det, 13-20 Dec 44, in 95th CIC Det Rpts File, Sep 44-Jun 45 (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

fully abreast of the tanks, the road suddenly rocked under the impact of the fire from the American armor. Fully half the battalion was killed or wounded; the remainder scattered in panic. The deceivers had become the deceived.[56]

Not all of CIC's work, even during the Battle of the Bulge, was in catching spies; routine duties also had to be taken care of. Among these were exaggerated rumors of the German advance. As a result of backtracking one such rumor, the 205th CIC Detachment captured and arrested Thomas Kuck and Louis Marechal who, having been released from prison in Malmedy during the German advance to seek asylum in the rear areas, had become self-appointed commentators. CIC turned them over to the Belgian authorities for further investigation and disposition.[57]

In Huy, Belgium, CIC neatly side-stepped a request by Front de l'Independence (FI) to be re-armed by advising them that it had no authority to grant such a request.[58] Elsewhere 301st CIC arrested a German soldier in civilian clothes and sent him through regular Prisoner of War channels.[59]

The Eighth Day: More Information Regarding Assassination Plot

The weather which had frozen Allied air power to the ground -- the cloudy skies, snow-filled and cold -- cleared suddenly, on 23 December, and new forms were seen in the sky as wave after wave of Allied aircraft added their weight to the battle.[60]

Frustrated in its tactical and long-range sabotage and espionage missions, the 150th Panzer Brigade sent seven of its members in U.S. uniform, on foot, behind American lines with the mission of locating a U.S. artillery battery near Geromont. Through conversations with the gun crew, the seven were to secure information concerning positions and intentions of the battery. The American artillerymen proved poor hosts and poorer quiz contestants, and the seven spies were detained and taken to the 30th CIC Detachment. This detachment rushed the group to the 301st CIC with the same speed with which the alert soldiers of the 117th U.S. Regiment had delivered the captives to them.

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56 VIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt #194, 28 Dec 44, in 1st U.S. Army G2 Journal and File, L-555 (17), 29 Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

57 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

58 Bi-Weekly CI Rpt #10, Hq ADSEC, dtd 25 Dec 44, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

59 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

60 A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley, (Henry Holt and Co., 1951), Chapter 21.

More information was gained concerning the Eisenhower assassination plot. Naval Sergeant Horst Goerlich said that he had heard Hardieck discussing the plan, which included the dropping of parachutists near Paris to aid the expedition. This statement added impetus to the threat since unconfirmed reports of parachutist droppings near Paris had been received on 20 December, three days before.

Acting Corporal Rolf Benjamin Meyer, alias Lt. Sammy Rosner, also substantiated previous versions of the plot, adding that the alleged assassins would have Nipolit, a plastic explosive, and specially manufactured poisoned ammunition.

Goerlich, Meyer and their five associates were executed on 30 December, four days after their sentence by a U.S. Military Commission. All seven had been members of the Einheit Stielau.[61]

Also, on 23 December, an Axis subject outside of the 150th Panzer Brigade revealed some knowledge of an "Eisenhower mission." An Italian prisoner of war from the Penal Colony of the 1st SS Division said that two German soldiers had told him of the plan. Except for the additional information that six trucks and British uniformed operatives would be used, his report was substantially the same as the others.[62]

Other intelligence agencies assisted in the development of information which would increase the probability of apprehending subsequent teams of these infiltration agents. Ordnance Intelligence, for example, determined that the money found on the captives was not counterfeit or else it was "...the best...ever seen." They also added to the fund of information about the jeeps used by the Einheit Stielau, by checking the vehicles. Among other equipment, the jeeps had especially built-in gasoline tanks.[63]

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61 12th Army Group Periodic Rpt #200, 22 Dec 44, in L-320.0, 12th Army Group Periodic Rpts (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia); and 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #10, 16-31 Dec 44, dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia), pp. 15, 16, 17, 26; and Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library), pp. 51, 52, and 67.

62 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library), p. 26.

63 Record of telephone conversation, 23 Dec 44, between Ordnance Intelligence and G2 1st Army in L-555, 1st U.S. Army G2 Journal and File, 23-29 Dec 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

The Ninth Day: Action Slows Perceptibly

Patton's Army drove a wedge toward Bastogne. The German advance continued in the center. All over the front, action slowed down perceptibly.

The ninth day, ending on Christmas Eve, yielded little of counterintelligence importance. The 301st CIC arrested two aliens in U.S. uniform, Russians who had been laboring for the U.S. Army. They were evacuated as displaced persons.[64]

The Tenth Day: Assassination Fears Wane

On Christmas Day, Patton's units steadily closed the breach between themselves and the 101st Airborne Division, stubbornly defending Bastogne.

Most counterintelligence specialists were growing increasingly skeptical of the rear area threat of assassination, but counterintelligence measures designed to protect key Allied leaders remained in force. Even the Commanding General of the Twelfth Army Group was affected. As General Bradley described it:

"Fearful that a detachment of Skorzeny's assassins might have penetrated the city of Luxembourg, Sibert had tucked me under an elaborate security wrap... Sibert evacuated my C-47 from the Luxembourg Airport...to a night fighter base... at Etain. I instructed Major Alvin E. Robinson to fly the plane from Etain and pick me up at Luxembourg, only two minutes' flying time from the German line... But, when Sibert got wind of these plans, he protested so strenuously that I abandoned the idea and...we took off from Etain..."

The Eleventh Day: "High Water Mark"

The "high water" mark was reached on 26 December when Harmon's 2d Armored Division defeated its German counterpart, the 2d Panzer Division, and the German advance was halted. The enemy had reached a point seventeen miles from Dinant. Now Patton's column had reached Bastogne and the enemy, facing possible disaster, slowly withdrew.[65]

By this time also the real threat of assassination had ended. To many, CIC's sensitivity to the possibility of such action had seemed overly zealous. Eisenhower, in his Crusade in Europe, was critical of the "Extraordinary fears" of the "Security Corps."

64 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #2, dtd 1 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

65 A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt and Co., 1951) Chapter 21.

"I was irritated," he wrote, "at the insistence of the Security Corps that I definitely circumscribe my freedom of movement, but I found that unless I conformed reasonably to their desires they merely used more men for protective measures."[66]

His naval aide, Commander Harry C. Butcher, titled the entry in his journal Saturday, December 23, 1944, "Prisoner of Security Police," and wrote as follows:

"There are all sorts of guards, some with machine guns, around the house, and he (Eisenhower) has to travel to and from the office led and at times followed by an armed guard in a jeep. He got some satisfaction yesterday in stepping out for a walk around the yard in deep snow, in the eyes of the security officers quite the most dangerous thing for him to do."[67]

Skorzeny Denies the Plan

Otto Skorzeny, perhaps the only man who would know whether he had ever planned an attack on the Supreme Allied Commander, has never admitted to it. In his megalomaniacal account of his victories and defeats, Skorzeny's Secret Missions, Skorzeny protested greatly against any claim of his participation in any assassination plot. He suggested that such an attempt, if successful, would have been a "frightful crime." Perhaps he protested too much.

Exit German Intelligence Service

The 150th Panzer Brigade and the Einheit Stielau had attempted small commando-type infiltration, deceptive reconnaissance, and full-scale tactical warfare. At each turn, they had been beaten.

Skorzeny, upon his capture, claimed only two successful missions for his Einheit Stielau, but amended the number to four in his book. The four, he stated, "...offered such clear and precise reports that their veracity could not be suspect."

66 Crusade in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Doubleday and Co., N.Y., 1948), pp. 359-360.

67 My Three Years with Eisenhower, Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1946), p. 728.

He added that two or four more teams may have crossed the lines, two being captured. Skorzeny gives no account of the other two teams.[68]

Reasons for Failure

The German deception had failed largely because roadblock personnel and roving guards had used the information collected by CIC interrogators and disseminated it rapidly to aid in the identification of the infiltrating units. The following activities became almost routine:

1. With vehicles, attention was directed to the rear, especially for radios and sabotage equipment.

2. Helmets were checked for the presence of markings which, among Allied forces, designated officers and non-officer personnel. The Germans had overlooked this design element.

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68 Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe (Unclassified), p. 71, (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library); Skorzeny's Secret Missions, by Otto Skorzeny, translated by Jacques Le Clerq, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1950, pgs. 243-246: The number of successful missions is open to controversy. Records indicate that one Lt. Stodick's team infiltrated and returned, and Skorzeny's revelations of the activities of an early group (probably Stodick's) are rather complete and almost wholly believable, in view of the turmoil created by the first one or two days of the German counteroffensive. His stories of the other three "commandos" are vague, and Skorzeny confuses the issue further by an earlier reference in the same chapter about three "groups" which were to look for a possibility of infiltrating the U. S. lines "so as to carry out their various missions to the best of their abilities." He mentions only one of these had returned with information, not about the American situation, but that the Germans had taken the town despite heavy opposition. The other three cases of accomplishments cited by Skorzeny are so commonplace among propaganda stories as to be of doubtful veracity. Furthermore, U.S. records indicate the capture of six different groups, four of which were linked through personnel to the Einheit Stielau, and report the destruction of two jeep teams, traditionally Einheit Stielau -- aside from the defeat of the brigade at Malmedy and a later mention of the killing of 17 OD-clad Germans by Third U.S. Army soldiers. It is difficult, if we accept Skorzeny's own figure of eight attempted penetrations by Einheit Stielau teams, to credit him with more than two successes, the second being highly hypothetical. That number -- two -- is interesting because it corresponds to the number Skorzeny originally cited.

3. Passwords were demanded and those who did not know the word currently in effect were scrutinized quite carefully to make sure they were genuine American personnel.

4. Since the driver usually was the poorest linguist among the members of the Einheit Stielau teams, drivers of vehicles were questioned throughly. No one could answer for him.

5. Vehicle trip tickets were examined in rear areas.

6. Any soldier possessing U.S. or British currency was suspect.

7. Identity documents were checked carefully. CIC had warned that: the Germans would use their pay-books to identify themselves; all Germans in the Einheit Stielau carried AGO #65-4 identity cards although few authentic ones were in the theater; and few Germans had "dog tags" (since they were not issued and it required personal initiative to confiscate them from U.S. prisoners of war).[69]

Other Einheit Stielau Men Captured

Throughout records of the Ardennes Campaign there were scattered references to other captures of teams of the Einheit Stielau. One report, for instance, mentioned the capture of a team when "they took a vehicle to an Ordnance Maintenance Unit for repair."[70] Other reports indicated heroism and alertness on the part of an individual soldier, who finding himself caught by two of the imposters, berated them in German for "interfering with his mission," and walked away, only to return later with reinforcements that captured one German and killed the other.

Though some of these reports were widespread, no unit or individual identification, no location, and no reports of interrogations are available which would serve to verify them.[71]

Typical Day-by Day CIC

A picture of representative CIC activities during this period of German advance was provided by the report of the 106th CIC. Prefaced by the statement, "A brief

69 Annex 4 to History of the Counterintelligence Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, pp. 56-59, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library).

70 G2 Periodic Report #199, 1st Inf, Div., dtd 26 Dec 44, in L-555, First U. S. Army G2 Journal (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

71 Annex 4 to History of the Counterintelligence Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, p. 72, (Unclassified), (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library).

outline of activities of the 106th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment from Saturday, 16 December 1944 through Tuesday, 26 December 1944 follows...," the document covered the 11-day period in diary fashion. Captain Jensen, Commanding Officer, admitted, in a postscript, that this report was not in accordance with the SOP dated 12 December which his detachment did not receive until after he had prepared his version. "Due to the fact of continued movement and emergency measures confronting this detachment," he commented, "it is deemed advisable to submit the report of activity in the above form." As such the report gave an accurate picture of one CIC Detachment's total effort during the period of German advance and revealed, in part, the following activities;

"Saturday, 16 December 1944: The 106th CIC Detachment was located in the town of St. Vith, Belgium....Shelling....began on the previous day and various units...left the town for...Decatur Rear...

"This Detachment continued its work of interviewing the many civilians...apprehended by guards... Passes for travel from St. Vith had been cancelled and no new ones were issued.

"...Lt. Jordan and Special Agent Underwood left St. Vith with CIC equipment for Vielsalm at 1600. Capt. Jensen and Agents St. Germain, Sullavan, Moore, and Jordan remained in the town to carry on with CIC work.

"Sunday, 17 December 1944; Members of the 7th Armored Division were contacted...in Vielsalm and an office was established...

"In the meantime (1700, 16 December 1944) members of the CCB Team of the 7th Armored Division CIC...in St. Vith...worked with Capt. Jensen and the 106th Detachment Agents.

"CIC Headquarters were set up in Vielsalm...St. Vith was cut off from communication.

"The 106th CIC Agents...interviewed civilians who were apprehended by guards. All credentials were inspected and those persons who were not from Vielsalm were forbidden to travel. Vielsalm civilians were instructed not to leave the town proper.

"Monday, 18 December 1944: Communication with St. Vith remained closed.

"Civilians in Vielsalm continued to jam the office seeking travel permits. These were denied.

"Capt. Jensen and Agents Sullavan, Moore, and Jordan left St. Vith at 1700 for Vielsalm when shelling of that town made it untenable. Theirs was the last tactical unit to leave. Agent St. Germain left at 1600 with three informers for Corps.

Tuesday, 19 December 1944:

"Records of the Nazi Party in St. Vith and adjoining towns, which had been collated by the 106th CIC Detachment, were turned over to the 7th CIC Detachment for their use in the Krombach section.

"The 106th CIC Detachment immediately mobilized Belgian Army members and members of the...Belgian Gendarmerie and then screened all members... These men were...placed on all roads, paths, and other vantage points as guards...to apprehend...civilians traveling on the roads or through the woods.

"Vielsalm is now closed to all travel from within and from without.

"It was announced by the 106th CIC Detachment that all residents of Vielsalm must obtain a "pass" or means of identification which would be issued by the 106th CIC if they were to travel on the streets of Vielsalm.

"Those persons whose loyalty was questionable were searched and then cleared; quartered in Vielsalm; or detained in the guardhouse of the Belgian Barracks, occupied by the Decatur Headquarters, and the Prisoner of War cage operated by the 7th Armored Division.

"A screening section was set up in the school house of Vielsalm and members of the Military Government section aided agents of the 106th CIC Detachment in screening all civilian residents of the town. Some 2,000 persons came to the school for identification cards.

"Credentials of all were certified and vouched for by the banker in Vielsalm who had recently been appointed head of the town bank by the Belgian government. Identification cards were printed by the 106th CIC Detachment on United States government water-marked paper. These cards were not good for travel, but were used merely as a means of identifying civilians of Vielsalm

and as an aid in apprehending. . .strangers who might and did come to town.

"Wednesday, 20 December 1944: Part of the 106th CIC Detachment was occupied the entire day continuing interviewing and issuing clearance identification to civilians of Vielsalm.

"For the record -- all Belgian guards ...remained at their posts and were at the appointed places when a detail was dispatched to pick them up at evening.

"In the evening and throughout the night, guards... continued to bring in civilians...

"Thursday, 21 December 1944: 106th CIC Detachment Agents continued clearance...of civilians...

"Some 30 civilians...(from) St. Vith arrived in Vielsalm... were...quartered...in the schoolhouse.

"Friday, 22 December 1944: Notification of the moving of Decatur Headquarters to Vaux Chavanne was received. Instructions were given 106th Military Police regarding civilians they were holding on orders from the 106th CIC Detachment. The 106th CIC Detachment, along with the Military Government team, left for Vaux Chavanne and then proceeded to Werbomont where CIC Headquarters were set up.

"Agent St. Germain arrived back from delivering the three informants...

"Saturday, 23 December 1944: Early on this date the 106th CIC Detachment left Werbomont for Ernoheid, Belgium, where Forward Decatur was located. Headquarters were established in a farmhouse and Decatur Headquarters, Military Police and other units notified. The day was occupied in making out Arrest Forms for persons turned over to the Military Police by the 106th CIC Detachment for return to Corps, and with security trips around the vicinity and with interviews with residents.

"Sunday, 24 December 1944: The 106th CIC Detachment remained in Eronheid and continued security trips and conversations with residents....

"Monday, 25 December 1944: Word was received that Decatur was moving to Aywaille. The 106th CIC Detachment moved.....

to Awan and set up headquarters. Headquarters, Military Police and Message Center were notified of the Detachment's location.

"Tuesday, 26 December 1944: Two teams of two agents each were dispatched to the following towns: Harze, Ernoheid, Werbomont, Harre, Aywaille, Spirment, Oneux, Hoyemont, and Comblain La Tour, to contact S-2s or their representatives and inform them of this Detachment's Headquarters and to establish screening areas.

"Contact was made again with the 7th Armored Division CIC."[72]

72 106th CIC Det Rpt, undated, s/Jensen in 218th CIC Det Periodic Rpts File 1-45 to 5-45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25098).

Chapter 3

CIC DIVISIONAL DETACHMENTS IN THE ADVANCE

Their whole Ardennes offensive a failure, the Nazis painfully withdrew along the roads back to Germany. By 16 January, a month after the break-through had begun, the "Bulge" was virtually non-existant and the front line was approximately at its 16 December location. In some places deeper Allied penetrations into Germany had resulted. A general cleaning up of the area continued until the end of January, and then, once again, Allied forces for the most part waited for the final offensive that would carry them deep into Germany.[73]

With the U.S. Armies regaining territory they had liberated once before, CIC detachments joined in the advance, a role to which they had become accustomed prior to the Bulge.

One of the surest signs of the renewed forward motion was the transfer of territories from Divisional CIC level to Corps CIC level. On 26 December, when the situation had turned in favor of the allies, 4th CIC relinquished the files on eighteen towns, the subversive files, all dossiers on outstanding cases, and a list of people on house arrest to Agent Harold B. Proudfoot of XII Corps CIC.

Among the outstanding cases turned over were those of
had been a prewar informant for the Germans, furnishing them with information about fortifications in Lorraine, troop movements, and civilian morale. a former member of the Deuxieme Bureau of France, had been arrested by Gestapo agents and later released. He was noticed afterwards to be a frequent associate of suspected Gestapo agents. traveled widely, operated in the Black Market under the German occupation, and was believed to be an informant responsible for the execution of a Luxembourg Customs official. The 212th CIC suspended the investigation on 27 December. Not enough evidence for conviction could be found, but the three were sent to Third Army Interrogation Center with a recommendation for internment for the duration. By 28 December, XII Corps CIC had relieved the 4th CIC in the area.[74]

For the remainder of the Ardennes battle, Agents of the 4th CIC Detachment screened natives of each town in their area, investigated wire-cutting reports, apprehended deserters from the Wehrmacht, placed under house arrest people

73 Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, Chapter 21.

74 4th CIC Det Rpt in 4th Inf Div G2 Journal and File, 304-2.3, (Unclassified), (28588), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

who were suspect but against whom there was not enough evidence for more severe action, manned control posts and roving patrols, enforced curfew regulations and travel restrictions, a: l established liaison with other agencies and town officials.[75]

Travel restrictions and control line operations that had been coordinated with curfew arrangements required liaison with other CIC Detachments in the bordering areas. The 4th CIC worked closely most of this time with 5th CIC in organizing a joint control line. A number of people were apprehended, including one Office of Strategic Services operative, returning from Germany.

One instance of omission, however, resulted in a two-day investigation which could have been prevented by a two-minute liaison stop. Two men in a jeep marked "CIC Det 11-2" were seen in the 4th Division sector, where they asked about deserters. A sheet of carbon paper, which the alleged agents dropped, bore the barely discernible name, "Capt Wiggard." Since CIC Detachment 11-2 was nonexistant and no Capt. Wiggard was known, an investigation was started; after two days, Agents of the 4th Detachment learned that both the Captain and the jeep were from the 5th Division CIC Detachment.[76]

Lack of proper liaison between two Civil Affairs Detachments caused 4th CIC some additional confusion. The Inter-Allied Mission's Civil Affairs Detachment in the city of Luxembourg had been issuing passes to permit entry into 4th Division territory, without the Division's own Civil Affairs being aware of it until CIC began rounding up numerous persons holding these passes. When CIC informed the local Civil Affairs of the situation some hasty post-arrangements were devised which solved the problem.[77]

At the end of January 1945, the 4th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt. Oliver D. Appleton, was operating with its Division along the Luxembourg border. Here, they encountered a problem which they were to experience many times in Germany. The difficulty was created by the procedure of requisitioning a few rooms in a dwelling for use as a division CP and allowing the family to occupy the rest of the dwelling upon the promise that they would not enter the military portion.

The S2 of Division Artillery reported the case of one who lived in the house in which Divarty Headquarters had been established. The woman's husband, it was learned, was in the SS and he visited her quite often.

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75 4th CIC Det Rpt in 4th Inf Div G2 Journal and File, 304-2.3 (28583), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

76 4th Inf Div, G2 Journal and File, 4-6 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia), (28588).

77 Ibid.

Further investigation revealed that a sealed document of instruction about the severing of communication lines was in her possession. CIC apprehended the woman and her two brothers and turned them over to VIII Corps CIC in Bastogne.[78]

Other Divisional CIC Activity

By the end of 1944, certain counterintelligence problems and techniques had become repetitious and their handling nearly automatic. But new problems arose and required new techniques as shown by the activities of the following divisional detachments.

One of these pressing problems was the handling of civilian suspects when there were no detention camps within a reasonable distance. The 1st CIC Detachment, under 1st Lt. C. G. Steinway, was baffled by this problem and sent Agents to three different Civil Affairs units to seek a solution. When they could offer no help, 1st CIC was forced to transfer persons suspected of subversive activity to collection centers for displaced persons.[79]

This improvised procedure resulted from failure to follow Twelfth Army Group's SOP which specified that Civilian Annexes would be provided at Prisoner of War enclosures for interning civilian suspects.[80] This lack of facilities made it necessary for CIC agents to taxi the suspects to the Displaced Persons Centers personally because Civil Affairs trucks were overburdened with bona fide displaced persons.[81]

Fortunately, immobilization by placing a suspect in a Displaced Persons Center made it easier to retrieve the person if CIC later uncovered proof of subversive activity. a for example, had been sent to a Displaced persons Center in Verviers as a security threat. He became more than a "security threat" when a line crosser known as named as his contact. captured at regimental level, readily admitted that he was an enemy agent. CIC recommended that be arrested at the Displaced Persons Center.[82]

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78 4th Inf Div, G2 Journal and File, 25-31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (28588), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

79 1st CIC Det Daily Rpt, 3-4 Jan 45 in 1st Inf Div G2 Journal, 301-2.2 (22292) (Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

80 A study of FUSAG CI SOP, Appendix 4 to Chapter entitled "Preparation for OVERLORD," reveals a vagueness about the delegation of authority in these matters that may well have caused this misunderstanding. The SOP, however, does make provision for handling civilian suspects.

81 1st CIC Det Daily Rpt, 4-5 Jan 45 in 1st Inf Div G2 Journal, 301-2.2 (22292), (Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

82 Ibid., 19-19 Jan 45.

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GI Plus Girl Equals Possible Security Breach

Among the many problems encountered by CIC agents in the ETO was one that CIP Agents in World War I had battled, i.e.: Some soldiers talk too much. One who called himself "Hans" for example, obtained from his friend, Katie Wei, a housemaid at the Germania Hotel in Robertville, the name of a girl in Weywertz with whom he might become acquainted. "Hans" explained that he would be in Weywertz on 15 December and that the rest of his outfit would arrive on the following day. Katie must have repeated the information for it eventually came to the ears of Maj. Lauten, 16th Infantry Regiment S2. CIC started a full investigation. Finally, the Assistant S2 of the Regiment, furnished with the results of the CIC probe, had enough information to locate the talkative soldier.[83]

The 1st CIC detachment performed an odd, but valuable service for Division G2. On 8 January, Agents Henri Diron and Adrian J. Pinsince, Jr., were dispatched to the l'Inprimerie Desoer, rue Ste-Veronique, 21, Liege to insure the security of intelligence documents, classified SECRET, which were to be bound at the shop. The agents explained the necessary security measures to the Administrateur-delegue, M. Henri Desoer, and two assistants. A list of workers in the shop was obtained and submitted to CIC Headquarters where a police check revealed no subversive records. A CIC survey of the firm's activities revealed no subversive connections. When the material was delivered to the bindery, the agents went on 24-hour duty. Irregular spot counts of bindings were made. At night, the agents slept in a locked shelter next to the material which was collected at the end of the day and nailed into boxes. The binding was carried out smoothly, aided by Civil Affairs personnel who quickly approved the employer's request for travel privileges for a special craftsman who lived outside the area limits. The resourceful CIC agents on this assignment undertook an extra-curricular survey of the 123 employees of the plant, learning that 93 had been robot-bombed out of their homes. This information they added to their own visual observation, concluding that 75 percent of the homes in Liege had been damaged or destroyed by the German robot bombs.[84]

The Wire Cases

Capt. Lyndon B. Allen's 5th CIC Detachment operated in two different areas during the mopping-up campaign in the Ardennes. In each, the Detachment was plagued by trouble with wires.

83 1st CIC Det Dr, 15-17 Jan 45 (22292), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

84 1st Inf Div G2 Journal, 13-14 Jan 45 Entry Jan 13, 1400 No. 51 from CIC "Report on the binding of 'Selected Intelligence Reports'...." (Unclassified).

In the first case, an enlisted man of the 705th Ordnance Company discovered a wire strung across the Boulevard L'Alcette, Luxembourg City, near the Cafe de Boulevard. From a telephone pole, the wire ran to a lamppost and then across the street, where it was tied loosely to an iron fence. The wire sagged to within four feet of the boulevard. An interview with a hardware store owner revealed the wire was similar to wire he sold which was made in Cologne, Germany. The investigation was inconclusive, and agents on the case consoled themselves in the belief it was the work of an inexpert saboteur.

Equally frustrating to members of the 5th CIC Detachment was a severed wire which was reported on 20 January 1945. This wire, the forward communication line of the 46th FA Battalion, had been cut in an open field by pliers. No road ran through the field, and the wire was paralleled by two others which were undamaged. At the same time, another battalion communication line had been shorted, the line repairman asserted, by someone with a knowledge of communications. At neither place did soldiers on duty remember seeing anyone in the vicinity around the time of the incident; they were about 100 yards away when the tampering supposedly occurred.[85]

During this period 155 individual suspects were handled by the Detachment. Of these, 109 cases had been turned over to 5th CIC by the 83d CIC which had preceded them into the area. An additional 262 civilians, mostly from front-line towns, were screened, and thirty-three deserters from the Wehrmacht were investigated and permitted to remain at home. Twelve civilians, apprehended while traveling without proper authorization, were investigated for Civil Affairs and turned over to them. Security surveys were conducted in seventeen towns in Division area. CIC agents of the 5th CIC arrested eleven persons, evacuating them to Luxembourg City. Of these, four were Luxembourg citizens who had deserted from the German Army, three were German citizens who were apprehended as deserters in civilian clothes and placed in Prisoner of War channels, and the remaining four were Luxembourg citizens who were considered security threats in the area.[86]

Women Suspects

During this period, agents of the 509th CIC Detachment of the 9th Armored Division were having their problems, predominantly with pro-Nazi women.

An in the village of owned a drug store. Persons of German nationality in the town, it was reported, had not registered as required

85 5th CIC Det, Hqs 5th Inf Div, Monthly Information Report, 13 Feb 45, "covering month ending 31 Jan 45." (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

86 5th Inf Div G2 After-Action Rpt, 1-31 Jan 45 in 305-2 (6610 Master) (RESTRICTED). (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

by French law because they said would expose them if the German Army returned. They said had been the favorite of German officers, Nazi officials and SS members during the occupation. Her relatives were said to be prominent in the German Army and in the Gestapo. On 7 January she attempted to obtain the password from an American soldier. All persons interviewed concurred in the opinion that she could be dangerous. CIC kept her under observation.

Agents operating in Ay-sur-Moselle had similar reports on a German national, known only as As a leader of German women's groups including the Deutschemaedel, was said to have coerced young girls into Nazi organizations. She was reported to have maintained a close relationship with civilian Nazi leaders in the town before the Americans arrived. CIC Agents arrested her and placed her in the custody of French authorities at Thionville.

was reported to 509th Detachment by a confidential informant who said the woman had been in the vicinity for only two weeks. Of unknown nationality and residence, allegedly had escaped from Berlin to France in the underground, aided by Edelweiss, an anti-Nazi organization. Since information on these activities was much desired, an intensive search was made but she could not be found.[87]

A Stay-Behind Is Uncovered

When the 17th Airborne Division's CIC Detachment arrested He confessed that he was a stay-behind agent for Germany. was sent to US Third Army Interrogation Center with his signed confession. He seemed to have been the only bona-fide agent reported during this period.[88]

A reminder that CIC agents were still performing combat intelligence missions was carried in the "War Diary" of the 17th Airborne's CIC Detachment. The entry for 6 January states, "Prendergast worked with various Regiments in Normandy movement to secure positive intelligence.[89]

87 Monthly Information Report, 509th CIC Det., Hqs 9th Armd Div, dtd 19 Feb 45, for month ending 31 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).
88 12th Army Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #13 for 1-15 Feb 45, dtd 15 Feb 45 (L-320), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).
89 17th A/B Div CIC Det "War Diary," 317-CIC-0.7 (22763), (Master), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Efficiency vs. Security

As U.S. forces moved from countries they had liberated into countries they would occupy, Civil Affairs changed its name to Military Government.[90] The change of name, from Civil Affairs to Military Government, however, did not alter the tendency of some officials to minimize security in favor of efficiency of government. A theory that governmental efficiency could be secured most easily by retaining the status quo as much as possible often led officials to give suspected Nazis the benefit of any doubts raised by CIC which had not been fully substantiated.

Undesirables at times received provisional clearances on the basis of sketchy investigations. As expressed by Capt. Noah Pennewell, 26th CIC Detachment Co, "It must be remembered that a detachment working with an infantry division has very little time to devote to any particular case, due to the fact that it is required to keep pace with the forward movement of the division. Therefore, it has been, of necessity, a general practice with this detachment to make quick decisions upon all matters coming to our attention."[91]

Although later CIC detachments might discover additional or substantiating derogatory information, Military Government officials sometimes referred to the initial clearance as authority to preserve the functioning government. This practice caused difficulties in liberated areas; in occupied areas it became extremely detrimental to security.

Particularly difficult was a situation that arose between the 29th CIC Detachment and the Military Government authorities in the area, which finally was settled by the Commanding General of Ninth Army in mid-January after more than a month of squabbling between the two organizations. Although the final argument in which the Ninth Army Commanding General intervened had to do with Military Government's retention of Nazis in office, it had been preceded by Military Government's release of three law-breakers arrested and investigated by the CIC Detachment. 1st Lt. Ellis O. Mayfield, 29th CIC Detachment Commander, had protested this action in special report to the 219th CIC Detachment and to the 29th Division Commanding General. Pointing out that these incidents had "caused this unit considerable embarrassment and...will result in the U.S. Military Government being held in ridicule," Lieutenant Mayfield concluded:

"It is believed that the failure of Military Government to take a firm stand in regard to violations of proclamations is highly detrimental to American standing

90 The Army Almanac, p. 757.

91 Monthly Information Report, 26th CIC Det, Hq 26 Inf Div, dtd 14 Feb 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

in this community and is not in accordance with the policy outlined by higher headquarters which has stressed the importance of firm orders, fairly given but strictly enforced against a militant people who understand nothing else." 92

The difficulty was finally resolved by a letter which Lieutenant General Simpson, Commanding General of Ninth Army, ordered sent to the Commanding Officer of the Military Government Detachment FIH2, directing Military Government to replace all Nazi officials, collaborators, and sympathizers with non-Nazis. "No exception will be made on grounds of administrative convenience or expediency," the letter specified. The letter quoted the following statement from the office of Strategic Services European Political Report of 8 December and directed that a report be made as to its correctness:

"In general Military Government appears to be cooperating closely with counterintelligence experts in selecting reliable Germans as collaborators. One independent report, however, states that in installed by Military Government had been Mayor of the town since 1934 and a member of the Nazi Party since May 1933. This man, according to the report, had 90 percent of his old staff working with him under the Allied authorities." 93

In answer, the Commanding Officer of the Military Government Detachment wrote, on 3 January, "There is absolutely no truth in the statement, or inference, that Military Government at has failed to cooperate with CIC," adding that every official, "prior to employment," had been cleared by CIC. The city officials, he explained, were "originally checked" by 30th CIC and then came under investigation by 29th CIC and XIX Corps CIC. "As a result of such latter investigations some City officials have been dismissed," he stated. After praising Burgermeister and explaining that all of his staff had been cleared by CIC, the Military Government officer concluded: "From all evidence available at this time, I am of the opinion that Burgermeister was merely a nominal Nazi." 94

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92 CIC Det 29, H2 29th Inf Div, Rpt on: "Military Government Situation in Germany," dtd 14 Dec 44, to Commanding General 29th Inf Div, and Rpt, same as above to XIX Corps CIC, dtd 13 Dec 44, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence file (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

93 Ltr from Office of CG, Hq, Ninth U.S. Army, dtd 30 Dec 44, to CO, Det FIH2 through CG, XIII Corps, by command of Lt.Gen. Simpson, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence file (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

94 Rpt, Det FIH2 to CG, 29th Inf Div, s/Lt.Col.Clarence Richmond, dtd 3 Jan 45, in 29th CIC Det correspondence file (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

In a complete report filed on 2 January by Lieutenant Mayfield, 29th CIC Detachment Commander, as a result of the Commanding General's letter to Military Government, it was explained that the 30th CIC Detachment's clearance of the Burgermeister has been "specifically stated to be 'preliminary' only," since there had been insufficient time to do more than establish that the officials were "not fanatical Nazis." The 30th CIC Detachment had no more than begun a more thorough investigation when they were moved, and the 29th CIC entered the area. A group of XIX Corps agents arrived in the town at about the same time and assumed the responsibility of investigating officials with the intent of setting up permanent civil government while the 29th CIC took over routine civilian screening and providing for the security of the area. However, before Corps agents could complete their investigations, they too were moved, and, for the first time, the 29th CIC Detachment assumed the responsibility of complete investigations of town officials. A memorandum from Agent Van Otten to Military Government on 18 December indicated that CIC had heard rumblings of discontent over retention and that a thorough investigation was being undertaken.

In this investigation, the 29th CIC Detachment learned that Burgermeister had evidenced Nazi sympathy in numerous ways. He had ordered all the town's important records transported to German-held territory immediately preceding the arrival of U.S. troops; he had evacuated his own family to central Germany; and, according to one informant, he had made the statement, "It is our desire to make every resident of a member of the Nazi Party." This information was included in the 2 January letter, with the recommendation that thoroughly cleared by CIC, be appointed as Burgermeister. Of ten other important officials, CIC had found five to be undesirable and had recommended dismissal of sixteen of the twenty members of the police department. CIC also had denied clearance to five top officials of the the scene of mistreatment of workers, and had recommended that two inspectors stand trial for their activities.

Pointing out that he was not offering an "excuse" for the lag in completion of investigations since "...it is not thought that the record requires one," Lt. Mayfield summarized a problem which was encountered throughout the European campaign and has been cited as one of CIC's greatest weaknesses:

> "Aside from the obvious difficulties of a speedy and effective clearance of German Civil Officials in an occupied area, the problems have been greatly increased by the transitory nature of CIC Detachments. No less than three detachments have operated in this town to date and it is still a division sector. In each case, when a turnover has been effected, CI coverage has decreased during the period while contacts are re-cultivated and their confidence restored and while

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loose ends of pending cases are picked up. In some cases, it has been necessary to start investigations anew."[95]

Results of the CIC investigation were reported in the 29th CIC Detachment Intelligence Report for the period 4 January 1945 to 19 January 1945 as follows:

> "With the ousting of the Mayors of Germany, and their replacement by more suitable officials, cooperation has been excellent. In all towns where registration has been undertaken, town officials have been extremely cooperative."[96]

After the setting up of civilian travel restrictions to keep the population fixed in these German Municipalities, CIC agents concentrated on developing informant networks and on registering all civilians over twelve years of age. The registration produced four civilians who were sent to higher echelon interrogation facilities under considerable suspicion as possible enemy agents. Fourteen deserters from the German army were apprehended and dispatched via Prisoner of War channels. In communities where CIC had found no lists of Nazi party members, complete party lists were compiled simply by asking the registering person if he had been a member. The presence of pro-Allied informants and the heavy sentences imposed on the first few who falsely denied membership decreased the chances of untruthfulness. Denunciations were numerous, and eight persons were arrested on various charges. Information not of Counterintelligence interest was forwarded to appropriate organizations. Counterintelligence data was obtained which suggested the course for future investigations of activities.

The 29th CIC Detachment also was making efforts to stimulate troop security consciousness. "Burma Shave signs," stressing security in clever jingles were posted along the roads. Even while showering, U.S. troops were warned against saying anything which might be of value to the enemy. CIC agents, ordered to take showers with the troops, were ready to reprimand any soldier who became too talkative.

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95 Ltr from CIC Det 29 to SMGO, Hq 29th Inf Div, subj, ' ment Situation from Counterintelligence Viewpoint," dtd 2 Jan 45, s/ Ellis O. Mayfield, 1st Lt., Div CI Officer, with attached Summary of Information in re: "CIC Activities in ' dtd 2 Jan 45 and Memorandum for the Military Government Office, subj, "Screening of Civilians," from 29th CIC Det, S/A Van Otten, 2d Lt., dtd 18 Dec 44, (SECRET), both in 29th CIC Det Correspondence file Jun 44-Sep 45, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

96 29th CIC Det Counterintelligence Rpt for period 4 Jan to 19 Jan 45, dtd 19 Jan 45 in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File, Apr 45 to Jul 45, (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094), (SECRET).

30th CIC Detachment: Atrocities

Captain Melvin Handville's 30th CIC Detachment was again on the advance after its effective countering of the Einheit Stielau. One of the Detachment's first reports for the new phase carried the news of atrocities. Between fifteen and thirty American Prisoners of War had been led into an open field and machine-gunned by the Germans on 17 December. In a nearby location, 127 men, women, and children from Malmedy and neighboring towns had been killed at short range by small arms fire two days later.[97]

78th CIC Detachment Informants

Agents of the 78th CIC Detachment worked in and around the German city of Roetgen, previously the jurisdiction of the 503d and 9th CIC Detachments. Through skillful handling of informants, cultivated by linguists assigned to CIC, agents of the Detachment were directed to two homes which had been searched previously but that still contained valuable information and evidence.

In one case, after the suspect's home had been searched four times by Military Police, CIC agents uncovered a hidden tear gas pistol and ten cartridges. In the second instance, informants supplied CIC with leads to the location of a hidden room in another suspect's basement. Behind a pile of coal, CIC agents tore down a recently constructed brick wall. In the secret room, among other stores, were Nazi party records. The home of the latter suspect had been searched five times; only the sixth attempt produced results.[98]

80th CIC Detachment: The Hitchhiker

Apparently, no sooner had the Germans retreated than some of the troops took a relaxed attitude toward security. The events preceding the arrest of Theodore Laubach of Gilsdorf, in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, revealed this security let-down.

Laubach was favored by the driver of a U.S. military vehicle with a ride to the forward area, although regulations forbade all civilian travel in that sector. Military guards along the route either overlooked him or passed him as the driver's responsibility, and civilian guards posted by CIC were not authorized to search military vehicles. Fortunately, the 80th CIC Detachment, under the command of

97 30th CIC Det Periodic Rpt for period dtd 7 Jan 45 No. 23 in 218th CIC Det Periodic Rpts Jan - May 45, (CONFIDIENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

98 Monthly Intelligence Rpt, 78th CIC Det, for period ending 31 Jan 45, dtd 12 Feb 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Capt. Thomas R. McMillen, had established an active guard and informant system in the area, maintained by civilians who were instructed to bring in all strangers and undesirables to CIC. The guards were sworn in by the local mayor in the presence of CIC personnel, were given specific duties by CIC, and wore distinctive armbands when on duty.

Fifteen minutes after Laubach reached his home, informants reported him to CIC. He was wanted by the 5th CIC Detachment as a suspected agent and Gestapo informant, and was turned over, with a report by 80th CIC.

87th CIC Detachment

Additional notice that troops had become less security-minded with the removal of the mass threat of Germans in U.S. uniform was revealed when Agents Robert Gunderson and Interpreter Werner Bamberger of 87th CIC checked the Command Post of the 364th Regiment. They found, among other things, carbon paper which had been used to type duplicates of secret documents. Classified manuals, photographs, overlays, addresses of several officers and enlisted men of the Regiment, the Division's stationery, and various forms, including an unused book of 48-hour pass forms, with listing of personnel at regimental headquarters on the back, had also been left behind.[99]

The laxity did not stop at Regimental level; it encompassed Division, too. In fact, when 87th Division Headquarters set up communications, they used the lines available at Libramont's telephone exchange without bothering to cut certain lines which ran to the homes of residents in the area. As set up, apparently on the party line system, the residents could listen-in on all types of communication. When the situation was discovered, CIC was called in. Investigation revealed that not one of the people who belonged to the "party line" understood English. At least, none of them admitted it. The lines finally were cut.[100]

Valuable information was provided the 87th CIC Detachment by two The first, informed CIC that the in Belgium was directly under the control of the French Forces of the Interior. He stated that recent uprisings against the existing government in Brussels were

99 87th CIC Det Memo, "Rpt of CP Search," dtd 14 Jan 45, s/ Robert W. Gunderson, attached as appendix to 87th CIC Det Daily Rpt dtd 14 Jan 45, in 95th CIC Det (sic) Rpt file, Sep 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25095).

100 Daily Rpt, 87th CIC Det, dtd 10 Jan 45, in 95th CIC Det (sic) Rpts File, Sept 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

attempts on the part of the [redacted] to overthrow it in favor of Communism. This information, the [redacted] said, was the result of an investigative mission which he had performed for his [redacted].[101]

The other [redacted], spoke of the anti-Nazi organization, Edelweiss, which he described as a Catholic Youth Resistance Organization, that was most active in large Rhineland cities. Franz Menke, a priest in Bedburn, Germany, was a leader in the organization, [redacted] stated. There were sound reasons for [redacted] anti-Nazi sentiments. Menke had been imprisoned for eight months; [redacted] brother, Peter, had been imprisoned in Dachau for four years.[102]

An investigation by the 87th CIC Detachment disclosed that eight Germans wearing U.S. uniforms had been billeted in a home at Wallerode from 25 December to 2 January. These men wore German uniforms in the house, and U.S. outfits when they went out. They left the town with the German Army.

On 19 January, the Detachment received another report of Germans in U.S. uniforms. Marie Armoldy of Vitebek told the 394th Infantry Regiment S2 that two had called on her the night before. CIC's investigation indicated the "Germans" were really American soldiers -- Military Police from the 4th Infantry Division who were on a personal mission to locate some fresh eggs.[104]

1st Lt. Sam E. Harwell replaced 1st Lt. Joseph A. Mondelli as Commanding Officer of the 87th CIC Detachment sometime during the last week of December.[105]

94th CIC: From Nine to Three

The 94th CIC Detachment moved up with their division which had been active in the rear areas for Ninth Army, to the front as part of XX Corps, Third Army.[106] On 7 January, Capt. Carl K. Goodson, Commanding the 94th, contacted Maj. Anthony S. Lobb, Commanding the 220th CIC Detachment of Corps, to be briefed on his Detachment's task in the new area.[107]

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101 Daily Rpt, 87th CIC Det, dtd 10 Jan 45, in 95th CIC Det (sic) Rpts File, Sep 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).
102 Ibid.
103 CI Rpt #3, 87th CIC Det, dtd 5 Feb 45, in 95 CIC Det (sic) Rpts File, Sep 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).
104 Daily Rpt, 87th CIC Det, dtd 19 Jan 45, in 95th CIC Det (sic) Det Rpts File, Sept 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).
105 Ibid., 20-31 Dec 44
106 Army Almanac, The op. cit., p. 564.
107 CI Rpt #3, 87th CIC Det, dtd 5 Feb 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts File, Sep 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

The Counter Intelligence Control Line in the Ardennes sector had been disrupted again, this time by the rapid advance of Allied units, and predictions indicated that the line there would not be firmly re-established until the front line was once more along the German border.[108] Capt. Goodson's report of his briefing to the Division G2 emphasized Third Army's interest in maintaining the high level of travel control which had been achieved. Exclusive of 94th CIC Detachment agents who would participate in the network, fifty-three agents -- from the 220th CIC Detachment; from Section "H" of the 420th CIC's Border Patrol, on detached service with XX Corps and III Corps CIC Detachments; and from Team 7 of the 418th CIC on detached service with Third Army and further detached to XX Corps -- manned and patrolled the Counter Intelligence Control Line in the northern area of the Saar-Moselle Triangle.[109]

Out of the Circle

The 101st Airborne Division claimed that the heaviest attack received by their lines at Bastogne was launched by the Germans in the first week of January, more than one week after the sea of German soldiers surrounding them had been bridged by elements of Third Army. . . .

By this time the 101st CIC Detachment had resumed its counterintelligence mission, and it was able to complete fifty suspect and incident investigations by the end of January, in addition to searching Command Posts, processing refugees and establishing roadblock controls.[110]

Of particular concern to the 101st CIC agents who had "good reason to know that the enemy used agents in civilian clothes and in OD's to spread reports about the presence of enemy in our rear areas," was the rumor mart. To combat this problem, the Division issued the following order:

> "(1) Any personnel in civilian clothes or American uniform passing on information intended to limit the movement or maneuverability of our troops by indicating presence of enemy in any particular area where they are not actually present will, if not recognized as a member of the Division or units attached to it, be apprehended and turned over to the Provost Marshal or CIC, whichever is most convenient, to be cleared by CIC.

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108 CI Rpt #3, 87th CIC Det, dtd 5 Feb 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts File, Sep 44 to Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

109 Memo to G2 94th Inf Div, from 94th CIC Det, dtd 8 Jan 45, in 94th CIC Det Correspondence File, Nov 43-Aug 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

110 101st Airborne Div Rpt of G2 Section - Belgium, France, Germany, 31 Jan 45 #3101 (11914)(Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

(2) Any Division or attached personnel passing on rumors about the presence of the enmy in areas where they actually are not present will be physically turned over to his unit commander and severe disciplinary measures will be taken." 111

106th CIC Detachment: An Einheit Stielau Success Confirmed

FOUO One of the two successful missions of the Einheit Stielau was confirmed as a result of an investigation by 106th CIC. Four Germans in U.S. uniform had arrived in St. Jacques, Belgium, on 18 December and had been quartered by the family. The German soldiers were joined the following day by other German forces in front of the home. Two daughters of that family had directed the German troops to the rendezvous point. and his daughters rode with the Germans to show them the way to Petit Halleux. The were not in St. Jacques when the Americans re-entered, but the dossier of the case was kept open.[112] No record of the apprehension has been found.

Other Divisional Activity

A number of divisional detachments, newly arrived in the Theater, were thrown into front-line activity. Little is known concerning these units beyond the names of the Commanding Officers. Even in these there is a possibility of error since the names were found in correspondence dated during February and March 1945, and in some instances by selection of the highest ranking officer on a partial roster of the detachment. Such units and their commanding officers are: 508th CIC Detachment (8th Armored Division), 1st Lt. Arnold C. Huebner; 13th CIC Detachment (13th Airborne Division), 1st Lt. Frank Popisil; 17th CIC Detachment (17th Airborne Division), 1st Lt. Gerard G. Cameron; 66th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. William J. J. Hoge; 69th CIC Detachment, Capt. Andrew H. Duvall; 75th CIC Detachment, 2d Lt. Henry A. Gassinger; 76th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt. William F. Barnaby; 511th CIC Detachment (11th Armored Division) Commanding Officer unknown.

In addition, several divisional detachments, mentioned in previous battles have been omitted, due in some cases to a paucity of reports from these units and in others to uneventful reports.[113]

111 G2 Periodic Rpt #203, First U.S.Army, 30 Dec 44, in G2 Estimates and Periodic Rpt L-496 (1A), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

112 Weekly CI Rpt, 106th CIC Det, in 218 CIC Det Periodic Rpts, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

113 List of units participating in the Ardennes Battle, giving general locations covered is attached as Appendix 2.

Chapter 4

CORPS CIC DETACHMENTS IN THE ADVANCE

Operational with the First Army during the battle were V, VIII, and XVIII Airborne Corps, which was a component of First Army at the outbreak of the campaign, but was transferred to Third Army on 20 December, when First Army was placed under British control.[114]

V Corps CIC: The Young Ones

The Hitler Jugend became a V Corps CIC project, largely because these pro-Nazis youths were active in their area. Four members of this organization were arrested by the 205th CIC Detachment between 27 December and 29 December. The actual harm done by all members of the Hitler Jugend, apprehended by various CIC units, was negligible. Most of them were turned over to Belgian authorities for re-education. However one, Karl Arno Punzler, was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage.

Their rabid Naziism exposed a potentiality to counterintelligence experts, as a bulletin of the First Army Interrogation Center stated, "Which may develop into a major counterintelligence problem in the future."

Representative of the Nazification of these youths were the letters written by Maria Beirganz, a 17-year-old Bund Deutscher Madel (League of German Girls, the female Hitler Jugend) leader who associated with Hitler Jugend leaders Punzler and Willi Laufenberg. CIC collected the following samples:

> "7 October 1944: There is still nothing better than the German soldiers. The cowardice of the Americans is indescribable."
> "8 October 1944: I feel clearly that we, the hard-tried but iron-steeled youth, are destined to fight for the ideas of our irreplaceable Fuehrer."
> "19 October 1944: It appears almost useless to write to Cologne. Seven terror attacks in five days. Those Bastards. Please excuse the coarse phrase, but it comes from the heart..."
> "21 October 1944: On Sunday, the entire youth sits around drinking and smoking. The Americans aid them in doing this; only we three faithfuls carry on. Our work is gradually increasing to point towards new missions. I can't report more about our work because..."

114 The Army Almanac, pages 519 to 590.

"3 November 1944: Although everyone here is already talking about hopeless end for Germany, I still believe firmly in victory."
"9 November 1944: With much joy we heard of the committment of the V-2. A ray of hope, Peter. But a great disappointment awaited me. My tense expectations were for nothing. The voice of our Fuehrer was not heard over the Radio." 115

VII Corps CIC: Work Slackens

The 207th CIC Detachment, which had spent three months in Germany before the Ardennes counteroffensive, looked upon their assignment into the Belgian area as somewhat of a vacation. The Monthly Information Report for the period ending 31 January summed up the Detachment's activity as follows:

"For the entire period the VII Corps occupied a sector of Belgium during its participation in the battle of the Ardennes salient. This region had been strongly pro-Allied and after initial liberation had enjoyed several months of counterintelligence coverage by the Belgian Surete and by CIC. Hence normal CIC problems were substantially minimized, with all Black List information previously exploited and no local denunciations occurring--in sharp contrast to three previous months in Germany. No cases of sabotage or espionage arose."116

On New Year's Day 1945, a member of VII Corps Headquarters checked the travel control system by traveling across the Corps zone. He was stopped no less than six times. But on several occasions, sentries at posts approached the vehicle and some put their heads inside of it, which led the Corps G2 to publish instructions for sentries built around the theme, "The enemy deals ruthlessly with a careless sentry. 117

XVIII Corps CIC: Screening Measures

During the German counteroffensive, the 218th CIC Detachment moved into action with Corps headquarters. In the Monthly CIC Information Report, Capt. Albin P. Dearing, Commanding Officer, pointed to some of the difficulties

115 First U.S. Army Interrogation Center, Bulletin #3, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).
116. Monthly Intelligence Rpt, 207th CIC Det, Hq VII Corps, dtd 1 Feb 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).
117 G2 Periodic Rpt No. 1, Hq VII Corps, dtd 1 Jan 45, in First U.S. Army G2 Journal and File, dtd 2 Jan 45, L-556 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

encountered by the Detachment. Large numbers of civilians, streaming toward the rear areas, created a grave counterintelligence problem. Agents at road control posts and on mobile patrols checked all civilians, since enemy agents had parachuted behind Allied lines wearing civilian clothing. Close liaison was maintained between the 218th CIC Detachment and governmental and other investigative agencies. Questionable characters, when found, were placed in local jails until properly identified. The 218th CIC obtained valuable positive intelligence which was forwarded to G2, XVIII Corps.

One agent not only checked local security measures and screened civilian employees, but also handled criminal cases inasmuch as there was no CID in the area during the period.[118]

Special Agent K.O. Walker and Agent Dunbar of the 301st CIC Detachment investigated a security violation which had been allowed to exist for some time.

It was discovered that XVIII Airborne Corps Message Center persistently forwarded unenveloped classified documents to First Army Message Center in unsealed pouches.[119] The shortage of envelopes had been accepted as an excuse for discarding the two-envelope method of transmitting classified information, even though, where no envelopes were available, the authorized procedure was to staple the document so that it could not be read without removing the fasteners.

The investigation was turned over to the 218th CIC Detachment by the 301st. The officer in charge of the XVIII Corps Message Center was instructed not to accept improperly prepared material, and to see that all classified data passing through his center had been properly sealed.

Corps CIC Detachments Under Third Army: Control Lines

Reports from all of the Corps in Third-Army reiterate Army's preoccupation with Control Lines.

III Corps established their Control Line on 27 December, and coordinated it between corps and division boundaries. Between the coordinating points, American troops manned check points, along with gendarmes and auxiliary police. Motorized

118 Monthly CI Rpt, 218th CIC Det Hq XVIII Airborne Corps, 7 Mar 45 in 218th CIC Det Per Rpts, 1/45-5/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

119 Incl to Notification by 301st CIC Det to XVIII Corps CIC, dtd 30 Dec 44, subj, "Security Violation," and Reply by Indorsement to CO 301st CID Det from 218th CIC Det, in 218th CIC Det Situation Summaries in Weekly Summary Rpts File, (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

patrols supplemented these efforts, and CIC screened apprehended persons "at the place of apprehension and/or PW Enclosures and/or established screening points on, or in the rear of, the CI line...."[120]

The 208th CIC Detachment, with VIII Corps, did not report any outstanding cases during the period, but echoed the suggestion of many other CIC Detachments when it advised detailed training and instruction in the enemy's intelligence and political organizations; geography and national characteristics; history and, of course, language.[121]

VIII Corps' accent on Control Line activity is obvious also, as each daily entry in the CIC Detachment's log mentioned some travel control procedure. The German drive reached Corps territory, but 208th CIC did not have too much trouble with the civilian population. Only a few sought safer areas to the rear. 1st Lt. L. Ermis, an Agent of the 208th CIC Detachment, reported, "Seeing American troops in or around their homes gives them great satisfaction."[122]

The Commanding Officer of the Detachment, Capt. Albert R. Bowen, Jr., had typewritten memorandums based on cases reported in other sectors distributed to each team in the 208th CIC. Usually the cases accentuated the need for thoroughness in counterintelligence work.[123]

He extended this practice to include teams of the 222d CIC Detachment when that unit was attached to the 208th CIC, for training and field experience.[124] The 222d remained attached to VIII Corps CIC from 4 January 1945 to 4 April 1945.[125]

On 19 January 1945, the 223d CIC Detachment was attached for the same reasons to the 203d CIC Detachment, and the 76th CIC Detachment joined the 220th CIC Detachment.[126]

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120 III Corps Periodical Rpt, 15-31 Jan 45 in III Corps Periodic Rpts 15-31, Jan 45, 1-812 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

121 Monthly Intelligence Rpt, 208th CIC Det, Hq VIII Corps, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

122 Daily Activities Rpts, 208th CIC Det, Dec-Jan 45 in 208th CIC Det CIC Journal, 12/44 2/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

123 Memorandum, 208th CIC Det, Jan-Feb 45 in 208th CIC Det Correspondence File 1/45-6/45, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

124 Ltr by Command of General Eisenhower, Hqs ETO, U.S.Army dtd 22 Jan 45 to all Commanding Generals, etc. in 208th CIC Det Corres File 1/45-6/45 (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

125 Ltr by Command of General Eisenhower, Hqs ETO, U.S.Army, dtd 4 Apr 45, to all Commanding Generals, etc. in 208th CIC Det Corres File 1/45-6/45 (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

126 Ibid., dtd 22 Jan 45.

XX Corps CIC

The 220th CIC Detachment, with XX Corps, investigated many cases during the period. One of the most widely reported involved a Frenchman who visited the Detachment on 27 January, requesting permission to travel. To make the CIC agents more sympathetic, he told them of the horrors he had suffered at the hands of les Boches. An alert CIC interrogator wondered why the man, who had claimed one town as his home, wished to live in another. Investigation proved that the man had grown wealthy as a collaborator with the Germans and, more precisely, a denouncer for the Gestapo. The 220th CIC warned other interrogators to be careful of people who come into the CIC office voluntarily to try to "...palm off a phoney story...."[127]

The 220th CIC's doggedness produced results in another incident, the case of was first arrested by Third Army as a suspected German agent and turned over to their Interrogation Center. The CIC interrogator there found no reason to suspect him and recommended repatriation.[128]

The 220th CIC Detachment was sent a copy of the interrogation report. Agents matched the statements made by during his initial interrogation against the current version of his past history, and investigated the case further. In twelve days, 220th CIC Agent Dennis H. Mahoney was able to submit a memorandum on the case which outlined the discrepancies in the findings of the Interrogation Center and the Corps CIC Detachment.

claimed to be a Separatist (a pre-Nazi movement not considered subversive by counterintelligence experts), but he had delivered the leader of the Separatist movement in Trier to the Nazi authorities, and he and his wife claimed he was arrested by the SS and Polizei Gericht (Police Court) as a criminal against the war economy. This was news to 220th CIC, and it could not be proven. moreover, had not mentioned it in his initial interrogation. His claim that he was an enemy of the Reich seemed odd in that he had suffered no loss of personal property or pension and that his son was later accepted as a volunteer in the Waffen SS.

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127 12th Army Group CIC Monthly Bulletin #1, undated, for January 1945, in 208th CIC Det Correspondence File 1/45-6/45 (CONFIDIENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097)

128 Memorandum for OIC, Hq, Third U.S. Army CIC Interrogation Center, Subj, dtd 16 Dec 44, in 220th CIC Det Correspondence File Spot Reports, 1/45-6/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

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contention that his son was forced into the organization was discredited by the son, who was a prisoner of war. ., had a Wehrpass (Army pass) in his possession which listed his father's profession as a member of SS Geheim Polizei (SS Secret Police). , relationship to some Nazi police organization was suggested further by his possession of identity documents from Gestapo headquarters which named him as an Aussenstellenleiter (Chief of a Gestapo sub-station). The suspect alleged that he had been imprisoned in the camp at Danzig-Matzkau where he had been given medical treatment by was located and he testified that avowal that the Germans did not accept his medical report was a falsehood. said his recommendations had permitted to stay at home for several months under the pretext of illness.

Agent Mahoney summarized the findings by stating that the suspect was "...at least one of their (the Gestapo's) informers."[129]

Major Anthony W. Lobb, commanding 220th CIC, sent the complete reports from the Interrogation Center and from the Detachment forward to the G2, with a recommendation for internment. The G2, XX Corps, forwarded the documents to G2, Third Army, who concurred with Major Lobb and was scheduled for detention "...until the tactical situation improves."[130]

The Migrating MG Detachment

The G2, XX Corps, called upon the 220th CIC the day following his transmittal of the Detachment's account of the case to investigate a delicate situation.

The Military Government Detachment in St. Avold had been celebrating New Year's Day with a few of the local officials, the official's wives, and civilian employees of the Detachment. At about 0100 hours, the party ended, and the civilians were taken home. An officer of a nearby Military Government Detachment informed the St. Avold Detachment that the tactical situation had changed adversely and that his outfit was withdrawing. A messenger was sent forward to seek the advice of a Ranger Battalion, the nearest tactical unit commander. In the absence

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129 Memorandum, 220th CIC Det, Hq XX Corps, Subj, ' to G2 XX Corps, dtd 28 Dec 44 in 220th CIC Det Spot Rpts File 1/45 - 4/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

130 Indorsement Hq Third U.S. Army G2, to G2, XX Corps, dtd 30 Jan 45 in response to Memorandum from latter to former with 5 inclosures, dtd 8 Jan 45; inclosures include Memorandum re: s/Lobb, Memorandum re: . s/Mahoney dtd 28 Dec 45, and Memorandum re: ., dtd 16 Dec 44 s/Wirth, in 220th CIC Det Spot Rpts File, 1/45-4/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

of the commander, the S2 of this Ranger Battalion advised Military Government's withdrawal. At 0400 the Military Government Detachment was on the rearward road to Nancy taking with them the mayor and his wife and three interpreters, in keeping with the policy of protecting pro-Allied collaborators. Fifty inhabitants and all but seven policemen promptly evacuated the town.

A French Intelligence officer spotted the exodus, and wrote an obviously biased account of the event which in time appeared as an Office of Strategic Service (OSS)/ Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) report.

The CIC investigation by Agents Gerald Stafford and Harry T. Schaeffer certified that everyone had acted in good faith, if a bit too hastily, in the midst of a confused tactical situation. Less than two hours after Military Government's withdrawal, a reconnaissance platoon had returned with negative information concerning the enemy's presence in the area. At no time had the Germans advanced closer than eleven miles from St. Avold. The fiasco had been precipitated through rumors and lack of accurate information.[131]

As a result of the investigation, CIC arrested two of the three interpreters Military Government had carried with them in the evacuation: one, a student from Austria, and the other, his mistress. They were turned over to XV Corps CIC for additional investigation.[132]

Lying to gain the sympathy of CIC was frequent with residents of the Saar-Moselle triangle. One young Frenchman, Franz Madon, told agents of the 220th CIC Detachment that he had escaped from the Germans after arrest for traveling without a permit. Interviews with the boy's parents discounted his story, and eventually he admitted his untruthfulness, saying that he had been told by Eglaia Lovato, with whom he had traveled, to invent a "cover story." Lovato at first denied the story, but confessed when confronted by Madon. Both were jailed for their attempted deception of American authority. Lovato, because he was the elder and had misdirected Madon, received the more severe punishment.[133]

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131 Memorandum from G2 XX Corps to CG XX Corps re: "Scare-rumor at St. Avold," dtd 9 Jan 45, with Incl 1; and Memorandum from CIC Det 220, Subj, "Investigation of Evacuation of St. Avold," to G2 XX Corps, dtd 13 Jan 45, in 220th CIC Det Spot Reports, 1/45-4/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

132 Counterintelligence Rpt #10, CIC Det 220, Hq XX Corps, dtd 18 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

133 Monthly Intelligence Rpt, 220th CIC Det, Hq XX Corps, dtd 11 Feb 45, for month ending 31 Jan 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

While some Detachments in Ninth Army areas enjoyed a period of routine counterintelligence activity, the 216th CIC Detachment did not. On 4 January the Detachment braved "An educational inspection..." by the Office of the Inspector General, XVI Corps.

A three-page listing of short-comings, primarily in administrative and preventive maintenance matters, resulted,[134] and the Corps Commander requested corrective action.[135] The Commanding Officer of the 216th CIC, Major William M. Frederick, replied, in a two-page endorsement three days later, indicating that corrective action had been taken where possible.[136]

The 216th CIC's counterintelligence operations were not hampered by the Inspector General's inspection. Acting in augmentation of XIII Corps CIC in[137] Holland from 23 December 1944, the Detachment turned in a high-quality performance.

Previously, 216th CIC had been responsible for the apprehension of one outstandingly pro-Nazi collaborationist and Gestapo informant, As a Gestapo informant she was responsible for the arrest of Belgian underground espionage agents during the occupation. Investigation also indicated her smuggling activities. At the request of 216th CIC Detachment the Belgian Gendarmerie terminated shady career.[138]

In Holland, most of the Detachment's work was performed in and around the town of Heerlen. A great number of loyalty clearance investigations were conducted on civilians for Civil Affairs: for curfew and travel passes, for installation of telephones, for employment by U.S. Army units, and for Army personnel who were to handle classified documents.[139]

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134 Memorandum from XX IG, XVI Corps, to CO 216th CIC Det, dtd 4 Jan 45, in 216th CIC Det Correspondence File 4/43-9/45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

135 1st Indorsement to Memorandum from IG to CO 216th CIC Det, dtd 7 Jan 45, in 216th CIC Det Correspondence File 4/43-9/45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

136 Ibid., 2nd Indorsement.

137 Records do not reveal the name of the CO of the 213th CIC Detachment.

138 Bi-Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt, 216th CIC Det, Exhibit "A", dtd 23 Dec 43, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts, 10/44-9/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

139 CIC Annex to After-Action Rpt, 216th CIC Det, 1 Jan 45 - 1 Feb 45, undated, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts, 10/44-9/45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

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Among the tasks of the Detachment was a Security Survey of the railroad yard at Heerlen. Food unloaded at this point for use of units in the area was being stolen. While cases of theft were a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) responsibility, security was CIC's assignment, and Agents of the 216th CIC studied the installation with the railhead officer, and proposed a system of guards which would simultaneously provide security and prevent thievery.[140]

Agent Undercover

On 7 January a report was received that two civilians in in Heerlen were trying to elicit information from American troops. After checking the reliability of the owner, an undercover CIC agent in a complete field uniform entered the cafe. The suspects drew the agent into conversation, and proceeded to vilify the English and the Russians while praising the Germans as humanitarians who had been blasphemed by the Jews, a viewpoint closely related to the German propaganda chatter. After checking with a local Dutch agency and finding that these two civilians had been suspected of cooperation with the Germans during the occupation, both were arrested by CIC and turned over to Dutch officials for trial and internment.

Agents Clarence Huntington of the 213th CIC and Eric M. Gross of the 216th CIC worked together to locate a collaborator who was reported to be employed in a sensitive position by an American Army unit. CIC was about to circularize the information to all units in the area when two Dutch civilians, seeking employment as interpreters with a U.S. battalion, mentioned the suspect in their interview. The CIC agents were quick to learn his whereabouts. The suspect, was picked up and turned over to Dutch authorities who interned him indefinitely.

A fixed surveillance on the home of a suspect, by Agents Huntington, 213th CIC Detachment, and Herbert W. Clarke, 216th CIC Detachment, resulted in his arrest. Prior to the surveillance, could not be located by either the Opsporingsdienst (Dutch Intelligence) or the CIC. had represented the Nazi Party in legal proceedings during the occupation. A political prisoner, was turned over to the Dutch for further investigation and trial.

Still another investigative technique, interrogation, proved its value to the 216th CIC during this period. The detachment used the interrogative technique

140 Security Survey of Heerlen Railroad Station and Yards, dtd 14 Jan 45, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts, 10/44 - 9/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

known as "Mutt and Jeff" or "Sweet and Sour" with and a Prisoner of War Interrogator (IPW) as the "Sweet" team and Agent Dillard W. Howell as the "Sour" interrogator. While Agent Howell blustered and threatened, Agent Rafaeli and his team-mate were sympathetic to the suspect, . who had a passport similar to that carried by high Nazi officials during the occupation. The divergent approaches netted results. had been employed in a German war plant for six years, before the outbreak of hostilities. He had more than 50,000 Reichmarks in a bank in Dusseldorf, Germany, and the indications were that he was someone of importance at the war plant. The Dutch jailed him immediately as a security threat, pending trial.[141]

XIX Corps CIC: Investigating the Hitler Youth

The 219th CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report for the month ending 31 January 1945 revealed an investigation of the Hitler Jugend, instigated by the report of an agent of the Deuxieme Direction, Belgian Ministry of National Defense, who said a group of former members of the Hitler youth were holding clandestine meetings in Raeren.

The town of Raeren was located in the section of the Belgian frontier which had been part of Germany until 1919 when it was ceded to Belgium under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1940, the Germans reclaimed the territory for the Reich. It was a natural breeding place for auxiliaries such as the Hitler Jugend because of the blood ties which transcended national boundaries.

219th CIC initiated a surveillance of seven individuals who had been singled out, by making use of local police and Gendarmes. The suspects, three boys and and four girls, were teen-agers. The surveillance continued for four weeks with no developments. On 29 January, the original Belgian agent informed CIC that at least one of the youths was aware that Allied authorities were interested in him because of his earlier Hitler Youth activities. This resulted in a decision to arrest the seven simultaneously. The boys were taken to XIX Corps CIC Interrogation Center at Aachen, Germany; the girls were interrogated by the local Belgian Counter Intelligence representatives. Despite their anti-Allied sentiments and the fact that the parents of three of the suspects had been arrested by Belgian authorities in September 1944 for their pro-Nazi activities before the liberation, the month of investigation had produced no evidence of subversion. However, their existence as a potentially dangerous force led Major Thomas A. Gagan, Commanding Officer of the 219th CIC Detachment, to comment:

141 Monthly Operational Rpt, 216th CIC Det, for month ending 31 Jan 45, dtd 13 Feb 45 in Operational Rpts, 216th CIC Det, 10/44 to 9/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098 and Staff and Faculty Library).

"This case is mentioned not as an example of brilliant research or investigative work on the part of CIC. It is believed, however, that it is of interest because it illustrates a situation that doubtless will be met by numerous CIC Detachments in Germany; that of groups of pro-Nazi youths who, if not actually formed into units for the purpose of subversive activities, are potentially a threat to security should they become organized. Their extreme youth and the fact that their education has been completely Nazi in character make them capable of the most fanatically stubborn resistance to the Allied occupation armies, should the proper directing and organizing force come into being. It appears that one of the problems of CIC will be to neutralize these groups even though evidence may be insufficient to warrant physical confinement."[142]

142 Monthly Intelligence Rpt, 219th CIC Det, Hq XIX Corps, dtd 24 Feb 45, for month ending 31 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 5

CIC AT ARMY LEVEL

First Army, which had borne the brunt of the German attack, had been greatly responsible for upsetting the German timetable and, eventually, for causing the failure of the counteroffensive.[143]

The 301st CIC Detachment, which operated over a wide area throughout the campaign, in addition to their escape route investigation,[144] was concerned primarily with security control measures. To ensure complete coverage of the areas entrusted to it, First Army CIC coordinated its activities with nearby ADSEC CIC teams.[145] On 21 December, Intelligence Personnel from "T" Force, with the exception of one CIC Detachment which was sent to assist in the protection of Twelfth Army Group with Headquarters in Luxembourg, were placed under direction of the Commander of the 301st CIC Detachment, Lt. Col. Horace Miner. The personnel, consisting of Prisoner of War Interrogators (IPW), Military Intelligence Interpreters (MII), and CIC were organized into security patrols.[146]

Members of the Einheit Stielau, operating on short range reconnaissance missions, were successful during this period in obtaining American passwords and countersigns. As a countermeasure, these signs were changed often, on theory that they had been compromised -- whether there was proof of this not.[147]

The Manpower Question

The flexibility of organization and the sources of additional personnel which the 301st CIC Detachment had developed were important administrative accomplishments. On 29 January, the Detachment forwarded a letter to the 305th CIC Detachment in Italy which explained the existing Tables of Organization and the methods of augmentation. The letter, signed by 1st Lt. Charles Conick for Colonel Miner, relayed the following information:

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143 War As I Knew It, George S. Patton, Jr., (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1947), Chapter 21.

144 See Chapter entitled "Rhineland, Phase I, Northern Armies."

145 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #11, 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 15 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

146 12th Army Group, Report of Operations, (Final After-Action Report), Vol. IV, Part V, page 13, (RESTRICTED).

147 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #11, 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

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146 12th Army Group, Report of Operations, (Final After-Action Report), Vol. IV, Part V, page 13, (RESTRICTED).

147 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #11, 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

"At present we are operating under the following tables of organization:

	0	EM	Headed By
Division	4	13	Captain
Corps	5	14	Major
Army	6	15	Lt. Colonel

In addition to the above, Twelfth Army Group has a pool of approximately 120 men and officers which, technically speaking, we can draw upon. In fact, this pool is split up into small teams of three officers and ten enlisted men and reattached to the Armies for their use. Thus, in addition to our usual complement, we have two pool teams constantly at our disposal working in the Army area. Any of the lower echelons in Corps and Divisions feel free to call on us at any time for additional personnel for a specific project, e.g. a large town, increased refugees, etc. In addition, we try to send to Corps teams three or four of our personnel to be placed on duty with them in larger towns that we intend to eventually take over. This serves two purposes:

a. It adds to their manpower.

b. It facilitates the take-over from Corps inasmuch as we already have a man who is familiar with the town problems and personalities.

Passing notice should be given to the Group T (rather than S)[148] Force. It is similar in construction to your S-Force and used in towns such as Paris, Luxembourg, etc., where a need for additional specialized personnel arises. This organization has been found useful at such times. While awaiting a town to fall, they are usually in Army area and, quite naturally, (as at present) their CIC personnel are available to us. It should be said, however, that due to the need for mobility in such a force, their service can never be considered definite and it is impossible to plan on the use of their personnel." [149]

148 In Italy, a force comparable to "T" Force was organized early in that campaign, known as "S" Force. See Chapters on Italy and Northern France for more information on the organization and use of these groups.

149 Letter, from Hq FUSA, 301st CIC Det to CO, Fifth U.S. Army CIC, Subj: Espionage Investigations, dtd 29 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

In clearing out the Bulge area which had previously received careful counter-intelligence considerations, few enemy agents and security threats were uncovered. The 301st CIC Detachment found that the changed situation created a lull in enemy espionage activity. In the period between New Year's Day and 15 January 1945, only four cases worthy of lengthy interrogation at the Master Interrogation Center developed despite the 301st CIC's widespread spy-catching efforts. One-pro-Nazi was turned over to the Belgians for disposition, and one German wearing parts of the U.S. uniform was evacuated as a prisoner of war. The two other cases proved negative.[150]

The Liberation of M/Sgt Johannisberg

A case, which was recounted many times in counterintelligence publications under the title, "The Man Who Stayed for Dinner," was precipitated by the desertion of German M/Sgt Johannisberg, during the January phases of the Ardennes battle.

Johannisberg had been in charge of sanitary facilities at the Fuehrer's Headquarters. Overheard repeating an "unfortunate" political joke, he had been transferred with dictatorial dispatch to a line outfit, the 62d Volksgrenadier Division. Johannisberg returned the favor by making a separate peace with the Allies immediately.

Radio Luxembourg carried the news of Johannisberg's defection, and when Hitler heard of it, he was said to have entered a period of sporadic depression, demanding that no effort be spared to repatriate Johannisberg before he could "spill" his information. Johannisberg's information was in a vein that could have proved extremely embarrassing to the Fuehrer.

Characteristically, SS Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny assumed supervision of the task. The man who had liberated Mussolini from the Allies set out to liberate M/Sgt Johannisberg from himself. In the presence of General Sepp Dietrich and Heinrich Himmler, Skorzeny briefed one Captain Franz Erich Von Frauenhofer on the mission.

Frauenhofer and his driver, Friederich Waldruch, dressed as a U.S. Army Major, GSC, and a Tech 5, respectively, were accompanied in their jeep by an almost incredible streak of luck in the early stages of their operation. Crossing the line into XVIII Airborne's sector on 15 January 1945, they were stopped by a sentry who looked them over and permitted them to pass. Boldly, Frauenhofer

150 First U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #3, dtd 15 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

tried to secure the password and countersign. The sentry, hard-pressed, was forced to admit that he did not know them.

Frauenhofer had even more luck in learning the password from the next sentry, and thereafter traveled to Verviers with comparative freedom. After a restful night, the pair resumed their journey in the morning. Sighting a truckload of German soldiers, now American prisoners, Frauenhofer and his driver fell in behind. The truck led them to the First Army Prisoner of War enclosure, arriving there at 0912 hours.

Admittance to the Cage was easily attained. Upon the presentation of a blue SHAEF pass, Frauenhofer entered, instructing his driver to wait in the jeep. The masquerading Major, posing as the head of a newly-formed "Prisoner and Prisoner of War Personalities Data Section," produced "unquestionable" authorizations (later questioned and found to be forgeries) and was permitted to evacuate Johannisberg in his personal custody. He departed immediately, but his jeep and his driver were nowhere in sight. A military policeman on duty revealed that the driver had waited around for eight minutes, just enough time to find out about the local houses of ill fame, before departing.

Since it was nearing luncheon hour and since he had been invited to remain for that meal, Frauenhofer felt he was obliged to return to the Cage to eat. And drink.

The privilege of sharing the officer's mess liquor ration proved Frauenhofer's undoing. He had claimed previously to have been a member of Class #6, Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. This seemed plausible when revealed with a slightly-Teutonic tone of tongue. After his third drink of liquor, Frauenhofer began speaking flawless English. Difficult words tripped from his tongue, without descent to malapropisms. Eyebrows were raised in suspicion at this fluency.[151] But the case was not cinched until Frauenhofer praised the meal--C-Rations and left-over Spam.

Though he attempted to bluff his way out of his situation, Frauenhofer was no match for First Army's seasoned interrogators. The description of driver Waldruch and pertinent directional information was forwarded to proper authorities.

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151 The reports on this case fail to indicate how fluency in English could trip up a Nazi posing as a U.S. Army Major. It seems likely that membership in Military Intelligence Training Center, where persons of foreign extraction were taught English, was chosen as a cover for Frauenhofer to explain his lack of general knowledge about the United States. Thus the German, who actually spoke good English, had to pretend a Teutonic accent to make his story convincing.

Frauenhofer seemed penitent and crestfallen as he assured his captors that he could be of great help, administering parts of conquered Germany. Assured that he would not be needed in that capacity, Frauenhofer's last words to the departing interrogator were: "By the way, if you hear over the radio that my driver has been awarded the Eichenlaub /Oak leaf cluster/ to the Good Conduct Medal, please notify me."[152]

Third Army CIC

In Third Army area, CIC detachments were giving coverage to territories which had been given previous attention by other units. Personnel shortages continued to be a problem, but it was solved in part by the attachment of CIC personnel from XXII and XXIII Corps[153] and from the 69th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which were on the continent but were inoperative. In addition, the new Army Group Reserve Team, formed with Agents from Third Army CIC detachments and from the 12th Army Group CIC Reserve Team, became the nucleus of the new 12th Army Group Team. Additional personnel with linguistic ability were obtained from tactical units to fill all five teams to TOE strength. Pending formal transfer, such personnel were placed on temporary duty for training with CIC and used as interpreters until they became familiar with CIC modus operandi.[154]

By this time, Third Army's Travel Controls were being executed more conscientiously, and the level of troop security-consciousness seemed to remain constantly high. Office of Strategic Service (OSS) reported that every one of their operatives who tried to infiltrate into enemy territory through Third Army's sector was captured and escorted back for identification.[155]

CIC at this time was on guard against enemy agents posing as non-combatant American auxiliary personnel such as Red Cross, War Correspondents and Technical Observers. Several of these non-combatants had been captured by the enemy. A list of the missing persons was distributed.[156]

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152 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt #12 for period 16-31 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

153 Maj Gordon S. Campbell was Commanding Officer of the 222d (XXII Corps) CIC Det and Maj William E. Keefe of the 223d (XXIII Corps) CIC Det.

154 Third U.S. Army After-Action Report (Staff and Faculty Library).

155 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #11, 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 15 Jan 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

156 III Corps Periodical Report #37, dtd 14 Jan 45, III Corps G2 Periodical Rpts, 31 Dec - 14 Jan 45, L-812 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

All civilian travel forward of the CIC Control Line in Third Army territory was prohibited. No civilian was permitted to enter or leave the area.[157] Pertinent regulations were posted everywhere. Gendarmes and local officials, at the request of CIC, imposed numerous fines on violators.[158]

Happy New Year

Agents of the 303d CIC Detachment started 1945 by penetrating the cover story of ... an uneducated man who was not overly intelligent, had entered a town and asked a soldier if it was the village of Habern. Since it was not, the soldier escorted to the CIC office. Despite the stubbornness with which he clung to his cover story, was broken because two sandwiches he carried were fresh, though he stated under interrogation that they were two days old. After his confession, was turned over to Luxembourg authorities for trial as an enemy agent.

303d CIC Agents in the city of Luxembourg also interrogated who had been arrested on 1 January by U.S. troops for intoxication and violation of curfew restrictions. An American citizen by birth, had been in Europe for 22 of his 25 years. He had encountered some difficulty because of his citizenship, eventually agreeing to be a Gestapo informant rather than be treated as an alien in Germany. He served the Gestapo for one year as an informer and as a "cut-out" between the Gestapo Headquarters and Gestapo agents.

On 5 September 1945, he was sent to contact a wireless-telegraph stay-behind agent in Diekirch, Luxembourg, to give tactical observations on the combat strength of the Americans in the area. He did. The following day, however, the Americans seized the town.

In an amazing and successful about face, joined pro-Allied militia, informing on several German collaborators and informers. Two weeks later, he attempted to enlist in the United States Army but was refused since he suffered from Tuberculosis. He wandered about from that time on, unhindered, until he had over-celebrated the coming of the New Year.[159]

157 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #12 16-31 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

158 Ibid., Rpt #11, 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 15 Jan 45.

159 Monthly Intelligence Rpt #1, Third U.S. Army CIC Detachment, dtd 20 Feb 45, for month ending 31 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Ninth Army CIC

Unmolested by the tactical situation, except by minor skirmishes along the line, components of the Ninth U.S. Army practised "business-as-usual." Their area of responsibility was extended to encompass the sector formerly covered by VII Corps. Line crossing activity, though anticipated, did not develop in the first two weeks of January because the static situation gave Military Government and CIC the opportunity to evacuate all civilians from the forward area and prepare a no-travel zone ten kilometers deep, west of the Roer River. Any civilian found in this restricted zone was arrested immediately and turned over to CIC for interrogation.

About 2,500 indigenous security guards were employed on road control points, and as guards for bridges and supply dumps. No sabotage incidents were reported in the month of January, but several cases of possible industrial sabotage were investigated. Some evidence of intentional "slowdown" efforts was accumulated, but the high priority placed on the mining and delivery of coal prompted SHAEF officials to retain the agitators rather than risk a greater slowdown through the inefficiency of inexperienced management of the mines.

Of the 33 cases pending at the time VII Corps Interrogation Center was taken over by 309th CIC, twenty-six were disposed of and nine new cases were handled between 1 January and 15 January 1945.

Several "blitz" searches in towns were made by Corps CIC teams, and forty-seven persons were arrested, thirty on violation of Military Government proclamations.[160]

Five linecrossers were caught in the last half of the month. Three of these were Hitler Jugend members, two of whom wore the uniform of that Nazi paramilitary auxiliary.

Following the arrest and interrogation of Guillaume Hendrix, age 15, who alleged he was left behind with nine other youths to commit sabotage, an investigation was undertaken which proved--as had the investigation of Hitler Jugend in other areas--that no formally organized group was yet in operation.[161]

160 After-Action Report CI Branch Ninth U.S. Army, 1-15 Jan 45, Incl 2 to G2 After-Action Report, dtd 19 Jan 45 in Ninth U.S. Army G2 Journal and File, Pt I, Jan 45, L-402 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

161 Ibid., 16-31 Jan 45, Incl 2 to G2 After-Action Report, dtd 4 Feb 45.

A summary of the number of cases handled by the 309th CIC Detachment revealed 305 cases in January. The breakdown and disposition of the arrestees were as follows:

a.	German soldiers in civilian clothes evacuated as Prisoners of War:	37
b.	Arrestees turned over to indigenous authorities:	24
c.	Arrested for security reasons; to be held until lines move forward:	24
d.	Arrested and turned over to Military Government or Civilian Authorities as DPs or violators of Military Government proclamations:	137
e.	Released for insufficient evidence:	19
f.	Pending further interrogation at Army and Corps Interrogation Centers:	54[162]

162 After-Action Reports CI Branch Ninth U.S. Army, 1-15 Jan 45 and 16-31 Jan 45, Incls to G2 After-Action Reports dtd 19 Jan 45 and 4 Feb 45 in Ninth U.S. Army G2 Journal and File, Pt I, Jan 45, L-402, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

Chapter 6

ADSEC COM Z CIC ACTIVITIES

The operation of most of the Advance Section Communications Zone CIC Detachments during the Ardennes Campaign could be summed up in two words: Control Line.

Section Y of the 424th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt. Jesse F. Gordon, comprehensively summarized the organization of an effective Border Control arrangement in a report drafted while this section was supervising all civilian travel over the German, Dutch and Belgian borders in a wide area of the line. Included in the report were several difficulties experienced by the section.

The organization of an effective control system depended on the use of indigenous personnel. Without them, the three officers and ten Agents of Section Y could not have operated successfully.

Rather than draw up a plan and then order indigenous groups to follow it, Section Y called in the heads of the agencies concerned: the Dutch Douane,[163] the Bewakenstrooepen (O.D.),[164] and the Constabulary. They participated in the formulation of the control plan, discussed recommendations and stressed cooperation. The plan, as devised, served the border areas as well as the back country lying along part of the Belgian border. The latter region was covered to prevent circulation to and from Germany through Belgium. As this situation grew less urgent with the introduction of Belgian patrols, the number of posts was limited to one, and fewer patrols were utilized.

Section Y supervised eight posts in the extreme southwest corner of the Netherlands. The posts were manned by four men, two on duty at the post and two on roving patrol to the next post. Patrols at Post #1 and Post #8, at the intersection of the German - Netherlands - Belgian border and at Mamelis, Holland, respectively, contacted posts under the supervision of the adjoining ADSEC COM Z Sections.

The highway from Massricht, Holland, to Aachen, Germany, was under constant patrol by police from Vaals, Holland, and by a detachment of American

163 Dutch Douane; formerly the Dutch Customs Guard, in pre-invasion days a well-organized border guard, underground during occupation.

164 Bewakenstrooepen (O.D.) was a resistance group, the new name of the "Home Guard."

Military Policemen. Two Military Policemen were also on duty at the main gate to Vaals.

Four Counter Intelligence Control Posts, manned by three CIC Agents each, were positioned on the Dutch and Belgian side of the German border. Agents operating these posts passed on the identity of all strange civilians rounded up by the indigenous guards. They also checked the validity of documents. Constant contact was maintained with all posts and patrols by a party-line telephone system.

The difficulties inherent in Border Control included the fact that the indigenous personnel were largely civilians who were not as well equipped as military personnel for this type of duty. Neither local civilians nor soldiers were outfitted properly for winter-time service on isolated posts. Arms were scarce and motor transportation practically non-existent.

Border towns, where German, Dutch, and Belgian gardens adjoined presented an overwhelming problem at night. Persons were believed to be crossing both ways at these points, but there was little that could be done to stop the traffic. There was evidence that mail was being passed from one country to the other at night "over-the-back-fence" route.

Confusion resulted when farmers who lived on one side of the border were prohibited from working the land they owned on the other side. Priests were cut off from their parishes; and sick persons, were denied medical attention because the doctor lived on the other side of the border.[165]

Section Y's activity during this period was fairly representative of ADSEC COM Z CIC units. An interesting note to COM Z CIC procedure was added, however, by Section K's use, for a few days, of Lt. Guenther Schulz, captured agent of the Einheit Stielau. Schulz was assigned to roving patrols, with the task of locating other German masqueraders.[166]

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165 Summary of Information, 424th CIC Det, Section Y, dtd 3 Jan 45 (CONFIDENTIAL),(Staff and Faculty Library).

166 Monthly Information Rpt, 421st CIC Det, Section K, dtd 20 Jan 45, for period ending 31 Dec 44 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library) /NOTE: Execution of Schulz who was captured at Liege, Belgium on 19 Dec 44 and sentenced to death was delayed pending detailed interrogation. On 14 Jun 1945 he was executed by Ninth U.S.Army, having been "lost" because his different locations were not located properly. Reference: Annex 4 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, p. 65 (Unclassified), (Manuscript Staff and Faculty Library)/.

Headquarters Advance Section, in a Bi-Weekly Counter Intelligence Report, told of two unfortunate incidents. One concerned a person in a U.S. uniform who was reported speaking German in a Liege Cafe. Challenged by soldiers for identification, the person resisted. He was shot and killed. Only then could the identity of the linguist be revealed. He was a bona fide U.S. soldier. The case was turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division.

The other announcement was of the successful sabotage of an ammunition train, with investigation netting nothing.[167]

167 Bi-Weekly CI Rpt #11, Hq ADSEC, dtd 25 Dec 44 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 7

12TH ARMY GROUP CIC AND OPERATION GISBOMB

Any hopes the German Intelligence Service might have possessed for a recovery after the Ardennes were cultivated in ignorance of a newly-created American policy, implemented under the name, "Operation GISBOMB."

As its name implied, "GISBOMB" called for aerial attacks to be made on the German Intelligence Service installations, from headquarters of various units to training schools for dangerous agents. All counterintelligence and other interrogation personnel were requested to obtain all possible information concerning the German Intelligence Service installations - location, description, and air defenses- and to forward this material to Chief Counter Intelligence Branch. Files were culled for maps and other pertinent data.[168]

The credit for the conception and organization of the policy has been given a CIC Agent, Capt. Ernest Sidney Baker, who was at the time a member of the Civil Security Section of the Counter Intelligence Branch (CIB) of the G2 Section of Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. Captain Baker had been the Commanding Officer of the 219th CIC Detachment. After his transfer to CIB, he obtained and assembled the information required to make up the necessary target data which was submitted to XIX Tactical Air Command of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, through the G2 (Air) Branch of the 12th Army Group at Luxembourg City.

The plan was devised to counter the increased enemy agent activity and to prevent more enemy agents, approaching a state of readiness, from being introduced into the battle. The advantages the U.S. Army first received by welcoming enemy agents and persuading them to talk, which had given an accurate picture of the potentialities and present capabilities of the enemy, were deemed insufficient now to allow the enemy to continue training agents without harassment. Further, the psychological benefits to be derived by bombing these "secret" training camps were many, not the least of which was the belief that less bold enemy agents would surrender immediately upon entering U.S. territory out of fear that the Americans knew all about them already.

Targets were selected and material collected from all sources. The first targets chosen for GISBOMB were: the radio school and station at Hundsbach,

168 Hq ADSEC COM Z CIC Information Memorandum No. 9, dtd 17 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

where radio agents were trained and which served as communications center for some agents in Allied territory; Leitstelle II West, the headquarters for German sabotage units; Kloster Tiefenthal, the center from which deceptive operations usually were directed and which also served as the headquarters of Jagdverbe ande South West and its training school and as a sabotage training school for guerrillas with the Wehrwolf organization; and the Waldburg Radio School, where radio agents for long-term missions were trained.

Kloster Tiefenthal was attacked by 11 P-38's at 1300 hours, on 13 February 1945. Ten 1,000 pound general-purpose bombs and four incendiaries bombarded the five buildings in the area, and the returning pilots were able to report a formidable explosion, with smoke columns rising to 4,000 feet. Interpretation of aerial photographs of the damage revealed that three of the five buildings had been destroyed, including the largest. The others sustained noticeable damage. Much later, visual investigation of the grounds and interrogation of the caretaker revealed that the burning had lasted two weeks; that all weapons, plastic explosives, school equipment and clothing supplies, (including Allied uniforms) were destroyed; and that many casualties were inflicted.[169] The explosion which the pilots witnessed shattered windows in a town one-half mile away.

Less damage was caused by two attacks by twelve P-38's on Hundsbach on 14 February and on 16 February. Only one building was demolished, and the school and the radio station received only superficial damage. Hundsbach radio did go off the air, and it was presumed that a number of potentially high-grade agents lost their lives. Certainly, morale suffered considerably, and, even though physical damage had not been extensive, the missions against Hundsbach were labeled as successful.

Lietstelle II West was missed completely by 16 P-47's on 14 February and moved to a new location, which was overrun by troops of the Third Army before enough information could be obtained to warrant a new raid.

The mission against the Waldburg Radio School was accomplished by 25 P-47's from the XII Tactical Air Command, at the request of the G2, Seventh Army. The school was completely destroyed. Later, a reliable informant reported that the raid killed twenty-four Franciste agents, and that all the members of the German training cadre were casualties, and that the Franciste chief, Richard Martin, was critically wounded. In addition, Radio Centrale,

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169 Ltr, Hq First U.S.Army, Office of AC of S, G2, to AC of S, G2, Twelfth AG Main, Attn: Chief CIB, Subject: Bomb Damage to Tiefenthal Convent, Feb. 45, dtd 6 Apr 45, s/Col. Dickson (Unclassified) attached to Annex 2, [Annex 2 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S.Army in Europe, (Unclassified) (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library)].

communication center for Agents parachuted into France, Belgium and the Netherlands, had been destroyed.

Operation GISBOMB was termed a success. In the official report of the completed operation, it was pointed out that it hit the enemy hard, where it hurt. Agent personnel, and those qualified to be trained as agents were scarce. Radio equipment was irreplaceable. Vehicle and gasoline shortages prevented effective recruitment of replacements, and substitute instructors were not readily available. The German Intelligence Service could not be sure that the agents they trained at the various centers would not surrender immediately, or, if caught, it knew the agents could be persuaded to reveal pertinent data about the schools. Clearly, the U.S. counterintelligence adoption of the policy of prevention was superior to pounds and pounds of cure at this phase of the war.[170]

Other Twelfth Army Group CIC Activity

Aside from the initiation of GISBOMB by Captain Baker, few reports are available of CIC activity at Army Group level during this period. The reports of Tactical Reserve Team No. 3 of the 418th CIC Detachment, and some suggestions in other reports, present the only picture of the maneuvers of the 418th CIC Detachment during the clean-up campaign in the Ardennes.

Tactical Reserve Team No. 3, attached as it was to Ninth Army, was not representative in its activities of the rest of the 418th CIC Detachment. This team, during early January, was at full strength after the rejoining of two sections, one under Lieutenant Stroud and one under Lieutenant Hardin. They operated in Bardenburg, Germany, the location of many Quartermaster depots. There were several air raids and low level strafing attacks in the daytime. During the counteroffensive, the team was alone in the area, except for a smaller divisional Military Government Detachment. Although the whole sector was empty of troops, CIC agents patrolled it day and night to give the impression that there were American reinforcements behind the two regiments holding the line.

Later, as the situation grew less tense, CIC agents registered and screened more than 10,000 of the town's inhabitants.[171]

It appears that those agents of the 418th CIC Detachment working at Army Group Level had, as their mission, the security of vital installations. In

170 Annex 2 to History of the CI Activity of the U.S. Army in Europe, (Unclassified) (Manuscript in Staff and Faculty Library).

171 Unit History of CIC Det #418, TRT #3, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Reports, dated 31 December 1944, 15 January 1945 and 31 January 1945, a breakdown of the distribution of CIC personnel for Twelfth Army Group indicated a consistent allotment of agents to five installations: Twelfth Army Group's Tactical Headquarters, Main Headquarters, Rear Headquarters, Interrogation Center and the T-Force Command Post. Fifty-three CIC agents were employed in these installations.[172] No records of their activity during this period are available, and records of the activities of CIC agents from Army Group operating with other CIC Detachments at lower echelons were incorporated into reports of the subordinate unit.

172 /12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report #10 for period 16-31 Dec 44 dtd 31 Dec 44, L-320, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia)/; /12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report #11 for period 1-15 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 15 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia)/; /12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Report #12 for period 16-31 Jan 45, L-381, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia)/.

Chapter 8

EYES ON THE RHINE

By the end of January, the only signs of the Battle of the Bulge were the rusting monuments to German defeat. Remnants of precious vehicles and armaments were pushed to the roadsides. The dead were buried. And once again the Allied armies stood on the threshold of conquest and waited.

Germany had spent twenty-four divisions in the Ardennes; twenty-four divisions which could not man the Siegfried Line.

The Allies did not speed after the withdrawing foe. Instead they halted until all was in readiness.[173]

CIC continued about its business of security, counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion. Its mission was to increase in importance in the months to come, but practically all the demands of combat counterintelligence in a withdrawal had been experienced in the Ardennes counteroffensive. The one lesson which should have been learned above all others was that a desperate enemy could be capable of many things, no matter how suicidal his attempts might seem to the advancing armies and their intelligence units.

173 A Soldier's Story, General Omar N. Bradley (Henry Holt & Co., 1951) Chapter 22.

Part II

Alsace Counteroffensive

Chapter I

Preparing the Defenses

By mid-December 1944, the combat troops of the 45th, 79th, 103rd Infantry and 14th Armored Divisions had driven across the defenses of the old Maginot Line, pushed over the border to Germany, and chased the withdrawing enemy back to its stronghold, the Siegfried Line. On 16 December, these Seventh Army Divisions dug in for the assault on Germany's line of fixed defenses.

The German boundary had been yielded with only token resistance, but the Wehrmacht was not collapsing before the Seventh Army thrust. As early as 7 December, reports from G2 indicated to the American commanders that intensive preparations were being made by the Germans to turn the Siegfried Line into an iron redoubt. These defenses were not planned as a trap for the Allied forces; they were the base from which German counterblows would be uncoiled.

Divisions serving under XV Corps found the breakthrough into the Rhineland more difficult than the four divisions of VI Corps that had reached the Siegfried Line. In the Northern sector of the Seventh Army advance, heavy resistance was met at the Maginot Line, and enemy fortifications at the "Ensemble de Bitche" repulsed the American attackers for over a week. The annihilation of the ring of fortresses around the town of Bitche provided XV Corps with new impetus for the push into Germany.

All units of the Seventh Army were now keyed for a northern drive that would hurtle against the German defenses with momentum gained from recent victories. But even as this drive mounted towards its peak, reports of the German counter-offensive in Belgium and Luxembourg reached Seventh Army Headquarters. On the night of 20-21 December, the thrust into the Saar was called off by orders from higher headquarters, and the Seventh Army divisions were directed to prepare a new line of defense. A fresh phase of operations began as the American units tightened their forward wall and waited for the enemy to counterattack.[174]

CIC in the New Operations

The sudden transition from highly accelerated to static operations was one of the exigencies of combat that CIC units with the Seventh Army had to meet. Problems such as the attempted infiltration of German soldiers dressed as Americans that CIC had rarely encountered during the periods of rapid advance now received careful attention. The stalling of the Seventh Army advance was a cause of bewilderment to the civilians in recently liberated regions. Wild rumors about a massive German

174 Report of Operations, The Seventh United States Army, in France and Germany: 1944-1945, Vol II, pp. 463-494.

[redacted]

drive to recapture Alsace circulated freely, and civilians fled in large numbers from front line areas. Friendly townspeople who regarded American troops as liberators feared that all would be lost if the Germans returned, and they made it clear that an American setback would show that the Seventh Army had "let them down." In the face of this situation, relations between counterintelligence staffs and local authorities were strained. CIC could not alleviate civilian uneasiness over the tactical situation, for this anxiety was shared by the American soldiers in the trenches and foxholes and their leaders at the command posts along the Alsatian front.

45th CIC and some Unfriendly Civilians

As the combat troops of the 45th Division forged across Eastern Alsace and the German border, the 45th CIC Detachment, under command of Captain Rupert W. Lenthner, doggedly kept pace with the forward elements. Agents reported increasing security dangers as they moved from a territory where the civilians were predominately friendly to one where the native populace looked upon the Americans as conquerors. The recent and complete domination of the Alsatians by the Germans had left telling marks; most of the NSDAP (Nazi Party) officials and members, including rank and file supporters, fled into Germany in the van of the Seventh Army advance, but a few fanatics remained as snipers to harass American troops from the rear.

Alsatian civilians offering information to the tactical commanders could not be trusted. Outside the town of Berenthal, voluntarily stated that a hundred Germans had left the town early in the morning; but an American reconnaissance unit returned an hour later to report that the enemy was still strongly positioned in Berenthal with no apparent intention of relinquishing the garrison. When the 45th Division entered the town two days later, was arrested by CIC and placed in a Civil prison.

At travel control roadblocks established in critical localities of the Division sector, CIC agents and the 15 Alsatian Gendarmes attached to the Division encountered numerous civilians with involved cover stories. told one of the best. A search of clothing had revealed a notebook containing several pages of cryptic words. After a brief questioning, he admitted that the scrambled writing constituted a code which he had received from a female acquaintance for his own protection. The purpose of this code, claimed, was to warn him of forthcoming German air activity. CIC agents lost no time in dispatching the man for confinement pending further interrogation.[175]

175 Rpt to ACofS, G-2 (CI), Hq VI Corps from Hq 45th Inf Div, G-2 Section, Subj: Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Rpt, dtd 21 Dec 44 in 45th CIC Det Correspondence File Aug 44 to Jul 45 (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

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Mysterious Motorcyclists

The operation of civilian roadblocks was not always a routine matter. On 30 December, French Forces of the Interior (FFI) guards outside Obermodern noticed a motorcycle with two men astride heading toward their post. They signalled the vehicle to stop, but the driver ignored the order and sped past the roadblock. A fleeting glimpse of the riders indicated that they were both dressed in American uniforms, complete with combat jackets and rubber boots. Guards in the Obermodern area were alerted to watch for the motorcycle, and later in the day, a French Forces of the Interior soldier spotted the two men in the vicinity of the railroad station. The motorcyclists complied with his order to halt, presented their identity papers, and were waved on their way. There was only one thing wrong with this check. The identity papers were written in English and the French Forces of the Interior soldier could not understand a word of the language.

When questioned by CIC Agent Fausto Molinet, the French Forces of the Interior expressed some suspicion of the two men since their manner of speech had differed from the ordinary "GI," and they had scrupulously avoided contact with other American soldiers. Their clothing was also somewhat unusual. No unit or rank insignia was apparent, and both men wore overseas caps with a "U.S." mounted on a round shield. To add to the mystery, the motorcycle bore no license plates and seemed to answer the description of a vehicle previously reported stolen in a nearby town. Agent Molinet felt certain that the motorcyclists were part of an enemy agent team dropped behind Allied lines to participate in espionage and sabotage activities, and he recommended that all security agencies be notified to maintain a vigil for the men. But the bluff had apparently succeeded; the suspected agents either had mingled with the native citizenry or returned to Germany.[176]

Morale in the 45th Division

The order that brought the 45th Division to a standstill and started retrenchment operations was expected to have an adverse effect on the morale of the front line soldiers. CIC discovered a particularly heavy flood of leaflets dropped by the Germans in the Division area. Various themes disquieting to the tired, battle-weary troops were intertwined. The leaflets mentioned that the Division had a high casualty rate, that the soldiers did not know what they were fighting for, that they had a good chance of being killed or wounded "for the sake of warmongers and profiteers who once more contrived to stay at home," that "the draft dodgers at home expect every Joe to do his duty." Drawings of tuxedoed civilians surrounded by alluring women and bottles of champagne were placed next to sketches of soldiers discovering the body of a dead buddy. One of the leaflets was entitled "Your First Winter in Europe" and went on to read:

176 Rpt to ACofS, G-2, from Hq 45th CIC Det, Subj: "Two Unidentified Men in American Uniform," dtd 31 Dec 44 in 45th CIC Det Correspondence file, Nov 44 - Mar 45, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

"EASY GOING HAS STOPPED.
Perhaps you've already noticed it-----the nearer the German border, the heavier your losses.

Naturally. They're defending their own homes.

Winter is just around the corner----hence diminishing AF activity.

More burdens on the shoulders of the Infantry----therefore heavier casualties."[177]

CIC agents discovered that despite the onslaught of this propaganda and the sudden change in the tactical situation, the Infantrymen generally maintained the high level of morale that had been present during the Allied advances.

103rd CIC Concentrates its Activities

The 103rd CIC Detachment, led by Lieutenant Dugald W. Hudson, took advantage of the static situation in December 1944 to accomplish more intensive counterintelligence work through travel control and individual investigation of complaints. In cooperation with Civil Affairs officials and other intelligence officers, the CIC agents made thorough searches within the Division area of occupation for firearms, signalling devices, and other potential security menaces. Mixed feelings towards the American troops on the part of civilians in Alsace and Lorraine made stringent security measures within towns and villages essential. Seventeen roadblocks manned by "white list" civilians supplemented the usual Military Police posts at critical junctions. A premium was placed on the issuance of "laissez passers," and those individuals given passes were strictly enjoined to restrict their travels both in frequency and length.

Although the CIC agents noted that important Nazi party leaders, extreme collaborationists and numerous enemy agents had hastened across the German border before the 103rd Division occupied the Alsatian towns, tight security controls netted 600 persons for CIC screening during December. Interrogation uncovered two SD agents, one Gestapo agent, and two Waffen SS members while thirty-four civilians were deemed suspicious enough to be placed under house arrest.

Resistance activities against the American troops were rarely encountered. The departing Germans had warned the Alsatians to expect brutal treatment from the Americans, but the behavior of the troops dispelled the effects of this propaganda. Even petty pilfering by front-line soldiers was largely eradicated as a result of an anti-looting campaign in the Division.[178]

177 Pamphlets in 45th CIC Detachment Correspondence Files, Aug 44 to Jul 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

178 103rd CIC Det, Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Rpt, dtd 7 Jan 45, in 103rd CIC Det Rpts File, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

44th CIC Establishes a Pattern of Town Control

During December, agents of the 44th CIC Detachment developed a system for the effective control of those towns in Alsace which showed marks or even traces of Nazi Party control.

The first step was to apprehend all the former Nazi leaders who had not fled the town, on the basis of information divulged by the captives and by voluntary informants. A proclamation forbidding any political organization within the town was posted. These measures usually put a hasty end to lingering Nazi hopes of rebellion.

To insure the security of American troops, CIC agents directed the collection of all weapons held by civilians or cached by the departed Germans. Civilians were advised that stringent hours of circulation would have to be adhered to without exception. Violators of curfew hours would be strictly punished. In towns that lay within battalion or company jurisdiction, the CIC agents took an additional step. A complete freeze was set on all civilian movement and lifted only when the American control of the town was no longer in doubt.[179]

514th Detachment Appraises CIC With an Armored Division

The 514th CIC Detachment, which was attached to the fast-striking 14th Armored Division, found the month of December 1944 relatively quiet. Accustomed to instituting security measures while moving at high speed, agents of the Detachment were able to reflect on their field experiences of the past months. Several factors that the agents considered essential in training CIC personnel for service with an armored division were mentioned by Captain Edward F. Biedron, the Detachment Commander, in his Monthly Information Report.

Governing all the operations of the CIC unit was the extreme mobility characteristic of the armored division in its tactical missions. In the course of a day or two, an armored column was likely to capture as many as ten or twelve villages and towns. The burden of establishing at least minimal security in these areas lay almost solely with the handful of CIC agents. Little thought could be given to proving the guilt of a person on whom suspicion was placed; the merest shred of evidence was considered reason enough to detain the individual as a security hazard. At all times, the security of the parent unit was the primary consideration.

Close cooperation with Civil Affairs/Military Government, the Military Police, and other Division agencies was considered essential. On civilian matters, CIC found that their operations could be neatly dove-tailed with Civil Affairs-Military Government, and tight tactical security could be built up by joint planning with the Military Police. When CIC assignments were particularly heavy, the Military Police were often able to lend important assistance.

179 44th CIC Det, Historical Report for Dec 44, undated, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The relation between a CIC unit with an armored division and the next higher echelon CIC unit had to be especially well-knit. Never certain of the amount of time available for its operations in a village, the division detachment had to keep the corps detachment fully appraised of the condition in which the security of the village was left. Investigations suspended in mid-air had to be completed; individuals apprehended and placed in temporary confinement had to be given further disposition; preliminary security measures such as blackouts and curfews, interruption of civil communications, impounding of mail, and establishment of a provisional town council had to be reinforced. Without proper briefing from division detachment agents, the CIC personnel at corps level were faced with tracking down futile leads and covering a great deal of unnecessary ground.

The demands on the individual agent serving with an armored division CIC detachment were rigorous. Good judgment alone was not enough. Each agent was required to make on-the-spot decisions without pondering over circumstances and details. There was no room in an armored division CIC detachment for a latter-day Sherlock Holmes; careful planning always had to be governed by the factor of speed. In addition, an agent unacquainted with the tactical movement and administrative control of an armored division was severely handicapped. Captain Biedron urged thorough training of CIC agents in basic concepts of armored warfare before assignment to his detachment.[180]

The effectiveness of the 514th CIC operations was demonstrated in the capture and handling of Otto Voelkel. Working from a master list of suspects prepared at a higher echelon, the division agents found Voelkel in the town of Wissembourg, Bas-Rhin. Voelkel tried to pass himself off as a loyal French National by producing a French Army paybook. CIC agents quickly noted that there was a discrepancy in the birth date listed in the paybook and that Voelkel did not possess the vital statistics listed in the physical description.

Interrogation revealed Voelkel as a professional toiler in the vineyards of illegal activity. Espionage was simply a new chapter in the long, unsavory story on his life. From 1928 to 1939, he was engaged in "business" in Casablanca, French Morocco. For the most part, Voelkel's enterprises consisted of border smuggling and opium deals. French authorities had arrested him, but he was soon released through the German armistice commission. Voelkel seemed to have a penchant for getting in trouble and, in March 1942, the French Securite Militaire arrested him in Marseille on charges of espionage for the SD.[181] Again, the Germans came to his rescue and he was released to their control in Dijon by November 1942. CIC made sure that Voelkel would at last receive his due; they sent him, along with his condemnatory dossier, to the Bureau de Security Militaire Territoriale for trial.[182]

180 514th CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 17 Jan 45, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

181 The Sicherheitsdienst, popularly called the SD, was the Security Service of the S.S.

182 Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Rpt No. 7 dtd 7 Jan 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

3rd Division CIC Catches a Pair of Agents

On 21 December, the combat troops of the 3rd and 36th Divisions were rotated, and the 3rd Division, which had held defenses in and around Strasbourg, was moved on line while the 36th Division, "desperately in need of relief and rehabilitation," was withdrawn from its operations in the Colmar Pocket with the First French Army.[183] Before leaving Strasbourg, members of the 3rd CIC Detachment dealt with a number of espionage agents on short-range missions. All these agents were part of a concerted German effort to gain information on the disposition of Allied forces prior to the January offensive.

Rene Alexander Jacob arrived in Kilstett, after being escorted across the Rhine in a motorboat by two German officers, four soldiers and a German espionage leader, on 20 December. Equipped with 150 Reichmarks, 5600 francs, the alias of "Pierre Gravilliers," and a transparent cover story, Jacob presented himself at the local French Forces of the Interior office. He claimed that he was an escaped French worker and volunteered some tactical information about the disposition of the German forces as proof of his allegiance to the Allied cause. French Forces of the Interior became suspicious when Jacob requested a travel permit for the Strasbourg-Belfort vicinity, and they referred the too-obliging "M. Gravilliers" to the 7th Infantry Regiment Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) team. Without interrogation, he was forwarded to 3rd Division CIC where agents quickly tore apart his flimsy cover.

Jacob soon disclosed that he was a member of the Nazi Party and that he had accepted a three-fold mission from the Frontaufklaerungstruppe 360 with his eyes on a 10,000 franc bonus and credentials in the espionage organization for successful completion of his work. Aware that all hope of reward was gone, Jacob spoke freely to the CIC agents. His mission was: to find out in Strasbourg why Frenchmen preferred to join the U.S. Army rather than volunteer for the French Forces of the Interior; to report on unit insignia, signs and vehicle markings observed between Strasbourg and Belfort; and to report on gun emplacements, types of tanks used, locations of airfields, troop barracks and camps, and any other military information concerning the U.S. Army. Jacob was scheduled to complete this mission within five days and return to the German lines near Colmar. His sojurn in Allied territory was to be marked by a visit to a stay-behind agent in Sigmaringen who would give Jacob another mission in the same area. But the embryo spy had been nipped just when his career was budding, and 3rd Division CIC turned him over to Special Counter Intelligence (SCI).

Joseph Litschgy was of a different background than Jacob, but his mission was similar. The Germans had recruited him from a concentration camp where he had developed a solid reputation as a malingerer and trouble maker. Litschgy was given

183 Seventh Army History, Vol II, p. 503, (Staff and Faculty Library).

a simple cover: he was to state that he had escaped from Germany by crossing the Rhine on a felled tree. Before sending him on his major mission, Litschgy's handling agent dispatched him on a trial mission of reconnoitering the west bank of the Rhine. After his successful return to Germany, Litschgy boarded a motorboat with three Infantry officers, four German soldiers and his ubiquitous handling agent. He was landed near a destroyed bridge where the Germans had established one prong of their attack. French Forces of the Interior seized Litschgy as he crossed into Allied territory and brought him directly to 3rd Division CIC.

After brief questioning, the CIC agents secured Litschgy's full confession. His primary mission was well-suited to his personality; Litschgy was to sound out lower-class opinion in Strasbourg regarding the end of the war, and to determine the attitude of these people toward the Allies. In addition, he was to note public proclamations, purchase newspapers, and discover tactical dispositions and identities of American units. The Germans had provided him with a circuitous route to follow that would bypass French Forces of the Interior posts near Gambsheim. They also had given him the name of a waitress-prostitute who could furnish him food and tobacco. But apparently, the German espionage unit had been poorly informed, for their carefully chosen route had led Litschgy right into the arms of the French Forces of the Interior.[184]

Counter Intelligence Effects of VI Corps Withdrawal

Agents of VI Corps CIC discovered that the American retrenchment operations during the latter half of December prompted a strong psychological reaction from the civilians in the Corps area. Confidence in an Allied victory, which had been growing with each advance of the Sixth Army Group, began to wane. The Alsatians no longer felt secure against the return of the Germans, and many civilians who had been openly cooperative with Allied Intelligence suddenly became reticent or left their communities for the safety of rear areas. Prompted more by fear of German reprisals than pro-Nazi feeling, the average civilian maintained almost utter silence when questioned by CIC agents. A pall of terror seemed to have descended upon the inhabitants that even friendly feeling towards the Allies and the Allied cause could not lift.

The denial of information to Allied intelligence was accompanied by considerable evidence of a rise of anti-American propaganda. Individuals who had been in hiding or who had remained in the background began to display overtly their distaste of the occupying forces. Their boldness rarely paid dividends. CIC kept a sensitive ear tuned to the mutterings of these malcontents and did not hesitate to apprehend the truly subversive elements among the population.

A serious security danger was added in the towns bordering on front line areas. Large numbers of French Forces of the Interior and civil officials entrusted by CIC

184 Hq Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 7.

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with the maintenance of order, fled their posts and joined the throng of refugees clogging the highways to the rear. The sight of these civil leaders in flight was hardly expected to bolster the morale of the remainder of the civilians, and the counterintelligence situation became correspondingly grimmer.

VI Corps CIC Evolves a New System of Control

To meet the increased problem of controlling civilian circulation, VI Corps CIC enlarged the network of roadblocks manned by Gendarmes and French Forces of the Interior personnel and the number of Military Police check posts and roving patrols. These posts and patrols stopped all traffic, military and civilians, checked identity papers, and enforced the restriction forbidding travel by civilians in military vehicles.

Added to this extensive network was a new system of roving patrols conducted by the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron. Twenty-four hours a day, members of this unit went around in jeeps and armored cars checking all civilian and military traffic as well as security measures in force at bridges, ammunition dumps, railroad yards and other vital installations. All patrols were equipped with radio communications and maintained contact with Squadron headquarters. A section of the VI Corps CIC Detachment was on duty at all times at this headquarters, and one Gendarme accompanied each patrol to help cope with civilian matters. Problems that required CIC action were immediately radioed to the Headquarters, and the agents became used to answering these calls on a moment's notice.[185]

Seventh Army CIC Catches Short Range Agent

Seventh Army CIC with its headquarters in Saverne on the outskirts of Strasbourg found plenty of work to accomplish during the latter half of December. The static situation was an invitation to increased espionage, and CIC agents, directed by Detachment commander Lt Col Kenneth Crowell, utilized the merest scraps of information to break up enemy nets. Under CIC interrogation, ill-trained, inexperienced, short range German agents often spilled out modus operandi and names of personalities in the espionage units that had dispatched them. was among these unintentionally helpful individuals.

Apprehended by a patrol from the 7th Infantry Regiment after crossing the Rhine early on the morning of 17 December, was whisked back to 3rd Division CIC. Preliminary screening led division agents to believe that this former employee of the Vichy Labor Ministry at Sigmaringen was sticking to an improbable cover story, and he was turned over to 307th CIC. In final interrogation by Agents Woodrow W. French and Philippe G. Jacques, account was torn apart.

185 206th CIC Detachment, Counter Intelligence Report #12 for period 24 Dec 44 to 11 Jan 45, dtd 11 Jan 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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he admitted that he had been given the mission of contacting one in the Stockfield sector of Strasbourg. was directed to hand 10,000 francs and instruct him to obtain immediate information about troop movements in Strasbourg and the stockpiling of Engineer amphibious material for the crossing of the Rhine. was supposed to transmit the information he gathered to who would return to the point on the Western bank of the Rhine where he had been landed. A pre-arranged flashing of blue, white, and red light signals at about 2200 hours on 18 December would alert Germans on the other side of the Rhine to pick up their agent by motor launch. Having completed the interrogation, CIC allowed to keep his date on the bank of the Rhine at the appointed time, but there was one inconvenience. was chaperoned by an infantry patrol from the 3rd Division. The signal lights were flashed, and soon the muffled drone of a motor launch was heard by the watchful patrol. As the boat neared the bank, shouted out a warning to his compatriots. His scream was too late. Zeroed in by the weapons of the American soldiers, the motor launch and its occupants were destroyed. attempting to escape as the soldiers opened fire, was critically wounded, a victim of his own folly.

But the incident did not end on the banks of the Rhine. Seventh Army CIC staged a raid on the house of the Strasbourg contact and a former Nazi Blockleiter. Caught without means of dodging the accusation of collaborationism, admitted that he had accepted a gift of 500 marks from the Germans. But apparently was to have given him his first mission. had been captured before the act.

Enemy agents were often compelled to lead complicated lives. landestine activities caused him to venture on what might be called the "long way home." A French national affiliated with a German Abwehr espionage group, had left France before the Allied advance, established a false identity as a French Prisoner of War in Germany, and "escaped" to Allied held territory. The speed of the Allied gains in Alsace prevented from reaching Metz where he was to collect information concerning French public opinion and troop dispositions. As a stop-gap measure, enlisted as a private in the French Forces of the Interior in Alsace, saving his false "laissez passer" and 100 Reichmarks for later use. But dual career as a French Forces of the Interior soldier and German espionage agent was halted before it had fairly begun. On 22 December, Seventh Army CIC, acting on a tip from a confessed agent, entered the French Forces of the Interior barracks in Strasbourg and arrested the young soldier. In his confession, claimed that he had been recruited into the Abwehr organization under duress; German agents had threatened to expose his Black Market activities to civil authorities.

Espionage Agent Discovered in Prison

Seventh Army CIC used every ruse known to counterintelligence in its effort to eradicate German stay-behind agents in Strasbourg. CIC knew that the unseen

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enemy was in their midst; the problem was to get wide enough coverage of the city to prevent the Germans from maintaining an espionage foothold in this critical area. Realizing that some of the civilians placed in Strasbourg jails for minor delinquencies might actually harbor serious anti-Allied espionage plans, the 307th CIC placed an agent provocateur in the Prison Departmentale in the hope that this covert worker would be able to gather the German sympathizers around him.

On 28 December, the first reward of this plan was reaped. a sixteen-year-old French National who had been detained in the prison for failure to possess proper identity papers, confided in the agent provocateur that he was serving the Germans as a link in an important espionage chain. The youth was taken to CIC headquarters where 2nd Lieutenant George Perper obtained the complete story of activities on behalf of the German SD organization.

The and ardent Abwehr agent, had recruited the youthful with a lure of 10,000 francs, to remain in Alsace after the Allied conquest of Strasbourg. was entrusted with the mission of obtaining information on Allied armament and material, the activities of security police agencies and their methods of operation in regard to circulation of civilians (requirements for identity papers and "laissez passers"), and the extent of reprisals against German collaborators apprehended by the Allies. When he completed his mission, was supposed to cross the lines and report to in the town of Oberkirch. The agent provocateur had detected just in time; the Prison Departmentale was preparing to release the youth at the same moment that CIC arrived on the scene.[186]

handling agent, had been indicted by many other captured German espionage figures and the dossier of this fanatic Nazi increased considerably with confession. But it was not until 24 June 1945, two months after the German surrender, that CIC caught up with agents of the 307th CIC found him in the woods near Augsburg calmly picking flowers and berries.[187]

In sending a mass of poorly-trained agents into Allied occupied territory during December 1944, the German Intelligence Service was clearly taking a calculated risk. But this "saturation" method was bound to produce some results. Allied security agencies were alert but not omnipresent, and the Germans were willing to sacrifice any number of agents for the few that would manage to re-cross the lines with information.

Most of the agents apprehended were thoroughly interrogated by the time Army CIC had finished with them. Leads were developed, personalities exposed and confessions secured before the 307th CIC passed the erstwhile agents to the Bureau

186 307th CIC Detachment, Monthly Information Report, dtd 20 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

187 Ibid., dtd 12 July 1945

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Securite Militaire Territoriale for trial and ultimate disposition. Occasionally an agent was encountered who seemed to possess better than average potentialities for use as a double agent. This type of individual was transferred to Special Counter Intelligence at Sixth Army Group, after the CIC interrogation had been completed. Officers at Special Counter Intelligence would then assess the chances of doubling the man.[188]

Seventh Army CIC Political Survey

Alsace, with its population of mixed German and French strains, presented a great conglomeration of national sympathies and allegiances. CIC agents had to get used to dealing with a people who, while not ardent supporters of the Third Reich, often possessed a lingering loyalty to the German "Fatherland." To obtain a sampling of public opinion, the 307th CIC Detachment instituted a survey of civilians attitudes in Strasbourg and outlying areas, during the period 24-28 December.

In Saverne and the district to the south of Strasbourg, the ratio of pro-French to pro-German civilians was gauged to be roughly four-to-one but, nearer the German border, the proportion was almost exactly reversed. Within Strasbourg, agents discovered that the Alsatian population had little interest in French domestic politics. The local political scene was markedly colored by the effects of German propaganda that had emphasized the close working arrangements between the Allied forces and the frequently Communist-dominated resistance groups. Civilians were confident that the Allies would be the eventual victors in the War. At the same time, they bitterly resented the aerial bombardment of the city and the destruction of surrounding areas by heavy artillery fire.

The Germans tried to bolster their supporters in the Allied-held city by booming broadcasts via loudspeakers set on the eastern bank of the Rhine. Regular reports proclaimed the imminence of the German counterattack that would return Strasbourg to German hands. To ward off the effects of these propaganda outbursts, Psychological Warfare sound trucks were dispatched through the streets of the city delivering reassurances of Allied military supremacy to the wavering confidence of the civilians.[189]

A Fifth Column Movement

Late in December, CIC agents attached to the First French Army arrested a team of enemy saboteurs that had penetrated deep into the rear sectors of the Allied forces. The saboteurs had failed to cause any damage to Allied material; their

188 307th CIC Detachment, Monthly Information Report, dtd 20 Jan 1945, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

189 Hq Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 7 dtd 7 Jan 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

confession, however, proved quite revealing of the clandestine operations of the German Intelligence Service.

The team was composed of three Frenchmen, former members of the fascist Legion of French Volunteers and the "Milia" (Militia). Each saboteur armed with a pistol, that had been concealed near the groin, and three grenades hidden beneath an American combat jacket. CIC interrogation disclosed that the saboteurs had been entrusted with the mission of destroying Allied vehicles and fuel dumps, including automobile gas trailers and railway tank-cars. Their particular mission was only the advance part of a large-scale plan to harass Allied supply areas.

At an intelligence school in Germany, three detachments, consisting of twelve French nationals each, were undergoing instruction in the art and practice of sabotage. Each detachment was composed of four teams and assigned a specific sector of responsibility. The teams were then alloted sub-sectors in which they would perform their operations. The first move of a team would be to contact an outpost in the Allied occupied territory. Members of the team were to declare that they were German-requisitioned laborers who had escaped from Germany with considerable difficulty. Numerous papers certifying that they had been employed in a particular factory or work-gang were provided. To help get past Allied refugee control points, the saboteurs carried a can of rations which they could offer to soldiers and security officials as a token of their respect and as a means of avoiding a thorough body search. Once past the front lines, the teams were instructed to avoid main lines of communications and proceed as quickly as possible to the targets in their assigned sectors.

Each team was equipped with four ration cans that would be carefully concealed from security officials and other inquisitive individuals. These cans contained four bombs, wrapped in silk and composed of the following parts:

1. A magnetic demolition charge, containing about 400 grams of explosives and two magnets that would insure immediate attachment of the bomb to a metallic surface.

2. A flexible detonating cord, 2 1/2 meters long, that terminated in a percussion cap.

3. A delayed-action primer with the percussion cap attached to a safety pin.

4. An incendiary compound, tubular in shape, with an 8 cm slow fuze attached to a friction igniter on one side and a 6 cm slow fuze with a detonating cap on the other side.

CIC agents noted for future reference how these materials could be used.

With these simple elements, each saboteur would have at his disposal material that could be used for destruction by explosion or fire. Utilizing the charge and the

delayed-action primer, the saboteur would have a compact explosive bomb. If fire would more readily produce the desired destruction, the saboteur could ignite the incendiary compound by rubbing the friction igniter. Or, if the saboteur wanted to combine both fire and explosion, he would only have to set off the detonating cap on one side and the friction igniter on the other.

The description of this mechanism convinced the CIC agents that the ration can contained a grimly compact yet innocent-looking sabotage device. Fastened under vehicles, it could be detonated instantaneously; and, carried by a vehicle in motion, the primed charge could explode as a result of vibration. All Sixth Army Group forces were warned to keep on the alert for men who fitted the description, given by the captured agents, of the operatives of the sabotage detachments.[190]

44th AAA Brigade CIC Security Measures

For the latter half of December 1944, the CIC agents serving along the Southern coast of France with the 44th AAA Brigade made continual surveys of the "Zone Interdite" and the "Zone Reservee" with a view to ascertaining and removing from combat areas any suspicious persons frequenting or living in these critical zones. By the end of the month thirteen citizens who represented a potential security menace had been detained, three suspected enemy agents were under investigation, and two saboteurs had been arrested.

In addition to this personality control, the 44th AAA Brigade CIC agents developed an overall plan for civilian control that was quickly placed into effect. The combat zone was divided into three sub-zones. Closest to the actual line of battle was the "evacuated area" from which all civilians were excluded. Immediately behind this area, was the "restricted zone" where civilians were allowed to remain only if they could prove residence in the locale prior to August 1944. Entry to and exit from this zone could be obtained only by display of a pass properly signed by a Securite Militaire officer and countersigned by the chief of a local Gendarme brigade. To the rear of the zone was the "unrestricted zone" which, despite its designation, was not free of controls. Civilians residing in this area or desiring to enter or leave it were required to possess an identity card. Circulation measures were enforced by roadblocks jointly manned by French Gendarmes and American Military Police, and evasion of these roadblocks was made increasingly difficult by the establishment of roving patrols that combed the area in search of stray wanderers.

CIC tightened controls on busdrivers who previously had connived with civilians desiring to pass roadblocks without being checked. A warning was issued that made

190 Annex 3 to G-2 Periodic Report #204, Hq VIII Corps, dtd 7 Jan 45 "Source: First French Army G-2 Periodic Report No. 130, 25 Dec 44," (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

busdrivers personally responsible for ascertaining their passengers' right to travel within the zone. All transgressions were jointly charged to the offenders and the busdrivers.

Security Precautions Breed Rumors

The extensive controls established in the 44th AAA Brigade area were necessary for the security of the Allied forces; their operation was successful, but the stringent enforcement of these rulings tended to lower civilian morale. Civilians living near front line areas interpreted the sudden increase in security precautions as a sign of waning Allied power and rumors began to spread throughout the Brigade region. False reports of enemy parachutists landing at La Turbie, Nice, Antibes, and Cannes and of enemy glider activity over Allied territory had to be denied. Swelling accounts of a gun-fight between American Military Police and enemy soldiers dressed in British uniforms had to be punctured.

Not all the rumors originated among elements unfriendly to the Allies. A British Broadcasting Company (BBC) broadcast reported the establishment of an enemy bridgehead in the vicinity of Strasbourg when, in fact, only a patrol had landed on the island. This newsflash gave rise to a great deal of uneasiness until the allegation was shown to be false. A First French Army report stated that the Swiss radio also had a demoralizing effect at times, since it generally chose to magnify German successes and belittle Allied gains. These pessimistic accounts, which indicated serious lapses in Allied communication censorship, complicated the work of American security and psychological warfare agencies.

Military Security Problem

While CIC agents hastened about the Sixth Army Group area establishing rigid civilian controls, they also recommended measures for a tightening of military security as the moment of the German counterstroke was awaited. Travel restrictions on military personnel were carried out with "extreme vigilance." At roadblocks, personnel were required to produce trip-tickets, dog-tags, "ID" cards, and similar military identification. This system prevented unauthorized circulation within critical areas and also was a means of snaring German soldiers masquerading as Allied personnel.

Security of information was generally good, but there were some laxities. The report of one German Prisoner of War was particularly disturbing to American security officials. Monitoring of Allied radio communications had apparently provided German intelligence with most of its information and, the prisoner claimed, his Division G2 had gained possession of almost all codes used by the Allies.

From the 100th Division came reports of several violations of censorship regulations. Members of the Division had occasionally left letters with civilians to be

mailed, evidencing a blind trust in the Alsatians which was unwarranted by their uncertain attitude towards the Allied forces.

On 16 December, CIC agents investigated the apparently malicious hacking of four carrier cables without determining the individual responsible for the sabotage. Other investigations were more successful. A farmer was apprehended after he had chopped and cut telephone wires which Signal Corps personnel had strung across the side entrance to his home. Motivated by annoyance at the blocking of access to his house rather than any general grievance to the Allies, the farmer nevertheless had committed an act of sabotage and he was turned over to the Bureau de Securite Militaire Territoriale for trial. The tense days of December 1944 were not suitable occasions for venting anger at the hardships and frustrations imposed by the War.

Countersabotage Requires Manpower

CIC discovered that some installations and structures required extra guards to prevent sabotage attempts. A two-kilometer long railway tunnel near Arzwiller was almost destroyed on 26 December; three American 81 mm mortar shells were found fastened to the railroad track in the tunnel in such a position that contact with the flange of a passing train would have detonated them. The nearness of disaster in this instance caused the posting of more guards at the tunnel exits and a continuous patrol of the interior of the structure. Security of vital installations could not be overdone in this area of latent German allegiances, since the build-up of German forces across the line was a powerful cue to enemy-inspired action against the Allied forces in Alsace in December 1944.[191]

191 Hq Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 7, dtd 7 Jan 44, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Chapter 2

The Germans Counterattack

Elements of the U.S. Seventh Army greeted the New Year of 1945 without joy. In the waning hours of 1944, General Patch had visited the Command Posts of XV Corps and VI Corps to warn the commanding generals that an enemy attack was to be expected during the early hours of New Year's Day. Official holiday celebrations were hastily cancelled and at thousands of foxholes strung out along the Seventh Army defensive line, soldiers peered into the dark night and waited.

German operation NORDWIND was unleashed upon the American lines with all the fury implied by its code name. At several points, the American forces reeled from the impact of the blow; some recovered to gain back the lost ground, others could not build enough strength for a counterattack. After the initial German thrust, SHAEF strategy dictated a limited withdrawal along the northern salients of the Sixth Army Group front. Strasbourg was to be defended, largely to maintain the morale of the French, and the French First Army was charged, along with elements of the Seventh Army, with sharing the defense of this city.

Towards the end of January, Seventh Army forces in Northern Alsace had stiffened to repulse the German attack, and, to the South, the French First Army, with attached American units, began to eliminate the troublesome pocket built up by the German Nineteenth Army in the Colmar region. By the early days of February, the Colmar pocket was empty; the tattered German forces had fled across the Rhine. Their flight marked the end of the last German offensive.[192]

The Watch for German "Jeep Parties"

The German effort to recover Alsace and pin a stunning defeat on Seventh Army forces was marked by a wide variety of desperation moves. One of the commonest of these desperation tactics was to send groups of three officers and a driver, clothed in American uniforms, across the front lines in a jeep painted OD and replete with U.S. unit markings, a maneuver that had been used with a marked lack of success during the Ardennes breakthrough further to the north during mid-December. The officers, selected for their ability to speak English, frequently managed to outwit American sentries and gain access to material which they hastily sabotaged. All members of these "jeep parties" were equipped with vials of acid that could be thrown in the faces of inquisitive sentries or other alert soldiers who tried to balk their movements. American intelligence repeatedly advised sentries to allow no vehicle to pass their posts until full identification of the vehicle and its occupants had been made. To cope with the "jeep party" situation Intelligence added the recommendation that the sentry question the driver (who frequently was unable to speak any English) of suspect vehicles and request a trip ticket from him.

192 Report of Operations, the Seventh United States Army in France and Germany 1944-1945, Vol II pp. 559 ff. (Staff and Faculty Library)

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The recommendation was only as effective as the men who were told to exercise this extra control measure. Typical of the laxity of sentries was an incident reported by the 3rd Infantry Division.

On 2 January, an officer riding in a civilian car painted OD with U.S. markings was stopped at a roadblock. The sentry peered into the vehicle, glanced at the officer, who was wearing no helmet liner and had no visible unit insignia, and waved the car on without a single question. Before moving, the officer decided to hold a brief interrogation session with the sentry.

"Why did you stop this car?"

"This is a roadblock, sir."

"What are you looking for?"

"We're checking vehicles to see if there are any Germans in American uniforms in them."

"Well, how do you know that I am not a German?"

"I know that you are an officer because I saw the bar on your collar."

"Don't you ask for the password?"

"Yes, in cases when we're not sure of the men."

"What do you do if a passerby does not know the password?....I don't know it myself."

"That's all right, sir. The password is BUZZ BOMB. You'll need it at the next road block down the way."[193]

This almost incredible incident revealed to 3rd Division CIC agents that routine security indoctrination of troops was not enough. Easy-going sentries had to be clearly shown that their own lives were in danger unless they assumed that a man approaching their station was an enemy until he proved otherwise.

Security Control of the Civilian Population

Despite the withdrawals that Seventh Army units had to make early in January, the CIC detachments were able to maintain and enlarge their effectively-functioning

193 3rd CIC Det Rpt, 3d Inf Div G-2, Journal 2 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

controls on civilian traffic. The procedure followed in XV Corps illustrated how CIC adjusted to shifting conditions in the tactical situation. During the enemy attack in the area around the town of Bitche, refugees were permitted to evacuate the immediate area and the CIC agents were compelled to withdraw several control posts. Once the attack had subsided, refugees were screened in the rear areas with the cooperation of Civil Affairs. By 7 January, the American forces were again in control of the tactical situation, and the rearward movement of refugees halted abruptly. Small bands of Alsatians began to return to their homes, and XV Corps CIC kept this migration under control while preventing civilian traffic from clogging the main roads.[194]

Travel Control Directive is Published

The experiences reported by CIC agents working on civilian travel control during December and January were utilized as the basis for a revised Seventh Army policy directive published on 27 January. A resume of this directive indicated the controls to be instituted at various command levels:

"1. Division Sectors- All travel by civilians in division sectors is prohibited, except in cases of extreme emergency. Permits for civilian travel will be issued by Civil Affairs officers when proof of extreme emergency is considered adequate, and will be approved by a member of the CIC. Issuance of permits will not be delegated to local civil authorities. All civilians found traveling without permits will be arrested and turned over to the nearest CIC Detachment for interrogation as suspects. All civilians attempting to enter or leave forward positions will be arrested and turned over to the nearest CIC Detachment as espionage or sabotage suspects.

"2. Corps Sectors- All travel by civilians in Corps sectors is prohibited except when necessary to the success of the Seventh Army operations. Permits for civilian travel will be issued by the Civil Affairs officer or by local civilian authorities of proven reliability. Each permit, however, must be approved by CIC before becoming valid.

"3. Army Sector- Free civilian travel for a distance of six kilometers will be permitted. Permits for travel in excess of six kilometers will be issued only when necessary to the success of Seventh Army operations."[195]

In almost all authorizations for civilian travel, the ultimate responsibility was lodged with CIC units; the prior performance of these units gave ample proof that

194 Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 8, dtd 21 Jan 45, L-461. (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

195 Ibid., Report No. 9, dtd 7 Feb 45.

CIC could handle the assignment. During the final two weeks of January alone, Seventh Army CIC Detachments had supervised the evacuation of about 8,000 refugees from forward areas. A severe test of CIC travel control of civilians had been passed with honors.

Civilian Attitudes in Strasbourg

CIC travel control could help prevent civilians from interfering physically with Seventh Army operations; CIC had little control, however, over the civilian mind. The city of Strasbourg continued to present the major security hazard in the Seventh Army area until taken over by the First French Army. The SHAEF decision to defend Strasbourg, almost regardless of cost, indicated how much the Allies had staked on holding the city.

Ever since the Allied liberation of Strasbourg in December, the inhabitants had been worried about the reoccupation of the city by the Germans. Agents of the 307th and 206th CIC Detachments assigned to Strasbourg noted that this fear, although diminished in force once the Allied intention to defend the city was clear, remained latent in the Alsatian mind. The slightest appearance of withdrawal or movement of troops in any direction would generate a current of rumors and worries. Before the Seventh Army had strengthened its defenses, the people in Strasbourg who had worked with the Allies received the brunt of the scorn, fear and despair voiced by the unsettled population.

During this period, CIC recommended that French authorities arrest 45 persons deemed dangerous to security. This group consisted chiefly of active pro-Germans who emerged from under wraps as the Germans approached the city. By noon, 3 January, a Seventh Army order to evacuate Strasbourg had been received, and American vehicles began to leave the city. Almost every French flag in the city was hauled down, with the exception of the banners on government buildings such as the Mairie and the Palais du Rhin. Civilian reaction to the military order was immediate and intense. Excitement swelled to a feverish pitch. Some people smiled and rejoiced; others dismally gathered together their belongings and began to leave the city by bicycle, with pushcarts or on foot.

At 1530 hours, the evacuation order was rescinded. All available means were used to allay the public fears, and Psychological Warfare sound-trucks circulated about the city to assure the public that the Allies were staying. At the time of transfer of the city to the French, the population was approaching its normal routine, and Allied flags began to drape the Strasbourg dwellings again.[196]

196 206th CIC Detachment, Counter Intelligence Report No. 12, for period 24 Dec 44 to 11 Jan 45 (SECRET), dtd 11 Jan 45 (Staff and Faculty Library); and Sixth Army Group G2, Fortnightly CI Rpt No. 8, dtd 21 Jan 45, L-461 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

CIC Behind the Scenes

Behind the recission of the order to evacuate Strasbourg was some advice given by two CIC agents for which they could be justly proud. Colonel Bruskin, who had delivered the SHAEF order to retreat from Strasbourg, passed through Saverne on his return to SHAEF Headquarters and was met by two agents of the 307th CIC who had not joined the detachment's displacement back to Lunneville. The agents, well acquainted with the morale of the Alsatians, pictured for the Colonel the disastrous consequences of an American retreat. They stressed that the Germans who re-conquered Alsace would turn the region into a "blood bath," executing freely any and all who had cooperated with the Allies. So convincing was the argument of the well-informed agents that Colonel Bruskin was able to persuade SHAEF to hold American forces in Strasbourg.

After convincing Colonel Bruskin of the necessity of defending Alsace, the two agents still had some urgent work to do. They rushed out to the refugee-clogged highways where one of the agents, wearing the eagles of an American Colonel, stood at roadblocks and utilized his commanding presence to turn the mobs back. The presence of these agents and a small garrison of American troops was enough to halt the panic that had seized the Alsatians and prove that the Americans were not going to evacuate after all.[197]

510th CIC Gives an Assist

The fighting at the northernmost salient of the Seventh Army raged bitterly during January. To provide a counter reconnaissance screen for the forces in this sector, the 10th Armored Division was moved on line from a Third Army rest area near Metz. With the combat troops came the 510th CIC Detachment, which was quickly divided into five teams: team one operated with Combat Command "A"; team two, with Combat Command "B"; teams three and four with Division Headquarters at Dieuze; and team five, as liaison between Combat Commands and Division.

The teams with the Combat Commands performed a variety of investigations, including the usual "suspicious lights" flashing in the night and the pigeon lofts, and screened towns for security. On one occasion, CIC agents with Combat Command "B" learned from residents of a small village that three prominent Nazi Party members, seemingly unconcerned about the fact that the Americans had taken over their town, were waging an intensive German propaganda campaign. CIC staged raids on the homes of these ardent Nazis, arrested the men and thoroughly searched their rooms for incriminating evidence. The surprise raid was a complete success. The unrepentant Nazis were turned over, along with their pro-German literature, to the Securite Militaire for final interrogation and disposition.

197 Interview with former Agent Victor deGuinzbourg, Brooklyn, NY, at Room 706, Library Building, United Nations, 8 Aug 55.

By 10 February, the combat units of XXI Corps and XV Corps had the battle completely under control, and the 10th Armored Division returned to Third Army; 510th CIC Detachment's brief contribution to the counterintelligence efforts of the Seventh Army was completed.[198]

Hitler Youth Develops Espionage Agents

CIC Agents working with Seventh Army detachments in Alsace had captured many poorly-trained enemy espionage agents and saboteurs during December 1944. In the following month, CIC discovered that not only were the German spies ill-trained; they were often inexperienced adolescents, products of the Hitler Jugend.

On 5 January 1945, members of the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment spotted a young boy crossing the front lines into Allied-held territory near the town of Lembach. The youth was apprehended and brought to the 45th CIC Detachment offices in Ingwiller. Interrogation failed to draw out more from the boy than his name, his age (sixteen years) and the story that he was escaping from forced labor on German fortifications. CIC suspected that the youth was masking the true account of his activities, and was held for re-interrogation.

On 22 January, as another German boy entered the outer lines of the 157th Infantry Regiment, he stumbled over a trip-wire and set off a charge that alerted the American combat troops. He was immediately picked up by the soldiers and sent to the 45th CIC Detachment. The agents who interrogated the boy heard a familiar story; he was a sixteen-year-old boy who was trying to return to his home after having been drafted by the German Volkssturm to dig fortifications; only the name, was different from the account given by The interrogators refused to accept dodge and kept questioning the youth until he said that he was one of a large group of Hitler Jugend boys who had been trained for short-range espionage missions in Allied territory. His specific task, he said, was to observe the caliber and number of weapons, strength of tanks, and the nationality of troops grouped in the vicinity of Lembach and other border towns.

After confessed to being a spy, the CIC agents had enough leads to re-interrogate the stubborn The youth broke down under the added pressure and revealed information on other Hitler Jugend members whom the Germans were dispatching on similar, short-range missions. On the basis of the confessions of and Seventh Army CIC Detachments stationed all along the line were warned to expect an influx of young spies. Three days later, agents from the 307th CIC Detachment serving with a Task Force that had been established to

198 510th CIC Detachment, Rpt: CIC Activities during month of January 1945, dtd 31 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

defend the Rhine Flank, apprehended another sixteen-year-old espionage agent, at a travel control point near Schirrhofen. Descriptions circulated about this youth prior to his capture pointed out only one difference between and the other Hitler Jugend members that had been captured--"shaved."[199]

A Typical Case

was more loquacious than his predecessors. He revealed to Agent Joseph C. Hutchinson that his mission was to have extended for two days, and that he was to have gathered tactical information, paying particular attention to shoulder patch insignia. The brief history of his espionage career provided CIC with further insight into the recruiting, training and handling methods of these boys by the German Intelligence Service.

On 1 September 1942, fourteen-year-old like many other boys in his home town of Weissemburg, Alsace, had joined the Hitler Jugend. The uniform and the martial discipline of this para-military organization evidently had made a deep impression on his adolescent mind. Until 15 December 1944, the life of the young recruit was not changed markedly. But on that day, with the Allies pressing their attack towards the German border, all males in Weissemburg were assembled for the Volkssturm. spent a short period of service as a messenger boy between local offices. The Germans soon selected him and the twelve other Hitler Jugend members from the town to undergo a one-week "basic training" course directed by a German non-commissioned officer of a Frontaufklaerungstruppe unit. On about 29 December, this training was completed. and three other Hitler Youths deemed to be "most trustworthy" were selected by the Hitler Jugend Bannfuerher of Weissemburg to be sent to German Army Headquarters at Baden-Baden.

After several weeks in Germany, was interviewed by a German Army officer who asked him "casually" whether he would be interested in a trip to Alsace to "see his family." Of course, the officer added, the visit would not be purely social. German Intelligence needed boys to go through the lines and find out as much as they could about the enemy. The thought of a return home and the lure of intrigue were sufficient incentives for the youth. He accepted without hesitation.

The Germans provided first of all, with a cover story that he was required to learn thoroughly. If stopped, was to claim that he had been taken with the Volkssturm to dig trenches, that he had escaped and wanted to reach Hagenau to find his parents. With this account committed to memory, was

199 Ltr to Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. from 45th CIC Detachment, Subj: Monthly Information Report, dtd 31 January 1945, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

equipped with suitable clothes, food and forty marks. All of his papers were held by the Germans as insurance that would return after the successful completion of his mission. The German officer also promised the boy that he would receive additional financial remuneration for bringing back the desired information.

On 15 January, crossed the lines and mingled with a group of refugees. American soldiers escorted the entire group to the CIC travel control point where brief espionage career came to an abrupt end.

The Danger of the Hitler Jugend Spies

CIC had been successful in capturing several of the Hitler Jugend youths sent into Alsace, and the agents were prepared to apprehend others as they entered Allied territory. But the danger of these young spies could not be overestimated. Great numbers were available to the Germans who did not need or expect them all to complete their missions with success. The boys could be hurriedly recruited and hurriedly trained in a given sector. They could be inserted in refugee family groups. Allied counterintelligence would have to adopt different techniques in interrogating these youths from the methods used for experienced and mature agents, and the time spent with these relatively unimportant espionage workers might provide the required "break" that would permit high level agents to escape from CIC vigilance.[200] All these factors combined to make the Hitler Jugend spies a security threat of considerable proportions.

Women Agents

German Intelligence had not hesitated to use raw, untrained youths to perform men's roles in the espionage effort against the Allied forces. It seemed only logical that women would also be "requested" to gather intelligence that would pave the way for German tactical advances. CIC failed to round up any glamorous female spies in January; there were no "types" among the women agents that were caught. Instead, like their male counterparts, these women were ordinary human beings trying to make a living or, sometimes, to stay alive.

On 6 January, 79th CIC agents operating in the town of Bischwiller received a tip from a young women that a lodger in her house claimed to have been in Germany recently. The agents immediately went to the house where they discovered the lodger to be a thirty-eight year old woman. On-the-spot interrogation drew forth a number of inconsistencies in the woman's story, and the agents forwarded her to the 79th CIC Detachment headquarters in Hagenau. Once again, the woman, who identified herself as insisted on supporting an account of her actions

200 Ltr to Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C. from 307th CIC Detachment, Subj: Monthly Information Report, dtd 8 Feb 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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endeavoring to reach Strasbourg where she had considerable property. Detailed interrogation caused her to admit that she was a thief and trapped her in several lies. still refused to capitulate. Her apparent dishonesty was sufficient cause for putting her in solitary confinement overnight in the Hagenau Prison.

The next morning, CIC agents began the interrogation all over, asking to tell them what she was doing in Alsace. For a third time, the same basic cover story was delivered. The interrogators, losing patience with this patent liar, ventured on a new tack. They threatened with death as an enemy agent. Even this threat almost failed to faze the tough woman until an interrogator reminded that she had admitted leaving a young daughter behind in Karlsruhe. The interrogator asked what she thought would happen to her daughter if she was executed as a spy. This proved the thrust that pierced Honsel's armor; she broke down completely and confessed that she was a German espionage agent.

The account of mission, as given to 79th CIC agents and, subsequently, to VI Corps CIC, indicated that the Germans were looking for information from Strasbourg on American troop strength, insignia worn by American units, and truck and tank capabilities. If unable to remember what she observed, had been instructed to prick the letters of words in a book on different pages. When held to the light, the pages of this book would then have spelled a complete message to the Germans. Due to the suspicions of the CIC informant in Bischwiller and the skill of CIC interrogators, chapter in the art of espionage was never written.

In contrast to another female espionage agent, was a "soft touch" for the interrogators of the 79th CIC Detachment. Apprehended by a CIC outpost near the front line, was sent to Hagenau for routine refugee screening. Before the CIC agents fully realized that they had another female espionage agent on their hands, the twenty-year-old Russian girl freely admitted that she had been recruited by the Gestapo to act as an espionage operative in Alsace. Her mission was substantially the same as with one additional requirement: was to determine how the Americans were treating civilians.

The cause of this unexpected confession became apparent when the girl revealed her recent history. said she had been interned at the Schirmeck concentration camp early in 1944 for allegedly having made anti-Nazi remarks in her diary. Evacuated to another concentration camp after the Allied invasion of Alsace, said she refused to work as an informer for the Gestapo in this camp and chose, instead, to accept the espionage mission on the understanding that she would be freed on her return to Germany. The selection of an obviously disaffected,

[redacted]

untrained girl for an espionage mission pointed to the low state of the German Intelligence Service in January 1945.[201]

Espionage for Love and Money

The old adage that "war makes strange bed fellows" was given a literal interpretation in the affair of a cleaning woman and a Fascist leader, a case which CIC agents encountered in January 1945.

Agents of the 14th Armored Division CIC first came across the name of while combing the records of the local Police office in the town of Woerth. After receiving several denunciations of the woman from reliable citizens of the town, CIC agents apprehended and brought her to the Detachment headquarters for interrogation. The confession of combined with available records, revealed that the woman had a long and complex history of association with Nazis.

In 1937-1938, had been the mistress of a who was instrumental in helping Fascists escape from France to Germany via Strasbourg. The woman could have been charged with more than guilt by association. She had furnished with political and economic intelligence about Strasbourg and acted as an informer against anti-Fascists in the city, particularly singling out Francophile Jews and Communists. Her only motive for informing was, by her own admission, "love."

During this period of romance and espionage, had served as a charwoman for a local French Government official and managed to pilfer from his desk maps of Maginot Line fortifications and a defense plan for the adjacent areas. Hiding these documents in a baby carriage that also contained her illegitimate child, set out one day to transmit the papers to her lover. She had started to cross over the Rhine River on the Kehl-Strasbourg Bridge when French police, alerted about the theft of the defense papers, stopped the woman and searched the baby carriage. Out came the baby, out came the papers, and off went to the Strasbourg jail. In the course of the trial that followed, turned state's evidence against several prominent Nazis and Gestapo agents. She was in prison when the Germans occupied Strasbourg sixteen months later and was soon released.

Not one to duck when opportunity beckoned, accepted employment as a cook for the strasbourg SD Headquarters. She had held this position for only a few months when the Gestapo uncovered the details of her confession at the trial. Once

201 Ltr to Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C. from Hq 79th CIC Detachment, Subj: Information Report, dtd 1 Feb 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library); and, Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter-Intelligence Rpt No 8, dtd 21 Jan 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

found herself before the "bar of justice." She managed to extricate herself from possible German vengeance with the assistance of a man named who was serving as interpreter for the Strasbourg SD after a career in espionage in North Africa.

Free once again, selected the path of least resistance. She became an "intimate associate" of so intimate in fact that she discovered that her erstwhile protector was in reality a double agent serving the anti-German, pro-Petain group that had effected the escape of the French General Giraud. was busy clandestinely warning French patriots and Catholic circles of impending Gestapo action against them. After managing to steal some of his papers, had no compunctions about blackmailing for 10,000 Reichmarks on threat of exposure to the Gestapo.

The entry of the Allies into Strasbourg brought an end to career. CIC agents found no certain evidence that had committed espionage activities against the Seventh Army. However, they did discover in her possession a small camera containing exposures of U.S. armored equipment. They turned her over to the Securite Militaire for trial.[202]

Espionage; the Better Alternative

was a woman who thrived on espionage. Agents of the 100th CIC discovered that was quite a different case. In the first place she was young (23 years old) and attractive. She was also unfortunate.

an Italian national, grew up in the French city of Lyon. Her father owned an Italian restaurant in the city, a restaurant that continued to flourish during the German occupation since it was freely patronized by Nazis and German soldiers. When the Allies began their triumphant drive through Southern France, and two of her girl friends, who worked as waitresses at the restaurant, fled to Pirmasens, Germany, fearing reprisals from angered partisians. labored in a shoe factory until 2 December 1944 when she and her friends left for the town of Bitche in Alsace.

In Bitche, made the acquaintance of a former French Forces of the Interior officer, who was trying to get in the good graces of the Gestapo by ascertaining Allied artillery positions, tank concentrations and other items significant for German tactical intelligence. This officer, was subsequently captured by the 100th CIC and confirmed account that she had been forced into espionage by the Gestapo who exploited the fact that she had no papers.

202 Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 9, dtd 7 Feb 45, L-461, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and, 514th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt dtd 31 Jan 45, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

NOT RELEASABLE

At first, the Gestapo had tried to convince and her friends to inform against French workers conscripted for construction work in Germany. When the girls refused, a captain offered a double-edged choice: accept an espionage mission or see her friends carted off to a concentration camp. Heeding the advice of a German 1st Sergeant named "Charlie," selected the first alternative.

On 17 January, the Gestapo captain, an artillery lieutenant unknown to and "Charlie" accompanied the girl to a forester's cabin near the front lines. The two officers stayed behind; "Charlie" and proceeded to a German bunker where a soldier joined them. The party of three continued towards the Allied lines. One kilometer past the last German minefield, "Charlie" and the other soldier left with instructions to proceed in a straight line to Lembach. Frightened and alone in the midst of a strange forest, became lost, and after several hours of aimless wandering, stumbled upon an American roadblock where she was apprehended.

was not defiant before the CIC agents who questioned her, although she relied heavily on her status as an attractive member of the opposite sex in an attempt to plead innocence of her intention to commit espionage."[203] She had been told by the Germans that she would have no trouble convincing the Americans that she was a refugee. But soon she confessed that the Gestapo had sent her across the lines to obtain and memorize information on troop and tank dispositions, artillery emplacements and the like. The only preparation for her mission had consisted of a quick demonstration of Allied shoulder patches, an order to complete her observations in three days, and a promise of ample remuneration on her return. story and mission had a familiar ring to the CIC agents; similar accounts could be gathered from many displaced persons to whom war was a matter of survival and not allegiance.[204]

Enemy Sabotage Prevented

Reports that filtered into Seventh Army CIC headquarters indicated that the weeding out of sabotage agents in stabilized areas, coupled with stringent measures for securing material, had completely eliminated major acts of sabotage in January. On one occasion, troops of the 44th Infantry Division caught a French boy of low mentality attempting to cut a communication wire. Questioning of the youth revealed

203 Ltr to Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., from Hq 100th CIC Detachment, Subj: Monthly Information Report, dtd 3 Feb 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

204 Ibid; and Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 9, dtd 7 Feb 45, L-461, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

that the German soldiers had given instructions to children to perform these minor acts of sabotage once the Allies occupied the Alsatian towns. CIC failed to find any widespread responses to these instructions.

On the afternoon of 5 January, a sentry guarding a Quartermaster gas dump in the VI Corps sector spotted several armed civilians approaching the restricted area. The sentry fired a couple of shots at the interlopers and managed to wound one of them. Subsequent investigation by agents of the 206th CIC revealed that the civilians had been hunting and were unaware of the existence of the American installation. The action of the sentry was considered justified under the circumstances, and the hunters were turned over to Civil Affairs for prosecution on the charge of bearing arms without permits.

Some displays of anti-Allied feeling were evident in such acts as the scattering of tacks along the main street of the town of Saverne and the switching of road signs to designate improper locations, but CIC was inclined to classify these deeds as harassment rather than enemy sabotage.[205]

The Reluctant Saboteur

had received one of the best educations in the art of clandestine destruction offered by the German Intelligence. A member of the Frontaufklaerungstruppe 251, studied for fourteen weeks at the Chateau de Maulny and La Montagnette sabotage schools. Completing this formal education in May 1944, was detailed to spend his next six months working in the feldgendarmarie (military police). In December 1944, the Commandant of the La Montagnette school decided to test his former pupil. was entrusted with the mission of going to the Allied-held town of Rohrwiller and placing explosive charges under American tanks in the vicinity. He was also given some routine espionage assignments: to ascertain the road conditions around Rohrwiller, to determine the exact number of tanks in the woods to the south of the town and the intentions of these armored units, and to pick up any rumors circulating in the town. The Commandant assured that the claim of being an escaped Todt worker attempting to make his way to Marseille would provide adequate cover in case he was questioned by American soldiers.

set out on his first mission early on the morning of 9 January, carrying a plastic charge and two British-made detonator pencils that somehow had fallen into German hands. Near the town of Herrlisheim, still in German territory, the novice's resolution faltered slightly, and he decided that the espionage aspects of his mission were more important than the matter of blowing up some American tanks. discarded his explosive equipment by the road-side, walked

205 Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 8, dtd 21 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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on towards the German lines which he crossed using the German Army password, and entered Allied occupied territory on the road to Bischwiller. Three and one-half hours after leaving the safety of the Fatherland, Denjean-Massia, using the alias of Willy Dietrich, met the first test of his resourcefulness as an espionage agent, when members of the 12th Armored Division questioned him at a roadblock. Denjean-Massia failed utterly to convince the American soldiers that he was bound for Marseille. Escorted to the Command Post of the 512th CIC Detachment, he confessed to CIC agents that he was on a mission for the Frontaufklaerungstruppe and soon revealed the details of his brief career as a sabotage agent.[206]

The "Brandenburg Formation"

CIC agents had interrogated so many amateur enemy agents in December and January that reports of a professional sabotage unit being formed in Germany was news of the highest importance and created a considerable stir among Seventh Army detachments.

The sabotage unit was prefacing its operations with reconnaissance of strategic Allied supply centers. On 8 January, troops of the 79th Infantry Division captured two suspicious-looking individuals and brought them to the VI Corps CIC Detachment. Both men were dressed in the same-type uniform; a jacket with hood, resembling but not identical to the standard American issue, and a pair of coveralls similar in color and shape to the trousers worn by members of American armored units. Under this rather bizarre outer garment was worn the uniform of an SS trooper.

George Tostain and Jean Poignet proved to be implacable Nazis, but they revealed their mission under the pressure of interrogation. Their primary aim was to determine whether an airport in the vicinity of Hagenau was operative and to locate American gasoline dumps. As forerunners of a major sabotage effort, these two men were to establish routes for the raiding parties that would accomplish the destruction.

The 206th CIC agents were not content with this information alone. They pressed Poignet and Tostain for details about the organization that had dispatched them, and soon a coherent picture of the so-called "Brandenburg Formation" began to emerge from the interrogation.

In its original form, the Brandenburg Division was one of the crack Jaegar Divisions (light infantry or, translated verbatim, "hunters") of the Wehrmacht. Time and again, the Brandenburg troops had been committed to vital fronts; their combat experience included campaigns in Russia, Italy, Greece, and the Balkans. As the Germans were being hemmed into their own land from all sides, high ranking officers in the SD decided to cadre politically trustworthy officers and non-commissioned officers of the Brandenburg Division into a new SD-controlled Brandenburg

206 Sixth Army Group G-2, Fortnightly Counter Intelligence Report No. 9, dtd 7 Feb 45, L-461, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

formation. The control of this unit by Otto Skorzeny, master sabotage director and rescuer of Mussolini, confirmed its sabotage mission.

Absolute independence was given to the Brandenburg formation to assure freedom of action. Its members were issued the newest equipment and armament. Special identification cards and travel permits were available to them. Every effort was made to perpetuate the high elan of the original Brandenburg Division, and each training company was carefully isolated to develop a genuine esprit de corps among its members. The training company was further divided into independent groups that were held to gether by the unshakeable enthusiasm of a "chief."

Training consisted primarily of patrolling, use of compass and map, and field problems. A typical problem required the penetration of a "guarded village" by a reconnaissance patrol which was to spot sensitive points that would be sabotaged later by a team of explosives experts.

Consideration was given to the vital points that made prime sabotage targets. In addition to the more obvious structures such as bridges, railway lines, and supply dumps, trainees were advised that civilian and military post offices were high-priority targets. The main goal of the instructors was to develop each member of the team into an expert, whether he served as a rifleman on reconnaissance or an explosives charge planter.

The camouflage military garments worn by Tostain and Poignet were issued only to men on scouting missions. Soldiers effecting the actual sabotage were to wear civilian gear, consisting of dark overcoats or trench coats, ski trousers and jackets, and berets. Foreign pistols of either Belgian or Czech manufacture would provide basic armament. Plastic explosives would be carried in several places, including a pack strapped to the "civilian's" back. The sabotage groups were expected to utilize American-built vehicles; a depot in Germany containing thirty-five American automobiles (including Cadillacs, Buicks, Oldsmobiles, and Packards)-camouflaged with OD paint, was at the disposal of the saboteurs.

Although Tostain and Poignet were captured, their deception had been successful for several days. Poignet stated: "I believe that the idea of our Commanding Officer to have us put on camouflage clothes and carry weapons resembling American equipment was very good. Even the Germans fell for it (I was detained by the Volkssturm and Wehrmacht for two days), and the population took us for escaped Canadians. We could have carried out our mission or at least a great part of it with a good chance of success. Only one detail was overlooked; our German belts and buckle. The arms we had, particularly the new German sub-machine gun, PI44, extra flat, with short barrel and half-moon clip, did not look like a German weapon. In my opinion, and according to all German and Alsatian reactions I saw, the camouflage thought up by our Commanding Officer was excellent, aside from the belt and buckle."

The report of the captured Brandenburgers indicated to CIC that an adversary of no mean proportions was preparing to accomplish the work that women, children,

and poorly trained male agents had so completely bungled. Sixth Army Group counterintelligence officials initiated the first measure of defense against the Brandenburg formation: the preparation of a roster of known personalities of the unit together with physical descriptions of these men. By 21 January, a list of twenty-one individuals preparing to cross into Allied territory was compiled, published, and distributed to all Sixth Army units.[207]

Defense Against Parachutists

Throughout the month of January, various CIC headquarters buzzed with reports of airborne infiltration by German agents. In order to guard against parachutist attacks during periods of tension, a system for spot-location of airborne landings by radar was instituted at Seventh Army CIC. In the 307th Detachment Headquarters, a large map (scale 1:50,000) of the vulnerable area was kept with an azimuth circle and a yardage range arm centered on the coordinates of the nearest radar unit. Range and azimuth figures on the course of an enemy plane were interpreted by the radar unit and then relayed by direct telephone communication to CIC Headquarters. As the radar men followed the flight of the plane, they issued periodic reports to CIC.

When a parachute drop was suspected, CIC units in the appropriate area were promptly alerted. CIC directed to the danger spot squads of ten soldiers and military police, previously organized and equipped with cars and weapons and available on five-minute notice. These squads were given operational authority to enlist the aid of any unit in the area in the hunt for the parachutists. Gendarmes and other roadblock personnel were contacted by CIC at critical periods. During this entire anti-parachutist operations, CIC headquarters served as the nerve center for all operations. This arrangement was logical; CIC had more at stake in the capture of enemy agents arriving in Allied zones by parachute drop.[208]

The system was quite successful. While the 307th CIC was in Lunneville during the Alsace campaign, the agents learned from interrogation of several captured enemy agents that a group of parachutists were to be dropped in the area. One night in January, the radar screen picked up some activity in the sky, and the patrols rushed out to the indicated spot. Spread over the ground were pieces of material from a wireless transmitter kit; apparently the equipment had spilled from a sack after a parachute strip binding the package had torn. Realizing that the espionage material had not been dropped at random, the CIC agents combed the area and shortly discovered nine espionage agents. Two attempted to escape; one was killed, another wounded. The prisoners were garbed in regulation Wehrmacht jump suits and, back at the 307th Command Post, the CIC agents were somewhat at a loss whether to

207 206th CIC Det, Counter Intelligence Report No. 12 dtd 11 Jan 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

208 Hq 307th CIC Det, to Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Wash., D.C. Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 8 Feb 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

...day the prisoners as spies or as Prisoners of War. However, they soon determined that the parachutists were members of Skorzeny's Brandenburg Unit--forerunners of a major sabotage effort against the Allied Forces.

After the interrogation of the prisoners was completed, the agents had an opportunity to examine the recovered espionage equipment. They found that, besides radio receivers, the aluminum containers held bread and a trowel. The parachutists themselves had shovels with which to bury their jump suits, but the CIC agents had been too quick in their apprehension, and the men were caught still wearing their uniforms.

Although the parachutist detection system generally was effective, there was one occasion when the CIC agents probably wished they had never heard of radar. At about 0300 hours on a bitterly cold January morning, agents were awakened by members of the radar team who excitedly explained that enemy agents were dropping everywhere. The CIC men donned their warmest gear and headed into a blinding snowstorm, two to a jeep, fanning across the countryside. One of the jeep teams noted after a short while that along the road were shreds of aluminum foil, haphazardly scattered. When other teams began to find similar metal strips, the search was suspended. What the radar men had so hastily labeled airborne espionage agents were strips of aluminum foil thrown out by British bombers to disturb German radar, in the belief that they were still over German-held territory.[209]

A Serious Breach of Security

On 22 January, Agent Leonid Ruminoff of the 45th CIC Detachment and Sous Li...ant Charles Escudero of the Securite Militaire unit attached to the 45th Divisi...tered the apartment of in Phalsbourg, France. The agents intended to spend several days in the town and had heard that this apartment was ...vailable as a billet. As they glanced about their prospective quarters, Ruminoff ...nd Escudero noticed a grey typewriter case that appeared to be American-made. ...he agents opened the case. Inside they found numerous documents, classified and ...nclassified, and personal papers belonging to a lieutenant colonel who held a high ...sition in the Sixth Army Group Civil Affairs section. No time was lost in insti...ing an investigation.

The agents discovered that the owner of the apartment, had been ested on 27 December by the Territoriale Gendarmarie on orders from a CIC ...chment. She was sent to Sarrebourg for internment as a security threat to ...American forces. The following day, an American lieutenant colonel had called

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...nterview with former Special Agents Robert R. Richards, Columbus, Ohio; ...Varren Bower, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, ...hio; and G. Kenneth Crowell, Chicago, Ill;, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel ...aldorf-Astoria, New York, 6 August 1955.

at the butcher shop owned by brother-in-law and requested the keys to the apartment. For three days, the lieutenant colonel and two other officers were billeted in the apartment. They hired a woman to serve them as maid and laundress, and this woman cleaned up the apartment upon the departure of the officers. She noted that some gloves, ties and a grey typewriter case had been left behind, but she made no effort to contact the officers; on leaving, they had stated that they would return. Several days later, an orderly came to collect the last bundles of laundry that the maid had prepared. No mention was made of the misplaced articles, and the orderly left with neither the garments nor the typewriter case.

A survey of the contents of the typewriter case revealed three documents classified "Secret," two "Confidential" papers, and several maps and documents that the agents believed to warrant a high classification. In addition, personal papers and photographs belonging to the lieutenant colonel were contained in the case.

The agents checked with confidential informants in the town and found no adverse information about relatives who were still in Phalsbourg. The maid was reported to be a woman of doubtful morals and low intellect, but she did not appear to be dangerous from a counterintelligence standpoint.

Ruminoff and Escudero realized that, while no apparent damage had been caused by the lieutenant colonel's carelessness, a serious breach of security had occurred. They forwarded the misplaced documents and a copy of their report to the G2 of the 45th Infantry Division for further action. This example of laxity stood out in severe contrast to the overall record of excellent security discipline among the units serving with the Seventh Army during the Alsace Campaign.[210]

Other CIC Detachments

During the battle for Alsace, several new CIC Detachments joined the Seventh Army units that had already been committed. Under command of Captain John F. Somerville, Jr, came the 221st CIC Detachment attached to XXI Corps;[211] while the 63d CIC, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Clinton R. Weidner,[212] the 70th CIC, led

210 Ltr to ACofS, G2, 45th Inf Div from Hq 45th CIC Det, subj: Violation of AR 380-5, dtd 24 Jan 45 in 45th CIC Det Correspondence File Nov 44 Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

211 Information concerning these detachments is available on Historical Data Cards. The men designated as commanding officers of the 221st and 70th CIC detachments are presumed to have been in charge during this period, since available records list them as CO in the month of February.

212 Ltr, Monthly Information Report from 63d Det dtd, 31 January 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

by Captain George H. McDonald, and the 42d CIC, the CO of which is not listed in available records, accompanied their respective divisions.

Six Weeks in Retrospect

The six-week period of the last German offensive in Alsace had provided CIC agents with Seventh Army units an opportunity to display their ability in the security field. The ebb and flow of the battle had swept thousands of refugees to rear areas and then back to their homes. German Intelligence had filled Alsace with agents, using the theory that quantity rather than quality was the winning ticket in the espionage game at this level. A wet and cold winter played no favorites and made the lot of all soldiers, American and German, combat troops and intelligence agents, a miserable one. Despite all these difficulties, the CIC units lengthened the successful record that they had achieved since the landings at Marseille. The bastions guarding the German Fatherland had been battered; now, along with the tactical forces of the Seventh Army, the CIC units prepared for the final drive.

Appendix 1

ENEMY AGENTS IN THE ARDENNES

Volume XVIII

HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

The story of the 150th Panzer Brigade (15 December 1944 - 31 January 1945): Recruiting, Formation, and Training, including the development of the Einheit Stielau. A study of German offensive intelligence preparation.[213]

213 "History of Counter Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Army in Europe, Annex 4." (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Hitler Tells Skorzeny

Late in October, 1944, Lt Col Otto Skorzeny, Chief of the German Sabotage Service and SS Jagdverbaende, was summoned to the Fuehrer's headquarters. Hitler, in the presence of General Oberst Jodl, Chief of the German Armed Forces Operations Staff, informed Skorzeny of the proposed offensive in the Ardennes. Obviously enthused over the plan, Skorzeny and Jodl quickly devised a program of deception, based primarily on the utilization of 2,000 German soldiers, dressed in United States Army uniforms. These soldiers would be assigned to a unit which was to be activated under the code name, the 150th Panzer Brigade.

An order signed by Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, was published subsequently and was distributed throughout the German Army, Navy, Air Force and SS. Volunteers were to possess the following qualifications (in addition to the ability to speak English, "including the American dialect"): physical fitness, suitability for special assignments, mental alertness, competency in close combat fighting, and a knowledge of military terminology. They were not to be retained by their units for military reasons. They were to be formed into a special unit, about two battalions in strength, for employment on the Western Front, "after being tested for suitability at Friedenthal, near Oranienburg... Captured clothing, equipment, weapons and vehicles would be utilized for the equipment (sic) of these special troops."

The Volunteers Arrive

From all corners of the diminishing German Empire, linguists--officer and enlisted man, those who had volunteered and those who had been volunteered--reported to Skorzeny's headquarters, Schloss Friedenthal. Most of the volunteers had responded believing they would be used as interpreters. A few had deciphered the connotative meaning of "special" in the order.

Upon arrival, the candidates were tested for fluency in English by a board of three officers from the SS and the Navy. Those suitable were selected for Operation Greif and were divided, according to their language proficiency, into four groups: Group I was rated excellent; Group II, satisfactory; Group III, poor; and Group IV, very poor.

The selected linguists were to form a segment of the 150th Panzer Brigade known as the Einheit Stielau, named after 1st Lt Stielau, Commander of the group. Considered good linguists, but poor soldiers, these men had come from all arms of the German services, and their backgrounds were as varied as their conceptions of what they would be expected to do for the Fuehrer.

The Curriculum

Members of the Einheit Stielau were given special training, while the other members of the brigade received only general field training. Group I personnel from the

linguist section were enrolled in the SS Interpreters' School at Oranienburg, a suburb of Berlin. Group II and Group III personnel, in subdivisions of ten men each, were assigned to prisoner of war camps, where they were to associate with the American prisoners, familiarizing themselves with documents and "GI" slang.

These members of the Einheit Stielau later reported to Grafenwoehr, where the 150th Panzer Brigade was trained as a unit, and where Group IV personnel were already in training for their role as replacements in the brigade.

The reunited members of the Einheit Stielau studied in small teams at Grafenwoehr, with members of Group I acting as supervisory personnel. Various officers and one alleged American, a Sergeant Sharper who wore civilian clothes, assisted. Singled out for detailed study was the manner in which Americans open a package of cigarettes; the way they manipulate knife and fork while dining; the position of the bath towel over the shoulder while washing; their idioms; and their general, all-purpose phrases, such as: "Shut up" and "Damm it."

All mannerisms and all spoken and written words were to be "Americanized". Men were taught not to respond to German.

American motion pictures, including "Coney Island," starring Betty Grable, and newsreels served as training aids for the members of Einheit Stielau. A manual on the U.S. Army was a requirement for study, and instruction was presented on U.S. military terminology, organization, identification, vehicle markings, and close order drill, with specialized aspects treated for each according to his potential mission.

Day and night marches, compass and orientation training, map reading, the estimation of various situations, hand signals, movement under combat conditions, camouflage and liaison and reconnaissance duties with tank units comprised the core of the 150th Panzer Brigade's field training. Supplementary instruction was given on explosives, especially Nipolit; the use of a hydro-cyanic acid capsule to overcome a prison guard, making escape possible; and deceptive techniques, such as raising the hands in pretense of surrender and throwing the headpiece toward the would-be captor, firing quickly with the free hand.

Training concentrated on street and forest fighting, and included the use of close combat anti-tank weapons and the firing of captured U.S. equipment. Night combat was especially stressed.

Training was interrupted occasionally for vehicle maintenance, for the drawing of supplies and equipment for other administrative details.

Security Skorzeny Style

Security procedures were lax at Schloss Friedenthal, but they became smotheringly stringent at Grafenwoehr. All personnel who entered the camp remained there,

brigade constantly reminded their soldiers of their duty to the Fatherland.

In the middle of November, when the members of the brigade learned of their mission, morale tumbled to a new low. A number of the students requested transfer immediately and were refused with the admonition that further notions of transfer would be viewed as treasonous. One officer is said to have persisted in his efforts to dissociate himself with the operation, gaining only a court martial trial and the death sentence.

Propaganda, with a view toward justifying to the brigade its future method of warfare, then cited the proposed tactic as an element of modern warfare, already being used by the Allies. This helped, but the wavering morale received a devastating blow when the hydocyanic ampules were issued, not only for escape purposes, but also as a suicidal device. Rumors were circulated toward the end of training that United States soldiers in German uniforms had been captured and would be dealt with [illegible] by their captors. Another favorite rumor concerned three German soldiers in U.S. uniforms who had returned to the German front lines safely after having spent three days in American-occupied Malmedy, Belgium. These rumors improved morale.

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Costumes for the Masquerade

Unwittingly, the American Red Cross became a contributor to the 150th Panzer Brigade. U.S. Army clothing, including new-issue field boots, sent under their auspices for distribution to American prisoners of war in German prison camps was confiscated and diverted to Grafenwoehr.

A supplementary source were American prisoners of war themselves. Prisoners of war at several camps were directed to turn in their uniforms at the request of authorized officials, armed with decrees from Skorzeny and, in some cases, from Hitler. This latter source proved frustrating to the German collectors as the uncooperative GIs preferred to burn, tear and cut their clothing rather than surrender useable equipment to their jailers. In one representative case, only a dozen pieces of clothing were serviceable out of 800 articles which had been collected.

The Germans were persistent, however, and eventually almost every member of the brigade was completely garbed in U.S. Army uniforms, from steel helmets to stolen boots. In addition, U.S. sub-machine guns and carbines were provided, and U.S. jeeps, trucks, weapons carriers and General Sherman tanks. The proud and pure-white star, so integral a part of U.S. Army vehicles, was a prominent feature on all the 150th Panzer Brigade's vehicles, and counterfeit identification markings were always in evidence.

Each vehicle was stocked with U.S. Army-type trip tickets.

All falsification and rectification of documents was accomplished by an assigned Faellscher Trupp, under the command of an SS Lieutenant Lochner. When required, watermarks were imitated by a wax stamp.

Documents, as issued, were in new condition, and individual members dirtied them and wrinkled them in an effort to age them.

Persons and units were equipped as dictated by necessity, with the members of Einheit Stielau receiving extensive consideration. Few members of the brigade who were not of the Einheit Stielau received personal documents, except by their own efforts.

Those of the Einheit Stielau were issued documents in accordance with their undercover rank. Germans who were to be enlisted men received a paybook and a typed permit to carry combat equipment in rear areas. Drivers received U.S. Army driving licenses. Those who were to act as officers were issued a pay-data card and an identity card with their photographs and fingerprints affixed.

Other, more resourceful individuals, acquired non-military personal documents and U.S. Army identification tags from prisoners of war or from dead U.S. soldiers.

In addition to uniforms, weapons, vehicles and documents, the linguists were issued $100.00 in various denominations of invasion currency and 100 counterfeit British one-pound notes. Each team was provided with ten "Pervitin" tablets (energy boosters), several pacifying devices (i.e. brass knuckles, blackjacks and truncheons), a copy of the New Testament of the Bible and American song books. Vials of hydrocyanic acid were freely proffered, and a few highly-honored members of the group were issued poison-bearing cartridges which could be fired.

These cartridges were manufactured at Skorzeny's request by the Technical Criminal Institute of Berlin. The poison was aconite compound, encased in the head of a 7.65mm pistol bullet. The missile had split sides through which the poison would escape into the victim's body, insuring death.

Organization: Einheit Stielau

The linguists of the 150th Panzer Brigade had already been classified according to their proficiency in the English language. Group IV personnel, the poorest in linguistic ability, were assigned to the replacement company of the brigade. Group I, II and III linguists, of which there were approximately 150, were assigned in three-man teams to the brigade's combat groups. Only a few teams were sent on individual missions.

In each team of the Einheit Stielau, Group I personnel were to be the speakers. They were instructed to wear the uniform of a U.S. commissioned officer and to sit in the front seat next to the driver. Category II personnel, being only satisfactory in their command of the English language, were to sit in the rear. Members of Group III were selected as drivers, since it was thought they would be required to speak few words, if any, in that position.

The missions of the Einheit Stielau teams varied, and each team had received specialized training to further its effectiveness on its assignment. There were reconnaissance teams, demolitions expert teams (called engineers), signal teams, and "special" teams, whose specialty was rumored to be assassination.

Organization: 150th Panzer Brigade

The Brigade was unquestionably dominated by the omnipresence of Otto Skorzeny, but it was officially under the command of SS Lt Col Hardieck. It had a unit strength of 3,000 officers and men, 2,400 of whom were combat personnel. Its Executive Officer was SS Lt Col Musculus; its Adjutant, 1st Lt Selle. In addition to the headquarters staff and the replacement company, the brigade was composed of three combat groups.

The First Kampfgruppe included two paratrooper companies, a tank section, a mortar section, and eight teams of the Einheit Stielau. Lt Col Wulf was its commander.

The Second Combat Group, commanded by Capt von Foelkersam, featured a battalion of paratroopers, an assault gun section, a tank section, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft section, a signal platoon, an engineer platoon, an armored reconnaissance troop, a supply column and elements of the Einheit Stielau.

Similar to the Second Combat Group, the Third varied only in its use of an armored infantry section in lieu of the assault gun section, an SS company in place of a signal platoon, and a mortar section instead of a supply column. SS Lt Col Hardieck, the Commanding Officer of the brigade, also chose to be the Commanding Officer of this combat organization.

The Plan

The overall mission of the 150th Panzer Brigade was to infiltrate the U.S.-occupied territory in the Ardennes sector of the battle line in order to create confusion in the path of the attacking German Armies and to secure bridges over the Mousel between Namur and Liege. Infiltration was to be accomplished under the cover of darkness. One combat group, dressed in U.S. uniforms and completely equipped, was to push between two arms of a pincers formed by German troops. They were then to attach themselves to the rear of a withdrawing American column, relying on the confused situation to escape detection. At a suitable point, the combat group would branch off from the American column and move to a pre-designated rendezvous point. From the assembly area, the sabotage, reconnaissance and demolitions teams of the Einheit Stielau were to depart for their assigned targets, as were the other reconnaissance and armored sections of the group.

Generally these targets included: the location and destruction of higher U.S. headquarters, all radio stations, and supply and ammunition dumps; the creation of confusion by occupying and obstructing roads and bridges, by altering and removing all road signs, and by using members masquerading as MPs to misdirect traffic; and the infiltration and ambushing of U.S. units.

The other combat groups were to infiltrate as their commanding officers chose, and their mission, aside from the general mission of provoking a confused atmosphere, was left to the commander's discretion also.

A few of the Einheit Stielau teams were to penetrate SHAEF headquarters in Paris and to kidnap or to assassinate the Supreme Allied Commander, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, and other high-ranking officers.

Parachutists were to be dropped to capture the bridges at Engis, Huy, Ombrerausa and Liege, but most of the paratrooper units were to fight as infantry.

The 150th Moves Out

The brigade moved from Grafenwoehr to Cologne by a special train which had been camouflaged to resemble a shipment of Christmas trees. All questions about the convoy were to be answered: "Wir transportieren Weihnachtsbaeume (Christmas trees) fuer die Westfront." The train moved only at night.

For the two nights of the journey from Grafenwoehr, the brigade was protected by the Gestapo. Detraining on the night of 14-15 December, the brigade was quartered at the troop training grounds at Wahn, near Cologne.

The following night, with blackout restrictions in effect, most of the brigade convoy drove to Scheuern, near Munstereifel, Germany. The Second Combat Group moved to a bivouac area in the woods at Stadtkyll.

The Night Before "Greif"

The 150th Panzer Brigade was about to be put to the test for which they had been kept a well-guarded, a well-fed, and, they hoped, a well-trained secret. How many of them slept well that evening before "Operation Greif" was to begin, we will never know. They may have gained some reassurance when, due to faulty camouflage of their U.S. uniforms and the white stars on their vehicles, German soldiers attempted to arrest them. Later, at Schauern, however, a marauding U.S. P-38 strafed one of their radio cars, perhaps as an omen of things to come.

Appendix 2

Volume XVIII

HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Location of CIC Detachments and Teams on 15 December, 1944, 1 January, 15 January, and 31 January 1945.

CIC Det.	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
12th AG	TAC Hq	13	TAC Hq	18	TAC Hq	18	TAC Hq	11
	Main Hq	17*	Main Hq	16*	Main Hq	16*	Main Hq	16#
	Rear Hq	8	Rear Hq	7	Rear Hq	6	Rear Hq	6
	Interrogation Center	4§	Interrogation Center	4§	Interrogation Center	4§	Interrogation Center	4§
	T-Force:		T-Force CP	9	T-Force CP	9	T-Force CP	16
	Remouchamps	5						
	Sprimont	7						
	Aywaille	7						
	La Reid	5						
	Filot	3						
	Harze	3						
	CP	4						
301st CIC	Aachen	2	T-Force	1	T-Force	1		
	Eupen Town Office	1*	Eupen Town Office	1*	Eupen Town Office	1*	Eupen Town Office	1*
	MIC(Henri-Chap'l')	1	Master Int Cntr	1	MIC (Huy)	1	MIC (Huy)	1
	PWE (Herbesthal)	3	PWE Encl #1	3	PWE (Huy)	3	PWE (Huy)	3
	Liege Town Office	8§	Liege Town Office	10#	Liege Town Office	8#	Liege Town Office	8#
	First Army CP	3	First Army CP	3	First Army CP	3	First Army CP	3
	Herve Town Security	2	Herve Town Security	2	Herve Town Security	2	Herve Town Security	2
	Spa Hq	10*	Tongres Hq	11§	Tongres Hq	8	Spa Hq	11§
	Spa Town Office	5	Spa Town Office	2	Spa Town Office	2	Spa Town Office	7
	Verviers Town Office	9*	Verviers Town Office	11*	Verviers Town Office	11*	Verviers Town Office	8*
					Tongres Town Office	3§		
205th CIC	Malmedy	5						
	Eupen	11	Eupen	11	Eupen	16	Eupen	14

* Supplemented by 4 SM.
# Supplemented by 3 SM.
§ Supplemented by 1 SA.

* Supplemented by one MII.
# Supplemented by two MII.
§ Supplemented by three MII.

2567

CIC Det.	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
207th CIC	Brand	5	Brand	5	Mean?	5	Bomal	11
	Komelimunster	5	Komelimunster	5	Maffe	3	Lierniux	8
	Aachen	9	Aachen	14	Mobile Patrol			
	Attached T-Force	8	Attached T-Force	8	(Corps Area)	11		
208th CIC	Corps CP	4	Corps CP	4	Corps Hqs (Floren-		Florenville	7#
	Esch	10	Esch	10	ville)*	7	Assenois	11#
	Bastogne	5	Bastogne	5	Bouillon	14	Bouillon	14#
	Arlon	3	Arlon	3	Bertrix	5	Bertrix	5#
	Houffalize	4	Houffalize	4	Givet	16	Bauriang?	11#
	* Transferred to Third U. S. Army.							
	# Estimate based on total given: 48.							
218th CIC					Corps CP	2	Corps CP	6
					TDY/82d Abn	2	TDY/82d Abn	1
					Mobile Control	5	Spa	4
							Remouchamps	4
303d CIC§	PWE, Toul	1*	PWE, Toul	1*	PWE, Marville	1*	PWE, Marville	1*
	PWE, Florange	1*	PWE, Florange	1*	PWE, Florange	2*	PWE, Florange	1*
	CI Interrogation Center	5#	CI Interrogation Center	5#	CI Interrogation Center	5#	CI Interrogation Center	5#
	CIC (Army Hq)	4	CIC (Army Hq)	4	CIC (Army Hq)	4	CIC (Army Hq)	4
	CIC Ck Pt (Hq)	5	CIC Ck Pt	5				
	CIC Research	7	CIC Research	7	CIC Research (Metz)	5	CIC Research	5
	Pont-a-Mousson	9	Pont-a-Mousson	4	Pont-a-Mousson	4		
	Nancy	12	Nancy	5	Nancy	4		
	Metz	12	Metz	7	Metz	7	Metz	12
	Toul	4	Morhange	3	Longwy	8	Longwy	7
	Commercy	10	Kreuzwald	15	Esch	4	Esch	4
	Verdun	10	Faulquemont	3	Bouzonville	15	Bouzonville	14
	Algrange	7	Lucky TAC	7	Luxembourg	6	Luxembourg	10
	Havange	2	Dieuze	3	Dieuze	3		

2568

CIC Det.	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
303d CIC§ (Continued)	Pettencourt	2	St Avold	2	Morhange	3		
	Chateau Salins	3						
	Piennes	2						
	• Supplemented by 1 MIS.							
	# Supplemented by 1 MIS and 2 SM.							
	§ The 303d CIC Detachment had a varying supplementary force of MIS, MII, AND BSM, in addition to the ones already cited. These were presumably used where needed. Strength was as follows:							
	7 MIS and 1 MII		7 MIS, 1 MII, 7 BSM		7 MIS, 1 MII, 5 BSM		6 MIS, 1 MII, 5 BSM	
203d CIC	Couflans vicin	•	•	•	Corps Hq	2	Corps Hq, Arlon	2#
	Metz	•			Arlon	9	Martleange	5#
					Habay La Neuve	6	Redange	4#
					Remoiville	4	Remoiville	4#
					Rambrouch	7	Ranbrouch	7#
					Merscheid	4	Merscheid	4#
	• Not reported.							
	# Estimate based on given total strength - 26.							
212th CIC	§Corps Area	•	Sarralbe	6	Sarralbe	5	#Mondorf, Mamer, Capellem, Hozem, Itzig, Sandweiler, Walferdingen, Nospelt, Kehlen, Bertrange, Neudorf	44
			Sarre Union	2	Mondorf	5		
			Sarreguemines	8	Luxembourg	35		
			Dieuze	8				
			Morhange	6				
			Falquemont	9				
			St Avold	2				
	• Not reported.							
	# Reported as total.							
	§ Supplemented by personnel as indicated:							
	None for this period		2 MIS, 11 MII		2 MIS, 11 MII, 3 Int.		2 MIS, 5 MII	

2569

CIC Det.	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
212th CIC (Continued)	+ Supplemented by 2 MII.		ASCZ#421-I:					
			Toul	10				
			Commercy	10				
			Charlesville	2				
			Nancy	3				
			418th CIC, TRT#5:+					
			Nancy	12				
			Metz	2				
			Pont-a-Mousson	5				
			Morhange	3				
			Faulquemont	4				
			Dieuze	3				
220th CIC	*Couflans, Neyeuvre, Thienville, Task Force Polk, Sierck, Metzervisse, Bouzonville, Metz.		*	*	Thionville	11	Thionville	11#
					Boulay	4	Boulay	4#
					Freistroff	5	Freistroff	5#
					Vigy	3	St Avold	3#
					Sierck	4	Waldweiss	4#
					Corps PWE	1		
					§Metz	12		
					+Pont-a-Mousson	5		
309th CIC	Army CP	2	Maastricht-Vise	22	Maastricht-Vise	5	Maastricht-Vise	22
	Maastricht	20	* Bardenburg	6	* Bardenburg	6	* Bardenburg	15
	Meersen, Vise	14			*102d Infantry Division	5	*102d Infantry Division	5
	* TRT#3, Det. 418		#Valkenburg, Hol	10	#Aachen, Ger	13	#Aachen	35
	# TRT#4, Det. 418							

* Not reported.
# Estimate based on total, 27 given. Figures include supplementary personnel: 8 IPW, 2 MII.
§ Det. 418-5, which also had 1 Interpreter.
+ Det. 418-6, figures include 2 MIS and 2 Civilian Interpreters.

2570

CIC Det.	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
213th CIC	Hoensbroek, Holland	9	Hoensbroek (Hq)	5	Kerkrade (CP)	11	Kerkrade	12
	Houthem (Rear)	2	Houthem	2	Houthem (Rear CP)	3	Houthem	3
	Waubach	2	Waubach	4	Waubach	4	Waubach	4
	Ubach, Germany	4	Ubach	2	Ubach	2	Ubach	3
			Heerlen, Holland	3	Heerlen	1		
			Kerkrade	4	Eygelshoven	3	Eygelshoven	2
					Liaison w/British	1		
216th CIC	*	*	Tongres, Belgium	18	Heerlen, Holland	10	Heerlen, Holland	18
			St Trond, Belgium	4				
	* Not reported, Detachment moved to Heerlen, Holland 23 December 1944.							
219th CIC	Heerlen	8	Heerlen-Aachen*	8	Aachen (Interro Ctr)	2	Aachen (Interro Ctr)	2
	Kerkrade	3	Kerkrade	3	Brand, Germany	2	Brand, Germany	4
	Alsdorf, Germany	3	Alsdorf, Germany	3	Eilendorf, Germany	2	Eilendorf, Germany	5
			Kornelmunster, Germany	3	Kornelmunster	8	Kornelmunster	6
					Raeran, Begium	4		
	* To Aachen on 23 December 1944.							
DIVISION CIC: Note: * Indicates assignment to FUSA. ** Indicates assignment to TUSA. *** Indicates assignment to NUSA. Other asterisk-groupings will be used as needed.								
1st CIC*	Vicht	16	Hauset	16	Jalhay	16	Jalhay/Sourbrodt	14
2d CIC*	St Vith, vicin ≠	15	Elsenborn	15	Ovifat/Verviers	13#	Ovifat/Verviers	15#
502d CIC***	Baesweiler	6	Baesweiler, Oldw'r,		≠Ciney-Pessoux	9	≠Div Area (Hosp I)	7
	Merkstein	4	Barmen	6	≠Division PWE	2	≠Division PWE	2
	Division CP	2	Division CP	2	≠Division CP	2	≠Division CP	2
	St Trond, Begium	2	Merkstein	4				
			St Trond, Belgium	2				

≠ Plus 6 MI.
Plus 2 MI.

2571

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
503d CIC*	Stolberg	6	Zilendorf	2	CC "A"	4	CC "A"	4
	Breinig, Dorff, Mausbach, Werth, Hastenrath, R'ran	4	Breinig, Dorff	4	CC "B"	4	CC "B"	4≠
			Mausbach, Werth, Hastenrath, Scherpenseel, Koetternich	4	Division Trains	2	Division Trains	2
	Division CP	3	Division CP	5	Division CP	5#	Division CP	4#
	≠ Plus 1 MII. # Plus 2 MII.							
4th CIC*	Each RCT/2 agts	6	Each RCT (2)	6	Each Regiment (2)	6#	Each Regt (2)	6#
	Division CP	8	Division CP	8	Division CP	8	Division CP	8
504th CIC*	Divisional Area	8	≠	≠	Division Hq#	5	Hesperange, Divange, Hagen-Haute, Zouffgen, Shifflange, et al	7§
					CC "A"	2		
					CC "B"	2		
	≠ Not reported. # Including 2 MII, 2 civilian linguists, and 1 Fr Sgt. § Including 2 MIS, 1 EM linguist, 1 Fr.							
5th CIC**	Thiacourt & Div A	≠	≠	≠	Div Hq, Fels	8	≠	≠
					Div PWE, Fels	1#		
					Each Regiment (2)	6§		
	≠ Not reported. # Plus 2 MII. § 1 Interpreter per Regiment.							
505th CIC*	Division CP	3	Division CP	3	Eupen	5≠	Eupen	6≠
	CC "A"	5	CC "A"	5	Baelen	2	Baelen	2
	CC "B"	4	CC "B"	4	Bilstein, Welk'r't	2≠	B'st'n and W'enraedt	2≠
	CC "R"	2	CC "R"	2	Walhorn	3≠		
			Hahn	2	Division Trains (Verviers-Pepinster)	1≠	Division Trains	1≠
							CC "R"	2
	≠ Plus 1 MII.							

2572

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
506th CIC**	Gros-Tenquin and Divisional Area	≠	≠	≠	Division Hq	5#	Division CP (Fwd), Division PWE and CC's	10§
					Division PWE	2		
					CC "A"	3#		
					CC "B"	3#		
	≠ Strength not reported. # Plus 1 Interpreter. § Plus 2 MII, and 1 Interpreter.							
507th CIC***	Robroek, Holland, Hqs	5	Robroek, on move	14	≠Division CP	4≠	≠Division CP	3#
	Heerlen CC "A"	5			CC "A"	1#	CC "A"	1#
	Klimmen CC "B"	4			CC "B"	3≠	CC "B"	2#
					Division Trains	3#	Division Trains	3#
	≠ Plus 2 MII. # Plus 1 MII.							
8th CIC*	Rotgen, Belgium (Roetgen?)	16	Division Area	16	Zweifall, Germany	11	Zweifall	11
					Breinig	7	Breinig	8
9th CIC*	Each RCT (2)	6	Each RCT (2)	6	Each RCT (2)	6	Each RCT (2)	6
	Division CP	1	Division CP	1	Division CP	1	Division CP	1
	Sourbrodt	5	Stolberg, Eschweil'	5	Eupen	6	Eupen, Monschau	6
	PWE	2≠	PWE	2	PWE	3	PWE	3
	≠ Plus 1 MII.							
509th CIC*	Mersch, Luxembourg	5	≠	≠	≠	≠	#Boulizicourt, Bockange, Ennery	5
	Trois Verges	3						
	≠ Not reported.							
510th CIC**	Divisional Area	7	≠	≠	≠	≠	≠	≠
	≠ Not reported.							

2573

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
26th CIC**	Divisional Area	7ǂ	#	#	Divisional Area	14	#	#
	ǂ Plus 6 MIS. # Not reported.							
28th CIC*	Wiltz	6	Wiltz	6	ǂ	ǂ	ǂ	ǂ
	Diekirch	6	Diekirch	6				
	Clerf	5	Clerf	5#				
	ǂ Not reported. # These towns were overrun by the Germans during this period - 16-31 December 1944.							
29th CIC***	Alsdorf & vicin	13	Alsdorf & vicin	13	Alsdorf, Ger	7	Alsdorf	7
					Wurselen	3	Wurselen	3
					Herzogenrath	2	Herzogenrath	2
					Oldtweiler	2	Oldtweiler	2
					Mariadorf	2	Mariadorf	2
30th CIC ***	Herzogenrath	3	Herzogenrath	3	ǂ	ǂ	Remouchamps, Belgium	4
	Wurselen	2	Wurselen	2			Malmedy	4
	Bardenburg	2	Bardenburg	2			Francorchamps	8
	(3) per Regt	9	(3) per Regt	9			(2) per RCT	6
	ǂ Not reported.							
35th CIC **	Divisional Area	9ǂ	#	#	Divisional Area (Perle and Koetschette)	10§	#	#
	ǂ Plus 2 MII, 2 SM. # Not reported. § Plus 1 MIS, 2 Interpreters, 3 French Officers.							
75th CIC*	-	-	-	-	ǂ	ǂ	Odromont	6
	ǂ No report received, previously uncommitted.							

2574

[redacted]

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
78th CIC*	Rotgen	≠	≠	≠	Roetgen, Rott, Ger	9	Roetgen	7
					Lammersdorf	4	Lammersdorf	4
							Rott	3
							Raeran, Belgium	2
	≠ Newly committed, no reports.							
80th CIC**	Hemy & Div Area	≠	≠	≠	Domeldingen, Reckangeless, Mersch, Vichten, Merzing, Colmar-Berg, Ettelbruck	14#	≠	≠
	≠ Not reported.							
	# Plus 7 Linguists.							
82d CIC*	-	-	-	-	Basse Boreux, Arbre Fontaine, Garonne, Lenieux, Malhay, Werbomont, Chevron, Trois Ponts	≠	Div CP	9
							(1) per Regiment	4
							Sissone, Fr	1
	≠ Strength not reported.						DS/Abn Army-UK	1
83d CIC*	Junglinster	2	Division Area	11≠	Div CP (Bar vaux)	15≠	Ottre & Jervigne	15≠
	Senningen	1#						
	Luxembourg City	8#						
	≠ Plus 2 MII.							
	# Plus 1 MII.							
84th CIC**	Palenberg	10	Palenberg, (on move)	11	≠ With Division	16≠	La Roche	4#
	Ubach	4					Barvaux	13
							Div CP	4
	≠ Plus 5 MII.							
	# Plus 1 MII.							
87th CIC**	Metz & Div Area	9	≠	≠	≠	≠	Div Hq	6#
	≠ Not reported.							
	# Plus 7 Interpreters.							

[redacted]

2575

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
90th CIC ••	GrossHemersdorf Veckring (Regt) Oberesch (Regt)	2ǂ 2 2	#	#	Kedange (Hq) Veckring (PWIC) Monneren Sierck Remeling Biringen	5§ 5 3 4 2 2	Boulaide, Surre Bevigne, Benorchamps, Sonlez	13+
94th CIC ••	Lorient Sector St Nazaire Sec	7ǂ 7§	Lorient Sector St Nazaire Sector	7ǂ	#	#	Div Hq, Sierck, Perl, Remeling, Div PWE	15
95th CIC ••	Div Area, Hq, Regt	10	ǂ	ǂ	Div Hq, Regt	7#	Div Hq, Reg	7#
99th CIC •	Bulligen	16	Krewinkel Vicht	11ǂ 5ǂ	Div CP Elsenborn Div CP (R) Verviers	4 7	Div CP Elsenborn Div CP Rear (Ve)	4 7
102d CIC •••	Ubach, Div Area Rear & PW Cage Left Flink Regt Rt Flank Regt	2 8 7 6	Ubach, Boscheln, Beggendorf, Setternich, Lovernich, Floverich, Puffendorf. Ederen, Flossdorf, Roerdorf, Welz, Gereonsweiler, Linnich, Vales, Holland.	11 14ǂ	Ubach II Palenberg Baesweiler Merksyein	9 7 7 3	Ubach II Palenberg Baesweiler Merksyein	8 7 5 3

ǂ Plus 1 IPW.
Not reported.
§ Includes IPW Team, 1 linguist, 1 OB.
+ Plus 2 IPW, 1 OB.

ǂ Plus 1 IPW.
Not reported.
§ Includes IPW Team, 1 linguist, 1 OB.

ǂ Not Reported.
Plus 2 MII.

ǂ Plus 1 MII.

ǂ Includes presumably some Army and Corps Personnel.

2576

DIVISION CIC	15 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	31 December 1944 Area	No. Agts.	15 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.	31 January 1945 Area	No. Agts.
104th CIC •	Div CP	4	≠	≠	Eschweiler, Ger	9	Eschweiler	9
	Stolberg, Busbach	4			Stolberg, Ger	7	Stolberg	7
	Eschweiler, PWE	8						
	≠ Not reported.							
106th CIC •	-	-	-	-	Comblain Au Pont	≠	Stavelot	12
							Trois-Ponts	1#
	≠ Newly assigned, not reported.							
	# Plus 2 MII.							

2577

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XIX

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THE RHINE BREACHED

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Chapter 1

Preparation for Attack

On 4 February, SHAEF's Weekly Intelligence Summary noted that inroads were being made continually into German lines, and that the German panzer divisions were being deployed erratically. German resistance in the Colmar pocket was waning.

The Russian Army's offensive on the East front, which had been initiated in mid-January, had succeeded at a rapid rate, taking a great deal of pressure off the Allied Western Forces.[1]

Some German Intelligence Service Agents Drop In

CIC's main efforts were directed toward the neutralization and defeat of the plans of the German Intelligence Services (GIS), who at this time began a concentrated effort to extend their operations by parachuting agents behind the Allied lines.

On the night of 3-4 February, a German-operated B-17 departed from Stuttgart with nine agents on whom, it was later revealed, GIS had spent much time and effort. Each agent had an individual objective as well as a general mission, but none escaped detection. They were dropped far distant from their objectives and eight were captured almost immediately. Of the three who came to earth near Maubeuge, France, south of Mons, one, using the name of Robert DuBois, alias Cavrol, managed to reach Paris, but was captured there.[2]

Detailed information is lacking concerning the capture of the other enemy agents, but a Monthly Information Report from the 307th CIC Detachment states that one was captured at a road block in Dalhain, Alsace. He was interrogated by Special Agents Origene J. Paquette, Jr., and Marion E. Porter of the 307th CIC Detachment. The agent was a wireless-telegraph operator who had waited eight days in Stuttgart for good flying weather. A French member of the pro-Nazi Francist movement, he had every intention of fulfilling his assignment. The Seventh Army CIC Detachment turned him over to Special Counter Intelligence.[3]

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1 Weekly Intelligence Summary, SHAEF, Office of ACofS, G2, No. 46, dtd 4 Feb 1945, Part I, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

2 12th Army Group Rpt of Opns (Final After-Action Rpt, Vol IV), (RESTRICTED), (Staff and Faculty Library), and G2 Periodic Rpt No. 62, First U.S. Army, undated, L548, FUSA (13), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.), and 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt No. 14, 16-18 Feb 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

3 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Feb 45, dtd 16 Mar 45, in 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpts file Apr 44-Jan 46 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25099).

Planning For Future Is Stressed

Instructions from SHAEF and Twelfth Army Group during February directed that emphasis be placed upon the planning and necessary coordination of all counter-intelligence activity, since future operations in Germany would involve dealing with a population known or assumed to be fundamentally hostile.[4]

Sixth Army Group CIC, too, spent considerable effort in planning. Based on a "higher headquarters" declaration that complete control of individuals crossing the German border would have to be maintained in order to catch enemy agents, war criminals, or other unauthorized persons and also to prevent illegal shipments of communications and funds, Major James F. Foothorap of Sixth Army Group drew up a comprehensive plan for the establishment of controls along the Franco-German border in that Group's area.

Major Foothorap noted that the Franco-German border in Group area divided itself into three well-defined sections. In one, the Rhine River provided a natural frontier from Basle, Switzerland, to Neuberg, near the juncture of the Rhine and Lauter Rivers, about 125 miles to the north. From Neuberg to Wissembourg, France, the Lauter River served as a natural obstacle, but the third leg, from Wissembourg to Volklingen, France -- the point of contact with the Twelfth Army Group boundary.-- was merely an artifical dividing line.

An area along the border which no personnel, civilian or military, would be permitted to enter except by authorized routes was the first restriction delineated. This was to be generally five kilometers wide, but its design would be influenced by such natural barriers as existed in the area. Where no natural boundary existed, Major Foothorap suggested construction of barbed wire entanglements.

Through this prohibited area, based upon tactical and logistical requirements, a minimum number of routes across the border were to be opened; all other roads were to be closed to traffic. Refugee traffic across the Rhine was to be limited to two bridges which were to be constructed approximately forty miles apart. At those points, in addition to guards, CIC and French authorities would establish travel control posts and would perform the necessary screening. At all other river crossings and at road junctions in the other sections reserved for military traffic, guards would be stationed, and CIC would check the posts daily.

Civilians in those areas unpartitioned by rivers would be controlled and directed to two travel control posts at road junctions not vital to military traffic.

Internal and external patrols were to operate in the prohibited zone. Foot patrols were to comb the entire prohibited area. Motorized patrols were scheduled

4 Third U.S. Army After-Action Rpt, G2 (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

to perform liaison activity between foot patrols and headquarters, in addition to their mobile scouting. Air patrols, manned by flight personnel in liaison aircraft with air-to-ground communications, were to observe any and all activity within the prohibited zone.

Plans called for a CIC "B-3" team, of three officers and eleven enlisted agents for each travel control post. In the event the French should decide to perform their own border control, CIC agents would be released for other duties.[5]

The Case of the Unsafe Safes

For importance and from the standpoint of the overall security of the United States, few cases in the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps can match the one which began in early February in Sixth Army Group area.

One GMC 6X6 truck, belonging to a signal unit, had been stolen after being left unguarded. An intensive investigation was quickly launched; for the truck contained a United States top diplomatic code and decoding devices. It was CIC's task to find the thief, the stolen truck, and, most important, the combination chests and one field safe which had been on the truck and which contained the supremely vital material. Those responsible for the negligence which allowed the thief to make his move allegedly were later court-martialed, but the words "court martial" alone do not indicate the gravity of the situation.

The strictest secrecy was placed on the investigation. The enemy might have stolen the vehicle, or it could have been in the hands of the Allies. CIC had no way of knowing.

Colonel David G. Erskine, recalling the event after nine and one-half years[6] said he learned later that code clerks in Washington, D. C. were called out to set up a new code at 11 P.M. on the night the news of the missing safes reached the Capitol.

Colonel Erskine, as Counter Intelligence Chief of Sixth Army Group at the time of the incident, supervised the search. Fifteen agents from Sixth Army Group CIC Detachments were detailed to the mission. G2's of all units in ETO were alerted. Colonel Erskine made discreet inquiries with high French officials to determine whether they knew what was missing. They did not.

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5 CIC Det, Hq, Sixth AG, Memo to Col Erskine, dtd 6 Feb 45, Subj: Recommendations Relative to Control of Franco-German Border, 6th Army Group Area, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

6 At the time of this interview, Colonel Erskine was Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps at Fort Holabird.

But a Frenchman did have the safes in his possession -- a Frenchman who, because his own truck had been stolen, had made up his mind to steal the first truck he saw.

After being halted at a roadblock and allowed to pass unmolested, the Frenchman decided to ditch his cargo. He stopped the truck in the middle of a bridge over the Geissen River and tumbled all three of the containers into the water. This was quite a feat, for each of the containers weighed 550 pounds empty.

CIC knew nothing of this. Their only source of information was rumor. One rumor placed the truck on a Rhine bridge as it had blown up. CIC agents, with the enemy sniping at them from the east bank, walked along the Rhine looking for some sign of their quarry. Agents in Piper Cubs flew all over the canals and rivers around Colmar, hoping that the safes would cast a shadow on the river bed which would be noticeable from the air. Intense rainfall which caused a flash flood had made the task more difficult.

A French warrant officer finally located the thief. He obtained a confession and information concerning the disposition of the safes. The truck was recovered easily. But the safes were still missing.

Deep sea divers from Cherbourg scoured the river bottom unsuccessfully in the area around the bridge. On 9 March 1945 the river subsided slightly and the two chests were located 100 yards down stream. The field safe could not be found.

Colonel Erskine had plans drawn up to divert the river. CIC agents searched along the banks of the Geissen with such frequency that unknowing travelers might have surmised that the whole U.S. Army was lonesome for the Mississippi.

On 20 March 1945, just before the Colonel's plan for diverting the river was to be implemented, an unnamed CIC agent, taking one last look, was attracted by a gleaming reflection in one spot on the river. The glimmer had come from the third safe, its paint having been scraped away as the rushing river waters tumbled it over and over in the river bed, carrying it 600 yards from where it had been dropped. It was quickly retrieved, loaded on a truck and taken rearward over the Vosges Mountains, with Colonel Erskine riding in escort.

In Paris, experts examined the three containers and determined that none had been tampered with, except by the Geissen River.

As a result of this theft, diplomatic codes no longer permitted to be taken forward of Army.[7] Colonel Erskine was awarded a Bronze Star for his part in the

7 Interviews with Col David G. Erskine, 23 Aug 54, at Ft Holabird; Frank G. Gorgie, NCICA Convention, Chicago, Ill., 7 Aug 54; and Book Message from G2 First U.S. Army to G2 3d Armd Div, 11 Feb 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts Oct 44-Jun 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

forty-two day search. To be sure, the citation for his Bronze Star did not mention that a most secret code of the United States had been lost. It merely mentioned "highly classified documents and material."[8]

Other U.S. Armies Prepare for Offensive

By mid-February, First and Third Armies were getting ready for their part in the offensive. On 18 February, an instructional letter from Twelfth Army Group Commander, General Omar Bradley, was distributed to the Commanding Generals of First, Third and Fifteenth Armies; to Special Troops from Twelfth Army Group; and to the 66th Infantry Division which was operating against the German-held pockets in Brittany. The purpose of the letter was to outline operational security control measures, their applications, and the manner of implementation.

No effort was made to limit security control measures to those presented in the document; it was understood that special cases would call for special security tactics.

Prior to all troop movements, directives were to be issued by Armies which would "insure that personnel do not discuss military instructions, plans, operations, composition or location of troops in the presence of civilians or other unknown persons." Security lectures were to emphasize instructions for individual behavior in case of capture, stressing the need for absolute silence under questioning, except for "name, rank and serial number." Punishment for violation of military security discipline was to be "stringently imposed and adequately publicized."

Camouflage, including smoke, was to be employed, and strict censorship and telephone security precautions were to be observed, and newly-evacuated areas were to be searched thoroughly to prevent anything of intelligence value from falling into the hands of the enemy.

In keeping with the general secrecy of operations, all movement was to be made under cover of darkness or in inclement weather or by infiltration, with the barest minimum of daylight vehicular travel. Radio communication nets and links were to be continued either by leaving radio personnel and equipment behind to continue operations in an area being vacated, or by infiltrating the personnel and equipment of the relieving unit before the unit had moved out. In areas without previous radio communication, radio silence was to be maintained until commitment or release by higher headquarters.

Commanders of divisions and lower units were encouraged to use ruses, feints, dummy positions and fake concentrations for short-term tactical deceptive measures, with the help, if desired, of specialist personnel and special troops and equipment furnished by Twelfth Army Group. Air and ground reconnaissance was to be

8 201 File, Colonel David G. Erskine.

employed deceptively, "in such a manner as to avoid indicating the location of the main effort or supporting operations."

Suitable prohibitions were to be placed on news gatherers and other visitors, and military personnel were to be restricted to their respective areas except when command or administrative duties made traveling necessary beyond that area.

Every practicable measure to prevent contact between briefed and unbriefed persons, civilian or military, was to be taken, and, prior to departure, a thorough check of personnel was to be made to ensure that individuals possessed only those documents or papers which were essential for the execution of their missions.

Civilian control, "at the appropriate time," was to include the following measures:

(1) Travel restrictions were to be made more binding and enforcement of travel control was to be improved by the addition of travel control stations at vital points.

(2) No travel permits were to be issued by Military Government or Civil Affairs to civilians except in cases of absolute necessity, and then "only to those persons who have received security clearance from counterintelligence personnel."

(3) Civilians crossing lines in either direction and those considered threats to security were to be interned immediately in this phase and held until their presence no longer would constitute a security hazard. Known or suspected enemy agents were to be processed through counterintelligence channels.

(4) Efforts were to be undertaken to prevent British and American penetration agents traveling through the concentration area on their way across the lines from learning anything about the intentions and dispositions of troops throughout the area.

Among the special security measures were the removal of unit insignias, the disguising of unit markings on vehicles, and the prohibition of the use of any unit identifications, including telephone code names, on road signs for traffic control or similar purposes.[9]

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9 Ltr from Hq 12th Army Group, dtd 18 Feb 45 to CGs of First U.S. Army, Fifteenth U.S. Army, 66th Inf Div, and Special Troops, 12th Army Group, subj: "Operational Security Control Measures," in 87th CIC Det Correspondence File, Jun 44-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

Suspect Categories Clarified

For the guidance of CIC in Germany, The First Army G2, on 12 February 1945, distributed a document containing a series of representative case histories, placing particular emphasis on the proper disposition of each type of arrestee.

The cases fell into three categories: those referred to and tried by Military Government courts; those interned as threats to military security; and Germans or enemy Displaced Persons evacuated to refugee camps or Allied nationals evacuated to United Nations Displaced Persons Centers after investigation at First Army Interrogation Center.

In examples of the cases tried by Military Government, the report stressed the importance of the defendants' confessions. In all cases where a confession had been obtained the suspects were found guilty, and sentences varied from small fines to death. Leniency was shown only in the reduction of two women's sentences from six years to two years imprisonment, based in one instance on the advanced age of the convicted and in the other on ill health.

Cases involving less than one year's imprisonment or less than a $1,000 fine were not subject to review, unless petitioned by the defendant within ten days after sentencing. All others were reviewed by higher authority. In one case, the higher authority commuted a sixteen-year-old boy's death sentence to life imprisonment, "by reason of the youth of the accused."

The case histories dealing with security threats reveal that factors to be considered in disposition included: intelligence, military skill, degree of indoctrination with Naziism, rank within the Nazi Party or government. The suspicion placed on an individual was liable to variation with these factors. Some persons were cited as short-range counterintelligence problems for whom immediate internment was necessary but could be terminated when the tactical situation improved or the lines advanced or a static situation resulted. Other individuals had to be jailed until long-range policies were established.

Cases involving those who were deemed to be Displaced Persons fell, for the most part, into two classes: "Controlled Displaced Persons" and "Displaced Persons." Persons with some element of Naziism in their past, but who were not automatic arrestees or threats to security, were considered Controlled Displaced Persons. Others, for whom no pro-Naziism could be proved, were considered Displaced Persons and were permitted relative freedom. Some, who had weathered the Nazi storm and had remained anti-Nazi by reputation, were referred to Military Government as potential employees.[10]

10 Intelligence Notes No. 3, First U.S. Army, dtd 12 Feb 45, in First Army File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

Protecting the Build-Up

In the Ninth Army area, the build-up for the forthcoming offensive was underway. The initial premise -- that evidence of a build-up could not be concealed -- was accepted, and security was directed toward deceiving the enemy about the number and types of troops in concentration.

Approximately 600 "security suspects," including 121 line crossers, were interned, to be released after the attack had been launched. Security instructions, issued to all Corps and Divisions, stressed these points: movement into Ninth Army area was to be accomplished under cover of darkness or, when practicable, by infiltration; unit and vehicle indentifications were to be removed; all personnel were to be restricted to unit areas; nearby cities were to be cited as "Off Limits"; radio silence was to be maintained; camouflage was to be used; and security lectures were to be given.

Civilian control included: the internment of all line crossers (found moving in either direction) and all security threats; rigid restriction of all civilian travel, especially in the occupied sections of Germany; and continuation of travel controls along the Meuse River in Ninth Army area.

For the first fifteen days of February, no cases of espionage or sabotage were reported in Ninth Army area, but fifteen German soldiers in civilian clothes were evacuated as Prisoners of War; twenty-four arrestees were turned over to indigenous authorities; thirty-six were arrested as Displaced Persons or violators of Military Government proclamations; and forty-seven were being held, pending further investigation -- in addition to the 600 previously mentioned.[11]

Later, counterintelligence briefs and target information were distributed "to all Corps and Division units...." Thirty-one line crossers were added to the previous total interned for security reasons, along with fifty-one other security threats. Of the 109 other cases handled in Ninth Army area, two proved outstanding. In one, a Military Government Intermediate Court sentenced a former Nazi ten years imprisonment for giving false information to CIC and fined him 10,000 marks. CIC agents reported that this type of positive action by the Allies against former Nazi officials greatly encouraged the inhabitants to divulge information on other Nazis in the community.

The second case involved two Hitler Jugend members who crossed the Roer on the night of 21 February with the mission of securing tactical information. After

11 Ninth U.S. Army After-Action Report for Period 1-15 Feb 45, from G2 Counter Intelligence Branch, Incl #32 to G2 After-Action Report, 1-15 Feb 45, dtd 19 Feb 45 in NUSA G2 Rpts, L-490 (4), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

their capture in the 35th Infantry Division area at the town of Birgden, the unsuccessful spies informed on other agents who had been recruited and could be expected in the area.[12]

VI Corps Clarifies Evacuation Channels

Major Harry G. Costello, Jr., commanding VI Corps CIC, circularized a letter on 18 February outlining the procedure to be followed in the use of Prisoner of War Channels, throughout the Seventh Army area as a result of a telephone conversation with the G2, Seventh Army. These instructions ordered that only bona fide prisoners of war be sent through Prisoner of War channels. French Nationals who were regarded as security hazards were to be turned over to local French authorities, while enemy agents or suspected agents were to be "forwarded through CIC channels for disposition," regardless of nationality.[13]

Civilian Travel Control: Plans Made

Plans for civilian traffic control in Seventh Army Areas were worked out in several conferences attended by Sixth Corps Civil Affairs and CIC officials.

The City of Strasbourg was the focal point of civilian travel control difficulties. The French officials in that city issued travel permits indiscriminately--in a spirit in keeping with their recent liberation, according to a 206th CIC Detachment report. Ten different types of permits were in circulation from that one locale, and civilians, moving out of the city, flocked into the Sixth Corps area. Despite the relocation of Gendarme posts to control the traffic, some civilians filtered into forward unit areas. To add to the problem, no adequate means of fixing fines or detentions had been put into effect to discourage routine travel violations.

As a result of the conferences, the requirements for issuance of passes in Strasbourg were revised and a central circulation bureau was established in the city, which was advised of the new travel control regulations. One pass form (a yellow laissez-passer) was supplied to the bureau, and passes were to be granted

12 Ninth U.S. Army After-Action Report for Period 15-28 February 1945, from G2 Counter Intelligence Branch, Incl #32 to G2 After-Action Report 16-28 February 1945, dtd 4 March 1945, in NUSA G2 Rpts, L-490 (4), (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

13 Ltr from 206th CIC Det to G2s of VI Corps and Seventh Army and to CIC Dets of 36th, 45th, and 103d Inf Divs and 101st Abn Div and 14th Armd Div, dtd 18 Feb 45, subj, "The Use of Prisoner of War Channels" in 45th CIC Det Correspondence File, Aug 43-May 44 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

only for necessary travel in the Corps Area to the rear of the Division Security Line. Residents were informed of the regulations by all available means.[14]

The area covered by VI Corps and its subordinate units in this period approximated 500 square miles. The goal was to set up a travel control system which would make the area impenetrable to enemy agents and in which travel restriction violations would be swiftly detected and dealt with. Many indigenous persons worked with VI Corps CIC and detachments at division level to create a fine network of roadblocks.

In VI Corps CIC Detachment's Zone, thirteen roadblocks were manned by teams consisting of one National Gendarme and one member of French Forces of the Interior (FFI) or the auxiliary police. Motorized territorial Gendarmes patrolled eight areas. In addition, four Gendarmes manned roadblocks of four main highways leading into Saverne. Nine FFI-manned roadblocks encircled Saverne. In Brumath, on the French side of the Franco-German border, where the 36th CIC Detachment was located, several roadblocks were established. Roadblocks in neighboring towns and villages consisted of five in Bischwiller, four in Weyersheim, and one each in six other towns. All posts were manned by FFI.

The 101st Airborne CIC Detachment, operating out of Hochfelden, placed one roadblock in that town and one in each of five nearby villages, using FFI personnel also.

The 514th CIC Detachment, with headquarters in Dotwiller, used Military Police at ten roadblocks in their territory, and FFI personnel at eight others.

In Bouxwiller and in surrounding villages, the 103rd CIC Detachment stationed FFI members at thirteen roadblocks.

The situation was slightly different in the area served by the 45th CIC Detachment. In and around the town of Phalsbourg, seventeen posts were manned by Military Police. Two of these were in Graufthal; one in the town and one at the

14 Ltr from 206th CIC Det to G2s VI Corps and Seventh Army; 307th CIC Dets of 36th, 45th, and all CIC Dets under VI Corps; Civil Affairs, VI Corps; office of Provost Marshal; VI Corps; S/A Moseley, S/A Mills and Lt Teague, subj, "Civilian Traffic Control," dtd 18 Feb 45, in 45th Div CIC Det Corres file; Aug 43-May 44 (sic) (CONFIDENTIAL), Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121; Memo for the OIC 206th CIC Det, subj, "Civilian Travel Control for the Period 1 Feb to 10 Feb 45," dtd 10 Feb 45, in 45th CIC Det corres file, Aug 43-May 44 (sic) (CONFIDENTIAL), Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121.

railroad junction. Only four roadblocks were in FFI hands, all to the rear of the Division's Command Post.[15]

The 45th CIC Detachment was wary of the French Forces of the Interior because of an unfortunate incident in which two American soldiers were shot and killed by a group of men in civilian clothes. Although it was not proved that these men were members of the French Forces of the Interior, the Division G2 instructed CIC that no FFI personnel were to man posts forward of the Division Command Post. This gave to the Military Police the dual responsibility of screening civilian, as well as military personnel. No civilian travel, other than in cases of extreme emergency, was permitted in the area forward of the Command Post, which made the Military Police task a little easier.[16]

French Forces of the Interior Dissolved

Actually, the decision of the G2, 45th Infantry Division to limit the use of French Forces of the Interior personnel enabled that CIC Detachment to reorganize travel control plans efficiently. As it turned out, such reorganization would have been inevitable, for ten days later the French Forces of the Interior was dissolved officially by the Commandant at Strasbourg. Other Detachments in the area were therefore thrown into a potentially dangerous situation, security-wise, as there was no alternate plan and no legal way to force the former French Forces of the Interior personnel to remain at their stations. As one of the detachments affected by the disbandment of the French Forces of the Interior, the 36th CIC Detachment, reported; "The road block system began to slip. French Forces of the Interior members stated that they could continue but not as regularly as before because they must earn enough to live." CIC agents, "arguing on the grounds of patriotism and the necessity of roadblocks for American military security," convinced members to continue serving temporarily.

CIC agents made a special trip to Strasbourg to interview Colonel Carre, Secretariat General of the Police. He advised that communities had the right to employ additional police--to preserve security--and that the Prefecture would extend credit to the towns upon submission of a list of auxiliary police to be employed, if communal finances were overburdened by such a move. Armed with this information, CIC called a meeting of all officials from towns in their area and aided in the

15 Memo for the OIC 206th CIC Det, subj, "Civilian Travel Control for the Period 1 Feb to 10 Feb 45," dtd 10 Feb 45, in 45th CIC Det Correspondence File, Aug 43-May 44 (sic) (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 45121).

16 Ltr, 45th CIC Det, to ACofS, G2, 45th Inf Div, dated 31 Jan 45, Subj: Civilian Travel Control, s/Ernest T. Gearheart, Jr., S/A, approved by Rupert W. Guenther, Capt, Cmdg (SOURCE: KCD CIC-C 000.4 45th CIC Det Correspondence File Folder 1, Aug 43-May 44 (sic) (SECRET), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

establishment of a "working Committee of Liberation with concrete responsibilities." The roadblock system was saved, and the Detachment Commander, Lt. William R. Mark, commented as follows: "Though civilian roadblocks never provide as perfect a security as military roadblocks, the present situation is deemed as close to perfect as possible."[17]

In all areas, there were some towns in which roadblocks of two different Divisions were in operation at the same time. Presumably the size of the town was a determining factor.[18]

"Take-over" Troubles--Again

The 45th CIC Detachment, on 3 February, encountered a difficulty many detachments in Europe had experienced due to weaknesses in the take-over procedure. They were confronted with a problem concerning six persons who had been arrested and interned by "an undetermined authority," and were subsequently released by the French for unknown reasons. A complete investigation was requested of VI Corps CIC Detachment, and 45th CIC Detachment pointed out that they had "no information concerning the reasons for the original arrest...." Neither did they know the reason for release of the arrestees, but they felt that the 100th CIC Detachment must have made the arrests or have had knowledge of them.[19]

VII Corps Establishes a Buffer Zone

As Allied units moved eastward, there was a gradual relaxation of restriction on civilian traffic in the rear of liberated areas. As of 9 February 1945, control of civilian traffic across the Meuse River was being handled by ADSEC CIC Sections. The Counterintelligence Control line had moved forward, however, and was established in First Army Area in a belt-like fashion, the forward boundary located along the German frontier from Holland south to within a few miles of the Luxembourg border. The depth varied from five to ten miles in the forty-mile belt. Forward of this line, along the Roer River, civilians had been evacuated to the rear, leaving the area virtually void of non-military personnel. No travel was permitted, and VII Corps, in its area, established a Corps Control line which was stretched along

17 36th Inf Div Semi Monthly Counterintelligence Report, dtd 21 Feb 45, in 36th CIC Det Arrest Reports, Etc (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

18 Memo for the OIC 206th CIC Det, subj: "Civilian Travel Control for the Period 1 Feb to 10 Feb 45," dtd 10 Feb 45, in 45th CIC Det Correspondence Files, Aug 43-May 44 (sic) (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center; Box 45121).

19 Ltr from 45th CIC Det to CO VI Corps CIC Det, dtd 3 Feb 45, in 45th CIC Det Correspondence File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).
NOTE: No further records of this case have been found.

the rear of this no-travel zone in an effort to catch anyone disobeying the restrictions or unaware of them.[20]

As VII Corps advanced, the 207th CIC Detachment planned to use the prominent terrain feature of bisecting rivers as an aid to their control line. The area lying between two such rivers, approximately seven kilometers wide, was to be evacuated by all civilians and established as a CIC Buffer Zone. Troops in the area were to arrest any civilians found in the buffer zone and turn them over to CIC. When the plans were implemented later in the month, Belgian Fusilier troops manned the check points. The scheme proved practicable and plans for using it in other areas were developed.[21]

VII Corps CIC Talks About "Take-Over Records"

Other arrangements for more efficient CIC operations received consideration within the 207th CIC Detachment. One memorandum, entitled "Take-Over Records," cited the fact that "Lax and haphazard records can completely defeat efficient CIC coverage and frustrate any intelligence take-over." An attempt toward standardizing record procedures was suggested by Major James K. Dorsett, Commander, who outlined the documents to be included in future take-over records.

Teams of CIC agents working in towns were to complete a Town Check List within the first three days of occupancy to provide a spot evaluation of take-over needs. They were to make out screening cards on all civilians interviewed and case sheets on every case investigated, cross-referenced to entries in other related files. Card files on informers, suspects, and civilian officials were "desirable," and alphabetical listings of these people were mandatory. All Arrest Reports were to be made out in duplicate, and an analysis of the general counterintelligence situation in the area was to be written. Black list information on suspects who had fled was to be entered on suspect cards and also sent to higher headquarters.

In summary, Major Dorsett wrote: "Remember you are only as good as your files--especially in the eyes of those who take over from you."

VIII Corps has a Take-Over Problem

During the first three weeks of February, VIII Corps CIC operated first in the Bastogne-Neufchateau area of Belgium, and later in the Ulfingen-Bissen region of

20 Counterintelligence Report No. 17, First U.S. Army, dtd 9 Feb 45, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 10-11 Feb 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

21 Monthly Information Report 207th CIC Det, dtd 1 Mar 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).
NOTE: Samples of the forms mentioned above are attached as appendix 2 to this chapter.

Luxembourg. Since this area had received CIC coverage before and after the German counteroffensive, few problems outside of routine security considerations were encountered.

Both the 69th and the 222d CIC Detachments, which had been temporarily attached to the 208th CIC Detachment, received orders to report to a new station in early February, before VIII Corps CIC was moved to new positions.[22]

On taking over the new territory, the 208th CIC Detachment was immediately confronted with a charge that one resident who had been placed under house arrest by the 203d, the preceding CIC organization, had violated his restriction. It took two days for the 208th CIC agents to ascertain why the man had been arrested in the first place. One agent left behind by the 203d CIC Detachment or one sent ahead by the 208th CIC Detachment could have saved this time and more, since either man would be fairly familiar with the territory and would have had records available for the use of the succeeding Detachment when it arrived.[23]

Generally, the remainder of the Detachment's work centered around blackout and security checks, ferreting out pro-Nazis among the Belgians and Luxembourgers, and enforcing the restrictions on the civilian population.[24]

Control Line activity in VIII Corps area was largely in the hands of Section "B" of 419th CIC Detachment, an ADSEC COM Z team, commanded by 1st Lt Meredith R. Wilson. Twelve to fifteen CIC agents and two interpreters, plus twenty-eight indigenous guards, maintained the control line operation. The guards manned stationary posts from 0730 to 1730 hours. CIC personnel patrolled the route from dawn to dusk, and at least one agent remained in the office every hour of the day.[25]

A Delinquency Report -- for Working

One trivial incident experienced by an officer of the 208th CIC Detachment illustrated a situation where CIC could not logically conform to regulations. A Delinquency Report reached the Detachment concerning one of the lieutenants in the organization. The charge: Driving a vehicle. A Corps policy prohibited any

22 208th CIC Det Daily Rpts, dtd 4 Feb and 12 Feb 45, in 208th CIC Jnl of Reports, 12/44-2/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).
23 Ibid., dtd 20 and 21 Feb 1945.
24 208th CIC Det CI Rpts for 2, 10 and 18 Feb 45 in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Reports, 1/45-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).
25 CIC Det 419th, sec "B", ADSEC COM Z, C.I. Travel Control Line Rpts (Weekly) dtd 8 and 15 Feb, in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts 1/45-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097)

officer from driving a vehicle, and the provost marshal notified the offender's Detachment of the delinquency. Captain Bowen, in his reply to the G2, took the blame for not advising the officer of the prohibition, adding, "It is a frequent situation that unless an Officer drives a vehicle, an urgent request for a counterintelligence investigation cannot be complied with."[26]

The Dutch Develop a Plan

The 216th CIC Detachment, attached to the XVI Corps of the Ninth Army, which was still under British control, operated in the peninsula-like extension of the Netherlands which separted fifty-odd miles of the Belgian border from the German border by distances of from ten to twenty-five miles.

Security measures in the division and corps areas were enforced, according to the counterintelligence Semi-Monthly Report for the period, and security appeared to be "good."

Information in the counterintelligence files of the British 12th Corps Field Security Section which had been turned over to the 216th CIC Detachment had been carded and all investigations completed by 24 February 1945.

All towns in Corps area were given security surveys, and liaison was established with appropriate officials and agencies. Personality sketches of the leading officials and brief histories of the towns were prepared Background investigations were conducted on all important individuals. Curfew regulations were rigidly enforced, and violators were quickly turned over to the CIC. Spot checks were made "from time to time."

In the course of the security surveying of towns in the area, agents noted that all houses of families under suspicion by the Dutch, for any reason, had signs upon them reading, "Under Suspicion," warning Allied soldiers to beware of those homes and the individuals within them. The notices bore the signature of the Commandant of the Mine District. The Detachment Commander, Major William W. Frederick, reported that the postings were a good security measures and that the whole idea was Dutch in origin. The Americans did not have to assume any responsibility for the measure.

CIC made a survey of the telephone exchange at Sittard, Holland, and, with the help of the Signal Corps, tried to institute Security measures. All lines running to

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26 Office of PM, Hq VIII Corps, dtd 18 Feb 45, subj: "Report of Delinquency re 1st Lt Leo L. Ermis, to CO 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts 1/45-6/45 (RESTRICTED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097), 1st Ind, 208th CIC Det, subj: "Traffic Violation," dtd 11 Mar 45, in 98th CIC Det Correspondence File Feb 45-Sep 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

other areas were taken over by the U.S. Army. All personnel working at the exchanges were cleared by CIC, and Signal Corps personnel were on hand at all times.[27]

The 270th British Field Security Section, apparently under XVI Corps, investigated local labor necessary to repair a road and kept the local laborers under guard to ensure that unauthorized persons did not join the group.

This British unit, attached to the British 7th Armored Division, patrolled the Maas River on the Division's left flank to prevent crossings. They captured three members of the old Dutch Customs Guard attempting to go by rowboat into Belgium for undisclosed reasons. The rowboat was destroyed and they were instructed not to make a similar attempt.

The 35th U.S. Division, also under XVI Corps, conducted road checks and security inspections of towns in their area to pick up any unregistered civilians and to implement restrictions.

Line-crossers, suspected collaborators, and members of the Dutch Nazi organization were discovered still in the area. In German border towns, the 216th CIC Detachment handled two important cases in which two Burgomeisters had been cleared by British Field Security Service and retained by British Civil Affairs and the succeeding American Military Guard organization. One Burgomeister readily admitted that he had been a Nazi of long standing; the other, on his Fragebogen,[28] declared he had never been a Nazi. The self-admitted Nazi was removed from office immediately. The other stood an interrogation by CIC agents and finally revealed his Nazi affiliation. The investigation was then expanded to gain corroboration of the man's Nazi background with an eye to trying him for falsifying information on an official form.[29]

Border Control In XVI Corps' Area

Section "Q" of the 424th CIC Detachment (normally a Normandy Base Section organization) which was comprised of one officer, Lt Herman G. Goldbeck, and

27 Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt for period 8-24 Feb 45, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts-Belgium, Holland, Germany (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098), Oct 44- Sep 45.

28 The Fragebogen was a "Personnel Questionnaire" which was required of each arrestee, city official, job applicant, etc.

29 Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt for period 8-24 Feb 45, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts- Belgium, Holland, Germany - Oct 44 - Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

five agents, worked on border control in XVI Corps area at the Netherlands-Germany frontier, patrolling between posts manned by indigenous personnel and collecting all line crossers.

Two-hundred-five line crossers were apprehended in February by units under XVI Corps CIC and were interrogated at Corps level. CIC also called in Military Intelligence Interpreter personnel so that the intelligence unit could find out as much tactical information as possible from the line crossers. All counterintelligence information collected from every source was transmitted to higher headquarters by Corps CIC.

The 216th CIC Detachment split itself into two teams, each with a definite geographical area of operations, with strength allocated apparently on a basis of population, since no physical targets remained to be reduced. The team operating in the northern part of the Corps area, out of Sittard, Holland, was comprised of two officers, five special agents, three agents, one clerk and one interpreter. The team operating in the south of Corps area had one officer, four special agents and two interpreters. The assignment of the only clerk indicated that administration duties were handled largely by the northern team.[30]

The 218th CIC Detachment: Pure Security

Complete responsibility for the security of Headquarters, XVIII Corps (Airborne) was delegated to the 218th CIC Detachment, under the command of Captain Albin P. Dearing.

To make the Headquarters more secure, CIC agents placed locks on all doors leading into "TOP SECRET rooms." Personnel whose duties required them to enter these rooms were issued "TOP SECRET passes." A record of each pass was kept and all personnel were familiarized with the instructions governing its use.

Daily burning of classified trash, proper use of passwords and countersigns, and increased use of guards were other security measures carried out at the insistence of the Corps CIC Detachment.

The Command Posts of the 13th and 17th Airborne Divisions were checked also, and some investigations were made -- mostly dealing with possible security violations.

In one case, on 21 February, copies of messages classified "SECRET" were discovered in an open box in a room occupied by armanent repair personnel. Research proved, however, that the messages were so outdated that their loss

30 216th CIC Det, CIC Annex to After-Action Rpt, 1 Feb 45 - 1 Mar 45, in 216th CIC Det Operational Rpts-Belgium, Holland, Germany, Oct 44 - Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

would not have caused the compromise of classified information. The Section Chief was approached and instructed that obsolete, formerly classified information was to be destroyed or reclassified and handled in a manner consistent with the revised classification.

-- "Sick Old Man?"

When Captain Albin Dearing, the Commander of the 218th CIC Detachment, read in the 18 February edition of Stars and Stripes that had invested in the Monte Carlo bank to keep the enemy "from carrying off her husband -- 67 years old and a sick man," he forwarded to the G2, ETOUSA, some inside information concerning the millionaire. The captain had spoken with on two occasions in December 1944, in St. Paul, Monaco. was living there with a young woman at the time, and claimed he had not "crossed a frontier in fourteen years," the reason he gave for being left unmolested by the Nazis. Others alleged that his wife's friendship with high-ranking German officers was the real reason. "Whatever the facts of this may be," Captain Dearing wrote, "it can be unquestionably stated that was far from being an ailing, sick, old man as recently as three months ago."[31]

An Informant Lies to CIC

An "American intelligence agency" lost one of its informants in the vicinity of Aachen when 219th CIC Detachment agents turned him over to the local Military Government Public Safety Officer to be charged and tried for violating a Military Government proclamation. The agents had been investigating a lead from a tactical unit which had discovered certain prohibited articles on the informants farm. Quantities of U.S. gasoline, shotgun ammunition and rifle grenades were found by the CIC agents. Without being told that CIC had already located the illegal cache, the man was questioned about his possession of the articles. He denied that he had any prohibited materials.

Division CIC Activity: Mostly Routine

The 1st CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt Charles G. Steinway, reported no outstanding cases during February. Activity of the Detachment consisted mostly of routine investigation of German deserters in civilian clothes, atrocities, pro-German Belgians and former Nazi Party members; security checking of CP's and communications; screening displaced persons and civilians; and lecturing on security.

31 Sum of Act, 218th CIC Det, 13 Feb - 25 Feb 45, to G2 1st Allied Abn Army, Attn: 351st CIC Det, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts Feb-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098)

[redacted]

The greater portion of the time was spent on the German side of the Belgian-German border, giving counterintelligence coverage to a number of small towns. The Detachment entered Germany about 11 February, after turning Weywertz, Belgium, over to the 99th CIC Detachment. The new headquarters of the Detachment was in Vicht, Germany, where the Division Command Post was located.[32]

For all of February, the 4th CIC Detachment operated in areas the Germans had occupied during the Ardennes campaign. Fewer than 250 people resided in the Division's forward area, minimizing any real threat to security. These individuals were severely restricted in their movement, and, while a number of displaced persons were directed into proper channels, little counterintelligence investigation was necessary.[33]

A similar situation existed in 5th Division area, and the 5th CIC Detachment, operating in Luxembourg, had only eighteen individual suspects to investigate and arrested none of them. CIC agents manned check points and roving patrols in Division area, but the evacuation of civilians was nearly complete here, as in 4th Division area, and security was easily maintained.[34]

Reports of limited activity were received from 44th CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Peter M. Cummins, Jr., which operated in Wittring, Lorraine;[35] from 69th CIC, under Captain Andrew R. Duvall, Jr.,[36] which had spent two weeks on the front lines for training and orientation purposes since their Division was newly-activated;[37] from the 82d CIC Detachment which spent the twenty-one days of this period along the Roer River near Hurtgen where, according to the Detachment CO, Captain John C. Pearce, "there were no cases of unusual significance;"[38] and from

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32 1st CIC Det Daily & Weekly Rpts, 1 Feb to 23 Feb 45, in G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 301-3.2 (22292) Master (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

33 4th CIC Det Monthly Inf Rpt for Feb 45, dtd 28 Feb 45 (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library).

34 5th Inf Div After-Action Rpt, 1-28 Feb 45, 305-2(6610) Master, (RESTRICTED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

35 44th CIC Det, Feb 45 Hist Rpt, dtd 2 Mar 45, Unsgd, Opns Rpts 207.03 344-CIC-0.3 (24815) Jan 45 - May 45), (CONFIDENTIAL); (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

36 69th CIC Det, Monthly Inf Rpt for Feb, dtd 1 Mar45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

37 69th Inf Div, G2 After-Action Rpt, undtd, 369-2 (12131) Master, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

38 82d CIC Det, Monthly Inf Rpt, Feb 45, dtd 28 Feb 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

the 83d CIC Detachment, which operated in Belgium and Germany under Captain Oliver A. Victor's command, enforcing travel restrictions. The 83d CIC Detachment, however, apprehended six possible security threats in Dalhem, Belgium, before moving with the Division into a non-operational zone.[39]

29th CIC Detachment: Return to D-Day Security Level

"These people speak ----- good English to ----- so zip the lip ----- till the fighting's thru ----- don't talk." This is a sample of the "Burma-Shave" security signs which were posted along main roads in the 29th Infantry Division sector in the 29th CIC Detachment's effort to bring security-consciousness up to "the 'D' day level." In addition, three articles were written and published in 29 Let's Go, the Division newspaper, on 8-10 February.

The subject of the articles was "Security," and the main theme was "Don't talk." Two of the messages were targeted to specific groups: One to "Headquarters and Service Troops Only," who, by virtue of their positions, had indirect and sometimes direct access to military information of impending operations; the other, to reinforcements, notoriously lax in security matters.

The message to the Headquarters group warned about the tendency to play "big-shot" by "shooting off" vocally about things before they happened. This article ended: "Did you remember what you told your buddy the other day when you were taking a shower--wasn't there a German civilian there? Oh, he doesn't speak or understand English? Just ask the Infantry.....CIC"

The article written to reinforcements explained how strict security was maintained prior to D-day, stressing the fact that American soldiers knew but none would talk about the invasion. Briefly, the article pointed out a deterioration of that spirit which culminated in the enemy's strike at the Allies' weakest point in the Ardennes, allegedly based on information given by captured American soldiers. "The book says," it concluded, "NAME, RANK and ASN, maybe there's a reason for it.....CIC"

The third article was directed to all troops, explaining that their entry into Germany created a situation where they were literally surrounded by the enemy. Its main message was that "WE HAVE SIGNED NO SEPARATE PEACE WITH THESE CIVILIANS; they are our enemy and you should no more talk in front of them than you would in front of an enemy soldier."

Since the major towns in the Division area had been taken over by Corps CIC detachments and since other towns in the Division sector had been evacuated, 1st

39 83d CIC Det, After-Action Rpts, dtd 1 Mar 45, In Opns Rpts 207.03, 383-CIC-0.3 (11786) Jan - May 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Lt Ellis O. Mayfield, commanding the Detachment, reported that activities had been limited purely to routine matters brought to the office by Military Government Detachments and units of the Division, with a few arrests for security reasons.[40]

The 35th CIC Detachment, under Captain John S. Foster, was limited in its activity during this period since the agents were operating in an evacuated area whose few remaining civilians had already been screened by other CIC and British FSS units under Ninth Army.

To increase Security, military personnel who wished to pass through Division Command Post area without knowledge of the current passwood were screened by CIC. In one twenty-four hour period, from 17 to 18 February, 150 persons were processed by CIC. Five percent of these were in charge of groups. The reasons cited by CIC for such widespread ignorance of the password were: faulty dissemination; use of a password not common to all organizations; and failure of military personnel to acquaint themselves with the password.[41]

CIC Aids Supply Economy

During security searches of premises and bivouac areas vacated by military personnel, agents of the 78th CIC Detachment learned that troops were abandoning supplies and equipment, including weapons. Upon recommendation of the Detachment, commanded by Captain Neil M. Ruge, the Division's Daily Bulletin of 2 February 1945 brought the matter to the attention of all unit commanders, recommending destruction of unusable material and explaining to the troops that such action aided enemy line-crossers and prolonged operations.[42]

87th CIC Detachment Has Family Problems

Thbugh operating in an area which also had undergone previous CIC coverage, 87th CIC Detachment found a few out-of-the-ordinary cases to investigate in early February.

1st Lt Sam E. Harwell's Detachment operated in the Belgian-German border area between the 82d Airborne CIC Detachment and the 4th CIC Detachment zones of responsibility, and Control Line activities of the three division detachments were coordinated by a Lt Long of ADSEC CIC, VIII Corps. Heavy snows made the use of mobile patrols impractical during this period, and the only Control Line activity

40 CI Rpt, 29th CIC Det, 4 Feb - 19 Feb 45, dtd 19 Feb, Correspondence File Jun 44 - Nov 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
41 CI Rpt 4, 8-20 Feb dtd 20 Feb, in 103d CIC Det (sic) Hist Jun 43 - Jan 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).
42 78th CIC Det, Monthly Inf Rpt, Feb 45, dtd 1 Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

involved the manning of posts at five road junctions on the outskirts of towns and at two places in towns: one in Lanzerath, Belgium; the other in Andler, Belgium. Since the Detachment's area had received prior counterintelligence coverage, little of specific interest developed, but agents were used to investigate a claim of looting by U.S. troops against Belgian nationals -- which was substantiated -- and to inquire into the circumstances which led a German soldier to leave a letter with a Belgian family for transmittal to the United States. The soldier actually was an American citizen who had married a German woman before the war and had been forced into service for the Fuehrer. His love for his wife and children kept him in bondage, according to his statements to the Belgian woman with whom he had left the letter. CIC agents felt that the letter was no propaganda ruse, giving tacit approval to its transmission to the United States citizens who were this "enemy" Soldier's mother, father and brother.[43]

Another case involving family relationships confronted 87th CIC Detachment agents, due in part to inadequate take-over records. A father and daughter under investigation claimed to have been cleared by a preceding CIC Detachment, but there were no records immediately available to verify this statement. Inquiries through channels, however, definitely established that CIC had investigated and cleared the pair. In fact, both had given information of tactical value to an American Tank Destroyer Battalion on its entry into the area. The girl had married a man who, she'd discovered later, was a Gestapo agent. She turned her spouse over to soldiers of the 4th U.S. Infantry Division upon their arrival in Schonberg, Belgium.[44]

On the German side of the border it was discovered that only a few civilians had not been evacuated further into Germany. Those remaining had been left to care for the livestock. CIC was particularly wary in screening them since the possibility existed that these people were stay-behind agents. Among the three families left behind in Neuendorf, Germany, a German soldier wearing civilian clothes was apprehended. The prisoner contended that he had been discharged on 3 January 1945 and had lost his papers when a vehicle in which he was riding had burst into flame after being strafed by American planes. CIC considered the account implausible and assumed that this person was "either a deserter or was left behind by the enemy for some purpose." The soldier was arrested and sent back through Prisoner of War channels.

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43 87th CIC Det, Daily Activities Rpts, 1-28 Feb 45, G2 Jnl, 87th Inf Div, L576, Feb 45 (RESTRICTED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

44 Ltr, CIC Det No. 208, dtd 21 Feb 45, Subj: Christian Haep and daughter, Louisa Roeringen (married to Gestapo Agent), residents in vicinity of Schonberg, Belgium; 1st Ind. from 2d CIC Det, dtd 27 Feb 45; 2d Ind. from 208th CIC Det to 87th CIC Det, dtd 4 Mar 45, in Jun 44 - May 45, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25095).

For the most part, however, the Detachment discovered that "civilians in the towns near the border do not appear to be as fanatical Nazis as those expected to be found further in the interior."[45]

Early Bird Gets Caught

At 0500 hours on 17 February, a civilian was stopped at a 94th Infantry Division outpost after crossing into the Division area from German positions in the vicinity of Borg, Germany. He was dressed in work clothes and wore a cap with a visor bearing the inscription "Foreign Laborer." He carried German lineman's equipment and had a pair of binoculars concealed in his shirt. The Germans were known to be using short-term line crossers with the cover of forced laborers. This knowledge and the appearance of the civilian immediately categorized him as a potential enemy agent. Anthony Geber, a member of the 94th CIC Detachment who was accumulating information concerning CIC personality and physical targets in the area facing the division, interrogated him and obtained information which was later proved accurate. A French Office of Strategic Services officer, attached to the Division, then interrogated the man for tactical information. A Military Intelligence Investigations team also questioned the line-crosser. After all the interrogators had learned as much as they could from the captive, he was taken to Third Army Interrogation Center.[46]

The "Town Commanders" Plan

A division-level project known as the "Town Commander Plan" was believed by the 100th CIC Detachment to "strengthen the security mindedness of the individual troops." The backbone of the plan was the placement of responsibility for the security of the troops and installations in the town upon the shoulders of the commander (or his designated assistant) of the organization stationed in the area. This undoubtedly contributed to greater cooperation with CIC and, in the 100th Infantry Division area, the Detachment was able to work with forty military-manned roadblocks and checkpoints, thirty-eight civilian-manned roadblocks and five Military Police roving patrols, established upon CIC recommendation. The patrols operated twelve hours daily.[47]

No reports have been found for many of the Divisional CIC Detachments, particularly those with Armored Divisions.

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45 87th CIC Det CI Rpt 4, 6 Feb - 20 Feb, undtd, 95th CIC Det Rpt Sep 44 - Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

46 94th Inf Div, Monthly Inf Report, 6 Mar 45, 94th CIC Det, Correspondence File, Nov 43 - Aug 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Branch, Box 25095)

47 100th CIC Det, Monthly Inf Rpt, for Feb 45, dtd 3 Mar 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Rear Area CIC Activity

Though most minds were filled with thoughts of the new Allied offensive into Germany, the German strongholds at Lorient and St. Nazaire in France remained tactical and counterintelligence problems. Refugees from those pockets needed thorough screening in addition to shelter and food.

On 21 February 1945, 2100 refugees from the St. Nazaire area were screened in Nantes by 66th CIC Detachment and CIC Detachment 424, Section Q, with the assistance of the French Bureau de Documentation, Deuxieme Bureau, French Forces of the Interior (FFI), and the Police Speciale. Guards for the refugee train as it passed the Allied front lines were provided by FFI, and guards for the building where the screening occured were from the Gendarmerie Nationale. As the refugees filed through, their documentation was checked by the French and an initial interview was held. CIC agents performed the second interview and suspects were held for further interrogation. Military Intelligence Investigative personnel were on hand to secure tactical information. The entire area surrounding the building in which the screening took place was evacuated of civilians, and all personnel working in the area carried passes authenticated by both the French and American security agencies.

The screening was accomplished in a single day with no mishaps. Twenty-three refugees were detained by the French because their papers were not in order.[48]

CIC and the Repatriates

On the French Riviera, CIC personnel with the Delta Base section assisted in the repatriation proceedings which were taking place between Germany and the Allies. A total of 5,379 Germans and 3,239 Allies were exchanged. CIC and MI I, in conjunction with the State Department, screened the 806 Allied civilians who were returned. Seventy-five American "protected" persons were repatriated. In addition, 525 American and British airmen were brought out of Switzerland. Security was largely in the hands of the CIC.[49]

Moscow's Other War

By this time it had become apparent to CIC, as it had to all branches of U. S. Intelligence, that the Communists were conducting two wars simultaneously, the

48 Incl to Hq, 66th CIC Det Monthly Int Report for Feb dtd 27 Feb 45; Subj: "Refugee Movement from St. Nazaire Pocket," dtd 23 Feb 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

49 Delta Base Section History, Feb 45, ADM 590 A - Vol II, Part I (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

second being a comparatively noiseless subversion of the newly-reinstated governments of liberated countries. Belgium appeared to be the prime Communist target.

CIC maintained a close watch on the attempted subversion of the Pierlot government of Belgium. Twelfth Army Group's CIC Detachment, in a Weekly Counterintelligence Report for the period 3 February to 10 February 1945, told of a meeting between members of the Belgian Communist Party and the Soviet Delegate, M. Ivan Aleksijiev, in Paris. The Soviet Delegate allegedly asked whether secret orders from Moscow were being followed, why the November attempt to seize the government of Belgium was unsuccessful, and how he could be of help to the party in Belgium in the future. The Belgian Communists present requested propaganda assistance and arms for an uprising, "as stones were useless against the rifles of the Gendarmerie."

According to the report, the four aims of the Belgian Communist Party appeared to be:

(1) The immediate overthrow of the Pierlot Government.

(2) Remobilization of the Resistance Groups.

(3) Establishment of "Workers' Committees" in factories.

(4) Recognition of their Comite de Lutte Syndicate, a labor organization generally believed to be responsible for a number of coal strikes in Belgium which greatly inconvenienced the people during the cold winter months of 1944-1945.

No Direct Action Allowed

Since there was no policy which permitted CIC to intervene against Communistic subversion of free governments, the policy of disarmament of all resistance groups was applied rigidly. This undoubtedly lessened the opportunities for violent overthrow of governments for, as the Communists had said, "Stones were useless..." Beyond insuring that these groups had no weapons of importance, CIC could only report to interested authorities the facts that had been collected by them.

Keeping Track of "Home Grown" Communists

Communists serving in the U.S. Army were tracked by CIC through the media of summaries of background investigations which followed them from station to station. They were categorized as "Military Personnel Suspected of Disloyalty or Subversive Activity," and they were restricted from sensitive duties. Other than the practice of keeping unit commanders aware of the Communists within the ranks and advising discreet observation "to determine whether Subject is in any way attempting to

influence his comrades toward Communism" -- and open act of subversion -- no course of action was authorized.[50]

Reports on Communists came to the attention of CIC personnel, who made recommendations to the Division G2 on the basis of established policy. The 503d CIC Detachment received such a report in February 1945, concerning a person serving with a Company in the 33d Armored Regiment. Well-known by the party name of , the suspect was evidently a person highly-esteemed in Communist Party circles.

Private ' before entering the Army in 1943, had been and had a record of Young Communist League affiliation dating back to 1928. He also had a police record which showed two arrests for in the early thirties. He had also been the Communist Party candidate for [51] He was a private who needed watching, and 503d CIC Detachment included a reference to this case in its weekly reports for the remainder of the tactical campaign in Germany, but nothing new developed.[52]

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50 Weekly Counterintelligence Report, 418th CIC Det, Hq 12th Army Group, dtd 10 Feb 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

51 503d CIC Det, Hq, 3d Armored Div, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, dtd 25 Feb 45, Re: Summary of FBI Investigation, G2 action, Subj: 33d Armd Regt, s/Theodore M. Black, Capt, Cmdg, in 503d CIC Det Rpts, Germany #2, Feb-Apr 45 (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104), (CONFIDENTIAL)

52 503d CIC Det, Situation Summaries, Feb-May 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

Chapter 2

Eastward Ho!

By the third week in February, the Roer River had subsided enough for Ninth U.S. Army to attack and to establish a bridgehead on the eastern bank. This action followed the 8 February offensive of the Canadian Army in the north by fifteen days. Though the Roer Dams had been in American control since 10 February, the Germans had opened them before they were captured, flooding the Roer and causing the delay in Ninth Army's advance.

The First and the Third U.S. Armies of Twelfth Army Group leaped to the offensive in the center of the line. The vigor of these drives forced the Germans to withdraw forces opposing the Sixth Army Group in the South.

On the eastern front, the Russian offensive had been slowed decisively by German reinforcements from the west.[5β]

Sixth Army Group Plans For ECLIPSE

While First and Third Armies were launching their attack which was to carry American forces to just west of the Rhine, Sixth Army Group to the south was planning its full offensive, code named ECLIPSE, which was scheduled to begin on 15 March.[54]

In preparation for CIC's part in this offensive, Major Robert N. Denniston of the Office of AC of S, G2, Headquarters, Sixth Army Group, drew up two memorandums which were sent to Colonel David G. Erskine, CI Officer of Sixth Army Group. The memorandums concerned the need for linguists and more CIC Agents by installations and CIC units within Sixth Army Group, and supplementary personnel who would have to be added upon entry into Germany.

Major Denniston anticipated the need for 104 interrogators and 178 interpreters to assist CIC at eight Frontier Security Control Posts, six Internment Camps and in cities of over 100,000 population. To bring all the CIC Detachments under Sixth Army Group to T/O strength by ETOUSA standards (some of the Detachments in this Group were working with the smaller NATOUSA allotments of CIC personnel), seven officers and seventy-seven non-officer agents were called for. For Germany,

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5β Eisenhower, op. cit., pp 375-377; and Weekly Intelligence Summary #49, dtd 25 Feb 45, SHAEF, Office of AC of S, G2, Part I (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

54 G2 History, Seventh Army Operations in Europe, 15 Aug 44-8 May 45, Part VIII, 1-31 Mar 45, RESTRICTED, Staff and Faculty Library.

Major Denniston noted, a total of 126 officer and 412 non-officer CIC agents were required to provide coverage of the Military District Headquarters, Army Headquarters Interrogation Center, six Internment Camps, nine cities of over 100,000 population, eight Frontier Security Control Posts, and a number of Concentration Camps and Displaced Person Centers. The agents were to be broken down into Detachments with solely installation and geographical jurisdiction.

A twenty-seven man Detachment was planned for Military District Headquarters; a fifteen-man Detachment for the Interrogation Center; an eighteen-man Detachment for each internment Camp; and eighteen or nineteen-man organizations for each city over 100,000 in population; and eighteen-man Detachment for each Frontier Security Control Post; one agent for each overrun Concentration Camp; and forty agents to cover Displaced Persons Centers. The number of Displaced Persons Center operating personnel would have to be enlarged as more such centers developed, according to the estimate.

Seventh Army had already begun recruitment of a number of agents, and others from Divisional Detachments in static situations were to be redeployed to the new detachments. The actual shortage of CIC personnel to fill the proposed and existing vacancies still numbered 97 officers and 344 enlisted agents -- which ETOUSA was requested to provide.[55]

Corps CIC Activity

Few records have been preserved from Army CIC Detachments for the early days of the offensive, but records from Corps CIC units under these armies indicate that their activities were not altered significantly by the advance and that they still had time for innovation and planning.

A small detachment of Military Government team members, Military Police, and one or two CIC agents toured all the outlying villages in V Corps area to prevent the terrorizing of local German civilians by individuals and groups of German soldiers in civilian clothes and other non-residents. Local officials and law enforcement agencies were given the responsibility of "cleaning up their community."

The visits served two purposes: suspects and civilian-clothed German soldiers were collected, thereby stopping all hostile activity, and the local population became aware that it was being watched by the occupying forces.[56]

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55 Hq, 6th AG, Off/AC of S, G2, Memo dtd 4 Mar 45, subj: "CI Interrogator and Interpreter Requirements for ECLIPSE, to Col David G. Erskine, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL); Hq, 6th AG, Off/AC of S, G2, Memo, 4 Mar 45, subj: CIC Needs For 6th AG Operation ECLIPSE, To: Col Erskine, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

56 Intelligence Operations of the V Corps, Extract, p. 17, (RESTRICTED), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Seventh Corps CIC Experiments in Population Control

In Eschweiler, a German town about ten miles from the Netherlands' border, VII Corps CIC Detachment experimented with security control, isolating all residents in one section of the town. The Detachment found that this procedure "greatly simplified the problem of securing military installations within the city, since troops and military police arbitrarily arrested any civilians detected outside their designated section of town."[57]

VII Corps CIC Detachment also checked carefully with Military Government to make sure that all prohibitions upon the civilian population were included in posted proclamations. Prior to this, persons apprehended in possession of instruments such as cameras and binoculars often were freed when they claimed ignorance of any prohibition against such possession.[58]

VIII Corps CIC: Innovation and Feud

VIII Corps CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Albert R. Bowen Jr., operated in the area between Trois Verges, and Vianden, Luxembourg, and into Germany for this two-week period. One team of CIC agents from this Detachment gave Counterintelligence coverage to the Sixth Cavalry Group area, while the remainder served Corps.

Few unusual cases developed, either in Luxembourg or in enemy territory. Five Russians who had claimed to be forced laborers later admitted to the CIC interrogators that they were actually regular members of the Wehrmacht. In another instance, a Maj Zellenlieter, picked up as a "suspicious civilian" attemped escape and was shot to death by a guard.

This Detachment, where practical, also carried out a policy of isolating the civilian population for security purposes. VIII Corps CIC Detachment not only restricted them to one area in town, but also placed them in as few buildings as possible and instituted a guard on the buildings, requiring them to remain indoors until CIC completed its screening.

The more usual practice, however, was to have Military Government proclamations read and posted warning civilians to remain in their homes for forty-eight hours after the American entry into the area. After that they were permitted to circulate during 0800 to 1730 hours. No travel outside of towns was allowed without a Military Government pass.[59]

57 207th CIC Det, dtd 1 Mar 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library), (Monthly Information Report).

58 12th Army Gp Semi-Monthly CI Rpt #14, 16-18 Feb 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

59 CI Rpt #5, 208th CIC Det, period 21 Feb to 5 Mar 45, udtd 208th CIC Det Journal of Rpts, 1/45-6/45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25097).

Although security and administrative efficiency were not inimical, the means necessary to produce each in a conquered territory produced friction between the agencies concerned. Correspondence between Captain Albert R. Bowen of the 208th CIC Detachment and Colonel Azol F. Hatch of G5, VIII Corps, illustrated the difference in viewpoint between the two agencies.

Writing to Colonel A. R. Reeves, G2, of travel control and civilian registration in Germany, Captain Bowen referred to counterintelligence instructions for Germany, Third U.S. Army, 2 February 1945.

He outlined the basic need for travel control as a means of interrupting enemy espionage efforts and made several recommendations, including: restriction of travel by civilians within the Corps zone to a one kilometer radius from their homes; issuance of Travel Permits by Military Government only to those who needed them, after screening by CIC; posting of standard Travel Notices in every German town by Military Government; notification of troops of existing travel restrictions with instructions that civilian violators be brought to Military Government or CIC; supplying Identity Documents for each resident; establishment of a definite procedure for the procurement of travel passes by the citizens; and readying of Military Government Courts to prosecute violators swiftly.

Captain Bowen suggested a procedure to be used in the issuance of Travel Permits:

"(1) The Burgomeister of each town will be given a standard set of written instructions.

"(2) Applications for passes will be made to the local Burgomeister.

"(3) If the applicant's reason for travel comes within the categories listed in the instructions given to the Burgomeister, then the Burgomeister will have the applicant fill out a Fragebogen. The Burgomeister will then certify that the reason for travel as stated is true and then send the Fragebogen and Certificate to the nearest MG Detachment.

"(4) The MG Detachment will have CIC screen the individual and issue the pass, if approved.

"(5) MG Detachments will keep a strict account of all passes issued and require that the pass be returned when the period of authorized travel has expired."

The G5 replied to Captain Bowen's proposals with counter-proposals. The main points of his reply were that tight restrictions would increase administrative

problems until they became unmanageable; that these restrictions would provide less security since Military Government and CIC would both be preoccupied with paper work; and that the lack of circulation would prohibit areas from functioning as economic entities.

Aside from generalities (i.e. "Restriction unless accompanied by a tight checking system provides no security," and "Restrictions that cannot be enforced merely breed contempt for the law."), Colonel Hatch described what he said would be several specific results of such strict regulation of civilian movement.

One flaw in Captain Bowen's plan, said Colonel Hatch, was that a civilian applying for a travel pass would violate the one-kilometer rule to get to the point of application. The Colonel also said an immense amount of paper work and investigative activity would be required to handle the pass requests. He noted that eighty applications a day were received from the 1,500 to 2,000 citizens of Wiltz, Luxembourg, and, projecting that proportion to a theoretical Corps area in a Rhine province in which 25,000 to 30,000 civilians might be encountered, he claimed that 6,000 to 7,000 applications might be received weekly to travel beyond the existing six-kilometer rule. Restriction to one-kilometer would multiply those figures, he stated, suggesting that Military Government functions would be interfered with by this workload, "even if CIC could handle promptly such a volume of screening."

In lieu of Captain Bowen's proposal, Colonel Hatch offered his own, which permitted unrestricted travel within the person's home Gemeinde (Commune averaging about 1,000 civilians in thirteen square miles); which allowed the Burgomeister to grant passes for travel from Gemeinde to Gemeinde within the Amter (average of 12,500 persons within 170 square miles) provided that he vouch for the pass holders and keep a roster of outstanding passes for Military Government inspection at any time. This would require application to Military Government with the accompanying CIC screening only after application to the Burgomeister for a bi-weekly or monthly travel pass from Amter to Amter by essential workers (i.e. doctors, nurses, officials).

He suggested further that registration of civilians be accomplished immediately after the Gemeinde came under Corps jurisdiction, using the Identity Document in triplicate for registering purposes.

Captain Bowen, in a second letter to the G2, restated his arguments, and in some cases amplified his original program. "By Order of the Army Commander, 'Security of the Army' will take precedence over the welfare and convenience of the civilian population," Captain Bowen wrote, alluding once more to Third Army's counterintelligence instructions for Germany. He pointed out that Exemption Certificates were prescribed by SHAEF for issuance to doctors, nurses, and other essential workers. The mass of the population, if Military Government organized

its area carefully, would have no reason for travel passes, he explained, except for infrequent emergencies. He doubted whether the Wiltz ratio would be repeated since he believed the high percentage of travel pass requests there to have been due to the lenient attitude adopted in a liberated Allied country. He also stated that local police, supervised by Military Government Police and supplemented by Corps troops (presumably with the power of detention) could effect an efficient enforcement of the restrictions.

Captain Bowen maintained that restrictions by linear measurement were more effective than those based on geopolitical boundaries since "Military Government Police or troops will hardly know these boundaries, particularly in a moving situation. Final enforcement will therefore be left almost completely up to German citizens." He indicated that no Burgomeister would have the authority, under Third Army's instructions, to issue a pass for a distance over six-kilometers. Travel from Gemeinde to Gemeinde would be greater than that in many instances, and only a Military Government Officer could authorize such a journey.

Captain Bowen asked for a conference between "G5, G2, G5 Police Safety Officer, and CIC in order to discuss a method of travel control agreeable to all concerned." He indicated some willingness to compromise when he dropped his insistence for a one-kilometer restriction, indicating that a two kilometer radius might be acceptable.

This open-minded approach drew the two camps closer together. Apparently the G2, and the G5 conferred on the matter, and a satisfactory compromise was reached, with the result that the following regulations were adopted by VIII Corps:

"1. Effective this date the following travel restrictions will be enforced in VIII Corps Zone between Division rear and Corps rear boundaries.

"2. No civilian will be allowed to travel beyond the boundary of the Gemeinde where he resides without a written Travel Permit issued by a Military Government Officer. MG will issue travel permits only in cases of individual emergency. Applications for travel permits will be made to the local mayor. MG travel notices to this effect will be posted in all towns.

"3. a. A Gemeinde in Germany is a small geographical area roughly equivalent to a Township in the United States.

"b. The MG travel permit is a standard printed form on which is stated, in English, the time and place the travel is authorized.

"c. Each Civilian in Corps zone will be issued a temporary Registration Certificate by MG (as soon as registration can be completed); this certificate, or the regular identity cards carried by the German individual, will show his place of residence.

"4. No civilian will be allowed to travel from VIII Corps zone forward into a Division zone without prior permission from the Division MG officer.

"5. Any civilian, without an MG travel permit, found traveling beyond the Gemeinde where he resides, at it is shown in his Registration Certificate or Identity Card, will be taken to the nearest MG or CIC Det for further action."

Actually the decision to keep the Gemeinde as the travel control unit did not extend the previously established six-kilometer rule. It was pointed out that persons within the Gemeinde would not travel more than three to five kilometers before crossing into another Gemeinde.[60]

Corps Detention Camp...

On 3 March 1945, VIII Corps headquarters circularized instructions for the establishment of a VIII Corps Detention Camp, apparently based on Third Army's letter dated 2 February 1945, Subject: "CI Instructions for Germany."

The VIII Corps Detention Camp was to provide temporary detention and interrogation facilities to accomodate counterintelligence arrestees from Corps and Division areas. Four categories of persons were to be transferred to this Camp: known and suspected enemy agents; security threats (presumably in the automatic arrest category or against whom there was sufficient evidence of illegal activity

60 Ltr from 208th CIC Det to G2 VIII Corps, 27 Feb 45, subj, "Travel Control and Civilian Registration in Germany; Ltr from G5 to G2 VIII Corps, 28 Feb 45, subj, "Comment on Travel Control and Civilian Registration,"; Ltr from 208th CIC Det to G2 VIII Corps, 2 Mar 45, subj, "Comments on Travel Control,"; Ltr G2 VIII Corps to C/S VIII Corps, 9 Mar 45, subj, "Civilian Travel Policy"; and Notice, Hq VIII Corps, to all units, 13 Mar 45, subj, "Restriction of Civilian Travel," (all in 208th CIC Det Correspondence File Feb-Sep 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).
NOTE: Standard Travel Notices in use by CIC in Germany early in 1945 are attached as Appendix 4, Exhibit F. Standard set written instructions given to each Burgomeister early in 1945 attached as Appendix 4, Exhibit G.

to permit trial); those alleged security threats against whom there was sufficient evidence for internment but not for trial; and war criminals.

Further instructions forbade the retention of persons at the Detention Camp for more than thirty days, and made the Counterintelligence Arrest Form (SHAEF AGO Form No. 7) a necessary accompaniment to each individual processed at the camp.

The Arrest Form was made out in quintuplicate, the original and three copies being forwarded with the individual, and the fifth copy remaining in the arresting CIC Detachment's permanent town file. In addition to the four copies of the form, all personal effects of the arrestee were to be sent to the Corps Detention Center with him, and the Arrest Form was to contain a statement "as to the status of the case as it pertained to the arresting unit: "Case closed", "Pending", "Investigation Continuing", or "Additional reports will be submitted." [61]

XVIII Corps CIC: Airfield Security

Security continued to be the main task of the 218th Airborne CIC Detachment. In the period between 26 February and 4 March, daily and nightly checks of the security of installations of Corps were continued, and some activity was undertaken within the areas served by the subordinate units.

Two agents from the 218th CIC Detachment studied the security aspects of the bivouac areas then in use and those proposed for future operations. Captain Dearing made a personal inspection of the 17th Airborne Division Headquarters installations and another agent of the Detachment checked the 13th Airborne Division Headquarters installations. A register of Top Secret documents was installed for documents leaving the Top Secret file room, and the Daily Bulletin carried a notice of instruction about the innovation. Counterintelligence was discussed at several conferences during the period, and security checks of personnel, procedures and places were abundant. Other investigations were carried out also, one involving a hot-tempered Frenchman who threw a grenade during a personal argument in late February. This incident was not significant to security, but the investigation had been requested by a subordinate unit.

In another case liaison with the French Chief of the Bureau Securite Territoire enabled CIC to initiate an investigation of a young blonde girl who had worked as a waitress in a local hotel, but who fled when the Gendarmerie Nationale began

61 Ltr, Hq, VIII Corps, dtd 3 Mar 45, subj: "VIII Corps Detention Camp," in 208th CIC Det Correspondence File, Feb - Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

investigations of collaborationists and suspicious persons. She had fled to Marseille, but, with information furnished by CIC, the French were able to locate her.

There was more to a CIC agent's life than just work -- or just CIC work. There was maintenance to perform on vehicles and equipment. There was Physical Training, five days per week. Some members of the Detachment were taking Glider rides, and others interviewed prospective CIC agents. Four agents traveled to Homilly, France, to attend a two-weeks course in Military Government. Others were on detached service or temporary duty with the 13th Airborne CIC Detachment and the 351st Airborne CIC Detachment of the First Allied Airborne Army.[62]

The 223d CIC Detachment: Rear Areas

The XXIII Corps CIC Detachment in February and March operated far to the rear of a tactical action and were largely unaffected by it. In the two-month period the agents were concerned with the area, roughly, between Arlon, Belgium, through Echternach, Luxembourg, to Bitburg, Germany, and the surrounding territories. Since the Belgian sector of the area had been under counterintelligence control for quite a long time, and since the whole area was scarcely more than twenty-five or thirty miles wide, little new counterintelligence investigating was necessary.

The Detachment, under the command of Major William E. Keefe, was apparently divided into three teams -- two operational teams and one administrative team located at Headquarters. Correspondence of the detachment indicated that the headquarters section covered widely diverse activities ranging from the procurement of interpreters and an unsuccessful attempt to gain a detachment subscription to Stars and Stripes; from screening civilians for employment to borrowing furniture for billets; from security surveys to securing adequate liquor rations.[63]

Except for ten days in March, few reports were filed by Team No. 1, under the supervision of Captain Loran L. Elliott. On 12 March, the team took over in Echternach, facing an immediate problem of what to do with four hundred displaced persons who had eaten extremely little in three days. Over the next few days, liaison was established with various indigenous and U.S. military agencies, control points were checked, the displaced persons moved rearward, civilians were screened, and one Nazi who had denounced Luxembourgers to the Germans was arrested and turned over to Third Army.

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62 218th CIC Det, Summary of Activities, 26 Feb - 4 Mar 45, dtd 9 Mar 45, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts, Feb - May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

63 223d CIC Correspondence, Feb - Mar 45 in 223d CIC Det Correspondence File Nov 44 - Oct 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

On 19 March, the team moved into Germany, to Bitburg. Nazi membership information in the vicinity was carded from captured documents and a self-confessed Nazi was interrogated.[64]

Team No. 2, which maintained records from 3 March in this period, began operations in an office formerly occupied by ADSEC CIC Detachment 418-6. One Agent and an interpreter had remained to protect the area and the good will which had been established by the ADSEC CIC Detachment until the Corps team arrived. The take-over was effected by 1st Lt. Jerry P. Frary supervising Team No. 2, and Agents (fnu) Powers and John Neri. The team moved to Esch, Luxembourg, on 5 March. Several deserters from the German Army were picked up and either placed in Prisoner of War channels or, because they were natives to the area and had been vouched for by leading officials in these liberated towns, allowed to remain in their homes. Later the Detachment team moved to Ettlebruck, again taking over from CIC Detachment 418-6 Agents. Four days after that, on 18 March, Team No. 2 relieved Team No. 1 in Echternach.

The team had many false alarms during this time but effected no permanent arrests of counterintelligence interest. They screened 583 persons.[65]

Division CIC Detachments Busy

Although Corps units were not at first affected by the new offensive, CIC units at Division level, which during the previous phase had operated largely under static conditions, again felt the brunt of counterintelligence activities during a fast moving situation.

Two Agents and a Task Force

One of the units which spearheaded Ninth Army's breach of the Roer River was Task Force Byrnes, a highly mobile unit composed of one infantry regiment and one tank battalion. Two CIC agents, Fendall G. Lyons and Sam M. Unger, of 35th CIC, moved with the Task Force, attached to the 320th Infantry Regiment. The accomplishments of these two agents in a fast moving situation are worthy of study.

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64 Team No. 1 File, Memorandums for the Officer in Charge, dtd 12 Mar-20 Mar Subj: Daily Report of Activities, s/Loran L. Elliott, Capt, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, CICC 000.4 223d CIC Det Tm #1, Mar 45, Bx 25099).

65 Team II File, Memorandums for the OIC, 3 Mar-21 Mar 45, Subj: Daily Activities Rpts, 223d CIC Det Team II, Mar 45, Box 25099, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center). NOTE: There is some confusion about CIC Det No. 418 since it is sometimes indicated that these units were assigned at Theater, and sometimes at Army Group. Calling it, as above, an ADSEC Unit, indicates a Theater assignment.

Task Force Byrnes crossed the Roer at Hilfarth, Germany, on the afternoon of 28 February. Lyon and Unger knew from past regimental experience that the logical place for them was with the regimental command group, close to Colonel Bernard A. Byrnes, task force commander, and the regimental S2, in case the officers had need for CIC effort. The CIC agents also worked closely with the Regimental Military Government Officer.

On To Arsbeck

On the following morning, 1 March, the force attacked northward. During the first halt, a one hour stop at Arsbeck, the CIC agents cleared and secured a house for the regimental staff to use during the interim, placed the few remaining civilians under guarded house arrests for later units to deal with, and confined twenty Dutch civilians, forced laborers, to a single location until a larger Military Government organization could assist them.

The second halt was called at Neiderkruchten. A second Command Post was prepared by the CIC agents, and they assisted Military Government in assembling the remaining 280 townspeople in the church. Military Government read its proclamations to the assemblage and warned of severe penalties for harboring German soldiers and for German soldiers who attempted to escape detection by changing into civilian clothes. One man confessed to being a soldier in civilian clothes and was given the opportunity of presenting his uniform and being evacuated as a Prisoner of War, which he did. The local priest was placed in charge of posting proclamations and collecting arms from the inhabitants. All regular officials had evacuated, and all Nazi records had been withdrawn before the American entry into the area. Papers of all male civilians were checked, and CIC left, on the heels of the task force, for Bruggen.

When Lyon and Unger arrived, Colonel Byrnes already had placed the Bruggen town hall under guard to preserve a considerable store of records. The CIC agents checked the records, and informed Colonel Byrnes that there were none of counter-intelligence interest. One civilian suspect, a teacher who had been deported by the Nazis from Luxembourg because of allegedly anti-Nazi sympathies but who had been permitted, oddly enough, to teach in Germany, was sent back through Prisoner of War channels to Division Headquarters for further interrogation. The remainder of the population was permitted to stay in their homes, and a restaurant owner was ordered to post proclamations and to go from house to house warning the inhabitants to remain at home and not to circulate.

In An Unsafe Area

A young Russian forced laborer in Bruggen, who was proved to have been the sole survivor of an anti-Nazi partisan band that had been led by an Allied pilot, was

of great assistance to CIC. Although the area was not yet cleared of enemy troops, he took CIC agents to the former Gestapo Headquarters outside of Bruggen. The building had been stripped of all records, but about thirty German field packs were found nearby. The agents returned to Bruggen in time to move out with the task force.

The momentum of the drive had increased, and the village of Bracht was by-passed. The next stop for the task force was Kaldenkirchen. No Germans were left in this town, but the streets were lined with Dutch civilians who had crossed the border to view the American advance. Word reached the Command Post that Venlo, a Dutch city north of Kaldenkirchen, had fallen and the task force was ordered to advance to it immediately.

Street-fighting was still in progress when Task Force BYRNES rolled into the city. The CIC agents met a Dutch resistance member on the streets and took him into a nearby house to secure the names of the former Mayor and of the underground resistance leaders. Somehow word had spread of CIC's location, and the three key men arrived at the house within fifteen minutes: Ex-Mayor Bernhard Berger, who had resigned his office in 1942 in protest to German pressures; Captain Peter Kuppers, the underground representative of the free Dutch Military authorities; and Maurice Russell, underground representative of the Dutch civil government headquarters in Maastricht, liberated seat of the province of Limberg. All three had maintained continuous contact with the Dutch Government, had information on the situation in Venlo, and had readied constructive plans for the restoration of order.

The Military Government Officer, Captain McCormick, began collecting the information necessary for his function, and Lyon and Unger informed the Dutch that they would be expected to deal with local traitors and collaborators. With approval of the CIC agents, the Military Government Commander made Berger the new Mayor of Venlo, and then initiated plans for a police force, requesting that names be submitted for approval the following day. Curfew and travel restrictions were set up, and the two CIC agents filed a complete report via radio to Captain John S. Foster, Commanding the 35th CIC Detachment, before retiring for the night. They requested that a CIC Team be sent to the city early in the morning. The total Task Force Byrnes' advance for that day had been more than 35 kilometers, with security at every stop.

The total Task Force Byrnes rolled eastward on the next day, 2 March, and Lyon and Unger left Venlo with the regimental command group. Captain Foster and Colonel Schneider, the Division Military Government Officer, arrived in Venlo early the next morning and attended a conference with the three local leaders, Captain McCormick and the two CIC agents. A list of physical targets was turned over to Captain Foster, and tactical intelligence found at one of the targets by Lyon and Unger was turned over to Division for study.

The Drive Is Stalled

The next objective was Straelen, over the German border and about ten kilometers away. The advance was held up for several hours by German resistance. When the Germans gave way, the Task Force charged on their heels so swiftly that Straelen was ignored for a further objective: Neiukerk.

It was after dark when the regimental command group arrived in Nieukerk, and the CIC agents, the Military Government Officer, and one other officer went to work clearing a group of farm buildings which were to serve as Command Post for the Task Force. In one building, the group burst through the door, weapons ready for action. A rustling noise indicated that the building was inhabited; and one of the group shouted for all civilians to surrender. One came from a darkened room. The noise persisted and the order was repeated, where upon nineteen German soldiers filed out of other rooms, their hands high in the air. The German weapons were found; the other buildings were cleared. The Prisoners of War were herded into an enclosed front yard and guarded until troops arrived to take them away.

Heavy fighting in the path of the advance forced the retention of the Command Post at Nieukerk longer than had been anticipated. The CIC agents sent for the mayor, a former Nazi Party official, the following morning. Since two thousand civilians had remained and someone familiar with the local situation was needed, the agents decided to make the Mayor temporarily responsible for the collection of arms, for the enforcement of travel restrictions, and for the inhabitants' compliance with all security regulations. He was kept under military escort at all times, and was not issued a pass. The CIC agents turned in a report on the mayor which led to his later arrest by a succeeding CIC Detachment.

Despite all the precautions they had taken, Lyon and Unger, exercising hindsight in their report, believed that the retention of the mayor had been a mistake, and that he should have been arrested immediately.

In Nieukirk also, the CIC agents discovered that Signal troops had failed to sever all telephone communications. Immediately, the agents procured a signal officer and some troops and cut every wire that could possibly be used. One person had already called the mayor's house to ask about troop dispositions in the area, but the soldier on duty was security-conscious enough not to divulge the information.

Public buildings, including the mayor's home and the post office, were searched for records, but none of significance were found. The agents gathered 250 displaced persons of many nationalities in one place for screening, and Military Government provided billets to keep them off the streets until they could be shipped to the rear.

On 4 March, the agents moved on to Sevelen, which had finally been cleared of opposing tactical forces. The mayor and the police chief were known to have

anti-Nazi sentiments, and each had held office for more than a quarter of a century. Although these functionaries were party members, both CIC agents and Military Government felt that their reputations appeared to justify their retention in office. They were given full authority for the enforcement of the usual rules and procedures.

In response to a division order for the evacuation of all German males between the ages of seventeen and thirty through Prisoner of War channels, over-zealous troops brought in Germans and also Displaced Persons between the ages of fourteen and seventy. The "weeding out" burden fell on Lyon and Unger. They arranged with the S-2 and with the Prisoner of War Interrogation team at the overflowing Prisoner of War Cage for all persons to be held for CIC-checking at three times during the day. The agents had to make out arrest reports on all those sent rearward, and the inclusion of Displaced Persons into Prisoner of War channels caused the two agents and Military Government some anxiety. Until the order was revoked subsequently, the agents considered themselves severely hampered in the performance of their mission by the writing of arrest reports on persons whom they could not decide fairly to be real security threats.

From 6 March until 10 March, when Task Force BYRNES had completed its operation with the capture of Alspray, a small town near the Rhine River, most of the agents' time was spent at the Prisoner of War Cage. Since most of the operations after Nieukirk involved rural areas, this handicap was not too serious. The two CIC agents went with the regiment into reserve on 10 March, after a hectic, and successful, eleven days on the move.[66]

The Rest of the Detachment

The other agents of the 35th CIC Detachment had their moments, too. On 23 February, two sixteen-year-old Hitler Jugend members were picked up after they had crossed the line into Division area. After extensive interrogation, the two youths signed confessions that they had been sent to spy on troop movements along the Gangelt-Geilenkirchen road. They were sent to Army Interrogation Center.

The Detachment performed routine security duties in a number of German towns, following in the wake of Task Force BYRNES most of the time.[67]

66 418th CIC Det, 12th Army Group, CIC Monthly Bulletin #4, Annex 2, from report submitted by 35th CIC Det, Jun 44 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

67 35th CIC Det, Daily Briefs for G2, 23 Feb - 3 Mar 45, in 103d(sic) CIC Det. History Jun 44 - Jan 45(sic), (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center Box 25096).

1st, 4th, and 5th CIC Detachments

The 1st CIC Detachment continued its routine activities, gradually assuming counterintelligence control of additional towns in their sector. Aside from assisting a First Army officer in infiltrating an agent across into German territory[68] and clipping the wings of thirty-two pigeons, agents of the Detachment reported no extraordinary activity for this two-week period.[69]

The 4th CIC Detachment also continued in its static area[70], but 5th CIC Detachment, in the period from 23 February to 7 March, moved from a static situation to the offensive with its Division. Early in the period, the Control Line was transplanted to four bridges over the Sauer River. Twenty civilians were placed under house arrest for violating circulation restrictions. Two ex-German soldiers were sent through Prisoner of War channels, and two others were sent rearward as security threats. Three hundred seventy-five persons were screened, including ten civilian employees of the Army. Security surveys were completed in nine villages and one case of suspected sabotage was investigated with no evidence of enemy saboteur activity apparent. Toward the end of the period, the Division began its advance and, once again, the Detachment, under Captain Lyncon B. Allen, was hard put to provide security for the military in a swiftly changing situation.[71]

9th CIC Detachment

Agents of the 9th CIC Detachment arrested the
and transferred her to Army Interrogation Center as a security menace. The female , who spoke several languages, including English, had served as a teletypist with the Luftwaffe Signal Corps and had never been discharged. She knew a great deal about Signal equipment but, when questioned about her activities, refused to give even general information, saying it would be espionage against the German government.[72]

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68 This agent was probably who was doubled by 301st CIC after his capture in the Ardennes and was sent into Cologne a few days before it fell.

69 1st CIC Det, Daily and Weekly Reports, 24 Feb-6 Mar 45, in 301-2.2 (22292) Master G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, Feb-Mar 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

70 4th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Feb 45, dtd 28 Feb 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library).

71 5th Inf Div After-Action Rpt, 1-28 Feb 45, 305-2 (6610) Master (RESTRICTED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia).

72 9th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 1 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

The 13th Airborne CIC Arrives

The 13th Airborne CIC Detachment, under 1st Lieutenant Frank Popisil, had just arrived in its area of jurisdiction, north of Paris, France. Agents spent much of their time familiarizing themselves with the territory. They scanned local periodicals for information of counterintelligence interest and performed routine security missions.[73]

The 14th Armored CIC Detachment and Evidence

Horace L. Hahn, 2d Lieutenant, Commander of the 514th CIC Detachment, launched a campaign during this period to educate combat officers in correct procedures for preservation of evidence.

Recognizing that many of the combat personnel who would be the first to discover acts of a subversive nature and many of the S2's and unit commanders who would be called to the scene were not familiar with methods of observing, protecting, preserving, and collecting evidence, Lieutenant Hahn arranged a series of conferences, in which members of the Detachment attempted to acquaint various personnel of all echelons in the Division with correct procedures. Forms for the recording of information about such incidents were prepared and supplied in liberal quantities to the units in the Division. Unit commanders were also shown the necessity for prevention of souvenir-hunting which often caused the compromise of evidence and important tactical data. The agents found a marked spirit of cooperation among the individual receiving the instruction.[74]

29th CIC Detachment: Fortuitous Fortnight

During the first two weeks of the offensive, the 29th CIC Detachment performed a variety of tasks. In a log which refers to their activities during this period as "Operation Grenade 1," is a summary which shows the agents screened approximately 305 civilians, arrested five wireless-telegraph agents (aided in two cases by the 175th Regiment), arrested one SHAEF black list personality, apprehended two others in the automatic arrest category, and arrested two security threats and five suspects. In addition to these arrestees, thirty-five other investigations were run, and fifty-seven target searches were completed. Ten informants were developed and two security checks of Command Posts were made. Seventeen agents from the Detachment worked in German towns.[75]

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73 13th CIC Det, Monthly Information Report dtd 28 Feb 45, 13th CIC Det Corres File, Dec 43-Jul 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25094).

74 514th CIC Det, MIR for Feb 45, dtd 28 Feb 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

75 29th CIC Det Log - Operation Grenade 1, dtd 14 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File, Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

How Five Wireless Transmitter Agents Were Captured

The most important investigation conducted by the 29th Detachment involved five female wireless transmitter agents. The first break came in Muenchen-Gladbach, when one of the agents turned herself in to American authorities on 3 March 1945, stating she was a trained radio operator who had been given a tactical reporting mission in a stay-behind capacity. The girl named four other women as agents and gave the localities in which each was scheduled to operate after the area had been overrun by American forces. The girl arrested claimed she had not sent any messages, having been instructed by the Germans to begin transmitting on 6 March.

She led Detachment Commander, 1st Lt Ellis O. Mayfield, to a second agent the same day. This agent said she had burned her codes and buried her radio set, and, while admitting her training, declared that she had not transmitted any tactical information.[76]

The following day, Lieutenant Mayfield arrested a third agent at Suchteln. She had reported in to the Germans on 20 February and still held her codes. Her radio, too, had been buried in the backyard of her home, and she claimed not to have given the Germans any information.

A fourth agent was arrested on 5 March by Lieutenant Mayfield in St. Hubert by Krefield (presumably at least one kilometer forward of the advance elements of the American forces). She claimed she destroyed both her codes and her radio, and had not transmitted any information.

The fifth agent was not located so easily, for CIC had only her name for identification.[77] CIC agent Gordon M. Anderson was assigned to locate this girl, who had the very common German name, Anneliese Schmitz.

On 5 March, Special Agent Anderson and Interpreter Pfc Serene J. Hepner, with the first female German agent for identification, proceeded to Krefeld, where

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76 Memo for CIC, 29th CIC Det, subj: "Apprehension of Trained German Radio Operators," dtd 6 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence Files, Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094) and 29th CIC Det Headquarters Personality Index, para 23, p. 112 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

77 Ltr from 103d SCI Unit, Hq (MAIN)'BIA, 21st Army Group to CO SCI, 12th Army Gp, subj: "Comment on CIC Activity in Connection with Recent Cases at Muenchen-Gladbach" dtd 18 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Corres. Files, Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094) and 29th CIC Det Hq Personality Index, para 25, 26, p. 112 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

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Anneliese Schmitz was believed to be. The Schmitz home had been bombed out two weeks previously, it was discovered, and inquiries in the neighborhood and in a nearby air raid shelter failed to produce a lead. At a second shelter, a bunker, a person who knew Anneliese Schmitz directed the searchers to a third bunker. This lead produced a girl with the same name, but who was not the wireless-transmitter operator agent. However, this girl had heard of another Anneliese Schmitz who was staying in a different bunker. Again, the agent and his assistants located a girl with the name who also was not the agent. This girl, too, had heard of a girl with the same name, and she promptly led the trio back to the first Anneliese Schmitz they had found.

Anneliese Schmitz #2 then suggested that the wanted agent might be located through the records of the Deutsches Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front) (DAF) if they could be found. After making a number of inquiries, the DAF office was located. It was badly damaged, but the records were intact and, after searching several sources, a card file was found and a card with the photograph of Anneliese Schmitz-the-agent was discovered. The only other information was background data, excluding address.

Anneliese Schmitz #2 was recontacted and shown the card but could give no further help. The searchers then went to the agent's birthplace, and in one bunker found several people who claimed to have seen her a few days before. The first lead brought the searchers to a house located on the Rhine River. Here Anneliese Schmitz #3, who bore a marked resemblance to the person sought after, had lived before she evacuated across the Rhine. Conversations with this girl's brother established the fact that she was not the one agent Anderson was looking for, and they retraced their steps. This time they found a girl who had gone to school with the agent-at-large. The last time the agent had been seen was two days previously, when she had left the bunker. Checking the area, the searchers located a home where the girl and her mother had stayed one day before. The chase was getting closer. A man staying there had helped Anneliese Schmitz and her mother move to Weierhofstrasse 101 in Krefeld. The man did not know her name; he identified her from the photograph on her DAF card. The group went back to Krefeld and found Anneliese Schmitz #4, the Anneliese Schmitz. The radio operator identified her. Her radio set was hidden in the basement and it was taken by the CIC agent, as was the fifth agent, back to the Detachment.[78]

Anneliese Schmitz was sent to Armor (XIX Corps) Interrogation Center, accompanied by her radio transmitter and receiver, in the same manner as the four agents arrested before her.[79]

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78 Memo for OIC, 29th CIC Det, subj: "Search for an Arrest of Anneliese Schmitz," dtd 6 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Corres. File (Report of Arrests) Jun 44-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

79 MG Arrest Reports #91-92-93-94-95, dtd 3-6 Mar 45 in 29th CIC Det Hq Corres. File (Record of Arrests) Jun 44-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

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Because Lieutenant Mayfield, with the cooperation of Major Gagan of XIX Corps CIC Detachment, had preserved the secrecy of the investigation by high classification,[80] not only was the immediate investigation successful, but two of the women agents were later used by SCI to transmit misleading information to the Germans.[81]

Plaudits and Post-Developments

Special Counter Intelligence made some very favorable comments about CIC ability after this episode. They were extremely pleased when they were handed a complete case, "with none of the component parts missing," and praised the "invaluable" help given by CIC during the transition of the cases to Special Counter Intelligence hands. Perhaps this comment summarized best how excellently CIC had operated:

"Our British associates at this (21st Army Group) Headquarters were greatly impressed by this display of efficiency, and unanimously acclaimed this work as a model job.[82]

But Special Counter Intelligence and the British were not alone in their praise of the efforts of Pfc Hepner, S/A Anderson and the newly-promoted Captain Mayfield. The Commanding General of XIX Corps forwarded a joint commendation for the three men to the Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division, Major General C. H. Gerhardt. General Gerhardt noted the commendation "with pleasure" and placed it into channels to the G2.[83]

Gordon M. Anderson was awarded a Bronze Star for his part of the investigation,[84] and, as an interesting sidelight, a Special Counter Intelligence representative later told Captain Mayfield that the two girl agents exploited by Special

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80 Ltr from 103 SCI Unit, Hq 'MAIN, BLA, 21st Army Group, to CO SCI, 12th Army Group, subj: "Comment on CIC Activity in Connection w/Recent Cases at Muenchen-Gladbach," dtd 18 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Corres. Files Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

81 29th CIC Det Informational Memo to G2, dtd 16 Apr 45, in 29th CI Det Corres. File, Jun 44-Sep 45 (Unclassified). (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25094).

82 Ltr from 103d SCI Unit, Hq 'MAIN, BLA, 21st Army Group, to CO SCI, 12th Army Group, subj: "Comment on CIC Activity in Connection with Recent Cases at Muenchen-Gladbach," dtd 18 Mar 45, in 29th CIC Det Corres. Files Jun 44 Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25094).

83 Ltr from CG, XIX Corps, subj: "Commendation," to CG, 29th Inf Div, and 1st Ind. s/C.H.Gerhardt, Maj Gen, Cmdg, dtd 5 Apr 45 in Hq, Corres. File Jun 44-Sep 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25094).

84 29th CIC Det CI Periodic Rpt, 19 Mar-19 Apr 45, dtd 20 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Hq Corres. Files Jun 44-Nov 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

Counter Intelligence to send erroneous messages were awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class, by the Germans "for their work in furnishing much valuable information to the German Army and for their bravery in operations behind the American lines."

These awards were the second and third Iron Crosses which Captain Mayfield said had been awarded to former enemy agents operating under control of American Intelligence.[85]

Who Said "Welcome Home?"

During this period the 45th Division G2 called in the 45th CIC Detachment to investigate the extent of the distribution of an official pamphlet entitled "Welcome Home," and the reaction of the men in the Division to it.

A package of the documents had arrived at the Division's APO in pouches which received first class mail handling. The Technician in charge did not remember where the documents had come from, but he remembered that batches were separated and tied and marked for various units within the Division. From past experience, he judged that the documents would have come from Seventh Army or APO 790 in Italy, a publications organization.

In the units which had received the pamphlets, each of the S2s had held up distribution. Some sent them back to the rear of Division, one copy to be given each man returning to the United States on temporary duty or for other reasons. Others merely held them at Regiment indefinitely. No general distribution had been made. Word-of-mouth "advertising" had made some soldiers aware that the pamphlets existed, but none had been handed out to substantiate the rumor.

CIC recommended that the policy of keeping them at Division rear should be followed and that the pamphlets should be disseminated only to those few who were soon to be welcomed home to the United States. They reassured the G2 that nothing serious had developed but suggested that further issuance of documents should be under control of the Division staff.[86]

85 29th CIC Det Informational Memo to G2, dtd 16 Apr 45, in 29th CI Det Corres. Files, Jun 44-Sep 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 23094). NOTE: It is presumed that the information of the awarding of the Iron Crosses was broadcast to the recipients, since they were located behind American lines.

86 Ltr, 45th CIC Det, dtd 27 Feb 45, Subj: Investigation on Receipt and Distribution of WD pamphlet entitled, "Welcome Home," in 45th CIC Det Corres. File Folder, 2 Nov 44-Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 45121).

The 63d CIC Detachment: GI Troubles

The 63d CIC Detachment under the command of 1st Lt. Clinton R. Weidner, operating in the province of Lorraine, France, initiated a number of cases involving Nazi collaborators, informers, and other pro-Nazis, but left the area before many could be concluded. Two cases concerning U.S. soldiers arose: one involving a deserter and the other, a conscientious soldier with an inquisitive pen-pal.

The deserter, a private belonging to the 44th Infantry Division, who had roamed undetected from 7 December 1944 until 4 March 1945, was apprehended when he attempted to pose as a CIC agent. He had written a note authorizing himself to investigate CIC and Civil Affairs activities, intending to use it to prevent his arrest by MP's. CIC turned him over to the Provost Marshal.

In the other case, a soldier turned over a letter to the Detachment, through channels, in which a correspondent from the U.S. had asked "a list of questions of a suspicious nature." The letter and a report of interview with the Pfc was forwarded to MIS, Washington, D.C. and the recipient was told to act as if he had never received the letter.[87]

69th CIC Detachment: Routine Work

The 69th Infantry Division's G2 After-Action Report summarized the activity of the 69th CIC Detachment during the "attack phase" of 1 March to 8 March rather simply, noting, "Our CIC Detachments operated in a normal manner of checking and screening civilians. Many deserters were screened from civilians and valuable information of enemy agents secured.[88]

The 87th CIC Detachment: Close Call

The 87th CIC Detachment had little excitement to report--with one exception. A German shell scored a direct hit on the billet of Agent Richard H. Beatty, who managed to escape unscathed.[89]

One investigation which could not be terminated conclusively dealt with a German girl found in a Bunder-Aid Station with four German soldiers. She had a letter requesting information about the status of her espionage courses at a

87 63d CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 31 Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

88 69th Inf Div, G2 After-Action Report, undated, in 369-2 (12131) (Master) (Unclassified), (DRB etc.).

89 87th CIC Det, Daily Activities Reports for 1-28 Feb 45, in G2 Journal, 87th Inf Div, L576, Feb 45, (RESTRICTED), (DRB etc.).

Bund Deutscher Madel school. Under interrogation she claimed that she had never taken any such courses, and that she was acting as nurse, housemaid, and cook for the four soldiers -- one of whom was her fiance. The Prisoners of War verified the latter statement, and investigation by the Detachment revealed that her father had been in trouble with the German authorities for expressing anti-Nazi sentiments. She was evacuated to Army Interrogation Center.[90]

This Detachment found that the policy of grouping civilians in a few houses, under guard, and segregating them from the troops brought good results. Experience also taught them that "if the town leaders are properly instructed and adequately warned that they will be held personally responsible for any acts on the part of civilians that might menace the safety of our troops, the town leaders will report any suspicious or strange persons in their midst.[91]

503d CIC Detachment on the Move

Third Armored Division, under VII Corps, was a part of the offensive force surging into the Rhineland. The 503d CIC Detachment moved with it.

On 27 February in a church in Berrendorf, ninety-two members of the Volkssturm were arrested as Prisoners of War. The two top leaders had fled, and the organization was left under the command of the Number Three man, an elderly gentleman. These members of the Volkssturm had done no fighting against the Allies, and their arms remained stored. Because of the swiftness of the advance, members of the Detachment merely listed the names of the arrestees, noting on the Arrest Report, "a recheck of names against lists is suggested as screening was done under fire, and under unfavorable conditions.[92]

The taking of other towns from the time of the Third Armored attack across the Roer River through 2 March created little or no problems. Birkesdorf, first entered by elements if the 104th Infantry Division, had been completely evacuated. Documents found there were sent to the Commanding Officer of the 207th CIC Detachment. Arnoldsweiler was also evacuated, and Military Government decided to use it as a collecting point for Displaced Persons.

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90 87th CIC Det Daily Activities Rpts, 1-31 Mar 45, in 87th Inf Div G2 Journals for Mar 45 (Unclassified), (DRB etc.).

91 87th CIC Det Counterintelligence Report #5, 21 Feb - 5 Mar, s/Sam E. Harwell, 1st Lt, CIC, Comdg, 95th (sic) CIC Det Reports, Folder of Bi-Weekly Reports, Sep 44 - Jun 45, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

92 503d CIC Det Arrest Report, dtd 27 Feb 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Reports, Oct 44 - Jun 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

The 200 civilians and Displaced Persons in Morschenich were placed under the guard of Military Government Police. There was no Military Government Detachment in town, but CIC Agent Collins and a Military Government Lieutenant screened civilians there, and arranged the posting of proclamations.

In Glesch, CIC Agents Porter Travis and Bruno Stramel screened civilians while dashing from cellar to cellar under enemy fire, and in Bergheim, the county capital, Capt. John Heminway of the 207th CIC Detachment and Lt. Philip Udoff and Detachment Commander Theodore M. Black, of the 503d CIC Detachment searched Kreise Headquarters in that locale, turning up some records. Some were forwarded to the 99th CIC Detachment, obviously slated for the take-over assignment, while those records of "bigger-picture interest" were taken by Capt. Heminway to Corps Headquarters, CIC. Captain Black pointed out that, "Such organized work as has been done along these lines (Civilian Security Control) is of a transitory nature, and probably will continue until the lines pass farther forward and static or semi-static Military Government supervision is provided.[93]

Between 2 March and 7 March, seven more towns fell under Third Armored CIC control, but in each instance the reports indicate that only minimal security could be provided. Volkssturm members and other security threats were gathered together and placed under guard; key offices were checked, mostly with negative results; officials were screened sketchily; and warnings were posted.[94]

Incomplete Reports

Arrest Reports on individuals made their way rearward, sometimes directly from Division to Army. Many of these reports were found lacking in sufficient evidence on which to conduct an interrogation. Four reports from one agent of the Third Armored CIC Detachment were poor enough to cause Colonel B.A. Dickson, G2 of First U.S. Army, to return the reports to the G2, VII Corps, explaining that "on the basis of these Arrest Reports, which represent the only information contained on these cases, it is impossible for CIC personnel at Army to do anything other than treat these individuals as displaced persons. Reference in two of these reports to 'SOP for further screening' is not clear and gives no information whatsoon which to conduct an interrogation at this level." Colonel Dickson requested that

93 503d CIC Det, Consolidated Situation Report, dtd 2 Mar 45, to CO 207th CIC Det, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

94 Ibid., dtd 7 Mar 45, to CO 207th CIC Det in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts, Mar 45.

arrestees of the type described be held at Division or Corps level until "screening or investigation produces evidence on which some action can be taken by Army."[95]

Communications Zone CIC: Not Much Ado About Anything

CIC personnel with Advance Section (ADSEC) and Base Section (BASEC), Communications Zone (COMZ), Detachments experienced, generally, an uneventful February. Monthly Information Reports from Section "B" of the 419th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt. Meredith R. Wilson[96] Section "H" of the 420th, under Capt. Donald M. Graham[97]; Section "K" of the 421st with Capt. Jesse F. Gordon as commander[98]; Section "G" of the same Detachment led by 1st Lt. Elbert M. Ryan[99]; Section "P", "R", and "Y" of the 424th with 1st Lt. Gordon C. Abrams[100], Capt. Earl S. Browning, Jr.[101], and Capt. Julian P. Prescott[102], commanding respectively; and Maj. John C. Schwarzwalder's 429th CIC Detachment[103] all of which were ADSEC CIC units--revealed a dearth of investigative activity. Since most of the ADSEC CIC Detachments were engaged in Travel Control on the German border or near to it, activity in the main was limited to patrolling the Counterintelligence Control Line and adjacent roads, checking posts manned by indigenous guards, and screening of arrestees. This screening was rather superficial for, as Section "G" reported, "No investigations or cases, as such, are handled by this section, the individuals being turned over to the proper military authorities." In most cases, suspect enemy agents were turned over to the nearest Army or Corps CIC Detachment.[104]

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95 Ltr from G2 1st Army dtd 6 Mar, subj: Arrest Reports, to G2, VII Corps, and 4 Incls: Arrest Reports, 503d CIC Det Germany #2, Feb-Apr 45, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

96 Section B, 419th CIC Det, Monthly Information Report for Feb, dtd 2 Mar 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (SECRET).

97 Section H, 420th CIC Det Monthly Information Report for Feb, dtd 1 Mar 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

98 Section K, 421st CIC Det, Monthly Information Report for Feb, dtd 3 Mar 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (attached from Section F), (SECRET).

99 Section G, 421st CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt for Feb, dtd 28 Feb 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL), (attached "F").

100 Section P, 424th, CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt for Feb, dtd 1 Mar 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

101 Ibid., Section R.

102 Ibid., Section Y.

103 429th CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt for Feb, dtd 27 Feb 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

104 Section G, 421 CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt for Feb, dtd 28 Feb 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

Occasionally, as happened on 10 February during screening being conducted by Section "L" personnel from the 422d CIC Detachment, a case developed at this level. In this specific instance, 2d Lt. Kjartan L. Christopher of Section "L" recognized one Russian in a group of five civilians who had been brought to the Verdun, France, CIC Office by Civil Affairs, Etain, for screening. In January, Lt. Christopher had considered the Russian to be a Displaced Person and had turned him over to Civil Affairs in Verdun for disposition.

Lieutenant Christopher not only recognized the Russian, but he also noticed a variance between the man's January story and the new one. When the report of the original interrogation and the "wanted" files were consulted, it was noted that the five Russians fitted the descriptions of Russian Prisoners of War who had escaped from a neighboring enclosure. The Lieutenant's alertness and his accurate files enabled five escapees to be returned to the Prisoner of War Enclosure.[105]

BASEC CIC Detachments on Routine Duties

Eleven reports on Normandy, Oise and Seine BASEC CIC Detachments indicated a similar uneventfulness in their areas during February. These CIC units were not concerned with Counterintelligence Control Lines, but were generally performing more investigative-type activity. They screened indigenous personnel for employment by U.S. Army agencies, conducting background investigations before sanctioning the employment of anyone. They also made security surveys and inspections of port installations and pipelines, and maintained liaison with local civilian and military agencies.[106]

Civilian Travel Restrictions Lifted

On 25 February, after the army offensive was under way, civilian travel restrictions were discontinued along the Meuse River. Freedom of movement was permitted from the rear of existing Corps areas in the First Army area to the seacoast, greatly relieving the pressure upon the Belgian population all along the front.

As the offensive continued, Twelfth Army Group warned subordinate units that the most effective means available to enemy intelligence would be that of employing well-prepared stay-behind agents in the larger Rhenish cities with the mission of supplying tactical information at first, and subsequently providing strategical data.[107]

105 Section L, 422d CIC Det, Monthly Information Rpt for Feb, dtd 28 Feb 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (CONFIDENTIAL).

106 BASEC CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, for Feb 45, (Staff and Faculty Library), (SECRET), (CONFIDENTIAL), and (Unclassified).

107 12th Army Group Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt #14, 16-18 Feb 45, Annex A, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Chapter 3

The Rhine is Reached and Breached

The Rhineland was being finally lost by the enemy, and with it, the greater part of three German Armies. On 7 March, an American column thrust down the natural corridor leading southeast from Euskirchen, battered its way through a German Corps, and seized the Rhine-spanning railroad bridge at Remagen virtually intact. In two days, the first American bridgehead east of the Rhine had been expanded to a depth of three miles. In Rhineland battles up to 11 March, the enemy had lost nearly 120,000 prisoners to Allied Armies in the area.

On 15 March, in the Saar, the Sixth Army Group began an offensive which was to crumble all enemy resistance west of the Rhine.[108]

Twelfth Army Group: Frontier Travel

As the Armies of the Twelfth Army Group pierced further into German territory, increased attention was directed toward the establishment of the CIC Frontier Security Control system. Twenty-three posts were fixed inside Germany within five kilometers of the border and at strategically effective points. These posts were under seven CIC Frontier Security Control teams, each team being responsible for the operation of three or four posts.

Two battalions of French troops, 200 Luxembourg policemen, a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers (complemented by a U.S. Army field artillery battery) and approximately 500 Dutch policemen and custom guards manned posts and patrols along the sections of the German border which faced their respective countries. Unfortunately, these were not enough, and Twelfth Army Group reported, "The rigid frontier control contemplated has not as yet fully materialized since the total manpower necessary ...has not been made available.[109]

A Vital Function of Group Headquarters

One of the most important tasks performed by the Office of the AC of S, G2, Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, was the preparation of personality indexes. This material was gathered from the Twelfth Army Group file of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for Germany and from all cards prepared at Group Headquarters.

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108 Op cit, Eisenhower, pgs. 378-380; and Weekly Intelligence Summary, SHAEF, Off/ACofS, G2, No. 51 dtd 11 Mar 45, Part I, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

109 CI Periodic Rpt No. 15, for March 1945, Office of AC of S, G2, s/Edwin C. Lee, Lt. Col., Open Reports L-502 (3) Mar 45, (Unclass) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The listed personality's "Name, Town, Organization or Rank, Rank or Position, and SHAEF classification . . . ."was given, and groups of personalities were divided into one type of list by Wehrkreis, [110] and in another by nationality. The latter list involved only non-Germans.[111]

Distribution was made to all Headquarters of Army level or higher. Army Headquarters whose subordinate units would be directly concerned with any territory within the Wehrkreis would receive fifteen copies of that personality index list, enough at least for one copy to go to each CIC Detachment. Other headquarters, not concerned with the area, would be sent one or two copies of the list. Eighteen copies were forwarded to Sixth Army Group and two to the British Twenty-first Army Group. It is not known whether these Groups prepared lists of their own or depended exclusively upon the SHAEF offering. Copies of the Twelfth Army Group listing were also sent to the G5 of Twelfth Army Group, apparently for use by subordinate Military Government Headquarters.[112]

Without modern tabulation machinery, this task would have been insurmountable. Thousands of names and pertinent data on each was collected by units in the field and transmitted, through channels, to the various research agencies. The information was punched in code on cards. From these, mimeograph stencils were made, bearing the coded information on a single line. The desired number of copies were produced from these stencils, and then collated and stapled before being distributed.[113]

First Army CIC Detachment

Between 7 and 25 March, agents of the 301st CIC Detachment turned twenty-one suspects of one type or another over to the First Army Interrogation Center, most of whom they had received from subordinate CIC Detachments, in the thick of the offensive.

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110 Ltrs, Hq Twelfth Army Group, dtd 19 Mar, SUBJECT: Personality Index Wehrkreise XIII and IX and XII, Office of AC of S G2, in 207th CIC Det Folder 1944-1945, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

111 Personality Card Index for Germany, Roster by Nationalities other than German-Mar 1945, undated, unsigned in 207th CIC Det Folder 1944-1945, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box, 25097).

112 Ltr, Hq, Twelfth Army Group, Office of AC of S G2, dtd 19 Mar 45, SUBJECT: Personality Index-Wehrkreise XIII and IX and XII, in 207th CIC Det Folder 1944-1945, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25097).

113 See Appendix II with exhibits "A" and "B" for Twelfth Army Groups established procedure for coding for Machine Records, and for samples of the finished product by territory "A" and by nationality "B", 207th CIC Det 1944-1945, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097); and, Circular 20, Hq, 12th AG, dtd 7 Dec 44, Subj: Machine Recording of SHAEF Personality Index Cards for Germany, for more information.

Six proved to be legitimate Prisoners of War, although some of them had been members of the Schutz Staffeln (SS or Protective Echelon), the Sicherheitsdienst (SD, or Security Service) and the Kripo (Criminal Police) before being committed to purely military activity against the advancing Allies. Two, who were guards in Rheinbach Prison had mistreated prisoners, were referred to the Inspector General. Eight were Gestapo and Kripo men from Cologne and were interned subsequently by the Provost Marshal, First U.S. Army. Three were captured "Gamma"[114] swimmers, who were sent rearward to Twelfth Army Group Interrogation Center. One, who was found to be a French national who informed for the Gestapo in Cologne, was turned over to French authorities, and one, suspected of complicity with an SD informer, was still under investigation as the period ended.

Exactly how much investigation was performed by agents of the 301st CIC Detachment was not apparent in the reports. Indications are that the Army Detachment personnel were used as augmentation teams in areas where counterintelligence problems were too large for the responsible Detachment, or concentrated or follow-up investigations of suspects developed at lower levels.[115]

The German Paracontraption

At this time First Army reported the German development of a parachute-dropped shell-shape container which could carry three agents safely down to earth. The German Intelligence Service had already used the device to float nine agents into the British Twenty-First Army Group area successfully.

While the device was difficult to camouflage or conceal, its invention made it possible for agents untrained in parachuting to be dropped in the rear of Allied areas.[116]

An Important Development: Security Troops

Indications of the establishment during this period of an organization of Security Guards to augment CIC Detachments was reported from two different sources. Based on the belief that enforcement of security controls would become more difficult as the

114 German Frogmen saboteurs.

115 First U.S. Army Interrogation Center, Bulletin No. 8, dtd 1 Apr 1945, (SOURCE: Kansas City Records Center CICC-C .000.4 207th CIC Det First Army File Mar 44 - Apr 45. Box 25097), (Confidential).

116 1st U.S. Army, G2 Estimate #74, dated 14 Mar 45 in Opns Rpts (L-595, (17) 15 Mar 45, No. A7 611099) (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); Incl 10 to G2 Periodic Report #73, VII Corps dtd 15 Mar 45 in Opns Rpts, L-557, FUSA (13) 15 Mar 45 No. A7 611115) (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

battle area advanced and life in German towns to the rear resumed a more normal pattern, additional troops were detailed for use as Security guards in the First Army area.

In Third Army area, a command directive was published which provided for "the creation of Security Detachments of two officers and ten enlisted men for each Counter Intelligence Corps team within the Third Army Area," with the objective of relieving CIC detachments of considerable administrative and housekeeping duties, so that agents could concentrate on their primary mission of apprehending enemy agents and personalities of CIC interest."

What specific functions these troops performed or, for that matter, whether they ever were readied in time to be of value is not revealed by available records. But it is significant that high level commanders recognized the necessity for relieving CIC agents of tedious and time-consuming duties which interfered with the efficient performance of their mission.[117]

Third Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

The 303d CIC Detachment, in its April 1945 Information Report, revealed the change in CIC operations in conquered, as opposed to liberated, areas.

Where CIC operations had been conducted openly in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, with the aid of local inhabitants and security forces, they became nearly covert in Germany. All identification of CIC was removed from vehicles, personnel, and offices. The "hostile populace" did not cooperate as willingly as the liberated peoples had, and it became necessary to "establish confidences, create an informant system, and to rely upon our previously created black and white lists; plus captured party, military and government records as a basis upon which to establish counter-intelligence records."

The swift movement of Third Army through the Rhineland made it "practically impossible to effect a complete and long-range counterintelligence coverage. Documents of counterintelligence value were uncovered in such quantities that there was no time for local evaluation, and it was deemed impracticable to remove them from the locale to which the records belonged. Consequently, records were sealed at the place of discovery and a record made of the location.

117 First U.S. Army Counterintelligence Periodical Rpt #19, dtd 24 Mar 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097); and Third U.S. Army After-Action Report, G2, (Unclassified), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

Third Army CIC Detachment reported military security was its primary function during the period of advance. Agents concentrated on jailing black list personnel, and on investigations of both denouncers and informants since the guilt of the one was largely dependent upon the integrity of the other.

Displaced persons, civilians judged to be security threats and sent to the Prisoner of War Enclosures, and suspected enemy agents were plentiful during the period--too plentiful. To add to the problem, agents were still careless about filling out arrest reports and memorandums in spite of numerous reminders; in fact the Third Army Provost Marshal estimated that fifty percent of the civilian security-threat suspects were arriving at the enclosure with incomplete reports, thereby forcing him to issue orders that such persons would no longer be accepted. The vast numbers of persons in each of the three categories made it necessary that field screening procedures be curtailed. Only suspect enemy agents, who were sent to Third Army CIC Interrogation Center, received careful interrogation, first by MII personnel assigned to aid the CIC interrogator because of the heavy load (as many as sixty-five suspects per week), and then by the CIC specialist.

With the increase in importance of counterintelligence operations in this phase of operation, the Interrogation Center passed to the direct control of G2 Security (CIB) and CIC personnel resumed combat CIC operations.[118]

Research Opened to All

The vast amount of data which had been collected at the Army Counterintelligence Research Center - a central collection agency, peculiar to Third U.S. Army- included much information of a technical nature, and the facilities of the Center were, at this time, made available to any authorized officer or enlisted man from the Engineers, Post Maintenance, Military Government, Signal or Ordnance. Signal and Ordnance Corps took full advantage of the opportunity by stationing a representative at the Center.[119]

Seventh Army CIC Detachment

No enemy agents were arrested in the Sixth Army Group area during the semi-static first fifteen days of March. The Seventh Army attack which began on 15 March quickly changed this situation, however, and in the last part of the month, nine enemy agents were arrested, seven for espionage and two for sabotage. One of the espionage agents, holder of a German Iron Cross First Class for his exploits behind Allied lines, was not really worthy of the honor. A German deserter had reported

118 303d CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt, for Mar 45, dtd 9 Apr 45 (Conf), (Staff and Faculty Library.).

119 Third U.S. Army After-Action Report, G2 (Unclassified) (Staff and Faculty Library.).

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this "hero" as having accomplished many successful line-crossing missions. CIC arrested the agent and discovered that he had deceived only his employers. He had hidden in a relative's home, near the line, and called upon his imagination for his tactical espionage reports.

There were many signs which pointed to a befuddlement of the German Intelligence Service regarding the tactical situation. High-ranking Prisoners of War complained about the poor quality of intelligence information that was being submitted to tactical commanders. Captured maps and reports showed a lack of knowledge of the Allied units facing the German forces. This lack of German Intelligence Service activity was not judged by Seventh Army CIC as a sign of indifference but rather as an indication that interest was being concentrated upon long-range plans. Parachute agents and stay-behinds were the center of attention, and training for such missions had been accelerated. It was becoming apparent that Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbel's "Wehrwolf" talk was not much more than talk. Plans had been devised, but the Germans had run out of time before they could be put into effect in the Rhineland.

The Doubled and Redirected Agent

A German radio-operator-agent arrested during the period claimed to be a Communist of long standing who had deserted the German Army only to be imprisoned by the Russians. The Russians had released him and had sent him on a parachute espionage mission into Berlin where he was arrested by the Gestapo and forced to continue contact with the Russians. Finally he was given a stay-behind mission in Seventh Army area. He was captured by the Americans before he could transmit any information of interest.

Espionage Agents, Junior-Style

Two youths, the older age 16, were arrested initially as vagrants for travelling without papers of any kind. They said that a Wehrmacht officer had ordered them to cross into Allied territory and to ask civilians questions about the strength and types of American troops and vehicles. They were given no training and had no cover story.

Military Government Almost Appoints a Saboteur

Sabotage agents were generally of a higher type. Of the two arrested during this period, one was picked up as he made his way, in civilian clothes, back to his camouflaged cave. The other, a Polish national, was a Military Government assistant who had been considered for the post of mayor of the town by that agency. He confessed to CIC that he was to sabotage U.S. equipment and kill U.S. soldiers at night.

Arrests Mushroom

On 22 March 1945, the 307th CIC Detachment received a letter requesting an interview with an intelligence officer and stating that the writer possessed information of importance for the High Command of the Armed Forces. Adhering to the writer's desire for a discreet approach, contact was made under cover of a search for billets. The form and style of the letter indicated that the writer had an intelligence background, but it was considered inadvisable to arrest him outright since he might have been a decoy for another wireless transmitter network operating in the area. Until this factor of doubt was removed, the writer, a German national forty-nine years old, was located covertly at his residence first and later was requested to contact an undercover CIC officer on the street during regular civilian circulation hours.

A high-ranking civilian official in the Abwehr, this German had organized a network of three wireless transmitter stay-behind agents several months before Allied entry into Germany. Test broadcasts from the agents had been completed in February at which time they were instructed to camouflage their radio equipment until an opportune time.

The organizer, under interrogation, named the three stay-behinds and gave the code of the operator at Kaiserslautern. He did not know the codes of the agents at Oberweiler and Einoed-Zweibruecken. The three stay-behinds were picked up before the end of March.[120]

Ninth Army CIC Detachment

While Ninth Army was preparing to lead the attack of American Forces against the enemy, the 309th CIC Detachment had as its main concern the security of the build up. After the push from Holland to the Rhine River started, the agents were occupied by a variety of investigative activities. Some of these were outside the CIC mission, but as often happened, the task fell to CIC mainly due to the absence of another investigative agency. One investigation in this category concerned an attempted fraud.

Civil Affairs in Maastricht, Holland, received a claim for 897,398.48 Belgian francs from a contractor, for materials he stated American forces had obtained from his depot in Belgium. In the course of the investigation Agent Lawrence J. Tess of the 309th CIC Detachment discovered a verified copy of a contract between the German government through the Organization

120 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 22 Apr 45, in 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpts File, Apr 44-Jan 46 (CONF) (Kansas City Records Branch Box 25099); and G2 History, Eleventh Army Operations in Europe, 15 Aug 44- 8 May 45. Part VIII, 1-31 Mar 45 (RESTRICTED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

construction company and evidence of payments. This information enabled Civil Affairs to disapprove the claimant's request for reimbursement.[121]

The 309th CIC Detachment's most productive case, however, concerned several stay-behind agents, captured as the result of a lead turned up during a special overall security mission in XVI Corps area.

On 13 March, the first day of the Corps-wide security mission, agents of the 508th CIC Detachment arrested a suspect and sent him to Ninth Army Interrogation Center. After three days of questioning, the arrestee revealed information about a carefully concealed hideout in dense woods near Hinsbeck, Germany.

The following day, 1st Lt Richard C. Guinan and five agents of the 309th CIC Detachment, guided by the arrestee, went to the location, but had to probe the earth with bayonets before they could find the trap-door entrance which had been sodded over for concealment purposes. Two stay-behind agents were captured, and a twenty day store of food and liquor and substantial amounts of sabotage equipment were found in the bunker. The bunker, completely underground, was ventilated by means of a pipe which was surfaced in an old hollow tree. The suspect had been the contact for the group, and the owner of a farm in the vicinity was arrested for providing the team with water, though he claimed to be unaware of their mission.

Later the same day, members of an Ordnance Battalion of the 8th Armored Division had arrested two men in Waffen SS uniforms who immediately revealed their connection with the stay-behind teams and said they had been sent out to secure whatever supplies were available in the area.

The 508th CIC Detachment had, in the meantime, received from the 84th CIC Detachment a German cook who was a former employee of a construction crew which had built some of these camouflaged hideouts (the Germans called them "Stuetzpunkte" or " Strongpoints") for sabotuers or local political exiles to operate from or to hide in when the Allies overran the territory. The ex-cook led agents from the 509th CIC Detachment and MII personnel to a hideout he remembered. Three more German agents were captured here, and, in addition to findings similar to those produced by the 309th CIC agents' raid, a map was discovered which showed the location of five more bunkers.

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121 309th CIC Detachment, Ninth U.S. Army, Monthly Information Report for March 45, dated 1 May 45 (RESTRICTED)(STAFF AND FACULTY LIBRARY)

Agents of the 508th CIC Detachment were able to follow through on the investigation because the "strongpoints" were in the neighborhood. Two of the hideouts were found flooded, and a third was unprovisioned. The installation in Goch, Germany, was provisioned, but had been evaucated of Personnel. The fifth could not be located during a three day search.[122]

The Gift, Not the Giver

Although the Corps-wide security mission had precipitated the first of these arrests, the commander of the 508th CIC Detachment, 1st Lt Arnold J. Huebner, did not feel that such an enterprise was practical. In the Detachment's March 1945 Information Report, Lieutenant Huebner gave a detailed account of the operation. XVI Corps area had been divided into three sections, and more than 400 officers and enlisted men were assigned the task of combing out security hazards and suspects. Sixty persons from CIC, and Prisoners of War, Order of Battle and Military Intelligence Interpreter teams screened civilians while the remaining members of the search party checked structures. Six combat men and one intelligence specialist operated as a team in this endeavor. The mission lasted six days.

From the ten towns in Corps area, ten suspects were arrested; 141 other suspects were released; and 210 displaced persons and eight prisoners of war were found. Only the first two stay-behind agents, their contact and the farmer, were included in the ten mentioned above.

Lieutenant Huebner's conclusions, based on this experience, were as follows:

(1) The best way to detect enemy agents is by use of informants and by thorough interrogation of suspects.
(2) The results obtained from a mass-screening of this type do not warrant the number of man-hours involved.
(3) Relations . . . were satisfactory.
Reconnaissance platoons are best suited for this type of work. The platoon organization and the type of transportation make for speedy efficient operation in urban as well as rural areas.[123]

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122 418th CIC Detachment, 12th Army Group. CIC Monthly Bulletin #3, dated 6 May 45 (CONF) (Staff and Faculty Library). 309th CIC Detachment, Ninth US Army Monthly Information Report for March 45, dated 1 May 45 (RESTRICTED) (Staff and Faculty Library). 508th CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report for March 45, dated 31 March 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty)

123 508th CIC Det Monthly Information Report for Mar 45, dated 31 Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

XVI Corps CIC Point of View

The Corps CIC report stated only that the mission was accomplished by the 508th CIC Detachment aided by personnel from the 30th and 35th CIC Detachments, and sixty-four members of other intelligence agencies. It made no reference to the use of tactical troops and summed up the results of the operation in this manner: "A few firearms and several PW's were picked up. Nothing of a CI interest has been developed as of this date (21 March 1945); however, the search is still in progress and further reports will be forthcoming.[124]

The "forthcoming" reports never developed for the simple reason that the mission had ended on 19 March 1945.[125] No other mention of this Corps-wide action was made in available documents from XVI Corps CIC Detachment.

XVI Corps Activity During Period

Corps area during this period approximated the entire area covered by Task Force BYRNES in their breakthrough in early March. This vast area - from Brussum and vicinity in Holland to Nieukerk and vicinity in Germany - required a reorganization of the 216th CIC Detachment's system of teams. Three teams were organized: Team I remained at Corps Command Post with Major Frederick, the Detachment Commander, in charge; Team II covered Brussum, Holland, and Kempen, Lohberg, and Gladbach, Germany; Team III operated in Venlo, Holland, and Wachtendonk and Nieukerk, Germany.

In addition to maintaining liaison with the officers-in-charge, Major Frederick kept in touch with division CIC commanders and division G2s, gaining cooperation when necessary and disseminating information as it became available to him.[126]

The Detachment adopted the Dutch practice of posting notices on the homes of suspected persons, with the difference that CIC posted only those homes of people who were under house arrest for oounterintelligence reasons.

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124 216th CIC Det CI Periodic Report, dated 21 Mar 45, in 216th CIC Det Operations Reports - Belgium, Holland, Germany, Oct 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Bx 28098)

125 508th CIC Det Monthly Information Report for Mar 45, dated 31 Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (STAFF and Faculty Library)

126 216th CIC Det, CIC Annex to After Action Report, 1 Mar 45 - 1 Apr 45, page 91, in 216th CIC Det Opn Rpts - Belgium, Holland, Germany, Oct 44 - Sep 45 (SECRET) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098)

In addition to routine security arrests in the course of security surveys and rches of "suspicious" homes, agents investigated two mine officials in Lintfort, Germany, the location of Corps Command Post, and found them to be radical Nazis. ouster was recommended ". . . if their removal would not seriously hamper nes production" - a curious reversion to a policy Military Government preferred, but which had been battled by almost every other CIC Detachment in the heater.[127]

The Buergermeister of a former Nazi official, was removed from ffice, however, and two former leaders of Nazi farmer organizations were arrested y agents of the Detachment.

A female agent of FAT 303 and two contacts on the Allied side of the Rhine River - hich she had crossed to get tactical information about U.S. troops and equipment - ere arrested in Nieukerk, Germany, on 16 March. The agent and one contact, a were sent to army for further investigation. The other accomplice, merchant, was placed under house arrest.

An Avenger of German Honor

A young German, apprehended while cutting Army Signal wires, confessed to wo other sabotage successes of the same type. The youth claimed membership in n organization known as the "Avengers of German Honor" and implicated fifteen t youths as fellow-members. Investigation by the 216th CIC Detachment failed o produce evidence of such an organization, and it was dismissed as a "product of fanciful and fanatical imagination."[128]

Corps CIC Helps Out Division

In mid-March, in answer to a hurried call from the 509th CIC Detachment, hree CIC agents from the 203d CIC Detachment and one Military Intelligence Interreter team were sent to prison, but not as inmates. The CIC agents with 9th U.S.

27 Note: Military Government, which constantly desired to make each area as economically self-sufficient as possible, often preferred to keep Nazis in key positions rather than replace them with less informed or inefficient personnel. Usually, CIC's attitude was that the security of the military establishment took precedence over the convenience of the population, and it was standard policy for Nazis to be removed immediately upon discovery of their affiliations with the party. It was usual also for Army and Group commanders to side with CIC on this question if a dispute with Military Government had developed.

28 216th CIC Det, CIC Annex to After Action Report, 1 Mar 45 - 1 Apr 45, in 216th CIC Det Opn Rpts - Belgium, Holland, Germany, Oct 44 - Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098).

Armored Division, the first unit to enter the town of Rheinbach, Germany, obviously realized that Rheinbach Prison posed a problem no free-wheeling CIC outfit could hope to solve before it moved on. At first impression, the CIC trio from the Corps Detachment must have wished that they, too, could pass the task on.

The trouble with Rheinbach Prison was its popularity. The prison contained 117 regular inmates which the Germans had not been able to evacuate; 80 German nationals, including political and non-political prisoners; 33 foreign nationals convicted for political crimes; and 4 foreign nationals imprisoned for non-political crimes. But posing a greater problem for the agents were 500 liberated prisoners of war who had been sent or brought back by tactical U.S. troops and more than one thousand civilians of various nationalities who had been confined within its walls.

To furrow the brows of the CIC agents even more, eighty sets of cell keys were in the hands of the prisoners and the soldiers billeted in part of the prison. Daily the number of internees continued to increase until - at the time the 203d CIC Detachment commander, Major H. P. Wardell, wrote to the G2, III Corps, explaining the situation - there were 2,100 people of both sexes inhabiting the institution.

The first problem faced by the agents was to ferret out persons who constituted a threat to military security. An informant network was established keyed around one man whose prison record showed that he had been interned for aiding downed American flyers escaping across Holland.

Secondly, eighteen remaining prison officials, guards and attendants of the former staff of thirty-four were interrogated and investigated. Twelve survived this process and were retained in various capacities. Five, who had been closely affiliated with the Nazi Party, were placed in cells to be turned over to Military Government for ultimate disposition, and one was scheduled to be sent to First Army Interrogation Center for further investigation.

Twenty deserters from the Wehrmacht, in and out of uniform, were sent through prisoner of war channels; three suspects were sent to First Army Interrogation Center as security threats; three others were being held for Military Government prosecution on charges of destroying records; and forty-six suspects were to be released by Military Government when the tactical situation permitted. These seventy-two persons had been sent to the prison by tactical units as "suspicious" during the CIC team's operation there.[129]

129 Ltr from 203d CIC Det, Hq, III Corps, to G2, dated 13 March 45 in Open Rpts L-595, 13 Mar 45. (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The agents also uncovered a war criminal of "the lowest type" among the foreign nationals interned by the Germans. Although thirty-five inmates of various nationalities had come to believe that [redacted] was a former [redacted] who had been interned for insulting German soldiers and for helping Jews, German prison records showed that this crime was blackmailing persons trying to escape from the Nazis. He was turned over to Military Government as a "war criminal." 130

Gamma Swimmers Attempt to Destroy Bridges at Remagen

The rest of the 203d CIC Detachment experienced a similarly eventful period. Having been warned of the attempts of German saboteur-swimmers to sabotage bridges in 21st Army Group area, Army Engineers and Agents of the 203d CIC Detachment cooperated to prevent the success of like attempts against the pontoon bridges at Remagen. 131

Among the measures used at Remagen to ensure their failure were: the placement of searchlights at strategic points; the arrangement of under water nets, booms and barbed wire entanglements; the utilization of self-propelled guns; and the instruction to all river guards to fire on all floating objects. 132

Effective security was obtained by adherence to all counterintelligence proposals. Corps and Division CIC units assisted further by cooperating with Military Government in the evacuation of all civilians from the area by thoroughly screening civilians hired for administrative and military duties, and by making all communications secure. 133

On the night of 16-17 March, seven German frogmen - called Flusskaempfer (river fighters) by the Germans, but Gamma Swimmers by the Allies - plunged into the murky Rhine to make the try. The U.S. Army was ready for them. When the battle was over, one of the saboteurs had been wounded fatally and three were captives. A fourth was captured later. The sixth, had taken eight "pep" tablets, instead of the prescribed two, it was learned, and his heart reacted so violently that he was unable to continue. He returned to his own lines. The seventh swimmer was never accounted for, but the pontoon bridges at Remagen were unmolested. 134

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130 III Corps, G2 Periodical Rpt #90, dtd 10 Mar 45 (SOURCE: G2 Journal, 11 Mar 45 (UNCLASSIFIED)

131 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) Vol IV, pg 333 (Restricted) (Staff and Faculty Library)

132 203d CIC Monthly Information Report for Mar, 1945, dtd 3 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

133 III Corps Periodical Rpt #96, dtd 17 Mar 45, III Corps G2 Journal, L-595, 17 Mar 45, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

134 12th Army Group Rpt of Operations (Final After-Action Report) Vol IV pg 333, (Restricted) (Staff and Faculty Library)

The special security regulations established by Major Wardell's CIC Detachment were recognized in Twelfth Army Group's 418th CIC Detachment's Monthly Bulletin as being partially responsible for the failure of the saboteurs.[135]

To agents of the 203d CIC fell the task of interrogating the three members of the group who were captured on the night of the action. The fourth prisoner, who stroked to the American side of the Rhine after a bullet punctured the float bearing his explosives, hid in the bushes along the river for two-and-one-half days before being spotted and captured by tactical troops. A Corps Prisoner of War Interrogator Team interrogated him.

From the interrogations much was learned about the training and equipment of the "Gamma Swimmers" and about the efficiency of the barriers the U.S. Army had placed in their path. Only one of the group, an officer, claimed that he could have succeeded. He had, with an enlisted man teammate, approached one of the bridges, but his companion received a fatal wound and the officer deserted his mission to aid the soldier. The other two captives had quit after losing their explosives as the result of diving to avoid fire from the shore. Their search for the charges left them exhausted and they swam to the shore and surrendered.

There was a great deal of interest shown in the fourth prisoner's ability to remain undetected for almost sixty hours, despite his frogman attire, but questions along that line led the interrogators nowhere. The river fighter incoherently expressed only bewilderment at German's continuance of the fight.[136]

One Bad Try Deserves Another

The complete rout of the Remagen group did not postpone plans the Germans had for the bridges crossing the Rhine in the vicinity of Oppenheim. On 24 March, five members of the first group's sister team dived into the Rhine. Two of this group were captured and three were unaccounted for, but no harm came to the bridges. One of the prisoners had actually reached the pontoon bridges, but his explosives had previously become so entangled in one of the nets that he had punctured the float, sinking his chances of doing real damage to American efforts. When shells started exploding around him, he wisely surrendered.

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135 418th CIC Det, 12th Army Group, CIC Monthly Bulletin "3, 6 May 45 (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library)

136 III Corps G2 Periodical Rpt #98, dtd 19 Mar 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 3-4 Apr 45 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.); and III Corps Daily IPW Rpt #80, in III Corps G2 Jnl, L-595, 21 Mar 45 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
Note: Detailed information concerning the training and equipment of the Gamma Swimmers attached as Appendix 1.

All six captives were transferred to Twelfth Army Group's Counterintelligence Interrogation Center where it was learned that the officer who claimed he might have succeeded had been the commander of all German Flusskaempfer units. His boss was none other than Lt Col Otto Skorzeny. Skorzeny had again come out the loser in his running battle with the U.S. Army and CIC.

The next stop for the six swimming saboteurs was a piece of dry land known as Prisoner of War Continental Central Enclosure Number Seventeen.[137]

Ah, Spring!

The Rhine River was full of surprises. No sooner had the threat of swimming saboteurs at Remagen been removed when a harbinger of spring emerged from those waters: a maiden in search of a mate. The young German girl told agents of the 203d CIC Detachment about the frightful man shortage at her Luftwaffe ground observer post, where she served as a German WAC. According to the report, "Ten-to-one is a bad state of affairs," said the girl to her interrogators. There were 200 girls in her camp and only twenty middle-aged men, mostly married...'They' told her that she should fight to the last man but the girl had come home to fight for the last man...For the time being, however, the report concluded, "she will take her pick at a Prisoner of War Enclosure somewhere in Europe, where on good authority we know that men (prisoners of war) are plentiful."[138]

A Stay-Behind Team Gets Caught

The airplane spotter described above was a rather harmless variety of "watcher," but other Germans were assigned the task of watching--and reporting--the movements of U.S. troops, their numbers and their equipment.

On 6 March, Freiderich Gustave Rohlfing and his campanion, Klaus Emil Arthur Lubold, a Hitler Jugend member, passed the screening at Antweiler, Germany, without detection. They proceeded to the vicinity of Satzvey to search for a hidden bunker to which they had been assigned. On the morning of 7 March, they found it. In the bunker were enough stores and equipment to keep the radio agent Rohlfing and his Hitler Jugend "feeder' operative for some time, In fact, everything had gone as promised by the German Intelligence Service except for one oversight.

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137 12th AG, Counterintelligence Interrogation Center, Rpt, titles "Rhine Bridge Sabotage Missions," dated 9 Apr 45, 207th CIC Det, Rpt on the Case of the Rhine Bridge Sabotage Missions Fldr, (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25097) (CONFIDENTIAL)

138 G2 Periodical Rpt #282, FUSA, dtd 19 Mar 45, extract from III Corps Opns Rpts, L-557 (16), 18 Mar 45 (Unclassified)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The manual containing call signs and frequency schedules was missing. Once a day on 9, 10, and 11 March, Rohlfing sent messages requesting this information. There was no answer. At noon on 11 March, an officer and a non-commissioned officer of a U.S. artillery group were led to the bunker by a German forester who had noticed the two German agents. Rohlfing and his "feeder" were captured and turned over to V Corps CIC where interrogation revealed much about their training and background.[139]

VI Corps CIC: Some Special Cases

Among the special activities reported by the 206th CIC Detachment in March were the arrests of a German national who varied his story often but failed to incriminate himself into a counterintelligence category; of an ex-Gestapo chauffeur who gave valuable information on Gestapo personalities; of two Hitler Jugend agents at a roadblock in Wissembourg who subsequently confessed to espionage; and of a colonel in the Sturmabteilungen (SA, or Nazi Party Storm Troops). With the exception of the Sturmabteilungen colonel who was interned immediately in accordance with policy, all other arrestees were sent to other authorities for further investigation and disposition.[140]

VIII Corps CIC: Too Busy

Teams One, Two, and Three and the Administration Section of the 208th CIC Detachment, during this time, moved about seventy miles - from Luxembourg to the Rhine.

One of the Detachment's constant counterintelligence measures was the blackout check. During the night, agents would check to see if any light was escaping from the Command Post or from homes in neighboring towns. Reports stated the blackout usually was executed satisfactorily.[141]

Most arrestees were minor party leaders and long term party members, the leading Nazis having fled before the American advance. Some Gestapo informers and "probable" spies were reported by the Detachment during the period, but no case of exceptional counterintelligence interest developed.

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139 First U.S. Army Annex 4 to G2 Periodical Rpt #290, 25 Mar 45 in Opn Rpts L-557 FUSA (23) (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)and 12th AG Rpt of Opns (FAAR) Vol IV, pg 328-9

140 VI Corps CIC Det, Monthly Intelligence Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 1 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

141 Reports of Blackout Checks, 208th CIC Det, 14-15 Mar 45, to G2 VIII Corps, in 208th CIC Det Correspondence Files 2/45-9/45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

The "Team" concept, initiated at Corps level by the 208th CIC Detachment, called for the utilization of four teams of four men each and one of three men, the latter assigned to Corps Detention Camp. The Administration team was established at Corps Command Post and was headed by the Detachment Commander. The other three teams were operating in the field and, at the end of this period, were responsible for three areas, one around Andernach, one around Adenau, and one at Kottenheim. This was an area of responsibility more than twenty miles deep that was constantly changing and that would continue to change since it was directly behind the Remagen bridgehead.[142]

Teams of the 208th CIC Detachment appeared to have had little time for investigation and, with the exception of routine security checks, could concern themselves only with German nationals who were in or near the automatic arrest category, with liaison with divisional CIC detachments under their jurisdiction working on both sides of the Rhine, and on liaison missions to neighboring corps CIC detachments and to T-Force CIC in Koblenz.[143]

The 212th CIC Detachment: Perseverance Pays Off

Five days of investigation led to the arrest of an enemy agent by members of the 212th CIC Detachment. 2d Lt. Carlos D. Smith and Special Agents John J. Adams, William J. Syring, and Joseph B. Shire, acting upon a report from 2d Cavalry Group that a Prisoner of War had helped an enemy line-crosser recently, began the investigation, guided only by a description of the agent and the prisoner of war's belief that the man had once lived in Dickweiler, Luxembourg. Descriptions of all residents of that town and surrounding towns who had fled with the Germans were acquired and compared, and various leads were followed up, with no positive results. When re-interviewed, the mayor of Dickweiler recalled seeing a former resident of Osweiler on the streets of Luxembourg City a few hours before. The man had left Osweiler in 1943, but the mayor's fine memory had placed him on sight. This lead proved a good one, and the man was arrested.

Twenty minutes of interrogation established him as the agent CIC was seeking. One day preceeding his identification by the mayor, he had completed a two-week sentence as a violator of travel restrictions, imposed after being picked up at a Division Counterintelligence Control Line.

142 208th CIC Det CI Rpt #8, for period 6 Mar - 20 Mar 45, in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Repts (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

143 208th CIC Det Teams Daily Reports, 7-25 March, in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts 1/45 - 6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

In his two days of freedom, the agent had changed his address three times. With his apprehension by 212th CIC Detachment agents, his moving days were over.

This detachment had two other significant cases during this period. One involved a curfew violator, who when arrested by the Military Police had produced a New York City birth certificate, claiming to be a citizen of the United States. Special Agents Harold B. Proudfoot, Joseph B. Shire, and Military Intelligence Interpreter M/Sgt Howard Menke interrogated the man, and, after catching him in one lie after another, discovered that he had been in the Wehrmacht and had been discharged to serve with the Gestapo. He was on a mission as a stay-behind agent when arrested.

Equally interesting was the interrogation of a civilian who had been arrested by the Security Patrol of 2d Cavalry Group for being in an evacuated zone. He said he was a forced laborer who had spent four days on the road trying to return to France. Yet he was clean-shaven and there was no mud on his shoes, despite the fact that he would have crossed four rivers, each with few bridges, if his story were true.

At first he stated that there were no rivers between his starting point and his point of arrest, but altered this story and said he had crossed one "in a rubber boat." The CIC interrogators, 2d Lt. Donald G. Avery and Special Agent Burton E. Fulmer, with the aid of a civilian interpreter, kept at him until he admitted being a German agent who had been parachuted into the area during the night.[144]

219th CIC Exposes Two Gestapo Informants

Dissemination of information again proved its value on 20 March 1945, when two Belgians who had crossed the Rhine from German-held Dusseldorf to American-occupied Oberkassel and identified themselves as "forced laborers" were apprehended by the Oberkassel Team of the 219th CIC Detachment. The espionage agents were first placed in the spptlight of counterintelligence suspicion when displaced persons told U.S. troops at a Displaced Persons Camp that the two Belgians were not "good Belgians." The Oberkassel CIC Team was called in to verify or dispel these suspicions. Because the names of the two men appeared on a list of all Gestapo informants, compiled by XIX Corps CIC at Rheydt after interrogation of a former secretary in the Dusseldorf Gestapo Headquarters, CIC was able to give a ready answer to the inquiry.

144 XII Corps CIC Monthly Information Report for March 1945, dated 8 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty)

After CIC in Oberkassel arrested them, the Belgians admitted readily that they were espionage agents with a political and tactical mission for the Gestapo.[145]

XX Corps CIC: With Third Army in Germany

In Ehrang, Germany, a German national presented himself to Military Government Detachment F2 G2 as an anti-Nazi who was eager to cooperate with the Allies. Interrogated by agents of the 220th CIC Detachment, he told a story of intrigue, the high point of which featured his cooperation with a British agent who drove a large Mercedes car. He and the British agent, he said, lighted lanterns on railroad tunnels during air raids, sabotaged machinery in large factories, destroyed ammunition, and transmitted information to the Allies. Unfortunately, he did not know the British agent's last name or his whereabouts, although allegedly they had labored together for two years. Nor did he know the birthdate, occupation, or father's name of Karl Engelhardt, his own alias, information which was available on the Wehrpass he claimed to have used for two years as identification.

Giving the man the benefit of the doubt, CIC sent him to a higher echelon where he might try to verify his own identity or the existence of the British agent.

The Polite Civilian

Amid the confusion in the town of Worms, 220th CIC Detachment agents noticed an extremely courteous act and became suspicious. A man in civilian clothes had taken a woman's satchel and seemed to be carrying it for her. When the agents approached the couple, the woman readily admitted that the man had accosted her a few minutes before, insisting that she let him carry the bag. Initially, the suspect claimed that he was a forced laborer who had returned to "liberated Worms." However, firm interrogation led him to admit that he was a German non-commissioned officer, one of about 200 soldiers in civilian clothes trying to make their way to the German side of the Rhine.

In Kirscheim-Bolanden, Germany, the CIC interrogator of a Schutz Staffeln officer who had also been an informer for the Sicherheitsdienst was so successful at breaking down the suspect's story that the German officer gave information which led to the arrest of a Schutz Staffeln Lieutenant Colonel who was the inspector of work camps on the West Wall and "the most prominent Nazi in the region."[146]

145 219th CIC Det, Hq XX Corps CIC Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 11 Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty)

146 220th CIC Det, Hq XX Corps, Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 4 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty)

Divisional CIC Detachments: The 2d CIC Detachment

A site of horror and Nazi terrorism was uncovered by agents of the 2d CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt. Thomas D. McLaughlin, in March 1945. The Heilanstalt (insane asylum) at Hadamar, Germany, one of six such institutions authorized by law in Germany, had been the scene of Nazi "mercy" killings. In the basement of the asylum, 15,000 human beings had been gassed. Some feeble-minded, some incurables had been killed. Others had been slaughtered for political reasons or for having Jewish blood in their veins.

Thirty-five hundred other persons had been starved and then innoculated. These, unlike the 15,000 whose bodies had been cremated, were buried - twenty to the grave.

The Detachment turned its findings, including information on some of the "doctors" and "nurses," to the Army Military Government Officer. Military Government continued the investigation.[147]

For the rest of the month, things were comparatively calm for the 2d CIC Detachment. On 18 March the agents arrested three persons who had crossed the Rhine in a boat. Investigation at First Army Interrogation Center established one as a genuine deserter and the other two as displaced persons.[148]

Armored Detachments: Few Reports

Few reports of activities of armored division CIC detachments are available. That they performed counterintelligence tasks at all is often indicated only by Group, Army, or Corps summaries or through Interrogation Center bulletins.

A First Army Interrogation Center Bulletin revealed that the 503d CIC Detachment arrested one Gestapo informer, and that 507th CIC Detachment arrested ten Hitler Jugend agents in March. The informer, a French national, was sent to French authorities. The ten youthful agents were turned over to Military Government for final disposition. The following story was representative of this group's unsuccessful attempts at espionage. Kurt Broda, a twenty-one year old German youth with a crippled arm, was possed with the desire to aid his country. He was unfit for regular military service, but he had been allowed to serve as clerk in a reserve trench-digging unit. On 20 February 1945, he was offered a "suicide mission" and accepted, although warned that he had only one chance in five of not being captured and shot. After a radio refresher course, Broda was sent across the lines as a "feeder" (an observer and runner), but he could not find the German

147 2d CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for March 1945, dtd 2 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty)

148 Op Cit, First Army Interrogation Center, Bulletin #8, (CONFIDENTIAL)

Intelligence Service sergeant with whom he was to work. Broda then followed his alternate mission: to remain behind the lines for two or three weeks and then cross back to German lines by swimming the Rhine. On March 8, in Sollar, Germany, Broda and a seventeen year old Hitler Jugend companion were stopped at a roadblock when the guard became suspicious of a black box Broda was carrying. When it was found to contain a radio generator, the pair were arrested by agents of the 7th Armored CIC Detachment. Under interrogation at First Army Interrogation Center, Broda and his companion confessed to the espionage mission.[149]

506th CIC Develops an Effective "Modus Operandi"

The 506th CIC Detachment added a new technique in communications counter-intelligence. Given the responsibility of cooperating with the Signal Corps in the neutralization of telephonic facilities, agents of the Detachment turned the "chore" to good advantage. They would stand guard over the local Burgermeister and make him call ahead to the next town to find out what the tactical situation was there. Several times it was learned that "white flags" were flying, and 6th Armored Division could roll into the area without long reconnaissance delays.

In another case not specifically within the CIC mission, agents of the Detachment experimented, together with Military Government, in a precursory audit of German banks in Mulhausen. Six banks were investigated and, in all of them, half of the funds were found to have been assigned to "The Peoples Health and Protection Bureau" of the Party. Persons with access to these funds were local Nazi officials and Nazi officials from Berlin. Among the procedures the Detachment, commanded by Capt. Judson B. De Loach, considered routine for its agent personnel were: to check civilians at random when engaged in a fast moving situation (at least one agent was kept free from other duties just for this purpose, and invariably this technique produced results); and to check hotels in all towns, since "wanted" personalities were often discovered in these establishments and information on others on the blacklist often could be located in hotel records.[150]

5th CIC Detachment: Quick Coverage

Sixty towns in five Kreise (districts) fell to the Red Diamond Division in twenty days, and the 5th CIC Detachment had the responsibility for initial counter-intelligence coverage in each of them. Agents of the Detachment barely had time

149 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) Vol IV (Restricted) (Staff and Faculty Library) and 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

150 506th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for Mar 45, dtd 8 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

to compile target sheets on each town and turn them over to XII Corps CIC. Thorough coverage of every town was impossible at division level. Eleven counterintelligence suspects, 199 German deserters, five Volkssturm members and five members of Organization Todt were placed in prisoner of war channels during the period, and 152 displaced persons, forced laborers and escaped prisoners of war were screened and referred to Military Government. Eighty-six other individual suspects were transferred to XII Corps CIC during the period.

The 5th CIC Detachment also developed new information which showed that the underground organization known as Raecher Deutscher Ehre (Avengers of German Honor) was functional. The 216th CIC Detachment had dismissed this enemy group as a "product of . . . imagination." The mission of the organization was, oddly enough, to prevent Germans from fraternizing with Americans. Not much else was known about the group, but it was not considered a major threat.[151]

The 8th CIC Detachment: A Confusing Report

If its Monthly Information Report for March was written accurately, the 8th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt. Arthur J. Newtown, was remiss in its counterintelligence efforts. The brief resume, placed under the Special Cases topic, noted:

> "Nothing in the way of unusual cases in which a knowledge of methods used will be beneficial to other CIC Detachments in training or in the field. All saboteurs and espionage agents apprehended during this period by this Detachment were apprehended through informants or through detailed interrogation of suspects who were "broken" and furnished leads to other agents. All total (sic), 26 established agents were apprehended during the period, along with seven complete demolition/sabotage kits."[152]

The First Army's Interrogation Center's Bulletin for the period indicated that only twenty suspects from the 8th CIC Detachment were given intensive interrogation at that level - where most enemy agents captured in that Army area were sent before final disposition was made. Five of these were of no Counterintelligence interest and evacuated as displaced persons. One was interned as a security threat. Eight investigations had not been completed by the end of the month (though two had progressed sufficiently to indicate possible guilt) and six, not

151. 5th Inf Div G2 After-Action Rpt, 1-31 Mar 45, 305-2 (6610) Master (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

152 8th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for Mar 45, dtd 1 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

twenty-six, were established as enemy agents. Five of these were of the Hitler Jugend variety.[153]

9th CIC Detachment Across the Rhine

The CIC Detachment with the 9th Infantry Division, one of the first organizations to cross the Rhine, was active removing security threats within the bridgehead.

Agents arrested a German civilian on the basis of an informant's report that the suspect had told him of firing at American troops across the Rhine. The civilian, though at first protesting that he had only asked to feel a German soldier's weapon, admitted to the statement, "We shot across." On 14 March, the arrestee was sent to Army Interrogation Center as a war criminal.

A Russian worker, who had been in Germany since 1942, told 9th CIC Detachment Agents an intricate story of his sabotage on the Allies' behalf, of his subsequent escape from the death sentence by falling out of a truck, of his aid to a British agent in a German general's uniform, of another arrest and escape from a concentration camp, and of a third arrest and sentence to a concentration camp near Bonn. Doubting his story, the agent arrested the Russian on 19 March and sent him rearward to the First Army Interrogation Center as a possible enemy agent.[154]

At the Interrogation Center, apparently, the Russian faced further doubt. Finally, the suspect named a man who would verify his story. When found and questioned about the Russian, this man turned out to be the Gestapo agent who had chased the Russian all over Germany and finally arranged his imprisonment. As the Interrogation Center's bulletin said, "Case closed: One innocent released, one Gestapo agent locked up."

The 9th CIC Detachment also sent two suspected enemy agents back to First Army Interrogation Center, but investigators there established that the two were merely escapees from a German penal camp. They were evacuated as prisoners of war.[155]

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153 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

154 9th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 1 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

155 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

514th CIC Detachment Reaps Dividends

The efforts made by the 514th CIC Detachment to ensure complete reporting of incidents occuring in their area proved their worth in the case of Johann Fels. Lengthy interrogation failed to disrupt Fels' prepared story until he used a preposition which differed from that on the arrest report. Suspect claimed he was on his way "to" Wissembourg; the arrest report indicated he was coming "from" Wissembourg. The inconsistency caused Fels to vary his story, creating new areas of inconsistency, until his story finally burst like a pin-pricked balloon.

Through cooperation with unit commanders, a list had been prepared of various soldiers who could translate documents of different languages. A piece of paper which Fels claimed he had found on the street, written in Yiddish in a peculiar script, was translated by a group of these linguists, increasing CIC's suspicion of the arrestee by linking him with a land swindler.[156]

A Slowdown for 29th CIC Detachment

The 29th CIC Detachment, after its auspicious activity earlier in March, remained in the Muenchen-Gladbach area with the mission of "Rear Area Security and Military Government" until 19 April. Displaced persons proved the biggest problem, with Prisoners of War the next most vexing. In general, 29th CIC Detachment's activities for the remainder of March could be summed up in the words, "routine security."[157]

One case illustrated the need for CIC to halt assemblies of persons in occupied countries. A meeting of fifteen persons in Muenchen-Gladbach was raided by a team of four agents and an interpreter, led by 1st Lt. Andrew Van Otten, at 0950 hours on 25 March. All participants were arrested, several of whom admitted Nazi party membership. While ostensibly a meeting for the revitalization of local commerce, the possibility existed that it had been called with subversive intentions. Regardless of the reason, the gathering was obviously in violation of the Military Government decree that no assemblages of more than five persons were permissible. In this report to Military Government, Lieutenant Van Otten recommended "that these men be tried and given a good stiff sentence and that the entire

156 514th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for March 1945, dtd 31 March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

157 29th CIC Det CI Periodic Rpt, 19 Mar - 19 Apr 45, dtd 20 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Hq Correspondence Files June 44-Nov 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25094)

town of Muenchen-Gladbach be made aware of this sentence so as to prevent a recurrence of any similar meetings and also to impress on all Germans the fact that we are the ones who will designate when and where and if any meetings are to be held."[158]

29th CIC Sets Up SOP

Captain Mayfield, Detachment Commander and Division Counterintelligence Officer, developed a SOP for 29th Division CIC operations, dated 21 March, which outlined duties which were specifically applicable to divisional CIC organizations.

Under the topic, Primary Duties of CIC, Captain Mayfield stated that one or more CIC agents would accompany the advance party of Military Government personnel into newly-captured areas for the purpose of outlining to officials the security restrictions to be placed on the population and of informing them that the responsibility for unqualified compliance with the regulations rested with them, as appointed representatives. Depending upon the size of the community and the priority of other CIC missions, the accompanying CIC personnel could undertake a brief preliminary interrogation and investigation to determine the major officials' suitability, in light of existing regulations. Valuable CIC targets of opportunity were to take precedence over these investigations, but, where possible, the CIC Agents were to advise Military Government in advance of entry whether a preliminary screening was to be attempted.

The remainder of the procedure involved practices which had become standard throughout the theater and which were not restricted to division CIC detachments.[159]

The 63d CIC Detachment: Ask Questions Later

The 63d CIC Detachment, during the offensive, barely had time to screen civilians for police duty before moving on. Occasionally, agents discovered that some of the persons being screened for these positions had definite Nazi Party affiliations. All suspects were cast into jail pending further investigation by succeeding CIC organizations. While this was not the handling prescribed, it took less time than any other.

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158 29th Inf Div, Memo to Mg Det H1H2, dtd 25 Mar, Subj: "Arrest of Civilians attending an Unauthorized Meeting," 29th CIC Det, Hq Corress. file (Record of Arrests) June 44-May 45 (Unclassified)(Kansas City Record Center Bx25094)

159 29th Inf Div, dtd 21 Mar, SOP for Div CIC Opns, 29th CIC Det, Hq, Corres, June 44-Sep 45 (Folder General Detachment Interest)(CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25094)

Three agents of this Detachment accompanied Task Force Harris which captured the cities of Neunkirchen, St. Ingbert, and Homberg, Germany. The CIC Team closely cooperated with Military Government and selected and appointed a mayor and a new police force in Neunkirchen, the task force's primary target.[160]

65th CIC Detachments on the Move

The 65th CIC Detachment, under the command of Capt. S.B. Tynes, one of the first CIC detachments assigned to a division of the Fifteenth Army to see action in Germany, reported that this was a period of constant movement for them. In the "few hours to 48 hours" that they remained in each community the agents attempted to fulfill their mission, seizing post offices, police and party headquarters, banks and black list personalities, but they explained in their March 1945 Information Report that the time element caused investigations to be "expedient and haphazard" and they urged "that scrutiny of officials should continue."[161]

The Fighting 69th's CIC Detachment Gets Help

To aid the 69th CIC Detachment to "speed up the screening of the area of responsibility" which included "many square miles of enemy territory" during the Division's advance, German-speaking personnel of the Prisoner of War Interpreter, Military Intelligence Interpreter, Positive Intelligence and Order of Battle Teams were made available to the Detachment.[162]

Three suspected line crossers arrested by the Detachment were cleared of counterintelligence charges by First Army Interrogation Center. Apparently no other cases from 69th CIC Detachment reached Army level.[163]

70th CIC Detachment: One of the Most Outstanding Cases

In addition to retrieving a French female agent employed by Seventh Army's Office of Strategic Services who had been stopped on a bridge in Saarbrucken by Military Government officials and returning her to that headquarters, agents of

160 63d CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 31 Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

161 65th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for March 45, dtd 3 Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

162 69th Inf Div, G2 After Action Report, undated, 369-2(12131) Master (Unclassified)(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

163 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44 - Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097).

the 70th CIC Detachment handled a number of cases in this period, the most important of which took two of their agents underground.

This case began when the Chief of Police of Dudweiler, Germany, whom CIC had previously determined to be reliable, brought to CIC Agents Henry Hoebel and James Olsen a local man who told that he was to meet a German officer named Wahlster who would take him to an assembly of Schutz Staffeln men in a secret hideout. The Agents told the man to proceed to his meeting with Wahlster.

The CIC agents tailed the informant and seized Wahlster, and then forced him to lead them and a contingent of combat troops to the rendezvous point, an elaborate underground cave, formerly a civilian air raid shelter. The main entrance had been demolished but two others, carefully camouflaged, had been constructed. There were several rooms, well provisioned with food, medical supplies, weapons, and munitions. The shelter was to serve as headquarters for a Wehrwolf cell, Wahlster later admitted under interrogation, while also telling of the general organization of the Wehrwolf system in the Rhineland.

Unfortunately, the Schutz Staffeln men never showed up at the meeting: apparently they had learned about the squad of American riflemen waiting for them to arrive and decided against it.[164]

Olsen and Hoebel were awarded Bronze Star Medals for their "courageous efficiency. . . in the pursuit of (their) mission . . ."[165]

The Detachment, in the same period, neutralized two other enemy agents and arrested a high-ranking automatic arrestee. Their work was recognized as superior by Col. William W. Quinn, Seventh Army G2, who complimented the 70th CIC Detachment for their work on these cases, as follows:

> "1. The apprehension by the 70th CIC Detachment of German Lieutenant Edouard WAHLSTER, and the discovery of a cache containing numerous weapons and demolitions material has developed into one of the most important counterintelligence finds in Seventh Army. Members of the 70th assured a higher degree of security for Seventh Army by its alertness in eliminating a unit of the German underground resistance movement.

164 Extract from 70th Inf Div, Reported in G2 Info Bull #56, Hqs, 7th U.S.Army dtd 4 Apr 45; G2 Jnl & File, FUSA, 8 Apr 45 (Unclassified) Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va., and interview with James Olsen, NCICA Convention, Chicago, Ill., 6-8 Aug 54.

165 201 File, S/Sgt James Olsen, 36, 254, 844, CIC, 70th CIC Det; Also, Hoebel, Henry, 13126110, S/Sgt, CIC, 70th CIC Det.

"2. The detection and neutralization of Louis FONTAINE, agent of Abwehr III, the apprehension of Grenadier Werner Ehrhardt, who was sought for espionage, and the security arrest of Allegemeine SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, acting Mayor of Saarbrucken, are gratifying indications of the professional attainments of your CIC personnel.

"3. I wish to express my appreciation for the superior work done by the 70th CIC Detachment." [166]

71st CIC Detachment Activities

1st Lt. Frank C. Zabaldano, 71st CIC Detachment Commander, partially solved his linguistic problems by obtaining permission from the Division Commanding General to recruit from the Division three men who possessed not only linguistic fluency but also "the common sense necessary to carry on an interrogation." The Commanding General stipulated that they could be chosen from any organization except infantry.

Tactical information obtained from civilians during routine counterintelligence screening was recognized as quite accurate by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon leader to whom it was submitted. In Schwegenheim, Germany, Agents of the Detachment arrested a Nazi Ortsgruppenleiter who had destroyed his party credentials, and in Speyer a man named Heinrich Thiery who was wanted by XXI Corps. Wholesale lots of party and government records were found in Pirmasens, Germany. [167]

The 80th CIC Detachment Lands a Big One

A personal friend of the Fuehrer's - among the first captured - was apprehended during the screening of Volksturm members in Bad Durkheim, Germany, on 22 March by agents of 80th CIC Detachment. Capt. Thomas R. McMillen's Detachment had indeed captured a key Nazi figure, the holder of membership card #325, but Ludwig Liebel, unlike others who were attempting to destroy

166 Ltr, Hq, Seventh Army, G2, Subject: 70th CIC Det, to G2, 70th Inf Div, dtd 31 Mar 45, Inclosure to 70th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for Mar 45, dtd 7 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

167 71st CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 31 Mar 45 (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library); and 71st Inf Div G2 Jnl, 20-23 Mar 45, in Periodic Rpts and Journals, 71st Inf Div (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

their association with the party, maintained his staunch admiration of Hitler, the man he had represented on "peace missions" to most of the countries of Europe which later felt the heel of the German boot. He was interned. [168]

83d CIC Detachment: Static on the Rhine

The 83d Infantry Division, like many others in this period, roared across Germany to the west bank of the Rhine and, finding the bridges blown, halted. The 83d CIC Detachment, at this point, found itself once more in a static situation, and set about its business of screening the 70,000 Germans in civilian clothes in the Oberkassel and Neuss areas. High ranking Nazis had fled and many of their party records had been disposed of, but agents of the 83d CIC Detachment, by interviews and by piecing together information which had been left behind, were able to delineate a complete picture of the Gestapo unit in Neuss and of the Nazi Party luminaries in Oberkassel. All Germans found crossing the Rhine were placed under controlled house arrest and 210 prisoners of war were discovered. The police force and civil administration appointed by Military Government were screened by CIC. [169]

One of the major activities in the Oberkassel-Neuss area for the 83d CIC Detachment was the prevention of enemy communication across the Rhine river. Cables in post offices in both cities were cut, but it was discovered that the Neuss cable had been spliced by the Germans within forty-eight hours of the American occupation on the assumption that the Americans would fail to discover them. Reports were received that several factories in these cities had direct telephonic communication with German-held Dusseldorf and, where these reports were substantiated, CIC and Signal personnel cut the lines. Reports of alleged wire tapping activity were investigated, all with negative results.

Military Government issued a proclamation ordering all radio transmitters, carrier pigeons, and other means of communication to be turned in by the inhabitants of the areas. Four baskets of pigeons were presented to CIC which passed them on to a non-commissioned officer from a Signal Corps pigeon company.

An informant outlined to CIC agents an interesting sabotage plan which the Germans had devised to prevent the allies from using German production plants without actually destroying the facilities. The idea was to hide vital components

168 Hq 80th Inf Div, 80th CIC Det MIR (Monthly Intelligence Report) of Mar 45 dated 2 Apr 45, s/Thomas R. McMillen, Capt, CO (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library #010838)

169 83d CIC Det, Narrative, undated, unsigned, Opns Rpt 207.03, 383-CIC-0.3 (11786) Jan-May 45 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch), AGO, Alexandria, Va.

of the machinery which the Allies could not replace. In this way the Germans, at some later date, could take these components out of hiding, put them back in the machines, and go into production without much effort. However, no incidents of this or any other type of sabotage were reported by 83d CIC Detachment. In order to provide coverage for this well-populated area, the 83d CIC Detachment was supplemented by three men on Detached Service from Division, four prisoner of war interpreter personnel, four Field Security Police agents, and four CIC agents from Corps. With the sixteen CIC agents from the Detachment active at this time, the total strength of the organization was thirty-one.

CIC posters addressed to German Prisoners of War in civilian clothes accounted for seventy-seven of 210 persons in this category found during the screening of 13,741 male civilians of military age. The seventy-seven had turned themselves in.

Twenty-one persons in Neuss were placed under house arrest. Eleven of these were Rhine crossers who had been cleared of suspicion by CIC. Two who later broke house arrest restrictions were awaiting trial by Military Government and faced jail sentences. Radical Nazis were also placed under house arrest, to prevent them from inciting less radical followers to non-cooperation with Military Government, and to serve as a non-deterrent to others who might wish to take up the cry of "non-collaboration."

All Nazis were recommended for dismissal from office, as were all others on whom "reliable" derogatory information had been collected.[170]

89th Has Busy First Month

The 89th CIC Detachment, which entered the combat area during this period under command of 1st Lt. Robert H. Gelineau, found themselves in a fast moving situation. Moving up to the Sauer River on 11 March, they began an offensive that took them across the Sauer on the 12th, the Moselle on the 17th, and the Rhine on the 26th. Between 11 and 31 March they arrested 296 persons; screened, 2,498 Displaced Persons; established as Prisoners of War 236 persons found in civilian clothes; and interrogated concerning their military status 1,267 civilians of military age. A total of sixty-one towns were covered by the detachment.[171]

170 83d CIC Det Counterintelligence Periodic Rpts, 19 Feb-19 Mar 45, dtd 19 Mar 45 in 83d CIC Det Periodic Intelligence Rpts Jul 44 - Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25095)

171 89th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, 12 Feb 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library) 89th Inf Div After Action Rpts, 389-2 (12635) Master, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va., and Army Almanac.)

99th CIC Detachment: Screening with a New Approach

The 99th CIC Detachment, during March, under the command of Capt. George D. Young, sent ten persons to First Army Interrogation Center. Five, in the automatic arrest category, were interned; four others were cleared of counterintelligence charges; and the fifth, a suspected line crosser, was held at the interrogation center for further investigation.[172]

As the result of a two day search of Division area, eighty-six Prisoners of War were uncovered, along with eighty other alleged former members of the Wehrmacht who were unable to produce satisfactory identification, 800 displaced were grouped, several potential informants revealed, and a considerable amount of military equipment was confiscated.

The mechanics of this screening brought to light a previously unreported technique. In the procedure followed by the 99th CIC Detachment, each Regiment was assigned an area of responsibility, with teams composed of a CIC representative, a Military Government representative, and two or more squads of infantry, depending upon the size of towns within the area.

Before the screening was begun, guards were placed on all roads leading out of each zone, and patrols were assigned routes, sealing the area against travel. In each town, as the screening team entered, the Burgermeister was contacted and told to gather the townspeople in a central place with all weapons and ammunition. When the assembly was complete, a Military Government proclamation was read, outlining the laws concerning retention of military equipment and those dealing with German soldiers in civilian clothes who failed to surrender themselves. While the townspeople were in one group, a patrol travelled the area looking for stragglers. Captain Young, in the Detachment's Monthly Information Report, stated that "the populace as a whole seemed most anxious to obey all commands issued by the screening parties."[173]

The 100th CIC Detachment

As part of the Seventh Army offensive force which sprang into action on 15 March, the 100th Infantry Division moved rapidly toward the Rhine, limiting the activities of the 100th CIC Detachment. As the Detachment moved with the Division, there was little chance for completion of investigations. Two suspected enemy agents and one definite security threat were discovered by agents of the Detachment, commanded by Capt. Anthony R. Mattos, and turned over to higher authority.

172 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

173 99th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 8 Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

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One suspected agent was arrested on the basis of informant reports which pictured him as a contact for the Gestapo. The suspect claimed that he used a leg injury to dissuade Gestapo Chief Mehl at Bitche from giving him an espionage mission behind American lines, but admitted that he finally turned informer, denouncing "unreliable" persons to the Gestapo. The Detachment turned the suspect over to the XV Corps Detachment for further investigation.

The second suspected agent, a well-travelled Danish newspaper correspondent in Germany, was evacuated to VI Corps CIC Detachment. The man had been a member of the Nazi party since 1929, and at the time of his arrest was Schulrat (School Administrator) for the Gau (Province) of West Mark. In this position, he controlled all secondary schools in the Gau. Because of this position of influence, the man was forwarded through Prisoner of War channels for internment at a higher level. [174]

The 102d CIC Detachment: A Saboteur, A Fire, A War Criminal

Capt. Horace A. Sutton's 102d CIC Detachment was with the Ninth Army's 102d Infantry Division in Germany. On 5 March, in the town of Krefeld, based on a tip from an International News Service correspondent who had acquired the information in an interview with a German civilian, a Nazi known as the "Blutrichter" (Blood Judge) for his merciless court decisions was located and arrested by Special Agents David J. Reisner and Edward W. Hoffer in a hospital where he was recovering from shrapnel wounds. The "Blood judge's" name was placed on the list of war criminals, and the information concerning him was forwarded to Ninth Army, "for war criminal prosecution."

Special Agent Hoffer, four days later, investigated a fire that had destroyed all construction sketches, formulas and intricate machine parts which comprised "the functional heart" of the Siempelkamp Machine Works. Here the processed armor plate for Panther and Tiger tanks, tools for plywood propellors, and machinery used in the production of synthetic gasoline and benzine had been manufactured. Immediately all executives of the plant were interrogated, one emerging as the prime suspect. The man was a fanatical Nazi who had urged the destruction of the factory before Krefeld had fallen, although the owner had protested strongly. Later examination of the wrecked building showed that the doors to fireproofed cabinets which had contained the valuable information had been left ajar prior to the fire.

174 100th CIC Det Monthly Intelligence Report for Mar 45, dtd 5 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

Although not enough evidence could be collected to convict the suspect of sabotage or of being an "undercover Nazi labor spy," he was evacuated as a threat to Allied security.

A bona fide "labor spy," an agent of the Abwehr Economic and Industrial Sabotage Section, surrendered himself to American forces as a member of the Wehrmacht on 14 March, three days after the registration of members of the German Armed Forces in Krefeld. After questioning by Prisoner of War Interrogators, he was referred to CIC as a "possible agent." Intensive interrogation by Special Agent Fred Ronis established him as a "labor spy."

CIC's civilian clothes - long a controversial subject - were considered necessary and their use was successful, by this Detachment, with one alteration. The clothing brought from the United States was replaced by German-manufactured cast-offs. 175

103d CIC Detachment: A Kriminal-Assistant

As in most CIC Detachments assigned to subordinate units of Seventh Army, the 103d CIC Detachment, under the command of 1st Lt. Dugald W. Hudson, accomplished little of dramatic interest during the static phase preceeding the offensive of 15 March. Once the offensive was underway, however, and new territories were liberated or conquered, it was inevitable that persons of counterintelligence interest would appear.

On 23 March, an Oberscharfuehrer was taken first as a Prisoner of War, wearing a Waffen Schutz Staffeln uniform and with a Soldbuch in his possession. Interrogation revealed him to be a Kriminal-Assistant in the Sicherheitspolizei who had been sought for employment as a Gestapo agent, but who had refused the offer. As Kriminal-Assistant, he had been active in the apprehension of anti-Nazis and, in 1943-1944, as an investigator of Greek resistance movements. He held the Nazi Party's Bronze Medal. The Division Detachment forwarded their captive to VI Corps CIC for further investigation, recommending internment. 176

The 104th CIC Detachment Arrests Eight

Eight suspects were sent to First Army by 104th CIC Detachment during the period. Two were established as Hitler Jugend agents with a mission, and investigation of them continued. Out of six "Rhine crossers," apprehended by the Detachment,

175 102d CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 1 Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

176 103d CIC Det for Mar 45 dtd 1 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

two proved to be Displaced Persons; three Prisoners of War, and the other was still under investigation at the end of the month.[177]

The 13th Airborne CIC Detachment: Security in Rear Areas

In an area north of Paris, the 13th Airborne CIC Detachment concentrated on checking civilians and security. Of 382 prospective employees of the U.S. Army, the Detachment discovered forty-four to be of doubtful morality and thirty-four undesirable from a security standpoint because of subversive or disloyal activities.

The Detachment made 108 security checks of Division installations and reported, ". . . at present the Division maintains an excellent physical security set-up."

The investigation of one suspicious person, later discovered to have been using fraudulent Office of Strategic Services identification, resulted in his arrest as a deserter from the Canadian Army and as a black marketeer. Three persons in Belgium were jailed and three American officers in Paris were held under suspicion of conspiring with the Canadian. The investigation initiated by CIC was followed up by Criminal Investigations Division (CID).

Airfield security,[178] especially at bases operated by the Troop Carrier Command, was surveyed by agents of this Detachment " for the purpose of providing the Division, G2, with a general picture of what the security responsibility of airborne troops will cover and what security measures are being taken by the Air Corps to safeguard any impending operation".

The 13th Airborne CIC Detachment claimed close cooperation from the G2 of Division and from the local Oise (France) Base Section CIC, as well as with Military Government. CIC and Military Government even shared quarters in the 13th Airborne Division, and both units planned "on continuing the practice whenever possible."[179]

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177 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25097)

178 A checklist developed sometime during this period which covers security necessary for mounting an airborne operation. Attached as Appendix 3

179 13th CIC Det, Monthly Rpts of CIC Activities, dated 31 Mar 45, in 13 CIC Det Corres File Dec 43 - Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25094)

Airborne Attack Against Wesel: "The Most Successful"

On the night of 23-24 March, a river-breaching bridgehead was established in the British 21st Army Group domain east of the Rhine at Wesel, Germany. Units of the Ninth U.S. Army, under British control, which participated were the 30th and the 79th Infantry Divisions of XVI Corps. These Divisions assaulted the far shore in landing crafts.

This bridgehead secured, airborne troops landed ahead of it, in Operation Varsity, joining up forces in what General Eisenhower called "the most successful airborne operation we carried out during the war."[180]

For the 17th Airborne CIC Detachment, however, the victory was not unmarred. The scrawled, inked daily entries in the War Diary of the 17th Airborne Division's CIC Detachment carried no hint of the tragedy which was imminent. It told of CIC Agents preparing for a mission, systematically, efficiently checking and re-checking security of the area to make sure that the enemy would not learn of the strike. Some of these entries gave a clear picture of Airborne CIC agents before an action getting ready to shoulder the dual responsibility of counterintelligence and combat.

The entry of 22 February 1945 stated: "Cleaning of weapons and servicing of jeeps were begun." Three days later new supplies were received, and "Lt. Whalen of the 18th AB Corps CIC visited this Detachment and G-2."

On 26 February the Detachment "requested and received from Division QM six glider badges for qualified glidermen." In the few days that followed, fingerprints were taken, the Articles of War were read, a film on "Germany" was shown and the repair of the jeeps was completed.

On 2 March, "Lt. (Eldon B) Allen,[181] T/Sgt (Kevin) Burk, T/3 (Ernest M.) Bouchard, T/3 (fnu) Resnick, Sgt (fnu) Lagemann, Pfc (Louis) Fischoff, Pvt. (Gunther) Antler took glider rides today. New weapons were received, stripped and cleaned on the 3d. "The next day the detachment" received a letter from Army Hq (First Allied Airborne Army) ordering glider rides on Feb 8th for T3s Bouchard and Resnick, Pfc Fischoff and Pvt (Anthony J.) Tornetta. Lt Allen and Pvt Tornetta inspected the War Rooms."

180 Op cit, Eisenhower 388-391

181 Lt. Eldon B. Allen, the CIC officer in whose honor Fort Holabird's Allen Hall has been named.

More fingerprinting, receipting of equipment, and glider rides for T/Sgt Erny W. Briggs and the newly-promoted Cpl. Anthony J. Tornetta filled a few more days, and on 9 March, "Lt Allen, T/Sgt Briggs and Cpl Fischoff visited airfields to check security."

Increased Prominence of Airfield Security

From this point on, airfield security assumed paramount importance. Briefing quarters of regiments were also thoroughly checked, and summaries of all security surveys were forwarded to Corps CIC, with the exception of the reports made as a result of a two-day confidential inspection of security at airfields in France, which were carried to the G2 by Lieutenant Allen.

New Men arrived from other units. Lt. Gerard G. Cameron of XVIII Airborne Corps (218th) CIC Detachment was attached to the Division Detachment on 18 March. Two agents arrived from 13th Airborne CIC to discuss security for airborne operations, and remained with 17th Airborne CIC for three days. Sgt. Kenneth W. Dobson of the 218th CIC Detachment was placed on temporary duty with the 17th CIC on or about 17 March.

Final briefings were held for agents "travelling with regiment . . ." On 19 March, Agents Burke and Kurt Gabel - on detached service with the 17th Airborne CIC - "left this morning to join the 507th Prcht (Parachute) Inf. Regt.

"T/Sgt Briggs and Cpl Antler left for 194th Glider Inf Regt. . . . Sgt Lagemann and Pvt John E. Gardner left for 513th Prcht Inf Regt . . . .CIC credentials left behind by agents who left today."

The entries for 20 March stated that preparation for movement continued and that Lieutenant Cameron was reported as attached to the Detachment to the Morning Report Section.

On 21 March: "Lt. Allen, Cpl Tornetta, and Pvt Rauner left at 9:30 A.M. in jeep for airfield. . . .Adj. Courivaud, T/3 Bouchard, Cpl Fischoff left at 11 A.M. by overland route."

Administrative details occupied the diary notes for the next week, but on 29 March, one sentence led off the entries.

"Learned of Lt. Allen's death in operations being continued in Germany." On 30 March, the rest of the tragedy was unveiled: "Learned that Lt. Cameron, Cpl Tornetta, and Pvt. Rauner had been killed together with Lt Allen in glider crash." The story had been completed for the three CIC Agents. Private Rauner, apparently, was not a CIC Agent. He may have been a jeep driver or an interpreter from one of

the Regiments in the 17th Airborne Division. He was only mentioned twice in the War Diary of the Detachment - when he left for the airfield, and when his death was announced.[182]

The glider which carried the four men into enemy territory was hit by anti-aircraft fire while landing. The four managed to get out safely, but were struck down by small arms fire from the enemy.[183]

Upon learning of the casualties, Captain Dearing wrote into the 218th CIC Detachment's records:

"It will be difficult indeed to fill their places in our ranks. It will be impossible to fill the places they hold in the affection and esteem of all their fellow members of these detachments.[184]

218th CIC Detachment: The Airborne Corps

The 218th CIC Detachment, with XVIII Airborne Corps, carried much responsibility for security of Operation VARSITY both in the planning and in the operational phases. Agents located one woman, accused by French National Police Inspector Lobet of informing on eleven members of the Maquis working in a Corps Artillery installation. She had been hired without request for CIC clearance. Two agents of the Detachment arrested her and turned her over to the French authorities for disposition.

Agents of the detachment recommended the dismissal of three other women, one employed at the Junior Officers' Mess and the other two by Corps Artillery, after investigation established them as German collaborators.

In another investigation, a Private, masquerading as a Major, was arrested when another enlisted man told CIC of their chance meeting in the park and the suspicious nature of the "Major's" questions. The alert enlisted man had made plans to meet the pseudo-officer again, and two CIC agents accompanied him.

182 War Diary of the 17th Airborne CIC Det, 15 Mar 43-29 May 45 (22763) Master-17th Abn Div - No. A8275472 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

183 Copy of Ltr, 218th CIC Det to Mr. A.G. Cameron, Princeton, N.J., dated 9 May 1945, s/Albin P. Dearing, Capt, Det Cmdr (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098)

184 218th CIC Detachment, Rpt of Activities, 19-25 Mar 45, dtd 28 Mar 45, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts, Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098)

When the man admitted he was a deserter, CIC turned him over to a Military Police battalion. He was declared of no interest to counterintelligence.[185]

CIC Agent Checks Scrambler

Upon the request of the G2, XVIII Airborne Corps, the 218th CIC Detachment conducted an investigation to check the security of a "scrambler," a device which scrambled outgoing messages and unscrambled incoming information. It was located in the closet in the Chief of Staff's clerk's office at Corps Headquarters.

One CIC agent, dressed as an officer, walked without interference into the closet, locked the door and remained fifteen minutes checking the possibility of tapping the device. The scrambler was not sealed, and the cover came off easily with the removal of a single wire. The agent left the room and proceeded to the courtyard of the Command Post. He located a ladder and climbed up to the ledge of a window in the clerk's office. With the telephone hand set that he carried, he simulated tapping the wires, remaining ten minutes on the ladder. He then climbed down, returned the ladder to its proper place, and left the Command Post, still carrying the telephone hand set. At no time was he questioned about his activities. The incident was reported to Corps Headquarters.[186]

Garrison and Field

With the committment of elements of XVIII Airborne Corps into action between 19 and 25 March, two phases of counterintelligence were performed simultaneously: The "Garrison" phase, or counterintelligence with the accent on area security, and "Field" counterintelligence, under combat conditions.

In Garrison, at Corps Base, advance details were organized for the move to forward areas assigned for the Corps "Land-Tail,"[187] which would participate in the airborne bridgehead across the Rhine.

185 218th CIC Det, Summary of Activities, 5 Mar-11 Mar 45, dated 12 Mar 45 in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts Feb 45-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098)

186 218th CIC Det, Summary of Activities, 12 Mar - 18 Mar 45, dtd 19 Mar 45 in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Reports Feb - May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098)

187 Land-Tail: Apparently a code name for the landing craft assault against Wesel.

One thousand displaced persons whom CIC believed to be a threat to the security of operations were removed from Corps area. Special passes for admittance to airborne assembly areas were prepared and flown under the supervision of a CIC agent to each of the subordinate airborne divisions.

Completed reports on security checks conducted on fifteen airborne assembly areas were forwarded to Army with the suggestion that they be filed for future reference. They were supplemented with overlays, notes on guard systems, and diagrams of temporary structures designed for the protection of the areas in accordance with security directives.

Last minute additions and changes in the Counterintelligence Annex to the Corps Intelligence document was forwarded to divisions participating in Operation VARSITY.

D-plus 1-at-Wesel

Armed with target lists prepared by the First Allied Airborne Army, Captain Dearing and Special Agent Marwick crossed the Rhine with Corps Tactical Command Post-probably as part of the "Land-Tail" operation - one day after the airborne bridgehead had been established. They soon discovered, however, that tactical unit commanders had ordered all civilians to be picked up and put away with the Prisoners of War. About four hundred civilians were interned by 25 March at several regimental Prisoners of War cages.

At one of the cages, Captain Dearing learned that other Special Agents of the 218th CIC Detachment had screened 137 Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Belgians, Dutch, Roumanians, and Italians. Those properly considered as displaced persons were sent to Displaced Persons Centers. The Germans were screened carefully, and suspects separated from those allowed to return to their homes under the aegis of Military Government.

In the Anglo- American air-water-land strike, the British Field Security Detachment under XIII Corps had responsibility for the town of Wesel. A search of Sturm Abteilungen Headquarters revealed some pertinent documents, but most addresses were wrong or the building had been bombed out. One-sixth of the town's population of 12,000 remained.[188]

188 218th CIC Det, Rept of Activities, 19-25 Mar 45, dtd 28 Mar 45, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Reports Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center Box 25098).

Chapter 4

CIC in German Cities

As a result of the Rhineland offensives in February and March, CIC operated for the first time in German cities which had not been almost wholly evacuated by the civilian inhabitants.

Three of these cities - Cologne, Bonn, and Coblenz - were considered of enough importance for exploitation by "T" Forces, in addition to exploitation by those units under whose jurisdiction the cities would fall as a result of tactical maneuvers.

The Plan is Formulated

Planning for the capture of the key Rhenish cities of Cologne and Bonn had been progressing since early in the European campaign. On 3 March, with tactical elements approaching the suburbs of Cologne, a letter from General Collins, VII Corps Commander, placed the responsibility for counterintelligence in Cologne jointly on the 207th CIC Detachment and T-Force CIC. To ensure adequate coverage of this German city, the largest west of the Rhine, General Collins requested that each Divisional CIC Detachment contribute to the Corps CIC Detachment a CIC team of one officer and four agents.

The naming of the 207th CIC Detachment as the responsible counterintelligence organization in Cologne, the letter noted, was "primarily designed to avoid the inevitable confusion and loss arising from changing jurisdiction and multiple 'take-over.'"[189]

The 503d CIC Detachment: Comments on CIC Organization

The 503d CIC Detachment, operating in and around Cologne during most of March, collected some individuals who fell within automatic arrest categories and arrested one woman in Liblar who was harboring a German soldier who had not been discharged. She was eventually turned over to Military Government for prosecution, after first being sent by mistake to First Army Interrogation Center with the captured soldier.

Some Suggestions Worthy of Note

The investigative experiences of VII Corps provided Detachment Commander Theodore Black of the 503d CIC with facts for some recommendations. The

189 Ltr, Hq, VII Corps, Subj: Counterintelligence Coverage of Koln, to CGs, 3d Armd, 8th, 99th, and 104th Inf Divs, dtd 3 Mar 45, in 503d CIC Det Sit Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Record Center, Box 25104).

Detachment's present situation in reserve status for the Division, he said, had placed a large area along the east bank of the Erft Canal under its jurisdiction. Records had been received from 8th and 104th CIC Detachments, which had prior jurisdiction over the area. The permanent Military Government Detachment at Frechen had indicated that there was much Military Government - CIC work of a "more-or-less longer-term nature to be done," but the indecision concerning their duration in the area presented several problems to the 503d CIC Detachment.

Immediate problems included rest and rehabilitation for Detachment personnel and maintenance of its equipment. Although Division personnel could use this period for rest and maintenance, members of the CIC Detachment worked constantly, handling the many counterintelligence tasks confronting them. They had no time to organize the piles of records they had accumulated; no chance to repair and overhaul their equipment; and no opportunity to relax, to shed some of their personal fatigue. They could make the time, but only at the expense of the area's security.

Another problem, "the inevitable confusion and loss arising from changing jurisdiction and multiple 'take-over,'" had been pointed out in General Collins' letter pertaining to counterintelligence jurisdiction in Cologne. Captain Black called it a "practical provision" which attempted to reduce the number of take-overs to a minimum, and asked recognition for the fact that the same loss of efficiency applied with "equal strength to large areas as well as thickly populated cities."

"As long as the jurisdiction over an area is shifted from one tactical commander to another, there will continue to be some flux in civil matters, as the tactical commanders are the Military Governors of their areas," Black continued. He cited Military Government's anticipation of the problem "to the extent of organizing Military Government Detachments, pin-pointed to handle civil matters within areas which correspond to German political subdivisions. Thus, Division Military Government entered the area to assume supervision of the activities of a permanent Military Government Detachment" which would have jurisdiction of an area until "US jurisdiction is eventually relinquished to the British." The Military Government Detachment remained stable, although different Divisions moved into and out of the area, with only the supervising authority being changed.

"On the other hand, CIC, while recognizing the problem in theory," commented the Detachment Commander, "has no practical method of maintaining the necessary continuity; until an area becomes ADSEC territory, CI problems must be handled on a transitory basis by transient CIC personnel attached to tactical units - an unsatisfactory system at best."

As a solution to the problems, Captain Black suggested "the attachment of CIC agents directly to Military Government Detachments, with the specific mission of covering such assignments as registration-screening, investigation of local officials and applicants for Military Government passes, building up of local informant

systems (a man-to-man job of great importance which cannot be handled on a transitory basis), and similar longer-range jobs." A solution to the problems, according to Captain Black, would be dearly appreciated by Detachments "such as this one, upon which the whole weight of the matter is thrown."

Captain Black also suggested the establishment of a Detention cage "set up close behind Division areas, possibly under Corps supervision, with MIC staffs..." which would preclude the necessity of sending suspects directly to First Army Interrogation Center, which, in Captain Black's opinion, "involves too great a displacement of the subject from the locale in which he would be of greatest value in CI investigations."[190] This had already been developed by Third Army, and VIII Corps, at least, had set up their Detention Camp by this time.

T-Force Gets Ready

On 1 March 1945, the Target Section of Headquarters "T" Force had been moved to Headquarters Twelfth Army Group Main and established there as a branch of G2 Section under Col. John H F. Hackett, with Lt Col B. Edwin Sackett as his Executive. The change was effected after the realization in February that the preparation and dissemination of target data to armies for the pending offensive would be an impractical task for the Target Section if it remained at Headquarters "T" Force.

On 2 March, "T" Force left Vieux Waleffe, Belgium, where the Command Post had been since 23 December and where components had reassembled after temporarily serving with First Army during the Battle of the Bulge. It moved to Eschweiler, Germany, to prepare for entry into Cologne. Because Bonn was expected to fall to American forces at about the same time, a sub-force under the command of Lt Col Dale M. Garvey was formed, called Sub-"T" Force "A".[191]

By 4 March, "T" Force was operating in the suburbs of Cologne, but the part of the city west of the Rhine was not opened completely until 8 March. An organization of 973 persons and 175 motor driven vehicles plus 215 investigators from 24 different intelligence agencies reduced the targets in Cologne by 25 March. Close liaison was maintained with VII Corps CIC and other intelligence units during the reduction process and complete files of "T" Force action on targets were delivered to VII Corps CIC at the end of the operation.

Eighteen CIC agents and special agents participated in the Cologne operation, attached to "T" Force. This group cooperated with VII Corps CIC, Tactical

190 503d CIC Det, CIC Situation Summary, 12-18 Mar 45, dtd 19 Mar 45, to ACofS G2, FUSA, thru VII Corps G2, in 503d CIC Det Situation Reports (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

191 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) Vol IV (RESTRICTED), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Reserve Teams of the 418th CIC Detachment, and military intelligence interpreter personnel. The size of the total force of intelligence and counterintelligence specialists made it possible for each place of civilian registration to be manned by experienced personnel. During the screening, several arrests of persons of counterintelligence interest were made on the spot. When "T" Force left Cologne, this was no longer possible. Instead, cards were filed and checked against black lists when the registration was completed. The Cologne area gradually came under the jurisdiction of the new Fifteenth U.S. Army.[192]

Another CIC Unit: Tactical Reserve Team No. 9

While Cologne was still under VII Corps jurisdiction, however, a number of exciting incidents afforded a break from the usual routine. Agent Henry Beissinger was apparently the first CIC agent to sample Cologne's strange brand of hospitality.

Agent Beissinger and another CIC agent, both from Tactical Reserve Team Number 9 of the 418th CIC Detachment, were trying to locate a German in whom SHAEF was interested. They dashed along the water front in Cologne, which was still under fire. Locating the house they had been looking for, the pair went inside. Beissinger walked down a long gloomy hall to a darkened living room. He assumed the footsteps he heard behind him were those of his partner. After surveying the room and finding no one, Beissinger said aloud, "Well, doesn't seem to be anybody here. What do you think?"

"Was?"

Beissinger whirled. A huge German soldier, fully equipped, faced him, his hands raised in surrender. The CIC agent then bellowed in German for everyone in the house to come to the living room. Four other German soldiers joined the group, and Beissinger's partner, who had gone into another room, returned to find the agent with five candidates for the Prisoner of War cage. Anticlimactically, the Germans claimed that it had been their intention to desert to the Americans anyway.[193]

VII Corps CIC Detachment: Counterintelligence at its Best

Agents of VII Corps CIC Detachment were kept busy in Cologne. The detachment jailed sixteen Gestapo espionage and sabotage agents, one Abwehr officer, four

192 15th US Army Counterintelligence Bulletin #3, dtd 24 Apr 45, pg. 3, from Memo, 418th CIC Det, TRT #14, 2 Apr 45 in L-633 (11) 15th Army Monthly CIC Reports and Counterintelligence Bulletin, Apr 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

193 418th CIC Det, 12th Army Group, CIC Monthly Bulletin #3, dtd 6 May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Gestapo employees, and several line crossers. The normal carload lots of arrestees continued to roll in. In one afternoon, with the aid of ten linguists, 200 prisoners of war were arrested and evacuated.

Aided by Tactical Reserve Team Number 14, VII Corps agents matched wits with a Gestapo officer on the enemy side of the Rhine for two weeks.

The Gestapo officer was charged with infiltrating agents into American territory, and he must have wondered how his hirelings were doing. One of his agents, arrested early in the contest, provided information on future river crossings. CIC compiled a timetable and alerted the river guards. As soon as an enemy appeared, he was caught and placed in the local jail. In a matter of days, six of the Gestapo's agents had crossed the Rhine into captivity.

Some of the German agents had been told by German Intelligence Service to volunteer to be "doubled" after they had been captured. The Americans, it was believed, would send each agent back to his homing place, but the German Intelligence Service had been ill-informed. None of the volunteers were handled so charitably by CIC.

Female agents, too, had instructions from German Intelligence Service. They were to use every means at their disposal to capture an American officer's attentions and learn through him the intentions of the tactical forces. According to the 418th CIC Detachment's Third Monthly CIC Report, "the seduction rate of American officers (was), from the German Intelligence Service's point of view, still at an alarmingly low state".[194]

This morality or security-consciousness was not an assured commodity, however, and First Army, in an annex to a G2 Periodic Report, treated the topic with less flippancy. Under the title, "Displaced Women," First Army cited the "thousands of women behind our lines and throughout Germany" as "a security menace that calls for more than passing consideration. . ." The report reassured the soldiers that not every woman there was a "Mata Hari," adding, "this is especially true since she was reputed to be a rather striking beauty. . ." But it did warn the soldier against trading military information for feminine companionship, and it reminded him that the policy of non-fraternization included everyone in Germany.[195]

Along Came Greta, An Extraordinary Girl

Oddly enough, it was a female German espionage-assassination agent who proved the most valuable "catch" for VII Corps CIC agents operating in Cologne.

194 418th CIC Det, 12th Army Group, CIC Monthly Bulletin #3, 6 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

195 First US Army, Annex 5 to G2 Periodic Rpt #290, 25 Mar 45, in Opn Rpts L557, FUSA, (23) (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Described as a "better-looking than average Belgian girl, in her twenties, medium height, blonde hair, and an interesting figure," the agent had been sent across the Rhine in a boat, which capsized. Her companions allegedly went down with the ship, but "Greta" -- as she was re-named by CIC -- made it ashore where she was captured by tactical troops and taken to VII Corps CIC Detachment.

From the time of her arrest on 12 March until she was turned over to Special Counter Intelligence for further exploitation, "Greta" provoked reactions of wonderment and suspicion from CIC Agents Fenton Moran, Daniel B. Badger and Henry Kent, who worked on her case and with her on subsequent cases.

"Greta's" missions for the Germans included the establishment of operational sites for radio agents who were to follow; the freeing of Cologne Gestapo personnel who had been collected as Prisoners of War by American troops (they had changed into ordinary police uniforms); and the assassination of a former interpreter and chief of foreign V-Maenner (petty informers) at the Cologne Gestapo, who was known to have stayed behind and who, the Germans believed, might reveal valuable information to the Americans.

With four years of Gestapo experience behind her, the girl agent was considered by the CIC agents who knew her capable of completing all of these assignments single-handedly. Her complacency during her employment as an informant by CIC under combat conditions and her steadfastness as she faced persons who would have killed her immediately if they had known she was working for the Americans caused CIC to relate that, beyond her physical attributes, no resemblance to "ordinary womanhood" existed.

"Greta" was fluent in French, German, Flemish and Dutch, and the agents suspected her of being adept linguistically in English, too, though she never faltered in her denials of this accomplishment.

Based on information from "Greta," CIC alerted the 415th Infantry Regiment's S2 to have outposts along the river ready to apprehend the anticipated radio agents. "Greta" stood on the shore at the designated point and flashed the prescribed light signals Rhine-ward, but the infiltration was not attempted.

The CIC agents discarded this effort after two nights, but, in the meantime, one agent put on civilian clothes and escorted "Greta" to an address she had been given by the Gestapo. At the house, "Greta" and the agent, who spoke fluent German, feigned a desire to make contact with Gestapo personnel. They learned that Gestapo Kommissar Klemmens had resided in the house before he had evacuated Cologne, and that the residents were quite eager to serve as a letter-drop for the Gestapo.

Other CIC agents arrested the residents after the undercover visit, and, after interrogation by VII Corps personnel, the would-be Gestapo aids were sent to First Army Interrogation Center.

"Greta" and other CIC informants aided in locating the Gestapo interpreter she had been sent to liquidate. Much information on the organization and personnel of the Cologne Gestapo was given by this lead. While in custody of CIC, he slashed his wrists, but the suicide attempt was unsuccessful. After recovery, he was sent to First Army's Interrogation Center.

In another case, "Greta" was placed in a room with a man awaiting interrogation after apprehension for trespassing in a restricted area. Preliminary interrogation had failed to develop any information except the plausible story that he was a former river boat captain and had violated the restriction because he wanted to repair his craft. "Greta," posing as a "cut-out" for a Gestapo operative (A Special Counterintelligence Agent in an undercover role), sounded out the seafarer on the prospect of getting her back to the Gestapo. The man agreed, after several contacts, but suddenly changed his mind on the basis that any act to help Germany at that time was futile. CIC Agent Henry Kent arrested him and sent him back to the Army Interrogation Center.

Before her final disposition to Special Counter Intelligence, "Greta" went through processing as a displaced person in order to "finger" any Gestapo agents she might encounter using the Displaced Persons stream as an artery of infiltration, and she aided other CIC agents in Cologne in their searches for stay-behinds.

Though her value to CIC was undeniable, "Greta" received none of the plaudits which would have been awarded "ordinary womanhood" for similar exploits. Instead, VII Corps Periodic Report No. 77, perhaps to reiterate the dangers of the feminine enemy, said, of this girl with "a rather appealing face, a pleasant and quiet manner," that "A gangster's moll is a haloed angel in comparison."[196]

The level of counterintelligence activity in Cologne by the 207th CIC remained high. A Dutch citizen, initially apprehended by CIC on denunciation as a Gestapo agent, admitted having assisted the Gestapo in several non-political arrests, but this was, he stated, a necessary cover for his true activity of organizing and operating the Free Netherlanders - a group of anti-Nazis of several nationalities who were forced laborers under the Germans. He gave 207th CIC agents valuable tactical and counterintelligence information. Nothing he did, however, was performed without CIC's knowledge, as agents were assigned to maintain a close, continuing surveillance of their informant.

A Belgian whom the 301st CIC Detachment had sent on a mission in October 1944 was arrested on 21 March 1945, after crossing the Rhine at night in a boat with

196 A compilation of material from: Hq, VII Corps, 207th CIC Det, Monthly Information Report for March 1945, dtd 1 Apr 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library); and VII Corps G2 Periodical Rpt #77 in Opn Rpts L557 FUSA (17), 17 Mar 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

several others. His story that he had engineered the boatride with Gestapo agents who were admittedly on espionage missions did not impress agents of the 207th CIC Detachment who interrogated him. They thought he should have returned sooner, and so did 301st CIC, which had placed his name on the First Army "Wanted List." The Belgian was forwarded to the Army Interrogation Center where he would also have to answer some adverse charges which had developed after his commitment as an Allied agent.

In another instance, CIC agents of the 207th CIC Detachment recognized a Frenchman who had been doubled by Special Counter Intelligence after his capture while on an espionage mission for the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. led the agents to a cellar where his mistress and three others were arrested simultaneously. indicated that with his mistress he had infiltrated a sabotage cell. While his concubine was kept in custody, was permitted to roam the streets in the hope that he would lead CIC to some other Gestapo personnel. He failed to produce, and all of the arrestees, except one who was found innocent, were sent to the Army Interrogation Center. The innocent one was kept under surveillance and a fixed surveillance was placed on the building in which the group had been arrested. This was unproductive, however, and on 10 March the remaining residents were arrested. Investigation revealed no Gestapo contact and they were released.

Other cases were handled by 207th CIC Detachment during March 1945. One concerned a recruiter for German stay-behind operators who was arrested through information supplied by a suspicious neighbor.

Another led to the capture of an espionage agent who had been entrusted with the mission of re-opening a restaurant in Cologne to serve as a rendezvous for German agents. Showing a strong lack of originality, the agent claimed upon interrogation by Special Agent Fenton Moran that he accepted the mission to be in a position to help the Americans. A test of his willingness to cooperate - in the form of a mission assigned by VII Corps command - shattered his facade of friendship, and he was sent rearward to the First Army Interrogation Center.

Six low level espionage agents from the Hitler Jugend organization were captured crossing the Rhine, and interrogation by 207th CIC Detachment revealed that more of these agents could be expected in the future.[197]

Relations with Military Government in Cologne

Certainly as important as 207th CIC Detachment's method of operation on these cases was that organization's relationship with Military Government in Cologne. A

197 207th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar, dtd 1 Apr 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

team, Special Agent John H. Reber and Agent Nobert G. Barr, was appointed to work with Military Government. According to one of their reports, the team's office at Military Government was "almost an undercover position from which CIC can investigate and keep in touch with what each category is doing, for persons of importance must come through this office, and they can be interviewed or called in under cover of Military Government screening, so that each category does not see itself as obviously under investigation."

The CIC agents reported that Military Government in Cologne generally kept to the policy of using no Nazi members in civil government. CIC pressure was needed in only a few cases, but these few cases were regarded as important "for if once an exception had been made, the flood would have begun." Military Government adherence to the policy and the careful selection of officials with CIC aid had resulted in a "clean official government," and since Military Government had not deviated from policy, the CIC agents noted, "Military Government is in complete command so far, a break from Aachen tradition."

The CIC team cited two missions for itself: screening of Military Government employees and civil government officials, and interviewing interesting personalities in Cologne politics, industry, trades, professions, "who naturally call at Military Government sooner or later."

Apparently, the Military Government Office CIC Team left footwork to the other agents from the Detachments operating in Cologne, and concentrated only on those persons who came to Military Government. Still, two CIC agents could not handle all the potential suspects who wandered in, and "only leading persons of the civil government. . ." were investigated. For minor positions, Military Government accepted persons stating by Fragebogen that they were never in the Nazi Party, the Sturm Abteilungen, or the Schutz Staffeln.

This team of agents cleared ninety-two persons for responsible positions with Military Government or the civil government in the week ending 26 March 1945. Of these, one was cleared purely on the basis of the agents' interrogation and one was cleared on this basis plus the recommendation of an informant. The other ninety were interrogated by the agents and were vouched for by three to twelve informants. In addition, seventy-seven persons were cleared for lesser positions.

Seventeen persons were rejected for positions, but were not considered suspects. Among these were pre-war members of dangerous Nazi organizations, German Military Government representatives in conquered areas, a Hitler Jugend member and one fellow who had spent "10 years in U.S. without effort to become a citizen."

Another seventeen were unveiled as suspects, though only two were interned by Military Government on the spot. The CIC team let some of the suspects go

back to their homes without suspicion that an investigation of them was imminent. One former Abwehr officer was sent to the Interrogation Center by the agents.

Key personnel at Cologne's Ford plant, on the newspaper Kolnische Zeitung (the only large newspaper in the city the Nazis had left in private hands), and of the legal profession in the city were carded, and some preliminary investigations of them were undertaken. Local intellectual leaders were referred to Military Government.

Agents Reber and Barr, at the time of their report, were cooperating with two CIC agents of the succeeding CIC Detachment, orienting them on the card files they had prepared.[198]

The Gestapo in Cologne

The Cologne operations uncovered enough positive information about the Gestapo organization in that city that it was possible for two lieutenants, 1st Lt Peter J. Lert and 2d Lt Bernie G. Hecht, on duty at the Interrogation Center to prepare a complete resume of the organization by 18 March 1945. The Cologne operation was one more indication that the German High Security Office was now in complete control, and the Gestapo in Cologne had been reorganized to follow the plan of the ruling body.

One of the first statements of a captured Gestapo member was that he never used "Gestapo methods." Members were extremely fatalistic about their futures and convinced they would die. They indicated they would consider Americans weaklings if they were not punished severely.[199]

The CIC in Bonn

Sub-"T" Force "A," with 274 persons assigned, entered Bonn on 9 March. All the targets, including twelve of opportunity, were reduced by 18 March, and the sub-force rejoined the main "T" Force unit at Cologne. A total of fifty-eight buildings and forty persons were processed. The Bonn Military Government Detachment was given the target files at the end of the operation.[200] Of "T" Force CIC personnel, fourteen were attached to this sub-force for the Bonn action.[201]

198 VII Corps, Memo to the OIC, Subj: "Activities of Cologne MG Team," dated 26 March 1945, 207th CIC Det Log, Feb 44 - Mar 45, (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

199 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center, Special Report on the Gestapo in Cologne, dtd 18 Mar 45 in 207th CIC Det First Army File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097)

200 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) pp. 15-16, Vol IV (RESTRICTED), (Staff and Faculty Library).

201 Ibid., p. 49.

The 1st CIC Detachment: Advance Information Uninformative

More than sixty German towns, in addition to the city of Bonn, fell under 1st Division control from 7 March until 25 March and the 1st CIC Detachment was, at various times, responsible for the security of each of them. Bonn, where the Detachment cooperated with "T" Forces CIC, was the major target.

It was inevitable, when a Detachment had to provide counterintelligence for an area far greater than its capabilities would permit, that some towns would be ignored. Reports from 1st CIC Detachment indicated that the Detachment received help from Regimental S2s in the selection of towns most urgently requiring counter-intelligence coverage. CIC found that higher headquarters had failed to provide them necessary target information in advance. So poor was the advance information 1st CIC Detachment was given about Bonn, that the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Steinway, commented in a weekly report: "In retrospect, it is apparent that information supplied to this detachment by higher headquarters on the city of Bonn was very inadequate. Investigation of suggested white names revealed that several of those named were no longer in the town, and others were located but found to be unreliable. Information on building targets and black names was extremely meager. Practically no plans could be made in advance. . ."

Fortunately for this Detachment, the cooperating "T" Force CIC organization had accurate and detailed target information which, after 1st CIC Detachment learned of it, was requested and subsequently received. This was of some aid to 1st CIC. According to Lieutenant Steinway, if the information had been in the hands of 1st CIC's agents prior to the entry into Bonn the probability of destruction of records and the escapes of several black list personalities would have been lessened. He recommended that the information not only be provided in advance, but also that "in the future such information. . . be made available to all CIC Detachments on all towns and cities in their respective areas."

Removal of Nazi officials was given high priority in Bonn and surrounding towns under 1st CIC Detachment jurisdiction. Ardent Nazis were sent to the "T" Force Detention camp for further interrogation.

In Bonn, the 1st CIC Detachment cooperated with the 301st CIC Detachment also, in investigating appointees to local government posts. This Detachment was relieved by 8th CIC Detachment of their responsibilities in the Division area on 16 March 1945, and continued to concentrate on Bonn for a few more days until the 301st CIC Detachment was ready to assume full counterintelligence control of the city.[202]

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202. 1st CIC Detachment, Weekly Report, 12 Mar - 19 Mar 45, in 301-2.2 (22292) G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 10-28 Mar 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

One outstanding discovery of 1st CIC Detachment during this period was a store of Nazi Party records "too great to permit removal in a single vehicle." The information was given G2 for transmission to higher headquarters.

On 23 March, 104th CIC Detachment relieved the 1st CIC Detachment in the towns of Hovel, Aegidienberg, Himberg, Rottbitze, Brungsberg, and Siefenhoven, but, at the end of the period, 1st CIC still had more than twenty towns in its area of counterintelligence responsibility, in the vicinity surrounding Bruckhausen.[203]

Six German Agents Go from Bonn to Belgium

When Gert Reemsa, Flemish leader of a six-man stay-behind team of German agents of Belgian nationality from Frontaufklaerungstruppen (FAT) 363, realized that displaced persons in Bonn were being sent rearward, he released all eight pigeons in his care with messages of tactical importance. One pigeon carried the message: "Everything under control. Are forced to evacuate to Brussels. Abandoning material. Will get in contact through Switzerland. Troops with soldier patch "Rangers" in the village."

Entering the displaced persons stream in Bonn, four members of the team traveled in it to the end - which, for them, was the Verviers, Belgium, Displaced Persons Center, a journey of about fifty-five miles. There, First Army Interrogation Center personnel, aware of the use made of this avenue of infiltration by German agents, screened out the four and arrested them. The fifth was arrested the same day, 18 March, by an ADSEC CIC team, the 429th CIC Detachment, at Chevremont.

Their arrest prevented them from performing an assigned mission which included: contacting pro-Nazi Belgians in Brussels and establishing espionage and sabotage networks; the transmittal of military information to FAT 363 headquarters; reporting damage caused by the use of a new V-weapon, allegedly about to be used against Brussels; and the penetration of Allied intelligence agencies.[204]

The sixth agent, as of 24 March 1945, was still at large, though it was believed that he and his wife would go to Tongres, Belgium.[205]

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203 Unless otherwise cited, information of 1st CIC Detachment is from Daily Rpts, 7 Mar - 25 Mar 45, in 301-2.2 (22292) G2 Jnl, 1st Inf Div, 7 Mar - 27 Mar 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

204 12th Army Group Counterintelligence Periodic Report #15, for Mar 1945, in Opns Rpts, L-502 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

205 1st U.S. Army Counterintelligence Rpt #19, for period 26 Feb - 25 Mar, in 207th CIC Det First Army File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

The Approach to Coblenz

In a village in the suburbs of Coblenz, on 9 March, CIC agents John B. Corcoran and Joseph H. Kadlec of the 4th CIC Detachment received, from a small girl and her uncle, the village priest, information about some buried boxes. The informants did not know what was in the boxes, but they did know that men in German uniforms had buried them in haste and had attempted to keep the interment secret by posting guards and prohibiting entrance into the area. The girl had watched from a second story window in the rectory.

With the aid of a mine detector, three boxes were located, each containing supplies of sabotage materials. One was sent to 7th Army CIC Detachment for their scrutiny, and Captain Oliver D. Appleton, commanding the Detachment, expressed his belief that the experience was "indicative of the trend of enemy operations along sabotage and espionage lines and would tend to point to an organized program leading to future activity behind our lines.[206]

CIC in Coblenz

On 8 March, in Cologne, Sub-Force "C" had been organized for Coblenz. The sub-force entered the city on 18 March and, in four days, reduced all targets. They handled seventy-three buildings and fifty-eight personalities. The force of 301 persons and 43 vehicles then withdrew, relinquishing its target files to the Coblenz Military Government Detachment.[207]

Thirteen CIC personnel participated in the "T" Force operations at Coblenz, traveling over the same ground that Corps of Intelligence Police Agents of World War I had worked 27 years before.

Assistance from the 87th CIC Detachment

While covering Coblenz, Sub-Force "C" received cooperation from the 87th CIC Detachment which had worked in more than seventy German towns, including Coblenz in the first twenty-five days in March. The only item of counterintelligence importance which was found in Coblenz were some Sicherheitsdienst records which had once been in Luxembourg City. These were sent to Army level with the understanding that information of use to tactical CIC units would be re-disseminated up front.

206 4th Inf Div, 4th CIC Det, Monthly Intelligence Report for Mar 45, dtd 31 Mar 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library)

207 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After-Action Report) Vol IV (Staff and Faculty Library)

Agents of the 87th CIC Detachment, working in two-man teams (the usual custom of this Detachment: one team per regiment and four at Division CIC Headquarters), encountered the usual screening and police problems, with one unusual twist. In order to screen the inhabitants of Coblenz, it was necessary for the two teams of agents to enter the city's twelve air raid shelters, in which most of the people in Coblenz were living.

The 87th CIC Detachment had anticipated becoming heir to Sub-"T" Force "C's" counterintelligence records when the sub-force retired from the city, but the 87th moved the same day to Gonderhausen and then to Buchholz.[208]

Writing of this period, First Lieutenant Harwell noted that the Nazi Party had exploited the people in the interior more than they had those along the border, but, even in the industrialized towns, Catholicism still played a vital role in the lives of the people and had not been seriously affected by Nazi ideologies. Some priests admitted that they had been curtailed in their activities and a few of them had been imprisoned.

Every town, Lieutenant Harwell indicated, had its Hitler Jugend, Bund Deutscher Madel, and Volksturm. Despite orders from the Wehrmacht for the Volksturm to take up arms against the invading Allies, no evidence of compliance was found. In some cases, road blocks constructed by the fleeing Wehrmacht were removed by Volksturm members While they claimed this was done to aid the Americans in the pursuit of the German Armies, it was believed that the roadblocks were eliminated so that the advancing forces would not fire into the villages.

Desertion, according to Lieutenant Harwell, had become a serious problem within the Wehrmacht. As evidence of this, he cited the fact that documents found in Fort Konstantin, Coblenz, stated that any soldier or civilian attempting to induce a soldier to discard his uniform and desert would be shot. Deserters also said there would have been mass desertion if the soldiers were not fearful of being shot by Schutz Staffeln men.[209]

Variety of Investigative Activity

From the Detachment's Daily Reports, the wide scope of the Detachment's activities during this period was apparent.

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208 87th CIC Det Daily Activities Rpts, 1-31 Mar 45, in 87th Inf Div G2 Jnls for Mar 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

209 87th CIC Det Counterintelligence Rpt #6, 6 Mar - 20 Mar 45, in 95th (sic) Counterintelligence Det Rpts, Folder of Bi-Weekly Rpts, Sep 44 - Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

On 8 March, for example, Special Agent Herman Schnepel, accompanied by a First Lieutenant from the S2's office, and a priest, went to search for a hunting lodge which had been used extensively as a German command post. Finding the doors locked, Schnepel broke a window. Hearing noises from the upper floor, he had the priest call out for any soldiers in the place to come down unarmed. Four Germans came down the stairs and were taken into custody.[210]

The following day, a Volksturm leader from Ripsdorf was arrested by CIC. He admitted that his organization had twelve Danish rifles and five boxes of Panzerfaust 30, but said that they were all stored in the firehouse and that no one had manned the anti-tank barricades even though they were ordered to do so by the Regimental Commander. The weapons were confiscated.[211]

On 10 March, the offices of the Landrat (Governing official of a Landkreise or Rural County) for the rural county of Schleiden were searched. This building was the focal point of state and local governments within the Nazi organization. The ten rooms which housed the offices were filled with voluminous well-kept records, including economic affairs and communal affairs documents, police records of towns within the county, identification records for policemen in the villages, and complete files dealing with food supply. These records were preserved for Military Government by CIC.[212] Upon orders, the Landrat had burned some records of men serving in the armed forces.

A rumor of atrocity involving an alleged lynching of a lone survivor of the double crash of two American bombers was investigated on 13 March. The report could not be substantiated, and it was believed that the survivor had been taken rearward by autocar into Germany.[213]

In Bassenheim the next day, while monitoring telephone connections with Signal Company personnel, CIC agents learned that conversations on military lines could be picked up through civilian phones. A Signal Officer explained that this sometimes happened when wires were parallel - messages could jump from one line to another. A list of telephones in the town was obtained and the phones were disconnected. The Signal Officer went to Ochtendung, where all lines from Bassenheim reached a central switchboard and where a trunk line to Coblenz existed, to ascertain if 4th Armored Division CIC had discovered all cables and cut them. They had.[214]

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210 87th CIC Det Daily Activity Rpts 7 Mar - 25 Mar 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Folder of Bi-Weekly Rpts, Sep 44 - Jun 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

211 Ibid., 9 Mar.

212 Ibid., 10 Mar.

213 Ibid., 13 Mar.

214 Ibid., 14 Mar.

On 15 March, a Headquarters CIC team worked Guls, a village under enemy observation and fire. Nineteen German deserters were arrested and marched back to the Prisoner of War Enclosure in Rudenach. One who had been shot in the leg trying to reach the Americans was abandoned. Three others were left behind under guard because enemy fire made it impossible to get them out. A Burgomeister was screened, approved and appointed by Military Government on the spot.[215] The CIC agents returned on 16 March and rounded up the four remaining deserters. Snipers fired five or six rounds at the agents of which "one came very close to the target."[216]

A sergeant of a Signal Pigeon Company requested CIC assistance on 17 December in finding out about some homing pigeons he had spotted. Twelve of them belonged to one German civilian, who claimed he had not used them. A soldier from the Signal Pigeon Company was moved into the house with the loft owner, with orders to watch the loft, and to seize any birds which flew in. The owner was prohibited from entering the loft.[217]

A Headquarters team, on 18 March, investigated a hunting lodge at Rehmstecken, where a collection of art treasures stolen from the Luxembourg Museum were reported to have been stored by the Germans. The CIC agents found the paintings and statues, each one bearing a plaque stating the piece belonged to the Coblenz Museum of Art. The original informant insisted that they were the property of Luxembourg. CIC placed "Off Limits" signs on the two doors leading into the storeroom and advised a Captain of a Field Artillery battery of the situation. He had decided to use the lodge as a command post.[218]

A week later, CIC received from the Division Chief of Staff a report that U.S. soldiers were leaving behind their captured rifles and bayonets, when they left Gonderhausen. Upon investigation, CIC discovered that the weapons being left had been taken from civilians and that these weapons were under the custody of a Captain of a Medical Battalion. CIC took the arms back to Buchholz and turned them in to an appropriate officer.[219]

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215 87th CIC Det Daily Activity Rpts 7 Mar - 25 Mar 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Folder of Bi-Weekly Rpts, Sep 44 - Jun 45 (Unclassified), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095), (Report for 15 Mar).

216 Ibid., 16 Mar.

217 Ibid., 17 Mar.

218 Ibid., 18 Mar.

219 Ibid., 25 Mar.

Chapter 5

Summaries and Anticipations

A statistical breakdown by percentages of counterintelligence arrests by categories for the month of March revealed that forty-five per cent of the arrestees were "security threats," who were interrogated and eventually cleared and transferred to Military Government as displaced persons or refugees; thirty per cent were deserters in civilian clothes; fifteen per cent were officials of the Nazi Party and strongly indoctrinated Germans who were also subject to internment; and ten per cent were Gestapo informers and petty V-Maenner (German internal security informers). As a result of interrogations, more than ten different German Intelligence Service dispatching units had been identified as operating against Twelfth Army Group.[220]

First Army Reports the Same Statistics

These percentages coincided exactly with those reported by the G2 of Headquarters, First Army, Colonel B. A. Dickson, five days before. Colonel Dickson's figures were for the area covered by First Army units only. It was conceivable that First Army's findings, on the supposition that they were representative, were published as Twelfth Army Group's statistics.

Special consideration was given in Colonel Dickson's report to the problem of fraternization. He indicated that compliance (with the non-fraternization policy) had been generally satisfactory, but that need for enforcement heightened when troops first entered a German city, such as Cologne, and were greeted as liberators. He also wrote that long static periods, which forced the occupation troops to be constantly exposed to the temptations of fraternization in a town, made strict enforcement necessary too.

The German civilians, in rear areas, seemed aware of the policy, and they viewed it with great interest. They recognize it as "merely a security measure" and they did not believe it would last. It was strongly suspected that some civilians, especially of the feminine sex, delighted in inducing soldiers to break the regulation, but it was not felt that there was any organized effort behind the attempts. The potentiality existed, of course, that a crafty Nazi underground might make use of such tactics, and CIC was alerted for that possibility.[221]

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220 12th Army Group CI Periodical Rpt #15, for Mar 45, in Opns Rpt L-502 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

221 1st U.S. Army CI Rpt #19, for 26 Feb - 25 Mar, dtd 24 Mar 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097)

The German View: A Temporary Defeat

Throughout this period there were indications that the Germans considered the tactical fight lost. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the indications of long-range underground preparations the Nazis were making, not only for Germany proper, but for formerly conquered areas as well.

First Army Interrogation Center brought this to light in their Bulletin covering March 1945. In addition to their interim and complete reports on nearly 100 counter-intelligence suspects, interrogation center personnel carefully pointed to the types of activities which could be expected from the Nazis in the immediate and far-distant future.

SS Jagdverbaende, which CIC had encountered first in Alsace and referred to as a "Brandenburg" formation, was another organization the interrogation center exposed. It was pointed out that members of this group, though initially captured in German uniforms, had also been issued civilian clothing and had been given stay-behind missions of a long-range nature. Of one group, composed of twenty-five French turncoats, sixteen had been accounted for by Allied counterintelligence agencies. The captives interrogated at First Army Interrogation Center revealed that shipments of American uniforms had recently been received at headquarters for the SS Jagdverbaende, for use by French-speaking agents who were to identify themselves as members of the French Army fighting with Americans. SS Lt Col Otto Skorzeny was in charge of SS Jagdverbaende.

Another organization of French pro-Nazis, the Maquis Blanc, was explained by the Interrogation Center Bulletin. Members of this group were given double missions which included short-range tactical espionage and long-range subversion. After completion of the short-range mission, the agents were to avail themselves of the free transportation provided by the Americans for displaced persons and be carried deep into France. Once free in France, these persons were to infiltrate French government and political parties, gaining positions of trust and responsibility.

At the right time, they were to overthrow the existing French government and create a neo-Nazi government in France. Similar plans were fashioned for members who would attempt to infiltrate Allied intelligence agencies. A Maquis Blanc organization was scheduled for development in Belgium also, and while all this pointed to a feeling of immediate setback, it indicated that long-range thinking on the part of the Germans advocated the formation of a new Fifth Column which---to the rabid Nazi---would mean eventual victory.

The third group of present and future importance to counterintelligence analysts was the Hitler Jugend. While their potential mission had been discussed often since the first members were captured, the Interrogation Center Bulletin described some of the elaborate bunker preparations which had been created for stay-behind spys and saboteurs. During March, twenty-two youthful agents were arrested by units

with the First Army and turned over to the interrogation center. Eleven were apprehended by 8th CIC Detachment; ten by 7th Armored CIC; and one by the 205th CIC Detachment. Those on whom the investigation had been completed and the charges substantiated were turned over to Military Government for disposition. Others were held until further investigation could be conducted.[222]

Beyond the Rhine

The Remagen bridgehead had been widened to the Sieg River in the North and to three miles below Neuweid in the south, approaching, in most places, a depth of about ten miles.

Two other bridgeheads were established: one, near Rees; the other, into the town of Wesel. With the exception of two small German bridgeheads in the Ludwigshafen-Lauter River tributary area of the Rhine, the river had been closed completely by Allied forces by 23 March. The two persistent bridgeheads were mopped up by 25 March, greatly increasing German losses for the battles.

During the Saar-Rhineland encounter, ending on 25 March, 230,000 German soldiers became Allied prisoners of war. With the dead and wounded added, the Weekly Intelligence Summary concluded that German losses totaled twenty divisions.[223]

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222 1st U.S. Army Interrogation Center Bulletin #8, dtd 1 Apr 45, in 207th CIC Det First Army File, Mar 44 - Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097)

223 Weekly Intelligence Summary, SHAEF, Office of the AC of S, G2, No. 53, dtd 25 Mar 45, Part I (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library); Op cit, Eisenhower, p. 384.

Appendix 1

Training and equipment of the "Gamma Swimmers" or "Kampfschwimmers" or "Flusskaempfer," Dienststelle 45817-K, taken from 12th Army Group CI Interrogation Center Report entitled "Rhine Bridge Sabotage Missions," dated 9 April 1945, in 207th CIC Detachment Report on the Case of the Rhine Bridge Sabotage Missions Folder (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

The swimming saboteurs referred to themselves as either "Kampfschwimmer" (combat swimmers) or as "Flusskaempfer" or FK (river fighters). The first term is a general one for any swimming saboteur; the second, which had been coined in September 1944 to replace "Gamma Schwimmer" (Rubber swimmer), indicates one who acts only in inland waters. A "Meereskaempfer" or MK (sea fighter) theoretically operated along seacoasts. "Gamma schwimmer" was dropped because it was of Italian origin, "Gamma" being Italian for "rubber."

All combat swimmers who belonged to the SS were at the time under the jurisdiction of the "Sondereinsatzabteilung der Waffen SS," directed by SS Lt Col Otto Skorzeny. Before November of 1944, since the SS had no facilities or instructors for this type of operation, the SS swimmers were placed under Naval jurisdiction with the "Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende" or KdK (warfare by small units) commanded by Admiral Heye. The captured river fighters knew little about other operations of KdK, but they did know that one man torpedos, one man submarines, radio-controlled explosive-laden motorboats and similar boats which were not controlled were included in KdK's offensive machinery.

Six schools were used to train German and Italian combat swimmers. The curriculum at the Valdagno, Italy, school included: instruction in the nomenclature and use of swimming and diving apparatus; singing (to develop lungs); lectures on the effects of deep sea diving on the human body, precautionary measures, etc.; surface and underwater swimming with and without weights; brief instruction in the use of timing devices; and practise in swimming under a ship and attaching charges to the hull, practise in walking on sea bottom with diving suits and lead shoes and in the recovery of practise torpedoes used in nearby naval maneuvers, classes in elementary navigation, lectures and demonstrations in passing under water obstacles such as booms and nets, and a refresher course in the use of timing devices.

One school in Vienna trained similarly to Valdagno, and another at Klosterneuberg, north of Vienna, was a specialist school for river fighters. Details of training at Bad Toelz, near Munich, and Sylt Island, off the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein, were unknown to the captives.

Equipment

The first layer of clothing worn by these swimmers included two one-piece suits of heavy white woolen underwear covering the feet (presumably like baby pajamas); a padded cotton cap which covered the top and back of the head, fastening under the chin; and woolen gloves. The second layer was a rubber suit which included a high-necked, long-sleeved shirt with tight-fitting bands of thin rubber for the collar and wrist cuffs; trousers and shoes in one piece; a waistband, worn like a cummerbund over the juncture of the trousers and shirt; a rubber hood with built in sponge rings to protect the ears from the pressure of the hood; and long rubber gloves reaching almost to the elbow.

A protective suit of cotton, with laces on sleeves, legs and waist for a snug fit, covered the rubber suit.

In cold water, a standard Luftwaffe jacket chemically treated to generate warmth for a period of three hours was worn. The jacket's bouyancy forced divers to carry lead weights when they used the jacket.

Fins, carrying straps and hooks and the breathing apparatus completed the ensemble, however, a dark green wool knit cap with a face-covering of dark net was worn on some operations when the swimmer was at work on the target.

Rubber cement was used to seal all separations in the rubber suit. The suit could be worn for forty-eight consecutive hours, in or out of water. The German swatzstika was worn on the left breast of the outermost jacket with the German eagle hovering over it.

See the illustration attached to this Appendix as Exhibit "A."

Appendix 2

Development of Code for Machine Recording of SHAEF Personality Card Index for Germany, and two exhibits: A-Personality list sample in alphabetical order in one Wehrkreise in Germany (Incomplete) as it appeared in mimeograph form; B-Personality list sample, excluding Germans, by nationality (incomplete).

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

310 (G-2) 28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Machine Recording of SHAEF Personality Card Index for Germany.

TO: Commanders concerned.

1. Annex A to Circular Number 20, Headquarters 12th Army Group, dated 7 December 1944, Subject, Machine Recording of SHAEF Personality Card Index for Germany, is hereby recinded.

2. The attached Annex A is supplied as a replacement for the rescinded Annex.

By Command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

/s/ J. H. BLOSS
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adj Gen

1 Incl - Annex 4

DISTRIBUTION: "E:, plus
CG, First US Army, Main Echelon, APO 230, AG Sec, Attn: 32nd MRU (M) - 1
CG, Third US Army, APO 403, Attn: 39th MRU (M) - 1
CG, Ninth US Army, APO 339, Attn: 47th MRU (M) - 1
CG, Fifteenth US Army, APO 408, Attn: 56th MRU (M) - 1
CG, III Corps, APO 303, Attn: 48th MRU (M) - 1
CG, V Corps, APO 905, Attn: 26th MRU (M) - 1
CG, VII Corps, APO 307, Attn: 5th MRU (M) - 1
CG, VIII Corps, APO 308, Attn: 13th MRU (M) - 1
CG, XII Corps, APO 312, Attn: 44th MRU (M) - 1
CG, XIII Corps, APO 463, Attn: 46th MRU (M) - 1
CG, XVI Corps, APO 197, Attn: 54th MRU (M) - 1
CG, XIX Corps, APO 270, Attn: 11th MRU (M) - 1
CG, XX Corps, APO 340, Attn: 38th MRU (M) - 1

ANNEX 4 - PART I: Spacing Assignment on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

SPACES	INFORMATION
1 - 20	Individual's name
21 - 34	Town
35	Sex of subject
36 - 37	Wehrkreis
38	Classification of subject
39 - 43	Organization or rank
44	Organizational level
45 - 46	Rank or position
47 - 48	Year position held at last report
49 - 50	Year of subject's birth
51 - 52	Nationality of subject
53 - 54	Source of information
55	Status of case
56 - 58	Place of detention
59 - 60	Disposition of case
61 - 65	Case number
66 - 67	Arresting agency
70 - 75	Arbitrary number assigned MRU card for accurate sorting
80	Duplicate cards

PART II: Code used on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

1 - 20 INDIVIDUAL'S NAME

Name spelled out, in order, last name
first name
middle initial
title

Each alias to be entered on a separate card in spaces 1 - 20, the normal space for names, and "C - (proper name under which filed)" entered in the space normally reserved for the name of the town, i.e., spaces 21 - 34 (C- being a one column homonym for see). In this way each alias will have an alternate MRU card for cross reference purposes.

21 - 34 TOWN

Town in which individual is most apt to be found (spelled out).

If individual has had an important post in one town and a residence in another, or if he has had any recent connection with more than one town which might suggest his continued presence in one of several towns, separate cards will be created.

35 SEX OF SUBJECT - one letter code.

Male M. Female F.

36 - 37 WEHRKREIS

The Wehrkreis are indicated by arabic numerals substituted for the usual Roman numerals except for the three indicated by the following two letter code:

GG General Government

PR Protectorate

AU Ausland

38 CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT

The SHAEF classification of individuals is used where applicable. The exceptions are three noted below under "S", "U" and "W". The augmented SHAEF classification is as follows:

A - denotes a person known or strongly suspected to be an officer, employee or member (but not an agent) of the Abwehr, Sipo & SD or GFP.

B - denotes a person known or strongly suspected to be an agent employed by the Abwehr or the Sipo & SD.

C - denotes a person who is known, or strongly suspected, to be an agent, but whose activities cannot be definitely related to either of the above organizations.

D - denotes a person who is under suspicion of being an agent or member of a hostile intelligence service because he has been reported as such, but on evidence which is felt to be inconclusive.

F - denotes a person who is anti-Nazi and believed willing to aid the Allies.

M - denotes a person who is suspect for any one of a number of miscellaneous reasons which are not categorized elsewhere.

N - denotes a member of the NSDAP or of other National Socialist or paramilitary organizations other than the SS.

O - denotes an official of the general civil administration.

P - denotes a member of the police, excluding the Gestapo and the Kripo but including the Feldgendarmerie.

R - denotes a renegade, any individual who owes allegiance to a power other than Germany but pays homage to Nazidom.

S - denotes a member of the SS other than an SS member who is also a member of Sipo & SD or the police and is therefore classified in one of the other categories even if primarily SS. (The normal SHAEF classification is SS).

U - denotes an individual who is the leader or a member of an organization plotting resistance against any Allied occupying force in Germany or an individual who has announced his intention of forming or joining such a group. (This is not a SHAEF classification).

W - denotes a War Criminal. (This is not a SHAEF classification).

39 - 43 ORGANIZATION OR RANK 5 letter and numeral code.

The code employed in spaces 39 - 43 is to be read in conjunction with the classification noted in space 38.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Abwehr, the branch, and if possible the level, of the office for which he worked will be shown by a code built up in the following manner:

ABT1A - denotes a member of Abteilung I A - personnel

AB1WI - denotes a member of Abteilung I Wirtschaft - economic information

ABT2S - denotes a member of Abteilung II S - sabotage

AB3KG - denotes a member of Abteilung III Kgf - prevention of espionage in PW camps

ABTZK - denotes a member of Abteilung Zentral-kartei - central registry

ALS1H - denotes a member of Abt I H in an Abwehrleitstelle or Alst

AS1MT - denotes a member of Abt I MT in an Abwehrstelle or Ast

NES2S - denotes a member of Abt II S in a Nebenstelle or Nest

AU1TL - denotes a member of Abt 1 TL in an Aussenstells or Aust

MEK3H - denotes a member of Abt III H in a Meldekopf or MK

If the individual is identified merely as associated with the Abwehr with no indication of branch, the code will be ABT. If only partial association is noted as "Member of Amt II", as much information as is noted is entered, in the example given, ABT2.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst, the code to be used will be SIPO if no indication is given of Aemter or other subdivision. If an Amt of the RSHA or SD is indicated, the code used will be SD followed by the number of the Amt, e.g., SD6. However, if Amt IV of the RSHA or the SD is mentioned, the code will be GESTA, as it will be when the only mention is Gestapo. If the individual holds a rank in the SS, the code for SS ranks noted below will be used in preference to the more general SIPO or SD inasmuch as the type of activity has already been indicated in column 38.

If the individual is a member of the Geheimefeldpolizei, the code used will be GFP.

If the individual is a member of the Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz Abteilung, the code used will be NDEA.

If the individual is a member of the SS Jadgverbaende or any subordinate group including the Streifkorps, Jaegarbataillon 502, a Feldjaegerkommando, Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, or the 150 Panzer Brigade, the code used will be JAGDV.

If the individual is a member of the Brandenburg Division, the code used will be BRAND.

If the individual is a member of the Kriminalpolizei, the code used will be KRIPO.

It will be noted, in recapitulation, that wherever possible standard abbreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY are used in coding the Personality Card Index for MRU. Other than standard abbreviations so listed, the following codes may be found in spaces 39 - 43, if space shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D":

ABT - the Abwehr, if followed by further identification, a specific branch of the Abwehr.

AL or ALS followed by numeral and letter - an Alst of the Abwehr.

NE or NES followed by numeral and letter - Nest of the Abwehr.

AU or AUS followed by numeral and letter - an Aust of the Abwehr.

ME or MEK followed by numeral and letter - a Meldekopf of the Abwehr.

BRAND - a member of the Brandenburg Division.

JAGDV - a member of a Jagdverband.

NDEA - a member of the Nachrichten Doimetscher Ersatz Abteilung.

When space 38 shows classification "N", the standard abbreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY for the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations furnish the code. Chief among these are the following:

NSDAP - Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - National Socialist German Workers Party - the Nazi party.

NSF - NS Frauenschaft - Nazi party women's organization.

HJ - Hitler Jugend - Hitler Youth.

STANF - Standartenfuehrer	7
OSTBF - Obersturmbannfuehrer	8
STUBF - Sturmbannfuehrer	9
HSTUF - Hauptsturmfuehrer	10
OSTUF - Obersturmfuehrer	11
USTUF - Untersturmfuehrer	12
STASF - Stabasscharfuehrer	13
STSCF - Sturmscharfuehrer	14
STOBJ - Standartenoberjunker	15
HSCHF - Hauptscharfuehrer	16
OSCHF - Oberscharfuehrer	17
SCHAF - Scharfuehrer	19
USCHF - Unterscharfuehrer	21
ROTTF - Rottenfuehrer	24
STURM - Sturmmann	25
S-MAN - SS Mann	26

When space 38 shows classification "F", "M", "R", "U" or "W", customarily there will be no further identification in spaces 39 - 43. Exception will occur when the individual has an SS rank or NSDAP affiliation.

When, after arrest, a man is interned for no further reason than the fact that he is considered a threat to the security of Allied military authorities, the code used will be SECTH.

44 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL - one digit code.

Space 44 is only filled when space 38 shows the classification "N" or "O", to indicate at what level of the regional organization the subject individual is employed.

BDM - Bund Deutscher Maedels - League of German Girls.

RAD - Reichserbeitsdienst - Compulsory national labor service.

NSAB - NS Aertsbund - National Socialist Physicians League.

NSDSB - NS Deutscher Studentenbund - Nazi University Students League.

SA - Stumabteilung - Organization of the storm troopers.

When space 38 shows classification "O", no indication of position will show in spaces 39 - 43 unless the title, i.e., MAYOR, can be spelled out or a reasonable abbreviation, e.g., LDRAT for Landrat, can be used.

When space 38 shows classification "P", the customary short-name of the organization or the first five letters of such short-name will be found in spaces 39 - 43 as follows:

ORPO - Ordnungspolizei - the regular uniformed German police.

SCHUP - Schutzpolizei - city police, branch of Orpo.

GEND - Gendarmerie - rural police, branch of Orpo.

FGEND - Feldgendarmerie - military police.

SELBS - Selbstschutzpolizei - civilian auxiliary police.

However, SS ranks where shown on the original card are entered in spaces 39 - 43 according to the code in the next paragraph, in preference to any of these police organizations.

When space 38 shows classification "S", spaces 39 - 43 will show the rank within the SS held by the subject as follows:

RCHFR - Reichsfuehrer	1
OBTGF - Oberstgruppenfuehrer	2
OBGRF - Obergruppenfuehrer	3
GRUPF - Gruppenfuehrer	4
BRIGF - Brigadefuehrer	5
OBERF - Oberfuehrer	6

1 - Reich, Reichsministerium

2 - Gau, Land, Provinz, Regierungsbezirk

3 - Kreis, Landkreis

4 - Ort, City (Gemeinde)

5 - Zelle

6 - Block

45 - 46 RANK OR POSITION - two digit code.

The rank within the organization which is held by the subject individual will be shown in spaces 45 - 46 by a number descending from the highest position to the lowest according to a two digit code. In police and paramilitary formations, this code is based on relative ranks so that all numbers are not represented within every formation. The numerical code for SS ranks, employed whenever a position for a member of the SS is used in spaces 39 - 43, is found after the ranks of the SS coded above.

If space 38 shows "N" and space 44 is filled, the following code is used to indicate the relative party position at any level:

1 - Leiter

2 - Hauptamtsleiter or Amtsleiter

3 - Hauptstellenleiter

4 - Stellenleiter

If space 38 shows "N" and spaces 39 - 43 show "HJ" or "BDM", the following code is employed in spaces 45 - 46:

1 - Reichsjugendfuehrer

2 - Stabsfuehrer der Reichsjugendfuehrung

3 - Obergebeitsfuehrer

4 - Gebeitsfuehrer, Gebeitsfuehrerin

5 - Hauptbannfuehrer, Hauptmaedelfuehrerin

6 - Oberbannfuehrer

7 - Bannfuehrer, Bannmaedelfuehrerin

8 - Oberstammfuehrer

9 - Stammfuehrerin, Maefelringfuehrerin

10 - Hauptgefolgschaftsfuehrer

11 - Obergefolgschaftsfuehrer

12 - Gefolgschaftsfuehrer, Maedelgruppenfuehrerin

19 - Oberscharfuehrer

21 - Scharfuehrer, Maedelscharfuehrerin

22 - Oberkameradschaftsfuehrer

23 - Kamaradschaftsfuehrer, Maedelschaftsfuehrerin

24 - Rottenfuehrer

26 - Hitlerjunge, BDM Maedel

If spaces 39 - 43 show "SA", "NSKK", or "NSFK", the following code is employed spaces 45 - 46:

1 - Stabschef

3 - Obergruppenfuehrer

4 - Gruppenfuehrer

5 - Brigadefuehrer

6 - Oberfuehrer

7 - Standartenfuehrer

8 - Obersturmbannfuehrer, Oberstaffelfuehrer

9 - Sturmbannfuehrer, Staffelfuehrer

10 - Hauptsturmfuehrer

11 - Obersturmfuehrer

12 - Sturmfuehrer

14 - Haupttruppfuehrer

16 - Obertruppfuehrer

17 - Truppfuehrer

19 - Oberscharfuehrer

21 - Scharfuehrer

24 - Rottenfuehrer

25 - Obersturmmann

26 - Sturmmann

When spaces 39 - 43 show the classification "RAD", the following code will be employed in columns 45 - 46:

3 - Reichsarbetisfuehrer

4 - Obergeneralarbeitsfuehrer

5 - Generalarbeitsfuehrer

7 - Oberstarbeitsfuehrer, Stabshauptfuehrerin

8 - Oberarbeitsfuehrer, Stabsoberfuehrerin

9 - Arbeitsfuehrer, Stabsfuehrerin

10 - Oberstfeldmeister, Maidenhauptfuehrerin

11 - Oberfeldmeister, Maidenoberfuehrerin

12 - Feldmeister, Maidenfuehrerin

13 - Unterfeldmeister, Maidenunterfuehrerin

17 - Obertruppfuehrer, Jungfuehrerin

21 - Truppfuehrer, Kameradschaftsaelteste

23 - Obervormann

24 - Vormann

26 - Arbeitsmann, Arbeitsmaid

When space 38 shows "P" or when the subject individual is a member of the Abwehr so that he holds Wehrmacht rank the following code is used:

1 - Generalfeldmarschall

2 - General Oberst

3 - General der Infanterie, General der Polizei

4 - Generalleutnant

5 - Generalmajor

7 - Oberst

8 - Oberstleutnant

9 - Major

10 - Hauptmann

11 - Oberleutnant, Schupo Inspektor

12 - Leutnant, Polizei Obermeister or Meister

If space 38 shows "F", "M", "O", "R", "S", "U" or "W", spaces 45 - 46 will customarily be left blank.

47 - 48 YEAR POSITION HELD AT LAST REPORT - two digit code.

All dates used will be shown by the last two digits of the year omitting the century, e.g., 1939 becomes 39.

49 - 50 YEAR OF BIRTH - two digit code.

Age of subject will be shown by use of the last two digits of the year of birth. When approximate ages are given, the mean of the approximation will be used, e.g., "born 1907 - 1909" becomes "08", "aged 55 - 60" becomes "88".

51 - 52 NATIONALITY OF SUBJECT - two digit code.

Nationality will be shown by the following two digit code:

1 - American	18 - Hebrew
2 - Alsatian (French)	19 - Swiss
3 - Belgian	20 - Austrian
4 - British	21 - Polish
5 - Canadian	22 - Arab
6 - Danish	23 - Jap
7 - French	24 - Finn
8 - German	25 - Dutch
9 - Hungarian	26 - Czech
10 - Italian	27 - Yugoslav
11 - Russian	28 - Greek
12 - Scottish	29 - Egyptian
13 - Spanish	30 - Moroccan
14 - Swedish	31 - Alsatian (German)
15 - Bulgarian	32 - Turk
16 - Chinese	33 - Welsh
17 - Irish	34 - Persian

35 - Portuguese

36 - Armenian

37 - Australian

38 - Haitian

39 - Algerian

40 - Norwegian

41 - Asiatic

42 - Estonian

43 - Syrian

44 - Luxembourgeois

45 - Indian

46 - Breton (French)

47 - Lithuanian

53 - 54 SOURCE OF INFORMATION - two digit code.

The following two digit code will be used to indicate the office originating the card:

6 - MI 6

9 - MI 9

10 - Office of Strategic Services

11 - Political Warfare Executive

12 - 12th Army Group

14 - MI 14

15 - M (Miscellaneous)

16 - 6th Army Group

17 - D (Document)

18 - F (Field)

20 - Federal Bureau of Investigation

21 - 21 Army Group

55 STATUS OF CASE - one digit code.

The following single digit code will be used to indicate the status of the carded individual:

1 - Subject not yet apprehended.

2 - Case pending. Subject apprehended and awaiting final disposition.

3 - Case closed. Final disposition of the individual made.

56 - 58 PLACE OF DETENTION - three digit code.

It is envisaged that all detention and interment camps will be numbered; the number of the camp in which the subject may be found will be entered in spaces 56 - 58.

59 - 60 DISPOSITION OF CASE - two digit code.

As pending cases ("2" in space 55) are closed, "3" will be entered in space 55 and the disposition will be shown in spaces 59 - 60 according to the following code:

1 - Evacuated as a prisoner of war.

31 - Transferred to French authorities.

32 - Transferred to Belgian authorities.

33 - Transferred to Luxembourg authorities.

34 - Transferred to Dutch authorities.

49 - Interned by military authorities.

50 - Released by military authorities without trial.

60 - Tried, acquitted, and released by military authorities.

61 - Tried, acquitted, and released by French authorities.

62 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Belgian authorities.

63 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Luxembourg authorities.

64 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Dutch authorities.

70 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by military authorities.

71 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by French authorities.

72 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Beligan authorities.

73 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Luxembourg authorities.

74 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Dutch authorities.

79 - Died during imprisonment.

89 - Reliably reported dead before capture.

91 - Tried, convicted, and executed by French authorities.

92 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Belgian authorities.

93 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Luxembourg authorities.

94 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Dutch authorities.

99 - Tried, convicted, and executed by military authorities.

61 - 65 CASE NUMBERS

It is envisaged that each card, as its subject changes from status "1" to status "2" on being apprehended, will become the primary document in a dossier. This dossier will be assigned a number which will be the number of the case. This number will at that time be entered on the MRU card.

66 - 67 ARRESTING AGENCY - two digit code.

The following code has been established to indicate the agency which arrests the subject individual:

1 - First Army

3 - Third Army

7 - Seventh Army

9 - Ninth Army

11 - First French Army

12 - 12th Army Group

15 - Fifteenth Army

22 - Communications Zone

25 - 15th Army Group

29 - Russian Armies

31 - French authorities

32 - Belgian authorities

33 - Luxembourg authorities

34 - Dutch authorities

70 - 76 MRU CARD NUMBER

To facilitate the handling of MRU cards, each personality card has been assigned an arbitrary number which is likewise carried by its MRU counterpart. This is a filing aid and has no significance for any office except the MRU office.

80 DUPLICATE CARDS

Whenever a duplicate MRU card is created for a single personality, because an individual has an alias or is associated with more than one town, the existence of the second card is noted by an asterisk in column 80.

DIEHM	SAARBRUECKEN	BRIGF	P
DIEHM	METZ		
DIEHM	SAARBRUCKEN		P
DIEHM CHRISTOPH	SAARBRUECKEN	BRIGF	A
DIEHM CHRISTOPH	SAARBRUECKEN	BRIGF	SP
DIERCKS	ANDERNACH	ASTII	A
DIESINGER WILLI	SAARBRUECKEN		S
DIETLEN	SAARBRUECKEN		F
DIETRICH	WIESBADEN		N
DIETRICH	WIESBADEN		F
DIETRICH DR	SAARBRUECKEN	OSTBF	A
DIETRICH DR	SAARBRUECKEN		P
DIETSCH	ST JEAN		D
DIETZ	METZ	SD5B41B	A
DIETZ	SAARPFALZ	KRIPO12	A
DIETZ VON BAYER	WIESBADEN		N
DIETZ WERNER	WIESBADEN	AST	A
DIETZEL HERMANN	MANNHEIM		10P
DIFFERDING HERMAN	ESSELBORN		N
DILLENBURG DR OTTO	BAD BERTRICH	SA	6N
DILLENBURGER WILHELM	ST GOARSHAUSEN		N
DILLMANN	BEUVANGE		N
DISTLER ROBERT	METZ	STSCF	A
DIVO PIERRE	BICKENHOLZ		B
DOERINGER LUDWIG	WIESBADEN	ABT	24A
DOERK WILLI	HACHENBURG	HSTUF	S
DOERNER HUGO	KOBLENZ	DAF	N
DOERR ADOLF	ILLINGEN		N
DOERR GEORG		SIPO	A
DOERR WILHELM	WIESBADEN	AST	A
DOERRER HEINRICH	TRIER	RDB	N
DOHMEN	HERBESTHAL	MAYOR	O
DOLLE JOSEPH FAMILY	THANVILLE		N
DOMMERMUTH GUSTAV	MONTABAUR	NSV	N
DOMMING	METZ	KRIPO	P
DOMMING	METZ	SD5	10A
DOMNING	METZ	SIPO	10A
DOMNING	SAARPFALZ	SIPO	10A
DORNER FRITZ	METZ	SIPO	21A
DOSTMANN HERMANN	MANNHEIM	OSTUF	P
DRABING	SAARBRUCKEN	GESTA	C
DREDEMIS JEAN	KOENIGSHOFFEN	SIPO	D
DREIBHOLTZ	NEUWIED RHEIN	ABT	C

DREXEL	METZ	SD3	10A
DREYER OTTO	COLLENBERG	OSTBF	S
DRIESSEN	METZ		S
DRODT	MAYEN	DAF	N
DRUEKE	SCHWALENBERG		N
DRUEPPEL FRANZ	WIESBADEN	ABT	23A
DUBOIS	C - BISEWIUS J		
DUHR FRANZ	TRIER		N
DUNCKERN	METZ	BRIGF	5P
DUNCKERN ANTON	METZ	BRIGF	A
DUNKER	METZ	HSTUF	S
DUPIN	METZ	HSTUF	A
DUPIN	METZ	SD3B	10A
DUPIN	METZ	HSTUF	A
DURANDY GEORGES	WIESBADEN		N
DURO	SAARBURG	NSLL	N
DURRMEYER PIERRE GEO	METZ		B
DURWEN JOSEPH	KOCHEM		P
EBEL	SAARBRUECKEN		1N
EBERSCHREIBER E	METZ		B
EBERT HUGO	HEIDELBERG	ABT	C
ECHTERHOF JEAN	ROMBAS		1D
ECKER	ST GOAR	DAF	N
ECKER	NEUNKIRCHEN		M
ECKERT	MANNHEIM	ALST	A
ECKERT HANS	MANNHEIM	NSV	N
ECKERT PAUL	MEUNKIRCHEN	USTUF	P
ECKHARDT	METZ	STUBF	S
EDELBLUTH MISS	SCHIRMECK		W
EDSCHMIDT KASIMIR	DARMSTADT		M
EGMOND IR H VAN	DARMSTADT		R
EHISI MARCEL	PONTPIERRE	GESTA	D
EHRET	MANNHEIM	HJ	N
EIBES VALENTIN	SAARBURG		1N
EICH	ENSHEIM	MAYOR	N
EICHHOFF ERNST PASTO	WIESBRADEN		N
EICHENLAUB	NEUSTADT		F
EISELE DR	KATZWEILER	OSTUF	S
EISEN	KOBLENZ	SCHUP	10P
ELBEN ARNOLD	OBERNDORF		M
ELSEN	BITBURG	RDB	N
ELSER EMILE	STE CROIXE	GESTA	C
ELSER ERNEST	STE CROIXE	GESTA	C

ELSNER	WUERZBURG	DAF	N	
EMIG ERNST LUDWIG	WIESBADEN	AS1WI	B	
EMIG ERNST LUDWIG	WIESBADEN	ABT1W	B	
EMMENDOERFER KARL H	KOBLENZ		M	
ENDER T KARL	LANDSWEILER	NSV	N	
ENGEL ADAM	ZWEIDRUECKEN		F	
ENGELKE HEINRICH	HEIDELBERG	NSKOV	N	
ENGLER	METZ		F	
ERBACH DR	KOBLENZ	NSRB	N	
ERBEN RUDI	HERMESKEIL	NSV	N	
ERDMANN	WIESBADEN	ABT	A	*
ERDMANN WERNER HAUPT	C - ERDMANN		A	*
ERKEL MARIE FRAU	METZ	SIPO	B	*
ERLAT	STARBRUECKEN		10P	
ERNEWWIN	METZ	NES3F	B	
ERSFELD	HINZERT	USCHF	S	*
ERSFELD	TRIER		S	*
ESCH	TRIER	SIPO	11A	
ESCHER	SAARBRUECKEN	HJ	7N	
ESPER	WIESBADEN	ORPO	12P	
ESSLEN JOS BERGFRIED	WIESBADEN		F	
ETTERICH ARTHUR	KOBLENZ	RAD	5N	
ETTERICH ARTHUR	KOBLENZ		O	*
EUBELL ALFRIDA	BETZDORF		1N	
EUCKEN WALTER	FREIBURG BR		F	
EVEN PAUL	METZ		C	
EWERT	METZ	OSTUF	S	
EWERT EUGENE	LUXEMBOURG		C	
EWIG PROF DR	WESTMARK	NSDAP	N	
FADT CHARLES	METZ	NSDAP	1N	
FALK OTTO	SARREBRUECKEN	GESTA	21A	
FANELSA	SAARPFALZ	SD6	11A	
FASSEL	DIEDENHOFEN		N	
FAULHABER DR HEIN	MANNHEIM	STANF	S	
FAULHABER DR VON	MANNHEIM	SA	7N	
FAUST DR	KOBLENZ		N	

AMERICAN

CALCPAUGH WILLIAM CU	12	SAARBRUECKEN	MPSIPO		18 *
COLEPAUGH	12	C - CALCPAUCH	WCMPSIPO		18 *
GUDENBERG WERNER G	10	HAMBURG	MCABT		99
KOHLENBACK	6	MUENCHEN-GLAD	MF		94

ARAB

ABDULMEER ABBAS HIL	17	WIEN	MR		
CARLO			MD		22
DAVULMI MAROUF			MBABT		
KUTOB			MBSIPO		11
MOHAMMED BEN ABDULLA	3	RANDSDORF	MCABT	17	
VOGELWERTH	5	STRASBOURG	MR		14

ARMENIAN

DEEB GEORG	8	BRESLAU	MBAST		
KAMSARAKAN PETER	17	VIENNA	MBRSHA		

AUSTRALIAN

DACHAUER PROFESSOR	17	VIENNA	MM		
PORTSCHY TOBIAS DR	18	EISENSTADT	MONSDAP		05
POSCHACHER ING	17	MAUTHAUSEN	MN		
RAMP BERNARD			MP		19
REICHEL ANTON DR	18	GRAZ	MN		77
RIEBESAM	17	PERG	MOLDRAT	4	

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AUSTRIAN

ACHLEITNER	17	SCHALCHEN	MNNSDAP	1	08
AICHINGER DR OF LAW	18	VILLACH	MOLDRAT		
ALBRECHT	18	I MST TYROL	MOLDRAT		
ALBRECHT RUDOLF	18	AU	MOMAYOR		04
ALLERBERGER BERNHARD	18	ZELL AM SEE	MOLDRAT	9	
ALLITSCH DR	18	BRUCK A MUR	MS		20
ALTENBERGER FRIEDR	18	SEEHAM	MNNSDAP		
ALTENBERGER JOHANN	18	SEEHAM	MN		
ALTENBURGER BARONIN	18	INNSBRUCK	FNNSF		12
ANDERLIK	18	SEEKIRCHEN	MNNSDAP	1	05 *
ANDRI FERDINAND PROF	17	VIENNA	MN		
ANDRIANI GERT	17	VIENNA	MM		*
ANKNICZ VON KLEEHOVE	17	VIENNA	MM		83
ARNHOLD	17	VIENNA	MN	1	
ASSMANN DR	18	GRAZ	MNNSDAP	1	95
ASSMANN DR	18	LEIBNITZ	MOLDRAT		
ATTEMS MAX COUNT	17	WIEN	MN		94
ATTEMS OTHMAR	17	WIEN	MP		02
AUERSPERG ALFRED DR	17	VIENNA	MN		97 *
AUFSCHNEIDER ALOIS	18	OBERAURACH	MN		05
AUGUST JOHANN	17	NIKITSCH	MOMAYOR		88
AUINGER	17	ST PANTALEON	MN		14
AUMAYER	17	MATTIGHOFEN	MNMAYOR		
BACHER JOHANN	18	SEEKIRCHEN	MOMAYOR		88
BACHLER MATHIAS	18	SCHLADMING	MSUSTUF		06
BACHMANN ALEXANDER	18	DORWERFEN	MNSA		
BACHNEK	18	KLAGENFURT	MNNSDAP	1	02
BAHNER ROMAN	17	WIEN	MN		
BANHOLZER DR FERDINA	18	JUDENBERG	MOLDRAT		
BARNEKOW VON FRITZ	17	VIENNA	MASTUBF		98
BARTSCH ROBERT	17	VIENNA	MN		80

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AUSTRIAN

BASTASCH	17 VIENNA	MBGESTA		95
BAUER	18 PETTAU	MOLDRAT		
BAUER	18 ST VEIT GLAN	MNNSDAP	1	97 *
BAUER	17 LINZ	MNDAF		
BAUER FRANZ	18 HALL	MOMAYOR	1	01

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Appendix 3

Informal Checklist for CIC and other intelligence personnel; titled Security Measures for Mounting an Airborne Operation.

HEADQUARTERS 13TH AIRBORNE DIVISION APO 333
13th CIC Detachment U.S. Army

The following is an informal check list for CIC and other intelligence personnel. It does not pretend to be all inclusive but it does raise critical security questions.

CHECK LIST
SECURITY MEASURES FOR MOUNTING AN AIRBORNE OPERATION

I. PREPARATORY TO OPERATION.

a. Division, Regimental, Battalion and other Separate Unit Headquarters Areas:

1. Is care being exercised for enforcing security measures unobtrusively?
2. Has civilian employment been restricted to absolute minimum?
3. Have civilian employees been carefully investigated?
4. Are casual visitors kept out?
5. What is the status of Red Cross civilian personnel?
6. Are armed guards posted on all routes leading into it?
7. Have guards been adequately indoctrinated?
8. Is use of password and countersign rigidly enforced?
9. Are guards regularly checked as to physical fitness, mental alertness, and knowledge of Special Orders?
10. Do guards have flashlights?
11. Have roving patrols been added to supplement fixed sentries' posts?
12. Has the Provost Marshal designated routes for these patrols?
13. Have rendezvous points been established for them?
14. Are they required to pass these at specified times?
15. Have any alarm sounding facilities been provided for emergencies?
16. What particular care is being exercised to assure that parachute packing sheds are properly protected against marauders, fire and other sabotage?
17. Is utmost caution and secrecy observed in the moving and delivery of parachutes?
18. Is adequate fire apparatus available in marshalling areas?

b. "Top Secret" Rooms

1. Is entry restricted to one door only?
2. Are windows adequately covered and securely barred or nailed closed?
3. Are unused entrances permanently sealed or barred?
4. Are the used doors locked from the inside?
5. Can doors, not being used, be easily forced open?
6. What other rooms, corridors, hallways are adjoining?
7. Are there other means of ingress or egress to this room?
8. Does voice carry to adjoining rooms, corridors, hallways--at early morning hours?

Check List (cont'd)

9. If so, what improvised sound-proof arrangements have been provided?
10. What is available for instant destruction of classified material?
11. Is there fire extinguishing equipment in room?
12. When was it last tested?
13. Are there emergency lights in room?
14. How are documents stored there?
15. How are they displayed?
16. Is a safe available in room; what kind?
17. Has an armed 24-hour guard been posted at entrance to room?
18. What are his weapons; are they loaded?
19. How long is guard's tour of duty?
20. Does he get temporary relief every hour?
21. Is he carrying a flashlight?
22. Is he properly instructed?
23. Are guards ever required to leave their posts?
24. Has he quick access to telephone?
25. Can he readily call for aid or relief?
26. Is trash and waste burned daily under competent supervision?

c. "Top Secret" Room Passes:

1. Has a controlled pass system been initiated?
2. Are visitors admitted on pass only?
3. Who is entitled to such pass?
4. Is applicant required to familiarize himself with instructions pertaining to issuance of such passes?
5. Is he required to sign statement to that effect?
6. Who supervises actual issuance of such passes?
7. Who passes an applicant's application for pass?
8. Are passes limited for any specific period?
9. Are they identified with reference to locale or operation?
10. Are passes numbered?
11. What items of information do they contain?
12. What record is kept of passes issued?
13. How are passes insured against forgeries?
14. How, to whom, and how soon must losses be notified?
15. How are losses noted and searches instituted?
16. How are visitors from other headquarters admitted?
17. Are visitors accompanied to particular destination?
18. Are they directed, guided, and watched?

d. Personnel:

1. Have "security officers" been appointed (below divisions) and briefed?
2. Have pathfinder units been sufficiently instructed in security?

Check List (cont'd)

3. Have new security precautions been stressed to troops?
4. Have they been warned of risks?
5. Are public places such as military clubs, bars, etc., being checked for security violations among bigotted personnel?
6. Are public places being checked for rumors and loose talk?
7. Have censorship regulations been reviewed by unit censors?
8. Is sufficient care being exercised in censoring of mail?
9. Are breaches of security reported without delay?
10. Has personnel been warned against requesting rush job favors from civilians?
11. Have provisions been made for handling troops' unfinished personal business after departure?
12. Have troops been advised of such arrangements?
13. Is care being exercised to keep movement secret from: (a) civilian personnel at officers' mess halls, (b) civilian employees at day rooms, (c) owners of troops or officers billets, (d) Red Cross workers?
14. Have insignia and devices been removed from uniform?
15. Have troops been instructed in road discipline?
16. Have identifying unit markings been obliterated: (a) troops, (b) vehicles?
17. Are skeleton forces maintained at headquarters to conceal permanent movement?
18. Are such forces instructed as to correct explanations to callers?
19. Has deadline been announced for termination of leaves, furloughs?

e. Communications:

1. Have censorship arrangements been reviewed and inspected?
2. Is all personal mail impounded?
3. Are telegrams censored by unit censor?
4. Have troops been warned of mail censorship aspects?
5. How are civilian telephones monitored?
6. How are official telephones monitored?
7. Is cryptographic security maintained?
8. Is message center personnel instructed in accordance with AR 380-5?
9. Are documents receipted for, recorded, and filed in accordance with regulations?
10. Is trash and waste burned daily under competent supervision?
11. Are qualified couriers used?
12. Are couriers adequately instructed?
13. Are they armed with loaded weapons?
14. How are other Allied couriers identified?
15. Are code names used when required?

Check List (cont'd)

II. MOVEMENT TO AIRBORNE ASSEMBLY AREAS

1. Have troops been instructed to maintain march discipline throughout movement?
2. Have routes been chosen to avoid large centers of population?
3. Has some form of motor patrol been arranged along route of march?
4. Has time of movement been planned for hours of darkness?

III. IN AIRBORNE ASSEMBLY AREAS

1. Is airfield perimeter adequately guarded (senior air force officer's responsibility)?
2. Are areas away from main roads?
3. Has liaison been established with other security agencies in area?
4. Has prisoner of war labor been removed from airfields, assembly areas, and adjacent installations?
5. Is liaison maintained with base CIC/FS units?
6. Are areas inaccessible to view from passers by, farmers, etc.?
7. Have airborne unit areas 24-hour interior guards?
8. Have troop carrier and other air corps personnel been placed under same restrictions as tactical troops?
9. Have areas been closed off by barbed wire?
10. Is black-out and camouflage discipline strictly adhered to?
11. Is SOS personnel sealed in separately from airborne troops?
12. Are rolls called at least twice daily?
13. Is CIC notified of medical cases requiring hospitalization?
14. Are such cases placed under CIC surveillance?
15. Are they isolated from other patients in hospital?
16. Has all mail been collected prior to emplaning?
17. Has it all been censored?
18. Have all orders or marked maps been left behind?
19. Have ground crews been restricted to their fields?
20. Has a strict pass system for each area been instituted?
21. Is all pre H-hour briefing conducted in sealed areas?
22. Have troops been cautioned that in event of their failure to reach target after take-off they will rejoin their unit without disclosure of mission to other friendly units. (Making a practice jump, etc)
23. Are troops sealed in once briefing has begun?
24. Are troops in assembly areas segregated from other troops?
25. Are briefing buildings guarded?
26. Is briefing conducted in accordance with security directives?
27. Has personnel been spot-checked for diaries, documents, souvenirs, etc.?
28. Are maps and other documents used in briefing kept away from permanent personnel and troops unauthorized to see them?

Check List (cont'd)

29. Have all maps, terrain models, identifying documents, etc., been collected before H-hour?
30. Are only official telephone calls and telegrams permitted after briefing?
31. Has all Troop Carrier Air Force personnel been restricted to fields?
32. In event of prolonged delay in assembly area is guard adequate to maintain security during extended period?
33. In case of delays, is static provision maintained to secure any new incoming personnel?

IV. POST AIRBORNE DEPARTURE

1. Have all troops left behind been sealed until official announcement of the operation?
2. Have returning pilots and airborne personnel been sealed until official announcement?
3. Is guard continued without change?
4. Have all documents, maps, etc., either been destroyed (or security preserved for shipment under guard to CP)?
5. Have all other security provisions, (mail, emergency hospitalization, communications), been maintained until official announcement?

V. MOVEMENT OF "SEA-TAILS," "LAND-TAILS," ETC.

1. Are unit designations obliterated from vehicles?
2. Have parachute jump suits, insignia, jump boots, airborne patches been packed up or left behind?
3. Have appropriate code names been adopted?
4. Have civilians been evacuated from all adjacent areas, roads and villages?
5. Are troops sealed in to prevent contact with civilians and other friendly units?

FRANK POSPISIL
1st Lt., Inf.
Commanding

Appendix 4

Some forms in use by CIC in Germany in 1945.

A. The Case Investigation Sheet
B. Town Team Check List (two pages)
C. The Fragebogen, bi-lingual personal identification form (four pages)
D. MG Temporary Registration Card
E. Screening Card (also known as VII Corps' "Brown Card" because of its light umber color)
F. Notice, Movement of Persons
G. Instructions to Burgomeisters form

CASE INVESTIGATION SHEET

Case Number _____ Date _____

Name of Suspect _____

Address _____

Occupation _____ Marital Status _____

Reason for Investigation _____

_____

_____

Remarks _____

_____

_____

_____

Case Assigned to _____

Case opened _____ Pending _____ Closed _____

Type of Case _____

Disposition _____

_____

References, Informants or Witnesses _____

_____

_____

Recommendations _____

_____

Unit _____

Signed _____

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TOWN TEAM CHECK LIST

(To be completed after initial two days.)

I CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS (Specify present condition and security action taken.)

1. Telephone Exchange.

2. Post Office.

3. Telegraph Office.

4. Radio Station.

5. Newspaper and Printing Offices.

II CIVILIAN SECURITY CONTROLS (State whether covered by MG proclamations and what enforcement action taken.)

1. Collection of arms, ammunition, and explosives.

2. Collection of radio transmitters.

3. Separate registration of all NSDAP members and officers of the SA, SS, and Hitler Jugend.

4. Separate registration of members of Wehrmacht since 1. January 33.

5. No use of cameras or binoculars.

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6. Registration pass to every civilian.

7. Curfew (was 1800 to 0700 on 10. February 45).

8. Pigeons (wings clipped or killed.)

9. No letter-carrying or other mode of communication.

10. No meetings of any sort.

III SEARCHES (Give exact location and what found)

1. NSDAP, SS, etc., offices.

2. SD, SIPO, and Gestapo offices.

3. Police offices.

4. Residences of leading Nazis and SS members.

5. Residences of SD and Gestapo members.

IV MISCELLANEOUS

1. Estimate of civilian population.

2. Jail facilities.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

FRAGEBOGEN

PERSONNEL QUESTIONNAIRE

WARNUNG. Im Interesse von Klarheit ist dieser Fragebogen in Deutsch und englisch verfasst. In Zweifelsfaellen ist der englische Text massgeblich. Jede Frage muss so beantwortet werden, wie sie gestellt ist. Unterlassung der Beantwortung, unrichtige oder unvollstaendige Angaben werden wegen Zuwiderhandlung gegen militarische Verordnungen gerichtlich verfolgt. Falls mehr Raum benotigt ist, sind weitere Bogen anzuheften.

WARNING. In the interests of clarity this questionnaire has been written in both German and English. If discrepancies exist, the English will prevail. Every question must be answered as indicated. Omissions or false or incomplete statements will result in prosecution as violations of military ordinances. Add supplementary sheets if there is not enough space in the questionnaire.

A. PERSONAL
PERSONNEL

Name..... Ausweiskarte Nr.....
Name Zuname / *Surname* — Vornamen / *Middle name* / *Christian Name* — *Identity Card No.*

Geburtsdatum..... Geburtsort.....
Date of birth — *Place of birth*

Staatsangehorigkeit..... Gegenwartige Anschrift.....
Citizenship — *Present address*

Standiger Wohnsitz..... Beruf.....
Permanent residence — *Occupation*

Gegenwartige Stellung..... Stellung, fur die Bewerkung ingereicht.....
Present position — *Position applied for*

Stellung vor dem Jahre 1933.....
Position before 1933

B. MITGLIEDSCHAFT IN DER NSDAP

1. Waren Sie jemals ein Mitglied der NSDAP?

   Ja.....Nein.....

2. Daten.....

3. Haben Sie jemals eine der folgenden Stellungen in der NSDAP Bekleidet?

(a) REICHSLEITER, oder Beamter in einer Stelle, die einem Reichsleiter unterstand? Ja.....Nein.....
Titel der Stellung.....Daten.....

(b) GAULEITER, oder Parteibeamter innerhalb eines Gaues? Ja.....Nein.....
Daten.....Amtsort.....

(c) KREISLEITER, oder Parteibeamter innerhalb eines Kreises? Ja.....Nein.....
Titel der Stellung.....Daten.....Amtsort.....

(d) ORTSGRUPPENLEITER, oder Parteibeamter innerhalb einer Ortsgruppe?
Titel der Stellung.....Ja.....Nein.....
Daten.....Amtsort.....

B. NAZI PARTY AFFILIATIONS

Have you ever been a member of the NSDAP? yes, no. Dates.

Have you ever held any of the following positions in the NSDAP?

REICHSLEITER or an official in an office headed by any Reichsleiter? yes, no; title of position; dates.

GAULEITER or a Party official within the jurisdiction of any Gau? yes, no; dates; location of office.

KREISLEITER or a Party official within the jurisdiction of any Kreis? yes, no; title of position; dates; location of office.

ORTSGRUPPENLEITER or a Party official within the jurisdiction of an Ortsgruppe? yes, no; title of position; dates; location of office.

(e) Ein Beamter in der Parteikanzlei? Ja.....Nein.....
Titel der
Daten.....Stellung.....

An official in the Party Chancellery? yes, no; dates; title of position.

(f) Ein Beamter in der REICHSLEITUNG der NSDAP?
Ja.....Nein.....
Titel der
Daten.....Stellung.....

An official within the Central NSDAP headquarters? yes, no; dates; title of positions.

(g) Ein Beamter im Hauptamte für Erzieher? Im Amte des Beauftragtens des Führers für Ueberwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP? Ein Direktor oder Lehrer in irgend einer Parteiausbildungschule? Ja.....Nein.....
Titel der
Daten.....Stellung.....
Name der Einheit oder Schule.....

An official within the NSDAP's Chief Education Office? In the office of the Führer's Representative for the Supervision of the Entire Intellectual and Politico-philosophical Education of the NSDAP? Or a director or instructor in any Party training school? yes, no; dates; title of position; name of unit or school.

(h) Waren Sie Mitglied des KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER?
Daten der
Ja.....Nein.....Mitgliedschaft.....

Were you a member of the CORPS OF POLITISCHE LEITER? yes, no; dates of membership.

(i) Waren Sie ein Leiter oder Funktionär in irgend einem anderen Amte, Einheit oder Stelle (ausgenommen sind die unter C unten angeführten Gliederungen, angeschlossenen Verbände und betreuten Organisationen der NSDAP?
Ja.....Nein.....
Daten.....Stellung.....

Were you a leader or functionary of any other NSDAP offices or units or agencies (except Formations, Affiliated Organizations and Supervised Organizations which are covered by questions under C below)? yes, no; dates; title of position.

(j) Haben sie irgenwelche nahe Verwandte, die irgend eine der oben angeführten Stellungen bekleidet haben?
Ja.....Nein.....
Wenn ja, geben Sie deren Namen und Anschriften und eine Bezeichnung deren Stellung.....
.....

Have you any close relatives who have occupied any of the positions named above? yes, no, if yes, give the name and address and a description of the position.

C. TÄTIGKEITEN IN NSDAP HILFSORGANISATIONEN

Geben Sie hier an, ob Sie ein Mitglied waren und in welchem Ausmasse Sie an den Tätigkeiten der folgenden Gliederungen, angeschlossenen Verbände und betreuten Organisationen teilgenommen haben.

C. NAZI 'AUXILIARY' ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

Indicate whether you were a member and the extent to which you participated in the activities of the following Formations, Affiliated Organizations or Supervised Organizations:

	Mitglied *Member*		Dauer des Mitgliedschaft *Period of Membership*	Aemter bekleidet *Offices Held*	Dauer *Period*
	Ja *Yes*	Nein *No*			
1. Gliederungen *Formations*					
(a) SS					
(b) SA					
(c) HJ					
(d) NSDStB					
(e) NSD					
(f) NSF					
(g) NSKK					
(h) NSFK					
2. Angeschlossene Verbande *Affiliated Organizations*					
(a) Reichsbund d. deut. Beamten					
(b) DAF einschl					
KdF					
(c) NSV					
(d) NSKOV					
(e) NS Bund deut. Technik					
(f) NSD Aertztebund					
(g) NS Lehrerbund					
(h) NS Rechtswahrerbund					
3. Betreute Organisationen *Supervised Organizations*					
(a) VDA					
(b) Deutsches Frauenwerk					
(c) Reichskolonialbund					
(d) Reichsbund deut. Familie					
(e) NS Reichsbund fur Leibesubungen					
(f) NS Reichsbund deutscher Schwestern					
(g) NS Altherrenbund					
4. Andere Organisationen *Other Organizations*					
(a) RAD					
(b) Deutscher Gemeindetag					
(c) NS Reichskriegerbund					
(d) Deutsche Studentenschaft					
(e) Reichsdozentenschaft					
(f) DRK					
(g) Deutsche Christen Bewegung					
(h) Deutsche Glaubensbewegung			2730		

5. Waren Sie jemals Mitglied irgend einer nationalsozialistischen Organisation die vorstehend nicht angefuhrt ist?
Ja.....Nein.....
Name der
Organisation.....Daten.....
Titel
Stellung.....Ort.....

Were you ever a member of any NS organization not listed above? yes, no; name of organization; dates; title of position; location.

6. Haben Sie jemals das Amt von Jugendwalter in einer Schule bekleidet? Ja.....Nein.....

Did you ever hold the position of Jugendwalter in a school? yes, no

7. Wurden Ihnen jemals irgendwelche Titel, Rang, Auszeichnungen oder Urkunden von einer der oben genannten Organisationen ehrenhalber verliehen oder seitens dieser andere Ehren zuteil....
Ja.....Nein.....
Falls ja, geben Sie an, was Ihnen verliehen wurde (Titel usw), das Datum, den Grund und Anlass fur die Verleihung.....

Have you ever been the recipient of any titles, ranks, medals testimonials or other honors from any of the above organizations? yes, no. If so, state the nature of the honor, the date conferred, and the reason and occasion for its bestowal.

D. SCHRIFTWERKT UND REDEN

Verzeichnen Sie auf einem anderen Bogen alle Veroffentlichungen von 1923 bis zum heutigen Tage, die ganz oder teilweise von Ihnen geschrieben, gesammelt oder herausgegeben wurden und alle Ansprachen und Vorlesungen, die Sie gehalten haben; der Titel, das Datum und die Verbreitung oder Zuhorerschaft sind anzugeben. Ausgenommen sind diejenigen die ausschliesslich technische, kunstlerische oder unpolitische Themen zum Inhalte hatten. Wenn Sie dies in Zusammenarbeit mit einer Organisation unternommen haben, so ist deren Name anzugeben. Falls keine, schreiben Sie 'Keine Reden oder Veroffentlichungen'.

D. WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

List on a separate sheet all publications from 1923 to the present which were written in whole or in part, or compiled, or edited by you, and all addresses or lectures made by you, except those of a strictly technical or artistic and non-political character, giving title, date and circulation or audience. If they were sponsored by any organization, give its name. If none, write 'No speeches or publications'.

E. DIENSTVERHALTNIS

Alle Ihre Dienstverhaltnisse seit 1. Januar 1930 bis zum heutigen Tage sind anzugeben. Alle Ihre Stellungen, die Art Ihrer Tatigkeit, der Name und die Anschrift Ihrer offentlichen und privaten Arbeitgeber sind zu verzeichnen. Ferner sind anzufuhren: Dauer der Dienstverhaltnisse, Grund deren Beendigung, Dauer etwaiger Arbeitslosigkeit, einschliesslich der durch Schulausbildung oder Militardienst verursachten Postenlosigkeit.

E. EMPLOYMENT

Give a history of your employment beginning with January 1, 1930 and continuing to date listing all positions held by you, your duties and the name and address of your employer or the governmental department or agency in which you were employed, the period of service, and the reasons for cessation of service, accounting for all periods of unemployment, including attendance at educational institutions and military service.

Von *From*	Bis *To*	Anstellung *Position*	Art der Tatigkeit *Duties*	Arbeitgeber *Employer*	Grund fur die Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses *Reasons for Cessation of Service*

F. EINKOMMEN

Verzeichnen Sie hier die Quellen und die Höhe Ihres Einkommens seit dem 1. Januar 1933.

F. INCOME

Show the sources and amount of your annual income since January 1, 1933.

Jahr *Year*	Einkommensquellen *Sources of Income*	Betrag *Amount*
1933		
1934		
1935		
1936		
1937		
1938		
1939		
1940		
1941		
1942		
1943		
1944		

G. MILITÄRDIENST

Haben Sie seit 1919 Militärdienst geleistet? Ja.....Nein.....
In welcher Waffengattung?.....Daten.....
Wo haben Sie gedient? .....Dienstrang.....
Haben Sie in militärähnlichen Organisationen Dienst geleistet? Ja.....Nein.....
In welchen? .....Wo? .....Daten.....
Sind Sie vom Militärdienste zurückgestellt worden? Ja.....Nein.....
Wann? .....Warum? .....

Haben Sie an der Militärregierung in irgend einem von Deutschland besetzten Lande einschliesslich Oesterreich und Sudetenland teilgenommen? Ja.....Nein.....
Wenn ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten über bekleidete Aemter Art Ihrer Tätigkeit, Gebiet und Dauer des Dienstes an ....
.....

G. MILITARY SERVICE

Have you rendered military service since 1919? yes, no. In which arm? Dates. Where did you serve? Grade or rank. Have you rendered service in paramilitary organizations? yes, no. In which ones? Where? Dates. Were you deferred from military service? yes, no. When? Why?

Did you serve as a part of the Military Government in any country occupied by Germany including Austria and the Sudeten land? yes, no. If so, give particulars of offices held, duties performed, territory and period of service.

H. AUSLANDSREISEN

Verzeichnen Sie hier alle Reisen, die Sie ausserhalb Deutschlands seit 1933 unternommen haben.

H. TRAVEL ABROAD

List all journeys outside of Germany since 1933:

Besuchte Länder *Countries visited*	Daten *Dates*	Zweck der Reise *Purpose of Journey*

Haben Sie die Reise auf eigene Kosten unternommen? Ja.....Nein.....
Falls nicht, unter wessen Beistand wurde die Reise unternommen? .....
.....

Was journey made on your own account? yes, no. If not, under whose auspices was the journey made? Persons or organizations visited.

Besuchte Personen oder Organisationen.....

Haben Sie in irgendeiner Eigenschaft an der Zivilverwaltung eines von Deutschland besetzten oder angeschlossenen Gebietes teilgenommen? Ja.....Nein.....
Falls ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten über bekleidete Aemter, Art Ihrer Tätigkeit, Gebiet und Dauer des Dienstes an
.....
.....

Did you ever serve in any capacity as part of the civil administration of any territory annexed to or occupied by the Reich? yes, no. If so, give particulars of offices held, duties performed, territory and period of service.

I. POLITISCHE MITGLIEDSCHAFT

(a) Welcher politischen Partei haben Sie als Mitglied vor 1933 angehört?.....

(b) Waren Sie Mitglied irgend einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder gruppe seit 1933? Ja.....Nein.....
Welcher?.....Seit wann?.....

(c) Waren Sie jemals ein Mitglied einer Gewerkschaft, Berufs-, Gewerblichen- oder Handelsorganisation, die nach dem Jahre 1933 aufgelöst und verboten wurde? Ja.....Nein.....

(d) Wurden Sie jemals aus dem öffentlichen Dienste, einer Lehrtätigkeit oder einem Kirchlichen Amte entlassen, weil Sie in irgend einer Form den Nationalsozialisten Widerstand leisteten oder gegen Lehren und Theorien auftraten? Ja.....Nein.....

(e) Wurden Sie jemals aus rassischen oder religiosen Gründen, der weil Sie aktiv oder passiv den Nationalsozialisten Widerstand leisteten, in Haft genommen oder in Ihrer Freizugigkeit, Niederlassungsfreiheit oder sonst wie in Ihrer gewerblichen oder beruflichen Freiheit beschränkt? Ja.....Nein..... Falls ja, dann geben Sie Einzelheiten sowie die Namen und Anschriften zweier Personen an, die die Wahrheit Ihrer Angaben bestätigen können .....
.....
.....

I. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Of what political party were you a member before 1933?

Have you ever been a member of any anti-Nazi underground party or groups since 1933? yes, no. Which one? Since when?

Have you ever been a member of any trade union or professional or business organization suppressed by the Nazis? yes, no.

Have you ever been imprisoned, or have restrictions of profession or ecclesiastical positions for active or passive resistance to the Nazis or their ideology? yes, no.

Have you ever been imprisoned, or have restrictions of movement, residence or freedom to practice your trade or profession been imposed on you for racial or religious reasons or because of active or passive resistance to the Nazis, yes, no. If the answer to any of the above questions is yes, give particulars and the names and addresses of two persons who can attest to the truth of your statement.

J. ANMERKUNGEN

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

J. REMARKS

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Die Angaben auf diesem Formular sind wahr.

Gezeichnet .....
Signed

The statements on this form are true.

Datum .....
Date

Zeuge .....
Witness

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

TEMPORARY REGISTRATION — Zeitweilige Registrierungskarte

Name _____ Alter _____ Geschlecht _____
Name — Age — Sex

Ständige Adresse _____ Beruf _____
Permanent Address — Occupation

Jetzige Adresse _____
Present Address

Der Inhaber dieser Karte ist als Einwohner von der Stadt _____ vorschriftsmässig registriert und ist es ihm oder ihr strengstens verboten, sich von diesem Platz zu entfernen. Zuwiderhandlung dieser Massnahme führt zu sofortigem Arrest. Der Inhaber dieses Scheines muss diesen Ausweis stets bei sich führen.

The holder of this card is duly registered as a resident of the town of _____ and is prohibited from leaving the place designated. Violation of this restriction will lead to immediate arrest. Registrant will at all times have this paper on his person.

Legitimations Nummer Identity Card Number		Name and Rank Mil Gov Officer, U.S. Army
Unterschrift des Inhabers Signature of Holder	Right Index Finger	Datum der Austellung Date of Issue

(Dies ist kein Personal-Ausweis und erlaubt keine Vorrechte.)
(This is not an identity document and allows no privileges.)

(Ex. IV)

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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1. Name _____ Date _____

2. Present Address _____

_____

3. Previous Address _____

4. Date of Birth _____ 5. Occupation _____ 6. Marital Status _____

7. Place of Birth _____ 8. Nationality _____

_____ 9. References _____

10. Identity Doc. _____ _____

_____ _____

MILITARY HISTORY

a) Military Doc. _____ Number _____

b) Classification _____ Period of Service _____

c) Date of Discharge _____ Remarks _____

_____

POLITICAL HISTORY

Political Affiliation _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Registrant's Signature

2735

MILITARY GOVERNMENT - GERMANY
SUPREME COMMANDER'S AREA OF CONTROL

NOTICE

MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

Article I
Travel Restrictions

No person shall travel more than one Kilometer from the place of his residence without a permit from the Military Government Officer. Applications for permits will be made to your local Burgermeister. Travel permits will be issued for no reasons other than an emergency.

Article II

Penalties

Violation of this notice is punishable by a Military Government Court.

BY ORDER OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

(EXHIBIT I)

CONFIDENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS TO BURGOMEISTERS ON MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

TO BURGOMEISTER OF _____.

1. By authority of Military Government, all Burgomeisters are bound to and will follow the procedure described herein regarding travel by all persons other than the Allied Forces.

2. No person shall travel more than one kilometer from the place of his residence without a permit from the Military Government Officer. All applications for permits will be submitted to the local Burgomeister.

3. The Burgomeister will refuse all applications for travel permits except those persons who must travel, (a) to secure emergency medical attention, (b) (G-5 will include all other necessary exemptions).

4. In the case of persons coming within the categories listed in Par 3 above, the Burgomeister will accept the application and have the applicant complete the MG Fragebogen form. The Burgomeister will conduct such inquiry into the applicant as will enable him to make the following certificate:

"I, _____, Burgomeister of _____ Germany, certify that _____ of _____ must travel from _____ to _____ on _____ (date) to _____ (date) by reason of _____

_____

_____

"I further certify that to my knowledge the statements made by the applicant in the MG Fragebogen are true.

_____"
(signed)

5. The Burgomeister will then forward the above certificate and completed Fragebogen to the MG Officer located at _____.

6. Violation of these instructions, or a false certificate by any Burgomeister is punishable by MG Court.

BY ORDER OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

(EXHIBIT 2)

App 4-13

2737

BOX NUMBER: ///

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME II

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS CHRONOLOGY 1775 - 1950

Classified by CDR USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1, 2 + 3
DECLASSIFY ON

March 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

0171

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

CHRONOLOGICAL GUIDE FOR CIC HISTORICAL PROJECT
(Reference DAP 20-200, Aug 1951, Page 52, Para 5)

SIGNIFICANT DATES IN THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND ALLIED AGENCIES

1775-1827

28 July 1775	General George Washington issued instructions for recruiting intelligence agents for the American Army.
1775-1783	Revolutionary War: Army intelligence agents and nets. No record of any counterintelligence service.
2 June 1784	American Army reduced to eighty men with no intelligence or counterintelligence service.
1784-1811	Ten official army wars, insurrections and expeditions with no record of intelligence or counterintelligence.
1789	United States Customs Service was established.
1804	Terrain intelligence by Capt Lewis and 2nd Lt Clark who surveyed and mapped Northwest under secret War Department orders.
1805	First Lieutenant Zebulon Pike ordered by Army to chart upper Mississippi River. Pike was arrested by the Spaniards while charting Arkansas.
1812-1815	War of 1812: Coast raided; Washington burned. No record of any intelligence or counterintelligence.
20 April 1815	Major William McRee and Capt Sylvanus Thayer sent to Europe on two year tour for "professional improvement." First foreign observers.
1819	Major Stephen Long of the Army's Topographical Engineers mapped the Denver, Colorado region.
Dec 1827	First Lieutenant Daniel Tyler sent as a military observer to France for two years, where he attended French artillery school at Metz as a student observer.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 May 1832	Captain Benjamin L. E. Bonneville left Independence, Mo on a three year mapping trip of the Oregon trail area.
May 1839	Permission obtained from France to have Lt Philip Kearney attend the French Cavalry School at Saumur.
1841	Second Lieutenant John C. Fremont started on the first of a series of surveying and mapping projects of Western United States.
15 May 1847	Mexican War: General Winfield Scott organized at Pueblo, Mexico, the "Mexican Spy Company" for army intelligence.
1 Nov 1848	Colonel Manuel Dominguez and his 100-man Mexican Spy Company who fled for safety to New Orleans at end of Mexican War made an unsuccessful appeal to Congress for financial aid.
1846-1861	Thirty-five official army campaigns. No record of intelligence or any counterintelligence services, except scouting.
2 Apr 1855	Secretary of War Jefferson Davis had a three-officer military commission sent to Europe for one year to study changes in tactics resulting from the Crimean War.
1855	British army established a Topographical and Statistical Department as the start of its intelligence service.
30 June 1860	Secret Service Division of the United States Treasury was organized.
26 Jul 1861	General George McClellan organized a Union Army Intelligence system, headed by Allen Pinkerton.
1861-1865	Civil War: Union Army intelligence service included some counterintelligence. Superintendent John Kennedy, of the New York Police, operated one service for the War Department.
1862	Professor T.S.C. Lowe organized the Army Balloon Corps to secure combat intelligence during the war.

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1862-1878

15 Feb 1862	War Department took over Detective Police from State Department. Brigadier General L.C. Baker named Chief and special Provost Marshal.
1863	Union Army Signal Corps had 30 telegraph wagons in use in combat zone which could transmit messages 20 miles each.
30 Mar 1863	Army Bureau of Military Information activated with Col G.H. Sharpe as Deputy Provost Marshal in Charge.
1864	Major H.B. Smith, Chief of Union Army Secret Service, Middle Department with headquarters at Baltimore, Maryland, set up deserter and refugee screening program to catch Confederate spies.
1866-1885	Twelve official Army campaigns against the Indians. No record of intelligence or counterintelligence services, except scouting.
Apr 1869	Captain C. P. Raymond of the Army Engineers started a six months survey trip of Alaska.
1870	General Philip H. Sheridan accompanied the German army as a military observer from battle of Gravellotte to siege of Paris.
Nov 1871	General William Tecumseh Sherman, Commanding General of the United States Army started a tour of Europe.
1 Apr 1873	British Army activated its Intelligence Branch assigned to the Adjutant General's Department.
23 Jun 1875	Major General Emory Upton, accompanied by two other officers, started 19 months foreign military tour which included Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and England. Wrote: Armies of Asia & Europe.
29 Dec 1878	First Lieutenant F.V. Green, Engineers, returned from one and a half years observations on the front with Russia during Russo-Turkish war.

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25 Aug 1880 — First step in securing regular flow or military intelligence taken when Gen Sherman ordered all officers travelling in foreign countries to avail themselves of "all opportunities within their reach" of obtaining information of value to the military service and to report it in writing to the AG.

15 Mar 1881 — Major General Emory Upton died at age of 41 with his famous book The Military Policy of the United States completed only to the middle of the Civil War.

23 Mar 1882 — Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) established by the United States Navy Bureau of Navigation.

2 Jun 1883 — First Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka and party of six started half year charting project in Alaska.

1885 — Major General R.D. Drum, Adjutant General, on his own initiative formed a division of Military Information to operate within the Military Reservations Division of the Miscellaneous Branch of the AG. Maj William J. Volkmar, who had just returned from a tour as an official observer in France, named chief.

1885 — Captain D.M. Taylor made first of a series of Canadian-American Frontier reconnaissances and charting trips.

10 Oct 1885 — So many intelligence reports received by War Department from officers travelling abroad that Army and Navy Journal reported additional personnel "imbued with certain special qualifications" would have to be employed.

1886 — Chiefs of all War Department bureaus, departments and all division commanders ordered to forward without delay any military information that might be considered useful. Also AG's of the several states and territories asked to send data.

1887 — British Admiralty created a permanent intelligence department.

22 Sep 1888 — Military Attache system organized after Congress authorized extra payments to army officers detailed to collect military information from abroad. Attache system never authorized as such.

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1889-1899

27 Feb 1889	"Security" regulation of Secretary of War limited dissemination of military information division data to Commanding General of the Army and Bureau Chiefs.
Mar 1889	First Military Attache posts established in Europe with offices at London, Paris, and Vienna. Later in year Berlin and St. Petersburg added.
12 Apr 1889	Secretary of War Redfield Proctor authorized the establishment of a Military Information Division of the Adjutant General's Office under direct supervision of the AG, himself . Capt Daniel M. Taylor, Chief, with W.N. Peck, Civilian Chief.
25 Feb 1890	Allowances established for Military Attaches included an office or unfurnished room; one desk or table; six chairs; one book or file case; fuel for one office fire; forage for a horse or costs of horse hire.
15 Mar 1892	Chief of Signal Corps overruled by Secretary of War S.B. Elkins in his effort to take over Information Division from the AG.
7 May 1892	Military Information Division anticipated Cuban problems and started compilation of data on that area.
1896	Military Information Division ordered to start work on a 905 section military map of the United States.
1898	Spanish American War: Army Military Information Service sent out first penetration agents including Lt "Message to Garcia" Rowan.
1898	Officer shortage caused by War with Spain resulted in a reduction of the Military Information Division from 11 to 2 officers and of attaches from 16 to 5.
1899	Insurgent Records Office created at Expeditionary Headquarters in Manila, Philippines.
11 Oct 1899	Boer War started and the United States Army had official observers with both the British and the Boers until the war ended 31 May 1902.

1899-1902

31 Dec 1899 — Eight inventions of the Nineteenth Century that modernized intelligence communications and transportation included: steamship, 1807; railroad, 1830; telegraph, 1844; trans-Atlantic cable, 1857; telephone exchanges, 1878; automobiles, 1887; celluloid film, 1888; and radio, 1895.

31 Dec 1899 — Six inventions of the Nineteenth Century that modernized intelligence collecting and recording included: cameras, 1839; typewriters, 1869; microphones, 1877; color photography, 1891; motion pictures, 1893; and disc recorders, 1896.

1900 — Presidential Commission investigating conduct of War Department in War with Spain revealed wide gap between acquisition of military information and its subsequent effective application in the field.

Oct 1900 — Brigadier General William Ludow recommended that the Military Information Division of the AG be transferred to the War College to be a "bureau of record."

23 Dec 1900 — Insurgent Record Office redesignated at Military Information Division of AG, Hq Division of the Philippines with Lt Col Joseph T. Dickman in charge.

Feb 1901 — Military Information Division of the United States Army of the Philippine Islands organized from Bureau of Insurgent Records.

1902 — Arrangements made with the Office of Naval Intelligence whereby data received either by ONI or MID of interest to the other agency would be sent to it.

21 Feb 1902 — Report to Secretary of War showed at the outbreak of the War with Spain the MID, AG had a staff of 11 officers, 10 civilian clerks and 2 messengers. It was jammed into four rooms and trying to work on an annual expense account of $3,640. Regular reports were being received from 16 attaches and 40 National Guard Intelligence officers.

18 Jun 1902 — Military Information Division of the Philippines became an integral branch of the Division in Washington, D.C.

10 Oct 1902 — State Department agreed to furnish army military information to MID from all legations where army officers were not accredited.

1903 Major Arthur L. Wagner, last chief of MID under AG, had published The Service of Security and Information which became an official text.

1903 Military Information Division removed from State, War and Navy building to second floor of nearby Lemon Building on New York Avenue.

Mar 1903 Captain C.B. Humphrey and 2nd Lt G.M.P. Murphy, just out of West Point selected at request of President Roosevelt to make a secret information gathering trip to areas of interest in case of hostilities in the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea. Reported back 16 Oct 1903, three weeks before Panamanian revolution. They had spent three months in Panama.

1903 Military Information Division of Adjutant General's Office transferred to United States Army General Staff, Second (MI) Division.

1903 British intelligence adopted the Military Attache system following United States lead.

14 Aug 1903 Military Information Division became the 2nd Division of the General Staff.

19 Aug 1903 Lieutenant General S.B.M. Young, first Chief of Staff when only five days in office issued memorandum requesting qualified officers to volunteer to assist the Military Information Division in the translation of Russian, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Portugese and Japanese military publications and documents.

4 Sep 1903 Military Information Division of the General Staff assigned the responsibility for handling liaison with foreign military attaches in the United States.

1904-1908 British War Office Intelligence Department organized its "Special Branch" (CIC equivalent).

1904 Major W.D. Beach allotted only six general staff officers including those on attache duty; thus only four of six sections of MID had full time OICs.

1904-1908

3 Feb 1904	Chief of Staff assigned Second (MI) Division function of handling military attaches and "the collection, arrangement, and publication of historical, statistical and geographical information including order of battle data and critical and analytical histories of important campaigns. Handling of the war library and war maps also included.
6 Feb 1904	Army had 8 military observers with the Russians and seven with the Japanese during Russo-Jap war which ended 5 Sep 1905.
12 Jan 1905	Secretary of the Interior agreed to furnish MID with special confidential military maps derived from its Geodetic mapping program.
1906	Two army officers sent from Manila Branch to China to secure topographical data covering rail and road routes to the sea from Peking and Tientsin.
6 Oct 1906	Army started 2 year 6 month occupation of Cuba "Cuban Pacification." MID had furnished information that enabled War Department to be ready with a plan when Cuba asked for help.
1907	Four army officers detailed for duty in Tokyo under Military Attache to learn the Japanese language.
Oct 1907	War Department GO #215, required that all official correspondence addressed to officers of the army, regardless of station or status, must pass through the AG office, and ended direct intelligence channels for the next decade. MID protested but exceptions were not permitted.
24 June 1908	War Department General Staff reorganized and Second and Third Division (War College) combined into a Second Section with the latter section divided into two main committees -- Military Information and War College.
1 Jul 1908	Special Secret Service Bureau of the Department of Justice (FBI) was established. Became Bureau of Investigation on 16 March 1909.

Jan 1909	One of first MI command jurisdictional incidents occurred when the Chief of MI, 2nd Division General Staff, ordered all attaches to send reports only to him. London attache did and Assistant Chief of Staff held he violated regulations.
27 Jan 1909	Chief of Second Division told that all his instruction on collection of intelligence sent to field commanders would have to go through the Adjutant General.
1 Apr 1909	Military Information Division closed its Havan branch where two officers and six clerks had been functioning. Office has been open 2 1/2 years.
2 Aug 1909	Army activated the Unites States Air Corps with acceptance of its first airplane. Air Corps remained with the Army for 38 years.
Apr 1910	Military Information Division files, clerical personnel merged with War College. No longer responsible for its own correspondence. Mission narrowed to support of college planners. Ceased to function as an intelligence service, when Maj Gen J. Franklin Bell retired as Chief of Staff.
Sep 1910	Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Leonard Wood, reorganized General Staff from two sections into four division but the MI committee remained part of the War College Division.
1911-1916	Mexican Border Disturbances: Military Intelligence Service inactive under War College "committee" management.
Nov 1911	Military Information Division not consulted or represented when War Department ordered a study to determine strategic value of various localities in the vicinity of the Panama Canal. Brig Gen John Biddle, chief of War College Division, sent.
Dec 1912	A four-officer cavalry board headed by Brig Gen E.J. McClernard refused permission to be military observers with the Bulgarian Army.
20 Jan 1913	Chief of Staff complained that the military information service of the War College had no training system for officer replacements; its reports were not evaluated; new military attaches were not informed of briefing data available to them; official monographs were incomplete; there was a lack of coordination of military information matters between the War College and other departments.

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[redacted]

1914-1917	Victor Voska formed a Czechoslovakian counterintelligence organization, at New York, to keep British intelligence informed on German intelligence activities in the United States.
1914	Federal Bureau of Investigation agents broke up a German passport forging ring assisting 800 German reserve officers in the United States to return to their homes.
1914	For fiscal year 1914-15 the Military Information committee received its first increase in budget since 1903 (from $10,000 to $11,000 a year) 11 years.
Feb 1914	Chief of the War College stated that military attaches in Spain, Italy, Austria and Belgium were unnecessary; Switzerland warranted a retired officer; Russian was doubtful and the Balkan states and Turkey of temporary importance.
3 Mar 1914	All Army units on the Mexican border ordered to detail officers, in addition to other duties, as intelligence officers and to collect information from refugees and other sources but not to cross the border.
Apr 1914	Chief of the Army War College stated that in event of extensive operations in the field five military attaches (four from Europe) and all 9 officer students in France and Germany should be recalled.
18 Jul 1914	Congress officially authorized an aviation section as part of the Army Signal Corps and ended the 6 year era of experimentation.
28 Jul 1914	World War I started with declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary.
3 Aug 1914	American Military Attaches in Paris and Vienna asked to go into the field, but told to stay at their posts, and War Department ordered that officers physically qualified for field duty be sent.
Nov 1914	Twenty special military observers were on duty as follows: With French, 6; Germany, 6; Austria, 3; Japan, 5. In addition, 13 military attaches were reporting. Military observers in France designated a military mission to increase prestige.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 Apr 1915	Captain Franz Von Rintelin, German saboteur, arrived in the United States and sank thirty-six ships with $10 million in cargo before detection.
3 May 1915	Primary function of the Military Information Section of the War College according to the division chief was to "document staff work."
24 Jul 1915	Secret Service surveillance of German industrial saboteur. Dr. Heinrich Albert provided chance for briefcase "switch" and the obtaining of incriminating documents.
1916	General Pershing given tactical use of First Squadron Aviation Section to furnish intelligence, but because of the low engine power of its eight planes the squadron was largely ineffective.
1916	War College arranged with the Command and General Staff School to publish intelligence reports for army dissemination. First report published violated agreement with the British not to publish, and arrangement ended.
21 Jan 1916	Brigadier General M.M. Macomb, chief of the War College Division forwarded to the chief of staff, Maj. R.H. Van Deman's staff study urging a separate intelligence division of the general staff. General Macomb strongly backed it.
Mar 1916	General J.J. Pershing appointed Maj James A. Ryan, 13th Cavalry, as his intelligence officer for the Punitive Expeditionary Force. Mexican informants were hired.
25 Apr 1916	All department commanders ordered to establish intelligence officers at their headquarters to operate under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Staff of the department and at the same time specified that these offices would be branches of the War Department General Staff. Question of final command raised.
3 Mar 1917	State Adjutant Generals ordered to detail officers in their various units to military intelligence duties which set up the first nation-wide intelligence coverage with offices in practically all large cities.

1917 - WORLD WAR I

6 Apr — First World War: When war was declared, there was no Army military intelligence or counterintelligence service and no naval counterintelligence service.

3 May — By direction of the Secretary of War, the Intelligence Branch of the United States Army War college was activated.

Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

United States Army added provisions for combat intelligence personnel in all units down to battalion size scheduled for overseas service.

United States Office of Naval Intelligence established its Domestic Branch (CIC equivalent).

United States Army Intelligence was given security responsibilities including plant protection; civil service passes; counter subversion detection; and codes and ciphers.

Congress passed the act authorizing increases in the United States Army, which made possible the Corps of Intelligence Police.

26 Jun — General John J. Pershing arrived in France and saw the necessity for an American Army counterintelligence service.

7 Jul — A Plan was formulated to select 160 lieutenants for duty as intelligence officers with overseas units.

11 Jul — General Pershing's Intelligence Chief sent a request to the Chief of Staff for 50 men and 54 officers for counterintelligence.

11 Aug — Chief of Army War College recommended supplying the 50 enlisted men for overseas duty.

13 Aug — Chief of Staff, United States Army, authorized the establishment of a Corps of Intelligence Police.

1 Sep — Course of instruction of intelligence officers opened at the Army War College for specially selected lieutenants.

1917

25 Nov — First 50 agents of the Corps of Intelligence Police landed at St. Nazaire, France.

28 Nov — Army Chief of Staff approved a request by the Acting Chairman of the Army War College to provide 250 men for CIP in the Zone of Interior.

December — Chief, Military Intelligence Bureau, was informed that few of the CIP agents sent to Europe were acceptable as they were either Belgians or had Belgian connections and could not be trusted until "examined."

Corps of Intelligence Police agents in France were trained at LeHavre by British and French intelligence.

United States Army purchased 153 acres of land at Colgate, Maryland, for its first Motor Transport Depot and Camp Holabird, Maryland, was activated.

Corps of Intelligence Police agents were stationed at Langres, Chaumont, Bourbon-les-Bain, and Evian-les-Bain in France.

Corps of Intelligence Police agents at Chaumont were used to dig latrines at General Headquarters. Military Intelligence personnel in France totaled 15 men prior to arrival of CIP.

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[redacted]

American Protective League of 65,000 members sponsored by Army Intelligence for intelligence informants.

Jan — Army CIP Paris office activated. Fifty thousands names of potential and actual subversives carded.

29 Jan — Army approved an increase from 50 to 750 agents for CIP duty overseas.

7 Feb — Military Intelligence Section transferred from Army War College to Executive Branch of the General Staff.

February — Provisional Counter Espionage instructions issued by MI.3, War Department General Staff (WDGS).

May — Principles of Counter Espionage Organization and Control within the Military Establishment. published by MI. 3.

5 Jun — Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

June — Corps of Intelligence Police was set up like a business concern. Sixty men were at Bordeaux and three or four each at Calais, Hendaye, Cerbere and Tours, in France.

Army Intelligence Service provided personnel for a Graft and Fraud Investigative section of the Quartermaster General Department.

Paris Headquarters, CIP, under Maj Cabot Ward (Air Corps) and Capt Arthur Campbell Turner established at Hotel St. Anne, Rue St. Anne, with eight officers and 15 enlisted men.

Four agents sent to open CIP office at Nantes, near St. Nazaire, France, base of AEF.

8 Jul — Army Director of Military Intelligence Division designated as Chief Military Censor of the Army.

7 Aug — War Department authorized CIP officers to wear civilian clothing when on duty.

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1918

17 Aug	Instructions for Commanding Officers of CIP Detachments, issued by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS.
20 Aug	Intelligence Instructions for Civilian Personnel under Military Control, issued by MI. 3 of MIB, Executive Division General Staff.
31 Aug	Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within Military Units, published.
August	Army Military Intelligence Service reestablished as Second Division of the War Department General Staff, G2.
4 Sep	Army approved an increase of agents for CIP, Zone of Interior, from 250 to 500 men.
23 Sep	Military Intelligence Division, G2, activated a Passport Control Section and a Port Control Section.
24 Sep	Military Intelligence Division, G2, organized a Graft and Fraud Section and handled 1128 cases in first 10 months.
11 Nov	Corps of Intelligence Police had about 75 officers and 350 enlisted men on duty.
5 Dec	Colonel R.H. Van Deman placed in charge counterespionage measures at Paris Peace Conference.
December	Critique of CIP overseas revealed identities compromised by having to stand in pay lines and travel between stations in uniform.
	Commanding Officer of CIP office at Brest urged recruitment of men from professional civilian positions.
	Corps of Intelligence Police agent disguised as Spanish workman trapped three spies at Beaune, France.
	Corps of Intelligence Police agents had been told not to take any civilian clothing with them to Europe. It took weeks to get permission to buy civilian clothing and then Quartermaster did not provide enough money. Men looked like tramps.

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Dec 1918	Sixty-man CIP office was established at Bordeaux, France, and smaller field offices were opened in other cities.
	Corps of Intelligence Police agents reported difficulties in a non-commissioned officer agent trying to get confidential information from an officer.
1 Jan 1919	Corps of Intelligence Police had 405 agents on duty with the AEF in France.
18 Jan	Corps of Intelligence Police agents assigned to provide security for American Peace Delegation at Paris, France.
1 Feb	Corps of Intelligence Police agents on duty in the United States totaled 128 men.
28 Jun	Treaty of Versailles signed and American troops were ordered withdrawn from Germany.
1 Jul	All CIP agents on duty (at twelve departments, stations, and cities) totaled 41 men.
1 Sep	All CIP agents on duty (at three departments and at Washington, D.C., and New York) totaled 28 men.
	Intelligence Unit of United States Treasury Department was organized.
	State Department motor pool operated out of Camp Holabird, Maryland.

0190

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1920

6 Jan	Corps of Intelligence Police decentralized with local procurement of personnel by Corps Area Commanders.
January	Roster reflected the CIP as having 18 men on duty with the Army.
6 Feb	Authority given to "detail" from line organizations 24 Sergeants for special duty as Intelligence Police.
23 Jun	Graft and Fraud Investigations Section of CIP terminated.
20 Aug	Only six CIP agents on duty. Permanent Corps of 50 requested as Army discovered International Workers of the World (IWW) armed services sedition plot.
1 Sep	Brigadier General Dennis E. Nolan became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.
8 Oct	Military Intelligence Division directed the grades and assignments of CIP agents for all Corps areas and departments.
20 Oct	Permanent CIP authorized by Section 4b-4c-25, National Defense Act, by War Department General Order #54.
22 Oct	Army survey by G2 showed that areas and departments had a need for 105 CIP agents.
23 Oct	By WDGS General Order #64, the CIP was authorized 45 sergeants. Military Intelligence Division requested $132,500.00 for CIP for 1921.
October	Military Intelligence Division regulations published defining duties and responsibilities.
14 Dec	Foreign language proficiency made mandatory requirement for CIP agents but subject to waiver.
16 Dec	Wearing of civilian clothing authorized by War Department for CIP agents on duty during peace time.
	First transcontinental motor convoy organized at Camp Holabird , Maryland.

0191

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1921

Domestic Branch (CIC equivalent) of Office of Naval Intelligence deactivated.

15 Jan — Army "line" enlisted men, detailed to the Corps of Intelligence Police, were returned to their various branches.

3 Mar — Panama Canal Department urgently requested assignment of two CIP agents who could speak Spanish.

7 Mar — Corps G2's told to collect information on radical activities, labor unrest, anti-American Racial Groups, foreign espionage, and subversive activities. (CIP mission).

7 Mar — Duties outlined for the 30 CIP agents. Scope broadened from negative intelligence to assistance for local G2's.

7 May — Army Director of Military Intelligence said there is no assigned mission for the Corps of Intelligence Police.

12 Aug — Director of Military Intelligence stated that use of CIP agents should be left to the discretion of the Corps area G2.

29 Aug — Section 2, War Department General Order #44, revoked requirement of Military Intelligence Division approval of CIP agents procured by the Corps areas and departments.

8 Sep — Brigadier General Stuart Heintzelman became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

1922

7 Feb — Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS, informed G3, WDGS, that the Corps of Intelligence Police could be reduced from 45 to 30 men as only 27 were actually on duty as of this date.

9 Jun — AG letter restricted CIP agents from attending radical meetings. Must get data from press and civil authorities.

12 Jul — G2 stated that because of the restrictions imposed on CIP agents in the Zone of Interior, it was redistributing allotments to increase men in overseas departments.

28 Jul — War Department General Order #33 cut authorized strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police from 45 to 30 men. No vacancies filled.

8 Sep — Redistribution of CIP agents, on basis of 30 men, ordered by the Army.

27 Nov — Colonel William K. Naylor became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS.

CONFIDENTIAL

1923

1 Jan	War Department General Staff removed restrictions on filling vacancies in CIP allotments.
27 Jan	Occupation of Germany officially ended.
23 Feb	Major General J.H. McRea, Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area quoted AG letter of 9 June 1922 as basis for recommending withdrawal of his CIP agent allotment.
16 Mar	Fifth Corps told it must keep its CIP agent and use him for G2 office work.
26 Jun	Military Information Division informed Philippine Islands Department that there were no Japanese speaking CIP agents available for its requirement.
14 Aug	Area and Department G2's ordered to report current personnel status and all changes as they occur.
7 Sep	Of the 28 CIC agents remaining on duty, none had any foreign language qualifications.
3 Nov	Corps of Intelligence Police duties defined by G2, WDGS, as of Special investigative nature to detect and forestall espionage and to investigate treason and disloyalty. Not police duties.

CONFIDENTIAL

1924

2 Jan	Corps of Intelligence Police at Eighth Corps Area given special liaison missions as the Immigration Service established the Mexican Border Patrol.
21 Feb	Army Industrial College founded at Washington, D.C., to train senior officers in domestic strategic mobilization factors.
25 Feb	Military Information Division concurs on proposal to organize a Military Police Corps.
1 Jul	Colonel James H. Reeves became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS.
18 Jul	War Department authorized a civilian clothing allowance for the new permanent Corps of Intelligence Police.
22 Sep	Military Information Division requested authorization for three technical sergeants and sixteen staff sergeant grades for CIP; request was rejected.
2 Oct	G2, Eighth Corps Area wrote, "To have one grade for CIP with no system of reward for efficient service is believed to be fundamentally wrong."
2 Oct	G2, Eighth Corps Area wrote, "Men have been able to add little or nothing to their pay by camouflage employment in civil pursuits. Only one man has been able to make any extra money and his business was buying and shipping bones (at Laredo, Tex.). All other CIP men in this area are financially embarassed."
17 Oct	Corps of Intelligence Police agents frozen in grade of sergeant despite efforts to promote them.
17 Oct	G2, First Corps Area wrote MID, "There has been, recently, promotions in every branch of the DEML on duty here, except the Corps of Intelligence Police, some with comparatively short service having been promoted ..."
7 Nov	Military Information Division resubmitted its request of 22 September 1924 for an increase in authorized CIP grades.

0195

14 Nov 1924	Brigadier General H.A. Drum, G3, WDGS, stated that the duty required and performed by CIP agents did not warrant the grade of Master Sergeant.
22 Nov	G4, WDGS, opposed increase in CIP agent grades because the expense was equivalent of 20 recruits.
5 Dec	Brigadier General Dennis E. Nolan, Deputy Chief of Staff, who fathered the Corps of Intelligence Police in 1917, approved increase in ratings without Master Sergeant grade.
5 Dec	Corps of Intelligence Police was authorized promotion of three agents to Technical Sergeant and sixteen to Staff Sergeant.
19 Dec	Administration of Corps of Intelligence Police agent assigned to G2 duty at Washington, D.C., transferred to the Army War College.
	Communist Party came out from underground -- now legal.
5 Feb 1925	Philippine Islands Department requested two CIP sergeant replacements with "no special qualifications."
26 Mar	War Department directed that CIP agents who fail to volunteer for overseas extensions be reduced to the grade of private.
	First Army fire truck built and tested at Quartermaster Depot, Camp Holabird, Maryland.

8 Jan — First CIP Mobilization Plan published. CIP to expand as secret service subsection of G2 with 250 men, 60 percent non-commissioned.

13 Jan — Ohio congressman wrote he had never heard of CIP and what was it? Wanted to get a constituent a job in CIP.

2 Apr — War Department General Order #7 reduced the Corps of Intelligence Police from 30 to 28 men by eliminating one agent in the Philippine Islands and one in the Eighth Corps Area. (Mexican Border).

23 Aug — Panama Canal Department vainly urged increase of allotment from two to three agents as it warned of "sudden emergency."

1 May 1927 — Colonel Stanley H. Ford became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS.

27 May — Analysis of 21 percent of CIP agents on duty showed: One had "TB"; one had "six kids and retires in six months"; one was unsuited for foreign duty; one "just a good old NCO"; one was "nothing extra... a good gumshoe man"; one "OK" and had one and one half years to serve.

28 May — Corps of Intelligence Police agent furnished for special duty with the Military Attache in Peking, China.

20 Sep — Corps of Intelligence Police agent at Tientsin, China, promoted from Private First Class to Staff Sergeant by taking rating away from the Eighth Corps Area.

4 Nov — Military Attache Section at Washington, D.C., informed China Attache that CIP had no regulations but civilian clothing allowance was $140.00 and maintenance $83.51.

Corps of Intelligence Police asked for an annual budget of $4,284.00 to provide an average of $153.00 clothing allowance for each of its 28 men.

24 May — Seventh Corps at Omaha, Nebraska, reported to War Department that it had no use for the CIP agent assigned.

14 Jul — Seventh Corps objected when G2, WDGS, requested release of the CIP agent to Eighth Corps, which needed CIP agent on the Mexican Border.

21 Sep — War Department revoked periodic report requirement of duties and status of CIP agents; only number and changes subsequently required.

11 Feb 1929 — Chief of War Department Plans and Training Branch stated that the Corps of Intelligence Police should be kept as a nucleus in case of war; that 28 agents were needed; and that civilian clothing be authorized only where official duties required them.

12 Feb — Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS, stated, "I do not want to do away with CIP nor their clothing allowance but I do not propose to be placed in a weak defensive position." Survey ordered.

18 Apr — Survey showed two areas and one department could each eliminate a CIP agent and two areas wanted an additional agent.

2 May — Unsuccessful personal pleas were made by Maj Gen William Lassiter of Eighth Corps to get Master Sergeant rating for his CIP agent in charge.

31 Dec — Six inventions of the first 30 years of the Twentieth Century, of importance to intelligence, included: radio phone, 1906; helicopter, 1909; and telephoto, 1925; sound movies, 1926; television, 1928; and teletypewriter, 1928.

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1930

14 Jun — Narcotics Bureau of the United States Treasury Department organized.

14 Jul — War Department authorized CIP grade of Master Sergeant and put all CIP agents on a single promotion list.

22 Jul — Major Thomas T. Handy, GSC, was Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Panama Canal Department.

15 Aug — "Is CIP necessary?" Survey similar to 1929 ordered from Corps and Departments.

15 Aug — Brigadier General Halstead Dorey, Commanding General, Eighth Corps Area, wrote: "It would be impracticable and would be inimical to the public service to replace Corps of Intelligence Police in this Corps Area by competent clerks."

16 Aug — Major General D.E. Nolan, Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area, who fathered CIP in 1917, wrote that under his restrictive instructions of 6 December 1922 (AG letter of 9 June 1922), ". . . no need is seen for assignment of members of the Corps of Intelligence Police to this headquarters. . . ."

18 Aug — Major General Johnson Hagood, Commanding General, Seventh Corps Area, wrote: ". . . that there was a place for CIP overseas in time of war but not in the United States in time of peace. CIP agents could be replaced by clerks."

20 Aug — Major General Frank Parker, Commanding General, Sixth Corps Area, wrote: "...the present number (CIP agents) is not considered adequate...."

26 Aug — Major General G. LeRoy Irwin, Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, personally wrote: "...the organization be modified to allow increased grades to insure obtaining and retaining the type of man necessary for this work..."

0199

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3 Jan	Brigadier General Alfred T. Smith became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.
25 Feb	Chief, Operations Branch, MID, stated: "... G3 has been and is opposed to any CIP as such..."
25 Feb	Military Information Division, G2, WDGS, took over allocation of CIP agents from Corps and Departments; basis, one agent each corps and additional as needed.
3 Mar	G2, WDGS, relieved CIP agent with China Military Attache as such duty was inconsistent with regulations establishing CIP.
5 Oct	Eighth Corps Area reported that newspaper publicity on promotion of one of its agents on the Mexican Border revealed his undercover work and agent had to "run for it."
10 Oct	Eighth Corps Area informed there was no means on single promotion list for retirement promotion for CIP agents.
18 Feb 1932	Eighth Corps Area Commander unsuccessfully appealed total service seniority basis of promotion of CIP agents which resulted in passing over an agent with more CIP experience.
Jun-Jul	CIP agents penetrated Bonus Marchers at Washington, D.C., to keep Army informed of subversive dangers.

18 Sep	Survey of the linguistic, general clerical, and special qualifications of all CIP agents ordered.
9 Oct	Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj Gen H.A. Drum, asked Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, for views on proposal to reduce Corps of Intelligence Police to not more than 15 men.
12 Oct	Survey ordered of Corps and Departments asking if their CIP agents could be replaced or dispensed with.
14 Nov	Survey showed Areas and Departments wanted seven more CIP agents. G2, with G1 concurrence, recommended no reduction.
5 Dec	Brigadier General J.H. Hughes, G3, recommended reduction of Corps of Intelligence Police to 15 men. He stated that the work, except on the Mexican Border and in Foreign departments, was clerical and could be more economically done by civilians. He further stated that attendance at public radical meetings was a Department of Justice function.
9 Dec	Major General H.A. Drum, Deputy Chief of Staff, ordered the Corps of Intelligence Police be reduced to 15 men by 1 June 1934.
16 Dec	Military Information Division, G2, WDGS, scheduled all CIP agents in eight corps areas to be eliminated and half of the agents in the Eighth Corps Area to be eliminated.
20 Jan 1934	Ninth Corps Area at San Francisco, California, urged retention of its CIP agent stressing increased Japanese activities on West Coast.
21 Feb	Orders issued to eliminate 13 agents. One loss through illness was to be filled by transfer to Hawaii.

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1 Feb — Brigadier General Harry E. Knight became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

22 Mar — G2, WDGS, stated marked increase in subversive activities since June 1934 and asked that the Corps of Intelligence Police be increased from 16 to 32 men. G1 and G4 concurred.

30 Mar — Brigadier General J.H. Hughes, G3, stated that he did not concur on CIP increase as grades "are needed for troops."

9 Apr — Survey of CIP needs in the Corps Areas and Departments ordered. Results showed total of 35 CIP agents desired.

13 May — Request for an increase of five men submitted to Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur; request disapproved.

23 May — Panama Canal Department authorized to use supplementary roster from G2 to AG to conceal identity of its CIP agents.

10 Oct — One additional CIP agent authorized for duty in the Philippine Islands; the Army turned over internal affairs to native administrators.

27 Nov — Colonel Francis H. Lincoln became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

24 Dec — Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Hawaiian Department, made a personal attempt to get a CIP technical sergeant promoted to master sergeant before retirement.

Domestic Branch of Office of Naval Intelligence, deactivated in 1921, was reactivated.

16 Jan 1936 — Retirement promotions for CIP agents regardless of experience and time in grade were refused because of no vacancies, but approval was given to transfer the agent to some other branch.

30 Apr — Major General D.E. Nolan, who was responsible for the organization of the CIP in WW I and for its retention in the peacetime Army, retired from the service.

0202

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1937

1 Jul — Colonel E. R. Warner McCabe became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

3 Jul — Congressional non-alien enlistment act deprived the Corps of Intelligence Police of three extremely valuable Filipino agents.

Transportation Corps Railway shops were activated at Camp Holabird, Maryland.

0203

[redacted]

17 Apr — Counterintelligence Branch established in G2 to handle censorship, counterespionage, domestic intelligence safeguarding of military information, and espionage functions for the agency.

23 Apr — G2 asked that, in view of urgent needs, the Corps of Intelligence Police be increased from 15 to 20 men.

5 May — G3 did not concur in request and stated that he was still of the opinion expressed on 5 December 1933, viz-CIP ranks greater than need; cost more than efficient clerks but do clerks work. Penciled note reference civilian clerks: "G2 has the money but doesn't want to spend."

5 May — G2, Philippine Islands, was given $700.00 from confidential funds to buy information after being ordered not to fill a CIP vacancy.

17 May — Operations Branch, G2, stated increases were earnestly needed because of troubled conditions in Mexico, Japanese West Coast activities, and German activities in the New York area.

20 Jun — Military Information Division formally assigned "Safeguarding Military Information."

2 Aug — Foreign Service Roster for CIP assignments established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

1 Sep — Corps of Intelligence Police authorized to carry one sergeant as surplus until a vacancy occurs, to prevent loss of China CIP agent.

30 Sep — Munich "Peace in Our Time"!

9 Nov — Corps of Intelligence Police replacements for Hawaiian Department to be sent, in the future, on a civilian status by first class passage to conceal identity.

21 Nov — Corps Area and Department G2s ordered to send in a report on the specific duties of their CIP agents.

23 Nov — A Department G2 wrote: "We have relied too much on gratuitous information and should now organize to go after it rather than to receive it...little of permanent and continuing value to the department is possible with the ever changing personnel..."

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1939

31 Mar — Corps of Intelligence Police reverted to 15 men authorized when surplus Staff Sergeant was absorbed following retirement of another CIP Sergeant.

4 Apr — Corps of Intelligence Police authorized 16 men again when War Department authorized an additional man for the Panama Department.

26 Jun — Presidential Proclamation of Investigative Jurisdiction assigned responsibilities of Army, Navy, and Treasury Departments.

1 Sep — Nazi Germany invaded Poland and World War II followed.

6 Sep — Delimitations Directive promulgated as basis for working agreement. Committees still worked on details.

9 Nov — One CIP agent for Puerto Rican Department authorized by transfer of one allotment from Eighth Corps Area.

27 Nov — First CIP agent sent to newly activated Puerto Rican Department which was under the jurisdiction of Second Corps Area, New York.

0205

[redacted]

3 Jan — President Roosevelt asked wartime powers and higher taxes for defense.

30 Apr — Brigadier General Sherman Miles became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

16 May — G2, WDGS, informed Corps and Areas that funds were available for detailing enlisted men and reserve officers for CIP duty.

5 Jun — Memo of Definitions of Jurisdictions issued jointly by MID, ONI, and FBI, as a working delimitations agreement.

Jul — John J. McCloy called to Washington at Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's personal request to advise the War Department in its counterintelligence work; after years of work as a lawyer investigating the Black Tom case he had a wide knowledge of prewar subversive methods.

3 Jul — G2, WDGS, requested that the Corps of Intelligence Police be increased from 16 to 42 men because of increased work load.

6 Jul — G1 concurred in above and stated that the necessary men and grades were now available from the War Department Reserve.

7 Jul — Secretary of War ordered the Corps of Intelligence Police be increased from 16 to 42 men.

15 Jul — Major Alexander R. Bolling, GSC, was named Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, of the First Corps Area at Boston, Massachusetts.

18 Jul — Corps Areas and Departments notified that sufficient grades were available for promotion of deserving CIP agents.

22 Jul — G2 informed that funds were available for the hiring of civilian clerical personnel for intelligence work.

3 Aug — Director of Intelligence informed Areas that there were no prescribed qualifications for CIP agents except highest integrity, minimum high school education, and ability to handle a given position.

CONFIDENTIAL

1940

10 Sep	Corps of Intelligence Police agent, on duty with Military Attache at Peking, China, since May 1927, transferred to Washington, D.C.
16 Sep	United States passed Selective Service Act.
October	Corps of Intelligence Police was authorized to employ civilian investigators. (Employment of civilian investigators on a $4.00 a day and expenses basis was terminated in 1917).
29 Oct	Military Information Division Credentials issued (blue and white) . The MI Badge of World War I was still in use (silver-black and oval in shape).
3 Nov	War Department ordered a roster of all CIP agents. Corps and Departments were ordered to furnish data.
9 Nov	G2 asked for increase of Corps of Intelligence Police to 188 men to provide agents at 26 arsenals and depots and at 51 Army camps, each with a scheduled population of 5,000 men or more.
21 Nov	The Adjutant General stated that the Corps of Intelligence Police had no insignia of a regimental character and "since it operated in a more or less confidential character, no publicity will be given it."
23 Nov	Increase of Corps of Intelligence Police from 42 men in July 1940 to 188 men authorized by the Chief of Staff.
2 Dec	Recommendation approved, that CIP agents be allotted by the War Department and suballotted to Corps; that the Office of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, be created; and that a CIP school be established.
26 Dec	Corps of Intelligence Police agent qualifications set at ages 22 to 33; minimum of a high school education; completion of basic training; and training in college law or accountancy and government investigative experience, were desirable.
December	Lieutenant Colonel Manton S. Eddy was Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, of Third Corps Area at Baltimore, Maryland.
	The Army's jeep was road tested on Camp Holabird's driving course.

1941

11 Jan	Panama Department authorized increase of twelve CIP agents.
15 Jan	Survey ordered of all army personnel in all Corps areas to find an American of German extraction and another of Italian extraction suitable for CIP duty.
16 Jan	Detailing of Military Intelligence Officers to the Corps of Intelligence Police authorized.
27 Jan	Major Garland H. Williams, Inf, reported as Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police and Commandant of the CIP Training School.
30 Jan	Clothing allowance of $40,845.00 was authorized for the Corps of Intelligence Police for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1941.
January	Appointment was made of a Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police subsection, Investigating Section Counter Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.
February	Public Relations Branch of G2, WDGS, was terminated and a separate Bureau of Public Relations was organized.
3 Feb	Military Intelligence Division stated that it did not desire waivers of any CIP qualifications. Vacancies were to be filled by transfer of eligible personnel from other areas.
6 Feb	Selectees were of little use to the Corps of Intelligence Police since they had to spend three months in basic training, leaving only nine months service.
7 Feb	Military Intelligence Division submitted a staff study recommending establishment of a Military Intelligence Espionage School to supplement the CIP Training School.
17 Feb	Hawaiian Department authorized to recruit two American citizens of Japanese extraction for CIP duty.
24 Feb	Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators Training School opened for non-commissioned officers. School opened at Army War College with 50 agents.

0208

CONFIDENTIAL

1941

24 Feb	Third Corps Area reported it had been unable to find a suitable man who could speak high German fluently.
20 Mar	Use of colored personnel authorized for CIP duty.
22 Mar	First class of CIP Investigators Training School graduated 39 men; 11 men failed the course.
31 Mar	Instructions, for safeguarding identity of CIP agents in handling Army records, sent to the field.
March	Army Security Agency established its school at Fort Monmouth, Red Bank, New Jersey.
1 Apr	Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Bolling, G2, First Corps Area, wrote G2, WDGS, "...if they (CIP agents) were in a line organization at this time, they would have attained without any difficulty, whatever at least the grades I have recommended. . . ."
2 Apr	Technical Manual 30-315 (Tentative) published and distributed to the field; comments on it ordered.
2 Apr	Personal History Statement required of all personnel assigned to the Corps of Intelligence Police or being considered for assignment to the Corps of Intelligence Police.
5 Apr	Increase ordered of CIP agents in Hawaiian Department, where 15 agents were on duty.
7 Apr	First Counter Intelligence Officers' Investigative Training School, since 1918, was activated.
17 Apr	G2s, all Corps Areas, ordered to expand CIP recruiting and to include men with mechanical, architectural or electrical engineering education, or factory or industrial experience.
19 Apr	Corps of Intelligence Police authorized an increase of 100 men, to a total of 288 men.

1941

21 Apr	Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, unable to furnish Panama Department with an experienced investigator because no Corps Area would release an agent.
22 Apr	Military Intelligence Division informed a Corps Area G2 that the CIP type of ability was "not necessarily connected with military experience or proficiency."
22 Apr	Ninth Corps Area told by G2 that no CIP agents should be quartered or rationed with military units and normally the Officer in Charge should meet them away from military reservations.
27 Apr	An additional week added to CIP Officers' Training Course to instruct on plant surveys and protection.
May	Second CIP Investigative Course for enlisted men began at War College 1 May 1941 and completed 31 May 1941.
3 May	First Officer Investigators Training Course ended with 37 graduates and 11 failures.
8 May	Corps of Intelligence Police authorized $25,000.00 for the purchase of technical and investigative equipment.
8 May	Troop Information and Education Branch of the Army established to handle counterpropaganda.
9 May	Corps of Intelligence Police agents required to submit a daily activities report. Forms sent to all Corps and Departments.
9 May	Recommendation of corrective not punitive action for disciplining CIP agents not approved. Area G2's allowed to "bust" men on first offenses.
9 May	A CIP agent in Fourth Service Command was reduced to the grade of private and separated from the Corps for unauthorized disclosure of his connection with Military Intelligence.

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1941

10 May	Corps of Intelligence Police agents stationed in Washington, D.C. transferred to the Third Corps Area for administration in order to conceal identity.
20 May	G2 reported that CIP had 2,600 investigations pending in the various Corps Areas.
20 May	Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, authorized to handle the centralized purchasing of all technical and investigative equipment.
27 May	Corps of Intelligence Police offices ordered to maintain closer cooperation with Ports of Embarkation in letter to G2, Ninth Corps Area, at San Francisco.
28 May	To avoid buying automobiles, the payment of 5¢ per mile to CIP agents using their own private vehicles was authorized.
28 May	Secretary of War directed that all men have 13 weeks basic training before being assigned to units.
31 May	Corps of Intelligence Police authorized an increase from 288 men to 513 enlisted men.
4 Jun	Over protests of the Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, the assignment and promotion of CIP agents was decentralized to Corps Area and Department Commanders.
6 Jun	Corps of Intelligence Police efficiency reports were distributed to all Corps Areas and Department for semi-annual reporting.
7 Jun	Corps Areas and Department again admonished not to use CIP agents for other than investigative work.
12 Jun	G2, WDGS, disapproved additional training schools for CIP agents, in foreign departments, and for officers.
19 Jun	Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, formulated policy that academic failure at CIP school is not cause for separation from the Corps of Intelligence Police as theory and practice are different.

1941

21 Jun	With the surrender of France, Germany had conquered western Europe.
30 Jun	Zone of Interior Army Headquarters were as follows: First, New York, New York; Second, Memphis, Tennessee; Third, San Antonio, Texas; Fourth, San Francisco, California.
30 Jun	Ten CIP agents of Sixth Corps Area completed 1,020 interviews during month of June.
3 Jul	Washington, D.C. Office allocated 25 agents as sudden growth of the Corps of Intelligence Police swamped administrative staff. Third Corps had 52 men.
7 Jul	G2's, all Corps Areas, ordered each to recruit one colored CIP agent.
7 Jul	US occupation of Iceland announced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
9 Jul	Centralized Corps of Intelligence Police requested by Chief Garland Williams since there are "...14 different policies, 14 different practices, 14 different methods of work and, in general, 14 separate and distinct units. . . ."
10 Jul	Corps of Intelligence Police ordered to provide qualified agents for a sensitive undercover assignment on the Army Transport West Point.
14 Jul	New CIP badge (shield) and credentials authorized as 167 old badges compromised by loss. Military Intelligence to have different identification.
16 Jul	Corps of Intelligence Police personnel ordered to Puerto Rico.
18 Jul	Corps Areas ordered to screen all tactical unit personnel for men speaking any one of eight different languages as screening at replacement centers did not fill vacancies.



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1941

19 Jul	Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, formulated policy that CIP enlisted men may marry provided their commanding officer approves.
22 Jul	Corps of Intelligence Police agents authorized to travel by commercial carriers to protect their identity.
22 Jul	First shipment of technical investigative equipment to CIP units in Corps Areas and Department included miniature cameras.
24 Jul	Sixth Corps Area G2 reported that, in four months of searching, he had been able to locate only one suitable colored agent.
25 Jul	Definition of "Investigator" given to the Adjutant General for use in Army classification of personnel.
27 Jul	New regulations on the procurement of civilian clothing issued to the field cover handling of unused allotments when CIP agents are transferred.
30 Jul	G2 informed Corps of Intelligence Police that five agents were to be secured for Iceland duty and other agents were to be alerted for duty in the Trinidad Sector.
31 Jul	Corps Areas informed that in the future it will be necessary to transfer trained CIP personnel to various base commands.
July	First two Corps of Intelligence Police agents arrived in Alaska.
July	Major David G. Erskine joined CIB, MIS, G2, also White House Aide.
August	Two new gilt badges were issued; one for CIP and one for MI.
2 Aug	Policy of War Department to send all men, including CIP agents, through 13 weeks basic training is reaffirmed.

1941

3 Aug	Captain Donald D. MacDonald replaced Maj Garland Williams as Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, Military Intelligence Div.
5 Aug	Corps of Intelligence Police informed that no selectees or reserve officers could be ordered to duty outside the United States without their consent.
6 Aug	Corps of Intelligence Police agents authorized for duty at St. Lucia and British Guiana in the Caribbean.
12 Aug	Major David G. Erskine, Assistant Executive Officer, CIB, MID, G2, directed that all requests for investigations relating to CIP personnel be handled through the Investigative Section, G2.
12 Aug	Corps of Intelligence Police quota for Fourth Corps Area reduced from 59 to 41 because of inability of the Corps to fill its quota.
12 Aug	Two CIP agents to be alerted for Bermuda on an undercover assignment with a construction crew.
21 Aug	Iceland Base Command authorized an increase to 12 CIP agents.
25 Aug	Roster revealed that CIP had on duty only 338 of its authorized 513 men.
27 Aug	Fort Belvoir, Virginia, conducted a course for Intelligence Officers for task force assignments.
28 Aug	Study initiated on consolidation of CIP Headquarters Field Office and Third Corps Area CIP Office, both in Washington, D.C.
28 Aug	G2 informed Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, that his office had been losing authority for a long time and to gradually expand his authority and start by taking regional control from the Corps Areas.

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1941

31 Aug	Corps of Intelligence Police, Sixth Service Command, reported for month of August that its 17 agents completed 67 cases and had 25 pending of which 17 were backlog. Two thirds of its investigations were personnel. There were 879 interviews conducted during the month.
August	Provost Marshal General's Office and Corps of Military Police were recreated by Executive Order.
2 Sep	Hawaiian Department reported that its CIP in August completed 15 cases of which one was espionage.
3 Sep	G2 instructed Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, to build up the Washington, D.C., CIP Detachment.
3 Sep	Major Erskine, at G2, instructed the Chief, CIP, to immediately secure two colored CIP agents for duty in Washington, D.C.
4 Sep	Control of Washington CIP Detachment "unsatisfactory" since three commands share responsibility for it: CCIP, ISCIBMID and CGIIICA.
6 Sep	Two CIP agents requested by G2 for assignment to Newfoundland Command.
6 Sep	Provost Marshal General's Police School proposed. Suggested that Military Police and Corps of Intelligence Police could be combined.
8 Sep	G2, Ninth Corps Area, recommended that Corps Area Commanders Control all CIP investigations in their areas with Post Intelligence Officers as their agents.
12 Sep	G2 Liaison Officer said: "...no assurance whatever CIP will merge with MPs," and "personally hopes we may be able to organize our own intelligence operating outfit...."

2 Sep — G2 instructed that Hawaiian and Philippine Islands Departments be notified that two instructors from the CIP school would be sent to them to establish accredited CIP schools of instruction there.

6 Sep — G2 requested that a CIP agent be alerted for assignment to Greenland Command.

7 Sep — G2 stated it was considering a reorganization of the CIP that would include authorization for appointment of warrant officers.

8 Sep — Office of the Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, started work on a revision of the Report Writing Manual.

9 Sep — G2 alerted the Corps of Intelligence Police to possibilities of having other CIP Schools in various cities of the country and necessary instructor "cadre" should be available.

9 Sep — S2 Trinidad Base Command requested the assignment of a CIP agent possessing qualifications "as to meeting and impressing ladies...in other words he should be good looking and have it."

2 Sep — G2 not satisfied with technical instruction given at CIP School. Said it may have to establish a separate school. Men should be able to install and use equipment.

6 Sep — Procedure for purchasing civilian clothing on confidential vouchers to conceal identity was being worked out with General Staff.

8 Sep — Corps Areas and Departments asked to name CO's for detachments.

ber — Federal Bureau of Investigation gave a one month special training course for 50 selective Army officers, 50 Navy and 3 Marines in Washington, D.C. Of the officers, Sheen and Wise were the only CIP officers that went.

[redacted]

1941

1 Oct	New Credentials issued (red - white) with CIP and MI separated.
1 Oct	G2, over protests of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, ordered new CIP badges and credentials shipped out by blocks to Corps Areas and Departments.
4 Oct	G2, Third Corps Area said that its 52 CIP agents were being used to full capacity and additional agents were needed for Plant and Post surveys.
6 Oct	Corps of Intelligence Police men on investigative functions ordered to be called "Mr" and the title described as "Special Agent."
7 Oct	Captain Henry Gordon Sheen assumed command of Corps of Intelligence Police, vice Capt MacDonald who was relieved.
10 Oct	Corps of Intelligence Police Hq informed a Corps Area that it had no special methods for investigation of CIP applicants.
17 Oct	Corps of Intelligence Police Hq advised Third Corps Area that prerequisite of basic military training for CIP agents was not considered a very important military requirement.
22 Oct	G2, Eighth Corps, recommended keeping all CIP files in the field at a minimum.
24 Oct	Provost Marshal General suggested that the CIP School be held at Arlington Cantonment, Arlington, Va., at the same location proposed for the Military Police School. It was pointed out that construction of housing for this move would cost $250,000.
27 Oct	All CIP agents ordered to spend a minimum of three hours per week in physical fitness activities.
29 Oct	Provost Marshal General took over authority, from the Corps of Intelligence Police, for the investigation of all applicants for military connected employment to include scientists, applicants for reserve officer commissions, visitor credentials, operation of the Visa and Passport sections, and operation of the Counter Fifth Column Plan.

1941

30 Oct	Authorization for establishment of the CIP School at Chicago, Illinois, received and arrangements were made with the Quartermaster Real Estate Division.
30 Oct	Maximum age limit for prospective CIP agents increased from 28 to 34 years.
1 Nov	Army Language School activated as part of Fourth Army Intelligence School at Presidio of San Francisco, California, with sixty Nisei enlisted students.
6 Nov	Staff Study "Efficient Operation of the CIP" approved. (No record of what this study contained).
10 Nov	Corps of Intelligence Police Training School established at Town Tower Club, Chicago, Ill.
12 Nov	War Department informed Service Commands that CIP personnel will be shifted from one command to another on detached service as needs vary.
12 Nov	Corps Areas and Departments ordered to select an officer as Chief for the Corps Area CIP Detachment.
12 Nov	Corps of Intelligence Police Efficiency reports ordered submitted semi-annually and upon transfer instead of quarterly.
12 Nov	Corps Areas ordered to appoint a CIP Chief to actively supervise agents and to be stabilized in the position.
13 Nov	G2 advised Corps of Intelligence Police that 90 agents and appropriate grades were to be released to the Provost Marshal General for the purpose of conducting "applicant and similar investigations from which duties the CIP would be released."
15 Nov	Corps of Intelligence Police Hq asked that departments, bases, Alaskan Defense Command, and G2, Washington Detachment be exempted from furnishing CIP agents for transfer to the Provost Marshal.

1941

18 Nov — Corps of Intelligence Police received 300,000 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition from the Chief of Ordnance and distributed it to Corps Areas.

22 Nov — Major David G. Erskine of G2, WDGS, started preparation of staff study on the establishment of new districts and 22 new offices.

22 Nov — S2 Trinidad, stated CIP undercover agents should be assigned as grease monkeys in a power shovel gang where sabotage of expensive machinery was suspected.

26 Nov — Chief of Staff, WDGS, directed that the CIP Investigators Training School remain in Chicago, Illinois.

28 Nov — Corps of Intelligence Police advised to be ready to provide a sizeable CIP Detachment for duty at headquarters of any theater of operations overseas.

1 Dec — Chief of CIP after inspection in five corps areas stated: (U)

a. FBI preferred to deal with MID and was much confused by dealings with the army's several other investigative agencies.
b. Confidential Fund restrictions were too arbitrary and responsible for low morale and improperly connected investigations.
c. Many COs were attempting to administer CIP like peacetime enlisted men in garrison and looked on agents with suspicion and contempt.
d. Majority of Post Intelligence Officers were being assigned additional duties having no bearing on intelligence functions.
e. The CIP policy of one stenographer-typist to each three agents had not been achieved.
f. Corps of Intelligence Police agents should be informed of the results of their work if high morale is to be maintained.

1 Dec — Three additional CIP agents were rushed to the Puerto Rican Department

1941

1 Dec — Captain H. G. Sheen recommended to G2 after inspection of five corps areas that:(U)

a. Fifteen additional Metropolitan Intelligence offices should be established in various districts.
b. CIP should be brought out from undercover but its personnel should not be identified.
c. The name CIP should be changed to eliminate "police" and be called Counter Intelligence Unit, U.S.A.
d. All areas and departments should be told to use "common sense" in handling of Confidential Funds.
e. Necessary action should be taken to fill quotas for stenographer-typists.

2 Dec — G2 instructed Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, to increase the number of agents in Alaska.

3 Dec — Secretary of War Directed the nine Corps Areas to transfer 90 CIP agents to the Provost Marshal General as of 15 Dec 41.

5 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police agents of Third Corps Area provided Army with coverage during "captive" mine strike.

5 Dec — Corps Areas and Departments were urged to send qualified CIP agents to Officer Candidate Schools.

INTELLIGENCE AXIOM

"...Many (officers) are uniquely qualified for staff intelligence duties and indeed would prefer to devote their careers to those tasks..."

--General Omar Bradley

[redacted]

1941

7 Dec — World War II - Pearl Harbor: CIP agents "stand by at field offices." G2 informed CIP Headquarters "no action to be taken until Monday, December 8."

8 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police submitted request to double its strength, recall all CIP enlisted reservists and revoke order to transfer 90 agents to Provost Marshal General.

9 Dec — Office of the Chief of Staff approved doubling Corps of Intelligence Police to 1026 men and recall of enlisted reservists; no action taken on transfer of 90 agents to PMG.

10 Dec — Second Corps Area reported 15 CIP agents were operating on detached service with the FBI on enemy alien cases in New York Area.

10 Dec — G2 authorized centralization of CIP personnel and administration, and the procurement of carefully selected officers for CIP duty; substandard officers to be eliminated; all backgrounds to be fully checked.

11 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police furnished two agents in uniform to assist in the security of classified interceptor protection at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C.

12 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police directed by G2 to make a security survey of the Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. Secret night office search scheduled for 17 December 1941.

13 Dec — Military Police units activated. Transfer included 90 CIP agents to Criminal Investigation Division (CID), as of 15 December.

15 Dec — Because of attitude of the new Panama Government, Canal Zone CIP agents were divided into two groups -- known or open and undercover.

18 Dec — G2, Fourth Corps Area requested instructions on handling the clothing allowance of CIP agents transferred to the PMG.

0222

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1941

19 Dec — Major General E. S. Adams, the Adjutant General, called on the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, to complain about the methods used by the CIP agents on the surprise search. General Adams was misled by his officers; oriented on true facts.

20 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police Headquarters flooded with visitors and mail of volunteers who had an idea the work consisted of "nothing but glamour and excitement."

22 Dec — Assignment to and transfers within the Corps of Intelligence Police in Corps Areas required to be approved by the Adjutant General.

22 Dec — Roster revealed that out of a total of 1026 men authorized CIP, there were only 405 men on duty of which 23 were in the Philippines.

23 Dec — Anonymity of existence, history, activities and jurisdiction of Corps of Intelligence Police relaxed, but identity of personnel to be undisclosed except as required to accomplish the missions.

23 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police formulated plans for coordination of counterintelligence activities with newly established defense command headquarters.

23 Dec — Corps of Intelligence Police agents "survey" rooms and organize security procedures for a meeting of the Supreme War Council at the Federal Reserve Building.

23 Dec — Chief, CIP requested funds be authorized for the purchase of recreational equipment to insure physical fitness of all agents.

24 Dec — Deputy Chief of Staff approved Corps of Intelligence Police plan for coming out from undercover and suggested Bureau of Public Relations prepare press releases.

24 Dec — Brigadier General F. E. Uhl, CG, Seventh Corps Area, wrote to the AG that the orders requiring AG approval for transfer of CIP agents was "....centralization to a degree that seriously interferes with proper performance of the responsibilities assigned to the Corps Area Commander...."

0223

1941

26 Dec	G2 informed Chief of Staff that "majority of officers assigned to CIP by local commanders unsuited and untrained" and "the counter-actions of the skillful professional enemy agents will not occur under inexperienced amateurs."
30 Dec	The Air Corps requested that a special allotment be made to provide at least one CIP agent be assigned to each air base.
31 Dec	G2 forwarded to the Corps of Intelligence Police an approved memorandum for the procurement of $46,000 worth of CIP equipment.

1 Jan — The Corps of Intelligence Police became the Counter Intelligence Corps recognizing change in mission from policing to intelligence.

1 Jan — Corps Areas and Department authorized to assign officers to duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps after clearance by G2, War Department General Staff.

1 Jan — Transfer of 12 CIP agents of the Western Defense Command to Provost Marshal which was accomplished "on paper" as of 15 December, rescinded and CIC kept the men.

2 Jan — G2 requested chief of Morale Branch allocate $2,052.00 per month (at the rate of $2 per agent) to rent recreational equipment necessary to maintain physical fitness.

6 Jan — Priorities ordered on all CIC investigations with incident cases rated as "1 a" and investigation of CIC applicants as "1 b."

6 Jan — Commanding General, Seventh Corps Area informed by AG that centralization was ordered only after decentralized procedure had introduced into the CIC "...a larger percentage of agents whose character, education, adaptability and experience in no way qualified them for the duties they would be required to perform...."

7 Jan — Fourth Service Command stated confusion and duplication would be avoided by using its CIC agents to investigate cases at local air bases instead of sending in agents of the CIC detachment of the A2 section of the (First) Troop Carrier Command at Stout Field, Indianapolis.

13 Jan — Chief, CIB, G2 asked all Corps Area G2s to report their need for CIC clerical assistance.

23 Jan — Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, required a report of the progress of physical fitness programs in the Corps Areas and Departments.

23 Jan — G2 stated that CIC applicants must have completed eight weeks basic training before being considered for the Corps.

23 Jan — Two CIC spaces allocated V Corps at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, from CIC general headquarters spaces.

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1942

23 Jan	Two CIC agents arrived in Belfast, Ireland, with first U.S. troops in Europe. V Corps designated MAGNET force.
27 Jan	Corps informed many reports of investigations of prospective special areas have had to be returned as some showed no investigation at all and others were "so sketchy as to afford no security."
January	Headquarters, Caribbean Defense Command, Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, began intensive recruitment program in all installations for potential CIC Agents.
February	CIC Caribbean Defense Command placed agents in undercover capacity throughout Canal Zone and neighboring Republic of Panama Cities. They were given false names and false employment with strict instructions to avoid all military personnel and each other.
1 Feb	Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS, after serving as Assistant G2.
1 Feb	G2, WDGS, took over control of all investigations of prospective CIC personnel.
3 Feb	CIC personnel authorized 300 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition per year; 200 rounds for target practice, 100 in reserve.
10 Feb	G2 Caribben Defense Command requested $5,000 for CIC travel and informant expenses for remainder of fiscal year and also authority to get passports for agents.
16 Feb	Chief, CIC provided Personnel Procedures Section of AG with outline of qualifications required for CIC assignment. First, must have investigative experience. Second, should have legal experience.
18 Feb	G2 informed G2, Seventh Corps Area that it had never had a requirement that CIC agents be unmarried and asked for source of information, which claimed they should.
21 Feb	Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, required all special agents to take an oath to conceal identity and classified information except "in the line of duty."

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1942

22 Feb — Final revision of Delimitations Agreement was approved and distributed to all Corps Areas and Departments.

23 Feb — Survey revealed CIC had only 314 of its authorized 526 agents. All Corps Areas ordered to intensify recruiting.

25 Feb — G2, Eastern Theater of Operations at New York, asked S2s of his command to report on need for CIC agents, benefits derived and improvements required.

26 Feb — Chief, CIC explained filing system for CIC had been selected by R Sec the G2, WD, as the miscellaneous classification 322.999 with eleven alphabetical cut-off re: general, automobiles, clothing, enlisted school, equipment, identification, officer school, rations, rosters, school lectures, and travel.

28 Feb — Corps Areas ordered to each send a CIC agent to CIC Headquarters, Washington, D. C. for training in reviewing reports of investigation of prospective CIC personnel.

2 Mar — War Department Circular #59, designated the Counter Intelligence Corps, except for detachments with task forces, the operating branch of the Military Intelligence Service.

3 Mar — Corps G2s ordered by Secretary of War to arrange to "tab" names of all soldiers being investigated for CIC assignment and freeze them in their current assignments until released.

3 Mar — Survey of CIC agent needs ordered from all army commanders.

9 Mar — General Dwight D. Eisenhower became Chief of the Organization and Planning Division and later reported "...a shocking deficiency" in the field of intelligence.

10 Mar — S2, Newfoundland stated positive benefits derived from his CIC agents but recommended that undercover status be established prior to arrival and that all administrative details of undercover be worked out in advance.

16 Mar — Survey revealed that Corps Areas G2's wanted an additional 447 CIC agents.

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1942

17 Mar — All requests for passports, for CIC agents on special assignments, ordered made through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

20 Mar — Military Intelligence Service of the Military Intelligence Division formed over protests of General Strong, G2.

21 Mar — G2, First Corps Area reported his 38 CIC agents had a backlog of 558 cases.

23 Mar — G2 Third Service Command reported its 78 agents were handling 2,089 CIC cases.

27 Mar — Technical Manual 30-205, Countersubversive Instructions, was approved and the establishment of the military CS system started.

29 Mar — Eleven CIC agents, 29 assigned spaces and the unexpended portion of $20,000 CIC fund of the Caribbean Command outside the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone ordered transferred to MIS, War Department.

30 Mar — CIC included with Provost Marshal investigators in authorization to issue blanket orders for local investigative travel.

31 Mar — Sixth Corps Area reported 725 cases under investigation by its 49 agents.

1 Apr — Chief, CIC, issues new badges and credentials.

2 Apr — First Military Intelligence Officer Candidate School opened in Chicago, Illinois.

3 Apr — Western Defense Command asked an increase of 179 agents to make a total of 150 and stated that when a potential espionage case developed in San Francisco, the CIC office there was so short handed that agents had to be withdrawn from a surveillance job to handle it.

4 Apr — G2 recommended a ratio of one CIC agent per 1000 troops in overseas operations.

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1942

4 Apr — G2 recommended that CIC be increased to 7,395 with 445 officers and 6,950 enlisted men. Of these 2,600 would be for the Air Corps and 3,271 for overseas.

7 Apr — Inspection showed Provost Marshal General injuring morale of CIC personnel by offering commissions in higher grades to officers including those with Military Intelligence and also granting commissions to civilians.

7 Apr — Trinidad Sector asked that eight CIC agents be furnished as local procurement was impossible. Among the need was for agents to check on submarine oil sales in the area.

8 Apr — G2 Alaska reported he did not have enough CIC agents to place one at each military post of his area. He asked for an increase from 13 to 19 men.

9 Apr — First Counter Intelligence Corps agents landed in Australia. Headquarters set up at Melbourne.

9 Apr — CIC Caribbean Defense Command flew three agents from Panama to Chicago School.

13 Apr — Maximum age limit for prospective CIC agents increased from 34 to 45.

16 Apr — Inspection of CIC in six Corps Areas revealed lack of uniform organization; lack of promotions; manpower shortage with clerk shortage acute; neglect of plant security work; agents performing too many run-of-the-mill background cases.

18 Apr — Staff Sergeant Arthur S. Komori at Fort Mills, Philippines, was transferred to U.S. Forces, Far East, with the MacArthur party en route to Australia.

20 Apr — Advanced Course was organized at the CIC Chicago School for training of CIC Officer Candidates (Prep School).

20 Apr — G2 Second Corps Area asked advice on how to get back two CIC agents who did so well in OCS that their carrier branch retained them.

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1942

21 Apr — Chief, CIC recommended that CIC personnel be assigned tactically as follows:

Unit	Officers	Agents	Clerks	Total
Division	1	3	2	6
Corps	2	8	2	12
Field Army	4	10	3	17

22 Apr — Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, CIC, wrote CO of CIC's 99th Infantry Division that "no written report or information is available as yet regarding the operation of a CIC detachment with a unit on maneuvers."

27 Apr — CIC authorized increase to 4,974 including officers for the first time, with 543 officers in the initial allotment.

27 Apr — Hawaii asked for an additional 66 agents with one CIC agent of Japanese extraction per 1,000 Japanese extraction residents.

27 Apr — CIC reorganization plan provided for CIC agents in all tactical units down to division level.

27 Apr — G3, WDGS, opposed an MI Officer Candidate School. Recommended using established schools.

April — Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, moved to a separate building at 1430 K. Street, NW, Washington, D. C., from the Securities and Exchange Building where G2 remained.

1 May — Chief, MIS, stated that tactical forces had gone overseas either without CIC personnel or without sufficiently prepared personnel. He urged that tactical commanders be informed they had the right to request CIC units.

1 May — Request of G2, Second Corps Area, for transfer of two CIC agents from Signal Corps to G2 refused because the Signal Corps was already short 1,000 officers.

5 May — Major General George V. Strong named Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS. General Eisenhower said: "A senior officer possessed of a keen mind."

0230

1942

5 May — Panama Canal Department reported that American negro agents were not practical for duty in Panama.

6 May — First CIC agents captured as Japanese take Corregidor, P.I. Of 30 CIC officers and men captured, nine were known to have died as Prisoners of War.

6 May — Survey revealed 165 CIC agents on duty at stations outside the USA with 57 of them undercover.

11 May — School of Military Government opened at University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.

14 May — Spaces allotted for CIC agents at Officer Candidate Schools for several branches.

14 May — CIC agents in Corps Area and Department ordered to fill out overseas preference cards.

14 May — Women's Auxiliary Army Corps was activated when Public Law 554, 77th Congress, was approved.

15 May — Three CIC agents of G2 Unit sent on 72 hour secret mission with 23rd Ferrying Squadron from Morrison Field, Florida.

20 May — Services of civilian agents, authorized in October 1940, to be terminated within three months.

20 May — Military Intelligence Service under the MID, G2 activities was directed to operate and administer the service of collection, compilation and dissemination of military intelligence; with CIC personnel directly assigned to MIS of which Brigadier General Hayes Kroner was made Chief.

20 May — Chief of CIC outlined a plan for organization and operation of a Theater CIC Detachment.

28 May — Chief of MIS stated that Special Agents would be assigned only with approval of the War Department but Agents could be assigned by Corps Areas following investigations, but neither Special Agents nor Agents could be transferred without approval by the War Department.

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1942

May	Instructions to CIC applicants stated Corps did not solicit men; nine out of 10 men were rejected; outside influence, political or otherwise, would not further an applicant's interest.
1 Jun	Military Intelligence Service informed Corps Areas that CIC agents should be used to investigate commissioned officers, regardless of location on or off military reservations. "No restrictions be placed on performance of these agents."
1 Jun	CIC Training Section was activated at Headquarters of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.
1 Jun	Chief, CIC, reported that 20,000 investigations would be required to secure an additional 4,200 officers and men.
3 Jun	Procurement of civilian type automobiles authorized. Cars to have no War Department markings visible to the public.
3 Jun	CIC agent was on duty at Dutch Harbor, Alaska, when Japanese planes bombed the port.
3 Jun	Twenty CIC agents rushed by special planes to G2 Western Defense Command to help handle an "emergency situation."
6 Jun	CIC Detachments ordered to issue $20 emergency money to each agent to be carried at all times and produced on demand.
6 Jun	Authorized purchase of 108 second hand two-door civilian type automobiles for use by CIC agents in Service Commands and in Washington, D. C.
10 Jun	G2, Canal Zone, reported that "unsatisfactory" CIC agent had proven satisfactory as a crew member of the CIC schooner and was serving as a mechanic, radio operator and signal man.
11 Jun	New regulations published regarding civilian clothing and revoking all previous regulations. Initial allowance $100 or less, given once only; $7.50 monthly maintenance. No allowance for agents assigned to tactical units. All procurement from confidential funds.
13 Jun	Military Intelligence Officer Candidate School, Chicago, Illinois, terminated. Thirty CIC agents graduated.

1942

13 Jun — Office of Strategic Service organized under General William Donovan to handle positive intelligence.

14 Jun — AG letter to all commanding generals stated: "All commanders are responsible for counterintelligence coverage within their commands." CIC personnel are assigned to "assist."

15 Jun — First Military Police School opened at Fort Myer, Virginia. Shortly afterward some of the 90 CIP men were returned to CIC from the Provost Marshal General.

June — Captain Ralph Sims named Commandant of Chicago CIC Investigators Training School.

June — Operations Section formed at the Office of the Chief, CIC, to organize detachments and prepare them for overseas shipment.

June — Major Lowell Bradford designated first CIC G2 Liaison Officer as a result of move of Office of the Chief, CIC, from G2 at the Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

June — First CIC agents arrived in the Fiji Islands with 37th Infantry Division. Start of New Caledonia detachment and island commands.

June — CIC Caribbean Defense Command sent agents undercover to Islands of Aruba and Curacao and to the Republic of Columbia. The cover used was industrial firms and missions in the areas.

1 Jul — First CIC Detachment of five officers and 15 men sailed for the European Theater.

1 Jul — The 14 "key" CIC agents of the Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, included a telephone "tap" expert; a former newspaper labor editor; a photographer; case reviewer; an attorney; two negro undercover men; a champion revolver shooter; an engineer; an "old army" first sergeant; a former states attorney; a former police secretary and two plain investigators.

1 Jul — Protest of Provost Marshal General on non-transfer of 12 CIC agents of the Western Defense Command to PM (see 1 Jan 42) resulted in G2 refusing to transfer on grounds (1) that the PM of the Western

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Defense Command said he didn't need them; (2) CIC had a serious need for trained personnel.

2 Jul — Japanese landings on the northeast coast of Papua, New Guinea, marked the high point of Japanese conquest.

4 Jul — Roster of 3rd Corps Area CIC Detachment listed 93 enlisted men. W. A. Maybury, 1st Lt, MI, Commanding.

6 Jul — War Department authorized CIC to send agents to established Officer Candidate Schools for officer training and return to the Corps. It also authorized direct commissions.

6 Jul — Reorganization of CIC provided officers, corporals, and privates in addition to sergeants; totaling 4,974. Of 543 officers, 337 were by transfer from those already detailed and 206 were from OCS. The 1900 corporals were to be agents and the 352 privates to be clerks. For first time, CIC had complete complement assigned to it.

14 Jul — First CIC detachment to European Theater erroneously assigned to Cheltenham, England. Repeated the "snafu on arrival" of the first CIP unit in Europe in 1917, when its members were "mistakenly" arrested by MPs.

17 Jul — Headquarters, ETO, U.S. Army, published Staff Memo No. 8 on the Security of Documents and Information.

20 Jul — Chief, CIC, ordered check made of Army location of former investigators in civilian life.

22 Jul — Army Corps Areas are redesignated as Service Commands under Army Service Forces which was activated 12 March 1942.

25 Jul — MOS 301 "Investigator" defined and furnished to the Army Personnel Classification Division.

29 Jul — Supply Officer, CIC, WDGS, designated accountable officer. Command G2's to designate local responsible officers for CIC equipment.

31 Jul — Transportation Corps activated and CIC agents assigned to it for Port Security duties.

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1942

July — Service Commands authorized to issue credentials but not badges, to corporal agents except when assigned overseas.

July — Major Theodore J. Walker designated Commandant of the CIC Investigators Training School.

July — Ordnance Corps took over automotive testing from Quartermaster Corps at Camp Holabird, Maryland. Army's famed "6 x 6" truck christened.

July — First CIC Training School of the Southwest Pacific opened at Melbourne, Australia.

1 Aug — CIC equipment to be furnished detachments direct from the Commanding General, SOS, and requisitions forwarded through OCCIC.

1 Aug — Major Hugh D. Wise designated Chief, CIC, as Lt Colonel Sheen was sent to Europe.

3 Aug — Brigadier General Hayes Kroner, Chief, MIS, stated in a letter to Service Commands that "...the primary function of the Counter Intelligence Corps must be considered as carrying forth appropriate Counter Intelligence Corps missions in Theaters of Operation..." Theaters were told that all CIC personnel except a listed 10% would be transferred as needed.

8 Aug — ETO advised by G2 that it was allocated six officers and 49 enlisted men with four officers and 15 enlisted men to be transferred from SOS, U.S. Forces British Isles. The Middle East Command was allotted the same number.

10 Aug — U.S. Army Forces Central Africa allotted 12 agents with one undercover agent being sent immediately.

17 Aug — Third Service Command, CIC, moved its headquarters to 100 W. 23d St., Baltimore, Maryland, and started its first Agent's Training Class, consisting of 29 enlisted men who graduated 12 September 1942. Robert B. Curtiss, Capt, Cav, Commanding.

18 Aug — CIC forces in Iceland increased to 47 special agents and 56 agents.

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1942

24 Aug — G2 informed Army Ground Forces that CIC personnel assigned to divisions are not part of "CS" system but do investigate any reports of possible subversive activity received through the system.

25 Aug — Service Commands ordered to designate not more than 10% of their personnel as "key" personnel; all others subject to transfer.

28 Aug — Military Intelligence Service informed G2, First Service Command, that the War Department planned to transfer to the First Service Command 26 CIC agents as the WD quota was filled and the Corps "...is in danger of losing a number of exceptionally well qualified soldiers unless they can be placed in Service Commands. MIS said these transferees could be substituted for others on the '10% keyman' lists."

28 Aug — Military Intelligence Service informed First Service Command that it had 139 agents tabbed for transfer at any time to tactical organizations.

August — CIC required to use regular Army channels for procurement of its supplies and equipment unless unavailable.

August — American CIC School Center activated at Shrivenham, England, in cooperation with British Intelligence. Also, British provided spaces for CIC agents at their Matlock Field Security School.

1 Sep — Captain Kirby M. Gillette designated as the first Chief, CIC, European Theater of Operations.

3 Sep — G2, Second Service Command, reported that his CIC agents had a backlog of 1,130 interviews waiting to be typed.

7 Sep — Chief, CIC, ordered to suggest the name of a "Major" to command a Special Operation (North Africa). Major C. A. Ellis of New York recommended.

8 Sep — Chief, MIS, turned down the request of the American Intelligence Command to have all 175 CIC agents in the Caribbean area transferred to AIC to attain "...smooth working coordination..."

1942

10 Sep — Caribbean Defense Command asked to advise G2 of the type of cover required and the localities for placement for sending in CIC agents

11 Sep — War Department Circular #308 authorized the transfer of men performing CIC duties to the CIC.

11 Sep — Four Service Commands tapped for 45 CIC agents who were sent to Field Army, A.P. Hill, Va., where Task Force "A" was staging for the North African invasion.

16 Sep — Colonel Townsend Heard, Chief of American Intelligence Command requested 12 CIC agents for use at Miami Beach, Florida, for use in CI work either outside the United States or as a result of CI activity outside the United States.

19 Sep — CIC policy promulgated not to accept "limited service" men unless the man had outstanding qualifications for a job.

21 Sep — CIC special agents reverted back to control of G2, MID, but CIC agents and clerks remain under control of the Service Commands.

21 Sep — Major C. A. Ellis reported to Chief of CIC for three day orientation at Washington en route to Camp A. P. Hill.

26 Sep — Second Lieutenant Heegaard-Jensen reported to the Chief of CIC from Hq, 2nd Armored Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., that his detachment was only authorized 45 caliber pistols but the division had only submachine guns; that no transportation was authorized; that lack of rank gave general impression of lack of importance of the unit; the detachment even had to borrow a typewriter from an officer. He said the unit had no instructions on mailing address or wearing of the insignia and that agents were "...unaccustomed to the rigors of field service..."

26 Sep — London cable signed by Eisenhower stated ETO needed 25 CIC officers and had six; needed 160 agents and had 19.

30 Sep — CIC ordered to have one agent on each of 15 boards of FBI, ONI and CIC to interview passengers arriving in Baltimore on 9 October 1942 on the S.S. Serpa Pinto.

September — Efforts to secure "housekeeping" personnel for administrative routine, and thereby free CIC personnel, were unsuccessful.

2 Oct — Chief, CIG, forwarded request of the American Intelligence Command (see 16 Sep 1942) to Chief of MIS and stated that CIC agents had not been trained and "...for the most part are not qualified to operate in foreign countries." He added further that "scope of their activities in foreign countries was limited by the military jurisdiction."

5 Oct — G2 at New York told Intelligence Conference that on overseas shipments, "...in 99 cases out of 100 the intelligence officers haven't the slightest idea of their jobs and don't even know what a subversive is."

5 Oct — G2, Fourth Service Command, reported to Intelligence Conference that Provost Marshal Generals in his area all outrank Post Intelligence Officers.

5 Oct — In answer to a request from Col D. G. Erskine, assistant executive officer of MIS, the Chief, CIC, stated, "No fixed policy has been established with respect to the numerical relationship of officers and enlisted men in Counter Intelligence Corps detachments."

6 Oct — G2, Second Service Command, told Intelligence Conference that half the time the intelligence officer is working on some other job.

6 Oct — Allotment of CIC enlisted personnel was 2,216 to Service Commands and 2,215 to Ground and Task and Theater forces.

6 Oct — Chief, CIC, told the Intelligence Conference that one of the supply problems was securing standard typewriters.

8 Oct — CIC refused a request to furnish personnel for a censorship unit scheduled for the North African invasion.

10 Oct — Third Service Command asked for eight additional agents for interrogation of passengers and crews of neutral ships (estimated at one every other day) entering Baltimore.

CONFIDENTIAL

1942

10 Oct — Experience for setting up detachments for North African invasion revealed:
a. Assemble detachment prior to reaching division staging area.
b. Have COs set up T/O and T/B/S at once in order to draw equipment because no authority exists.

15 Oct — Allotment of CIC enlisted personnel to Service Command for purposes of procurement and training for subsequent assignment to tactical units withdrawn. 619 CIC agents assigned to an MIS Reserve Pool and subdivided into various Service Commands.

16 Oct — Chief, CIC, advised Alaskan Section of Operations Division, WD, that no Russian speaking CIC agent would be available to fill an urgent need for three weeks.

17 Oct — First CIC agents arrived at Port Moresby, New Guinea. Ship panelling and port security became an important function.

21 Oct — Service Commands obtained operational control through policy that "Office of Origin" controls an investigative case, and authority granted to send and receive "lateral" leads.

26 Oct — G2 informed G1 that allotments of CIC personnel were available to tactical units on basis of: division, 6 men; corps, 13; field army, 50; air forces, 22; and theaters, 55. G2 also stated that apparently many tactical commanders were not cognizant of the fact that their units could request CIC personnel.

27 Oct — G2 stated that it was not believed advisable to select a large number of limited service men for duty with CIC but exceptions could be made in cases of outstanding qualifications.

29 Oct — Service Commands, Bases, and Depots ordered to establish basic CIC training schools. Chicago school to become an advanced school.

30 Oct — Arrangements made for reception centers to furnish Service Commands with data on men who have had investigative or stenographic experience.

October — Agents of 3rd Service Command seized munitions plant near Baltimore. Plant operated by pro-Nazi. FBI credited for this operation.

1942

1 Nov	Second special organization activated at Fort Meade, South Dakota, to which potential subversive military personnel would be assigned.
5 Nov	Arrangements made for agents to use their own cars and be reimbursed, and with CPA, to get gas ration books without disclosure of their identity.
6 Nov	Authority to issue badges and credentials again decentralized to Service Commands.
8 Nov	More than three score CIC agents landed with combat troops at the invasion of North Africa. First combat mission of CIC. CIC agents seized complete Italian Secret Service list of French Intelligence Service and list of French sympathizers working with the Axis.
9 Nov	Basic military training for eight weeks made mandatory for each accepted CIC candidate. Refresher courses urged.
11 Nov	Service Commands ordered by the War Department to organize their own CIC detachments.
11 Nov	Panama CIC Detachments acquired two schooners, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific, to make security checks at small ports.
12 Nov	Chief, MIS, urged passage of HR 7580 to confer power of arrest upon certain personnel of the Army (CIC). Opposed by the Attorney General. IG later investigated possible pressure. CIC didn't recommend.
12 Nov	First CIC agents landed in the Middle East and opened Headquarters at Cairo, Egypt.
12 Nov	Provisions of TM 30-225, relating to CIC efficiency reports, rescinded and reports ordered submitted only semi-annually. Special provisions to cover frequent transfers were provided.
12 Nov	MIS, G2, WDGS, informed Service Commands that CIC personnel would be placed on "detached service" from one command to another according to the most urgent need.

1942

12 Nov — Authority for the transfer of corporal agents and privates (clerks) with CIC in Service Commands to tactical units.

12 Nov — G2 stated it was no longer authorized to request changes in departmental allotments, and the only solution for deserving officers stuck by a T/O in a certain grade was reassignment.

13 Nov — CIC personnel alerted as follows: for Brazil, 23; Central Africa, 11; North Africa, 22; Europe, 45; South Pacific, 12; and Southern Defense Command, 12 (colored).

15 Nov — Service Commands again given authority to issue all CIC personnel badges and credentials without clearance from OCCIC.

17 Nov — Seventh Corps, G2, explained to the G2, WDGS that he rated eight CIC agents only "satisfactory" because they were only corporals or sergeants.

17 Nov — Major General G. V. Strong, G2, reported that G2 had only 97 of its 543 officers authorized 6 July and requested the CG, SOS, to furnish 80 officers who could be ordered to CIC duty upon graduation from CIC school since the Service Commands would not release officers they had sent to school.

17 Nov — Service Commands asked to rush completion of investigations of agents and clerks (CIC) who have been transferred to tactical organizations while their investigations were still pending.

20 Nov — Major General M. A. Reckord, CG, Third Service Command, wrote a personnel letter to General G. V. Strong, G2, citing that when he wanted to commission a sergeant and to use limited service men he found G2 had restrictions which he considered contrary to War Department directives.

21 Nov — CIC allotment to Second Service Command increase by 15 to provide personnel to cover New York Port of Embarkation.

22 Nov — Catalogue of equipment and supplies required through 31 December 1943 approved by Commanding General, SOS.

1942

26 Nov — Air Transport Command asked to be exempted from provisions of Para 9d of TM 30-215 which required all CIC in a theater of operations be assigned to the theater Hq stated that flexibility of Central Control was required so personnel could be shifted between Wings.

27 Nov — Plans were announced for CIC Detachments with all tactical units of division size or larger.

28 Nov — G2 informed CG of Third Service Command that because of the quality of CIC agents and their selection by investigation and training at a large consumption of time and expense, their transfers had to be controlled. He further added that it was desired CIC agents go to OCS rather than get direct commissions because services would raid CIC and commissioning from such a small group would create a "morale" problem.

1 Dec — G2, WDGS, directed that each command have an accountable, as well as a responsible, officer for CIC equipment.

2 Dec — G2 conference held at Army War College. Colonel Erskine spoke on availability of CIC complements when requested by commanders.

3 Dec — Officer grades assigned to MIS. Service Commands told to recommend officers for transfer and then assignment (temporary) back to them. Suggested: OIC, CIC, his assistants and CO's of field offices.

17 Dec — Chief, CIC, reported that Service Commands will not, if left without curb, maintain the standards of CIC.

19 Dec — G2, Sixth Service Command, reported that the ban of voluntary enlistments for CIC had deprived the Corps of many experienced men.

21 Dec — Summary of a G2 conference at Army Ground Forces headquarters:

a. CIC units in combat training in ZI should insist that Service Commands make all investigations except those in the unit itself.
b. CIC units should be above board like the FBI at home offices, and for undercover work request assistance of service command.
c. If CIC personnel are not satisfactory they can be returned and a replacement will be furnished.

0242

1942

24 Dec	Fourth Service Command asked authority to spend $100 to $125 a month to provide gym facilities for its officers and men at Daly's Health Club in Atlanta, Ga.
24 Dec	G2, 28th Division CIC, asked whether his detachment is under the division CG or under a separate "Corps" chain of command.
28 Dec	Colonel J. T. Bissell, Chief CIC Group stated that age reductions and abolishment of voluntary enlistments for CIC would be unfavorable to CIC but, he added, the loss would not "justify positive action" by MIS.
29 Dec	Organization plan for six sections authorized for Office of the Chief, CIC. Sections were: Personnel, Liaison, Operations, Training, Supply and Fiscal.
29 Dec	G2 asked the Chief of Staff to have duties of Commanding Generals of SOS installations amended to provide for counterintelligence responsibilities and authorization for CIC to conduct investigations.
31 Dec	Minimum age limit for prospective CIC agents remained at 22 but clerks were authorized down to age 20.
31 Dec	Colonel Percy G. Black, G2, Western Task Force, stated his CI subsection was organized on a territorial basis in French Morocco and needed 46 more officers and agents, a radio gonometric (illegal transmitter spotter), and an adequate T/O to provide promotions, and the latter is "extremely vital."
December	Second CIC Training Course of SWP established at Sydney, Australia, with 19 agent students.
	Survey of Intelligence Situation in the USA reported in MI 725/1, AGO, War Department, stated, "...insufficient facts...and no trained personnel for either strategic or combat intelligence."

1 Jan — Chief, CIC, stated that CIC should be separated from its staff position and established under a special staff officer as an operational division similar to the Signal Corps.

1 Jan — Chain of Command, G2 to CIC: Maj Gen George V. Strong, G2, Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, Chief, MIS, and Col John T. Bissell Chief, CIC.

1 Jan — Post Intelligence Officer at Fort Eustis, Va., reported his efforts to locate a qualified negro clerk for CIC duty had been unsuccessful.

1 Jan — Major General Henry Terrell, Jr., commanding the 90th Motorized Division at Camp Barkeley, Texas, requested that a CIC unit be furnished his division. This was first of scores of requests.

4 Jan — The Adjutant General of the 36th Infantry Division asked for instructions on how to account for its CIC detachment which arrived with men listed on Detached Enlisted Men's List (DEML).

4 Jan — South Pacific G2 informed CIG that CIC personnel arriving in the theater had been instilled with the belief that instant promotions and perhaps even a commission is waiting him across the sea.

5 Jan — G2, Caribbean Defense Command, reported War Department was going to furnish OCS graduates for CIC duty in ratio of one officer to each 10 enlisted agents or even higher ratio.

5 Jan — CIC at Trinidad Sector increased from 15 to 43 men because area coverage required FBI type investigations in addition to the normal CIC load.

6 Jan — Major Kirby M. Gillette, CO, CIC Detachment, Hq ETOUSA, wrote CIC Center that battle reports of CIC in North Africa revealed:

a. Linguists are invaluable and conversational language training is essential.
b. Field operations require civilian clothes for CIC agents in many instances.
c. CIC Detachments must orient their organization on the CIC mission.

7 Jan — CIC in Zone of Interior again ordered to keep physically fit by taking proper exercise.

0244



1943

9 Jan — Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment of 75th Division, reported the Division G2 had said he didn't care for CIC and he doesn't think they can be of any use in this country, but they will be of use overseas running the Counter Subversion System.

9 Jan — CIC's 1944 budget estimated at $10,476,910, based on an estimate of 7,500 men.

13 Jan — G2, North Africa, stated that T/O said T/BA be reused as "CIC personnel in a theater are valueless if some means of representation is not provided.

15 Jan — Chief, CIC, asked CO of CIC, Western Defense Command on how to address pay checks to agents in the DEML detachment and whether rank and serial number should be placed on the envelope. Told not to put it on outside envelope.

18 Jan — Master Sergeant John J. Maurer, CIP in charge of MID's investigation of Communist activities and subversive Army personnel, retired because of health had been in charge since 1929.

18 Jan — Lieutenant Colonel H. R. Kebler, acting director of Sixth Service Command wrote Hq Troop Carrier Command to take steps to correct the situation that permitted agents of its CIC detachment to operate in an investigative capacity within the boundaries of the Sixth Service Command.

19 Jan — Military Intelligence Service stated it was not the policy of G2 to indicate to EM that they may expect promotions on arrival at any theater.

20 Jan — Military Intelligence Service established SOP for divisional CIC as follows:

a. Set up as a separate detachment assigned to Hq Co. Service Hq.
b. Operate under the CG of the Division.
c. CO of detachment performs CIC duties assigned by AC of S, G2, of the division.
d. The detachment is an operational organization available to division G2.
e. Personnel should not be changed from DEML to the Arm of Service.
f. T/O is not amended as men are on an allotment of vacancies furnished to the division by the AG.

g. Detachment operates on an integral part of the division both in training and in combat.
h. Personnel of this detachment are openly assigned to CIC duties and not normally for any undercover duties.
i. CO of detachments is responsible to CO of the unit for operations and discipline.

26 Jan — G2, WD, informed 8th Service Command that CIC applicants should not be required to go to G2 office at Dallas at their own expense for an interview. Post Intelligence Officers or CIC agents can make the interviews.

26 Jan — CIC units ordered to request all .38 caliber special ammunition through Chief, CIC, as an economy measure. "Dry shooting" urged.

27 Jan — Arrangements made with Selective Service to provide draft cards for CIC agents to protect their identity.

28 Jan — Office of the Chief, CIC, moved from Washington, D.C., to 2327 North Charles St., Baltimore, Maryland, to avoid loss of officers under 35, who were prohibited from service in Washington, D.C.

January — Third Service Command Intelligence Division initiated a five weeks school for case reviewers to enable field officers to prepare final form reports and ease Hq typing backlog. Training consisted of writing reports of investigation under supervision of Hq personnel.

2 Feb — Chief, CIC, informed CG, ASF, that the five CIC men of a divisional unit was believed to be the minimum for efficient operations.

3 Feb — G2, Eighth Service Command asked that with few exceptions all civilian agents in his area be attached to his office and those with tactical units be assigned to him until overseas shipment was imminent as he could train them and protect their identity.

9 Feb — First two CIC officers -- Second Lieutenants Bernard W. Menke and James E. Southerland assigned to the Manhattan Engineering District at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

11 Feb — Hawaiian Department investigating two men of Japanese antecedents and five Hawaiians for service with CIC in the vicinity of New Caledonia, South Pacific.

0246

[redacted]

1943

11 Feb	Air Priority requested by the Chief of CIC to fly one officer and 18 specially selected agents to the Caribbean Defense Command.
12 Feb	G2's of Service Commands were ordered by Intelligence Division to eliminate all unnecessary CIC investigations.
14 Feb	General Eisenhower's comment on Faid, Tunisia, battle, "...although accurate reports were submitted," Army and AFHQ intelligence divisions "discounted" them. "The G2 error was serious."
15 Feb	Tentative Basic Field Manual for CIC duties with tactical organizations was published and sent to the field for comment.
15 Feb	Chief, USAFIME at Cairo, Egypt, reported ship carrying CIC equipment for five of his groups had been sunk.
17 Feb	Service Commands told to obtain personnel from the Air Corps for training and reassignment to Air Corps for CIC duty.
20 Feb	Chief, CIC advised Fourth Service Command which had over 100 vacancies in the grade of corporal to offset part of this by overstrength in grades of private and Pfc to provide sufficient clerks.
23 Feb	Survey revealed that CIC had 274 of its authorized 543 officers and 3,355 of its 4,431 EM. World-wide request accelerating.
23 Feb	Chief, CIC, presented a staff study asking a reorganization and expansion of the Corps, asking a strength of 1392 officers and 8360 EM; that 800 vacancies be authorized for CIC at OCS; that personnel can be assigned over and above existing T/Os and that CIC control procurement, training, assignment and relief of its personnel.
25 Feb	Chief, CIC, advised G2, AGF, that there was no T/O or T/B/A for CIC but AG was authorized to grant a CIC allotment over and above T/Os.
25 Feb	First Troop Carrier Command had asked for more men and its own CF fund, but Chief, CIC, said use Service Command agents and get CF from local Service Command.

1943

25 Feb	CIC personnel for Army Air Force furnished with three detachments of one officer and six agents assigned to the South Atlantic, African-Middle East, and Caribbean Wings, and plans made to assign teams to India-China, Pacific, North Atlantic, Alaskan and West Coast Wings.
26 Feb	Field survey of investigations of prospective CIC candidates revealed that investigative priorities were not being observed.
26 Feb	Military Intelligence Service told Director of Intelligence, Sixth Service Command, not to send undesirables to tactical units but to transfer them out of the Corps.
February	General Omar Bradley commented on Allied Intelligence in North Africa, "...we had overlooked the need for specialization in such activities as intelligence....misfits frequently found themselves assigned...the Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings."
1 Mar	G2, Southwest Pacific Theater asked that all CIC detachments be assigned to his Hq for reassignment to subordinate units.
4 Mar	CIC Advanced School at Chicago, Illinois, requested $1,000 to establish a photographic laboratory.
4 Mar	G2, WDGS, informed all major commands that officers and MIS, CIC men assigned to duty with CIC in their commands are not chargeable to them but charged to the CIC, MIS, WD allotment.
4 Mar	G2 ordered that Reports of Change of personnel status from outside continental USA be classified Secret and all others confidential.
9 Mar	CIC was informed that the Air Corps needed CIC Detachments assigned to its various bases.
10 Mar	Inspection of the CIC Detachment of the First Service Command revealed a backlog of 2,000 cases waiting to be typed.
11 Mar	Eight CIC agents at New York given special training for an undercover mission with training emphasizing pistol practice.

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13 Mar — The Secretary of War directed that the practice of Service Commands meeting requests for personnel for assignment to tactical organizations with personnel most easily spared would be discontinued, and that qualified personnel who had completed eight weeks basic training would be furnished. He added that "a notable failure to obtain linguists had been apparent."

18 Mar — CIC Hq interviewed two students attending MIT Center at Camp Ritchie, who stated they did not fully understand the purpose for which they were being given this training and that the Post Intelligence Officer had a somewhat poor opinion of the CIC's EM caused by what he termed a lack of adequate training for duties with tactical units.

20 Mar — Service Commands ordered to end practice of assigning least desirable personnel to tactical units.

20 Mar — G2, Western Defense Command (eight states) recommended that assignment of CIC agents of Second Air Force to Washington, D.C., be revoked and no agents of units except tactical be allowed in the area. He added, if it was necessary to have them, then limit investigative jurisdiction to their own units.

21 Mar — A CIC lieutenant in ETO wrote to his friends at CIC Headquarters to have more security work in New York area and to have the Chicago course rougher with the physical training.

22 Mar — Director of Intelligence, Eighth Service Command, stated it hurt morale when a junior CIC agent was promoted merely because it took less time to complete his background investigation then it did for some other agent senior to him. The problem arose because completion of background investigations varied from six weeks to eight months.

23 Mar — CIC headquarters authorized additional expense money for six CIC agents waiting air transportation at Miami, Florida, en route to the Caribbean Defense Command.

25 Mar — Curriculum for Basic CIC Schools was revised and sent to Service Commands. Training adjusted to coordinate with changes in advanced School at Chicago, Illinois.

1943

26 Mar — Major General G. V. Strong, G2, WD, told the Air Force its CIC investigative field is local within the immediate vicinity of their organization and extends primarily to matters of local interest to that organization. Memo for Record stated, for efficient operation, all CIC activities including funds and reports must be handled through the same channels.

30 Mar — G2, Hq Second Armored Corps, wrote to Col D. G. Erskine, Executive Officer, CI Branch, G2, asking whether Corps Commander has the power to promote, demote or reclassify CIC personnel and what special rules there are for handling.

30 Mar — Colonel D. G. Erskine, asked G2, New York, if a CIC agent could appear before a British Courts Martial provided that it was a secret session, but he was accompanied by an officer. That it would be reported that his identity with CIC not be discussed and that his testimony and any questions be confined to what he heard the accused say without any mention of the agents activities.

31 Mar — CIC Depot activated at Office of the Chief, CIC, at Baltimore, Md.

31 Mar — Two officers and 10 enlisted men selected for Pacific undercover assignment.

Spring 1943 — Third Service Command, Intelligence Division, initiated one week motor course at Camp Holabird, teaching agents how to sabotage motor vehicles, as well as how to detect sabotage, theory of fuel and ignition system of the internal combustion engine. Students also received instruction and were qualified as operators of motorcycles, light and medium tanks, tractors, and trucks, received experience in night driving in convoy blackouts.

1 Apr — CIC Hq advised a prospective CIC officer not to try to attend Provost Marshal CCS because "in all probability he would not be made available to return to CIC."

3 Apr — The AG informed all major commands that the Report of Change required by AR 345-8 did not apply to personnel of CIC - MIS and that CIC - MIS personnel would be reported on Individual Reports of Change.

1943

3 Apr — CIC Section leader told Camp Ritchie instructor there was general confusion in the minds of all the men as to just why they were at Ritchie.

6 Apr — The Secretary of War directed that all CIC personnel be relieved from any non-CIC duties and in the future be assigned only appropriate CIC duties.

6 Apr — Colonel Erskine stated CIC furnished two tactical units are carried over and above T/O of units.

8 Apr — During month-long battle at El Guettar, Tunisia, CIC Detachment duties included directing the psychological warfare activities.

8 Apr — Officer of Dependency Benefits complained to G2, Second Service Command that classification of application by intelligence workers did more to call attention to them than as if they were unclassified.

9 Apr — Headquarters CIC advised G2 that it could use 90 men a month from the graduates of the Army Training Program starting in January 1944.

9 Apr — Colonel L. C. Forney had taken over as Chief, CIC, MIS from Colonel Bissell.

9 Apr — G2, Second Army, at Memphis queried G2, WD, stating "considerable confusion exists regarding current assignments of CIC personnel to tactical units, tentative manual being interpreted as contradictory -- are these detachments assigned attached or organic? Are unit G2s responsible for their training and functions or does G2 exercise supervisory functions only?"

10 Apr — G2, Sixth Service Command, reported comments heard on CIC with tactical units as follows:

a. Men not used on CIC work because division G2's do not know capabilities, training or types of duty 20 men get either routine or combat.

b. CIC men feel they have not been trained for combat intelligence work.

c. Cooperation with CIC poor as other EM of the division regard CIC with distrust and suspicion and officers do not give any weight of authority to CIC duties.

0251



d. Agents are not allowed to use their credentials or investigate a commissioned officer.
e. If no promotions, agents want to go to OCS or some type of service and not considered as outcasts.
f. A CIC officer with a division stated, that if he put some of the CIC manual doctrine into practice both the divisional G2 and the camp CO would see "RED."

10 Apr — Algiers cabled G2 that graduates of the Field Security Course at Camp Ritchie were suggested for transfer to CIC for theater replacements.

12 Apr — Colonel J. K. Cockrell, G2, Panama Canal Department wrote the Chief, CIG, that "it is difficult to keep up the morale and efficiency of the officers when they do not see any future in Intelligence work."

14 Apr — G2, WD, stated, G2, Second Army that CIC detachments are special troops over and above regular T/O's and are attached but G2's are responsible for performance of security and investigative duties within the organization.

15 Apr — CIC requested that 1,080 Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) students be assigned to the Corps during 1944 at the rate of 90 per month.

15 Apr — CIC Headquarters advised the G2 of the 75th Infantry that a divisional CIC detachment was under the command of the Division Commanding General but under the supervision and control of the division G2; that identity of the CIC personnel need not be concealed; that uniforms and insignia should be worn and that the men were not part of the Counter Subversion System.

16 Apr — Deputy Chief of Staff, WDGS, asked for roster of personnel, Washington Branch Office, CIC.

17 Apr — Chief, CICB, informed CO of the Trinidad Detachment, "you are of course under the command of the AC of S, G2, and therefore, what he says goes. However, it should be possible in a tactful way to bring to him a realization of the proper functions of CIC."

20 Apr — North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) CIC Detachment was established consolidating tactical CIC units; CIC became a general staff unit.

1943

21 Apr — South Pacific Provisional CIC Detachment, Island Command #3, at Spiritu Santos acquired a fifty foot fishing vessel for CIC island patrol work. Vessel was manned by two Ensigns and one Warrant Officer (Navy).

22 Apr — CIC suggested directive to all ground force units as follows:

a. Officers and EM of tactical CIC detachments are chargeable to ED overhead with enlisted men on DEML.
b. CO of detachment is advisor on CIC to G2.
c. CO to perform all CIC missions made, supervision of G2.
d. CIC mission is CI coverage over subversive enemy activity namely Treason, Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion (TESS), Disaffection and 380-5.
e. CIC not to perform routine duties or KP, table waiter, guard duty or non-CIC cleared duties.
f. CIC detachment to work as a team and not be separated for other duties.
g. Enlisted men are under CO of detachment and his chain of command and not subject to orders of other officers of the command.
h. CIC detachment will not replace their intelligence units but will be available to CO of the unit for CI enforcement and discipline.
i. The detachment CO or trained expert should afford the maximum of latitude and exercise of judgment in the initiation and conduct of investigations.
j. Since CIC personnel are carried as excess, transfer accomplished only through recommendations to MIS.
k. CO of the detachment originates recommendations for promotion of EM to Chief CIC.
l. When unit in combat or on maneuvers CIC detachment is part of rear echelon where intelligence activity may be expected to endanger security of the organization.
m. Detachment will be given office space where confidential information can be handled without compromise and preferable separate from G2 section.
n. CO of detachment may properly initiate correspondence through channels relating to specific needs or problems of the detachment.

23 Apr — Chief, CIC, informed G2, Fifth Service Command that cover will be desired in the future for certain CIC agents going overseas.

24 Apr — Service Command control of CIC personnel was withdrawn and all CIC personnel were assigned to the War Department and detailed out.

24 Apr — Headquarters, CIC anticipated a need within 60 days for 175 graduates of the air mechanics school, 75 men from the radio operators school and mechanics school, and 50 from other Air Force technical schools.

24 Apr — Army Ground Force replied to CIC suggested directive:

a. The CIC Field Manual should govern the instructions covered but be issued as a directive.
b. Policy matters must go through CO or G2 channels authorized by CO but CIC problems are policies since the detachments are something new.
c. CIC detachments will be diverted from purely investigative duties to do this part of the housekeeping and to be given the training and physical conditioning all men of divisions get.
d. Some commanders may want to keep the detachment together. Some may want to assign individually. They should be part of the G2 section and used as circumstances dictate.

26 Apr — Chief, CIC, completed a survey of utilization of CIC Detachments with tactical divisions and informed Army Ground Forces that G2's did not know how to use their CIC. CIC and AGF held a conference relative to problems arising between G2 and CIC detachments in tactical commands.

26 Apr — Army Exchange Service rejected a request of Chief, CIC, that post exchange and gasoline credit cards be issued to CIC agents showing their connection with MIS or the Army. The Exchange Service stated the AG should issue such a directive.

26 Apr — CIC Headquarters informed VIII Corps that CIC agents with tactical units desiring to attend OCS or other schools should be handled just as other enlisted men of the outfit were.

28 Apr — Chief, CIC, advised the CO of CIC Detachment, 98th Division, that "if undercover personnel are needed they will be transferred in from the CIC Detachment of the next higher echelon. The CIC Detachment will normally in its own unit operate entirely in the open, making investigations, unit and barracks checks, and

performing other duties necessary to accomplishing their mission. It is not contemplated nor is it practicable that the identities of CIC personnel be kept confidential."

26 Apr — Second Army at Memphis issued an SOP to CGs of its Corps and Divisions on use and training of attached personnel and stated, "They (CIC personnel) have been already schooled in one line of work and are now to be schooled in another." Any lack of current knowledge on their part on tactical subjects should not be taken as an index of their ability to learn. In their own field they are selected specialists.

29 Apr — The Intelligence Officer at Curacao, N.W.I. requested that a CIC agent be sent undercover as a clerk with the U.S.O.

29 Apr — The Infantry Replacement Training Center at Camp Roberts, California, reported that the CIC "tabbing" system had resulted in many enlisted men being held at their Center for from six months to a year.

30 Apr — Officers ordered to wear uniforms when reporting to CIC schools but were to bring some civilian clothing.

April — Panama Canal CIC Detachment received 10 new and identical sedans bearing consecutive license plates at a time when no new cars were available locally.

1 May — All CIC enlisted personnel were assigned to War Department overhead.

1 May — General MacArthur cabled MIS, Washington, D. C., that his theater had enough negro personnel.

1 May

3 May — Chief, CIC, stated a plan for furnishing CIC detachments with organic transportation and other equipment was being considered by the War Department.

3 May — Counterintelligence Conference held at CIC Headquarters, Baltimore, Md.

4 May — Headquarters Army Air Forces announced its policy to transfer qualified enlisted men to CIC duty.

5 May — Assistant Secretary of War asked for the CIC policy on having its enlisted men go to OCS.

5 May — CO of CIC detachment of XV Corps wrote Chief, CIC, that the G2 contemplated attaching his CIC to a newly activated division for twelve weeks basic training along with the recruits because G2 feels that their present basic training is insufficient to enable them to carry on with units in combat under adverse conditions.

6 May — Chief, CIC, reported need for a Casual Detachment to provide necessary refresher training for CIC agents assigned overseas.

6 May — Brigadier General Hayes Kroner, Chief of MID, commended CIC Headquarters, Baltimore, Md., for "a very excellent inspection."

1943

8 May — Administrative Section of the Office of the Chief, CIC, was activated at Baltimore, Md.

8 May — CIC Headquarters again explained to an Infantry Division (the 28th) the procedure for promotion of its CIC personnel, school attendance, use of confidential funds, and securing CIC specialized equipment.

8 May — CIC Chief informed XV Corps that tactical CIC detachments should:
a. Do all the CIC investigating within their own units.
b. Insure that the CS system was working since the efficiency of the CIC unit largely depended on it.
c. School and train their men thoroughly as field soldiers as well as investigators.
d. Stick to its CIC mission and not be diverted by other activities.

10 May — Colonel H. R. Kibler became Chief, CIC, replacing Lt Col Wise who became Deputy Chief.

10 May — CIC Headquarters had unfilled requisitions from 62 CIC units in the field for 525 enlisted men and 77 officers.

10 May — CIC Training School activated at Ain el Turk near Oran, North Africa. Nicknamed CIC-by-the-Sea.

12 May — Major General Strong reported that since MIS had no Officer Candidate School for its assigned personnel, highly qualified CIC enlisted personnel could not get on OCS quotas and that not only were there 100 vacancies for CIC officers but the situation was having "a deleterious effect upon morale" and "is not in the best interests of the service."

14 May — Secretary of War ordered arrangements made so that CIC agents would not have to show name, serial number, and military assignment to obtain military privileges at Post Exchange, etc.

14 May — Air Corps requested that 1,026 CIC agents be assigned to it with 680 to be at overseas air bases.

14 May — The CIC Center sent 500 copies of the Personnel Qualification Card to be filled out by each CIC prospect for use by the Investigations and Record Section CICB, CIG, MIS, G2, WDGS.

1943

14 May — Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Sheen reported to CIG on his 60 days in North Africa that:

a. British CI was highly efficient; USA in "very bad shape."
b. Fundamental reason, need competent US officer heading up CI Section.
c. Colonel Parsons did a "bang up job" on port and frontier security; other units "kicked" around.
d. T/O is needed whereby promotions can be made, as it is "causing us some difficulty" and "morale of many deserving officers is dragging."

14 May — Lieutenant Colonel Sheen recommended from North Africa:

a. Greater discretion in selection of G2's -- Low serial number, field grade and Leavenworth G2 course doesn't make a G2.
b. Reduce investigative training of tactical CIC and give more combat intelligence training.
c. Don't sell CIC agents on immediate promotions to get them overseas.
d. Here are at least 85% of CIC overseas personnel linguists.
e. Establish T/B/A since tactical CIC is useless without transportation, communications, and weapons.
f. CIC credentials should be in passport (booklet form) and in prevailing languages.

15 May — Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, established the policy that the Counter Intelligence Corps would have no CIC agents with close foreign background.

15 May — Chief, CIC, told XV Corps to report all its CIC agents taking basic training, and this would be returned to the Service Commands for replacement.

15 May — G2 reported that the Corps now losing men. Many men will transfer. Good prospects will avoid Corps.

15 May — G2 asked for an authorization (CIC) for 318 officers including 19 Colonels, 57 Lt Colonels, 160 Majors, 401 Captains, and 3787 enlisted men including 323 master sergeants. Asked also for officer training -- either have a G2 OCS or grant 2000 OCS vacancies to the Corps.

[redacted]

1943

15 May — Staff study of Joint CIC Board stated four factors determines size of Corps:

a. Total size of Army.
b. Number of Army civilians.
c. Size of Army forces overseas.
d. Extent of geographical areas of jurisdiction.

15 May — Survey revealed increase in ZI cases for previous six months from 8,510 to 11,627, but that Corps would be recruited up to authorized strength within two weeks.

15 May — G2 was reported to Chief of Staff that experience of the past year indicated that to accomplish its assigned mission, changes must be made in the grades allotted to CIC to provide a much higher ratio of commissioned personnel. The CIC "is finding that the accomplishment of its mission is jeopardized because of its enlisted status" and this situation is particularly true in all activities "involving cooperation with Naval Intelligence and the FBI." Yet CIC agents are doing work "on an exact level" of the investigations required of agents of the FBI and ONI, yet the standards of the Corps are higher than OCS.

15 May — G2 in staff study stated that all personnel were officer caliber, two-thirds of CIC men were college graduates, and more than half were attorneys or had similar professional education. That in addition to their three months basic training they were given two months basic and advanced specialized training and a complete background investigation. The inability of this quality personnel to get promotions and commissioned status had resulted in a serious morale question and there was a real danger of collapse of the CIC.

17 May — CIC Headquarters informed CO of 80th Infantry CIC Detachment that there was no T/B/A for CIC transportation, tentage, etc.

18 May — Counter Intelligence Branch officers at Baltimore ordered to take a half day off each week for physical exercise.

20 May — CO, CIC Detachment, 45th Division at Camp Pickett reported that the Division G2 felt CIC should supply its own truck drivers.

21 May — Chief, CICB, CIG, MIS G2, WDGS informed Army Ground Forces that the "shortcomings" of the present CIC "tabbings" were recognized and a new arrangement was under consideration.

1943

21 May — Requirement of attendance of CIC personnel at MIT, Camp Ritchie, was rescinded.

21 May — Conference between G2, ASF, and CCICB developed: G2, ASF felt that:

a. CIC should not be responsible for enforcement of SMI.
b. CIC should not be specialized in combat intelligence.
c. CIC should be with its unit a minimum of 30 days prior to overseas shipment.
d. He could not interfere with units. In spite of changes, CIC officers were not left in charge of detachments, and CIC agents were dispersed.

22 May — Chief, CIC, recommended that the Investigative Section of the Provost Marshal General's office take over loyalty checks and personnel investigations from CIC. This would reduce Service Command work loads by 50 percent.

22 May — In view of refusal to increase size of CIC from 4,797 to 7,593 officers and enlisted men, the Chief, CIC, recommended eliminating misfits and confining use of CIC personnel to CIC duties.

22 May — Chief, CIC, urged increase in grades and ratings for CIC personnel and stated, "...unless morale can be maintained it is doubtful that the Corps at its present strength can satisfactorily accomplish its mission..."

22 May — Chief, CIC, reported to Chicago School that the rumors that CIC agents in the Fifth Service Command got direct commissions was true, but that it was done without prior approval of CCIC and MIS had refused to permit their reassignment to CIC. Rumors had upset morale at the school.

25 May — G2, Southwest Pacific Area stated that the Australian Army had an excellent counterintelligence organization.

25 May — G2, AGF, stated that while CICB of EDGS desired that tactical CIC detachments function and train under command of the senior CIC officer it was realized that this was "not practicable in all cases." Reports prepared by the CIC officer should be signed by or for the G2 of each echelon.

1943

26 May — The Secretary of War wrote the Commanding General of the North African Theater that the transfer of William V. Tyng to an area where his Chinese background and language qualifications would be useful was contemplated in the near future. (In North Africa he had learned French, and he had learned Italian, and married an Italian girl before he was transferred from Italy).

27 May — Colonel L. R. Forney, Chief, CIG, MIS, wrote the Director of Intelligence, First Service Command, "Our greatest difficulty in this matter (sabotage investigations) is that we have to deal with inexperienced and uninformed intelligence personnel at posts, camps, and stations where often there is a rapid turnover of personnel."

28 May — G2, X Corps reported to Chief, CIC, that his CIC personnel had become demoralized because of lack of work, and "because they are required to live with and work in a section with men who do not have their abilities, yet outrank CIC enlisted personnel by two or three grades."

29 May — G2, Second Army stated that the Second Army had 15 CIC detachments and that there was some confusion as to the exact status and purpose of these detachments. They are said to be "assigned" when they are "attached" and the question is: "are they trained for use of the unit or using the unit to train and then go elsewhere?"

29 May — Colonel Forney informed all directors of intelligence of Service Commands, that:

a. The CIC had a strength of 4,300 with 1,200 overseas.
b. That there was no hope of an increase when CIC reached its authorized 4,900.
c. However, there are requisitions for 1900 agents overseas which have not been filled.
d. Service Commands will have to provide them without replacements.
e. G2 has been asked to relieve CIC of responsibility for loyalty checks and personnel investigations and for service and investigations of SMI -- G2 favors this as an emergency measure.

31 May — Captain G. Haig, Field Artillery, accused four CIC officers, including a Lt Col, of perjuring themselves and making false reports. He asked for an investigation.

1943

May — One hundred additional spaces procured at Officer Candidate Schools for training CIC officers.

May — Lack of promotions for agents working in ZI side-by-side with commissioned Navy agents and FBI agents receiving equivalent of officer pay, created morale problem -- "Corps of Indignant Corporals."

Summer 1943 — Third Service Command Intelligence Division initiated one week course at detachment headquarters with familiarization of various small arms and grenades, also instruction in field stripping .45 cal pistol and sub-machine gun while blindfolded.

1 Jun — Puerto Rican Department was changed to the Antilles Department to include a larger area.

2 Jun — Major General G. V. Strong, G2, informed Operating Division G3 that CIC detachments are operational and cannot be intrinsically a component of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) as desired for the CBI Theater.

2 Jun — G2, Western Defense Command, advised all his branches that 15 negro CIC agents were available for undercover assignments. They could be transferred into units but the company commander has to be taken in confidence in order to "divert" certain reports.

4 Jun — G2, Army Command Forces, told G2, Second Army at Memphis, that "the jurisdiction of these (tactical) CIC units has not really been clarified."

4 Jun — Inspection of CIC detachment and VIII Corps at Texas, under Lt Albert R. Brown, revealed intensive liaison had won goodwill for his unit.

4 Jun — The Director of Intelligence, Eighth Service Command at Dallas, Texas, wrote the Chief, CIG, that CIC detachments could not be justified in any economy program for CIC personnel because:

a. "Not sufficient work in such units." Proper CS system could handle work.

[redacted]

b. Much time and effort is spent on work "outside the jurisdiction of CIC particularly since G2's in most cases have no concept of proper use of such detachments."
c. Lack of work and wrong work hurts morale and spirit -- many are getting out of CIC.
d. The present concept from reports is, that CIC should be trained on the basis of use overseas in area or theater.
e. Identity of CIC personnel with tactical units is completely exposed to all other military personnel.

5 Jun — Commanding Officer of the CIC detachment at Accura, Gold Coast, British West Africa, informed overseas CIC agents will not be ordered back to the United States for CIC school. CIC Center recommended the use of school at Oran, North Africa.

7 Jun — Training Section activated in Office of the Chief, CIC, at Baltimore, Maryland.

8 Jun — Commanding Officer of CIC Detachment, 79th Infantry Division told he can promote a CIC agent provided that before he becomes a staff sergeant, the man must be a Special Agent and before he can be a Special Agent the War Department must approve.

8 Jun — CIC Headquarters stated its current policy was to reduce divisional CIC detachment from four to three enlisted men.

10 Jun — Total of 100 CIC Detachments were serving in the field.

10 Jun — Chief, CIC, stated that specific uses of tactical CIC units included:
a. Supervision of the Counter Subversion System.
b. Investigation of personnel of enemy alien background.
c. Surveys to educate on compliance with AR 380-5 rather than to apprehend violators.
d. Security Surveys of and sabotage protection of vital installations supplies, power, communications, motor pools, and Fire fighting equipment.
e. Conduct CIC courses at division intelligence schools.
f. Conduct complaint investigations.

10 Jun — Chief, CIC, stated tactical training given CIC should not be so extensive as to hinder their practical CIC training or to result in failure to accomplish their mission. For combat training the

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detachment CO should select the appropriate courses from the general training program of the unit to include physical and mental conditioning for performing their specialized tasks in combat.

10 Jun — World-wide survey ordered of CIC equipment and supply needs, based on actual experiences in the field.

11 Jun — CIC Detachment Commander at an African Air Base wrote, "The intelligence officers here have no conception or little knowledge of the CIC function and doctrines...the apparent universal dislike overseas for CIC...We utilize all intelligence agencies fully, and I have been extremely cautious in placing the proper type of agent to do the specific liaison work required to win full confidence and willingness to cooperate by opening their files to us."

15 Jun — Survey showed CIC units had serious lack of transportation. One jeep for every two agents in tactical units recommended.

15 Jun — Authority of Hawaiian Department and Caribbean Defense Command to select CIC Special Agents rescinded since they have selected men not sufficiently investigated nor who appear to be of the same caliber as those in the USA.

16 Jun — Chief of CIC reported that G2, AGF, did not favor attaching CIC units to divisions after formation and only a couple of months prior to overseas departure. G2, AGF, said it was easier to integrate a new unit during divisional formation periods and further there was more CIC work to be done then.

16 Jun — G2, Second Army, asked G2, Fifth Service Command, to tell him "informally and unofficially" the specific use of CIC detachments with tactical units and stated that some confusion existed in the minds of detachment commanders and G2 of units, G2, Fifth Service Command bucked request to Chief of CIC.

17 Jun — Air Transport Command issued air SOP for its Intelligence and Security Officers.

18 Jun — G2, Sixth Service Command, informed his CIC agents that the CIC was now in process of becoming one of the smallest and most select groups in the Army and that the qualifications and performance of all agents would be constantly checked with a view to new elimination of those not excellent to superior.

1943

19 Jun — Brigadier General R. L. Walsh, of the USAF, South Atlantic, protested a plan to have an Espionage Section in a CIC detachment assigned to the Transport Command, "Experience in the past has shown that there are very few agents who on attempting to operate are not discovered in short order by the Brazilian police network." It does not appear logical that when we are at war and have an ally who is helping us that we should spy on that ally.

21 Jun — Monthly roster of CIC personnel ordered from units, in place of old CIP report requirement.

22 Jun — Chief, CIC, recommended to G2, Southwest Pacific that the least capable members of the Corps be "screened out" since the corps was up to strength and that would be the only means of promotion of deserving men.

22 Jun — On this date, the first CIC Combat Detachment in SWPA began to undertake a mission against the enemy, landed with a Sixth Army Task Force on Kiriwina Island. This unit was led by Lt Thomas H. Applegate and six agents. At the same time Lt Thomas H. Major and six agents also landed with Task Force units on nearby Woodlark Island. Landings on both islands (which are located off the northeast coast of British New Guinea) were unopposed and little if any action followed.

23 Jun — Bermuda Base Command reported it required an undercover CIC replacement posing as a safety inspector with Post Engineers.

23 Jun — Commanding Officer of the CIC detachment, 38th Infantry Division, said that, in certain commands, legitimate requests for travel orders for CIC personnel have met with the issuing office's deliberate obstructionisms or the manner of cooperation has been consistent with straight interpretation of regulations or directives.

23 Jun — Director of Intelligence, Seventh Service Command, informed G2, Second Army, that it had heard that two factors had undermined the usefulness of CIC detachments in tactical units. "First, G2's have not known their use and have used detachments for other duties both ZI and overseas where some were used as combat replacements leaving vital CIC work undone. Secondly, CIC agents have lived as civilians in ZI so long it takes time for them to get back into military discipline. Further, they have had drilled into them so long

not to exceed their investigative jurisdiction that they sometimes appear Prima Donnas by hesitating to investigate such activities as the loaded dice in Company B."

24 Jun — G1, WDGS, stated it agreed that CIC should be reorganized and expanded but did not agree with G2 solution. G1 stated, that CIC activities are an essential element of command responsibilities and must operate within channels. CIC of the MID should confine itself to plans, policies, supervision, procurement of men and supplies and training and not retain administrative control.

24 Jun — G1 stated, the ratio of one officer to one enlisted man is excessive and the quota of 2000 OCS vacancies is approximately 10% of our capacity of the schools and subject to prior commitments. Additional officers should be obtained from those already commissioned.

24 Jun — G1, WDGS, recommended that CIC personnel after procurement and training by CIC be turned over to unit agencies and that using agencies requisition agents as they do other personnel.

25 Jun — The 18-man special detachment flown to Caribbean Defense Command in February 1943 returned to ZI disaffected, after the job they were selected for was taken over by another intelligence agency.

25 Jun — Chief of CIC stated, that the Basic Field Manual had been revised to read that CIC detachments were "attached" and not "assigned" to tactical units.

26 Jun — Colonel Forney informed Eighth Service Command that what the War Department had in mind was that, many CIC agents working in the metropolitan areas had come with the Corps direct from basic training and had been out of touch with the Army for many months. The attachment was "to learn how to do CIC work with the Military Establishment," and "to learn something about soldiering."

28 Jun — CIC allotments to theaters cancelled and all CIC personnel assigned to the War Department.

1943

30 Jun — CIC representative at Camp Ritchie was told by assistant adjutant that Col C. Y. Banfill was head of all intelligence training and that the G2, WDGS, had told Colonel Banfill he could move the Chicago CIC School to Ritchie if he saw fit.

30 Jun — CIC and AGF agree that efforts should be made to reduce divisional CIC detachments personnel to one officer and three enlisted men.

30 Jun — G2, 80th Division reported his CIC detachment had difficulty in obtaining necessary equipment for field duty.

30 Jun — Chief, CIC, informed Chief, MIS, that his group believed the Iceland Base Command had many more CIC personnel than needed and that much of this personnel was being used for non-CIC duties such as beach patrols, signal intelligence, PM investigations, etc. Further, that through local procurement, the caliber of men was below standard and much of this personnel should be eliminated. It was stated there were more CIC in Iceland than in remainder of ETO and more than in several other theaters combined.

June — Separate Liaison Office established between CIC and War Department at Washington, D. C., in the Pentagon. Major Lowell J. Bradford in charge.

2 Jul — Army Service Forces allocated $15,000 for language training for CIC agents.

2 Jul — Screening started of all CIC personnel of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Area, to eliminate undesirables.

3 Jul — Audit of Machine Unit Records of CIC revealed several deficiencies. It was ordered that both military specialty and main civilian occupation be shown.

4 Jul — Air mechanics training schools for CIC agents were established at Penn State, Middleton Depot and Chanute Field. Later at Ogden, Utah.

5 Jul — CIC Overseas Staging Area activated at Logan Field Air Base, Baltimore, Maryland, with Lt Col Neville K. Adkinson as Control Officer. During seven months existence, it processed 2,419 personnel.

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1943

5 Jul — G2, Third Service Command, published a course for tactical G2's to include use of Counter Intelligence Corps.

6 Jul — By seventh endorsement, Chief of CIC reported to G2 that his officers had confidentially discussed with Captain Haig, his complaint regarding four CIC officers (See 31 May 43) and that no further action was contemplated. Colonel Kibler added, however, that his decision was not intended in any way to impede the preference by Captain Haig of charges if he desired.

6 Jul — Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force Tactical Command, wrote South Atlantic Wing (See 19 June 1943) that a CIC Espionage Section was not to spy on an ally but to investigate suspected espionage at various U.S. bases. If there were indications that persons off the base were involved to turn the information over to the Brazilian Police.

7 Jul — Deficiencies noted in the first group of CIC officers processed through Baltimore Staging area included:

a. Bringing their families and private autos.
b. Enlisted personnel bringing leather luggage.
c. Some personnel not equipped for full field duty.
d. Men should be troop age and physically fit for general service.

9 Jul — All CIC units were informed that efforts to increase size of CIC had been unavailing and the Corps had reached its personnel ceiling. New policy; exacting standards; weed out undesirables.

9 Jul — Manhattan Engineering District reported that it needed 174 CIC officers and 20 enlisted men for its special project.

10 Jul — First of 10 CIC detachments took part in the invasion of Sicily.

11 Jul — First tactical unit (CIC) in the Pacific joined the 1st Cavalry Division at Brisbane, Australia.

13 Jul — Chief, CIC, commended the Director of Intelligence, Eighth Service Command for sending a properly organized CIC detachment to the new CIC staging area.

13 Jul — Chief, CIC, reported to Army Service Forces that CIC was not in a position to use special coins for identification of its agents as suggested by a member of the National Inventors Counsel.

0268

1943

13 Jul — Survey revealed CIC had 69 negro CIC agents including four lieutenants.

15 Jul — "Tabbing" of soldier's classification cards in effect from late 1941 or early 42 for CIC consideration was discontinued as it prevented transfers. Cover letter will accompany all his records.

15 Jul — Chief, CIC, called attention to G2, AGF, that CIC agents were being transferred from their detachments without prior approval of CIC Headquarters and that AGF units should be informed that this was not authorized.

16 Jul — Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Brigadier General William Bryden, ordered the IG to investigate the activities of Directors of Intelligence of Service Commands including CIC.

16 Jul — Third Service Command sent out a guide: Manual of Instruction for Tactical S2's.

17 Jul — Eleven CIC agents alone for five hours in a Sicilian town after Germans retreated, ended hysterical riots, restored order, and seized valuable papers at former German Headquarters.

17 Jul — Basic CIC allowances: Chemical, three items; Engineer, five items; Medical, one item; Ordnance, 10 items; Transportation, eight items; Quartermaster, 39 items; Signal Corps, four items; CIC specialized equipment, 92 items. Special List of Equipment and Supplies (SLOES), authorized for CIC units, was issued. Tactical CIC to requisition through Technical Services.

19 Jul — Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Parsons replaced Major Theodore J. Walker as Commandant of the CIC School, Chicago, Illinois.

19 Jul — CIC detachments furnished AG Forces on basis of priority established on basis of training and urgency of need.

19 Jul — Chief, CIB, 5th Air Force recommended:

a. Organic transportation for CIC detachments with minimum of two jeeps to a unit in a forward area.
b. That replacement CIC be selected and trained in the theater of use.

21 Jul — Chief, CIC, explained that CIC detachment furnished to Air Transport Command in Brazil was strictly counterespionage with the undercover CIC mechanics furnishing leads for the open CIC. (See 6 July 1943).

22 Jul — Chief of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Air Transport Command told CIC it was the duty of CIG and MIS to educate Theater G2's and suggested traveling officers should be used to "sell" proper procedures to G2's.

24 Jul — Western Defense Command and Fourth Army inaugurated a four-week orientation tour for new CIC officers.

24 Jul — Thirty-two CIC detachments were to be furnished AGF between 31 July and 11 November 1943 for a total of 31 officers and 111 enlisted men.

25 Jul — Allied Forces Headquarters, North Africa, issued instructions for duties of CIC agents who become Prisoners of War. One important duty was to handle escape and evasion plans.

25 Jul — Service Commands told to maintain physical fitness of CIC personnel.

27 Jul — Third Service Command and MDW both disclaim investigative jurisdiction at Vint Hill Farm Station (Army Security Agency School), Warrenton, Va.

27 Jul — G2, Fourth Service Command, complained an agent who spoke Italian fluently and who was examined and found physically fit for overseas was returned three weeks after he left by the tactical CIC Commander as not being fit nor fluent.

27 Jul — Survey of permanent needs of CIC ordered of all commands.

29 Jul — G2, Second Service Command, recommended ratio of one officer agent to each three enlisted agents to attain ONI and FBI parity.

29 Jul — Investigation revealed that complete strength of CIC was not being reported to the AG, and Chief of CIC worked on plan for getting accurate reports to Machine Records Branch.

1943

30 Jul — Western Defense Command stated it had no CIC Italian linguists, no age in grade second lieutenants, no clerks available to transfer to CIC staging area.

July — CIC Advanced Training School at Chicago, Illinois, expanded to include lessons learned in European combat.

July — CIC agents captured overlays of major enemy mine fields in Sicily.

2 Aug — Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment, Caribbean Defense Command, wrote that they had been embarrassed in dealings with other intelligence agencies including Navy, FBI, British, French and Dutch, which all employed officer agents. He further added that Navy, Dutch, and British agencies in his area held ranks equal or above colonel.

5 Aug — Commanding Officer, CIC Staging Area, reported quality of officers being processed as "medium average."

5 Aug — The CIC was asked to furnish three other negro agents for undercover use at Camp Polk, Louisiana, Third Army manuevers.

5 Aug — Chief, CIB, stated that he did not see the objection of G2, ASF, to publishing instructions to CIC tactical units taken from the 10 June 1943 Military Reports of the United Nations as this document was direct from an active theater and included lessons learned. Colonel Kibler also stated that CIC had a definite coordinated training program for all its personnel except personnel attached to AGF units.

6 Aug — CIC ordered to provide information for removal of potential subversives, including close foreign backgrounds, from sensitive spots.

8 Aug — CIC Overseas Staging Area moved to Camp Holabird, Maryland, where 2,200 CIC personnel were processed up to deactivation, 5 February 1944.

8 Aug — AGF believes it is of value to have CIC units train with divisions and corps but did not feel it a sound procedure for CIC detachments with AGF units to have direct communication with War Department G2. AGF recommended that it establish a central CIC administration

office following command channels and that 93 officers and men be assigned to this AGF unit.

8 Aug — Army Ground Forces requested 93 officers and 478 enlisted men for CIC Detachments assigned to troops in training.

9 Aug — Enlisted men attending the CIC School at Chicago, Illinois, ordered into uniform as officers had been previously.

10 Aug — Survey showed that during July, commercial companies made 100,000 routine investigations for the Provost Marshal General's Office at $3 each.

11 Aug — Army Inspector General ordered to extend his investigation of Service Command Intelligence to include investigative activities of Provost Marshal General.

12 Aug — Lieutenant Colonel Sheen transferred to ETO.

12 Aug — Four CIC agents flown out of Miami, Florida, by commercial aviation to Quarry Heights Canal Zone on undercover mission. Two of these were from the group of 18 men previously recalled from the Zone.

14 Aug — Ordnance Depot activated at Camp Holabird, Maryland.

17 Aug — Survey of CIC operations revealed that more training was needed in the use of investigative equipment.

17 Aug — European Theater of Operations issued SOP for CIC, stating that CIC personnel used for investigative purposes will be quartered and messed away from Troops. CIC on field security will be with troops.

18 Aug — CIC agents undercover at Camp Ritchie compromised by having their mail addressed to them care of the Post Intelligence Officer.

19 Aug — Selective Service requested to furnish Selective Service registration card and a notice of classification to 15 CIC agents selected for an undercover mission.

20 Aug — During 39-day Sicilian Campaign, CIC agents captured 13 radio transmitters and four radar units.

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1943

20 Aug — Chief, CIC, informed Chief, CIG, that port security had definite CIC aspects and CIC should have supervisory control and should recommend systems, but bulk of personnel should be furnished by Transportation Corps.

21 Aug — G2's of both IV and XIII Corps felt that field security should be part of the CIC mission, and that CIC should understand AMGOT.

24 Aug — Survey revealed that in 1943, to date, CIC had lost 565 men by transfer; and additional 261 men to special projects outside of T/O requirements. One hundred transfers were to OCS.

24 Aug — Office of Price Administration (OPS) agreement amended so that CIC agents could buy tires and tubes beyond ration limits.

27 Aug — The 18-man CIC detachment sent to the Caribbean Defense Command in March returned to CIC Center for interrogation.

31 Aug — More than 100 espionage agents were captured in North Africa by CIC between 8 November 1942 and August 1943.

31 Aug — Two weeks training ordered at Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, for CIC agents going overseas.

31 Aug — Chief, CIC, submitted request for 1,331 CIC officers and 5,432 men based on world-wide survey. Of 6,763 total, 2,317 were for overseas; 1,182 for Air Force, and 3,264 for the Zone of Interior.

31 Aug — Major Edward L. Ray, Chief, CIC, AF Headquarters, wrote G2, ETOUSA, that the new T/B/A for CIC was considered ludicrous; that it was obviously drawn up by someone with no knowledge of the tactical operations of the Corps. Transportation allowed virtually demobilizes CIC who must be highly mobile in teams of two regardless of size of the detachment. Furthermore, very little of the mass of other equipment is needed or desired. It is absolutely no practical merit and if not revised will practically destroy the value of CIC with tactical units.

August — At Oran, North Africa, 135 officers were at CIC Field Training School.

August — Three CIC agents inspecting various airdromes in India to determine where CIC units should be sent.

0273

1943

August — Approximately 10 new agents undergoing training and schooling at the Provisional CIC Detachment, Iceland Base Command at headquarters in Reykjavik.

1 Sep — Seventh Army G2 survey revealed that CIC of II Corps, the Provisional Corps, 1st, 3rd and 45th Infantry Divisions, and Second Armored were rated "indispensable" in the Sicilian campaign.

1 Sep — Accomplishments of CIC in the Sicilian campaign included capturing 50 espionage agents; 30 clandestine radios; discovery of maps of principal mine fields; capture of all Fascist Party records; records of enemy OB in Sicily and the Balkans; records of Centro Contra Spanaggio; code of German radar; several radar sets; and sacks of mail.

2 Sep — Air Force stated that allotments of commissioned officers as Special Agents needed in connection with aircraft investigations. Requested 344 officers and 963 enlisted men.

2 Sep — Air Force asked Chief, MIS, WDGS, for an allotment of 344 officers and 963 enlisted men. Stated that in the best interest of efficient aircraft investigation which requires close association with and interrogation of high ranking officers, allotment of commissioned personnel in the capacity of Special Agents is advisable.

3 Sep — CIC Center told Service Command that letters on CIC prospects attached to service records are no longer classified.

5 Sep — First CIC Course started at MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

6 Sep — Berlitz School courses for CIC agents established at Baltimore, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.

6 Sep — AGF Colonel from South Pacific reported that his experience with CIC demonstrated that they worked very effectively in garrison but in a tactical situation their lack of military knowledge and poor physical condition was evident.

6 Sep — General G. V. Strong, G2, on an inspection tour in ETO, cabled MIS that CIC equipment in ETO "...is making CIC an ineffective laughing stock..."

0274



1943

8 Sep — CIC Detachments with tactical units took part in the invasion of Italy.

10 Sep — Field reports indicated that the 2" barrel revolver is best for CIC work. Plans made for conversion of 4" barrels.

10 Sep — Arrangements completed for obtaining photographic supplies through the Signal Corps on a quarterly requisition basis.

14 Sep — Following investigation of ETO CIC equipment, General Strong told Colonel L. R. Forney, Chief, CIG, that "'all is forgiven' if he keeps up the good record of CIC since 3 months ago..."

15 Sep — G1 concurred in publication of TM 30-215 which included field security as a CIC mission (published 22 Sep 43).

16 Sep — G2, War Department, informed Third Service Command at Baltimore, Maryland, that its CIC would be cut from 311 to 65 officers and enlisted men after 1 October 1943.

16 Sep — Colonel L. R. Forney, assistant Executive Officer of MIS, wrote G2's, Service Command that for past nine months efforts to have size of corps increased had been unsuccessful. He stated that now demands from theaters of operations had reached a place where it had become necessary to demand the Service Commands.

16 Sep — Army Air Forces Training Command stated that its CIC detachments should contain at least 50% mechanics and/or technicians.

17 Sep — Plan to implement decision of Chief, MIS, to transfer CIC to the using agencies, forwarded to MIS.

18 Sep — Chief, CIG, MIS, informed the Director of Intelligence, ASF, that the 59 officers and the 728 enlisted men who would remain in Service Commands as CIC personnel would be considered an allotment to ASF.

20 Sep — CIC TM 30-215 published with T/O's and first overseas instructions.

20 Sep — Chief, CICB, stated he did not approve proposal to use CIC personnel as classified mail couriers since CIC personnel were urgently needed for CIC missions.

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22 Sep — Chief, CICB, stated he did not believe CIC officers could be put in an MIS promotion pool since the CIC officers allotment was fixed by the War Department.

22 Sep — Secretary of War ordered that 165 CIC officers and 1,894 enlisted men in the ZI be transferred overseas prior to 31 January 1944, leaving 59 CIC officers and 728 enlisted men in the United States, which would be considered an ASF allotment. Explained MDW detachment would be left disproportionately large because of its work directly for the War Department.

23 Sep — G2 forwarded request for authorization to have 1,331 officers and 5,432 enlisted men.

23 Sep — Army Service Forces "gladly" accepted suballotment of the ZI non-tactical CIC detachments as proposed by CIG, MIS, G2, WDGS, on 18 September 1943.

23 Sep — In a staff study, General Strong restated his claim that CIC had outgrown its 6 July 1942 authorization because its mission had been expanded to include Field Security. He asked specifically that CIC be authorized 1,513 officers and 5,909 enlisted men.

23 Sep — General Strong, G2, reported to the Chief of Staff that CIC needed an increase of officers because the low rank of its leaders hampered operations since CIC worked in small detachments. Further enlisted men of the Corps have basic officer qualifications much higher than found among the general run of students at officer candidate schools.

23 Sep — General Strong, G2, stated that the retention of highly qualified men in the CIC was essential to its efficiency and that they could be retained by affording them better opportunities for advancement than now exist.

24 Sep — Retention of limited service CIC personnel left to local commanders providing the total did not exceed 15%.

25 Sep — Leavenworth Command and General Staff School added a one-hour orientation course on CIC.

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25 Sep — Major General M. A. Reckord, Third Service Command, protested cut in his quota of CIC agents and urged that a minimum of 236 enlisted men and officers be retained and that CS net work be retained. General Reckord stated that his command was prepared to take the maximum "calculated risk" but "to weaken our counter-intelligence coverage beyond that limit would be hazardous and a greater threat to the safety of our people abroad than if we sent them no CIC at all."

28 Sep — Promotions in CIC were frozen as Corps reached the ceiling of its authorized strength.

28 Sep — Second Service Command asked to provide undercover agent who has mental and physical ability to protect himself under adverse and emergency conditions; who will be furnished a fictitious "Section VIII" Dishonorable discharge from the army and introduced into a certain group as a malcontent and dishonorably discharged soldier. The assignment is to last for some months.

28 Sep — The Secretary of War temporarily withdrew authority of all commands except theaters of operation to promote CIC enlisted personnel in order for the War Department to accomplish mass transfers.

28 Sep — Chief, CIC, recommended to AGF that before a CIC detachment was openly assigned to the Second Cavalry Division (colored) that its personnel be given orientation talks on what CIC will do for them and that it guards them not "spies" on them.

30 Sep — Roster revealed that CIC had 4,901 of its authorized 4,974 with 1,720 or 35%, overseas.

30 Sep — CIC roster revealed 480 officers and 4,121 men on duty with 2,721 Service Commands, 898 in Theaters, 288 with Ground Forces, 92 with the Air Force, 153 with Base Commands, 412 at CIC Center School and Staging Area, and 37 on the Manhattan Project.

September — CIC agents provided security for Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt during her visit to New Zealand.

September — First CIC agent, Major D. E. MacKenzie, arrived at New Delhi, India. (On 11 Nov the first detachment arrived).

1943

September	Colonel Harry F. Meyers, CAC, AGF, observer reported results of a G2 Questionnaire Specific problem of combat intelligence "Immediate clarification of combat counterintelligence or field security responsibilities and functions as distinguished from investigations and undercover mission prescribed for CIC."
1 Oct	Refusals of other tactical officers to recognize the attachment of CIC detachments to a unit led to the recommendation that such orders be issued, since in one case, the AG would not authorize requisitioning equipment, and in another CIC men were not allowed to fire on the range.
1 Oct	Title, Chief of CIC resumed. From 3 March 1943 to 30 September title was Chief of CIC Branch, CIG, MIS.
1-19 Oct	Inspection revealed that OSS had taken over the counterespionage mission in ETO and CIC relegated to field security work with tactical units and routine CE work with static units.
1-19 Oct	Consideration being given to having CIC units with airborne divisions; personnel to be obtained on a volunteer basis.
1-19 Oct	ETO experience led to recommendation of need for public relations training for CIC agents to aid in dealing with civilians.
1-19 Oct	ETO experience indicated that need for rotation of personnel would be reduced if thirty day stateside leaves were authorized periodically.
6 Oct	G1, Operations Division, recommended substantial reductions in strength of CIC recommended by G2 and, in February 43, recommended elimination of field security duties. (G2 stated field security was established as a function "in recognition of a condition already in existance.")
7 Oct	Colonel F. S. Doll, Director of Intelligence, Third Service Command, protested to AG the reduction of his CIC force from 323 to 75 persons -- letter sent in accordance with General Strong's desires.
8 Oct	Quota for the CIC Advanced Training School at Chicago, Illinois, increased to 270 men per class

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9 Oct	Major Lowell J. Bradford, CIC Liaison Officer, urged the appointment of a CIC Public Relations Officer.
10 Oct	ETO activated a CIC Training Section in England.
10 Oct	Authority to promote CIC enlisted men was withdrawn from the various Service Commands.
11 Oct	Port Security course authorized in cooperation with the Coast Guard at Baltimore Port; 725 men graduated this course.
12 Oct	G3 recommended added officers for CIC be obtained out of officer surplus. G2 objected because of training it would require, whereas CIC agents could be given commissions and do the work.
13 Oct	CIC informed AGF that its summer survey revealed Service Commands wanted 2,344 CIC personnel of which 1,970 would be enlisted.
14 Oct	Classes at CIC Overseas Staging Area increased from 150 to 600 each.
14 Oct	Operation Section, CIC, advised Western Defense Command that a "Section VIII" discharge would provide better cover than a misconduct reputation which would arouse undue publicity.
15 Oct	Army Ground Forces Adjutant General informed CIC that it was believed that the experience level of some of the CIC detachment commanders was not sufficient to delegate to them complete authority for running their detachments.
15 Oct	Chief, CIG, stated that as a result of the drastic reduction of CIC personnel in Service Commands that investigative priorities would be established.
16 Oct	Request made for authorization of one jeep for each two CIC agents assigned to a tactical unit.
16 Oct	Actual strength of CIC: 4,598 with 476 officers, 1,433 Special Agents, 2,429 agents and 260 clerks.
17 Oct	Chief of CIC stated that CIC prospects could not be obtained from any single source.

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17 Oct	Request for increase in CIC strength referred to Chief of Staff.
17 Oct	Field Security Course for CIC agents activated at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; 700 men graduated this course.
19 Oct	G2 forwarded a staff study to the Chief of Staff recommending increasing the Corps by 1,789 spaces from 4,974 to 6,763. Largest increase would be in officers from 543 to 1331. G1 and G3 recommended increases but felt they should be smaller. Both felt that officers should be procured from existing surplus and not by promotion of EM. Both felt field security duties should be eliminated.
20 Oct	Survey made of CIC by Overseas Section of SMI Branch, G2, to determine relationship. The SMI Branch reported that: CIC was essentially an administrative and training organization and does not establish policies on military information nor take any steps to determine the degree of adherence and the extent that more stringent security measures are required.
28 Oct	Inspector General's Department finished 15-week study of Intelligence Activities in Service Commands.
28 Oct	Request of the Caribbean Wing of the Air Transport Command for a unit detachment of one officer and six men refused because of CIC curtailment.
30 Oct	CIC completed arrangements for exchange lecturers with Military Government and Censorship.
30 Oct	CIC Center informed field offices that there has been no indication of a compromise of identity of undercover CIC agents by submission of confidential morning reports.
October	One week training (later changed to three days) was established for CIC agents at the Prisoner of War Branch at Fort Hunt, Va.
October	Survey showed there were 770 civilians working with CIC Detachments.
October	Inspector General report revealed that PMGO investigative personnel totaled approximately 900.
October	Signal Depot was activated at Camp Holabird, Maryland, and Ordnance Corps moved to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

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5 Nov	CIC personnel prohibited from operating in Washington, D.C., and vicinity by paragraph 2, Memo AG 320.2 PO-M-A, Subject: "Allotment to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, WDGS, for CIC Personnel."
6 Nov	Inspector General made his report on "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands" to the Deputy Chief of Staff.
8 Nov	Automotive course for CIC agents organized at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
9 Nov	CIC corporal sent from CIC Center to Western Defense Command on Special undercover mission "D" with a Section VIII discharge and a fictitious draft card classifying him a 1-C.
12 Nov	Chief CIC asked all Theater CIC commanders to inform the Center.
12 Nov	Commanding Officer's of Theater CIC detachments were as follows: North Africa, Maj E. L. Ray, Jr. FA; South Pacific, Maj Art Turner, Inf; Europe, Maj Howard Wilson, Inf; Middle East, Lt Col L. J. Query, Inf; CBI, Maj Donald E. McKenzie, MI; Southwest Pacific, Maj Albert Vreeland, MI.
13 Nov	Copies of Reports of Operation of CIC in North Africa and in Sicily and other extracts of CIC activities forwarded world-wide in Information Bulletins to various CIC detachments.
15 Nov	T/O&E for Allied Forces Headquarters, North Africa, published.
15 Nov	G2, asked MIS what steps could be taken to supply CIC personnel for theaters now that controls were being decentralized and service commands cannot be used as manpower pools.
15 Nov	G2 asked AG to allocate 81% OCS vacancies to various theaters of operation.
16 Nov	CIC Center working on rotation plans for CIC personnel overseas.
19 Nov	Bureau of Public Relations made a study of CIC publicity possibilities for increasing the efficiency of the Corps.

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22 Nov — AG requested to inform Army Air Forces that activation of CIC tactical units would be in accordance with TM 30-215 of 22 Sep 43 with grade allotments as prescribed in it.

22 Nov — G1 stated that non-combat officer appointments should be made overseas to qualified enlisted men of CIC who "because of importance of their work cannot be relieved for attendance at OCS."

22 Nov — Military Intelligence Service inspection of intelligence activities with five Corps revealed that the morale of CIC detachment commanders as well as agents is not good and the situation is all related to lack of understanding on the part of G2's. Inspecting captain recommended that a uniform training program based on the CIC overseas mission be developed. He concluded that CIC detachment commanders were doing a creditable job under rather severe conditions.

22 Nov — CIC agents assisted in providing security for President Roosevelt at the conference held at Cairo, Egypt, and Teheran.

22 Nov — CIC Agent Robert S. Whraugh "doubled" for President Roosevelt to provide additional security.

25 Nov — Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney ordered recommendations of Inspector General carried out. This provided merger of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions in Service and Defense Commands.

25 Nov — TM 30-205, Counter Subversive Instructions, was rescinded. A commanding officer "at his discretion," was given authority to organize and operate an adequate channel of communication for reports of disloyalty, disaffection and sabotage.

25 Nov — Roster showed CIC personnel totaled 4,620, with 492 officers and 4,128 men, of which 1,926 were still in Service Commands; 935 in Theaters; 224 with Air Forces; 150 with Base Commands; 378 with Ground Forces; 967 with CIC Center School and Staging Area; and 40 with Manhattan project.

25 Nov — Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, designated as a specialized CIC Center.

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28 Nov — Commanding Officer, South Pacific Area requested guidance on whether men with tropical diseases should be assigned back to the States or should stay until ordered back by the medics.

29 Nov — Revised list of special equipment and supplies for CIC was issued.

30 Nov — G2 recommendation for CIC increase in personnel returned by C/S to G3 for reconsideration with recommended increases to be on a troop basis.

2 Dec — Major General G. V. Strong recommended terminating CIC specialized training as follows:

- 8 Dec Berlitz School, New York
- 8 Jan Aviation Mechanics, Chanute Field
- 15 Jan CIC Advanced School, Chicago
- 5 Feb
  - a. Aviation Mechanic, Hill Field
  - b. Staging Area at Fort Holabird
  - c. Fort Hunt, E&E training
  - d. Fort Belvoir, Booby Trap & Demolitions
  - e. Port Security, Baltimore Coast Guard

3 Dec — G3, WDGS, reported to the Chief of Staff that work had started on a CIC T/O to be included on a troop basis.

3 Dec — AG Letter, Subject: "CS File SPX 300.7 TM 30-205," published abolishing CS system.

3 Dec — G3 asked G2, WD, to prepare a T/O for CIC on a troop basis using cellular type tables.

3 Dec — By AG Ltr, 300.7 TM 30-205 (2 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M Subject: "CS System," all letters, directive instructions or portions thereof issued by this or any other office pertaining to the operation of the CS System were rescinded. All copies of TM 30-205 to be destroyed by burning and certificates sent in. All station reports personnel records and instructions concerning the CS System will be thoroughly destroyed.

6 Dec — Chief CIC informed Air Force that CIC agents assigned to it would buy two suits of civilian clothing, but would not bring automobiles as men were not allowed to bring them to the staging area.

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7 Dec — Air Materiel Command asked for nine CIC agents but it did not need men with mechanical training. CIC Colonel Adkinson stated that might be a good way to dispose of certain men with no particular qualifications.

11 Dec — Pittsburg (Calif) Replacement Depot reported that of 13 CIC EM who arrived, six major deficiencies involving 11 out of the 13 were found, including no furloughs, no pay books, glasses needed, shots lacking, and none had fired a rifle.

12 Dec — Deputy Chief approved request of G2 for CIC agents to be retained in the ZI with Air Force units for investigation of airplane crashes and specific incidents and for security duties in connection with flight safety; also that CIC agents be allowed to train with tactical units in the ZI prior to overseas shipment and also remain assigned to the Manhattan Engineering District.

13 Dec — Commanders authorized to issue blanket orders for all CIC local monthly travel.

13 Dec — Brigadier General L. R. Groves requested that Lt Col John Lansdale, Jr., of G2 be designated CO of the Special Detachment of 176 officers and men for the Manhattan Project. General Groves further recommended plans he made for commissioning qualified CIC agents since there are not enough CIC officers available.

13 Dec — Army Service Forces Letter, Subject, "Abolition of the CS System and Destruction of TM 30-205." Letter required submission of roster of disaffected or subversive personnel under investigation.

14 Dec — War Department Circular #324 officially transferred CIC ZI functions and activities to Army Service Forces effective 1 January 1944, and transferred all personnel out of CIC except those in advanced training or on duty overseas.

14 Dec — Army Service Forces Circular #149 made supervision of all CIC investigative functions and activities the responsibility of the PMG.

14 Dec — Chief, CIC, reported that analysis of above reports indicated that CIC, with few exceptions, was to be used overseas; that G2 would have no command function over CIC.

14 Dec — Chief, CICB, recommended Supply Depot be transferred from OCIC to the MITC at Camp Ritchie.

17 Dec — Major Edward L. Ray, Jr., F.A., Chief of CIC, North Africa, submitted to Chief of CIC the following suggestions relating to CIC in Europe in the post-hostilities period:

a. It is not too early to commence planning, otherwise "CIC will flounder around."
b. With the collapse of Germany, a vast field will open up overnight--that of political intelligence.
c. Comparable agencies such as OSS, AMG, JICA, and others will actively seek the recognition of being the US's chief counterintelligence organization.
d. CIC should get a "charter" defining it as the responsible US CI agency in post war Europe.
e. CIC in the occupation era should be one organization with headquarters with the supreme American or allied headquarters and account only to CG of this command.
f. CIC in its field should be as autonomous as AMG is.
g. CIC should revert to a status of specialized civilians and end the current unsatisfactory basis of operation which prevents promotions and handicaps agents dealing with higher ranks.

18 Dec — CIC Overseas Pool activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, to replace Baltimore CIC Staging Area, which was being activated.

18 Dec — G2 gave G3 its proposed T/O&E and stated it was a modified cellular type since CIC did not break down into surveillance and technical specialists similar to Signal Corps.

20 Dec — Service Forces ordered consolidation of Intelligence and Internal Security Provision at all service commands and posts with all investigations under the supervision of the Provost Marshal General. Service commands were told every effort should be made, therefore, to reduce the number of investigative personnel now employed on loyalty investigations.

20 Dec — Office, Chief, CIC, informed that the CIC detachment at the Headquarters Air Materiel Command, has not been properly organized or administered and is injuring morale and efficiency of the men.

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24 Dec — Agreement reached that CIC would furnish special investigative equipment to PMG detachments when merger was made.

25 Dec — CIC agents in Italy arrested sixteen persons in Fascist plot.

28 Dec — AG asked to issue orders transferring 861 enlisted CIC effective 1 Jan 44 from CIC MIS WD to Service Commands.

29 Dec — CIC Middle East operations resulted in discovery and confiscation of $100,000 in gold which was being smuggled out of Egypt by airplane.

29 Dec — G2, WDGS requested that facilities be provided at the MP RTC at Fort Custer, Michigan as of 1 March 1944 for training CIC personnel for overseas shipment.

29 Dec — Chief, CIC, advised CO, CIC, South Pacific Area that conditions beyond the control of CIC made it impossible to effect the return to the US of men recuperating from tropical diseases.

29 Dec — Rumors concerning the future of CIC believed to have resulted in a large number of men receiving unsatisfactory grades at MITC at Camp Ritchie.

31 Dec — Allotments worked out for CIC agents in three departments and seven base commands.

31 Dec — G3 returned CIC T/O&E to G2 and stated that it did not feel the intent of the Deputy Chief of Staff letter had been complied with and reiterated its desire for a cellular type organization.

December — Army Ground Forces issued a training program for all CIC detachments attached to AGF preparatory to overseas shipment.

December — Fifty-man Italian CIC Unit, Sicurezza Informazione Militare (SIMCS), was placed under command of Fifth Army CIC.

December — Report revealed 26 CIC units in operation in the Southwest Pacific area.

December — CIC Detachment of XX Corps, at Camp Campbell, Kentucky, established a training record by marching 25 miles with full field packs and rifles at the rate of 4.06 miles per hour.

1944

1 Jan — CIC personnel were being transferred to four major commands--Army Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Theaters of Operations.

2 Jan — Headquarters Third Army stated its five man detachment was "inadequate" and asked that eleven more personnel be attached.

3 Jan — Headquarters Army Air Forces Materiel Command was operating nine nation-wide CIC offices with a force of 28 men and had 57 cases on hand. The commanding officer stated that he was in urgent need of more investigative equipment, more CF, and more vehicles. He also asked that CIC Headquarters stop sending mail with military rank shown.

4 Jan — Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was ordered to activate the 964th CIC Detachment as of 15 February 1944.

4 Jan — Chief, CIB, Alaska reported minimum of two years active duty required before rotation is permitted.

5 Jan — Roster revealed CIC had 437 of its authorized 483 officers.

8 Jan — A Second Lieutenant commanding an Air Force base CIC detachment wrote to ask about the "periodicity of submission of morning reports, i.e., daily or weekly." He was told to submit it daily.

8 Jan — One week preliminary CIC training school, stressing local law enforcement, was concluded at Trinidad Base.

9 Jan — First Air-Force-trained CIC arrived in Hawaii.

10 Jan — Service Commands ordered to consolidate CIC and PMG agents into a "Security Intelligence Corps."

11 Jan — Captain Edward P. Barry of CIC was awarded the Legion of Merit for CIC security work at Three-Party conference at Teheran, Iran, 26 Nov to 2 Dec 1943.

11 Jan — North African theater cabled for criminal investigators with a counterintelligence background. WD asked theater to be more explicit.

1944

13 Jan	Chief CIC asked Selective Service for thirteen draft cards (4F) for agents going on undercover work.
15 Jan	All CIC badges and credentials from men transferred to service commands and from all non-CIC personnel were ordered destroyed. All CIC badges and credentials issued will be called in for reissue to service commands.
15 Jan	CIC agent vehicle training concluded at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 400 men were trained in 2 1/2 months.
17 Jan	Air Materiel Command told it must follow provisions of TM 30-215 (see 26 Nov 42) pending revision of TM.
18 Jan	G2 revised the T/O&E as requested by G3 to provide a flexible cellular basis with new classifications to be provided for officers, special agents, agents, and clerks.
19 Jan	AG Memo 320.2, 5 Nov 43, was published prohibiting CIC from operating in Military District of Washington.
24 Jan	Specifications for MOS 9302, 301, and 405 were defined as applicable to selection of CIC personnel.
24 Jan	T/O&E 30-500 was published providing for administrative and operational teams or "cells."
26 Jan	Chief, CIC Branch reported that ETO had requested 71 officers and 402 enlisted men and that excess men and spaces given AGF on 1 Jan 44 be returned.
26 Jan	Chief, CIC asked that twelve officers and forty enlisted men be allowed duty in Washington and vicinity.
27 Jan	Staff Sergeant Buster Cole of CIC, Iceland Base Command, was awarded the Soldier's Medal for saving lives when his ship was bombed on 16 June 1943.
1 Feb	Chief CIC estimated that on revised T/O&E CIC would have a total of 4,038 on duty as of 31 Dec 44 with 2,642 overseas.

0288



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b Air Force CIC detachment operating in four-state area had no transportation of its own.

b The three Air Mechanics CIC schools were closed; in seven months, 365 Agents had been trained.

b CIC Advanced School, Chicago, Illinois, was closed; was scheduled to but did not reopen as Security and Intelligence School.

b CIC Staging Area at Camp Holabird, Maryland, was deactivated; in six months operations, 2,200 officers and men were processed.

b Major General Clayton Bissell became AC of S, G2, WDGS.

b Office of the Chief, CIC, was abolished.

b CIC Center at Baltimore, Maryland, was deactivated. European Theater had a request pending for 473 more agents at the time.

b CIC troop basis was established by G3 with 1,954 for Europe, 936 for Pacific, 208 for American Theater, and 908 reserve. Total: 4,006.

b CIC Overseas Pool was activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as an assembly point for CIC personnel.

b Aleutian Branch CIC office established at Adak, Alaska, and later sub-branches of this office were opened.

b Six officers and seven civilians, formerly with CIC Center at Baltimore, Maryland, were ordered to the Pentagon. Major G. L. Staudt became Chief of CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, G2, WDGS.

b Ten CIC officers and 101 enlisted men left Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, for China, Burma and India.

b Captain Marvin C. Goff, Jr., of CIC was awarded the Soldier's Medal for heroic action in the South Pacific on 1 November 1943.

b CIC agents working on sabotage investigations out of USAFSA at Recife, Brazil, undercover as "War Department Inspectors."

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1944

29 Feb — CIC agents with 1st Cavalry Division at Los Negros in Admiralty Islands captured many documents of value.

February — CIC Equipment and Supply Depot moved from Baltimore to Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

February — Two German saboteurs were apprehended by CIC agents near Agnone, Italy, and hidden explosives were recovered.

1 Mar — Commanding Officer, AAF CIC units, reported serious jurisdictional problem in New York area where 2nd Service Command restricted its activities.

1 Mar — CIC in combat at Los Negros Island reported "Dig in if you want to live and be prepared in advance to label captured documents."

1 Mar — Ten-month summary of 441st CIC Detachment in Australia showed 10,897 cases handled, of which 67% were personnel.

4 Mar — CIC lessons learned in Italy included the necessity for continuous liaison with all intelligence agencies and the necessity to be an expert in booby traps and mines because frequently CIC agents are the first military personnel to enter an evacuated town.

7 Mar — Survey showed fifty CIC agents fluent in Japanese would be needed during 1944 to provide a minimum of two per division.

8 Mar — CIC agents in the 88th CIC Detachment, north of Naples, captured seventeen well-trained and -equipped Nazi espionage agents.

10 Mar — Commanding Officer, CIC Air Command, reported a lowering of morale because of lack of promotions.

12 Mar — Mediterranean Forces reported Capt John L. Rubsarn, O1284581, 34th Inf Div CIC Detachment, missing in action since 2 February and that previously Sgt Anthony G. Parrard, 36513660, had died of wounds received during attack by enemy planes.

13 Mar — "Delimitations" agreement in terms of jurisdictions of six major army commands.

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1944

14 Mar	Official transfer order (AG 322, 6 Mar 44) transferring all CIC personnel assigned to MIS, War Department, to AAF, AGF, SW Pacific, Theaters of Operation, Carribbean Defense Command, Alaskan Department, and Base Commands put into effect. ASF to ship all CIC at Camp Holabird and Fort Meade to theaters.
14 Mar	CIC detachments ordered to organize provisionally under T/O&E 30-500. All communications relating to CIC ordered sent to The Adjutant General.
15 Mar	British and Americans agree on a system for classification and handling matters to be safeguarded. Top Secret, which the United States had regarded as a separate division of Secret, became a separate classification.
15 Mar	Caribbean Command authorized to transfer thirteen CIC agents back to the United States as men were not needed due to the arrival of Air Force CIC.
17 Mar	European Theater was given the authority to make direct non-combat appointments of 2nd lieutenants who had special technical skill (CIC).
18 Mar	CIC detachments authorized to take overseas with them one complete outfit of civilian clothing per agent.
28 Mar	Letter, AG OM-F-201.11, stated that authority had not been given to activate CIC detachments under T/O&E 30-500 but "30-500 (will be) used as a guide in organizing these detachments..."
28 Mar	AG stated no classification placed on morning reports or files of records of CIC personnel maintained by War Department but, "...if so desired classification may be directed by local headquarters for local files of such records maintained..."
30 Mar	Accounting procedures were published regarding overseas confidential funds.
March	Central Pacific, CIC, opened a San Francisco Branch of its Trans-Pacific Travel Control Bureau with an officer from its Honolulu office in charge.

0291

1944

March — Air Force CIC command and training separated from the ASF.

March — One-hundred CIC officers and men were released from Third Army to assist in providing security for Overlord planning.

1 Apr — Commanding Officer, Fourth Air Force CIC Detachment, reported lack of transportation was handicapping his investigations.

1 Apr — CIC training plans provided for 17 weeks basic, tactical, and technical training at PMG RTC Fort Custer, Michigan, and four weeks at Security and Intelligence School, Chicago, Illinois.

7 Apr — Headquarters CIC ASC AAF at Dayton, Ohio, in its March 1944 report stated that difficulties disclosed during the month included use of CIC agents on non-CIC duties and non-jurisdictional investigations at various bases. Also a lack of official transportation and a lack of gas ration books to operate privately owned cars.

14 Apr — CIC procurement procedures with the need based on 94 officer vacancies and 334 enlisted vacancies recommended:

1. General qualifications: ages 24-38, physically fit, loyalty clearance, US citizen and five years US residence. Specific qualifications (officers): college graduate, language fluency and military experience may be required. Specific qualifications (enlisted men): AGCT of 110, high school graduate, completion of CIC training.

2. Forced quota system for three major commands based on proportion of their ZI enlisted men strength.

14 Apr — Deputy Chief of Staff disapproved request by Chief, CIC, to allow any CIC personnel to operate in and around Washington.

20 Apr — Second Lieutenant Oscar Stradinger of CIC was awarded a Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service in Combat, 17 March to 8 April 1943 in Tunisia.

22 Apr — CIC base established at Tanah Merah Bay, Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, as site for transfer of Australian CIC base.

0292

1944

22 Apr — CIC enlisted personnel ordered not to be listed on records as "DEML" but under listings of arm or service, the word "no" would be written.

24 Apr — Commanding Officer, CIC Combat Detachment "C," 1st Cavalry Division, recommended having a boat made available for CIC use.

25 Apr — G2, WDGS, requested reconsideration of prohibition on CIC agents operating in MDW and stated that agents would not be MID men but Air Corps and Manhattan Project. Asked for twelve officers and forty enlisted men.

26 Apr — First two CIC agents qualified as parachutists with 101st Airborne Division.

April — ETO survey showed acute shortage of CIC linguists with an average of less than two per field detachment.

1 May — April report revealed 118 officers and 885 enlisted men in ETO with about 50% with tactical units.

1 May — CIC Branch, CIG, informed that War Department Office of Plans and Operations Division was not interested in the proportion of officers to enlisted men for troop basis.

9 May — Air Force CIC Headquarters reported that the comparatively low rank of CIC officers was handicapping operations because when other personnel found the agents were commanded by a 2nd Lt they knew the Agents were enlisted personnel. "This is having a disastrous effect on their mission."

9 May — I Corps, Hollandia, New Guinea, recommended CIC have an 18-foot inboard motor boat if an operation is amphibious.

9 May — G2 informed the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff that CIC personnel figures shown at a General Council meeting were highly inaccurate.

10 May — AG 123 OB-S-B-M, "Use of Military Intelligence Funds," was published listing specifically authorized expenditures.

1944

11 May	Brigadier General O. L. Nelson, AC of S, approved CIC request for Air Force and Manhattan Project agents, but number was cut to six officers and twenty men allowed in MDW area.
13 May	Second Lieutenant Bertram R. Russell, 3rd Division CIC Detachment, was awarded a Purple Heart Medal for wounds received 20 Feb 44 at Nettuno, Italy.
15 May	Statistical Branch, WDGS, stated that because of closing of CIC office, latest authenticated roster was 31 Jan 44 and it was used "...rather than having this personnel omitted from the strength of the Army."
17 May	Military District of Washington authorized by Secretary of War to have four CIC officers and 14 CIC enlisted men detailed to the District.
20 May	AG letter 420 was published relative CIC clothing allowance.
23 May	CIC instructed by WD Circular 203 that requests for supplies by overseas units must be forwarded through command channels.
24 May	AG letter 312.3 (22 May 44) OB-S-B-M, "Channels of Communication with the FBI," and AG letter 250.1 (22 May 44) OB-S-M, "CI Investigation Activities," were published. Air Force CIC made responsible for cases in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, formerly handled by MDW and Third Service Command.
26 May	War Department policy established so that CIC personnel returned to ZI will be sent to normal reassignment centers and assigned to other units.
27 May	CIC became a section instead of a branch of the MIS, G2.
30 May	Army Air Forces Headquarters report for April stated that the cost of living of CIC agents and officers in many localities was well above reimbursement for quarters and rations. Need for civilian-type government automobiles continued to exist and regulations for their use hampered operations.
30 May	CIC agents in Hollandia, New Guinea, arrested a Dutch school teacher who was working as a spy for the Japanese forces and controlling some 750 natives through six tribal chiefs.

0294

1944

May	Group of ten officers and 101 enlisted agents arrived in Bombay, India.
May	CIC personnel attended British Intelligence School in Karachi, India.
May	General Omar Bradley reported that 200 CIC agents were assigned to safeguard security of the "D-Day" invasion.
May	Two CIC agents in Iceland captured three German espionage agents and by interrogation got full data on German espionage and sabotage schools and codes used.
1 Jun	War Department Circular 216 established procurement and training program for CIC personnel and placed G2, WDGS, in charge of overseas training. This circular was rescinded before ever being acted upon.
5 Jun	Fifty CIC agents entered Rome, Italy, with the advance combat troops and represented half the security force.
6 Jun	Six CIC detachments landed at dawn on "D-Day" in Normandy, first of total of 87 units.
7 Jun	Army Air Forces Headquarters reported that during the month of May its Negro CIC agents were rushed to two air bases where Negro troops had rioted.
7 Jun	Rome CIC agents broke by interrogation members of a "stay-behind" German sabotage ring. Ten men identified, eight were in custody. Twenty hidden explosive dumps found.
7 Jun	Air Force CIC asked for the authority to have on duty in the MDW area one additional officer and eleven enlisted men as investigations had increased from eleven to 1,462 in four months.
11 Jun	G3, Southern Base Section, England, reported twenty-one CIC officers and 250 enlisted men had worked on the security of the European invasion plans.
12 Jun	CIC basic training to be held at PMG Center, Fort Custer, Michigan.

1944

17 Jun — Brigadier General R. A. Osmun, Chief, MIS, WDGS, stated procurement and training of CIC personnel had been held in abeyance, except for emergency requests, since 25 Nov 43.

20 Jun — Policy Chief, G2, requested a substitute for WD Circular 216, published 1 Jun 44.

23 Jun — Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff approved a request of ASF establishing a CIC Center including authorized training personnel as of 1 July 44.

24 Jun — NATOUSA consolidated three CIC detachments and reorganized theater units under provisions of T/O&E 30-500.

26 Jun — Army Air Forces CIC units reorganized under T/O&E 30-500. Squadron Order 57 stated, "...regardless of seniority status, officers of the section will exercise command jurisdiction only over their respective detachment or teams..." Fatigue and administrative details were prohibited.

29 Jun — G2 informed G1, WD, that there was an immediate need for ninety 2nd lieutenants for CIC and 398 vacancies for them in authorized strength. Of these, fifty-one should speak German; sixteen should speak French.

June — CIC agents in the Antilles Department, Caribbean Command, took over loyalty investigations formerly handled by PMG.

2 Jul — Observation of CIC in Italy reported--(1) Functions of CIC and AMGOT had been defined; (2) Sixty agents captured to date.

5 Jul — Urgent requests for CIC personnel overseas resulted in draft on Security Intelligence Corps personnel for the ZI to fill part of 675-officer and 390-enlisted CIC vacancies.

7 Jul — Increase of personnel for MDW given Air Force CIC by Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff who stated, "...need for great prudence in ordering investigations of enlisted personnel...Investigations should be held at a minimum, and those performed should be carried out with great thoroughness."

0296

1944

12 Jul	Reorganization ordered under T/O&E 30-500 of 150 CIC detachments in fourteen world-wide areas.
22 Jul	Largest shipment of its history made from the CIC Depot, with 113 crates sent, including 800 revolvers and 75,000 rounds of ammunition, and 138 cameras, all for ETO CIC detachments.
24 Jul	Security Branch, MIS, was dissolved and Security Branch, G2, was activated.
24 Jul	Air Force CIC units 1-12 redesignated 601-604 and 700-707 CIC Detachments.
25 Jul	The Adjutant General ordered all functions and personnel of CIC Section, Security Branch, MIS, transferred to DI, ASF, leaving only staff action on changes in allotment of CIC personnel to G2, WDGS.
26 Jul	Overseas requests for CIC personnel total 1,042 officers and 3,090 enlisted men, which would give CIC a strength of 7,446 by June 1945.
26 Jul	With the transfer of CIC Service Command personnel, CIC strength was 3,000 overseas, 485 in AGF, and 823 in AAF.
31 Jul	CIC personnel procurement ordered to be handled as required under the general Army overseas replacement system as outlined in WD Circular 317.
31 Jul	CIC Caribbean Defense Command was disbanded and five separate CIC detachments were formed.
July	CIC training school established at Brisbane, Australia, for orientation of CIC agents in the Philippine Islands.
1 Aug	All supervision and administration of CIC transferred from G2 to various using agencies; personnel of CIC Branch transferred to ASF.
2 Aug	CIC training school was activated at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

0297

1944

8 Aug — Allied Forces, Caserta, Italy, radioed War Department that Negro agents were unsuitable and should not be sent.

10 Aug — Request of Mediterranean Theater that no colored CIC agents be sent into combat divisions and the detachment with the 92nd Infantry Division pulled.

12 Aug — AG 200.2 prescribed the current regulations for issuance of badges and credentials to CIC personnel. ASF designated office of record.

15 Aug — With invasion of Southern France, CIC Pyreness Border Control was established between France and Spain.

15 Aug — At Landerman, France, near Brest, CIC agents of the 6th Armored Division were the only troops present for three days.

15 Aug — WD Circular 333 stated that all CIC matters, both command and administrative, were under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Attn: Director of Intelligence.

19 Aug — Director of Intelligence, ASF, was responsible for all investigations except those specifically under the PMG which were supervised by the Deputy Chief of Staff, ASF, for Service Commands.

20 Aug — CIC at HQ USAF South Atlantic at Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil, reported that data on Lucia Montez, Argentine singer who associated only with American Army and Navy officers, had been forwarded.

21 Aug — Revised CIC training program included twelve weeks of language training--the largest single block of instruction.

22 Aug — First group of thirty CIC students reported to Camp Ritchie, Maryland, for eight weeks general intelligence course.

24 Aug — CIC agents entered Paris, France, with advance combat troops.

25 Aug — Major General Archer L. Lerch, PMG, informed the DCS that requests for CIC overseas had increased from 400 in December 1943 to 1100 in July 1944 and to 2300 in August 1944.

1944

29 Aug — Letter, AG 420-OB-S-BM, prescribed "Civilian Clothing for CIC Personnel" to be worn whenever necessary for their duties. Initial allowance authorized at $125 and maintenance at $144 per year.

August — Twelfth Army Group CIC became operational in Europe.

7 Sep — War Department Memo 350-44 prescribed CIC training procedures and designated the MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, for CIC basic training.

7 Sep — Vital importance of an effective travel control system reported by 307th CIC Detachment, Seventh Army, in France.

9 Sep — Agents of the 441st CIC Detachment, searching Japanese caves and bunkers for papers, found use of white phosphorous grenades destroyed papers.

11 Sep — Allied troops crossed boundary into Germany.

15 Sep — First CIC agents crossed the border into Germany near Aachen.

19 Sep — War Department Circular 379 rescinded WD Circular 216 (21 Jun 44) and established a new CIC procurement system to overcome major deficiencies.

21 Sep — Chief, CIC Section, Domestic and CI Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, ordered sixteen officers just starting at the Security Intelligence School at Chicago reassigned since they were not considered qualified for CIC assignment.

27 Sep — Overseas commands ordered to report any personnel with CIC experience not currently in CIC.

29 Sep — All ZI commands ordered to report to CIC all former CIC officers to assist CIC in filling emergency requisitions for overseas. Seventeen were secured.

29 Sep — Immediate action ordered of Air, Ground, and Service Forces to procure 110 officers and 333 enlisted men for CIC duty with languages as follows: French, 51; German, 33; Filipino, 33; Japanese, 21; Chinese, 12; Malayan, 9; and Dutch, 6.

0299

1944

30 Sep — CIC Monthly Situation Report discontinued and a monthly administrative and a monthly information report required.

30 Sep — Army Service Forces asked theater commanders for their approval of a plan whereby each selected his most qualified personnel and had them trained in the ZI in CIC work.

30 Sep — Fourth Air Force CIC Detachment reported that CI divisions would be eliminated and CIC would perform all types of investigations on bases.

September — CIC obtained information on Fritz Wiedeman, who was in Tiensien, China.

1 Oct — Survey showed that overseas theaters wanted 946 more CIC officers and 1,442 enlisted men, but only thirty-one officers and 133 enlisted men were currently being trained.

4 Oct — Commanding Officer, 100th CIC Detachment, reported that CIC agents should be given four to five months combat training before being sent overseas.

5 Oct — CIC Section, ASF, reported it had made provision for six CIC teams totaling forty-eight officers and 124 enlisted to fill an emergency request from the POA (Pacific Ocean Areas).

9 Oct — Commanding Officer of 603rd CIC Detachment reported no difficulties during the month of September 1944 except "...those normally encountered in connection with the reorganization of a major headquarters on the Three Director System."

9 Oct — Commanding Officer, First Air Force, Mitchell Field, New York, reported that "...the effectiveness of any intelligence or investigative section or agency is curtailed when it is responsible to any echelon other than the commander or head of the organization."

9 Oct — War Department 380-44 issued listing monthly reports required of CIC detachments, both administrative and operational.

10 Oct — Army Service Forces reported to G2 that commissioned and enlisted personnel were urgently needed to be assigned to CIC for overseas duty.

1944

12 Oct — Eighth Service Command reported it had twenty-five former CIC officer and five former CIC enlisted men in its area. Of these, four were considered "top key" personnel and unavailable for assignment.

13 Oct — CIC agents with Sixth Armored Division, Brest, France, in two months apprehended three enemy agents, thirty-three "black list" personnel, interned the security risks, and worked with OSS in obtaining CI information

13 Oct — CIC procurement quotas were assigned to the three major commands on a percentage based on their troop strength as follows: Service Forces, 27.8%; Ground Forces, 38.8%; and Air Forces, 33.4%.

14 Oct — Judge Advocate General reported he had sixty-nine former CIC officers working for him but because of the acute need for JA's they were not available for retransfer to CIC.

20 Oct — Seventy CIC agents landed at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on "A-Day."

20 Oct — SHAEF CIC report stated that agents had discovered thirteen German "sabotage" dumps hidden in sections of evacuated France.

22 Oct — CIC agents in Leyte invasion captured three high officials of the Japanese puppet government.

23 Oct — AG letter authorized reorganization and activation of additional CIC units to meet growing demand in ETO; 806 additional CIC authorized for ETO.

25 Oct — CIC responsibilities in Hawaii increased as martial law, imposed on 7 Dec 41, was terminated.

26 Oct — Commandant MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, asked that immediate air travel and temporary duty be obtained for CIC officers as instructors for the various major commands. General Banfill stated that experience had confirmed the value of enhancing instruction, authenticity, and receptivity of students.

30 Oct — SOP for CIC operation in Germany was issued by V Corps.

0301

1944

31 Oct	CIC School at villa "Palmarosa" at Brisbane, Australia, was closed. Special CIC school was to orient twenty newly assigned WAC personnel.
October	CIC agents in 441st CIC Detachment had given security talks to nearly 100,000 troops in past five months.
3 Nov	Commanding Officer, 437th CIC Detachment on Espiritu Santo Island recommended more training in port security and security measures in newly occupied territory.
4 Nov	General Eisenhower informed War Department that CIC personnel were "...urgently needed in the ETO." ZI basic training believed sufficient as "...best training is actual experience in the field working with CIC teams now in operational units...gives needed assistance to overtaxed CIC personnel presently serving with tactical units."
4 Nov	First CIC training quotas asked under Circular 379--Air Force asked for 209, Ground Forces for 207, Service Forces for 49.
11 Nov	Special List of Equipment for CIC Southwest Pacific issued. Submachine guns abandoned for carbine and bayonet; 3/4 ton truck and two types of boats added.
12 Nov	War Department G2 stated he would like to know current strength of CIC and OCS vacancies available.
13 Nov	CIC TM 30-215 was rescinded and replaced by AG letter 322. G2, WDGS, established CIC policies, but CG, ASF (Director of Intelligence) supervised administration and operation of CIC. Overseas responsibilities and procedures were outlined.
13 Nov	AG stated that CIC weapons firing would be conducted under provisions of AR 775-10.
13 Nov	Secretary of War authorized the initial recruiting of CIC men into the Regular Army.
15 Nov	Deputy Director of Intelligence, ASF, reported to an overseas commander that the Security Intelligence School at Chicago had been moved to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and was no longer utilized for CIC.

0302

1944

21 Nov — War Department asked all overseas commanders for their views on need for Negro CIC agents.

23 Nov — Major General W. G. Livesay commended the work of the 91st CIC Detachment as the division faced the Gothic Line in Italy.

24 Nov — VII Corps under Lt Gen J. Lawton Collins issued SOP for CIC units operating in occupied Germany. G2, VII Corps in Germany stated: "The role of CIC looms increasingly more significant and with intelligent readjustment its contribution to the occupying forces in Germany can exceed any past achievement.

25 Nov — Forty-four CIC officer students from MITC, Camp Ritchie, concluded a two-day orientation tour of Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation.

29 Nov — CIC Special List of Equipment and Supplies (SLOES) revised on basis of combat reports.

30 Nov — Army Service Forces intelligence chain of command: Director of Intelligence to Domestic and Counter Intelligence Branch to CIC Section.

November — First classes at CIC school established at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea.

1 Dec — CIC changed from a section to a separate branch of Director of Intelligence, ASF.

1 Dec — Alaskan Department said it had no need for Negro CIC agents.

4 Dec — ETO Com Z informed WD it not only did not want Negro CIC agents but would trade six colored for six white agents.

4 Dec — Chief CIC Branch, ASF, reported that there were sufficient CIC officers in training to fill requirements from the theaters. On 6 December Staudt added, "It is not anticipated a quota for procurement of officers will be assigned AGF in December."

5 Dec — Field experience of the 100th CIC Detachment in France led to recommendation that all Agents be linguists and also given comprehensive area training.

0303

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1944

5 Dec — USAF South America reported it had no need for Negro CIC agents.

6 Dec — Lieutenant General S. M. Patch, Seventh Army, commended five "Dragoon" CIC detachments as units advanced on the Rhine at Strasbourg.

7 Dec — ETO detailed several CIC officers to the United States to assist in training CIC replacements.

8 Dec — Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command reported that its two Negro agents were sufficient for its needs.

8 Dec — Twelfth Army Group circulated CIC SOP to all commands as general attack to the Rhine started.

9 Dec — Persian Gulf Command stated it had no need for Negro CIC agents.

9 Dec — CIC Caribbean Defense Command reported it had screened all its theater personnel and investigated CIC prospects. It stated that it had thus built up a reserve and was ready to start a rotation plan. Five agents would be sent back to the USA and replaced by local trainees.

9 Dec — South Pacific Base Area Command reported it did not need any Negro CIC agents and that it felt they were really needed as operational teams with a Negro tactical command.

9 Dec — Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Areas reported that Negro CIC agents would not be desirable.

9 Dec — Plans made whereby CIC personnel returned from overseas would be exchanged for overseas qualified SIC personnel in Service Commands.

11 Dec — Headquarters Tenth Army stated it did not need Negro CIC agents unless they could read, speak, and write Japanese.

12 Dec — Headquarters MTOUSA reported use of Negro CIC agents not practical in North Africa and Italy particularly because of local race prejudice.

1944

13 Dec	Middle East Command stated it had no need for Negro CIC agents and that in several areas normal sources would not be open to colored agents.
13 Dec	Caribbean Defense Command reported that locally-procured Negro agents were invaluable.
13 Dec	Caribbean Defense Command stated that because of distinctive manners of speech it did not require any American Negro agents; it planned to procure two more locally to supplement the three highly successful Negro agents it now had.
15 Dec	Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark stated: "The CIC has done a great job--outstanding...It has been a great help to the Fifth Army."
16 Dec	American Magazine for January 1945 came out with the first national publicity on CIC, called "G-Men in Khaki."
23 Dec	Eastern Defense Command reported that its Iceland, Newfoundland, and Bermuda Bases had no need for Negro CIC agents. APO 100 (AF) felt that they might be used in the ZI.
23 Dec	Chief, CIC, in European Theater, stressed urgent need for German linguists in ETO.
31 Dec	Survey showed 4,621 ships checked by CIC panels during 1944 in the Far East Command.
31 Dec	Survey revealed that out of 7,800 aircraft accidents reported, 4,572 were of intelligence interest.

1945

1 Jan Director of Intelligence, ASF, stated that it was anticipated that quotas for CIC personnel to the ASF and Service Commands would decline to such an extent that an adjustment of (such) quotas will be impractical.

3 Jan G2, WDGS, recommended direct appointment of twelve EMs of CIC Detachment, Air Transport Command, AAF, because, while they had served much time overseas, their home was officially Washington, D.C., so its members were not eligible for direct appointments, combat or non-combat, as currently authorized.

4 Jan G1 recommended to G2 that G2 recommend non-combat appointments of CIC agents to officers.

4 Jan Chief, CICB, stated there were no special directives concerning CIC personnel who were returned from overseas.

7 Jan Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, did not concur on CIC recommendation to include German language training for agents scheduled for ETO.

9 Jan Thirty CIC detachments took part in the invasion of Luzon in the Philippine Islands.

10 Jan Unit training to be given six CIC detachments activated at MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

12 Jan Special List of Equipment and Supplies was published for CIC units of the XVIII Corps Airborne.

15 Jan China Theater Hq, CIC Detachment authorized in addition to three regular CIC detachments, 411th, 412th and 413th.

16 Jan Lieutenant General Patch awarded the bronze star medal to Sgt W.F. Chamberlain for meritorious service 3 to 13 Oct 44; to 2nd Lt W.W.French for the same period and Major A.L.McDuff for the period August - November 1944.

23 Jan Specification Serial Nos. ordered entered on records of all CIC personnel.

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1945

28 Jan — CIC German instruction terminated at University of Pennsylvania.

February — A "Special Agent South West Pacific CIC School" established in Queson City, Philippine Islands, under direction of Brig Gen E. R. Thorpe and Lt Col Galloway.

1 Feb — Caribbean Defense Command, Greenland, Estern, Newfoundland, Pacific Ocean Areas, ETO needed no personnel up to 30 June.

1 Feb — G2 recommended assignment of a CIC detachment to the Chief of Transportation for Port Security; approved for 40 officers and 117 enlisted men.

2 Feb — United States Armed Forces Middle East stated its 22 CIC personnel due for rotation. Iceland needed 6, Alaska 3 and Italy 47.

3 Feb — Director of Intelligence, ASF, approved a four week German course for ETO-bound CIC agents at the University of Pennsylvania at $80 each for instruction, housing, mess and medical service; 91 students sent.

3 Feb — CIC units entered Manila, P.I., with combat troops.

10 Feb — Army Air Forces stated it would not require any ASF CIC personnel in the period 1 Jan to 30 June 1945.

13 Feb — The 703rd CIC Det (AAF) reported that, acting on information from OSS Calcutta, Chinese Intelligence was concentrating on the XX Bomber Command. It had screened all 150 Chinese civilians employed at the base and closed all non-service connected restaurants of the area.

26 Feb — Chief, CIC Branch, ID, ASF, stated Intelligence Division did not have on hand any cases where CIC had investigated treason.

27 Feb — Staff study forwarded on post-war investigation of aircraft accidents. Stated no war-time evidence of organized enemy sabotage; CIC had the only trained and available personnel; CIC had handled approximately 1,250 separate investigations per month; safety cases had

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totaled about 90% of AAF CIC work; sabotage was always possible until proven otherwise. Recommended the CIC set up be continued in post-war era.

1 Mar — Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, instituted Japanese language course for CIC students.

3 Mar — War Department Memo 600-45 ordered agent credentials discontinued and authorized special agent credential issued to all CIC agents.

15 Mar — CIC was short 992 persons of its authorized 6,223 strength; of its authorized 1,481 officers it had only 923 or a deficit of 558.

15 Mar — CIC in Europe given 47 German speaking agents to be trained in the USA unless urgently needed.

21 Mar — The 91 CIC agents graduated from the German course at University of Pennsylvania and were flown to Germany by air transport.

24 Mar — Colonel Kibler, Executive Officer, ID, ASF, reported Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, not complying with WD Memo 350-44 by not separating CIC training and by curtailment of investigative and security training.

27 Mar — Analysis in ETO of the newly arrived 91 agents revealed an inability to make quick judgments; lack of "low level" knowledge of the German way of life; and lack of investigative techniques.

29 Mar — Requisitions revealed 607 CIC officers and enlisted men needed for Pacific, of which 96 were needed for CBI.

29 Mar — Director of Intelligence established quotas for assignment of 50 men for AAF, AGF and ASF for CIC training.

March — CIC Pyrenees Border Control Group shifted from border of Spain to French-Swiss Border.

CONFIDENTIAL

1945

1 Apr	CIC units landed at Okinawa; last advance landing of World War II, three agents were killed.
2 Apr	AG-400 authorized special CIC equipment for the 405th and 416th CIC Detachments.
5 Apr	Army Service Forces outlined the procedure for CIC redeployment training slanted toward Pacific action.
12 Apr	President Franklin D. Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia.
16 Apr	Army Ground Forces told CIC detachments attached to units redeployed through the United States will revert to CIC control.
26 Apr	Transportation Corps CIC Detachment established with 157 men under a Lt Col.
April	CIC French-Swiss Border Control Group transferred to 6th Army Group, Heidelberg, and subsequently disbanded after VE Day.
April	Central-Pacific CIC established its second USA branch of Trans Pacific Travel Control Bureau at Seattle, Washington.
4 May	Agents of 36th Division in Germany arrested Dr. Hans Frank, notorious Nazi governor of Poland.
7 May	Major General C.H. Danielson, Seventh Service Command, requested that SIC and CIC agents be authorized to administer oaths.
7 May	Germany surrendered and CIC started preparation of its European occupation duties.
9 May	Agents of 103rd CIC Detachment at Innsbruck, Austria, discovered founder of the Austrian SS disguised as a major.
10 May	Survey revealed 1,281 CIC officers and enlisted men had graduated from classes held at MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.
10 May	Army Service Forces-Army Ground Forces agreement reached, that CIC detachments will return to AGF after redeployment training.

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1945

10 May — To consolidate CIC units for occupation duty, the 970th CIC Group was activated in Germany.

13 May — Agents of 206th CIC at Durlach, Allgau, Germany, arrested Douglas Chandler, German Radio's "Paul Revere". Chandler, a Chicago born journalist, who had instituted the German Lord Haw Haw broadcasts, was turned over to the FBI.

15 May — First Section of the 430th CIC Detachment arrived in Austria at Innsbruck via the Brenner Pass.

16 May — Survey showed 294 officers and 929 enlisted men trained for using agencies during previous seven months.

18 May — Redeployment staff study submitted stating CIC would need an additional 1,065 men, including a training group of 788 men. Asked that Office, Chief, CIC, and a Class IV Center be re-established.

18 May — Staff study defined four phases of CIC: I, Dec 40 to May 43, procurement and training for ZI; II, May 43 to Feb 44, 3,000 men to tactical units and T/Os; III, Feb 44 to May 45, training for using agencies; IV, redeployment.

19 May — Agents of 80th CIC at Alt Aussee, Germany, arrested British renegade, Norman Ballie Stewart.

21 May — Summary on staff study to G2 stated present setup "not adequate" and additional 60 officers and men will be needed to handle CIC training.

23 May — G2 comment on staff study sent to Chief of Staff, stated increase would make no change in CIC operations ZI and no language instruction would be given until Theater Commanders expressed their opinions on the necessity.

28 May — Army Service Forces sent Army Ground Forces a Pacific Preparation Training Program for CIC units at reassignment centers; included vehicle, weapon, physical and on-the-job training; and continued study of area, language, and investigative techniques.

May — CIC Detachments (461st, 462, 464th, 465th) in Iceland awarded Meritorious Service Unit Award.

May — Ritter von Greim, Hermann Goering's successor as Chief of the Luftwaffe, commits suicide in a Kitzbuhel, Austria, hospital, while a prisoner of 42nd CIC. 42nd CIC disappointed.

1 Jun — Conclusions of commander after four years with CIC in the Caribbean Defense Command included:

a. Strength based on area and installations; not troops.
b. Officers in a higher ratio to enlisted men.
c. Practical experience can surpass college education.
d. Foreign background ban injurious to procurement.
e. Technicians were always in short supply.
f. Typists should be in ratio of one to each four agents.
g. Potential subversives are more easily identified prior to outbreak of hostilities.

2 Jun — Ground Forces recommend that not less than 607 officers and men be procured and trained for CIC duty in the Pacific to take care of redeployment.

2 Jun — AG stated it took an average of 3½ months to complete the top priority investigation and only 15% of civilians going overseas are investigated prior to departure.

4 Jun — Army published procedures for "Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel."

5 Jun — Director of Intelligence, ASF, specified as the controlling officer of all investigations concerning personnel being considered for the CIC.

5 Jun — 405th CIC Detachment, CBI, reported it staged a "Security Week" from 11 to 16 December 1944, at New Delhi, India, and that the week paid dividends.

11 Jun — G2 reported that the CG, SWPAC, had requested more than 1,000 Japanese-speaking personnel.

19 Jun — Intelligence Division, ASF, recommended a revision of T/O&E 30-500 to provide for commissioning of CIC agents as second lieutenants since all the war experiences indicated the necessity for commissioned status. Col.

0311

Frederich O. Sharp, Deputy Director of Intelligence, stated that the subterfuges employed by CIC investigators to accomplish their mission had caused administrative difficulties and embarrassment to the Army. He also stated CIC agent standards were officer standards and that ONI and FBI had officer standards.

23 Jun — Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff told by Intelligence Director, ASF, that the establishment of an administrative supply and training group was not a permanent thing and that it would, "...pass out of the picture, with minor exceptions, when the last increment for the Pacific is processed..."

23 Jun — Deputy Chief of Staff authorized a CIC Center at an installation now operating and outside the Washington, D.C., area. Also authorized training carried on outside of MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

25 Jun — By WD order Ag 322 (21 Jun 45) OB.I-GNGCT-M, the Commander-in-Chief of US Forces, Pacific, was ordered to disband 54 tactical CIC detachments and reorganize the 441st CIC Detachment with 193 officers and 672 men.

25 Jun — Selective Service asked CIC to review all its requests for certificates and classification cards and return any unneeded documents.

26 Jun — Army Service Forces asked space for CIC at Fort Belvoir, Va., for 1,000 officers and enlisted men, with a ratio of one officer for each three enlisted men.

27 Jun — Major Edwin Bennett was named Chief of the CIC Branch of the Director of Intelligence, ASF.

27 Jun — Army Service Forces personnel asked for allocation of grade on one colonel, five lieutenant colonels, eight majors, twenty-five company grade officers, and thirty-one non-commissioned officers to operate CIC Center.

30 Jun — Survey of CIC requirements revealed that shipment scheduled for the Pacific for July and August would total 87 officers and 319 men with the bulk of this requirement, 73 officers and 268 men, being redeployed from ETO.

1945

30 Jun	Survey showed CIC had 1,423 in its 970th CIC Detachment in Europe plus 16 officers and 40 EM's in eight division CIC detachments.
June	General von Oberg, "The Butcher of Paris," together with secretary (read-mistress) plucked from an Alpine peak at Kitzbuhel, Austria, by 42nd CIC Det. (Court martial trial of Oberg recently featured in Life Magazine).
June	Belma Imredy, former Prime Minister of Nazi-satellitized Hungary, apprehended near Leogang, Austria, by 42nd CIC Det. (Note: In 1946 he was photographed having his legs pulled in Hungary. This is a unique Hungarian method of severing the spine at the neck).
4 Jul	Eight AAF CIC detachments reorganized and personnel to be furnished as fillers for the 702d.
4 Jul	702d CIC Det (AAF) transferred without personnel and equipment to European Theater. Its authorized strength of 76 officers and 199 EMs to be filled by requisition on Commanding General, AAF.
9 Jul	Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, completed preparations for a two-week redeployment course for CIC agents.
12 Jul	Army Service Forces Circular #268 authorized the establishment of a CIC Center at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as a Class IV activity.
12 Jul	Second CIC quota assissed AAF, AGE, and ASF calling for 52 officers and 357 enlisted men to be furnished for CIC training.
13 Jul	Colonel H. R. Kibler, GSC, resumed the position of Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.
13 Jul	Emergency requisition of 52 officers for CIC duty was approved.
14 Jul	970th CIC in Germany moved to Frankfurt from Wiesbaden when US Forces European Theater (USFET) was activated.

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1945

15 Jul — CIC Training Group of 60 officers and men was activated at CIC Center with personnel obtained from existing detachment; personnel to be re-absorbed into future Pacific units.

15 Jul — From the crossing of the Rhine in mid-March, to date, CIC agents had arrested 35,000 of 54,000 on the automatic arrest list.

15 Jul — Army Service Forces CIC detachment under D/I. ASF established to function at Ft. G.G.Meade, Maryland, under command of the Chief CIC.

16 Jul — 441st increased by 18 officers and 56 men as 433rd CIC Detachment is disbanded.

17 Jul — CIC assisted in providing security for President Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference in Germany.

18 Jul — First large shipment of enlisted CIC personnel to new CIC Center, Ft Meade, Maryland, per paragraph 20, SO 171, WD MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, dated 18 Jul 45.

19 Jul — Director of Intelligence estimated that CIC Center could handle the 443 CIC personnel ready for Pacific shipment in October.

20 Jul — Provisions of letter of 8 Jun 1943, prohibiting the assignment of personnel with close foreign backgrounds to the Counter Intelligence Corps, were rescinded.

21 Jul — Director of Intelligence, ASF requested that two staff cars be assigned for use by the CIC Center at Fort Meade.

22 Jul — Allied Forces, Pacific, requested 110 CIC detachments totaling 1,379 officers and men.

28 Jul — Arrangements were completed for transfer of the CIC Depot from MITC, Camp Ritchie, to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

28 Jul — Camp Ritchie ordered to start necessary procedures to transfer CIC depot to Fort Meade.

28 Jul — Experience in the Pacific resulted in a request of G2 to have T/O&E 30-500 amended to eliminate requirement for an administrative as well as

an operational team in division detachments.

30 Jul — G2 requested G1 to procure 209 officers and 900 enlisted men between 15 Aug and 1 Sep for CIC training.

30 Jul — Director of Intelligence informed G1 that the increase in the Pacific troop basis called for an increase of 2,582 in CIC requirements of which 1,109 would have to be requisitioned from the three major commands during August and September.

31 Jul — CIC authorized a strength of 5,719 with 1,359 officers and 4,360 enlisted men.

31 Jul — Quartermaster General urged that Para 57 of ASF Cir 265 dated 11 Jul 45 which placed intelligence and counter intelligence of Class IV installations under Service Commands be deleted. Letter to G2 cited the technical services problems.

31 Jul — Chief, Chemical Warfare, requested the technical services retain control of its intelligence and CI activities.

July — CIC tactical missions in India and Burma were completed and personnel were returned to China.

July — Unit of the 430th CIC Detachment reached Vienna, Austria, and established office there.

1 Aug — Special class of eighty Nisei men for CIC duty was organized at MITC, Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

1 Aug — Chief, Signal Officer, asked for clarification of conflicting directives on responsibility.

3 Aug — Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service formed four detachments in CBI with base detachment at Calcutta.

3 Aug — Director of Intelligence, ASF asked that ASF Cir 265, Para 57, be deleted so that intelligence and counter intelligence responsibilities at Class IV installations remain in command channels of the technical services. D/I stated, since technical services took over under Cir 324 on 14 Dec 43, there has not been one instance of confusion, friction, or overlapping.

[redacted]

1945

4 Aug	Investigative equipment ordered included in direct shipment of fourteen, CIC teams from ETO to the Pacific reporting to the 441st at Manila.
7 Aug	Chief, CIC, asked that CIC personnel with the Transportation Corps detachment and at the CIC Center be exempted from overseas service requirements.
8 Aug	Chief, CIC Forces Far East (USAFFE), requested shipment of CIC agents be continued even if Japan surrendered.
9 Aug	Plans made for three day Engineer and three day POW training courses for group of 36 CIC students at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
9 Aug	Army Air Force Letter published on "Organization, Administration, and Operations of CIC,AAF."
10 Aug	One hundred and ten CIC detachments were activated for training and deployment overseas as requests poured in for agents.
11 Aug	To meet emergency requisitions from the Pacific, CIC Center requested 30 officers and men from AAF CIC.
11 Aug	Colonel Forney, G2, stated that Japanese having dual citizenship were eligible for the Corps if otherwise qualified and suitable.
13 Aug	Approximately 56 personnel for four CIC detachments ordered supplied from Hawaii as CIC Center could not supply the required Japanese-speaking personnel.
14 Aug	Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland, ordered to convert to post-war training and to make analysis of World War II combat intelligence reports as a basis for future training.
14 Aug	CIC recommended curtailing its training program to eight weeks, fly back personnel from ETO, and procure additional personnel from Air Force and Service Commands.
14 Aug	Pacific reserve eliminated and 608 men and officers ordered from three major commands.

[redacted]

14 Aug — Mediterranean Theater of Operations disbanded twelve CIC units and reorganized the 428th CIC Detachment with 295 men and the 430th CIC Detachment with 62 men.

14 Aug — Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves commended CIC for its security work with the Manhattan Project. He stated: "...the manner in which they (CIC) carried out the task will survive to the lasting credit of that organization..."

15 Aug — CICB, G2, stated that the identity and mission of an individual would not be compromised to any appreciable degree by use of the symbol "CIC" and the designation of the word "Military" on transportation requests.

17 Aug — War Department stopped direct shipment of CIC detachments to the Pacific. No replacements available for those whose 74 points bar them for further overseas shipment.

18 Aug — Service Command Security Intelligence Corps was transferred from jurisdiction of PMG, ASF, to Director of Intelligence, ASF.

20 Aug — CIC Pacific radioed War Department that because of the occupation of Japan, CIC personnel were urgently needed.

20 Aug — Colonel E. W. Grutin, Chief, Special Investigative Sub-Section at Hq (USFET), office of AC of S, G2, wrote to D/I, ASF, that two of his officers had interrogated six prominent German generals including Heinz Guderian, tank expert, and Dr. Scheidt, Hitler"s private historian.

22 Aug — Major General Daniel Noce, Director, P&O, ASF, designated the CIC Center as an agency to issue movement orders for overseas detachments.

22 Aug — CIC Center informed that upon deactivation of a detachment, personnel become casuals and must be given a six months ZI assignment prior to further overseas duty.

23 Aug — CIC Center's request for authority to issue duty orders was disapproved. Post Commanders issued orders for installations and were responsible for all common administrative and service functions.

0317

23 Aug — Emergency requisitions were approved for 114 additional officers for CIC duty.

23 Aug — War Department OPD informed CIC Pacific that since the Jap's surrender, requirements for CIC personnel have increased and recruiting should be continued.

23 Aug — The Chief of Staff directed that fourteen CIC detachments returning from Europe be given ten days at home and then assembled at a West Coast POE.

26 Aug — CIC personnel logistically attached to elements of the 43rd Division landed in Yokohama and formed the 35th (?) Area CIC Detachment with Headquarters in Matsumoto, Nagano.

28 Aug — Twenty-three men studying Chinese at Yale made available for CIC consideration.

28 Aug — Strength of the 441st CIC increased to 241 officers and 795 EMs as 963d, 964th, and 965th Detachments are inactivated.

31 Aug — Occupation SOP for CIC administration in Italy was issued to the 428th CIC Detachment at Caserta, Italy.

1 Sep — Redeployment training at CIC Center included one hour orientation on Korea "...in case CIC should be sent there..."

2 Sep — 80th Metropolitan CIC Unit landed at Yokohama, Japan

2 Sep — Japanese surrendered and 441st CIC Detachment at Manila, P.I., prepared to move to Tokyo, Japan.

SECRET

0318

[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE AXIOM

"...Future attack upon the United States may well be without warning except what may be obtained from an active national intelligence agency..."

--General H.H. Arnold

[redacted]

POST WAR ERA

3 Sep Japanese occupation of Korea, since 1904, was ended and 971st CIC Detachment was established in Korea.

3 Sep CIC needs listed at 390 officers and 1,383 EMs.

4 Sep Air transportation to Tokyo for four CIC Russian linguists requested by 441st.

6 Sep Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Caribbean Command, added his conclusions after 2½ years of working with CIC, that Corps should be on a permanent basis and for its officers:

a. Mastery of the English language required.
b. Two years of college not enough.
c. Training as "line" officers needed.
d. Leadership qualities vital.
e. Real language fluency necessary.
f. Investigative experience required.
g. Must know Army Administration and Finance.
h. Must have ability to instruct.

6 Sep CICB - G2 estimated that by 1 Jul 46, it could operate with three military and three civilian employees compared to current five each, a forty percent cut.

6 Sep Chief, CIC, stated that losses of personnel had resulted in a shortage of 1,000 CIC personnel requested for the Pacific. WD OPS Division inferred that standards cannot be waived nor training reduced below 13 weeks if effective personnel is desired. A new source needed.

7 Sep Director of Intelligence, ASF, had to write a letter to CG, Third Service Command, to get two trucks for the CIC Center.

7 Sep CIC detachments for redeployed units remaining in the ZI reduced to two officers and five men as point and age separation procedures deplete units.

8 Sep Chief, CIC, reported to D/I, ASF, that 33 out of the 65 officers operating the CIC Center were eligible for release under the point system.

10 Sep Firm requests received from the Pacific for 2,000 additional and replacement CIC agents. ASF, G2, estimated that in view of occupation requests, CIC procurement, and training would continue indefinitely.

10 Sep War Department, G1, told CIC it would be almost impossible to place CIC personnel on the Scarce Category list.

11 Sep Seventeen CIC detachments from ETO enroute to CIC Center.

11 Sep CIC agents of 441st CIC Detachment, Tokyo, Japan, arrested Hideki Tojo, Japanese War Minister.

12 Sep Immediate procurement asked of G1 for 657 officers and 1,844 EM for delivery to CIC Center 10 October, to meet emergency requisitions.

12 Sep Director of Intelligence, ASF, advised AF, Pacific, that all CIC training was now conducted at Meade and not MITC.

13 Sep Emergency procurement for CIC was authorized with age lowered to 22 and physical qualifications lowered. Theaters asked that CIC training be shortened or eliminated to hasten replacements.

13 Sep CIC reported that AGF had furnished only 121 EMs out of a previous quota of 608.

13 Sep Emergency requisitions for CIC personnel from theaters, for fourth quarter 1945 and for 1946, total 651 officers and 1,721 EM, of which 1,809 were for Europe.

15 Sep 80th Metropolitan CIC Unit moved to Tokyo, Japan.

17 Sep China Theater CIC Detachment forwarded copies of 215 CIC reports in compliance with WD Memo 850-45 subject "Disposition of Overseas CIC Investigative Reports dated 4 May 1945."

17 Sep CIC emergency procurement quotas assigned to major commands were 657 officers and 1,844 EM to report to CIC Center 10 October 1945.

19 Sep War Department authorized increases and replacements for CIC of 2,501 officers and EM as of 10 October 1945.

1945

24 Sep Emergency procurement orders for CIC personnel reached 5,000 and ASF, G1, asked to authorize an additional 606 men for CIC administration and housekeeping duties.

24 Sep Director of Intelligence, ASF, estimated that the CIC Center would have a population of 5,000 by 10 Oct. Asked increase of 156 officers and 571 EM's to operate the Center.

24 Sep ASF told to stop sending officers and men to CIC Center who do not meet the qualifications.

24 Sep AGF again requested not to send unqualified personnel to CIC Center in meeting its quota of 225 officers and 800 EM's.

25 Sep Commanding General, USAF, on TO radioed relative to CIC that "acute shortage exists in this theater. Have requested for USFET CIC personnel."

27 Sep Philippines informed WD that it wanted investigators to suppress black market activities in Philippine bases and that these investigators did not have to have CIC training.

28 Sep Russian typewriter (Remington) furnished on loan to CIC Center for training.

30 Sep CIC Center at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, ordered transferred to Camp Holabird, Maryland.

September The town of Karuizawa, Gumma Prefecture, Japan, was raided in concentrated effort by approximately fifty CIC personnel, which resulted in the apprehension of numerous German Fifth Columnists and former SS troopers.

1 Oct Strategic Intelligence School opened at Washington, D.C., with a four week lecture course.

1 Oct Intelligence Director asked Distribution Division to authorize CIC to draw SHEETS for its 5,000 personnel when it moved from Meade to Holabird.

2 Oct Army Service Forces, Director of Personnel, approved the CIC request for an additional 606 personnel for CIC Center operation.

2 Oct CIC Center reported it had a total of 14 men available out of 58 requested by Mediterranean Theater.

[redacted]

1945

3 Oct The 432d CIC Detachment in Brazil ordered inactivated.

3 Oct Transfer of CIC Center from Fort Meade to Holabird Signal Depot between 1 and 15 Oct 1945, ordered by AG Ltr Order 37015 (28 Sep 45)

3 Oct Casual CIC shipment to Tokyo made of 96 Nisei EM and 29 White officers.

3 Oct Over 50 percent of CIC personnel previously procurred was no longer eligible for shipment. No trained personnel in Service Commands or redeployed units; critically short of officers; age requirement lowered to 22 years.

10 Oct CIC Center established at Camp Holabird; 130 CIC Units made the move.

10 Oct G2 refused to agree to destruction of loyalty clearance and accompanying identification photos of cyptographic personnel now filed. Stated that they should be preserved as are other service records, reports of investigation, and similar personnel records

10 Oct Final eight week CIC training class held at MITC, Camp Ritchie.

10 Oct Director of Intelligence, ASF, again asked that Chief, CIC, be authorized to issue temporary duty orders.

11 Oct CIC not authorized to issue orders; Commanding Officer, Camp Holabird (Signal Depot), as Post Commander, authorized to issue orders.

12 Oct Emergency procurement of an additional 105 officers for CIC duty was approved.

15 Oct CIC basis training classes transferred from Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to Camp Holabird, Maryland.

16 Oct CIC Tactical units in Japan placed under the operational control of the 441st CIC Detachment.

16 Oct Intelligence Agency (including TO CIC Det), Intelligence & Security Division, OCT, awarded Meritorious Service Unit Award

[redacted]

18 Oct Report of arrival of trainees at CIC Center revealed that OSS had furnished 28 officers and 151 EM.

19 Oct All major commands asked to submit their recommendations for revision of T/O&E 30-500 by 1 December 1945.

19 Oct Major Commands authorized to make direct appointments to 2nd Lt with qualified EM's to fill 2nd Lt vacancies in CIC and to appoint warrant officers provided EM recommended by CO of CIC detachment. Men must have been experienced.

20 Oct Warrant Officers authorized for CIC by change in T/O&E 30-500.

22 Oct CICB informed AGF that need for CIC officers was "immediate and urgent."

1 Nov Office of Naval Intelligence was given jurisdiction over all matters requiring investigation in the Naval establishment.

2 Nov Allied Forces Pacific stated it would need 300 officers and 1,200 enlisted men on a continuing basis and that it was currently short 240 CIC officers and men.

2 Nov 441st at Tokyo radioed that lowering of draft age and ASF (Intell) scores would create difficulties in securing investigators. Recommended steps be taken to secure civilian investigators.

6 Nov Director of Intelligence, G2, informed G1 to either fill the 460 officers procurement deficit of AAF and ASF or advise theaters their requisitions will not be filled.

6 Nov Second Service Command furnished five surplus CIC automobiles to CIC Center.

6 Nov Of assigned quotas of 928 CIC officers, only 360 had been secured, and Director of Intelligence, ASF, stated that Service Commands must either fill quotas quickly or ASF must advise AFPAC, ETO, and MO that their request could not be met.

7 Nov G1 told CICB, G2, that it would investigate possible sources of additional officers but was not hopeful of procuring any.

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[redacted]

1945

8 Nov — Surplus, trained CIC personnel at CIC Center not qualified for overseas ordered assigned to Service Commands on a promoted basis without regard to formal requisition.

10 Nov — ETO Intelligence School opened at Brieux, France, and later moved to Oberammergau, Germany.

14 Nov — 441st, 428th, and 970th CIC Detachments informed that CIC Center will not be able to secure desired number of officers stateside.

15 Nov — 400th CIC Detachment with Headquarters at Cairo, Egypt, was deactivated.

15 Nov — War Department Personnel Board rejected recommendation of promotion to major of a CIC captain at the CIC Center stating "responsibilities have not greatly increased since the termination of hostilities nor is the rank necessary for adequate performance of duty."

16 Nov — Third Service Command ordered to make confidential funds available in units of $500 or less to the CIC Center; Center designated an officer to handle funds.

24 Nov — General H.H. Arnold's report published in Army-Navy journal on 24 Nov 45 indicated that past concept of intelligence needs was insufficient to cover requirements of modern war; that detailed and moment-to-moment knowledge of all aspects of military and civilian activity within the territory of potential enemies is essential to sound planning in peace or war time; that a great need for a permanent national organization which not only deals with broad questions of policy but also collects, evaluates, and disseminates a continuous stream of intelligence data.

November — CIC training school moved from the Philippine Islands and was resumed by the 441st CIC Detachment, Tokyo, Japan.

1 Dec — Combat Intelligence School was activated at Fort Riley, Kansas and replaced MITC at Camp Ritchie.

1 Dec — G2, US Forces European Command, took over operational control of all former tactical CIC teams through 970th CIC Detachment.

[redacted]

4 Dec 405th CIC Detachment, New Delhi, India, closed its branch office at Bagalore, Five other branches remained open.

4 Dec Pacific stated it required 300 officers and 1,200 EM's for 1946, so plans for additional detachments were cancelled. Further efforts to have CIC personnel placed on the critical list abandoned.

4 Dec Investigations of prospective CIC personnel being reviewed so that those no longer eligible for overseas training are discontinued.

10 Dec ETO radioed for an additional 400 CIC officers and 1,200 EM's.

10 Dec Chief, CICB, recommended that former CIC agents be allowed to enlist in the regular Army directly into CIC if approved by appropriate Director of Intelligence.

10 Dec CIC reported start of separation of Intelligence and Security by General Order #162 for 1st Service Command.

10 Dec AG published orders to inactivate the 701st, 704th, 705th, 706th and 707th CIC Detachments (AAF).

11 Dec Information received that CIC personnel reenlisting are being given other than CIC assignments. The Director of Intelligence, WD, requested that separation centers be instructed to send all former CIC personnel to CIC Center for final assignment.

14 Dec Commanding Officer, Holabird Signal Depot, ordered not to answer CIC correspondence; he had answered inquiry of a Congressman.

20 Dec Emergency CIC needs curtailed to 1,500 men capacity of CIC Center. Center ordered to provide all possible personnel.

20 Dec Staff study prepared by Chief of CICB for merger of SIC and CIC showing examples of general Army policy of central control and tendency in history of intelligence to merge under a central department; present organization and deficiencies.

20 Dec G1, WDGS, concurred with G2 on the emergency procurement of 1,503 officers and EM's to fill CIC training center to its capacity.

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26 Dec Change three to T/O&E 30-500 was published. Change provided for CIC Warrant officers, more commissioned officers, and direct appointments to enlisted men who would serve for one year.

27 Dec Proposed reorganization of Service Command CIC detachments called for 844 compared to 924 in SIC as of 30 Nov.

31 Dec Survey revealed that during World War II, CIC employed the services of more than 13,000 persons.

31 Dec ASF statistics revealed that during hostilities of World War II 2,350,000 loyalty investigations were processed.

September - December Analysis revealed that theaters had requested 1,041 officers; that only 375 had been procured and only 230 qualified for training and shipment.

December 319th Military Intelligence Company was activated in Japan to train Japanese language specialists who worked with CIC.

December General Board of Officers (including 2d Lt John S.D. Eisenhower), prepared an analysis of the organization and operation of CIC in ETO. Recommended:

a. CIC remain under operational control of a theater of operations with several CIC detachments attached to G2 sections of divisions, corps, armies, and army groups at all times.

b. Centralized control of CIC in communication zone be retained by G2 of the zone, irrespective of advanced or base section territorial jurisdiction.

c. That greater emphasis be made on procurement of qualified linguists.

d. Proper training manuals be prepared setting forth mission and method of operation of the CIC.

e. High standards of procurement be maintained and no one be assigned until he has passed his basic military training.

f. That specialist training be toward developing investigative techniques and train only a limited number of men as technical experts.

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1945 There were CIC agents in Iran (Persia) from 1944-1945.

CONFIDE

1946

1 Jan CIC detachments in occupied countries, found a new mission materializing--reporting on political, economical, and labor factors. Noted specifically by 441st CIC Detachment, Japan.

1 Jan Chief, CIC, reported that theater requests for CIC personnel totaled 1,503 for the first quarter of 1946.

1 Jan Survey revealed that 9,000 former CIC personnel had been separated and returned to civilian life.

2 Jan G2 reported that the CIC Center in the past two and a half months had lost by separation fifty percent of its trainees or nearly 1,300 men.

11 Jan Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg became AC of S, G2, replacing Major General Clayton Bissell.

15 Jan Colonel M. C. Noble replaced Colonel Kibler but was titled Commanding Officer, CIC Center, instead of Chief, CIC.

15 Jan CIC policy and operations were separated, with CO of CIC Center handling the new Center, and Chief, CIC Branch, ODI, handling policy.

15 Jan CIC three week Field Security Course at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, revised to incorporate World War II experience.

21 Jan Commands reminded they must not transfer CIC agents to non-CIC duties without prior approval of DI, WDGS, except deficiencies specifically listed "for cause."

22 Jan CIC Center Planning Division reported 296 civilians were needed at the CIC Center to replace military personnel before 30 Jun 46.

22 Jan National Intelligence Authority established by Presidential Directive.

23 Jan 1135th CIC Detachment activated at Manila, PI, and took over headquarters and nine branch offices of 441st CIC Detachment.

29 Jan CIC Center authorized to give four week course to Service Command SIC Agents on "the Communist party and communist front organizations and their connection with labor disturbances which affect the army or national security."

January CIC School course in Chinese for CBI replacements was being phased out.

11 Feb Director of Intelligence, WD asked that use of CIC agents for other duties such as CID, IG, and positive intelligence collection, be eliminated. Cited deterioration of CIC work since end of war.

13 Feb CIC Planning Division recommended a four week basic CIC course followed by four week advanced course covering language and area requirements of various theaters.

27 Feb Secretary of War directed CIC quotas be filled as quickly as possible because of "present critical need in overseas theaters."

27 Feb Director of Ordnance informed that CIC desired to continue its five day, motor vehicle course at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

27 Feb Director of Intelligence informed Chief of Engineers that CIC desired to continue its three day course at Fort Belvoir.

27 Feb Army Information School was activated at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

28 Feb CIC Center made plans for physical consolidation of its activities at Camp Holabird into a center area and a school area.

28 Feb Personnel survey of CIC Center was made to implement necessity of reduction in housekeeping personnel. Recommended 150 officers and 409 EMs.

February CIC in Calcutta covered civil disturbances as part of political security reporting.

February CIC agents authorized to convert from military to civil service with CAF grades; few did.

February TWX from ASF to CO, CIC Center, recommending that active measures be taken to encourage all former intelligence personnel to apply for reserve commissions with MI, ORC.

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1946

1 Mar Control of Okinawa CIC personnel was transferred from 441st CIC Detachment, Japan, to 1135th CIC Detachment, PI.

5 Mar CIC Port Security course at New York reduced from five to three days.

11 Mar Director of Intelligence, WD, recommended SIC be merged with CIC; said 1944 directive gave Army two uneconomical investigative agencies. Total of 512 SIC personnel in Service Commands; 206 officers and 306 EM.

11 Mar Four week typing school inaugurated for CIC cadre of CIC Center.

12 Mar CIC Center study showed abuse of understudy system such as "understudys" for dining room orderlies, barracks orderlies, and firemen.

13 Mar CIC Planning Division conducted test of Speak-O-Phones to determine how they stood up under road travel. They stood up well.

14 Mar CIC agents of 970th CIC Detachment in Berlin, Germany, arrested Mildred Gillars (Axis Sally).

19 Mar CIC Planning Division submitted a minimum and optimum standard for CIC procurement of officers and EM.

19 Mar CIC personnel returning from overseas were ordered to CIC Center, Camp Holabird, Maryland, for disposition.

20 Mar CIC Planning Division recommended that Chief, CIC, be authorized to promote all EM who pass the CIC course including the appointment of master sergeants as warrant officers.

25 Mar Substitution of warrant officers for commissioned officers for CIC duty was authorized provided not over 5% of quotas.

31 Mar Survey showed 39.3 percent of officers and 65.3 percent of enlisted men of CIC Center staff had an anticipated service of at least one year. School had 826 students in training and reenlistments were increasing.

March CIC agents of Third Service Command provided security detail for guarding Honorable Winston Churchill and General Dwight D. Eisenhower on visit to Washington.

March CIC school discontinued Italian language and orientation courses.

CONFIDENTIAL

March CIC Center worked out plans for training ten percent of its students in the Russian language.

March CIC branch offices in Assam closed and personnel were transferred to Calcutta, India.

1 Apr CIC Center Planning and Liaison Division recommended a corps of 11,713, of which 5,843 would be officers. Troop basis 4.5 percent. Recommended further that rank of corporal be abolished for CIC; recommended General Officer be Chief, CIC, in overseas theaters; Chief, CIC, WD, should be major general.

1 Apr CIC agents in Germany broke up subversive group by arresting 200 suspects in a swoop coordinated with British CIC.

2 Apr Standard Operating Procedure published for handling transient and visiting officers at CIC center.

3 Apr War Department authorized recall of officers to active duty to fill vacancies for technical specialists - CIC allotted quota of 100.

4 Apr War Department Manpower Board surveyed CIC Center and recommended operating Center with a force of 408 for a 1,079 student load and 642 for an 1800 student load.

5 Apr AGF directive reminded AGF CIC Agents that their investigative jurisdiction was confined to their unit and its area.

5 Apr Army Service Forces published letter dealing with changes in qualification requirements for SIC applicants.

12 Apr War Department AGO letter was published furnishing procurement quotas to each Service Command, MDW, and OCT for screening of unassigned ASF personnel for SIC assignment. CIC personnel of commands mentioned accomplished the screening.

13 Apr War Department Circular 108, paragraph 4, was published transferring personnel of SIC to CIC (AG 322 20 Mar 46), and rescinded WD Circular 324, 1943.

13 Apr Commanding Officer, CIC Center, informed G2 that

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future CIC trainees would have to perform housekeeping duties during training because of manpower shortage.

13 Apr Commanding Officer, CIC Center, informed G2 that "increasing numbers of personnel who do not possess proper background for CIC duty and whose integrity, judgement and discretion are questionable are being received...trainees are young, immature and possess intelligence quotients comparable to high school students..."

13 Apr Commanding Officer, CIC Center, reported deterrent factors of being a Class IV installation subordinate to another Class IV installation and recommended moving to "a post of our own."

13 Apr Commanding Officer, CIC Center, reported TC was recalling 40% of the motor vehicles at the CIC Center by 30 June, taking eight currently and the other eight in June.

15 Apr Provost Marshal General credentials issued to the 602 SIC personnel were revoked and replaced by CIC credentials and badges.

15 Apr Chief, CIC, advised MIS that it was not considered desirable under present conditions to train members of the WAC as CIC agents but that twenty-six WAC's could readily be used in the Center in administrative capacities.

16 Apr Army Air Forces SIC students at the CIC Center were asked to comment on their course. Many said it was one of the best Army Schools, several wanted more legal, countersubversive, and counter-sabotage training.

22 Apr Direct enlistment of non-CIC personnel authorized for CIC if men enlist for three years, are US citizens, are twenty to thirty-eight years old, high school graduates, have AGCT score of 110 or higher, and have law education or have investigative or linguistive experience.

25 Apr Plan completed for consolidated, thirty-two week course of CIC instruction.

26 Apr Requisition received for 540 more CIC personnel. This added to a shortage of 300 on a former pro-

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curement, to 900 ASTP, AGF, ASF, and Marine Corps personnel scheduled for training and the scheduled replacement quota of 1,500. CIC Center had more than 3,000 men to train. Facilities were inadequate.

29 Apr Troop Commander, CIC Center, published uniform regulations for Camp Holabird.

29 Apr CIC Course at Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was revised with more emphasis on counter-sabotage techniques.

30 Apr First and Second Training Battalions reorganized at CIC Center; Third Battalion organized and Fourth Battalion discontinued.

30 Apr 405th CIC Detachment was deactivated after unit had been moved from New Delhi to Calcutta, India.

April Tour of Service Commands by CIC officer revealed no standardization of thought of desired CIC ZI training; viewpoints varied with geographical locations.

April Commanding Officer, CIC Center, informed G2 that returnees had reported that in the Pacific Theater only officers and warrant officers were used as agents and enlisted CIC personnel were used for other duties. If true, CIC recommended procuring more officers and appointing high caliber enlisted men to lieutenants or warrant officers.

April Two-hour Friday inspections and reviews at CIC Center, Camp Holabird, replaced Saturday morning inspections. Planning to organize CIC Band. Building 136 obtained for CIC use.

1 May Commanding Officer, CIC Center, recommended a six month basic course and Spanish language training for CIC personnel, for duty with attaches, missions, and commissions in South America.

1 May Commanding Officer, CIC Center, repeated recommendation that the CIC Center should have a post of its own.

1 May CIC Center faces a serious problem of procuring serviceable and presentable clothing to issue to its personnel.

[redacted]
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1 May Commanding Officer, CIC Center, strongly stressed the expediency of completing background investigations prior to graduation of CIC school students.

1 May CIC agents of 430th CIC Detachment, Austria, culminated long investigation with arrest of Helmut Von Hummel and recovery of six million dollars in church gold.

1 May War Department separation policy made eighty officers of the staff and cadre eligible for discharge; plans made to discharge in units of ten every ten days at CIC Center.

1 May Two officers furnished the Center on a TDY basis returned to Fort McClellan as unsuitable.

1 May Commanding Officer, CIC Center, reported that only seven out of twenty nine civilians authorized for the Center had been hired. He added that those of the right type and efficiency were "among the scarce categories."

2 May Personnel being shipped from the CIC School with only half of eight weeks training in order to meet critical demands.

6 May CIC screening team at Yale University to interest qualified ASTP students to transfer to CIC. ASTP students at Universities of Pennsylvania and Minnesota to be screened later.

10 May War Department ordered twelve CIC detachments to be activated in the nine Service Commands. MDW, and at the NYPOE for the TC.

13 May Consolidation of CIC units in Europe continued as 307th and 504th CIC units merged at Heidelberg, Germany.

22 May Inadequacy of Camp Holabird as a CIC Center became critical. Fort Meade surveyed; also inadequate. Camp Holabird could be made adequate if Signal Depot moved from post. Fort Warren, Wyoming to be surveyed.

22 May CIC, assisted by CID, MG, and US Constabulary, raided the 397 boats of the Danube River Units of the Hungarian Navy and arrested 232 persons. Small arms, land mines, and counterfeiting outfits were seized in raid near Passau, Germany.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 May Study showed 417,925 square feet needed for peak load of 6,000 students at CIC Center; average - 70 square feet per student, for classroom and administrative requirements.

28 May CIC agents in the Philippine Islands reverted from occupation status to military base security status as Philippine Islands inaugurated its first President.

31 May General operational policy of CIC remained unchanged as Secretary of War Book Message reaffirmed policy letter AG 322, 13 Nov 44.

31 May CIC authorized 600 EM as clerical specialists under T/O&E 30-500 to release qualified investigators. Personnel will be of lower quality and their use as special agents will not be permitted. One month administrative training recommended for them.

10 Jun The nine Service Command CIC Detachments (107-115) were reassigned to the six new Army areas.

10 Jun The 118th CIC Detachment at Washington, DC, was reassigned from the DI, ASF, to the DI, WD.

11 Jun Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlain became AC of S, G2 WDGS.

11 Jun Army Service Forces deactivated and CIC control was assigned to G2, WDGS, under Security Group as a branch, with Lt Col C.E. Leydecker as Chief.

11 Jun CIC Planning Division recommended CIC Center control arrival of trainees and reported: (1) Unpredictable arrival of prospective trainees necessitated a processing system for handling from five to 500 persons at one time and made efficiency in handling an impossibility. (2) Approximately twenty-five percent of the prospective trainees were eliminated as ineligible after reporting to the CIC Center.

12 Jun CIC Detachment, ASF, disbanded and personnel were transferred to separation centers; CIC Center became Class II activity.

13 Jun Survey revealed ninety-five percent of all CIC Center correspondence was addressed to the G2, WD.

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18 Jun Assignment of 400 enlisted administrative men, MOS 405, to CIC was authorized. Men to be sent to CIC Center for training.

19 Jun CIC Planning Division recommended two-week administrative course for 500 students which would require twenty-nine instructors, fourteen classrooms, and 500 typewriters.

19 Jun Chief of Staff approved Office of Provost Marshal General and Corps of Military Police as permanent components of the Army.

23 Jun CIC Planning Division completed programs for a twelve and a six week CIC course.

26 Jun Responsibility of CIC Branch, Security Group, Intelligence Division, for dealing with the Commanding Officer of CIC Center divided between Security Group, Personnel and Administrative Group, and Combat Intelligence and Training Group.

26 Jun CIC Center Planning Division prepared study on use of Keeler Lie Detector (Polygraph) and recommended experimental trial use of two machines.

28 Jun Armed Forces Staff College was activated at Norfolk, Virginia, as start of integration of services.

28 Jun Survey of results of 597 circular letters sent former CIC officers asking them to return to active duty: returned unclaimed - 17; no reply - 518; replies - 67; number recalled - 0.

June CIC school acquired 1,000 German language books from former Prisoner of War libraries in various sections of the country.

June CIC enlisted agents in Germany ordered into uniform; also ordered to wear rank and to live in Army barracks.

1 Jul Lieutenant General J. R. Hodge wrote the 971st CIC Detachment"...to express to the CIC Detachment in Korea my thanks and appreciation for the splendid work it has done...the mission of our Army of Occupation brought new concepts of CIC operations..."

2 Jul Chief, CIC Branch, stated a comprehensive study was contemplated to determine practicability of adoption for use by CIC units of such innovations in in-

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vestigative aids as the polygraph, infrared photographic equipment, improved wire and tape recording devices, concealable cameras, etc.

2 Jul — CIC Center reported a critical shortage of instructors. Training classes will average thirty to forty men with a student load of 1,500.

3 Jul — Recommend activation of the 118th CIC Detachment of four officers and six enlisted men to be assigned to the CIC Center and operate directly under Chief, Security Group, on high level War Department investigations.

4 Jul — Philippine Islands became independent and CIC at Manila closed four of its branch offices.

9 Jul — Study showed CIC had 3,988 men deployed worldwide but CIC requirements were 6,620 men with 2,156 in the ZI.

12 Jul — Study showed that of 120 hours of FBI type training, forty were of value to high ranking CIC personnel and another forty were of value to field agents. The final forty were of no CIC value.

15 Jul — CIC Center regulations published in General Order 19, CIC Center.

16 Jul — Training status report revealed thirty-seven groups totaling 1,136 CIC students consisted of 201 officers and 935 EM; of these 902 were schedule for Europe, 210 for Pacific, and twenty-four for Zone of the Interior.

16 Jul — Survey showed thirteen CIC agents on duty with Security Section, ID, and no means of promoting them on this TDY even though doing "important jobs."

18 Jul — CIC planning board recommended WD Memo 380-44, Subject: "CIC Monthly Reports, "be rescinded and new memo issued requiring monthly report from all CIC detachments combing administrative and operational data.

19 Jul — Deficiencies of major commands in meeting quotas on procurement of CIC personnel result in rescinding previous quotas and issuing a new quota of 245 CIC officers and 1,060 EM.

22 Jul — Study showed 200,925 square feet required for a

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peak load of 2,000 students at CIC Center or an average of about 100 square feet per student for classroom and administrative purposes.

22 Jul CIC informed that under terms of Geneva Convention lead bullets were prohibited and were to be used for training purposes. Steel jacketed bullets issued for operational purposes.

24 Jul CIC planning division stated that, in view of the infrequent need of CIC units world-wide for a scientific criminological laboratory, the CIC should use FBI facilities as needed.

31 Jul Appointment of 400 second lieutenants to AUS for CIC duty was authorized.

31 Jul Security Group recommends CIC school increase instruction time on informants and decrease codes and ciphers and fingerprinting instruction time.

July Director of Intelligence, WDGS, takes over approval of direct appointment of warrant officers and second lieutenants.

5 Aug Screening of personnel at reception centers for civilian occupation specialties was started.

13 Aug CIC strength for fiscal year 1948 estimated at 4,670.

21 Aug CIC Center planning division recommended that CIC Center be relocated at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming.

22 Aug Table of Operation for CIC Center based on 1,500 student load, five divisions with 208 officers, 429 enlisted men, twenty-seven civilians, or a total of 664. Grades included were four colonels, twelve lieutenant colonels, thirty-seven majors, 141 company grade and fourteen warrant officers. Enlisted grades included fifteen master sergeants.

26 Aug CIC recommended a Mobilization Plan based on global troop basis of 8,500, with two week refresher courses for recalled personnel.

August CIC agents provided coverage of the August riots in Korea.

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August CIC organized photographic course for Army officers who were to serve as military attaches.

14 Sep Study by CIC Center planning division on use of one-way glass recommended purchase of two sections at $7.00 per square foot.

17 Sep Commands notified that 400 enlisted clerical specialists were being procured for CIC duties.

18 Sep Revised CIC Center budget for 1948 submitted based on student load of 3,000 and calling for $461,815.91 or average of $153 per student direct expense.

18 Sep Chief, Security Group, ID, stated overall classification of basic and administrative CIC courses labeled RESTRICTED. For academic credit for courses at Army Service Schools CIC, courses in language, legal activities, report writing, typing, and English may be furnished, but length of course or information on techniques is classified.

25 Sep Commanding Officer, CIC Center, requested authorization for three wool shirts and two jackets to insure good appearance of men, since dry cleaning facilities for troops at Camp Holabird required a week.

26 Sep Brigadier General Arthur G. Trudeau, GSC, Chief of Manpower Control Group, authorized increase of 200 in CIC quota for recall to active duty for reserve and national guard officers as Corps was short 315 officers.

27 Sep CIC informed that because of budget limitations there will be drastic personnel reductions.

30 Sep AGAO-S-A-M 210.31 published revised regulations for assignment, investigation, training, and control of CIC personnel in ZI. Personnel to be assigned on recommendation of CIC but local procurement still authorized. Directive prevented arbitrary transfers to non-CIC duties.

September CIC Center recommended to ID that Keeler Polygraph machine be purchased and lie detector training be given to selected personnel.

2 Oct CIC planning division stated that trainees reporting to CIC Center for duty were younger, less experienced, and less educated with each procurement; study recommended new system of procurement.

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3 Oct Commanding Officer, CIC, stated he believed "tactical units not sufficiently familiar with the proper utilization of their assigned CIC detachments."

4 Oct Security Group officers visited CIC Center and "clarified outstanding differences..."with the Commanding Officer. Reported "feud" was straightened out. Reported Col Noble had many other troubles beside personnel assignment, training, and local administration.

7 Oct Commanding Officer, CIC Center, criticized for holding 2,000 people on parade for the uncertain arrival of G2 inspectors from Washington.

10 Oct War Department authorizes key CIC personnel to volunteer for retention overseas.

10 Oct CIC school ordered to reduce teaching of foreign positive intelligence from ten hours to two hours and reduce domestic intelligence from five to four hours.

10 Oct CIC Center planning division recommended that half a dozen cadre be trained as stenotype operators.

17 Oct Director of Intelligence informed 117th CIC Detachment that there was a critical shortage of CIC personnel and that if insufficient work existed agents not needed should be reported for reassignment.

18 Oct Protest by Commanding Officer, CIC Center, of being responsible to both the training and the security groups of ID was solved by DI by transfer from training to security group all responsibilities for activities at the CIC Center.

19 Oct CIC agents at Stuttgart, Germany, started investigation of Germany's first serious post-war sabotage--bombing of Denazification Court Building.

19 Oct General McNarney issued directive defining responsibilities between CIC and AMGOT in Europe.

20 Oct Chief, Security Group, ID, stated Commanding Officer, CIC Center, had made incorrect assumption of increased student load in planning reorganization, since load would level off at $2,000 a year in 1947 and ratio of cadre to students could be on a one for one basis.

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21 Oct Chief of Security Group reported to DI that because of the very unusual status of the CIC in that the Corps is neither a branch or service it can be considered only as coming within a Branch Immaterial category. No allotment of officers, warrant officers, or enlisted men has been contemplated under Branch Immaterial. Col L. R. Forney recommended for the post-war Army an allotment of 5,925 men, of which 1,860 would be officers, 991 warrant officers, and 3,074 EM. Of these, 4,198 would be overseas, 1,512 in ZI commands, and 215 in the Air Forces. He also stated "whenever there is a reduction of occupational forces, there should be a corresponding increase in CIC coverage and personnel."

22 Oct Negro agents to be furnished detachments because of reports of a disproportionate number of incidents to the number of Negro troops.

22 Oct Vint Hill Farms School at Warrenton, Virginia, redesignated as Army Security Agency School.

30 Oct Major commands failed to meet CIC procurement quota by 192 men. Shortage and current needs resulted in a need for 400 additional enlisted administrative personnel for CIC (MOS 405).

October CIC agents in Korea investigated the rice riots where fifty policemen were killed. Leaders were identified and apprehended.

October CIC agents in Germany, in cooperation with British and with German police, raided 373 targets and at 245 banks and businesses recovered seven million dollars worth of diamonds, gold, silver, and platinum.

8 Nov Emergency requirements for 700 officers, 200 warrant officers, and 1,100 EM for CIC duty during next ninety days.

8 Nov War Department Memo 600-750-4 published authorizing direct enlistment for CIC for two years and providing for waivers of qualifications upon application.

12 Nov Security Group, ID, returned CIC Center reorganization proposal for revision. Cited small student load.

19 Nov CIC Center asked that its original recommendations be approved; stated personnel in school represented only half the total as an equal number were always

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on hand awaiting the start of classes or shipment following graduation. Furthermore, no housekeeping personnel were available so more were needed.

25 Nov CIC agents in Stuttgart, Germany, apprehended gang responsible for bombings; leader was sentenced to be hanged but was later pardoned.

25 Nov War Department Memo, 8 Nov 46, rescinded to remove delay caused by initial clearance requirement since men were so critically needed.

25 Nov War Manpower Board and G3 veto request for separate CIC detachment for Guided Missile Center at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fourth Army detachment ordered to handle.

27 Nov Forced CIC quota system inaugurated as ZI armies and services ordered to transfer 401 men during January 1947, with MOS 405 (administrative).

27 Nov CIC planning and liaison division worked on first draft of a text "CIC Detachment Administration."

29 Nov Foreign military personnel prohibited from attending the CIC school.

29 Nov New York Herald Tribune carried story by ex-CIC agent stating that General Joseph T. McNarney had "stripped CIC of its police powers in Europe."

30 Nov Major General W.A.Burress, G2, Europe, wrote the CO, 970th CIC Detachment, that General McNarney and his executive, General Huebner, had confidence in the CIC and had no intention of stripping it of any power. Directive of 19 Oct merely defined responsibilities.

November Assignment of fifty WAC personnel to the CIC was authorized and arrangements for training were started.

November 115th CIC Detachment discovers the presence of "Meat-Ball" Kawakita in the US. Gets ball rolling. FBI gets credit for conviction and death sentence for treason.

3 Dec Screening of all Air Force personnel in replacement stream for CIC and European Language Theater Training was ordered.

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10 Dec The 441st CIC Detachment, Japan, reported it was operating with only fifty percent of its authorized strength and that it would soon be reduced to twenty-five percent by anticipated losses.

13 Dec Chief of Security Group, G2, stated, "The demand for new CIC personnel during the past year simply has been beyond any possibility of being met. At a time when the old CIC was being wiped out by demobilization, new personnel coming into the Army consisted almost entirely of new men under twenty and those of the necessary age, maturity, and basic qualifications simply did not exist in the numbers required...In addition the great demands have forced curtailment of the period of specialized training in order to keep any substantial number of men in the field at all...This situation will continue critical at least until the summer of 1947 and even then there will be no great improvement in the quality of men procured because the new Army simply does not contain such men in quantity..."

26 Dec 970th CIC Detachment, Germany, was ordered to investigate black marketing in the American Zone, which had gone beyond control of CID.

December CIC planning division reported many complaints regarding the report writing course but the division had to shelve project for revision indefinitely.

December The 80th Metropolitan Unit of 441st CIC Detachment at Tokyo continued investigation of Case 700,109, Toguri D'Aquino, Iva (Tokyo Rose).

December The 970th CIC Detachment, Germany reported twenty-one important subversive organizations under surveillance.

December The 430th CIC Detachment swooped Austrian underground in black market raid coded "Operation Sugar."

December Authority obtained during 1946 for CIC officers who volunteer to remain overseas longer than the regular thirty-six month tour.

December During 1946 the Army was screened for urgently required linguists for CIC duty: Col C. E. Leydecker reported need partially filled.

December During 1946 MOS's 9302, 1301, and 1405 were reserved exclusively for CIC personnel to prevent

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requisitions of these MOS's for other duties.

December During 1946 revision of TM 30-215, the Mobilization Plan, T/O&E 30-500, CIC Periodic Reports, and other basic data in progress.

December CIC extension courses were written during 1946 and preparations made to put them into use.

December All former CIC officers in ORC, MI-Reserve files were tabbed for CIC in the event of mobilization.

December CIC reserve training had been integrated into the general ORC program and coordinated with commanding generals of the Ground and Air Forces.

1 Jan Control of atomic energy was transferred from the US Army to the Atomic Energy Commission.

1 Jan Overseas survey revealed 2,446 men, with 1,640 in Europe, 692 in Pacific, and 114 in Alaska, Caribbean, and China and other areas.

2 Jan Security Group IOM delineated consolidation of activities and functions of CIC Branch, ID, and CIC Center to eliminate duplication and to keep CIC Branch exclusively as a policy organization.

6 Jan Survey revealed 623 CIC personnel authorized in the ZI had a backlog of 18,254 investigations. Increase of 169 agents authorized.

7 Jan General George C. Marshall was appointed Secretary of State.

10 Jan CIC Center ordered to give only refresher course to direct officer appointments, CIC.

14 Jan Officer troop basis for CIC as of 30 June established at 1,559; deficiency 580. Automatic assignment of OCS graduates to CIC was requested.

16 Jan President Harry S. Truman announced that the Army and Navy had agreed to merge under a Secretary of Defense.

16 Jan Three CIC agents sent to the Pentagon to gather material for a course on espionage activities in the US.

20 Jan Chief, Security Group, appointed a board of four officers to consider whether or not CIC should be a permanent branch of the Regular Army.

24 Jan AG stated a large number of CIC recruits were being sent to the CIC Center who did not meet requirements, particularly educational, and ordered that more careful screening of applicants be made.

31 Jan CIC Branch Board of Officers recommended that CIC be made a permanent Corps with a Brigadier General as Chief; with an Officer Corps of not over two percent of the regular officers and an enlisted strength of half of one percent of the strength of the Army.

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January — CIC agents in Wakayama sub-detachment of the 441st CIC Detachment, Japan, rode out an earthquake and tidal wave and worked with the Japanese authorities on disaster relief.

1 Feb — European Intelligence School, Oberammergau, Bavaria, Germany, was conducting a 251-hour German language course and a 248-hour Intelligence course including forty-two hours of occupation orientation; forty-three hours operational intelligence; seventy-six hours of counterintelligence, and thirty-three hours of German.

1 Feb — Survey revealed CIC had a strength of 3,789 of its 5,175 authorized on a Troop Basis. Of the 1,386 shortage, 1,025 were officer spaces.

1 Feb — Personnel survey revealed 612 agents on duty in Army areas and other special ZI assignments, 540 on duty at CIC Center, and 123 with the Army Air Force. CIC Center had 1,935 students.

3 Feb — Arrangements made to get an immediate FBI fingerprint check on the 600 incoming students at the CIC school each month.

6 Feb — Colonel L. R. Forney, Chief, Security Group, ID, recommended to G2 that CIC not become a permanent Corps because officer Corps would be too small; suggested officers be assigned by four year details, and enlisted men continue from Detached Enlisted Men's List (DEML)

7 Feb — The eighteen using agencies of CIC were sent a letter by DI on the subject: "Improvement of the Counter Intelligence Corps," which described the deterioration of the quality of personnel since the end of the war.

10 Feb — Chief, CIC Branch, ID, status report revealed:

a. CIC Center had five functions: viz, training, replacements, separations, depot, and laboratory.

b. Overseas trainees were given nine week basic course and three weeks of language with five languages being offered.

c. Two special courses given--four week administration and one week attache photographic course.

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d. Former fourteen week overseas course and six week ZI course were being phased out.

e. CIC current student load of 2,100 believed peak and the end of emergency requisitions.

f. All small theaters and ZI up to strength; Europe and Pacific about two-thirds of strength.

g. To activate 315th MIS Detachment (linguists), 117 men taken from 441st CIC Detachment in Japan.

12 Feb Survey revealed that if CIC took over operation of Camp Holabird, 538 persons would be needed for housekeeping assignments, including 304 civilians.

12 Feb CIC budget for 1948 estimated at $461,815.91. Direct costs per student estimated at: $1.00, training aids; $4.00, textbook material; $3.00, CIC library; $4.00, surveillance practice; $3.33, investigative photography: total, $15.33.

13 Feb Emergency procurements since 20 Dec 45, had resulted in procuring 1,828 officers, 200 warrant officers, and 5,433 EM to date in addition to 389 direct lieutenant appointments and 183 warrant officer appointments.

18 Feb All major commands noted WAC personnel would be available for investigations as of 20 Mar 47.

20 Feb CIC agents of the 970th CIC Detachment, Germany, broke up a huge watch-stealing ring with the arrest of nine men and the recovery of 900 Army watches, as part of an anti-black marketing mission.

21 Feb Normal CIC procurement program set up as need for emergency requisitions appears ended. Clerk-typist ratio one for each twelve CIC agents.

21 Feb Annual CIC replacement figure estimated at thirty-seven percent and quotas requested on that basis to end "present undesirable emergency procurement system." Forty-two officers and 100 EM per month needed.

26 Feb Survey at CIC Center revealed CIC Training School had a total of 2,600 students.

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February	Third Army CIC in Germany consolidated with the 970th CIC Detachment with headquarters in Frankfurt.
3 Mar	By direction of Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a letter was issued on "Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities" and commanders were told to "Allocate personnel to Intelligence, recognizing the principle that as our positive power for security declines our reliance on intelligence to determine the strength and direction of threats to our security increases."
6 Mar	Cost of packing and crating CIC Center property for evacuation estimated at $67,989 on the basis of 1,689,740 pounds at four cents per pound.
7 Mar	CIC Group, ID, ordered CIC Center to prepare a staff study on its requirement for an experimental laboratory and board on the basis of an initial setup of six persons and a budget of $5,000.
15 Mar	Survey revealed 111th CIC Detachment, Atlanta, Georgia, had completed 6,500 cases in less than a year.
21 Mar	Executive Order 9835. The President of the United States directed the Secretary of War "to continue to enforce and maintain the highest standards of loyalty" within the Army.
21 Mar	Plans made to create special group in CIC--expert on enemy intelligence.
25 Mar	TAG letter was issued renewing authorization to appoint qualified CIC enlisted personnel as second lieutenants or warrant officers, junior grade.
26 Mar	CIC Center prepared a ten day course for future military attaches, including investigative techniques, technical aids, and security.
31 Mar	Average AGCT of enlisted men sent to the CIC Center by Army Ground Forces was 118.4.
31 Mar	The US Selective Service Act expired.
March	The first six WAC's graduated from the CIC school basic course.

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2 Apr CIC Board study was returned from ID to the CIC Center for more justification, better preparation.

18 Apr Procurement schedules exceeded requisitions for the first time since before World War II, starting with July.

18 Apr Per paragraph 3, SC 17, WD, Brig Gen George V. Keyser, FA, was assigned as CG, CIC Center; Chief, CIC; and CG, Camp Holabird. General Keyser's Staff consisted of Col M. C. Noble, Deputy; Lt Col C. E. Leydecker, Executive Officer; Lt Col J. E. Stearns, Assistant Commandant, CIC School; and Capt H.R. Aaron, Adjutant General.

19 Apr War Department Circular 101 provided for direct commissioning in the reserve to qualified CIC enlisted personnel.

24 Apr ID Security Group requests $2,000 to buy special equipment necessary for instruction course for certain State Department personnel.

April CIC school opened a new course specially designed for CIC agents to be assigned to continental US.

1 May Trieste sub-office of 428th CIC Detachment, Italy, became the 17th CIC Detachment as TRUST Command was activated.

6 May CIC Branch, ID, personnel, except for Liaison Officer, to be integrated into the CIC Center. Lt Col C. E. Leydecker as Executive; Maj James Reitz as Assistant. CIC Board officers to be Lt Col V. C. Neeson, Capt Hodgson, and Capt Jacobson. Investigations and Records Division, CIC Center, officers to be Capt Moran and Lt Sheward.

6 May CIC liaison office remaining at Pentagon to represent CIC with Career Management and to handle routine correspondence, Maj Hough to be CIC. Office to serve as an information center on CIC with WD.

8 May CIC WD Liaison Office made a branch of the Personnel Division, CIC Center.

13 May Assignment to ETO of CIC personnel with less than four years US citizenship prohibited by Chief of CIC.

15 May Chief, CIC, recommended to field that qualified EM

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be appointed as warrant officers as a shortage existed, and not to lieutenants, where there was a temporary overage.

15 May The 502nd CIC Detachment was activated at Guam.

21 May Chief of Staff had proposal to make CIC school a special service school, quota obtained for Army Language School.

21 May Plan was formulated for CIC Reserve Officer program and for a CIC career management schedule. Quota obtained of MI reserve personnel authorized temporary duty.

21 May Lieutenant Colonel Leydecker summarized CIC progress since January 1946 when the CIC Branch, ID, had three officers and five civilians. He stated:

a. Since 1941 there had been "a succession of varying and often contradictory directives concerning the administration and operation of CIC..."

b. In CIC "change in actual control and lack of stable and permanent training facilities had all resulted in confusion and misunderstanding ..."

c. Greatest difficulties of the past sixteen months have included frequent changes in the CIC staff and extreme loss of qualified personnel.

28 May CIC Branch, ID, was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the CIC Center as a Class II activity under DI.

9 Jun CIC school was designated as a specialist school in accordance with AR 350-5 and listed in the Army School Catalogue as part of the Army School System.

9 Jun Reorganization of the CIC Center under the Chief, CIC, the Assistant Commandant became Director of the Organization, Operations and Training; Director of Supply became Director of Services and Supply to include mess, motor pool, and maintenance.

13 Jun First Army reported that with the personnel "re-adjustment" of 1 Jul it would accomplish only fifty percent of its requirements.

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14 Jun War Department Circular 210 enlarged the CIC Specialization of Military Intelligence Reserve of the ORC.

16 Jun Chief, CIC, addressed the conference of G2's held at Fort Riley, Kansas, and told them:

a. CIC personnel must be requisitioned through command channels to the Adjutant General.

b. To changes must be requested through command channels to the Director of Organization and Training.

c. CIC had no overall quotas for various army schools. Men must be sent on local command quotas.

d. All locally procured CIC personnel must be sent to the CIC school at the earliest possible date.

e. Officer-Agent students are sent to ZI detachments to determine their field performance.

f. Loyalty investigations of prospective CIC personnel are Number One Priority.

23 Jun Fourth Army estimated it needed a twenty percent increase in personnel to handle its requirements.

30 Jun Global troop basis authorized CIC 5,241 officers and EM.

1 Jul Military Occupational Specialty 405, CIC Clerical, four week course started at CIC Center.

1 Jul Educational level of enlisted men sent to CIC Center for training included during second quarter averaged twelve years.

3 Jul Fifth Army stated with its present personnel it could accomplish about seventy percent of its mission.

14 Jul CIC detachment in Regensburg, Germany, broke up a subversive group in Regen, near Czechoslovakian border, with the arrest of three leaders.

23 Jul Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Detachment, Far East (Lt Col W.E.Homan), wrote Chief of CIC, "I believe

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it imperative we get away from the idea that something is better than nothing. That is not true in the sensitive and intricate work carried on by the CIC. More frequently an inapt or incompetent man is much worse than nothing at all..."

26 Jul President Truman signed the Unification Bill for the merging of the Armed Services.

29 Jul Chief, CIC, Brig Gen G. V. Keyser, stated that "...overseas our greatest difficulty in CIC is that counter intelligence staff officers and others in G2 sections are not vaguely familiar with the capabilities of agents and their proper use..."

31 Jul Comparative strength reports revealed the following:

Type	Auth	Actual	(1945)
Officers	1,173	1,194	1,359
WO's	605	385	0
Enlisted	1,986	2,213	4,360
Total	3,764	3,792	5,719

15 Aug CIC, Giessen, Germany, investigated suspected sabotage attempt of CIC and MG gasoline. Two men arrested but sabotage intent doubtful.

18 Aug Brigadier General G. V. Keyser, Chief, CIC, stated "...every time things go wrong in a foreign theater, the trouble can be directly traced to the G2's ignorance of the CIC mission, the nature of its personnel and operations, and the necessity for a minimum of military restrictions in order to give agents a better chance to operate...I am an advocate of an Intelligence Corps..."

21 Aug Caribbean Defense Command requested that its replacement personnel travel from the US to the command in civilian clothes.

August CIC detachment in the Philippine Islands closed its offices at Baguio and San Fernando.

August CIC, Stuttgart, Germany, uncovered a lead which led to the eventual apprehension by CIC of Gertrude Schloz-Klink, Nazi Women's Leader, and her lieutenant general husband, one of Himmler's school directors.

15 Sep The 17th CIC Detachment, Trieste, covered riots in which three were killed and seventeen injured, including eleven policemen.

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17 Sep National Military Establishment (NME) became operative with Army, Navy, and Air as three departments of the Defense Department.

22 Sep Central Intelligence Agency replaced National Intelligence Authority.

September CIC in Germany discovered evidence that it was Soviet policy to control traffic across the interzonal boundaries.

8 Oct Commanding Officer, 112th CIC Detachment, Fourth Army, estimated that with the new civilian loyalty program added to present CIC requirements, work will be quadrupled.

October Basic course at the CIC School increased from eight weeks to twelve weeks and two day "detachment problem" was inaugurated.

5 Nov The 428th CIC Detachment, Italy, was deactivated as Italian government took over full security; four officers were left behind for CIC work.

18 Nov Proposed revision of T/O&E 30-500 would provide 780 Regular Army Officers out of 4,335 total officer strength and would be increased until by 1951 the Corps would be fifty percent Regular Army officer.

November CIC Book Store opened to provide CIC personnel with basic reference books at reasonable costs.

November Three agents of the 401st CIC Detachment, Hawaii, were sent to Eniwetok and Kwajelein Islands to provide security for atomic tests.

November Reserve Affairs section established by G2 at the CIC Center.

14 Dec The last of the US Army troops sailed from Italy including the final four CIC agents.

15 Dec Okinawa CIC Detachment was separated from Philippine Islands. The fifty-five islands of Ryukyus Command now covered by 526th CIC Detachment.

31 Dec Army General Classification Test average of students at CIC Center up to 123.4 for final quarter and educational level of CIC students up to 12.7 years.

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December Accomplishments of the year included design of an official CIC emblem for school use.

December CIC school figures showed that with the .45 caliber pistol, there were 12.2 percent experts and 27.17 percent who failed to qualify; with the.38 caliber revolver, there were 28.7 percent experts and 7.23 percent who failed to qualify.

December CIC in Japan was commended by GHQ Far East for its disclosure of the rice delivery slow-down plot of the Communists.

December Statistical summary revealed that during the Second World War, eight-three agents had died in line of duty.

December War Reports of General H. H. Arnold were published. General Arnold said, "In the future it will be suicidally dangerous to depend upon reports of military attaches and routine casual sources of information regarding foreign states.

December Brigadier General George V. Keyser was ordered overseas, but another General Officer was scheduled for replacement as Chief, CIC.

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16 Jan Brigadier General E. A. Zundel became Chief of CIC.

1 Jun First Service Command CIC unit reduced to sub-detachment as consolidations under Army Areas continued.

June G2 instructs that Intelligence Field Files be maintained only when derogatory information exists.

July CIC Center had an active Public Information Center which among other activities published the CIC Digest.

August Air Force, CIC, transferred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

15 Oct G2, DA, proposed that five percent of the officers assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Army Security Agency, and Strategic Intelligence be on a permanent career basis.

October 113th CIC investigation disproves one of the first flying saucer scares.

1 Nov Major General Stafford Irwin became G2 of the Army.

November Tightening background requirements led to large numbers of rejections at the CIC school.

December School Research Library, Student Library, and bookstore opened at CIC school.

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25 Jan Only forty six percent of the number of required instructors on duty at CIC School.

14 Feb CIC Center faced problem of men being lost to CIC when field units lifted their MOS.

14 Feb Chief, CIC, orders study to find out why CIC requires so many replacements.

16 Mar Pretests ordered at CIC Center to eliminate poor quality.

9 Jun Brigadier General John K. Rice became Chief of CIC.

9 Jun Major General A. R. Bolling became G2 of the Army.

6 Sep All emergency requisitions for CIC agents filled out and Corps approaching saturation point.

25 Oct To retain CIC Center cadre required that such personnel be trained as CIC specialists.

15 Nov More CIC agents needed in Austria as Displaced Persons Clearance Program starts.

December CIC assigned additional language spaces at Army Language School but school complained that men without aptitude were being sent.

5 Jan Dedication of Hubbard, Hunter, and Allen Halls at Camp Holabird.

5 Jan Out of 133 average reserve officers, 31 were selected to be recommended for retention.

13 Jan Authority received by the Center to establish a Clerk-Typist Course and awarded an SSN 405.

20 Jan CIC Equipment Panel organized to make recommendations on the selection, standardization, laboratory testing, training, maneuvers, testing, and adoption or rejection of equipment.

20 Jan CIC Center to study advisability of not listing CIC school in the DA School Catalgue to prevent present situation where CIC school quotas were listed and reprinted in the Army and Navy Jornal. ASA does not list its school.

20 Jan Security Control Division asked to draw up a set of security principles which would apply to Center and the Corps to end "rule of thumb" decisions.

24 Jan Center protests SR which limits brief cases to finance and property auditors and asks that CIC agents be included with those authorized to carry brief cases.

27 Jan Ground breaking ceremony for Cummins Apartments scheduled for 6 February.

7 Feb Security and Training Group Intelligence Division desires system whereby it can determine, if a reservist's CIC specialty in MI reserve is withdrawn whether man is eligible for some other MI specialty or should be transferred out of MI.

7 Feb Total of 60 officers lost to CIC by cutbacks. All but 15 company grade.

13 Feb WAC Chief approves plan to assign WACs with CIC, as 1405's and to train a limited number of enlisted WACs as 1301's.

13 Feb Chief, CIC, requested close liaison be maintained between CIC Center and Public Information School.

13 Feb CIC Advanced Course approved.

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14 Feb Policy established to have local Army Area detachments participate in CIC reserve detachment training.

17 Feb CIC Center authorized to assign SSN's 1301 and 1405 to WAC personnel.

17 Feb Economy move results in Center no longer authorized to have CIC personnel sent to their new stations via the CIC detachment headquarters at the Army Area. Men must go direct to field assignments.

21 Feb Army Field Forces proposed that it prepare, supervise, and amend T/O&E 30-500 as part of Army's decentralization. CIC Center opposed.

21 Feb Proposal made to assign a CIC officer to the Staff of Army Senior Instructor in states where there are a large number of CIC reservists.

28 Feb Plan worked out for securing reserve officers with mobilization assignment at the Center for 30,60, or 90 day tours in the division where they would be assigned.

3 Mar Study to be made of creating a small detachment to be available for maneuvers and exercises to handle technical work and be on call to ZI detachment to handle delicate investigations.

3 Mar 311th CIC Detachment commended for its excellent work with aggressor forces in Operation MIKI.

10 Mar Chief, CIC, inspection reveals 109th CIC Detachment and G2, Second Army, working together enthusiastically and in close harmony despite lack of clear delineation between staff and command.

10 Mar First 4405 (Clerk-Typist) class scheduled for graduation.

10 Mar Operations Branch Section and Training Group ID makes first use of CIC Center CIP files.

14 Mar PFC English instructor at CIC school could not be promoted because CIC Center has an overage in corporals.

20 Mar Second "temporary" long German course started to supply linguists for the 66th CIC Detachment.

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20 Mar CIC Center informed Assistant Secretary of the Army that while the number of personnel in its pipeline was high, CIC "is not a situation typical to other schools."

20 Mar Army Field Forces will handle T/O&E 30-500, but the Intelligence Division will have final approval.

20 Mar CIC Center at Camp Holabird assured at least in peacetime.

20 Mar Microfilming report from the 66th CIC reveals only 158,400 cards photographed and one million yet to do. Also 270,000 dossiers to be done.

21 Mar Major James Hay of 112th CIC Detachment protests positive intelligence and psychological warfare missions assigned CIC agents in maneuver aggressor roles. Also suggested that if they are assigned undercover missions that agents from other areas be brought in to carry them out.

24 Mar Order published redesignating the CIC Center Staff Division to G1, 2, 3, 4. Six General Staff Corps with troop personnel spaces were authorized.

24 Mar CIC authorized to assign field grade officers to detachments as overstrength and without requisitions to compensate for shortage of company grade officers.

24 Mar Center authorized to assign twenty percent excess manpower to 116th CIC and eliminate semi-permanent TDY situation.

28 Mar CIC Center asked that it be allowed to comment on proposed revisions of SR 310-30-1.

31 Mar Hubbard Hall dedicated.

31 Mar Second Army informed G4, CIC Center, that fireproof, three-way, locked cabinets were being reserved for Top Secret documents.

31 Mar Department of Army requested to suspend all enlistments and reenlistments to CIC because of cut-down in school quota during July and August.

4 Apr As of 1 April all transfers to CIC were to be handled in accordance with the new AR 600-148 "Transfers to CIC."

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15 Apr Camp Holabird became Fort Holabird.

17 Apr Use of Fort Meade band authorized for Holabird.

25 Apr The Center was considering a Second Army request to provide space for an Organized Reserve Corps school.

28 Apr Office of Strategic Intelligence in the Philippines work over the files of the deactivated 229th CIC Detachment, and reported an estimated fifty to sixty percent duplication of files.

28 Apr Center had to inform overage MI Reserve officers that it could not make exceptions to retain them.

28 Apr CIC AG placed four file cabinets of historical material at disposal of the CIC school.

2 May Plans being discussed for a three-year Organized Reserve Corps training program.

2 May Survey shows only seventy percent of CIC reserve officers on active duty plan to sign new category statement. This means a loss of 400 officers in 1951, leaving Corps 120-130 under strength.

2 May Colonel Kibler, former chief of CIC completed fifteen day tour active duty in his mobilization assignment as Troop Commander, later changed to a staff assignment.

5 May Center G1 stated that while short seven lieutenant colonels in EUCOM, the command was over sixteen to seventeen majors, and the shortage of field grade was not "acute."

5 May Intelligence Career Plan, which included CIC program for recurring and continuous tours of CIC officers, approved by G2, DA.

10 May Chief, CIC, directs that when TM 30-215 is revised into an SR that it "clearly specify and define exactly what command responsibilities are deemed appropriate for CIC Commanders."

10 May Analysis of two student groups revealed officers and enlisted men below CIC standard. Chief, CIC, asked for investigation to see if waivers have been misused.

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10 May Chief, CIC, directed that students failing the 1301 course were not to be reassigned to the 1405 course.

12 May Department of Army, G4, reported mobilization status of Fort Holabird was being decided.

12 May Included in plans for CIC Reserve officer training would be sending out two teams, of four instructors each, to various Army areas.

12 May Chief, CIC expressed desire to know more about the Canadian counter-part of CIC and that training at the Center should be offered them. G2, DA, approval being requested.

12 May Plans being completed for one officer and nine EM's to handle security at Eniwetok tests.

12 May Secretary of Defense asked Chief, CIC, to make security surveys of nineteen government buildings in Washington, a project taking about a year.

12 May Chief, CIC, approved plan to send a CIC officer to the Command General School at Fort Riley to teach and to assist aggressor forces. He does not approve providing a CIC Detachment for the aggressor forces.

12 May CIC Center asked to provide personnel for a CIC section of the mobilization plan of Army Field Forces.

16 May CIC policy that all CIC officers assigned to Airborne units be either jump qualified or willing and able to be.

16 May Chief of CIC concerned about using first three graders for KP. Second Army to be asked to furnish permanent detail.

19 May Table of Allowances for Reserve units approved by Army Field Forces and now goes to Army area for comments.

19 May The Equipment Modification List for the 10th CIC Detachment was approved.

23 May Atomic Energy Commission provided one unit for the work on the new CPI files.

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23 May CIC center studying how to obtain accurate data on time and cost involving in conducting the average background investigation.

26 May Chief, CIC, asked that study be made of the effect of the increased attention placed on security within the government. The problem arose over the increasing backlog of work in the 116th CIC Detachment and its request for additional personnel.

26 May Proposal made to lengthen CIC investigations course.

6 Jun CIC asked to provide lieutenant colonel or senior major as security officer in office of Secretary of Defense.

6 Jun Out of ninety-four reservists with mobilization assignments at the CIC Center who were requested by letter to take training at the Center, forty answered, twenty declined, fifteen accepted and five said they would apply but did not.

6 Jun Out of thirteen to fifteen CIC officers submitted for approval for attendance at the Associate Advanced Course, only three approved, although a majority of the names submitted were officers with CIC duty during the war who had had background clearances.

6 Jun Plan to reorganize the CIC School on the G1, 2, 3, 4, basis to conform to the Center.

9 Jun Chief, CIC, decided field grade officer spaces would be filled, and if not enough had CIC experience some with G2 experience would be accepted.

30 Jun Fort Holabird alerted against sabotage as Korean War opened. No civilian clothing worn on post.

7 Jul Plans made for special course in language and area background to train agents for possible assignment to such areas as Korea, Yugoslavia, and Iran.

11 Jul G3 ordered to inquire what the present status would be of Fort Holabird in a mobilization.

11 Jul Center made plans to secure a reasonable quota of Branch Officer Candidate School spaces if the Korean War reopened them. Staff Conference notes state "Considerable disaffection was engendered during World War II by the inability of the Corps to com-

mission a large number of its qualified personnel."

18 Jul No reserve officers to be released prior to category expiration.

18 Jul Plans made for officer levy on Arms and Services for administration personnel to release 9302 and for calling up reserve officers if CIC qualifies in the Technical Specialty category, being recalled by the emergency.

18 Jul First inductees under new draft processed through Fort Holabird.

18 Jul Home Radio station and two vehicular radio units to be operating within a week at Fort Holabird.

21 Jul Study ordered on how to get back into CIC ranks the Niseis in Hawaii who were released when Corps was reduced in strength.

21 Jul Study ordered on how to earmark, prior to their basic training, draftees suitable for CIC.

21 Jul Fifth Army Commanding General informed CIC Center that loss of its CIC majors for shipment to Far East Command was going to disrupt operations to some extent.

21 Jul General Bolling, G2, ordered Center to furnish list of company grade MI reserve on AMP-2. Officers to be asked their desires on returning to active duty.

25 Jul Brigadier General John Weckerling named Chief of Intelligence Div, G2, DA.

26 Jul CIC asked to have the privileges of designating what units it desired and let Army Field Forces actually order them to active duty.

26 Jul Arrangements made with reserve affairs, G2, DA, to get up to date rosters of CIC reserve units after the Center discovered that only two out of seven agents cleared for assignment in units were still with them.

27 Jul Recommended CIC personnel be more careful in what they tell their wives. The accuracy of their information at times is almost uncanny.

28 Jul All foreign tours of personnel overseas frozen for

six months.

31 Jul Chief, CIC, stated he desires to support all CIC units in combat to the fullest extent even if it worked to the detriment of the rest of the organization. He stated he would meet field officer needs by recalling as quickly as possible selected reserve officers. He suggested that senior grade company officers might be promoted to major. He stated the need for CIC personnel today is such that, if possible, action should be initiated now.

1 Aug Six GSC spaces for the Center have been approved.

3 Aug SR 380-160-1 published, establishing criteria for clearances of personnel handling classified information.

14 Aug Center informed that the CIC field grade officers rushed to the port for FECOM, were held a week, and then sent on a slow victory ship.

18 Aug Chief, CIC, ordered the assistant commandant of the CIC school to make rounds of all Army branch schools, the Command and General School and the Army War College and arrange to have CIC on their guest speaker lists. The Chief said the results of such speaker publicity would be that:

a. Volunteers for CIC would be more plentiful.
b. CIC operation on a mutual faith and confidence basis would accrue.
c. Command and Staff relationships of CIC detachment commanding officers would be bettered.

18 Aug Microfilm team trained for Austria to be diverted by a FECOM request. Was not diverted on orders of Chief of CIC. A special team was trained for FECOM.

23 Aug No accurate information as to the existence of location of the original files of the inactivated Korean CIC detachment was found and only about twenty percent of the microfilm was readable.

23 Aug Survey disclosed that some ZI Army areas had failed to immediately secure PHS's from all personnel assigned to ORC CIC units.

25 Aug Plan made to train sixteen additional polygraph operators.

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1 Sep Ten British and Canadian officers of high rank and position to be given a one-day orientation at Fort Holabird.

1 Sep Arrangements made to have CIC casualty and decoration lists sent to Center, as it was found at the end of the World War II no such data had been compiled.

5 Sep Far East Command has asked approval for eight division and corp size detachments and one army size detachment to be organized in Japan and sent to Korea on detached service of the 441st.

7 Sep The 342d and the 279th CIC reserve detachments arrived at Fort Holabird.

8 Sep Newly arrived CIC detachments carried orders attaching them to Second Army instead of Fort Holabird. Snafu was straightened out.

12 Sep All Organized Reserve Corps five year commissions extended for an indefinite period.

15 Sep Propose change to SR 350-350-2 so that former CIC agents may elect to return to CIC directly upon graduation from OCS.

15 Sep About twenty-five percent of reservists reporting for CIC unable to qualify because of AGCT deficiency.

19 Sep Investigation revealed low AGCT reservists had no desire to serve with CIC. They had joined a CIC unit in their home area because it was the only one available.

19 Sep Chief, CIC, asks that procurement be speeded up. Three weeks with no action had passed since G1, DA, approved calling up 500 EMs for CIC training. Out of 141 reserve officers called on 15 August only nine accepted and they would not arrive until 8 October.

22 Sep The CIC Center was informed that its request to have CIC reserve units assigned to it instead of Second Army would be a major change in DA policy -- Center still seeking solution.

22 Sep CIC request for 527 additional warrant officers being held by G1, DA, pending revision of AR 610-15.

22 Sep G1 and G3, DA, approved CIC officer and enlisted men levy on Army area during mobilization.

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22 Sep Recall of 648 reserve officers to CIC approved.

26 Sep DA rules that ORC - CIC units will be assigned only to G2's or to Army Areas. CIC regiments will be assigned to G2, DA, and indorsed to the CIC Center.

3 Oct CIC Center protested plan of Engineers to recall all their officers on duty with CIC.

3 Oct A military subjects course was organized to fill in time until "overflow" of students started CIC school.

10 Oct Department of Army, G2, and Army Field Forces worked on plans to have all linguists coming back into service assigned to one training division as a pool from which various intelligence agencies, including CIC, could draw.

24 Oct Cellular CIC team at the Center proposed to handle high level cases.

24 Oct Center informed that G2, DA, had concurred on its plan for training post S2's for Army Field Forces.

24 Oct Activation of 210th CIC Detachment for X Corps, the 181st for the First Marine Division, and the 705th detachment for the Third Logistical Command ordered.

24 Oct Department of Army reported that 443 EM would arrive at the Center between 1 and 15 November and that 69 officers would arrive in November.

24 Oct Center advised that SR 615-120-50, "Enlistment and Reenlistment for CIC" had been approved and published.

31 Oct Chief, CIC, reported he had had a conference with G2, DA, and the Information Chief, DA, on CIC publicity. General Rice stated he wanted to show that the CIC was not a "novice" and disprove claims that it "couldn't possibly compete with foreign agents." General Rice said he desired to avoid any charge that he is attempting to build an "elite Corps."

14 Nov Army areas complained they were furnished unqualified CIC personnel. One man had a sixty percent disability. Another was 43 years old and had only

a seventh grade education.

17 Nov SR 380-405-1, "Military Security," was published 1 Nov. It outlined the Provost Marshal General's responsibility for the investigation of civilian employees working on DA contracts. This policy was contrary to the recommendations of two staff studies submitted to DA by CIC.

21 Nov Three ORC - CIC detachment were ordered activated at the Center 1 Dec with a mere nucleus of personnel. The units would be operated with administrative support of the Center AG and G4 for ten days before getting their full complement of men.

8 Dec CIC Center requested WAC detachment be increased to 200 women.

8 Dec Center G1 reported 81 officers who had been deferred "for some reason or other" would report for duty on 2 Jan 1951.

8 Dec CIC personnel for DP program were shipped to Austria as requested, except for a SMOE technician, " as there was no technician available."

11 Dec Colonel David G. Erskine became Deputy Chief of CIC and Chief of Staff of the CIC Center.

15 Dec G2, DA, ruled there would be no extension to any thing we have at the present time regarding our publicity policy -- no television, radio, and motion pictures.

15 Dec Because of the tight supply situation, only thirty percent of the actual vehicles were issued to newly activated units in training. After four months training fifty percent were issued.

15 Dec Proposal was made to change MOS 1405 to 4247.

15 Dec CIC troop commander reported he found personnel of reserve detachments completely unqualified to assume their own administration and recommended a weeks training in morning reports before activation of the unit.

19 Dec Chief, CIC, asked that all information discovered of CIC being included in awards to units of which it was a part be forwarded to the Center historical

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file.

22 Dec CIC protested that application of fifty percent cut in Army vehicles to its units as backlogs of investigation would "go out of control."

22 Dec CIC officers with world-wide experience advised the Center that in many cases, especially to foreign-born persons and overseas, the badge is far more impressive than the credentials.

29 Dec Study asked to define CIC/CIA responsibilities and procedures in development of special investigative equipment.

29 Dec CIC Center considering proposal that G2 move its clearances and file operation to Fort Holabird.

29 Dec "CIC' suffix to MOS 4247 approved.

29 Dec Second Army informed the Center that Fort Holabird troop capacity was 4,155 based on 120 sq ft for officers, 72 sq ft for first three graders, and 60 sq ft for other enlisted personnel.

[redacted]

HIGHLIGHTS ONLY FOR 1951 - 1955

1951

20 Aug Brigadier General Philip E. Gallagher, Chief CIC.

1952

November General Partridge became G2 of the Army.

December Physical security agency established.

1953

2 Jul CIC Board made permanent by DA memo 15-10-3.

19 Aug Lieutenant Colonel Gero Iwai of the 441st CIC completed 22 years continuous active duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps -- longest of anyone in the Corps.

25 Nov SR 600-145-32 published, defining selection and retention criteria for personnel assigned to Field Operation Intelligence (FOI) duties. School for FOI in June.

20 Aug Major General George B. Burton, Chief, CIC.

19 Oct Major General Boniface Campbell, Chief, CIC.

October General Arthur G. Trudeau, G2.

1954

31 Aug By General Order 65, DA, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence Center.

1955

1 Jan Million dollar CIC school building dedicated.

1 May CIC school redesignated Army Intelligence School, as Class II activity.

[redacted]

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

FOR

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Note: The following rosters of CIC Detachments who served in the ETO campaign are incomplete and, in many cases, unverified. Some have been obtained from offical rosters; others have been compiled from signatures on reports; and others from personal files of former members of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

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1st CIC Detachment (1st Infantry Division)

Steinway, Charles G.
Weimer, Robert M.
Ray, James E.
Meadows, Charles D.
Beesley, Charles H.
Farley, Eugene E.
Califf, John W.
Lovett, Edward C.
Banyar, Frank G.
Biron, Henry A.
Ellert, Arthur R.
Finch, Richard F.
Hull, Allan F.
LaFraniere, Victor H.
Lang, Richard C.
Pinsince, Adrian J., Jr.
Rothwell, Robert G.
Neuss, Henry
Kellman, William
Jenkins, William L.
Auciello, Domenico
Cody, Charles J.
Menendez, Warren F.
Little, John W.
Diron, Henri
Knutowicz, Frank
Frankl, Frederic L.

2nd CIC Detachment (2nd Infantry Division)

Jenkins, Arthur D.
McLaughlin, Thomas D.
Walker, George H.
May, Robert S. Jr.
Kennell, Christian R.
Walker, George H.
Weems, Julian T.
Beach, George G.
Howard, William C.
Rae, Nelson S.
Shockley, Marvel E.
Wells, Gordon S.
Anthony, William A.
Grogan, Alvin C.
Meisetz, Fred E.
Omodt, Hollis W.
Linn, Wayne E.
Drucker, Ernest
Lachmann, John W.

3rd CIC Detachment (3rd Infantry Division)

Greene, Walter E.
Clark, Norman A.
Cowles, Leonard R.
Hamilton, John F.
Martowski, Patrick S.
Nesmith, Albert N.

4th CIC Detachment (4th Infantry Division)

Appleton, Oliver D.
Boyce, Bernard F., Jr.
Maher, William A.
Williams, Robert H.
Gutierrez, Robert A.
West, Thomas J.
Corcoran, John S.
Fillppu, Kaarlo
McGrail, Myles F.
Altaras, Jack C.
Colombo, Frank C.
Kadlac, Joseph H.
Keenan, John L.
Salinger, Jerome D.
Fitzgerald, Paul J.
Haynes, Alexander G.
Leahy, Richard D.
Schindler, Herbert
Speer, Claus
Roetter, Jurgen H.

5th CIC Detachment (5th Infantry Division)

Allen, Lyndon B.
Dumm, Paul J.
McKenna, John P.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Salstrom, Edward
Hanson, August W.
Barron, Thomas J.
Young, Stuart A., Jr.
Branson, Arthur F.
Shields, James P.
Williams, George F.
Dineen, William P.
Dinning, Woodford W.
Eline, Alton J.
Kennedy, Roger D.
Kleitsch, Robert J.
Lytle, Scott H.
Pedigo, Walter S., Jr.
Wyper, David
Burns, Kenneth M.
Marcus, Fred
Kandel, Paul

[redacted]

8th CIC Detachment (8th Infantry Division)

McQuade, John C.
Appel, Charles S.,Jr.
Cox, James C.
Miller, Robert C.
Newton, Arthur J.
Doyle, John P.
Shinn, John S.
Wemple, Richard I.
Ciurej, Frank S.
Cole, Hazen W.
Fahey, John A.
Frielinghaus, Henry
McQuigg, William G.
Willey,Arthur K.,Jr.
Carnanos, Paul
Pelletier,Edward C.
Dreyfuss, Erich

9th CIC Detachment (9th Infantry Division)

Musick, Joseph W.
Wheeler, Richard W.
Lueck, William O.
Grice, Luther E.
Gallagher, George R.
Ferguson, Joseph H.
Klunder, John H.
Mangam, Charles R.
Northrop, Richard M.
Clancy, Frank B.
Fennell, Fred F.
Hill, Ralph N.,Jr.
Klunder, Willard C.
Ladd, Edward T.
Lundgren, Allen H.
Morris, George W.
Novak, George J.
Rose, Hugh S.
Sowa, Edward V.
Lamb, Kurt L.
Katzenstein, Alfred
Weil, Joseph
Conick, Charles B.
Ingargiola,Henry B.
Hanson,Leonard E.
Zielasko,Gustave W.
Parker, Jerry J.

13th CIC Detachment (13th Airborne Division)

McGeoch, Charles H.
Henderson, William H.
Howe, John R.
Pospisil, Frank
Benedict, George H.
Burnham, George
Bruder, Charles W.
Schanek, John C.

17th CIC Detachment (17th Airborne Division)

Stalker, Ian F.
Briggs, Erny W.
Burke, Kevin
Antler, Gunther
Gabel, Kurt
Gardner, John E.
Bouchard, Ernest M.
Whelan, Patrick J.
Fischoff, Louis
Dannahey, Joseph F.
Allen, Eldon B. (KIA)
Tornetta,Anthony J.(KIA)
Resnick, David
Lagemann, Joseph B.
Cournaud, FN unknown
Cameron, Gerard G.
Ranner, FN unknown
Chodoski, Edward J.

26th CIC Detachment (26th Infantry Division)

Pennewell, Noah A.
Goergen, Joseph H.
Farrell, Martin P.
Zellar, Jan B.
Morgan, Charles R.
Wyles, Paul V.
Maxwell, Drummond F.
Fourness, John C.
Stern, Siggi
Nahas, Albert G.
Lederman, Harry M.
Sava, Anthony J.
Fuchs, Emanuel

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28th CIC Detachment (28th Infantry Division)

Miller, Albert B.	Toomey, Cornelius H.	Holloran, William J.
McManus, Neil C.	Welsh, Jay Y.	McCoy, John A.
Flood, Thomas W.	Bradon, Paul R.	Smith, Leroy H.
McBee, John	Brunjes, John W.	Houg, Elmer J.
Gutierrez, Emeterio, Jr.	Constant, Napoleon A.	Weissglas, Simon
Hoffman, William S.	D'Ambrosio, Michael V.	Stingl, Fred

29th CIC Detachment (29th Infantry Division)

Mayfield, Ellis O.	Mitchell, Allen R.	Hitchcock, Rex W.
Neuenschwander, Lynn E.	Anderson, George M.	Powers, Daniel M.
Gripenstraw, Louie L.	Beall, Sam D.	Warner, Jack R.
Van Otten, Andrew C.	Choever, Roger W.	Whaley, Byron A.
Palmer, Hugh J.	DeWalt, Clarence W.	Braude, Emanuel
Harwell, David J.	Gillespie, Bryant W.	Hepner, Sevens J.

30th CIC Detachment (30th Infantry Division)

Handville, Melvin	Monson, Paul J.	Vogel, Charles C.
Roberts, John W.	Olsen, Erling C.	Colman, Daniel A.
Denlinger, Richard G.	Belkin, Paul N.	Seligmann, Herman
Sears, George F.	Cranberry, Billy S.	Fraenkel, George K.
Staley, Jack	Kuehner, Junior W.	Mueller, Robert
Mackey, James E., Jr.	Nevius, Blake R.	Spear, Hans N.
Frisby, John C.	Oswald, William B.	

35th CIC Detachment (35th Infantry Division)

Foster, John S.	Lyon, Fendall G.	Welborn, Charles
Medina, Marcello	McGrane, Henry M.	Woods, John T.
Ayr, Allenby B.	Murphy, Robert E.	Dudarri, Antoun H.
Colgan, Charles	Tolli, Joseph P.	Cass, Donald L.
Schrager, Howard	Damn, Norman A.	Rohleder, Alfred H.
Unger, Sam M.	Kelch, Thelford E.	Kornfield, Ralph E.
Drolsum, Darrel D.	Bertsche, William I.	

36th CIC Detachment (36th Infantry Division)

Hammond, John G.	Gray, Jesse G.	Mark, William R.
Garo, Raymond	McOwen, William R.	

42nd CIC Detachment

Donnell, Newman R.	Nimovitz, Morris	Grootmann, Paul G.
Chamberlin, Wells F.	Golding, George M.	Jacoby, Hans F.
Burwasser, Joseph	Winter, Samuel	

44th CIC Detachment

DeCindis, Edward A.	Bernabei, Anthony A.	Raack, Walter E.
Husted, Stanley N.	Serlin, Henry	Balles, John J.
Kincher, Harold W.	Herney, John R.	Stewart, Charles L.
Hoffstot, Henry P. Jr.		

45th CIC Detachment (45th Infantry Division)

Guenthner, Rupert W.	Gearheart, Ernest T.Jr.	Ruminoff, Leonid
Birsner, John H.	Molinet, Fausto E.	Schutt, Willard A.

63rd CIC Detachment (63rd Infantry Division)

Weidner, Clinton R.	Phaneuf, Bernard G.	Fuld, Arthur J.
Linnane, William F.	Brucato, Albert V.	Chrapciak, Martin Jr.
Champagne, R. B.	Beck, Ernst A.	Clifford, Joseph W.
Apatsky, Joseph	Chrapiak, Martin	Seegers, Martin P.
Regis, Peter	Seitz, John H.	

65th CIC Detachment (65th Infantry Division)

Rich, Albert H.	Wheeler, Arthur D.	Shutt, Robert H.
Friedenberg, Stanley	Meyer, Anton F.	Houston, Henry W.
Vekich, John D.	Pawlosky, Edward	Ognanovich, John
Falchek, Walter K.	Zolna, Walter J.	Glodis, Frank J.
Tomasic, Steve E.	Cates, William H.	

66th CIC Detachment (66th Infantry Division)

Ansbacher, Edgar A.	Falk, Fred	Swan, Charles K.
Amson, Gaston	Aronoff, William R.	Scelba, Anthony P.
Hess, Walter	Hoge, William J. J.	Nowlan, Donald L.
Barnes, Alfred S.	Dawson, James F.	

69th CIC Detachment (69th Infantry Division)

Duvall, Andrew H.	Applegate, Arthur H.	Hoffman, Abraham
Stokes, Albert G.	Kulikowski, Charles J.	Rosenthal, Kenneth L.
Doyle, William A	Galicki, Edmund	Knudsen, Henning A.
Hahn, John H.	Littell, Duane O.	Levine, Ellis M.
Shay, Morris J.	Gregg, Robert E.	Newstetter, Wilber I.
Bellis, Sydney W.	Thomas, Edgar V.	Weiskopf, William J.
Titman, Paul W.	Jacobs, Joseph S.	

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70th CIC Detachment (70th Infantry Division)

Kalish, Jacob	Denton, James G.	Milner, Robert S.
Lasater, Roy A.	Kiley, George L.	Henley, Albert T.
Olsen, James M.	Collins, Ulysses S.	Gagen, Joseph
Colombo, Primitivo M. L.	Lanier, Ward P.	Cowles, Leonard R.
Fuhr, Walter E.	Canfield, Daniel C.	Bissell, Harry Jr.
Iskin, Arnold J.	Ehrenshaft, Harry	Zoller, Alvin
Gutman, Harvey E.	Neville, Stephen J.	Brown, Keirn C.
Hoebel, Henry L.	McDonald, G. H.	Lipper, William

71st CIC Detachment (71st Infantry Division)

Zabaldeno, Frank C.	Kelly, Floyd M.	Schlosser, Robert
Ricciardelli, Albert A.	Zeman, George	Kula, Clement J.
Teller, Gustav	La Framboise, Ernest J.	Peepcke, Eric
Jackson, Merrill R.		

75th CIC Detachment (75th Infantry Division)

Gassinger, Henry A.	Kauffeld, John H.	Doda, John P.
Misuraco, Joseph V.	O'Neil, James F.	Gakemeier, Norman H.
Turkowski, Leonard S.	Del Guercio, Mario C.	

76th CIC Detachment (76th Infantry Division)

Zernicke, George A.	Filppula, Taistc C.	Krauss, Marvin D.
Barnaby, William F.	Bezek, Dan J.	Madel, Melvin R.
Achin, Roland M.	Edstrom, Albert K.	Posner, Samuel
Manning, Jack C.	Koch, Harold S.	

78th CIC Detachment (78th Infantry Division)

Ruge, Neil M.	Anderson, Arthur E.	Hellriegel, Walter
Vogt, Albert D.	Jung, Richard H.	Popper, Felix A.
Merbach, Robert H.	Steinharter, Fred P.	Romney, Henry J.
Bettershell, Harold R.	Stracke, Emil H.	Gilbert, Irvin
Farnaw, Frederick Z.	Blau, Jack Z.	

79th CIC Detachment (79th Infantry Division)

Bogatin, Irvin	Strong, William B.	Gillen, Edward J.
Gonzales, Richard M.	Birt, Francis M.	Forsyth, James A.
Keggins, Alfred G.	Bullock, Thomas B.	Potter, David M.
Burton, William C.	Conyers, Ben J.	Beissinger, Harvy
Tittle, Clarence S.	Nelson, Edward J.	Boksen, Herbert
Zintz, David	Seims, Gordon	Markusiewicz, Anthony
Ellsberry, William G.	Sojet, Frank A.	

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80th CIC Detachment (80th Infantry Division)

McMillen, Thomas R.
Motell, Curt
Caminer, Jack A.
O'Neal, Carl F.
Axtell, Clayton M.
Matterson, Robert E.
Klimek, John
Vance, John C.
Rothschild, Robert G.
Sussemann, Karl

82nd CIC Detachment (82nd Infantry Division)

Wallace, William H.Jr.
Salstrom, Edward D.
Kummer, Albert J.
Jacobi, Fnu
Pearce, John C.
Goldstein, Sidney L.
Whalen, Joseph R.
Allen, Eldon L.
Davis, Thomas C.
O'Neill, James P.
Both, Edwin O.
Gladney, Graves
McRae, Leonard K.
Waldren, Taylor C.
Daniel, Russell
Fredinand, Howard R.
Fuller, Francis, J.
George, George J.
Lowance, Carter O.
Wheeler, Donald L.
Osterman, Victor C.
Stevens, Harold L.
Sloan, Paul G.
Scanlon, John E.
Goldenfeld, Ernest A.
Perper, George A.
Charlton, John R.
Ralston, Robert J.
Stollak, Jules

83rd CIC Detachment (83rd Infantry Division)

Victor, Oliver A.
Kerns, Lawrence A.
O'Donnell, John B.
Sweeney, John P.
Novel, Roy B.
Horton, Harry H.,Jr.
Janazen, William A.
DeWitt, Erville D.
Davenport, Basil
Salsinger, William L.
Florsheim, George D.
Lammert, Paul E.
Meinstein, Siegfried
Van Der Ploeg, Jacob J.
Steiermann, Gordon L.

84th CIC Detachment (84th Infantry Division)

Murray, W. R.
Lunstedt, Carl A.
Toscano, Frank V.
Miller, Robert C.
Rountree, Charles A.
Welborn, Charles
Gleason, Thomas J.
Gernazian, Stephen
Weir, Alfred
Wanner, Maximilian R.
Kissinger, Henry A.
Bellack, Robert O.
Levitch, Frank R.

87th CIC Detachment (87th Infantry Division)

Arnold, Frank S.
Crawford, John J.
Schnepel, Herman H.
Bamberger, Werner
Klaus, Walter
Reineke, Kurt
Hirechstein, Ralph
Brook, Kurt D.
Niklas, Robert J.
Davis, Charles R.
Perry, Albert L.
Harwell, Sam E.
Mondelli, Joseph A.
Nathans, David
Cobb, Ward R.
Strul, Edmund S.
Gunderson, Robert W.
Beatty, Richard H.
Berger, Fred
Eisenberg, Max
Sharpe, Lawrence A.
Bauer, Paul

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89th CIC Detachment (89th Infantry Division)

Geers, John P.
Cordella, Robert H.
Russi, David P.
Toombs, Harry B.
Morace, John J.
Signa, Louis M.
Keating, Joseph P.
Kogut, Henry J.
Skubik, Stephen J.
Belak, Frank E.
Gillespie, William L.
May, Ralph E.
Poulin, Joseph A.L.P.

90th CIC Detachment (90th Infantry Division)

Osborne, Walter D.
Miller, Edgar R.
Sims, John E.
Ash, William J.
Dinwiddie, Harry E., Jr.
McGee, Leo C.
Fyanes, Francis D.
Blanton, Charles K.
Boudreau, Amadee R.
Davis, Joseph A.
Ehrenshaft, Harry
Gowan, Ralph L.
Lustig, Raymond W.
Morton, William M., Jr.
Misonow, Jack
Stansell, Theodore L.
McGee, Harold
Balkcan, Robert A.
Weitzenkorn, Paul
Bauer, Albert
Eckmann, Alexander J.
Haberman, Joseph

94th CIC Detachment (94th Infantry Division)

Goodson, Carl K.
West, Bill C.
Bishop, Robert F.
Gober, Anthony
Greer, Rudy
Stern, Kurt
Phillips, Daniel T.
Willer, James F.
Zuk, Peter
Ireland, Fred H.
Akers, Buford L.
Sender, Henry
Schwarz, Herbert
Deininger, Richard
Lee, Francis
Thurmond, Benjamin J.
Jacobs, Weldon M.

95th CIC Detachment

Castle, James C.
Barnes, Everard G.
Veach, John L.
Fischl, Stephan T.
Davey, Floyd B.
Shellan, Gerard M.
Waugh, Sanford A.
Allen, Thomas B.
Keiffer, Pierre G.
Pohlen, Kurt R.

97th CIC Detachment (97th Infantry Division)

Grimes, Oscar
Seaton, Charles T.

99th CIC Detachment (99th Infantry Division)

Young, George D.
Cody, Francis T.
Stephens, Howard V.
Provenzano, John D.
La Crosse, Louis T.
Sloan, Charles
Gardin, Vic
Brooks, Roy W.
Gordon, Victor M.
Stautner, Joseph F.
Short, Stannard K.
Goure, Leon
Holt, Frederick
Landa, Daniel
Mercier, Alfred J.

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100th CIC Detachment (100th Infantry Division)

Mattos, Anthony R.
Smith, Guthrie J.
Wilson, Alvin M.
Connor, Thomas J.
Schueler, Arthur M.
Langford, Berry F.
Brannon, Louis T.
Neiman, Joseph
Scharzchild, Henry
Scully, Leo F.
Jacobi, Carl H.
Johnson, Lawrence M.
Suder, Robert W.
Valente, Frank J.
Anderson, Warren R.

101st CIC Detachment (101st Airborne Division)

McGuire, Martin E.
McKennan, Bradley
Notopoulos, Alexander A.
Whalen, FNU
Gannon, William F.
Stemple, Max L.
Tofant, William J.
Foster, Curtis M.
Benson, Frank E., Jr.
Clark, William E.
Giambalvo, Nunzio A.
Kapic, Roman F.
Martin, George E.
Reed, William P.
Robinson, Frank L.
Ryan, Thomas E.
Symmes, Howard W.
Parsons, Bernard R.
Bowers, William E.
Freedman, Abraham A.
Fraund, William

102nd CIC Detachment (102nd Infantry Division)

Sutton, Horace A.
Reisner, David J.
Tait, Charles W.
[illegible]ydon, John J.
Suman, John G.
O'Toole, Joseph V.
Hugo, Eugene F.
Flynn, Thomas F.
Hoffer, Wolfgand E.
Ronis, Fred
Weyer, John J.
Erdman, Alexander E.

103rd CIC Detachment (103rd Infantry Division)

Hudson, Dugald W.
Elms, Grady
Gowdy, Charles M.
Friestedt, Herman F.
Fedder, Walter F.
Macganwell, John E.
Evans, Albert E.
Lins, Milton K.
Hansen, Ernst F.
Garner, Gerard
Sandel, Leo

104th CIC Detachment (104th Infantry Division)

Julian, Brooks P.
Casserly, John P.
Evans, Townsend
Hanna, David L.
Motroni, Ralph J.
Fial, Allen I.
Gellatly, Robert N.
McCabe, Harold E.
Schurpf, Paul T.
Matusik, Mieczyslaus K.
Robertson, Robert S.
Keiffer, Reinhardt J.

106th CIC Detachment (106th Infantry Division)

Coad, Francis E.
Jordan, Edward J.
Kleinman, Abraham
Jensen, Leslie A.
Barlabas, George
Urry, Donald C.
Brilty, Francis X.
McIntyre, James W.
Wendt, William F.
Yaeger, Edwin R.
Garner, Doniphan M.
Jacobson, Milford E.
Rakestraw, George F.
Bamberth, Peter H.
Underwood, FNU
St. Germain, Jules B.
Sullivan, Richard M.
Moore, William J.
Czjkowski, Caslmir J.

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201st CIC Detachment (I Armored Corps)

Heegaard-Jensen, Paul A.	Costello, Harry	Cameron, Jack B.
Stradinger, Oscar	Brod, Mario E.	Amerman, Harry L.
Joyce, Herbert M.	Vengrouskie, Victor J.	Johnson, Reginald M.
Golden, Bernard H.	Halloran, Paul L.	Ellison, Herbert T.
French, Woodrow W.	Gray, Alfred	Gordon, Peter
Bucher, Donald C.	Hernandez, Crispin C.	Nadir, Nubar
Ford, Quintin U.	Somers, George B.	Pogue, Earl
Metastazio, Arthur P.	MacGruer, John A.	Rumatz, George
Haseltine, Marshall	O'Connor, Rhea T.	Smith, Richard
Emmet, Thomas A.	Stefanik, Thadeus	Flynn, Francis P.
Richards, Robert R.	Gordon, Wendell G.	Jacovine, Anthony E.
Bergman, Victor C.	Devere, Perry A.	Bailey, Perry O.
Brockmeier, Robert	Pawson, Joseph E.	Voitle, Robert F.

202nd CIC Detachment (II Corps)

Dinehart, Alan F.	Brown, Jarvis J.	Fangel, Lloyd
Stephens, Thomas G.	Keeler, Clark B.	Wittrock, Norbett
Princi, Peter W.	Tozier, Roy G.	Sullivan, Daniel J.

203rd CIC Detachment (III Corps)

Wardell, Hilliare P.

205th CIC Detachment (5th Corps under 12th Army Group)

Weil, Eric L.	Holland, Maurice O.	Olsen, Holden W.
Alden, Harry E.	Kearns, Thomas E.	Reynolds, Floyd L.
Berle, Gus	Leslie, Robert J.	Stegmaier, Arthur G.
Jost, Erwin W.	Marcum, Herbert C.	Furniss, Robert D.
Kostrich, Max	Niemi, Raymond	Boosel, Harry X.
Pettus, Erle, Jr.	Thiele, Joseph C.	Allen, Holand S.
Riddle, Daniel M. Jr.	Williams, Richard J.	McCarthy, Donnell B.
Grier, Harry D. M.	Bacon, Leonard L.	Baer, Manfred
Daly, Phillip J.	Demers, Armand A.	

206th CIC Detachment (VI Corps)

Costello, Harry G., Jr.	Cortes, Louis J.	Martin, Paul J.
Judson, Clarence H. Jr.	Ford, Quintin U.	Medaglia, John D.
Kruse, Donald F.	Hofemann, Albert G., Jr.	Metastazio, Arthur P.
Peadle, Edward S.	McKee, Claude M.	Mills, Jack W.

207th CIC Detachment (VII Corps)

Dorsett, James K.
Hemmingway, John H.
Bennett, Edwin
Kinsey, Benjamin, T.
Zielasko, Gustave W.
Ballsrud, Wesley E.
Brady, William T.
Jaudon, Elbert W.
Hall, Joseph H.
Meyer, Fred A.
Schluter, Claymer
Stollenwerck, Edward C.

Reber, John H.
Badger, Daniel B.
Schiller, John
Schroeder, Charles J.
Varenick, Michael I.
Vargas, Frank A.
Neville, Stephen J.,Jr.
Norvish, Franklin
Perry, Albert L.
Rountree, Charles A.
Wright, David
Hoffman, Paul L.
Moran, Fenton
Cartier, Normand R.
DeClercq, Albert
Barr, Nobert G.
Kent, Henry

208th CIC Detachment (VIII Corps)

Bowen, Albert R., Jr.
Ermis, Leo L.
Rand, Harvey H.
Eberly, Donald A.
Leach, James H.
Rooney, Julian R.
Spooner, Jack A.
Walker, Dewey S.
intz, David
lock, Joseph D.
Bradley, Harry L.
Braune, Edward L.
Brown, George P.
Kutzlo, Steve
Wallenhorst, Harry H.
Finnel, Albert T.
Pelo, Richard J.
Tignor, Patrick H.
Wilson, Meredith R.

Note: Following named men First Names Unknown

Long
Slifer
Wolfe
Strauss
Finnel
Weinstein
Tober
Wayne

Sample
Knudsen
Doyle

Schwartzkopf

Michel
Hoffman
Levine
Bennigson
Kubikowski
Titman
Bellis
Newsstatter
DeWitt
Weisskopf
Rosenthal
Applegate

212th CIC Detachment (XII Corps)

Bogin, Issac
Shire, Joseph
Smith, Carlos D.
Adams, John J.
Syring, William J.
Proudfoot, Harold B.
Avery, Donald C.
Fulmer, Burton E.

213th CIC Detachment (XIII Corps)

Huntington, Clarence

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215th CIC Detachment (XV Corps)

Fossieck, Theore R.
Bell, Edward P.
Segal, Hans E.
Kocem, Felix H.
McKeogh, Francis M.
Wilgus, Sidney D.
Babilya, Peter J., Jr.
Cornish, Lorenzo E.
Finegan, Eugene E.
Gleason, Thomas J.
Jury, William H.
Ogg, Lyman
Slater, Russell R.
Dilles, Stanley E.
Jones, Carroll E.
McNiece, Harry W.
Mowrey, Elmous N.
Sabulski, Alvin A.
Siffin, John J.
Sims, Harry B.

216th CIC Detachment (XVI Corps)

Frederick, William W.
Goldbeck, Herman G.
Gross, Eric M.
Clarke, Herbert W.
Rafaeli, Alexander
Howell, Dillard W.

218th CIC Det (XVIII Corps (Airborne))

Dearing, Albin P.
Gordon, Lewis F.
Whalen, Joseph R.
Dobson, Kenneth W.
Gundersen, Ernest C.
Kuziv, Michael
Pearce, John C.
Stalker, Ian F.
Tracy, Richard L.
Schepsis, Anthony A.
Heavey, Robert W.
Follansbee, Harvey O.
Daley, John W.
Burrill, Leon M.
Rockwood, Joe S.
Eckhardt, Henri E.
Kennedy, George B.
Pendergast, John F.
Rehnberg, James B.
Walzer, Howard B.
Davine, Edward J.
Smith, Frederick M.
Anderson, Edmund O.
Dohrn, William J.
Kartell, Arthur C.
Marwick, Lawrence
Collyer, Charles H.
Lagemann, Joseph B.
Dibblee, Albert
Briefs, Henry W.
Leon, Henry
Brunswick, Edmund J.
Hauvelhorst, Herman
Bauman, Jack M.
Donohue, Joseph T.
Walker, K. O.
Dunbar, L. L.

219th CIC Detachment (XIX Corps)

Gagen, Thomas A.
Baker, Ernest S.
Holtzner, Francis J.
Jenkins, William L.
Stanton, Francis W.
Cadden, Francis L.
Thompson, William G.
Truton, Hallam W., Jr.
Fossum, Norman H.
Hotchkiss, David H.
Jeka, Ralph J.
McManus, Alfred B.
Myers, Lawrence A.
Roumeles, Samuel J.
Vandenbulcke, Charles E.
Wilkins, Ernest J.
Burgess, Eugene B.
Clark, Philip T.
Kayser, Ernest
Lear, Darvin E.
Hannes, Max R.

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220th CIC Detachment (XX Corps)

Lobb, Anthony W.	Gregory, George D.,Jr.	Oyler, Robert B.
Preston, Nathan R.	Hinkle, Wayne W.	Pierce, Elwood W.
Stafford, Gerald	Kahoe, Richard O.	Rosen, Joseph E.
Edington, Thomas A.	Mahoney, Dennis H.	Curley, Frederick M.
Hahn, Rose B.	Marz, Roy W.	Davison, Russell C.
Smith, James E.	McLeroy, Thomas P.	Schaeffer, Harry T.

221st CIC Detachment (XXI Corps)

Somerville, John F.	Holmes, Harry	Graham, William J.
Lane, Dan R.	Mitchell, Charles M.	Rooney, Joseph W.
McKee, Howard A.	Kennedy, James H.	Shughart, Dale F.
Engel, Martin	Smith, Lucius S.	

222nd CIC Detachment (XXII Corps)

Rutledge, Frederick R.	Mahlab, Salim S.	Rock, Alexander P.
Curry, Patrick F.	Ohlin, Lloyd E.	Keilty, Joseph J.
Mihan, Donald E.	Chrisholm, Douglas T.	Lukas, Peter P.
Bready, James H.	Levine, Theodore	Knapp, Harold F.

223rd CIC Detachment (XXIII Corps)

Elliott, Loran L.	McBurney, W. H.	Keefe, William E.
Harrigan, Richard J.	Neri, John G.	Frary, Jerry P.
Knight, Jack W.	Smith, Robert O.	Powers, FNU
Haring, James J.	Korpela, Elton P.	
Kivimaki, Elmer N.	Pickett, Anthony V.	

301st CIC Detachment (1st US Army)

Miner, Horace M.	Conick, Charles B.	Bulkley, Charles C.
Finch, Heber	Hartung, Peter H.	Hilbruner, William J.
Kraft, Richard P.	McCarthy, Edward J.	Benedict, Coleman H.
Hayes, Virgil E.	Jensen, Garth N.	McWilliams, Walter E.
Peine, Gilbert S.	Thoumsin, Servious F.	Young, Wesley I.
Conohan, Robert J.	Dean, Howard E.	Duggan, James M.
Fitzgerald, Vincent P.	Hamilton, Hal A.	Hanson, Leonard E.
Miller, William F.	Moran, Fenton	Murphy, Thomas I.
Murray, Winslow H.	Printz, Robert G.	Proctor, David G.
Ratliff, James H.	Zeender, John K.	Barlock, Joseph A.
Brodeur, Wilfrid J.	Dunbar, Lawrence L.	Fain, Douglas W.
Hannigan, John J.	Kinch, Robert T.	Sazama, Robert J.
Biedenharn, Albert M.	Blackburn, Duane A.	Burgess, Robert M.
Butler, Milton	Carlson, George A.	Carolan, Edwin J.
Cartier, Normand J.	Cleary, Vincent W.	DeBordes, Arnaud J.
Declercq, Albert	Dombrowski, Henry E.	Fagan, James G.

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301st CIC Detachment (1st US Army (Cont)

Farris, Ralph W.	Gikas, Christos S.	Goetz, Ford G.
Grainger, Charles W.	Green, William B.	Hudson, Raymond E.
Jersin, Edward A.	Kehrig, Francis A.	Kelly, Donald A.
Kennard, Claude L.	Kopec, Roman F.	Mendenhall, George M.
Mendoza, Frank	Mertens, Arthur R.	Murgia, Joseph
Park, Andrew	Phair, James A.	Powell, Ward H.
Short, Charles N.	Skrigan, Paul S.	Stewart, Charles L.
Walker, Kenneth O.	Wolkomir, Maurice N.	Woodall, John B.
Gagan, FNU	McInerney, FNU	Schluter, FNU
Ksienwicz, FNU	Stroud, FNU	Hancock, FNU

303rd CIC Detachment (3rd US Army)

Foothorap, James F.	Rapp, Oliver L.	Hallett, James B.
Holton, Edgar H.	Sims, John E.	Hanahan, James S.
Ray, James E.	Sayers, Sam R. Jr.	Yarnevich, Ernest
Callan, Albert S. Jr.	Beissenherz, Lloyd H.	Koenig, Wirth H.
Vaivada, Anthony S.	Cody, Charles J.	Craps, John E.
Lawless, Mark J.	Stanton, John M.	Ulmer, Max
Atkinson, Harry G.	Forsberg, William H.	Gernazian, Stephen
Burglund, Oliver O.	Meehan, John F.	Park, Andrew J.
Prosser, Everett	Shoemaker, Alfred L.	Tarman, Thomas W.
Voertman, Russell	Wirth, Otto	Hardeson, Robert F.
Coyne, Martin J.	Haggard, John D.	Kegel, Kenneth K.
Levine, Robert H.	Smith, George E.	Aronson, Zola A.
Conn, Robert L.	Fairley, Paul J.	Gallagher, William J.
Merrick, Edward J.	Seaman, James O.	Baker, William G.
McCarthy, Claire F.	Geiselhart, Richard F.	Oliver, Paul E.
Oberle, Norman W,	Proctor, George F.	Vargas, Frank A.
Denton, Clark W.	Holland, Alvin E.	Keller, Alvin E.
Mason, Will E.	Merrick, James J.	Fanning, Julius N.
Kelley, Homer F.	Knight, John B.	O'Neill, Timothy J.
McClure, Donald V.	O'Gara, James A.	Pfotenhauer, Jay A.
Rafferty, John M.	Seaton, John E.	Shea, Eugene D.
Taylor, Eugene S.	MacNamara, Richard C.	

307th CIC Detachment (7th US Army)

Crowell, G. Kenneth	McDuff, Alvie L.	Porter, Marion E.
Bower, William N.	Brussell, Abraham W.	Caldwell, Robert G. Jr.,
Guinzbourg, Victor S.	Haseltine, Marshall	Moseley, George T.
Richards, Robert R.	Anderson, Warren R.	Baraty, Edward
Baraty, Edward	Barker, Harold O., Jr.	Beaudette, Francis S.
Bergman, Victor C.,Jr.	Blake, Emmet R.	Brockmeier, Robert
Brown, Keirn C.	Chamberlin, Wells F.	Dinehart,Alan F.,Jr.
Emmet, Thomas A.	French, Woodrow W.	Gordon, Wendell C.

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307th CIC Detachment (7th US Army) (Cont)

Horner, David S.	Hutchinson, Joseph C.	Jacques, Phillippe G.
Kandt, William C.	LaChance, Herve R.	LeFebvre, George A.
McCoy, Scott D.	O'Brien, Philip A.	Paquette, Origene J.Jr.
Perper, George A.	Powell, Francis E.	Regis, Peter
Sevier, Lewis V.	Sparks, Bertel M,	Sullivan, Daniel J.
Tousignant, Edmond J.		

309th CIC Detachment (9th Army)

Guinan, Richard C.	Bellocchio, Paul L.	Behr, John L.
Conley, Francis E.	Madd, Francis E.	Dale, J. Thomas

315th CIC Detachment (15th Army)

Brenneck, Francis C.	Williams, David S.	Boren, Robert D.
Dreshler, Harold F.	Hickman, Glenn H.	Knapp, Todd B.
Shafton, Edward	Crutcher, Marshall B.	Honig, Robert S.
Johnson, Darrel L.	Underwood, Donald E.	Blaser, Glenn F.
Cook, Herman F.	Holden, William P.	Kurzon, Raymond
McVey, William L.	Ensign, Robert	Hurt, Wesley R.
Hwass, Edward R.	Kelm, Edwin H.	Kirehnert, Carl
Beach, George	Kroh, Herman (just for a while)	

48th CIC Detachment (12th Army Group)

Gagan, Thomas A.	McInerney, Maurice F.	Callan, Albert S.Jr.
Hancock, Harold H.	Ray, James E.	Hall, Frank B.
Hardin, Kenneth E.	Henahan, James S.	Ksieniewicz, Casimir A.
Sayers, Sam R., Jr.	Schluter, Claymer	Sheldon, George C.
Stoud, Donald R.	Yarnevich, Ernest N.	Finch, Heber
Kraft, Richard P.,Jr.	McCarthy, Claire F.	McCarthy, Edward J.
Preston, Stuart D.	Benedict, Coleman H.	Coyne, Martin, J.
Gaudrault, Robert J.	Geiselhart, Richard F.	Haggard, John D.
Jensen, Garth H.	Kelley, Homer F.	McWilliams, Walter E.
Peine, Gilbert S.	Thoumsin, Servious F.	Young, Wesley I.
Bearce, Roger M.	Conohan, Robert J.	Dean, Howard E.
DeGroot, Henry J.	Egan, William P.	Fitzgerald, Vincent P.
Hagen, Arnold J.	Hanson, Leonard E.	Havighurst, Alfred F.
Kegel, Kenneth K.	Levine, Robert H.	Miller, William F.
Murphy, Thomas I.	Murray, Winslow H.	Oberle, Norman W.
Oliver, Alfred R.	Printz, Robert G.	Proctor, David G.
Proctor, George P.	Ratliff, James H.	Smith, George E.
Zeender, John K.	Biedenharn, Albert M.	Blackburn, Duane A.
Butler, Milton	Carlson, George A.	Carolan, Edwin J.
Cleary, Vincent W.	Conn, Robert L.	Denton, Clark W.

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Dombrowski, Henry E.
Gallagher, William J.
Grainger, Charles W.
Hogan, Vincent P.
Jersin, Edward A.
Mamdoza, Frank
O'Brien, Thomas M.
Short, Charles N.
Baker, William C.
Hannigan, John J.
Liston, Raymond J.
Merrick, James J.
Ayr, Allenby H.
Musick, Joseph W.
Locke, Harry F.
Mertens, Arthur R.
Amberg, Walter A. Jr.
Boyd, William S., Jr.
Clark, William E.

Finch, Richard F.
McGrail, Myles F.
Oliver, Alfred R.
Poole, Albert E.
Stern, Frederick S.,Jr.

Bray, James F.
Hanna, Elias
Jaudon, Elbert W.
Landry, Donald H.
McKeogh, Francis M.
Murphy, Francis J.
Rendler, John C., Jr.
Wall, Merrill C.
Beissinger, Henry
Clancy, Frank B.
Feltenstein, Paul I.
Gallagher, Thomas P.
Hotchkiss, David H.
Lewis, Austin A.
O'Gara, James A.
Pfotenhauer, Jay A.
Prosser, Everett
Rubin, Carl F.
Shea, Eugene D.
Taylor, Eugene S.

Vargas, Frank A., Jr.

Fairley, Paul J.
Gikas, Christos S.
Green, William B.
Holland, Alvin E.
Kelly, Donald A.
Merrick, Edward J.
Park, Harry L.
Stewart, Charles L.
Dunbar, Lawrence L.
Keller, Alvin J.
MacNamara, Richard C.
Sazama, Robert J.
Dunn, William B.
Hahn, John H.
Marshall, Richard A.
Sweeney, John R.
Bauer, Philip Jr.
Braden, Paul R.
Duncan, Thomas N.

Foster, Curtis M.
Miksis, Joseph D.
Oliver, Paul E.
Stuart, Malcolm R.
Allen, Robert R.

Dermody, James A.
Helland, Maurice O.
Johnson, Clayton L.
Langer, Walter C.
Monferrato, Albert C.
O'Neill, Timothy J.
Reynolds, Floyd J.
West, Thomas J.
Belkin, Paul M.
Cole, David J.
Fields, Robert E.
Hardison, Robert F.
Kehrig, Francis A.
McClure, Donald V.
Paris, John
Phair, James A.
Rafferty, John M.
Seaton, John E.
Tahmouse, Albert J.
Tittle, Clarence S.

Watkins, James E.,Jr.

Farris, Ralph W.
Goetz, Ferd G.
Heitner, Robert R.
Hudson, Raymond E.
Kennard, Claude L.
Murgia, Joseph
Seaman, James O.
Wolkomir, Maurice N.
Fain, Douglas W.
Kinch, Robert T.
Mason, Will E.
Hearn, Norman J.
McKenna, John P.
Heyrman, John H.
McManus, Neil C.
Altaras, Jack C.
Boudreau, Amedee R.
Brunjes, John W.
Fanning, Julius N.j Jr.

Keenan, John L.
Moran, Fenton
Pinsince, Adrian J.
Walker, George D.
Anderson, Walter J., Jr.

Dow, Laurence E.
Holman, Frank A.
Koontz, Vance H.
McBee, John
Moruza, Tito G.
Oswald, William B.
Schilke, Carl R.
Whaley, Byron A.
Branson, Arthur F.
Ellsberry, William G.
Forsberg, William H.
Hill, Clyde C.
Ladd, Edward T.
Meyersberg, Charles H.
Peters, Jack H.
Pierce, Elwood M.
Rosen, Joseph E.
Shaw, Andre M. P.
Tatge, Paul M.
Vandenbulcke, Charles E.

Wechsler, Henry C.

[redacted]

418th CIC Detachment (12th Army Group) (Cont)

Wienckowski, Louis
Blanton, Charles K.
Breitenbach, Gustave
Dulaney, Thomas E.
Frank, Walter
Hawes, Kenneth E.
Kaufman, Harry S.
Mayer, William F.
Nester, Raymond J.
Park, Andrew J.
Regis, John G.
Smith, Leroy H.
Tomke, Richard A.
Aktsinov, Waldemar
Boniecki, Conrad B.
DiGioja, Roger
Ehrlich, Max
Goldsmith, Albert
Jansen, Marvin W.
Lytle, Scott H.
McKinley, Ambrose A.
Nielsem, Paul H.
Popper, Alfred
Richter, Bruno C.
Spitzer, Robert W.
Weasher, Warren K.
Biel, Fred W.
Boyce, Ralph J., Jr.
Dito, Frank E.
Dusseault, Henry J.
Gross, Paul P.
Katz, Walter J.
May, Leo C.
Mower, Harold
Osterman, Victor C.
Ratzersdorfer, Marc L.
Rodell, Jerome W.
Steiner, Leopold
Wirtshafter, Robert J.

Hallowell, Robert E.
David, Kurt D.
Goldenberg, Paul H.
Koprowski, Joseph S.
Ortman, Erik J.
Swant, Raymond H.
Golz, Paul
Pollack, Fred
Mulkeen, William J.
Borter, Howard
Eisenberg, Jack W.
Grohs, Lothar
Lane, Denzil L.
Randall, Earle S.
Hellman, Robert J.
Laughlin, Glen W.
Wittenberger, Park
Zweig, Michael H. W.
Couture, Remi A.
Freed, Fred P.
Jacobson, Henry
Meyer, Andre O.
Stanko, Michael B.
Forel, Bruno
Malin, Morton V.
Knoll, Eberhard F.

427th CIC Detachment (Continental Advance Section)

Read, Clarence E.
Van Kirk, Arthur H.
Carranza, Ignacio
Anderson, James L.
Blumner, Lester A.
Cerame, Ralph T.
Devere, Perry A.
Gendron, Honorat R.
Joy, Walter S.
McCormick, Francis X.
Nickson, Albert N.
Saloom, Kaliste J.
Vasse, Louis L.
Wood, Kenneth I.
Picard, Lucien L.
DePourtales, Alex W.G.
Vidal, Joseph
Archon, Dion J. J.
Briel, Alfred W.
Cole, James E.
Friebolin, Brookes
Hall, Thomas W.
Liper, Milton W.
Manley, James T.
O'Connell, Charles W.
Starr, Joseph R.
Vaughn, Bradley W.
Woollett, Leroy A., Jr.
Tucker, Robert W.
Hardage, John M.
Vincent, Arthur T.
Baldwin, Langford
Burns, Joseph A.
Crosby, Robert T.
Fulsher, Remy W.
Hoylen, Paul J.
McClive, Robert D.
Mickey, Carrol M.
Ploghoft, Merl V.
Stasaitis, Stanley J.
Werrenrath, George H.
Zocca, Rouis R.

429th CIC Detachment (Continental Advance Section)

Schwarzwalder, John C.
Bailey, James B.
Kimball, Harvey L.
Neagoy, George
Williams, Harold B.
Kirkland, Ira B., Jr.
Carr, Donald J.
McIntosh, Ashleigh D.
O'Neill, Harvey J.
Smith, Gregory B.
Daguerre, Raymond P.
Moseley, Frank A.
Roy, Joseph H.

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502d CIC Detachment (2nd Armored Division)

Beebe, Richard W.
Meldrum, Gilbert S.
Dermody, James A.
Brigham, Morrison
Armstrong, Robert F.
Mostecak, John
Leahy, Daniel A.
Houser, George J.
Gross, Philip
Coulter, Philemon B.
Downing, Frederic E.
Davis, Caleb W.
Filley, Walter O.
Zajac, Peter
Mitchell, Joseph M.
Mess, Charles W.
LaBranche, Robert R.
Anderson, Alexander A.
Hallen, Norman R.
Foyt, Anton
Madson, John N.
Mertens, Arthur R.
Myers, Lawrence A.

503rd CIC Detachment (3rd Armored Division)

Black, Theodore W.
Duncan, Thomas N.
Travis, Porter M., Jr.
Dow, Laurence E.
Monferrato, Albert C.
Bogotay, George W.
Alter, John E.
Higgins, Timothy
Park, Edwin C.
Parker, Olan, Jr.
Denton, James G.
Collins, Ulysses S.
Udoff, Philip S.
Robinson, Harold H.
Stramel, Bruno F.
Hiller, Hans A.
Kiehl, Marvin E.
DeMers, Roy G.
O'Neil, James F.
Kiley, George L.
Dietz, Ralph E.
Anderson, Hilding A.
Romey, John H.
Mendenhall, George M.
Berger, Fred
Lynch, Henry W.

504th CIC Detachment (4th Armored Division)

Flinn, Thomas E.
Miksis, Joseph D.
Janura, Arthur L.
Kime, Otho G.
Shaw, Andre M. P.
Dito, Frank E.
Schrenzel, Eugene P.
Rood, Wilson A.
Wall, Merrill C.
Watkins, James E., Jr.
Obert, Norbert B.
Skrigan, Paul S.
Hawes, Kenneth E.
James, Harold W.
Bray, James F.
Boyd, William S., Jr.
Clark, Arthur S., Jr.
Peters, Jack H.
Wienckowski, Louis
Rogers, Martin

505th CIC Detachment (5th Armored Division)

McKenna, John P.
Elliott, Hugh F.
Newhouse, Joseph F.
Barton, Victor
Cambria, Frank J.
Maucher, Andrew G.
Hughes, Kenneth T.
Gallagher, Thomas P.
Pender, William E.
Brookens, John W.
Herrnstadt, Gerald E.
Farmer, Sam C.
Thaxter, John H.
Higgins, George L.
Bartnett, Edmond J.
Roe, Rexford K.
Mainczyk, Steven
Treitel, Henry D.

506th CIC Detachment (6th Armored Division)

DeLoach, Judson B.
Weaston, Robert Q.
Gingher, Thomas R.
Tahmoush, Albert J.
Elmer, Fred
Hagnauer, Maximilian W.
Jordan, Dale M.
Lyman, Samuel K.
Dolph, Robert E.
Mulkeen, William J. G.
Embley, Richard O.
Howard, Jack J.
Tobler, Frederick C.
Travis, Porter M.
Fields, Robert E.
Murphy, Francis J.
Liston, Raymond J.
Diehl, Fred A.
Cox, Clarence C.

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507th CIC Detachment (7th Armored Division)

Brambach, Walter
Downs, Frederick H.
Kuusiste, Wayne V.
Horwitz, Ralph E.
Soucy, Roy J.
Roberts, Lloyd D.
Jorgensen, Charles A.

508th CIC Detachment (8th Armored Division)

Gillet, Louis E.
Koesch, Paul C.
Feguson, Albert C.
Silberman, Albert G.
Kemph, Eugene F.
Opp, Raymond H.
Feist, Herbert B.
Graham, Earl C.
McLaughlin, Robert V.
Deldebbio,Bernard P.
Marquit, Harold
Huebner, Arnold G.
Lee, Joseph F.

509th CIC Detachment (9th Armored Division)

Donohue, Edward G.
Douglas, Edwin L.
Shauck, Hewitt A.
Ott, Andrew D.
Lloyd, Robert S.
Sheridan, Edward P.
Lueck, William O.
Lichtblau, John H.

510th CIC Detachment

Schroeter, Karl G.
Gumpel, Henry J.
Pollack, Peter I.
Hendricks, Alford C.
Dickman, Bentley
Baker, Edgar E.
Humphrey, William C.
Robiczek, Fred F.

511th CIC Detachment

Galbraith, Robert C.
Hart, Leo J., Jr.
Buckley, Thomas H.
Hayes, Charles R.
Powell, Norman R.

512th CIC Detachment

Criqui, Francis B.
McCoy, Scott D.
Ewing, William S.
Meade, Paul J.
Munson, Boardman
Meyer, Joseph G.
Hutchinson, Joseph, C.
Overholser, John D.

513th CIC Detachment

Parker, Olan, Jr.
Sluizer, Hans V.
Winkler, Mark
McBurney, Clark M.
Stevenson, Douglas F.
Mueller, Ernst J.

514th CIC Detachment (14th Armored Division of 12th Army Group)

Hahn, Horace L.
Dinehart, Alan
Huber, Frank
Maskrey, Robert M.
Schnakenberg, Henry J.
Spiegler, John L.
Weight, Harold H.
Blalock, John H.
Giese, Otto C.
Hurley, William F.
Norton, Arthur H.
Schwabe, Milton F.
Stevie, Robert J.
Pentecost, Hal W.
Braun, Berthold R.
Hall, Frank W.
Jacques, Philippe J.
Pfeiffer, John W.
Shannon, Jay
Trabant, Warren E.
Sheridan, Edward P.

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514th CIC Detachment (14th Armored Division of 12th Army Group) (Cont)

Lane, Denzil L.	Guenthner, Rupert W.	England, Chester B.
Evans, James	Forrest, Gerald	Harnish, Carroll
Mott, William	Pappas, James Louis	Rosen, Irving
Finch, Richard R.	Oswald, William B.	Heitner, Robert R.
Ellsberry, William G.	Tomke, Richard A.	Beebe, Richard W.
Brigham, Morison	Downing, Frederick G.	Armstrong, Robert F.
Madson, John N.	Mostecak, John	Bernard, Charles A.
Gordon, Louis A.	Maguire, Charles J.	O'Grady, James M.
Halpern, Joseph B.	Tumino, Ralph	Altschuler, Franz
Tomich, Alex	Kline, Robert J.	Schwarzbrott, Louis

516th CIC Detachment (16th Armored Division)

Richardson, John E.	Molloy, Edwin T.	Carter, Henry S.
Grant, Robert H.	Beguelin, Dayton	Baker, Marion P.
Bennett, Charles R.	Krchniak, John	

520th CIC Detachment (20th Armored Division)

Pinneo, Dee W.	Davenport, Philip B.	Behm, Carl M.

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Larios, Ernest E.	Johnson, Alvin	Beatty, Walcott H.
Wilson, Meredith	Christopherson, Kjarten	Ryan, John J.
Fahey, Gregory J.	Jarsted, Gordon K.	Benham, Charles C.
McIntosh, James D.	Morrison, William A.	Swantek, Andrew H.
Tracy, Richard L.	Burns, Cecil	Cullinan, Henry J.
Gostisha, Jaohn R.	Grey, Alfred E., Jr.	Holmegard, Henry C.
MacGregor, Paul C.	Nunez, Peter	Pariseau, Theodore
Radoulovitch, Vladimir	Sloan, Paul G., Jr.	Stuart, George B.
Abella, Luis	Alsdorf, James R.	Kavanaugh, George F.
Kelly, John J.	Lindholm, Richard W.	Muhleman, Harry N.
Phillips, Dayton E.	Poirier, Philip P.	Schultz, Walter J.
Feindt, Lawrence R.	DeNardo, Bernard J.	Bennett, Edwin
Graham, Donald M.	Dowd, Thomas	Ryan, Thomas A.
Schantz, Grover A.	Hay, John R.	Jonathan, Virgil
Klein, Keith B.	Poitras, Warren E.	Barlabas, George
Casey, John P.	Fernholz, Emil F.	Jefferson, Philip L.
Kennington, Robert J.	Lemar, Clarence E.	Myers, Elmer C.
Swock, John E.	Barrett, Raymond F.	Brilty, Francis X.
Canfield, Daniel C.	Condon, Gerald T.	Crotty, Joseph P.
Driver, Frank S.	Garner, Doniphan M.	Hartnett, Robert B.
Hartsell, John S.	Hughes, John A.	McIntyre, James W.
McMurray, Jonathan H.	Meddaugh, Leonard S.	Moriarty, James P.
Morrissey, William F.	Nielson, Earl A.	Urry, Donald C.
Bardusch, William E., Jr.	Millman, Leonard	Rungee, Joseph P.
Prescott, Julian P.	Taylor, Frank D.	Vinson, John B.

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Lester, Calvin D.	Baumann, Lester H.	Donnelly, Andrew J.
Hicks, Mason A.	Kroll, Lester H.	Perry, Robert J.
Blankenship, Lonnie R.	Connolly, Edward P.	Cartley, Herbert B., Jr.
Gregg, Robert E.	Kennedy, Edward J. H.	Lundquist, Donald C.
Mihan, Donald E.	Munoz, Anthony	Pupanek, Michael R.
Wallace, Lew	Hayes, Thomas J.	Herrero, Charles
Howard, Clinton A.	Ireton, Henry F.	Jackson, Thomas S.
Kaiser, Stanley R.	Klinck, Herbert G.	Koenig, Ira
MacKeith, James A.	Martinco, John P.	McCormack, John G.
Pickett, Charles A.	Ralston, David P.	Roller, Otto J.
Shea, Daniel A., Jr.	Torphy, Francis X.	Weston, Payson G.
White, Robert S.	Foothorap, James F.	Lindjord, Haakon
Ryan, Elbert M.	Dorsey, Cam D.	Edwards, Frank
Long, Fred H.	Biegert, William A.	Carter, Ernest R.
Stevenson, Alfred B.	Traicoff, George	Agnetta, Frederick N.
Alexander, Harry E.	Anderson, William L.	Burkhead, B. W.
Keena, Joseph W.	Lynch, Robert J.	McAleer, Frank H.
O'Neill, Robert E.	Rice, William M.	Anderson, Elmer F.
Avance, James D.	Brett, James	Graf, Ellsworth E.
Issaeff, Rostislav G.	Little, John W.	Lyon, Francis E.
McCann, Bernard T.	McKay, Robert L.	Noonan, Edward J.
Rinehart, Lowell S.	Shearer, Joseph C.	Snyder, Richard A.
[illegible]tein, Gerhold S.	Stickney, Melvin J.	Taylor, Job
[illegible]th, Geza	Tyson, Kenneth S.	Woltz, Robert K.
Michelmann, Oswald C.	Browning, Earl S.	Sweeney, Thomas P.
Gallagher, George R.	Sexton, William J.	Frizzell, Russell B.
Loney, Theodore R.	Medina, Marcells	Hines, Canfield M.
Langford, Berry F.	Maguire, John N.	Maranda, Walter F.
Moore, James M.	Peterson, John H.	Reeves, Delmore E.
Walker, George D.	Coad, Francis E.	Donovan, Edward P.
Ens, William A.	Fingerson, Robert F.	Funderburk, Harold W.
Holmes, Frederick L.	Johnson, Dan W.	Jones, Edward C.
Jovan, George	Murray, William R.	Obuhanich, Nicholas
Reeder, Joseph C., Jr.	Savage, Jack E.	Armijo, Enrique M.
Baer, David	Baggs, Walter M.	Bechtel, John G.
Becker, Max J.	Church, Hudson R.	Dunlap, Joseph R.
Ferguson, Howard M.	Goldbeck, Herman C.	Gorgie, Frank J.
Haeger, Robert A.	Henigan, Joseph W.	Johnson, Clayton L.
King, William H.	Koulka, Edward R.	Kramer, Charles E.
Landry, Donald H.	McBride, George B.	Newman, Frank A.
Rakow, William J.	Reider, Robert W.	Rendler, John C.
Smith, Homer F.	Steinberg, Harry C.	Sweeney, Jay P.
Valk, Joseph E.	Yoh, Franklin C.	Young, Jon L.
Young, William G.	Abbott, Lyman, Jr.	Alter, Richard J.
Ballard, George H.	Bittman, Lyman W.	Bowlus, Thomas N.
Bray, Archie J.	Bryson, Arthur R.	Byerly, Milton R.
Cain, Wilfred, W.	Canoff, James I.	Clausen, Theodore T.

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Cusick, Charles A.	Dalton, Charles C.	Denton, William E.
Donehower, Wilford J.	Franklin, Arthur H.	Frazier, Alfred
Fritsche, Noble S.	Funk, Paul J.	Gaughn, John R.
Geary, Robert X.	Gillespie, Henry	Gordon, Jay E.
Haley, Sanford E.	Heine, Edward	Henderson, George W.
Henderson, Oliver S.	Higgins, James B.	Hyde, Upshur H.,Jr.
Jundzil, Stanley J.	Jurco, Stephen	Keane, James M.
Keaster, Leonard W.	Kennedy, Edward H.	King, John W.
Kovacik, Andrew H.	Kritsky, Andrew N.	Lang, James W., Jr.
Lennon, Ernest J.	Loftus, Frank	Mansour, Farris
McCormick, Edgar T.	McCoy, Raymond E.	McDonough, Joseph T.
Meyers, Charles F.	Nilan, William F.	O'Conner, Herbert W.
Petz, Henry	Quatman, Joseph B.	Reagan, Frank T.
Rissinger, Marvin L.	Russell, Ralph R.	Schedt, Eddie W.
Sherfy, Raphael	Siddens, J. G.	Thompson, John H.
Tierney, John J.	Underwood, Clayton H.	VanNuys, Hervey A.
Ward, Andrew L.	Welch, Ernest G.	Welch, Leo E.
Wood, James L.	Zanzuccki, Albert A.	Ziff, Bertram A.
Bucko, Stephan A.	Frazee, Claude J.	Hewisem, Donald A.
Schrader, Marvin J.	Kellman, Rudolph G.	Kinsey, Benjamin T.
Hick, William G.	Adams, John J.	Hart, Gale M.
Proudfoot, Harold B.	Smith, Carlos D.	Avery, Donald G.
Dardas, Leon R.	Fulmer, Burton E.	Palmer, Ralph D.
Flanagan, Joseph M.	Syring, William J.	Templeton, William B.
Foster, John S.	Nichols, Richard H.	Amberg, Walter A.
Smith, Robert L.	Bloemsna, Eugene P.	Czajkowski, Anthony F.
Hopkins, Sam C.	Conover, John A.	Flynn, Charles F.
Harris, John R.	Pentecost, Hal W.	Schaffner, Montford H.
Smith, James E.	Burke, Thomas J.	Cowles, William W.
Kupiszewski, Michael L.	Martin, Duane L.	Peck, David W.
Stockbridge, William D.	Smith, Guy T.	Lathan, James S.
Arnold, Thomas D.	Wright, George B.	MacIntyre, Gould O.
Lloyd, Charles N.	Waller, John W.	Davison, Russell C., Jr.
Yaeger, Edwin R.	Deahl, Warren A.	Naylor, Ralph V.
Pappas, Thomas	Sorensen, Emil S.,Jr.	Szarvas, Alexander J.
Pfeferblum, Max	Cimino, Eugene L.	Hill, Roy C.
McCarty, Kenneth T.	Hales, Delbert R.	Monson, Paul J.
Nevius, Blake R.	Sledge, Wayne D.	Cain, Albert P.
Munguia, Oscar A.	Meyerhoff, Fred R.	Schilling, Albert J.
Federici, Anthony G.	Romano, Salvator S.	Emberling, Lloyd E.
Ellert, Arthur R.	Robinson, Harold H.	Burgess, Eugene B.
Triumpho, James B.	Angel, August D.	Cordts, Gover W.
Cahoon, Richard C.	Carr, William L.	LaPrice, Marcel R.
Levi, Jack	Wagner, Walter W.	Peterson, Ralph J.
Morel, Edward L.	Gilbert, Reginald E.	Lewis, Irving J.
Perellman, Charles	Edwards, Marvin L.	Bradford, Kermit C.
Tignor, Patrick H.	Vines, William	Hale, Kenneth B.

[redacted]

Roberts, John W.	Abrams, Gordon C.	Alcotte, Chauncey G.
Baray, Albert A.	Ewing, Charles G.	Henrich, Carl A.
Senn, Milton A.	Wyman, Paul H.	Cohen, Victor D.
Coleman, Ernest T.	Ehlers, Kenneth H.	Haskell, George D.
Miller, George J.	Plankenhorn, William F.	Scott, Wallace P.
Udoff, Philip S.	Adams, Edward G.	Kaiser, Samuel J.
Moore, James M.	Mulchrone, David F.	Rowley, Joseph G.
Aiken, John N.	Blum, Walter L.	Cincotta, Jack
Estenson, Lyle O.	Cargiulo, Vincent A.	Leahy, Richard D.
Oakes, Benjamin F.	Pezzati, Albert	Carney, Edwin S.
Dewan, James T.	Hull, Addis E. III	Kristeller, Herman W.
Miller, Purviance	Montgomery, Charles O.	Morison, Absalom K.
Newirth, Samuel A.	Obright, William J.	Pasek, Henry
Quaranta, Francesco S.	Senigallia, Silvio	Schwedel, Dorian
Sladky, Eugene J.	Thompson, Matthew C., Jr.	Voight, Erich J.
Vyth, Arnold	Wimer, Walter	Bruschi, Dominic P.
Bruschi, Peter J.	Carey, Francis W.	Carey, John P.
Frechette, Rheo J.	Fronauer, Henry J.	Gernand, Carl F.
Godden, Laurence A.	Guarnieri, Fred R.	Guarnieri, George T.
Hazard, Jeffrey	Kraut, Samuel	MacPherson, Gordon B.
Monasch, Walter J.	Nusinow, Jack	Peterson, Ernest O.
Raine, Philip	Fleetwood, Harry B.	Davis, Robert L.
Ethier, Raymond T.	Gross, William F.	Knoop, Raymond R.
Prisbeck, Stanley J.	Young, Oscar	Gordon, Jesse F.
Wallace, William H., Jr.	Dumm, Paul J.	Julin, George A., Jr.
Carlson, Clifford W.	Fennell, Fred F.	Hill, Ralph N., Jr.
Mitchell, Allen R.	Palmer, Hugh J.	Staley, Jack
Welsh, Paul E.	Brady, William T.	Buck, David F.
Fitzwilliam, Leo M.	Freese, Leslie T.	Kennedy, Edward J.
Cheever, Roger W.	Davenport, Basil	Dilles, Stanley E.
Glennon, John J.	Gubellini, Charles L.	Jones, Edgar C., Jr.
Klinck, Herbert G.	Kopec, Roman F.	Landry, Joseph A.
White, Frederick J.	Kirstein, William A.	Mankin, Paul A.
Rohlfes, Bruno O.	Skrigan, Paul S.	Dubofsky, Jack
Daguerre, Raymond P.	Moseley, Frank A.	McIntosh, Ashleigh D.
Neagoy, George	Williams, Harold B.	O'Neill, Harvey J.
Kimball, Harvey L.	Cannon, Joseph D.	Kuroski, Steven A.
Seawell, Donald R.	Herms, John F.	Klipa, Edmund X.
Goza, Claude L.	Cambere, Edgar	Carpenter, Francis M.
Cole, Francis K.	Kearns, Frank M.	Stacy, John T.
Ahrold, Robert W.	Booker, Charles L.	Hahn, Bela A.
Hauser, Max A.	Hughes, Kenneth T.	Ingalls, William L.
O'Neill, James P.	Schodt, Eddie W.	Spitzel, Herbert S.G.
Stanchion, Andrew J.	Teague, Charles C.	Burgess, Robert M.
Carroll, Joseph F.	Capane, Ralph T.	DeBordes, Arnaud J.
Dunworth, Gerald J.	Fiebig, Carl F.	Filppu, Kaarlo
Gutierrez, Robert A.	Horton, Harry H., Jr.	Kelch, Thelford E.
Kirkland Ira B., Jr.	Lovett, Edward C.	Maguire, John N.

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McKee, Claude M.
Murphy, Robert E.
Turner, Emery D.
Zimmerman, Richard G.
Beatson, Gerald L.
Dungan, Nelson Van N.
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Lieberman, James J.
Robichaud, Joseph E.
Tepley, Elmer
Bailey, James B.
Dermer, John H.
Gordon, Augustus F.
Heuman, Stephen
Kaspar, Oldrich C.
Pattullo, Ambrose D.
Smalhout, John J.
Wiebe, Austin R.
Albera, Rudolph C.

Clark, Frederick M.
Fagan, James G.
Hogberg, Rudolph L.
King, Timothy R.
Larson, George F.
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Silberstein, Mendel
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Blanck, Karl H.
Constant, Jerry I.
Fishalon Nathan
Harvey, Eldon Jr.
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Wolf, Edwin II
Brohan, William K.

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Albrecht, Eric M.
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Dennis, David
Grey, Leo
Kaufman, Walter
Leonard, Nathaniel W.
Oldeman, Howard D.
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Friedland, John
Smith, Samuel S.
Previti, Marte
Powell, Ward H.
Schulz, Thomas F.
Cartier, Normand J.
Zahn, Richard T.

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Spaeth, Walter P., Jr.
Youmans, David R.
Donlon, Thomas M.

ETOUSA

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Kearns, Frank M.
Booker, Charles L.
Porreca, Albert C.
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Julin, George A.
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Bauder, Harry P.

SHAEF

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Gordon, Jesse F.
Francis, William H. Jr.

Abrams, Gordon C.
Smith, Edward P.
Kuroski, Steven A.
Dungan, Nelson, V. N.
Seawell, Donald R.
Hilsz, August W
Meckes, Lewis J.
Jackson, Brent C.
Cannon, Joseph D.
Elliott, James T.
Verity, Felix S.
Finley, John C.
Hogberg, Rudolph L.
O'Hara, William P.
Farran, Robert C.
Harms, John F.
Basko, James L.
Klipa, Edmund X.
Hadgis, Michael W.
Larson, George F.

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Owsley, Charles H.
Rainey, Birt J.
Comfort, Robert H.
Edgar, William R.
Karns, Robert E.
Puller, James B.
Stankewicz, Joseph P.
Dobson, Joseph D.
Gregory, Stewart E.
Lamb, Henry M.
Clay, William R.
Wagner, John J.
Davison, William E.
Fagaly, Joseph T.
Lord, Richard G.
Kaminsky, Andrew G.
Zeller, Theodore R.
Grabner, Francis W.
Grubbs, Kenneth R.
Loughry, Daniel F.
St. John, Robert L.
Bower, Malcolm B.
Donahoe, John T.
Hall, Joseph W.
McGough, William P.
Oberlin, Jerry V.
Daley, James L.
Graham, Ellis C.
Holch, Carl E.
Riley, Francis X.

NINTH AIR FORCE

Lamet, Leon L.
Hopper, Marvin C.
Whitworth, Milton T.
Kelly, William R.
Smith, Robert F.
Zuspann, Eugene P.
Erdoes, Frank F.
Lantz, Clarence T.
Moss, Dalton
Bone, John H.
Larsen, Marvin N.
Somers, Louis M.
Daniel, Guy S.
Freedman, Mark O.
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Stewart, Robert H.
Coleman, Clair H.
McCandless, Paul D.
Tidrick, Don L.
DesAutels, Roland E.
Halal, Charles E.

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Licalzi, Laurence A.	Vance, John C.	Anthony, Samuel C.
Berg, Arthur W.	Bernitz, Samuel I.	Buffan, James E.
Higbie, Traynor W.	Lloyd, Charles N.	Snyder, Jack P.
Waller, John W.		

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XX

GERMANY OVERRUN - PART I

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March 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Chapter I

ENCIRCLEMENT AND REDUCTION OF THE RUHR

By 26 March, American soldiers occupied German soil east of the Rhine in five areas. The Ninth US Army, with the Canadian First and the British Second Armies, held fast to their two-day-old bridgehead around Wesel. First US Army's Remagen grab of 7 March had developed into an American fortress. Third US Army's breach of the Rhine south of the river's juncture with the Main River was solid after only four days. Seventh US Army had established its bridgehead north of Mannheim on the 26th. The same day, First US Army forces broke out of their Remagen hold and carved a southeasterly trail of destruction of German forces, making contact with Third US Army units.

Other units of First Army attacked eastward, parallel to Ninth Army's offensive farther north. Between the two armies lay the industrially important Ruhr. By 2 April, the day following the First French Army's Rhine-crossing operation at Phillipsburg, elements of the First and Ninth American Armies met near Lippstadt, completing the envelopment of the Ruhr. The enemy, caught within the sealed pocket, persisted in its defense until 18 April.[1]

SHAEF Keeps CIC Informed

While CIC units in the field kept pace with the fast-moving combat troops, SHAEF continued to issue operational directives to guide CI staff officers during this pre-surrender period. One of the more important directives indicated the division of responsibility between CIC and Military Government Public Safety detachments.

"Whereas Counterintelligence is primarily concerned with the discovery and supervision of secret and subversive activities, the main task of Public Safety is through the medium of a recognized German Police Force to establish secure conditions for civil administration to function."

With this definition of missions as a basis, the SHAEF directive outlined the responsibilities of Counterintelligence and Public Safety. Counterintelligence duties were to include the protection of Allied interests from espoionage, sabotage, and subversive activity; the collection and study of information

1. SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summary, did 1 Apr 45 (SECRET); and Crusade in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1948, pgs. 391-397 and 404.

[redacted]

relative to under ground movements; the liquidation of the German Intelligence Service (the Schutz Staffeln and the Gestapo); and the arrest and investigation of Germans whose activities were a danger to Allied security. The area of Public Safety concern, more strictly limited by the terms of the directive, included the purging, reorganization, and reactivation of the German Police; the operation and control of the German Police in accordance with Military Government requirements; the enforcement of security measures in conjunction with CIC; and the investigation of public officials and applicants for public office.

In a significant comment at the end of the directive, it was pointed out that the division of responsibilities could not be construed as iron-clad and inflexible. CIC experiences in the ensuing months often called for the liberal interpretation of the provisions of the directive.[2]

SHAEF Requests Information for Psychological Warfare

Situations which required close liaison between counterintelligence and psychological warfare personnel were outlined in a memorandum from SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division, published on 25 April 1945 for dissemination to G2 staffs at all levels.

The object of this memorandum was to secure cooperation from counterintelligence personnel for Information Control Units, whose main function was the control of German Information Services in the post-hostilities era. This cooperation was to consist of supplying information to Psychological Warfare Division, including background information on all personnel in the German Information Services field, plans made before surrender for clandestine or subversive information activities, location and quantity of communication installations and components, and organizational information about the German Information Services and their operations under Nazi control.

Psychological Warfare Division also requested that counterintelligence personnel remain alert for documentary evidence from Nazi sources "proving German guilt and the

2. SHAEF Directive for Counterintelligence (Pre-Surrender Period), Germany, from 15th Army Monthly CIC Rpt and CI Bulletins, Apr 45, L-633 (11), (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
NOTE: 12th Army Group CI Directive for Germany, which is based upon the SHAEF Directive, but has been expanded in greater detail, is attached as Appendix 1.

[redacted]

responsibility of the National Socialist Party for the moral degradation of the German people."[3]

The Adversery

Besides releasing policy directives to CIC, SHAEF attempted to keep the forward units constantly informed about the intelligence organizations that CIC would have to deal with as they approached the heartland of the German Reich.

In their analysis of sabotage methods, it was stated that there would be an increasing tendency toward assassination and terrorism as the end of conflict approached. German agents were trained in the neutralization of sentries and guards as part of an attack on a sabotage target, and they were increasingly prone to use this training.

Part of the terroristic tactics SHAEF reported would be the attempted assassination of important figures and the use of antipersonnel bombs such as the "Buttermould" bomb. There would be use of poisoned aspirin tablets, chocolate bars, and sugar. One of the most fiendish of the new sabotage devices reported by SHAEF was a cigarette lighter that could poison a cigarette smoker. A small spherical pellet about one mm. in diameter of unknown chemical constitution was fixed on the cigarette lighter near the wick, so that when the wick burned, the pellet became heated and vaporized, giving off a deadly poison. This same chemical pill could be placed in an ash tray where the heat of a cigarette being stubbed would suffice to volatize the pellet.

SHAEF said that the new terrorist tactics could be partly traced to the assumption of control over sabotage activities by the Schutz Staffeln. The aims of this campaign were considered principally to foment trouble and general unrest as part of a long term political subversion that the Nazis would attempt in Allied countries. Within Germany, itself, the campaign was viewed by SHAEF experts as an underground resistance measure with efforts directed at the assassination of German nationals working for the Allies.[4]

CIC Agents in the field were also warned to view with

3. SHAEF Psychological Warfare Div, Memo, subj: "Intelligence Requirements for Information Control Work in Germany," dtd 25 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Jun 44-Sep 45,(CONFIDENTIAL), Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

4. SHAEF CI Bulletin, from G2, Jnl and File, FUSA, L-558, dtd 20 Apr 45,(Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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suspicion the German Postal officials in occupied towns. Captured documents revealed that the Nazi Government had solicited the postal authorities to determine what trustworthy postal employees would volunteer to stay behind in Allied occupied territory.

It appeared only logical that other Government departments had made similar arrangements to leave behind "good Nazis" in the belief that the Allied Military Government would retain them in their positions. CIC personnel were enjoined to "focus special attention on all Post Office officials who have remained at their posts."[5]

German Intelligence Reorganizes

The report of interrogation of a voluble prisoner of war (an officer of a German sabotage unit) provided SHAEF with a picture of the organization of the Abwehr during April 1945. A major change was noted in the assignment of the special mission of performing R-Aufgaben (stay-behind sabotage tasks) to Frontaufklaerungskommando groups. Abwehr units on the Eastern front had already undertaken these new duties. Weapons and explosives had been buried in the districts of upper Silesia, and citizens of that province had received training as partisans. The Nazis were also attempting to install priests as leaders of anti-Communist and anti-Russian activities.

The significance of these activities to the analysts at SHAEF was that blueprints for similar operations on the Western Front were said to exist. The code name for the Abwehr R-Aufgaben operation was a word that Allied officials were to encounter with increasing regularity in the coming months--Wehrwolf.[6]

12th Army Group: Reporting

Counterintelligence officials at 12th Army Group continued to gather and collate reports from lower echelons

5. SHAEF, G2, CIC Rpt and CI Bulletins, Apr 45, L-633,(11), (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

6. SHAEF Intelligence Notes, from CI Bulletin No. 3, Hq 15th US Army, 24 Apr 45, Annex "B": "More Notes on Sabotage and Espionage Agencies," in 15th Army Monthly CI Rpt and CI Bulletins, L-633 (11), Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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until the end of the ETO Campaign. The Counterintelligence Periodic Report for April discussed the overall security situation as the Allied forces drove deep into Germany.

The main security problem for all Armies was the same: The attempt to control the mass migration of thousands of civilians who were fleeing in the van of the Russian advance to the comparative sanctity of the Western Occupation. CIC detachments throughout the commands faced an extraordinary melange of people--bona fide displaced persons, German soldiers in civilian clothes, German civilians, and legitimate German Prisoners of War en route to the rear. Screening of these masses was accomplished to the greatest possible extent at road blocks and displaced persons centers. But the task of sorting out all counterintelligence personalities from the chaotic jumbles of humanity was beyond fulfillment. CIC agents could hope to detain only the obviously suspect individuals for further interrogation.

The Counterintelligence operatives found that the German population was generally docile and amenable to the orders of military government. This attitude, it was felt, reflected the Germans' bewilderment under the first shock of battle and early occupation. The agents found that the matter of handling displaced persons was at once more immediate and pressing than controls over the civil population. Military traffic was clogged as DP's straggled along the highways to the West, and wholesale looting and violent reprisals against the Germans were committed by the people who had previously been the victims of the Nazi regime.

One factor that assisted CIC during this period was the surprisingly helpful attitude of local authorities and police toward counterintelligence staffs and personnel. In many towns, local police were required to furnish list of persons within the automatic arrest categories. Compliance with this order was customary.

The 12th Army Group was able to report a "generally satisfactory security status among its units, and an improvement in security consciousness was evident among personnel who entered into well-populated areas of Germany.

As the Allied Armies consolidated their gains in Germany, the problem of frontier security along the borders of the conquered country became increasingly important. The 12th Army Group discovered that the chief obstacle to establishing rigid frontier control was the lack of adequate manpower to guard and patrol the frontier and process displaced persons.

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By the end of April, this obstacle was somewhat overcome. Corps Frontier Commands were established and Allied Expeditionary Forces personnel were assigned to guard the borders and to establish a Prohibited Frontier Zone through which travel was unauthorized.[7]

21st Army Group: Information and Advice

At 21st Army Group, a Counterintelligence news sheet was prepared, containing latest information on enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive organizations. More important, it indicated the principal counter measures which should be employed by Counterintelligence field units in tracking down the remnants of the German Intelligence Service.

The report stated that German Intelligence Service had built up elaborate and extensive records covering every field of its activities, including the names and histories of all its members, agents and informants. Although many of these records had been destroyed in the path of the Allied advance, many others had been removed to unknown destinations. The importance of these documents was obvious: The German Intelligence Service could be destroyed if its activities and the names of its operatives were exposed at the same time.

Personnel of the Amt III of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the Sturm Abteilungen proper) were deemed to be the most dangerous from a counterintelligence standpoint. These were the agents that in all likelihood would be selected for post-war missions to prolong the German hopes of eventual world conquest. Penetration of these agents into Allied staffs and national political parties had to be checked, and all evidence to support or refute rumors of subversive activities had to be closely studied during the counterintelligence drive on the German Intelligence Service.

The 21st Army Group suggested other cautions. The possibility of agents among foreign displaced persons who chose to remain in Germany and obtain posts with Allied organizations as drivers, cooks, interpreters and other miscellaneous workers had to be considered. Investigations would be required of small groups of ex-officers who might band together for secret meetings. Other subjects of surveillance were to be Hitler Youth members (both male and female) and persons

7. The 12th Army Group CI Periodic Rpt Nr 16 for Apr 45, dtd 6 May 45, in Ops Rpts 12th Army Group, L-570, Apr 45, (Unclassified), Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.

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with close commercial connections in such countries as Spain, Switzerland, South America, and Sweden--places where German agents had already gained substantial footholds.

Another technique 21st Army Group predicted the residual Nazi organizations might employ was the breeding of dissention among the victors. Subversive propaganda, purported to have originated from Allied sources or persons liberated by the Allies, would be circulated to emphasize differences in pay, allowances, and living conditions among Allied troops and to breed resentment in the local population by accusing the Allies of encouraging Communism and Anarachy.

It soon appeared that these warnings of future German Intelligence Service activity were not merely speculation on the part of Army Group officials. The Allied forces intercepted a handbill alleged to have originated from American sources denouncing a supposed speech by Winston Churchill in which the Prime Minister lamented the absence of markets for British trade after the war because of American intervention.

Other leaflets picked up played on the theme of imminent conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The documents were always framed to give the impression of having been composed by representatives of an Allied power.

From developments during the early days of May, 21st Army group was able to make one confident but cautious prediction: "There is reason to believe that the Wehrwolf organization has been overtaken by the march of events before it got into its stride." On 6 May, a German broadcast, supposedly by order of Admiral Doenitz, called for the cessation of Wehrwolf activities behind the Anglo-American lines.

In general, the 21st Army Group report indicated that British Field Security units were experiencing many of the same difficulties and successes as their American CIC counterparts. Lack of court evidence was one consistently nagging problem that cropped up in the trials of German civilians for offenses against the military government. A review of recent Field Security arrestees brought up for trial showed in many cases that the prosecution had failed to secure a conviction because the evidence produced by the Field Security Section was either insufficient or inaccurate. Frequently, the only evidence produced was a brief arrest report, and the Field Security was not represented in court to provide further details.

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The 21st Army Group reminded the Field Security units that "CI personnel must constantly bear in mind that their eventual aim is to secure the conviction of the suspect for whatever offense he has committed.... If it is not desirable for the Field Security officer or non-commissioned officer to be present personally in court as a witness, he should send a written statement of evidence and a certificate that he is unable for military reasons to attend."[8]

First Army CIC Gives the Alert

On 5 April, CIC agents at First Army completed a Special Counterintelligence target study that forecast to subordinate CIC units what to expect in the closing phase of the battle for Germany. The following courses of action that the enemy intelligence was capable of pursuing were included in the estimate:

1. The installation of stay behind agents with radio transmitters in the larger towns. It was considered that the Nazis most likely would use wireless transmitter operators of French or Belgian nationality.

2. The increased use of stay-behind long-range saboteurs who would have previously prepared hiding places and stores of sabotage equipment at their disposal.

3. The employment of ever increasing numbers of Hitler Jugend agents for both sabotage and espionage missions. These youths in many instances would be well trained and completely equipped for their missions; making them highly suited to use by the German Intelligence Service.

4. Penetration by German agents into prisoner of war and foreign labor camps in order to escape detection, and penetration into Allied intelligence organizations or evacuation to France or Belgium as the first step of a long-range mission.

5. Infiltration of trapped Nazi officials or German intelligence personnel into Wehrmacht or Volkssturm units.

6. The use of short-range line crossing espionage and sabotage agents primarily of German, Luxembourg, French, Belgian or Dutch Nationality.

8. 21st Army Group News Sheet Nr 19, dtd 9 May 45 (SECRET).

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7. The use of mines, booby traps, and delayed action bombs in large buildings, particularily possible sites for future headquarters or billets.

8. The beginnings of partisan warfare combined with a program of "black" propaganda designed to arouse the population against the occupying troops and discourage collaboration with military government.[9]

Some Predictions Come True

Almost immediately some of the 301st CIC Detachment's predictions were shown to have been well founded. Reports that Skorzeny was broadcasting appeals to the German people to commit resistance and sabotage acts were received. It was also said that he was training saboteurs to remain in areas overrun by Allied troops and harass the occupation forces.

By the end of April, enemy subversive activities in the First Army area were definitely increasing. Enemy sabotage organizations had recovered from the initial shocks of defeat and had not yet seen the futility of resistance acts. CIC received reports daily that lone jeeps had been ambushed or pirated and US uniforms were frequently pilfered.

Ninth Army troops encountered two groups of Schutz Staffeln men operating radios in the vicinity of Moehne. In both cases, the men were fanatic enough to prefer death to arrest. Hitler Jugend members carried out instructions for incapacitating Allied vehicles and hacking wire lines, and in the early morning of 25 April, two Piper Cub aircraft were sabotaged.[10]

The training of German saboteurs continued even as the Allied troops approached. Reports from the First Army Master Interrogation Center indicated that a sabotage school had been launched at Dessau-Rosslau and had succeeded in graduating about 20 well-equipped teams of one officer and four men between 20 March and 10 April.[11]

9. 1st Army Rpt from Annex 2, G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 193, 82d Abn Div, dtd 8 Apr 45, subj: "Security Notes," in G2 Jnl & File, FUSA, 12 Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

10. 1st Army Rpt, from A2 Periodic Rpt Nr 281, Hq IX Tactical Air Cmd, dtd 30 Apr 45, in G2 Jnl & File, FUSA, L-558, dtd 30 Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

11. 1st Army Rpt in FUSA G2 Jnl, L- 558, dtd 3 May 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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Not all the sabotage efforts were committed on the ground. Former Luftwaffe pilots were captured in April when seven Arado type training planes carrying demolitions and documents were forced down in the First Army area. Subsequent interrogation revealed that the German Air Force men were part of a group of 50 planes and 100 fliers slated to accomplish missions near their home towns.[12]

In addition to the saboteurs, a number of German agents of French and Belgian nationality were captured in the First Army area. They had been dispatched by the German Intelligence Service to their own countries on long-range political espionage missions.[13]

False Expectations

While these espionage and sabotage efforts supported some forecasts in First Army's Counterintelligence estimate, other predictions failed to materialize. Partisan warfare did not break out as feared, and such resistance organizations as the "Wehrwolf" were encountered more in theory than in practice. The rapid advance of the Allied troops had caught most Wehrwolf units in the embryonic stage.[14]

First Army Counterintelligence officials were surprised that Gestapo agents from Cologne had been ordered to remain in the city and help the Wehrmacht. As soldiers, these once-feared Secret Police agents proved dismal failures and the Gestapo agents often ended up in POW cages. CIC agents were instructed to alert POW interrogators to the presence of former Gestapo operatives among their prisoners and to arrange for their transer to counterintelligence control.[15]

Communist Tremors

12. 12th Army Group G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 333, 4 May 45 in 12th AG Opns Rpts, L-616, dtd May 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)
13. 1st Army Rpt, from G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 281, Hqs IX Tactical Air Cmd, dtd 30 Apr 45, in G2 Jnl and File, FUSA, L-558, dtd 30 Apr(Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)
14. 1st Army Rpt, from G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 281, Hq IX Tactical Air Cmd, dtd 30 Apr 45, in G2 Jnl and File, FUSA, L-558, dtd 30 Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)
15. 15th Army CI Bulletin Nr 3, 24 Apr 45, in 15th Army Monthly CI Rpt and CI Bulletins, L-633,(11), Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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As the bitter German fighting gave way to Allied occupation, CIC began to realize its impending problems in the new occupational role. In the city of Leipzig, a "Free Germany" Committee, under the leadership of General Von Seydlitz, was found in operation. This Communist inspired group and the presence of Russian agents were indicative of Soviet intentions to disturb the Allied occupation before it had fairly begun. First Army CIC noted that "it can be assumed that intelligence from any 'Free Germany' Committee or Russian agents will be transmitted only to the Russians."[16]

Arrest Reports, First Army Format

On 30 April, the First Army G2, Colonel B. A. Dickson, published instructions for the CIC Detachments at Corps and Division level to follow when filling out Arrest Reports, SHAEF, Form Number Seven. Throughout the ETO campaign, the lack of proper arrest records had received official notice upon numerous occasions, but these instructions constitute the first comprehensive directive found in CIC records.

The Detachments were advised that these reports were to be completed fully by typewriter or legibly handwritten or hand-printed in ink. Pencil was taboo. Except in the case of POW each report was to concern a single individual. The full unit designation, not the telephone code name, was requested, and agents were told to sign all copies of the report. The arrestee's "Address of Last Residence," if known, and the "Place of Arrest"were to be stated clearly, using coordinates where necessary.

Certain requisites were established for filling in the item, "Military or Civil Authority Taking Custody of the Prisoner". If the arresting Detachment considered the suspect worthy of further interrogation or if the suspect was a security threat not covered by mandatory internment policies or if the arrestee was obviously of interest to other agencies at Army or higher echelons, the entry after the item was to read: "Master Interrogation Center."

If an individual had been arrested on the basis of mandatory internment policies, the "Reason for Arrest" topic was to include the arrestee's title, and the item involving custody was to be "First Army Internment Camp."

The status of the case was to be specified in the space allotted by the phrase which was most appropriate, such as

16. 15th Army CI Bulletin Nr 3, 24 Apr 45, in 15th Army Monthly CI Rpt and CI Bulletins, L-633,(11), Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

[redacted]

[redacted]

"Case Closed," or "Investigation Continues." Additional notations, either "Investigation Report Follows" or "No Further Investigation," were to be made in cases where the Report of Investigation was not attached to the arrest document.

The three prescribed copies of the Arrest Report were to be carried by the Officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the escort guard and turned over to the Military Police representative at the point of delivery and checked against the group of arrestees. No civilian arrestee was to be sent rearward without the accompanying Arrest Report.17

"Vehme" Means Revenge

On the night of 25 March, the Allied-appointed Burgermeister of Aachen was murdered. According to an account compiled from the remarks of witnesses, three German soldiers, dressed in jumper suits with zippers from crotch to neck, but wearing no headdress, had committed the killing. The soldiers, claiming to have been forced down on a return flight over Brussels, had appealed to the Burgermeister for aid. When he refused they shot him.

This was the story of witnesses. CIC agents of the 203d Detachment read more into the murder. It seemed plausible that this assassination was the first measure in an organized plan to create disorder and confusion among the civilians in Allied occupied territory, and that Otto Skorzeny, the prime promoter of aggressive activity in the German Intelligence Service, was behind the plan.

An organization known as Vehme (Revenge) was rumored to exist. Its membership was parceled into closely knit groups of from three to five persons whose aim was to kill Allied appointed officials and other Germans who chose to cooperate with the Allied forces. The assassination in Aachen possessed all the qualifications of a Skorzeny-directed mission. III Corps intelligence remained skeptical of the popular version of the assassination, but no evidence was found to disprove or confirm it.18

III Corps CIC Makes A Quick Catch

17. 1st Army G2 Ltr to Corps and Div G2s, subj: "Arrest Procedure," dtd 30 Apr 45 in 87th CIC Det Correspondence File, 6/44- 5/45 (Unclassified), Kansas City Records Center BX 25095.
18. III Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 106, Annex 4, subj: "Revenge Warfare," dtd 27 Mar 45, in III Corps Opns Rpts (29) L-595 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 5 April, III Corps moved its Command Post to a new location. A few hours after this shift, agents of the 203rd CIC Detachment, operating with Corps Military Police, captured twelve Wehrmacht deserters in civilian clothes and five Nazi Party members who were within the automatic arrest category.

This hasty roundup indicated more than the fact that CIC was wideawake; 203rd CIC estimated that about 50 per cent of the male civilians of military age who were traveling along highways or living in occupied communities would prove to be enemy soldiers. Three distinct types could be discerned among these pseudo-civilians: bonafide deserters attempting to reach their homes; isolated troops trying to get back to an assembly area within their own lines, and agents on sabotage or espionage missions.

Some of the former German soldiers turned themselves in to the Allied authorities. One uniformed member of the Wehrmacht who appeared at the 203rd CIC Detachment was found to have in his possession both a Soldbuch and a Wehrpass. Since the Wehrpass was issued only to civilians or soldiers who had reverted to civilian status, the man was questioned closely by the CIC agents.

The POW revealed that the officers of two companies, including his own, had given their men Wehrpasses, and ordered them to infiltrate to Hannover. The plan required them to change to civilian garb at the first opportunity so that, with their identity papers, they could pass as legitimate civilians. When the CIC agents asked why he had surrendered, the prisoner explained that after walking for three days, Hannover still seemed a long way off.

There were still other problems involving POW and their identity documents. Some deserters in civilian clothing had to be stripped completely before their Soldbuchs were located hidden in their socks.[19] One member of a Schutz Staffeln Jagdverbande unit who surrendered to III Corps troops revealed that German sabotage units had received American uniforms prior to being sent on missions. Each of these units was also supposed to have Thompson sub-machine guns, carbines and M1 Rifles and five US Jeeps. Posing as American-equipped

19. III Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 115, dtd 5 Apr 45, in III Corps Opns Rpts (8) L-263 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

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French and Dutch soldiers who had been separated from their organizations, they were to operate behind Allied lines committing espionage and sabotage.[20]

Phony Passes

Skepticism was an attitude that CIC agents continually had to develop among American troops. The average GI was a frequent "sucker" for Germans who played upon his good nature and credulity. On 9 April, CIC Agents with the 203rd Detachment found two German soldiers dressed in civilian clothing. They presented "passes" that had been written on scraps of notebook paper as follows:

Johann Beckers
is allowed to go to
Freckenhorst

April 4, 1945
Mil. Gov.
Security Guard

Upon interrogation, the two men claimed that the passes were received from an American soldier at Burg; their destination, Freckenhorst, was about 150 kilometers north of this town. The prisoners admitted that the passes had aided them several times in their journey before they were apprehended by the 203rd CIC. How often similar false documentation had helped Germans past Allied scrutiny could not be determined, but CIC reiterated a familiar warning:

"The attention of all guards should again be directed toward the security threat presented by these civilian-garbed members of the Wehrmacht. No passes or permits should be accepted as valid unless the pass form is known to the guards. Slips of paper with unsigned instructions in English or alleged passes in foreign languages should not be accepted at face value---turn all questionable or suspicious individuals over to the nearest CIC Detachment."[21]

20. III Corps Rpt, "Jagdverband Groups in US Uniform," dtd 8 Apr 45, in III Corps Jnl & File, L-623, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

21. III Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 119, dtd 9 Apr 45 in III Corps Opns Rpt (12) L-623, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

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Phony Discharges

The false identity documents being carried by German soldiers were not limited to passes. On 16 April, Agents of the 203rd Detachment apprehended 43 former members of the Wehrmacht. Among them was a talkative Prisoner of War who told CIC of a discharge procedure that had been implemented by some German officers.

Several days prior to his capture, the POW, Walter Jost, had been ordered to escort five sick French Prisoners of War from Dusseldorf to Lauenau. On arrival at the destination, Jost learned from other German soldiers about a TODT organization office that was offering "discharges" to members of beaten and disorganized German units.

The system was quite simple in operation. Any German soldier or TODT worker wearing a uniform could go before one of several officers who issued and signed a discharge paper on the spot. Few questions were asked; no identification was required. The heading of the particular unit to which the individual belonged topped the document. These discharges were prepared by the hundreds on typewriters, and lacked official certification. The explanation for the missing stamp mark was that the certifying equipment had been destroyed by "enemy action."

How effective were these spurious papers? Jost, like the other recipients, had been ordered to proceed to his home and report to the local police chief to aid in home defense. After burning his Soldbuch and uniform, Jost had donned civilian clothes and started on the route home using his counterfeit discharge as identification when stopped or questioned. He had managed to travel more than 150 kilometers before the Agents of the 203rd CIC halted his progress.[22]

The Danger of Pseudo-Civilian

The counterintelligence officials' principal concern over the now-soldier, now-civilian routine was that espionage and sabotage agents in mufti could practice the same deceptions as the former Wehrmacht troopers. A POW report received by III Corps CIC from the Eifel area confirmed this fear.

The captured German soldier stated that several days

22. III Corps G2 Information Bulletin #43, dtd 16 Apr 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl & File - dtd 17 Apr 45 (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

earlier his friend, a Wehrmacht operative of the German Intelligence Service, had become drunk and spelled out the details of an undercover mission that was to be launched in the vicinity of Eitorf and Sieburg. Several teams of agents equipped with a radio set were to perform wireless transmitter operations within the Allied-held territory. All agents would, of course, discard their uniforms to appear as natives of the Eifel area. CIC's interest in these and other German Intelligence Service operatives made the need for close scrutiny of all "civilians" essential.[23]

V Corps CIC: Few Men, Much to Do

During the closing campaign, the cities of Leipzig and Kassel both fell within the V Corps zone of action. The 205th CIC Detachment had to be split into sub-units in order to handle the large counterintelligence task posed by these cities. In addition to the usual CIC routine of screening city officials and police and apprehending automatic arrestees and Black List personalities, the Agents had to inspect and arrange guards for the numerous important intelligence targets that ranged from manufacturing concerns to Gestapo Headquarters.[24]

Rear Echelon Saboteurs

While V Corps was operating in the city of Hof, American soldiers became suspicious of a man and four boys wheeling a push cart. Examination proved the suspicions; the cart was filled with sabotage materials. In the confusion attendant on this discovery, the man was shot and killed, and a search of his body revealed Schutz Staffeln papers. Under interrogation the boys quickly admitted that they were members of a group of 30 Germans who remained in rear areas with the purpose of committing acts of sabotage. The group was divided into six sections, similar to the one CIC had intercepted, of one man and five youths. CIC agents concluded that the modus operandi of all these sections might be identical and warned guards to watch for carts pushed by

23. III Corps Rpt dtd 10 Apr 45, in 1st US Army G2 Jnl, L-623, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

24. Intelligence Operations of V Corps, Chapter III, Operations, G2 Section undated, (Restricted), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

[redacted]

seeming refugees. The term "rear area" could sound deceptively serene; it was in such areas that counter-intelligence work was often the most demanding.[25]

VII Corps CIC Detachment: Cologne, Then Move On

Agents of the 207th CIC Detachment continued their work in Cologne for a few days after the offensive across the Rhine had begun, tying up loose ends in so far as was possible for the succeeding CIC Detachment. Then they, too, moved to the Ruhr battle and later to the Harz Mountain area nearer the Elbe and Mulde Rivers.

Cologne was the scene of the largest scale CIC operation so far encountered in Germany. Among the problems was the disposition of thousands of Displaced Persons.

These people, mostly forced laborers, were left behind by the Germans when they evacuated. Ten thousand of them were handled by Military Government and CIC in Cologne alone.

The military government detachments with the 104th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division had set up collection areas, and the 207th CIC Detachment sent a team of agents to screen refugees sent to these points. Because of the preponderance of displaced persons and the scarcity of CIC personnel, only a superficial screening was planned, which called for no attempt to separate suspects from the pack unless they were easily detectable. CIC evidently favored 3d Armored's collection procedure: As soon as a truckful of displaced persons was collected, they were driven to a large center. The 104th used two centers, and often left it up to the displaced persons themselves to find their way to one of them. Eventually, however, all displaced persons were moved into the single center run by the 3d Armored Military Government. Few actual CIC investigations were accomplished as a result of this screening. Several denunciations were checked, but none proved positive.[26]

Unwilling Saboteurs

25. 418th CIC Det Bulletin #4, Hq 12th Army Group, CIV, G2 undtd (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

26. 207th CIC Det Memo to OIC, dtd 26 Mar 45, subj: "Displaced Foreign Nationals Found in Cologne Area, re: Screening," in 207th CIC Det Log, Feb 44-Mar 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), Box 25097 (Kansas City Records Center).

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 28 March, based on a denunciation report, a sixteen-year-old youth who was living with his girl friend was arrested. He admitted to having been trained in sabotage at a school run by the Germans for Hitler Jugend members and to having been given a mission---the usual---to sabotage targets of opportunity.

This young man lead CIC Agent Frank A. Wolff to the second member of the three-man team, who was working in the garden in his parents' home. He had buried the team's supplies in the same garden, and dug them up for the agent. Neither boy knew where the third member of the team was.

Under interrogation, the boys did not appear to be thoroughly indocrinated with Nazism, nor did they seem to be interested in carrying out the mission the Germans had assigned them. The fact that they had thrown some of their equipment in a manure pit, rendering it useless, substantiated this point of view.

Agent Wolff, moving out with his detachment, did not arrest the youths; and, in his report, suggested clemency for the third member of the team on the part of the succeeding agent handling the case.[27]

A man who had been a petty informer for the Gestapo had accepted a mission for the Americans after his arrest by the 104th CIC Detachment. On the 28th, the man set out to cross the Rhine but soon returned, complaining that the currents of the river were too strong for one man in a rubber boat to navigate. Special Agent Fenton Moran of the 207th CIC Detachment interrogated him and because of his disreputable background and his connection with the Gestapo, sent him to First US Army for internment as a security threat.[28]

Enemy Agents in Disguise

VII Corps CIC had a problem in common with other CIC units in Germany: Ferreting out enemy agents who had assumed varied disguises. In the course of VII Corps' rapid advance, hordes of non-Germanic oppressed laborers were overrun.

27. 207th CIC Det Memo for OIC, dtd 28 Mar 45, subj: "Hitler Youth, in 207th CIC Det Log Feb 45-Mar 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

28. 207th CIC Det Memo for OIC, dtd 28 Mar 45, subj: "Franz German, etc.," in 207th CIC Det Log Feb 45-Mar 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, BX 25097).

[redacted]

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French and Belgian Displaced Persons were most in evidence, but there were also large groups of Russians and Poles. The CIC Agents noted a dangerous tendency toward indulgence and blind acceptance of these individuals by the American troops. Soldiers accepted gifts of wine from the ebullient liberatees and eagerly entered into conversations with them.

CIC had good reason for urging caution before fraternization. Within a single week, seven German espionage agents were plucked out of the masses of displaced persons, and all indications pointed to the increasing use of this convenient cover.

The surest prevention of this espionage was to isolate the displaced persons from military installations and contact with American troops, and CIC suggested the following rules of thumb:

1. "Keep displaced persons away from your installations.

2. "Whenever possible, corral those wandering about and segregate them under guard to get them to the nearest Military Government camp.

3. Consider every one of these people a potential German espionage agent. Their true status will be determined by trained personnel at the rear following their evacuation.

4. "Above all, don't indulge in soft assumptions. Better to extend the good man's oppression another day than to ease the machinations of an enemy agent."[29]

VII Corps CIC Agents soon found that their suspicions of civilians had to be almost universal. Reliable informants stated that members of the Nazi underground movement were preparing to use "Red Cross" armbands as entree to occupied areas. The CIC Agents recommended that all civilians in the Corps zone be checked thoroughly for their connections with Red Cross activity. Even if they proved bona fide Red Cross workers, they would have to be kept under surveillance.[30]

5th CIC Detachment: Frankfurt and the Ruhr

29. III Corps G2 Periodic Report Nr 113, dtd 3 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 3-4 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

30. VII Corps Rpt, G2 Jnl & File, dtd 16 Apr 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Brance, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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Agents of the 5th CIC Detachment spent the first week of April in Frankfurt collecting individuals of counter-intelligence interest. The Division's commitment against the German forces in the Ruhr during the middle of the month brought the agents sharply against a major problem: the hordes of German soldiers with recent discharge papers.

In the frantic last days of the Ruhr pocket, Wehrmacht members tried to obtain discharges as a means of evading capture, and the area was flooded with recipients of these wholesale releases from active duty. 5th CIC made it a policy to treat recently-discharged soldiers as POW, and announced publicly that all German soldiers discharged after 17 March must report to the Allied authorities.[31]

9th Infantry Division: Diversity

As Agents of the 9th CIC Detachment entered German towns in April, they found that the civilian population often resembled an international congress, so diverse were the nationalities present. In one town, all men of military age were brought to the Burgermeister's office for CIC screening. Of a total of 455 men questioned, there were 215 Germans, 100 Russians, 80 Serbians, 30 Poles, 25 Italians, and 5 Frenchmen. Most of these people were dealt with routinely, and POW found in civilian clothes were sent through prisoner of war channels. But among the number were eight displaced persons from Holland with suspicious backgrounds and three counterintelligence targets. These were held for further interrogation at the First Army Interrogation Center. The diverse national backgrounds of the men CIC had screened in this single town reflected the upheavals and migrations which were wrought throughout Europe during the War.[32]

The Man Called "B"

Among the persons that CIC had to investigate during the April drive was a man identified in reports as "B." Charged with violating the Military Government Weapon Proclamation, "B" was found to have further claim to CIC attention. The investigation disclosed the "B" had been employed for three years by a charcoal factory in Zueschen, where his principal

31. 5th Inf Div G2 After Action Rpt, in 305-2 (6610) Master (UNCLASSIFIED). (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

32. VII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt #97, Incl 4, subj: "Security," dtd 7 Apr 45 (source, 9th Inf Div) in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 11-15 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

[redacted]

duties were to beat the Russian labor and to use any other means of coercion that would promote employee efficiency. One of "B's" favorite devices was to harass the foreign laborers by waving a pistol at them.

When the American troops occupied the towns, all German civilians were immediately instructed to surrender any weapons they possessed to the Burgermeister. "B" complied.. ..to a degree. He turned in two rifles, but withheld his pistol. When questioned about this violation, "B" explained that he had kept the pistol as protection against the Russian workers. The story of "B" was not uncommon. There were many such petty war criminals among the towns that CIC agents entered in Germany.[33]

CIC in Action: The Town of Koetchen

In the closing days of the ETO campaign, CIC agents with the 9th CIC Detachment entered and covered towns rapidly. The targets were similar to those exploited in hundreds of other towns, but experience had quickened and refined CIC techniques. The Agent Report submitted on the town of Koetchen gave a typical picture of the problems CIC faced and the work they accomplished.

In general, the CIC Agents found Koetchen and vicinity quiet. No organized subversive activity was observed, and the Agents concentrated on apprehending party officials, members of the Schutz Staffeln and German soldiers in hiding.

The civil situation was not as serene. The CIC agents discovered that the local Junkers plant had been looted and the tools stolen. Investigation revealed that the mayor had refused to prosecute the offenders, ostensibly to "save the face" of his fellow citizens, but actually for a more personal reason: some of his close friends had participated in the raid. The looters had been due money from the factory, and had decided to square their accounts with the management by paying themselves in tools and equipment. The raid and the civil adminstrations failure to act were submitted by CIC as "evidence of city-wide graft headed by the Mayor." Interviews with other officials of Koetchen confirmed the CIC analysis.

33. VII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt #97, Incl 4, subj: "Security," dtd 7 Apr 45 (source, 9th Inf Div) in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 11-15 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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CIC also discovered a rather widespread black market in unpurified alcohol. Several families were found to be in possession of as much as five gallons of the deadly fluid which apparently had been intended for use as a V2 propellant. The civilians evidently had considered manufacturing and distilling a homemade liquor from the alcohol which could be sold or bartered in shops, stores or other homes in exchange for food and scarce commodities. CIC directed confiscation of the alcohol.

Among the political notes that CIC compiled was the report of a Communist movement which was under way in Koetchen. The Agents were unable to gather any positive information to support the rumor, and no overt party activity was observed.[34]

The 29th CIC Detachment: Rear Area Security and Military Government

The 29th Infantry Division, for most of this period, continued on its mission: "Rear Area Security and Military Government." The title of the mission is misleading since a static situation is indicated by it. As a matter of fact, however, the Division as a whole moved ninety miles into central Germany between the end of March and 19 April, and its 116th Regiment actively participated in the reduction of the Ruhr while other units, after taking part in the encirclement of that industrial area, raced on to the Elbe and saw action in the Klotze Forest skirmishes.

Emphasis was placed on rear area security because of the streams of displaced persons, freed Allied prisoners of war, refugees, and German soldiers in uniform and in civilian clothes in Ninth US Army area. To control this human flood, checkpoints were formed at each road junction in each unit's area, where all persons were stopped and held until transportation arrived to take them to central collection centers. Here they were segregated by nationalities, Germans being given a brief interrogation to determine their status. Suspicious persons were held for CIC interrogation. Freed Allied servicemen were placed in well-provisioned camps. Displaced person centers were also adequately supplied with necessities.

In the month from 19 March to 19 April, the division's

34. 9th Inf Div Agent Rpt on Koetchen, VII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 129, dtd 9 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl, 10 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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camps handled the following totals of persons in each category: 72,041 displaced persons; 40,442 freed Allied prisoners; and 845 German soldiers.

CIC's Part in the Mission

CIC Agents, augmented by Military Intelligence Interpreter personnel worked in teams with division artillery, division headquarters, and each of the three regiments. During this period 29th CIC Detachment agents introduced themselves to burgermeisters and chiefs of police as "The American Gestapo," and told these officials that they would be held responsible for the compliance of the citizens with military government and CIC decrees. "Under such an understanding," wrote Captain Ellis O. Mayfield, detachment commanding officer, "there has been complete deference to the CIC by all officials."

The division's area of responsibility for the period was a large one, shaped like an isosceles triangle with the base of forty miles running between the vicinity of Osnabruck and an area five miles southwest of Gutersloh, on a northeast southwest axis. The apex of the triangle, about fifty miles from the base, was located five miles NNE of Gladbeck.[35]

Detachment commander and division counterintelligence officer Captain Mayfield, who had previously voiced his discontent with military government procedures during the Battle of the Bulge in the German town of Alsdorf, again found cause for a multiplicity of complaints which he voiced in a memorandum to the division G2 on 14 April under the subject of "Problems encountered by CIC in the 'Security and Military Government Phase of Operations." The memorandum purported to be a consolidation of the comments from the Detachment's "five CIC operational teams...."

The main complaint centered around the number of military government personnel compared to CIC Agents, especially in view of the amount of effort the former expected the latter to expend. Captain Mayfield charged that the detachment was "not physically capable of carrying out the counterintelligence mission in an area 200 X 50 kilometers if they are forced to do a considerable share of the work of the 14 military government detachments and the military government section

35. 29th CIC Det Periodical Rpt from 19 Mar to 19 Apr 45, dtd 20 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Jun 44-Nov 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25094).

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which are assigned to that same area." He cited many duties which together comprised "approximately fifty percent of all work," but either were not CIC responsibilities or were "compartively minor duties which could be handled by another agency." They included "(1) the establishment of civilian governments and the investigation of the persons placed in office; (2) the investigation of persons suspected of being deserters; and (3) the investigations of denouncement based on minor war atrocities, such as the beating of Allied Nationals."

In defense of this point of view, the CIC detachment commander outlined some incidents under each category which revealed the wastefulness of these types of investigations.

The captain stated, in connection with the first item, that CIC had "been asked or directed to find and place in office suitable officials for the local administration." He cited an instance when two agents and two interpreters had spent a full day with military government officers tracking down town officials. Only two prospects who could be cleared were found. What really made CIC's position difficult was that it took "the better part of a day for CIC to throw all the Nazis out of the office...." when military government officers established town adminstrations on their own. Captain Mayfield charged that military government, despite existing procedures and the continual denials of clearances for Nazis by CIC, persisted in submitting fragebogens of persons they wanted cleared when, on the first page of that document, the individual had admitted Nazi party membership.

Captain Mayfield stated that there were instances where military government officers entered towns, collected "all of the good pistols and cameras," and "left without any definite word to anyone about the town's problems."

After one such instance the Captain wrote that CIC, without any request from Military Government, undertook a house-cleaning in which they recommended the removal of the Burgermeister and twenty-four police and recommended suitable men for the jobs. The military government officer, after confiscating local arms, radios, and cameras, had left them with the Nazi Burgermeister, but had failed to give him any instructions. When CIC Agents arrived they discovered that the Burgermeister had not only fired two non-Nazis from the police force, but still continued to show motion pictures twice a day in his theater.

Captain Mayfield pointed out to the division G2 that

military government was "responsible for the establishment of a non-Nazi government" and that "all that is required of the CIC by the directives is that they check the appointees against the counterintelligence blacklists."

Captain Mayfield recognized the detection of German soldiers in civilian clothes as a CIC function, but he thought that Intelligence POW teams, after a brief orientation course in various German identity documents, would be able to screen out about fifty percent of the cases which were being sent to CIC. "The great majority," wrote the Detachment Commander, "of those being referred to our offices have complete civilian identity documents which are in proper order and have legitimate reasons for not being in the army." He indicated that seventy-five percent of a group of 121 civilians sent to CIC between 13 April and 14 April by one battalion for screening were considered suspicious because they carried "Wehrpasses"--the one authentic proof of civilian status. Nineteen of the group were sent all the way back to the division PW enclosure, although thirteen had complete documentation in their possession. Three were boys under the draft age. One admitted he was a deserter. Only real suspects stopped at the preliminary screen should have come under CIC investigation, he pointed out.

The Denounced and the Denouncers

Ninety-nine per cent of the reports concerning alleged Gestapo and Schutz Staffeln personalities were found to have emanated from Russians, according to the five CIC teams; and, in the agents opinions, twenty-five per cent of their time was spent running down these Russians stories with the following result: "Not one item of counterintelligence interest was developed from any investigation based on such reports." Most of the denouncements were the results of personal prejudices, language difficulties, or the wholesale "get-even" attitude of the Russian displaced persons.

Captain Mayfield suggested that all unit commanders be advised to listen to the Russians' stories carefully, to determine their reasonableness. Those with no firm basis to their stories were to be assured that the matter would be investigated and to be told to return to their camp.

Aside from these weaknesses in the mission of the Detachment, Captain Mayfield reported that on the whole "CIC is well received, if not well understood."[36]

36. 29th CIC Det, Memo for G2 29th Inf Div, dtd 14 Apr 45 in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Jun 44-Sep 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25094).

Investigations of CIC Value

Many of the investigations undertaken by teams of the 29th CIC Detachment in the Ruhr vicinity proved of some counterintelligence value. One, completed in Muenchen-Gladbach before the Division crossed the Rhine, indicated that the Germans could not count too heavily on their Hitler Jugend members, no matter how well trained. In this case Special Agents Gordon M. Anderson and Emanuel Braude arrested and interrogated a leader in the local Hitler Jugend organization. Though he and twelve others had been ordered to stay behind and fight off American tanks with bazookas, the Hitler Jugend leader had not carried out the order because his mother had forbidden him. The young man informed the CIC Agents of other Hitler Jugend personnel in the area, and, because he had a knowledge of German flame-throwing tanks, the agents recommended that he be interrogated at a higher level by CIC and Military Intelligence personnel.[37]

Atrocity

1st Lt Lynn E. Neunechwander and Special Agent Sam D. Beall investigated an atrocity case concerning the crew of an American bomber which had been shot down in August 1944 near the community of Hohenhausen-Eichholz, twenty-five miles northeast of Gutersloh, Germany. Of the nine crew members, two failed to get out of the plane and burned with it, and two were carried to neighboring towns by their parachutes where they were captured by the German army. Investigation revealed that five came down in the vicinity of the crash, were captured and turned over to local police. Two officers of the local police took the Americans to a farmhouse, where they left three under guard of the farmer and a chimneysweep while they took the other two to a nearby field and shot them in the back. Returning to the farmhouse, the leading officer announced that the remaining three Americans were also to be shot. When his comrade in the first killing refused to take another life, his place was taken by the chimneysweep. The police chief, the farmer and the chimneysweep had the American airmen turn around, and from very close range, shot them in the back of the head.

The Americans had not been tried. They had not tried to escape. They had not pleaded for their lives. They had

37. 29th CIC Det Memo for OIC, dtd 30 Mar 45, subj: "Gorgus, Frederick," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests Jun 44-May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center BX 25094).

[redacted]

said nothing. The five murdered airmen and the charred bodies of the two who had crashed with the plane were placed in a common grave.

Agents were able to arrest two of the killers and obtain their confessions as well as descriptions and photographs of the other two killers, and names and addresses of witnesses to the crime and the burial.

The documentary evidence and three witnesses were forwarded to the Judge Advocate of Headquarters, 29th Infantry Division, by Captain Mayfield; the two prisoners were sent through POW channels to the Ninth US Army Civilian Interrogation Center.[38]

Stay-Behind Ring

An espionage ring which the Germans had organized in October 1944 to operate in case of occupation by Allied troops was uncovered by Captain Mayfield and Special Agent Emanuel Braude on 15 April. The ring, organized by Front Aufklarungs Kommande 306 and taken over by an Abwehr Stelle in January 1945, was to operate in an area about twenty miles deep covering the towns Haltern, Dulmen, Lette, Darup and Coesfeld, over which the headquarters team of the 29th CIC Detachment had jurisdiction.

The five towns, mapped, are in a zig-zagging line running overall in a south-north direction. Agents in the towns were to serve primarily as channels of communication, with the "letter-drop" as the chief means of transmission of information until the message reached a well-camouflaged wireless transmitter plant in the woods near Munster. A secondary method of transmission was introduced allegedly with the addition of a pigeon loft in the vicinity of Lette, the intermediate station in the chain about five miles south of Coesfeld. In January, Havixbeck was believed to have been added as the territory for another agent. Other agents were established at Geschner, west of Coesfeld, and Merfeld, south of Lette.

The CIC Agents rounded up one agent at Coesfeld, one at

38. 29th Inf Div, ltr and incls, dtd 17 Apr 45, from Div CI officer to JA, 29th Inf Div, subj: "War Crime and Atrocity Rpts," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests, Jun 44-May 45, Doc #131 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

[redacted]

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Dulmen, two at Lette, one at Merfeld, and one at Darup.

At the time of the memorandum to the CIC on this case, Captain Mayfield and Special Agent Braude had not yet had an opportunity to interrogate the agent from Darup, described as a youth with a crippled left hand. The five others had confessed their association with the ring, but each had claimed their recruitment had been largely involuntary.

The agent from Coesfeld, a 65 year-old pharmacist, said he took the job because he wanted to escape evacuation. He claimed not to have been a member of the Nazi party.

The agent from Dulmen, though admitting party membership, claimed to be an anti-Nazi who had not intended to carry out his orders but had consented to serve the ring only to escape evacuation and service in the Volkssturm.

One of the two agents captured in Lette, a farmer, claimed to have enlisted in the ring to be able to stay on his farm. He also professed no intention of carrying out his orders.

His partner, a church organist and pigeon fancier, had been recruited to take care of the ring's pigeons as well as serve as an agent, but claimed to have changed his mind at a later date and to have notified the Front's commander of his new dicision. He had received no reply to his proposal of separation.

The Merfeld agent, the town's burgermeister-schoolteacher-farmer, also allegedly joined to prevent his evacuation and to escape serving with the Volkssturm. According to the arrestee, he was "violently anti-Nazi," and had been turned down for the job of espionage agent by the Kreisleiter. He sought to prove his claim by being cooperative, hoping as a result to curry favor with the Allies.

Documents located in the search of the headquarters of the group were turned over to Special Counterintelligence, Ninth Army. None of the agents were arrested. They were merely told that they would be kept under surveillance. Captain Mayfield noted the loose way the group was organized, and expressed the opinion that another ring may have existed in the same area.[39]

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39. 29th CIC Det, Memo to OIC, dtd 19 Apr 45, subj: "Investigation of Espionage Ring in Coesfeld-Dulman Area," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Misc Rpts Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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Logistics

Deterioration of the detachment's vehicles created a problem. Tires, in particular, were scare, and other deficiencies were not correctable due to a general lack of spare parts. The division as a whole was not awarded a priority, since it was not officially in combat. CIC's role, of course, had increased in scope and geographical area; yet there was no provision for it to replace or repair vehicles or equipment.40

The 35th CIC Detachment: Brushing the Surface

Following a rest in Kaldenkirchen, the 35th CIC Detachment, with the 35th Infantry Division, as part of Ninth Army's XVI Corps, attacked across the Rhine on 26 March and participated in the Ruhr encounters until 12 April.

The Division's counterintelligence report for the period of activity in the Ruhr notes, "The volume of counterintelligence business has been so great as to prohibit a report in detail." As a result, only a general picture of the activities of the detachment may be given.

In the Ruhr pocket it was especially apparent that CIC could only "brush the surface" of counterintelligence problems. There was an enormous increase in the number of automatic arrestees, and security control of civilians was particularly difficult. In the first place, ordinary troops were unable to determine whether a civilian was a security threat or even whether his actions were suspicious. Secondly, military government was unable to quickly control the movement and activities of the populace.

Believing that most civilians would comply with rules if they were informed, CIC indicated that the best way to control German civilians was to post military government proclamations immediately. Traffic between towns could also be reduced by definitive proclamations and by training troops in traffic control and using them for that purpose when possible. Many cases came up during the period which showed the extreme laxity of security resulting from the swiftly changing lines of battle. In one instance a German soldier in civilian clothes traveled unhindered from Paderborn to Buer--about sixty-five miles--part of the way as the guest of two

40. 29th CIC Det, Memo for G2 29th Inf Div, dtd 14 Apr 45 in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Jun 44-Sep 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, 25094).

[redacted]

American soldiers in a jeep. They had satisfied themselves of his integrity after a cursory glance at his driver's license. The same license got him past a guard post along the way. He was arrested in Buer. The case was not an isolated instance, but was repeated with variations many times.

This Detachment also reported that the Communists, though they were especially active in the Ruhr in trying to assist CIC, appeared largely unorganized and tended to confuse CIC by concentrating on "small fry" (i.e. prison guards, or just any Nazi Party member).

After finishing in the Ruhr, the detachment moved with the division on toward the Elbe, under XIII Corps.[41]

78th CIC Detachment: How-to-Do-It

During April, agencies of the 78th CIC Detachment arrested more than 350 people deemed security threats in addition to about 2,500 Wehrmacht members posing as civilians. The bulk of individuals in the security threat classification were former officials of the Nazi Party and other para-military organizations whose rank placed them in automatic arrest categories. These Nazi leaders were not always easy to locate and apprehend.

On 4 April, the 78th CIC Detachment heard from an informant who claimed that an Ortsgruppenleiter was hiding in the town of Asbach. Agent Emil H. Stracke, a member of the CIC team operating in Obereip, several miles from Asbach, was assigned to track down the man, a mission which was made doubly difficult by the tactical situation and the distance he would have to travel.

Upon arriving in Asbach, Stracke contacted several civilians and soon learned that the report was accurate. There had been an Ortsgruppenleiter in the vicinity, named Heinrich Zimmermann. Zimmermann could not be located at his former residence, and the citizens concluded that he had fled or gone into hiding. But, pursuing his inquiry, Agent Stracke learned that Zimmermann had been a baker by trade and that his brother also lived in Asbach.

These two facts provided the clue Stracke needed. He located the brother, who instantly disclaimed any knowledge of

41. 35th Inf Div Counterintelligence Report #6, dated 20 April 1945, for period 25 March-20 April 1945 in 103d (sic) CIC Det Reports Sep 44-Jun 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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where Zimmermann could be found. Playing a hunch, Stracke stated that he was sorry to hear this news, since he represented the Military Government and was looking for a baker to hire. He had hoped that Zimmermann would have been a suitable choice. This ruse activated the brother's sluggish memory. Now he just happened to remember where Zimmermann was located, and volunteered to accompany Stracke to the place. Within a few minutes, Agent Stracke had his man.[42]

Wire Crew Lends CIC An Assist

On 8 April, in the town of Wissen, the 78th CIC investigated a case which reflected both the need for and the result of security indoctrination. A wire crew reported that, while checking a line, they had overheard what they thought were the voices of American soldiers in conversation with German civilians. Captain Neil M. Ruge, the Detachment Commander, and 2d Lieutenant Arthur E. Anderson did not hesitate after receiving the information. They proceeded to the indicated house and stealthily crept near the door where they were able to overhear the conversation taking place in the house. Almost as if reading from a script for CIC's benefit, the soldiers inside committed one security violation after another. They told their German hosts the name of the unit to which they were assigned, the names of their officers, details of the battles they had fought and other choice bits of military information. When the CIC Agents had heard enough, they called for a guard to be posted around the house to prevent any escapes. Then they entered.

Inside the home, several soldiers were found drinking with a German family. The CIC men obtained the soldiers' names and ordered them to report back to their unit. Before leaving the house, the Agents warned the civilians not to repeat what they had heard. CIC work in the case was completed with the Agent's Report to the violators' unit, which was used in the Special Court Martial proceedings against the men.[43]

The Little Foxes

The 78th CIC Detachment spent a busy day on 28 April arresting boys who had been detailed to accomplish men's work.

42. 78th CIC Det Monthly Information Report, dtd 1 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).
43. 78th CIC Det Monthly Information Report, dtd 1 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Seven youths were apprehended at Alsfeld where they had gathered to plot destruction of Allied communication lines and to attack American vehicles in order to obtain arms and transportation. The boys, ranging in age from 15 to 18 years, admitted to membership in the Wehrwolf and the Hitler Jugend. They wore Nazi badges under the lapels of their jackets, and the CIC agents found a quantity of small arms, dynamite and 9 mm ammunition in their possession.

The same day, four German boys, alleged to be Wehrwolf members, were arrested on the basis of information received by CIC personnel at Giessen. The boys had only one pistol but many plans. They had intended to ambush an Army jeep, destroy a bridge in the vicinity of Dorlar, a railroad bridge between Lollar and Wetzlar, and an ammunition train. Although their plans were big, the youths still needed to procure the demolition material, arms and ammunition.

Although these young Wehrwolves had been caught before the act, the threat that they and their compatriots posed for the Allied troops was not an idle one. The main thing that these fanatic adolescents were lacking was organization. CIC had to make increasingly sure that other little foxes could not ban together.44

Take-Over Weaknesses Discussed

Weaknesses in the take-over system which had plagued CIC throughout the ETO campaign and a possible means for overcoming them were discussed by Captain Ruge of the 78th CIC Detachment in his April Monthly Information Report. Prefacing his remarks by a comment that, although his recommendation was too late to be of any value in the ETO campaign, it was being offered "for consideration in future campaigns in the Far East and any possible future wars." He suggested that CIC adopt the system used by Military Government. Under this system, a small detachment was permanently assigned to a division, and, during the combat phase, was assisted by teams permanently assigned to the area. When the division team moved on after the area was conquered, the permanent teams stayed on and could continue their work without any break in operation.

"Experience has shown that in several instances,"--Captain Ruge wrote, "permanent Military Government teams began operations in an area within a day or two of its conquest and

44. 78th Div, Rpt of Telephone Conversations, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558 dtd 28 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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at the time of this report have operated continuously in that area for a month or more, while several CIC teams have attempted to cover the area with none of them being able to accomplish a satisfactory job because of their brief stay..."[45]

79th CIC Detachment: Suspect Denies All

Acting on a tip from an informant, British Field Security men attached to the 79th CIC Detachment arrested Wilhelm Soldan, a former Gestapo agent and Schutz Staffeln Hauptsturmfuhrer who had been responsible for outrages committed against anti-Nazis in Bochum and had been implicated in the deaths of eighty political prisoners on 8 April. During interrogation, Soldan stolidly denied all connections with the Gestapo. But there was more than sufficient evidence to counter denials, for the allegations against Soldan had been substantiated by the testimony of a dozen independent witnesses. CIC did not hesitate to forward the recalcitrant prisoner to Camp "Q" Ninth US Army's Civilian Detention Camp, for further questioning.

Radio Equipment Found

In Schwartz, an informant told the 79th CIC that a man named Emil Mauss was in possession of considerable radio equipment and would bear watching. On 26 April, a CIC raiding party led by 1st Lt Richard M. Gonzales surprised Mauss in his home and found sending apparatus, several radio sets and other radio equipment, just as the informant had claimed. Mauss stated that this equipment had been used in his job of teaching members of the Hitler Jugend how to transmit and receive messages. When a continued probe of Mauss' past activities failed to uncover any evidence to prove he was actually an agent, he was sent through prisoner of war channels on the charge of illegal ownership of a Wehrmacht sending set.

79th CIC agents uncovered more radio equipment before the end of April. A CIC team led by Special Agent Anthony Markusiewicz raided the hideout of five former German soldiers whom informants had termed members of a sabotage ring. In their lodging was a radio transmitter and receiver.

Interrogation failed to establish any connection between this ring and the previously-arrested Mauss. Three of the prisoners cooperated with the CIC agents and were dispatched

45. 78th CIC Det Monthly Information Report, dated 1 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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through regular POW channels, after no further evidence was adduced to support the claim that all five were implicated in a plan for sabotage. The remaining two suspects who proved themselves liars with conflicting testimony were routed to Camp "Q" for further interrogation.

Not Quite Clever Enough

The wearing of civilian clothes was a device used by many former Wehrmacht members to escape detection. For the most part, this ruse failed because the apparent military age of an individutal usually aroused suspicions, and the documents in his possession often failed to substantiate his civilian status. Various devices also were used for forging documents. Agents of the 79th CIC Detachment uncovered an unusual one while screening a group of young men at a road block in the Ludinghausen sector. One man carried a pass on which the photograph seemingly was impregnated with a bona fide stamp until close scruntiny by the Agents revealed that the picture had actually been impregnated through the use of an ordinary five mark coin.[46]

An Anti-Nazi Organization

While covering the town of Hamborn, Agents of the 79th CIC Detachment came across an anti-Nazi organization known as the Frei-Korps, Rhein/Ruhr. The movement had been founded on 1 December 1944 by Herman Brockmann, a former Wehrmacht member who had received a medical discharge. Brockmann had managed to gather about fifty men, mostly foreign workers, to support the following goals:

1. Complete destruction of Naziism.
2. Complete destruction of German militarism, including all its affiliations and units.
3. Complete abolition of all laws put into effect by Nazis.
4. Severe punishment of all war criminals.
5. To work for peace, order, security and freedom.

The Frei-Korps, Rhein/Ruhr, had been able to distribute propaganda leaflets bearing caricatures and the following message: "The German soldier has it good: Hitler thinks for him, Himmler sees to it that his wife is not lonesome, and he,

46. 79th CIC Det Monthly Information Report, dtd 1 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

[redacted]

himself, remains at the front until he dies."

The organization apparently was primarily active in influencing members of the Wehrmacht to desert. When the Allied troops arrived in the Hamborn area, Frei-Korps operatives organized the surrender of the town by putting up a white flag in the church steeple.

The existance of this anti-Nazi organization was encouraging, but CIC was unable to determine if similar groups were present in other locales.[47]

95th CIC Detachment: Factory Sabotage

The 95th Infantry Division moved on line along the Lippe River and Canal, and by 4 April, was committed to assist in the coordinated reduction of the Ruhr.

In the city of Neuss agents of the 95th CIC Detachment were informed that the Gestapo Chief had instructed plant managers of local factories to appoint workers to commit sabotage after the Allies entered. The number of men assigned this mission was to vary with the size of the plant.

The manager of the National Radiator Company in Neuss stated that he had been ordered to name four men at his factory but had failed to do so. He felt, however, that the appointment of sabotage agents might be a general rule, and advised CIC to contact plant managers who would know the names of the men selected.[48]

Toward the end of April, with the Division stabilizing, all intelligence personnel of the 95th Division were lumped into two classifications of military government activities: Special Purpose and General Purpose. The Special Purpose personnel, consisting of the CIC agents, were responsible for apprehending Nazi Party officials, screening all civilian appointees, interrogating persons arrested for suspicious activity, following up counterintelligence targets and locating new targets.

The General Purpose group, consisting of all other intelligence personnel and augmented by German linguists from

47. 12th Army Group CI Periodic Rpt Nr 16 for Apr 45, dtd 6 May 45, in Opns Rpts 12th Army Group, L-570, Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)
48. XXII Corps GE Periodic Rpt Nr 5, dtd 3 Apr 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 3-4 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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the area commander's unit, were to screen German civilian males, age 14-60, for military personnel, to segregate and screen personnel in prisoner of war and displaced persons camps, and to report and investigate all subversive and sabotage activities.

Existing records fail to point out the degree of success that this arbitrary division of activities achieved.[49]

97th CIC Detachment: Suspicious Soap Factory

In Oberkassel, CIC Agents of the 97th CIC Detachment were alerted to the possibility of subversive activity within a local plant, the P.C. Cremer Soap Factory, which despite the ebb and flow of war had continued operating with about 1,000 employees. The owner, before departing from the scene prior to the arrival of the Allies, had boasted to his employees that he would return and that there were some places in his factory area into which Allied military personnel would never penetrate.

Initial CIC inquiries uncovered a rumor that weapons were stored on the factory premises and that one of the high buildings was being used for observation purposes. Some form of communication between the factory and German forces on the Western side of the Rhine was considered likely and the presence of a guard on duty at the plant each night between 2000 and 2100 hours lent credence to this report.

Existing records fail to reveal the outcome of the 97th CIC's investigation. But the mere fact that CIC had to investigate such a harmless-seeming concern as a soap factory indicates the scope of counterintelligence activities as the Allies pressed the battle in the German homeland.[50]

During the closing phases of the ETO campaign, CIC Agents continued to round up Hitler Jugend members who had been sent on intelligence missions. Among these in Juchen was a sixteen-year-old who, with four weeks training, had been sent to the front in civilian clothes, but when captured was bearing ammunition for a combat patrol's machine pistols.

Two Hitler youths, caught by 97th CIC agents on 11 April,

49. 95th Inf Div G2 After Action Rpt, Jan-Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
50. XII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 5, 3 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 3-4 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

told of being required to attend an "HJ Sports Instructors School" from 6 to 21 March. In the midst of this course these two boys and other volunteers were selected for training in Wehrwolf terrorism at a school called "ABS Rhoda Rhoen." Twenty boys were taught to drive pins through telephones wires to cause phones to ring at both ends of a circuit. They also learned to cut through cables and then, after insulating the severed ends, to seal the break in such a way as to prevent immediate discovery of the sabotage. The teachers at the school also impressed the youths with the need for distributing political tracts and pamphlets.[51]

Special Fighting Unit "Paul"

On 30 April, careful research and investigation by Agents of the 212th and the 97th detachments paid handsome dividends. In a dramatic round-up, twenty-eight members of an organized sabotage group known as Special Fighting Unit "Paul" were captured by the CIC men. The story behind the round-up is one of counterintelligence operations at its best.

CIC's interest in Special Fighting Unit "Paul" began when an apparently ordinary civilian contacted two agents of the 212th CIC Detachment, and gave detailed information concerning a group of German officers and men located behind Allied lines.

The 212th CIC, enlisting the aid of the 97th CIC, immediately began to develop the offered leads. The groundwork of investigation was completed on 30 April, and the CIC agents, supported by troops from the 387th Infantry, began to comb the wooded area between Seslarn and Schonsee, guided by the informant who had eventually admitted to being a deserter from the clandestine organization.

Members of "M" Company of the regiment succeeded in finding one German officer and two enlisted men, who themselves were attempting to locate the Command Post of Colonel Krueger, the commander of the organization. In another part of the woods a rude shack proved the abode of three foresters; a trio who, under detailed questioning, admitted that they were serving as a "front" for the hideout.

One of the men finally admitted that he had seen the

51. XVIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 10, dtd 11 Apr in III Corps G2 Jnl, dtd 10 Apr 45, L-623 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Colonel that morning in the woods. The search was resumed, but two hours of hunting failed to flush out any enemy personnel. Just as plans were being made to suspend the search, one of the foresters told the location of the organization's supply shack.

Four CIC agents rushed to the indicated place, where they found two men in civilian clothes and three women. The informant immediately identified one of the men as Colonel Krueger, the other as one of his lieutenants, and the three women as members of the Reichsarbeitesdienst who were, according to the report, "working their way through college." When confronted with the information CIC had concerning his Special Fighting Unit, the Colonel agreed to lead the American troops to the woodland retreat of the members of his small command.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the regiment accompanied the CIC agents and Colonel Krueger into the backwoods country timber and tangled underbrush which barely permitted the passage of motorized vehicles. Deep in the forest, the destination was reached. Colonel Krueger called out to his officers to gather the entire body of men and surrender. A rustling and crackling of the dense underbrush followed and out of perfectly camouflaged positions dug in the ground, the men of Special Fighting Unit "Paul" emerged from all directions. The captured group totaled seventeen. Informed of a second group of the same organization located five kilometers away, American personnel were dispatched at once and soon recovered four additional prisoners.

In subsequent study of the organization, CIC discovered that its mission was to remain in hiding in the woods until the American troops had passed the area, then form an attack upon Allied supply lines, aiming particularily at the destruction of gasoline trucks and depots. But this mission differed from the customary Wehrwolf pattern. Most of the members of Special Fighting Unit "Paul" wore regular army uniforms, and could always claim, if captured, the "protection of their lawful uniform."

CIC agents who had participated in the search could not deny that the organization had shown itself a worthy adversary. The entrenched positions were so well camouflaged that an automobile had been carried into the forest and completely concealed. In the initial search, an American patrol had

crossed the area without the slightest awareness of the presence of the enemy.[52]

99th CIC Detachment: Keeping Pace With the Division

April was a month of acceleration for the 99th Division. The advance was so rapid that CIC work was necessarily limited to checking communications in towns, apprehending individuals who fell within automatic arrest categories, screening travel restriction violators and spotting Wehrmacht deserters in civilian clothes.

By the end of the month arrests totaled 155 automatic arrestees and 1,906 German soldiers in mufti. A considerable number of the latter, who at first denied being soldiers, eventually admitted their true status; but were found to be of no counterintelligence interest and sent through regular prisoner of war channels.

The individual of greatest interest to the CIC Detachment was apprehended in Michelbach by combat troops on 25 April; the man was a cripple whose left leg was two inches shorter than his right. He claimed that his name was Ernst Vogel; that he had been bombed out of his home in Nurnberg, where his identity papers had also been destroyed; and that now he was trying to return to his home. He continued to give many details concerning his life.

When CIC agents managed to spot a discrepancy in the account of Vogel's education, he began to make admissions which finally led to his full confession. The final story was that he had been working as a teletypist in police headquarters in Nurnberg. On 10 April, he was transferred to Gestapo headquarters at Echwell and a week later was called before the local commissar along with twenty other employees having physical defects. Vogel was ordered to return to Nurnberg, which was then under Allied occupation, in order to observe the people and report on those accepting office or cooperating with the Americans. No sabotage instructions were included in this mission, Vogel claimed, but said he was told to note supply dumps and other strategic areas as targets for possible later sabotage. Finally, he

52. 94th Inf Div CI Notes, "Special Fighting Unit 'Paul'," Annex Nr 2, G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 31, in FUSA G2 Jnl dtd 2 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED),(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

had been given the code name "Vogt" and instructed to deliver his reports to the person who would call at his home using that code. 53

104th CIC Detachment: Three are Captured

During the early part of April, while the 104th Division was helping to trap the German troops in the Ruhr pocket, members of the 104th CIC Detachment had a correspondingly busy time reducing counterintelligence targets.

On the morning of 11 April, Lt Allan Fial and Agents Robert Robertson and Paul Schurf checked in with the S2 of the 414th Regiment for a briefing session. After scanning the situation maps, the CIC men decided that the area into which they were planning to go had been cleared of enemy troops during the night. Their mission was to cover the towns in the area for counterintelligence targets.

Driving in their jeep along the road of Scharzfeld, the Agents spotted one destroyed German tank. Otherwise, the road was clear and quiet. The town itself was equally serene. There were no persons on the street, and no visible activity.

Agent Schurf dismounted from the jeep and went into a house to find someone who knew something about the state of affairs in the town of Scharzfeld. A few minutes later, he came back with the report that there were neither German nor American troops in the area. The next stop was made at the city hall where the agents hoped to find the burgermeister. A Polish girl in the building told them that the burgermeister was taking refuge in an air raid shelter. She also revealed that there were still a few German soldiers in the town, but disclaimed any knowledge of their whereabouts.

The CIC agents decided to stay since American tanks were expected to rumble into town momentarily. Robertson returned to the jeep, which they had parked against a brick wall across the street from the city hall, to get the remaining weapons: a grease gun and a German rifle. As he started to leave the building, he glanced back to see four German paratroopers disarming Fial and Schurf. They had emerged from one of the rooms in the building.

53. 99th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 12 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Robertson went back to join the others, who were busily trying to convince the Germans that the whole American Army would be along in a few minutes, and that the wise alternative was to surrender now. The Germans simply replied that their commanding officer would be interested in this information. All three agents were taken from Scharzfeld in the jeep to a mountain hideout.

The commanding officer of the German unit proved a young ardent Nazi, who ordered a guard detail to accompany the captured Americans to the battalion command post. The CIC men, clutching at what seemed to be a last straw, tried to "work on" their guards during the trip. They almost succeeded, but the sergeant-in-charge, possessed with a strong sense of duty, refused to yield to the persuasion. On the way, Schurf managed to throw away his credentials.

The prisoners arrived at the battalion CP and were hastily shunted along to the regimental command post where they were searched thoroughly. The remaining credentials were found, and the Germans started a real interrogation, but the questioning was interrupted when a runner arrived with the message that the prisoners were to be brought immediately to division headquarters.

Once again the CIC agents were loaded into a vehicle. This time the drive lasted about thirty minutes and ended at a large house where a party was in progress. Fial, Robertson and Schurf were taken into the kitchen and soon all the women from the party crowded around them, plying the agents with such questions as, "What kind of treatment can we expect from the Americans?"

This impromptu session closed with the arrival of a colonel who was more concerned about military matters. After some additional interrogation, the colonel apologized about the makeshift quarters where the prisoners would have to be lodged and dispatched them to a barn under guard. The CIC men had a glimmer of hope when they discovered that their guard had been on the Russian front, had deserted and made his way back to Germany via Norway. He seemed to be disaffected and interested in defecting, but he could not make up his mind. Despite the urging of the Agents, the guard decided to postpone his decision until the next day.

The next day proved too late. The captives were moved to corps headquarters which was located in a hotel in a resort town. There, for the first time, they were faced with the pile of documents that had been discovered in their

jeeps---documents which had been accumulated over several days previously during which the agents had not been able to check in with headquarters. The most incriminating papers were arrest reports that had been stored in Robertson's brief case. These the G2, who was to conduct the interrogation, dumped on the desk before the Agents. The G2 started to send for an interpreter, but Schurf and Robertson both convinced him that this measure wouldn't be necessary--they both spoke perfect German.

Under the G2's orders, the agents began to explain rapidly the meaning of the arrest reports, surreptitiously slipping the most sensitive ones back into the brief case. The G2's principal line of questioning was directed towards finding out the nature of CIC. He knew nothing about the organization. The Agents managed to parry most of the G2's inquiries by keeping him talking about his own experiences on the Moscow front.

The interrogation came to an inconclusive end. Again the agents were moved, this time to Schutz Staffeln Battalion headquarters where they were hastily engulfed in a crowd of rough young soldiers, who had been separated from their own outfits, and some of their girl friends. All began to ask questions until an officer appeared who dispersed the crowd in order to have a private session with the prisoners. This man was strictly concerned with his own personal problems. His wife and children were in an Allied occupied zone and he wanted to know how they were being treated. The officer also began to extend feelers to the agents about the chances of getting a job with military government after the war.

Soon the heavily questioned agents were returned to the town and lodged, with apologies, in the city jail. Schurf and Fial were placed in one cell and Robertson in another, but later that night, at their own request, the three men were moved into a single cell. The evening was not entirely their own. They were taken upstairs to the council hall where there was a large table surrounded by high ranking German officers, evidently a German General Staff. The entire body rose as the Americans entered and their subsequent questions hewed largely to a single line: What kind of treatment could be expected from the Americans?

The next morning the 1st US Division began moving into town. The German general wanted to evacuate the town because there were many wounded soldiers in the hotels which had been utilized as emergency hospitals. The Schutz Staffeln would

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not permit retreat. American shells bombarded the stubbornly-defended town, and the three CIC Agents in their cell played "Black Jack" to pass the time.

When night came the town was still in the hands of the Germans. An officer entered the agents' cell and gave quick vent to his intense hatred of the Americans. It turned out that his wife and children had been killed in an air raid at Paderborn, and the officer was intent on exacting revenge. Although he came near to shooting the captives on the spot, he eventually left, leaving the agents unharmed.

The CIC men were not out of danger. After the officer had departed, the jailer came in and apologetically announced that the order had been issued to execute the prisoners, since the town was being evacuated and the Americans could not be taken along. Besides, the Germans now realized that the CIC men were "Intelligence." In a few minutes, an officer came to carry out the execution, but through fast talking, the agents persuaded him to lock them up and join the retreating forces.

Even at this point, the prisoners could not breathe freely. The habit the GI's had, on entering a town, of tossing grenades into basement windows and looking later posed a new problem. The jailer unlocked the cell, but the men did not dare to go out because the American troops were still firing at anything in uniform that moved. Civilians began to crowd into the cell for protection, knowing the prisoners to be Americans. This was actually false security since the oncoming troops had no idea that their compatriots were imprisoned.

Robertson, at this point, reckoned on American psychology. He selected the most attractive girl from among the civilians and persuaded her to walk down the middle of the street until she found some American soldiers she could guide to the Jail.

"They will never shoot you," Robertson explained to the girl.

He was right. The three-day imprisonment came to an abrupt and welcome end shortly after. An interesting post script to the adventure was written when the war was over. Schurf returned to the scene of the capture and found his credentials where he tossed them from the jeep.[54]

54. Interview with Captain Robert Robertson (Res.) at Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Md. on 16 September 1954.

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The Caught Do Some Catching

Although these three agents of the 104th CIC, in their zeal for carrying out the counterintelligence mission, were apprehended, the detachment did some impressive apprehending themselves during April.

The biggest catch of the month was Dr. Albin Sawatzki, reported to have been the inventor of both the V-1 and V-2 rockets. Considered one of the foremost scientists in Nazi Germany, Sawatzki had been summoned early in 1944 to supervise the completion of an underground factory near Nordhausen, in addition to his work on the V missiles. In April 1944, with Himmler, Goering and Goebbels in attendance, a final test of the weapons was conducted at the plant site under Sawatzki's supervision.

Sawatzki was also responsible for the design of the Royal Tiger Tank, and the coordination of production of Junkers airplane engines. The CIC Agents who arrested him described him as "the typical MGM character to play the part"--slightly stooped, round shouldered, apologetic, and wearing thick-lensed glasses. Because of his technical knowledge and the valuable scientific information he possessed, Sawatzki was evacuated through Corps to be interrogated by Army technical intelligence.[55]

On 16 April, the 104th CIC Detachment began operations in Halle. Within short order, 429 German soldiers in civilian clothes were arrested. CIC was aided in apprehending these soldiers by use of a sound truck that traversed the main city routes, announcing in German that all members of the Wehrmacht would present themselves at one of four specified screening points or be liable to punishment as spies by American forces.[56]

Others apprehended by CIC included the police president, the oberburgermeister, five ortagruppenleiters, a member of the Sicherheitsdienst, a Gestapo secretary, 14 Sicherheitz-polizei (SIPO or Security Police) and members of the Gauleiter's staff.

55. 104th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt #169, dtd 13 Apr 45 in FUSA G2 in Jnl and File, dtd 14 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
56. 1st US Army G2 Jnl and File, L-558, dtd 23 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

A well-organized anti-Nazi group based at the University of Halle proved most helpful in providing counterintelligence information In addition, a Count Von Luckner who allegedly was opposed to militarism and favored a democratic government for Germany, tipped CIC off about the local Wehrwolf organization. Contact was established with one of the Wehrwolf leaders who agreed to accumulate evidence on members. He claimed that he had been merely posing as a Wehrwolf member to determine the real leaders of the movement. On 22 April, the 207th CIC moved in to complete the investigations in Halle started by the 104th CIC Detachment.[57]

Below the Belt

A 104th CIC Detachment informant who had spent seven years in various concentration camps in Germany charged that Max Schmeling, one-time world's heavyweight boxing champion, was an official at the Buchenwald Concentration camp near Weimar. According to the informant, Schmeling had been among the most cruel of the Schutz Staffeln men in his treatment of political prisoners. The CIC agents who heard this report passed it on through G2 channels.[58]

CIC Augmented in Closing Phase

In the final phase of the campaign, the counterintelligence work took on a greater urgency than most other intelligence responsibilities. Consequently, Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII), Order of Battle (OB), Photo Interpreter (PI), and German linguist personnel were ordered to reinforce the 104th CIC Teams as the Division boundaries were extended and stabilized for Occupation duties.[59]

The 503d CIC Detachment: Free-Wheelers

The 3d Armored Division, under VIII Corps, played a major part in the encirclement and reduction of the Ruhr. The 503d CIC Detachment also played a major part in top level Intelligence plans in that area, before the Division moved on to the Elbe.

The Detachment's activity on the offensive started with a wild goose chase undertaken by Detachment Commander Theodore M. Black. Lt James Denton of the 503d, Lt David Hanna of the

57. 104th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt #179, dtd 23 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File 25 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
58. Available records reveal no further information on this matter.
59. 104th Inf Div G2 Intelligence Summary Nr 1, dtd 7 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File, L-558, 7-8 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

104th, and enlisted Agents of both Detachments under the direction of Captain John H. Heminway of the 207th CIC Detachment, entered Alternkirchen early on the morning of 27 March, immediately after it had been cleared by tactical troops from both the 3d Armored and 104th Infantry Division. A thorough investigation was impossible, because residents had huddled in their cellars during the fighting and were told to remain there by Military Government until the divisions of VII Corps had all passed through.

The CIC group was looking for evidences that Skorzeny's saboteurs were present in the town, but they could find none. The members of the 503d CIC Detachment moved out the following morning and the 104th CIC Detachment was scheduled to leave shortly after. Evidently the apparent inaccuracy of the advance information the detachments had been given led Captain Black to ask in a note in his report, "Could it be possible that the Alternkirchen mentioned is the one located at G4708, rather than the one checked?" No record of any answer to his question has been found.[60]

The Detachment moved with the Division, apparently without too much happening of CIC interest, until it reached Paderborn on 3 April. The Division had travelled more than one hundred miles in the first week of its offensive.

CIC Agents attached to Combat Command "A" of the Division, interrogated a staff sergeant who claimed to have been a US Army Air Force prisoner of war liberated from a hospital in that city. The agents grew suspicious of the sergeant because he spoke fluent German and spoke English with a German accent, unexplained by reason of family or educational background. Although he had been in Germany fourteen months as a prisoner, interrogators believed it impossible for him to have developed a heavy accent that quickly.

A second puzzler increased CIC's interest in the non-commissioned officer. He stated he was the son of a share-cropper, yet he used English in the British manner, and possessed a vocabulary far beyond that of the high-school education he claimed. Letters from his sister revealed a much lower literacy level, although he claimed her education had been the same as his. The interrogatee appeared totally ignorant of American slang words, including the Air Force's own "gremlin" creation, and his knowledge of traditionally

60. 503d CIC Det Memo for CO, 207th CIC Det, dtd 28 May 45, subj: "Saboteurs at Alternkirchen," in 503d CIC Det, Germany #2 File, Feb 45-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

[redacted]

American sports like football and baseball was inadequate although he showed knowledge of international sports. A Russian in the hospital with him said the sergeant had been there three months, not the one year he alluded to.

The agents arrested the alleged American, but because his injured foot required treatment, he was evacuated to a hospital.[61]

At Paderborn, five target objectives designated by the high-level Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS) fell to the Third Armored Division, and CIC reported the status of each target through channels. Two of the targets were under Military Police guard, one was being protected by indigenous police, and another was occupied by US Army Engineers who were revitalizing the installation. The fifth target was being used by Military Government to house displaced persons, apparently inadvertently; and troops already had strewn many records around the area. CIC suggested direct CIOS exploitation and notification to higher Military Government authorities of the importance of the fifth target to head off damage the displaced persons might cause.[62]

507th CIC Detachment: Where's the Fire?

Few records are available for operations of the 507th CIC Detachment with the 7th Armored Division in Northwest Germany in April. One incident, however, revealed that the CIC task of checking Military Government civil appointees was not always a routine one.

In the town of Gelsenkirchen, a group of firemen and policemen were selected for employment by Military Government, but just before they were set to work, they were turned over to CIC for security screening.

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61. 503d CIC Det, Ltr to G2 FUSA, dtd 3 Apr 45, subj, "Sgt Hartney Gibson, Alleged US AAF POW, Paderborn," in 503d CIC Det German #2 File, Feb 45-Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104); (Once again records do not indicate final disposition of this case).
62. 1st US Arly Ltr, to Corps Commanders, subj: "CIOS," dtd 27 May 45, and 2d Ind, dtd 8 Apr 45 in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts, 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104). (NOTE: CIOS was an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which coordinated and considered nominations submitted by various Allied Intelligence agencies to exploit specific targets in enemyheld territory for technical and other important intelligence data).

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The CIC interrogators discovered that the firemen and policemen had been ordered to join a group of 140 persons to go through the woods from Olsberg to Elleringhausen with the aim of disrupting Allied supply lines. They were to have been armed with French and Italian carbines. CIC's alertness and careful interrogation in this instance probably precluded a major sabotage effort against the Allied forces.[63]

63. 7th Armd Div G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 232, dtd 7 Apr 45 in III Corps G2 Jnl, L-623, dtd 8 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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Chapter 2

THE RACE TO THE ELBE

While some units of the First and Ninth US Armies were engaged in the reduction of the Ruhr, other units--some of which had been instrumental in the encirclement--raced across Germany to the Elbe River. By 14 April, that river--the line agreed upon for the meeting of the Allied armies from the West and the Russian forces from the East--had been reached by four American Divisions. Two bridgeheads east of the Elbe had been attempted, but only one was successfully retained.[64]

309th CIC Detachment: False Wehrpasses

Among the CIC Detachments participating in the eastward dash was the 309th attached to Ninth Army. One of the major problems encountered by CIC Agents with this Detachment was the fact that identity cards were being accepted by Military Government as prima facie evidence of a civilian's right to be in a particular place at a particular time. Frequently, CIC discovered that these identity documents had to be scanned with a skeptical eye.

On 20 April, Special Agent Paul L. Bellocchio, while inspecting the Wehrpass of a German who claimed to be a civilian, noticed that the document had an improper stamp and that all the entries had been made in the same handwriting. Agent Bellocchio's questioning of the individual disclosed that the Wehrpass had been used successfully to traverse two roadblocks operated by US Army personnel. Further investigation indicated that a woman had given him the false Wehrpass upon his discharge from the German Military Hospital in Bielefeld, Germany.

Shortly after the interrogation, CIC agents raided the office in which the woman was employed. They caught her flagrante delicto in the process of making forty-five similar fake Wehrpasses for German soldiers.[65]

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64. Op Cit, Eisenhower, Dwight D., pp 407-410.
65. 309th CIC Det Monthly Infor. Rpt, dtd 5 May 45, (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY), (Staff & Faculty Library).

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A Field Day for CIC

By the beginning of May, Ninth Army units were poised along the banks of the Elbe and a virtually static situation had begun. No longer governed by factors of time and movement, CIC personnel had a field day arresting Germans in SHAEF automatic arrest categories. Arrests were slowed only by lack of counterintelligence personnel and the number of arrest reports CIC agents could write out in the space of each day.

All of the First Army area, except that occupied by V Corps, and a portion of the Third Army area were transferred to Ninth Army control. The only civilian internment camp in this additional area had a limited capacity, necessitating the immediate construction of a new camp to lodge civilian arrestees. 309th CIC agents were fortunate in that the departing units had left counterintelligence personnel, thus preventing a major take-over problem.

No reports of serious sabotage efforts were received during the ten days preceding the formal German surrender, but several American soldiers were killed in the Harz mountain area, presumably by German soldiers who had hidden in this wild and desolate region.

As the period drew to a close, the Assistant G2 of Ninth Army reported that reorganization for the static phase was well under way and a fine start had been made in removing the key men of the Nazi Party from all communities.[66]

VII Corps CIC: Cleaning Up

To handle affairs in Czechoslovakia as the VII Corps forces drove across Germany, the 207th CIC Detachment prepared a study of Naziism in that country. Included in the study was a brief history of the pro-Nazi parties that provided interrogators with back-ground information on the growth of the Nazi movement and the significant membership about which to question suspects.[67]

VII Corps CIC agents had mounting proof that the Germans had left behind a network of espionage agents to gather information on Allied troops even as the battle approached its

66. 9th US Army "After Action Rpt for Period 1-15 May 45, from G2 CI Branch," Incl 2 to G2 After Action Rpt, 1-15 May 45, in 9th Army G2 Rpts, May 45, L-654 (3) (UNCLASSIFIED), (Department Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
67. 1st US Army G2 Periodic Rpt #326, dtd 2 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

final stages. In the five day period from 23 April to 28 April, VII Corps CIC apprehended and obtained confessions from four stay-behind agents. Two of the men possessed radio sets.

CIC knew that these four were not the only ones. They considered the last-ditch agents to be a constant menace both as relayers of tactical intelligence and organizers of all forms of subversive and guerilla activities. "Security precautions cannot be too painstaking," was the concluding comment in the detachment's report.[68]

The Russian Way

A young German Luftwaffe pilot who voluntarily surrended to the American forces had some interesting information to relay to VII Corps CIC about Russian treatment and indoctrination of German prisoners of war.

The 23-year-old flier revealed that before joining the Luftwaffe he had been a leader in the Hitler Jugend, and was, according to his own admission, a thorough-going Nazi. From 1940 until 1943, he flew regular missions for the German Air Force until he was shot down over Russia. After being captured, he was shipped to a prisoner of war camp near Moscow and invited to participate in a re-education and indoctrination school for German prisoners. At first, the flier resisted, but he finally became interested and attended the five-month course.

The prisoner explained that the school was run jointly by Russians and a staff of Germans, exiles from German and "converted" prisoners of war, principally high ranking officers. Among the pilot's classmates were several German generals, and the course was under the auspices of the "National Committee for Free Germany."

The success of the system seemed to lie in the careful selection of the teaching staff and the emphasis on modern history which included demonstrations of the falsehoods in the Nazi theories and "convincing presentation of the true course of events since Hitler's regime." Just what background the young flier had for judging the accuracy of this material was debatable: he had been exposed previously

68. VII Corps Periodic Rpt #118, Incl 4, "Enemy Agent at Large," dtd 28 Apr 45, in 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl and File, 30 Apr-11 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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to material that had been prepared by the German propaganda mills and little more. Proof of the falsity of these doctrines was enough to shatter his faith.

Under the influence of the teaching and contacts afforded by the school, the flier was won over to an anti-facist outlook and volunteered to further the cause of the movement. The sponsorship of high-ranking German officers to whom the students could look for guidance was cited as a factor in the indoctrination.

Graduates of the school were given three choices: to carry on propaganda work inside other prisoner of war camps; to perform propaganda work at the front through loudspeakers and pamphlets; or to participate in secret anti-Nazi work in Germany. The flier selected the third alternative and was assigned with other "converts" to do some military espionage in the Torgau-Wittenberg area which the Russians expected to occupy. On 28 March, he was dropped by parachute with two co-consipirators, including a radio operator with a wireless transmitter set, near Torgau. Separated from the others during the jump and unable to complete the mission, the flier went home.

How truly effective the Russian indoctrination had been was difficult for CIC to gauge. The flier stated that the majority of the "students" with him shared his favorable reaction to the course and attended the school out of genuine interest rather than desire for better living conditions. He placed the number of Germans who had volunteered for espionage work against the Germans "in the hundreds."

According to the CIC informant, no attempt had been made to instill a communist faith among the students; instead the goal had been "in a democratic direction." The flier believed that the Russians planned to use members of the National Committee to organize military government in occupied Germany, and he contended that the communist system would not be forced upon the country by the Russians.[69]

"National Komitee Freies Deutschland"

VII Corps CIC had previously received information about the "National Komitee Freies Deutschland" (National Committee

69. 9th US Army G2 Periodic Rpt #219, Annex Nr 1, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, dtd 2 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

for Free Germany). On 18 April, when American troops of the VII Corps entered the city of Leipzig, Military Government found itself for the first time in the German campaign confronted with a German underground movement of apparent size and force. The leaders of this movement immediately contacted Allied authorities and put themselves at the disposal of the occupation. This contact with Military Government proved a mere formality. The National Komitee had acted in the Allied interest, although without Allied instructions, before the occupation of Leipzig, in the midst of the arrival of US Forces, and soon thereafter. By 26 April, the Allied Military Government had no choice but to order the movement's disbandment on the grounds that several of its adherents had taken unauthorized actions, and the organization as a whole had a political nature.

But the Allies had not completely finished with the organization. VII Corps CIC was called upon to conduct an investigation of the movement to ascertain the true motivation of this German resistance group and to appraise its potentialities for future use by the Occupation.

The CIC inquiry revealed that the National Komitee Freies Deutschland was, from its start in 1935, formed by the union of disparate, anti-Nazi groups. Some of the group survived various anti-Nazi purges and in the spring of 1943, under the influence of Russian broadcasts, the movement --now strongly anti-Fascist--formally adopted the title of "National Komitee Freies Deutschland." From this time on, the Leipzig committee was able to keep in continuous touch with similar resistance groups in Chemnitz, Dresden, Thuringia, and Berlin.

Although the National Komitee Freies Deutschland never committed any positive sabotage and confined itself primarily to distributing anti-Nazi leaflets, the movement was sufficiently well-known to the Gestapo to cause the arrest and execution of about 20 prominent members between the end of 1944 and April 1945. On the basis of the investigation, the CIC agents concluded that although the National Komitee Freies Deutschland had derived its name from the Russian-inspired, anti-Nazi movement in Moscow, there was no evidence of actual contact between local members and Russia. The agents also felt that the choice of title was dictated by the need for "some recognized banner around which to rally," rather than the fact that many of the present members were former communists.

CIC evaluated the Leipzig leaders as sincere men whose initial interest was to assist the Allies in the uprooting of Naziism. The VII Corps Detachment recommended to Military

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Government that the organization be partially reactivated and utilized as an informer service, in recognition of the need of a far flung informer system for counterintelligence in the densely populated city. The CIC analysis ended with the statement, "Although not without blemish or above suspicion, the National Komitee Freies Deutschland has the virtues of being ready-made and, for a German organization, understandably in the same directions as American interests."[70]

VII Corps CIC Ammo Dump Investigation

On 23 April, a German in civilian clothes was stopped by Agent Gary G. Hauptmann of the 207th CIC Detachment in the vicinity of the Corps' Command Post and asked for his papers. This simple identity check led to an important find. The man produced a Military Government pass which was made out to an Otto Miller, stating that he had permission to go "home." Since this was a rather anomalous destination, Agent Hauptmann interrogated the man thoroughly, discovering that he was still a member of the Wehrmacht. The man had obtained the pass from a farmer named Otto Miller whom he had met on the road.

The German told the agent that one of the last tasks he had participated in for the Wehrmacht was hiding a cache of ammunition and demolitions equipment for the use of the Wehrwolf organization.

A raiding party was formed and moved to the locale of the hidden supplies. As they approached, they were fired upon, and after their first volley in return, three German soldiers came out of the woods and surrendered. Added to the two guards the party had surprised and captured, CIC was doing all right in the POW market, but they had come seeking a hidden ammo dump. The German soldiers led the party to it. On their way, they picked up a civilian whom the German soldiers identified immediately as the man placed in charge of the Wehrwolf activity for the area. He denied this vehemently, but had no papers or other identification.

The ammunition dump was discovered and destroyed, and the raiding party and their seven prisoners headed back to Thale. Along the way they were stopped by American Engineers who were going to blow up a booby-trapped German vehicle that was blocking the road. As the party waited for the explosion,

70. Army G2 Periodic Report #253, Annex 2, dtd 15 May 45 (Source VII Corps) in 9th US Army G2 Periodic Reports, L-654, May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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the alleged leader of the Wehrwolf cell leaped out of the Detachment's vehicle and tried to get away over a cliff. Immediately, the Agents opened fire, wounding the man severely in the left leg, necessitating his removal to a first aid station and later to an evacuation hospital.[71]

A simple identity check had again proved its worth.

213th CIC Detachment: Few Reports

The scanty reports that have survived the activities of the 213th CIC Detachment during the end of the Germany campaign indicate that, like all CIC units, the main order of the day was rounding up automatic arrestees and others deemed dangerous to the United States Troops.

On 7 May, 213th CIC Detachment agents captured two Germans as they tried to pass through a road block as refugees. The interrogation which followed preliminary screening resulted in confessions from the men that they had taken advance demolition and sabotage courses and were currently on their first mission. Their assignment was to dynamite railroad tracks at Bodenteich and ammunition dumps at two airdromes. But the captured men never saw their goals. They were sent by the Corps agents to higher level for prosecution.[72]

The 218th CIC Detachment: A Busy Period

XVIII Corps and their CIC detachment, under Captain Albin P. Dearing, were working at the outset of the period with other American and British units to expand their bridgehead at Wesel and to make it more secure. On 30 March, the Corps moved back to base and were attached briefly to the British Second Army.

Most of the detachment's activity was in searching for white and black list personalities and providing civil and military security. All information Corps agents had produced in the Wesel-Peddenburg-Dravenack area was turned over to the British 74th Field Security Section at Wesel when the XVIII Corps moved back to base. On 31 March, the CIC Detachment

71. 207th CIC Det Memo to CIC, dtd 24 Apr 45, subj: "Ammunition Dump for Wehrwolves," in 207th CIC Det Log, Feb-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).
72. XIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 180, dtd May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File 7-8 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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moved to Appelhulsen, to wait until the tactical situation would permit entry into Munster. Elements of the US 17th Airborne Division and the British Coldstream Guards took Appelhulsen, and the 218th CIC Detachment moved in at 0900.

By the time CIC arrived, the unsupervised soldiers had resorted to raiding and general disorder after locking the inhabitants in a school building. There was no Military Government agency available to excerise control of the population, and the Detachment had to assume the responsibility for emergency Military Government functions. They screened the entire population of 400, segregating and interrogating all males between the ages of fourteen and sixty; and sending 165 Displaced Persons rearward to the center at Wesel. Due to the proximity of the front lines, security was strengthened by collecting all the townspeople in the Catholic Church under the responsibility of the local priest, who had been investigated and cleared previously by CIC.

In his weekly report the detachment commander cited other non-CIC duties which required much of CIC's time. Captain Dearing reported: " A day spent carrying women through the street who have fainted from starvation (three days locked up in a school building without food or water); helping midwife a cow (the farm labor was also interned and the droves of fine stock left untended); doctoring a young girl who had lacerations on her face from our shelling; settling the problems of sorting out and shipping 78 Poles, Dutch, Italians, and French, while at the same time finding white bread for a dying diabetic; putting out fires; chasing drunken GI's out of the Headquarters; and finding details to bury dead Jerries...is a far cry from the intelligent, systematic search for the dissident elements whom we have come here to find, all of which are problems which would not have existed had civilians been allowed to remain in their homes." This, he said, was the general condition of all German towns which had been occupied by the Americans long before Military Government assumed responsibility. He stressed that such a situation left a very poor impression in the minds of the townspeople who had been locked up without food while the ransacking was going on or who had been left interned when troops quit the area. This type of atmosphere would produce civilians vulnerable to incitement by underground Nazi elements, he asserted.[73]

73. 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary of Activities, 25 Mar-1 Apr 45, dtd 2 Apr 45 in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts, Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

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Munster fell finally on 4 April and CIC Agents of the 218th CIC Detachment worked in the town under small arms fire and shellfire for six hours until they were relieved by the 213th CIC Detachment, reinforced by two British Field Security teams, a US Navy counterintelligence team, a Ninth US Army CIC Detachment, Army Group "T" Force and the 17th Airborne Divisional Detachment. Documents, files, information and personnel dossiers on Munster were delivered to the G-2 of XIII Corps. During their operations in Muster, the Corps CIC Agents had located only one white list personality. The Detachment rejoined Corps Headquarters in the field at Dillenberg on 8 April.

At Dillenberg, the detachment discovered that the Communists had taken control. A Karl Schneider appeared to be the ringleader of a group which had installed a burgermeister and other officials who were sympathetic to the Communist cause. As a CIC informant, his information was described as "voluminous and filled with personal bias," of little value except as confirmation of information obtained from other sources.

Several industrial and political institutions were raided in Dillenberg and in the immediate surrounding area, but nothing exceptional interest developed. Some important documents were returned to First US Army CIC Detachment, and several tools were forwarded to Engineer Technical Intelligence at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, U.S.A.[74]

A Boost for Non-Fraternization: Nazi Style

Agents operating in Siegen discovered a number of important documents and one interesting propaganda campaign planned by the Germans to effect a non-fraternization program of their own.

The systematic preparation of the German people for non-fraternization was to be launched with a news release, purported to have been written by a United Press correspondent, in which the non-fraternization steadfastness of the Germans in the Eupen area during the previous winter was lauded. The second installment was to be a message telling loyal Germans not to harbor deserters. This was to be released as occupation became inevitable. The last was a listing of rules of behavior which, if followed would have made enforcement of non-fraternization rules placed on the American soldier

74. 218th CIC Det Periodic CI Rpt, 2 Apr-8 Apr 45, dtd 8 Apr 45, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

[redacted]

infinitely easier. These steps were not followed, however, for the documents themselves were found in a sealed envelope which noted that it was not to be opened except on orders from the Fuehrer.[75]

Other unopened envelopes were found which, when inspected by CIC, revealed large scale plans for the evacuation of German civilians and industry. The first phase of this proposed program featured the orderly reduction of material stockpiles and specified that procurement was to be limited to a fourteen day requirement basis. Other phases were similarly designed to limit material on hand, yet enable the factories to continue at full blast until evacuation orders were received, at which time an orderly plan was to be followed. People were to be evacuated--women and children first--in accordance with a code-word system. The complete plans, including the code-words, were picked up by CIC, but the war ended too quickly for use to be made of them.

The 218th CIC Detachment continued working in and around Dillenberg during the week of 9-15 April, arresting a number of prisoners of war in civilian clothes and sending them through POW channels. Informants were obviously growing less and less recalcitrant. The number of denunciations handled by the Detachment increased. Several agents and people having mysterious connections with the Gestapo were arrested, as were a few automatic arrestees and security threats. When the Detachment finally did move out, pertinent information was turned over to the British Town Major in Siegen.[76]

Maria of the Cologne Kripo

Captain Dearing, on 16 and 17 April, participated, with the 97th CIC Detachment, in the round-up of a number of Cologne Kripo agents, including Klemmens, their chief. This was noted to be the first wholesale arrest of Gestapo-connected agent personnel.[77] Among those captured was a Dutch girl who, as Kriminal Kommissar Klemmens' servant, was assigned to bring civilian clothes to German agents in their underground hideout, a minor role, at best. During the interrogations that followed the arrest of the Gestapo group, a CIC

75. 218th CIC Det Special CI Rpt #1, dtd 14 Apr 45, in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).
76. 218th CIC Det Special CI Rpt #2, dtd 15 Apr 45 in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts, Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).
77. See 97th CIC Detachment in latter portion this chapter.

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[redacted] Agent realized that Maria was not quite as fanatically Nazi as her comrades and suggested that she be used to "finger" others connected with the group. She quickly agreed and led a CIC team to a nest of radio operators. The 218th CIC Detachment eventually "adopted" her, and she was "outfitted to the extent of four suitcases full of clothing nabbed in a later raid on an Abwehr Espionage Agent's School, treated to a shampoo, bath and permanent and installed as a reasonably permanent fixture among the Detachment's informants."

Maria showed her hearty distaste for Gestapo personnel by willingness to chase them down at any time, day or night. Sitting before a map, she was subjected to a night-long interrogation concerning the location of Gestapo members-at-large of which she had knowledge, and was able to pinpoint on the map many of her former comrades and acquaintances. Her information was coordinated by agents of the detachment and led to the raid upon the town of Marienheids.

Ten hours prior to the raid, which lasted from dawn until 1600 hours, part of "M" Company of the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division blocked off all roads and trails leading from the town, locked up all civilians caught roaming and required proper identification from all military personnel. The rest of "M" Company and the Corps CIC Detachment embarked at dawn upon the search of every house, store, office and factory in the town.

The area was systematically zoned and numbers were chalked on each door. Then fifteen three-man teams went from house to house, and, as they entered, handed the senior house-member written instructions to have every resident of the house assembled immediately in one room. When this was done, two searchers and the householder checked every section of the building from cellar to roof. In the room selected for the gathering of the residents, the third member of the raiding party advised each person to register on the instruction form giving his name, age and sex. Six hundred males of military age were sent under the escort of one searcher to CIC Headquarters in the principal hotel.

More than twenty deserters in civilian clothes, a uniformed Wehrmacht Colonel, a number of contraband weapons, and documents concerning the Gestapo were picked up in the process. One man who failed to heed the command to halt was shot and killed.

Abwehr Espionage School Raid

Maria also helped in a raid on the Abwehr Esponiage

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School at Wiehl. Acting upon leads furnished by former students, two agents of the 218th CIC Detachment, accompanied by Maria and an ex-graduate, approached the school by jeep at about dusk. American and British officials had surveyed the personalities and the property of the school four hours before, finding nothing remiss. The school had been closed when the Allied vise closed around the Ruhr and began compressing its resistance into a smaller and smaller area. All the students had been quickly graduated and a fast face-lifting had been administered to make the school seem to be a simple hunting lodge. Obviously this disguise had been sufficient for CIC's predecessors. It might have been for CIC, too, if two dignified Abwehr officers had not been called in from their hiding places in the surrounding woods after the first visitors had left. When they saw CIC's jeep approaching, they attempted, unsuccessfully, to escape through the garret and out to the roof, without shoes. Both men were colonels in the German Intelligence Service, one being the former commandant of the school, the other, an assignment officer. Though much material had been removed from the school prior to its evacuation by the German students of the last class, the CIC agents found documents, identification photographs, money and ten trunks of civilian clothes. Maria was rewarded with part of the clothing. Underground caverns beneath the structure could have provided numerous hiding places.

The ex-commandant and his fellow Abwehr officer were forwarded to the First US Army Interrogation Center. When the 218th CIC Detachment moved on, it reluctantly turned Maria over to the succeeding detachment as an informant.[78]

How the General Died

The leader of the German forces that became entrapped in the Ruhr pocket, Field Marshal Walter Von Model, had committed suicide. Of this, the Allies were fairly certain, but official authentication of the fact was lacking.

The 218th CIC Detachment was unable to prove the suicide theory but it did provide information that suggested the frame of mind of the commanders of the beleaguered forces. According to a reliable informant, Brigadier General Ekhardt, Model's Dusseldorf Commander, took his own life on 17 April. The informant, who saw the General's body, reported that Eckhardt

78. 218th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 2 May 45 in 218th CIC Det Periodic Rpts Jan 45-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), ([redacted] City Records Center, Box 25098).

had returned from a meeting with Model late in the morning, changed to civilian clothes, and dined in the apartment of a Captain Dusseldorf. After the meal, General Eckhardt retired to a bedroom and shot himself. The Dusseldorf Police came to remove the body.

As for the Field Marshal himself, CIC was told it was rumored Model had not received orders from Hitler to fly to Berlin, even when the plight of his forces was obvious beyond a doubt. The Fuehrer, according to rumor, had decided that the flagging Nazi morale might be bolstered by the heroic death of a Field Marshal on the Ruhr battleground. The CIC informants who reported this theory stated that Model, piqued by Hitler's attitude, would have tried to slip through the American lines and rejoin his wife. The Field Marshal's mother-in-law revealed to CIC that her daughter was still residing at the Model home in Dresden. Beyond this fact, the 218th CIC agents were stymied in their investigation.[79]

Secret Weapons

That the Nazis had hoped to win the war by secret weapons became evident to XVIII Corps CIC Agents with the capture and subsequent interrogation of Werner Piel, a special air courier of secret technical devices for the Luftwaffe.

Piel claimed that the German laboratories that had produced V-1 and V-2 missiles had also perfected an array of diabolical devices that needed only large scale production before they could be used against the Allied armies.

The stangest and most fascinating of these secret weapons was described as a "secret ray" that would paralyze any vehicle to a halt. The instrument, which the Germans called "Adlergeracht" or "Eagle Apparatus," was demonstrated to Piel and others at a proving ground near Danzig in July 1944. Piel asserted that an automobile driven across the testing area was brought to a complete standstill by the ray as if the spark of the vehicle had suddenly failed.

The mechanism was principally adapted for use by the Luftwaffe in night fighting. Planes equipped with the Adlergeraeht could allegedly trail behind an adversary, bring

79. 82d Abn Div Situation Summary Nr 19, Annex Nr 2, dtd 27 Apr 45, (Source XVIII Corps) (Abn) FUSA G2 Jnl and File, L-558, dtd 30 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

him in range and then drop him from the sky by "konking out" his engines without firing a single round. This was the theory. No estimate of actual effectiveness had been made.

Piel's connection with the secret devices was largely during the six weeks prior to his capture when he ferried the equipment from Berlin to Glasshuette, where the finished devices were made, and then delivered them to aircraft manufacturers.

Before CIC completed the interrogation of the ray-obsessed Piel, the Agents learned the current disposition of the informant's organization, the Air Force High Command, Chief of Technical Division for Air Armament Transport. Apparently, Allied Bombing of Berlin had been so effective that this German technical air wing had to be split into two branches, one in Austria and the other along the Baltic Sea.[80]

219th CIC Detachment: Augmented

At the beginning of May, elements of XIX Corps were deployed along the Elbe River at Magdeburg. Firm contact had been made east of the Elbe with units of the XXVII Russian Corps.

Since XIX Corps had no area of occupation strictly its own during this period, only a single CIC team was assigned to Corps headquarters. The remainder of the Agents worked under control of 2d Armored, 8th Armored and 30th Infantry Divisions. CIC strength was augmented by the assignment of Prisoner of War Interrogator, Positive Intelligence and Military Intelligence Interpreter teams.

Many Wehrmacht deserters came in voluntarily to the CIC offices, but the agents kept apprehending German soldiers in civilian clothes. The main counterintelligence emphasis remained on the arrest of known Nazi Party leaders and black list personalities as the situation became stabilized for the Occupation.[81]

2d CIC Detachment: In Leipzig

80. XVIII Corps (Abn) G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 9, Annex Nr 1, "CIC Notes," dtd 5 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File, 7-8 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

81. XIX Corps After Action Rpt, CIC Rpt, L-648, 1-9 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Activities of the 2d CIC Detachment centered in and around the city of Leipzig during the latter part of April. Every day brought new faces to the CIC office as the roundup of automatic arrestees and other counterintelligence personalities moved at a steady pace.

On 23 April, a German accused of being a Wehrwolf leader in the City was arrested. On-the-spot questioning drew forth the alleged fact that the organization possessed some weapons and had established a headquarters in the northeast section of Leipzig, but CIC was unable to learn more from the prisoner. On the way to the regimental CIC office, he attempted to escape and was shot.

"Naturally, a Bullet through the Head"

The counterintelligence "catch of the day" on 24 April was a man named Otto Klinger, who had been chief of the Constabulary of Berlin until August 1944 and possessed the impressive-sounding title, "General-leutnant der Polizei und Gruppenfuehrer der Schutz Staffeln (SS)."

When newspaper correspondents with the Allied forces heard that there was a German general at CIC Headquarters, they made a quick dash to see the creature in person. Ushered into the presence of the captive, the newsmen soon sought to bait him with pictures of the atrocities that had been committed in various concentration camps. The general, who appeared "incapable of producing either a frown or a smile," replied that he was unaware of these mass crimes. He said that he had on one occasion visited the camp at Orianburg and found the inmates well cared for and even happy, but admitted, however, that he had inspected only a small portion of the camp.

The newsmen, eager to crack the German's stolid front, asked what treatment he would expect from his capture if he were Kaltenbrunner, one of the most brutal concentration camp overseers, rather than Klinger. The general responded in character. Naturally, he said, he would have "put a bullet through his head" before being arrested.[82]

Forced Labor

One of the major investigations of the 2d CIC Detachment

82. 2d Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 303, dtd 24 Apr 45, in III Corps G2 Jnl dtd 27 Apr 45, L-623 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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in April started with the arrest of a guard of the concentration camp at Flossberg and expanded into a full scale examination of the camp itself.

As German concentration camps went, Flossberg seemed an emergency affair that had been established when the German government let contracts to a Leipzig firm for the construction of a factory that could produce panzerfausts. Labor for the building was alloted from the concentration camp at Buchenwald, and arrangements were made by 15 December 1944 for the transporting, guarding and working of the slaves by two companies of Schutz Staffeln troops.

The labor proved as efficient as it was cheap. By February 1945, the factory began to produce and a rate of 1,200 weapons per month had been reached when the plant closed in the beginning of April. A high price in human lives had been paid for the speed. The treatment of the slaves was "inconceivably brutal"; between 400 and 600 of the enforced laborers were beaten to death during the period from December to April. The dead bodies were deposited in piles of 10 to 20 in graves well concealed in nearby woods.

CIC compiled records on the individuals who had directed the enterprise, including the chief of the Schutz Staffeln guards who was known by the name of "Zick-Zack."[83]

8th CIC Detachment: Travelling

The final period in the battle for Europe found the 8th Infantry Division shifted north from the area around Bonn until the unit was placed under the operational control of the British Second Army, ending the combat phase in Schwerin. The 8th CIC detachment travelled with the Division.

On the town of Duez, five members of the Hitler Jugend were captured by the 8th CIC. The boys were all dressed in civilian clothing, but they were heavily armed. Hand grenades, pistols and rifles formed their portable arsenal. One of the boys had, in addition, a supply of tacks.

Under CIC interrogation, the youths admitted that they were part of a group of 200 Hitler Jugend members committed to cross the lines and harass Allied troops. CIC sounded the

83. 2d CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 2 May 45 (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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alert to watch for 17 more of these members in the XVIII Corps area.[84]

Near the end of April, a series of quick CIC raids that developed from leads furnished by informants netted two enemy agent radio operators with their transmitters and an American-born woman spy who for five years had worked with the German Military Intelligence. At the time of her arrest, this woman was trying to get employment as an interpreter for the Military Government.[85]

9th CIC Detachment: The German Foreign Ministry Files

One of the most significant document finds of the entire European Theatre of Operations campaign was made by Special Agent George J. Novak of the 9th CIC Detachment in the waning days of the battle for Germany.

On 17 April the Ninth Infantry Division was operating in the town of Pansfelds in the Harz Mountains. Agent Novak, the sole CIC agent attached to the 47th Infantry Regiment, was directed by the S2 to take charge of a column of jeeps and search a castle in which German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop allegedly was hiding.

Novak assembled the column and headed towards the designated region. Little resistance was faced by the motorcade, but American soldiers lying in ditches alongside the roads continued to mop up the remaining German troops. The searching party found the castle, or chateau, deeply imbedded in the evergreen forests that utterly concealed it from air attack The place evidently had been chosen by the Nazis for its seclusion.

Novak led his small force into the castle. There was no sign of Von Ribbentrop, but there was a wealth of evidence that the Foreign Minister had been there. At the door of one of the buildings, the searchers were met by Baron Witilo Von Griesheim who had with him a large board containing keys to all the rooms in the castle where secret documents were stored.

84. 97th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt, dtd 6 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File, dtd 8 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED),(Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
85. 82d Abn Div Situation Summary Nr 19, Annex Nr 2, dtd 27 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File, 30 Apr 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch,AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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As the Baron led Novak around the castle, he unlocked room after room in which documents were carefully stacked, in neat packages that bore mysterious numbers. Von Griesheim had a master catalogue and knew where to locate every one of the thousands of documents stored in the castle. Novak did not open any of the files. Realizing the immense importance of the discovery, he stationed Military Police around the castle with strict orders to allow no one to enter or leave the area. As an additional security reminder, Novak put up a CIC poster showing that the castle was off limits to all Army personnel.

After Novak had been through the entire castle he asked the Baron to accompany him and his interpreter back to higher headquarters. This was a polite way of telling the Baron that he was under arrest.

The Baron showed Novak a telegram which he had received several days before from Berlin, ordering him to destroy all the documents at once. The wily nobleman had burned, instead, some old newspapers to make it appear as though he had complied with the Berlin mandate. He told Novak that he had saved the documents so historians of the future could determine the facts and responsibility for the war.

And well they could. The pile of papers represented the German Foreign Ministry files from 1871 to 1944. Among the subjects covered were the official exchanges between Berlin and London during the Chamberlain years, the documents dealing with the German-Russian negotiations in 1939, and a letter sent by the French turncoat General Petain to Hitler in early August 1944, three weeks before Paris was liberated, in which the old Marshal had begged the Fuehrer to declare the French capital an open city and save it from destruction.

When the report of the great discovery reached SHAEF, a message came back immediately stating that nothing further was to be done until a two-man team representing the State Department and the British Foreign Office arrived to authenticate the material. The diplomats arrived, certified the identity of the documents correct as reported, and soon about 200 trucks came through the mountains to the castle and transported the documents back to Army headquarters.

Eventually, as Novak recalled, the documents were transferred to Berlin where historians assumed the task of studying

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them. The documents also may have provided evidence for the trials at Nuremberg.[86]

The 29th CIC Detachment Moves Further East.

After its action in the encirclement and reduction of the Ruhr, the 29th Division moved on to the Elbe River, advancing their jurisdiction control to an area 120 miles further into central Germany, continuing their rear area mission of "Security and Military Government." Elements of the Division also participated in the fighting in the forest at Klotze.

After their arrival at the Elbe, the 29th CIC Detachment entered an occupational phase. Displaced persons and freed prisoners of war continually were a problem, streaming along major supply and communication routes. In controlling these people and guarding vital installations, the entire 29th Infantry Division had become engaged in basic counterintelligence duties.

The 29th CIC Detachment, supplemented Military Intelligence Interpreters (MII) and Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) personnel, retained the same set-up as in the previous period-five operationally autonomous teams. Automatic arrestees, war criminals and security menaces provided the bulk of work for the Detachment's teams, although, "personalities," traitorous collaborators from various countries who sought to hide out on farms, in hospitals, and in obscure towns, were also discovered and turned over to their native countries through counterintelligence channels.[87]

It was in Luchow, however, a small town not far from the Elbe, that most of this detachment performed its investigations. The day before, Captain Mayfield and Special Agent Braude had arrested a woman and three civilian-clad German soldiers she was harboring. She quietly confessed.[88]

86. Letter from George J. Novak, Law Offices, Kuicek, Novak, & Kubicek, 837-841 Highley Bldg, Cedar Rapids, Iowa to Historical Project, Fort Holabird, Maryland, dtd 20 Dec 54, (UNCLASSIFIED).
87. 29th CIC Det, doc entitled, "Counter Intelligence," dtd 3 May 45 in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Misc Rpts #200m Jun 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
88. 29th CIC Det, translation of statement, dtd 23 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Arrest Rpts Jun 44-May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

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On 24 April, a fanatic Nazi woman was taken into custody by men of the 5th Armored Division and turned over to "CIC, Luchow," headquarters team of the 29th CIC Detachment.

There were a number of complaints against the woman. Denunciators claimed she had urged her fellow townspeople to withdraw their white flags of surrender, and had become quite bellicose when a picture of Hitler was "abused." Under questioning by CIC Agents, she expressed her admiration of Hitler, her opinion that victory would be Germany's in the end, and her wish that the German people would fight on to that end. The woman was sent back for internment.[89]

Three youths in civilian clothes, who turned out to be soldiers of the Wehrmacht (the oldest having served almost four months), were picked up by American troops at Kaltenhof, in the vicinity of an explosion at a railroad bridge. They were turned over to CIC, Luchow. Agents interrogating the trio had no luck until one cracked. Then the other two quickly confessed to sabotaging the bridge. All three had received sabotage training as part of their Hitler Youth training. They were sent to Camp "Q" Ninth US Army's Civilian Dentention Camp.[90]

Eight days before the Detachment's final case of the war, agents of the detachment located at the University of Berlin a complete collection of secret strategic intelligence documents, newspaper clippings dealing with economic and political subjects of all countries, and a card index file. The documents had been moved to Wieren by the Germans for sa safe keeping.

Captain Mayfield notified the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Ninth US Army of the find, expressing the opinion that the documents could be of value to the Psychological Warfare Division. No final record is available of the ultimate disposition of these documents.[91]

89. 29th CIC Det Arrest Rpt dtd 2 Apr 45, in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests, Jun-44-May 45, #139 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
90. 29th CIC Det Memo for OIC, dtd 25 Apr 45, subj: "Sabotage Act Committed by etc," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests #140 Jun 44-May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
91. 29th CIC Det, Ltr to CIB. G2 Sect, 9th US Army, subj: "Documents of the Univ of Berlin found at Wieren, Germany, in 29th CI Det Correspondence Files #204 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

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Last Case of the War for the 29th

By 9 May the 29th CIC Detachment was in the process of moving into a new area, but that did not hinder Special Agent Emmanuel Braude from following up some information provided by a former female Abwehr employee. She implicated a naturalized German citizen of Swiss birth as an agent of the German Intelligence Service. The man had lived in a Paris apartment house which the Germans used exclusively to house their confidential agents and informers. He had large sums of money at all times, though he had no apparent means of obtaining it, and he was seen on several occasions at a Parisian cafe which was a rendezvous for German agents.

Because of his detachment's temporary situation, Braude was able to give the man only a superficial interrogation. The CIC agent also searched the German's quarters, finding a large sum of money in new bills in series, parts to a radio set on which the suspect was working, and letters from the man's wife which were "of considerable interest," according to Agent Braude. These things were sent to Camp "Q" with the suspect.92

The informant who had provided the information, described by Agent Braude as "a woman of culture and education," was at the time of her interrogation an implicitly trusted employee of the British Military Government in Warendorf. She, too, was sent to Camp "Q" by the agent, but with instructions that she was to be handled tactfully. No charge was placed on her arrest report, but Agent Braude's report mentioned the possibilities that she was "either extremely clever or sincere in her dealings with Allied authorities." The report stressed that the woman had not been formally arrested, and that her assistance was to be viewed as voluntary. Special mention was made to ensure that she not be allowed to believe she was being traiorous by giving information about German agents to Allied authorities, but rather that she was helping Germany.93

30th CIC Detachment: Sabotage in Neunkirchen

92. 29th CIC Det, Memo to OIC, dtd 9 May 45, subj: "Vladimir Plinatus," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests #162 Jun 44-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).
93. 29th CIC Det Arrest Rpt and Memo to OIC, dtd 9 May 45, subj: "Elizabeth Brand," in 29th CIC Det Correspondence File Record of Arrests #163, Jun 44-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

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On 3 April, in the town of Neunkirchen, a booby trap apparently mounted on the spring of a jeep exployed. One soldier in the vehicle suffered the loss of both of his feet and another was injured.

Agents of the 30th CIC Detachment, who were called in to investigate the incident, discovered only a few scraps of brown paper and a battered eight-inch piece of aluminum as remnants of the bomb. Further investigation disclosed that the vehicle had been parked outside an American occupied building over night under the "general surveillance of a guard in the vicinity." It was believed that the bomb must have been placed during this interval.

On the morning of 3 April, the jeep had been driven to another part of the town and parked outside a unit headquarters under constant observation of American soldiers. The driver came out of the building, moved the vehicle to the center of the road, and stopped while other soldiers climbed in. It was at this point that the booby trap was detonated.

The incident was another grim reminder that American troops had to maintain unceasing vigilance against sabotage acts by a still hostile populace. The report on the explosion stated: "Standard military booby traps and materials for makeshift devices must be assumed to be widely dispersed about this area. All that a would-be saboteur needs for another such act as this is carelessness on our part."94

CIC Agents in Germany had been accustomed to the fact that English-speaking German soldiers could take advantage of their linguistic ability in a number of ways. A possible new technique was revealed to the 30th CIC Detachment, when a deserter from a German espionage unit claimed that members of his organization might pose as Allied Military Police and misdirect convoys of Allied supplies.95

The 35th CIC Detachment: To the Salt Mine

Two major discoveries highlighted the 35th CIC Detachment's

94. 15th US Army G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 12, Annex 4, dtd 12 Apr 45, "In Occupied Germany," in G2 Periodic Rpts April 45, L-633 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
95. XX Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 324, dtd 28 Apr 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 28 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria , Va.).

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work on their move from the Ruhr to the Elbe. At Grasleben, a lead from Ninth US Army and one from 448th AAA Battalion directed CIC Agents to a salt mine. Exploring the mine, the only one in the area, the agents located the municipal files of important German cites, Reichsverischerungs Anstalt records, and records of the Reich Propaganda Ministry--430 meters underground. Pending the arrival of a T-Force group, Agents placed five of the persons involved in the operation in custody and placed guards at the mine.[96]

The second discovery, from CIC's point of view, was of greater significance. In the northern part of the Forest Letzlingen, Agents Darrel D. Drolsum and Alfred H. Ronleder had been searching for officials of the Kreis Gardelegen who were thought to be hiding there. The forest had been by-passed by American troops in their drive to the Elbe a few days before, and elements of the German Army, known to be in the area, had ambushed motor convoys and raided rear installations.

In spite of this, the two agents went about the business of systematically searching the forest. They interrogated all the civilians they encountered, a procedure which paid dividends. In one house in the forest the CIC agents made the most important arrest of the period. Although he was wearing civilian clothes, Major General Heinz Jost, head of all Gestapo activities outside the territorial limits of Germany, was recognized by the agents. This Nazi's connection with the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst, his position as Brigade Fuehrer of the Shutz Staffeln and as head of the "Amt Ausland" of Reichsicherheitshauptamt, classified him easily as one of the most dangerous of the enemy. He was believed to have been actively engaged in an underground resistance movement at the time of his arrest. The agents, with their quarry in tow, returned to the detachment.[97] Jost was evacuated to Ninth US Army's Civilian Internment Camp.[98]

69th CIC Detachment: Work Unending

The first and biggest task for the 69th CIC Detachment

96. 35th Inf Div CI Rpt #6, dtd 20 Apr 45, for period 25 Mar-20 Apr 45 in 103d (sic) CIC Det Rpts Sep 44-Jun 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).
97. 35th Inf Div Monthly Information Rpt for Apr, dtd 5 May 45 in 103d (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Sep 44-Jun 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).
98. 35th Inf Div CIC Rpt #7, dtd 22 May 45 for 21 Apr-20 May 45 in 103d (sic) CIC Det Rpts Sep 44-Jun 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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CIC was apprehending Nazi Party leaders, major and minor, most of whom claimed that they had been "forced into the Party." But counterintelligence activity also had to include screening civilians, many of whom turned out to be members of the Wehrmacht.

Among the masses of displaced persons and prisoners of war, the CIC Agents discovered many counterintelligence personalities but the screening was at best a fairly porous seive. The extreme confusion attendant on the enemy's sudden reverses and the huge numbers of stragglers clogging the roads made for a "seemingly insurmountable situation." The only means to cope with the problem was the use of all echelons to aid in the screening; and, at times, this became the main duty of command channels.

In the days of May leading to the surrender, security patrols were kept in operation throughout the 69th Division sector. At first, these patrols were established to apprehend German soldiers, but their responsibilities were expanded to include the screening of civilians. Motorized patrols served as roving road blocks and were also employed to check on civilians violating curfew regulations.[99]

The 83d CIC Detachment: No Detours

Under XIX Corps, the 83d Infantry Division was one of the Ninth US Army units that sped straight to the Elbe, with no detour for the Ruhr. From the Oberkassel-Neuss arena of counterintelligence, the CIC Detachment with the Division found itself in a very fast-moving situation until the Elbe was reached.

There was no opportunity to follow cases through to a logical conclusion. "Only the most temporary provisions for civil security" were undertaken, and those provisions had more to do with the maintenance of military security than with civil arrangements. Key German government and Nazi Party officials, the detachment discovered, had fled the larger towns in the wake of the Allied advances. In smaller towns most of the key officials who remained behind tried to hide, and five even committed suicide.

German civilians, in some instances, encouraged CIC

99. 69th Inf Div After Action Rpt 1 Apr-30 Apr 45 1 May-9 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Agents to shoot local officials rather than arrest them and also proved ready to lead CIC Agents to caches of arms and equipment to prevent their use by fanatical opponents of the occupation.

In Eschershausen, about half-way from the Rhine to the Elbe, agents of the 83d Detachment came upon the Stein Company, engaged in the manufacture of aircraft for the Luftwaffe. Ten officials of the company were apprehended, arrested and forwarded to the Ninth US Army Interrogation Center.

The Stein Company conducted most of its operations underground with the use of impressed labor. CIC interest was channelled mainly into two concentration camps established near the company and upon Schutz Staffeln personnel who operated the camps. In addition to arresting the ten company officials, the detachment discovered some official papers in the home of the leading Schutz Staffeln figure, and forwarded them to the 219th CIC Detachment.

Many party records were discovered intact, as a result of the speed with which the tactical forces advanced. In one town, the removal of the enemy had been so swift that CIC Agents found a half-consumed cup of tea and a piece of toast still on the desk of a party official at Kreis level. Sealing those buildings in which Nazi records were kept remained a preliminary CIC duty.

In almost every town entered by 83d CIC Agents, enemy communication facilities were found to be in working condition. CIC had to make sure that these communications were neutralized at once, a task which required coordination with Signal personnel. Smashing telephone cables with an axe was forbidden, for it was essential to preserve the systems for later communication with rear areas. The trained Signal personnel who accompanied CIC on its communications forays accomplished their mission by simply removing certain vital parts from the telephone equipment.100

The 83rd CIC Detachment arrested a Polish national who claimed to be an Office of Strategic Services operative. The Pole knew so much about the operations of the organization that the CIC agents were convinced that, if his story was not true, he was at least a clever enemy agent. The detachment,

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100. 83d CIC Det, Action Against Enemy Rpts in After Action Rpts, dtd 1 May 45, in Army Opns Rpts 207.03, 383-CIC-0.3 (11786) Jan-May 45 (SECRET), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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still on the move, sent the Pole to the Ninth US Army's Interrogation Center.

Two days later, on 12 April, a German suspect said that up until 1942 he had veen an Abwehr agent, "with the work of sending spies and saboteurs to the United States and Britain," and that he later became a Signal non-commissioned officer in German Naval Intelligence engaged in deciphering Allied codes. He, too, was sent to Ninth US Army Interrogation Center.

Once the Division reached the Elbe, the Detachment moved into a static security phase, setting up headquarters at Calbe, near the Saare River. More permanent steps were taken to ensure the security of the Division area.

Travel was frozen throughout Division area. Agents discovered that most of the violators were German soldiers in civilian clothes, attempting to return to their homes. In the first five days, fifty of these POW's were apprehended.

A report of Wehrwolf activity in Calbe precipitated the arrest of five alleged leaders, two of whom, denied any connection with the underground organization. All five were evacuated as security threats.

A youthful German caused the only terrorist activity in the area when he fired upon an officer of Division Rear Echelon. He missed, but four American soldiers who witnessed the incident did not, and the German youth was killed. "This occurrence has had a salutary effect upon the population of Calbe," the detachment's report noted.

In the early days of the occupation-type activity in Calbe, many concentration camp evacuees arrived in that area from Magdeburg. When a middle-aged man who claimed to be a factory worker stated it took him a week to get from Magdeburg by bicycle, CIC agents were suspicious, and when the suspect produced a deferment paper which appeared to be about two weeks old but which was dated 1943 the Agents evacuated him as a probable enemy agent.[101]

As the Russians moved toward the American positions on the Elbe, an increased flow of refugees from the Russian occupied area attempted to reach American-held territory. The

101. 83d CIC Det CI Periodic Rpt for 18 May-17 Apr 45, dtd 18 Apr 45, in 83d CIC Periodic Rpts Jul 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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Counter Intelligence Periodic Report for the rest of the time the detachment operated in Calbe indicated that "every effort was made to prohibit entry into the American lines from the Western side of the Elbe River...." In spite of this action it was feared that many persons of counterintelligence interest might have successfully made their way through. It was even opined that "some important Nazi officials, particularly from Berlin, may now be found in or out of hiding within the American and British areas of occupation." However, the detachment made no arrests.[102]

Waterborne Saboteurs

On 20 April, three would-be saboteurs were brought to the 83rd CIC after their attempt to destroy Allied bridges across the Elbe River met with failure.

The men were members of the Kriegsmarine and formed a team that had the mission of placing a torpedo mine under a bridge near Breitenhagen. The first two were captured shortly after dawn near Breitenhagen; and the leader, a lieutenant, was located during the afternoon by troops who found him lying concealed in the bushes approximately 400 yards from the bridge. The team had lost their bomb when they had become tangled in mine-sweeping devices. These snares had set off an explosive charge that totally disorganized the swimmers.

The prisoners mentioned that a second team composed of four men had been assigned a similar mission of destroying another American bridge if the first team failed. All seven men of the two teams were volunteer swimming experts who had received training in underwater demolition at the Kriegsmarine Specialty School in Venice, Italy. After completing their training, the men had been assigned to their original units to await a call for special service. On 17 April, they had assembled in Berlin, where they received instructions from a Kreigsmarine officer in the use of a torpedo-type mine. The next day they were taken by truck to a forest near Steckby. Attached to the truck was a trailer bearing two of the torpedo mines.

At 0100 hours on 20 April, the group had backed the trailer into the Elbe River, unloaded the mines, and proceeded downstream to the Allied bridges. Darkness and river currents worked against the teams and they became separated. Three

102. 83d CIC Det CI Periodic Rpt for 18 Apr-15 May 45, dtd 16 May 45 in 83rd CIC Det Periodic Rpts Jul 44-Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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hours after their entry into the Elbe, the captured men encountered the minesweeping boom and nets that had foiled their sabotage plan.[103]

84th CIC Detachment: A Berserk Burgermeister

Screening of civilians for employment by Military Government was a necessary but often tedious duty for CIC agents. Occasionally, the routine of this screening was interrupted by an individual who proved especially interesting. Such was the case in the town of Bomengion, which agents labeled "The Case of the Berserk Burgermeister."

When the commanding officer of a combat battalion situated near the town noticed that an unprecedented number of official passes seemed to be circulated among the civilians, he decided to have a few words with the local Burgermeister. His efforts to track down the town official led to a Rathaus where the Burgermeister was "in a rather unprofessional situtation" with a pretty young stenographer. Feeling that such behavior was hardly within the category of official business, the battalion commander referred the matter to Agents of the 84th CIC Detachment.

From this point, the original account of the investigation continues: "Like a Congressional committee, CIC descended upon the hapless Burgermeister. The latter, of Napoleonic height, 35-40 years of age, with popping blue eyes, was again enjoying the delights of feminine companionship. Thus encouraged, CIC took to their task with unbounded zeal. Six more women were discovered in connecting offices. Further search revealed five policemen and a jail in which was lodged an irate individual who claimed that he was the real Burgermeister and that the incumbent Don Juan was a usurper; in fact, a nut, who only recently was released from an insane asylum.

"Presented with these allegations, the incumbent was indignant and with kindly gestures waved his accusers away. Much against his wishes, the pseudo-Burgermeister was searched and papers found proving him to be a slightly cracked nut.

"Back at the asylum, the usurper was heard to remark,'It

103. XIX Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 310, dtd 21 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 22 Apr 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

was a lot of fun while it lasted,' to which we can only echo our agreement."[104]

Other impostors encountered by 84th CIC could not be regarded so lightly. In Salzwedel, a CIC agent was approached by an auxiliary civilian policeman and requested to serve as an interpreter for a "CIC" officer who did not speak any English. This request became the first step of an investigation.

The agent discovered that a few doors from the headquarters of the local Military Government unit, a deserter from a German Parachute Regiment had set himself in office as the local CIC, and was freely conducting investigations. CIC hastily put this impersonator under arrest and added his name to the list of people to be tried by a Military Government court.[105]

The 97th CIC Detachment: Jackpot!

One of the more recent arrivals on the continent, the 97th Infantry Division moved from defensive positions west of the Rhine, where it had been under the Fifteenth US Army, to partake in the reduction of the Ruhr as a component of XVIII Corps of the First US Army.

Perhaps it was beginner's luck, but the 97th CIC Detachment, under Captain Oscar Grimes, wasted little time in establishing a favorable reputation for itself. Seventeen days after joining XVIII Corps, the detachment rounded up a substantial package of Gestapo operatives. The Corps Detachment Commander, making a "routine visit," was on hand when the agents of Division CIC went into action. Captain Albin P. Dearing, commanding the 218th CIC Detachment, was obviously so pleased with the catch that he authorized the official report on the case sent to higher headquarters.[106]

The chain of events leading to the Gestapo round-up began with the arrival of Mademoiselle Paulette Pauleo at the 97th

104. VII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt #316, Annex 3 (source: 84th Inf Div), dtd 29 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, L-558 30 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
105. XIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 180, dtd 7 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl and File 7-8 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
106. 218th CIC Det, ltr to G2 FUSA, Attn CO, 301st CIC Det, dtd 20 Apr 45, subj: "Arrest of Cologne Kripo Officials by 97th CIC Det," in 218th CIC Det Weekly Summary Rpts, Feb-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Bx 25098).

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CIC Detachment Headquarters in Mulheim. Allegedly a French agent, the mademoiselle expressed a desire to culminate "two year' work of penetrating the Nazi secret services" by arresting high Gestapo officials--with American help, mais naturellement.

(b) The informant related two versions of her past. The first was that, as a native of Belfort, France, she had at the tender age of sixteen volunteered to work as an interpreter for the Deuxieme Bureau. Being fluent in German and Arabic as well as in her native tongue, she was suited for this work, and her subsequent thoroughness in that type of activity, she said, made the French aware of her possibilities as an agent. She was sent through the lines to report German troop dispositions and later to penetrate the German secret services. She possessed certain feminine charms and the frame of mind to use them to gain her ends. She said who was eventually a arrested by the Germans, imprisoned, "tortured,"[107] and sentenced to die. She escaped and, little by little, managed to ingratiate herself into the favor of the Secret Police to such an extent that she eventually became a prominent Gestapo agent. Her father had been an officer in the French Foreign Legion, she declared, adding one more note of dime-noval drama to her first story.

(c) Her second story differed in respect to her activities after she had passed through the German lines. She claimed this time to have been arrested and jailed for political reasons in Germany for seventeen months, at which time she was allowed to leave after giving her word "to behave." She said she joined the German Motor Corps, served loyally and retreated with the Germans toward the Rhine. When they were overrun by advancing Americans, she was captured and imprisoned "long enough to get another 'mission' from the French." She recrossed the lines, still in her Motor Corps uniform, into the outstretched arms of her German acquaintances "who had been pretty worried about her." From that time on, she said it was just a matter of getting along with the "right folks" until she came to the attention of Dr. Vende, Sicherheitsdienst Chief ~~in Cologne.~~ He recommended her to Klemmer, alias Klemmens, Kriminal Kommissar. Then she waited for the right moment to expose her colleagues.

At any rate, the informant led the agents to Klemmer's underground hideout, where they arrested Klemmer and three of his leading lieutenants, including the leader of the Nazi-

107. These quotation marks appear in the original report.

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subsidized National Socialist French Movement, and four women agents of the German Secret Police.

These were the first ranking Gestapo agents of the Third Reich captured by any Allied agency and the action resulted in the collection of information on past activities and future underground plans "of this specially despised category of Naziism." A considerable amount of documents, false identity cards, uniforms and civilian clothes for escape purposes, weapons, police paraphernalia, and all the "drab panoply of cloak and dagger detective yarns" were discovered including poison, hair bleaching powders, and secret coded messages.

According to the Kriminal Kommissar, whose name ranked high on SHAEF's list of wanted persons, his orders had been to change identity, allow American troops to overrun his hide-out in the swift American deflation of German Commander Model's Ruhr pocket, and then spy on all Germans collaborating with the Allies, making lists of them while awaiting further orders.

The once-proud Nazis proved to be very willing to cooperate with their CIC interrogators, to the point of informing on each other and members of the group who had not yet been apprehended. The men had been in the service of Nazidom since the early days, and their high ranks indicated the esteem with which the Reich considered them. As captives, deprived of their deathgrip on the German people, these Nazis were ready to sell out anyone or anything. They were so despised by the German people that none had given them food or water in their travels; and, after Mlle. Pauleo had informed on them, CIC had received three calls from German civilians that they were in the area.

The girls, each of whom had been compromised in one fashion or another in earlier days and had eventually found their way into the Gestapo lair at Cologne, seemed penitent also in revealing their rather sordid pasts. One wished to get to her American father in Detroit or to her brother in the US Air Force. Another wanted to return to the two children she had borne to her uncle, whom she had married when the first child was on its way. A Third, a Dutch girl, who played a minor role in the attempted deception, sought to be an informant for the Allies to return herself to the good graces of the folks back home. The fourth, a comely miss who had been the cause of a row between the Kriminal Kommissar and his Kriminal Assistant, said nothing.

(C) As for Mlle. Pauleo--all did not go well for her either. By some odd twist of fate, a bona fide French penetration agent

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showed up at CIC's headquarters less than thirty minutes after her departure with the CIC Agents. The Frenchman had been shot in the leg trying to escape from the very group which Mlle. Pauleo claimed to be exposing. Another French agent, a friend of the late arrival, had been killed in the escape. An American tank crew had found the successful escapee lying on a road and, after reviving him, had taken him to CIC at his request. He identified each of the gang, including Mlle. Pauleo, as Gestapo operatives. The mademoiselle, however, clung to her story of being a French spy, and since she was regarded suspiciously by both the Germans and the Allies, Division CIC left it up to higher echelons to classify her. Unfortunately, the complete absence of records of her final disposition give the case a "Lady or the Tiger" finish.

The Dutch girl, Maria Van Castel, was used by CIC, and she led them to a nestful of radio operators in the employ of the Gestapo. En route, she was mobbed by Russian displaced persons who recognized her as a Gestapo personality. In spite of this, she successfully carried out her mission and was later adopted by the 218th CIC Detachment to whom she rendered invaluable aid.[108]

All the prisoners, including Maria, were sent to the First US Army Interrogation Center after the Division had given them preliminary interrogations. Maria then was reclaimed by the Corps' CIC Detachment.

"Freies Deutschland"

Second Lieutenant Kurt F. Korf of a CIC Military Intelligence Interpreter Team (MII), participated at regimental level in interviewing members of the Dusseldorf Free Germany movement which had been formed prior to American entry into the city by consolidating five resistance groups into one. They told ~~of having selected five~~ leaders from among themselves to serve as officials at police headquarters in the town after they had jailed the Police President and Schutz Staffeln Brigadier General, who were key figures in resisting the Allied conquest of the city. They installed as Police President a Lieutenant ~~Colonel~~ who had public confidence and democratic leanings.

When one of the selected leaders returned to the jail later and was not heard from, a second went to see what had ~~happened and~~ he too disappeared; so did the Lieutenant Colonel. One of the remaining leaders made the educated guess that Schutz

108. See 218th Corps CIC, Section 1, this chapter.

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Staffeln Police leader Gutenburger of the city had discovered the rebellion and had countered it by killing the three Free German members along with two others, and allowing the jailed Nazis to be released. A German First Lieutenant, who had occupied a desk in the Police Headquarters until five minutes before the S2 of the 303d Infantry Regiment of the Division had arrived to arrest him, was cited as the executioner of all five of the resistance group.

When the Americans arrived, about two days after the Free Germany group had attempted their coup, the bodies of the five members of the organization were discovered. The Nazis concerned with their murder had gone into hiding or escaped.[109]

102d CIC Detachment: Among Those Arrested

In the early days of May, the types of individuals that the 102d CIC Detachment apprehended gave a summary view of counterintelligence activities as the Division settled into a semi-occupational role.

The discovery by a CIC informant of a scrap of paper carelessly discarded on a street led to the arrest of a Hauptscharfuehrer of the Schutz Staffeln, and former guard at Buchenwald Concentration Camp.

A prosperous land owner was turned over to the CIC agents when he was heard to state that he was living for the day when the Americans would leave and he could put the Poles back to work.

The mayor of Kassieck was arrested and jailed, after an ultimatum period during which he had failed to produce the murderer of an American soldier.

A German escapee from an American POW enclosure was brought to the CIC office by a Polish displaced person whom the prisoner had asked for a set of false identification photos, mistaking the DP for a German. The entrapped POW made another break for freedom in front of the CIC office but was recaptured and eventually placed under protective custody of a Russian provisional guard in the POW cage.[110]

109. 97th Inf Div G2 Sect, ltr dtd 19 Apr 45, subj: "Investigations in Dusseldorf," in 218th CIC Det Periodical Rpts Jan-May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).
110. XIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 180, dtd 7 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 7-8 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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These were all isolated cases and were dealt with individually. In addition, the 102d CIC agents encountered several people whose arrests had wider implications.

Division Combat troops flushed out four armed Schutz Staffeln men hiding in a home in Bonn, a building which investigation revealed to be a station along the underground that was transporting Schutz Staffeln men back to their homes clandestinely. The woman who owned the home was a former German Army nurse who told CIC interrogators that her obligation to German soldiers was far greater than any American Military Government proclamation.[111]

On 9 May, the 102d CIC Agents operating out of the town of Neuhaldensleben uncovered and arrested four Gestapo agents, who in their confessions compromised almost the entire police unit. In this fashion, some investigations expanded into matters of further counterintelligence interest.[112]

503d CIC Detachment: Division Spearheads VII Corps' Advance

After assisting in the complete encirclement of the Ruhr, the 3d Armored Division raced across to Dessau on the Elbe in the fore of VII Corps' attack, crossing the Weser River, passing south of the Harz Mountains, and then swinging northeast to their objective. Again the rapid movement interfered with CIC's attempts to provide security. It also made evacuation of arrestees and displaced persons impossible, and thrust upon Military Government an extremely difficult collection and concentration problem, in which CIC gave assistance. Facing increasing hostility on all sides as they moved deeper into Central Germany, the troops became more security conscious, making the security task somewhat easier.[113]

After relinquishing Dessau to the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Armored moved to a rest and rehabilitation center where the 503d CIC Detachment kept working, covering an area of one

111. XIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 181, dtd 7 May 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 7-8 May 45, L-558 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
112. XIII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 183, dtd 9 May 45, In FUSA G2 Jnl, Operational, 10-12 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
113. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 18 Apr 45, for 2-15 Apr 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts, 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

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thousand square kilometers which later was expanded to "about 3,500 square kilometers." The change occurred after a plan for the systematic coverage of the first area had been developed.

Division IPW and MII personnel were placed at the disposal of CIC, and, after establishing offices in five towns, the detachment set about the business of rounding up automatic arrestees and German soldiers in civilian clothes through town screening procedures. In two weeks, 742 of the civilian-garbed POW were taken and more than thirty towns were screened. A total of 138 Nazi officers within the automatic arrest category were apprehended. General security was rated fair.[114]

Extensive Record Find

Certainly one of the major record "finds" of the campaign was accomplished through the efforts of Special Agent U.S. Collins and Agent P.L. Ettlinger of the Detachment. Military Government in Sangerhausen had a tip that Schutz Staffeln men were living in the Kryffhauser Hotel there, and the two CIC Agents took off after them. They found no Schutz Staffeln agents, but they did find 200,000 case files that dated back to 1934, each case concerning an investigation of a Schutz Staffeln agent and prospective bride. The hotel had become the main office of the marriage record bureau of the Schutz Staffeln, a Heiratz Amt. Before any member and his frau-to-be could be married, they had to send their family background records to this office where an investigation was undertaken to ensure that both the Schutz Staffeln man and his future bride had only Aryan blood in their veins. Both Waffen and Allegemein Schutz Staffeln men had submitted these applications, and pictures of half of the applicants were still in the files.[115] Additional records were unearthed by members of the Combat Command "B" CIC team, including the personal correspondence of Schutz Staffeln Obergruppenfuhrer Richard Hildebrandt. The records were later inspected and removed by members of First US Army's Documents Section.[116]

114. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 7 May 45, for 23 Apr 6 May 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).
115. 503d CIC Det, Memo to Capt Black, dtd 22 Apr 45, subj: "SS Files," in 503d CIC Det Germany #2 File (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).
116. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 7 May 45, for 23 Apr-6 May 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

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Underground

Two members of the Hitler Jugend provided harassment for the 503d CIC Detachment by cutting two wires. CIC and combat troops elicited the names of the guilty by applying pressure on the townspeople of Kinsdorf. Two other cases of wire-cutting in a forest in the area remained unsolved however, and the delayed report of the discovery lessened the possibility that they ever would be.

Seven Nazis and Sturm Abteilungen of Wickerode who threatened a Military Government-appointed anti-Nazi policeman with assassination were arrested. But these instances were minor compared to CIC's detection of the Pionier Sonderkommando Wehrwolf group.

The members of this group were Wehrmacht engineers, who had been hurriedly trained and equipped, and sent through American lines for the purpose of disrupting supplies and communications. This was the first organized resistance the Detachment had encountered, but it could hardly be called "underground" even though it bore a Wehrwolf designation. In fact, its members all wore uniforms. Of the five captured by the Detachment, only one--who claimed to have deserted--was not officially garbed.[117]

The lead which awakened CIC to the threat of the sabotage group was furnished by a captain who found the group's log book in a cave in the area on 25 April. The log gave the names of the members, their area of operations and an account of the damage they had caused up to the date it was found.[118]

Three days later, Division troops captured the first two men in a field. Both were in uniform and armed, and had demolitions in their possession. Captain Black and an IPW Officer questioned the men, thus obtaining additional background information on the group.[119]

Although the five prisoners claimed that a much larger

117. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 7 May 45, for 23 Apr 6 May 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).
118. 503d CIC Det, ltr to G2 FUSA, dtd 26 Apr 45, subj: "Sonderkommando Wehrwolf," in 503d CIC Germany #2 File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).
119. 503d CIC Det, Memo for the OIC,,dtd 28 Apr 45, subj: "Interrogations of O/C Wolfgang Delfs, Group 18, and O/C Ludwig Hepp, Group 17, Sonderkommando 5, " in 503d CIC Det Germany #2 File (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

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number were apparently still operational, no others were rounded up in 3d Armored area.[120] Agents Ettlinger and Veitner (MII) and Collins followed up a tip by making the rounds of Gast-Hauser Taverns in three villages; and uncovered not beer, but Wehrmacht radio equipment in each of the establishments. The agents recommended an area-wide continuance of these searches to ascertain whether this was an established procedure with the enemy.[121]

Numerous additional prisoners and security threats and nearly two hundred automatic arrestees were tagged by the Detachment during the two-week period. The thirty CIC, IPW, and MII personnel were still providing counterintelligence coverage for the 3,500 square kilometers at the end of the conflict in Europe.[122]

505th CIC Detachment: Murder, Wehrwolf Style

On 9 April, Amtsburgermeister Peiper of the town of Kirchlegern was shot shortly after nightfall. The following morning, a police officer who had been at the scene immediately before and after the crime, reported to the 505th CIC Detachment. Stationed near the office of the murdered man, the police officer had observed the prospective murderer for several days previously--a young man who had always beat a hasty retreat when asked what he wanted. The day of the murder he replied to the Policeman's question that he wanted to speak to the Burgermeister about a personal matter. The policeman told the youth that the Burgermeister was in his office, sent him in, and then started home for dinner.

Several moments later, two pistol shots rang out. The officer hurried back and found the Amtsburgermeister Peiper lying wounded on the floor of his office. He coughed two or three times and rolled over dead. Beside him on the floor was a scrap of paper, the word "traitor" scrawled in red crayon and beneath, in ink, the inscription, "Die Wehrwolfe." Numerous young Germans had responded to the call to resistance

120. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 7 May 45, for 23 April-6 May 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center Box 25104).
121. 503d CIC Det, Memo for the OIC, dtd 30 Apr 45, in 503d CIC Det Germany #2 File (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).
122. 503d CIC Det Situation Summary, dtd 7 May 45, for 23 Apr-6 May 45, in 503d CIC Det Situation Rpts 10/44-6/45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25104).

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with a vengeance, but this was the first instance that 505th CIC Agents encountered where an overt act had been committed by the Wehrwolf since the organization's formation was announced by German radio broadcast on 1 April.[123]

CIC Agent in Emissary Group

With the troops of Combat Command "R" drawn up outside Rintelin, an emissary group from the unit composed of the S2, the IPW Officer and CIC Agent Krekow, went into the town to persuade the German commander to surrender and spare destruction. On the next day, the German Commanding Officer agreed to surrender the town and the successful emissaries returned. In the report on the affair, notation was made that "the value of such an undertaking is that, even if the Commanding Officer will not give up, the townspeople learn that the offer has been made to save their city..."

Nazi Hater?

505th CIC Agents were paid a visit by a 20-year-old German who offered "any and all assistance against the Nazis." The youth's anti-Nazi feeling seemed, to the Agents, to have developed during a year's imprisonment in a concentration camp.

Detailed questioning of the youth by the CIC Agents made his story less credible, and a careful body search proved his downfall. In the boy's shoes were two certificates signed by fellow soldiers which acknowledged the fact that he personally accounted for two American tanks, the latest on 11 April.

These documents forced the young soldier to admit that he had hoped to pass as a civilian, go to his home, and work for CIC until such time as he was contacted by a Nazi resistance group at which time he could show the certificates of his military prowess to prove that in reality he was working against the Americans. He had one regret: The rapid advance of the 5th Armored Division had prevented him from destroying his third tank for which he would have been awarded a fifteen-day furlough.[124]

123. 78th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt Nr 119, Annex 6, "Intelligence Notes," (source, 5th Armd Div) in 78th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File, 12 Apr (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).
124. 1st US Army G2 Jnl, dtd 2 May 45, L-558 (Source, 5th Armd Div) (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

[redacted]

508th CIC Detachment: Moving with Division

Agents of the 508th CIC Detachment, under command of 1st Lt Arnold G. Huebner, accompanied the Eighth Armored Division as it moved north, across the Lippe canal at Dorsten, and then east to Sennenlager. After helping in the reduction of the Ruhr pocket, the Division joined units that were completing the destruction of German panzer forces in the Harz mountains. OB, PI, MII and IPW teams were assigned to CIC to aid in overcoming occupation problems. Other than this fact, no reports remain to indicate what the 508th CIC was doing or how they were doing it.125

125. 8th Armd Div G2 After Action Rpt, Jan-May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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Chapter 3

FROM THE RHINE TO THE DANUBE

Several Third US Army units had fought across Germany in a wide arc, some ending in a southerly push to the Danube. On 22 April, the III and XX Corps established bridgeheads over the Danube River to the east and west of Regensburg. Other units, notably the 11th Armored Division of the XII Corps, pushed into Austria, arriving in Linz on 5 May. One day later, the V Corps, a reinforcement from the First US Army (then with the Third US Army), entered Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, to wait for Russian forces along an agreed line of restraint.

The Sixth US Army Group had met considerable opposition from the enemy in its advance from the Rhine, but it continued on. On 16 April, the XVI Corps took Nurnberg, on the 30th, Munich, and on May 4 Berchtesgaden and Salzburg. The XXI Corps and VI Corps crossed the Danube on 22 April, and on 3 May, Innsbruck fell. Later, elements of the 103d Infantry Division moved into the renowned Brenner Pass.[126]

Sixth Army Group; General Survey

At Sixth Army Group, the Monthly Counter Intelligence Report covering the closing phase of the ETO Campaign contained several important generalizations in the survey of the counter-intelligence situation. The rapidity of the advance of Army Group forces from France to Bavaria had caused security coverage of the area to be "cursory." But, despite the broad area that had come under Seventh Army control, no major act of sabotage was reported during the victorious drive across southern Germany.

A profound sense of relief that the war was almost over was noted among the civilian inhabitants. In most villages, counterintelligence authorities received cooperation once the rabid Nazis were interned, and no shortage of informants was reported.

In some instances, the speed of the forward rush did not permit close interrogations. Suspects had to be detained even when the burden of proof had not been established. Counter-intelligence units were urged to weigh carefully each apprehension that did not fall in an automatic arrest category.

126 Op cit. Eisenhower, pp 412-418.

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During this final period, little was heard or seen of the German Intelligence Service. Apparently GIS personnel had fled or gone into hiding. The organization had prepared for retreat by destroying its files in such key cities as Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Baden-Baden.

Military security by Sixth Army Group forces remained reasonably good during the rapid advance. CIC detachments watched for signal communications available to the enemy or the civilian population, and agents discovered that, in many towns, the telephone systems were still in operation. Signal Corps personnel assisted in the neutralization of these systems.

With the Allies occupying a large portion of southern Germany, the problem of frontier security loomed large for counterintelligence officials at Sixth Army Group. The French-German border was patrolled on a twenty-four hour basis by elements of the Seventh Army, and, by agreement with Sixth Army Group, G2, the Swiss-German border was declared a "prohibited zone." Orders were issued for the entire border zone to be evacuated and then protected by barbed wire fencing and a minefield. Once these barriers had been erected, the area was to be guarded by sentries and patrols with orders to shoot any person travelling within the prohibited zone. Pending completion of the fencing, Sixth Army Group troops were ordered to seal off the border "by any means at their disposal." [127]

307th CIC Detachment: Catching Remnants of the Rout

While the scope of Seventh Army CIC's activities remained the same in April as in previous months, the quantity of work to be accomplished, increased manifold. The speed of the advance meant that counterintelligence measures, instituted on the run by divisional detachments, could never be completed. To the 307th CIC Detachment fell the task of apprehending the remnants of the rout.

It was discovered that Nazi officials and black list personalities had left the cities before the Allied occupation and had taken refuge in small outlying villages in the Seventh Army area. Small squads of agents from the 307th CIC were continually dispatched to the towns reported as possible centers of clandestine activities.

Flexibility in the deployment of personnel was a necessity. Available security resources had to be spread thinly over the

127 6th Army Group Monthly CI Rpt No 13, for 25 Mar-25 Apr 45, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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large service area of Seventh Army. Even with decentralization, there was more than enough work for every member of the detachment.

During April, two reports of political unrest among the civilians in Seventh Army service area were investigated by CIC agents. One group of alleged anti-Nazis had been accused of starting a movement against former Nazi party members holding public office. Carrying out the Military Government structure that forbade opposition to the duly constituted authorities, CIC investigated and warned the individuals supporting the movement.

A second group of Germans who fell within the 307th CIC's jurisdiction were found to be confiscating food not only for German ex-soldiers hiding in the woods but also for frightened Nazi party members still hiding in the cities. The stock of hoarded food was seized and the leader of the movement was arrested and turned over to Military Government.[128]

Gestapo Agents

The disintegration of the German Intelligence Service, which accompanied the repeated setbacks of the German Field forces, made spy-catching a secondary task for 307th CIC agents many of whom were busy rounding up Gestapo members, and other counterintelligence persons in automatic arrest categories.

The cases of "special interest" reported by the 307th CIC Detachment dealt primarily with apprehended Gestapo men, some of whom attempted to evade arrest through strategem. Among those was a man named Laszlo Santa.

On 7 April, Santa volunteered to 307th CIC agents, information about Nazi and Shutz Staffeln individuals in the cities of Darmstadt and Zoningenburg. When questioned about his activities, Santa told the interrogators a story of his life that "would label him as a nonpartisan in any Nazi activities." CIC accepted Santa's account, grateful for the information that he had provided.

But Santa overplayed his good luck. On 9 April, he returned to the CIC office with further information. This time the interrogating agents, Lt. George A. Perper and Chandler Flickinger, were more skeptical of Santa's background. Intensive questioning finally brought out his true past. Santa had been an agent for the Gestapo and the Abwehr. He had performed various missions in France and Belgium before the outbreak of war and had been imprisoned by the Belgians before the Nazi

128 Ibid

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conquest. From 1940 until the Allies neared Darmstadt, Santa fulfilled the typical Gestapo role of informing on anti-Nazis, communists and foreign workers. After obtaining a full confession from the man, CIC recommended that he be interned as a security menace. [129]

CIC and The German Civilians

Unlike some of the CIC units in the north, the 307th, CIC did not advertise itself as the "American Gestapo." Agents found that by taking a tough and disciplined attitude towards their work, they made a greater impression upon the German civilians than by attempting to intimidate them. Most of the agents from the 307th CIC were well seasoned veterans whose service extended back to the North African campaign. They were "not in any mood to be pushed around by the Germans," and they discovered that once the civilians learned that CIC was an intelligence unit, cooperation was certain. The civilians obeyed the orders of the CIC agents, and often seemed frightened of the counterintelligence operatives although "CIC gave them no outward reason for that feeling."

While the Germans were, on the whole, cooperative with agents of the 307th CIC, there was no rush of informants to the Detachment headquarters. The Germans accepted their lot as a conquered people but did not over extend themselves on behalf of the occupying force. [130]

307th CIC Agents at Dachau

The Commander of Seventh Army, General Patch, had consistently demonstrated his faith in the agents of the 307th CIC. The efforts of the Detachment in Southern France and Alsace in making the Seventh Army area "off limits" for German Intelligence, justified his confidence. When the Seventh Army forces reached the Dachau concentration camp, scene of the Nazis' most brutal and wanton outrages against their prisoners, General Patch requested the 307th CIC to provide a team of agents to handle the preliminary investigations.

The two agents on this team were the first investigators to arrive at Dachau. Their immediate mission was to weed out Shutz Staffeln and other Nazi officials who conceivably had gone undercover in an effort to escape retribution for their crimes.

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129 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 16 May 45, (SECRET)(Staff and Faculty Library)

130 Interview with former Special Agents Robert R. Richards, Columbus, Ohio, Warren Bower, Swarthmore, Penna, Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, NY, on 6 August 1955. XX-91

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Among the camp officials that the agents plucked from hiding, was a Dr. Schmidt masquerading as a hospital patient. In general, CIC agents discovered that the men who had been the harshest guards were the most cowardly when imprisoned by the Americans.

To assist in the uncloaking of Dachau's personnel, the CIC team organized committees of inmates, representing every nationality present in the camp. These committees were also used to screen the people in the camp for their nationality, and to spot individuals who might be of counterintelligence interest.[131]

Preparations to Reduce the National Redoubt

As elements of the Seventh Army started their southern swing towards Austria, Allied authorities feared the possibility of a German national redoubt near Berchtesgaden, which fanatic Nazis would defend to the last man. CIC agents, serving with Seventh Army, were alerted to this possibility and specially schooled in the most recent techniques of German sabotage. They were shown how the dangerous explosive, nipolite, could be moulded into the lining of raincoats, belts, shoes, and other wearing apparel. All the last-minute training was in anticipation of, what Allied Intelligence believed to be, a diehard Nazi sabotage campaign.

What the Americans eventually discovered was in sharp contrast to what they had expected. According to one of the 307th CIC agents, the "Germans had had enough of war," and the meager preparations for a resistance campaign at Berchtesgaden supported this conclusion. The supposed redoubt "could not possibly have been used as a base for a German military attack." However, there were some plans, for industrial sabotage, that never left the drafting stage. Funds that had been earmarked for this sabotage were intercepted at several places by CIC, and the speedy reconnaissance of the Berchtesgaden area, by elements of the Seventh Army, set the Allied authorities at ease.[132]

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131 Interview with former Special Agents Robert R. Richards, Columbus, Ohio, Warren Bowen, Swarthmore, Penna, and Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, NY, on 6 August 1955.

132 Interview with former Special Agents Robert R. Richards, Columbus, Ohio, Warren Bower, Swarthmore, Penna., Robert Brockmeier, Cincinnati, Ohio, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, NY, on 6 August 1955.

Gold in Austria

During one of the waning days of battle, while elements of the French First Army penetrated into the Tyrolean regions of Western Austria, a pastor presented himself at the 307th CIC office. He revealed that he had been formerly connected with the German Foreign Office and was apparently a highly trusted agent. He came to the Detachment, to tell CIC about two caches of gold bullion which the Germans had hidden in the area being overrun by the French forces. The pastor preferred that the Americans should recover the bullion rather than the French, who conceivably might discover it by accident.

Special Agent Victor de Guinzboug was called in to take charge of the recovery operation. Considerable care had to be taken to prevent arousing French suspicions when an American convoy entered their zone. Therefore, de Guinzbourg planned to have the convoy wait nearby, while he accompanied the informant to the supposed location of the gold cache.

The plan was executed as scheduled. After the entry into the French zone, de Guinzbourg and the pastor went to one of the storage points, a building which at that time was occupied by a group of French WACs. According to the Germans, the gold was stored in the cellar, under a pile of coal. The problem facing de Guinzbourg was how to get at it. The CIC agent ordered the convoy to draw up near the building. Then, assuming his most commanding appearance, de Guinzbourg entered the temporary barracks and ordered the WACs to leave. The squad of military police, who had accompanied the convoy, rushed into the building, searched the cellar, and uncovered several tons of gold. The soldiers hoisted the precious metal bars up the stairs from the cellar, out of the building, and into the waiting trucks. The operation went quickly, without a "hitch," and the convoy was out of town before any trouble could start.

This escapade was only the first phase of the gold-seeking operations. The second cache was not far from the first--also within the French zone of operations. The German pastor lead Agent de Guinzbourg to a farm house, where the two met a farmer and his wife. After telling the couple that he had come to "fetch for the Americans what the Germans had left," the pastor was shown the hiding place and Agent de Guinzbourg quickly had the bullion bars loaded onto trucks. Without further ado, the treasure-laden caravan sped back to the American zone.

The fortune in bullion was turned over the Seventh Army finance officer, once the convoy had returned, and the Americans deposited the funds in the Allied account. Almost eight tons

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of gold had been recovered as a result of the snatch operation. [133]

Legal Knowledge Needed

After the 307th CIC had been in Germany for more than two months, Major Alvie L. McDuff, the Detachment Commander, noted that the agents' operations had shown a lack of knowledge about the legal aspects of investigations. He suggested that CIC personnel be trained in the formal definitions of espionage sabotage, and treason so that adequate facts could be presented in a proper manner in the cases brought to trial. With arrest lists swelling daily, it was increasingly important that the individuals interned by CIC were rightfully detained. [134]

303rd CIC Detachment: Intelligence Center

The tremendous volume of counterintelligence work during April, motivated Third Army to establish an Intelligence Center to expedite the handling of personality and organization targets. By the close of the month, 44 officers and 316 enlisted men were on duty at this Intelligence Center.

At the beginning of the month, the Third Army Interrogators had to adopt a policy of brief questioning of suspects, primarily with the aim of extracting tactical information or establishing identity. When the Third Army Intelligence Center was set in operation, interrogations were carried out more effectively and prisoners were routed to the agencies that could best use their information. Among the branches that were included at the Intelligence Center, in addition to CIC interrogators were: a Research Section for developing counter intelligence and intelligence targets; Counter Intelligence Personality files; Enemy documents section; "T" Branch activities; Advance Censorship Detachment; and War Crimes Section with personnel furnished by the Judge Advocate General.

The small nucleus of CIC agents, working with enemy documents, personnel who staffed the Research Section, were able to utilize information for use both by lower and higher echelons. The records developed by this section afforded an accurate check for corps and division CIC units when suspects were apprehended.

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133 Interview with former Special Agent Victor de Guinzbourg, Brooklyn, New York, at the office of the Military Staff Committee, Library Building, United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY, on 8 August 1955.

134 Ibid.

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In addition, the counterintelligence personnel operating at the Third Army Intelligence Center were supplemented by fifty clerks and linguists, procured through reinforcement channels. These men were grouped into "Security Detachments" that were employed under CIC direction.

Allied Army Members Screen Displaced Persons

The Third Army Intelligence Center effectively reduced the burden that previously had been borne by corps and division CIC units in the field. This was actually the second boon that Third Army CIC had received within a month. Late in March, a special unit composed of members of the Belgian, Dutch, French, and Polish Armies, and augmented by displaced civilians, who served as interpreters, had been organized into teams for the purpose of screening Displaced Persons. Military Government assumed administrative control of these teams, while G2, operational supervisors, and CIC directed their operations.[135]

Non-Combatant Identification Credentials

The administrative shufflings that helped to centralize counterintelligence activities in Third Army, clearly aided the 303rd CIC Detachment's operations in April.

As the campaign neared a close, CIC kept wary of all possible German Intelligence Service attempts to infiltrate Allied lines. A large number of non-combatant personnel, (war correspondents, Red Cross workers, and technical observers), operating with the US forces, possessed credentials that could be utilized, if captured, by the German Intelligence Service. Several of these non-combatants were already POW, and CIC Detachments were warned to check, closely, the credentials of every person in the combat area who claimed to be a civilian. Troop commanders were informed that the best counter-measure for possible German Intelligence Service infiltration was to be especially suspicious of individuals in non-combatant categories and to refer, to CIC, any person who could not be positively identified.[136]

German Non-Commissioned Officer in Monk's Clothing

The 303rd CIC agents found that in the face of the rout of

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135 3d Army After Action Rpt, 1944-45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

136 82nd Abn Div, G2 Periodic Report No 197, Annex #1 (source, 3d Army) dtd 12 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File dtd 14 Apr 45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Department Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

German field forces, Wehrmacht members deserted in droves. These German soldiers, properly POW, hoped, by donning civilian clothes to escape internment. There seemed no limits to which the soldiers would go in attempting to disguise themselves.

An agent with the 103rd CIC Detachment, while conducting an investigation of suspected Wehrmacht members, encountered two Franciscan monks. One proved to have a valid status in the Brotherhood, the other, replete with a six day growth of beard to enhance his disguise, turned out to be a former German non-commissioned officer. [137]

As the close of hostilities neared, in May, deserters from the Wehrmacht increased to such an extent that highways were choked with individuals in uniforms, in mufti, and in combinations of civilian and military garb. CIC agents could not check all these soldiers, and strays wandered, virtually at will, through areas that had not been consolidated by Allied troops. [138]

203rd CIC Detachment: Civilian Reactions and Attitudes

Agents of the 203rd CIC found that gauging civilian attitudes in the wake of the Allied rush to victory was a difficult matter. The first reaction, from all overrun sectors, was relief that the war had now passed them and, with the exception of diehard Nazis, a "wait and see" attitude seemed to prevail.

There was a difference, however, between the reception that the troops had received in the Rhineland and the reception in central Germany. In general, the Americans were eyed coldly. In the heavily-Catholic Rhineland, people had stayed behind, waiting for the Allied occupation, despite threats of coercion. Here, in a section of Germany which had been among the first to align with the Nazi party, hostile elements had been swelled by the influx of refugees from both the eastern and western areas of Germany.

The civilians attempted no uprisings against their conquerors, but cooperation was often reluctant. Goebbel's propaganda, frequently shrugged off by civilians of the Rhineland, had taken a deeper hold in central Germany, and ever-increasing Wehrwolf threats restrained individuals who wished to cooperate with the Allies.

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137 3d Army G2 Information Bulletin #47, Annex 2, dtd 25 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 26 Apr 45, (Unclassified), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

138 3rd US Army Monthly Periodic Rpt. No 3, for May 45, dtd 25 May 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Typical was the case of an individual, screened by the Allies, and found suitable to serve as Burgermeister of Goettingen. After tentatively accepting the appointment, the man refused the office out of fear for his personal safety. CIC had proof that Wehrwolf threats had caused this change of heart.

Whether the Wehrwolf was actually effective in promoting a resitance campaign was not CIC's only concern. The organization could do vast damage by serving as a propaganda mill and creating a fear psychosis among the German civilians in occupied territory. [139]

Informants Report on the Wehrwolf

According to the report of a former administrative employee of the Gestapo, on about 15 April, high officials of the Reichssicherheits-Hauptampt, the party security organization, came from Berlin to Gestapo headquarters in Nurenberg. These officials along with local Gestapo and Schutz Staffeln leaders, were entrusted with the mission of organizing the Wehrwolf movement in Nurenberg. Their aim was to enlist Schutz Staffeln men, party officials, discharged Wehrmact members, and other Nazis in a "coming freedom movement" (Kommense Freiheitzbewegung). This organization was scheduled to materialize instantly, prepared to operate as soon as the Allies occupied an area. Its functions were dual: to terrorize Germans who were inclined to assist the Allies, and to sabotage Allied Military installations and communications lines. The group's ultimate purpose was to render Allied military government so ineffective that the Nazis could re-seize the reins of power. [140]

The plans of these fanatic Germans proved far more impressive than their deeds. On 25 April, the agents of the 203rd CIC captured Karl Volkert, a Nazi Kreisleiter, who was well aware of the resistance situation, in and around Nurnberg, and was quite willing to talk. When questioned about the Wehrwolf, Volkert suggested that the American Army had little to fear from the organization, because planning for the resistance had begun too late. Even as Kreisleiter, Volkert had been given no personnel, no workable plans, and no material for creating an effective Wehrwolf band. He summed up the Wehrwolf plans by stating that the Gauleiter had "just told us to do what we

139 78th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt No 126, 17 Apr 45, from III Corps G2 Jnl, L-623, 19 Apr 45, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Center, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

140 III Corps G2 Periodic Rpt No 137, dtd 27 Apr 45, in III Corps G2 Jnl 27 Apr 45, L-623, (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

could." Volkert did mention, however, the possibility that some "loyal" Germans, influenced by the talk of a Wehrwolf organization, might attempt to accomplish, singly, what had been planned for a group effort.

After Volkert had finished minimizing the significance of the Wehrwolf, he went on to explain that the Freikorps Adolf Hitler posed a far more serious threat to the security of the Allied armies. Twenty-three men had been requisitioned from his kreis to receive training in guerilla warfare and sabotage at a special camp. These men were to form a hard core of armed resistance.

The Kreisleiter either could not, or would not, supply CIC with information on the location of this Freikorps' hidden weapons caches, but 203rd agents gathered this information from other informants and the contraband was collected from about six munitions stores.

Portrait of a Diehard Nazi

The CIC agents who interrogated Volkert had the opportunity of learning the philosophy of a diehard Nazi. The Kreisleiter claimed that his flight, from the city of Furth to a cabin in a forest, was not an act of cowardice. He firmly believed that the war would be decided within two weeks, probably in a German victory, and that by hiding he could escape capture by the Americans. Volkert felt that if he was apprehended his fate would be public humiliation before his countrymen, followed by execution.

When he was asked about the Nazis' probable course of action, the Kreisleiter retorted that, if by some remote possibility the Americans should win the war, Hitler would take up arms and join his troops in the field where he would fight until killed. In this way, Volkert contended, the Fuehrer, like Christ, would be martyred at the hands of his enemies, and his ideas would live on eternally.

The thought of defeat had plunged Volkert into despair. He envisaged that Germany would be turned over to the Jewish people who would seek revenge. A German victory, on the other hand, would assure that Germany would be rebuilt again in ten years, through the strength of Adolf Hitler. This, then, was the state of mind of one of the Nazi minions that 203rd CIC Agents encountered during the final days of battle.[141]

CIC Agents as Gravediggers

On the afternoon of 6 May, upon the recommendation of the Military Government-appointed Oberburgermeister of Landshut, three agents of the 203rd CIC Detachment, armed with shovels

141 III Corps G2 Periodic Rpt No 135, dtd 25 Apr 45, in III Corps Opns Rpts, 25 Apr 45, L-623, (UNCLASSIFIED). (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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and pickaxes, proceeded to the local cemetery, where they had heard some items of interest were buried in a vault.

At the cemetery, the agents contacted the director who led them to the vault. Aided by two soldiers, from the 99th Infantry Division, the CIC agents pushed aside the marble cover of the tomb. They peered inside the vault and spotted seven cases, many loose bundles, and a coffin. With the aid of the director, the cases and bundles were dragged to the surface and pried open. Inside were many Wehrmacht records pertaining to the Kreis Landshut: officers' and enlisted men's personnel service records, secret honor court procedures, and other documents. Still unopened was the coffin that lay in the center of the vault.

The agents ordered the director to open the coffin, but, after bending over it several times, the man demurred, claiming that he required a gas mask since he "could not possibly stand the bad smell of the bones in this coffin." When he had asked for the gas mask a third time and started to perspire freely, one of the CIC agents became suspicious and climbed down into the vault to open the coffin himself.

The contents surprised even the agent. In the coffin were the Sturm Abteilungen uniform of a Sturmfuehrer, flags, boots, a picture of Goering, a silver bust of Hitler, books ranging from a Catholic almanac to a dogeared copy of Mein Kampf, and a photo of the cemetery director. The culprit's anxiety over opening the coffin had been justified.

The cemetery director confessed to the CIC agents that he had received the Wehrmacht files a few days prior to the entry of US troops. As for the personal items in the coffin, the director had placed them there"in order to have something to remember those times which were Germany's greatest." The CIC agents took the man back to headquarters. The report concluded with the statement that the erstwhile cemetery director "is now in an Army Internment Center trying to forget." [142]

206th CIC Detachment: Travel Control

During April, the 206th CIC Detachment made sure that strict travel control was maintained within the Corps area. In cooperation with Military Government, a uniform type of pass was created, and specimens of this single authorized pass were distributed to all individuals responsible for checking travel permits, in order that they might become familiar with it. Issuance of the passes was kept to the minimum consistent with

142 III Corps Periodic Rpt No 147, dtd 7 May 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl, L-558, 9-11 May 45 (Unclassified). (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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efficient civil administration.

The VI Corps CIC and Divisional detachments supervised the establishment of strategically placed road blocks manned by a battalion of Dutch Fusiliers. The road block guards referred all violators of travel restrictions to the nearest CIC office for interrogation. Those considered as suspects were detained for further investigation while those charged as being only travel violators were sent to local Military Government authorities for punishment. [143]

The 220th CIC Detachment: Franconia to Thuringia

The XX Corps of Third Army took part in the northeastern thrust into Thuringia.

Two members of the Gestapo and the Schutz Staffeln presented themselves at the Detachment's Headquarters at Mainz on 29 March, volunteering to act as informers to escape being arrested. Informants revealed that both had been guilty of informing and of brutalities against the Jews. CIC decided not to arrest the pair immediately, and they reaped a dividend from this postponement in the person of an Abwehr official who came in two days later and presented himself to the Detachment. After determining that these were the only three such personalities left in the Mainz area, CIC arrested them and sent them to the Third US Army Interrogation Center.

Among civilian curfew violators, there were, consistantly, some who, for one reason or another, were regarded with more suspicion than the normal offender.

Carl Hoferbert was an example. On 31 March, Hoferbert was brought to the 220th CIC Detachment office in Mainz, Germany. He gave his name as Albert Kruger and presented an incomplete document which showed no armed forces' experience. The arrestee claimed he had not been inducted into the Wehrmacht because of a stomach ailment. When CIC agents pointed out that the Mainz address which he had given was that of a building which had been reduced to rubble by bombardment, he then claimed that he had been living with a woman in Morbach, Germany. Hoferbert and a CIC agent set out for Morbach to verify this fact.

En route to Morbach, Hoferbert suddenly stated that he was a German soldier, separated from his unit, and that he had found Kruger's papers. He then gave his real name. The CIC agent, nevertheless, continued on to Morbach where the woman identified

143 XXII Corps G2 Periodic Rpt No 10, Annex No 3, "Counter-intelligence," (Source, VI Corps), dtd 8 Apr 45 in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, 9 Apr 45 (Unclassified) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

Hoferbert as Kruger. Confronted with a threat of imprisonment, the woman was broken easily and revealed that Hoferbert had made her promise to recognize him as Kruger because he was a German soldier trying to return to his unit.

Since the suspect was in civilian clothes and had tried to deceive the counterintelligence authorities, he was forwarded to Third US Army Interrogation Center as a possible agent.

A third case in Mainz involved an alleged Frenchman who claimed to be an agent of French Intelligence. He named his specific unit and his case officer. He was traveling with three others, one of whom, he said, was a Fifth Columnist wanted by the French, another the fiancee of a German agent supposedly hard at work in Paris organizing an underground ring, and the third a Displaced Person. Since Office of Strategic Services personnel could not identify the man, CIC reasoned that if the Frenchman's story were true, two dangerous persons were in his party and, if untrue, possibly four dangerous persons were involved. Keeping the Frenchman's claim of association with an Intelligence organization a secret from his three companions, CIC turned the group over to the Third US Army Interrogation Center with instructions to preserve the Frenchman's disguise until it could be substantiated or refuted; thus he would be able to follow through on his investigation if his status were verified. [144]

Herr Doktor

Within ten days, in early April, this Detachment arrested three German doctors who were examples of the corruption of ethics in the medical profession under Hitler's regime. The first operated as a political informer for the Sicherheitsdienst, using natural cover and employing a ring of twelve informants to procure information for a weekly report on the behavior of the people in Spangenberg and their willingness to follow Adolf Hitler. He was arrested on the advice of a CIC informant and, under interrogation, revealed much information about Sicherheitsdienst personalities.

A week later, a second doctor was arrested in Weimar. He was an officer of the Sturm Abteilungen, the Totenkopfverband Schutz Staffeln, and a member of the Schutz Staffeln and the German Army Medical Corps, serving as director of 21,000 inmates

144 220th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Mar 45, dtd 4 Apr 45, in 220th CIC Det Rpts, Aug 44-Oct 45, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

[redacted]

[redacted]

at Buchenwald, near Weimar. As such, he conducted experiments using human beings ("tests on guinea pigs were unreliable") as the test animals. Eighty percent of six groups of from twenty to eighty people died as a result of one series. This Nazi claimed he had given the identity documents of three dead French workers to three captured Allied agents, but, even if true, CIC did not believe that to be restitution enough for his cruelties and sent him through Provost Marshal channels as a war criminal.

The third doctor, also from Weimar, served as an indicator to CIC that many of these Nazified professionals were not repentant. CIC conducted an investigation of the doctor and of the hospital staff based on information supplied by a member of a hospital staff. This individual was afraid that the entire personnel of the hospital, including patients, would suffer if the doctor were allowed to follow certain plans he had professed. CIC found that the doctor was, as the informant had said, actively engaged in preparing an underground cell to harass the Allied occupation. Weapons had been buried in the hospital's yard and elsewhere, and the doctor himself was doing the recruiting, aided principally by his wife and one of the laboratory technicians. Some of the hospital patients were former Wehrmacht members and had expressed the desire to cooperate. CIC arrested the three principals in the organization and evacuated them to the Third US Army Interrogation Center, with the written confessions obtained by the interrogating agents of the 220th CIC Detachment.

Gestapo Men Grabbed

Preliminary and general inquiry had indicated that the Weimar Gestapo had fled. However, on the day the underground operation of the third doctor was exposed, 16 April, three Polish forced laborers brought to the CIC office a Roumanian, whom they identified as a Gestapo agent who had been brutal in his treatment of foreign workers in Germany. This chagrined the Roumanian, since he had secured from the Poles the promise that they would say he had been only an interpreter for the Gestapo, and it had been his idea for them to go to CIC.

After his compromise by the vengeful Poles, the Gestapo agent, seeking other avenues of self-preservation, informed CIC that three important Gestapo officials were still in hiding in Weimar. From this information, CIC was able to take into custody the wives of the three officials and the Kriminal Kommissar. The Kriminal Kommissar was interrogated for four hours, but refused to admit his Gestapo connections until confronted by the statements his wife had made under separate interrogation. The other two wives were threatened with arrest as hostages. Their husbands surrendered to CIC on the following day. The trio was evacuated through POW channels.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Bluffs are Tried

At the Corps Detention camp at Amberg, voluntary informant Guido Wilde, a Dutchman, told camp authorities that two of their prisoners were not German, but Dutch, and that they should be released immediately. Unfortunately, for the would-be-liberator, a member of the Dutch Intelligence organization overheard the allegation and reported it to be a complete lie. CIC then interrogated Wilde and learned that he had been a Dutch Nazi since 1941 and had worked for the Germans as a statistician in Nurnberg. A search of his person revealed detailed accounts of all American military movements in the vicinity of Amberg, and Wilde was sent to the Army Interrogation Center as an espionage suspect.

The same day a woman told two American soldiers that another woman was harboring a German soldier. The other woman promptly told the soldiers that her accuser, Johanna Simmerman, alias Janina Cieslowna, was a German spy. This looked like a grudge denunciation, but after the soldiers turned Simmerman over to CIC, the case developed into one of real counterintelligence interest.

From her interrogation CIC agents learned that shortly after the Americans had arrived in Amberg, Simmerman, a native of Poland, had been evacuated to the Sicherheitsdienst offices, in Regensburg, where she was given fifty marks and a mission. She had been working for the organization since January 1945, listening in on conversations, wherever she could, to determine who was politically reliable. She was now instructed to observe who aided the Americans, who was captured by them and who was shot. Whether she had turned her back on her Sicherheitsdienst employers in the wake of American successes or was attempting to ingratiate herself with American authorities by telling of her friend's hidden soldier is not determinable from the record.

Among Others in April

A retired Luftwaffe Lieutenant General, a proud Nazi who would not reveal his party position until CIC agents alluded to his lack of patriotism for the Reich, and two war criminals, rounded out the Detachment's key arrests for April. Each was evacuated to appropriate higher echelons. [145]

Maytime in Austria

Because of the rapidity of their advance through Bavaria

145 220th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 5 May 45, in 220th CIC Rpts Aug 44-Oct 45, (Confidential), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

[redacted]

into Austria, there were relatively few outstanding cases for the XX Corps CIC Detachment to report until the static period, after the hostilities, was officially declared ended. Before that happened, however, CIC agents with the Detachment did manage to arrest a female Schutz Staffeln agent. She was one of a group of four women sent to Regensburg on a tactical espionage mission by a Waffen Schutz Staffeln unit commanded by General Dietrich. The Detachment also apprehended four officials of the Nazi Hungarian Government who had fled from the Russians into Rhein, Germany.

CIC ended the combat phase by arresting, on 9 May, an American-born German who had spent five of his twenty-eight years in German prisons for his opposition to National Socialism. Equipped with some home-made American credentials, identifying himself as the Chief of the American Secret Service, he was confiscating equipment of Wehrmacht deserters and issuing them passes to return home, and also was removing certain German officials from public office. He had impressed three former Wehrmacht members into his service, and provided them, too, with his home-made credentials. He could give no reason for his action, and he was sent to the Army Interrogation Center. His three "aides" were evacuated as POW. [146]

208th CIC Detachment: With a Corps Under Three Armies

The VIII Corps was under the Third US Army until 22 April, when it went under First US Army which it served until 6 May when Ninth US Army became its higher headquarters. At one time, the Corps found itself with five divisions operating under it. Despite conditions which might have provoked confusion, CIC operations--inasmuch as possible under the constant geographical change--were relatively unaffected. The primary change was that horizontal liaison suffered and that the arrestees were scattered among three Army CIC Detachments and Interrogation Centers by the end of the period.

These changes in jurisdiction were the result of the Corps' direction of advance. The advance in a more northerly direction than any of the other units under Third Army, crossed the Rhine at a point between the Lahn River and the turn in the Rhine which parallels it. The Corps then veered due east, eventually widening their frontal territory and thereby making it a logical move for them to be transferred to First US Army jurisdiction since most of the Third Army was farther south.

146 220th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for May 45, dtd 1 Jun 45 in 220th CIC Det Rpts Aug 44-Oct 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25098).

[redacted]

CIC Summary of Activities

While the Corps was still under Third Army, CIC agents of the 208th CIC Detachment conducted security surveys of thirty-two towns across Germany. Each of these towns had its original population almost intact and was bolstered by scores of Displaced Persons who seemed determined to steal, loot and commit other acts of "revenge" against the populace. These Displaced Persons were the most persistent violators of Military Government regulations. They pleaded innocent, because posters, announcing the regulations, were prepared only in German and English neither of which, as a rule, they comprehended. CIC recommended that future posters be multi-lingual, including as many languages as possible.

Seven Corps Artillery observation aircraft were damaged by saboteurs, but due to the laxity of the guards at the airfield, none of the saboteurs was apprehended. A spot investigation, on the night of the incident, by members of the 208th CIC Detachment, 24-25 April, revealed no leads.

Civilians in Jena reported that they were receiving threatening letters warning them not to cooperate with the American authorities. CIC set out to find the source of the letters, after being informed that a Wehrwolf group was known to be operating in the area. CIC recorded names and addresses of ten members and arrested some of them, but no indication of an organized effort existed, and no lead to the source of the warnings was uncovered. [147]

The Detachment arrested ten Hitler Jugend members who, as Volkssturm members, had borne arms against Allied troops. In addition to the Jugend members, three other Volkssturm members who fought against the Allies, 243 Wehrmacht deserts in civilian clothes, and seventy-two automatic arrestees and security threats were apprehended. [148]

Under First Army

In the first week under First US Army, the VIII Corps Detachment noted not only that there was little or no change from previously overrun populations, but also that civil security continued to be poor due to the lack of opportunity for enforcement. The general type of major arrestees continued to be

147 208th CIC Det Weekly CI Rpt #1, dtd 29 Apr 45, in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts, Jan 45-Jun 45, (CONFIDENTIAL,) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

148 208th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt #1, for the month ending 20 Apr 45, in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts Jan 45-Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL,) (Kansas City Records Center Box 25097).

[redacted]

the same as before. It was also discovered that Wehrmacht deserters, who had reported voluntarily to Military Government often had been told to return to their homes, many without having been issued passes signed by Military Government. This complicated CIC's job of screening and classifying all males of military age.

By the end of April and the beginning of May, the corps found itself in a static situation. Traditionally, static situations permitted CIC detachments to improve the security of their areas. Now, however, the corps detachment found itself floundering around in an area 120 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide, too large an area to cover adequately.

Time became the deciding factor as to whether or not a Military Government-appointed official was investigated, records were guarded or investigated, and allegations were reported or followed up.

In spite of the huge area under its jurisdiction, the detachment managed to produce tangible evidence of its value to the armies. Documents yielding information about operations, training, and confidential funds of Abwehr, and about other organizations and personalities of counterintelligence interest were turned over to the 301st CIC Detachment. Testimony that some Kripo officials in towns under 25,000 population had missions as Gestapo agents was also passed along.

During the corps' operation under First Army, the Corps Detention Camp--largely a CIC project--handled 252 cases from corps detachment and various division detachments, including twenty-one cases involving enemy intelligence personnel. The Detention Camp functioned to process Party officials, government officials, enemy agents, the Schutz Staffeln, the Sturm Abteilungen, and the Hitler Jugend members of the Sicherheitsdienst. The camp also processed police in the automatic arrest category, and war criminals and security threats.[149]

4th CIC Detachment: Racing

The 4th CIC Detachment, under Captain Oliver D. Appleton, dealt with no special cases during April. For the greater part of the month, the agents were racing across Germany with the division, seldom working in any one town for more than twenty-four hours. First priority was given to the security of tactical troops, and second priority to the "arresting of as many individuals as possible who held high enough positions in the Nazi

149 208th CIC Det Weekly CI Rpt #2, dtd 6 May 45 in 208th CIC Det Jnl of Rpts Jan-Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25097).

[redacted]

[redacted]

regime to place them in the automatic arrest category." [150]

The touch-and-go character of investigations was shown in a typical report, the daily CIC report for 16 April, 0001 to 2400 hours:

"Location of CIC Hqs: Creglingen
Towns worked:
Rinderfeld, Streichental, Dundendorf:
Very small farming communities; inhabitants display little or no interest in politics; further CI work deemed unnecessary. Arrested two officials.
Windentierbach, Heinberg, Hachtel, Wokersfelden:
All under same administration; on recommendation of CIC, a new Burgermeister was appointed. CI situation good. Hermann BECK was reported to have mistreated American aviators. Case with names of witnesses reported to XXI Corps JAG.
Vorbachzimmern:
Burgermeister, Nazi, should be removed. Ortsgruppenleiter arrested. Nothing else of CI interest.
Neuherberg:
Small town of no CI consequence.
Ettenhausen:
Said to have less than 10 members of NSDAP. Burgermeister believed reliable. Ortsgruppenleiter arrested.
Strueth:
Population doubled by refugees; checked, apparently authentic. Burgermeister deemed reliable.
Bartenstein:
Officials and people cooperative. Priests say no dangerous persons present."

In this fashion, agents of the 4th CIC Detachment attempted to account for at least minimum security as the division pursued the routed Wehrmacht. [151]

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150 4th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt dtd 1 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

151 4th CIC Det Daily Rpt, 0001-2400 hrs 16 Apr 45, in the 4th Inf Div G2 Jnl & File. 15-19 Apr 45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

36th CIC Detachment: Covering the Rear

With the advance of the Seventh Army forces east of the Rhine, the responsibility for security in the rear of army area was given the 36th CIC Detachment. Between 29 March and 27 April, the 36th Division was not operating under a corps, but directly under Army.

The swollen size of the Army made it "particularly difficult to enforce travel restrictions," and there was comparative freedom of movement throughout the area. Through the posting of Military Government proclamations and the screening of the male population in the sector, 679 POW were apprehended between 2 April and 15 April. An attempt by one 17 year-old to organize a Wehrwolf cell was squelched. The boy was arrested as a result of information from a youthful informant who had tried unsuccessfully to join the organization. On the other side of the ledger, members of Zentraler Aktionsausschuss, an organization formed by middle-of-the-road political elements, proved very valuable as informants against high office Nazis.[152]

While under Seventh Army's direct control, the 36th CIC Detachment sent to the division POW cage ninety-four persons whose position in the Nazi party, its organizations, or the government of the Third Reich made them automatic arrestees. Twenty-five security threats were sent to the same cage, along with the Wehrwolf organizer and three travelers who had no identification.

It was not until the division came under the jurisdiction of the XXI Corps and moved into Bavaria and Austria, that the 36th CIC Detachment produced high quality results.

Between 27 April and 8 May, the Detachment arrested nineteen persons in the automatic arrest category, three security threats, and one war criminal.

German publisher Max Amann, the number three Nazi on the Party list, was arrested on 4 May at St. Quirin am Tegernsee. On the same day, the former Nazi Governor General of Poland, Dr. Hans Frank, reputed to be "No. 1 on the Russian Black List," was captured by agents of the detachment at Eischhausen am Schliersee.

On 8 May, CIC agents discovered a cache of hidden treasure, jewelry, watches, precious coins, bullion, and banknotes, in-

152 36th CIC Det Periodic CI Rpt for 15 Mar 45-15 Apr 45, dtd 15 Apr 45, in 36th XX CIC Det Periodic Rpts, 1945. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

cluding a large amount of US currency. The cache also contained the personal card of Ernst Kaltenbruner, Himmler's second in command, and a currency-filled envelope bearing the seal of the German Minstry of the Interior, Chief of Police. The wealth was turned over to the XXI Corps' Counterintelligence officer with a report of the discovery. 153

42d CIC Detachment: An Enemy Within

On 29 March, [redacted] a Military Government assistant in the town of Bruckweiler, was arrested by agents of the 42d CIC Detachment after he had aroused suspicion by his persistent attempts to gain travel permits. The arrest was made at an opportune moment because [redacted] was considered a likely appointee as mayor of the town.

What CIC discovered from [redacted] after persistent interrogation, was enough to chill the Allied officials who had selected and worked with him. During February and March, [redacted] a Polish national, had attended two sabotage and demolition schools operated by the Nazis. He was then ordered to secure a position with the Allies from which he could sabotage US Army equipment and supplies, kill American soldiers at night, and report on troop movements and insignia.

On 23 March, [redacted] had accomplished the first step in his mission. He had managed to obtain civilian clothing from a German woman, but he was unable to transmit information to his headquarters due to the restrictions on civilian travel.

On 23 April, after the confessed spy had been tried by courts martial, he was executed by firing squad. Psychological Warfare personnel prepared a poster picturing [redacted] tied to a stake and blindfolded, and stating that other spies and saboteurs would meet the same end. This poster was printed in German and given wide distribution over the Seventh Army area. 154

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153 Ibid, and 36th CIC Det Periodic CIC Rpt for 15 Apr-15 May, dtd 15 May 45 in 36th CIC Det Periodic CI Reports, 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

154 6th Army Group Monthly CI Rpt No 13, for 25 Mar 45-25 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.) also: 307th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 16 May 45 (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

NOTE: Records do not indicate why this man was tried by "courts martial" instead of "Military Commission." It may be assumed that the reason lay in the fact that he was a U.S. Military Government "employee."

[redacted]

[redacted]

44th CIC Detachment; Overrunning the Fleeing

The thousands of Nazis who had sought refuge in the heart of Germany from the fast moving Allied forces, discovered that as far as their safety was concerned, they had taken a "flight to nowhere." Agents of the 44th CIC Detachment screened numerous refugees during April and ferreted out wanted individuals from all parts of Germany.

However the divisional detachment could not do a thorough job; their task was too large, their personnel too small, and their time too limited. All possible measures were taken to prevent enemy access to Allied military information. Due to the enemy's decreased area of operations, opportunities for espionage were substantially reduced. At the same time, the fluid situation and the enemy's presence behind Allied lines increased the likelihood of sabotage.

CIC agents confiscated and destroyed all wireless transmitting sets and other sending equipment that they encountered, in addition to suspending all means of civilian communication. These measures, coupled with the apprehension of the automatic arrestees who readily could be found, were 44th CIC's major contributions to the security of the division in April.[155]

Detachment Commander Murdered

On 17 April, slightly more than three weeks before V-E Day, the bodies of Captain Peter M. Cummins, Jr., 44th CIC Detachment Commander, and Major Bennet, Division G5, were discovered in the woods near Eherbach. The two men apparently had been murdered.

At the time, the 44th Infantry Division was moving diagonally across the area of the 63rd Division to go into action on line. The killings were reported to agents of the 63rd CIC Detachment. First reports received from a 44th Division Military Government officer indicated that the two men had been severely beaten and tortured before being shot to death, but subsequent medical reports from the Division failed to support this story.

The 63rd CIC Detachment, supplemented by three agents of the 307th CIC, instituted an immediate investigation. The first measure was accomplished by an order from the G3, 63rd Division, for the immediate clearing of the forest area.

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155 44th CIC Det Historical Rpt for month of Apr 45, in Army Opns Rpts 207.03 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Prisoners caught in this woodland dragnet were turned over to the CIC Agents. Within a few hours of the roundup, the CIC men had pieced together the whole story from the interrogations of two captured German soldiers.

A small German battalion, of approximately 130 men, commanded by a Captain Schwaben, had been passed by the onrushing American troops in the forested area around Eherbach. The mission of this intentionally stranded unit was to harrass Allied supply lines in the rear. On the evening of 16 April, the German soldiers at one of the battalion's outposts spotted Captain Cummins and Major Bennet travelling along a road through the forest and opened fire. The two officers, who apparently had lost their way, were caught completely unaware and, in the exchange of fire, Major Bennet was killed. Captain Cummins, slightly wounded in the encounter, was taken prisoner and led before the battalion commander.

The German officer wasted no time. He ordered the American transported to the scene of the fighting and shot. After the murder was accomplished, German soldiers dragged the bodies of the two men about fifty yards from their vehicle, and removed the men's credentials, papers, and boots.

The CIC interrogators did not cease their questioning of the German prisoners until they had learned the names and descriptions of the officers and men responsible for the killing. This data was provided all POW cages, and the windup of the case was left to Seventh Army CIC when the 63rd Division moved on.[156]

45th CIC Detachment: On the Offensive

The 45th Infantry Division was one of the few which operated under the same Corps, the XV Corps, throughout the whole period of the final offensive. The Division attacked across the Rhine toward the Main and Tauber Rivers. Automatic arrestees, security threats, war criminals, POW, and accused snipers comprised the bulk of arrests made during this period. Two German diplomats were sent rearward to the Seventh Army G2 for special counter-intelligence use. Early in the period almost all arrestees were sent back to Corps or Army CIC, but as the campaign progressed,

156 63d Inf Div, Unit History of G2 Sect, CIC, from 1 Apr to 30 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

the least dangerous ones were sent through POW channels directly to internment.[157]

Bensheim Gestapo Case

On 28 March, Agents Willard A. Schutt and Albert Schiff of the 45th CIC Detachment, while checking a report of an atrocity perpetrated against two Allied airmen in November 1944, opened up another atrocity case. This case was to be closed several times during the following month, only to be reopened each time as new information cropped up in various cities. The Bensheim (Hesse) Gestapo office was the focus of the investigation, but the investigation itself was carried out in an area more than 150 miles long.

The mayor of Westhofen on the Rhine and one of the town's inhabitants were the guilty parties in the case involving the two Allied airmen. That case, at the time, seemed to be an isolated incident. The mayor had fled, but his accomplice was captured and turned over to the Worms Allied Military Government office, along with statements by persons who witnessed the atrocity.[158]

At the same time, another atrocity report was being investigated by other agents of the detachment at Bensheim on the east side of the Rhine. A man appeared at the CIC office with information that he had witnessed the escape of a Gestapo agent. Unfortunately, for the "witness," CIC agents subjected him to a lengthly interrogation, during which he explained that he knew the escapee was a Gestapo agent, because another man had pointed him out as such. However, when interviewed by Agent Herman W. Kristeller, the man, who allegedly had pointed out the Gestapo agent, suggested that the "witness" may have helped the agent escape. When other information, obtained locally, indicated that the "witness" probably was himself a Gestapo agent, he was sent rearward to the division cage along with a Frenchman who claimed, without substantiating evidence, that he had been beaten by the Gestapo in Bensheim a week previously.[159]

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157 45th CIC Det CI Periodic Rpts for 13 Mar-13 Apr, dtd 13 Apr 45, and for 14 Apr-14 May, dtd 14 May 45 in 45th CIC Det File 30, Aug 43-May 44 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

158 45th CIC Det, ltr to 45th Div G2, subj, "Krohler, William," dtd 28 Mar 45 in 45th CIC Det File 31, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center,Box 45121)

159 45th CIC Det, ltr to 45th Div G2, Subj,"Krisaneck, Johann," in 45th CIC Det FILE 31, Nov 44- Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL,) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Agent Walter Wimer interviewed a Polish janitor-handyman who had worked at the Gestapo Headquarters. In the course of the same investigation, Alfredo Parisi, attached to the detachment by the division, apprehended a woman who allegedly only had been an interpreter for the Gestapo.

The janitor gave information which increased the probability that the woman was more than just an interpreter, and he also gave details of an atrocity which had occured on 24 March 1945 at the headquarters. Nine men and three women from a nearby prison had been tortured and killed, as had four American soldiers. The janitor, personally, knew of only two murders. He had seen two of the Americans interrogated and then marched down a stairway. The janitor heard three shots while the group was on the stairs, and immediately thereafter saw the bodies of two American soldiers being buried in the garden of Gestapo Headquarters. Gestapo men trampled on the earth, attempting to hide evidence of the grave. The janitor led CIC agents and the detachment commander to the graves, where the body of an American serviceman was exhumed. Official Army and personal documents identified the American. [160]

Later the second body was uncovered. The remains, personal effects, photographs of the wounds, and boots found at the Gestapo Headquarters were turned over to Special Agent Peter J. Badilya of the XV Corps CIC Detachment. [161]

During initial interrogation, the woman interpreter had identified by full or partial names, function, and description--49 persons who had been employed by the Gestapo in Bensheim. However, she claimed to have no knowledge of any interrogation of Allied servicemen. [162]

The Polish janitor-handyman named and described 51 personalities of the Bensheim Gestapo office, including six secretaries, and identified by name, title, and description, the

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160 45th CIC Det, Memo to 45th Div G2, Subj, "Bensheim, Germany, Gestapo Case," dtd 28 Mar 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

161 45th CIC Det, receipt, dtd 29 Mar 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

162 45th CIC Det, ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 29 Mar 45, subj,"Boe Marie Therese Genevieve," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

two men who had murdered the Americans. He also told how he had sabotaged one of the Gestapo's getaway cars and had purposely failed to put two suitcases belonging to one of the Gestapo chiefs in another car. Instead, he dropped them on the street and fled. [163]

Agents Arnold Vyth and Herman Kristeller interrogated the first of the secretaries, arrested on information furnished by the janitor. The 21 year old girl had worked for the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst for four years.

The CIC agents secured from her, not only a list of fifty personalities of the Bensheim Gestapo office, but also were given an accurate breakdown of departments and functions. She also gave information concerning methods of operation of the Gestapo at this office, possible German Gestapo counterintelligence agents hiding in the vicinity, and destinations of those Gestapo personnel who had fled prior to the American entry. The young woman explained that all key Gestapo people had received cover identification in non-automatic arrestee units of the German armed forces. Their names and birthdates remained the same on the new identification. [164]

A second secretary, interviewed by the two agents, revealed substantially, the same information about personalities already mentioned by the previous three interrogatees. She pointed out, however, that the woman interpreter had been a long term employee of the Gestapo and was, if nothing else a traitor to France. She also knew that one of the Americans had been interrogated by the Gestapo, and she also had been told by the Polish janitor of the murder of two American prisoners. [165]

A third secretary was interviewed by Agent Vyth. She also named key Gestapo figures. She had been in the Bensheim office

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163 45th CIC Det, Memo to 45th Div G2, subj, "Bensheim, Germany, Gestapo Case:" dtd 28 Mar 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL)(Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121); and 45th CIC Det Ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 29 Mar 45, subj, "Bensheim, Germany Gestapo Case," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

164 45th CIC Det, ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 28 Mar 45, subj, "Leonard, Erna," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

165 45th CIC Det, ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 29 Mar 45, subj, "Franziska Meier, Employee of the Gestapo," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

only a short time before it fell to the Americans and could not give much information about its operation. She did remember, however, seeing one American leave the office with the two Gestapo men the janitor had identified as the criminals and she remembered that the two Gestapo men returned shortly afterward without the prisoner. [166]

Agent Kristeller interviewed a fourth secretary. She was in an administrative position and "too busy to pay attention to anything but her own work." She gave little information, except for the single fact that there were 60 officials and employees in the Bensheim office. [167]

Because the divisional detachment had to move on with its parent organization the whole case was turned over to the 215th Detachment. The 45th CIC Detachment had developed, however, very complete information, all from "little people," as Captain Guenther pointed out in the periodic report. [168]

If, with the transfer of information, arrestees, and informants to the XV Corps CIC, the 45th CIC Detachment felt they would be through with the Bensheim case, they later discovered they were mistaken. It had only been temporarily interrupted.

Now information regarding the Bensheim Gestapo atrocity case was developed in the former Gestapo Headquarters at Grossumstadt on 1 April. CIC agents Fausto E. Molinet, Schiff, and Herman Kristeller found and forwarded to the 45th Division AC of S G2, two steel helmets containing liners marked with the serial numbers of the murdered soldiers. Fingerprint records of the murdered men were sent along, too. These had been provided by the Graves Registration group which had been given the bodies. [169]

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166 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 29 Mar 45, subj, "Gantmer, Elizabeth Ann," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-Mar 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

167 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 29 Mar 45, subj, "Eleanor Metzger, secretary of Gestapo," in 45th CIC Det File, Nov 44-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

168 45th CIC Det CI Periodic Rpts for 13 Mar-13 Apr, dtd 13 Apr 45 and for 14 Apr - 14 May, dtd 14 May 45, in 45th CIC Det File 30 Aug 43-May 44 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

169 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 1 Apr 45, subj, "American Equipment Found on Gestapo Headquarters at Grossumstadt," in 45th CIC Det File Apr-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

On 2 April, the same agents discovered a number of photographic plates. They believed that these were to be photographs of Gestapo agents and personnel from the Bensheim Gestapo office, so they sent the plates to the Seventh Army CIC Detachment, which had taken over the case. Once again the 45th CIC wrote "finis" to the Bensheim Gestapo case, and once again they were premature in doing so. [170]

Four Guards from Bensheim

On 14 April, four Estonions, who had served as guards for the Sicherheitsdienst and the Sicherheitspolizei in Bensheim, surrendered to American troops in Bamberg. Once again the 45th CIC opened the Bensheim Gestapo file. The guards had made their way, on foot, from Bensheim to Grossumstadt to Bamberg. One, who had been in Bensheim on the night of the atrocity, was vague about how much of the incident he had noticed, saying only that he saw two Americans and heard shots. He claimed not to have witnessed the actual execution or the burial. Agents Henry J. Fronauer and Herman W. Kristeller conducted the interrogations of the Estonians. [171] Once more the file was closed.

Then, after almost two weeks of relative obscurity, the Bensheim Gestapo case was news again. A civilian travelling through the woods at Ammerfeld was picked up by elements of the 45th Infantry Division after a firefight between the Americans and some German infantrymen. He was sent through the regimental POW cage to the divisional cage, where he identified himself, during interrogation, as Heinrich Lenz, and claimed he was searching for his wife. He had none of the usual documents on his person, but the three he carried were of recent vintage. A body search revealed a tatooed "A" on his left armpit. He admitted then that he had been a member of the Schutzpolizei, but claimed that he had deserted and used an alias to avoid capture by German police. A review of the files of the Bensheim Gestapo office identified the man as Heinrich Lacks, a member of the Bensheim Gestapo. When confronted with the evidence, he became

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170 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 2 Apr 45, subj, "Photographic Plates Found in Gestapo Headquarters at Grossumstadt," in 45th CIC Det File Apr-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

171 45th CIC Det, ltrs to G2 45th Div, subjs, "Kirsimaie, Juhan, an SD guard captured at Bamberg;" "Metsharrg, Eduard, an SD Guard;" "Remmel, Leonhard, etc"; "Rannamets, Elmar, etc"; in 45th CIC Det File, Apr-May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

[redacted]

very cooperative, naming persons and organizations, describing how members of the Bensheim Gestapo were travelling, and even revealing the destinations of some. He gave information about the establishment of a passive, information-gathering group, known as Bundshuh, and cited which towns were to be its communication centers. He mentioned nothing of the atrocity in which the two Americans had been murdered, but he gave information which indicated that one of the four Estonian guards, already in custody, had murdered a woman who had been entrusted to his care.

Based on the information given by the captured Gestapo counterintelligence operative, the detachment alerted the XV Corps CIC and, with trucks, combed the division area. In addition to a member of the Gestapo from Nurnberg, the detachment managed to apprehend two more of the Bensheim group. [172]

These two were a team with a definite mission for Bundshuh. One was identified, from the Bensheim files, as a person with a reputation for brutality. Agents told him they knew of his methods and informed him he might expect similar treatment if he did not cooperate. After that threat, he became very talkative. He corroborated the Polish janitor's accusation of two specific individuals in connection with the atrocity. He cited Lacks as one of two members of Bundshuh whose role was to eliminate people who were not carrying out their orders. He disclosed the complete organization of Bundshuh, named rendezvous points, gave passwords and countersigns, described the mission of his team, and named a number of Gestapo personnel of various offices. [173]

The teammate also proved a willing confessor of other people's sins. He stated that one group of eight Bundshuh members had active sabotage missions. He, too, revealed rendezvous points, passwords, personalities, and organized data. [174]

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172 45th CIC Det, ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 27 Apr 45, subj, "Lacks, Heinrich, member of Gestapo, Bensheim," in 45th CIC Det File, Apr-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

173 45th CIC Det, ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 27 Apr, subj, "Frischbier, Karl, Kriminalsekretar, Gestapo, Bensheim, Germany," in 45th CIC Det File, Apr-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

174 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 27 Apr 45, subj, "Gotz, Heinrich, Gestapo Agent," in 45th CI Det File, Apr-May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

[redacted]

The interrogating CIC agents felt that, despite the avid cooperative spirit exhibited by the three captives, they should be reinterrogated at XV Corps CIC--in case some information "may have slipped the subject's mind." [175] On this note, the Bensheim case closed.

CIC With the Division's Advance

All the various facets of the Bensheim investigation were accomplished while the 45th CIC Detachment was on the run with the division. The division had remained on the attack until the end of the war, cutting a semi-circular path from Worms into Bavaria, and thence through the German cities of Aschaffenberg, Nurnberg, Munich and hundreds of small towns and villages. The Detachment made arrests in thirty-one of these towns. Most of these were routine arrests of persons in automatic arrest categories, but a few were of more than routine interest. [176]

On 4 April, Dr. George Schaller, who had served as vice-consul in various countries when the seeds of Naziism initially were being planted preceding each country's conquest, was arrested in Marnes. He was interrogated by Agent J. H. Birsner before being turned over the division G2 for special counter-intelligence exploitation. [177]

On 12 April, Agent Molinet heard the Hitler Jugend anthem coming from a home in Konigshofen. The residence belonged to a German police lieutenant and a subsequent search produced papers which apparently had come from the Luftwaffe High Command. Interrogation of the policeman"s wife revealed that she had made technical drawings of an antiaircraft missile,based on the V-2 principle, which incorporated a timing device, enabling it to explode at any desired altitude. Agent Molinet recommended haste and tact in following up on his interview.

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175 Loc. cit., Ltrs dated 27 Apr

176 45th CIC Det CI Periodic Rpts for 13 Mar-13 Apr, dtd 13 Apr 45, and for 14 Apr-14 May, dtd 14 May 45 in the 45th CIC Det File 30, Aug 42-May 44 (CONFIDENTIAL), Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

177 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 4 Apr 45, subj, "Dr. George Schaller," in 45th CIC Det File Apr 45-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121)

[redacted]

He did not arrest the woman, but he notified higher authorities of her existence. [178]

In Nurnberg

As Captain Guenther explained in the Detachment's Monthly Information Report for April, the 45th CIC never, during their entire campaign in Germany, had been supplied with T-Force-type target information by higher echelons. In preparing for the fall of German cities to the 45th Infantry Division, the Detachment organized its own target sheets by culling information from general documents. However, the Detachment was supplied with complete target information, well in advance of the actual seizure of Nurnberg.[179]

Fortunately, the Detachment had additional target information. Agent Leonid Ruminoff had interrogated a girl who had worked in the Intelligence office of the Headquarters of the Wehrkreise Military District. She provided information about personnel and physical targets in Nurnberg, including where some of the personnel and target offices had moved, how many had been destroyed, and which ones were believed to be inoperative.[180]

The Target Sheets and Personnel

Each target sheet gave the name, location, a brief description, source of information, and the priority rating of each target. The majority of the target locations were plotted on town plans. The operational plan for the Nurnberg Target Force called for targets to be raided and quickly searched by CIC. Guards were then to be posted in the more cruicial areas.

To accomplish this, a Target Force was formed from the following: the 45th CIC Detachment and a supplement of 20 CIC agents and Military Intelligence Interpreter personnel from the XV Corps and Seventh Army; an engineer battalion to serve

178 45th CIC Det ltr to G2 45th Div, dtd 12 Apr 45, subj, "Schmitt, Hannelore," in 45th CIC Det File Apr-May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED),(Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

179 45th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 30 Apr 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Aug 43-May 44, (sic) (UNCLASSIFIED),(Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

180 45th CIC Det Rpt to G2, dtd 18 Apr 45, subj, "Interrogation of Gronn, Ottilie," in 45th CIC Det File Apr-May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

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as guards; and five Military Government officers from the division with a Military Government Detachment and a field artillery battalion (for additional security guards). Personnel from the three component groups established a central headquarters for the operation.

A company of engineers was sent to each of the three infantry regiments, to move in with forward elements and, as each target was cleared of opposing troops, to post "off-limits" signs, establish a guard system, and notify Target Force Headquarters. Targets which had been moved or destroyed were also reported.

CIC teams were to inspect each target and evaluate the contents to make recommendations for increasing, decreasing, or removing the guard system entirely. It was impossible for CIC to cover the targets as quickly as they were cleared, but the placement of the guards secured them from belated attempts at destruction by the enemy.

Liaison was established between each engineer company and its regiment, and radio communication with the battalion, Target Force Headquarters, and division headquarters was maintained. The S2 and the S3 of the engineers, the engineer companies and Target Force Headquarters kept situation maps during the reduction process.

Record of Activities

Continuous account of the uncovering of targets, their inspection, guard provisions, condition of targets, and decisions reached by all coordinating officials of the Target Headquarters and the division G2 was kept in a journal which was turned over to the relieving force when the division moved out of Nurnberg. A copy of the journal was also attached to the Detachment's Monthly Information Report.

Brief Look at the Operation

From the journal, it is possible to get a complete picture of the operation of the Target Force personnel in Nurnberg. For the 100-hour period that the force operated in that city, 161 entries were made in the journal. Excerpts from these entries give an indication of the scope of work performed.

According to the first entry, at 1130 hours on 17 April, two days before the Force actually became established in Nurnberg, Agent Ernest J. Gearheart, one engineer officer, and a squad of men answered a call from the 180th Infantry Regiment concerning a German POW compound which housed 13,000 Allied Prisoners of War. On the same day, Agent Francisco S. Quaranta and French

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Lieutenant Schmutz checked civil guards at an "electric factory" and two ammunition dumps. Captain Guenther and an unidentified warrant officer took part in a tactical battle against some Germans, believed to be Schutz Staffeln men. Agents Albert Schiff and Frederich J. White located a suitable command post for Target Force Headquarters. By nightfall, arrests were beginning to be made. One informant told of a Wehrwolf organization, and Agents Willard A. Schutt and Henry J. Fronauer went out to arrest the organizer. Security risks were promptly interned. German soldiers in civilian clothes were found everywhere.

Agents Thomas and White, on their way to pick up an automatic arrestee, were informed at Hersbruck that the town for which they were heading was in German hands. They collected tactical information about the situation ahead and forwarded it to Target Force Headquarters, along with a report of initial security measures they had instigated in Hersbruck. In addition to the normal arms collection, curfew, travel restrictions, and communications disconnection, the two Agents arrested an official of Organization Todt and indicated the existence of a war crimes' situation in the town. Agent Schiff was performing all interrogations as the day ended. Most of this work had been performed in suburban areas.

On 18 April, Nurnberg, itself, had not yet been entered. Loose ends were picked up. Information from Hersbruck had been passed on to the XV Corps War Crimes by the division's G2. Army CIC Teams were scheduled to arrive at 1330 hours, and Corps teams had already been placed on duty at the POW cage and at the division command post. A depot of Red Cross supplies was uncovered at 1450, and German police guards were arrested, de-uniformed, and released by American troops. Engineer-guards were placed on the depot, and Military Government was notified. The city had been reached.

Captain Guenther and a Major Bishop surveyed roads in the area with an eye toward setting up truck patrols to pick up circulating civilians. A displaced persons center site had been selected, and agents were beginning their inspection of numbered targets.

At 1620 hours, 1,000 people were found in a German displaced persons camp, and three CIC agents went to investigate the forced laborers.

Ten minutes after Agent Herman W. Kristeller learned from a Frenchman of the existence of two Nazis nearby, he had arrested them and returned to Target Force Headquarters with them.

At 1730 hours an undestroyed heavy equipment factory had

been inspected and "off-limits" signs posted. An old night watchman was allowed to remain on duty. Ten minutes later, the Nurnberg Chief of Police was arrested by the 179th POW Interrogation Team. Several railroad cars, filled with heavy equipment, were found at a target site, and, since it was decided that the equipment could not be sabotaged or looted, guards were deemed unnecessary.

At 1805 hours, Agents Schutt and Leonid Ruminoff reported that they had searched several targets, finding in one office a document which showed the new location of Party Headquarters. The Nazis had been bombed out of their old quarters. Captain Guenther and Captain Coniff of the engineers announced completion of their plans for a displaced person center requiring 24 guards for 24 hour duty on four posts, plus two noncommissioned officers. However, the Military Government Officer, Major Campbell, claimed that it was unfeasible to use that much manpower, and suggested instead, "coaxing methods to get displaced persons off the road and into the camp, plus reliable Displaced Person guards." The journal does not describe what "coaxing methods" were appropriate, or whether Major Campbell had been specific in his suggestion.

Captain Guenther and Agent Schiff, in the meantime, had returned the city's chief of police to the detachment, along with 11 of his policemen. The policemen were to act as guides for the engineer-guards in Nurnberg.

On 19 April, Agents White and Gordon B. MacPherson, located, in Lauf, a ceramics plant which made high frequency radio parts. They removed a tube from a radio transmitter in the laboratory, and detained two officials of the plant for interrogation. One was a Volkasturm Captain and a "probable Sicherheitsdienst informant." Signal Intelligence, upon being notified of the find, scheduled an inspection.

At 1000 hours, Major Campbell located a numbered target and, finding it almost completely destroyed, left one squad of engineer-guards to protect it.

More targets, (i.e. post offices, factories, canal bridges, and official offices of the local and national party and government) as well as an increasing number of arrestees, were uncovered by the Target Force personnel as the day went on. Road patrols picked up five travel violators, two of whom were POW. The other three were punished by Major Campbell, who "put them in a room in Fishback for two days, without food, under the supervision of the Mayor." Captain Coniff reported at 1900 that he had secured Schutz Staffeln headquarters. One-half hour later a report came in that jet airplane engines and radio parts were on railroad cars in the city marshalling yards. CIC

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Agents Schutt and Molinet were sent to inspect the target. At 1930 on 19 April, Target Force Headquarters moved into Nurnberg proper. In the marshalling yards, the agents found the jet engines in good condition. Other cars in loading areas were on fire, however, and some were filled with explosives and incendiaries. The agents reported that this was a security hazard in itself, especially at night. The news was passed up through intelligence channels. At 2150 hours, some of the cars began to explode in the loading areas.

Agent Gearhart's group reported on nine scheduled targets and one target of opportunity they had covered, but nothing of much importance had been developed. A POW Interpreter Team sent in word that the local party leader had an estate near Cadolzburg.

The work in Nurnberg continued at a swift pace on 20 April. Secondary targets, which had not been handled in the initial phase, were scheduled for consideration, the order being "to hit as many...as possible."

At 1515 hours, four men, claiming to be undercover Allied intelligence operatives, were sent to the Military Government office in Lauf where an Office of Strategic Services representative was to pick them up.

The rudiments of inspection and the guarding of targets continued to be the primary aim of the Target Force for the remainder of the time in Nurnberg. Records which seemed important were often transferred to Target Force Headquarters, but less crucial documents merely were kept under guard. Personnel targets were immediately placed in proper channels.

The final journal entry was made at 1500 hours on 21 April. Presumably, at the time, the division had moved through Nurnberg and continued on the offensive. The information gathered by members of the Target Force was turned over to the receiving organization for further exploitation. [181]

Into Munich

The 45th Infantry Division entered the last phase of its operation in its march to Munich, breeding place of the early Hitler movement. In this key city, too, the 45th CIC Detach-

181 45th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 30 Apr 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Aug 43-May 44, (sic), (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

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[redacted]

ment was able to control, satisfactorily, the civilian population, except for disorders provoked by non-enemy nationals upon their release. Since they entered a stable period after the fall of Munich, the agents of the Detachment also were able to delve more deeply into counterintelligence matters.

The day after Munich was cleared of enemy forces, a Security Control Branch, consisting of a field grade officer from the G2 Section of the 45th Infantry Division Headquarters and a special agent from the 45th CIC Detachment, began operations. Immediately, transportation and communication facilities were frozen. Civilian circulation between towns was forbidden, road blocks were placed on the main routes, and curfews were published and enforced. Mass arrests of violators on the first few nights, resulted in the civilian population being more compliant with the curfew laws.

The 45th CIC Detachment set up an interrogation center in the middle of the city and received and screened individuals sent in from regimental check points. A team of CIC agents from the 307th CIC Detachment "hit" many dangerous personality targets quickly, thereby reducing the possibilities of organized guerilla efforts. Mobile columns of riot troops from the infantry were available for momentary dispatch by radio to threatened communities. Vulnerable industrial and commercial installations were guarded by the field troops to prevent looting. German prison camps were guarded too, to retain the inmates for processing. Liaison was maintained with the military police and the Security Branch of Military Government. [182]

63rd CIC Detachment: Scratching the Surface

Like other units of the Seventh Army, the 63rd Infantry Division pushed forward at full speed in April, crossing the Danube and driving within reach of the Swiss border before being relieved by the 36th Division.

Agents of the 63rd CIC Detachment operating with the Division's regiments found that they had barely enough time to scratch the surface in any town for counterintelligence coverage before the order to advance was given. Several mayors and police officials were screened for Military Government, and considerable time was also spent in checking the steady stream of German

182 45th Inf Div, G2 Section, Counterintelligence Periodic Rpt for 14 Apr-14 May, dtd 14 May 45, in 45th CIC Det File, Apr-May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 45121).

[redacted]

soldiers (in civilian clothes) that spilled across Allied lines. A Seventh Army TWX, stating that Wehrmacht deserters should not be apprehended unless either they belonged to the Schutz Staffeln or constituted a security threat, eased the CIC teams' work somewhat, late in April.

Among the important investigations carried out by the 63rd CIC agents towards the campaign's end, was the determination of the murderers of the commanding officer of the 44th CIC Detachment.[183]

CIC agents reported that the Military Government was seriously negligent in its handling of weapons confiscated in occupied Germany. In several instances, the weapons turned in by civilians, upon order of Military Government, were collected and placed in the local town hall, without any measures of safeguarding them.

A similar failing was noted in the storing of German military weapons, ammunition, and hand grenades. Shacks and other buildings, easily within access of the Germans, provided convenient, but obviously insecure, storehouses. CIC recommended that action be taken, at once, to correct this practice.[184]

70th CIC Detachment: Destroying Sabotage Cells

During April, the 70th Division was engaged in mop-up operations and the protection of Third Army communication lines east and west of the Rhine. The more or less static situation gave agents of the 70th CIC Detachment an opportunity for careful investigative work within the Division area. The agents met the challenge by breaking up a major sabotage organization that had affiliates throughout Allied occupied regions.

Interrogation of a Schutz Staffeln member, who had been arrested in Bad Krueznach, started CIC on the trail of six sabotage cell organizations. Between 17 and 21 April, the Detachment arrested 16 individuals who confessed that they were saboteurs with the mission of destroying Allied material. All the arrestees were members of a group, subdivided into local cells, consisting of a few trained men and supplied with food and sabotage equipment.

From the confessions of these individuals, 70th CIC Detachment was able to furnish higher headquarters with information and undeveloped leads about eleven related sabotage units in

183 cf., 44th CIC Detachment, this Section.
184 63d Inf Div, Unit History of G2 Section, CIC, 1 Apr 45-30 Apr 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

[redacted]

the Moselle region but outside the Detachment's jurisdiction.

In a separate investigation early in April, members of the 70th CIC Detachment discovered a saboteurs' hideout at the bottom of a mineshaft, 300 meters underground. Two of the saboteurs were killed as they attempted to break for safety. A third member of the cell was apprehended and provided CIC with additional leads on saboteurs still at large.[185]

71st CIC Detachment: Female Wehrwolf Organizer

Agents of the 71st CIC Detachment discovered, in the town of Hessburg, that individuals in Germany who wanted to resist the Allied occupation were not all males. Elizabeth Stolle, apprehended on 12 April, admitted having been swayed by Wehrwolf radio propaganda. She had contacted at least a dozen families in Hessburg with the intention of organizing a Wehrwolf band, its slogan to be, "To destroy the enemy wherever we find him after he has entered Germany."

The time limitations that hampered the work of other CIC Detachments during April, also limited the activites of the 71st CIC Detachment. On occasion, the advance of the division was so rapid that the lists of targets received from Corps CIC dealt with towns and locations that had already been passed.[186]

The 87th CIC Detachment: The Long Thrust

The 87th Infantry Division remained a part of the VIII Corps throughout the final campaign. On 22 April, the VIII Corps passed from the control of the Third to the First US Army.

The Division moved from the Rhine, in the vicinity of Koblenz, into Czechloslovakia. By 29 April, their CIC Detachment, under First Lieutenant Sam E. Harwell, had turned over town plans and arrest reports covering 204 German and Czechoslavakian communities.[187]

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185 70th Inf Div, Master, G2 Opns Rpt, Feb-May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

186 71st CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 30 Apr 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

187 87th CIC Det, ltrs to CO, 208th CIC Det, HQ, VIII Corps, dtd 31 Mar, 19 Apr and 29 Apr 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Sep 44-Jun 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

[redacted]

In the Division's advance through the state of Thuringen, generally conceded to be the hotbed of Nazi fanaticism, it was found that the Detachment's fears that the population would become increasingly hostile were baseless; instead the population's reaction was "passively unfriendly." The most serious security problem came from civilian forced laborers, who, considering the arrival of American troops to be synonomous with "liberation,' departed by the thousands in all directions. Mixed in with them were German soldiers, war criminals, high party officials, and others who had chosen cover as displaced persons to lose their punishable pasts. Control was Military Government's responsibility, but to CIC fell the task of weeding out the false displaced persons.[188]

Summary of Events

The 87th CIC Detachment maintained rather complete Daily Activities reports, noting disposition of personnel and the work performed by different teams of the Detachment. Some of the highlights form the basis for the following narrative of the Detachment's activities.

The first area, east of the Rhine, worked by the 87th CIC Detachment was a wooded area south of the intersection of the Lahr and the Rhine Rivers. On 26 March, tactical equipment was picked up by a headquarters CIC team on a mountain-top which had served, until a few hours before, as an observation post for six German soldiers. The mountain also housed the ruins of a medieval Teutonic castle, called Dragonfels.

Detachment activities, for the first few days, consisted mostly of security checking of towns, arrests of Volkssturm members as POW, apprehension of displaced persons, and the reporting of security violations. On 29 March, near Balvenstein, they examined Castle Shaumberg, which the Germans had used as a library for naval text books and fiction which was sent to German naval personnel on active duty. Several crates of books and a small quantity of arms and ammunition were impounded by the agents, but no records or data of counterintelligence value were found.

On 31 March, Special Agents Edmund St. Strul and Frank B. Arnold, with interpreter Kurt Reineke, arrested the director of an underground aircraft parts factory. A search of the factory was made, and Army Air Force and Tactical Air Command Intelligence officers were notified.

188 87th CIC Det Summary of CI Activities, 13 Dec 44-30 May 45, in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Folder of Bi-Weekly Rpts, Sept 44-Jun 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

[redacted]

On 1 April, as a result of information forwarded by one of the regimental CIC teams who had interrogated informants about tactical information; three US tanks and accompanying infantrymen captured 200 German soldiers in the woods near Langgons.

For the next ten days all efforts were directed to clearing non-Nazi Burgermeisters, investigating rumors, following up statements of informants, and similar routine activities. On 11 March, however, an informant developed by one of the regimental CIC teams lead headquarters CIC personnel to 11 metal-lined, waterproofed boxes in which were considerable stores of food and ammunition, ostensibly earmarked for use by Wehrwolf personnel.

On the following day a woman accused a friend of burying food and ammunition. Her friend, seemingly perplexed, told CIC agents that the informant originally had directed her to purchase the material. Investigation revealed that the original informant was a purposeful prostitute and that her friend was an Ortsgruppenleiter. The Ortsgruppenleiter was immediately arrested.

The prostitute eventually made it known that her own occupation had two sides to it; she was also an agent for the Communist party in Germany. Her modus operandi was quite basic. She "lured" men to her apartment, drugged them, and then searched their clothing for documents or papers. The detachment did not consider this woman to be "a security threat at the present time," but the CIC agents suggested that she be kept under observation, and they filed a report with higher headquarters.

On 13 April, a headquarters CIC team investigaged a Machine Records Unit of the German Navy, located in a roadside Tavern on the way to Rudolstadt. The pay records of 80,000 naval employees and servicemen were kept by the unit, but all secret records had been burned two weeks before the Americans arrived. The personnel and equipment of the office were placed under guard by Military Government; and the director was made personally responsible for the maintenance of remaining records and the behavior of his personnel.

Three days later CIC was handed a civilian by division troops. Interrogator Bamberger learned that the man, Walter Schubert, was an Oberstrumfuhrer in the Waffen Schutz Staffeln and an employee in Department II of the Reichssicherheitshauptant. Threatened with internment in a Russian Prison Camp, the arrestee broke down and cried. He was sent back to the POW enclosure, with a recommendation that he be interrogated further.

The same day, the troops of the 35th Engineers brought in three men: a middle-aged man, a Russian, and an Italian POW. The Russian denounced the middle-aged man as a German soldier, claiming the men knew where some wireless-telegraph sets were stored, and offered to lead the Americans to some buried ammunition and weapons. The middle-aged man proved that he had been discharged from the German Army in 1942, but admitted having been seen by the Russian in a Volkssturm uniform, though he did not participate in action against American troops. Upon inspection, the "wireless-telegraph sets" were discovered to be regular radio receiving sets which a retail store owner had moved to a barn for protection from damage by shelling. The "buried arms and ammunition" turned out to be foodstuffs which evacuees, living in the area, had hidden for an amergency.

Once again, according to reports, activities became rather routine, until 26 April when a CIC team assisted Military Government in blowing up a large bank vault of the Reichbank at Plauen. Three-quarters of one million dollars were found,--$275,000 in US gold currency--and one hundred cases and trunks of material confiscated from occupied territories. Schutz Staffeln Chief Himmler had deposited the gold. [189]

How to Meet the Russians

An undated, unsigned, and unclassified document, presumably copied by the 87th CIC Detachment, is the only available source which indicates what the established procedure was for the meeting of the Western Allies with the Red Army.

According to the report the Third US Army had notified the VIII Corps that the Russians were "25 kilometers east of us. We will hold present positions. Liaison parties of Russians will be allowed to come across our lines, but no large bodies of troops will be permitted to cross and no territory will be given up except on authority of this headquarters."

The VIII Corps notified its subordinate units, advising that "Russian POW be used to assist in identifying and translating. Be particularly alert for the approach of Russians, so as to avoid a fight over mistaken identity. Notify this headquarters immediately when contact is made. If any high ranking Russian Officer appears, send him to this headquarters."

189 87th CIC Det Daily Activities Rpts, dtd 26 Mar-9 May 45 in 95th (sic) CIC Det Rpts, Folder of Bi-Weekly Rpts, Sep 44-Jun 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

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General Culin, Commanding General of the 87th Infantry Division, at "conference call," gave the following instructions for subordinate units to follow.

"1. Contents of preceding message from VIII Corps apply to all elements of this command. This headquarters, referred to above, means through Division.

2. Get Russian interpreters to front line units at once.

3. Be sure every road leading into your positions from the east is covered and blocked and have interpreter at each point.

4. Hold your present outpost positions and restrict patrolling, first to lateral patrols for contact between units and second to investigage reported presence of Russians to the front, then later get interpreters.

5. Use Civil Affairs Officers and personnel section to secure Russian interpreters, preferably our own people and, if POW, use former Russian soldiers that will assist in identification. If unable to secure same in necessary numbers, notify Division G2.

6. No contact with Russian troops other than transactions of official business.

7. You can expect arrivals of numbers of German soldiers withdrawing from the Russian advance. These may possibly be willing or anxious to surrender to Americans rather than Russians, but be alert and place under strong guard any such German.

8. All forward positions will have normal guards doubled until further notice.

9. Such additional measures as you think necessary will be taken. Notify G3 of any change in present dispositions resulting from additional measures.

10. All shoulder and hand weapons of any foreign make will be taken up immediately by unit CO's. You may tag such weapons for present owners. They may be held under guard and returned if and when situation permits.

[redacted]

11. Do not assume this means termination of hostilities, or broadcast such impression by any word or act, or relax, in any degree, any measures of security now ordered or directed by the circumstances."[190]

89th CIC Detachment: Scorecard

The consolidated statement of activities for the members of the 89th CIC Detachment during April revealed some impressive totals: 71 towns were covered; 5,323 displaced persons were screened and turned over to Military Government for handling; 1,942 former Wehrmacht members, in civilian clothes, were apprehended and interrogated; an additional 17,804 civilians were interrogated regarding their military status; and 713 counterintelligence arrests were made.

The Detachment which compiled this record spent a third of the month in a static position in the vicinity of Greiz, which enabled the agents to make more complete coverage of towns within the Division area than had been previously possible. Directories of the Nazi party and Schutz Staffeln members, picked up by agents in the towns, often simplified the task of determining automatic arrests, too.

Interrogations could not always be completed, even in the case of automatic arrestees, and the CIC agents often dealt with individuals whose guilt was apparently greater, but against whom evidence was lacking. Four persons among the many that CIC arrested attempted to commit suicide rather than submit to Allied justice. CIC noted that in each instance, there was not enough information at hand to make a case against the individual, and these four might have gone free had their conscience or fears not mastered them.

The suicide of Willy Schon fitted the pattern. An hour and one half of interrogation had failed to reveal anything more about Schon than Nazi political affiliations and an industrious business life along with his position in the Schutz Staffeln as a Standerenfuhrer. However, Schon must have expected more to eventually come to light, and he took his own life by hanging.

Some of the German offenders anticipated retaliation from the Americans on a quid pro quo basis. One woman internee,

190 Document titled: "No rumors Will be Spread about the Following Message," undated, unsigned, in 87th CIC Det Correspondence File, 6/44-5/45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

[redacted]

fully aware of her misdeeds, asked whether she would be shot on the spot or in another town.

A great boon to the CIC agents was the excellent cooperation received from local civilian police who followed orders to the letter and, at times, volunteered information which led to the arrest of individuals of counterintelligence interest.[191]

CIC could not secure the names of all persons who merited internment under an automatic arrest category, and it was almost inevitable that chance, which allowed some individuals to escape, would also trap others.

One man, picked up, after curfew, by a roving patrol, was brought to the 89th CIC for routine screening. Nothing would have indicated this person to be more than a curfew violator, but persistent CIC interrogation forced the man to admit that he had been a Schutz Staffeln guard in the concentration camps at Auswitz and Buchenwald. CIC had the man interned as a war criminal on the grounds "that the sights at Ohrduf (another concentration camp) testify that no person connected with any such institution can be considered anything but a war criminal.[192]

By the end of April, with reports spreading that the war in Europe was practically over, agents of the 89th CIC Detachment, feared that a let-down in security consciousness might make the American forces vulnerable to attack. If not by enemy troops, possibly by Wehrwolves or other resistance groups. Therefore, they cautioned their operatives, "Let us remember the old adage 'a chain is as strong as its weakest link' and keep all phases of our security up to the highest standards."[193]

Four Prefer Death

During the early part of May, the 89th Division was on occupation status in the Zwickau area, and 89th CIC agents were able to complete a wave of arrests. Evasion by wanted Germans

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191 89th Inf Div After Action Rpt, dtd 1 Apr to 30 Apr 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

192 89th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt #47, Annex 4, CIC Activity Rpt dtd 26 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, dtd 27 Apr 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

193 89th Inf Div G2 Periodic Rpt #50, Annex 5, CIC Activity Rpt dtd 29 Apr 45, in FUSA G2 Jnl & File, dtd 30 Apr 45, L-558, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

was made more difficult by the stable situation, and the "ones who got away" frequently did so only by suicide.

A man named Dost, whom CIC had been trying to grasp for three weeks, was finally located and brought into the CIC office for questioning. After the initial interrogation session, Dost was left alone in an attic devoid of furniture and stripped of all weapons and instruments for self-destruction. But the following day, with the aid of a trip of silk, Dost was able to hang himself.

Another Zwickau resident, and former Kreisamtsleiter, was arrested and placed in a city hall awaiting further disposition. Before he could be transferred, this individual also committed suicide by hanging.

Not all the Nazis who took their own lives waited to be taken into the custody of the Americans. One 89th CIC agent located the address of Martin Hammitzch, the brother-in-law of Hitler, but when Hammitzch discovered that capture was imminent, he fired a pistol into his temple.

A CIC agent almost arrested Otto Halm, a much-hated individual who had performed acts of cruelty against both the British POW and the foreign labor that had worked in his mines. But, as the agent started up the stairs of the house, Halm killed himself.

Final Skirmish

As 89th CIC agents were beginning to become accustomed to occupation-type duties, they found themselves accompanying combat troops in cleaning up a pocket of enemy resistance in the town of Lugau.

In the early hours of 7 May, the armed detail moved towards the objective, and proceeded smoothly to a roadblock guarding the approach to the town. The American soldiers blasted out this position, and the CIC agents went forward with the combat troops until pinned down at a crossroads by small arms fire. The agents skirted the circle of troops and tried to reach the Rathaus to apprehend the Burgermeister and obtain a map of the town. Machine-gun fire halted their advance, and they were forced to return to a temporary command post where civilians from the captured sectors of Lugau were screened.

This operation was interrupted for three hours when American artillery rounds were lobbed into the town, and all persons sought safety in cellars. Soon after the shelling ended, the town was taken. All male civilians were brought before the CIC

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team for checking. Of the 1,200 persons screened, 75 were interned as security threats, and an entire new city administration was effected by the combined efforts of CIC and Military Government units.[194]

The 100th CIC Detachment: Fast Moving

The 100th Infantry Division remained on the offensive until April 25th, when they assumed occupational duties. Security in the Division sector, according to this Detachment's Monthly Information Report, continued as top priority. Surveys of the most sensitive installations were conducted as frequently as possible, and recommendations regarding locations and guard systems were made. Due to the rapidity of the advance, many towns were by-passed and received no counterintelligence attention.

Automatic arrestees, security threats, and potential agents comprised the bulk of the internees taken by the Detachment, although the outfit did have an opportunity to act against an alleged Wehrwolf plot. Based on information received by the Detachment, of an impending Wehrwolf plot to stage a riot and kill a company commander on 29 April, 19 persons were arrested. Of these, seven were interned, after interrogation, as fanatical Nazis and as the probable influences of any planning to keep Nazism alive in the town of Fellbach. No traces of an organized Wehrwolf group or of a scheme to riot were uncovered. The internment of the seven was a measure to ensure that no similar subversion would be perpetrated in the town at any time.

The leader of another potential resistance group, the Hitler Jugend, was arrested in Sulzbach. The youth admitted painting threatening signs, found in the village of Sulzbach, and intended to carry out underground activity, until American tanks rolled into town, shattering his nerve. He was interned through POW channels.[195]

Generally, however, the 100th CIC Detachment found no organized underground movement in its advance across Germany. Agents noted the overwhelming sentiment among the German people that resistance was futile, and reported that informants told

194 89th Inf Div After Action Rpt, 1 May-8 May 45, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

195 100th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 3 May 45, in 100th CIC Det Monthly Administrative and Information Rpts, Oct 44-Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

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them the townspeople would be the first to denounce a Wehrwolf movement.[196]

196 100th CIC Det Monthly CIC Rpt #10, for 15 Apr 45-15 May 45, dtd 15 May 45, in 100th CIC Det Monthly Administration and Information Rpts, Oct 44-Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096).

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101st CIC Detachment: Agents Alerted For Special Mission

The final Allied offensive found the troops of the 101st Division driving deep into Austria, while agents of the 101st CIC were busy apprehending Black List Nazis along the way. The Detachment was split at the beginning of this drive, as Captain McGuire and several other agents were alerted for a special mission. The remainder of the Detachment was placed under command of Lt Francis E. Martini.

The special mission was to be performed with some agents of the 82d CIC and a battalion of paratroopers from each division. SHAEF was fearful that fanatical Nazis might execute Allied POW en masse in retaliation for losing the war, and a target list of 30 POW camps was compiled, many of which were deep behind enemy lines. If the Allied intelligence discovered that the Germans would carry out the grim executions, the task force was prepared to jump into the POW camps and hold off the Nazis until aid arrived. McGuire was placed in charge of all CIC men assigned to the mission. However, the threat never materialized, and the agents were relieved from what might have been extremely hazardous duty.[197]

103d CIC Detachment: Slow Start, and Then...

Up to 29 March, the 103d Infantry Division had been in the final offensive of the Sixth Army Group west of the Rhine. On that date the Division moved under the direct jurisdiction of the Seventh US Army, and assumed occupational duties east of the Rhine in areas cleared by other attacking US units. The CIC office was located in Schifferstadt for four days, then in Neustadt and finally, on 8 April, to Bensheim, where it remained until the Division was committed to the offensive on 20 April as a component of the VI Corps.

Since there were approximately fifty towns for each agent, CIC limited its activity, in the initial occupation phase, to only the most important areas. As a result, many towns did not receive counterintelligence coverage. A survey of the territory, made by airplane, indicated too much civilian travel, but, fortunately, nothing noticeably detrimental to security occurred.

In addition to routine security and counterintelligence investigations, the agents of the 103d CIC Detachment had several interesting experiences.

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197 Interview with Major Martin E. McGuire on 24 Mar 54, Ft Holabird, Md, (UNCLASSIFIED).

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In one case, a man claiming to be an American citizen was located in a prison in Frankenthal and immediately transferred to the Division's civilian cage at Neustadt. John Ketterring, alias Hans Kettering, told CIC interrogators that he had been a resident of the United States from 1922 to 1939, and an officer in the US Army Air Corps. Ketterring claimed to have been forced to serve as a captain in the Todt organization, where he had the responsibility of supervising from 100-3,000 forced laborers for the Germans. He was unable to explain how it was possible for him to write to his wife for his citizenship papers, yet not visit the American Consulate between 1939 and 1941. Ketterring's contention that he had been placed in prison for failure to fight ggainst the Allies was disproved by prison records which indicated the charge against him as rape. Other falsifications in his story were uncovered, and the agents sent him to Army CIC as a treason suspect and for making false official statements.

In the occupational phase, six agents from army CIC, five Military Intelligence Interpreter (MIII) teams, six Interrogation of Prisoner of War (IPW) teams, two Order of Battle (OB) teams, 30 linguists and two stenographers were placed at the disposal of the 103d CIC Detachment. These teams either brought their own transportation or were supplied vehicles by tactical units in their areas of operation.

From 20 April to 4 May, the Division was able to advance 250 miles, due to the crumbling Nazi resistance. In all towns covered by CIC, the leading Nazi officials were arrested. At Grieslingen, a group of CIC agents remained for a few days to clear up the local situation. On 4 May, Innsbruck fell to the Division, and the Detachment once more resumed an occupational role.

The outstanding case of this period involved Leopold Volker, self-described "professional espionage agent," who claimed to have been in that field since 1928. His story was that he had worked for the Germans as a special censor for all telephone, telegraph, and mail communication in Berlin until 1940 at which time his book, "Rudiments of Censorship," was established as the text for later workers. From then until May 1942 he was stationed in Paris where he organized a headquarters to handle all army espionage work in France. Volker said he served in that capacity until he was arrested by the French authorities and released, reporting back to Sicherheitsdienst Headquarters in Berlin. For a time, he headed a Sicherheitsdienst Agency in Tunis. Recalled to Berlin in 1943, he was later returned to France where he was to make a study of the operational methods of the De Gaullist espionage system in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse and Bordeaux.

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In December 1944, Volker explained, he made a complete report of the American, English, French and Polish methods of espionage, but as the Allies advanced, he withdrew to Germany and helped formulate underground plans for the Nazis. He gave CIC complete information on personalities and meeting places of underground Nazi agents. In the course of the interrogation, he also mentioned Syn-Archie, an espionage organization, supposedly founded by European industrialists about the time of the Spanish Civil War, which had succeeded in planting members inside the secret police systems in Europe. The detachment forwarded the man to the 307th CIC Detachment for additional interrogation.

Another case involved Alfred Fravenfeld, who identified himself as "only a simple major in the Wehrmacht." A lengthy interrogation revealed that he was actually one of the party pioneers, and had served as Gaulziter of Austria from 1929 until 1932. An attempted coup by Fravenfeld in 1934 caused his imprisonment for six months. After the Germans occupied Austria, Fravenfeld was told that he was too notorious to be given public office there, but he was treated very well by the Nazis. From 1940-1943, he was General Counsel to von Ribbentrop, and as late as January 1945, he had addressed an assembly of Sicherheitsdienst and Gestapo agents in Vienna, calling for stern resistance. His identification papers proved to be forgeries and, after his unsuccessful attempt at suicide, 103d CIC Detachment turned him over to Army CIC.

"Tomorrow the World"

One of the most fanatic of all the individuals the 103d CIC agents arrested in April was Dieter Klemm, a 12½ year old member of the Hitler Jugend. When asked his name, this former Jugendschaftfuhrer answered promptly, but as the interrogator queried the youth about his address, Klemm snapped to attention, and, instead of answering the question, answered:

"I hate you Americans. I wish I had a pistol to kill all of you. I shall never betray my Fuehrer as long as I breathe. I realize that you are going to put me away in some camp or prison, but some day I shall be released and then I shall continue my fight for Hitler and Nazi Germany. There are at least a dozen boys in Auerbach of my age, whom you have not arrested, who think exactly as I do. I shall not give you their names. As for the boys who were brought here with me, I am proud to say that my brother, Wolf, and three more are just as good Germans, and therefore just as good Nazis, as myself. I am ashamed of those among the boys who betray the Fuehrer. Do not hope ever to eradicate our National Socialistic ideals or ideas. There are enough of us left to continue the fight as

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long as we live. That is all I have to say and now you can do with me whatever you please."

Klemm was evacuated through POW channels for internment as a security menace.[198]

Other CIC Units in the Final Campaign

In the closing weeks of the battle for victory, several CIC units, that had not previously been committed to action, joined the European campaign. The 13th Armored, 16th Armored, 20th Armored and 86th Infantry Division were accompanied respectively by the 513th, 516th, 520th, and 86th CIC Detachments. No records of the activities of these detachments have been recovered.[199]

198 103d CIC Det Monthly CI Rpt, dtd 20 Apr 45, in 103d CIC Det Monthly and Semi-Monthly Rpts, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25096), and 103d CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 1 May 45, (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

199 Historical Data Cards in Historical Project Files.

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Chapter 4

THE REAR AREAS

During this period, the Fifteenth US Army conducted operations on two fronts: the 66th Infantry Division contained German forces within the Lorient-St. Nazaire pockets, while the XXII Corps aided in "the greatest double-envelopment in the history of military tactics--that of the Ruhr Pocket."

As the advance of the Allied armies proceeded eastward from the Rhine, the Fifteenth Army occupied, organized, and governed the Rheinprovinz, Saarland, Pfalz, and that portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River.[200]

In addition to the units of the Fifteenth Army, organizations under communication zone headquarters, and those assigned various high echelon headquarters, operated in the rear areas.

CIC Personnel Available to Fifteenth Army

As of 1 April, agents of both the 222d and 223d CIC Detachments were operating under the XXII Corps, since the XXIII Corps had not yet become operative. The organic 315th CIC Detachment from army headquarters was operating in Dinant, Belgium. These three Detachments, augmented by both French and German MII teams and IPW teams, attempted a static coverage. Higher headquarters furnished one tactical reserve CIC team, from the 418th CIC Detachment, to cover the city of Cologne. A team from the 315th CIC Detachment, augmented by an IPW team and two Netherlands interpreters, assumed the responsibility for the city of Aachen and that territory west of the Roer River to the German frontier. The massive area to be covered and the few personnel available to cover it made for superficial security at best. Various specialist teams were gradually made available during the month, until, by the end of April, five tactical reserve CIC teams, plus a full complement of MII and IPW teams were operating in Fifteenth Army's territory.

On 11 April, Rheinbach Prison was established as the Army's Interrogation Center, although an agreement with First US Army permitted First Army Interrogators to continue their work in the installation until cases already under way were completed. Initial inspection indicated that more than 400 permanent in-

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200 History of the Fifteenth US Army, Foreword, Lt Gen, G. T. Gerow, p 3, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Staff and Faculty Library)

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ternees-- "proscribed and automatic arrest categories"--were imprisoned there, as well as a number of displaced persons, war criminals, German police for use by Military Government, and POW. This overcrowded condition prevented effective security and the efficient operation of a detailed interrogation center. Three IPW teams and one MII (German) team were added to the interrogation staff in the following few days, and the Army Provost Marshal made available custodial and housekeeping personnel.

Frontier Control

The Twelfth Army Group released operational control of the CIC teams employed along the German frontier to Fifteenth Army also, which Army, in turn, passed under the control of corps in their respective areas. The general policy for frontier security contemplated establishment of a prohibited frontier zone not to exceed five kilometers in width from the frontier inside Germany, from which all civilians would be evacuated, and which would be patrolled by a security command supplemented by air reconnaissance to prevent unauthorized border-crossings. Crossings were to be made only when authorized and only through designated ports of entry and exit. The Army commander was authorized to modify the inner line of the prohibited zone in order to take advantage of natural barriers. This would also prevent the need for displacement of persons in large cities or those engaged in essential occupations, such as farming. Any modifications were to be consistent with security considerations.[201]

XXII Corps: Travel Control

Operating within the rear areas in Germany--from the border to the Rhine--the XXII Corps placed a heavy accent on counter-intelligence operations. In their area they were charged with the responsibility of placing personnel from the CIC Detachments operating along the border at predetermined transit points to provide competent and complete coverage of the border area. Policies for permitting or denying frontier passage were established by SHAEF, Twelfth Army Group, Fifteenth US Army and XXII Corps.

During this period, the 222d CIC Detachment was given five specific duties.

201 15th US Army, G2 After Action Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 6 May 45 in G2 Section 15th Army After Action Rpts, Apr-May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

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First, they were to provide a counterintelligence staff for corps headquarters. The duties, number of personnel, and organization of this staff are not described in available documents.

Secondly, they were to provide personnel for the Rhine River Control Teams, which operated at each bridge site. These teams were to screen all non-US military personnel seeking to cross, according to policies devised by corps and higher headquarters. These teams, while functioning as one separate unit, operated under the commander of the area in which the bridge was located.

A third duty was the reinforcement of area CIC staffs, mainly by operating in areas in which no division CIC detachment had representation. The counterintelligence operations within any area were the responsibility of the area commander as a normal command security function. Those division CIC detachments which needed augmentation were to be provided with personnel from the corps CIC detachment. Areas under the control of units having no organic counterintelligence personnel, i.e. field artillery brigades or battalions, were to be supplied members of corps CIC IPW and MII detachments on an attached basis.

The fourth duty was to make special investigations as called for, though it is not known how many personnel were available to the corps if its members were operating elsewhere.

The fifth provision of the program dictated the training of additional personnel in counterintelligence functions.[202]

To accomplish the training of the additional personnel, a Counterintelligence School was organized in Munchen-Gladbach to present a series of three five-day courses. These sessions began on 25 April, 1 May, and 7 May respectively.[203]

Classes were scheduled from 0800 hours to 1700 hours daily, and students were instructed to spend two hours each evening on studies. The student group was comprised of one officer and one enlisted man from each battalion in the corps, except for those battalions within the 28th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Infantry Division, although the latter was permitted

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202 XXII Corps Ltr, dtd 20 Apr 45, subj, "Counterintelligence Opns, XXII Zone, in 94th CIC Det Correspondence File, Nov 43-Aug 45 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

203 See Annex 2 this chapter for schedule of classes.

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to send "a limited number." Students, the notification advised, "should have some aptitude for investigatory techniques, previous experience in intelligence or comparable subjects, and, if possible, ability to speak German."

Each unit was to send the names of the persons who would attend 24 hours prior to the beginning of the course. The students were instructed to report to the corps' G2 Section at Building 285 on Bokal Street, one block north of the opera house. Mess and billeting arrangements had been made, except for cots, bedrolls, and mess kits which had to be brought by each student, along with a notebook, fifty sheets of 8"x10" paper and a writing implement. This registration was to be accomplished before 1700 hours of the day prior to the beginning date for the session.[204]

The object of the school was to provide, for each company or battery in the corps, at least two persons who had been alerted to German undercover organizations, sabotage methods, and rudimentary counterintelligence techniques.[205]

XXIII Corps CIC: On Its Own, At Last

The XIII Corps, a January arrival to the battle scene, became operational for the first time in April, and its CIC detachment was able to put into practice much of the experience it had gained under the tutelage of the 303d and 222d CIC Detachments.

The first assignment, undertaken on 10 April, was in an area of operations containing high Nazi officials, automatic arrest personalities, displaced persons, espionage agents and saboteurs, and large numbers of Wehrmacht deserters.[206]

The town of Idar-Oberstein was the first of many in the Saar-Mosel area of Germany to receive counterintelligence coverage from the XXIII Corps Detachment working on its own.

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204 XXII Corps ltr, dtd 20 Apr 45, to All Units under XXII Corps, Subj, "Counterintelligence (CI) School," in 94th CIC Det Correspondence File, Nov 43-Aug 45 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095.)

205 XXII Corps Ltr, dtd 20 Apr 45, subj, "Counterintelligence Opns, XXII Zone, in 94th CIC Det Correspondence File, Nov 43-Aug 45 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095).

206 223d CIC Det Rpt After Action Against the Enemy, undated, unsigned for period 10 Apr 45-30 Apr 45, in 223d CIC Det Unit History, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

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The first step taken was to screen the town's police force.[207] Teams from the Detachment were deployed to six towns while one was retained at headquarters. Leads supplied by the G2, XXIII Corps, were disseminated to teams in the field, and a "vast quantity" of general information on target personalities was secured from ETOUSA and the Fifteenth US Army. In their immediate towns and the surrounding areas, Detachment agents took "automatic arrest category" Nazis into custody, enforced security measures, tightened up restrictions on displaced persons, and investigated shooting forays and other disturbances between German nationals and internees in camps for nationals of Allied nations.

In conjunction with Corps G2, the Detachment "re-drafted" the Personal History Questionnaire for use in investigating German nationals for temporary employment with the US organizations in the area. A system of screening German nationals to serve as informants for CIC was instituted, producing "invaluable" results.[208]

On 12 April, the 223d was augmented by the 516th CIC Detachment, ADSEC Detachment Nr 418-28, an Army Reserve CIC team, two IPW teams, and one MII team.[209]

Liaison was established among all interested agencies and offices, and progress was made in the clearing of civilians for employment by Military Government.

The CIC Detachment was already working at its peak on 22 April when their outstanding case broke. It involved Sonderkommando W-12, a German sabotage movement affecting the entire area of Corps responsibility. The 70th CIC Detachment had uncovered the underground organization, but the 223d CIC Detachment took over the case when the 70th was alerted to join its division in Frankfurt. The case status report and prisoners of the 70th CIC Detachment connected with the ring were turned over, and all teams of the 223d CIC Detachment went into action. This was undertaken in addition to the regular duties of the

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207 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 10 Apr 45 in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center 25099)

208 223d CIC Det Rpt After Action Against the Enemy, undated unsigned, for period 10 Apr 45-30 Apr 45, in 223d CIC Det Unit History, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)

209 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 12 Apr 45 in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center Box 25099).

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teams. Members of the ring were sought, captured, and interrogated for further information and to secure confessions; caches of sabotage equipment and foodstuffs were unearthed; and liaison was established with ordnance and other sections which cooperated in the movement by taking charge of reclaimed explosives and destroying them. The Fifteenth US Army sent a photographic team to corps CIC office to accompany various elements of the Detachment, to photograph evidence for use in military courts and to obtain material for a countersabotage training film under production by the army. Special night interrogation facilities were constructed. Sonderkommando W-12 became a round-the-clock problem.[210]

Developments

A confidential informant led agents of the Detachment to four of the underground group's supply dumps on the first day.[211] The following day two suspected saboteurs were picked up, but one was released after interrogation.[212] The other confessed to being a member of a sabotage cell. He lead CIC Agents to another cache of supplies and gave new personality information. On the same day, 24 April, a woman was picked up and interrogated about the suspected sabotage activities of her husband and one of her friends.[213] On the 26th, the friend was picked up. He confessed, giving names of other members--one of whom CIC had already arrested. Another confessed saboteur of the group led CIC agents to three sabotage supply caches.[214] Two more members of the ring were apprehended and interrogated, both confessing. One of them led CIC agents to three dumps in the Trier area, while the other provided information about his cell's operation and personnel.[215] On 29 April, three members of still another cell were apprehended,[216] and, on the 30th, two more saboteurs were arrested. The net gain in this last

210 223d CIC Det Rpt After Action Against the Enemy, undated, unsigned, for period 10 Apr 45-30 Apr 45, in 223d CIC Det Unit History, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

211 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 23 Apr 45 in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

212 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 25 April 45 in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED)(Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

213 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 26 April 45, in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099).

214 Ibid, 27 April (UNCLASSIFIED)

215 Ibid, 28 April (UNCLASSIFIED)

216 Ibid, 30 April (UNCLASSIFIED)

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case was only one, however, since a suspect arrested earlier was released. A search for another suspect, supposedly in the area, proved fruitless[217] until 28 May, when, upon arrest, he confessed immediately to having attended the Wiesbaden Sabotage School. He was placed under house arrest pending further investigation.[218] On 1 May, two new sabotage dumps were located by the agents,[219] and a week later they discovered another dump and the body of a former member of one of the cells. Investigation revealed that he had been murdered.[220]

Progress on the case had slowed down perceptibly by the day of official surrender, but had not stopped. The Detachment had, by that time, developed the information that Sonderkommando W-12 cells were operating in eighteen towns in that area and in other units' areas nearby.

Neutralization of the enemy's sabotage plans was, of course, the main objective of the CIC investigations. Teams in the field were reassigned to areas with access to the territory of operations for the known cells. "Wanted persons" lists containing the names of known cell members were distributed.

The problem was somewhat complicated by the uncovering, on 5 May, of Sonderkommando Bienenstock, an airborne saboteur group fostered by the Luftwaffe for behind-the-line action. Two members of the group were captured and confessed to their CIC interrogators. Teams of two airmen were to land German aircraft behind Allied lines, destroy the craft after removing all sabotage equipment, and function as sabotage teams. The self-confessed agents outlined other aspects of the plan, including areas in which the alleged landings would be made. They claimed that 30 or 40 aircraft, manned by these teams, were already on their missions. The 223d CIC Detachment arranged for flash warnings to be sent through G2, XXIII Corps, to the cities which were cited as targets.

The search for members and munitions belonging to the Sonderkommando W-12 group carried on into June, with eventually

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217 223d CIC Det Daily Rpt, dtd 1 May 45 in 223d CIC Det Hq Team File, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)
218 Ibid 29 May (UNCLASSIFIED)
219 Ibid 3 May (UNCLASSIFIED)
220 Ibid 9 May (UNCLASSIFIED)

four more arrests and two investigations of sabotage dumps, which were found to be empty.[221]

Another Corps School for Counterintelligence

Some agents of the Detachment served as instructors at the XXIII Corps Counterintelligence School, instituted by the Corps G2. Three classes were held, resulting in the training of nearly 400 individuals in counterintelligence and counter-sabotage work. The quality of instruction in this school was commended by Major General Hugh J. Gaffey of the US Army in a letter to the members of the faculty on 23 May.[222]

The 94th CIC Detachment: Ruhr and Occupation

The 94th Infantry Division of the XXII Corps was one of the units under the Fifteenth US Army which participated in action against the enemy during this period. The 94th was directly concerned in the encirclement and reduction of the Ruhr, and in its later occupation.

The 94th CIC Detachment, under Captain Carl K. Goodson, boasted a diversity of experience by the end of the tactical war which was matched by few detachments. With their division, they had participated in the containment action against the St. Nazaire-Lorient pockets, in the active defense of the Saar-Moselle triangle, in the breakthrough from the Saar to the Rhine, and in the Ruhr as a tactical and occupational force. On the basis of this wide background which "afforded encounters with every type of security responsibility, civilian and military," a collective critique[223] was prepared "to indi-

221 223d CIC Det Rpt After Action Against the Enemy, undated, unsigned, for periods 10-31 May and 1-30 Jun 45, in 223d CIC Det Unit History, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)

222 223d CIC Det Rpt After Action Against the Enemy, undated, unsigned, for period 1-9 May 45, in 223d CIC Det Unit History, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)

223 NOTE: The critique is, unfortunately, an unsigned, undated, and unfinished document, classified Secret. Plans had evidently been made to include an Appraisal after the Critique, but, for an unknown reason, this segment of the document was not attempted beyond the title stage. Within the twelve pages of critique are three sections: Personnel Problems, Equipment, and Administration and Operations. Under each section some suggestions or explanations have been crossed out in pencil. Although obviously "unofficial," this document contains so much pertinent material that it is impossible to ignore it.

[redacted]

cate the most effectual and realistic solution of the operational necessities of counterintelligence under all combat conditions." The critique is twelve pages in length, broken down into three subheadings: Personnel Problems, Equipment, and Administration and Operations.

Under the heading, "Personnel Problems" the "desirability of having in reserve at higher Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters a pool of trained CIC personnel available to supplement the tactical unit detachment. . . ." was noted, especially for ". . . . relatively static operations (and) to augment tactical detachments during an initial, urgent, and turbulent occupational period in an area of the magnitude occupied by this division in the . . . Ruhr pocket." The training of CIC agents in the basic rudiments of the language of the country in which they would be operating was recommended. "A more rapid assimilation of the language once foreign operations were undertaken, " was anticipated by this, as was the ability of the agent to interview and interrogate better through interpreters because of the control which could be exercised. Another suggestion was for much closer liaison between forward and rear counterintelligence echelons, when tactical detachments are in a mobile combat phase. In this way there would be increased "security continuity" through the formation and utilization of "permanent, or semi-permanent pin-point occupational counterintelligence teams." According to the critique, these teams would accompany the division detachments into towns and cities specifically designated for their coverage.[224]

An increase in the number of operational teams within the CIC detachment was advocated to permit the attachment of at least one two-man team to give CIC service to the "artillery positions and skilled artillery personnel" of division artillery. A second increase in the T/O was suggested to provide for drivers and service personnel to handle and keep in repair the detachment's vehicles.

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224 (NOTE: The document elaborates this suggestion, explaining that these teams should study their assigned areas comprehensively through research, and that they could be held in reserve at corps or army level until fall of their target area was imminent. The document also criticized "apparently superfluous CIC personnel...complacently engaged in routine assignments of a highly postponable character" in rear areas, "(army, army group, and com Z levels)," stating the belief that "these rear area supernumeraries could have been employed to much greater advantage, and would have contributed more tangibly to the counterintelligence function, if they had been deployed as aforementioned pin-point teams. . . .")

[redacted]

[redacted]

The critique also favored establishment of the ranks of agent and special agent on a basis similar to the warrant officer grades or that of Flight officer in the air force,[225] and the maintenance of stability within operating teams of the detachment by keeping inter-team transfers of personnel at a minimum. There was also a positive suggestion for the redeployment of personnel. It would be accomplished on a "loan" basis with CIC personnel from evacuated static areas being sent to active areas.[226]

Under "Equipment" the complaint was repeated that much of the "impediments" provided for the detachment had proven superfluous, including most of the special investigative equipment. However, the lack of listening devices was noted definitely as an oversight. Numerous instances had arisen where such devices could have been used advantageously by the detachment.

The only other recommendation concerned the substitution of one three-quarter-ton truck and trailer for the jeep and trailer originally provided for moving the detachment. The three-quarter-ton vehicle, the document explained, could be utilized (1) to move bulky and weighty items more efficiently, (2) as a mobile office in rapidly changing field situations, and (3) for transporting large groups of arrestees to jails, interrogation centers, and sites of local detention, "when the tactical situation makes it temporarily impossible to obtain suitable unit transportation."

Administration and operation recommendations were numerous. The first suggested that the system of supplying the division detachment with only one copy of master blacklists was most inefficient, since the lists could not be reproduced at division level soon enough to be of use unless agents were taken off operational duties and given the administrative task of copying the lists. According to the critique, a minimum of five lists should have been supplied, one for each CIC team and one copy for CIC headquarters.

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225 (NOTE: This recommendation was crossed out on the document with no hint being given as to the deleter's identity or the reasons for the deletion. Before its cancellation, the paragraph had dealt specifically with (1) the high-quality caliber of CIC personnel, (2) the important responsibilities they were expected to assume, (3) the authority and influence each agent wields which "is totally incommensurate" with their status in the "military hierarchy," (4) the difficulty high-ranking officers had in conducting mutually-necessary affairs with enlisted CIC agents.)

226 This was also crossed out, in pencil.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The detachment also suggested the appointment in each combat squad of a "security NCO" who would be trained in elementary counterintelligence to enable him to handle minor civilian problems on his own. Informative lectures on the responsibilities of Military Government and CIC would complement this program, providing for all troops, general background information on civilian problems in the combat phase and clearly defining the categorical differences between incidents of CIC concern and instances of Military Government interest. Such a plan would make available a supplemental force of combat men who could provide basic security in outlying towns usually not covered by CIC in fast-moving situations.

The third recommendation involved the pre-alerting of CIC when a unit was to move into a new area. Thus CIC could send agents into the new area, with or before the advance party, to effect a take-over from the preceding detachment and begin security measures before the bulk of the unit arrived.

Another recommendation concerned the establishment of counterintelligence document teams in a task force. The sole responsibility of these teams would be the analyzing of documents of counterintelligence interest at pre-determined targets. This would provide CIC teams with information promptly, and permit them to seek out personality targets much more rapidly.

Finally, the critique dealt with the most propitious time for CIC agents to enter a combat area to begin counterintelligence action. The document reflected a belief that the arrival of CIC should coincide with the establishment of the regimental command post in any specific area. Premature entrance had usually proved "abortive," according to the document, since the civilian contacts were unable to cooperate with agents while the fighting was still raging or the combat clean-up was still in progress.[227]

CIC Work During the Period

One of the 94th CIC Detachment's notable accomplishments during April was the arrest of Hans Goebbels, brother of the notorious Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Josef Goebbels. The head of the largest insurance business in the area and holder of several German and Nazi Party honors, Hans Goebbels claimed that he was not too active in politics or party affairs. He openly admired his brother. A search of his home was unproductive. CIC agents sent Goebbels to the division POW cage

227 94th CIC Det, Doc #81, in 94th CIC Det Correspondence File Nov 43-Aug 44 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

[redacted]

[redacted]

until he could be picked up by representatives of higher Intelligence echelons to "be milked of all the information a person of his position, influence, and consanguinity may be expected to have."

The leader of the Dusseldorf Bund Deutcher Madel was arrested by the detachment also. Holding a rank equivalent to that of colonel, she had ten thousand girls under her command. She explained the organization's aims, and told of a recent meeting she had attended where the topic to be discussed was Wehrwolf activities for the organization. She claimed that her hesitation about committing herself to live up to the party's dictates concerning Wehrwolf activities had caused the discussion to be called off. Evidently the Nazis were fearful that she would break easily under interrogation if she were not for the plan wholeheartedly. She gave pertinent counter-intelligence personality information on the Bund Deutcher Madel and on the Hitler Jugend.[228]

Threats

On the morning of 7 April, an informant from Kaldenhausen came to the 94th CIC Detachment with a warning sign which had been placed on the front door of his home during the night. The sign, constructed of cardboard from a US Army ration box, carried the following message written in heavy blue pencil:

"AUCH FUR DICH DU USA SOLDLING IS DIE
STUNDE DER BERGELTUNG NAHE I .WARNUNG SS"

(For you too, USA hireling, will come
the day of vengeance soon. 1st Warning SS)

Agents discovered that another individual, who had been used by CIC as an informant, had received an identical warning on his door. However, neither of the informants had any idea who might be responsible for the threats.

CIC made arrangements to put both houses under guard of US Army personnel during the hours of darkness. CIC fully realized that an informant's willingness to cooperate would be likely to falter in the face of these threats.[229]

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228 94th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 8 May 45, in 94th CIC Det Corres. File Nov 43-Aug 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25095)

229 15th US Army G2 Periodic Rpt #11, dtd 10 Apr 45, Annex 3, in G2 Jnl & File FUSA, 11 Apr 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Cologne: CIC Still Busy

Tactical Reserve Team Nr 14 of the 418th CIC Detachment had assumed counterintelligence control of Cologne, Germany, after the American advance west of the Rhine had begun. At the end of their first week of operation there, the Detachment reported:

> "At the present time, in the city of Cologne, there are more than 300 cases on which action is deemed necessary, but which this team has been unable to develop due to lack of personnel."

As a result, only high priority cases were given immediate action. Security violations were handled by security guards, responsible for the enforcement of Military Government proclamations. These guards were active in a raid against an anticipated Hitler Jugend meeting on the night of 2 April. They arrested 13 youths who had gathered in cell-size groups of two or three. Some of these claimed to be members of "Edelweiss," and all were released. Arrangements were made to secure an informant to penetrate the organization and keep CIC informed.

Two Rhine-crossing enemy agents were apprehended and sent through channels for disposition.[230]

Team 28 of 418th CIC Detachment

Team 28 commanded by 2d Lt Alfred R Oliver of the 418th CIC Detachment, moved into Trier, Germany, about five miles from the Luxembourg border, and became an unofficial CIC occupation organization. Team 28 was evidently subordinate to the 223d CIC Detachment of XXIII Corps of Fifteenth US Army.

In addition to providing counterintelligence measures in Trier and surrounding areas, personnel of Team 28 manned screening offices in a civilian internment camp and a displaced persons center.

Three buried caches of sabotage equipment were uncovered through the efforts of CIC agents of Team 28 and of XXIII Corps who were led to the hiding places by an informant. In each instance, the explosive and equipment were buried near a tree which had been marked with a "W." Motion pictures of the excavating were taken for training purposes. The sabotage equipment was removed from the CIC office by an engineer battalion.

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230 418th CIC Det (12th Army Group) TRP 14, Counterintelligence Rpt for 30 Mar-5 Apr 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Forty persons were arrested by the Detachment's agents in and around Trier, including a Schutz Staffeln officer; a Sicherheitsdienst official and Gestapo informant; two Sturm Abteilunger members; and a Hitler Jugend member who had hidden weapons and ammunition.231

The 13th Airborne CIC Detachment: at Oise in France

The 13th Airborne CIC Detachment, commanded by Captain Frank Popisil, continued to provide security for the 13th Airborne Infantry Division, posted in an area thirty miles north of Paris, France and attached to the Oise Section, Com Z.

The bulk of the Detachment's investigations was concerned with civilian loyalty checks for potential employees of the US Army, and with security checking of troop movements, base echelons, and thirteen marshalling areas. Thirteen of the potential employees were found to be "of doubtful morals and character."

During April, personnel of the Detachment prepared a Counter Intelligence Plan and a CIC Annex for an airborne operation which was later cancelled. Before that happened, however, division command had issued a staff memorandum, delineating duties in the areas which were to be conquered, and giving authority for full control over civilians jointly to CIC and Military Government. By a subsequent field order, CIC was permitted complete freedom of movement and the full cooperation of all elements of the command.

In addition to checking security and civilian loyalty, the Detachment conducted two military loyalty checks and six cases categorized as "Miscellaneous." Under that title came an investigation of a censorship violation picked up by the US Censorship office, which contained a reference to time and place of troop movements. The offender acknowledged his guilt and faced trial by courts martial. In the second, military personnel -- five officers and four enlisted men -- were found "guilty of loose talk and illegal use of government property", and were subjected to disciplinary action. The third case involved a French civilian who was photographing a practice airborne operation. His film was impounded, but investigation revealed nothing derogatory about the man. The fourth bit of miscellany netted, with negative results, two talkative Frenchmen who loitered around military installations. Another in-

231 418th CIC Det, Team 28, Daily Activities Rpts, 26 Apr 45-2 May 45 to CO 418th CIC Det, in Trier Sub District Rpts, Apr-Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25099)

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[redacted]

volved theft of lard legitimately shipped from the United States for distribution to French civilians. CIC turned this case over to the French. An investigation of counterfeit invasion currency led to Corbeil, France, where the Criminal Investigation Detachment, Seine Base, took over the case.

Cases involving blackmarketing and rumors complete the resume of types of investigation conducted by the CIC agents of the detachment. Unfortunately, US military personnel sometimes were involved in both types of violations.[232]

The COM Z Units

Communications Zone CIC Detachments were scattered throughout most of the western portion of the European continent, from the Pyrenees to the Netherlands, and from the Cherbourg peninsula to central Germany. The final 45 days seemed, on the whole, uneventful for these organizations.

For Section 420-C, however, operating on the Cherbourg peninsula, a tactical attempt on the part of the Germans gave the Detachment agents something to do. They interrogated captured members of an 18-man sabotage group which had landed on the beach near Vauville, Manche, France. The mission of the group was to disrupt transportation on the peninsula and in Cherbourg Harbor. The group succeeded -- without causing any physical damage -- for all work in the area stopped until 17 of the Germans were captured. The 18th was believed to have been killed by mines.[233]

The Joining Up

On 25 April, soldiers of the 69th Infantry Division of the V Corps met elements of the Red Army's 58th Guards Division in Torgau. This was the first meeting of the two Allies on the battlefield and burial ground of Germany.

As both the American and Russian Armies drew up along the Elbe River, these meetings increased.

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232 13th CIC Det Monthly Rpts of CIC Activities, to CG, 1st Allied Abn Army, ATTN: CO 351st CIC Det, dtd 31 Mar 45, in 13th CIC Det Correspondence File Dec 43-Jul 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094)

233 420-C CIC Section, Beach District, NBS, Monthly Information Rpt, dtd 30 Apr 45 (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library)

[redacted]

Another "first" meeting took place on 8 May between soldiers of the 103d Infantry Division of the VI Corps, Seventh US Army, and soldiers of the 88th Infantry Division of the Fifth US Army from Italy.[234]

For the tactical troops, the war was at an end. For CIC, however, the war continued. In the days, months, and years following the surrender -- as long as the occupation of Germany and Austria lasted -- army counterintelligence in Europe grew in importance.

234 Op Cit, Eisenhower, pages 410-418.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXI

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GERMANY OVERRUN - PART II

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Appendix 1

GERMANY OVERRUN

12TH ARMY GROUP COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

10 APRIL 1945

HEADQUARTERS
12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655, U S ARMY

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL
UNDATED AND AUTHORITY NOT CITED

HEADQUARTERS
12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655, U S ARMY

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

1. This directive contains the policies and detailed instructions governing CI operations in GERMANY which are designed to;

a. Secure our forces against enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities;

b. Destroy the enemy secret intelligence services, all security or secret police agencies and affiliated para-military organizations;

c. Assist in the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates and prevent their rebirth in any form;

d. Aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers; and

e. Insure the detention of selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

2. Organizations, upon redeployment from GERMANY, will return their issued copies of this directive to this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

2903

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

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HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL.

a. The instructions contained in this directive pertain to CI in GERMANY.

b. Wherever the term "CI" is used herein it will be understood to mean counterintelligence as supervised by the G-2 of an appropriate command.

c. All references herein to Army/Military Districts will be understood to refer as well to the U.S. Port Enclave.

d. The attention of all CI personnel is directed to the following SHAEF publications:

(1) HANDBOOK FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY.

(2) PUBLIC SAFETY MANUAL OF PROCEDURES.

(3) HANDBOOK GOVERNING POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

2. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this directive, the following definitions will apply:

a. Counterintelligence (CI). Pertains to and includes passive security control measures, offensive measures designed to counter and destroy enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive organizations and activities, and those operations of CI agencies which will aid in the dissolution of the NSDAP and affiliates and prevent their resurgence in any form.

b. CI Personnel. All personnel assigned or attached for CI duty.

c. Security. Pertains to and includes all internal, civil, frontier, travel, and port security control measures designed to ensure the protection of our military interests. (See Chapter III).

d. Internal Security Control. Pertains to the passive security control measures adopted within the military body to neutralize the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversive elements. (See Chapter III).

e. Civil Security Control. Pertains to the passive security control measures prescribed for and imposed upon the civilian population to neutralize the efforts of enemy intelligence, sabotage and subversive elements. (See Chapter III).

f. Sabotage. Pertains to any surreptitious efforts to destroy facilities and materiel vital to our forces. From a CI point of view, sabotage does not include demolition or destruction, when attempted in support of normal military operations by undisguised enemy troops. However, CI personnel will be accorded the opportunity to interrogate such of these enemy troops who may be captured. The countersabotage measures of security control will defend against all sabotage, whether or not it comes within the scope of the definition of sabotage as stated above. (See Chapter IV).

g. Subversion. Pertains to and includes the surreptitious activities of the enemy and of our own military personnel who seek to interfere with our military interests through mediums other than espionage and sabotage such as, propagandizing, rumor mongering, incitement to riot or resistance, intentional violations of security laws or regulations and organization of groups opposed to the aims of MG.

3. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

a. With the advance of our forces into GERMANY, counterintelligence, especially the security aspect thereof, has become increasingly vital. Prior to the defeat of the enemy's orthodox, organized military forces, security will become even more important; the enemy secret intelligence services, aided by fanatical and sympathetic civilians, are intensifying their efforts. Our forces are opposed by an unscrupulous enemy nation desperately fighting its last stand on its own soil against unconditional surrender.

b. The enemy secret intelligence services, security and secret police, and para-military organizations are believed to have made elaborate plans and preparations for progressively going underground as our forces advance. It is assumed that these organizations, united with other elements of the NSDAP will constitute major threats to the successful accomplishment of our military mission in GERMANY.

c. At the present time no major underground operations of an obvious or significant nature have been revealed in GERMANY. However, it is believed that the basic policy of the organized underground is of long-range character; to lie low initially, participating only in that espionage, sabotage and subversive activity which will not endanger the organization itself, pending an opportunity to regain active control under more favorable conditions. In later stages, guerrilla warfare and sporadic resistance in the form of sabotage and subversive activity, including

[illegible] from individual members of our forces and individuals who collaborate [illegible], [illegible] will be forthcoming to a much greater degree from organized [illegible] semi-organized resistance groups and fanatical individuals.

c. The ultimate defeat and disarmament of the enemy military organi[illegible] may somewhat lessen the security problem of CI. However, the new and [illegible] problems of [illegible] every vestige of the enemy secret intelli[illegible] services, security and secret police and para-military organizations, and [illegible] dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates, will then dominate all CI opera[illegible].

2. Military collapse by the enemy may be accompanied by a general condition of internal chaos and disorder. Some eight million displaced persons will [illegible] to return to their homes; many will seek revenge before departing from [illegible]. Although some individuals may attempt to ingratiate themselves in the presence of the conquerors, the belligerent attitude of the German population, [illegible] substantial percentage of which is known to be armed, probably will not undergo [illegible] early change. Resistance will probably continue to stem from semi-organized groups and individuals. Initially, there will be no dependable nor acceptable assistance available to our CI agencies from German police or other civil authorities. The organized underground will foster the continuance of unsettled conditions and will take advantage of the confusion to strengthen its position for the future; plans for the destruction of and secreting of documents, secret processes and equipment probably will have been implemented; plans for the penetration of all administrative offices, industrial programs and public enterprises to be established or supervised by MG will be set in motion; guerrilla warfare may be continued. Many enemy intelligence and police agents, war criminals and NSDAP officials, other than those individuals who upon their own initiative have escaped, hidden themselves and/or assumed new identities, and those who have gone "underground" with the organized underground movement, will seek to escape across neutral borders. Many will attempt to escape across national boundaries in the guise of displaced persons and Allied PWs. Others will surrender themselves to our control, hoping to obtain clemency in exchange for becoming informants. The arrest and detention problem in the US Zone may be increased substantially by the many agents, criminals and officials who, along with the civilians of other categories, may flee from the Russian to the US Zone. As a final premise, every native German and displaced person found within the REICH must be considered initially, from a CI point of view, a suspect individual.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Army/Military District Commanders. The operation of CI is a responsibility of Army/Military District Commanders to be discharged pursuant to the instructions contained in this directive.

b. Naval Commanders. Naval Commanders are responsible for the security of naval installations and stores ashore, and the CI precautions for all naval ships and craft in port. (See Chapter III).

c. Air Force Commanders. Air Force Commanders are responsible for the internal security of Air Force installations, and for air-travel security control.

5. ORGANIZATION. Army Commanders are responsible for concurrently:

a. Maintaining a CI organization to conduct tactical CI operations with their lower units during the advance into GERMANY.

b. Establishing progressively the organization for static CI coverage of areas conquered by their lower units in GERMANY. (See Chapter II).

6. MISSION. The CI mission of our forces within GERMANY is:

a. To provide maximum security for our military interests against espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. (See Chapter III).

b. To destroy the enemy secret intelligence services, all security or secret police and affiliated para-military organizations. (See Chapter V).

c. To assist by CI procedures in the dissolution of the NSDAP and its affiliates and in the prevention of their rebirth in any form. (See Chapter V).

d. To aid in the disposal of the German General Staff Corps, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers. (See Chapter V).

e. To detain selected enemy scientists and industrial technologists. (See Chapter V).

7. BASIC PRINCIPLES.

a. The non-fraternization policy will be considered in all CI planning and operations.

b. The security of military interests will take priority over the welfare and convenience of the enemy civilian population.

c. Every effort will be made to contain within GERMANY all persons of CI interest.

d. No arrestee, identified as coming within the categories enumerated in Table "C", Chapter V, will be released from arrest without the specific approval of this or higher headquarters.

e. Evidence collected against all persons of CI interest and War Criminals, whether captured or not, will be collected and maintained in accordance with such procedures as will ensure the maximum value of such evidence upon its admission in court. (See Chapter VI).

f. Upon capture by any agency, all known and suspect spies, saboteurs and subverters, and all persons belonging to or associated in any manner with the enemy secret intelligence services, security or secret police and the prescribed members of para-military organizations, will be referred to CI for interrogation and investigation.

g. The burden of proof as to identity and innocence will be placed upon the accused when such matters are under CI investigation.

h. Concurrent with the military advance, positive action will be taken to gather documentary and other evidence against those persons of CI interest who have fled into enemy occupied territory or who, for other reasons, remain at large.

i. US Army Commanders whose forces advance into areas to be later occupied by British, Russian or French forces will, upon withdrawal therefrom, insure prompt delivery of all CI internees and arrestees and pertinent detailed CI records to the appropriate relieving authorities, as well as such other information which has an exclusive bearing upon such areas. This principle is likewise applicable in the event that an area occupied by one US Army is turned over to another US Army.

j. Prior to surrender by the enemy, the maximum CI emphasis will be placed upon military security. Other than to satisfy the immediate requirements of military security, the search for, arrest, detention, investigation, trial and execution of judgment concerning enemy intelligence agents and subversive individuals who do not constitute an immediate threat to security will be secondary to security. However, when conditions permit, positive action will be taken concurrent with the military advance to obtain documentary and other evidence against those persons of CI interest who remain at large.

8. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE.

a. Information and Intelligence. To assist in the implementation of CI within GERMANY, Army/Military District commanders and commanders of lower echelons, where appropriate, have been, or will be supplied with information and intelligence to include the following:

(1) "BASIC HANDBOOK, GERMANY": Contains general description of historic, economic, political and administrative structures of the German nation.

(2) "GERMANY ZONE HANDBOOKS": Contain detailed information concerning specific areas in GERMANY and supplements information contained in the "BASIC HANDBOOK, GERMANY".

(3) "TARGET ADDRESSES, WEHRKREISE": Lists of the locations and also titles of certain place targets and officials of CI interest.

(4) Personality Cards (Black and White Lists): Contain information from MI 5, MI 6, MI 9, MI 14, PWE, OSS, captured documents, PW interrogations, field reports, Allied governmental and miscellaneous sources, regarding personalities of the enemy intelligence services; renegades of Allied nationality; officials of General Civil Administration; Police, including Feldgendarmerie; SS; party members or members of para-military organizations, and persons who may be helpful to the Allies or prove useful as informants.

(5) "CI HANDBOOK, GERMANY": A general guide to the main administrative and intelligence agencies of the Nazi state.

(6) "IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN GERMANY": Contains information and examples of the categories of identity and other documents now carried by Germans, alien laborers and free aliens in the REICH.

(7) "Wanted" Lists: Details concerning individuals of CI interest who were previously unknown to CI and who continue to remain at large; to be distributed periodically by this headquarters.

(8) SCI Information.

(9) Summaries of CI information of general and special interest.

(10) Periodic CI Reports.

(11) Miscellaneous CI studies pertaining to the enemy intelligence services, security or secret police, para-military organizations and other organizations within or affiliated with the NSDAP, German General Staff, enemy scientists and industrial technologists.

b. Field Sources of Information and Intelligence. Appropriate commanders will collect additional CI information in the field through:

(1) The interrogation of arrestees.

(2) The study of captured documents.

(3) The interrogation of appropriate PWs.

(4) The reports of voluntary and paid informants.

(5) The interrogation of civilians (other than arrestees and informants).

(6) Use of undercover agents.

(7) Coordination with MG, PM, P & PW, Signal Corps and the personnel of other appropriate staff sections.

c. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) The German Intelligence Services, RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and subordinate or affiliated agencies including:

(a) SD.
(b) Abwehr.
(c) GFP (Geheimefeldpolizei).
(d) Jagdverbaende.

Information on personalities, organizations, headquarters, methods of operation, location of sabotage dumps, training programs and schools, future operations in post-hostility period and cooperation or dissension between services.

(2) Military, Para-Military and Police Organizations including:

(a) Waffen SS (Schutzstaffeln).

(b) Allgemeine SS (Schutzstaffeln).

(c) SA (Sturmabteilung).

(d) NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer Korps).

(e) HJ and BDM (Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels).

(f) NSFK (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps).

(g) Orpo (Ordnungspolizei), including Technische Nothilfe.

(h) Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei), including Kripo (Reichs-Kriminalpolizei), Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) and Grenzpolizei.

Here the emphasis should be placed upon secret communication systems of the above organizations, definite knowledge of local personalities, names and addresses of leaders, names of outstanding members, as well as any recent changes in programs or organization. Priority on information concerning plans for postwar underground activity.

(3) Other Party Organizations including:

(a) NSF (Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft).
(b) RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst).
(c) DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront).
(d) NSV (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt).
(e) VDA (Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland).

Information on local personalities, with stress on fanatical members.

(4) Local Officials.

(a) Oberbuergermeister, Buergermeister or Landrat.
(b) Gauleiter and members of Gauleitung.
(c) Kreisleiter and members of Kreisleitung.
(d) Ortsgruppenleiter and members of Ortsgruppenleitung.
(e) Zellenleiter.
(f) Blockleiter.

Detailed information concerning activities, length of time in office, degree of fanaticism and location of offices.

(5) Anti-Nazi Personalities and Underground Movements.

(a) Information concerning names, addresses, background and activities of anti-Nazi individuals, with an estimate of their degree of hostility to the party and an evaluation of their basic patriotism and loyalty to GERMANY.

(b) Information concerning organized anti-Nazi resistance movements, their leaders, activities, symbols or insignia and the evaluation of the degree to which they may be of assistance to Allied Forces.

(6) Miscellaneous information concerning:

(a) Plans for escape of Nazi officials.

(b) Personalities involved in war crimes.

(c) Ordensburgen and Junkerschulen; location, training programs, known graduates and their present activities.

(d) Current attitude towards the war and postwar period on the part of German youth and German women.

(e) Volkssturm (Peoples Army); organization, plans, degree of training, evaluation of effectiveness during military operations, and its possible effectiveness after cessation of hostilities.

(f) Functions and capabilities of individual enemy scientists and industrial technologists as related to their future contributions to the recreation of GERMANY as a first class military power.

(g) Communications of subversive organizations.

9. RESOURCES. The following personnel, facilities and funds are or will be made available to G-2 for CI:

a. Allied CI Liaison Personnel. Personnel of Allied CI services attached to the G-2 Sections of this Headquarters, Army/Military District and certain other headquarters. Their function is to provide liaison between the headquarters to which they are attached and the security services of the nation which they represent. In addition, they perform important functions relating to the security screening of their own nationals in GERMANY. (See Chapter X).

b. CI Branch (CIB) Personnel. Assigned CI staff personnel of G-2 sections. Their functions, under the direction of the G-2 of the appropriate headquarters are to formulate CI policy and to supervise generally all CI operations and the activities of attached CI personnel.

c. CI Corps (CIC) Personnel. Personnel attached to the G-2 Sections of this Headquarters, Armies, Corps, Divisions, Military Districts and certain other headquarters. CIC personnel are trained to perform all general CI operations. (See Chapter VIII).

d. Intelligence Laboratory. Laboratory facilities are available at this headquarters for the scientific analysis of items believed to have an evidence value of CI interest. (See Chapter XI). This facility is available to Hq, 6th Army Group.

e. Machine Records Unit Facilities. The basic information contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index held by this headquarters has been recorded on Machine Record Unit cards. Various rosters and other information can be reproduced expeditiously by this method of recording and will be supplied to appropriate headquarters, including those of 6th Army Group, upon request. (See Chapter VII).

f. Civil Censorship Facilities. These facilities will be made available to CI personnel to assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission. (See Chapter XII).

g. Combat and Service Troops. Commanding Generals of Armies, Corps, Divisions, Military Districts and certain other headquarters having attached CI elements will provide them with the requisite combat and service troops, equipped with transportation necessary to effect arrests and searches, escort arrestees, patrol and guard the frontier and the Prohibited Frontier Zone, guard arrestees and premises, and afford protection to CI personnel. In order that combat and service troops may perform their CI work with maximum efficiency, CI personnel will be required to train them in the techniques of their special duties; therefore, consideration should be given to the permanent detail of specific troops to assist in CI operations.

h. Confidential G-2 Funds. These funds have been allotted to this Headquarters, Armies, Corps and Divisions and will be allotted to Military Districts and certain other headquarters for confidential G-2 purposes.

i. Countersabotage Officers. This headquarters and each Army/Military District headquarters will have available a specially trained Engineer officer to recommend countersabotage protective measures and a specially trained CIC officer to supervise countersabotage investigations. (Chapter IV).

j. Document Center Facilities. Centers for the examination of captured documents and the preparation of reports relating thereto, including those of CI interest, will be established and operated under G-2 supervision by this headquarters and the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts. Frequently, by reason of their being the first troops to discover and identify documents, CI personnel will be able to render valuable assistance to Document Centers. CI personnel will report promptly to Document Centers, through G-2 channels, information pertaining

to the source, location, nature and volume of documents discovered. Small quantities of documents will be transmitted to Document Centers or placed for safekeeping in a local general repository; the location of large repositories of documents will be reported to the nearest tactical commander in order that he may take necessary action to preserve them.

k. Document Sections. Prior to the establishment of Document Centers, Document Sections at Army Group and Armies will assist in CI matters to the fullest possible extent.

l. Internment Camps. Internment Camps for the detention of CI arrestees will be established by Army/Military District Commanders. (See Chapter VI).

m. Interrogation Centers. Interrogation Centers having CI Annexes will be established at this headquarters and at each Army/Military District headquarters for the purpose of interrogating certain CI arrestees. The CI Annex of the Interrogation Center of this headquarters will be made available to Hq, 6th Army Group. (See Chapter VI).

n. Interrogation, Prisoners of War (IPW) Team Personnel. As the normal work of this personnel decreases, they will be assigned exclusively to assist CI personnel in the accomplishment of the CI mission. Prior thereto, they will assist in CI operations to the fullest possible extent.

o. Military Censorship Facilities. These facilities may be utilized by CI personnel in requesting examination of specific written or wire communications of military personnel. Periodic military censorship reports will be examined for indications of local and general matters of CI interest.

p. Military Intelligence Interpreter (MII) Team Personnel. As the normal work of this personnel decreases, they will be assigned exclusively to assist CI personnel in the accomplishment of the CI mission. Prior thereto, they will assist in CI operations to such extent as is possible.

q. Prohibited Frontier Zone. A Prohibited Frontier Zone, from which all unauthorized persons will be evacuated, is being established along the German frontier to assist in the implementation of frontier control. (See Chapter III).

r. Radio Direction-Finding Facilities. The services of mobile equipment and operators for the detection of clandestine radio transmitters are available through this headquarters. (See Chapter IX).

s. Security Committees. In order to achieve the maximum degree of cooperation, joint security committees of CI and MG Public Safety representatives, together with representatives of other interested agencies, may be formed in all

suitable areas to consider policy and action upon matters of common security interest.

t. Security Enforcement. The Provost Marshal is responsible for assisting MG in the enforcement of civil law and order, including security measures, through military police, MG Security Guards or other troops, where the civil police or other civil law enforcing agencies are not available. CI, MG and PM will insure that close cooperation and mutual assistance exist among them in the enforcement of security measures upon the civilian population.

u. Special CI (SCI) Personnel. Personnel attached to the G-2 Sections of this headquarters, Army/Military District headquarters and certain other headquarters. This personnel functions largely as advisers and as a means for conveying special information to CI branches on CI matters. (See Chapter IX).

v. Technical Assistance. When CI personnel require assistance of a technical nature, such as for the severing of communications and the clearing of mines or booby traps, qualified technical personnel from service units will be made available to them by appropriate commanders.

w. Teletype Network. This headquarters will provide, as soon as practicable, for CI teletype communications from this headquarters to the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts, and laterally between the headquarters of Armies/Military Districts. Commanders of Armies/Military Districts will provide for CI teletype communications within their command during the static phase as follows:

(1) At headquarters Army/Military District to subordinate headquarters of Military Sub-Districts and Internment Camps.

(2) Laterally between all headquarters of Military Sub-Districts and Internment Camps.

(3) Between Frontier Security Control Posts. (See Chapter III).

10. COORDINATION AND LIAISON. All CI personnel will coordinate matters of mutual interest and maintain liaison with:

a. CI elements of adjacent commands.
b. MG personnel, particularly Public Safety Officers.
c. G-1 personnel.
d. PM personnel, including MP and CID personnel.
e. JA personnel, including War Crimes Investigators.

f. "T" Force.
g. Civil Censorship personnel.

11.

12.

13.

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER II

CI ORGANIZATION

14. GENERAL. Army commanders are responsible for concurrently:

a. Maintaining a CI organization to conduct tactical CI operations with their lower units during the advance into GERMANY.

b. Establishing progressively the organization for the static CI coverage of areas conquered by their lower units in GERMANY.

15. PLANNING PRINCIPLES. The easterly advance of the Armies will gradually open territory in which the inherent problems of frontier security control, area security control, security control of major cities, and security control of the Rhine River crossings will require the immediate and continuous attention of CI personnel. In addition to these security problems, numerous targets of CI interest will be uncovered and will require exploitation over relatively long periods of time.

a. Experience has shown that CI coverage in a static area is effected most efficiently when the supervision of the area is continued under the control of the CI unit which instituted the original coverage.

b. The rapid easterly advance of the Armies, and the initial shortage of CI personnel, make it immediately necessary to prepare plans for the organization of static CI coverage, including the allocation of the present supply of CI personnel into areas and tasks where their efforts will render the most effective results.

16. ALLOCATION OF CI PERSONNEL. This headquarters will attach CI personnel to Armies/Military Districts in accordance with the various pertinent provisions of this directive. Army/Military District Commanders will allocate CI personnel to their lower commands and will provide for the augmentation of CI personnel from appropriate intelligence or other personnel sources under their control.

a. While Corps are tactically employed, Corps Commanders will be responsible for maintaining the CI support of their own operations, and, in accordance with Army instructions, will initially establish the static CI organization using the CI personnel allocated by Armies for that purpose.

b. While Divisions are tactically employed, Division Commanders will be responsible for maintaining the CI support of their own operations.

c. When Corps and Divisions are in static areas, Corps and Division Commanders will be responsible for the internal security control of their respective commands. However, Army/Military District commanders may make Corps and Division commanders responsible for CI coverage within a specific area or may withdraw CI personnel from Corps and Divisions.

17. ORGANIZATION FOR CI STATIC OPERATIONS.

a. Attached as Appendix I is a chart illustrating the currently planned organization for CI static operations.

b. A chart illustrating the organization of the CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters is attached as Appendix II.

c. A chart illustrating the suggested organization of the CI Branch, G-2 Section of an Army/Military District, is attached as Appendix III.

d. The details pertaining to the organization of the CI Annex of an Army/Military District Interrogation Center are included in Chapter VI.

e. The details pertaining to the CI staff of an Army/Military District Internment Camp are included in Chapter VI.

f. The details pertaining to Frontier Security Control Posts are included in Chapter III.

g. Headquarters of CI Sub-Districts will be organized by Army/Military District commanders.

h. The CI organizations required for security control and other CI operations in urban and inter-urban areas will be organized, as necessary, to function under the supervision of the headquarters of the appropriate CI Sub-Districts.

18.

19.

20.

CI STATIC ORGANIZATION

APPENDIX I



COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) BRANCH
G-2 SECTION, HQ. 12TH ARMY GROUP/US ZONE



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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI) BRANCH
G-2 SECTION, HQ. ARMIES/MILITARY DISTRICTS



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HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER III

SECURITY CONTROL

21. INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL. All commanders will continue to be responsible at all times for the internal security of their commands in GERMANY.

a. All personnel will be thoroughly instructed in the fundamentals of individual security discipline, and the non-fraternization policy will be enforced strictly.

b. Adequate patrols, guards, sentries, physical barriers, countersigns and countersabotage measures are essential aids to internal security control and will be employed to the fullest extent.

c. All measures necessary for the safeguarding of classified material will be implemented and continually checked for effectiveness.

d. Civilians will not be transported in military vehicles, except when expressly authorized in writing by appropriate military authorities. (See letter, this headquarters, file 230 (PM), dated 5 November 1944, subject: "Carrying civilians in military transportation".)

e. Enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent nationals may be employed by our forces for menial tasks or for work directly concerned with enemy civilian welfare or similar activities. They will not be employed in any case unless all efforts have failed to procure the necessary personnel from (1) US and Allied military resources, (2) nationals of liberated territories, or (3) non-Germans in GERMANY. They will not be employed under conditions which would foster fraternization or give them access to classified information or vital parts of the military establishment.

f. (1) Displaced persons, who are not enemy, ex-enemy or co-belligerent nationals, may be employed by Allied military units and agencies after due consideration of security requirements. The employing unit or agency is responsible that CI clearance is obtained in doubtful cases.

(2) CI clearance initially will be provisional only. It will be based upon a personal interview with the prospective employee and a name check against available records. Final clearance will be made by MG in conjunction with CI. Prior to final clearance,

employment will be provisional only. Upon provisional employment, the employee will be required by his prospective employer to fill out the required Fragebogen which will be sent to MG for evaluation. This evaluation will be made by MG in accordance with Section VI of the Public Safety Manual of Procedures. CI investigative agencies and data will be available to MG to assist in the final clearing of the provisional employee.

g. Countersabotage measures will be established and maintained. (See Chapter IV).

22. CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL. The security control of the civilian population in occupied GERMANY is a command responsibility which is exercised normally through MG, in close consultation with CI. In general, all civilian control regulations are published by MG in the form of proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and other enactments and are rigidly enforced by MG Detachments through their supervision of the German police and other resources available to them. The closest working relationships will be maintained by MG Detachments and CI staffs and personnel. Wherever practicable, MG Detachments will serve as the channel for dealing with agencies of the public and will insure, in particular, that requisite police assistance is given to CI personnel. However, in emergencies and on routine matters, CI personnel will deal directly with appropriate police agencies. To coordinate security matters, joint security committees may be established, consisting of representatives of all agencies concerned with the security control of the civil population. The following information, policies and instructions are of particular interest to CI:

a. Security Control Regulations.

(1) Blackout. Blackout will be observed as directed by the responsible military commander.

(2) Curfew. A curfew will be imposed on all civilians as directed by the appropriate military commander. When essential, exemptions from curfew may be granted by MG to certain classes of persons.

(3) Travel Restrictions. Where travel restrictions are necessary, MG will establish check systems at road barriers, bridges, railway stations and docks.

a. Initially, civilians will be prohibited from travelling more than six kilometers from their homes, except by virtue of a MG pass.

b. Travel by motor vehicles or train will be permitted only by MG pass.

c. Civilian motor transport will be used only in the interests of our forces.

d. Civilians will not be transported in military vehicles except when expressly authorized in writing by appropriate military authorities. (See letter, this headquarters, file 230 (PM), dated 5 November 1944, subject: "Carrying civilians in military transportation".)

e. MG may authorize German transport agencies to issue permits for their own circulation within a fifty mile radius of a given point. However, circulation beyond that distance will require specific MG approval.

(4) Documents.

a. Identity Cards. All civilians twelve years of age and older will be required by MG to carry identity cards at all times. Any recognized document such as a Kennkarte, Wehrpass, Mitgliedsbuch, Arbeitsbuch or MG Form DP/1 identity card will be satisfactory, initially, as valid identification. At some later date, new identity documents containing photographs, fingerprints, registration numbers and other identifying data may become necessary, in which case a standard form and procedure will be prescribed by this headquarters.

b. Passes, Permits and Exemptions. MG will be responsible for the preparation and issuance of passes, permits and exemptions pertaining to security restrictions. CI, in consultation with MG, will be responsible for determining the applicable policy and will work in close coordination with MG in the implementation of such policy. Exemptions from security restrictions will be held to the minimum.

1. CI personnel will be supplied by MG with forms for the issuance of passes and permits in special cases only. Normally, MG will issue passes, permits and exemptions for CI purposes.

2. Particular precautions will be taken by MG to insure that there is strict accountability for all exemption forms, passes and official stamps.

[redacted]

3. Exemption forms will be numbered.

c. Forgeries. MG will report to CI all forgeries of CI interest, including forgeries of identity cards, permits and passes.

(5) Political Activity and Meetings.

a. Political Activity. Political activity of any kind will be prohibited by MG.

b. Public Meetings. Gatherings of more than five persons for purposes of discussion, either public or private (except those of an immediate family or when authorized by MG) will be prohibited by MG.

c. Religious Meetings. Bonafide religious services should not be curtailed. However, religious authorities will furnish MG due notice of the time and place of all proposed religious services in order that such services may be observed by MG or CI personnel.

(6) Prohibited Articles.

a. Cameras. Civilians will not be permitted to use cameras or photographic material.

b. Firearms and other Lethal Weapons. All firearms, ammunition, explosives and other lethal weapons will be collected and securely impounded by MG. Firearms and limited supplies of ammunition may be reissued to police by MG after clearance by CI.

c. Pigeons. Pigeon flights will be prohibited by MG. Public notice thereof will be given by MG and the pigeons will be confiscated or collected by MG. The birds, if not desired by the Signal Corps, will either be killed or have their wings clipped.

d. Radio Transmitters. MG will prohibit possession of and will collect all radio transmitters and actual or possible radio communication devices, regardless of power or type, or will require that such transmitters and devices be placed under the control of US Army authorities.

[redacted]

c. Uniform. Civilians will not be permitted to wear US uniforms or any part thereof. (See letter, this headquarters, file 421 (G-2), dated 10 November 44, subject: Unauthorized Wearing of United States Uniform.)

(7) Security Control Check Points and Security Control Raids.

a. Security Control Check Points. CI, in conjunction with MG and PM, will establish check points, where appropriate, for the "snap" security checking of civilians.

b. Security Control Raids. CI, in conjunction with MG and PM, will conduct unannounced periodic raids in civil communities for the purpose of checking the effectiveness of the enforcement of security regulations.

(8) Violations of Security Control Regulations. Violations of security control regulations will not be overlooked under any circumstances. Suitable publicity will be given to the punishment of offenders. MG will inform CI of any serious, extensive violations or of evidence of organized activity detrimental to security.

b. Wehrmacht, Volkssturm and Todt Personnel.

(1) Wehrmacht Personnel.

a. Former Members of the Wehrmacht. All persons who served in the Wehrmacht at any time will be required by MG order to register themselves with MG. In addition to personal details, this registration should include dates of service, branch of service, highest rank attained and date of and reason for the last discharge.

1. Wehrmacht personnel discharged by the Germans prior to the cessation of hostilities should have a Wehrpass giving details of their service.

2. Members of the Wehrmacht discharged by the Allied authorities subsequent to the cessation of hostilities will not have a Wehrpass in their possession but should have a discharge certificate.

b. Discharged Wehrmacht Personnel. Discharged Wehrmacht personnel are to be treated as civilians and, as such, are not entitled to PW status.

c. Deserters in Civilian Clothing.

1. Any person in civilian clothing who is determined to be a Wehrmacht deserter will be treated as a PW.

According to the circumstances of the capture of the deserter, the nature of the military identification carried by him and whether such identification was carried openly or hidden on the person, and the prisoner's statement under interrogation will accompany all German soldiers evacuated in civilian clothing. This report may be written on the reverse side of the Arrest Form which must accompany all persons evacuated in civilian clothing through PW channels.

(2) Volkssturm. Captured members of the Volkssturm will be treated as lawful belligerents and given a PW status, provided that:

a. They were commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

b. They wear the prescribed armlet bearing the German emblem and the words "Deutscher Volkssturm".

c. They carry arms openly.

d. They conduct their operations in accordance with laws and usages of war.

(3) Todt Workers. Foreign workers in the OT will be treated as displaced persons; German OT workers as refugees and will be screened as such. The officers and uniformed guards thereof will be disarmed by combat troops and placed in concentration areas pending disbandment. There is no CI arrest category in OT. The static organization is not of CI interest and its headquarters are not CI targets. It will be dissolved, disarmed and disbanded locally by MG.

c. Allied Military and United Nations Personnel.

(1) Allied PWs. When not detained as security suspects, persons of Allied nationality who claim to have been PWs and are encountered outside PW camps, will be referred to MG to be cared for, initially, as United Nations displaced persons.

(2) Escapers and Evaders. When not detained as security suspects, persons who claim to be members of the Allied Military forces who have escaped or evaded capture by the enemy and are encountered in the course of military operations will be referred to MG to be treated initially as United Nations displaced persons

(3) United Nations Nationals Demobilized From the German Armed Forces. Such individuals when not detained as security suspects will be referred to MG for disposition.

(4) United Nations Nationals Who Are Members of the German Armed Forces and Captured While in Uniform. Those not detained as security suspects will be treated as PWs.

d. Concentration Camps, Political Prisoners and Internees.

(1) Concentration Camps. Army/Military District Commanders, upon the occupation of an area, will insure that all places of detention, including concentration camps, are promptly seized and investigated and that the cases of the inmates are reviewed with the least practicable delay.

a. All concentration camp guards and staffs will be arrested and detained by MG.

b. Each concentration camp will be provided with an MG Administrative Staff which will include such CI representation as may be necessary under the circumstances.

c. Each concentration camp will establish a Case Review Board which will include CI representation, to review the cases of inmates and make specific recommendations as to their disposal.

(2) Political Prisoners. CI personnel will assist MG in dealing with security suspects uncovered by MG examination of persons held in detention as political prisoners by the Germans.

(3) Allied Civilian Internees. When not detained as security suspects, US and British civilians who claim to have been civilian internees and are encountered outside Internment Camps, will be referred to MG to be cared for, initially, as United Nations displaced persons.

e. Displaced Persons and Miscellaneous Personnel.

(1) Displaced Persons. Displaced persons are those civilians who, by reason of war, are outside the national boundaries of their country and are (1) desirous, but unable, to return home or find homes, or (2) are to be returned to enemy, ex-enemy or co-belligerent territory.

a. The care and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is a MG responsibility. Displaced persons in this category will be restrained in place until such time as facilities are available to transport these persons, in sealed trains or trucks, to Reception Centers outside GERMANY where appropriate national authorities will arrange for the care, fooding and repatriation of their respective subjects. These national authorities will be responsible for the CI screening of such persons in order to insure that none of the persons categorized in Table C, Chapter V, have escaped through displaced persons channels. In addition, they are responsible for making security checks of all displaced persons of the United Nations.

b. The control and repatriation of enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent displaced persons will be a responsibility of the German authorities, acting under MG supervision.

c. MG will have available Allied Liaison Officers for Repatriation to assist in the processing of the displaced persons of their nations. Their specific duties include:

1. Issuing repatriation visas.

2. Assisting MG in the verification of identity and registration of their nationals.

3. Assisting military authorities and appropriate Allied CI liaison personnel in making security checks of their nationals.

d. MG and CI personnel are jointly responsible for insuring that none of the persons categorized in Table C, Chapter V, escape from GERMANY through displaced persons channels.

e. The security check of displaced persons by CI personnel, assisted by appropriate Allied CI liaison personnel, at Displaced Persons Assembly Centers, will consist of:

1. Identifying the individual, with the aid of the Allied Liaison Officer for Repatriation concerned.

2. Checking the name of the individual against available CI records.

3. Conducting such additional investigation as is practicable and necessary.

f. Displaced persons found travelling without authority will be interrogated by CI personnel and, if not detained as security suspects, will be referred to MG for disposition.

g. Processing centers for displaced persons will maintain rosters of persons received therein and checks will be made to insure that all persons received in the camp are present. Names of missing persons will be reported to CI in order that prompt search for such persons may be instituted.

h. United Nations displaced persons, while awaiting repatriation, if approved by the appropriate Allied Liaison Officer for Repatriation, will be given the opportunity to join the armed forces of their country or engage in approved civilian work.

i. In order to prevent the infiltration and escape of "wanted" persons, as well as the smuggling of documents, funds, and goods, MG will insure that:

1. Only displaced persons who have been thoroughly searched and security checked are loaded into trains, trucks or other vehicles for movement out of GERMANY.

2. The transporting of displaced persons from the loading point to and across the German frontier is accomplished in "sealed" and guarded trains or convoys.

(2) Expatriates. When not detained as security suspects, persons who claim to be United Nations expatriates, i.e., United Nations nationals permanently residing in but not nationals of GERMANY, will be referred to MG for disposition.

(3) Stateless Persons. When not detained as security suspects, stateless persons, including stateless persons of German origin, will be referred to MG for disposition. Such persons will be handled under the same procedure as those for the processing of United Nations displaced persons.

(4) Neutrals. When not detained as security suspects, neutral displaced persons will be referred to MG for disposition and will be accorded the same assistance granted to United Nations displaced persons.

(5) Enemy, Ex-enemy and Co-belligerent Nationals. Enemy, ex-enemy and co-belligerent nationals will be identified and registered by MG. Those whose freedom of movement might endanger the security of our forces, or who are otherwise undesirable, will be interned by CI or their activities will be curtailed to the extent necessary under the circumstances.

(6) Enemy Diplomatic and Consular Officials. Enemy diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be issued.

f. Enemy Civilian Labor and Employees.

(1) Civilian Labor. MG will prohibit and suppress strikes and lockouts which threaten security.

(2) Civilian Employees.

a. MG will consult with CI when doubt exists as to the political tendencies of an official or employee directly or indirectly supervised by MG.

b. Civilian employees of the Army will be granted no special privileges not necessitated by their official duties.

g. Civil Communications.

(1) Under the provisions of MG Law No. 76 (Amended) entitled, "Posts, Telephones, Telegraphs and Radio", all telephone and telegraph and radio services (inland, foreign, and transit) and all internal, external, and transit mail services are suspended in GERMANY. The reopening of such suspended communications is a command function and will be conducted strictly in

accordance with procedure outlined in paragraph 5 of Circular No. 2, this headquarters, dated 15 January 1945. subject: "Civil Censorship in GERMANY."

(2) All active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers will be removed from the Reichspost by MG, assisted by CI. Other Reichspost employees may be required to remain at their positions until otherwise ordered by MG. MG will inform Reichspost officials that they will be held responsible for taking all precautions to prevent the sabotage of communications and any interference with the carrying out of MG instructions covering the operation of communications facilities.

(3) MG will arrange for the impounding and protection of all mail found to be in course of circulation and will inform G-2 (Censorship) of the measures taken. Such mail will be disposed of pursuant to censorship instructions. However, CI personnel will be permitted to examine such of the mail as may be of immediate CI interest.

(4) MG will arrange for the guarding and protection of post offices, telephone exchanges, repeater stations, and other premises vital to communications.

h. Propaganda and Information Services.

(1) Propaganda. Propagation of enemy doctrines in any form will be prohibited by MG.

(2) Public Information Services. MG will prohibit unauthorized German operation of press services, radio stations, printing facilities, public entertainment facilities, and other facilities for the dissemination of news and information. Operation of such public information services by civilians will not be permitted without the approval of this headquarters.

i. Countersabotage.

(1) MG will direct that officials of all German agencies insure the countersabotage protection of all facilities directly or indirectly under civil control. MG will notify appropriate German authorities, officials and employees that they are held responsible for the safeguarding of structures, installations, equipment, stores, fuels and facilities and for the preservation of documents, information and records. MG will be responsible for arranging

for the guarding of all civilian premises vital to our military interests. Incidents which, after preliminary investigation by MG appear to involve sabotage, will be referred to CI by MG.

23. FRONTIER SECURITY CONTROL. Frontier security control will be established and GERMANY will be "sealed off".

a. Frontier security control is a command responsibility to be exercised by the Army or Military District commander in whose zone of operations any part of the borders of GERMANY, as of 1937, is located.

b. The "sealing off" of GERMANY by the imposition of rigid frontier control measures is required in order to:

(1) Assist in the detection and the prevention of the movements of personnel, communications and funds of the German intelligence services, secret police and para-military organizations and of any underground subversive organization out of occupied GERMANY.

(2) Prevent the escape of Black List and categorized individuals enumerated in Table C, Chapter V, War Criminals and other "wanted" persons.

(3) Assist in the control of displaced persons.

(4) Prevent all unauthorized movements into and out of GERMANY of persons, communications including documents of all kinds, funds and property, particularly those funds and properties illegally acquired.

c. Military Government Law No. 161 has been revised to prohibit movement into the "Prohibited Frontier Zone" as well as the unauthorized movement of persons, goods and property over the frontier of GERMANY. This law will be published to the German people by MG, and the appropriate German authorities will be instructed by MG to enforce this prohibition. The following persons only will be authorized to cross the German frontier:

(1) Persons who are in possession of valid US, British or Allied Military Identity Documents and appropriate travel orders.

(2) Persons having in their possession a properly executed AEF Permit issued by SHAEF authority and a valid national passport.

(3) Displaced persons identified as moving for repatriation, under the auspices, responsibility, and supervision of MG.

(4) Frontaliers travelling pursuant to the provision of subparagraph m, below.

(5) War Correspondents holding War Correspondents' licenses issued by US, British or other Allied Service Departments and who are accredited to SHAEF.

d. To assist in the implementation of frontier security control, responsible commanders will establish a "Prohibited Frontier Zone", paralleling and adjacent to the German frontier and extending approximately five kilometers into German territory. The commander responsible for an area will fix the exact zone and is authorized to vary the inner line thereof to conform to natural barriers or to avoid the evacuation of large centers of population, such as AACHEN.

(1) All persons, except those expressly authorized to remain therein, who are not members of the Allied armed forces, civilian agencies and employees attached thereto, will be evacuated immediately from the Prohibited Frontier Zone into GERMANY.

(2) After the Prohibited Frontier Zone has been evacuated, all unauthorized movement into it will be prohibited. Only those persons authorized to cross the German frontier will be permitted to enter the Prohibited Frontier Zone and then only on the routes specifically designated for such travel.

(3) The specific travel routes for use by individuals authorized to cross the Prohibited Frontier Zone and the German frontier will be announced by the responsible military commanders. Railways will normally remain open; however, appropriate commanders will select the minimum number of highways required for civilian travel only through the Prohibited Frontier Zone and will publicize them as "authorized civilian travel routes". All roads and footpaths, not specifically designated as military "main supply routes" or as "authorized civilian travel routes" will, at the inner and outer boundaries of the Prohibited Frontier Zone, have erected thereon physical barriers constructed so as to prevent ingress without force, by vehicles or persons travelling on the road or pathway. In addition, such barriers will be posted with notices prohibiting movement into the Prohibited Frontier Zone and specifying the nearest route for authorized civilian travel through the Prohibited Frontier Zone.

(4) MG will make appropriate public notification of the Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions and will widely publicize the punishments of violators as announced by MG courts.

(5) All persons who act, or conspire to act, in violation of Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions will be apprehended and placed under immediate arrest. Such persons will be escorted to the nearest Frontier Security Control Post for interrogation and investigation.

(6) Unauthorized persons who, without intent to violate Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions, seek permission from Prohibited Frontier Zone guards to cross the Prohibited Frontier Zone on the routes specifically designated for travel, will be denied permission and will be referred to the nearest MG agency responsible for displaced persons and refugees. Notices in all appropriate languages will be prominently displayed at the entrances to the Prohibited Frontier Zone on the military main supply routes and the authorized civilian travel routes to inform all concerned of the location of the nearest MG establishment responsible for displaced persons and refugees.

e. The Communications Zone is making available to this headquarters and to Hq, 6th Army Group a limited number of CIC teams, type B-3, which will be placed under the operational control of Army Group headquarters initially. This personnel will man the several Frontier Security Control Posts in the Prohibited Frontier Zone.

f. Army commanders will provide the troops, equipped with necessary transportation and radio communications, for Frontier and Prohibited Frontier Zone guards, patrols and escorts. CIC personnel will not be employed as guards and patrols but may be used as escorts under unusual circumstances involving special cases of CI interest. Whenever practicable, aerial reconnaissance patrols of the Prohibited Frontier Zone will be established. The aircraft so employed should have direct communication with ground patrol personnel in order to facilitate the capture of persons making "cross-country" traverses of the prohibited Frontier Zone.

g. SHAEF has retained responsibility for negotiating the broad policy agreements necessary for frontier control purposes between liberated and neutral nations and the Allied armed forces. However, the responsible Army/Military District Commander will consult with the local frontier guard representatives of the nation concerned regarding any possible local assistance and local frontier control operational procedures and responsibilities.

h. Existing German frontier control authorities and personnel will be discharged by MG in consultation with CI at the earliest opportunity. At a later time, personnel of the purged and reorganized German frontier control organizations may be allowed to operate under strict CI supervision and control.

i. The responsible Army/Military District commander will provide:

(1) Teletype and telephone facilities for communication between the Chief, CIB, at Army/Military District Headquarters and the Frontier Security Control Posts and between all Frontier Security Control Posts in his area.

(2) Radio facilities for communication between Frontier Security Control Posts and Frontier Security Control Patrols.

(3) Telephone facilities for communication between Frontier Security Control Posts and all fixed Frontier Security Control Guard Posts.

j. Frontier Security Control Posts are established within the Prohibited Frontier Zone on each route authorized for travel through the Zone. The function of the CI personnel operating the Frontier Security Control Posts will be to:

(1) Identify and examine the credentials of those travellers who are escorted to the Post by border patrol troops.

(2) Detain, interrogate, investigate and render appropriate reports upon apprehended violators of the Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions. A check of the Black List will be made as part of the preliminary investigation of all violators apprehended.

(3) Insure delivery to the appropriate Internment Camp or Interrogation Center of those arrestees who are considered to be security suspects, together with Arrest Reports giving full details concerning the arrestees.

(4) Insure that those violators of Prohibited Frontier Zone instructions who are not detained as security suspects are escorted to MG. A full report concerning the capture of each violator will accompany the violator.

(5) Conduct searches and examinations of persons and effects as deemed necessary. Particular attention will be given to luggage which might contain radio transmitters, sabotage devices, etc.

(6) Insure that persons crossing the frontiers of GERMANY are not carrying unauthorized communications.

(7) Make daily inspections to determine the effectiveness of the implementation of frontier security control measures and, when necessary, make recommendations to appropriate authorities for the improvement thereof.

(8) Effect security checks of railroad crews and passengers on international trips.

(9) Maintain close working liaison and coordination at their level with adjacent Frontier Security Control Posts, the frontier control personnel of the bordering nation and with MG Border Control Stations or other MG agencies.

k. Unauthorized persons who attempt to enter GERMANY will be handed over to the frontier control authorities of the country from which they enter unless they are wanted by the Allied occupational authorities.

l. MG will establish Border Control Stations upon the frontier of GERMANY in order to process displaced persons arriving thereat.

m. Agreements and the issuance of permits pertaining to frontaliers will be an MG responsibility for handling locally in consultation with CI when conditions are stablized. However, frontaliers will not be granted access to the Prohibited Frontier Zone except to pass through on the civilian travel routes specifically authorized for such travel. A standardized travel permit form for issuance to frontaliers will be provided by this headquarters when received from higher headquarters.

24. PORT SECURITY CONTROL.

a. Port security control is a responsibility of the US Port Enclave Commander. It will embody all appropriate internal, civil, frontier and travel security control policies and measures contained in this directive.

b. To assist in the implementation of port security control, several CIC port teams will be made available to the Port Enclave Commander from the CIC Occupation Detachment. The Port Enclave Commander will provide CIC Port teams with the water transportation necessary to accomplish their duties.

c. (1) The staff of the Port Enclave Commander will include a CI staff element (CIB, G-2) to which will be attached appropriate CI operating personnel such as CIC and SCI.

(2) The Chief, CIB, G-2 Section of the Port Enclave will, in addition to his normal duties, act as advisor on CI matters to Naval and other authorities in the Port Enclave.

d. The specific duties of the Officer in Charge of each CIC Port Team will include the following:

(1) Implement directives and instructions relating to travel control received from the Port Commander.

(2) Conduct security surveys within the Port area and recommend to the Port Commander those measures designed to insure the security of merchant ships and installations ashore. (Each Port Commander is responsible that masters of merchant vessels conform to security regulations of the port and mount adequate sentries and guards.

(3) Plan and supervise the control of entry to, and exit from, the dock areas from the landward side and from ship to shore. (Initially, and for a considerable period thereafter, shore leave for merchant vessel personnel will be prohibited; if such shore leave is permitted, it will be controlled and regulated by the Port Commander and passes will be issued by CIC Port Teams.)

(4) Establish and supervise the necessary security check and control of civilian labor and personnel, and persons with business in the port, to whom passes are issued for entry into the dock areas.

(5) Board and search any vessel or craft, (other than Allied Naval vessels) when deemed desirable for travel control or other CI purposes. Register all fishing vessels and harbor craft and screen their crews before they are permitted to operate in or out of the Port Enclave.

(6) Within the port area, establish and coordinate measures to prevent illicit communications between sea and shore, and illegal entry or exit along the coastline. Measures ashore relating to the security of the coastline will be coordinated with any security measures established by appropriate naval authorities.

25. TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL.

a. Travel security control responsibilities for the issuance of travel permits (other than for permits issued to frontaliers) for travel over the German

frontier and for negotiating broad policy agreements with the authorities of liberated and neutral countries contiguous to GERMANY with reference to travel control have been retained by SHAEF. However, this headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2) will authorize the travel of civilians leaving GERMANY for intelligence or CI reasons, under the waybill procedure.

b. Air-travel. Appropriate Air Force commanders are responsible for effecting rigid air-travel security control at all airfields used for flights into and out of GERMANY.

26. INTER-ZONAL BOUNDARY CONTROL. At the present time, it is not contemplated that any fixed security control of movement be established between national occupational zones in GERMANY.

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HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER IV

COUNTERSABOTAGE

29. GENERAL. The countersabotage protection of our materiel and installations, including civilian facilities vital to the interests of our forces, is a command responsibility.

30. PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS. This headquarters and the headquarters of each Army/Military District will have countersabotage officers and personnel available as follows:

a. The Engineer Section of this and Army/Military District headquarters will have available an engineer officer specially trained in countersabotage preventive techniques. This officer, upon request, will conduct surveys and inspections of vital facilities and installations and will recommend protective measures therefor.

b. The CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters has organized a CIC Countersabotage Section. The functions of this section are contained in G-2 letter, this headquarters, dated 6 February 1945, subject: "CIC Countersabotage Section."

c. The CI Branch, G-2 Section of each Army/Military District headquarters has available a CIC officer specially trained in countersabotage. This officer will supervise the investigation of sabotage cases.

d. All CIC personnel are qualified and will be made available, as necessary, to conduct countersabotage security surveys and investigations in conjunction with the engineer officers and CIC officers mentioned in paragraphs a and c above.

31. INVESTIGATIONS. All cases of suspected sabotage will be reported immediately, through G-2 channels, to appropriate CI staffs. The investigation of such cases will be undertaken by CI personnel. If it becomes apparent that an offense under the Articles of War by Allied military personnel may be involved, PM (Criminal Investigation Detachment) will be informed.

a. Information from special sources regarding sabotage activities of enemy agents will be made available to CI staffs by SCI personnel. This personnel will also advise CI staffs on the action to be taken with respect to such agents.

b. Any arrestee known or suspected to be a saboteur will be processed as an enemy agent.

32. DISPOSAL OF SABOTAGE EQUIPMENT. The responsibility for the neutralization or removal of enemy sabotage devices or equipment rests with the engineers or with the ordnance bomb disposal squads. In an emergency, CI personnel may deal with such devices or equipment, but, whenever practicable, they should await the assistance of engineers or an ordnance bomb disposal squad. After sabotage devices and equipment are rendered harmless by the engineers or ordnance bomb disposal personnel, they will be handed over to CI personnel for disposition as instructed by CI staffs. New types of sabotage devices and equipment will be delivered, as soon as practicable, to the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

33. JOINT COUNTERSABOTAGE COMMITTEES. Joint countersabotage committees, which should include appropriate representation from G-2 (CI), G-3, Engineer, Ordnance and Signal Corps sections, may be established by commanders of major units in order to consider and solve countersabotage problems which will exist in GERMANY.

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HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER V

EXTIRPATION OF NAZISM AND GERMAN MILITARISM

37. GENERAL. The dissolution of the NSDAP and the eradication of Nazism as well as the corollary destruction of German militarism, are declared war aims of the United Nations. The German armed forces, the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) and its affiliates, and the German government, including the war production and civil administrations, are motivated by the Nazi moral, political and economic concepts. Therefore, the measures required to effect the extirpation of Nazism and German militarism (see Tables A, B, C, D and E attached hereto) will include:

a. The abolishment of the NSDAP and its subsidiary non-military political organizations.

b. The disarmament, demobilization and disbandment of the armed forces and all Nazi military and para-military organizations.

c. The purging, reorganization and control of the German police.

d. The dismissal of all active Nazis and ardent sympathizers of the party and of all militarists and leading military figures from government offices and other positions of influence and trust.

e. The dismantling of super-centralized and typically Nazi agencies of government and of agencies for war mobilization and production.

38. MG LAW NO. 5. MG Law No. 5, entitled, "DISSOLUTION OF NAZI PARTY", is the instrument which declares the illegality, prohibits the activities, and orders the dissolution of NSDAP and all offices, organizations and institutions enumerated by the law. (See Table A hereto). This law will be publicized by MG.

39. RESPONSIBILITIES. The enforcement of the provisions of MG Law No. 5 is a command responsibility to be conducted pursuant to these and other appropriate instructions. The operations necessary to accomplish the dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliates and the eradication of Nazism and the agencies particularly concerned therewith, are as follows:

a. The dissolution of the NSDAP and its subsidiary organizations is a primary responsibility of CI, assisted by MG.

b. The disarmament, demobilization and disbandment of Nazi military and para-military mobilized bodies is a responsibility of all commanders, advised and assisted by MG and CI.

c. The purge of the police and the removal of Nazis from the civil administration of GERMANY is a primary responsibility of MG, assisted by CI.

d. MG, assisted by CI, will be primarily responsible for ensuring that all persons placed in civil administrative posts and other positions of influence and authority are neither active Nazis nor ardent Nazi sympathizers.

e. The reorganization of all types of administrative agencies necessary for government is a primary responsibility of MG.

f. CI will be primarily responsible for ensuring that those Nazis who might be dangerous to military security are interned or kept under surveillance.

40. PERSONS TO BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE. All political office holders and civil servants, as enumerated categorically in Table B hereto, will be dismissed or suspended from office by MG. Table D hereto enumerates those positions, the holders of which will be denied service with MG if held at any time. Table E hereto enumerates those quasi-governmental positions from which the principal officers should be removed. Those persons of the categories listed in Tables B, D and E, who are also categorized in Table C hereto, will, if encountered by MG, be arrested by MG and referred to CI for disposal.

41. ARREST CATEGORIES. All persons who are identified to be, or to have been, in the prescribed categories enumerated in Table C hereto, will be arrested and interned by CI.

42. GERMAN POLICE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. As soon as the military situation permits, the command hierarchy of the German police will be abolished, and chief officers of regional and local police units will be made responsible to civil administration officials at regional and local levels. Under MG control, the police will be responsible for maintaining civilian law and order. Nazi officials, methods and influences will be eradicated from the German police and operations inimical to the interests of the United Nations will be prevented. Undesirable police personnel will be discharged and, where necessary, interned. All military training and military practices will be discontinued, and the police will be disarmed of all weapons, except that sidearms and carbines may be reissued, where necessary, due to exceptional circumstances. The ammunition per weapon will be strictly limited. With the exception of the Criminal Police, all elements of the Security Police, including the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst der SS, will be dissolved. All offices combining control

of both the police and SS, or police and the SD, or completing a chain of command from the national to the local level will be abolished. Armlets and warrant cards will be furnished to approved German police by MG.

a. Security Police and Security Service of the SS (SIPO and SD). CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst of the SS and will arrest and dispose of all members thereof.

b. The Secret State Police (GESTAPO). CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the Gestapo and will arrest and dispose of all members thereof.

c. The Technical Emergency Service (TENO). The Technische Nothilfe embraces units of highly skilled civilian engineers used for demolitions and repairs to public utilities damaged in air raids. They are likely to be encountered in mobilized units. They hold stocks of explosives and, unless controlled, are dangerous as potential saboteurs. MG will be responsible for disarming them and for seizing stocks of explosives.

d. The Criminal Police (KRIPO). MG will seize the headquarters and records of the Kripo, and CI will arrest and dispose of those Kripo members who are prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C). After the Kripo has been purged by MG in consultation with CI, it will continue to function as part of the local police administration, but not under control of the Central BERLIN Office.

e. The Barracks Police (Kasernierte Polizei). The Barracks Police, a special branch of the Schupo originally formed to quell strikes and riots, have been used extensively against the resistance forces of the occupied countries. They are not specifically of CI interest but are likely to contain a high percentage of War Criminals.

f. The Mobile Police (Motorisierte Gendarmerie). The motorized units of the Gendarmerie are likely to be found as mobilized armed units. They are not specifically of CI interest.

g. The Order Police (ORPO). In order to provide a police element for the maintenance of law and order, the Ordnungspolizei, which includes the Schupo (the municipal police), the Gendarmerie, Fire, PAD and all other uniformed police services will be disarmed, purged, reorganized and controlled by MG in consultation with CI. MG will seize the headquarters and records of the Orpo, and CI will arrest and dispose of those Orpo members who are prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

h. Waffen SS. All commanders responsible for disarmament and control of enemy forces will give highest priority to and take extraordinary

precautions in the primary disarmament and control of the Waffen SS. After primary disarmament, all Waffen SS officers and non-commissioned officers of the rank of Scharfuehrer and above will be arrested and interned. All Waffen SS units will then be completely disorganized as units and the personnel will be attached to Wehrmacht units. In effecting this attachment, care will be taken to insure that a minimum number of individuals who previously served together in the same unit are attached to the same Wehrmacht unit. Wehrmacht commanders will be held responsible for the conduct of this personnel and will be instructed to distribute them evenly throughout their Wehrmacht units so that the total number of Waffen SS personnel in any one unit never exceeds 25% of the total unit's strength.

i. The Allgemeine SS. The Allgemeine SS will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. CI will seize Allgemeine SS headquarters and documents, and will arrest and dispose of such Allgemeine SS members as are prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C). Members who hold public office will be a responsibility of MG in consultation with CI.

j. Nazi Party Storm Troops (SA). The SA will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG Detachments. CI will arrest and dispose of the SA officers prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

k. Hitler Youth (HJ). Mobilized units of the HJ will be processed pursuant to the instructions for processing mobilized units of NSKK (see paragraph m, below). The static HJ organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, records and documents of the static organization and will arrest and dispose of the HJ members prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

l. National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK). Mobilized units of the NSFK, together with personnel of schools and training establishments, will be processed pursuant to the instructions for the processing of mobilized units of the NSKK (see paragraph m, below). The static organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, documents and records of the static organization and will arrest and dispose of the NSFK members prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

m. The Nazi Party Motor Transport Corps (NSKK). The NSKK will be encountered as mobilized units serving with the Wehrmacht and as a static organization controlling all transport within the Wehrkreise. Mobilized units; together with personnel of schools and training establishments, will be disarmed by combat troops and concentrated for disbandment. NSKK officers will be "screened" by PW and intelligence personnel in order to identify those officers who are prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C); at the time of disbandment, those officers will be referred to CI for disposal. The static organization will be

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dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the documents and records of the static NSKK organization and will dispose of those members thereof who are prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

n. German Labor Service (RAD). All units of the RAD will be processed pursuant to the instructions for the processing of the mobilized units of the NSKK (see paragraph m, above). The organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG. However, CI will seize the headquarters, documents and records of the organization and will arrest and dispose of the RAD members prescribed in the arrest categories (Table C).

o. Todt Labor Forces (OT). The officers and uniformed guards of OT will be disarmed by combat troops and concentrated for disbandment. The static organization will be dissolved, disarmed and dispersed locally by MG, except for such units as may be retained at the discretion of Army/Military District commanders for clearing of devastated areas or other rehabilitation.

p. Heimat Flak. Regular GAF personnel in the Heimat Flak will be discharged through the armed forces machinery.

43. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF.

a. The coordination and supervision of the search for and arrest of all members of the German General Staff Corps and equivalent Naval and Air Force officers is a CI function.

b. All General Staff Officers and their Naval and Air Force equivalents, excluding those officers who have been captured in military operations prior to "A" Day, will be disposed of as follows:

(1) Those officers whose names appear on Personality Cards as having adverse records or who are listed as War Criminals will be processed as other individuals in those categories.

(2) Those officers who are not in the category as set forth in (1) above but who are regarded as security threats will be interned.

(3) Those officers who are not in the categories as set forth in (1) and (2) above will be detained, placed under house arrest and/or kept under CI surveillance.

c. Those German General Staff Officers who, after initial detention, house arrest and/or surveillance, are found to be of potential value in assisting disarmament and demobilization duties will be permitted to return to their posts

but will be kept under CI surveillance through local arrangement with the appropriate U.S. military disarmament or disbandment authorities concerned.

d. Lists of officers to be detained are to be furnished by SHAEF through this headquarters.

44. GERMAN SCIENTISTS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGISTS.

a. Disposal and control of those German scientists and industrial technologists whose background and prior activities are such that they could conceivably play an important part in the rebirth of the German war machine is a CI function.

b. Such individuals will be detained pending further instructions. Information and interrogation reports will be transmitted to this headquarters.

c. Lists of German scientists or industrial technologists to be detained will be distributed as received from SHAEF.

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TABLE "A"

NAZI POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ABOLISHED

1. Central Offices of the NSDAP.

a. Party Chancellery (Partei Kanzlei).

b. Fuehrer's Chancellery (Kanzlei des Fuehrers der NSDAP).

c. Organization of Germans Abroad (Auslandsorganization).

d. Offices in GERMANY of the National Union for German Elements Abroad (Volksbund fuer des Deutschtum in Ausland).

e. Center for Volksdeutsche (Volksdeutschenmittelstelle).

f. Party Scrutiny Commission for the Protection of National Socialist Literature (Parteiamtliche Pruefungskommission zum Schutze des NS-Schrifttums).

g. Office of the Reich Organization Leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP).

h. Office of the Reich Treasurer of the Party (Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP).

i. Supreme Party Court (Oberstesparteigericht) and Subordinate Courts.

j. Office of the Fuehrer's Commissioner for the Supervision of the Whole Intellectual and Ideological Training and Education of the Party (Beauftragter des Fuehrers fuer die Ueberwachung der Gesamten Geistigen und Woltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP).

k. Office of the Reich Propaganda Leader of the Party (Reichspropagandaleiter der NSDAP).

l. Office of the Reich Leader for the Press (Reichsleiter fuer die Presse und Zontralverlag der NSDAP (Eherverlag) together with the publishing houses owned by the Party and controlled by him.

m. Office of the Reich Press Chief of the Party (Reichspressehof der NSDAP).

n. Reich Office for the Agrarian Population (Reichsamt fuer das Landvolk).

o. Head Office for Public Health (Hauptamt fuer Volksgesundheit).

p. Head Office for Technology (Hauptamt fuer Technik).

q. Head Office for Teachers (Hauptamt fuer Erzieher).

r. Head Office for Local Government (Hauptamt fuer Kommunal-politik).

s. Head Office for Officials (Hauptamt fuer Beamten).

t. Office of the Party Commissioner for all Racial Questions (Beauftragter der NSDAP fuer alle Volkstumsfragen).

u. Racial-Political Office of the Party (Rassenpolitischesamt der NSDAP)

v. Office of Genealogical Research (Amt fuer Sippenferschung).

w. Colonial Office of the Party (Kolonialpolitischesamt der NSDAP).

x. Foreign Office of the Party (Aussenpolitischesamt der NSDAP).

y. Reichstag Party of the NSDAP (Reichstagsfraktion der NSDAP).

z. Reich Women's Leadership (Reichsfrauenfuehrung).

aa. Head Office for War Victims (Hauptamt fuer Kriegsepfer).

2. Regional and Local Offices of Party Administration.

a. Gauleitung in each Party Gau or Reichagau.

b. Kreisleitung in each Party Kreis.

c. Ortsgruppenleitung in each Party Ortsgruppe.

d. Zollen and Block offices.

e. The Beauftragter der NSDAP in each Governmental Unit.

3. Professional, Political and other Party Organizations.

a. Reich League of Doctors (NS-Acrztebund).

b. Party League of German Technicians (NS-Bund Deutscher Technik).

c. Party League of Teachers (NS-Lehrerbund).

d. Reich League of German Officials (Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten).

e. Reich Colonial League (Reichskolonialbund).

f. NS Women's Organization (NS Frauenschaft).

g. NS Reich League of Nurses (NS Reichsbund der Deutschen Schwestern).

h. German Women's Association (Deutsches Frauenwork).

i. Reich Student Leadership (Reichsstudentenfuehrung).

j. National Socialist German Students' League (NSD-Studentenbund).

k. German Students' Association (Deutsche Studentenschaft).

l. National Socialist German Lecturers' Association (NSD-Dozentenbund).

m. Party League of Lawyers, Notaries and Accountants (NS-Rechtswahrerbund).

n. Party League of Old Students (NS-Altherrenbund der Deutschen Studenten).

o. Reich League of German Families (Reichsbund Deutsche Familie).

p. German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront).

q. Party Association for Physical Training (NS-Reichsbund fuer Leibesuebungen).

r. NS-Ex-Servicemen's League (NS-Reichskriegerbund).

s. Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer).

t. German Local Government Union (Deutscher Gemeindetag).

u. German Hunters' Association (Deutsche Jaegerschaft).

v. Council of Experts on Population and Race Politics (NS Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt).

w. Reich Committee for the Protection of German Blood (Reichsausschuss zum Schutze des Deutschen Blutes).

x. National Socialist Relief Organization for War Victims (NS-Kriegsepferversergung).

y. Winter Relief (Winterhilfswerk).

z. Reich Chamber of Commerce (Reichswirtschaftskommer).

4. Para-Military and Police Organizations.

a. The SS (Schutzstaffeln), including the Armed-SS (Waffen SS) and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst).

b. Secret Police (Geheime Staatspolizei).

c. The Storm Troops, SA (Sturmabteilungen), including the SA-Wehrmannschaften or pre-military training centers.

d. The National Socialist Flying Corps, NSFK (NS-Fleigerkorps).

e. The National Socialist Automobile Corps, NSKK (NS-Kraftfahrer-Korps).

f. The HJ and BDM (Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels).

g. The Reich Labour Service, RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst).

h. The Todt Organization, OT (Organization Todt). (See par 42,o, this Chapter for exception).

i. The Technical Emergency Squads, TENO (Technische Nothilfe).

Note: Pending surrender, or the declaration by the Supreme Commander that the Germans have been defeated, all German personnel of the organizations cited in paragraph 4 above are entitled to the status and privileges of Prisoners of War.

TABLE "B"

POLITICAL OFFICERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS WHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED

(The holders of the offices marked with asterisk will be suspended)

Item	Title of Position
1.	Reich Ministers and State Secretaries, Ministerial Directors**
2.	Land Ministers, State Secretaries and Ministerial Directors of the Laender**
3.	(a) Provisional Presidents and Reich Governors.
	(b) Department Heads of Provinces and Reichsgaue**
4.	Other Supreme Reich Authorities. At present these are:
	Commissioner General for Medical and Health Service Reich Housing Commissioner Reich Commissioner for Security of the German People Reich Commissioner for Shipping Inspector-General for Water and Power Inspector-General for German Roads Inspector-General for Motor Transportation Reich Commissioner for Treatment of Enemy Property Reich Youth Leader Head of the Reichsstelle fuer Raubmerdung Division Chief in Four-Year Plan Office
5.	Heads of Reich Institutions. At present these are:
	Supreme Administrative Tribunal Reich Committee for Public Health Service Reich Office for Social Insurance Reich Hereditary Court Reich Labor Court Reich Honor Court Reich Archives
6.	Reich Labor Trustees
7.	Reich Food Estate Officials from Kreisbauernfuehrer up

Item	Title of Position
8.	Chiefs of Military and Civil Administration in the Occupied Countries
9.	Regierungspraesidenten
10.	Landraete
11.	Oberbuergermeister of Cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants
12.	Officials of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, National, Regional and subsidiary agencies
13.	Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production high officials, including the Chairman of the Hauptausschuesse and Ringe
14.	Members of the present German Reichstag not already covered on account of other positions held
15.	Members of the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), the People's Court (Volksgericht), Special Court (Sendergericht), members of the Courts of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)**
16.	Chief Public Prosecutors (Oberreichsanwaelte, General Staatsanwaelte, and Oberstaatsanwaelte)**
17.	Police Officials:

(a) Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police

(b) All higher SS and Police leaders

(c) All Police Presidents and Directors, and Police Officials above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel

(d) All members of the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst

(e) Members of the Administrative Police who are serving with the Gestapo, either in their Hq or as "Special Investigators". Those who have served should be treated on their merits after investigation.

(f) Inspectors of the Security Police and ORPO

Item	Title of Position
	(g) Commissioned officers of the Technische Nothilfe
18.	University Rectors and Curators, including Heads of Institutions of University rank

TABLE "C"

NAZI PARTY, POLICE, PARA-MILITARY AND

OTHER PERSONNEL TO BE INTERNED

All individuals (whose names are contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY and all persons) who are identified to be or to have been in the categories prescribed below will be arrested and interned in GERMANY.

A. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

1. Acmter (Departments) I, II, III, VI, including Militaerisches Amt (formerly Abwehr), and VII of RSHA, together with the out stations and organizations dependent on or controlled by any of them — all personnel.

2. Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) — all personnel.

3. Reichssicherheitsdionst (Reich Security Service) — all personnel.

B. THE SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI.

1. Gestapo (including Grenzpolizei) — all personnel.

2. Kripo — all officials down to and including the rank of Oberst (Colonel).

C. HIGHER POLICE OFFICIALS.

1. Polizeipraesidenten und Direktoren.

2. Oberpraesidenten in Prussia, Stadtpraesident in Berlin, Regierungspraesidenten und Landracte.

3. Befehlshaber der Orpo und der Sipo.

4. Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer.

D. ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI — all officers down to and including the rank of Oberst (Colonel), (Landesfuehrer in Tono and Luftschutzpolizei) in the following branches:

1. Schutzpolizei.

2. Feuerschutzpolizei.

3. Luftschutzpolizei.

4. Gendarmerie.

5. Wasserschutzpolizei.

6. Verwaltungspolizei.

7. Hilfspolizei.

8. Technische Nothilfe.

E. PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

1. Waffen SS — all officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Scharfuehrer, all ranks of the Tolenkopfverbaende and all female members of the SS.

2. Allgemeine SS — all officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Unterscharfuehrer and all female members (except those members of the Orpo and Kripo who would appear to have held only nominal SS rank and not to have taken an active part in SS work).

3. SA —all officers down to and including the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer.

4. Hitler Jugend — all officers down to and including the rank of Stammfuehrer.

5. Bund deutscher Maedels —all officers down to and including the rank of Bannmaedelfuehrerin.

6. NSKK — all officers down to and including the rank of Staffelfuehrer.

7. NSFK — all officers down to and including the rank of Sturmbannfuehrer.

8. RAD — all officers down to and including the rank of Arbeitsfuehrer.

F. NAZI PARTY OFFICIALS

1. Administrative officials of the Party down to and including the post of Amtsleitor at Ortsgruppe level.

2. All other members of the Party down to and including the rank of Gemeinschaftsleiter.

G. REICH AUTHORITIES.

1. All members of the Hoehere Dienst appointed since 1 March 1939.

2. All civil servants down to and including the rank of Ministerialrat or its equivalent, irrespective of the date of appointment.

H. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. All members of the German General Staff, including equivalent Air Force and Naval officers.

TABLE "D"

POSITIONS IN NAZI PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND FORMATIONS AND RELATIONS TO THE PARTY WHICH ARE TO BE REGARDED AS DISQUALIFYING HOLDER FROM SERVICE WITH MG IF HELD AT ANY TIME

1. NSDAP; National Socialist Workers Party: membership in the NSDAP prior to 1933.

2. NSDAP; National Socialist Workers Party: holders of the positions in the Nazi formations referred to below or listed among the Party Officials in Table C.

3. SS: Schutzstaffeln--holders of the rank of Unterscharfuehrer or higher, and any person who was a member of the SS before 1933.

4. SA Sturmabteilung: holders of the rank of Scharfuehrer or higher, membership in the SA prior to 1933.

5. Hitler Jugend and Bund deutscher Maedels: holders of the rank of Bannfuehrer or Bannmaedelfrehrerin or higher.

6. NS Dozentenbund: officials of this formation.

7. NS Deutscher Studentenbund: officials of this formation.

8. NS Frauenschaft: officials of this formation.

9. NS Kraftfahrer Korps: holders of commissioned rank in this formation.

10. NS Fliegerkorps: holders of commissioned rank in this formation.

11. RAD—Reichsarbeitsdienst: holders of the rank of Arbeitsfuehrer and above.

12. Business men who have accepted Nazi honors, such as the "Ehrendolch" or "Ehrensold" or "Blutorden".

13. Persons holding the positions in quasi-governmental organizations listed in Table E.

14. Officials in the "Affiliated Organizations" of the NSDAP named in items a, b, c, d, n, p, and x in Category 3 of Table A(Professional, Political and other Party Organizations) and officials of the NSV (NS Volkswohlfahrt).

15. Officials of the "Supervised Organization of the NSDAP named in item d in Category 1 of Table A (CENTRAL OFFICES) and officials of the similar organizations named in items e, g, h, n, o and q in Category 3 (Professional, Political and other Party Organizations) of Table A.

TABLE "E"

QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS FROM WHICH PRINCIPAL OFFICERS SHOULD BE REMOVED

1. Head of the National Economic Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskammer), and his immediate subordinates; or president or chairman of a Gau Economic Chamber or affiliated Economic Chamber.

2. Chairman, president or deputy of a Reichsgruppe or an Economic Group (Wirtschaftsgruppe).

3. Chairman, president or deputy of a National Transportation Group (Reichsverkehrsgruppe).

4. Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

CHAPTER VI

PROCESSING OF CI ARRESTEES

48. GENERAL. The arrest and internment of all persons whose continued liberty is likely to constitute a threat to the security of our forces is a command responsibility to be accomplished primarily through the employment of CI personnel. The following categories of persons will be arrested by CI.

a. Those Nazis who are to be arrested because of their rank or office. (See Table C, Chapter V).

b. Those security suspects named in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY, most of whom are to be arrested because they are known or suspect members of the enemy intelligence services.

c. Those persons who become security suspects as a result of CI field operations.

49. VIOLATIONS OF MG SECURITY ENACTMENTS.

a. Persons who violate MG enactments for the security control of the civilian population are not necessarily security suspects nor are they necessarily of interest to CI. Normally, such persons will be arrested and disposed of by MG. However, if there is any reason to believe that the offense involves espionage, sabotage or subversive activity, the arrestee will be referred to CI for investigation.

b. CI personnel will transfer to MG those cases which are not of CI interest, but which are merely violations of MG security control enactments. In all such cases, the arrestee and a fully completed arrest report will be handed over to MG.

50. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMINALS. War Crimes are violations of the laws and usages of war of general application and acceptance, including acts in contravention of treaties and conventions dealing with the conduct of war, as well as other offenses against persons or property which outrage common justice or involve moral turpitude, committed in connection with military operations or occupation with or without orders or sanction of governments or commanders. War Criminals are those who have committed War Crimes, or who have ordered, directed, or countenanced the commission of War Crimes, without regard to their nationality or the capacity in which they acted.

a. When a person arrested by CI personnel is discovered to be a War Criminal, as well as an arrestee of CI interest, the following procedure will be applied:

(1) The War Criminal will be identified by CI personnel, who will complete in triplicate the detention report form to be provided by SHAEF for that purpose.

(2) The completed detention report form will be forwarded to the G-1 of the command in whose area the arrestee is being detained. The detention report form will be accompanied by a notification to the effect that the War Criminal is being detained not as a War Criminal but as a person primarily of interest to CI.

(3) If absolved of suspicion as a security suspect, the War Criminal will be continued in detention and instructions as to his disposal will will be requested from the appropriate G-1.

(4) In all other respects, the War Criminal will be handled according to CI requirements.

b. Whenever CI personnel, in the course of their CI operations, obtain oral evidence pertaining to a War Criminal, whether apprehended or not, such evidence will be reduced to writing in the form of a statement sworn to by the witness, or, if the witness refuses to testify under oath, in a statement sworn to by the interrogator and those other witnesses who may be present when the evidence is given. Photographic and physical evidence will be submitted together with appropriate affidavits pertaining to the procurement thereof. All evidence pertaining to War Crimes will be submitted to the appropriate G-1.

c. Since CI personnel are being employed to apprehend the numerous persons of the categories defined in paragraph 48 above, normally such personnel will not be required to apprehend, identify, investigate or detain War Criminals unless they are specifically of CI interest.

51. CI ARRESTS. CI arrests will be accomplished as follows:

a. Wehrmacht Personnel. Personnel of the Abwehr, Geheimefeldpolizei, Lehr Regiment Kurfuerst and similar organizations held as PWs in the ETO will be processed by intelligence and other interested personnel of all echelons to locate those who are prescribed for arrest as CI personality targets. CI will be notified as to the persence of such prescribed personnel, after which those who are to be arrested will be discharged from the Wehrmacht and turned over to CI for arrest and internment as civilian security suspects.

b. Personnel of Para-Military and Police Organizations. The procedures for the arrest of members of the mobilized units and static elements of the various para-military and police organizations are included in Chapter V.

c. Persons in the arrest categories hold as PWs outside the ETO will, when repatriated be discharged, arrested and interned as civilian security suspects, provided that other persons in similar arrest categories continue to be interned.

d. All other persons specified for CI arrest will be apprehended and arrested by CI personnel, assisted by combat troops, MG Military Police and such specialist personnel as are necessary. Normally, CI personnel will not themselves effect the physical apprehension of persons to be arrested but will direct combat troops and other elements assisting in the operation.

e. Power of Arrest. All members of our forces are empowered to arrest any person committing acts prejudicial to MG, to the security of our forces, or in violation of any MG proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order. Arrested persons will be turned over without delay to the nearest CIC, MG Security Guard or MP with a written statement, signed by the arresting individual giving the time, date, place and reason pertaining to the arrest.

52. SEARCHES MADE IN CONNECTION WITH ARRESTS. Searches made in connection with arrests will be made by CI personnel or other personnel operating under the supervision of CI personnel. Such searches will be made as follows:

a. Premises. The living quarters and offices of arrestees will be searched thoroughly. Items of evidence collected will be catalogued under heading "Office at (address)" or "Residence at (address)" on the receptacle which is to contain them.

b. Arrestees. Arrestees will be ordered to surrender all possessions held on their persons; the items surrendered will be catalogued under the heading "Surrendered", on the receptacle which is to contain them. The arrestee will then be thoroughly searched and those items he failed to surrender upon order will be catalogued under the heading "Not Surrendered Voluntarily", on the receptacle which is to contain them.

c. Chain of Possession. All items of evidence will be placed in a suitable receptacle, labeled, sealed and delivered with the arrestee. The label will state clearly the identity of the arrestee, where and when the evidence was recovered, and the name, rank and serial number of the officer who inventories the evidence. Whenever there is a change in the custody of the evidence, a receipt will be entered on the receptacle label.

53. EVACUATION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be guarded, escorted and evacuated by CI personnel or personnel operating under the supervision of CI personnel.

a. Persons arrested because of their rank or position, i.e., those who are identified as being persons prescribed for arrest in Table C, Chapter V, will be evacuated to Internment Camps.

b. Known or suspect members of the enemy intelligence services, to include persons detected in acts of espionage, sabotage or subversion and persons found in possession of sabotage equipment, secret writing materials, codes or communication devices, or in other suspicious circumstances, will be evacuated to the CI Annex of the Army/Military District Interrogation Center.

c. Other security suspects will be processed according to the merit of the individual case.

d. Certain priority subjects, as defined in paragraph 54, f, below, will be evacuated to the CI Annex of the Army Group/U.S. Zone Interrogation Center.

54. DETENTION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be detained by CI personnel, or personnel operating under supervision of CI personnel, in available facilities or in those to be provided as follows:

a. House Arrest. Arrestees may be held under guard in "House Arrest" for limited periods of time, pending their evacuation to more secure places for detainment.

b. Local Jails. Arrestees may be held in local jails or prisons, pending the completion of preliminary identification, interrogation and investigation prior to the evacuation of arrestees to internment camps or the Army/Military District Interrogation Center. If local jails exist, MG will make them available for this purpose and will provide for the guarding of inmates. When CI personnel place arrestees in local jails, they will provide the jailor with an Arrest Report stating that the prisoner is to be held incommunicado on security grounds pending further instructions from CI.

c. Local Detention Camps. In areas where adequate civilian jail facilities are not available, local commanders will provide and administer detention camps where arrestees may be held, pending the completion of preliminary identification, interrogation and investigation, prior to the evacuation of arrestees to Internment Camps or the Army/Military District Interrogation Center.

d. Internment Camps. In instructions separate from these, each Army/Military District Commander is directed to establish Internment Camps within his command. The following special requirements of CI for Internment Camps have been specified:

(1) From the CI point of view, the desirable capacity of a single Internment Camp is 7,500 internees. However, any capacity between 5,000 and 10,000 internees is considered satisfactory.

(2) Insofar as conditions permits, it is desirable for CI purposes to have Internment Camps established near the major centers of population and spaced equally distant within Army/Military District areas. The safeguarding of the inmates should be the paramount consideration in determining the siting of Internment Camps.

(3) Each Internment Camp should have a distinctive name or other designation which will facilitate the maintenance and identification of CI records pertaining to CI internees held therein.

(4) Each Internment Camp should be so arranged as to permit segregation and appropriate supervision of male and female internees. If persons other than those of CI interest are to be interned in the same Internment Camp in which CI arrestees are interned, arrangements for the complete segregation of the two categories are essential. It may also become desirable to segregate the various categories of CI arrestees interned.

(5) Each Internment Camp should have accommodations for the solitary confinement of 50 CI arrestees.

(6) Each Internment Camp will have a Reception Center wherein arrestees will be held for processing, prior to being interned.

(7) The Administrative Staff of each Internment Camp should have interpreters qualified to interpret in the German, French, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Slavic and Italian languages.

(8) The Administrative Staff and facilities of each Internment Camp should be organized to process arrestees upon their reception at the Camp in accordance with the following schedule.

(a) CI arrestees are not to be accepted for processing and internment unless accompanied by an Arrest Report properly executed in triplicate. If the arrestee's escort does not have an Arrest Report pertaining to his prisoner, the Internment Camp CI officer will be consulted.

(b) Receipt of Person and Property will be rendered to the officer or guard who escorts the arrestee to the Internment Camp for detention. This receipt should be entered on the escort's copy of the Arrest Report which will be returned to the arresting agency.

(c) An identification number will be assigned to each arrestee received for internment. The identification number should be prefixed by the Internment Camp designation.

(d) Each arrestee will be registered by reception date, identification number and name.

(e) Any property and evidence which is delivered with the arrestee to the Internment Camp will be registered and placed in secure custody.

(f) A Detention Report Form (to be furnished by SHAEF) will be completed in triplicate for each arrestee. Copies will be distributed as follows:

1 One forwarded to G-1 Division, SHAEF.

2 One forwarded to Army Group/Zone Headquarters. (Attention: G-1 Section).

3 One retained.

(g) Each arrestee will be fingerprinted.

(h) Each arrestee will be photographed.

(i) All Arrest Reports and evidence will be delivered along with the CI arrestee to the Internment Camp CI officer for CI processing.

(9) A CI staff, from CI personnel resources of Army/Military District commanders, will be attached or assigned to each Internment Camp approximately in strength as follows:

(a) 1 CI officer. (CIC)

(b) 3 assistant CI officers.

(c) 12 interrogators.

(d) 6 clerical personnel.

(10) Each Internment Camp will provide the CI staff thereof with all necessary office space, furniture and equipment, and private interrogation rooms.

(11) The duties of the CI Staff at the Internment Camps will be to:

(a) Advise the Internment Camp Commander regarding the internal security of the camp.

(b) Complete a Fragebogen (MG personnel questionnaire) on each CI arrestee received for internment.

(c) Interrogate each CI arrestee received for internment.

(d) Submit to Army/Military District Hq the required periodic CI reports.

(e) Transmit to this headquarters, through G-2 channels, the Arrest Reports, Fragebogen and a copy of interrogation reports pertaining to all CI internees.

(f) Recommend to the CI Annex of the Army/Military District Interrogation Center which CI arrestees should be interrogated in detail at the Army/Military District Interrogation Center.

(g) Maintain CI records pertaining to CI internees.

(h) Report to this headquarters, through G-2 channels, any change in status of an internee (release, escape, execution, natural death, etc.)

(i) Operate an informant system among the CI internees in the Camp.

(j) Clear CI arrestees for release upon instructions of the Army/Military District Commander.

(k) Prepare Arrest Reports on arrestees who are delivered for internment without an Arrest Report.

e. CI Annex to the Army/Military District Interrogation Center. In instructions separate from these, each Army/Military District Commander is directed to establish an Interrogation Center to accomplish intelligence and CI interrogation within his command. These Interrogation Centers are to be fully self-administered and self-contained and prepared to handle female as well as male prisoners. Each Interrogation Center should have interpreters qualified in the German, French, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Slavic and Italian languages, available to assist CI interrogators when required. In addition, each Interrogation Center will have a CI Annex for which the following special requirements are specified.

(1) Accommodations for the secret solitary confinement of up to 100 arrestees at one time. The facilities for the detention, messing, exercising, interrogation, etc, of all CI prisoners will be a part of the Interrogation Center, but should be so arranged so that the presence of an individual CI arrestee in the Interrogation Center may be kept secret from all other CI arrestees and inmates thereof.

(2) Ten cells, so constructed and equipped as to provide for the secret monitoring and recording of conversations which may take place in the cells.

(3) Ten private, sound-proof interrogation rooms.

(4) Twenty expert, full time, German-speaking CI interrogators.

(5) Twenty stenographers, (5 of whom should be German linguists) equipped with stenographic necessities, to work at the disposal of the CI interrogators.

(6) Facilities for the photographing and fingerprinting of each arrestee.

f. CI Annex to the 12th Army Group/US Zone Interrogation Center. The facilities of the CI Annex of the Army Group/US Zone Interrogation Center will be utilized as follows:

(1) Only those persons who are in possession of detailed information of value to our operations against the German Intelligence Service, Security Services, and subversive hostile elements will be subject to interrogation at the CI Annex of the 12th Army

Group/US Zone Interrogation Center. The mere fact that a person is a known or suspect agent will not of itself require that such a person be processed at this Center.

(2) Priority subjects for processing at this Center are persons possessing detailed information concerning the organization, personnel and future intentions of:

(a) Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA).

(b) Sicherheitsdienst (SD).

(c) Abwehr.

(d) Geheimestaatspolizei (Gestapo).

(e) Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo).

(f) Geheimefeldpolizei (GFP).

(3) Other priority subjects are persons in possession of detailed information concerning future intentions of the following organizations with particular reference to plans of these, or affiliated organizations, to go underground upon the cessation of hostilities in GERMANY.

(a) SS.

(b) SA.

(c) NSDAP.

(d) Nazi Youth Movements.

(e) NSKK.

(f) NSFK.

(g) Ordensburgen.

(h) Junkerschule.

(4) All such persons will be sent to the Interrogation Center as soon as possible, subject to the provision that no persons, regardless of category, will be forwarded to the Interrogation Center without the specific approval of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section of

this headquarters. All information pertaining to subjects believed to warrant interrogation at this Center will be transmitted to the Chief, CIB, this headquarters, in writing or orally, with a recommendation for processing at this Center.

(5) In every instance, escorts accompanying persons forwarded to the Interrogation Center will be in possession of a completed Arrest Report, including a reason for arrest sufficiently detailed to serve as a basis for interrogation, together with all pertinent documents and materials.

55. DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTS RE CI ARRESTEES.

a. Arrest Report. When an arrest is made, the arresting agency will complete the standard Arrest Report forms in triplicate, and will include a brief record of any important statement made by the arrestee when he was being arrested.

(1) The original Arrest Report will accompany the arrestee at all times.

(2) The first copy of the Arrest Report pertaining to an individual who is accepted for internment or interrogation by the Army/Military District Internment Camps or Interrogation Centers will be sent immediately to this headquarters (Attention Chief, CIB, G-2 Section), through G-2 channels.

(3) The second copy of the Arrest Report will be retained by the arresting agency, but will be sent with the arrestee to the Internment Camp or Interrogation Center in order that a receipt of person and property may be entered on the copy for return to the arresting agency.

b. Photographs. Each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center will be photographed, if the photographing has not been accomplished at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. The photograph will be mounted upon the Detention Report Form which will be prepared in triplicate by the Commanding Officers of all PW and Internment Camps and Interrogation Centers.

c. Fingerprints. Each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center will be fingerprinted, if he has not been so processed previously at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center in accordance with instructions to be issued by SHAEF.

d. Fragebogen. A Fragebogen (MG form PS/G-9 "Personnel Questionnaire") will be completed for each arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center, if he has not been so processed previously at another Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. The Fragebogen will accompany the arrestee until his interrogation and investigation at the Internment Camp or Interrogation Center is completed. It will then be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) together with the Summary Report cited in paragraph f below.

e. Special Reports. Whenever, during the course of an investigation or interrogation, information, believed to be of vital interest, is developed, a special report thereof will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

f. Summary Reports. When the interrogation and investigation of an arrestee has been completed and the disposition to be made of the arrestee has been decided at Army/Military District level, a report containing a summary of all facts and information pertinent to the case, together with the Fragebogen, will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

(1) In the case of an individual who is interned after interrogation at the Internment Camp and is not considered of sufficient importance to merit detailed interrogation at the Army/Military District Interrogation Center, the Summary Report together with the Fragebogen will be transmitted to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) from the Internment Camp through G-2 channels.

g. Status Reports. This headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) will be notified of any change of status pertaining to an arrestee accepted at an Internment Camp or Interrogation Center. Status Reports will be rendered when an arrestee is transferred from one place of detention to another, and also in the event of an arrestee's release, escape, execution or natural death. In the event of an arrestee's natural death or execution, his records will be sent to this headquarters (Attention: Chief, CIB, G-2 Section) through G-2 channels.

h. Transfer of Arrestees. Whenever, an arrestee is transferred between Internment Camps and Interrogation Centers, the records on the arrestee will accompany the arrestee and will be receipted for by the recipient.

i. Evidence. Confessions of identity or guilt and incriminating testimony of witnesses will be reduced, wherever possible, to writing and subscribed to under oath. Whenever a witness refuses to subscribe to his testimony under oath, the evidence given will be submitted in statements sworn to by the interrogator

and any other witnesses. Evidence of probative value found in documents may be submitted in the form of certified photostatic or photographic reproductions of the document or in the form of hand written or typewritten extract copies of the document, sworn to as true copies but, whatever practicable, the document itself should be submitted. Original papers of evidence will accompany the arrestee at all times.

56. INTERROGATION OF ARRESTEES. Arrestees will be interrogated as follows:

a. In the case of Black List or categorized individuals, the interrogation of an arrestee by the arresting agency will consist only of that interrogation which is required to (1) identify the arrestee, (2) extract from him any information which will assist in the immediate arrest of other individuals, (3) enable the immediate recovery of documents and material of CI interest, and (4) enable the immediate neutralization of any sabotage, espionage and subversive effort already made by the arrestee.

b. The interrogation of persons delivered to Internment Camps will consist of only that interrogation necessary to identify the arrestee, determine his background and discover whether he should be interrogated in detail at the Army/Military District Interrogation Center.

c. The interrogation of a person accepted at Army/Military District Interrogation Centers will be made in detail in order to extract from him the essential elements of information enumerated in paragraph 8, Chapter I, and to determine the appropriate disposition of the arrestee.

57. DISPOSAL OF ARRESTEES.

(rescinded 21 Sept 45)

a. No person who is interned because he is an individual named in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY will be released from internment without the specific approval of this or higher headquarters.

b. No person who is interned because he is one of the persons described in the prescribed arrest categories (See Table C, Chapter V) will be released from internment without the specific approval of this headquarters.

c. The ultimate disposal of captured members of the German intelligence services will be decided by this or higher headquarters (Chief, CIB, G-2 Section).

d. Those persons against whom sufficient evidence has been gathered to warrant trial will be prosecuted by the appropriate US Military Commission or MG Court.

e. Those persons who are considered to be security hazards if allowed to remain at liberty, and against whom there is insufficient evidence to warrant trial, will be interned for such time as is deemed appropriate.

f. Army/Military District Commanders will establish review boards to review on a tri-monthly basis the cases of those persons interned pursuant to the instructions contained in paragraph e above. The review boards will include appropriate representation from G-2 (CI), G-5, IA, and PM, and will recommend the release, provisional release, or continued internment of the individuals whose cases are reviewed.

58.

59.

60.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER VII

REPORTS AND RECORDS

61. PERSONALITY INDEX. Army/Military District Commanders will maintain their copies of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY. Supplementary information to be recorded on these cards, as well as additional cards, will be supplied by this headquarters.

62. ROSTERS OF PERSONALITIES. This headquarters will supply Machine Record Unit rosters of "Wanted" persons; CI arrestees, and other information as indicated in Appendix B hereto.

63. FILES. Army/Military District Commanders are not required to maintain permanent files or dossiers pertaining to individual arrestees. This headquarters will be the central repository for all such files and records, to include those received from Hq, 6th Army Group.

64. SPECIAL STUDIES. Army/Military District Commanders are not required to prepare special studies pertaining to CI organizations, trends or personalities. When such studies are required by lower echelons, a request therefor will be submitted to this headquarters.

65. REPORTS. Army/Military District Commanders are required to submit the various reports and records pertaining to individuals, as directed in Chapter VI. In addition, CI Periodic Reports will be submitted monthly by Army/Military District Commanders in the form attached hereto as Appendix I. The reports will be submitted in sextuplicate so as to arrive at the Army Group/Zone headquarters on the twenty-fifth day of each month.

66. DISTRIBUTION. Necessary reproduction and distribution of CI intelligence and information will be made by this headquarters.

67.

68.

69.

(NOTE: Words containing a letter or letters with umlaut will be written with the expressed "e", i.e., u will be written "ue", a will be written "ae".)

APPENDIX I

FORM FOR CI PERIODIC REPORTS TO ARMY GROUP/ZONE HEADQUARTERS

CI PERIODIC REPORT NO ____

For the month of _____, 194 ____.

PART I - CIVIL SECURITY CONTROL

A. General survey.

B. Security control of civil population.

C. Resistance organizations.
Reports on organizations attempting to stimulate resistance to the Allies or engaged in activities prejudicial to Allied interests.

D. Attitude of local authorities and police to CI staffs and personnel.
A note on the performance, satisfactory or otherwise, of the duties assigned to German authorities.

E. Special cases of CI interest.
A summary of arrests of important persons or other information about them.

F. Pro-Allied and anti-Nazi organizations.
Reports on organizations claiming to favor the Allied occupation or to assist in the eradication of Nazism.

G. Rumors.

PART II - INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROL

A. General survey.

B. Security of information.
Report on measures taken to prevent leakage of information with notes on serious violations.

C. Security of material.
Report on measures taken to prevent sabotage with notes on sabotage incidents.

D. Security of personnel.
Report on enemy propaganda (leaflets, broadcasting, publications, etc.) and its effects.

PART III - PORT, FRONTIER AND TRAVEL SECURITY CONTROL

A. Port Security Control.
(Information under the following headings will be submitted for each port under control of the U.S. Port Enclave)

1. Number or port CI personnel and area covered.

2. Port CI.

   a. Security of dock area.

      (1) Physical barriers.
      (2) Adequacy of gate and perimeter control personnel.
      (3) System of issue of passes.
      (4) Shore leave policy.
      (5) Control of harbor craft.
      (6) Control of fishing.
      (7) Countersabotage precautions.

   b. Relations with other port authorities.

   c. General comments.

3. Coastline security control.

4. Travel security control.

   a. Ships:

      (1) Entering port _____
      (2) Leaving port _____

   b. Civilian passengers:

      (1) Arriving _____
      (2) Departing _____

   c. Seamen:

      (1) Signed on _____
      (2) Signed off _____

   d. Censorship violations, etc.

e. Special reports
(Give brief details - subject, reference and date of any special reports on travellers (passengers/seamen) or on travel security matters submitted during the period under review).

f. General comments.

B. Frontier Security Control.
(This will be a consolidated survey covering the entire frontier under the control of the Army/Military District concerned.)

1. General survey.
This includes the location or disposition, as of last day of the period under review, of:

a. Frontier security control posts.

b. CIC detachments.

c. AEF frontier guards.

d. MG border control stations.

e. Indigenous frontier control personnel.

(It will be sufficient to note changes where these are few.)

2. Authorized civilian travellers.

a. Number entering GERMANY _____

b. Number leaving GERMANY _____

3. Displaced persons.

a. Estimated number of authorized displaced persons allowed to cross frontier.

(1) Out of GERMANY _____
(2) Into GERMANY _____

b. Estimated number of unauthorized displaced persons dealt with.

c. General comments.

4. Prohibited Frontier Zone.

5. Relations with frontier control authorities.

6. General comments.
(Including details of any unauthorized crossings of the frontier.)

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APPENDIX II

MACHINE RECORDING OF SHAEF PERSONALITY CARD INDEX FOR GERMANY

SECTION I. GENERAL.

1. All basic information contained in the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY ("Black and White Lists") is being recorded at this headquarters on Machine Record Unit (MRU) cards.

2. The following information, or that part of it available on the original SHAEF card, is a basic minimum recorded by the MRU; therefore, it is readily possible to prepare by mechanical means a listing of all individuals having the same entry on any single item or any group of the items enumerated hereafter:

a. Name of subject, to include known aliases.

b. Towns in which subject might be located.

c. Sex of subject.

d. Wehrkreise of towns referred to in "b".

e. Classification of subject according to SHAEF categories.

f. Organization to which subject is attached.

g. Level or organization at which subject worked.

h. Rank or position held within the organization.

i. Year position was held according to last report.

j. Age of subject.

k. Nationality of subject.

l. Source of information.

m. Status of case.

n. Place of detention, if arrested.

o. Disposition of case.

p. Case number.

3. a. Special lists of personalities who are members of specific German intelligence or security services or affiliated agencies, as well as rosters of "Black or White List" individuals in designated communities or areas, will be furnished to authorized headquarters or agencies upon request to Chief, CI Branch, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

b. Inasmuch as this headquarters, serving as a Central Registry, will maintain complete records and supply all information requested by subordinate units, it is not considered necessary for other headquarters to duplicate this Machine Records system.

4. Details regarding the spacing assignment and the coding system utilized in the machine recording of the SHAEF Personality Card Index for GERMANY are contained in SECTIONS II and III below.

SECTION II. Spacing Assignment on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

SPACES	INFORMATION
1 - 20	Individual's name
21 - 34	Town
35	Sex of subject
36 - 37	Wehrkreis
38	Classification of subject
39 - 43	Organization or rank
44 -	Organizational level
45 - 46	Rank or position
47 - 48	Year position held at last report
49 - 50	Year of subject's birth
51 - 52	Nationality of subject

53 - 54	Source of information
55	Status of case
56 - 58	Place of detention
59 - 60	Disposition of case
61 - 65	Case number
66 - 67	Arresting agency
70 - 75	Arbitrary number assigned MRU card for accurate sorting
80	Duplicate cards

SECTION III. Code used on the Machine Records Unit Cards.

1 - 20 INDIVIDUAL'S NAME

Name spelled out, in order, last name
first name
middle initial
title

Each alias to be entered on a separate card in spaces 1 - 20, the normal space for names, and "C - (proper name under which filed)" entered in the space normally reserved for the name of the town, i.e., spaces 21 - 34 (C - being a one column homonyn for see). In this way each alias will have an alternate MRU card for cross reference purposes.

21 - 34 TOWN

Town in which individual is most apt to be found (spelled out).

If individual has had an important post in one town and a residence in another, or if he has had any recent connection with more than one town which might suggest his continued presence in one of several towns, separate cards will be created.

35 SEX OF SUBJECT - one letter code

Male M. Female F.

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36 - 37 WEHRKREIS

The Wehrkreise are indicated by arabic numerals substituted for the usual Roman numerals except for the three indicated by the following two letter code:

R - denotes a renegade, any individual who owes allegiance to a power other than GERMANY but pays homage to Nazidom.

S - denotes a member of the SS other than an SS member who is also a member of Sipo and SD or the police and is therefore classified in one of the other other categories even if primarily SS. (The normal SHAEF classification is SS).

U - denotes an individual who is the leader or a member of an organization plotting resistance against any Allied occupying force in GERMANY or an individual who has announced his intention of forming or joining such a group. (This is not a SHAEF classification.)

W - denotes a War Criminal. (This is not a SHAEF classification).

39 - 43 ORGANIZATION OR RANK - 5 letter and numeral code.

The code employed in spaces 39 - 43 is to be read in conjunction with the classification noted in space 38.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Abwehr, the branch, and if possible the level, of the office for which he worked will be shown by a code built up in the following manner:

ABT1A - denotes a member of Abteilung I A - personnel

AB1WI - denotes a member of Abteilung I Wirtschaft - economic information

ABT2S - denotes a member of Abteilung II S - sabotage

AB3KG - denotes a member of Abteilung III Kgf - prevention of espionage in PW camps

ABTZX - denotes a member of Abteilung Zentralkartei - central registry

ALS1H - denotes a member of Abt I H in an Abwehrleitstelle or Alst

AS1MT - denotes a member of Abt I MT in an Abwehrstelle or Ast

NES2S - denotes a member of Abt II S in a Nebenstelle or Nest

AU1TL - denotes a member of Abt I TL in an Aussenstelle or Aust

MEK3H - denotes a member of Abt III H in a Meldekopf or MK

If the individual is identified merely as associated with the Abwehr with no indication of branch; the code will be ABT. If only partial association is noted as "Member of Amt II", as much information as is noted is entered, in the example given, ABT2.

When space 38 shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D", if the individual is a member of the Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst, the code to be used will be SIPO if no indication is given of Aemter or other subdivision. If an Amt of the RSHA or SD is indicated, the code used will be SD followed by the number of the Amt, e.g., SD6. However, if Amt IV of the RSHA or the SD is mentioned, the code will be GESTA, as it will be when the only mention is Gestapo. If the individual holds a rank in the SS, the code for SS ranks noted below will be used in preference to the more general SIPO or SD inasmuch as the type of activity has already been indicated in column 38.

If the individual is a member of the Geheimefeldpolizei, the code used will be GFP.

If the individual is a member of the Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz Abteilung the code used will be NDEA.

If the individual is a member of the SS Jagdverbaende or any subordinate group including the Streifkorps, Jaegerbataillon 502, a Feldjaegerkommando, Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, or the 150 Panzer Brigade, the code used will be JAGDV.

If the individual is a member of the Brandenburg Division, the code used will be BRAND.

If the individual is a member of the Kriminalpolizei, the code used will be KRIPO.

It will be noted, in recapitualtion, that wherever possible standard abbreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY are used in coding the Personality Card Index for MRU. Othen than standard abbreviations so listed, the following codes may be found in spaces 39 - 43, if space shows classification "A", "B", "C" or "D":

ABT - the Abwehr, if followed by further identification, a specific branch of the Abwehr.

AL or ALS followed by numeral and letter - an Alst of the Abwehr.

NE or NES followed by numeral and letter - a Nest of the Abwehr

AU or AUS followed by numeral and letter - an Aust of the Abwehr.

ME or MEK followed by numeral and letter - a Meldekopf of the Abwehr.

BRAND - a member of the Brandenburg Division.

JAGDV - a member of a Jagdverband.

NDEA - a member of the Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz Abteilung.

When space 38 shows classification "N", the standard abbreviations as listed in the SHAEF CI HANDBOOK GERMANY for the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations furnish the code. Chief among these are the following:

NSDAP - National sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - National Socialist German Workers Party - the Nazi party.

NSF - NS Frauenschaft - Nazi party women's organization.

HJ - Hitler Jugend - Hitler Youth.

BDM - Bund deutscher Maedels - League of German Girls.

RAD - Reichsarbeitsdienst - Compulsory national labor service.

NSAD - NS Aerztebund - National Socialist Physicians League.

NSDSB - NS Deutscher Studentenbund - Nazi University Students League.

SA - Sturmabteilung - Organization of the storm troopers.

When space 38 shows classification "O", no indication of position will show in spaces 39 - 43 unless the title, i.e., MAYOR, can be spelled out or a reasonable abbreviation, e.g., LDRAT for Landrat, can be used.

When space 38 shows classification "P", the customary short-name of the organization or the first five letters of such short-name will be found in spaces 39 - 43 as follows:

ORPO - Ordnungspolizei - the regular uniformed German police.

SCHUP - Schutzpolizei - city police, branch of Orpo.

GEND - Gendarmerie - rural police, branch of Orpo.

FGEND - Feldgendarmerie - military police.

SELBS - Selbstschutzpolizei - civilian auxiliary police.

However, SS ranks where shown on the original card are entered in spaces 39 - 43, according to the code in the next paragraph, in preference to any of these police organizations.

When space 38 shows classification "S", spaces 39 - 43 will show the rank within the SS held by the subject as follows:

RCHFR - Reichsfuehrer	1
OBTGF - Oberstgruppenfuehrer	2
OBGRF - Obergruppenfuehrer	3
GRUPF - Gruppenfuehrer	4
BRIGF - Brigadefuehrer	5
OBERF - Oberfuehrer	6
STANF - Standartenfuehrer	7
OSTBF - Obersturmbannfuehrer	8
STUBF - Sturmbannfuehrer	9
HSTUF - Hauptsturmfuehrer	10
OSTUF - Obersturmfuehrer	11
USTUF - Untersturmfuehrer	12
STASF - Stabsscharfuehrer	13
STSCF - Sturmscharfuehrer	14
STOBJ - Standartenoberjunker	15
HSCHF - Hauptscharfuehrer	16

OSCHF - Oberscharfuehrer	17
SCHAF - Scharfuehrer	19
USCHF - Unterscharfuehrer	21
ROTTF - Rottenfuehrer	24
STURM - Sturmmann	25
S-MAN - SS Mann	26

When space 38 shows classification "F", "M", "R", "U" or "W", customarily there will be no further identification in spaces 39 - 43. Exception will occur when the individual has an SS rank or NSDAP affiliation.

When, after arrest, a man is interned for no further reason than the fact that he is considered a threat to the security of Allied military authorities, the code used will be SECTH.

44 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL - one digit code.

Space 44 is only filled when space 38 shows the classification "N" or "O", to indicate at what level of the regional organization the subject individual is employed:

1 - Reich, Reichsministerium

2 - Gau, Land, Provinz, Regierungsbezirk

3 - Kreis, Landkreis

4 - Ort, City (Gemeinde)

5 - Zelle

6 - Block

45 - 46 RANK OR POSITION - two digit code.

The rank within the organization which is held by the subject individual will be shown in spaces 45 - 46 by a number descending from the highest position to the lowest according to a two digit code. In police and paramilitary formations, this code is based on relative ranks so that all numbers are not represented within every formation. The numerical code for SS ranks, employed whenever a position

for a member of the SS is used in spaces 39 - 43, is found after the ranks of the ; coded above.

If space 38 shows "N" and space 44 is filled, the following code is used to indicate the relative party position at any level:

1 - Leiter

2 - Hauptamtsleiter or Amtsleiter

3 - Hauptstellenleiter

4 - Stellenleiter

If space 38 shows "N" and space 39 - 43 show "HJ" or "BDM", the following code is employed in spaces 45 - 46:

1 - Reichsjugendfuehrer

2 - Stabsfuehrer der Reichsjugeadfuehrung

3 - Obergebeitsfuehrer

4 - Gebeitsfuehrer, Gebeitsfuehrerin

5 - Hauptbannfuehrer, Hauptmaedelfuehrerin

6 - Oberbannfuehrer

7 - Bannfuehrer, Bannmaedelfuehrerin

8 - Oberstannfuehrer

9 - Stammfuehrerin, Maedelringfuehrerin

10 - Hauptgefolgschaftsfuehrer

11 - Obergefolgschaftsfuehrer

12 - Gefolgschaftsfuehrer, Maedelgruppenfuehrerin

19 - Oberscharfeuhrer

21 - Scharfeuhrer, Maedelscharfuehrerin

22 - Oberkameradschaftsfuehrer

23 - Kameradschaftsfuehrer, Maedelschaftsfuehrerin

24 - Rottenfuehrer

26 - Hitlerjunge, BDM Maedel

If spaces 39 - 43 show "SA", "NSKK", or "NSFK", the following code is employed in spaces 45 - 46:

1 - Stabschef

3 - Obergruppenfuehrer

4 - Gruppenfuehrer

5 - Brigadefuehrer

6 - Oberfuehrer

7 - Standartenfuehrer

8 - Obersturmbannfuehrer, Oberstaffelfuehrer

9 - Sturmbannfuehrer, Staffelfuehrer

10 - Hauptsturmfuehrer

11 - Obersturmfuehrer

12 - Sturmfuehrer

14 - Haupttruppfuehrer

16 - Obertruppfuehrer

17 - Truppfuehrer

19 - Oberscharfuehrer

21 - Scharfuehrer

24 - Rottenfuehrer

25 - Obersturmmann

26 - Sturmmann

When spaces 39 - 43 show the classification "RAD", the following code will be employed in columns 45 - 46:

3 - Reichsarbeitsfuehrer

4 - Obergeneralarbeitsfuehrer

5 - Generalarbeitsfuehrer

7 - Oberstarbeitsfuehrer, Stabshauptfuehrerin

8 - Oberarbeitsfuehrer, Stabsoberfuehrerin

9 - Arbeitsfuehrer, Stabsfuehrerin

10 - Oberstfeldmeister, Maidenhauptfuehrerin

11 - Oberfeldmeister, Maidenoberfuehrerin

12 - Feldmeister, Maidenfuehrerin

13 - Unterfeldmeister, Maidenunterfuehrerin

17 - Obertruppfuehrer, Jungfuehrerin

21 - Truppfuehrer, Kameradschaftsaeltesto

23 - Obervormann

24 - Vormann

26 - Arbeitsmann, Arbeitsmaid

When space 38 shows "P" or when the subject individual is a member of the Abwehr so that he holds Wehrmacht rank the following code is used:

1 - Generalfeldmarschall

2 - General Oberst

3 - General der Infanterie, General der Polizei

4 - Generalleutnant

5 - Generalmajor

7 - Oberst

8 - Oberstleutnant

9 - Major

10 - Hauptmann

11 - Oberleutnant, Schupo Inspekteur

12 - Leutnant, Polizei Obermeister or Meister

If space 38 shows "F", "M", "O", "R", "S", "U", or "W", spaces 45 - 46 will customarily be left blank.

47 - 48 YEAR POSITION HELD AT LAST REPORT - two digit code.

All dates used will be shown by the last two digits of the year omitting the century, e.g., 1939 becomes 39.

49 - 40 YEAR OF BIRTH - two digit code.

Age of subject will be shown by use of the last two digits of the year of birth. When approximate ages are given, the mean of the approximation will be used, e.g., "born 1907 - 1909" becomes "08", "aged 55 - 60" becomes "88".

51 - 52 NATIONALITY OF SUBJECT - two digit code.

Nationality will be shown by the following two digit code:

1 - American

2 - Alsatian (French)

3 - Belgian

4 - British

5 - Canadian

6 - Danish

7 - French

8 - German

9 - Hungarian

10 - Italian

11 - Russian

12 - Scottish

13 - Spanish

14 - Swedish

15 - Bulgarian

16 - Chinese

17 - Irish

18 - Hebrew

19 - Swiss

20 - Austrian

21 - Polish

22 - Arab

23 - Jap

24 - Finn

25 - Dutch

26 - Czech

27 - Yugoslav

28 - Greek

29 - Egyptian

30 - Moroccan

31 - Alsatian (German)

32 - Turk

33 - Welsh

34 - Persian

35 - Portugese

36 - Armenian

37 - Australian

38 - Haitian

39 - Algerian

40 - Norwegian

41 - Asiatic

42 - Estonian

43 - Syrian

44 - Luxembourgeois

45 - Indian

46 - Breton (French)

47 - Lithuanian

53 - 54 SOURCE OF INFORMATION - two digit code.

The following two digit code will be used to indicate the office originating the card:

6 - MI 6

9 - MI 9

10 - Office of Strategic Services

11 - Political Warfare Executive

12 - 12th Army Group

14 - MI 14

15 - M (Miscellaneous)

16 - 6th Army Group

17 - D (Document)

18 - F (Field)

20 - Federal Bureau of Investigation

21 - 21 Army Group

55 STATUS OF CASE - one digit code.

The following single digit code will be used to indicate the status of the carded individual:

1 - Subject not yet apprehended.

2 - Case pending. Subject apprehended and awaiting final disposition.

3 - Case closed. Final disposition of the individual made.

56 - 58 PLACE OF DETENTION - three digit code.

It is envisaged that all detention and internment camps will be numbered; the number of the camp in which the subject may be found will be entered in spaces 56 - 58.

59 - 60 DISPOSITION OF CASE - two digit code.

As pending cases ("2" in space 55) are closed, "3" will be entered in space 55 and the disposition will be shown in spaces 59 - 60 according to the following code:

1 - Evacuated as a prisoner of war.

31 - Transferred to French authorities.

32 - Transferred to Belgian authorities.

33 - Transferred to Luxembourg authorities.

34 - Transferred to Dutch authorities.

49 - Interned by military authorities.

50 - Released by military authorities without trial.

60 - Tried, acquitted, and released by military authorities.

- Tried, acquitted, and released by French authorities.

62 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Belgian authorities.

63 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Luxembourg authorities.

64 - Tried, acquitted, and released by Dutch authorities.

70 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by military authorities.

71 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by French authorities.

72 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Belgian authorities.

73 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Luxembourg authorities.

74 - Tried, convicted, and imprisoned by Dutch authorities.

79 - Died during imprisonment.

89 - Reliably reported dead before capture.

91 - Tried, convicted, and executed by French authorities.

92 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Belgian authorities.

93 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Luxembourg authorities.

94 - Tried, convicted, and executed by Dutch authorities.

99 - Tried, convicted, and executed by military authorities.

61 - 65 CASE NUMBERS

It is envisaged that each card, as its subject changes from status "1" to status "2" on being apprehended, will become the primary document is a dossier. This dossier will be assigned a number which will be the number of the case. This number will at that time be entered on the MRU card.

66 - 67 ARRESTING AGENCY - two digit code.

The following code has been established to indicate the agency which arrests the subject individual.

1 - First Army

3 - Third Army

7 - Seventh Army

9 - Ninth Army

11 - First French Army

12 - 12th Army Group

15 - Fifteenth Army

16 - 6th Army Group

21 - 21 Army Group

22 - Communications Zone

25 - 15th Army Group

29 - Russian Armies

31 - French authorities

32 - Belgian authorities

33 - Luxembourg authorities

34 - Dutch authorities

70 - 76 MRU CARD NUMBER

To facilitate the handling of MRU cards, each personality card has been assigned an arbitrary number which is likewise carried by its MRU counterpart. This is a filing aid and has no significance for any office except the MRU office.

80 - DUPLICATE CARDS

Whenever a duplicate MRU card is created for a single personality, because an individual has an alias or is associated with more than one town, the existence of the second card is noted by an asterisk in column 80.

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PART IV - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND PERSONNEL

A statement indicating the areas allotted to CI staffs and the resources of CI personnel available in each area.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER VIII

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

70. GENERAL. Pursuant to the instructions contained herein, personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be administered and operated under the direction of the G-2 (Chief, CIB) of the command to which they are attached, and in accordance with the provisions of letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, file AG 322 OpGB, dated 2 December 1944, subject "Counter Intelligence Corps", which quotes the War Department letter, file AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) B-S-B-M, dated 13 November 1944, same subject.

71. STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Procurement. Procurement will be effected in accordance with letter, this headquarters, file 200.3 (G-2), dated 9 December 1944, subject "Enlisted Personnel for CIC Detachments".

b. Training. Detachment Commanders are responsible that personnel of their detachments maintain high standards of operational and administrative efficiency.

c. Uniform.

(1) Enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps will wear the uniform prescribed for enlisted men of the U.S. Army with or without sleeve insignia of rank, excepting as follows:

(a) Enlisted personnel may wear the enlisted uniform without insignia of rank and with metal "US" insignia on both sides of the shirt collar when actually engaged in interrogation duties at interrogation centers, internment camps, detention facilities and similar installations.

(2) CIC credentials and badges will be carried and CIC armbands will be worn as part of the uniform except when they might jeopardize the safety of the agents or the successful accomplishment of their mission.

d. Vehicles. Vehicles used by CIC personnel will bear no markings identifying them as CIC vehicles. Appropriate steps will be taken to eliminate

CIC identification and substitute therefor markings which will conceal the true assignment of the vehicles. This action will be coordinated with appropriate authorities of the unit to which the detachment is attached.

e. Operations.

(1) Operational Functions.

(a) The operational functions of personnel of the CIC and that personnel which operates under the supervision of CIC personnel are as follows:

1. To arrest any person who constitutes a threat to the security of the Allied armed forces, including leaders of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, as directed. (See Chapters V and VI).

2. To investigate cases of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

3. To search buildings, billets and installations which are known to or may contain documents of CI value. The appropriate G-2 or S-2 will be notified at once if documents or articles of intelligence value are found during the search of such premises.

4. To search for documents which the Germans consider important as a basis for creating a new military machine or for the continuation of the Nazi Party.

5. To contact the civil authorities initially with MG, if practicable.

6. To establish informant systems among local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information of CI interest, particularly that information relating to underground Nazi or anti-Allied activity.

7. To locate and seize enemy sabotage equipment. It will be placed under guard until instructions for disposition thereof have been received from the G-2 of the appropriate Army/Military District, to whom a report will be made describing such equipment in detail.

8. To coordinate with MG in the discovery and collection of any hidden armament, radio transmitters or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with MG proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices or orders.

9. To cooperate with MG and PM regarding security requirements involved in marshalling refugees and the screening of refugees for individuals of security interest.

10. To coordinate with MG the establishment of check points for travel security control and to recommend to MG approval or disapproval of requests of applicants for travel permits.

11. To conduct security surveys and make continual security checks for protection against sabotage of military, public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the Allied armed forces.

12. To coordinate with AAA to secure information indicating the dropping of parachute agents.

13. To check, in coordination with MG, the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and orders issued by MG and to make recommendations to MG for added measures or for improvement in the enforcement thereof.

14. To recommend to MG the removal of unreliable officials. Civil officials will be arrested by CIC without consulting MG only when immediate apprehension is necessary for security reasons.

15. To investigate civilians employed by the Army in capacities which might endanger classified information or equipment.

16. To report all trends of civil dissension to the appropriate G-2 (CIB).

(2) Security of CIC Personnel, Credentials and Records.

(a) Before complete subjugation of conquered German territory, CIC Detachments may billet in town with MG and MP units or bivouac with the CP of the unit to which it is attached. Detachments will not detach small numbers of agents to isolated towns, but will work in these towns during daylight, returning to a secure bivouac at night. CIC armbands will not be worn in GERMANY except when such identification is absolutely necessary, the occasion warrants the risk and their wearing is directed by the Detachment Commander. Detachment Commanders may consider it inadvisable to establish a publicly known CIC office until such time as the most dangerous Nazi elements have been arrested and security control measures have been effectively established in the area. They should be guided in these decisions by consideration of the prevailing counterintelligence situation to the end that members of their commands will not be unduly imperiled and the success of their missions impaired by early publicity of their counterintelligence status.

(b) CIC personnel undertaking missions in forward combat areas will deposit their credentials and badges in their Detachment safe or with the G-2 of their unit and will not carry on their persons any documents or article susceptible of identifying them to the enemy as intelligence personnel in the event of capture. Intelligence material obtained or notes made in the performance of their missions will be destroyed if it appears that capture by the enemy is imminent.

(3) Discovery and Apprehension of Known or Suspect Enemy Agents and Persons Engaging in Subversive Activities.

(a) Persons of this category may come to the attention of CIC in one or more of the following ways:

1. Information furnished by CI staff of this and other headquarters. (See par 8, Chapter I).

2. Identification as enemy agents through interrogation of captured agents.

3. Detection in the act of espionage, sabotage or subversion.

4. Voluntary surrender.

5. Capture of documents or materials disclosing sabotage, espionage or subversive activities.

6. Security screening operations at ports, frontier crossings, MG security check points and other security controls. (See Chapter III).

7. Denunciations.

8. Security raids.

9. Violations of security control ordinances. (See Chapter VI).

(b) Known or suspect enemy agents will be taken into custody and escorted by CIC at such times and under such conditions that the fact of their capture will, whenever possible, be concealed from the public and the local police. (See Chapter VI).

(c) Arrestees will be processed according to the instructions set forth in Chapter VI.

(d) The CIC of each division will insure that all line crossers apprehended by combat troops are delivered by them with the least practicable delay to MP or CIC custody. A short, signed statement of related facts will be obtained from the apprehending troops and will accompany the prisoners.

(4) Civilian Informants.

(a) There are two categories of civilian informants: overt denouncers and covert informers.

1. The minimum record of denunciations will consist of name and address of the denouncer and the denounced, a short synopsis of the information given, and the interrogator's evaluation of the source of the information. These denunciations will be dealt with methodi-

cally, culling out rumors and hearsay information and pursuing specific leads.

2. A system of informants will be developed by CIC within the civilian population. These informants can be paid from confidential funds either for spot information or on a salary basis. A CONFIDENTIAL file will be maintained by CIC in each office giving the name, address and description of each informant. Entries will be made on the records of these informants referring to information in the files which they have furnished.

3.

(b) Reliable members of anti-Nazi groups may be of great informant assistance to CIC Detachments. However, many persons, by reason of self-interest, are expected to pretend membership and participation in such groups. Verification of these representations must be made by referring names to known leaders or members of these organizations and by examination of lists of anti-Nazi persons furnished by this and other headquarters.

(5) Files and Indices.

(a) Files.

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1. When sufficiently numerous, files will be separated into the following classifications:

   a. Individual suspects.

   b. Suspect organizations.

   c. Names of informants.

   d. Records of denunciations.

   e. Security controls.

   f. Passes and permits.

   g. Copies of completed Arrest Reports.

(b) Card Index.-

1. Particulars of all suspects, suspect organizations, informants and addresses, will be carded on half sheets of 8 x 10 1/2 paper.

2. Cards relating to individual suspects will record:

   a. Full name (with any aliases), address, occupation and description.

   b. Any details of the case and of action taken which will assist in identification.

   c. Reference to files on the case.

   d. Cross-reference to names of any associated individuals.

3. Cards dealing with organizations, suspect establishments (cafes, etc) will record:

   a. Names and address (addresses)

   b. Brief case history.

   c. Reference to any files dealing with it.

d. Cross reference to individuals connected with it, if not in files.

e. Action taken.

4. Cards relating to informants will record:

a. Full name (with any aliases), address, occupation and description.

b. Reference to files containing any related documents.

c. Unless already noted in files:

(i) How first contacted.

(ii) Estimated reliability.

(iii) Cross reference to any suspects or cases reported by the informant.

(c) Because of the transitory nature of the occupation of the smaller towns by any specific CIC personnel during the advance, the foregoing records must be turned over completely to the CIC personnel relieving the withdrawing Detachment, or, if continued CIC coverage of the town is not planned, the records will be turned over to the CIC in the nearest city permanently occupied by CIC personnel.

(6) Captured Records and Archives. Captured records and archives will be disposed of according to the instructions contained in paragraph 9, j, Chapter I.

(7) Liaison.

(a) Liaison between CI personnel and all Allied CI services is the responsibility of CI staffs. However, members of the CIC will work in closest cooperation with:

1. MG

2. MP and PM personnel

3. SCI personnel

4. SCI/Radio DF personnel

5. Document teams

6. Civil Censorship personnel

7. IPW teams

8. MII teams

9. P & PW personnel

10. Signal security services

11. Attached Allied CI personnel

12. Naval, Air Force, and Com Z personnel

(b) Before undertaking an investigation in any area, representatives of CI agencies will clear with the CIC team responsible for the area.

(8) Scope of Employment of CIC Personnel. CIC personnel will be employed only on tasks involving counterintelligence interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine PW interrogations, black market investigations, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with their performance of counterintelligence duties. CIC personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of a comparable nature.

72. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.

a. Requirements.

(1) An extensive and flexible CIC organization is required in order to assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission in GERMANY. The strength of the CIC of the 12th Army Group is not presently sufficient to accomplish fully their assigned missions and for that reason, action is now being taken to supplement the present personnel with additional CIC officers and agents from other commands, and to effect a partial reorganization of the 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. Reorganization. The reorganization will be effected as follows:

(1) A single CIC detachment is being activated consisting of 323 officers and 1100 enlisted men and organized in appropriate teams in accordance with T/O & E 30-500. Personnel will be made available for this organization by the simultaneous inactivation of the following detachments and portions of detachments.

Communications Zone Detachments	611
SHAEF Detachment	14
Hq, 12th Army Group Detachment	245
56 teams, type B-2, from Divisions	560
TOTAL	1,430

(2) The bulk of the detachment (hereinafter called "Occupation Detachment") will consist of 83 teams type B-3, composed of 3 officers and 11 enlisted men. The balance of the detachment will consist of various headquarters teams.

(3) Appropriate type teams will be placed on detached service with Army Group/U.S. Zone headquarters, Army/Military District headquarters, headquarters of the Port Enclave, and to the BERLIN Military District Headquarters in BERLIN. Initially, teams will also be placed on detached service with SHAEF, 6th Army Group and Com Z. Armies/Military Districts will make such distribution of teams to subordinate headquarters as circumstances require.

(4) This reorganization brings about no change in existing detachments attached to headquarters of Armies or Corps but reduces the Division detachments to one team type A-1 and one team type B-1, totaling 2 officers and 5 enlisted men. Detachments remaining with tactical units will accompany them in the event units leave this theater of operations. However, all officer and enlisted CIC personnel who possess particular qualifications of value to CI operations in this theater will be transferred into the Occupation Detachment. The primary mission of Corps and Division detachments in the post-hostilities period will be that of insuring the internal security of headquarters, personnel and material. However, they can be assigned additional CIC missions by Armies/Military Districts in the vicinity of the headquarters to which they are attached if there

is no conflict with their internal security mission and if they can be assembled without delay in the event of a movement of the headquarters to which they are attached. As warranted by future developments, detachments attached to tactical units may be relieved from such attachment and attached to the Occupation Detachment; if so, they would be re-attached to the tactical unit when transfer of the unit from this Theater of Operations appears imminent. Units from which CIC detachments are thus withdrawn will be afforded necessary CI coverage by the CIC personnel responsible for the area in which the unit is located.

c. Implementation.

(1) Upon activation of the Occupation Detachment, Headquarters, ETOUSA, will publish orders transferring personnel from the inactivated detachments and portions of detachments into the Occupation Detachment. Such personnel, in the case of Division detachments, will consist of those officers and men who are best suited for work within GERMANY, especially those who speak European languages. Division detachment personnel affected by such orders will be placed on detached service with the several Armies/Military Districts, which may effect further distribution of personnel to subordinate headquarters.

(2) 12th Army Group CIC Reserve Teams transferred into the Occupation Detachment will be placed on detached service with Armies/Military Districts, Port Enclave Headquarters and BERLIN Military District. Com Z CIC personnel transferred into the Occupation Detachment will be withdrawn from the Communications Zone as rapidly as the situation permits and likewise, placed on detached service with the aforementioned headquarters.

(3) Immediately upon transfer of the personnel from Division detachments to the Occupation Detachment, an appropriate division of organizational and investigative property will be made between the Division detachment and the transferred personnel. The highest ranking officer on the team will be designated Team Commander and will assume responsibility for such property. Each team will receive a number designation from the Commanding Officer of the Occupation Detachment for use thereafter in identifying the team.

d. Administration. The following administrative instructions pertaining to CIC personnel in the 12th Army Group will become effective immediately:

(1) Correspondence dealing with Occupation Detachment administrative matters will be forwarded through CIC channels in the 12th Army Group, except when instructed otherwise by Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(2) Subject to operational needs, every effort will be made to keep Occupation Detachment teams intact.

(3) Orders transferring Occupation Detachment personnel between Armies/Military Districts will be issued only by this headquarters.

(4) Personnel will not be shifted among teams of the Occupation Detachment except by authority of the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(5) Promotions of officers and enlisted men of the Occupation Detachment will be accomplished only at this headquarters. Officers will be promoted upon the recommendation of the G-2 of the headquarters to which they are attached for duty. Enlisted personnel will be promoted when recommended by the team commander and approved by the CIC Detachment Commander of the Army/Military District to which they are attached.

(6) Copies of all orders affecting personnel of the Occupation Detachment will be furnished the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(7) WD AGO Forms 66-1 of all officers of the Occupation Detachment will be maintained at the office of the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(8) Service records and allied papers of Occupation Detachment enlisted personnel will be maintained by the detachment to which the personnel is attached for duty unless instructed otherwise by the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

(9) Personnel matters requiring entry on the Morning Report of the organization to which the Occupation Detachment personnel is assigned, particularly hospitalization cases, will be reported to Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment without delay.

(10) Occupation Detachment Team Commanders will maintain appropriate property records of organizational and investigative property.

(11) Organizational equipment listed in T/O & E 30-500 and investigative equipment listed in the Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps will be requisitioned by Occupation Detachment Team Commanders from the Commanding Officer, Occupation Detachment.

e. Organization of CIC Personnel, 12th Army Group.

(1) The planned distribution of Occupation Detachment personnel in the 12th Army Group/U.S. Zone is as follows:

(a) 12th Army Group/U.S. Zone Headquarters: 15 officers and 36 enlisted men.

(b) Port Enclave: 9 officers and 33 enlisted men.

(c) BERLIN District Headquarters at BERLIN: 7 officers and 22 enlisted men.

(2) A number of teams will be placed on detached service with each Army/Military District Headquarters to perform the CIC mission in the Army Zone or Military District. It will be the responsibility of Armies/Military Districts to allot this personnel to the Military Sub-districts, installations and areas where they will be most effective. Armies/Military Districts will request additional teams from G-2 (Chief, CIB), this headquarters.

73.

74.

75.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER IX

(U) SPECIAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (SCI) DETACHMENT

76(U) GENERAL.

(U) a. The SCI Detachment, 12th Army Group, furnishes a channel for special information pertaining to the German intelligence services (GIS), which is available in LONDON but which is not suitable for transmission through ordinary intelligence channels, and advises and assists in the use of this information. It also interrogates and makes use of captured GIS agents and officials, introduces penetration agents into the GIS, and provides additional special CI assistance as outlined herein.

(U) b. Pursuant to these instructions, SCI personnel operate under the direction of the G-2 (Chief, CIB) of the command to which they are attached.

(U) 77. ADMINISTRATION. The SCI Detachment operates as part of the CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, but is administered by Hq, Special Troops, 12th Army Group.

(U) 78. ORGANIZATION.

(U) a. The SCI Detachment maintains its principal offices in proximity to the office of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

(U) b. The SCI Detachment will provide liaison officers to the headquarters of Armies and "T" Force of 12th Army Group and to Hq, 21 Army Group, so as to ensure proper coordination of SCI activities between these headquarters. The SCI Detachment will also be responsible for proper coordination of SCI activities with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and with the British-U.S. CI War Room in LONDON. In order to carry out this duty, the SCI Detachment is provided with its own radio communication facilities which maintain direct contact with the SCI liaison officers at Armies, "T" Force, 21 Army Group and with OSS in PARIS and LONDON.

(U) c. Whenever elements of the SCI Detachment operate with an army, their operational control is vested in the Army Commander concerned (Chief, CIB, G-2 Section). Copies of reports rendered by those SCI elements will be furnished to the Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, this headquarters.

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80. OPERATIONS.

a. Enemy Radio Agents. SCI officers will be notified immediately, through G-2 channels, of the capture of an enemy agent equipped with radio, so as to evaluate and possibly exploit the case with the minimum loss of time or of security. The radio equipment, ciphers, codes, instructions and all documents captured with the enemy agent will be turned over to SCI personnel for examination.

b. Double and Penetration Agents. The operation of double agents or of penetration agents by the SCI Detachment will be conducted under the supervision of the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, in conjunction with Special Plans, G-3 Section, this headquarters.

c. Detection of Clandestine Radio Transmitters.

(1) In order to make most effective use of the mobile radio D/F (Direction-Finding) units available to this headquarters for determining the location of clandestine radio transmitters, SCI will be furnished, through G-2 channels, the fullest information possible on radio signals which indicate the existence of such illicit transmitters. This information will include, as far as possible, the following data:

(a) Time and date of transmissions.
(b) Frequency of signal.
(c) Call signs.
(d) Sample of preamble and procedure.
(e) Sample of traffic.
(f) Whether telegraphy or telephony.
(g) Type of receiver on which signal heard.

(2) The SCI Detachment will forward such information to Central Control, which monitors and analyzes the traffic. If Central Control determines that the signal is clandestine, it provides necessary operational data for the mobile radio D/Fing units. The SCI Detachment will coordinate with the Signal Intelligence Service of this headquarters the dispatch of such units to the indicated area.

d. Reports. The SCI Detachment will furnish to Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, weekly operations reports and special reports, when necessary, regarding the progress of radio double agents and of penetration agents.

79. FUNCTIONS. Normally, SCI personnel will function in a staff capacity as advisers without executive responsibilities. However, they will also be used to assist in exploiting CI targets such as GIS headquarters, personnel and documents, which require detailed knowledge of the enemy intelligence services. They will not be employed on other than CI duties nor will they be employed in areas where there is danger of capture. Their principal duties are to:

a. Provide a direct channel, using their own communication facilities, for the special information pertaining to the GIS which is available in LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON.

b. Advise and assist with reference to the use of the aforementioned information.

c. Aid in compiling, preparing and disseminating, in required form, all available information concerning the GIS.

d. Advise in the selection and method of handling countersabotage targets and assist, as required, in the exploitation of such targets.

e. Assist in the interrogation of captured GIS agents, officials or employees and in the examination of captured enemy material of CI interest.

f. Operate radio or other double agents, under the supervision of Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters, and in conjunction with Special Plans, G-3 Section, of this headquarters.

g. Recruit, train and dispatch penetration agents to infiltrate the GIS, or, for CI purposes, any other subversive organization.

h. Evaluate and check reports of possible clandestine radio transmitters so that the location thereof may be pinpointed through monitoring and through the use of mobile radio D/F (Direction-Finding) units.

i. Coordinate and supervise the special CI activities of any Allied Special CI services operating in the 12th Army Group zone of operations and report thereon to the Chief, CIB, G-2 Section, this headquarters.

j. Transmit to LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON information on the GIS collected in the field, including captured documents and other material of purely CI interest, as approved by the G-2 of this headquarters.

k. Check the CI records of LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON for background information on captured GIS agents, officials or suspects.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER X

ALLIED CI LIAISON PERSONNEL

85. GENERAL. Liaison personnel of the French, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Luxembourg Security Services will be attached to the G-2 Sections of this headquarters and the headquarters of the Armies/Military Districts.

86. FUNCTIONS. The functions of the Allied CI liaison personnel are as follows:

a. To provide liaison with the security service of the nation they represent.

b. To cooperate with US CI personnel in conducting necessary investigations pertaining to operations of the German intelligence services and of individual German intelligence agents which were conducted in their respective countries or territories.

c. To aid in the security check of (see paragraph 22, Chapter III) and .o exploit as sources of CI information prisoners of war and displaced persons of their respective nationalities. The detailed security control of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons will be effected at Reception Centers in their own countries.

d. To recruit and run agents for penetration purposes, under the direction of the appropriate G-2.

87. OPERATIONS.

a. Besides acting as a channel for information collected by their respective national security services, Allied CI liaison personnel will advise and assist US CI staffs in the exploitation of such information.

b. The following limitations will govern the activities of Allied CI liaison personnel in GERMANY.

(1) Such personnel will not engage in CI activities within GERMANY without the prior approval of the appropriate G-2 in each specific case.

81. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ADVANCE INTO AND OCCUPATION OF GERMANY. In addition to continuance of its functions and operations, as stated in pars. 79 and 80 above, the SCI Detachment, during and following the occupation of GERMANY will:

a. Overrun and pick up the penetration agents it sent into GERMANY, and utilize their information to ascertain the activities or whereabouts of GIS officials, agents and documents.

b. Reinsert into GIS such of these agents as are deemed suitable.

c. Provide additional penetration agents to contact the underground GIS.

d. Provide a channel for the flow of information from Hq, 21 Army Group, Allied Force Headquarters, LONDON, PARIS, WASHINGTON and neutral countries regarding GIS agents and officials to be encountered in 12th Army Group area in GERMANY.

e. Supply LONDON, PARIS and WASHINGTON with information on GIS officials and agents who have fled from GERMANY so that they can be tracked down.

f. Provide specialized officer and enlisted personnel for attachment to the CI Branch, G-2 Section of this headquarters and to the CI Branch, G-2 Section, of each Army/Military District headquarters; also liaison officers with the Zone Headquarters of Allied nations in GERMANY, with the U.S. Group Control Council in BERLIN and with Allied Force Headquarters.

g. Furnish each such Army/Military District SCI office and SCI Liaison officer with radio equipment for communications direct to the 12th Army Group SCI Detachment.

h. Take over at the proper time and reallocate, as necessary, the SCI personnel of 6th Army Group which is to be absorbed at a specified future date into the SCI Detachment, 12th Army Group.

82.

83.

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(2) In every case, such personnel will transmit a complete report of the results of operations conducted by them in GERMANY to the appropriate G-2.

c. Allied CI liaison personnel will be notified of the arrest of all members of the German intelligence services who have operated in their respective countries or territories. Every facility will be given to Allied CI liaison personnel to interrogate such members of the German intelligence services whose activities are or have been of interest to their respective nations.

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CHAPTER XI

INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY

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91. MASS TESTING. The Intelligence Laboratory is not designed for mass-testing of correspondence or for mass-photography of any kind and will not be called upon for such work.

(U) 92. REQUIRED INFORMATION. CI questions submitted to the Intelligence Laboratory for technical opinion and CI documents or articles sent thereto for examination will be accompanied by the fullest possible information as to the general nature and significance of the case.

(U) 93. CHAIN OF EVIDENCE. Attention is directed to the strict necessity for maintaining the chain of evidence where CI material of any nature, submitted for analysis or examination by the Intelligence Laboratory, may be required at a later date for submission or evidence in legal proceedings.

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95.

96.

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIRECTIVE FOR GERMANY

CHAPTER XII

CENSORSHIP

97. GENERAL. The establishment of policy pertaining to and the supervision of censorship control of civilian postal and electrical communications and communications carried by civilian travellers in GERMANY, will be conducted by the G-2 (Censorship Branch) of this headquarters.

98. COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL.

a. Public Law No. 76 (amended), promulgated by MG, suspends civilian use of all communications channels in areas of GERMANY occupied by our forces.

b. The re-opening of suspended communications for civilian use whether intra-city, inter-city, or passing across Army Group boundaries is a command function, and any authorization for the re-opening of communications will be in accordance with directives issued by Army Group/Zone Headquarters.

99. CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS.

a. While hostilities continue, censorship control will be exercised by Advance Censor Sections attached to Army headquarters (G-2 Section). These sections will, primarily, ascertain that unauthorized facilities are suspended and apply spot-check examination and monitoring to authorized communications. As a result of such spot-check examinations and monitoring, information considered detrimental to the Allied cause, as well as material of operational value, will be made available immediately to the appropriate intelligence agencies.

b. Upon cessation of hostilities, censorship control of the U.S. Zone of Occupation will be maintained by the establishment of Censorship District Stations. Field Stations for travel censorship and electrical communications control will be established as required.

100. ASSISTANCE TO CI.

a. The accomplishment of the CI mission will be assisted by civil censorship through the surveillance which can be afforded to communications to and from suspect persons or groups. Within operational limitations, watch will be maintained and information furnished upon request by authorized CI agencies.

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b. In addition, civil censorship will afford CI and other agencies access to information which will assist in:

(1) The destruction of the NSDAP and its affiliates.

(2) The detection of underground military, para-military, secret police, intelligence and political bodies.

(3) Uncovering possible subversive activities and anti-Allied agitation by groups or leaders within or out of occupied areas.

(4) The apprehension of collaborators and War Criminals.

(5) The prevention of acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

(6) The detection of individuals using secret inks, codes, ciphers, "cleaks" and intermediaries with subversive intent.

(7) The disclosure of hidden arms, munitions, war equipment and material and unlawful trafficing therein.

(8) The maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of the terms of surrender.

(9) The apprehension and prosecution of individuals or groups of individuals evading or violating MG laws, ordinances and proclamations.

(10) The apprehension of persons concealing their identity or impersonating others.

(11) The recovery of permits and personal documents unlawfully in use or possession.

(12) The investigation of irregularity of and trafficing with documents, passports, travel permits and visas.

(13) Stopping unauthorized travel or the evasion of frontier security control measures.

(14) The protection of intelligence items and the revelation of means by which unauthorized individuals procured such knowledge.

(15) Following important political and economic trends.

101.

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Appendix 2

GERMANY OVERRUN

SCHEDULE OF COURSES

XXII CORPS CI SCHOOL

GERMANY, APRIL 1945

XXII Corps

Annex 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45, s/Crystal, G-2

--copy--

HEADQUARTERS XXII CORPS
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
US Army

25 Apr 45
GERMANY

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION - CI SCHOOL

FIRST DAY

Period	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
1	Introduction to CI. Mission of school; methods used; documents; Internal SOP; discipline; student notebooks will be kept; daily written exams; practical work in course.	Col CRYSTAL	Issue CI Opns Ltr XXII Corps (20 Apr 45)
2	History of CIC. Basic operations plan; CI estimate of situation in Rhineland today; explanation of CI Handbook.	Maj CAMPBELL	Issue XXII Corps CI Handbook
3	The Rhineland and XXII Corps Area. History; geography; pertinent facts.	Capt VOLK	School maps and XXII Corps Chart displayed.
4	Powers of Observation Test.	Capt HAYES	Issue Blitzquiz No 1 - 15 min.
	Newspaper reportorial style. PRO attitude toward visiting correspondents.	Capt VOLK	Issue News Release on XXII Corps; History of Corps Insignia; biography of CG.

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XXII Corps
Annex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45
Schedule of Instruction -- CI School (Continued)

Period	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
	Internal school SOP. Student internal organization for administration and discipline.	Capt HAYES Senior Student	Organize class into 10-man sections each of which has 2-3 German speakers.
5	Organization of German Intelligence and CI network; police; underground; Abwehr; SIPO; GESTAPO.	Capt BAER (15th Army)	Blackboard and chalk. Issue Chart I, II and III.
6	Interrogation of Germans. General background of Hitlerite Germany; importance of documents.	Capt BAER (15th Army)	Blackboard.
7 & 8	The Nazi party; rise of Hitler. Organization of Germany since 1934.	Agent KLINGER	Issue pamphlets: CIC vs Naziism (VII Corps), CI Opns in Germany (FUSA), CI Opn Info (15th Army). Issue: SHAEF/ CI Handbook, SHAEF CI Directive for Germany.
	SECOND DAY		
1	Criminal Investigation Division of Provost Marshal's office; functions; and duties; contact and work with G-2 and CIC and S-2s.	Lt LIPSIT (CID)	
2	Post World War I Germany. The German psychology and people.	Lt MEISEL	Maps of Germany on display.

hedule of Instruction - CI School (Continued)

eriod	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
3	G-5 and its relations with CI. Security Screening of German MG appointed officials; organization and functioning of MG; Pragebogen.	Col McFARLAND (G-5)	Display of all MG Proclamations, Ordnances, etc., now applicable.
4	Foreign Liaison Officers and their work with their nationals in screening.	Lt SERINGE (Fr Ln O)	
4 1/2	Examination on night study assignments, with markings by students and discussion of solution.	Capt HAYES	Issue Blitzquiz No 2.
5 & 6	German Frontier Control. SHAEF Policies and directives; problems of enforcement; frontaliers; Frontier Command.	Maj HILL (15th Army) Capt PRESCOTT (Frontier CIC Detachment)	Map of Border, Chart of CI Cover.
& 8	Counter Espionage. Experience in this war; German techniques and equipment.	Lt BEACH (15th Army CIC Det)	Equipment brought by Lt Beach.
	THIRD DAY		
1	Post, Installation and Area Security Survey.	Lt COULTER	
2	Public Safety Officers in MG Detachments. Their duties and administration; Fragebogen.	Lt BLANTON (Public Safety Division MG)	
3	Displaced Persons. Their processing, administration; security screening; present status.	Capt CAMPBELL (Corps DP Office)	
4	Corps of Army Interrogation Centers. Their operation; function; liaison with MG, PM, G-1.	Lt COULTER	

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XXII Corps
Annex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45
Schedule of Instruction - CI School (Continued)

Period	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
4 2/3	Examination on Second Day's Instruction.	Capt HAYES	Issue: Blitz-quiz No 3
5 plus 1/2 of 6	German Sabotage Techniques. Experiences in this war; equipment.	Lt DRESCHLER (15th Army)	German Sabotage Equipment. Table for display.
Last 1/2 of 6	How to make a "Spot Check".	Capt WILLIAMS (15th Army)	Issue: Spot Check List.
7 & 8	Students go out in 1/2 sections of 5 each; they stop and "Spot Check" all civilians encountered in MUNCHEN-GLADBACH; each student in turn acts as chief and examines those Germans' identity documents and fills in check list; ends up with decision to permit to circulate or else detains; all groups return to Opera House prior to 1630 with detainees for further checking or account to rest of class of each's experience.	Capt WILLIAMS (15th Army)	Students turn in one report per student.
	FOURTH DAY		
1 & 2	CI methods, techniques and principles.	Capt WILLIAMS (15th Army)	Blackboard.
3	Interrogation of suspects "Screening	IPW or MII Students	Issue: Interrogation Blank Form.
4	Typical day in CI Office. Normal problems and their solution.	Lt RUTLEDGE	Group from various XXII Corps teams assist in demonstration.

XXII Corps

nnex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45
chedule of Instruction - CI School (Continued)

Period	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
5,6,&7	Practical interrogation; students go to MUNCHEN-GLADBACH jail and in 1/2 sections of 5 each interrogate known suspects or criminals; each writes separate report using interrogation blank form and ends up with recommended disposition of case.	IPW, MII and CIC students assist in this exercise.	Arrange for 25 prisoners in MUNCHEN-GLADBACH jail and 25 rooms each with 6 chairs and a table.
8	Return to Opera House; each group, in turn, tells all rest of its experience and findings.	Maj CAMPBELL	Students turn in one report per student. Issue: Student critique of course forms.

FIFTH DAY

1	Informants. How to get them; use them; what to do to get the most out of them; denunciations.	Agent OHLIN	
2	CI Files. Card forms; personality targets; reports; forms; administration of a CI office; how to take over and turn over; initial scanning of MG registration file copies and local civic files; fragebogen	Agent JOHNSON	Issue SOP blank forms: Card file Arrest form. ((sic))
3	Review of all pertinent CI documents containing directives (SHAEF, 12th Army Group) on restrictions on and policies toward Germans; procedures to get assistance on CI targets, handling suspects.	Maj CAMPBELL	
4	Students turn in all documents that they were not issued to keep; pack so as to leave school after CG presents diplomas.	Capt HAYES	

XXII Corps
Annex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45
Schedule of Instruction - CI School (Continued)

Period	Subject	Instructor	Staff Action
5	The G-2 Section and its functions, duties, resources today; handling of visitors; war correspondents.	Col CRYSTAL	Issue: Rhine Province Survey Questionnaire on Occupied Germany (12th Army Group) Visitors Bureau.
	Division G-2, Brigade and Group S-2 and their relation to CI and CIC.	Div G-2s, Brig S-2s, Gp S-2s	
6	Provost Marshal and his relationship to CI; handling and processing of PWs; CID and Liaison with CIC and Provost Marshal.	Col GRUBB (Provost Marshal)	
7	Student critique of CI School. Course; ideas to make it better; questions; free discussion.	All of instructors who can be present.	
8	Graduation; presentation of Certificates.	Gen HARMON	ARC Clubmobile Group "A" with... (sic)

NOTES:

Each day's instruction consists of 8 one-hour periods; the normal period consists of 40 minutes of instruction followed by 10 minutes of discussion and questions; then a 10 minute break. Instruction periods are numbered as follows:

1	0800 - 0900
2	0900 - 1000
3	1000 - 1100
4	1100 - 1200
Lunch	
5	1300 - 1400
6	1400 - 1500
7	1500 - 1600
8	1600 - 1700

XXII Corps

nex No. 3 to G-2 Periodic Report No 22, XXII Corps, 26 Apr 45
hedule of Instruction - CI School (Continued)

Documents are issued on the first day of the course; students spend two hours study on them each evening. One examination is given daily; this is normally a 10 statement "True-False" "Blitzquiz" with some written opinion appended.

Students march from quarters to class; retreat formation is at 1700 daily. All tests are brought to all classes.

s/ THOMAS L. CRYSTAL, JR.
Lt Colonel, GSC
A C of S, G-2

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXII

PROPERTY OF
US ARMY

CIC IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC AND CHINA, BURMA, INDIA

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather
RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CIC IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC AND CHINA, BURMA, INDIA

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Part I: The Counter Intelligence Corps in China, Burma, India

Section 1

CIC GIVEN MISSION IN INDIA-BURMA CAMPAIGN

Before the war was two years old, Burma, a strange and little-known country in Southeast Asia, had assumed a strategic importance probably unsurpassed by any other area in the world. This country of rugged mountains, dense jungles and disease-laden swamps, known to most Americans only through Kipling's stories, offered the only life-line to China. China was still struggling on, although supplies, arms, and equipment were practically nonexistent.

By early summer 1943, the situation was truly desperate. It was recognized that Chiang Kai-shek could not hold out much longer unless the United States could get to him trucks, artillery, tanks, and other heavy equipment. Major General Chennault's Flying Tigers were desperately trying to ferry in 10,000 tons of supplies a month via the famed Hump route over the Himalayan Mountains from Assam, India, to the Yunnan plateau in China, but they could not fly in the heavy equipment. If China fell, Japan would be able to exploit tremendous resources without harrassment, and, when the United States was finally able to apply pressure to the home islands, the Government could even flee to the mainland and continue the war, perhaps for years.[1]

United States Army Forces, China-Burma-India (USAF CBI) had been activated on 4 March 1942 with headquarters in Chungking, China, later transferred to New Delhi, India, where British headquarters were located. Chungking then became the forward echelon. Gradually the mission, which had started out to "increase the effectiveness of United States assistance to the Chinese Government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army," had been enlarged to include specifically "the exploitation of the development of overland communications to China."[2]

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 and at the TRIDENT and QUADRANT conferences later in the year, plans were made to build a road through North Burma, paralleled by an oil pipeline which would connect with a similar one to be built from Calcutta to Ledo, not only to supply the Generalissimo's hard pressed forces, but to supply the B-29 bases which were to be built in China to bring to the Japanese islands the same kind of devastating air assault that was pulverizing Germany. The road and the pipeline would make it possible to get in 85,000 tons of general supplies and 54,000 tons of petroleum products each month.[3]

1 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 209-216.
2 The Army Almanac, p. 613.
3 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 209-211.

after the Italian campaign was well under way, and Tyng joined the China detachment in early summer of 1945.[6]

As Colonel Kibler had anticipated, the requisition did come through, and although it was impossible to provide the number of men the theater considered an absolute minimum, he was able to assemble and train a group of ten officers and 100 enlisted men.[7]

By the time Major MacKenzie arrived in India in September 1943, the Japanese had conquered all of Burma except for fringes of mountain, jungle, and swamp on the north and west, and were threatening to seize the British base at Imphal and sever the Bengal-Assam railroad below the base, on which Hump air transport and the projected road depended. General Stilwell's famous "walk-out" was now past history and the Allies were preparing for major offensives from both India and China, offensives which had to await the end of the monsoon season in November. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Commander of the Southeast Asia Command, was assembling troops and supplies in Bengal and Mainpuri; General Stillwell, who held the dual role of Mountbatten's deputy and Chief of Staff for Allied operations in the China Theater, was training two Chinese divisions, who as "X" Forces, were to push through the jungle to clear out the Japanese ahead of the road; and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was strengthening his "Y" Forces, with headquarters at Kunming, along the Salween River in Yunnan.[8]

Prior to the war, only one road had connected Burma with China. This was the Burma Road, extending approximately 1,445 miles, from Rangoon to Chungking. Actually it consisted of a railroad from Rangoon to Lashio; a new motor road from Lashio to Kunming, constructed by the Chinese between 1937 and 1939; and an old highway on to Chungking. Engineers under Brigadier General Lewis A. Pick were to build a road from Ledo, in Assam, to the Irrawaddy River near Myitkyina, down the river valley around the southern end of the impassable Kumon mountain range to cross the Shweli River and intersect the old Burma Road at Mongyu, near the Yunnan border.[9]

When Major MacKenzie reported to the office of Col H. T. Creswell, AC of S, G-2, at New Delhi, he was appointed head of the CIC for the theater and

---

6 Ltr from Col Kibler to AC of S, G-2, file MID 201, Tyng, Wm V. (6/28/43), subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," dtd 28 Jan 43, p. 356, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

7 History of CIC in CBI by MacKenzie, (R) (Central Records Facility); and interview with Col H. R. Kibler (MI Res), 15 Oct 53.

8 Stillwell Papers, p. 160; The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 210-214; and Merrill's Marauders, p. 7.

9 The War Reports of General Marshall, p. 211; The Stillwell Papers, pp. 243 and 269.

charged with the mission of setting up a counterintelligence section within the G-2 Section. He learned that no ground work had been done and that there would be no personnel to assist him until the arrival of Lieutenant Wilson with his divisional detachment in November.

First CIC Work Begun

Major MacKenzie set about his first task of separating the counterintelligence files from the others in the G-2 Section. Upon completion of this, he prepared a directive to be published by theater headquarters directing the submission of monthly counterintelligence summaries by base sections and units in the field.

Early in October he went up to the Service of Supply (SOS) Base area in upper Assam, accompanied by a representative of the Inspector General, to investigate a rumored widespread espionage ring among civilian employees and a reported theft of a tremendous amount of ammunition. Thorough investigation proved the report on ammunition loss to be grossly exaggerated and the espionage ring rumor completely unfounded. The trip, however, gave him opportunity to make security surveys of the SOS installations, revealing a lack of security planning. Each evening, instructions for the next day's air shipments to China were being given in the clear over field telephones whose wires ran along beside the public highway within easy reach of anyone who might desire to tap them. Countermeasures against sabotage were practically nonexistent.[10] Warehouses containing vital materials were left unguarded, or at best guarded only by unarmed Chinese or Indian watchmen. Unguarded bamboo sheds held large quantities of smokeless powder, some of the boxes broken, and the powder leaking onto the ground. Responsible authorities, whose attention Major MacKenzie called to these discrepancies, explained it away by "lack of personnel." All this occured within easy infiltration reach of the Japanese.[11]

According to Major MacKenzie, there ran, throughout all ranks, a persistant belief that there was no use in trying to conceal information because the Japanese knew everything we did or planned to do immediately. Various recommendations were made, and some were adopted to help the situation somewhat.

"It is a bit hard to account for this ready acceptance of the omniscience of Jap Intelligence," Major MacKenzie wrote. "No evidence was ever obtained that the Japanese did obtain the information which passed over the phone lines, but if they had agents in the area, every opportunity was given them to get it. Available

10 History of CIC in the China, Burma, India Theater, by Major MacKenzie, Ibid.

11 Monthly Situation Summary Counterintelligence, CIC Det, Hq USAF, China, Burma, India Theater, Nr 2, dtd 31 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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evidence appears to indicate that they did not have either spies or saboteurs in the area, because although opportunities for both types of agents were unlimited, no sabotage occured, and there is little concrete evidence that they obtained information of value."[12]

Major MacKenzie also noted the increasing number of potentially subversive personnel arriving in the theater, most of whom were suspected of being involved with Communist activity among the restless Indian population. There was as yet no trained personnel in the theater to conduct an organized campaign of security education, or to investigate these cases.[13]

Upon his return to New Delhi, Major MacKenzie proceeded to China to make surveys of various headquarters there at the request of the G-2. He discovered that security measures were adequate at Forward Echelon Headquarters at Chungking, and excellent at "Y" Force Headquarters at Kunming. They were lax, however, at the others visited: 14th Air Force and SOS Headquarters at Kunming and the 14th Air Force Forward Echelon and SOS installations at Kweilin. Recommendations which were submitted to the headquarters concerned and to the theater commander were put into effect within the limitations imposed by personnel and equipment.[14]

However, even the best of physical security measures could not counter the danger found in the probability that Kweilin, the site of 14th Air Force installations, was a center from which Japanese espionage agents were being distributed throughout Free China. Refugees from the Canton area, many of whom were suspected of being in Japanese pay, had collected in Kweilin and reports were circulating that Japanese radios were operating in the Kunming and Kweilin areas. The list of subversive suspects among the Armed Forces or employed by them was growing. Obviously CIC was needed.[15]

First Small Detachment Arrives

While Major MacKenzie was away on this assignment, Lieutenant Wilson and his detachment of five arrived at Calcutta and, while awaiting Major MacKenzie's return, made a security survey of the base section and the port, working under the supervision of the S-2. Early in December the detachment was transferred to theater headquarters. McArdle and Fong were sent to the British Field Security School at Karachi, where they not only received valuable instructions, but also made a number of British friends who proved valuable to them in their work in the field.

12 History of CIC in CBI by MacKenzie, Ibid.
13 Monthly CI Situation Summary, Nr 2, 31 Oct 43, Ibid.
14 History of CIC in CBI, Ibid.
15 Counterintelligence Summary Nr 1, CIC Det, Hq USAF CBI, dtd 31 Dec 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Comisky was assigned as liaison agent with the Field Security Section. McArdle was sent to Calcutta and Nowlan to Bombay, in both of which the security situation was extremely bad, to accomplish what they could and to make plans for adequate coverage when the bulk of the detachment would arrive the following spring. When the Japanese cut off Imphal and laid seige to the city in April 1944, Edmond Fong was flown in to assist the S-2 of the Special Headquarters. A little later two agents were sent to make a security survey of conditions along the portion of the Bengal-Assam railway that was being operated by American personnel. From their findings, it was decided that as soon as the bulk of the detachment arrived, agents would be assigned for liaison work between the railway operating units and the Field Security detachments, who were responsible for the actual security of the line.[16]

Specialized Training for Selected Group Begins

In the meantime, the requisition for additional men had come through to the Office of the Chief of CIC. The men had been assembled and were undergoing training. There was time for the training, not only the specialized training for intelligence under combat conditions which the men in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy had needed so badly but had not received, but also training in special political, geographical and psychological conditions they might expect in the Orient.[17] Amusingly, one of the complaints made and reported in an official survey of the work of CIC personnel in the theater was that the emphasis on "front line activities" in their training, given as a direct result of recommendations from the Mediterranean area, had been of little value since their mission was mainly that of protecting the security of transportation and supply installations.[18]

A group of 25 men who were to be assigned to Air Force installations were trained in means of detecting airplane sabotage in a six weeks Field Service School at Hill Field, Ogden, Utah. Various short courses in specialized subjects, one of which was the Motor School then at Camp Holabird, were attended by some of the group. On 3 January 1944 most of the group arrived at the CIC staging area at Camp Ritchie, where they were given instruction in special theater conditions and field service training in problems involving German and Japanese maps and weapons,

16 History of CIC in CBI, by MacKenzie, Ibid.; Ltr from American Consulate, Bombay, to Chief, CIC, CBI, dtd April 44 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and Ltr File MID 322.999, subj: "Letter of Transmittal," to S2, Hq Base Section SOS, APO 886, from Chief CIC, CBI, dtd 23 Dec 43, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

17 Memorandum for Col Roamer from Maj Staudt, dtd 22 Dec 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), Ibid.

18 Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence ASF, Subj: "The Counter Intelligence Corps in India-Burma Theater," from Lt Col Wm P. Gray, dtd 7 Dec 44, (Central Records Facility).

map reading and various combat situations. Additional staging area training was given at Camp Holabird, Camp Ritchie, Fort Meade, and Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, their last stop before sailing from Hampton Roads on 2 March 1944.[19]

Maj Fariss Hardin and S/Sgt Donald M. Bernston remained behind to obtain equipment and supplies for the detachment and later joined them in Karachi, India.

Everyone seemed to agree that this was one detachment that went to the field with all the equipment and supplies they needed, including, of course, much for which they had no need.[20] Writing later of his experiences, Capt Philip F. Shapiro, who went to the China Theater in the spring of 1945, stated: "This unit was one of the best supplied I have ever seen....this unit brought their own equipment, mainly transportation in the way of jeeps, to this theater. As we had the longest delivery line in the world, I saw many units of other organizations arriving in China without equipment, and they would be bogged down for months because of lack of transportation..."[21]

The bulk of the group, nine officers and 99 enlisted men, with Capt Harold G. Gelwicks in command, sailed from Hampton Roads on 2 March and, upon their arrival in Oran, Algeria, were sent for two weeks to a staging camp known as "Lion Mountain." During their stay, Captain Gelwicks assigned a small group under S/Sgt William Hoffman, to prepare a port security plan which they could later use in CBI Theater ports. They worked with CIC agents in Oran in handling port security problems, which included boarding incoming ships, giving instructions to ship officials and issuing passes.

On 4 April they continued their journey on a Dutch ship operated by the British, through the Suez Canal with stops at Suez, Alexandria, and Port Said, and across the Indian Ocean to Bombay, arriving there on 25 April 1944. A few more agents were sent later, and a few were recruited locally, but this group furnished the bulk of CIC for the CBI Theater throughout the war.[22]

According to a prearranged plan, they were sent through a two-weeks course at the British Field Security School at Karachi, where they were briefed on operational methods of British intelligence organizations and on the general conditions existing in the theater, most of which were new to them.

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19 Memorandum for Colonel Roamer, (CONFIDENTIAL), Ibid; and interview with CWO William Hoffman.

20 Interview with CWO William Hoffman.

21 Ltr Hq CIC Center, Baltimore, Md, from Captain Shapiro to CO, CIC Center, subj: "Interview with Captain Shapiro," dtd 8 Apr 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

22 Interview with CWO Wm Hoffman.

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Theater CIC Headquarters at New Delhi

Major MacKenzie, with Lieutenant Wilson as his executive, 2d Lt Edward White as his administrative officer, and several enlisted agents set about their work of organizing CIC on a theater wide basis from their headquarters at New Delhi, a process which was more complicated than in some other areas. Lt Charles D. Farris was added locally as supply officer.

Following completion of the British Field Security School at Karachi the men who were to be assigned for duty in Assam, India, and with the "X" and "Y" Forces in Burma were sent to the British Jungle Warfare School at Budni, in the Central Provinces, where they were put through a conditioning course, and given combat training under the jungle conditions with which they would have to contend.

Many of the others were sent directly to stations in India where they operated for a time as teams with letter designations. Records seem to indicate that there was a certain amount of confusion regarding their status while final word from the War Department was awaited. Then on 18 August 1944, 12 detachments were set up at War Department order. The 405th CIC Detachment was designated as Theater Headquarters, with the additional duty of covering the New Delhi area; the 406th was assigned to Karachi; the 407th, Bombay; the 408th, Calcutta; the 409th, Chabua; the 410th and 414th, Ledo, Assam; the 411th, 412th, and 415th, China; the 413th, 10th Air Force; and the 416th, XX Bomber Force, then at Kharagpur, India.

As in all theaters, the number of CIC agents was considered inadequate for the tasks they were expected to perform, and even before those present had been assigned to stations, requests were forwarded for additional men. In response to a War Department cable asking for estimated requirements,[23] Major MacKenzie asked for a total of "70 officers and 212 EM against the present authorized strength of 12 officers and 104 EM."[24] MacKenzie also asked for an allocation of 20 direct commissions to CBI "for exclusive use of CIC in preference to requisitioning officer personnel from U.S. This is deemed eminently desirable from standpoint of morale. CIC enlisted personnel qualified by training, character and ability to fulfill the duties of CIC officers are present in theater in sufficient number to fill existing officer vacancies if direct commissions are authorized."[25]

23 Cable, WARX 52669, fr Bissell WDGBI agd Ulio TAG, dtd 18 Jun 44, (Kansas City Records Center, Folder, "T/O Correspondence") (SECRET).

24 Cable from AMDEL to WASHINGTON, dtd 10 Jul 44; and ltr to Col Harry I. T. Creswell, GSC, AC of S, G2, Hq US Army Forces, China, Burma, India, from Maj D. E. MacKenzie, dtd 25 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

25 Cable from AMDEL to Washington, dtd 25 Sep 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center, Folder, "T/O Correspondence").

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There is no evidence that this proposal was favorably considered until six months later. On 31 March 1945 the following were commissioned as second lieutenants: Joel M. Brecheen, W. F. Davis Gebhart, James H. Carr, Jr., Richard W. Klise, Karl R. Manwell, James F. Murray, Leroy T. Newland, Jr., Charles F. G. Smith, and James L. Beauchamp. In the meantime, several officers, untrained in counterintelligence work, had been added from troops already in the theater, and shortly thereafter a number were brought over from the United States.[26]

Major MacKenzie also came up against an inflexible wall in setting up his detachments, a situation that greatly increased administrative and supply problems, and, due to particular situations in the theater, hampered operations. In spite of repeated requests that only one detachment be set up for the theater, composed of appropriate teams as authorized by T/O&E 30-500, the War Department was adamant in its decision that 12 detachments, numbered 405 through 416, be set up for the theater. The problem as it affected operations was that, although this was, from an allied standpoint, a combat theater, the mission of the overwhelming majority of US troops was a logistical and advisory one. Except for a small group, it was not contemplated that CIC agents would be utilized in a tactical situation, and even these would not operate with divisions, corps, and armies, as was true in other combat theaters. Even selection of the static areas in which they would operate would depend upon changing conditions, and no one could anticipate those changes. Organization into a single detachment, composed of teams as authorized by T/O&E 30-500, would have permitted the rapid shifting of teams into areas as the situation demanded.[27]

The inflexibility of the War Department order forced certain detachments to be set up immediately, earmarked for eventual shipment to China. They then sat around for months until the China Theater was ready for them. Some of these agents were placed on TDY with other detachments after it became evident that the wait would be a long one, but efficiency and morale suffered in the meantime.[28]

26 Monthly Administrative Reports, CIC, USF, CBI Theater, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center).

27 Cable from AMDEL to Washington, dtd 3 Aug 44, CRA 9826, (SECRET); and Cable from CG Army Service Forces signed Somervell, ref CRA 9826, dtd 3 Aug 44, dtd 7 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center, Folder, "T/O Correspondence").

28 Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, 7 Dec 44, Ibid.

29. Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, ASF, Subject: "The Counter Intelligence Corps in India-Burma," dated 7 December 1944, signed, William P. Gray, Lt Col, Inf; and Letter SPINT 322.999, Office of CG, ASF, Washington, D.C., Subject: "CIC Operations in India-Burma," to CG, India-Burma Theater (ATTN: AC of S, G2), signed: J. M. Roamer, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, dated 3 January 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

30 Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, ASF, subject: "The Counter Intelligence Corps in India-Burma," dated 7 December 1944, signed: William P. Gray, Lt Col, Inf; and Letter SPINT 322.999, Office of CG, ASF, Washington, D.C., subject: "CIC Operations in India-Burma," to CG, India-Burma Theater (ATTN: AC of S, G2), signed: J.M. Roamer, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, dated 3 January 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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32 Ltr to Col C. W. Bennett, AC of S, G2, IBT, from Col J. M. Roamer, Dir of Intell., ASF, Washington, D.C., dtd 7 Feb 45. (CONFIDENTIAL).

Administration Becomes Complicated

With the constant shifting of personnel from one detachment to another as well as a liberal use of detached service and temporary duty assignments, administration became a highly complicated procedure. At times half the men working with a detachment would be on TDY or DS orders from another detachment, while several members who actually belonged would be with another outfit. The long distances involved and the shortage of transportation would not permit getting agents back to their outfits as the situation changed and others from nearer stations would be sent in to take their places, all still remaining by name with their parent organization.[36]

An idea of the extent of the confusion can be gained from a letter written to all detachments on 23 August 1944, explaining how morning reports were to be kept: "Changes affecting a man on detached service (DS) should be reported by the detachment with which he is actually serving. He will be carried as absent by the detachment to which he is assigned. For example: Lt Kendall and the men under his command are assigned to the 412th CIC Detachment (Capt Grieve), but are on DS with the 414th CIC Detachment (Lt Thorn). They will be carried as absent on the Morning Report of the 412th and picked up as 'present for duty, attached from other organizations,' by the 414th.

"Although most of the personnel of the 412th are on TD with the ATC, Capt Grieve will submit a daily morning report covering all changes affecting such men in addition to changes affecting Lt Kendall and his men. He will, however, carry Agent George Reynolds as absent, and Lt Steptoe will report changes affecting Reynolds, who is on DS with the 406th Detachment as 'Present for duty, attached from other organizations.' The same principle will apply in the case of Agent Ballou, who is on DS with the 416th Detachment. In a like manner, Capt Gelwicks and Lt Dailey will prepare morning reports, and neither they nor their men will appear on SAC Smith's report."

Anticipating the bewilderment of the detachment commanders who would receive this letter and expressing perhaps some of his own, Lieutenant White, administrative officer at Theater CIC Headquarters, and innocent victim of the situation; added, "The reasons for many of these instructions will not be clear to you. It is sufficient to say, however..."[37]

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36 Hq USAF, China, Burma, India, CIC Det, Memorandum to all CIC Detachments, subject: "Activation of CIC Detachments and Related Administrative Duties," dated 23 August 1944, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center, Folder, "Correspondence 10/44 to 6/45,").

37 Memo to all detachments, subj: "Activation of CIC Detachments and Related Administrative Duties," from CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 23 Aug 44, (Kansas City Records Center).

Supply Problems Acute

Under existing conditions, supply and property accountability problems became acute. Particularly difficult was the situation encountered by the "Interrogation Teams" operating along the Ledo Road. Actually five detachments were assigned to this area, but the nature of this work and the necessity for rapid mobility required that they operate under one commander. Since the set-up required, however, that property accountability be kept strictly separated by detachments, an officer was designated as commanding officer for each of four of the detachments with the stipulation that: "This designation extends only to assumption of property responsibility." The commanding officer of the fifth detachment remained the commander for all the detachments "for operational purposes."[38]

To further complicate the property situation, detachments and individuals were sent out on assignments before the actual formation of the 12 detachments by War Department orders on 18 August 1944. Before leaving Theater Headquarters, these detachments as well as individuals were issued property on memorandum receipts. After the detachments were activated officially, there followed the necessity of setting up property accountability books which were sent out to each detachment, along with shipping tickets representing the property thought to be in the possession of individual members of the detachment.

Since, by this time, much shifting had taken place among the various detachments, each commander was directed to adjust his property books: "Commanders of detachments losing any persons...(by such person's either being assigned to another detachment or being placed on detached service, but not temporary duty, with another detachment) will ascertain what items of detachment property were taken away by such person. The commander of the detachment losing such a person will then prepare shipping tickets for such items (one shipping ticket to cover items for each supply service) and forward the shipping tickets to the new detachment commander for signature and return." Inactivation of the detachments at the end of the war found some commanders still trying to trace property allocated to individuals.[39]

Although as previously mentioned, CIC had come to the theater well equipped, at least in comparison with the detachments going to other theaters, there were

38 Ltr, Hq USF, IB Theater, CIC Det, Subj: "Property Responsibility," to 406th, 407th, 408th, 414th, and 416th Detachments, dtd 4 May 45, (R) (Kansas City Records Center).

39 Ltr, Hq USAF, CBI, CIC Det, Subj: "Installation of Property Accounting for CIC Detachments," to CO, 414th CIC Det, Hq NCAC, dtd 14 Oct 44, (Unclassified); 1st Ind, CIC Det, Hq USAF, IBT, to CO, 414th CIC Det, Hq NCAC, dtd 3 Apr 45 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and correspondence records, all units, 405th through 416th.

certain additional items required from time to time, either because these items were not obtainable in the beginning or because of loss or wear-out. These became almost impossible to obtain, mainly because these items were on the Special List of Equipment (SLOE) which, by War Department order, were to be requisitioned from MID, Washington, even though many of these items, such as weapons and various signal items, could have been obtained from supply services then in the theater. Major MacKenzie in a letter to the War Department in October 1944, recommended that the SLOE be reexamined, and that items which were regularly stocked by established supply services be removed and added to the T/O&E.[40]

Delay Encountered by Detachments

Although the 12 detachments were activated and assigned to the areas indicated, some of them did not get to their stations for many months, and several others did not remain long in their assigned spots. The 411th, in command of Captain Gelwicks, the 412th, under Capt William G. Grieve, and the 415th, under 2d Lt Daniel H. Dailey, all earmarked for China, were sent to Calcutta to await, impatiently, the word that they were to fly over the "Hump." This word was slow coming.

It had been planned that Captain Gelwicks and his detachment of six agents would be the vanguard for the China detachments. The China Theater was notified on 13 July 1944 that these six men, along with 1,900 pounds of organization equipment (including investigative), plus four jeeps and two trailers, were in Calcutta, awaiting transportation. In answer, the China Theater, which was then known as the Rear Echelon of the CBI Theater, sent the following message: "Due to tactical situation causing limited tonnage to be used for vital war supplies...it is not deemed advisable for CIC detachment to be shipped at this time. Will advise when tonnage can be spared for them."

In the meantime, Captain Grieve, realizing that the wait would be a long one, had sold the services of his group to the Air Transport Command,[41] and through ATC was able to get over to SOS Headquarters in China to assess the possibilities of CIC's departure for that area. In his report to Major MacKenzie and Captain Gelwicks can be seen the oft-repeated story of the lack of understanding of CIC's mission on the part of other Army personnel and especially of those assigned to intelligence work. Grieve reported an interview with the S2 at SOS Headquarters to whom "the operations and functions of CIC were explained in detail with apparent futile results." The S2 estimated that in their installations at Chungking, Kweilin, Chanyi, Tuyon, Yunnanyi and Burma Road Engineers (Grieve added that the S2 was

40 Ltr Hq, USF, India-Burma, file 320.2 (28 Oct 44), subj: "TO&E 30-500," To CG, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., dtd 28 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

41 Memorandum to Director of Intelligence by Colonel Gray, Ibid.

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not sure that this list was correct), there was only about "one incident a month that could in any way be estimated as coming under CIC jurisdiction, and that these were turned over to the 14th A.F., since they have investigators." Grieve added, in parentheses, "The 14th AF has no investigators known to this Officer." The S2 added that later, "when the supply problem is lessened," he would like to have a detachment, but doubted that he would need six men. After observing that the S2 "apparently has no understanding of the possibility of subversive activities," Grieve recommended that the negotiations for the detachment be taken up with higher authorities.[42]

Captain Grieve's estimate of the S2 seems to have been valid when it is remembered that for at least eight months previous, numerous reports had indicated that the Japanese had sent not only espionage agents but also trained saboteurs in large numbers to operate in the vicinity of Kweilin and Kunming; that the Japanese Special Service had organized an assassination squad of about 200 men with British and American officers in China as their targets and with bonuses of from CN$ 500,000 to CN$ 700,000 as rewards; and that the Japanese were introducing poisoned liquor and poisoned cigarettes into China for sale to American troops. In addition, there had been numerous reports of sabotage to telephone wires, including two occasions when the lines in the air warning net were cut prior to raids at Hengyang on 10 December 1943 and at Yunnanyi on 15 December 1943.[43]

In September, Grieve's group was attached to Theater Headquarters for Army Air Forces. When the work with the Northern Combat Command increased with the progress of the Stilwell Road, several men from both the 411th and the 412th were detached for work there, as were members of the 415th. When the alert finally came, on 6 December 1944, for the 411th, 412th and 415th to prepare to move to China on about 5 January 1945, the personnel of these units had been so shifted about that their rosters bore little resemblance to the original rosters.[44]

The same kind of shifting about occurred with the other detachments. The 406th, 407th, and 408th were removed from their locations and sent up to join the detachments operating in upper Burma in the vicinity of the Stilwell Road, and branch offices of the 405th were set up to take their places.

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42 Ltr from WGG, Hq 1340th AAF Base Unit, ATC, Subj: "Report of Activities," to CO, CIC Det, USAF, CBI, dtd 4 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

43 Counterintelligence Summary Nr 1, Rear Echelon, USAF, CBI, dtd 31 Dec 43; Counterintelligence Summary Nr 2, dtd 31 Jan 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

44 Ltr from Hq USF, IBT, CIC Det, Subj: "Transfer of CIC Detachments to China Theater," to CO's, 411th, 412th, and 415th CIC Dets, dtd 6 Dec 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

Because of this constant shifting of detachments as well as the shifting of agents among detachments, the remainder of the history of the China, Burma, India Theater will be recorded by areas rather than by numbered detachments.

"Selling CIC" is First Task

To all of these groups the first immediate task was that of "selling" themselves to the people under whom and with whom they were to work. It was the same old story with which the CIC was confronted whenever it first arrived in a theater--few persons had more than a vague idea of CIC's mission and few preparations had been made for their arrival. They found their own billets, set up liaison with the British and with other staff sections, plotted their own missions, and so insinuated themselves into the military mission of the theater that, before the end of the war, they had won the warm commendations of practically everyone from the Commanding General on down.

Their pathway was smoothed somewhat by the publication, even before they began work, of a directive containing operational prerogatives which had been won by CIC agents in the North African and European Theaters only after a long struggle. On 10 June 1944, over the command line of Lieutenant General Stilwell, a directive was published which contained the following:[45]

> "c. Civilian Clothes. CIC personnel are authorized to wear civilian clothes or the uniform prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces.
>
> "d. Protection of Identities. It is necessary that CIC enlisted personnel wearing civilian clothes or the civilian uniform be addressed and referred to as 'Mister,' and not by military title, and that they be extended the same facilities and afforded the same treatment as civilians serving with the armed forces. Unless unavoidable, under combat conditions, such personnel will be billeted, messed, hospitalized and draw supplies under the same conditions prescribed for civilians."

This directive did not solve the civilian status problem completely, and there were scattered incidents of resistance on the part of commanders, S2's and G2's, but its observance generally made it possible for CIC to operate effectively from the very beginning. One serious incident which occurred in Karachi in December 1944 in violation of the theater ruling made it necessary for two agents to be transferred to another detachment. The detachment CO had introduced the two agents

45 Ltr; Hq CBI, file 350.09-4, Subj: "The Counter Intelligence Corps, USAF, CBI," dtd 10 June 44, as quoted in Ltr, Hq 406th CIC Det, Subj: "Protection of Identities of CIC Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

to the Executive Officer of the SOS Base Section, who examined their credentials and listened without apparent disagreement to the explanation of their mission and the theater ruling which specified their treatment. Yet six days later, their status as enlisted men was revealed when they were ordered out of the officers' mess hall by the mess officer, acting upon specific orders of the Executive, who had already appealed to the brigadier general in command of the base section to back up his order. An attempt by the S2 and the detachment SAC to obtain an explanation from the Executive resulted only in the Executive's declaration that "some civilians" serving with the armed forces were "treated and messed as enlisted men and others as officers," and that the agents involved would "fall within the class of civilians who were treated and messed as enlisted men." He was unable to cite any regulation upon which his decision was based or to name any instance within his experience in which civilians were messed as enlisted men.

There seemed to be no solution to this situation, which CIC had encountered upon many occasions in other theaters, in which individuals in a subordinate command had overridden explicit orders of higher authority in venting their spleen at CIC.[46]

Happily, incidents such as the above were rare. Usually resistance was met only before the arrival of the CIC detachment, and before the Intelligence Staff and the Commander had met the agents and learned of the help they could give. In most instances, they responded rapidly to education. In two areas, attempts were made to place CIC under control of the Provost Marshal. In one, Karachi, the quickly discarded attempt seemed to be caused by a basic misunderstanding of CIC's mission; in the other, New Delhi, the continued attempts seemed to stem from the head of the Criminal Investigating Division in the office of the theater Provost Marshal, who was unrelenting in his attempts to force the CIC agents to live in the enlisted barracks. In both places the attempts were unsuccessful, but operations were believed to have suffered, and much time was consumed by the officers and SAC's of these detachments in fighting off the attempts and convincing top-side officials each time the question arose.[47]

Political Unrest in India Complicates CIC's Task

Although U.S. authorities in the China, Burma, India Theater had concentrated their security fears upon the dangers of espionage and sabotage by Japanese infiltrees, it early became evident that the situation was far more complex. The

46 Ltr, Hq CBI, file 350.09-4, Subj: "The Counter Intelligence Corps, USAF, CBI," dtd 10 June 44, as quoted in Ltr, Hq 406th CIC Det, Subj: "Protection of Identities of CIC Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

47 History of the 406th CIC Detachment, by Steptoe (L-17) (R); and Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, ASF, by Col Gray, Ibid.

anticipated danger was of course a real one, and was augmented tremendously by the tendency of troops distant from actual combat to indulge in "loose talk." But it soon became evident that U.S. troops were in the middle of a cauldron of political unrest. Long-time hatreds of Hindu and Burmese Nationalists for the British, further played upon by Communist agitation, provided fertile ground for Japanese propagandists who were not slow in taking advantage of these easily won allies. Because of their subversive potentials, protection against sabotage became, perhaps, CIC's most important mission in the theater. Sabotage was particularly difficult to control, since it could come from so many sources: a disgruntled worker, who had been influenced by Communist agitation; a British-hater who identified all Caucasians with the British; or a bona fide Japanese agent of whom many were suspected to be in the theater.

Branch Office Number 1 Covers New Delhi Area

To cover the New Delhi area, Branch Office Number 1 of the 405th was set up and operated throughout the war under Special Agent James L. Beauchamp, at first a sergeant and later a second lieutenant. With Beauchamp throughout most of this period were Bernard Auer, George F. Lynch, Norman Brasseur, and James D. Brooks. These five men were credited by Major MacKenzie with making a "vast improvement" in the security situation in the area, "working against the inertia of men who felt that Delhi was too far from the combat areas for security to matter."

The problem of security was an engrossing one, and not only did this branch office attack it with vigor in its own area, but made their program felt throughout the theater. Auer was credited with establishing a theater-wide program of security education. He designed security posters which were duplicated and sent to all detachments for use in their own areas; he wrote security slogans and persuaded the Army Radio Service to use them throughout their daily programs; and he obtained British security-trained lecturers to address troops in the area from Karachi to Ledo.[48] The Theater Chief of X-2, OSS, added his words of praise for the program which he rated "of exceptionally high calibre."[49]

A practice manhunt put on by this detachment during an "Allied Security Week" in February 1945 aroused the interest of the whole area. In advance of the stunt, 1,500 posters carrying the picture and description of Norman Brasseur as the

48 Ltr, Hq USF, IBT, CIC Det, Subj: "CIC Branch Office Nr 1, New Delhi," to AC of S, G-2, Hq US Forces, India-Burma Theater, dtd 14 Aug 45; (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and History of CIC in CBI, by MacKenzie, Ibid.

49 Ltr to Mr Bernard Auer, Special Agent, CIC, US Army, New Delhi, dtd 18 Oct 45, from Joseph P. McCarthy, Chief, X-2, OSS, IBT, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

"wanted man" were distributed and five particular areas were designated as ones through which he would pass. The prize for the first person to recognize him in each of the areas as he wandered about in various uniforms ranging from private to colonel was a $10 War Bond.[50]

In February 1945, Auer made a tour throughout Burma and India and in numerous places where there were high concentrations of U.S. and British troops, put on a well planned "Security Drive," of a week's duration. The type of activity used in this program can be seen from highlights from a report on the drive in Calcutta which was rated as "highly successful:"[51]

a. Over 20,000 officers and enlisted men saw security films in a total of 71 showings.

b. All civilian employees in the area, totalling 20,000, attended lectures given by members of the British Inter Services Education Department.

c. Fifteen thousand security posters, most of which were prepared by the British, were used.

d. All daily news sheets and menus in all hotels and restaurants patronized by Allied military personnel carried security reminders.

e. A large security banner was suspended over the street in front of Base Headquarters.

f. Security slides were shown in a number of theaters prior to the showing of the feature film.

g. Radio talks were given by seven high ranking officers, including General Stratemeyer.

h. A security contest, the purpose of which was to increase the vigilance of installation guards was judged to be the most successful device used. One security officer reported that, for the first time in months, the guards were scrutinizing every person who entered the installation.

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50 Monthly Information Report, 405th CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, dtd 15 Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

51 Ltr, Subj: "Security Drive, APO 465," dtd 22 Feb 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

These agents were credited also with establishing and maintaining excellent relations with all British civil and military security agencies, not only in Delhi and New Delhi, but in numerous cities over a large surrounding area from Lahore in Pakistan to Agra in Northern India. These efforts at liaison not only made CIC operations more effective throughout the war, but on one occasion at least, brought a letter of personal praise for Brooks and Lynch from the American Consul General for their assistance during a visit of the State Department's relief vessel to Bombay, and "most important of all" for obtaining "the cooperation of their British counterparts to the end that the work of embarkation was not impeded."[52] They were sent to Bombay on this special assignment after the CIC office in Bombay had been closed.

Several other agents were assigned to New Delhi, but records do not indicate whether they were with Headquarters or with the Branch Office: Philip Detweiler, Keith M. Peterson, and Francis S. O'Neill. In addition, several others appear to have worked for short periods in this area. Also carried as members of the 405th were James F. Murray, who throughout the war performed security duties along the railway from Calcutta to Ledo, with a private car as his residence, and Charles Schultz whose duties were concerned with the Theater Postal Office.[53] Eugene Redden was assigned for several months to railway security up in the Assam area.[54]

Karachi Detachment Meets Administrative Difficulty

The Karachi group, the 406th, although they were ready for work as soon as they finished the British Field Security course, seemed to have more difficulty in getting started than did some of the other groups. In commenting upon this in the official history, Capt Thomas W. Steptoe, then 1st Lieutenant Steptoe, attributed this partially to their location in a remote rear area which encouraged a general apathetic feeling in regard to security and an increased amount of "red tape."

In a letter to IBT Headquarters written on 1 June 1944, Steptoe pointed out that certain difficulties had already arisen, partly because the S2 of the base section to which they were attached preferred that they not begin any operations

52 Ltr from Charles O. Thompson, American Consulate General, Bombay, India, to Major D. E. MacKenzie, CIC, USF, IBT, dtd July 21, 1945, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

53 History of CIC in CBI, by MacKenzie, Ibid.; Historical Data Cards, DA Historical Division; Memorandum for Director of Intelligence, ASF, by Col Gray, Ibid.; and Interview with CWO William Hoffman.

54 Ltr Hq CIC, CBI, to CO, 409th CIC Det, Subj: "Railway Security," dtd 10 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

until the orders activating the detachment arrived, in the hope that such orders would clarify "such matters as quarters and rations, method of dress and uniform, office space and other operational data."[55]

The orders activating the group as Detachment "A" and placing it on temporary duty with Headquarters, Base Section Number 1, SOS, arrived on 14 June 1944. Steptoe reported a generally helpful attitude on the part of base officials, and an easing of supply problems, but delay in finding billets and further delay in finding office space postponed the day when the detachment could begin work.[56]

The detachment also had to fend off attempts to place them under the control of the Provost Marshal, and although this action was not taken, Steptoe explained that operations were somewhat hampered by these administrative tangles.

At first the detachment, in addition to providing security coverage for all SOS installations in the area, provided security coverage for all Air Force installations with the exception of the Air Transport Command, but with the establishment of a Headquarters Air Force Detachment, this area of their work was relinquished.[57]

Early in November, Steptoe left to take over the 409th up at Chabua, in Assam, and soon thereafter the 406th was officially transferred to the Myitkyiana area. In addition to Steptoe, the original group consisted of William W. Blanton, Ernest E. Heim, Charles A. Gerlach, and Thomas P. Whelley, who, before the transfer, had been joined by George L. Reynolds and Bart R. Hynes. As with all the detachments in the CBI, the members were fairly well scattered at about the time of the transfer. When the detachment moved, a small field office under the 405th was set up in Karachi for a short time, with Blanton in charge.[58]

Plans for Bombay Detachment Go Awry

In no place in the theater was the arrival of CIC anticipated with so much eagerness as was the 407th in Bombay and in no spot had so much been done to

55 Ltr 1st Lt Steptoe, Hq Base Section Nr 1, SOS USAF CBI, to CO, CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 1 Jun 44, Subj: "CIC Detachment (Casual), APO 9524, c/o PM, NY," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

56 Ltr 1st Lt Steptoe, Hq Base Section Nr 1, SOS, USAF, CBI, to CO, CIC Det, c/o Sq Base Section Nr 2, Subj: "Detachment 'A'," dtd 16 Jun 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

57 History of the 406th CIC Detachment, by Steptoe, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

58 History of the CIC in CBI, by MacKenzie (R); Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, ASF, by Col Gray, (CONFIDENTIAL); and Ltr, Hq CIC Det, CBI, to 1st Lt Steptoe, Subj: "Badges and Credentials," dtd 10 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

prepare for them. Viewing the records ten years later, it is difficult to understand the complete "snafu" attendant upon their arrival.

The military observer attached to the American Consulate, Capt Coulter D. Huyler, had asked for a CIC detachment for the area long before they were sent, and evidently had worked ceaselessly to prepare the way for them. Because of the need for CIC, Nowlan, one of the five who had arrived with Lieutenant Wilson in November 1943, was sent for a short time to Bombay, and, according to Huyler, had been of great assistance.

In several letters to the theater CIC Chief in April 1944, Huyler described the mission for CIC in the area as principally that of security education of troops arriving in the theater. He had already secured promise of complete cooperation from the British, who also were eagerly awaiting the detachment. Another need for CIC, Huyler pointed out, was the screening of Americans in transit to the United States, since large numbers from the whole Far East were passing through the Bombay Port. He pointed out that many of these persons were "considered to be corrupt--dealing in narcotics, stolen Army property and espionage." He told of one case in Bombay on which he was then working: "She will be jailed tomorrow and will be interrogated by us after she has been stewing for several days. She is an ex-brothel proprietress in Chungking, now headed for the States, and has in her possession, among other things, some opium. Chungking wired the Consulate to watch out for her, as she is believed also to have indulged in espionage....

"I have already chinned with the Chairman of the Port Authorities, the Commissioner of Police; British GSI; and am rapidly developing contacts that the CIC will want," Huyler wrote.

Huyler asked for any theater intelligence bulletins or summaries which he could use for the "education" of the SOS Base Commander, from whom he feared not much cooperation could be obtained. The S2, a young lieutenant, Huyler pointed out, was untrained in intelligence work and had the additional duties of "Special Service Officer, Liquor Rationing Officer, etc., etc..." However, he appeared anxious to learn, and Huyler thought he could keep him "in line." Because of his doubts about the attitude of the base commander, Huyler strongly recommended that the agents be sent on detached service rather than be attached to the SOS Base. Even if DS could not be arranged, he asked that the agents be directed by orders to report directly to the office of the military observer, a maneuver which would weaken the "strict jurisdiction" of the base CO and "would doubtless give them more freedom."

In response to a question from the CIC Chief about quarters for the men, Huyler wrote that he had an apartment with ample space to put them up almost indefinitely until they could find quarters of their own. This would be possible

only if they arrived in civilian clothes, a request that he had made in previous letters, with the usual reasons carefully explained. He added that he could not house them in his apartment if they were in uniform, "as people would frown." Huyler explained that, while he could not "be officially tied in with CIC," he could and would be able to give them a great deal of assistance "without attracting notice..."

Regardless of the status under which they would arrive, Huyler asked that he be notified of the exact time of their arrival so that he could be on hand to greet them. He gave his office and home addresses and telephone numbers for both places.[59]

Huyler's earnest desire to help CIC, his insight into the problems they would meet and the means for anticipating some of them in advance is understandable when a check of the records reveals that he had entered the CIP in October 1941, had been commissioned and assigned as a CIC officer a year later, and at the end of December 1943, had been transferred to MIS and sent to his assignment in Bombay.[60]

After all of Huyler's planning and the correspondence between him and the CIC Chief at theater headquarters, the four-man detachment consisting of Edwin W. Simpson as SAC (Simpson was then a staff sergeant), John T. Cox, Milton Musick, and Daniel E. Teeter arrived in Bombay on Sunday, 18 June 1944, in uniform, completely unexpected, and carrying only Restricted orders attaching them to the SOS Base. Captain Huyler did not learn they were there until the next day. By then the agents were well known by their rank, and Captain Huyler could not share his apartment with them as he had planned or perform many of the path-smoothing tactics he had in mind, all of which he had believed acceptable to the CIC Chief of CBI.

The men were disappointed and bewildered by this situation. In his first biweekly report to the theater CIC Chief, SAC Simpson wrote:

"Detachment arrived this station A.M. Sunday, 18 June 44. No advance knowledge of or plans for arrival. Met by MP in charge at station and conveyed

59 Report from US Military Observer, New Delhi, India, dtd 4 Jun 44, Subj: "Means of Safeguarding Military Information," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center); Ltrs from Office of US Military Observer, American Consulate, Bombay, to Chief, CIC, CBI, dtd Apr 44 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); 9 May 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and 24 May 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and Ltr from Chief, CIC, CBI, to Capt Coulter B. Huyler, Jr., US Consulate, APO 881, dtd 17 May 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

60 G2 Files, Ft Holabird.

to military barracks; thence to the adjutant at headquarters, port of debarkation, then to rooming house near Taj Mahal Hotel, quartering military personnel by arrangements of billets NCO at Hq POD. Four men assigned one room off rooming house dining room which affords no privacy until change can be effected. . . .If the detachment had been provided with civilian clothes and arrived in such, they could have been quartered in Capt Huyler's place of abode. But no time, funds, travel orders, or information in this wise were granted to the detachment prior to its arrival at this station to effect the 'civilian status' clause of the Secret Orders."[61]

The only comment Simpson received from the chief about this predicament was the following: "I find it a bit difficult to understand your remarks. . .It seems to me that on the journey to Bombay there was ample time to have made the change from military to civilian uniform, since all that was needed was to attach the 'U.S.' collar ornaments to the men's shirts."[62]

It was obvious that inadequate briefing had been given the men, probably because they left for Bombay directly from Karachi after attending the Brisith school,[63] while the correspondence between Captain Huyler and the Chief in New Delhi had been kept as a matter of concern only to headquarters. A partial explanation may be found in a letter from the Chief, CIC, CBI, to Huyler in mid-July in answer to several letters of inquiry concerning funds, clerical assistance and other matters of interest to the detachment in which this statement is found: "I have not been ignoring the need of funds for operations, but have been so darned busy trying to find our missing equipment and getting what we did have issued to the detachments that it has taken most of my time and temporarily at least other things had to wait."[64] Briefing evidently had been one of the "other things."

On 12 July, nearly three weeks after the detachment arrived in Bombay and learned that they were to live as civilians, but with no means provided for doing so, the Chief, CIC, CBI, wrote to Simpson, "With reference to your difficulties about obtaining suitable quarters, I would suggest that you arrange for the entire detachment to be placed on Commutation of Rations and Quarters and have each

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61 Summary Report, from E. W. Simpson, SAC, CIC Det B, to OIC, CIC Det, Hq USAF CBI, dtd 1 Jul 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

62 Ltr, from CIC Det, Hq CBI, to SAC, CIC Det B, dtd 12 Jul 44, Subj: "Report of July 1, 1944," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

63 Ltr, from Hq Base Section Nr 1, SOS, USAF, CBI, to CO, CIC Det, c/o S2, Base Section Nr 2, dtd 16 Jun 44, Subj: "Detachment "A"," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

64 Ltr to Capt Coulter B. Huyler, Jr., Military Observer, American Consulate, APO 881, from CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 12 Jul 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

man try to find a room or other suitable quarters as an individual. While I realize that this will not be easy in Bombay, I believe that it is the only way in which separate quarters can be arranged."[65]

Simpson was unable to arrange the Commutation of Quarters and on 8 August wrote to headquarters (his letter was written with a "scratchy pen" since, although the equipment mentioned earlier had arrived on 24 July, they had not been able to unpack it since they had not yet obtained an office):[66] "...although the Col C.O. instructed the billeting officer to locate us appropriately, and he thought we were, we are still in one boarding house room without telephone (and our contact net is really hampered there), without privacy for discussion (and the house manager is a very curious Goanese; besides the fact that the house is constantly full of transients, all types), and without adequate safe-keeping of our files, so we have them in a tin trunk and one man guarding them all the time."[67]

Adequate quarters were not arranged until 22 August 1944,[68] but by that time the detachment had been able to accomplish a considerable amount of work and set up such excellent liaison with all American and British personnel in the area and local police officials that they already were considered indispensible. Within a few days after their arrival they had made the rounds to meet the officials with whom they would have to work and learned that Captain Huyler and, under his tutelage, the S2, had prepared well for their coming.[69] "The British are expecting us to take over and are willing to help us in any way we require." Simpson wrote.[70]

Huyler's preparatory work obviously smoothed the way for the detachment in advance, but records indicate that these agents in Bombay more than lived up to Huyler's advance promises. One outstanding indication of this fact is that the base commander, whom even Huyler had not felt could be won over, became one of the detachment's greatest boosters. Late in December the SAC wrote: "As of 1 January 1945 we are to have three weeks to do what we want in the way of security surveys, telephone monitoring, night raids, etc. This is to be done with the full support of the commanding officer and any one not showing proper cooperation is

65 Ltr to SAC, CIC Det B, from CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 12 Jul 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

66 Ltr to CIC Det, Hq CBI, Subj: "Equipment and Supplies," dtd 28 Jul 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

67 Ltr, from CIC Det B, to 2d Lt White, CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 8 Aug 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

68 Ltr, from George L. Wilson, 1st Lt, Inf, to CO, CIC, CBI, dtd 24 Aug 44, Subj: "Report of Activities," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

69 Summary Report, from SAC, Det B, dtd 1 Jul 44, Ibid.

70 Ltr, from Simpson, SAC, Det B, to Lt Edward S. White, Personnel and Administrative Officer, dtd 8 Jul 44, Ibid.

to be taken to him at once." He also reported that the CO had decided to appoint a security officer since the S2 was too busy to give proper attention to these duties; the new man would be turned over to the CIC agents for instructions on his job.[71]

Throughout CIC's stay in Bombay, until the office was closed in the latter part of June 1945,[72] ship boarding was one of CIC's principal duties. All ships entering the harbor were boarded, all crew members' papers were inspected and crew members were interviewed for any information of a security nature which they might have. All repatriates going through the port were also interviewed.[73]

CIC agents in Bombay also had to deal with their share of the attempts made by certain dissident groups to draw Americans into their quarrels with the British and by others to inflame the populace against them, as did other detachments throughout India.

They were plagued by a flood of rumors derogatory to the United States, some of which were printed in pamphlets and newspapers. The Bombay Sentinel and the Free Press Journal, both English language newspapers, were particularly scurrilous. "You would hardly believe that the Philippines are to be liberated by the Americans from the Japs to be reoccupied by the Americans. The New World Order is at work," and "You would hardly believe that in Belgium the people starve and the food situation is much worse now than it was in preinvasion--apparently famine and the Allies go hand in hand," were quoted in an October report as typical of the inflamatory statements made.[74] "Shoe-shine boys and beggar girls seem to be the only caste and community with which groups of soldiers and most Yankees have come to form bonds of fraternity," one charge read. Rumors also were rife--rumors of outbreaks of leprosy, of impending air attacks, of an influx of Japanese espionage agents, of peace to be made by Germany and Russia. All of these called for CIC attention.[75]

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71 Ltr, from W. T. Comiskey, SAC, Branch Office #4, to CO, CIC, USF, IBT, dtd 23 Dec 44, Subj: "General Situation," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

72 Ltr, from Hq CIC Det, USF, IBT, to SAC, Branch Office Nr 4, 405th CIC Det, dtd 22 Jun 45, Subj: "Closing of Branch Office Nr 4," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

73 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, 407th CIC Det, Subj: "Boarding Activities," dtd 29 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center); and CI Summary for Period 15 to 21 Oct 44, 407th CIC Det, dtd 23 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

74 CI Summary for Period 15 to 21 Oct 44, 407th CIC Det, dtd 23 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

75 CI Summaries, IBT, Nr 10, dtd 1 Oct 44; Nr 11, dtd 1 Nov 44; and Nr 12, dtd 1 Dec 44; and CI Weekly Abstract Nr 2, dtd 14 Nov 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The Bombay detachment had its share of personnel changes. Before the end of June 1944, Musick had been reassigned to the 413th and Michael Whyte sent in his place. In September Simpson was sent to Chabua, Assam, and Comiskey was sent to Bombay as SAC. Later in the year the 407th was officially withdrawn from Bombay and sent to the Northern Combat Command, but Comiskey and Whyte remained in Bombay to operate as a field office under the 405th. In May 1945, Comiskey returned to the United States to attend OCS and George F. Lynch went to Bombay until the office was closed in June 1945.

Calcutta Area is Security Problem

Calcutta, as the chief port of entry for American supplies to the theater, was considered particularly vulnerable, especially since early intelligence reports had indicated the state of Bengal as the gathering place for all espionage agencies operating in India as well as the seat of the most violent anti-British political movements. Prior to the arrival of the bulk of the theater detachment, Agent Paul J. McArdle who had arrived in November 1943 with Lieutenant Wilson, was sent to Calcutta to work with the Intelligence Section there and survey the situation in preparation for the arrival of the rest of the detachment. There he found that every incident occurring between U.S. soldiers and the native population--and of course there were some--was played up beyond all actual proportion. One incident, which he reported in April 1944 in which a Sikh taxicab driver was stabbed by a U.S. soldier, resulted in a strike by all taxicab drivers in the city, and a plethora of rumors including one that the cab driver had been attacked by four colored soldiers. Actually the soldier in question was white.[76]

When Harry G. Smith, a master sergeant who was to be special agent in charge (SAC) of the Calcutta office, designated originally as the 408th CIC Detachment, and Agents Richard W. Klise, Lawrence F. Hughes, and Young W. Chinn, arrived in June, they found much work awaiting them. Twenty separate incidents of wire cutting along the telephone lines between Calcutta and Kharagpur, the base of the XX Bomber Command, had been reported. Although many were thought to be pilferage cases, several were judged to be deliberate sabotage; whatever the cause, the destruction had to be stopped. Klise was assigned to investigate and take remedial action. He travelled the length of the line, about 100 miles, stopping in all adjacent villages to visit with the police chief and other village leaders. He complimented them on past cooperation, passed out cigars judiciously and generally won their friendship. Along with the friendly conversation and the cigars, he added the precaution of reminding them that each village

76 S/I, Subj: "Killing of Civilian, APO 465," to Officer in Charge, Theater CIC Detachment, Rear Echelon Hq USAF, CBI, APO 885; dtd 15 Apr 44, signed Paul J. McArdle, SAC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

would be assessed a fine whenever an accident occurred to the line within their area. Interruptions on this line were practically ended.[77]

Fearing that the gasoline pipeline, which had just gone into operation to carry oil from Calcutta to the beginning of the Ledo Road, would prove a target for saboteurs, agents were sent the length of the line with similar instructions for establishing village responsibility. This proved a valuable precaution, since there were few interruptions in the operation of the line for the remainder of the war.[78]

In July, Pardee Lowe was sent from the New Delhi detachment to survey the possibilities of undercover operations in Calcutta's Chinatown. After a complete survey of the area, in which he was assisted by Agent Chinn and several OSS officers with whom Chinn was working closely, his conclusion was that such an attempt would be impossible, because the complete Americanization of the Chinese-American personnel available would mark them immediately in such a compact racial community. The survey further seemed to indicate that the situation there was not serious enough to require such an operation. Although the CIC in Calcutta kept a close watch on the community throughout the war, there is no evidence that it caused any serious threat to security.[79]

CIC had to remain alert to rumors, of which there seem to have been an abundance, many of which were natural to concentrations of troops in a noncombat area, but many of which were believed to have been maliciously inspired for the purpose of lowering the morale of American troops and increasing civilian unrest. Among the rumors which the Calcutta detachment had to attempt to trace and to make plans for overcoming were: that U.S. troops would be put into British uniform with pay cuts and lengthened service to correspond with the British; that the Bengal food shortage was due to the feeding of large numbers of troops in India and the export of grain to other Allied armies; that the rotation plan had been abandoned; that no Christmas packages would be allowed to be sent into the CBI Theater; that the American Red Cross refused to send cables for servicemen; and that many cholera fatalities had occurred at the Great Eastern Hotel, which was occupied by high ranking U.S. officers (actually one civilian had died from cholera).[80]

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77 History of CIC in CBI, by MacKenzie, Ibid.; Memorandum for Dir of Intell, ASF, by Col Gray, Ibid.; and CI Summary Nr 8, Hq USAF, CBI CIC Det, dtd 1 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Facility).

78 Ibid.

79 Memorandum to Officer in Charge, Subj: "Agent's CIC Activities in Calcutta for Period July 9th to 16th, 1944," dtd 20 Jul 1944, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

80 CI Summaries, Nr 5 thru Nr 10, dtd 30 Apr 44 to 1 Oct 44, CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

The absolute necessity of making free use of civilian clothing and civilian status for CIC agents is found in documents concerning this period in Calcutta, a situation which, in fact, was true all over the theater. At a meeting in December 1944, "convened by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Burdwan Range, to discuss ways and means of checking the pilfering of military and other stores from railways," the roster, which contains the names of several high-ranking railway and police officials, and several British officers, contains only one American: "Harry G. Smith, Esq., CIC, U.S. Army Base Section."[81] Smith was a master sergeant.

A short time later, after Smith had been assigned to Air Force Headquarters and Klise had been designated SAC of the Calcutta office, Klise reported that he had become disturbed by the lack of security of advance information on ship arrivals at the port, and that numerous civilian agencies seemed to have access to the information.

Klise continued his report, "I had a conference the early part of this week with Commander Benkart, the United States Naval Liaison Officer, and he is in accord with my opinion that a general survey of the situation is indicated. It is planned, therefore, that Naval Intelligence and the CIC will make a joint survey, and the British will be asked to participate."[82] Klise was then a sergeant.

As mentioned previously, the 408th, as a numbered detachment, was sent up into the Myitkyiana area in December 1944, and a branch office of the 405th was set up to take its place. Not all the personnel were moved, however, and February 1945 found Klise and McArdle still in Calcutta. The following had been added: Ernest E. Heim, John T. Cox, and Keith M. Peterson. The 408th returned to Calcutta for a while and finally was inactivated in March 1945 and a branch office under the 405th was set up.[83]

First Group Arrives in Jungle Area

The 409th Detachment was activated while its members were attending the jungle training course at Budni, Central Provinces, and was assigned to the Intermediate Section Nr 2, SOS in Assam, India. Upon completion of the course they went to Calcutta to draw their equipment and be processed through staging. On 8 July they began their four day trek to Chabua, first by train to Bongaigaon,

81 Report dtd 7/12/44, signed by J. L. Jenkins, Dy Inspr Genl of Police, Burwan Range, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

82 Ltr, Br Off #3, 405th CIC Det, USF, IBT, to CO, CIC, Hq USF, IBT, dtd 13 Jan 45, Subj: "Arrival of US Ships at Calcutta," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

83 Ltr, Hq, CIC, USF, IBT, Subj: "Inactivation of 408th," dtd 5 Nov 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

Assam, and the rest of the way by jeep. 2d Lt Robert Puryear was in charge, with William C. Holland, Alexander Monro, Andrew P. Lee, John D. Vorhees, and George F. Lynch.

The detachment had the usual personnel changes. In November Lieutenant White, from headquarters, replaced Lieutenant Puryear, who joined one of the detachments preparing to go to China. Holland and Lee also were assigned to a China detachment and Lynch was sent to Bombay. Edwin W. Simpson and Donald E. Teeter from the Bombay detachment were added to the group. In January, Lieutenant White joined another China detachment and Steptoe, by then a captain, took over as CO.

They were temporarily lodged with the ATC, CIC Detachment in a bungalow on the Deohall Tea Estate, at Hoograjon, Assam, but two weeks later moved into their own bungalow with the equally strange-sounding address of Dhoedaam Tea Garden, Barahapjan, which was located near the town of Doom Dooma, about 35 miles from Chabua.[84]

In January 1945 their bungalow was so damaged by fire that they had to move to another one on the same estate, but no one was injured and loss of detachment equipment and property was slight.[85]

Although the distance of their headquarters from the SOS headquarters under which they were to operate was inconvenient, it no doubt had its advantageous side. At any rate, this detachment seemed to run into none of the difficulties anent their civilian status that were suffered by some of the others.[86] They also had the advantage of having received positive directions before they left Calcutta. In a letter to Lieutenant Puryear on 9 June 1944, directing him to proceed to Chabua, Major MacKenzie stated: "You will request the commanding general to furnish quarters suitable for civilians attached to the Army, and will operate on a civilian status. You will also request him to furnish office accommodations which are physically removed from the headquarters of Advance Section Nr 2, SOS."[87]

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84 History of 409th by Steptoe, Ibid; and Administrative Files "527 Detachment 409," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

85 Ltr, from 409th CIC Detachment, to CO, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, dtd 31 Jan 45, Subj: "Fire at CIC Bungalow, Dhoedaam Tea Estate, Barahajan," (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

86 Ltr, from 409th CIC Det, to CO, CIC Det, Hq USFIB, dtd 17 Nov 44, Subj: "Informal Report on Administrative Matters," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

87 Ltr Orders, Hq CIC Det, USAF, CBI, to 2d Lt Robert Puryear, O-1595109, dtd 9 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center). NOTE: Although the Letter Orders refer to the Base as Advance Section Nr 2, SOS, all other documents refer to it as Intermediate Section Nr 2, SOS.

This group was responsible for coverage of most of Upper Assam except the Ledo area and the 726th Railway Operating Battalion at Pandu. They met with immediate cooperation from the S2 of the Base Section who leaned heavily upon them for security surveys of installations and for security education of personnel assigned in the area.[88]

The detachment felt that much of their success with security surveys was the result of careful planning as well as the whole-hearted support of the base S2. Prior to a survey of an installation the base S2 would send to the commanding officer a letter outlining the purpose and scope of the survey and the need for full cooperation with the surveying agents. Prior to the survey the agents would visit the installation, confer with the CO and the S2 and have them send to each section a similar letter. At completion of the survey, before writing a report, agents would again confer with the CO and the S2. In his official history, Captain Steptoe stated that these measures had contributed to a spirit of cooperation throughout the command and "have proven quite successful as a means of breaking down the inherent suspicion which otherwise attaches to an independent investigating agency checking conditions in a U.S. Army unit.[89]

One of the more important responsibilities was the security of the gasoline pipelines. Early in January 1945, Captain Steptoe and Agent Monro traveled to Calcutta to coordinate with the detachment there plans for a survey of the Chittagong-Tansukia pipeline; and two days after their return to Chabua, Monro and Voorhees set out to cover the upper end of the line to meet Calcutta agents who were covering the lower end.[90]

Late in February, upon the completion of the Stilwell Road, Agent Simpson traveled the length of the road, 1,120 miles, from Doom Dooma, Assam, to Kunming, China, with the 610th Ordnance Ammunition Company, the first complete unit to make the trip. Before the trip he assisted in the necessary security planning, conferred with key officers and gave security lectures. On the ten-day trip Simpson made a study of the SOP for convoys on the road and after completion prepared a written report containing his comments and recommendations.

Along the way he also collected considerable information of counterintelligence interest from Indian soldiers and civilians, an operation that was possible only, it was pointed out in the official report, because he was able to speak fluent Hindustani.[91]

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88 Ltr, from Hq 409th CIC Det, to CO, CIC Det, Hq USFIB, dtd 22 Nov 44, Subj: "Scope of Detachment Activities," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

89 History of the 409th by Steptoe, Ibid.

90 Weekly Progress Rpt, to CO CIC, USF, IBT, APO 885, dtd 22 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

91 CIC Monthly Information Report, 409th CIC Det, dtd 2 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

Late in April 1945 the detachment was given the temporary responsibility of questioning approximately 2,000 refugees from French Indo-China for strategic information of interest to intelligence. Three French speaking agents, Leroy T. Newland, Julian H. Nixon, and Maurice F. McMahan, who had been with the interrogation teams operating in the Myitkyiana-Bhamo area, were sent on temporary duty to assist with this work.[92]

Along in May 1945, as additional men were being pulled from the Burma-India detachments for China, the detachment was reduced in size, and at the end of July, the 409th was combined with all the detachments operating in Burma and Assam.[93]

410th Assigned to Ledo Area

Early in February 1944, recognizing that the large number of Chinese shopkeepers and dentists in the Ledo area, many of whom were newcomers, posed a security threat to our forces in this extremely strategic area, an attempt was made to place _ there in an undercover capacity. It was learned, however, as it was in other sectors, that the clannishness of the Chinese would make such a maneuver impossible. Therefore, early in April, he was sent there in a semi-undercover role as a Chinese-American soldier, in an attempt to ascertain whether the sudden influx of Chinese shopkeepers in Ledo and Margherita was based upon any espionage plans or was merely for the purpose of doing business with Allied soldiers. He found an interesting situation, particularly among the dentists. Most of them were Hupeh Chinese, among whom the profession of dentistry had been handed down for generations. When large numbers of colored soldiers began arriving in the area in January 1943, the Chinese found them excellent customers for gold crowns; many more rushed to the area from Calcutta and set up business in bazaars owned by friends or relatives. When a theater order in September 1943 had banned American patronage of local bazaar dentists on the basis of unsanitary conditions, most of the dentists remained and became shopkeepers.

managed to strike up a friendship with several of the shopkeepers and came to the conclusion that there was little danger of espionage among the Chinese in the area, and that even this danger would be lessened soon by a U.S.

92 Ltr, from CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, to CO, 409th CIC Det, dtd 28 Apr 45, Subj: "Refugees from French Indo-China," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

93 Ltr, 409th CIC Det, to CO, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, dtd 31 Jul 45, Subj: "Operational Plan for CIC Detachments in Burma and Assam," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

military order that all shopkeepers except those who had been in business prior to 1 January 1943 would have to leave.[94]

However, a real security threat remained, due to their strategic location at one end of the road which, when completed, would furnish the only land route to China and the necessity for protecting the gasoline pipelines which passed through the area. On 15 July 1944, three days after the 409th had arrived at Chabua, the 410th arrived at Base Section Nr 3, SOS, popularly called the Advance Section, with the assignment of covering an area extending approximately 300 miles, from Digboi, Assam, to Myitkyina, Burma, then under seige by American and Chinese forces. The famed Ledo-Burma Road, later to be named the Stilwell Road, was by this time open to Warazup, Burma, approximately 190 miles from Ledo.

Staff Sergeant Arnold B. Reinertson was SAC of this group. Other members were John E. Rebman, James G. McNamara, John C. Nebo, and
A short time later was added, and he and worked in an undercover capacity similar to that used previously by in order to keep watch over the Chinese in the area.[95]

Recognizing early the strategic significance of this area as the entrance to the Burma combat zone, CIC immediately set about planning means of controlling movement. Among their most effective recommendations was the establishment of the Hellgate Control Post at Hellgate, Assam, where it could be readily ascertained that convoys were not carrying undesirables in either direction. CIC made periodic spot checks of this post and drafted regulations to cover any weaknesses found in its handling.[96]

On 28 February, James G. McNamara completed a survey of the pipeline from Tinsukia to Myitkyiana to determine the extent of security measures and

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94 Memorandum from , Hq Base Section Nr 3, SOS, USAF, CBI, dtd 12 Apr 44, Subj: "Chinese Shops and Dentists in Ledo and Margherita Bazaars Potentially Suspected as Espionage Purpose of the Enemy," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

95 Historical Records of the 410th CIC Detachment, assigned to Hq Adv Sec Nr 3, Ledo, Assam, by Arnold B. Reinertson, SAC, dtd 9 Mar 45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); Ltr, from CIC Det, Hq USF, CBI, to Arnold B. Reinertson, SAC, dtd 9 Jun 44, Subj: "Letter Orders," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center); Ltr, from CIC Det "F", to CO, CIC Det, Hq USAF, CBI, dtd 31 Jul 44, Subj: "Payment of Per Diem Vouchers," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

96 Ltr, 410th CIC Det, dtd 16 Feb 45, Subj: "CIC Situation Summary, Covering Period 16 January to 15 February 1945," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

recommend measures to prevent sabotage. The Calcutta and Chabua detachments had completed the survey up to the point where the 410th took it over.[97]

As in many other areas throughout the war, CIC found itself performing tasks which were not included in the book, but which served to increase the respect in which CIC was held by other units and their commanders.

When it was recognized, in December 1944, that four of the seven battalions in the 45th Quartermaster Group, a negro outfit commanded by white officers, was having to replace its trucks at a far lower mileage than the other battalions, CIC was called in to investigate. They interviewed numerous persons and drew up charts and graphs showing performance and repair records. The cause was found to be as suspected: wilful neglect of first echelon repairs by the drivers and a few cases of intentional destruction, all traceable to a notoriously bad morale situation. CIC Agents Rebman and Nebo, who conducted the investigation, made recommendations which were accepted thankfully by Base Headquarters.[98] Some of the causes, of course, nothing could be done about--length of time overseas, the debilitating climate and the long monsoon season--but their recommendations for improvements in living conditions and recreational facilities were put into effect immediately with a noticeable upturn in morale. Publicizing the charts and graphs also helped by making even those who had been wilfully negligent aware of the seriousness of the situation. CIC's gain was that the survey revealed a number of disaffected persons who were deliberately causing trouble. One miscellaneous case concerned a private with one of the units along the Ledo Road who was receiving letters from a woman in New York claiming that he was the father of her illegitimate child and urging him to desert the Army. Another was the case of a master sergeant suspected of disaffection but revealed by the investigation to be mentally ill.[99]

Their survey also revealed a need for more security education. Nebo was assigned to put on a special program along the lines of those undertaken in other parts of the theater.

Prior to CIC's arrival in the area no background checks had been made on the civilians working in and around American installations along the Ledo Road, and there was no pass system for identification. McNamara was assigned to set up a program for processing these individuals, including interviews, photographs, and fingerprints. A pass system was also inaugurated.[100]

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97 Ltr, 410th CIC Det, to CG, ASF, Wash, D.C., dtd 1 Apr 45, Subj: "Monthly Information Report," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

98 Historical Records of 410th CIC Det, Ibid.

99 Ltr, 410th CIC Det, Subj: "Monthly Information Report," to CG, ASF, Wash., D.C., dtd 1 Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

100 Ltr, "Monthly Information Report," dtd 1 Mar 45, Ibid.

CIC agents discovered a number of discrepancies in the handling of classified documents, including the fact that many documents were being over-classified merely to speed up deliveries, and that some of the units were taking their documents to the air strips for delivery to the pilots rather than go through the necessary registration with the courier service. CIC's recommendations were credited with bringing noticeable improvement in the situation.[101]

It was estimated that prior to the Japanese invasion, the Chinese population of Myitkyina, Burma, was about 200 persons, most of whom escaped to the walled city of Teng Chung, in Yunnan Province in China, about 120 miles away. Prior to the war a rough but passable road between these two cities had served as a smuggling route between China and Burma. With the recapture of the city by the Allies in August 1944, the sudden influx of Chinese to the city again posed a security problem. By March 1945, the Chinese population had grown to 2,000, drawn by the possibilities of black market operations, as well as legitimate business operations with the chances of easy money. CIC recommended that the Bazaar area be put off limits to discourage the "easy money" idea and that a frontier control post be set up and controlled by both American and Chinese soldiers. Manning the post with Chinese soldiers only would be pointless, since experience had taught that the Chinese soldiers would protect Chinese civilians in their activities.[102]

In June 1945, Reinertson returned to the United States and Lt William Daube, newly arrived in the theater, was placed in command.[103] At about this time operational functions of the detachment were combined with the 406th, the 407th, and the 409th all operating in Assam and Burma under the direction of Captain Steptoe, CO of the 409th.[104] Considerable shifting of members of the detachment began soon thereafter and, on 30 October 1945, the detachment was inactivated.[105]

Group Assigned to 10th Air Force

The group assigned to the 10th Air Force, the 413th CIC Detachment, was activated on 9 June 1944, with Maj Fariss Hardin in command, and left Calcutta early in July in three groups. Major Hardin, Don B. Bernston, Jack A. Hockman, Lionel J. Hall, Francis W. Krauser, and Milton Musick went to 10th Air Force

101 Historical Records of the 410th CIC Det, by Reinertson, Ibid.
102 Ltr, 410th CIC Det, "Monthly Information Report," dtd 1 Mar 45, Ibid.
103 Ltr, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, to 410th CIC Det, dtd 14 Jun 45, Subj: "Command of 410th CIC Detachment," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).
104 Ltr, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, Subj: "Inactivation of 410th CIC Detachment," dtd 30 Oct 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).
105 Ltr, 409th CIC Det, to CO, CIC Det, USF, IBT, dtd 31 Jul 45, Subj: "Operational Plan for CIC Dets in Assam and Burma," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

Headquarters at Kanjiloa, Assam, near the India-Burma border. They later were joined by Lt Thomas Kendall and Joseph Fuchs. The group attached to the 7th Bombardment Group at Kurmitola, India, near Calcutta, consisted of S/Sgt Donald C. Mauro (SAC), Harold T. McGovern, William J. Adams, Walter B. Baker, Jr., Harold M. Fetters, and Press C. Southworth, Jr. To the 12th Bombardment Group Headquarters at Feni, India, east of Calcutta near the India-Burma border, went S/Sgt William E. Hoffman (SAC), Joseph A. Smith, Norman E. Albright, John McDonnell, Earl C. Snyder, and Robert Vautrain.

As with other groups there was a certain amount of shifting of personnel. Early in November 1944, because of the progress of the campaign in Burma, there was a complete reorganization of the unit. Headquarters moved to Myitkyina up in Northeast Burma; Krauser and Musick went to set up a field office at Dinjan, Assam, 32 miles west of Ledo, within driving distance of four airfields; and Bernston and Southworth were sent to Tingkawk, Sakan, Burma, headquarters of the 80th Bomber Group, to furnish security for four airfields along the Stilwell Road.[106]

Another shift came in December when the detachment was assigned to Theater Air Force because of the increased Air Force jurisdiction. Several new members were added, and Hoffman, Mauro, and McDonnell were assigned to the 412th which was preparing, finally, to go to China. As soon as an airstrip was taken from the enemy, an advance CIC party preceded the move to check physical security of the location and security of communications and native personnel.

Security was the all-consuming mission of this detachment. They made security surveys of air bases; investigated all civilian employees; set up identification systems for travelers; conducted security campaigns among the military and the civilian employees; and investigated all explosions and fires on air bases for possibility of sabotage. They maintained close liaison with all other intelligence and police units, British and Indian as well as American. Through this liaison, they were able to assist in working out a solution for civilian refugee problems in Burma through which they obtained much information of counterintelligence value. Investigation of all cases of suspected sabotage of planes at 10th Air Force Base came within their purview.[107]

One "loose talk" investigation which this group brought to a swift climax concerned an impending large scale operation planned for 11 February 1945. On 31 January, a warrant officer assigned to Publications ran a stencil outlining instructions for the operation. That same evening he told a lieutenant assigned

106 History of 413th CIC Det, (Kansas City Records Center).

107 History of the 413th CIC Det, By Major Fariss Hardin, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility), and interviews with CWO William Hoffman, and Mr Frank Krauser, Indianapolis, Indiana.

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to the Photo Laboratory, "I think I can tell you boys something and trust that you won't talk. The first part of February there is going to be an all out show. It will be the biggest ever attempted. The Rangoon area is going to catch hell. All Allied aircraft are participating, including the B-29's."

On 5 February the lieutenant passed the story on casually to two Red Cross workers and an Army captain. On 8 February one of the Red Cross workers repeated the story to a captain and a major, both members of the 7th Bombardment Group. This time the hearers were conscious of the security implications and questioned her until she admitted from whom she had heard the story. The case was immediately turned over to CIC agents who were able to round up all the persons who had heard the story. They were not hard to convince that it should go no further. As for the persons involved, two were tried by General Court, with the result that one was fined $50 per month for 12 months.[108]

A similar case, referred to them by the British Field Security Section, also involved the Rangoon operation. An American glider pilot was charged with having discussed the planned operation with an Indian woman who in turn passed on the information to a British officer. The suspected pilot had already left the theater, but the information was sent forward with a request for disciplinary action.[109]

An interesting document, prepared in February 1945, lists in brief form 32 types of activity performed by this detachment in India and Burma. "Close contact" and "liaison" are the key words in practically every activity listed. "...together with NCAC, CIC, CAS and British Intelligence agencies, raided..." "...close liaison between British civil affairs in Burma..." "...assistance of a counter-intelligence nature...to China National Airways Corporation..." The above are typical comments.[110] How much bearing this constant stress upon liaison had upon the successful operations of the detachment cannot be estimated from a study of documents after a lapse of ten years, but it is significant that the records contain no mention of the occasional petty, but nevertheless annoying, types of difficulties encountered by some of the other detachments.

Even more significant perhaps is the letter of commendation written by Maj Gen Howard C. Davidson, 10th Air Force Commander as the unit was preparing to leave for China. General Davidson wrote in part, "The devotion to duty of these CIC agents is exemplified in the high esteem held for them by 10th Air

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108 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, dtd 12 Feb 45, Subj: "Security Violations re Mission of 11 Feb 45, Case #16039," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center); History of the 413th Detachment by Maj Fariss Hardin, (Central Records Facility).

109 History of the 413th Detachment, by Maj Fariss Hardin, Ibid.

110 CIC Operations with the 10th Air Force in India and Burma, dtd 27 Feb 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

Force personnel who have had occasion to deal with them. They have been a major asset in the assurance of security within the Air Force and I greatly appreciate their constant material aid.... The integrity and loyalty of these agents has been shown by their activities in the successful completion of counter-intelligence investigations.... I wish to commend Major Hardin and each of his 10th Air Force agents for the accomplishment of their counterintelligence duties..."

This letter was indorsed by Maj Gen George E. Stratemever, Commander of Theater Army Air Forces, in part, "It is a pleasure to add my personal commendation to that of the Commanding General, 10th Air Force, for the outstanding performance of duty by your organization throughout your tour of duty in this theater. You have justifiably won the respect and pride of the services..."[111]

Early in May 1945, the entire detachment, less a few who were transferred to other detachments and augmented by personnel drawn from other Burma and India detachments, was alerted to move to China.[112]

General LeMay Backs CIC "To the Limit"

The 416th CIC Detachment, under command of Lt Paul F. Ward, was sent to Tactical Section #5, then at Kharagpur, India, the secret base of the XX Bomber Command. With him went Lawson A. Moyer, John F. McElligott, Harold C. Dorn, and James G. Brock.[113] Most of their work was with the XX Bomber Command, in which they found their principal problem to be that of security which was considered particularly lax. By early November 1944, security surveys and general security education, as well as investigations of reports of "loose talk," were credited with having brought about considerable improvement. According to official reports, CIC's measures for improving security were backed "to the limit" by Maj Gen Curtis LeMay. A variety of cases of suspected sabotage, including the presence of loose bolts in the magneto housing of an aircraft, "shot bags" found in a parachute, and fires at breaks in air oil pipe line were investigated as were numerous suspected espionage cases.[114]

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111 Ltr, Office of the CG, Hq 10th AF, US Army, to CG, AAF, IBT, dtd 30 Apr 45, Subj: "Commendation of 413th CIC Detachment," and 1st Ind thereto dtd 9 May 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

112 History of the 413th CIC Det by Hardin, Ibid., and interviews with CWO William Hoffman, Don Bernston, and Frank Krauser.

113 Memorandum for Dir of Intell, ASF, by Col Gray, (CONFIDENTIAL); and Hist Data Card for 416th.

114 Counterintelligence Abstract Nr 1, dtd 14 Nov 44; Counterintelligence Summaries Nr 10, dtd 1 Oct 44; Nr 11, dtd 1 Nov 44; and Nr 12, dtd 1 Dec 44, Hq India-Burma Theater, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

In September, three members of the detachment were sent to an advance base at Chengtu, China, and early in 1945, the remainder of the unit moved up to Bhamo, and for a time worked in conjunction with the Northern Combat Area Command detachments, until they were transferred to the 703d CIC Detachment and moved out of the theater with the XX Bomber Command.[115]

In May 1945 the unit was reorganized with six agents assigned and travelled to China to join the detachment there.

China Detachments Deployed to Other Units

As previously mentioned, the 411th, the 412th, and the 415th CIC Detachments which had been earmarked for China simply had to wait and in the meantime were sent to Calcutta to find whatever work they could do. Captain Grieve and his 412th Detachment of 2d Lt Thomas H. Kendall, W. F. Dennis Gebhart, Robert L. Baldwin, William R. Boggs, Hugh Gregg, John J. Brennan, William T. Elliot, Kong T. Louie, George L. Lyan, and George L. Reynolds seem to have been somewhat more successful than the others, since they sold their services to the ATC and later to the Air Force.[116]

After several delays made it clear that even the small detachment under Captain Gelwicks would not go to China for some time, Captain Gelwicks was sent to the British school at Karachi and his 411th Detachment of Robert B. Edris, George E. Nixon, Sum M. Seto, George G. C. K. Mah, William A. Reynolds, Wah Foo Quon, Edwin S. Belknap, and Charles F. Gentile was merged with Lieutenant Dailey's 415th Detachment consisting of Charles F. G. Smith, John Nowlan, Joel Breechen, Laurence H. Ballou, and John P. Shanley.[117]

By October, most of the members of these three groups had been sent up to the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), and when, on 6 December 1944, they were alerted to be ready to leave for China on about 5 January 1945, it was necessary to reassign a number of them to Burma detachments and substitute others from other detachments.[118] During their stay in Burma, these three, along with the other detachments there, operated as one unit.

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115 Ltr, Hq USF, IBT, to CG, ASF, Wash, D.C., ATTN Dir of Intelligence, Subj: "Letter of Transmittal," File 350.09, dtd 15 Mar 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center), and Ltr, Hq USF, IBT to CO, 703d CIC Det, Hq XX Bomber Com, dtd 22 Feb 45, Subj: "CIC Conference," (Kansas City Records Center). NOTE: Very few records of this unit are available, probably because of this shift to Air Forces.

116 Memorandum to Dir of Intell, By Col Gray, Ibid.

117 Ltr, from Hq USAF, CBI, CIC Det, to Capt Harold Gelwicks, 181st Gen Hosp, dtd 8 Oct 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

118 Ltr, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, Subj: "Transfer of CIC Detachments to China Theater," dtd 6 Dec 44, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

Agents Assigned to GALAHAD Force

The Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) was at first doubtful about accepting its assigned CIC detachment, but after Lt John H. Thorne, officer in charge, traveled to NCAC Headquarters at Shadazup, about 100 miles down the Stilwell Road, for conferences with the G2, G3, and the Chief of Staff, it was decided not only that they could be used, but that an additional detachment was desired, to be made up of persons awaiting shipment to China. One detachment would be utilized as a security detachment at headquarters while the other would be assigned to the GALAHAD Task Force, the code name given to Brig Gen Frank D. Merrill's jungle troops. This force, popularly called Merrill's Marauders, had moved through the jungle to cut off the Japanese at several spots ahead of General Stilwell's Chinese divisions, and had by that time captured the airstrip at Myitkyina and laid seige to the city, key strategic spot near the projected road. Lieutenant Thorne flew to Myitkyina airport where he received the approval of the G2 and other ranking officers, who said they would welcome the CIC detachment as soon as they could be flown in. Thorne returned to Ledo where arrangements were made for flying in the detachment with necessary equipment and a jeep for transportation, and for bringing the additional group up from Calcutta. Still later, additional agents from the China group were brought up into Burma to join the NCAC detachment, and the 406th, the 407th, and the 408th Detachments were brought in. Although these units kept their own identities for administrative purposes, they all operated as one unit under Thorne, by then a captain.[119]

The specific mission for the NCAC group is outlined by Col Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., AC of S, G2, was to install an effective and rapid system for classifying the native population into "black" and "white" categories; to apprehend known enemy agents, collaborators and saboteurs; to maintain security between the front lines and the rear areas; and to effect close liaison with the British Civil Affairs Service.[120]

CIC Enters Myitkyina With First Wave

Thorne and the members of the 414th CIC Detachment, Leroy T. Newland, Karl R. Manwell, Jean A. Curran, and James H. Carr, Jr.,[121] joined the GALAHAD Task Force in time to enter Myitkyina with the first wave of assault

119 History of the 406th, 407th, etc., Ibid; and Ltr, Hq USF, IBT, CIC Det, Subj: "Property Responsibility," dtd 4 May 45, (R) (Kansas City Records Center).

120 History of CIC Detachments in CBI Theater, 31 Jul 44 to 31 Mar 45, (R) (Central Records Facility).

121 Ibid; and Interview with Leroy T. Newland, Washington, D.C.

troops when the city fell, and search enemy headquarters for documents of intelligence interest, with the result that for the first time in the Burma Campaign a quantity of valuable enemy documents was obtained for use by G2.

About two and one half tons of documents were secured, but it was believed that a much greater quantity had been destroyed by the Chinese because they had not been trained to collect such items. By the time the second group arrived on about 7 September, the detachment was engaged in clearing local civilians for employment by the Army and in hunting the persons who were on the previously compiled Black List. The first three they found were employed by Civil Affairs, who knew they were on the list, but insisted they had to employ them because of their special qualifications. CIC was able to apprehend and send them out to India for further interrogations and probable trial only after appeal to NCAC Headquarters. Searches for wanted persons required extensive travel through the jungles to remote villages, by jeep, elephant, boat, and foot.[122]

One outstanding case was conducted by S/Sgt Edmund Fong, who set out on 21 September, accompanied by a Burmese Sub-Inspector, to apprehend Sinwa Nawng, headman of Kansi Village in North Burma, a notorious Japanese collaborator who was charged with seizing, disarming, and turning over to the Japanese, 15 native Indian-British troops and Lt Stewart Walker, a downed American pilot. Although suffering from malaria and jaundice, Fong traveled with his companion for two weeks by plane, jeep, and motor boat, and on foot. Upon their arrival in the area, the U.S. liaison officer protested the man's arrest, explaining that he had been very helpful in obtaining foodstuffs and laborers for them and expressing the opinion that he had helped the Japanese only to the extent to which he had been forced. Sensing that the Chinese had been taken in by the man, Fong realized that they would not permit his arrest and that he would have to be removed from the territory by subterfuge. Therefore he told the Chinese officials as well as Sinwa Nawng that he was wanted in Myitkyina to relate his experiences during the Japanese occupation in order to aid the Allied forces in Burma to understand the Japanese tactics in dealing with the civilian population. Such subterfuges often had to be used in dealing with the Chinese. During the return trip to Myitkyina, Fong picked up another prisoner who was wanted in Myitkyina and also accepted two other prisoners whom other units wanted sent back. Upon his return with his four prisoners Fong entered the hospital for treatment for malaria and jaundice.[123]

122 History of CIC in CBI Theater, by MacKenzie, (R).

123 Case Supplement to Report, CIC Operations in Burma, 31 Sep 44 to 5 Mar 45, (R) (Central Records Facility).

Interrogation Teams Organized for Jungle Work

In October 1944, all the members of the detachment, with the exception of the headquarters group consisting of Lieutenant Thorne, Lt Daniel Dailey, S/Sgt Charles Smith, and Cpl Joel Breechen, were organized into interrogation teams, a set-up unique to this theater. For the remainder of the campaign these teams, consisting of two or three CIC agents accompanied by native Burmese interpreters furnished by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment 101, traveled throughout the area, each team equipped with its own jeep and necessary bedding, food and other supplies. Their mission was to apprehend enemy agents and collaborators; obtain additional names for the Black List; secure enemy documents; and, in general, obtain all possible information concerning the enemy.

Combat Interrogation Team (CIT) #1 began operations on 4 November at Mohnyin, south of the Stilwell Road between Myitkyina and Indaw. This team, consisting of Karl R. Manwell, L. T. Newland, Jean A. Curran, and Wah Foo Quon, all corporals, handled several interesting cases, most notable of which was the capture of the leaders of a bandit gang which, operating under the Japanese, had captured and tortured many Allied soldiers. Both Saung Swe, the leader, and the second in command of the gang later were executed. Two spies who had reported movements of the Chinese forces were captured and interrogated. In all, 26 arrests were made in this area, resulting in three death sentences, four life imprisonment sentences, and two sentences of shorter duration.

In mid-December, Manwell and Curran moved on down to Indaw, while Newland and Quon formed a new team, Team #4, and moved over to Katha near the Chinese border, between Indaw and Bhamo. The Indaw area proved to be seething with intrigue, particularly the village of Manlai, headquarters of a gang which, witnesses claimed, had tied an American soldier to a tree and burned out his eyes. Ten members of the gang were arrested. While here Manwell and Curran became great friends with the local leaders who, as a mark of honor, christened them "Bo Gyi" and "Bo Gale." Their largest weapons haul was made here, 300 Japanese rifles in addition to other weapons.

The next location for Team #1 was Tigyaing, where they were joined by Cpl Thomas P. Wheeley, who had been with the detachment at Karachi. Here they arrested many Japanese collaborators, among whom were five natives who had ferried a party of the Wingate (British) force to an island in the river and then reported them to the Japanese. Leaders of the Tigyaing Women's Thakin League, who had collaborated wholeheartedly with the Japanese and had acted as procuresses for them, were arrested. Arrests in this area totaled 12, and a number of police documents were obtained.

Roads were practically nonexistent, although the natives called a trail through the rice paddies a motor road. Late in February the team was ordered to join the British 36th Division which was operating in an area about midway between Katha and Mandalay. Again they were told that a motor road was available, but at several places they had to hire natives to clear trees from the trail, and to build a raft to get them across the Schwei River. After joining the division they operated with the forward troops in the occupation of captured villages. By the end of March they had arrested 18 persons, including one whom they had trailed from Mohnyin, and another who was charged with the arrest of Lt Joe Wilson of the U.S. Air Corps. They then established a listening post in Mogok to serve the area between there and the Stilwell Road.

Team #2 Travels by Boat and on Foot

CIT #2 was formed at Myitkyina on 8 November and two days later moved to Schwegu, situated on the Irawaddy River half way between Bhamo and Katha. This team, consisting of Sgts James H. Carr, Jr., and Sick Foon Woo; Cpl Robert B. Edris and an interpreter from Detachment 101, was augmented from time to time by personnel of Headquarters Company, 96th Signal Battalion, for radio communication, and by Kachin Rangers from Detachment 101. Since there were no roads in the area, the team was given a boat with outboard motor which they could use along the river and neighboring streams; the rest of their travel was done by foot. In addition to investigating suspected collaborators, they spent much time in hunting radio transmitters that reportedly were operating from the area. On one occasion a six day search was conducted arodnd the Kaukwe Chaung area, and a road block was set up in an attempt to head off an enemy radio team rumored to be escaping down the Kaukwe River.

Rumors of looting of Burmese villages by Kachins and by Chinese guerillas had to be investigated as did various Japanese-inspired societies set up among the natives, but one of the major tasks encountered was the uncovering of the so-called Anti-Fascist League, organized by disgruntled members of the Thakin League.

In mid-February, the team journeyed by boat to Moda Gyi Village where they arrested six members of "Wa-Bat," a raiding gang who had been trained by the Japanese in jungle warfare and who, at the instigation of a Japanese agent, had sabotaged the railroad line above Mawlu, Burma.

In all, the team arrested 40 persons and developed sufficient information against most of them to warrant their being brought to trial as Japanese collaborators.[124]

124 History of the 406th, 407th, 408th, 414th, and 416th CIC Detachments in the CBI Theater, 31 Jul 44 to 31 Mar 45, (Central Records Facility).

One of the most ambitious projects undertaken by the team was a survey of the area bordered by the towns of Namkham, Hosi, and Muse between 1 March and 12 March 1945 to determine the attitude of the natives toward the Allies and to learn of their food problems; to investigate the reports of raids by Chinese guerillas; to obtain any intelligence information about the enemy; and to learn the extent of collaboration with the enemy.

For 12 days, Edris, Carr, and Woo, accompanied by interpreters and radio men, slogged over 120 miles of barely discernible trails through difficult mountain terrain, visiting 15 villages where they interviewed the headmen and village elders. It is interesting to note that the monthly report in which this information is contained states, in the space allotted for "recommendations," "...that the physical condition of CIC personnel continue to be stressed."[125]

Team #3 Organized to Enter Bhamo

On 19 November, CIT #3, consisting of S/Sgt Edmund Fong and Cpls Edwin S. Belknap and W. F. Davis Gebhart, with two interpreters from Detachment 101, were sent to 48th Division Headquarters, then ten miles north of Bhamo, to be ready to go into the city as soon as Chinese forces invaded it, to sift the civilian population for Japanese collaborators and to obtain any military information before it could be destroyed. They departed Myitkyina by jeep and within two days had advanced beyond the construction work of the engineers. The trip took four days, a distance that could be traveled in six hours after the road was completed.

Upon arrival, Fong attempted to establish liaison with the G2 of the Chinese division, which operated its own counterintelligence system. For a time this was unsuccessful; the Chinese persisted in jailing collaborators and turning enemy agents over to civilian authorities without informing CIC of their action. The CIC, therefore, had to set up its own independent informant system and proceed with the interrogation of suspects without help from the Chinese. To make the situation more frustrating, the Chinese ordered all civilians to move outside a five mile radius of Bhamo, thereby shattering CIC's newly created network. With the assignment of a colonel from the Chinese First Army to act as their liaison with high Chinese officials, the situation improved; the Chinese began to understand CIC's mission and to turn over enemy agents to them.

Upon the fall of Bhamo one month after the team's arrival, they entered the city while the Japanese snipers were still active and found many documents of interest to G2. Team #3 then set up its office in Minhla Village in north Bhamo where, in coordination with the Chinese, they investigated and arrested 43 Japanese

125 Monthly Information Report, 414th CIC Det, NCAC, dtd 2 Apr 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

agents and collaborationists. At first, information on individuals and on the activities of various pro-Japanese organizations was difficult to obtain, because the Japanese had instilled fear in the people by telling them that they were retreating merely to create a trap for the Allies and that they would return, bringing reprisals to those who cooperated with the Allies. Gradually, the large amount of American equipment impressed the natives with the permanency of Allied intentions. The greatest factor in winning their confidence, however, was CIC's insistence that Civil Affairs employ only those who were truly pro-Ally and who had suffered during the Japanese occupation because of this sympathy, by-passing those whose sympathies had been in doubt. A system was set up whereby every civilian employed had to be approved by CIC and the Chinese police.

On 17 January the team moved to the Namhkam area in order to maintain contact with the rapidly moving Chinese First Army, leaving Bhamo relatively secure. CIC agents moved into Namhkam with the Chinese on the heels of the retreating Japanese; however, few documents were found as the garrison had been small and had withdrawn without prolonged seige. The CIC agents stayed at Namhkam only about two weeks, a period which proved to be a pleasant interlude. The natives, particularly the Shans of the Schweli Valley, were so happy to be rid of the Japanese oppression that they forgot their former petty grievances against the British and even dropped their traditional feuds with the Kachins of the hills in appreciation of the Kachins' part in driving out the Japanese. Even the food supply was fairly adequate since the Japanese had failed to destroy the rice paddies in the Namhkam Valley before their retreat; however, practically all the cattle of the area had been destroyed. The effective Chinese counterintelligence system rid the area of most enemy agents ahead of CIC's arrival. Those arrested later were turned over to CIC, as evidence of improved relations brought about through the dual efforts of Agent Fong and Roderick Du, of the Chinese First Army.

Since this quiet, peaceful area offered little need for CIC, the team reluctantly moved, on 5 February 1945, to Muse, near the border between the Northern Shan States and Yunnan. Here also they found little counterespionage and countersubversive work to do, but they did meet a serious situation that required CIC attention. Two gangs of Chinese bandits were operating across the border into Burma in the guise of intelligence agents, without the authority of NCAC or the new First Army. They pretended to be hunting Japanese spies, but investigation revealed that all the persons arrested were wealthy and were released after payment of ransom. This situation offered a serious security threat, not only because of the attitude engendered among the natives but also because the bandits could tap the pipe line for gasoline and the telephone line for critical metals. In mid-February, leaving in the jail 23 collaborationists who had been rounded up at Namhkam and Muse, the team moved on to Kutkai to replace Team #5, which had moved in immediately after the fall of the city. At Kutkai, only four or five collaborationists were found, but investigation of the bandit gangs continued.

Team #3 Divides

Early in March Team #3 divided, Belknap and an interpreter proceeding to the Hsenwi area a few miles south of Kutkai, while Gebhart and Cpl Julian H. Nixon, who had recently been added to the team, went to Lashio, arriving while the town was still under Japanese artillery fire. At Hsenwi, Belknap found many important civilian government documents, obtained information on a school conducted by the Japanese for the administration of the Shan States, and an account of Chinese political aspirations in North Burma. He also arrested a Burmese who had worked for the Japanese and had turned over to them an American pilot shot down near Kulong.

The agents who went to Lashio found the city to be a center of considerable Japanese espionage and political activity. They arrested eight suspected agents and collaborationists the first week and 12 the second, using as their guide the suspect list compiled by headquarters, augmented by information locally obtained. Most of these were in the nature of collaborationists, since the Japanese had taken most of their trained agents with them when they retreated. They also arrested a Burmese, long sought as an officer in the Japanese Army who had fought actively throughout the Hukawang Valley Campaign; and, through questioning, obtained much valuable information from 20 escaped Indian prisoners of war.

As soon as Lashio was made secure for the incoming Allied installations, the team extended its activities southeast to Mongyai and northeast to Mongyang, all the while maintaining its connection with the NCAC Forward Command Post.

Team #4 Arrests 21 in Katha Area

On 14 December, Newland and Quon, who had began operations with Team #1 at Mohnyin, were designated as Team #4 and set out for Katha, accompanied by an interpreter. They arrived three days after the fall of the city. A brigade of the British 36th Division and a company of Kachin Levies were also in the city for about two weeks, but when they moved on, the CIC team was left in control except for a British Civil Affairs team with whom some difficulty was encountered because of the Civil Affairs policy of handling Japanese collaborators according to peacetime rules. CIC insisted upon holding these persons under arrest instead of permitting them to move about freely while their cases were being investigated. The team felt that its policy was correct because they quickly won the respect of the population, and the saying became common that "if one was picked up by the CIC jeep, one did not come back."

A total of 21 outstanding suspects in the area were arrested by CIC. Few documents were found since the Japanese had moved their headquarters to a village about 30 miles down the Irawaddy River two months before the Allies moved in.

However, a contest with awards for the persons who turned in the most material found in the villages in the area 15 miles south of Katha produced a number of valuable documents and propaganda leaflets.

As the only American unit in the area for a time, this CIC team was called upon for a variety of tasks, from acting as information center for incoming American personnel to ruling on the disposition of 18 elephants and their drivers who were trying to contact the Kachin Levies.

An assault boat with outboard motor was added to their equipment for use on long trips up and down the Taiping River, but since gasoline was scarce, most of their travel was by foot. During their stay in Katha, two more interpreters and a Kachin guide were added to the team.

When the area was turned over to SOS jurisdiction, the team proceeded to Bhamo, one agent making the trip by boat and the other by jeep, with a forest ranger as guide. A short time after their arrival in Bhamo on 4 March 1945, Newland and Quon moved south to join Team #5.

Team #5 Responsible for Security of NCAC Forward Command Post

Team #5, consisting of Lieutenant James Lucas and Cpl Seymour Abeles and two interpreters from Detachment 101, was activated on 19 December 1944 to fulfill security requirements of the NCAC Forward Command Post which had just moved to Nansin. There existed the necessity, not only of screening the local population for enemy agents, but also of planning the protection of the Command Post against bands of Japanese stragglers making their way south from Bhamo after the anticipated move to China of the Chinese 22d Division. Since the Japanese had not occupied this area, there was no prepared Black List and no list of friendly natives. In order to set up a warning screen over a large area, the village headmen in all the surrounding areas were contacted immediately and given the responsibility of reporting any information concerning the Japanese or the presence of any strangers in their village, with the threat of punishment if they failed to follow out the order. This system was completely successful with the Kachins, but only moderately so with the Shans.

Late in December the team moved to Si-U where they performed security work for the Chinese 50th Division as well as for the NCAC Forward Command Post. Their duties called for much liaison work between the division and the natives as well as acting as a pro tem Civil Affairs team; this gave them an opportunity to gain the good will of the natives who willingly passed along information.

In January natives reported that Ushikawa, a notorious Japanese agent, was in the area. An agent, accompanied by two interpreters and two Kachins, started on his trail, and although they did not apprehend him, were able to keep him on the move until he left the territory. On another occasion natives reported that two Shans in a neighboring village had worked as spies for the Japanese. When these two men were arrested, they proudly admitted that they were spies and told of their activities as follows: "The headman of Si-U called us in and told us we had to work as spies. We refused but he told us we would be killed if we didn't obey. So he gave us one rupee apiece and some eggs and sent us up to Sikangyi to see if any British or American aircraft were landing there. We went to Sikangyi and told the headman that we were spies and asked him if he had seen any planes. He said no, so we returned to Si-U and reported that. That was all."

Early in February the NCAC Command Post returned to Bhamo. The team remained for a week with the 50th Division, but since the area was static and did not justify their remaining, they soon followed and then were sent to Nampakka, headquarters for the 5342 Brigade. In this area they made several arrests and added several names to the Black List. They set up a security network by visiting, on foot, the headmen of all the villages within a 15-mile area. They moved down the old Burma Road to Kutkai after the Japanese withdrawal and, being the first Allied soldiers to enter, were able to pick up many valuable Japanese documents. In Kutkai they were able to obtain a great deal of tactical intelligence information, leads, and suspects, which they turned over to Team #3 before they left on 21 February.

On 15 February Lucas and Abeles volunteered to help in the rescue of two Americans who had been caught in a Japanese trap six miles south of Kutkai. They discovered that the Americans had been killed before their arrival. As they were bringing out the bodies, their party was ambushed. Abeles was wounded by machine gun fire, becoming the first CIC agent in the theater to win a Purple Heart. A few days later Lucas and Fong, who had joined the team from Team #3, flew to rejoin the 50th Division and marched 25 miles with them to Panghai, a suburb of Namtu, arriving there on 23 February. Panghai was still receiving artillery fire and snipers were active in Namtu. Joel M. Breecheen, who had come from headquarters at Bhamo on business, was wounded by a splinter from a 75mm shell, becoming the second Purple Heart winner.

From then on Team #5 was very busy, since this area was a center of Indian Independence League activities. Within the first two weeks 25 arrests were made, numerous names were added to the Black List, informant systems were established and documents were captured. Interrogation of many Indians and Shans who had come through enemy lines produced much valuable tactical information. At the end of February, L. T. Newland, Eugene Redden, and Wah Foo Quon joined the team, Newland and Quon having previously served with Teams #1 and #4. Shortly

afterward Lucas was hospitalized, and Newland assumed charge of the team. In mid-March two members were sent to Hsipaw, further south, while the Japanese were attempting to infiltrate the town, and the remaining members set up a branch office at Kyaukme on 11 April.[126]

Near the end of January 1945, Newland, Carr, Gebhart and 2d Lt James Lucas completed comprehensive food surveys in the areas in which their teams were operating.

This survey consisted of comparative figures for supply and cost of food stuffs during British and Japanese rule and probable future supply. Although far afield from CIC's recognized mission, it was believed that this survey would enable CIC to deal more effectively with the civil population as well as furnish the Office of War Information (OWI) with good propaganda material.[127]

A further example of the cooperation of this unit with OWI as well as evidence of a wide range of CIC activity can be seen in an "urgent request" to CIC CBI Headquarters for a copy of the Koran "to extract some proverbs to be used in pamphlets for the OWI." A copy of the Koran in parallel English and Arabic versions was dispatched immediately.[128] Lieutenant Farris at headquarters was used to strange requests. In October 1944, before the combat interrogation teams had begun their work in the Burma jungles, he had answered an overnight request for 12 colored silk "escape" maps of Burma, such as used by the Air Corps, needed because they would hold up under constant folding and the damp Burma climate.[129]

While the interrogation teams were ranging throughout the area on their special missions, other agents with NCAC were engaged in a variety of activities. William J. Adams was credited with outstanding work in the investigation of a break in the gasoline pipeline from Myitkyina to Bhamo. A search of three small villages in the area of the break revealed many small containers of gasoline which had been removed for use in lamps and in the fermentation of rice in the Burmese version of moonshining. Adams, accompanied by a CID representative and the civil police, found two persons who had made the gasoline available to the villagers. He also set up a certain amount of assurance against future similar incidents by gathering the headmen of the three villages together and warning them that any

126 History of the 406th, 408th, 414th CIC Detachments in the CBI Theater, 31 Jul 44 to 31 Mar 45, (R) (Central Records Facility).

127 Monthly Information Report, 414th CIC Det, NCAC, dtd 31 Jan 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

128 Ltr, Hq 414th CIC Det, NCAC, to Maj D. E. MacKenzie, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

129 Ltr, 414th CIC Det, NCAC, subj: "Escape Maps," to Supply Officer, CIC Det USAFSBI, dtd 18 Oct 44, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

recurrence of such an incident would cause a large fine to be levied upon the village. The civil police added a warning that the villages would be burned if the pipeline were again opened by the natives.[130]

At the direct request of the NCAC Chief of Staff, Edmond Fong was sent in June 1945 to investigate a touchy situation involving armed conflict between Chinese troops and a Kachin rifle company along the Burma-China border, and was credited not only with showing excellent tact in obtaining complete information concerning all the charges and countercharges from both sides, but also exhibiting understanding of the political tensions in the area.[131]

CIC Completes Tactical Mission

By July 1945, CIC had completed its tactical mission in India-Burma and the bulk of the China detachment had crossed over the Hump. There still remained the tremendous task of protecting the China life-line and reporting on the political situation which was becoming more and more difficult.

Early in August all the detachments in Assam and Burma, the 406th, 407th, 409th and 410th, were combined operationally under Captain Steptoe.[132] The 411th, 413th, 414th, 415th, and 416th had gone to China, and the 408th had returned to Calcutta.

With the end of the war, Major MacKenzie returned to the United States and Wilson, by then a major, became Theater Chief.[133]

CIC Turns to War Crimes Investigations

With the cessation of hostilities, all American prisoners of war released from prison camps in Java, Singapore, Burma, Thailand, Saigon, and Indo-China were taken to Calcutta for emergency hospital treatment before being transferred to the United States. To CIC was assigned the responsibility of gathering information for the War Criminals Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office. Since the utmost speed and efficiency were required in order not to delay liberated

130 Monthly Information Report, CIC, NCAC, dtd 31 May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

131 Monthly Information Report, CIC, NCAC, dtd 30 Jun 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

132 Ltr 409th CIC Det, to CO CIC Det Hq USF, IBT, dtd 31 Jul 45, subj: "Operational Plan for CIC Detachments in Assam and Burma," (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center); Ltr, Hq CIC Det, IBT, MacKenzie, to Steptoe, dtd 3 Aug 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

133 SO 1, CIC Det, Hq USF, IBT, APO 885, dtd 13 Aug 45, (Kansas City Records Center).

prisoners in their return home, all agents who could possibly be spared from their normal duties in Calcutta, Assam, and Burma, were assigned to this work. Between 17 August and 31 October 1945, they interviewed approximately 750 former prisoners of war and took more than 200 statements and depositions to use as evidence of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers and Korean guards at prison camps. A lengthy "Rogues List" of wanted Japanese was compiled. The major portion of the ex-prisoners interviewed were personnel of the U.S.S. Houston which was sunk on 1 March 1942 in the Sunda Straits, and members of the Second Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, which was forced to surrender at Garato, Java, on 9 March 1942.[134]

Almost immediately after V-J Day, deployment to the United States of those eligible began, and, in order to increase the effectiveness of the small number of agents remaining and to accomplish final deactivation more efficiently, all remaining personnel were assigned to the 405th CIC Detachment with headquarters in New Delhi and six branch offices at New Delhi, Karachi, Calcutta, Chabua, Ledo, and Bangalore, all of which were closed as rapidly as the U.S. installations which they served were evacuated.[135]

Prior to the end of the war, CIC's Post V-J Day mission in the India-Burma Theater had been written into a neat little package with the following as the principal activities:

a. To observe and investigate subversive elements within our own forces.

b. To advise and recommend on protective measures to safeguard our installations and equipment against local subversive activity.

c. To observe and report on Inter-Allied Relations.

d. To watch for attempts to involve U.S. personnel in Indian politics and to report on U.S. personnel who may be engaging in local political activity.

e. To conduct security checks upon the evacuation of any headquarters.[136]

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134 CIC History, 1945-1948, India-Burma, (R) (Central Records Facility); Ltr, Hq 405th CIC Det, USF, CBI, to CG, ASF, Washington, D.C., dtd 5 Nov 45, subj: "Monthly Information Report," (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); Ltr Hq USF, IBT, to AC of S, G2, dtd 18 Oct 45, subj: "Intelligence Processing of Recovered American Personnel," (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

135 CIC History, 1945-1948, Ibid.

136 "CIC Operations IBT-Post V-J Day," prepared by Major Wilson, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

No sooner had the trek to the United States begun than it was realized that CIC's services were needed perhaps more than they had been in many months and that this task was far more complex than the "mission" would indicate.

Throughout India, subversive groups chose the opportunity to stage riots and demonstrations, which had to be observed closely by CIC because of the possible danger to American personnel and installations.

For the Communist Party, the situation was ideal since they could combine the ever-present nationalistic urges with the unrest brought about by the cancellation of many wartime jobs and the rumored lowering of wages. Throughout India, riots and demonstrations called for CIC's full powers of observation. To report and to observe were CIC's only permitted activities in these cases, since they were warned not to become implicated. On 24 November eight Americans were hospitalized and 20 others treated for injuries in Calcutta, but CIC's observation was that the violence was directed only at the British and that Americans were injured only when they went too near the rioters. Constant warnings were directed at Americans not to permit themselves to be drawn into the situation on either side.[137]

One of these in March 1945 warned CIC agents against participating in raids and arrests arranged by British and Indian authorities, and especially those of the "witch hunting variety which seek to obtain evidence of a general nature having no connection with military security."[138]

The success with which CIC agents met the challenge in obtaining the pertinent information to keep War Department officials aware of the political situation, while at the same time maintaining close liaison with the British without becoming embroiled in the situation, can be seen from a number of documents, all of which serve as a tribute to the superior ability and integrity of the individual agents.

In other areas CIC agents were also accepted on exactly the same plane as other officials concerned with security, without any attention to rank. Dressed always in civilian clothes, and other agents in similar situations could be judged on ability rather than on rank.[139]

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137 Counterintelligence Abstract Nr 1, Hq USF, IBT, CIC Det, dtd 16 Sep 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center); and Memorandum to Colonel Bennett, from Lt Klise, dtd 24 Nov 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

138 Ltr, CIC Det Hq IBT, Subj: "Participation in Raids on and Arrests of Chinese in India," dtd 21 Mar 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

139 Minutes of 42d Meeting Inter-Allied Conference, 13 December 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

Gratitude for CIC's "cooperation and the liaison which we have built up since you first came to Calcutta," was expressed in a letter which also commented upon the "smooth work" of the detachment, written by the British Liaison Officer in Calcutta as he was preparing to return to England. This same attitude was expressed many times by the British in this and other sections.[140]

CIC agents were constantly apprehensive of any occurrence or situation which might endanger this liaison which they had arranged carefully and intelligently, and were quick to take up with proper authorities any situation that might endanger this liaison or cause embarrassment to U.S. forces. One such incident occurred in November 1945, when the British objected to the fact that "a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores" had been deposited in a water tank where it was available to natives of the area, with the comment that "in view of the present unrest, can something be done to render it harmless?" From the S4 of the service group to whom the British had reported the situation had come the answer, "Subject matter has been investigated. The condition that exists is normal and it shouldn't perturb anyone concerned."[141]

When Klise received a report of the situation from the British, he reported to the intelligence officer at AAF Headquarters with the comment that "the abandonment of property of this kind may place material in the hands of certain elements who may use it not only against the British, but against the Americans as well... I feel that the British are entitled to a little more explanation than is contained...in view of conditions in India at the present time." He further pointed out the danger that the United States Government "...may some day be called upon to pay damages for the contamination of tanks, which are frequently the only source of water supply for villages."[142]

A month later, Klise again recommended to the intelligence officers at the base section in Calcutta, at AAF Headquarters and ATC Headquarters that "adequate steps be taken to insure that U.S. Army salvage dumps or other

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140 Copy of Ltr from Lt Col R. E. M. Mayme, contained in Ltr from Klise, Br Off #3, Subj: "British Liaison," dtd 17 Mar 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

141 Ltr A. L. 562 ES Section, ASANOL, Serial Nr V/94/45, to Capt Rettinger, P.M. USAAF, ASANOL, Subj: "Disposal of Ammunition," dtd 23 Nov 45, and 1st Ind, Hq 305th Air Service Group, Office of the S4 Officer APO 690, signed, Kenneth L. Turner, Major, Air Corps, Asst S4 Officer, dtd 29 Nov 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

142 Memo for Intell Off, Hq AAF, APO 671, from CIC Br Off #3, APO 465, Subj: "Disposal of Air Corps Materiel at Madhigung," signed Richard W. Klise, SAC, dtd 4 Dec 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

disposal areas do not make...equipment available to the public," and pointed out that this particularly should apply to wireless or radio sending or receiving equipment.[143]

The thing that is particularly significant as a tribute to the recognized capabilities of CIC agents in this theater is the fact that at the time of the above recommendations Klise was a junior second lieutenant, having been, until 31 March 1945, an enlisted man. Yet he made his decisions and recommendations at all levels based upon his own judgment. The records reveal no situation where his judgment or authority was challenged; on the contrary they contain several letters of praise. One, written by Colonel Clarence W. Bennett who held the dual role of Theater G2 and Chief of the U.S. Military Observer Group, described one of Klise's political reports as "the best of its type we have had to date," which, as such, had been sent to the Chief of Military Intelligence Service, War Department.[144]

Records do not indicate to which particular report Colonel Bennett had reference, but it may well have been one which Klise had prepared two weeks earlier on 15 November 1945, in which he painted a gloomy future for any real solution to the Indian question.

"The Hindus are crying, more loudly than ever before, 'Quit India.' The Muslims qualify their demands by saying, 'Quit India, yes, but not until you have secured us against tyrannical rule by the Hindus' (Pakistan theory). The British still say, 'Show us a government capable of taking over and running the country in a democratic way, and you shall have your freedom.' One prominent and influential Indian businessman in Bengal recently told a British official, 'We want complete self-government, yes, but it must be within the British Empire. India cannot get along without Britain'."

Klise pointed out that in recent days the nationalist press had become "increasingly blatant in its printing of seditious copy," much of which was election propaganda in preparation for the All-India elections in December and the provincial elections in February, and that the Government of India was making no effort to curb this propaganda, probably because it did not wish "to create even the appearance of either influencing the elections or of interfering with free and impartial elections." The existence of two major terrorist parties, the traditional hatreds between the Muslims and Hindus, the ultra nationalistic attitude of even the legitimate political parties--all of these factors set the stage for a huge uprising within the next month and a half. Although none of these groups were

143 Ltr, Hq Br Off #3, APO 465, Subj: "Disposal of Surplus Property," dtd 27 Dec 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

144 Ltr, Hq USF, IBT, to 1st Lt Richard W. Klise, Subj: "Commendation," dtd 29 Nov 45, (R) (Kansas City Records Center).

basically anti-American, Klise pointed out, "To predict that any uprising in India would be exclusively anti-British, would seem to be inconsistent with the common knowledge that the Indians are apparently unable to agree to act in concert on any issue... It should be assumed that a low caste Indian in a fanatical mob may be unable to tell the difference between a Briton and an American--or more likely--that he may not bother to attempt to differentiate." On the basis of the prevailing situation, he made definite recommendations for the protection of Americans and American property in India in the event of an uprising, which he expected to occur.[145]

Klise's associate, James M. McTighe, was also praised by Colonel Bennett for a weekly press analysis. "Your analysis of press trends reveals a rare talent for eliminating the mass of extraneous detail presented by a strongly partisan press and selecting only salient points for comment... This report has been of great value as an aid in determining the local attitude toward the United States military establishment in India," Colonel Bennett wrote.[146]

While agents in the base sections in India were observing and reporting on the touchy political situation, agents in North Burma found themselves in a number of roles, one of which was chief relief-giver to the natives. One agent found himself with the only transportation in the area of Hsipaw for a two week period due to floods which had washed out bridges and communications. During this time he transported 80 persons to a refugee camp hospital and for several days was fed only through the kindness of the appreciative Burmese people.[147]

Gradually the detachments operating in Burma and Assam began closing out their activities, and in mid-November, they were inactivated and only a few persons left in Chabua to operate a branch office for a short time.[148]

Klise's predictions, of course, were correct, and the riots began in earnest early in February, with CIC charged with the mission of observing. They were

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145 Ltr, Br Off #3, USF, IBT, APO 465, Subj: "Political Situation in Base Section, IBT, as It May Affect Security of U.S. Troops and Installations," dtd 15 Nov 45, to CO, CIC, Hq USF, IBT, APO 885, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

146 Ltr, Hq USF, IBT, Subj: "Commendation," to M/Sgt James McTighe, through CO 405th CIC Det, USF, IBT, dtd 6 Apr 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

147 Counterintelligence Abstract Nr 1, Hq USF, IBT, CIC Det, 16 Sep 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

148 Ltr, Hq CIC Det, IBT, Subj: "Inactivation of 410th CIC Det," dtd 30 Oct 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center); and Ltr, CIC Det, Hq IBT, Subj: "Inactivation of Detachments," dtd 7 Nov 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

expected to come up with timely warnings if U.S. personnel or installations seemed to be in danger. Records contain a number of "Spot Reports," principally received at theater headquarters in New Delhi, transmitted by telephone from Calcutta, seemingly the seat of most of the trouble. Insurrections flared up in Calcutta on 11 February, with road blocks set up by the rioters stranding a U.S. convoy of 1,100 soldiers in North Calcutta. Several U.S. soldiers were injured and several vehicles destroyed. The British finally called out troops after it became evident that local Indian police could not furnish adequate protection.[149]

The trouble continued throughout India. On 26 February, McTighe, in his weekly press analysis wrote: "No sooner had the Calcutta disturbances of 11 to 15 February abated than the rated men of the Royal Indian Navy staged demonstrations ranging from sit-down strikes to riots and mutiny aboard docked ships... and Indian students all over the country, notorious for their super-patriotism and their lack of horse sense, staged sympathy meetings and riots. The younger generation was in the saddle...and a bewildered citizenry went along for the ride which resulted, in Bombay alone during four days of rioting, in estimates as high as 250 dead and 1,200 injured...

"The Bombay riots, and the lesser minor incidents in Calcutta last week, received the usual biased treatment in the Calcutta press. Responsibility for both was, according to Indian newspapers, shared by the local police and the British military... Political support for the riots was roundly denied by the parties and the Press...and it is interesting to note that Jinnah arrived in Calcutta the day after the riots ended; Gandhi left Bombay for Poona in the early stages of the Bombay fracas, and Nehru left Allahabad for Bombay the day after the Bombay situation cooled off. Timely intervention by political leaders might well have saved many lives and much trouble, but party business always seems to keep the political leaders far from the trouble spots...

"The Indian Press, from the broad viewpoint, is becoming more violently anti-British each day...and markedly anti-American. While it hastens to give good play to stories of little credit to America, it unfailingly chooses for its American sources of news such unrepresentative sources as Drew Pearson, Anne McCormick and the Chicago Tribune."[150]

About this time the "Bring the GI's Home" campaign reached the India-Burma Theater in full force, and CIC agents found themselves with the extra burden of observing and reporting its various aspects and investigating in detail the

149 Hq, USF, IBT, re Civil Disturbances in Calcutta, dtd 12 Feb 46 to 22 Feb 46, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

150 Memorandum to the Special Agent in Charge, from CIC Br Off #3, USF, IBT, APO 465, dtd 26 Feb 46, signed, James D. McTighe, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

circumstances under which numerous pamphlets and other literature had been distributed to troops,[151] and investigating the persons responsible for mass meetings held in various areas.[152] The situation became particularly difficult up in Chabua, Assam, from which station William A. Blalock reported on 28 February: "The troops have assumed a rebellious attitude toward the Indians due to injuries inflicted by them on American troops in the demonstration in Calcutta and Bombay. The big question in their minds is why they are kept here. Their jobs are over and they have nothing to do. It is also impossible for them to understand why the Negro troops are being sent out in larger numbers than they are. Their attitude is that if you have to make trouble to be shipped home, then why shouldn't they start."[153]

In March 1946, 1st Lt Karl R. Manwell, who had arrived in India with the detachment of 108 men in April 1944 as a corporal, became commander, followed in the position on 16 April by 1st Lt Richard Klise, also a member of the original group as a sergeant.

On 30 April 1946, Klise wrote the last Counterintelligence Summary for the theater, predicting that the trouble would continue. On that date the detachment was deactivated and all personnel reassigned to the United States, with the exception of the commanding officer, who remained for a while as Assistant AC of S, G2.[154]

CIC had closed out another chapter of its history and judging from the letters of commendation contained in the files, a most successful one. Records indicate that a large number of the agents in the Burma-India Detachment were commended at one time or another for some specific task performed well, far too many to include in this account.[155]

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151 Memorandum for I & S Officer, Base Section, APO 465, Br Off #3, Subj: "Distribution of 'Bring the GI's Home' Pamphlets," dtd 5 Jan 46 and 6 Jan 46, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

152 Ltr, Hq 405th CIC Det, APO 885, Subj: "Demobilization Mass Meetings - Calcutta," to SAC, Br Off #3, dtd 15 Jan 46, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

153 Weekly Situation Summary for period 23 Feb to 27 Feb 46, 405th CIC Det, Chabua, Assam, APO 629, dtd 28 Feb 46, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

154 Semi-Monthly Counterintelligence Summary Nr 8, Hq 405th CIC Det, USF, IBT, dtd 30 Apr 46, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

155 Files entitled, "Awards and Decorations," (Kansas City Records Center).

Section 2

CIC MOVES TO CHINA

While CIC agents in India and Burma were continuing to make themselves indespensible, agents in China also were having a busy time. As previously mentioned, 40 men had been tabbed for assignment to China even before their arrival in Bombay near the end of April 1944, but with the rapid deterioration of the military situation in China, space on the planes flying the Hump was too precious to be allocated to any but combat personnel and essential supplies. Soon after his arrival, Captain Grieve had flown to China for a conference with Maj Gen Claire L. Chennault at which time it was decided that a detachment would be requested for his 14th Air Force as soon as transportation could be spared.[156] Since those earmarked for China had been selected carefully on the basis of linguistic ability and knowledge of the area, an attempt was made to hold them together, but requirements in the theater, particularly along the Stilwell Road in Burma, had continually drained off personnel until the group had lost its identity by the time China was ready for them.

With the separation of the China Theater from the CBI on 24 October 1944, the China Theater requested a detachment of eight officers and 150 enlisted men, a number which actually was greater than the total then in the entire theater. It was impossible to assign more than a small portion of the number requested, but an immediate shifting of personnel began in order to send as many as possible. Only a few of those originally intended could be sent, however, since many were working on interrogation teams up and down the Stilwell Road where the fighting was still continuing.

A few CIC agents were already in China. In December 1943, Lt Douglass K. Ballentine and Russell Zachis, of the CIC detachment serving with the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command, had set up a field office in Kunming, with the primary mission of protecting ATC bases and operations in China from sabotage and espionage. They were withdrawn in March 1945 and their duties taken over by the regular detachments which had arrived by that time. Three agents had gone from India to the XX Bomber Command advance base at Chengtu, China, in September 1944; when the command moved to the Marianas in March 1945, two of them, Sgt James G. Brock and Cpl Harold C. Dorn, remained in China and joined the newly arrived detachment.

In response to urgent requests from the China Theater, Capt Harold Gelwicks, 1st Lt Edward S. White, S/Sgt George C. K. Mah and Sgt Francis E. Barnhart were sent to Chungking late in November 1944 to perform the necessary staff work and in general lay the groundwork for the CIC detachments then being organized in India-Burma.

156 Memorandum for Director of Intelligence, ASF, by Colonel Gray, Ibid.

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By the time this advance party arrived in Chunking on 12 December 1944, the Japanese had reached their furthest point of penetration moving westward toward Kweiyang. Base after base had been lost to the Japanese, each loss accompanied by increased undercover activity in the area of the remaining bases. If the Japanese were able to take Kweiyang, they would cut the principal overland route between Kunming and Chunking. Few persons at theater headquarters knew from personal experience what could be expected of CIC, but throughout headquarters there was an appreciation of the vulnerability of military information both from Japanese spies and from dissident groups within the Chinese forces. Certain of these groups, notably the Communists, often seemed less interested in the defeat of the Japanese than in the promotion of their own interests, thereby making it necessary that they be considered almost in the same light as enemy spies, and yet handled all the time with the utmost tact and diplomacy. Diplomacy was a requirement in all dealings in China, since the U.S. Army, with the exception of the Air Corps, was in China in an advisory capacity; in fact, it has been described as a "gigantic military mission."

Advance Party Makes Plans

The four who were assigned the task of planning CIC's activities in China knew from experiences in Burma that their problem was even greater than had been anticipated by the military commanders who were looking forward to their arrival. They had already experienced in Burma the frustration of trying to cope with the Chinese Army's complete disregard for security and lack of any coordinated preventive counterintelligence, a situation so glaring that U.S. military planners had found it necessary to withhold from the Chinese until the last possible moment information concerning projected plans.

In China they met an additional situation that required the utmost diplomacy, the lack of coordination which often amounted to competition between local law enforcement agencies and between these agencies and the military authorities. Even when there was no serious political animosity concerned, activities of these organizations were constantly marked by jealousy, bickering, red tape and jockeying for position. U.S. military agencies often found themselves right in the middle, with one agency subtly refusing to deal with them if they conducted business with a rival agency. One agency had been known even to arrest and hold as hostages members of another, and it was said, with some justification, that almost every Chinese was gathering information for someone in authority.

Against these almost overwhelming odds CIC was brought into China at the orders of Maj Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General of the newly created China Theater, and assigned the mission of protecting the security of U.S. military information and U.S. military installations. It was to call for all the ingenuity, tact and wisdom these CIC agents possessed, since they, like all the U.S. military in China, could act only through the appropriate Chinese authorities.

The advance group found the theater headquarters at Chunking involved in reorganization and expansion to meet the critical tactical situation, and the G2 particularly overburdened and understaffed. It therefore fell upon them to make their own plans with little assistance or guidance. Using CIC's experience in India-Burma and all that could be learned of activities in other theaters as a basis, they formulated a theater directive outlining the mission, organization, operations, and administration of CIC.[157]

CIC Granted Great Authority

Published on 28 December 1944 "By command of Major General Wedemeyer," the directive granted to the China Theater CIC perhaps greater authority and greater freedom of movement than that enjoyed by CIC in any other theater during the war. Defining CIC's mission "...to furnish appropriate commanders with carefully selected personnel specially trained and equipped for investigative and field security functions incident to the prevention or neutralization of the activities of enemy agents," the directive put teeth in CIC's status by the following: "CIC personnel are authorized to call on all military and civilian personnel of this command for any assistance they may require in the performance of their duties. Personnel of this command will extend to CIC personnel such administrative assistance and other facilities as may be necessary to protect the identity of CIC personnel and expedite the accomplishment of their assigned missions."

The directive authorized CIC personnel "...to travel in any manner, and their freedom of movement when on assigned missions will not be hindered at any time of day or night by the military police or other military agency. CIC credentials and badges will be honored at all times." CIC agents were authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians and to operate without rank, and all personnel were warned of the necessity of maintaining the secrecy of the identity of CIC agents, their distribution, training and methods of operation.[158]

Nor was this only a "paper" directive. Writing about CIC's experiences in China in June 1945, about four months after the arrival of the bulk of the detachment, Maj Fariss Hardin, Commanding Officer, wrote: "The peculiar organization and functions of the Corps and the civilian status of the agents have always created administrative problems. The key of the situation has always been the degree of cooperation the Adjutant General is willing to give to such administrative peculiarities. It has been found that in the Army there is always a way, and in

157 Unit History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, China Theater, prepared in June 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

158 Circular Nr 4, Rear Echelon Headquarters U.S. Forces, China Theater, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps," dated 28 December 1944, (Central Records Facility).

China the theater Adjutant General and his assistants have gone out of their way to provide the means for handling such problems smoothly."[159]

The publication of the theater directive was followed, on 9 January, by a general order which placed the 411th Detachment with the Services of Supply (SOS) Headquarters and the 412th and 415th Detachments with Headquarters, China Forces, but the commander of the Theater CIC Detachment was to retain the responsibility for coordinating CIC activities and insuring proper counterintelligence coverage and effective cooperation between detachments throughout the theater.[160] Even before the detachments arrived from India, a further delineation of CIC responsibility was made in order to fulfill requests anticipated from the 14th Air Force and the China Air Service Command. A letter was published dividing the theater into two areas for the purpose of CIC operations: the northern area, roughly that part north of the Yangtze River, would be handled by personnel attached to Theater Headquarters at Chunking; the area south of the Yangtze would be handled by the SOS Detachment.[161]

Soon after the arrival of the detachments from India it became apparent that CIC personnel could not operate effectively under a headquarters such as SOS and still do the work that was expected of them with other organizations in the area. Consequently, on 28 March, all detachments in the theater were placed directly under theater headquarters, with operational control to be exercised by the AC of S, G2; the arbitrary dividing line was abolished. The personnel at Kunming, however, remained there, attached to Rear Echelon Headquarters for administration only. Commanders of subordinate commands were authorized to request the services of CIC personnel on a temporary duty basis. Authorization also was made for the establishment of resident agencies, with the agents authorized to receive requests for their services.[162]

38 Men Readied for China

As soon as the advance party left India early in December 1944, India-Burma Headquarters began shuffling its personnel about in order to send as many agents as could be spared to the China Theater. Forty persons originally had been assigned to the 411th, 412th, and 415th Detachments, but, as was mentioned previously, personnel had been drawn off so that only six officers and 32 enlisted

159 Unit History of CIC, China Theater, Ibid.

160 General Orders Nr 4, Rear Echelon Hq, U.S. Forces, China Theater, dtd 9 Jan 45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

161 Ltr, AG 322, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 27 Jan 45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

162 Ltr, AG 322, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 28 March 45, (CWO Hoffman's File) (CONFIDENTIAL)

men were available for immediate assignment to China with these units, leaving 10 officers and 67 enlisted men in India and Burma.

Late in December and early in January these 38 assembled in Calcutta where they were quartered in luxurious Burdwan Palace while awaiting transportation over the Hump. For some it was a long wait. Movement began on 30 January, but it was not until 23 February that the last of the detachment arrived in China. Negotiations were begun immediately for additional personnel, with the result that the 414th and 416th Detachments, with a total of four officers and eight enlisted men, who had been assigned to the NCAC in Burma, arrived in China on 6 June 1945. A number of these were Chinese linguists and had been among the persons originally scheduled for China. In July the 413th wound up its work with the 10th Air Force in India-Burma and proceeded, on 1 August, to China.

On 12 August 1945, by War Department authorization, all CIC agents in China were concentrated in the 415th, and the other detachments were disbanded. Several agents had been transferred out of the theater and several had been locally procured so that the detachment, at the time of the reorganization, totaled 29 officers and 44 enlisted men as against a T/O authorization of 39 officers and 116 enlisted men.[163]

China Detachment Blazes Its Own Trail

As in all new theaters, the first CIC detachment arriving in China had to blaze its own trail. Only a few of the first agents to arrive had ever been in China, none in recent years, and there was no set pattern for dealing with the complex and often baffling situation in the theater. Protection of the security of information in U.S. Army installations was obviously of primary importance and a mission upon which they could concentrate while in the process of getting their feet on the ground.

In some places agents found security exceedingly lax, but they met instant cooperation of installation commanders in accepting their recommendations for measures to lessen the chances for security leaks. This spirit was augmented, perhaps, by the wide-spread knowledge that CIC had the complete backing of the theater commander.

CIC's biggest problem was in setting up some means of establishing background clearances for Chinese civilians employed by the U.S. Army, especially in SOS installations, where they often had access to classified information or were

163 Unit History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, China Theater, dtd Jun 45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Supplement I to Unit History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, China Theater, dtd 15 Sep 45, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

in a position to obtain it easily. CIC required each Chinese civilian to fill out a personal history statement and to name a guarantor, which gave a basis for checking with Chinese agencies. The frustrations in dealing with rival Chinese investigative agencies could not be completely overcome, but through carefully planned efforts they were able to make considerable headway in establishing good liaison with the principal ones, through whose information they were able to get rid of a number of serious security risks among the Chinese.[164]

Soon after the arrival of the detachment, the requests for CIC agents at installations throughout China became so great that it was obvious that adequate coverage could be given best through the establishment of numerous resident agencies attached to the various SOS and Air Force headquarters strategically located throughout China. By the middle of April, resident agencies had been set up as follows: Chengtu, James G. Brook and George L. Reynolds; Hsian, Lawrence H. Ballou and Eugene D. Tilley; Paoshan, William R. Boggs; Yunnanyi, Lawrence F. Hughes; Chanyi, William E. Hoffman; Kweiyang, Robert F. Scott; and Peishii, Kong T. Louie.[165]

Great Responsibility Placed on Agents

The responsibility placed upon these agents, most of whom were corporals or sergeants--the highest rank represented was technical sergeant--is reflected in directives which stated that "Counter Intelligence Corps resident agents...will lend every assistance to all U.S. Army organizations and installations located within their areas of jurisdiction. They are authorized to receive and act upon requests for their services without prior reference to this headquarters,"[166] and "will have sole authority in assigning priority to these requests."[167]

Each agent was preceded by a command letter to the SOS or Air Force commander in the assigned area, informing him of the agent's expected arrival, and requesting that the agent be provided with quarters, rations, office space and supplies and vehicle maintenance.

A letter written to the SOS Area Commander at Chanyi to apprise him of the assignment of Hoffman as resident agent is typical. "Mr Hoffman has received

164 Unit History of CIC, China Theater, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
165 Ltr, AG 322, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Subj: "Establishment of Counter Intelligence Corps Resident Agencies," dated 18 Apr 45, (R) (Central Records Facility).
166 Ltr, AG 322, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Subj: "Establishment of Counter Intelligence Corps Resident Agencies," dated 18 Apr 45, (Central Records Facility).
167 Ltr, AG 322, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," dated 27 Jan 45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

specialized training in security matters and related subjects. His services should be of great value in improving conditions at your headquarters and in your subordinate commands... His mission is of vital importance, for it is essential that effective measures be taken to prevent the enemy from obtaining information on our projects and installations."

After directing that the agent's reports concerning security conditions were to be forwarded with indorsement explaining action taken on recommendations made, the letter added, "It is directed that wherever possible security violations be corrected at once and not included in the agent's report," further evidence of the recognition given by the command to the judgement and ability of these agents.[168]

Much of the work of the resident agents was done for the Air Corps. This was especially true of the three who were operating north of the Yangtze: at Chengtu, the former base of the XX Bomber Command; at Hsian, a base just south of the Communist area; and at Paishii, 30 miles southwest of Chunking. The detachment at Kunming also performed many security surveys for 14th Air Force Headquarters and for subordinate commands throughout South China, and investigated all incidents of suspected sabotage or espionage.

CIC investigated reports of flares, fires, rockets, and other obvious signals to enemy airmen, which invariably accompanied enemy air raids up until the time such raids abruptly ceased near the end of March 1945. At most of the air installations, CIC was credited with establishing cordial relations between the American and Chinese security representatives, and in some areas were even able to bring about a certain amount of coordination between Chinese agencies, an almost unheard-of procedure.[169]

Ingenuity--Diplomacy Necessary

Occasionally, these resident agents ran into a case in which they had to use all the tact, diplomacy, and ingenuity they possessed to unravel the fantastic plots surrounding Oriental espionage agents, and to counter the petty jealousies, suspicion, intrigue, and sometimes corruption of Chinese officials. One such case was handled successfully by Agents Ballou and Tilley at the Hsian Office in collaboration with agents of the Office of Strategic Services and a Chinese intelligence agency, with resulting high praise for their work from the Office of Strategic Services.

The case attained high priority in May 1945 when a man named Ching Ming Shang was identified by a former associate as a Japanese agent... The former associate had been induced to come through the lines for this purpose by a Chinese

168 201 File, CWO Hoffman.
169 Unit History of CIC, China Theater, Ibid.

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intelligence agent known only by the code name of YSX-007. This coded agent moved in with a small network of agents for a close surveillance as soon as the identification was made. After the surveillance revealed that Ching frequented two places which were registered with the Chinese National Tax Bureau under false names, and that Ching and his brother moved freely back and forth across the lines, the chief of YSX-077's agency, with the knowledge of the two U.S. intelligence agencies concerned, authorized Ching's arrest. Under interrogation, Ching confessed, implicating a sizeable network of agents, including their spy-master. YSX-007 was then authorized to arrest as many of the net as possible. He had accomplished seven of these arrests before he and his men were arrested by Chinese Police of the Hsian Garrison Command through "arrangements" made by the very "chief" whom he had been ordered to arrest.

Two days were required to smooth out the petty jealousies that frustratingly seemed always to exist between rival Chinese governmental agencies. While negotiations were under way for YSX-007's release, the CIC agents and Office of Strategic Services representatives, with forethought and dispatch, removed the seven men, under cover of darkness, to a U.S. compound. Three of the men confessed to their espionage activities and implicated 15 others in the area. A fourth was strongly implicated by a note he was carrying, but escaped before he had made a confession. The remaining three were able to convince their interrogators of their innocence and were released.

Agents Ballou and Tilley turned over the three confessed agents to Tai Li, a Chinese intelligence organization, along with their confessions and information concerning the 15 additional agents. When Agent Ballou conferred six days later with General Wen Ch'ing, local Tai Li head, he found the whole case bogged down in organizational jealousy. It seemed that YSX-007's superior had incurred the general's dislike by purging all his men some time previously. Agent Ballou found the general arguing that YSX-007 had no right to arrest the men in the first place; that the suspects had been tortured to obtain their confessions; and that he had been apprised of the situation only by a very vague letter from Agent Tilley. With these "facts" in mind, the general explained, Tai Li was unwilling to go any further until these two questions were answered:

1. Who first put the "finger" on these men?
2. What assurance did CIC have, other than the information in the letter, that these men were agents of the Japanese?

Smothering his indignation at the inaccuracy and injustice of the general's attitude, Agent Ballou was profuse in his apologies for the mishandling of the case, and carefully presented "new" evidence--actually the same information that had been submitted before. He succeeded so completely that Office of Strategic Services decided in the future to turn suspects whom they were unable

to handle over to Ballou for transmission to Tai Li. In his report of the affair, Agent Ballou wrote: "It will be the job of this agent to train Tai Li not to ask too many questions as to how he gets his suspects."[170]

In their official report the Office of Strategic Services wrote: "It is desired to highly commend the resident agents of CIC for their individual help in this case. Agents Larry Ballou and Eugene Tilley did outstanding work, helping in every possible way. It is believed that the collaboration of the two agencies on this case is an outstanding example of how the two can function smoothly together."[171]

Beautiful and Glamorous Spy

Many espionage cases were handled by the resident agents, most of them of persons found working at the U.S. Services of Supply installation in the area. One unusual case--unusual principally because of the age, name, and beauty of the subject, variously reported at 20 and at 25 years, but consistently reported as beautiful--was handled, among many others, at Chanyi by Agent Hoffman. On 20 March 1945, Hoffman received the information that a typist at Services of Supply Headquarters, had been imprisoned, along with her sister, by the Chinese at Kukong Garrison Headquarters from December 1942 until December 1943, on a charge of spying for the Japanese. They were released at the instigation of a "Mr Phoon," whose arguments and whose complete identity remained vague.

After her release, she had moved through a number of areas and held several U.S. jobs, and had been working at Chanyi for several months before the above report was received.

A general surveillance by Chinese authorities revealed nothing, but on 28 April an unauthorized "coolie" was found sleeping in one of the Chinese interpreters' tents and under interrogation, the story of began to unfold. The "coolie" readily confessed to being a spy for the Kempei Tai, claiming that he acted as a messenger with as his "boss." Their mission, he claimed, was to spy on the U.S. Army in Chanyi, with especial attention to activities and training of troops and the construction of the Chanyi Railway. Some sabotage was planned. He claimed to have come from Burma with seven associates and a number of radios. A search of the place he claimed to have hidden the radios, however, was negative.

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170 CI Section, Northern Defense Area, Progress Report, Subj: "Case Nr I-3000, Shang, Ching-ning et al," TO: Special Agent in Charge, CIC Hqs, USF, CT, s/Lawrence H. Ballou, S/A, CIC, (Folder Nr 00001691, 9 Jun 45), (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

171 OSS, X-2 Branch Rpt, Subj: et al," Classification: Espionage, 2 May - 1 June 45, (Folder Nr 00001691), (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

A search of quarters revealed a copy of the China Lantern with numerous letters marked by tiny pencilled dots which seemed to contain a message concerning Chinese Nationalist Forces, although the U.S. Signal Corps was unable "break" the code. Co-workers claimed that she had made attempts to listen to ephone conversations and to see classified correspondence not connected with her work.

never admitted anything, although she did change her stories with frequency. The "dotted" China Lantern had been given to her by a soldier, identity forgotten; she had listened to the conversations through boredom; she had used a name other than her own in a bank transaction through "carelessness;" she explained the possession of large sums of money at various times by varying stories; she disclaimed knowledge of the background of the mysterious "Mr Phoon" and his reasons for obtaining her release in Kukong.

Finally, on 26 July 1945, the agent wrote: "It is recommended that the case be closed by this agency and that any further action be taken by the Chinese Government." Oral word was received later that she quickly was executed by the Chinese.[172]

Espionage is Often a Family Affair

CIC agents soon learned that when one member of a family was guilty of spionage, the entire family often was implicated. Such was the case of the family, five of whose members were working for U.S. installations.

This group first came to the attention of CIC in March of 1945 through a letter from the Security Officer of the 14th United States Air Force, stating that both were under suspicion of having acted as espionage agents for the enemy in Kweilin, prior to its evacuation. CIC immediately began an investigation.

Special Agent Charles A. Gerlach unearthed a great deal of background material on the family by scanning records found in the offices of the British Army Aid Group and Chinese Intelligence, Kunming Garrison Command, beginning with the family's return to China in 1936 Later, the migrated to Hongkong where they smuggled and worked for the Japanese, and associated with people suspected of being Japanese espionage agents.

From Hongkong, the family moved in August of 1943 to Kweilin and continued its shady dealings. was implicated in the planting of a time

172 Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, Summary Rpt, Case D-703, dtd 26 Jul 45, Records Facility); and interview with CWO Hoffman.

Services of Supply office at Kweilin, and the entire family was arrested in 1944 as suspected enemy espionage agents. They were released by the Chinese authorities ostensibly for lack of evidence, although reliable sources later reported that they bribed certain Chinese officials to obtain their release. By December of 1944, had arrived in Kunming, where they obtained employment with a U.S. military unit.

After collating all known facts, Special Agent Gerlach recommended that employed by the Ordnance Section Headquarters, Services of Supply, and handling classified information as part of her duties, be removed to a position of a less sensitive nature where she would have no access to classified data, but that be allowed to remain in their positions with Services of Supply since they did not handle or see classified matter, and because they were under constant surveillance and would escape possible detection if discharged. Moreover, Gerlach did not want to close the case until Chinese intelligence agents finished interrogating an informant, who gave promise of giving information which would implicate the family as espionage agents in Kunming, and result in their trial and imprisonment by the Chinese.[173]

When no significant new trends or leads developed in the case after about a month, Lieutenant Colonel Wells, G2 Services of Supply, decided that he must act to safeguard the security of his organization. Consequently, were discharged from their posts with the Services of Supply in Kunming and from the Laowhangoing Air Base. All five were subsequently placed on the Black List as people not to be rehired by any U.S. employing agency. In so doing, Lieutenant Colonel Wells complied with part of Agent Gerlach's request: he made sure that some distance was put between the and any classified information.[174]

The Colonel and His Ladies

Generally speaking, U.S. military personnel in China were willing to assist agents of the CIC in the performance of their mission. Occasionally, however, CIC met up with an individual in the U.S. armed forces who flagrantly disregarded security requirements. Such a person was the

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173 Rear Echelon, Hqs, U.S. Forces, CT, CIC Rpt, Subj: 9 May 45, s/Charles A. Gerlach, S/A, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

174 Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Subj: " TO: Lieutenant Colonel Wells, AC of S, G2, Hqs, SOS, APO 677, Case Nr 12 Jun 45, s/Charles A. Gerlach, S/A, , (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

This commander, was involved in a situation "...which, if permitted to grow, will probably adversely affect the security of the The other principals in the case were who had been employed in U.S. Army installations "...through the personal intervention of...(this officer)."

After scanning the four girls' backgrounds, U.S. officials had cause for alarm. Originally from Hongkong, the had fled from that city shortly before it fell to the Japanese. Subsequently, the opened the Cafe in Kweilin, and moved it to Luichow and Kweiyang following their evacuation from these areas.

In all three areas, the was known to be a favorite hangout for U.S. and British military personnel. During this period, the were, it was alleged, "most intimate" with suspected enemy agents. One, was later executed by Chinese authorities as a Japanese spy.

By December of 1944, went to Chengtu, where the hired as his personal secretary and recommended for work with the American Red Cross club at the same base. About one month later, the appeared at and were subsequently hired by U.S. Ordnance, and at the office of the Red Cross Director,

In each case, it was reported, the personally vouched for the security and other qualifications and barred any investigation of them by American investigative agencies. Moreover, the was "extremely friendly" with the "...living with them at base...driving them to work and arranging accommodations for them at a missionary's home when he drove to "

In recommending that CIC be assigned to investigate the case, higher headquarters requested "...that the investigation be conducted without any 'apparent' cooperation with any other investigative group in order to obtain as free and unbiased a report on the subjects and their activities as possible."[175]

Agents subsequently discovered that the had come by American convoy from stopping overnight at Peishiyi. Kong T. Louie, CIC agent in Peishiyi, learned, through a confidential informant, that the reportedly going to Chunking to rest, were planning to stay with

175 Hqs, U.S. Forces, CT, CIC, SOI, Subj: 12 Apr 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

The informant could not tell Agent Louie what the intended to do once they reached Chunking.[176]

Later, CIC was to learn that the were attempting to leave China for the United States. In attempting to head off this move, CIC contacted head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, , and asked that have a letter disseminated throughout the command directing that air transportation be denied th in the event they made such a request for departure from China.[177]

Evidently, was a little late in getting the letter disseminated because, as one report from the China Theater, Counterintelligence Section, G2, remarked: has left for the States despite the disapproval of the Chinese Government..." Still hopeful of preventing the from leaving China and desirous of learning the full particulars about departure, Theater G2, in a letter to Agent James G. Brock, asked for "any details that you may have in regard to departure for the States." Available records do not give the final outcome of the case, nor was the colonel further identified.[178]

Survey of Chinese Units Reveals Laxness

From the beginning, U.S. personnel of the Chinese Combat Command (CCC) were acutely conscious of the vulnerability of information given to the Chinese unit commanders by American liaison teams in the field and of the weakness of Chinese military counterintelligence. In an attempt to arrive at a plan whereby CIC could best be used to overcome this situation, Lt Edward S. White and George G. C. K. Mah were sent, on 16 April 1945, to make a survey of the situation in the Kwangsi Command. During their 30 day trip they visited the headquarters at Posch and all the subordinate units except the guerilla battalions, and interviewed most of the Chinese generals and ranking members of their staffs, American liaison officers, members of the French military mission in Tingsi and representatives of Office of Strategic Services.

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176 4 Jul 45, s/Kong T. Louie, S/A, ((CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

177 for Special Agent In Charge, Subj: 13 Jul 45, s/George L. Reynolds, S/A, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

178 Hqs, U.S. Forces, CT, CI Section, G2, ltr TO: Mr James G. Brock, CIS, APO 210 28 June 45, s/William B. Rose, Lt Col, FA, Chief CIS, G2, (CCIC Files, Folder Nr (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Throughout the command, White and Mah found a most cordial relationship between the Chinese and their U.S. Military Advisory teams, a relationship which the Chinese seemed most anxious to extend to them, but they found an equally serene disregard of any appreciation of the importance of security. Throughout the command they found the telephone to be the principal means of communication. The wires, which ran over mountain trails only rarely patrolled by repairmen, were sometimes exclusively military lines, but more often were shared by the military and the civilians. Daily intelligence reports, reports from division and regimental commanders to higher echelons and directives for tactical operations all went over these lines in the clear. Directives to troops en route often were delivered to the only householder in a village who had a telephone, to be relayed to the unit commander when he arrived. White and Mah made strong recommendations that all Chinese units be provided with radio equipment as the only means of eliminating the danger of compromise through the use of the telephone.

In all the subordinate command headquarters, the intelligence and situation maps, showing Chinese and enemy troop dispositions, and routes and direction of movement, hung unprotected even by a curtain on the wall of the office or the bedroom of the commanding general or the chief of his operations staff. No attempt was made to guard these rooms when not in use. Unit moves usually were preceded by drinking parties and festivities to which the townspeople were invited to help celebrate the occasion.

Although the agents did not include the guerilla battalions in their official survey, they learned a great deal about one of these battalions, including the names of the American personnel attached, the unit's mission and its present location behind the Japanese lines. All this they learned from Chinese civilians during their 125-mile trip from Poseh to Tsingsi. These civilians were anxious to hear the latest news about the welfare of their friends with whom they had become acquainted while the battalion was training in their area. An American officer with the unit later told them that Army headquarters had given the unit its marching orders by telephone in the clear and at the same time had notified all other subordinate units of its plans for the battalion, also by telephone.

Throughout their survey the agents were unable to find any Chinese approximation for the U.S. Army's Regulation 380-5, setting up any prescribed manner for the handling of information which might be of aid to the enemy, and the Chinese seemed blandly unaware that such a system was advisable.

One of the tremendous problems recognized by the Chinese--but accepted as so insoluble as to almost preclude planning--was the penetration of the area by literally thousands of Japanese troops disguised as Chinese coolies or sometimes as Chinese soldiers. These Japanese performed reconnaissance and combat missions, ambushing Chinese patrols, attacking Chinese units on the flanks and

a minimum coordination of effort. To the surprise of the CIC agents making the survey, numerous Japanese agents actually were captured in this confusion of espionage and counterespionage.

To the Chinese officers with whom they discussed this problem, the CIC agents made the suggestion that a special group of troops be trained in the various methods that had proved most effective. In each instance they met agreement that the suggestion had merit, but none of the Chinese officers would commit themselves further. Practically their only plan for meeting the situation was to wait until the Chinese were on the offensive, arguing that at such time the civilian population would become afraid to collaborate with the Japanese and Japanese plainclothes troop activity and operations of the infiltration groups would become less effective. The CIC agents were not convinced of the soundness of this reasoning.

Liaison Personnel Aware of Danger

U.S. liaison personnel were aware of the dangers inherent in the complete lack of security but, with no assigned personnel trained in planning adequate security measures, they had given up and more or less accepted the Chinese view that there was nothing that could be done.

White and Mah had been given three objectives in making their survey: to make security surveys of the headquarters and the subordinate installations of the Chinese Combat Command and make necessary recommendations for improving the security; to determine whether counterintelligence operations could be carried on by CIC in collaboration with corresponding Chinese military agencies; and to determine what specific functions could be carried on effectively by CIC.

They were unable to complete the first of their objectives, since Colonel Bowman did not desire that security surveys be made; however, Colonel Bowman agreed that there had been a degree of deterioration of security in U.S. liaison headquarters. The agents reached the conclusion that it would be useless to attempt any collaboration with the Chinese in actual counterespionage activities since the Chinese regarded this as peculiarly their own field and would be extremely reluctant to include CIC in their activities until after a long and tactful association with them in other activities.

They did feel, however, that if CIC teams were attached to the liaison groups, the Chinese would accept advice on counterintelligence measures in the same spirit that they welcomed American cooperation and assistance in other fields of training and operations. These teams would be in a position to impress Chinese officers with the need for protecting the security of military information, and to assist in working out plans for controlling refugees and commercial traffic.

Although Colonel Bowman's long and often tragic experiences with the deficiencies of Chinese Army counterintelligence had made him pessimistic, he agreed to accept a small detachment in his command, adding the proviso that the personnel of such a detachment must be "in A-1 physical condition," and "willing to go to the front with the liaison teams serving with the subordinate Chinese units, and not satisfied only when they are in the headquarters at Poseh."

The CIC agents felt that two additional objectives could be attained from this attachment: such teams would be in a position to tighten up security within U.S. liaison headquarters, in some of which the Chinese philosophy seemed to prevail; and, through the use of tact and diplomacy, CIC teams could eventually obtain from the Chinese much counterintelligence information concerning Japanese personalities and activities that would be useful in the future.[179]

Study Made of Chinese SOS Installation

At about the same time Mah and White were performing their survey with the Chinese Combat Command, Agent James R. Hunter, a Chinese linguist with considerable previous experience in China, was making a study of means taken by the Chinese in their Services of Supply headquarters for the protection of highly classified information. He found that they had none. He ran into one amusing, although dangerous, example of Chinese handling of a TOP SECRET document. Knowing of the U.S. Army's rigid control system, the Chinese made only one translation of this document and added to it an appropriate cover sheet listing the names of Americans who should have access to it. At the same time they made an unlimited number of copies in Chinese and distributed them throughout the headquarters with no record or receipts of the distribution.

Hunter pointed out that an excellent SOP for the handling of documents had been drawn up by U.S. officers and had been ordered put into effect by the Chinese headquarters commander. The Chinese paid little attention to it, however, because it had not been made official by Gen Ho Ying Chin's "chop;" it was explained that the SOP was not taken to General Ho because "the Chinese do not like to be told what to do; they want to do and think it up themselves." Hunter found that some of the U.S. officers had become lax in their handling of classified information, seemingly feeling that since the Chinese made no attempt to protect information, there was no use in bothering.

179 Ltr Report, Rear Echelon, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, CIC Case Nr F-1109, Subj: "Report on Counterintelligence Survey of Kwangsi Command," CCC, dated 15 May 45; Supplemental Memorandum Nr 1, dated 14 May 45; and Supplemental Memorandum Nr 2, dated 14 May 45, signed by Edward S. White, S/A, and George G. C. K. Mah, S/A, (R) (Kansas City Records Center).

Hunter then pointed out that much of the fault lay with many U.S. officers who, by their inability to get along with the Chinese, were actually hindering instead of helping in all phases of the work, including security. "This is one of the reasons that the Chinese are reluctant to accept what the Americans call 'advice'," Hunter wrote. "From observations and interviews, it is this agent's opinion that in many cases this so-called 'advice' is usually in the form of a snobby command or curt and impatient answer. This is usually caused by a feeling of superiority and a complete disrespect of Chinese rank. Few if any of the courtesies and amenities are ever shown by U.S. officers to Chinese officers."[180]

Protection of Pipeline Essential

As in the India-Burma Theater, the protection of the gasoline pipeline was considered of vital importance. The line which started at Calcutta and continued up through Chabua, in Assam, and followed generally the Stilwell Road as it wandered through the mountains of Burma, entered China at Wanting and terminated in two branches at Luliang and Chany. It was discovered that almost probibitive losses of fuel were occurring through numerous taps along the line. Between 27 June and 13 August 1945, William C. Holland personally covered every foot of this line, performing exhaustive investigations of every incident of damage to the line. His investigations not only resulted in arrests of some of the leading culprits, but furnished information from which precautionary measures could be taken for future protection.[181]

CIC Agents Assigned to Chinese Combat Command

As a result of the survey made by White and Mah in April and early May, a seven man detachment was assigned early in June 1945 to work with the Chinese Combat Command on an experimental basis with a three-fold mission: to make a security survey of all American installations; to set up a security education program for all Chinese units being trained by the Command; and to gather tactical and counterintelligence information. The detachment consisted of William Tyng, newly arrived from the North African Theater as SAC, Frank G. St. Angel, and John L. Bates, also new to CIC in the theater, and James H. Carr, Edwin W. Simpson, Robert B. Edris and William R. Boggs, who had come up from the jungles of North Burma.[182]

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180 Ltr, Rear Echelon, Hq U.S. Forces, China Theater, CIC, Subj: "Security of TOP SECRET Information in Chinese SOS," APO 627, dtd 10 Jul 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

181 Ltr, CIC Det, Hw China Theater, Subj: "Award of the Bronze Star Medal," dtd 21 Jan 46, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

182 Sec III, par 1, Supplement I to Unit History of CIC, China Theater, and Exh D, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center); and Memorandum Nr 13, U.S. Forces, China Theater, CIC, dtd Aug 45, (CWO Hoffman's 201 File).

In addition to the seven-man team, Bernard J. Kotulak was also assigned to the Chinese Combat Command with the specific duty of adapting American training methods for use in a program of security education for Chinese troops.[183]

Tyng later became Counterintelligence Staff Officer for the Command and, aside from other duties, set up a security training program for Chinese troops.[184]

A team from this detachment, composed of Bates and Edris, entered Kweilin on 29 July 1945, on the heels of the first Chinese combat troops, the first Americans to enter the city. There they found a complete traffic jam which was paralyzing the movement of military vehicles. Not only were they credited with getting the situation untangled; but, an even more difficult task, they were able to do so with such tact and diplomacy that they won the complete cooperation of the large number of Chinese commanders in the area. They then set up a refugee control plan which the Chinese accepted, gathered a number of valuable documents and obtained considerable information both of positive and counterintelligence interest, including a large amount of order of battle intelligence, all in one week's time.[185]

The detachment drew up a security plan based upon the weaknesses found in surveys of their installations, but the cessation of hostilities prevented its complete implementation. The same was true of the educational plan for the training of the Chinese in basic security. Although the Chinese viewed their plan favorably, there was not time to put it fully into operation before the end of the war. The team felt more was accomplished in the third phase of their work, the gathering of intelligence information, especially in the Central Command, where they concentrated their efforts. They obtained full cooperation of Marshal Tang En Po, who issued them special credentials and assigned two field grade Chinese officers to work with them.

The principal difficulties encountered lay in the lack of defined jurisdiction of CIC responsibilities and the necessity of "selling" counterintelligence to both American and Chinese personnel. Members of the team felt more complete advance information on the political character of Chinese units and communities would have enabled them to act more decisively without the danger of "stepping on the toes" of the wrong persons. As it was they had to proceed slowly.[186]

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183 Ltr, CIC Det, China Theater, Subj: "Award of Bronze Star Medal," dtd 10 Dec 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

184 Ltr, CIC Det, Hq China Theater, Subj: "Award of Bronze Star Medal," dtd 4 Feb 46, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

185 Ltr, CIC Det, Chinese Combat Command, Subj: "Award of Bronze Star Medal," dtd 25 Aug 45 and 8 Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

186 Supplement I to Unit History, Ibid.

Special Security Detachment

In May 1945, numerous incidents of loose handling and compromise of Top Secret information, made it clear that the special G2 sub-section, created in February 1945 to protect security of plans and operations, was simply unable to cope with the situation. CIC was given the job, and a special detachment was created headed by Captain Grieve and consisting of Lieutenant White, William T. Elliot, Charles F. Gentile, George A. Ladner, James R. Hunter, and Paul E. Duffy. All of these men except Duffy had had long experience in the Burma-India Theater before coming to China. Each agent was given special credentials which authorized him to have access to all Top Secret information and ordered all commanders to cooperate fully with him in his task of setting up protective measures. Agents were placed in the planning sections of each of the major commands to study the control of planning material. They discovered that the constantly changing situation made the application of general security measures of little value, and that the only answer was constant daily supervision. As a result of their recommendations, a permanent detachment was set up to carry on continuous investigation of the handling of highly classified information in all commands, reporting directly to the theater commander all violations and recommendations for changes.[187]

Agent Does Background Investigation on Chinese Admiral, General

Although most of the background investigations performed by CIC agents were with U.S. employees as subjects, in April 1945, Agent Pardee Lowe was assigned to conduct such an investigation of a Chinese admiral and a Chinese general. Top U.S. authorities were anxious to learn something of the political and military backgrounds of these two ranking Chinese officers who were to play leading roles in the event Allied military forces attempted to land on the South China coast.

In investigating and reporting on the two men, Special Agent Lowe faced a challenging task-political reporting and interpreting on the highest level. His evaluation of the data he received on the two men could well influence proposed or anticipated Allied tactical plans.

Agent Lowe discovered that, according to the "Chinese Who's Who" section of the China Handbook of 1943, published by the Chinese Ministry of Information, both subjects had a long association with the Kuomintang Party. Both men were evidently ardent friends and supporters of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who, at that time, was putting the strongest Cantonese leaders he could find in charge of the future affairs of Canton and Kwantung Provinces.

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187 Supplement I to Unit History, CIC Detachment, China Theater, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Adm Chan Cheuk was being selected as the future mayor of Canton because of his influence over the various political and military elements of Kwantung, his friendship for the British, and his knowledge of the waterways of Canton and Hongkong. Gen Li Fu-lin, despite his apparent uncouthness and age, was being called upon to rally his old bandit and guerilla comrades to serve as possible Fifth Columnists in aiding any possible Allied landings.[188]

In compiling details on the two men for relay to higher headquarters, Agent Lowe ran across an illuminating sidelight in the background of crusty old Gen Li Fu-lin, a sidelight which made it evident why the Generalissimo had such sublime confidence in Gen Li Fu-lin's actions. In March 1938, the Japanese attempted to seize Canton by trickery. They employed a notorious traitor, Chen Chung-fa, to approach General Li, asking him to organize his own staff and new army to support the Japanese advance on Canton. General Li feigned acceptance of the plan, receiving 100,000 yuan and 80,000 firearms which had been shipped from Macao to Canton hidden in a load of potatoes. Ultimately, General Li handed over the funds and the supplies to the Generalissimo, captured the Japanese Fifth Columnists, and for the time being frustrated the enemy's attempt to take Canton.[189]

Other pertinent facts came to the front in the course of the investigation. The intelligence operatives of the National Military Council Bureau of Investigations and Statistics were definitely to be included in every move made by the Central or Nationalist Chinese Government in its plans to recover Kwantung Province from the enemy. The pattern of the future Chinese operations in the Kwantung area was not immediately clear to Agent Lowe. However, as Lowe remarked: "...it was intimated that the infiltration of Chinese agents into occupied Kwantung, the suborning of Japanese puppet troops and leaders with offers of Chinese Governmental support and posts, the enlistment of Kwantung bandits and guerillas, would certainly continue." These Fifth Column activities were typical of the tactics used by Chinese war-lords and the Chinese Government at various intervals in history.

These same Fifth Column activities, Lowe discovered, had also been used with varying success by the Japanese, who had encouraged puppet leaders in Kwantung. These puppet leaders and their troops, according to numerous informants, were not pro-Japanese at heart, but bandits willing to work for the highest bidder. With a leader like Gen Li Fu-lin to rally these people, not much

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[188] CIC Det Summary Rpt, Subj: "Adm Chan Cheuk [illegible] 21 Apr 45, s/Pardee Lowe, S/A, CIC, (Folder Nr [illegible] Central Records Facility).

[189] CIC, G2 Section, G2, Memo to CIC, Subj: "Adm Chan [illegible]," 20 Apr 45, s/Pardee Lowe, S/A, CIC, (Folder [illegible] (Central Records Facility).

difficulty was anticipated, informants stated, in winning them back to the Chinese Government's cause, a fact which was undoubtedly heartening to Allied military planners.[190]

Southeast China Project

The investigation of the general and the admiral by Agent Lowe may have influenced the formulation of plans, during May 1945, for one of the most unusual operations assigned to CIC throughout the whole war. These plans embraced the sending of a CIC detachment into Eastern Kwantung Province, east of the Japanese-held corridor, in order to gather and analyze information which would be of value to U.S. forces when they made their eventual advance into Canton and other ports in the Kwantung Province. In addition to the information gathered, these agents were expected to act as "ambassadors" to set up working relationships with the Chinese governmental agencies seated there. This project was possible only because the CIC detachment had available agents fluent in Cantonese and Hakka, dialects prevalent in the area. Much assistance in this project was expected from a ranking Chinese general, American educated and with three years of close cooperation with U.S. forces in India and Burma. He was on the staff of Adm Chan Cheuk, recently appointed mayor of Canton, for whom Pardee Lowe had given endorsement as a result of his background investigation the previous month.

When the plan was presented to the Chief of the X-2 Branch of OSS, it met with instant approval and the suggestion that the project be a joint OSS-CIC enterprise. Advantages of joining forces were evident: OSS already had certain units in the area, had set up transportation and communication facilities and had accumulated a considerable volume of information which would be placed at CIC's disposal.

The plan was approved on 25 June 1945, with the change that the project should cover the entire Southeast China coast instead of Kwantung Province alone, and Lieutenant Puryear, Lieutenant Kendall, George Mah, Sum M. Seto, George L. Lyau, and Wah Foo Quon were assigned to the detachment. Part of the detachment proceeded into Kwantung to set up an office at Hsingning on 14 July, while the rest remained at theater headquarters to study information which OSS had gathered but had been unable to analyze because of lack of personnel.

190. U.S. Forces, CT, 412th CIC Det Summary Rpt, Subj: "Adm Chan Cheuk and Gen Li Fu-lin," 1-21 Apr 45, s/Pardee Lowe, S/A, CIC, (SECRET) (Folder Nr 00001812) (Central Records Facility).

The end of the war closed out this project before its real value could be determined, and the detachment members moved on into Canton with the Chinese Municipal Government.[191]

CIC Resident Agencies Contribute to Liaison

The operation of CIC's resident agencies was rated as one of the most valuable activities of the Corps in the China Theater. As previously mentioned, early in April, residencies were set up in seven different locations throughout the area held by the Allies. These agents not only handled espionage and sabotage suspects, arranged security clearances for civilian employees, and collected counterintelligence information, but also performed many "diplomatic-type" missions. They were credited with ironing out numerous difficulties and disputes involving American personnel, improving the caliber of the Chinese guard personnel assigned to American installations, reducing misunderstandings in the numerous business transactions between Chinese and American organizations in widely scattered areas, and collecting much information, not of a strictly counterintelligence interest, that was sufficiently important to reach the theater commander's desk. Their work was considered of such great value that, by 1 August 1945, CIC agents were assigned to operate in 17 different locations, in addition to theater and Theater Air Force Headquarters.

CIC operated from theater headquarters in Chunking with Major Hardin as CO, assisted by Captain Gelwicks, Leo R. Wisniewski, Joseph Fuchs, Edward S. Withrow, and Alexander H. Westfried. Apart from theater headquarters a resident agency in Chunking was manned by Lawrence H. Ballou, Francis W. Barnhart, and Arthur J. Jong. Donald B. Bernston and P.C. Southworth were with AAF Headquarters,[192] and Andrew P. Lee and Alan D. Jung were with the Yenan Observer Group.[193]

Other agents were distributed as follows throughout the theater:

Kunming: Alexander J. Munro, John R. McDonnell, Young Y. Chinn, Alfred I. Zipprian, Thomas B. Whelley, Bart R. Hynes and Lawrence F. Hughes

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191 Par 3, Sec III, Supplement I to Unit History, CIC Detachment, China Theater, and Exhibit C, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center); and Memorandum Nr 13, Ibid.

192 Memorandum Nr 13, Ibid.

193 Ltr CIC Det, CT, Subj: "Award of Bronze Star Medal," dtd 15 Dec 45, (Kansas City Records Center); and Ltr, same subj, dtd 28 May 46, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

Kweiyang: Robert L. Baldwin, Robert F. Scott, William C. Holland, Singkata Tongyai, and Charles P. Penney

Chengut-Hsian: James G. Brock, Thomas M. Persico, Julius Lang, Lionel J. Hall, and Harold M. Fetters

Peishil: Kong T. Louie and Frank M. Widner

Liangshan: Edwin S. Belknap

Chanyi: Robert G. Vautrain

Nanning: Charles A. Gerlach and William Hoffman

Luichow: W. F. Davis Gebhart, John P. Shanley, and Sick Foon Woo.

Kweilin: Harold McGovern

Chih-Chiang: Ignazio Seminara and Milton Musick

Luliang: John T. Day

Ch'eng Kung: Walter D. Baker and Norman E. Albright

Luhsien: James A. Hockman [194]

War's End Brings Personnel Reshuffle

Some of these resident agents had scarcely set up in their new locations when the Japanese surrender caused a complete reshuffle of personnel. Theater CIC headquarters were established at Shanghai, with branch offices at Nanking and Peiping, and a group of agents under William Tyng were assigned to move forward with the Chinese Combat Command.

Along with the rapid shuffle of personnel also came a complete change in CIC's mission. It had been anticipated that with the end of hostilities, emphasis would shift from the security of military information to the tracking down and apprehension of collaborationists, the tracing of enemy investments and industrial enterprises in China, and the prevention of sabotage. CIC agents did have all these to contend with, and in addition found one of their chief functions to be that of political reporting. The determination of the Communists to continue the war until their own objectives were won had long been known by Americans in China,

194 Memorandum Nr 13, Ibid.

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but the flood of Soviet agents directing their efforts at learning everything possible about U.S. Forces and U.S. intentions in China had scarcely been anticipated. Investigation of employees infiltrated into U.S. installations ranked in importance with the hunt for war criminals and collaborationists.[195]

First Group Moves to Shanghai

Capt Philip F. Shapiro, newly arrived in the theater, took the first 10 agents into Shanghai by plane, arriving about one month before Chinese troops were flown in. Writing of his experiences after his return to the United States, he described this month as one in which CIC operated in much the same manner as in other occupied areas, in Italy, France, and Germany. They set up headquarters in the Park Hotel, the most prominent building in Shanghai, advertised their existence and mission, invited the submission of information, visited the nine prisoner of war camps in the area, and gathered a vast amount of information concerning the Japanese, German, Italian, and Soviet intelligence organization which had been operating there throughout the war. They froze bank accounts of suspected persons and organizations, arrested war crimes suspects, and set up excellent liaison with the myriad other British and U.S. intelligence units.

Shapiro continued with the comment that their operations were made more difficult when the Chinese troops came in. Investigations of Chinese personnel could be made only after a request had been sent through the proper channels. More often than not, the investigation would be blocked, especially if it concerned anyone other than an insignificant laborer, Shapiro stated.[196]

By early in October 1945, rotation of troops to the United States was in full swing and soon practically the entire detachment had been replaced by persons new to the theater. A few persons were added from the India-Burma Theater, whose experience with the Chinese in Burma was a distinct asset to their work in China. Among these was Pardee Lowe, Chinese-American, who was able to perform liaison work, sometimes at high level. In general, however, the work of the detachment suffered through loss of the liaison which had been built up so painstakingly while the war was on.

In an official comment on the situation, prepared in May 1946, Col Ivan D. Yeaton, AC of S, G-2, for U.S. Army Forces in China, stated, "Features of the existing situation during the entire period of CIC operations and activities in China have no real parallel...in any theater of operations. Prior to the cessation of

195 Ltr, U.S. Forces, China Theater, CIC, Subj: "Change of Assignment," dated 17 Aug 45; and CIC History, 1945-1948, China, (R) (Central Records Facility).

196 Ltr, Hq CIC Center, Holabird Signal Depot, subj: "Interview with Captain Shapiro," dtd 8 Apr 46, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

hostilities, the broad general mission of U.S. Forces, China Theater, was to assist and advise appropriate Chinese Central Government agencies in the prosecution of the war against the Japanese. During this period, the CIC in China was dependent in large measure for assistance from Chinese investigative and police agencies in the implementation of the mission directed by the War Department...

"Because of the complexity of developments during the period following the surrender, highlighted by a rapidly deteriorating Central Government political position, and with the war-time necessity...much less a factor, the CIC experienced greater difficulties than before. Rapid redeployment, with a consequent loss of experienced personnel, worked against the effectiveness of activities undertaken by CIC during the period..."[197]

Communism Becomes Real Menace

A study of investigations made by CIC during this period indicates that the "complexity of developments" mentioned by Colonel Yeaton in his May 1946 report actually referred principally to the determination of Russia to communize China at all costs. Well before the end of 1945, CIC agents in China were daily encountering incidents and reliable information to prove that the Soviet Union was playing for big stakes in China. Agents were constantly deluged with reports disclosing that the undermining of U.S. interests and prestige was high on the priority list of Russian plans.

197 1st Ind to Report of General Board, USFET, Study Nr 13, Hq U.S. Forces, China, dated 26 May 1946, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

198 Hqs U.S. Forces, CT, CIC, Memo for OIC, Subj: "Soviet Intelligence in Shanghai," dtd 27 Dec 45, s/Harold G. Dora, (SECRET) (Folder Nr 06501658) (Central Records Facility).

Soviets Accelerate Espionage Activities

This was not the last CIC agents heard of Soviet espionage plans; in fact, they continued at accelerated pace as long as U.S. Forces remained in China, according to information received by CIC agents. One such report revealed that a Mr A. M. Abineff, Soviet Representative of the Trade Mission in China and head of the Shanghai G.P.U.[199] met with a number of Soviet agents on 20 August 1946 to discuss future espionage objectives.

According to the report, greater emphasis was to be placed on the gathering of information concerning troops, with specific targets to include: the arrival of U.S. warships at Woosung; departure of U.S. Naval units and their destinations; movements of Marine personnel in Shanghai; lists of all U.S. officers in Shanghai; names of all persons in U.S. intelligence units; departure and arrival of U.S. troops in Shanghai; and the exact location of all armor, heavy equipment, and artillery of the U.S. Army, Navy, or Marines in China. Especially recommended as a means of obtaining this information was the questioning of U.S. personnel in bars and other places of recreation.[200]

Communists in the U.S. Army

Because of the avowed Russian desire to cultivate Communist followers and contacts among U.S. military personnel, CIC agents in China were sensitive to anything which remotely resembled Red rumblings in the U.S. military. Typical of the efforts expended by CIC against Communist penetration tactics was the assignment given Agent Jim Becker in June of 1946 to check on the a potentially subversive organization known to include Red-sympathizing American servicemen as members.

One of the principals in the investigation was a , an avowed Communist. This first expressed his Communistic political views to staff members of the Stars and Stripes. Investigation revealed that he had associated with a member of the U.S. Air Force who had been involved in January 1945, in the "Go Home" demonstration, Communist-inspired disturbances aimed at sending U.S. military men in China back to the States.

This Air Force soldier had attempted to sign a waiver so that he might remain in China, presumably to aid the Red cause, but he had been sent back to the U.S. Another of the associates in China was an organization whose headquarters in Shanghai had been a favorite

199 G.P.U.--believed to be Chinese Communist counterpart of Soviet NKVD

200 Hqs, Security Control Section, SOI, Subj: "Soviet Activities," 18 Oct 46, (Folder Nr 00001658), (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

hangout for Reds in the U.S. armed forces, but had lost much of its business through rotation of pro-Red American servicemen to the States. However, many of these men had written expressing a desire to return to China.

In hopes of obtaining more particulars on how the functioned and how it obtained its members, Agent Becker planned to make casual visits to the offices. However, Agent Becker did not feel that there was great immediate danger from this quarter, because "...most of the Communist and leftists in the armed forces have been returned to the States." Becker was worried, however, about the fact that several of these men had been "...angling for civilian jobs which will permit their return to China."[201]

Was Korean War Brewing in 1946?

When the Chinese Communists poured into South Korea in June of 1950, they may have startled a few people, but CIC agents who had been in China from 1944 to 1949 were probably not surprised. They knew that this Red attack was shaping up as far back as 1946.

One summary of information, evaluated on "Soviet intelligence activities," in November of 1946, disclosed that a Major Uss, Soviet Military Attache in Tietsin and head of the Soviet Intelligence in North China, was reportedly attempting to recruit and infiltrate agents into South Korea. One Soviet resident of Tietsin, a disclosed that Major Uss had requested him to supply two or three persons, not over middle age and in good health, for a possible mission. Similar requests had been made of Dobrovolsky by Serebennikoff, one of the most influential Soviets in Tietsin, who frankly told Dobrovolsky that such personnel were needed to carry out a survey in the zone of Korea occupied by the Americans. Serebennikoff indicated that the purpose of this survey would be to determine the attitude of the Korean people toward American occupation troops and to gather any intelligence information possible.

The Soviets, according to the report, believed that this survey could be carried out more easily from Tietsin because Americans in China were much more friendly to the Russians, making it easier for the Soviets to gain their confidence and infiltrate agents through them. This survey, it was thought, was being carried out because agents infiltrated into South Korea from North Korea were not obtaining satisfactory results. The Korean Communist Party, which was reportedly doing intelligence work for the Soviets, was said not to have been able to establish proper liaison, and since almost all Koreans had come to be regarded as double agents, the Korean Communists had not been able to gain the confidence of the Americans.

201 CIC, SOI, Subj: "Army Communists," 5 Jun 46, s/Jim Becker, S/A, CIC, (Unclassified) (Folder Nr 00091655) (Central Records Facility).

These facts tended to hinder Soviet intelligence work, especially operations from Manchuria and North Korea. And since relations with the United States at that time were regarded as tense by the Russians, the Soviets were determined to obtain only prompt and reliable information.[202]

A Meeting of the Minds

In their unremitting efforts to eradicate any traces of American influence in China, the Russians were leaving few stones unturned, and few possibilities undeveloped. No means which could be used to further the Party cause escaped their scrutiny, and the public press, long recognized by Communists as a necessary force in the moulding of public opinion, came in for a great deal of their attention.

As reported to the 415th CIC Detachment, a group of pro-Russian journalists and reporters had met at the Soviet Club, 805 Avenue Foch, Shanghai, on 8 July 1946 to discuss means by which political news could be obtained or suppressed. The meeting, called by the Tass News Agency, reportedly was attended by a Mr Chebikin, Soviet expert in the control of the press and reporters. He, along with other Soviet officials, was charged with the mission of seeing that a centralized procedure was set up for the control of all news.

Several objectives were listed as items to be pointed up in future releases from the Soviet-controlled press. The fact that the Americans had failed to show their friendship to the Chinese people by taking up for them in Indo-China was to be stressed. The amount of anti-American feeling in China was to be exaggerated by "blowing up" all incidents of friction between Americans and Chinese. The Soviet press was to dwell on the idea of a coalition of all democratic parties in China. The hands-off policy which Russia was pretending to follow regarding the civil war then raging in China was to come in for repeated treatment, and emphasis was to be given to the number of dead and wounded as a result of American aid to the Nationalists.[203]

Pilferers, Kouimintang, or Soviet Agents?

The Communists could not always be blamed for disturbances and acts of sabotage, as CIC learned while trying to find those guilty of the sabotage of the

202 Security Control Section, Shanghai Det, AAG, SOI, subj: "Soviet Intelligence Activities," Re: Korea, 21 Nov 46, s/Frew W. Eggers, Maj FA, CIC, (SECRET) (Folder Nr 00001658), (Central Records Facility).

203 Hqs, 415th CIC Det, China Service Command, SOI, subj: "Soviet Activities," 26 Jul 46, Folder Nr 00001658, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

radio receiving station of the U.S. Army Advisory Group in Nanking in November 1946, a case in which the best CIC could do was reach a conclusion as to probability.

One of the rhombic antenna towers of the receiving station had been brought down by unscrewing the nuts and bolts in the base of the turnbuckle of the rear guy wire. The aerial was also broken about 70 feet from the other tower and disconnected from the broken tower. Several insulators were broken and the aerial and some resistors were missing, presumably stolen.

The task of isolating the most likely suspects was an exacting one because several suspects or suspect groups possessed opportunity, motive and means to perpetrate the act. However, CIC finally surmised that both pilferers and Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Government) agents possessed opportunity and motive to a greater extent than any other suspects.

In analyzing the probability that the act was committed by Kuomintang agents, CIC examined every facet of the case which might serve to support or refute these suspicions. The agents reasoned that because of the close relationship between the Americans and the Chinese Government and the consequent absence of suspicion on the part of the Americans, Kuomintang agents would have a better opportunity to commit the act than any of the other suspects, with the exceptions of pilferers or thieves.

Kuomintang agents had a strong motive to sabotage the station. Any sabotage of American property which could be charged to the Communists would obviously tend to discredit the Communists in American eyes and to increase American support of the Central Chinese Government, the Kuomintang.[204]

CIC agents in China at the time of the incident could well appreciate the subtleties of the Oriental mind. It was well known in intelligence circles that the Bureau of Information and Statistics of the National Military Council, the intelligence arm of the Kuomintang, popularly called BIS, had been giving "tips" to the American intelligence units that the Communists were to "stage a demonstration;" "attack U.S. Army installations;" "smash the airfields;" and in this case, "break into the receiver station." These "tips" had come to be labelled as meaning mis-information or "smoke" and were used either to gauge the reaction of U.S. forces or to trace intelligence channels.

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204 Army Advisor Group, Office of the Chief, Memo TO: Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, AAG, subj: "Sabotage at the Radio Receiving Station, AAG," 2 Dec 46, s/Earl Mottice, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, Folder Nr 00001642, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

As was the case in Shanghai, this "smoke" was used to make the CIC and the Office of Strategic Services incorrectly evaluate reports, lean heavily on the BIS, and mainly draw attention to anti-American feelings and activities of the Communists. It was an example of "smoke" being used in a propaganda campaign. But because few if any of these incidents ever materialized, suspicion of this Chinese method of action was aroused, and it was eventually circumstantially proved that most of the "tips" were completely without basis.[205]

In the instance of the sabotage of the Nanking receiving station, CIC noted that the report of the intention of the Communists to sabotage the receiving station came from Kuomintang sources. "It may well be, therefore, that the actual sabotage...was at least connived...by the Kuomintang in order to give credence to these reports," one CIC report from the desk of Col Earl Mottice, GSC, Director of Intelligence, noted.[206]

However, since CIC agents investigating the case were not satisfied with suppositions and a copious quantity of conjecturings, they next examined the Communist motives and means.

It was common knowledge that an unknown number of Soviet agents were installed in Nanking. Therefore, it was logical for CIC to presume that Soviet agents, possibly with "inside" connections, would have better facilities to acquire requisite knowledge of the Nanking installation, and access thereto, than the Chinese Communists.

The Soviets had a motive too. Since the two principal, ultimate aims of Soviet policy toward China at that time were, according to top-level foreign policy officials in Washington, to end the present American sphere of influence in China, and to replace it with its own, the Soviets had a reason for committing the act. Moreover, there was plenty of documentary evidence to prove that recent Soviet activities, principally in the Shanghai area and not to a great extent, as yet, in the Nanking area, had been directed against Americans in the following ways: acquiring, by all means, information of American activities; using propaganda, sometimes a little too obvious, to discredit Americans with the Chinese and encourage American withdrawal from China; and using "strong arm" methods (killing and injuring American soldiers and sailors, mainly through the employment of Chinese thugs) to drive Americans out of China.

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205 C-27, Memo Nr 3, Sabotage of Receiver Station in Nanking, 26 Nov 46, s/Russel D. Tyler, S/A, CIC, AAG, Folder Nr 000016-12, (SECRET). (Central Records Facility).

206 Army Advisor Group, Office of the Chief, Memo TO: Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, AAG, subj: "Sabotage at the Radio Receiving Station, AAG," 2 Dec 46, s/Earl Mottice, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, Folder Nr 000016-12, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

However, CIC agreed that at the time of the sabotage incident, the Soviet espionage and sabotage ring in the Shanghai-Nanking area was undergoing a reorganization, and its anti-American activities were virtually at a standstill.[207] Moreover, the incident was of such small importance and the reaction against the Communists, and therefore Russian interests, would have been so great as to rule out the possibility of Soviet participation. Then, too, the Communists did not have the strength, nor was it their policy, CIC reasoned, to risk American reaction in Nanking. Instead, the Communists limited their activities to anti-American propaganda.[208]

It was possible that pilferers were guilty because approximately 700 feet of pure copper wire was taken from the station area; however, the fact that other more valuable items were unmolested tended to rule out the possibility that thieves sabotaged the station.

Agents finally listed the suspects in the following order:

1. Pilferers, with the possible connivance of Kuomintang authorities.
2. The Communists.
3. Soviet agents.

Because of the lack of counterintelligence facilities, it was virtually impossible for CIC to build up a case of definite proof against any of the three suspect groups. CIC agents did plan to be alert for future acts of sabotage in the hope that they could link them with the Nanking sabotage act, thereby establishing a firmer case. The Metropolitan Police (Nanking) had been asked to see if they could recover the stolen wire.

To protect the receiving station towers from future such acts, CIC recommended that a system of mechanical alarms be installed which would alert those on duty at the receiving station when tampering occurred, and that flood lights be installed to illuminate the most critical parts of the field. Special guards, if and when they were posted, were to be instructed in the rudimentary principles of security. Agents did not deem it wise or practical to enclose the field in which

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207 Army Advisor Group, Office of the Chief, Memo TO: Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, AAG, subj: "Sabotage at the Radio Receiving Station, AAG," 2 Dec 46, s/Earl Mottice, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, Folder Nr 00001642, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

208 AAG, Office of the Chief, Security Control Group, Summary of Memos, Case C-27, TO: Chief, AAG, THRU: Director of Intelligence, OIC, Security Control Section, Shanghai Det, 26 Nov 46, s/Russel D. Tyler, S/A, CIC, Folder Nr 00001642, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

the towers were located with a barbed wire fence unless a sufficient number of sentries could be found and hired to guard the fence.[209]

CIC Plagued by Incidents

Throughout 1946 CIC was plagued by a succession of incidents in which U.S. personnel were attacked by Chinese coolies, all of these requiring investigation since it was known that a major portion of them were caused by Soviet-inspired hoodlum gangs. These gangs had actually received training, with graduation exercises at the end of the course. The Merchant Marine sailors were particular targets for such attacks until they began arming themselves and always assigning one of their number to remain sober. By continued agitation the Communists were able to arouse among the Chinese coolies considerable resentment against Americans, resentment which even showed itself in insolence of employees in billets and post exchanges. At one time it was learned that the waiters at the Race Course Post Exchange Restaurant, where most civilians ate their noon meal, were working a vicious racket. Unless the waiter received a tip at the time the order was taken, the customer never received his order.

One such "ticklist" incident concerned two Russian citizens living in Shanghai and an American Army corporal. The incident was touched off when a U.S. Army jeep, driven by a Corporal Carson, ran into the rear of a civilian car which had stopped suddenly on the Rue Des Soeurs in Shanghai. The occupants of the civilian car, afterward identified as V. D. Marthoff and Nicolai Chuzo, both Russians, jumped out of their car and assaulted Corporal Carson. In the ensuing melee, Corporal Carson was mauled and the ignition wires in his jeep were torn out.

Carson was saved from further beatings when American military police and their Officer of the Day arrived on the scene. In attempting to break up the fight, the military police were forced to subdue the belligerent Russians, who were intoxicated, and take them to the Chinese Whangpoo Police Station.

After they reached the police station, an agent from the 415th CIC Detachment was called to handle the situation. The agent was questioning the participants in the fray when a Mr Shumsky, Russian detective of the Shanghai Municipal Police, arrived and, after a lengthy discussion, persuaded the CIC agent not to prefer charges against the two Russians for assaulting the corporal. The two Russians were then released from the custody of the Chinese police and turned over to Mr Shumsky.

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209 Army Advisory Group, Office of the Chief, Memo TO: Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief, AAG, subj: "Sabotage at the Radio Receiving Station, AAG," 2 Dec 46, s/Earl Miottice, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, Folder Nr 00001042, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Before departing, however, the intoxicated Russians vowed that they would report the incident to the Russian consul in the morning, and that they, with the aid of friends, would, in the future, beat up every American soldier they saw. Mr Shumsky, being the only sober Russian present, endeavored to restore peace by admonishing the two Russians and asking them to quit talking foolishly.[210]

The Russians kept their promise because the next day the Russian Consul General lodged a complaint with the Honorable Monnett B. Davis, American Consul General in Shanghai, alleging that the Russians had been badly mauled in the fight. Mr Davis, anxious to gain all the true particulars of the case, dispatched a letter to Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., theater commander, asking that a detailed report of the incident be sent to the American consul. General Gillem complied with the request and sent to American Consul General Davis a complete report of the occurrence, as prepared by 1st Lt Charlton T. Howard, CIC agent.[211]

Lieutenant Howard's report completely exonerated jeep driver Carson and the American military police. As Howard pointed out, the Russians were obviously under the influence of liquor, a point which was brought to the attention of Lieutenant Howard by Mr Shumsky in an attempt to soothe over the matter. As cited in the report, Mr Martinoff, one of the Russians in the car, when asked if he had been drinking vodka, replied: "We Russians don't drink vodka... Only you ignorant Americans drink Vodka. I've been drinking good whiskey."

Despite reports in the anti-American press to the contrary, a check of the hospital files by CIC disclosed that on 3 September 1946, V. D. Martinoff and N. Chuzo were given first aid only for superficial lacerations and bruises, and departed immediately. As Lieutenant Howard wrote in his report: "This agent's examination of Martinoff, when his injuries were exhibited for the policeman's gaze, determined that he had a cut on his head, a cut on his leg, and a few minor cuts and bruises."

Other mitigating factors were included in Agent Howard's report. Nicolai Chuzo was identified as a prominent member of the Soviet intelligence network in Shanghai and the NKVD, "...which is second to none in influence in Russian politics." Martinoff was described as a trouble-maker who was well known to veteran American military and shore police in Shanghai as a ringleader of a gang of hoodlums who specialized in beating up Americans when they found them alone in a deserted street or alley.

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210 Hqs 415th CIC Det Rpt, Subj: "Incident Involving Russian Civilians and MPs," 23 Sep 46, Folder Nr 00001610, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

211 Hqs, China Service Command, Shanghai, China, ltr TO: Honorable Monnett B. Davis, American Consul General, Shanghai, China, FROM: Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Lt Gen U.S.A., 27 Sep 46, Folder Nr 00001610, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Furthermore, it was mentioned that the military police investigating the incident were pushed around by the two Russians and had no other alternative but to defend themselves and subdue the Russians. The concluding paragraph in the report read: "It is well known that the police station covering the area has always adopted an anti-American attitude. It would be amiss not to mention that there were Chinese police at the scene of the incident who refused to restrain the two Russians at the request of the MP's, thereby allowing the incident to develop."[212]

The final note in the case was sounded by Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., when, in his reply to American Consul General Mr Davis, he remarked: "Possibly our personnel erred in not pressing charges against the two Russians concerned. However, the incident was not considered exceptional at the time of the occurrence and upon recommendation of a Russian member of the Municipal Police Force, the charges were not pressed."[213]

415th Deactivated

On 30 September 1946, the 415th CIC Detachment was officially deactivated and the remaining personnel were designated as the Security Control Section of the Army Advisory Group, with Maj Fred W. Eggers commanding. Headquarters for the section remained in Shanghai, with three agents; and field offices operated in Nanking with three agents and in Peiping with four.[214]

Explanation of the above change was made by Major Eggers in a report to Director of Intelligence, WDGS, on 2 January 1947: "...Due to the requirement of General Marshall that no intelligence work could be done within the American forces in China, the identification of the CIC was changed to Security Control Section. Under this title the personnel are now operating. To further comply with the requirement of General Marshall, no positive intelligence nor counter-intelligence work is done where the Chinese forces are concerned."[215]

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212 Hqs, 415th CIC Det, Memo to OIC, subj: "Continued Investigation of Incident Involving Two Russian Civilians and MPs," 25 Sep 46, s/Charlton T. Howard, 1st Lt, CMP, CIC, Folder Nr 00001610, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

213 Hqs, China Service Command, Shanghai, China, Ltr TO: Honorable Monnett B. Davis, American Consul General, Shanghai, China, FROM: Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Lt Gen, U.S.A., 27 Sep 46, Folder Nr 00001610, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

214 Monthly Intelligence Reports, 415th CIC Det, China Service Command, dtd 23 Aug, 16, 17, 18, & 27 Sep 1946, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

215 Monthly Information Report, Security Control Section, Shanghai Detachment, A.A.G., dated 2 Jan 47, signed by Maj Fred W. Eggers, to Director of Intelligence, WDGS, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Throughout 1947 CIC's duties were officially limited to protection of security of U.S. installations, background checks on civilian employees and investigation of cases of suspected disaffection and sabotage. An interesting commentary on this situation is contained in an indorsement to a CIC Monthly Information Report, written by the Chief of Staff of the Army Advisory Group on 1 March 1947: "The above report has been edited so as to delete certain items of information concerning general conditions in China. Future reports of this nature will not contain such informational items. The reason for this action is that, should the Chinese or others suspect personnel connected with the Army Advisory Group of engaging in operational intelligence activities, not only would the effectiveness of the group be weakened but also unfavorable publicity might result. It is therefore felt that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel connected with the Army Advisory Group must limit their activities to such matters as loyalty checks, clearances of civilian personnel for employment, security inspections and the like.[216]

Two Russian interpreters, employed by the Criminal Investigation Detachment, were recruited and briefed to pose as the supposed aliens in an attempt to trap the crew member on the transport. No further information concerning the case was found in available records.[217]

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216 1st Ind to CIC Monthly Information Report, Security Control Section, (CIC), Shanghai Detachment, dated 1 Mar 1947, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

217 Security Control Section, Shanghai Port Facility, AAG, Memo for CIC, 20 Oct 47, s/W. H. Green, S/A, CIC, Folder Nr 00001725, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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The Case of the Disappearing Engraved Plates

Also typical of the many nonsecurity cases reported by CIC was one which occurred in Shanghai in June 1948, and had to do with engraved plates for the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. As told by a "very reliable informant" to a CIC agent of the Shanghai Port Facility, Security Control Section, the story was that a group of U.S. investigators had appeared in Shanghai, searching for counterfeit U.S. money. While combing the city for any traces or clues which might ultimately lead them to the money, the investigators were approached by an unscrupulous character named (forger in his own right), who offered to guide the U.S. authorities in their search.

The search continued for several weeks. Meanwhile, contacted an artist-engraver named and arranged for to engrave some counterfeit $10.00 and $20.00 U.S. plates. While continued to serve as guide for the U.S. investigators, completed the plates but was forced to flee when the Chinese underworld passed him the rumor that the Chinese police (Wusung Garrison) were wise to his activities and were closing in on him. In a desperate attempt to hide the evidence, placed the plates in a small hand bag and went in search of a hiding place. The search was futile and he was apprehended.

When came up for trial, the only evidence that found its way into court was an old, half-finished plate of a U.S. $10.00. , who received a one year sentence, knew that he had been double-crossed and swore vengeance. The informant believed that if the proper approach were made to he would reveal the entire story of the missing plates. However, the informant urged the CIC agent to act quickly because ". . may be in danger after release." Reports do not disclose what use, if any, CIC made of this information, evaluated F-6.[218]

One case, typical of the kind that formerly would have called for a full investigation, in February 1948 was reported briefly with no evidence of a follow-up investigation. This brief case, called to the attention of CIC agents with the Security Control Section by an intelligence liaison officer in Shanghai, involved a comely blond woman and her adroit card trick method of obtaining information from guilible U.S. servicemen, mostly seamen.

The shapely blonde's procedure, as outlined by the liaison officer, was briefly this: among the various vendors and trades people who boarded U.S.

218 Security Control Section, Shanghai Port Facility, Army Advisory Group, Agent Rpt, Subj: "The Disappearing Engraved Plates for the Counterfeiting of 'US' Currency," 5 Jun 48, Folder Nr 00001570, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

vessels upon their arrival at Tsingtao was the blond girl, apparently of Russian extraction, who made a specialty of approaching newly-arrived Army and Navy officers.

Observers reported that the blond would talk with the officers and request their patronage at the Jade Store, informing them that she could obtain a ten percent discount on curios and merchandise for them there. In order to effect this, the officer was given a card and asked to fill in his name, rank and service. The blonde would jot down similar data, explaining to the officer that when he presented his card at the shop, it would be checked against the blonde's list for authenticity so that she could receive credit for any patronage.

Later, the blonde would ask to be introduced to shipmates and friends of the officer, thereby increasing the number of officers contacted and cards compiled. When some of the officers contacted by the blonde later showed up at the Jade Shop, discreet inquiries were made as to destination and duty station.

The intelligence liaison officer conceded in his report that: "It is possible that this is simply a sales promotion device. However, it has all the elements of typical Soviet espionage. It is not known whether the girl is a Soviet citizen or not, but it would make little difference in view of the known Soviet policy of using non-Soviets for foreign espionage."

United States intelligence agencies knew what the standard Soviet espionage targets in China were. They included: an up-to-date roster of military personnel in China, with dates of entry, departure and destination; evidence of increased or decreased personnel in any specific corps or branch; and dates of arrival and lists of personnel belonging to a corps or organization not previously in China, particularly personnel with specialized skills or training.

With this knowledge, American intelligence men were wary of any procedure which required U.S. military personnel to give name, rank, and other data. Therefore, the shapely blonde and her card signing device appeared to be a most useful way to obtain intelligence information in a form which would be acceptable to Razuedupr (Soviet Military Intelligence Service) Headquarters as reliable. As the report concluded: "It is believed that if the scheme was not originally devised by them (Russians) or is not presently being taken advantage of, it will not be overlooked for long."[219]

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219 Commander Naval Forces, Western Pacific, (Intelligence Liaison Officer), Shanghai, China, Rpt, FROM: Intelligence Liaison Officer, TO: Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, subj: "U.S.S.R. Espionage, Possible Activity in Tsingtao," 14 Feb 48, s/T. W. Joyce, Folder Nr 00001658, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

In April 1947 the Peiping office was closed and the remaining personnel transferred to Shanghai. At that time the detachment in Shanghai consisted of Major Eggers, Capt C. T. Howard, Capt John G. Taylor, and Agents Morris J. Grossman, William Green, and Howard Tarrant, while Capt V. H. Herald operated the field office at Nanking. Within the next year, Captain Howard departed for the United States; 2d Lt Howard W. Eng and Agents Victor Watkins, Albert T. Wong, Walfrido Z. Concepcion, Allen D. Jung and Robert Lee arrived from the United States, and 1st Lt John Haley transferred into CIC from the Office of the Director of Intelligence, Army Advisory Group.[220]

The CIC detachment assisted in the orderly evacuation of American civilians from troubled areas as the Communists continued their advance and, in January 1949, when it became evident that all of the Chinese mainland would soon fall to the Communists, left with the remainder of the Army Advisory Group.[221]

220 Monthly Information Reports, Detachment "G", General Staff, U.S. Army, Shanghai Detachment, Army Advisory Group, dated 1 Apr 47, 1 Aug 47, and 6 Nov 47, (CONFIDENTIAL); and ltr from Security Control Section, U.S. Army Advisory Group, Shanghai, China, to OIC, Firearms Licensing Section, Municipal Police Bureau, Shanghai, China, dated 7 July 1948, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

221 CIC History, 1945-1948, China, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Appendix 1

ROSTER FOR CBI CHAPTER

Abeles, Seymour
Acerno, Albert V.
Adams, William J.
Aikens, Keith R.
Albright, Norman E.
Auer, Bernard
Baker, Walter B., Jr.
Baldwin, Robert L.
Ballou, Lawrence H.
Barnhart, Francis C.
Beauchamp, James L.
Belknap, Edwin S.
Bernston, Donald B.
Blanton, William W.
Blalock, William A.
Blaul, Arthur F.
Boggs, William R.
Brasseur, Norman
Breechen, Joel
Brennan, John J.
Brock, James G.
Brooks, James D.
Brotman, Stanley S.
Burns, John L.
Callahan, Leonard M.
Carr, James H., Jr
Chinn, Young W.
Comiskey, William T.
Cox, John T.
Curran, Jean A.
Dailey, Daniel H.
Daube, William J.
Detweiler, Philip
Dorn, Harold C.
Edris, Robert B.
Elliott, William T.
Ellman, Julius
Farris, Charles D.
Fetters, Harold M.
Finney, Oliver J.
Fong, Edmond
Fuchs, Joseph
Gebhart, W. F. Davis
Gelwicks, Harold
Gentile, Charles F.
Gerlach, Charles A.
Gosling, Gleen D.
Gregg, Hugh
Grieve, William G.
Hakim, Clement M.
Hall, Lionel J.
Hammond, Eugene L.
Hanley, Martin J.
Hardin, Fariss
Heim, Ernest E.
Hockman, (NFN)
Hoffman, William
Holland, William
Hughes, Lawrence F.
Hunter, James R.
Hynes, Bart R.
James, Arthur
Jong, Arthur J.
Kendall, Thomas H.
Klise, Richard W.
Kotulak, Bernard J.
Korba, John
Krauser, Francis W.
Ladner, George A., Jr
Lee, Andrew Pang
Louie, Kong T.
Lowe, Pardee
Luening, Robert A.
Lucas, James R.
Lyau, George L.
Lynch, George F.
MacKenzie, D. E.
Mah, George G. C. K.
Manwell, Karl R.
Mauro, Donald C.
McDonnel, John R.
McElligott, John F.
McGovern, Harold
McMahan, Maurice F.
McNamara, James G.
McTighe, James D.
Merritt, Melvin J.
Mohammad, Ali
Morgan, Walter T.
Moyer, Lawson
Muldoon, John E.
Munro, Alex J.
Murray, James F.
Musick, Milton
Nebo, John C.
Newland, L. T.
Nixon, Julian H.
Norvell, George E.
O'Neill, Francis S.
Nowlan, John
Page, Proctor, Jr
Perry, Harold O.
Peoples, Frederick C.
Peterson, John D.
Peterson, Keith M.
Pucciarelli, Donato D.
Puryear, Robert E.
Quon, Wah, Foo
Patterson, Edwin C.
Redman, John E.
Redden, Eugene
Reinterson, Arnold B.
Reynolds, George L.
Reynolds, William
Rogers, George D.
Romito, Alphonso
Schultz, Charles

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Roster for CBI Chapter (Continued)

Scott, Robert F.
Seto, Sum M.
Shanley, John P.
Simpson, Edwin W.
Small, George W.
Smith, Charles F. C.
Smith, Stanley J.
Smith, Harry G.
Smith, Joseph A.
Snodgrass, Robert S.
Snyder, Earl C.
Solana, Frederick J.
Southworth, P. C., Jr
Steptoe, Thomas W.
Stevens, Stanford S.
Teeter, Daniel E.
Thorn, John H.
Tilley, Eugene D.
Tongyai, Singkata
Tucker, Knowles
Tyng, William
Vautrain, Robert G.
Voorhees, John D.
Ward, Paul F.
Westfried, Alex H.
Whelley, Thomas P.
White, Rollie H.
White, Edward S.
Whyte, Michael
Widner, Frank M.
Wilson, George
Wisniewski, Leo R.
Withrow, Eddy S.
Zinn, Charles W.
Zipprian, Alfred I.

Part II: CIC in the Central Pacific Theater

Section 1

CIC's MISSION IN HAWAII

At 7:55 A.M. Hawaiian Time (1:25 P.M. EST) on 7 December 1941, elements of the Japanese Air Force, in an unprecedented sneak attack, bombed units of the U.S. fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor. Other key military installations in the Hawaiian Islands were hit simultaneously.

During the first minutes of the raid, agents of the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP), scattered throughout the island of Oahu, raced to CIP headquarters in the Dillingham Building in downtown Honolulu. A hurried 10-minute conference and the agents were out on their first assignment of the war. Following a previously arranged plan, they dispersed in teams. Their mission was to apprehend all pro-Japanese sympathizers.

Operation "Pickup"

For many months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the CIP had quietly compiled what they referred to as a "Pickup" list. On it were the names and addresses of individuals who would be of potential danger to the United States should war occur. Suspects classified as "1-A" were to be apprehended immediately; others listed as "1-B" were to be put under surveillance and their activities curtailed. There were approximately 300 persons in each group, the vast majority being Japanese.

The bulk of information about the Japanese population in the Islands came from United States citizens of Japanese ancestry, commonly called Niseis, although the term Nisei actually applies only to those of first generation citizenship. The FBI alone had 750 Niseis acting as listeners. The CIP also had many among their informants.[222]

CIP agents, together with the FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Honolulu Police Department worked untiringly that fateful Sunday. By 1100 hours, while the raids still continued, the first suspect was taken into custody.[223] By the end of that first day, some 200 strongly pro-Japanese persons were in temporary detention compounds.[224]

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222 Americans from Japan by Bradford Smith, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1948, p. 170.

223 The CIC in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History, p. 3.

224 War-Time CIC History AFMIDPAC, p. 19.

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225 Americans from Japan by Bradford Smith, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1948, p. 169-170. From a footnote, "See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, p. 1,867."

226 Letter from Lt Col Gero Iwai to Miss Ann Bray dated 18 October 1954.

227 Americans from Japan by Bradford Smith, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1948, p. 170.

228 Letter from Lt Col Gero Iwai to Miss Ann Bray, 18 October 1954. At the time of this writing, Colonel Iwai had the longest record of service in the CIP and CIC of any one in the Corps.

229 Americans From Japan by Bradford Smith, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1948, pp. 169-170.

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Arrests Mount

During the 72 hours following the attack, the CIP pressed Operation "Pickup." By 10 December, more than 400 persons were under arrest and in confinement at the Honolulu immigration station. Approximately three-fourths were Japanese.[230]

Although the CIP devoted a limited amount of time to other activities, apprehension of subversives was given top priority during those first frantic days. The few agents that could be spared were directed to trace the origin of the numerous wild rumors which were rampant on Oahu. Others made inspections and surveys of installations at the urgent requests of suddenly "security conscious" commanders. Thus, from a position of almost total oblivion, the CIP in Hawaii was suddenly thrust into the lime light.

Where Were the Spies and Saboteurs

Where were the Japanese spies and saboteurs who at the signal of attack were supposed to rise up and aid their racial brothers from within?

They simply did not exist. Not one of the flamboyant stories of road-blocking, disguised machine gun nests and other penny-thriller paraphernalia was true. FBI agent, Robert L. Shivers, later had this to say:

> "In spite of what Admiral Kimmel or anyone else may have said about the fifth column activity in Hawaii, I want to emphasize that there was no such activity in Hawaii before, during, or after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Consequently there was no confusion in Hawaii as a result of fifth column activities.
>
> "I was in a position to know this fact, and I speak with authority when I say that the confusion in Hawaii was in the minds of the confused and not because of fifth column activities.
>
> "It was not the civilian population who was confused. Nowhere under the sun could there have been a more intelligent response to the needs of the hour than was given by the entire population of these islands.
>
> "As a matter of fact had it not been for the lack of hysteria in the civilian community and the orderly manner in which they responded as a result of the preparation the civilian community had made for war, especially the doctors, the law enforcement agencies and the Office of

230 The CIC in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History, p. 3 (J-23).

Civilian Defense, there would have been confusion with which the community would not have been able to cope."[231]

Shivers' statement was supported by similar ones from the Honolulu Chief of Police and Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, who replaced Lt Gen Walter C. Short as commander of the Hawaiian department. Yet many Americans believed for months, even years, that there was sabotage at Pearl Harbor. As late as February 1943 Colliers Magazine printed as fact the story about a milk wagon dropping its sides and machine-gunning personnel at Hickam Field.[232]

Hawaiian CIP Prior to the Attack

Until 1941, the Hawaiian CIP unit had consisted of a meager four-man staff. During those lean years operations were considerably restricted. With the limited personnel available and no definite mission to perform, agents devoted most of their time to a fact-gathering campaign. Practically unnoticed, they went about the islands observing persons and events of intelligence interest. Subsequent reports were filed for future reference.

On 5 April 1941, with the threat of war increasing, the Hawaiian department was strengthened by the arrival of several agents from the United States. Succeeding shipments increased the unit to 12 officers and 18 special agents by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.[233] Shortly thereafter, additional agents were flown in from the West Coast to aid in the questioning and processing of the many hundreds of suspects.[234]

Martial Law and the Delimitations Agreement

During the first months of the war, two events took place which were to affect seriously counterintelligence operations in the Hawaiian Islands throughout the war. The first was the declaration of martial law in Hawaii by the civil governor immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack.[235] This decree, in effect until October 1944,[236] was to give the Counter Intelligence Corps unusually broad powers, nowhere else delegated to CIC in American territory for so long a time.

231 Americans From Japan by Bradford Smith, J. B. Lippincott Co. 1948, p. 171-172.
232 Ibid.
233 The CIC in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History, p. 3, (J-23).
234 Processing Japanese-Americans and Japanese Nationals in the Hawaiian Islands, (I-93).
235 The CIC in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History, p. 3, (J-23).
236 Ibid., p. 5.

The second event which greatly influenced operations was the Delimitations Agreement which was formally reached by the CIC, FBI, and ONI in February 1942. Under the terms of this agreement, CIC was given responsibility for the internal security of the Territory of Hawaii. All cases of espionage, treason, sabotage, and other subversive activities were under CIC jurisdiction with the exception of those cases taking place on naval reservations or in which naval personnel were involved.[237]

The change from the Corps of Intelligence Police to the Counter Intelligence Corps did not affect operations in Hawaii. CIP agents were absorbed by the new group, issued a table of organization and assigned to G2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.[238]

Initially, the CIC unit in Hawaii, was known as the Contact Office. Later, it operated as the Counter Intelligence Division (CID). The Contact Office first worked for the Hawaiian Department G2, and then successively for the Central Pacific Area (CPA), Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC), and the Middle Pacific Area (MIDPAC) G2's. While assigned to CPBC, the CID was considered the theater CIC detachment since the commanding officer, Col Joseph J. Twitty,[239] was also the Chief, CIC, in the Territory of Hawaii. Colonel Twitty succeeded Col George W. Bicknell who was reassigned on 3 April 1943. On 20 August 1943, Colonel Twitty left and his position was taken by Lt Col Frank O. Blake. On 1 October 1943, Lt Col Byron Meurlott became the commanding officer and remained in that position until 18 August 1945 when he was relieved by Lt Col Kirby M. Gillette.[240]

Not until the closing months of the war was the Counter Intelligence Division given a numbered designation. Then it was split into four detachments and most of the officers and agents sent to forward combat areas.[241] However, there were other CIC detachments in Hawaii during the war. They were either stationed there permanently, as in the case of the 607th CIC Detachment, or paused briefly for further training before pushing on towards the fighting in the Southwest Pacific.[242]

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237 The CIC in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History, p. 3, (J-23).

238 "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History," dtd 21 May 1945, taken from Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

239 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIOPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 15, (Staff and Faculty Library).

240 Ibid, p. 54 (R-2).

241 Ibid, p. 17.

242 Incomplete roster attached as Appendix 1.

The Japanese Problem

Of the major problems that faced the CIC in Hawaii shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, the most important was the maintainence of close supervision over likely and potential subversives. Operation "Pickup," which lasted but a few weeks, was successful in that it led to the apprehension of a few hundred suspects. However, still at large on the islands were 160,000 Japanese or persons with Japanese ancestry. Each one was a potential saboteur and espionage agent. The majority of these people were loyal Americans, but the knowledge that in their midst were a few fanatically pro-Japanese individuals was alarming to even the most complacent U.S. military commanders.

The only feasible method of sifting out these fanatics was through an extensive screening program. The enormity of such a program was reflected by the fact that almost one-third of the population of the Hawaiian Islands had some Japanese ancestry. The extent to which these people still held allegiance to Japan was of vital concern to the United States.

Several years before the war, the Japanese Government had established one of its most important and active consulates in Honolulu. Although it was never proven, U.S. counterintelligence agencies suspected that the consulate served as a clearing house for espionage data collected by Japanese agents. Members of the consulate readily admitted that they had been sent with the purpose of reminding the Japanese in Hawaii of their devout adherence to the emperor.

Under the supervision of the consulate, every major sect of the nationalistic Shinto and Buddhist religions was in existence in the islands. Schools taught Japanese children the Japanese language and ideologies. The people were organized into various societies with such purposes as contributing to Japanese war relief, purchasing Japanese patriotic bonds, and entertaining visiting Japanese naval training squadrons. They maintained their own chamber of commerce and other business organizations.

The consulate was able to keep in close touch with the Japanese population through a network of unofficial "consular agents" or "Toritsuginin." Among the duties assumed by these so-called "ambassadors of good-will" were registering the births of Japanese children with the consulate, conducting official censuses for the Japanese Government, applying for military deferment with the Japanese Government for Hawaiian residents, and arranging tours to Japan. More often than not, they also functioned as informants or low-level espionage agents for the consulate. It was not difficult for them to pick up important bits of information during their frequent trips about Oahu.

The registering of births with the consulate caused a peculiar situation. Children whose births were so registered came under an "extra-legal" concept.[243] They were considered dual citizens of the United States and Japan. To become separated from Japanese citizenship was a long and somewhat complicated process and was handled through the consular agents.

When a Japanese had accumulated enough money and vacation time, after years of working, he was urged to take a two or three months vacation in Japan. With the aliens, the desire to make this journey was understandable. Japan was their native land--perhaps their parents were still alive there. But the same attitude often was found among the Nisei. In many cases they had been sent or taken to Japan by their parents when they were quite young, and as a result, a great many of them spent their formative years and received most of their education there. Such persons were known as "Kibeis," and, in general, they formed the most dangerous class of Japanese in Hawaii. They had the youth, the strength, and the training to be potential threats to the internal security of the islands. The majority were trained in Japan during the decade immediately preceeding the war when the Japanese war lords were becoming the dominant powers in the country and intense nationalism was the keynote of all education.

Throughout the war, constant observation of all persons of Japanese blood, both aliens and citizens, was maintained by the CIC. Most of the consular agents and many of the Kibeis were on the initial "Pickup" list. As investigations proceeded during the following months, hundreds of other Japanese and a few Germans and Italians were taken into custody by the CIC. All of these people had shown signs of dubious loyalty to the United States.[244]

During the first year the internment program required the largest amount of CIC concern. There were approximately 5,000 Kibeis living in Hawaii and nearly all of them were eventually processed. The large and active Japanese fishing fleet in operation before the war was composed of a nationalistic alien group totaling several hundred, and they too were processed. Other Japanese that CIC screened included Buddhist and Shinto priests as well as language school officials.

In January 1942, only a month after the war had started, internees were removed from the Honolulu immigration station and sent to a newly constructed internment camp on Sand Island, located in Honolulu Harbor. Most of the aliens interned there eventually were sent to mainland internment camps in the United States, but a few citizens were kept on Sand Island in custodial detention. By the

243 "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History," dtd 21 May 1945, taken from Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

244 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIOPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 19, (Staff and Faculty Library).

spring of 1943, a prisoner of war camp was completed in Honolulu, and internees still at Sand Island were transferred to the new site. For the remainder of the war, all persons under detention were kept at Honolulu.[245]

Hearing Boards--Martial Law Challenged

In order to insure fairness to the Japanese, hearing boards were established to review the cases of interned persons. Each subject was brought first before what was known as the Preliminary Hearing Board. It consisted of a CIC officer or agent and one representative each from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. If the board decided a subject should be interned, his case then was presented by CIC to the Civilian Hearing Board which was composed of two Army officers and three Honolulu civilians. At this conclave, the subject was allowed to bring in witnesses and have an attorney with him. Irrespective of the recommendation rendered by the Civilian Hearing Board, the case next was sent before the Intelligence Reviewing Board. This board was composed of the heads of the three counterintelligence agencies--CIC, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Office of Naval Intelligence. The officials could either concur in the decision of the Civilian Hearing Board, or make an opposite recommendation. Ultimately, each case was sent to the Military Governor's Review Board where the final recommendation was made. That recommendation, when signed by the Military Governor (later Military Commander), closed the procedure: the subject was interned or released.[246]

These hearing boards, established under martial law, met with considerable objection from citizens and aliens alike, who argued that martial law in the Hawaiian Islands was not necessary. They argued that it was evident that the Japanese could not launch any sizeable attack against the Islands after their stunning defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. However, Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, Commander of the Hawaiian Department, saw fit to continue martial law, as did Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., when he assumed command of the Hawaiian Islands in June 1943.[247]

On 30 July 1943, two internees-
citizens of German extraction--petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, a right suspended by martial law. Their petition was a direct challenge to martial law, and by inference, to activities of CIC where the right to make arrests was exercised. Although were evacuated to the mainland and released there, thus achieving their purpose, their attack on martial law was not successful.

245 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIOPAC, pp. 22-25, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).
246 Ibid, p. 24.
247 The Army Almanac, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 610.

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Nine months later, a war worker sentenced by a provost court petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus also. He was upheld in his petition by a Federal judge who declared martial law in Hawaii nonexistent.

On 25 October 1944, the controversy ended when the President of the United States abolished martial law in the Territory of Hawaii by proclamation. Immediately, the provost courts were dissolved--the only substantial change resulting from the order. But other changes occurred in form, however. The area was designated the Territory of Hawaii Military Area, with the former Military Governor becoming Military Commander, and the Office of the Military Governor was redesignated the Office of Internal Security. From the Military Commander, Lieutenant General Richardson, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington and Hawaii concurring, CIC received the green light to continue its investigative jurisdiction over all cases of espionage, sabotage, and related activities.

Although apprehensions continued to be made even after the abolishment of martial law, citizens were no longer placed in custodial detention. They instead were excluded from Hawaii and evacuated to the mainland. The cases of all citizens in Honolulu previously placed in detention were reviewed; some of these individuals were paroled and the rest evacuated. Sixty-seven departed in the first group.

By September 1945, 1,579 persons had been apprehended in Hawaii. Of these, 1,466 were Japanese; the remainder included 114 Germans, 17 Italians, and 2 French. Of the 1,579, 617 had been released or paroled, 67 excluded, 313 relocated on the mainland, 79 repatriated and 13 died. Still in custody in Hawaii and the United States were 494 persons.[248]

Travel Control, Security Program and CIC School

From the beginning of the war, it was obvious that espionage was a potent danger. There was no guarantee that a completely tight counterespionage fence could be drawn around Hawaii, but every possible attempt had to be made. Investigating potential suspects accomplished a large share of the task, but many loopholes remained.

To plug one of these gaps, a system of travel control was organized. By the summer of 1943, every person leaving Hawaii had to be cleared first by an organization which was known as the Trans-Pacific Travel Control Bureau. It was activated by a General Order of the Military Governor, and continued after 25

248 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIOPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), pp. 25-26 (J-23), (Staff and Faculty Library).

October 1944 under the Office of Internal Security.[249] The office in Honolulu was staffed by the Navy, but recommendations governing travel were made jointly by CIC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

During March 1944, a large branch office was opened in San Francisco under the direction of travel control officers from Honolulu and headed by an officer from the Honolulu CIC office. Another branch office was activated in Seattle in April 1945. It was also manned by a CIC officer and agents from the Counter Intelligence Division. Altogether, there were two officers and six agents on detached service at these two offices.

Virtually every civilian entering or leaving Hawaii was given prior clearance by these offices. As the war in the Pacific increased in scope, the system became even more valuable. More and more civilian workers were going to forward areas, and it became increasingly important to have them pass through a screening system before being sent to critical areas. Between 2,000 and 3,500 persons were processed monthly in Honolulu, approximately 1,500 in San Francisco and from 500 to 1,000 in Seattle.

A further function of the Trans-Pacific Travel Control Bureau was the supervision of baggage searches and the furnishing of representatives to meet each ship or aircraft carrying passengers to insure that no one went aboard or left who had not been validated.

Inter-Hawaiian Island travel also was under continuous supervision, a task handled solely by CIC. Every citizen traveling from one island to any of the others had to appear before a CIC representative for a brief interview and file clerk. From 600 to 900 persons were processed weekly in Honolulu with 100 to 200 screened on Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Kauai.

Security Program Important

As Hawaii developed into a huge supply base and staging area for troops, the need for a security program became increasingly apparent. This program was incorporated into CIC's sphere of activities in Hawaii by 1943. Army posts, airfields, ammunition dumps, power plants, the waterfront and all other vital installations were continually surveyed. A special department of the Contact Office--the Security Subsection--was charged with carrying out this program. So vast did the work become that at one time or another, almost all of the agents in the office took their turn surveying various installations.

249 This was in accordance with the Presidential Proclamation abolishing Martial Law in the Territory.

Agents used various disguises in covert attempts to enter restricted areas or to gain access to classified material. They showed on occasion how a saboteur could destroy an ammunition tunnel or wreck a hangar full of planes or interfere with gasoline distribution. They followed up each test with a complete survey. The commanding officer concerned was given a copy of the findings and recommendations. Later, following the original tests, the submissions of recommendations and the establishment of preventive measures, another test was made. In this way, constant vigilance was maintained.

Another function of the subsection was an educational project that was instituted to teach Army personnel security measures. The procedure was to present hour-long lectures to the troops and to headquarters units as they arrived in Hawaii. Civilians, including War Department employees, Red Cross workers, and USO entertainers, heard these lectures. A new series was given to each group of alerted troops, emphasizing their special security problems and how to handle them.[250] More than 100,000 persons were reached by this program which produced positive results.[251]

Agents Recruited Locally

As was the case in some of the other theaters, many of the CIC agents assigned in Hawaii lacked any formal investigative training. They were recruited from other units stationed in the islands during the first months of the war when there was an urgent need for agents. Although this weakness was recognized almost at once, it was impossible to take positive action to correct it for some time.

As early as August 1941, two CIP agents were sent back to the States to attend the CIP school in Washington and it was planned to send two every month. As it turned out, they were the only two agents to leave for training. Pearl Harbor and the critical situation which followed made further shipments impossible.

When CIC was activated in Hawaii in January 1942, it was planned that all officers and agents would eventually attend the CIC Training School in Chicago. Not until a year later, however, was the Contact Office able to spare even one agent to attend the school. From then on, other agents and officers, in small numbers, were sent by the Contact Office to attend mainland schools. This arrangement could not accommodate all the new CIC personnel arriving on Oahu. In April 1943 a preliminary CIC school, along the lines of the CIC Chicago school, was organized near Honolulu. Half the agents who had no formal investigative

250 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 27-29, (Staff and Faculty Library).

251 Ibid., p. 20.

training attended one month, the remainder the following month. During the next year and a half two more similar schools were conducted in Hawaii for the benefit of new agents.[252]

Command Changes

At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the CIC, then the Corps of Intelligence Police, was an agency of the Hawaiian Department. Just one week after the war began, Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons assumed command of the Islands. Although the Hawaiian Department was reorganized and expanded several times during the next year and a half, the mission of the command remained the same:

"Hold Oahu at all costs against attacks by sea, land, and air forces . . . and against all hostile sympathizers."[253]

In May 1943, Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., replaced General Emmons as commander of the Hawaiian Department. Three months later, on 14 August 1943, the Hawaiian Department was superseded by the newly activated United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area (USAFCPA). The Hawaiian Department continued a "paper" existence until formally terminated on 15 November 1947.

As commanding general of USAFCPA, General Richardson was responsible for the administration and training of all U.S. Army ground and air troops within the area and was subject to the direction of Adm Chester Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC), in the preparation and execution of plans for the employment of Army forces in the area.[254]

The second major organization change in the theater took place on 1 August 1944. On that date, USAFCPA was superseded by United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA). General Richardson was designated commander of this new organization also. Incorporated into it were all troops formerly assigned to United States Armed Forces in South Pacific Area (USAFISPA).[255] The Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) was also established as a subordinate administrative command to USAFPOA.

CIC was assigned to CPBC, an arrangement which from the first proved satisfactory. The commanding general of USAFPOA, General Richardson, under Presidential Executive Order Nr 9489, was charged with the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. Immediately, he organized the Office of Internal Security

252 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 35, (Staff and Faculty Library).
253 The Army Almanac, U.S. Government Printing Office 1950, p. 610.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid., p. 611.

and designated CIC as the special investigative agency to pursue all Security Order violations and supervise the internment of both aliens and citizens.[256] However, since it was assigned to CPBC, CIC had no official jurisdiction over the internal security of the islands.

Considerable difficulty arose because of this divided jurisdiction, the security responsibility being charged to the Commanding General, USAFPOA and not redelegated to lower echelons, while the means or activities to effect security were under the control of the Commanding General, CPBC.

In addition to this discrepancy, by 1944 the theater G2 had the responsibility of requisitioning and providing CIC detachments for attachment to Army ground forces in the Western Pacific. With no personnel on hand, personnel had to be requisitioned from CPBC.

In June 1945, action was initiated to have CIC raised to theater level. CIC officials requested that all CIC detachments in the theater be assigned to USAFPOA.[257]

At about this same time, all the Pacific areas were coordinated under Gen Douglas MacArthur. The new command was designated as United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC). USAFPOA was redesignated United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific (USAF, MIDPAC) on 1 July 1945 with General Richardson again commander.[258] Orders were issued assigning all CIC detachments in the theater to the new command. In addition a circular was published covering the mission of CIC and the responsibilities of the commanding officers of organizations to which detachments might be assigned. With this command change, G2, MIDPAC had control of all CIC units and was better able to carry out the local and forward area duties assigned to CIC.[259]

256 War-Time CIC History, AFMIDPAC, p. 15.
257 Ibid., p. 8.
258 The Army Almanac, U.S. Government Printing Office 1950, p. 611.
259 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), pp. 8-9, (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Section 2

DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION

The Contact Office, later the Counter Intelligence Division, was organized to carry out its own particular mission of maintaining internal security within Hawaii in the most efficient manner possible. The unit was "departmentalized with the view of gathering information, providing a constant sounding board of public opinion, and detecting any subversive feeling or action."[260]

Headquarters was maintained on the second floor of an office building in downtown Honolulu. A fleet of 33 vehicles, 30 of them civilian style automobiles, was used to cover Oahu, an area of approximately 600 square miles. Agents were on duty 24 hours a day.

Expansion of the Contact Office was rapid following the outbreak of hostilities. By 27 January 1942 there were 27 agents in the area and by February, 33. One year later there were 81 agents and two years later 97 agents, the greatest total reached.[261] The T/O for the Territory of Hawaii Military Area provided for 36 officers and 107 EM agents.[262]

Personnel for the CIC Contact Office came from three sources: local residents inducted into the Army, given military training and brought into CIC; troops sent to the Territory of Hawaii as casuals or assigned to Army units; and CIC replacements shipped from the United States. Because of new personnel assignments, old agents going out to forward units, and other agents going to officer candidate school, the turn-over in the CIC in Hawaii by May 1945 was approximately 80 percent.[263]

In addition to headquarters on Oahu, CIC had branch offices on the other three major islands in the Territory--Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai. Each had its own preliminary hearing board, and most of the cases which arose on these islands were handled by the two to four resident agents stationed there.

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260 Manual on Hawaii Background, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

261 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONDIDENTIAL), p. 14, (Staff and Faculty Library).

262 "The Counter Intelligence Corps in the Central Pacific Area, A Brief History," dtd 21 May 1945, taken from Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Theaters, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 4, (Staff and Faculty Library).

263 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), p. 15, (Staff and Faculty Library).

The scope of activities of the Personnel Subsection included loyalty investigations of military personnel and employees of the War Department.[267]

The General Subsection functioned as an auxiliary for the other three subsections. When called upon, it furnished additional agents for large or important investigations. It also received general complaint cases and followed through on investigations of military personnel with regard to disaffection, subversive activity and possible sabotage or espionage.

Technical Section

Although the strength of the Technical Section varied from time to time, it usually numbered seven agents. The section's main duties consisted of exercising technical surveillance over various types of electrical communication systems throughout Hawaii and handling investigations of aircraft accidents in which sabotage was suspected. The vast majority of these accidents were found to be the result of carelessness. In fact, no known act of Axis-inspired sabotage was committed in Hawaii after the beginning of hostilities.[268]

The assignments given the Technical Section fell into three general categories: "outside," "inside," and "laboratory." The outside assignments included investigations of aliens possessing or suspected of possessing shortwave receivers and all pre-war amateur radio operators, microphone surveillances, and cooperation with the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) in surveillance and investigation of possible contraband transmitters. Personnel from the section also accompanied agents from other departments within the detachment on searches to determine violations of General Orders pertaining to radio.

The General Orders, issued by the Military Governor, prohibited enemy aliens from listening to shortwave broadcasts other than those originating in the United States. Inasmuch as the alien population was predominately Japanese and the signal from Radio Tokyo extremely strong, CIC was constantly on the alert for violators.

The inside work of the Technical Section consisted mainly of monitoring the two-way police radio and installing and maintaining various audio and inter office communication systems in the Contact Office. Many times throughout each day, the Honolulu Police Department was called on cases the nature of which in some way, large or small, had a bearing on CIC operations. Therefore, the Technical

267 Proposed Table of Organization--CIC Branch, Hawaii, dtd March 1943, p. 30, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

268 History of the CIC in Hawaiian Islands (Processing Japanese-Americans and Japanese Nationals in Hawaiian Islands), (Unclassified) (Staff and Faculty Library).

The three main echelons in the Honolulu office were the Officer in Charge (sometimes referred to as the Chief, CIC, U.S. Territory of Hawaii), the Executive Officer and the Chief of the Investigative Section. The remainder of the office was split into various sections and subsections.[264]

Administrative Section

The Administrative Section consisted of one officer, 1st Lt Andrew S. Wong, five administrative assistants and 12 clerk-typists. It was charged with the planning, coordination, and execution of the detailed administrative functions of the organization.

All incoming and outgoing correspondence passed through the section. With few exceptions, all papers, reports, and letters received by and copies sent out by the office were filed.

The section performed other miscellaneous functions as well, including mimeographing, personnel administration and fiscal accounting.[265]

Investigative Section

The Investigative Section, largest in the office, was broken down into four subsections--Espionage, Sabotage, Personnel, and General.

The Espionage Subsection dealt mainly with investigating Japanese residents. Of the many hundreds of subjects processed, only one was ever convicted of espionage--and he was a German. The man was taken into custody shortly after the war began and sentenced to a term in a federal penitentiary.

The primary responsibility of the Sabotage Subsection was to investigate actual cases of sabotage, but the institution of countersabotage measures was an additional key mission. The two-man subsection of Agents Donald Fenton and Elbert Turner made numerous surveys of vital installations and public utilities following suspected sabotage incidents. Close liaison was maintained with other agencies to try to ascertain if a series or pattern of incidents was developing. Their investigations revealed that the vast majority of sabotage complaints were cases of destruction or damage caused by carelessness or negligence.[266]

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264 War-Time History of CIC, AFMIDPAC, (CONFIDENTIAL), pp. 30-31, (Staff and Faculty Library).

265 Proposed Table of Organization--CIC Branch, Hawaii, dtd March 1943, p. 26, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

266 Proposed Table of Organization--CIC Branch, Hawaii, dtd March 1943, p. 5, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Section maintained a 24-hour monitor on the police calls. When a dispatch appeared to be of interest to the Contact Office, the agent on duty notified the duty officer who evaluated the call. When deemed advisable, an agent was sent out to determine the true nature of the case.

Most of the laboratory work dealt with photography. Two specially-trained agents spent their time developing crime-scene pictures and examining confiscated films and documents.[269]

Japanese Section

Organized to handle classes of Japanese deemed potentially dangerous by virtue of their past activity, the Japanese Section was one of the most active in the detachment. By March 1943, only nine months after it was organized, the section had located and processed well over 1,000 individuals.

When information was compiled indicating that a subject might be an enemy sympathizer, the case was usually turned over to the Investigative Section. It was the mission of the Japanese Section merely to screen Japanese whose loyalty was questioned, but not necessarily to pursue an investigation to a conclusion if derogatory information was uncovered. During the peak of operations, the section was staffed by six agents under Lt Kanemi Kanazawi.[270]

"All Other Enemies" Section

The "All Other Enemies" Section was charged with the responsibility of investigating all Military Intelligence Division (MID) cases of espionage and disaffection involving persons not of Oriental blood. Because of the CIP groundwork in this field prior to 7 December 1941, most of the pro-Axis sympathizers were known, and it was a simple matter to take them into custody.

Many subjects were later released, but kept under constant scrutiny by means of confidential informants, mail clerks, and surveillances. Through these means the section remained constantly abreast of the activities of former members of groups which were considered subversive.

The effectiveness of the informant net established on Oahu was well illustrated by an incident which took place during the summer of 1943. An impromtu party was given by several members of a group considered to be subversive. Even before

269 History of the CIC in Hawaiian Islands (Processing Japanese-Americans and Japanese Nationals in Hawaiian Islands), p. 32, (Unclassified) (Staff and Faculty Library).

270 Ibid., p. 10.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXIII

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THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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October 1959

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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

[redacted]

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Preface

CIC's LOST DETACHMENT

On 9 April 1942, the first CIC-trained officers arrived in Australia to form the nucleus of the detachment that was to accompany combat troops into nearly every phase of the bitter fighting on the road to Tokyo. At the same time the Philippine CIC Detachment was nearing the end of its last-ditch fight along with the remnants of other United States units who had escaped to Corregidor. With the surrender of Corregidor to the Japanese on 6 May, this became CIC's "Lost Detachment." Only one member of the detachment escaped - Arthur Komori, who was taken to Australia just before the fall of Corregidor to act as an interpreter at GHQ.

Little is known of this detachment. There is no certain list of its members. Only one official document has been found to verify even its existence; but part of the story has been pieced together from interviews with a few who escaped from the enemy or were released from prison camps at the end of the war.

The one official document is a cable, dated 23 January 1945, from the Director of Intelligence to the "Commander in Chief SWPA," listing twenty-four names that the "records indicate" were on duty in the Philippines with the CIC at the time of the Japanese invasion.[1] Nine of these men are known to have died while in the hands of the enemy.[2]

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1 SPINT 322.999 CIC, 24 Jan 45, Subj: "Corps of Intelligence Police Personnel in the Philippines," TO: Commander in Chief SWPA; ATTN: AC of S, G2, signed, Roamer, Director of Intelligence, (Kansas City Records Center). The following names were listed: Lorenzo Alvarado, John A. Anderson, William R. Connor, Bernabe M. Datuin, James E. Delanty, Joseph A. Delia Malva, Grenfell D. Drisko, Stewart L. Garrison, Ahmad Gaspar, Jr., Harry B. Glass, Will Scott Gordon, Charles W. Henderson, Leon H. Jay, Raymond W. Kujawski, John T. Lynch, Paul A. Marinas, Ralph W. Montgomery, James J. Rubarb, Richard M. Sakakida, Paul Sebestyen, Guadencio Sillona, Antonio Tabaniag, Clyde L. Teske and Robert F. Wallbaum.

NOTE: Arthur Komori said that Palone (fnu) was also a member of the Detachment. He said that Sillona, Marinas, Tabaniag and Alvarado were Filipinos and Gaspar was a Moro.

2 Information obtained by the CIC Board from returnees indicated that Anderson died of diptheria and Glass of malaria in Cabantuan Prison, and that Gordon, Jay, Wallbaum and Henderson went down on sinking prison ships. There is no information on the deaths of Datuin, Drisko and Gaspar. Information obtained from returnees also indicated that Henderson had been commissioned a First Lieutenant before his capture.

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Although the list of twenty-four did not contain any officers, since officers were not yet "detailed" to CIC, it is known that at least five officers who were working as a part of the CIC Detachment, as well as the former commanding officer, who had become G2 of the Philippine command after General Willoughby left for Australia, were captured. Of these, three died while in captivity and one, wounded critically on Bataan, died soon after his release from the enemy.[3]

There are no records to indicate the work of the Philippine Detachment during those last days on Bataan and Corregidor, but a partial story has been culled from the memories of two Nisei agents, Arthur S. Komori and Richard M. Sakakida, the first Japanese-Americans taken into CIP.[4]

First Nisei Agents go to Philippines

Nine months prior to the fall of Corregidor, on 13 March 1941, Sakakida and Komori were sworn in as sergeants of the CIP in Hawaii. The first Niseis taken into CIP, they were told to prepare to go on a secret mission, the nature of which would be revealed later. Their destination was Manila, but even that could be revealed only to their immediate families.

Less than a month later they were on their way to Manila on the U.S. Army Transport Republic, signed on as crew members to protect their identity. Their only instructions were that they would be given instructions upon arrival. When the ship was about three miles out from Manila on 21 April, the purser brought word that they were to report to the Captain on the bridge. There they were met by Captain Nelson Raymond (later Major and Commanding Officer of the Detachment) who arranged to meet them later. At the next meeting Captain Raymond, accompanied by Agent Grenfell D. Drisko, drove them on a short tour of the city and gave them their instructions. Captain Raymond, a long-time agent, gave them

3 Those known to have been captured were: Lt Col Stuart Wood, former CO; Maj Nelson Raymond, who became CO after Colonel Wood became G2; Capt Raymond E. Bibee, 1st Lt Jack Erwin, Capt Ralph Keeler and Capt (fnu) Rosveare. According to CIC Board records, Major Raymond and Captain Keeler were drowned on sinking prison ships; and Lieutenant Erwin died of malaria in a Japanese prison camp. The cause of Captain Bibee's death has not been established; according to some reports he died on a prison ship, but according to others, in Fujuska prison camp in Japan. According to Capt Richard Sakakida, Captain Keeler was recovered from the enemy, but died a short time later.

4 The remainder of this Preface is taken from a document prepared after the war by Arthur Komori, who at the time of this writing was serving as an instructor at the AIC School, Fort Holabird; and from an interview with Capt Richard Sakakida, OSI, Air Force, at OSI Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 18 March 1955.

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implicit instructions and encouragement and, as time went on, according to Komori, "gradually instilled in us the techniques of subtle investigations and subterfuges in the best traditions of the CIP." Until after the outbreak of war only Captain Raymond and Agent Drisko knew of the two Nisei agents.

The agents were given a mail box at the Central Post Office in Manila under the name "Sixto Borja"--Sixto, since Sakakida's code was B-16, and Borja, a common Filipino name--which they were to check twice daily for instructions as to rendezvous points. Captain Raymond--sometimes Agent Drisko--would pick them up at the named spot someplace in the city and take them by a roundabout route to the G-2 office in Fort Santiago to submit their reports or receive briefings.

At the meeting with Captain Raymond the day of their arrival, the magnitude of their task dawned on them, for it was then that they were told they were to investigate the Japanese community of Manila. Sakakida was instructed to go to the Nishikawa Hotel and Komori to the Toyo Hotel. Both were to use the cover of having tired of their sea duties and having "jumped ship," a convenient cover since a freighter had unexpectedly put into port that day. Komori added the fact that he was a "draft dodger," which, he said, "was favorably received by the pro-Emperor sons of Japan."

Komori

During the eight months before Pearl Harbor, Komori managed to insinuate himself into the good graces of the Japanese Consul General, the Chief of the Japan Tourist Bureau, the Chief of the Japan Cultural Hall, the Chief of the Domei News Agency, and other leading Japanese residents of Manila. Komori found many of the Japanese "arrogant and expansionist minded," and becoming increasingly impatient with the "weak-kneed" policies of the Konoye Cabinet. They were so sure of their future role in the Orient that a reporter, who was a student at an English class which Komori taught at the Japan Cultural Hall wrote, for a newspaper in Osaka, Japan, the probable route of Japanese troops if they should invade Singapore.

Komori found his connections with the Japanese too close for comfort when, after the outbreak of war, he was caught by Filipino Constabularymen in the Domei News Agency office drinking a toast to the Emperor. To the Constabularymen he was just as Japanese as the others. They surrounded the captives with fixed bayonets and herded them into buses which took them to "the hell-hole of Manila, stinking old Bilidid Prison." With complete faith that Captain Raymond would somehow manage to learn his whereabouts and rescue him, Komori began trying to find out if any of the other internees had been implicated in plans for the attack. Although it seemed that none of them had known in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack, Komori "learned much of the arrogant and warlike mentality of the supposedly peaceful businessmen from Japan in that first week of war."

After a week Captain Raymond sent Agent Drisko to obtain Komori's release from Bilidid on a pretext, and Komori was able for the first time to get acquainted with the other members of the detachment.

Sakakida

In the meantime, Sakakida was also busy making contacts in the spots where information could be obtained. Fortunately the Nishikawa Hotel was operated by a childless couple named Fujii, who took an instant liking to Sakakida and soon wanted to adopt him; they even wrote to his mother in Hawaii asking her permission. During his first days there, Sakakida was asked hundreds of questions by the Fujii's, the hotel's permanent residents, and the many frequenters of the hotel. He maintained that he had been born and reared in Hawaii, but growing tired of life there, had gone to sea. His freighter had unexpectedly stopped off in Manila, and he had jumped ship, deciding that the city looked like a nice place to live for a while.

His past accounted for, it was necessary for the new agent to establish some kind of cover for his present activities. He let it be known to his new Japanese friends that he had obtained a job with the Marsman Trading Company, sole agents for Sears Roebuck in the Philippines. Captain Raymond arranged for Sakakida's name to be placed on the Marsman employee list. To keep up pretenses, he wandered into the trading company every morning at 0800, loitered for a while, and then spent the rest of the morning at the Lyric Theater. His Japanese acquaintances, told he worked only in the morning, had the pleasure of his company for the rest of the day. He soon began working as a clerk in Mr. Fujii's hotel in exchange for room and board. The important thing, however, was that this job gave him an opportunity to inspect passports and to assist many persons in making out requests for passport entries as required by the Philippine Commonwealth government.

A little later, when the United States government froze all Japanese assets in the Philippines, Japanese nationals were required to file declarations of all bank accounts and other assets. Since many Japanese required assistance in filling out the numerous forms, Sakakida performed this service at a nominal fee, and thus was able to interview a good portion of the Japanese population of Manila and subtly obtain much information that did not go on the forms. The most pertinent question was one concerning prior military service. Often the Japanese would ask Sakakida if they should admit their military service on the forms; sometimes he would advise them not to, but of course would report the information to G2. In this way he was able to report to G2 the complete military backgrounds of a large portion of the Japanese population in Manila.

Soon after his arrival in Manila, Sakakida was directed by Captain Raymond to establish friendship with Clarence Yamagata, a Hawaiian-born Nisei who was practicing law in Manila and also acting as part-time legal adviser to the Japanese

Consulate. Through Yamagata he became acquainted with persons in the Consulate from whom he obtained general information. Late in November, Mr. Yamagata told Sakakida he had arranged employment for him at the Japanese Vice-Consulate at Davao, on Mindanao. Captain Raymond approved this move, but before it materialized it was cancelled by the outbreak of war.

The outbreak of war found Sakakida, like Komori, to all outward appearances a Japanese among a hostile people. For his own protection he went to the Japanese Club House on Taft Boulevard which had been designated an evacuation center for Japanese Nationals. As he presented himself he was met by Paul Marinas, who, as he learned later, was an agent of the Philippine CIC Detachment. In searching Sakakida's belongings, Marinas found his passport which, although fictitious, did reveal Sakakida's American citizenship. Marinas at first told Sakakida that since he was a United States citizen, he could not enter the evacuation center, but when Sakakida explained that his Japanese features would place him in physical danger from the Filipinos, Marinas consented to let him stay but said he should feel free to leave at any time. A few days later, Sakakida was sent out with another internee to Manila City to obtain milk for the children and other foods of which the camp was in short supply. After obtaining the food, Sakakida went to the Nishikawa hotel to pick up his belongings. While he was packing his things, three Constabulary secret

They took him to Bilidid where, like Komori, he was rescued by Agent Drisko a few days later, and for the first time met the other members of the CIP Detachment.

Detachment Busy During Last Days

A couple of days before Manila was declared an "open city" on 26 December, the detachment, along with the G-2 Section with which they were working, packed up all its documents and left Manila on a tiny steamer, bound for Bataan via Corregidor. They set up headquarters in a spot hidden by tall timber and jungle growth, near Little Baguio. With little precedent to guide them, these agents plunged into a frenzy of activity, performing a variety of tasks simply because there was noone else to do them. They collected enemy information, interrogated prisoners of war, checked the security of communications and documents, went on patrols and scouting expeditions through the lines, interned collaborators, and translated captured enemy documents and the inscriptions on captured enemy materials. So great was the quantity and variety of captured materials that one day among a pile of equipment dumped in the headquarters were found a land mine and a "Molotov Cocktail."

For a while Komori was attached to General Wainwright's Headquarters on the Western Front, specifically for help in identifying Japanese units. In the meantime several members of the detachment had been sent over to Corregidor. Sakakida was among these, with the specific duty of deciphering the Japanese code.

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Early in April he was joined by Komori and Yamagata, Sakakida's contact in Manila, whom Captain Raymond had brought out of Manila with the detachment to assist in translating documents.

During those days when capture by the enemy was imminent and few could escape, there was concern both in General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia and General Wainwright's headquarters on Corregidor over the two Nisei agents. They would no doubt fare worse under captivity than would the Caucasians, since the Japanese refused to recognize the right of anyone of Japanese blood to bear loyalty to another country. Then too, there was the danger that their nine months of undercover activity in the Philippines would be revealed.

Early in April Komori and Sakakida were informed by Lt Col Stuart Wood, former Commanding Officer of the detachment, who had become G2 after General Willoughby's departure, that orders had been received from General MacArthur's headquarters that they were to leave via the "bamboo fleet."

Sakakida Gives His Place to Another

It was at this moment that Sakakida had to make his most difficult decision. He realized that Yamagata's situation under capture would be worse than his own. Yamagata would not even have the protection due a member of the Armed Forces. He was a civilian, had worked openly for the Japanese in a position of trust, and had willingly come over to the Americans. Besides, his wife and two children were then in Japan. Sakakida persuaded Colonel Wood that Yamagata should take his place. Colonel Wood obtained General Wainwright's permission, who in turn obtained permission from General MacArthur in Australia.

So, in the early morning of 13 April, Komori and Yamagata, along with an emissary from Chiang Kai-shek and a correspondent named Hewlett, left for the tiny airstrip in what was considered a "fifty-fifty attempt" to get out in two Army training planes. Komori rode as co-pilot in one, due to his previous C.A.A. flight training in Hawaii, to Iloilo, Panay. As recorded by Komori, "Captain 'P.I.' Gunn rescued us from Panay with his B-25 in a flight in broad daylight through enemy territory in a hedge-hopping, canyon-shooting, wave-skipping trip, which were Gunn's specialties. He kept our morale up by telling us that enemy planes could not see us since we were flying only a few feet above our shadow." At Mindanao, they were picked up by "General Boyce's raiding squadron" and were flown on to Melbourne, where Komori joined the little handful of CIC agents who had arrived on 6 April. Among his duties was helping to set up the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) to which so many Niseis were to give their ability and loyalty throughout the war. Komori was one of the first CIC agents to enter Japan after the surrender - but that is another story.

Sakakida set about preparing for the inevitable surrender. Other than the destruction of records, there was little to do but wait. On 6 May, the day of the final surrender, Sakakida accompanied General Wainwright's party to Bataan to act as interpreter at the surrender conference, but at Cabacabana Port, he was informed by the Japanese that they would use their own interpreters.

For the next several months he was under constant interrogation by either the Japanese Military Police or officers of the Judge Advocate General's section of 14th Japanese Army Headquarters, interrogation that eventually degenerated into severe torture. They told him he was on trial for treason--although he was never brought into court--since anyone of Japanese ancestry was of necessity a Japanese citizen. Finally, 14th Army Headquarters received word from the Japanese Ministry in Tokyo that, although Sakakida had been registered with the Japanese Consul in Hawaii at birth, as was the custom of Japanese residents there, his citizenship had been officially voided in August 1941. His mother had had the forethought to take this action after Sakakida had left for the Philippines as a CIP agent, an action which even the Japanese recognized made the charge of treason illegal. They then changed the charge to one of disturbing the peace and order of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines, and the interrogation continued.

Through it all Sakakida stuck to his original story. He was a victim of circumstances. The Americans had taken him to Bataan and Corregidor as an interpreter. He was an American citizen (which was true)--and a civilian (which was not true). Finally, in February 1943, he was taken from Bilidid Prison to the office of a Colonel Nishiharu, Chief Judge Advocate of 14th Army Headquarters. He was told that he was to work in the office, run the mimeograph machine, make tea, and help out generally where he was needed, and that on his off-duty time he would serve as a houseboy at the Colonel's home.

The Japanese continued in devious ways to attempt to gain an admission that he was in the U.S. Army. He was thrown a .45 and curtly ordered to clean it. Realizing that if he properly disassembled the weapon, it would be an indication of military service, Sakakida merely wiped the .45 with an oily rag. He explained that if someone would take the weapon apart he would be only too glad to clean the rest of it. Once the officer in charge of counterespionage with the 14th Army suddenly accused him of being a sergeant in the United States Army. Although alarmed, Sakakida was able to deny the statement convincingly enough that the officer turned to other matters. Another officer, who happened to be a graduate of Harvard, seemingly in a sympathetic mood one day asked Sakakida how much the U.S. Army paid him for his work as an interpreter. Recognizing this as a ruse he had used himself to learn the rank of prisoners, he claimed that he had received no money, inasmuch as under the circumstances he had had no need for any.

Sakakida Contacts Guerillas

The dual job of office work and houseboy continued for a time until one day the Colonel discovered that Sakakida was dipping into his stock of American cigarettes and banished him from the houseboy job; as it turned out this was a fortunate change. He was sent to live in a civilian barracks, the former English Club in Manila City. The barracks was under the strict discipline of a warrant officer who took roll call at 0600 and 2230 and a bed check at midnight, but overlooked the hours between midnight and the morning roll call. This gave Sakakida about five hours in which to contact persons to whom he could give information gained at headquarters during the day.

He had already made one fortunate contact at headquarters. One day the wife of Ernest Tupas, who had formerly worked with CIP and since the war began had been working with guerillas, came to the JAG office and asked Sakakida to interpret for her a request to visit her husband who had been captured and was confined on a fifteen year sentence in Muntinglupa Prison. Sakakida made himself known to her, and filled out passes for her and many of the other guerillas' wives with forms he had stolen from the office. He assurred her she need have no fear in using the passes at the prison since the Filipino guards couldn't read English anyway.

Prison Break Engineered

Sakakida began making plans to free Tupas and about 500 other guerillas who were confined in the prison. Through guerillas he was able to contact during his 'free hours" and through others that Mrs. Tupas was able to contact, the plans were made. It was arranged for Tupas to get a job with the prison electrical department so at a designated time he could short-circuit electrical facilities. Guerillas sent to case the prison came up with the information that officers from the Japanese garrison made a tour, something of a security check, nightly between 2400 and 0200.

On the big night, Sakakida left his barracks as soon as bed-check was over and, with four of the local guerillas, all dressed as Japanese officers, approached the prison's main gate. Certain these officers were making the nightly security inspection, the guards bowed low in respect for their superiors. To their amazement, they found .45's stuck in their ribs. Out went the prison lights. Approximately 25 guerilla members overpowered the rest of the guards, and nearly 500 Filipino prisoners were released.

Sakakida hustled back to his quarters to make 0630 roll call. The next morning he was at work in the Colonel's office when the superintendent of Muntinglupa Prison came dashing in to report the break. The Colonel hit the ceiling. When the furore died away, the superintendent was dismissed for his unfortunate mistakes.

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Shortly after the break, Sakakida was able to contact Tupas, who had fled to the mountains of Rizal with the guerillas. Tupas had established wireless contact with General MacArthur's headquarters. At last, Sakakida had a means of relaying to the Americans the vast amount of information he picked up around the Colonel's office, particularly data on Japanese troop movements and shipping activities. Probably his single most important contribution was a portion of the plans for a Japanese Expeditionary Force to Australia. Some months later Sakakida learned what happended to this task force. An officer assigned to the JAG office had been aboard one of the fifteen vessels that had left the Philippines with ideas of landing at Port Darwin. He was also aboard the only ship that got back to the Philippines. U.S. submarines had taken care of the rest.

At one time in 1943 Sakakida's hopes were raised when he was approached by a stranger who told him that another person had requested he inquire whether Sakakida would like to escape to Australia. Cautiously Sakakida said he would like to talk to the original inquirer. He heard nothing of it again until after the war, when he learned that the Anderson guerillas were trying to get him out at the direction of General MacArthur's headquarters, but that the message had been garbled by passing through several emissaries and the word had got back that he preferred to remain in the Philippines.

In December 1944, the Japanese 14th Army Headquarters had to move to Northern Luzon because of heavy air attacks on the city, and in April 1945 it moved further inland. In the early part of June, Sakakida made his escape into the hills. About a week later, he met a small band of guerillas in the vicinity of Farmschol and joined forces with them. Ten days later the guerillas took a severe shelling. Sakakida was wounded and left behind. He existed alone in the hills until September 1945.

"Lost" Agent Returns

In September he found himself in close proximity to the Asing River. Sakakida, still unaware the war was over, decided to follow the river, figuring he would reach some semblance of civilization sooner or later. Racked by malaria, dysentery and beri-beri, his progress was extremely slow. Finally he spotted seven or eight soldiers. At first he thought they were Germans, because they wore uniforms and equipment which were strange to him. Getting closer and hearing the soldiers' conversation, Sakakida realized they were Americans. He turned himself in and was taken to the soldiers' battalion headquarters. The outfit turned out to be a medical evacuation unit posted in the forward areas to collect stragglers. Sakakida was taken to the major commanding the unit and identified himself as an intelligence agent captured by the Japanese at the outbreak of the war. He gave the major his serial number and other pertinent data. The major was suspicious but put through

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a telephone call to the CIC Field Office. Two hours later two CIC lieutenants arrived in a jeep, identified the weary agent and transported him to the Bagabec Field Office of the First CIC Region, 441st CIC Detachment.

The happiness with which Sakakida was received by CIC was summed up simply by his friend Komori: "His successful duping of the Japs is the finest story of Counter Intelligence within enemy lines. His recovery was considered more important than the capture of General Yamashita...."

The agents gave him a warm welcome and a festive banquet. Sakakida had lived for six months on wild foods and grass, and the rich food consumed at the banquet reacted immediately. It took him a week to recover from the effects of the meal but that was the only recuperation he had the opportunity to enjoy. There were War Crimes suspects to round up, identify, interrogate and try, and Sakakida was a key figure in this activity. Until the War Crimes trials were completed, there was no time for hospitalization or sick leave for Sakakida; by this time he had recovered from the ills which had plagued him during captivity.

There were Bronze Stars for both Arthur Komori and Richard Sakakida for their work in the Philippines during 1941 which "they performed. . .with complete disregard of the personal danger in which they found themselves." But more important to these men, the first Americans of Japanese ancestry to be taken into CIC, was this sentence in their commendation:

> "These two Nisei noncommissioned officers are a credit to their people and to the United States Army."

While Richard Sakakida had been fighting his private war against the Japanese, other CIC agents, after getting off to a slow start, had been moving forward, island by island, along with the South West Pacific Area combat troops, from their starting point in Australia.

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Part I: Build-up in the South

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Chapter 1

PREPARATION FOR COUNTERATTACK

The organization, operations and mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps, which varied widely among the Theaters of War and Base Commands during World War II, found even wider divergence in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). In order to understand the reasons behind these marked divergences, it is necessary first to recount briefly the numerous changes in organization and the seeming welter of alphabetical designations that made up the Theater's command structure.

The Outbreak of War

On 7 December 1941, Major General Julian F. Barnes, commander of a convoy of nine ships carrying 4,700 troops, fifty A-20 light bombers, and other materiel, which had set out from Honolulu eight days before to reinforce General MacArthur's Philippine contingent, received this message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet:

"JAPAN STARTED HOSTILITIES GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY."

General Barnes turned his convoy toward the Fiji Islands, and, on 12 December, one day before reaching his destination, named his force "Task Force, South Pacific." New orders sent the convoy to Australia where it was redesignated United States Forces in Australia. Two weeks later, on 5 January 1942, a new designation, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) was given.[5]

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5 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, (p. 1), (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
NOTE: This document must be actually considered as two separate documents, since the text is based upon another document, "A History of Counter Intelligence Operations in the Southwest Pacific and United States Army Forces, Pacific Theater, During World War II," prepared by the Office of the Chief Counter-intelligence Officer, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946. In addition to the text of the original document, reference has been expanded by the addition of documentary sources and added explanations and comments, many of which are bitterly critical of the text. Reference was prepared under the editorship of Major General C. A. Willoughby, G2, GHQ, AFHQ, while the basic document presumably was prepared under Brigadier General Elliot R. Thorpe, USAFFE G2. (Both documents are on file at the Central Records Facility)

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[redacted]

There were few organized counterintelligence activities during this period when the Australian headquarters was interested primarily in getting established, a process that was hampered by the uncertainty as to whether they might still be sent to the Philippines. Planning was further hampered by changes in personnel: the G2, in whom counterintelligence responsibilities were vested, was changed seven times between December 1941 and April 1942, and there were nine changes in Commanding Generals between December 1941 and July 1942. To add to the difficulties, the headquarters moved, in January 1942, from Brisbane to Melbourne, a distance of 1,500 miles.

Handicapped by a shortage of personnel, the G2 staff had only four officers. Intelligence work was confined to a tightening of security measures, the imposition of censorship and attempting to keep a situation map of Japan's rapid thrusts in the Pacific, using a map from an old copy of the National Geographic Magazine.[6]

Following the arrival of General MacArthur from the Philippines, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ, SWPA) was established in Melbourne, with USAFIA and United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) as subordinate commands. For all practical purposes, the latter ceased to exist after the fall of Corregidor the following month.

With a major reorganization of staff sections and their missions, USAFIA, although technically the United States Army Command in the Southwest Pacific, became essentially the administrative headquarters, with the responsibility of administration, procurement, training and supply of United States troops in the area.[7]

On 20 July 1942, USAFIA was renamed United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS), but no change in personnel, organization or functions was involved. On the same day GHQ, SWPA moved 1,500 miles forward, to Brisbane, and, a few weeks later, USASOS moved, about half that distance to Sydney.[8]

In February 1943 another major organizational change took place with the reconstitution of General Headquarters, United States Army Forces of the Far East (USAFFE). This was a "reconstitution," since, having come into being as a consolidation of United States Forces and Philippine Forces on 26 July 1941, the unit had never been deactivated after the fall of the Philippines, although its continuance had been only nominal. Strategic and tactical operations were under the direction of GHQ, SWPA (Forward Echelon); administrative matters were delegated

6 Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 1., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

7 Ibid, p. 3.

8 Ibid, p. 8.

to GHQ, USAFFE (Rear Echelon); and the major functions of supply and evacuation remained with USASOS. This structure remained until the formation of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, in 1945.[9]

These structural changes are important in a history of the Counter Intelligence Corps in this area, since operational intelligence activities were assigned to the G2, GHQ, SWPA, and counterintelligence to the G2, USAFIA, then to USASOS and later, after the reorganization in February 1943, to the G2, GHQ, USAFFE.

In the beginning, CIC agents were assigned directly to the Base Command or combat unit with which they were to operate, but by War Department order on 18 May 1943, all CIC personnel in the Theater were relieved from their units and assigned to Headquarters USAFFE.[10]

The final Theater-wide change which affected CIC came on 6 April 1945 when, in preparation for the invasion of Japan, code-named Operation OLYMPIC, General Headquarters, United States Forces, Pacific (AFPAC) was established, bringing under one command nearly all units then in the Pacific Theater. The G2, GHQ, SWPA, became the G2 of the new AFPAC, but the G-2 Office of USAFFE became a special staff section charged with the continued responsibility for counterintelligence.[11]

Praise and Criticism

The separation of counterintelligence from operational intelligence throughout the war was explained as being "in accordance with this command structure," but was criticized severely in a history of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, prepared under the editorship of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, who served as G2, GHQ, SWPA, throughout the war: "This division was completely unwarranted; it is contrary to existing Staff Manuals...[12] The continuance of two G2's, one for SWPA and one for USAFFE was an administrative absurdity."[13] Of the continuance of the G2 USAFFE office as a special staff section under AFPAC this criticism was leveled: "This must be considered as a conspiracy to continue the unhealthy division of intelligence operations."[14]

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9 Operations of Counter Intelligence in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 1 and p. 16, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

10 Ibid, p. 21

11 Ibid, pp. 88, 89.

12 Ibid, p. 3 and footnote.

13 Ibid, p. 17 and footnote.

14 Ibid, footnote, p. 89.

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In the history prepared by the Office of the Chief Counterintelligence Officer, GHQ, AFPAC, the assignment of all CIC agents to Headquarters USAFFE in May 1943, was hailed as a "corrective move." Prior to this change, this history stated, "the administration of CIC personnel depended upon the judgement of the commander of units to which they were assigned. At this time not many unit commanders had a clear conception of the function of CIC."[15] Immediate steps were taken to activate a theater CIC detachment, but "lack of precedents, as well as uncertainty regarding other changes to be ordered by the War Department, did not make this immediately possible." It was not until April 1944 that the 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional) was authorized. In the meantime, the Office of the Chief, CIC, continued to function as Theater CIC Headquarters. At a conference held on 26 June 1943, the revised "chain of command," necessitated by the reassignment of CIC personnel, was explained to representatives of Sixth Army, Fifth Air Force and USASOS. All personnel on duty in units other than Headquarters USAFFE were placed on temporary duty status with those units. At the conclusion of the conference a letter was issued stipulating, in part: "The Counter Intelligence Corps, SWPA, is the direct responsibility of the Chief, CIC. The Sixth Army, Fifth Air Force, and USASOS will each have a CIC detachment on detached service for which they will be responsible, but in order that CIC activities may be coordinated efficiently general supervision is exercised by the Chief, CIC."[16]

In the history prepared in the office of the G2, SWPA, this move also was bitterly criticized; "there was never the slightest reason, tactical or functional, why CIC within the command area of a tactical unit should not operate under its G2."[17] Further criticism was given: "In evaluating these conspiratorial measures, the theater as a whole must be considered; the combat zone, at this time, was deeper in New Guinea, over 2,000 miles from a purely administrative headquarters (USAFFE), then located at Sydney and Brisbane, Australia; the proposal was to establish a 'central administration,' at that point; as a matter of fact, what the Theater CIC really arrived at (and almost obtained) was not 'administrative' supervision only but absolute operational control."[18]

This division of intelligence responsibility "ultimately led to friction, overlap, duplication and general inefficiency," according to the history prepared in General Willoughby's office,[19] while the history prepared in General Thorpe's headquarters stated, "There was to be close cooperation between G-2 Section, USAFIA and the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA.[20]

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15 Operations of Counter Intelligence in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 21, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

16 Ibid, p. 21 and Appendix 2.

17 Ibid, footnote, p. 20.

18 Ibid, footnote, p. 21.

19 Ibid, Preface, p. 1.

20 Ibid, p. 3.

From the documents available it is impossible to assess objectively the relative validity of these widely divergent views. Documents do indicate, however, that CIC agents, operating in detachments and as individuals, were generally able to overcome whatever handicaps the peculiar command structure of the Theater may have imposed.

Counterintelligence operations got off to a slow start in the Theater. It was not until 9 April 1942, the day the United States Forces surrendered on Bataan, that the first trained Counter Intelligence Corps officers arrived in Australia to join the slowly-assembling Allied units preparing to start the long struggle toward Tokyo.[21]

Variety of Duties Assigned

Working under Colonel (later Brigadier General) Thorpe, USAFIA G2, these first CIC officers were given a variety of duties, not entirely within the scope of the CIC mission. The responsibility for establishing CIC operations was delegated to First Lieutenant John N. Irwin, II, who was also designated assistant executive officer of the G-2 Section. Another of the CIC officers, Second Lieutenant Leo J. Nielsen, Jr., was appointed assistant military censor; Second Lieutenant Harold G. Gelwicks was assigned to Base Section 4 at Melbourne as Intelligence Officer in addition to duties as a G2 investigative officer; Second Lieutenant Blair P. Labatt also worked as a G2 investigative officer.[22]

These officers, along with five other officers and five enlisted men added locally, formed the nucleus of the counterintelligence agency that eventually was to become the 441st CIC Detachment.[23]

The first enlisted CIC agent in the theater was Sergeant Lars Skattebol, a United States citizen who operated a credit investigation system in Australia before the war began. Skattebol enlisted in the Army shortly after the start of hostilities and was placed on duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps because of his investigative experience in Australia.

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21 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 4, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

22 Ibid; and History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 42 through 1 July 45, dtd 1 Jul 45, p. 1-5, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

23 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 1, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

By April 1942, the G-2 office at Headquarters, USAFIA, was operating primarily as a counterintelligence agency, despite a dearth of trained counter-intelligence officers and agents. There was no clear distinction between CIC work and other routine counterintelligence measures performed by the G-2 section.[24]

Early Growth of Counter Intelligence

This confusion was understandable in the light of the military situation in early 1942. Japanese forces had met virtually no resistance as they jumped hopscotch-like from island to island in the Southwest Pacific, and a Japanese invasion of Australia seemed possible. Allied prospects in the battle against Japan were desperate. The new headquarters in Australia found itself under tremendous pressure to build up and organize Allied forces to meet and repel the invaders. Speed was essential; expediency dictated policy.

The great build-up was launched in April 1942 with the arrival of the 41st Infantry Division in Australia. Troops of the 32d Division landed a month later, and intense training for jungle warfare was inaugurated immediately. The 1st Replacement Depot was organized at Melbourne in May. By 10 June 1942, United States Forces in SWPA numbered 88,550.[25]

At the time of the inception of GHQ, SWPA, United States military activity in Australia was centered in seven principal base sections: Base Section 1 at Birdun (later Darwin), Base Section 2 at Townsville, Base Section 3 at Brisbane, Base Section 4 at Melbourne, Base Section 5 at Adelaide (later Cairns), Base Section 6 at Perth, and Base Section 7 at Sydney.

A foundation for counterintelligence work in these base sections had been laid by July 1942 with the assignment of intelligence officers to five of the base sections. Although the intelligence officers were administratively responsible to the base commanders, G2, USAFIA, prescribed and controlled counterintelligence responsibilities. These counterintelligence duties included control of civilian employment by Army agencies and security lectures to fresh troops arriving from the United States.[26]

An acute shortage of CIC personnel made adequate counterintelligence coverage of the base sections virtually impossible. Realizing this, Colonel Thorpe asked the

24 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and United States Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During World War II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946, p. 16, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

25 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul, p. 4. (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

26 Ibid, p. 5.

War Department for a CIC Table of Organization and any other information available on the unpublicized counterintelligence agency. He also requested an advance shipment of 40 CIC officers and agents. Neither request was given immediate attention. Most CIC Training School graduates were being channeled into the European Theater and stateside detachments; moreover, the role of CIC in a combat zone still was not clear.[27]

Troop Indoctrination Assigned to CIC

In the absence of directives clarifying the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Colonel Thorpe utilized his first CIC agents primarily for security indoctrination of troops. However, as early as May 1942, CIC agents investigated the possibility of sabotage in connection with a series of mysterious accidents along Australian transportation lines at Adelaide, Alice Springs, Brisbane, Darwin, and Sydney. Major Blair P. Labatt, chief of an investigative subsection of the G-2 office, continued to give high priorities to investigations of other questionable accidents.

By July 1942, the Counter Subversive System had been installed in most American units within the theater, and Agent Skattebol was assigned to assist the officer who directed this G-2 activity.[28] Until 28 December 1943, when the Counter Subversive System was abandoned in the SWPA, CIC was charged with considerable supervisory work in connection with the plan. Agents assisted in the preparation of monthly reports on morale, disaffection, and subversive activities.[29]

At the same time, cooperation with Australian Intelligence authorities became more pronounced. The Commonwealth Army joined the stepped-up program of securing the continent against the enemy.

In May, arrangements were made with Brigadier John D. Rogers, Director of Australian Military Intelligence, to send American intelligence personnel, including CIC agents, to Australian intelligence schools. Captain James Pros, intelligence officer at the Adelaide Base Section, was ordered to take a six-week course in combat intelligence at a Military Intelligence School near Melbourne. Americans attended similar schools throughout the war.[30]

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27 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul, p. 6. (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

28 Ibid, p. 7.

29 Ibid, p. 41.

30 A History of CIC in the SWPA and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During WW II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces Pacific, 1946, p. 27, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

When USAFIA was redesignated USASOS on 20 July 1942, its G-2 section included 12 officers, 16 enlisted men and 19 civilians. Only four of the enlisted men were CIC agents.

In July, Major Labatt opened a field office in Brisbane to conduct liaison between G2, USASOS and GHQ, SWPA. Later the same month, two CIC agents were placed on duty with the intelligence officer of the Motor Transport Command at Mout Isa.[31]

Theater CIC Training School Established

No enlisted CIC agents had arrived from the United States by the end of July. To meet the pressing need for trained investigators, Colonel Thorpe received permission to recruit a group of men from the 1st Replacement Depot at Camp Darley for CIC duty.

He set high standards for the potential agents. Men who had scored less than the minimum requirement for Officers' Candidate Schools on the Army General Classification Test were not considered. Preference was given to men with backgrounds as lawyers, investigators, and newspapermen. Emphasis was on youth. Of 1,500 men considered for CIC, only fourteen were selected after interviews with Colonel Thorpe and other officers of the G-2 section.

This group, augmented by one man who had been transferred from the 32d Division, embarked on 3 August on a three-week CIC course at Melbourne. This first CIC Training School in the theater, patterned after the Advanced CIC School in Chicago, was the forerunner of a permanent school established in 1943. In addition to instructors from the G-2 section, experts from Australian Intelligence Agencies lectured the class on their specialties.

While the class was in progress, six CIC agents who had received both training and operational experience in the United States arrived in Melbourne. These agents, John O. Platt, Jr., Grahame T. Smallwood, James R. Morris, Jr., James S. Latham, Jr., Ray W. Hodgson, and Maurice H. Towne, joined the classes at the CIC school.

Major General Richard J. Marshall, Commanding General, USASOS, presented diplomas to this first group of graduates on 22 August 1942. After graduation, the agents were known officially as G2 investigators. They served under Base Section intelligence officers and were assigned to Australia's principal cities.[32]

31 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, p. 8, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

32 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 42, p. 2-6, thru 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

CIC Stresses Security

CIC attempted early to make United States troops security-conscious. A program coordinating security indoctrination began taking shape in August 1942, under the direction of Lieutenant William Shelton, a Naval Intelligence officer serving with G2, USASOS.

Many devices were employed in the security campaign. Posters warned of the danger of loose talk and stressed field security measures. Thousands of menu folders and small table cards inscribed with security phrases were printed and distributed throughout areas of great troop concentrations. Australian businessmen cooperated enthusiastically in displaying the posters and cards in their establishments.

On military installations, training films with security themes were shown to troops whenever possible to supplement security lectures by CIC agents. Some of these films, particularly those of the animated cartoon type, became quite popular among the men. To implement AR 380-5, local regulations for safeguarding classified information were written and published in directive form.[33]

Work of the Counter Intelligence Corps in Australia was widely publicized in a "Bi-weekly Intelligence Summary" published by Headquarters, USASOS, beginning 15 November 1942. Edited by Lieutenant Shelton, the bulletin contained lists of civilians considered undesirable for work in U.S. Army agencies, articles on Japanese intelligence, reports of losses of intelligence credentials, lists of outstanding suspects sought by Allied intelligence, and discussions of Australian political and social groups. A unique feature of the summary was the tabulation of the latest rumors circulating in military units with illustrations of the danger of repeating unfounded rumors.

The summary, later retitled "Counter Intelligence Bulletin," was classified "CONFIDENTIAL" and was designed for use by unit commanders. In addition to other information, the publication stressed the ways in which commanders could receive assistance from CIC agents.[34]

All these security measures were continued and augmented through the succeeding months, and were adapted to field conditions as Allied troops began the gradual movement northward into New Guinea and the islands of the Southwest Pacific.

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33 A History of CIC in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During WW II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces Pacific, 1946, p. 35, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

34 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, p. 10., GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Agents Move Closer to Combat

The real push northward, through combat, was still almost a year away for CIC.

As the summer of 1942 waned, Australian and American forces initiated the Papuan campaign against the Japanese in New Guinea. By 12 September the Allies had halted the Japanese in the Owen Stanley Mountains, a mere twenty airline miles from Port Moresby.[35] A month later, CIC Agents Walter C. Wagner and Frank J. Leahy were sent to Port Moresby to provide counterintelligence coverage for the advance base there. In December, Captain Pros and Agents Dean H. Cazian and Arthur W. Linde began similar duties at Milne Bay, where a sub-advance base had been created after the expulsion of the Japanese. Two additional officers and four agents were assigned to the Port Moresby office in January 1943.[36]

Although CIC still had not entered combat in the Southwest Pacific, the proximity of enemy lines to Advance Base offices alerted agents to the immediate threat of espionage and sabotage by enemy agents and collaborators at work within the Allied lines.

Sabotage Incidents Investigated

During December 1942, three cases of apparent sabotage were reported at a single airfield, the Jackson Airdrome at Port Moresby. Fire extinguishers were found filled with alcohol; washers had been slipped over the noses of machine gun ammunition, and the machine gun feed belts had been jammed with solder. Agents were placed on a 24-hour alert so that investigators would be available whenever such an incident might develop. Available records do not indicate results of the sabotage investigations.

CIC also conducted disaffection investigations, air and ship panelling, including the movement of native craft along the New Guinea coast, and studied relations between white and negro troops. Troops entering battle zones were thoroughly indoctrinated by CIC agents in various aspects of combat security, such as safeguarding military documents, preventing unit identification, and conduct in case of capture.[37]

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35 A History of CIC in the Southwestern Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During WW II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). p. 38.

36 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, p. 11, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48 (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

37 Ibid, p. 11.

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Meanwhile, most CIC activity in the Southwest Pacific still was concentrated in Australia, where the situation was relatively static.

Field Offices Opened

By the end of 1942, CIC field offices had been opened in Melbourne, Brisbane, Sydney, and Rockhampton, with agents in those cities operating in addition to and independent of the Base Section intelligence offices. However, the field offices always maintained close contact with the S2's of the Base Sections and established good liaison with other military commands.

Considerable progress in constructing a satisfactory counterintelligence program was achieved by the end of the first full year of the war. Yet the period must be considered as only a beginning, when confusion and uncertainty gradually gave way to coordination and positive results. The entire counterintelligence program was at the outset severely hampered by personnel and material inadequacies and lack of policy precedents. The frequent reorganization of headquarters, policies, and directives testified to the uncertainty as well as the urgency of the times.[38]

The Allies spent 1943 largely in building up their strength in the Southwest Pacific. On 26 February, USAFFE was reconstituted at Brisbane as the administrative echelon for all U.S. Army Forces in the Southwest Pacific, including the Sixth Army (activated earlier in February), the Fifth Air Force, (activated in October 1942 as the air echelon), and Headquarters, USASOS (retained principally as a supply and base administration headquarters). USAFFE assumed the counterintelligence functions previously exercised by USASOS.[39]

Build-up of Intelligence Sections Planned

With the reactivation of USAFFE, steps were taken to build up the intelligence sections of the lower echelons, USASOS, Sixth Army, and Fifth Air Force.

Seven enlisted men who had been carefully selected and trained in counterintelligence procedures were assigned to the A-2 Section of the Fifth Air Forces in January 1943. In March, Lieutenant Colonel James M. Jones left his temporary assignment at G2 USAFFE to take over the counterintelligence sub-section of the A-2 office.

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38 A History of CIC in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During WW II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946, p. 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

39 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, pp. 16, 17, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

On 16 March 1943, the top policy-making officers of the various commands met to formulate plans for delegating counterintelligence responsibilities. The lower echelons were made responsible for counterintelligence operations within their organizations, subject to supervision by G2, USAFFE.[40]

A second conference was held on 12 June to discuss further the establishment of counterintelligence organizations within each command. Counterintelligence responsibilities were defined and published in letter form.[41]

With this accomplishment, the remainder of 1943 was spent in acquiring the necessary personnel and in organizing the various intelligence agencies in accord with the policies set forth in the two conferences.

CIC's Role in Combat Studied

The year 1943 saw the Counter Intelligence Corps come into its own as an integral element of Southwest Pacific operations. At the beginning of the year, CIC was still something of an unknown quantity, lacking recognition, precedence, reputation and a clearly-defined mission. Agents operating out of the USAFFE G-2 office in Australia's base sections checked port and coast security, examined suspect individuals and organizations, investigated accidents involving Allied personnel and equipment, and traced unfounded rumors and loose talk to their sources. All this was accomplished with the lack of an integral CIC organization and an extreme personnel shortage.

Only 23 CIC officers and agents had reached the Theater by February 1943. Even counting supervisory personnel in the G-2 office and base intelligence officers, the total was barely 50, including those procured locally.

For several months in late 1942 and early 1943, Colonel Thorpe had requested the War Department to send a field grade officer trained in CIC procedure to Australia. Finally, on 30 March 1943, the need was filled with the arrival of Major Albert L. Vreeland from Washington. With him came one other CIC officer, 2d Lieutenant James A. Bledsoe, and 20 agents.[42]

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40 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, p. 17, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

41 Counter Intelligence Conference, Policy File 322.999 G2 USAFFE, 26 June 1943, as cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, p. 18, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

42 Ibid, p. 19. NOTE: Roster of CIC Agents in SWPA attached as Appendix 1.

The arrival of Major Vreeland made possible the physical separation of G-2 and CIC offices. A separate CIC headquarters, responsible for the entire intelligence investigative function, was officially established on 7 April 1943, at 144 Bowen Terrace in Brisbane. Major Vreeland became Chief of CIC in the Theater, and Major Labatt, one of the original CIC officers in the Southwest Pacific was named executive officer.[43]

CIC operated substantially as an independent unit. Later, when a Theater CIC Detachment was formed, the CIC office became almost entirely divorced from G2, both operationally and administratively. From the CIC headquarters set up in the Southwest Pacific at this time emerged the theater-wide 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional) and its successor, the 441st CIC Detachment. Despite the physical separation of CIC and G-2 offices, there was always close cooperation between the two sections.

In early 1943, there was still some uncertainty as how best to employ CIC in combat in the Southwest Pacific. CIC had been recognized in the United States as a competent military investigative agency, working against espionage, sabotage, and subversive activity, and observers were convinced that the combat intelligence mission was too limited in scope to embrace such activities as field security and the thwarting of enemy intelligence operations.[44]

Thus the need for CIC agents to accompany combat units in the Southwest Pacific was recognized as early as August 1942, when G2, USASOS, recommended such disposition. Lieutenant Irwin, then chief of the G-2 section, proposed to the Commanding General, SWPA, that "Combat Counter Intelligence Sections" be formed within divisions and combat units. He suggested that these sections would "make a continuous check of the battle area for civilians and enemy personnel; insure internal security; interrogate refugees; combat fifth column activities; and secure and guard vital installations, such as public utilities."[45]

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43 USAFFE ltr, dtd 6 April 1943, Subject: Establishment of CIC Operations, Hq USAFFE APO 501, as cited on p. 19 of Operation of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

44 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During World War II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946, p. 68, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

45 G2, USASOS ltr to CG, GHQ, SWPA, dtd 3 Aug 43, Subject: Formation of Combat Counterintelligence Sections, as cited on p. 20 of Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Personnel shortages and a lack of policy precedents prevented formation of combat counterintelligence units at that time, however.

First Combat CIC Personnel Arrive

After the brilliant work of CIC units in the North African campaigns, combat training facilities for CIC agents were expanded in the United States. First CIC personnel with combat training to reach the Southwest Pacific were five officers and 39 agents, who arrived in Australia on 17 April 1943. Destined for the Sixth Army, the detachment was commanded by Captain Richard G. Earle.

Thus began an influx of combat-trained CIC agents into the Southwestern Pacific. Captain William J. Koenigsdorf commanded a group of two officers and 11 agents assigned to I Corps Headquarters at Rockhampton, Australia. To Headquarters Fifth Air Force went two officers and 11 agents led by Captain Charles H. Albertson. First Lieutenant Harold F. Frederick and five agents arrived for duty with the First Cavalry Division, and Second Lieutenant Philip Q. Roach commanded five agents assigned to the 32d Division at Camp Columbia, Australia. To Oro Bay, New Guinea, where the 41st Division was located, went Second Lieutenant Victor I. Cook and five agents.[46]

CIC personnel assigned to combat units were both administratively and operationally controlled by the commanding officer of their tactical unit until the reorganization which assigned them first to Headquarters USAFFE. They later were assigned to CIC, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and "attached to USAFFE, a change which was, in effect, only technical."[47]

To clarify CIC's role in combat, G2, USAFFE called another conference of intelligence officers of subordinate echelons. Meeting at Brisbane on 8 September 1943, the planners decided to make the Chief, CIC, and the Commanding General, Sixth Army, jointly responsible for forming detachments to accompany Sixth Army Task Forces into combat. The CIC officer in charge was to have actual control of operations, under the supervision of the task force commander and his intelligence officer.

Receipt of Training Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," dated 22 September 1943, the first official directive concerning the use of CIC agents received in the Theater, further clarified the role that CIC was to play in the Southwest Pacific. Long awaited by the growing CIC organization in the Theater, the new training manual listed detailed operating procedures.[48]

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46 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 20, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

47 Ibid, p. 22.

48 Ibid, p. 22.

Troop Shipment Increases

The influx of American troops into the Southwest Pacific increased considerably during 1943, although not enough to fulfill every command's requirements. The total strength of the United States forces in the theater when USAFFE was reconstituted was 137,363. Of these, 88,823 were in Australia and 48,304 in New Guinea. The high point of troop shipments to the theater was not reached until July 1944, when 116,571 men arrived.[49]

Unfortunately, shipments of CIC personnel did not parallel the movement of other troops into the theater. The shortage of qualified personnel to man the expanding CIC organization threatened to hamper plans to send CIC agents into combat.

Increased CIC Training in Australia

The result was a new emphasis on recruitment and training of CIC agents within the theater--an emphasis which culminated in the establishment of a permanent CIC Training School at Brisbane on 28 June 1943.

Under Major Vreeland's guidance, the curriculum was geared to combat conditions. Rugged classes in jungle warfare, physical conditioning, combat counter-intelligence, field security, and map reading were included. Field problems simulated battle conditions in the island jungles. The principal native language of the Dutch East Indies, Malayan, was taught. Other instruction included military organization, enemy intelligence organization, investigative procedures, and the handling of prisoners of war and captured documents. Each course lasted from two to four weeks, depending on the type of training required and the time allowed by the tactical situation.[50]

The school was first installed in the cramped quarters of CIC headquarters at Brisbane. With the increased flow of troops into the theater and the corresponding increase of CIC activity, the quarters at Bowen Terrace soon proved inadequate for both CIC headquarters and the school. With the cooperation of Australian authorities, a mansion in Brisbane was requisitioned. The building reputedly was 100 years old and had once been the residence of the Premier of Queensland, but had long since been evacuated and was in a deteriorated condition. Suitably rebuilt, the mansion remained in use as the CIC School until Headquarters USAFFE and the school moved to Hollandia, New Guinea, in September 1944.

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49 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 18, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

50 Ibid, p. 23.

All CIC personnel in the theater were required to attend the school, but its enrollment was not restricted to CIC agents. Dutch and Australian military personnel and members of all branches of American armed forces attended the classes at Brisbane.[51]

To further prepare CIC agents for jungle warfare, some were sent into the field with patrols of the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit, the Australian agency which administrated Papua, New Guinea. Teams from the agency patrolled areas of New Guinea which had been retaken from the Japanese. In June 1943, ten agents from the Sixth Army Detachment were placed on duty with an Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit team for training purposes. For three months the agents patrolled the jungles, gaining a wealth of experience in dealing with the natives and learning to adapt themselves to field conditions. The work, both dangerous and arduous, was to prove invaluable in the months ahead.

The agents also studied Japanese methods of administration of conquered territories. In doing so, they learned that firm but intelligent handling could win the allegiance of the natives, who had detested the cruel, crude methods of the Japanese. Findings of these agents were relayed to all detachments in the area and formed the basis for additional CIC training.

Other CIC agents completed training for combat by attending classes at the Australian School of Military Intelligence, Field Security Wing. In addition, the Australian Jungle Warfare School at Canungra was made available to the Americans. During 1943 and 1944 many CIC agents trained in this school, well-known in the theater for its rigorous program of combat and jungle warfare problems.[52]

At last CIC agents in the Southwest Pacific had a concept of their role in combat. They knew something of what to expect from the enemy and from the natives of the tiny Pacific islands. They had learned to live and fight in the steaming jungles.

They were ready to begin the long march to Tokyo.

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51 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 23, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

52 Ibid, pp. 23-24.

Chapter 2

THE ISLAND CAMPAIGNS

It was mid-1943 before the Counter Intelligence Corps tasted combat in the Southwest Pacific. By then, the Japanese onslaught had been checked and the Allies had assumed a tactical offensive.

Allied Naval units had already inflicted heavy blows to Japanese expansion ambitions in the memorable battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. In New Guinea, Australian and American troops had checked the enemy advance and had begun the two-year task of driving the Japanese from the island. The Papuan campaign had ended in a decisive Allied victory. American soldiers and marines were firmly entrenched on Guadalcanal, in the Solomon Islands.[53] The northward movement was now under way.

CIC Enters Combat

For CIC's first combat test in the Southwest Pacific, two temporary detachments were formed to accompany the Sixth Army's Alamo Task Force in the seizure of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands.

These tiny islands, located about halfway between Alamo Task Force Headquarters at Milne Bay, New Guinea, and the main islands of the Solomon group, were occupied by small pockets of Japanese troops. Little resistance was expected. But the campaign was important, since it was the first test of the Alamo Task Force as well as CIC's initial combat action.

Twelve agents, led by Second Lieutenants Thomas M. Applegate and Thomas H. Major, were selected for the operation. Another CIC officer, First Lieutenant Louis Kohn, and two agents remained at Milne Bay to coordinate activities of the detachments in the field.

The mission assigned CIC by the task force commander was primarily a positive intelligence function. Agents were instructed to accompany the assault troops in the landings, then make a political and economic survey of the islands. Emphasis in the surveys was to be placed on the Army's relations with the natives.

The landing was scheduled for 22 July 1943. In the early morning, elements of the task force landed simultaneously on both islands. They met virtually no resistance.

53 The Army Almanac, pp. 444-445.

Lieutenant Applegate and six agents waded ashore with the first troops at Kiriwina; Lieutenant Major led the other agents in the Woodlark landing. CIC action was similar on both islands.

Agents quickly fanned out over the islands, searching for abandoned enemy command posts which would possibly yield important documents. Others checked security at American command posts. Agents accompanied patrols that searched the island for pockets of Japanese troops. Throughout the campaign, which lasted until 19 August, the detachments gathered information for the surveys requested by the task force commander. Close liaison was established with the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit Teams which arrived shortly after the landings.[54]

CIC gathered a wealth of information in the Kiriwina-Woodlark landings--information that was to prove helpful in the months ahead as tactical detachments hopped from island to island with the combat troops. But the operations also revealed a serious weakness: while CIC agents were being trained for combat in the Australian schools, no adequate effort had been made to acquaint tactical commanders with the role of the detachments in battle.

The result was that tactical commanders in the Kiriwina-Woodlark operation were caught unprepared and were reluctant to cooperate fully with CIC. Some commanders confused agents with operatives of the Criminal Investigation Division, the FBI, or the Office of Strategic Service. CIC men were considered everything from "spies for our side" to special orderlies of some kind, and at times received treatment as if they were the latter. Several agents were required to participate in menial work details, a task specifically prohibited.

But as a result of operations on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, CIC became better known to the combat commanders. An intensive education program followed, and by the time the movement northward gained momentum, most commanders were well aware of the specialized role of CIC in combat.

Kiriwina and Woodlark was a dry run in preparation for bigger tasks ahead.[55]

One of the next steps ahead was Bougainville, in the Solomon Islands. Marines launched an invasion at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville on 1 November 1943. Seven days later, CIC agents accompanied the 37th Infantry Division when it arrived

54 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, Appendix 14, pp. 1-2, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

55 Ibid, pp. 44-46.

to relieve Marine units. In December, the America Division and its CIC detachment landed on Bougainville.[56]

CIC in the Admiralties

Continuing the push to the north, American forces spotted the Admiralty Islands north of New Guinea as one of the next major targets. The 1st Cavalry Division, which had arrived in Australia in July 1943, was ordered to drive the Japanese from the tiny archipelago.

The CIC detachment attached to the 1st Cavalry Division was composed of five agents under the command of First Lieutenant Harold F. Frederick. The entire detachment had completed training at the CIC School in Brisbane and at the Australian Jungle School.

On 17 December 1943, two agents were sent in advance to Oro Bay, New Guinea, where the division was to stage for the invasion of the Admiralties. Lieutenant Frederick and the remainder of the detachment arrived in New Guinea on 22 February, just seven days before the division entered battle. For a week agents checked equipment, received instructions on their role in combat, and briefed troops on field security measures.

Then, on 29 February, one agent landed on Los Negros Island in the Admiralties group with advance reconnaissance elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. Working with a member of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, he gathered several hundred pounds of captured enemy documents and dispatched the first significant report on CIC combat activities with assault troops. Japanese documents taken by this agent contained data which made it possible for a later landing in strength on Manus Island.

Other members of the detachment landed in the Admiralties from 1-10 March 1944.

The Japanese fought fanatically, inflicting heavy casualties on the American forces. CIC was pinned down temporarily, but the entire detachment came through the fierce fighting unscathed and went ahead to make an excellent record as the first CIC detachment in the Theater to participate in a complete operation.

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56 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, Appendix 14, p. 1, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
The Army Almanac, pp. 539 and 572.
Records of the work of the 37th Division and America Division CIC Detachments on Bougainville are not available.

By the end of March, when the Japanese on Los Negros were routed, CIC patrols had captured many valuable enemy documents, including Japanese espionage manuals, and a considerable amount of enemy equipment. In April and May, agents advanced with troops of the 1st Cavalry Division as surrounding islands in the Admiralties group were captured.[57]

A Prisoner for CIC

The first prisoner captured by the 1st Cavalry Division's CIC detachment was a Japanese soldier found alone in an abandoned shack.

Starved and emaciated, the enemy soldier did not resist when a CIC agent put him in a wheelbarrow and hauled him back to a first aid tent. Medics gave the prisoner an injection in an attempt to save his life, but he died shortly afterward, to the chagrin of his CIC captor.[58]

When the fighting had ended the detachment established a museum to exhibit enemy equipment captured by CIC. Between 200 and 300 visitors viewed the exhibit daily, and the display eventually was transported throughout the area for training purposes.[59]

Investigation of cases which had been suspended during combat was resumed. A panelling system was established, and agents screened passengers of ships and airplanes landing in their areas. Working with the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit, the 1st Cavalry CIC Detachment studied the problems of the natives and learned how to secure their cooperation in the continuing search for enemy documents.

Agents established a souvenir "grab bag" to persuade troops to turn in any enemy equipment they had captured. Items of no intelligence value such as Japanese post cards, stationery, pictures, and clothing, were placed in a container. When souvenirs turned in by a soldier were kept for intelligence analysis, he was permitted to take an item out of the "grab bag." Combat troops were much more willing to relinquish their war trophies after establishment of the CIC "grab bag."[60]

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57 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, Appendix 14, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

58 Interview with Harold F. Frederick, National CIC Convention, Chicago, August 1954, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility),

59 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, Appendix 14, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

60 USAFFE Report on CIC Operations in the Admiralty Islands Campaign, to AC of S, G2, War Department, dtd 24 April 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and interview with Harold F. Frederick, (Unclassified).

CIC Goes to Church

CIC agents found chaplains and missionaries particularly helpful in dealings with natives in the Admiralties. Prior to the coming of the Japanese, many natives in the islands had been converted to Christianity. Deeply religious, the natives continued to worship regularly. Native drums relayed the announcement of church services from village to village, and the natives responded by gathering in a central location to hear the missionary's sermon. With them came pigs, goats, other domestic animals, and CIC agents.

After church services the agents mingled with the natives and cultivated their friendship. Often they persuaded the natives to lead them to Japanese stragglers.[61]

The 1st Cavalry Division CIC Detachment remained in the Admiralties conducting an extensive program of security indoctrination for troops until October 1944, when they embarked for the Philippines.[62]

Hollandia-Aitape Campaign

After the Admiralty Islands were occupied by Allied forces, the next major move, to Hollandia and Aitape on 22 April 1944, involved a leapfrog advance westward of more than 400 miles. Air support was provided by Navy carriers since the landing was beyond the effective range of U.S. Air Force fighters. Three excellent Japanese airfields were located near Hollandia, and Humboldt Bay provided a suitable advanced naval and supply base. Three main landings were made by troops of Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger's I Corps; the 32d Infantry Division landed just east of Aitape, the 24th Division in Tanahmerah Bay and the 41st Infantry Division in Humboldt Bay, the latter two in the Hollandia area. The enemy was taken by surprise. Fewer than 5,000 Japanese troops were in the entire Hollandia area. By the end of April the Hollandia airfields were in American hands. The Hollandia-Aitape operation cut off more than 50,000 Japanese troops to the east. The advance westward was continued in mid-May 1944, when elements of the 41st Infantry Division accomplished an unopposed landing near Arara in Dutch New Guinea.

General Krueger's Sixth Army headquarters moved to Hollandia on 6 July 1944, and on 8 September 1944 General MacArthur's headquarters was advanced to Hollandia from Brisbane. On the same date General Eichelberger was assigned to command the newly-activated Eighth Army with headquarters also at Hollandia.[63]

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61 Interview with Harold F. Frederick, National CIC Convention, Chicago, August 1954, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

62 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, p. 2, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

63 The War Reports of Marshall, p. 225.

The participation of CIC in the Hollandia campaign increased proportionately to the size of the operation itself. Involved in the task force which hit the enemy at Hollandia were CIC combat detachments with I Corps (the highest echelon tactical unit involved) and with the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions. Another CIC combat detachment accompanied the 32d Infantry Division at Aitape.

The campaign had been in the planning phase for two months prior to the actual assault. Each CIC detachment received additional special training for the Hollandia operation. During that period security was of the utmost importance, and CIC agents successfully carried out positive security steps, thus preserving the element of surprise when the attack was eventually launched.

In addition to a prodigious number of security-leak investigations and normal counterintelligence duties, the CIC agents were put through a rigorous physical conditioning program, more weapons training, many lectures on searching for documents, material and booby traps, and other subjects pertinent to their forthcoming jungle mission. They were also briefed on the Malayan language, the tongue of the natives of the area to be taken. To assist in this instruction and later to act as guides and interpreters, 26 members of the Netherlands East Indies Army were assigned to the task force CIC section. All of these men spoke English well and all were highly-trained soldiers who had, besides combat experience, some training in the CIC schools operating in Australia. These men were assigned to routine CIC combat duties.

Advance elements of the CIC combat detachment with I Corps and the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions landed in the Hollandia area on D-Day, 22 April 1944, shortly after assault troops hit the beaches. CIC Detachment "D" with I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Victor I. Cook, and the combat Detachment "B", 24th Division, under Lieutenant Thomas H. Major, landed on one side of Hollandia at Tanahmerah Bay. The 41st Division Combat CIC Detachment "E" under Lieutenant Jack Y. Canon debarked at the other side of Hollandia at Humboldt Bay. The problem of coordinating the activities of the three CIC detachments fell to the I Corps detachment, CIC Combat Detachment "D".

A day after the landings, Detachment "D" moved to the Humboldt Bay side of Hollandia and set up its headquarters at Brinkman's Plantation. By D-plus-4 the 41st Division had penetrated 25 miles inland, seizing the important Cyclops and Sentani Airdromes. CIC agents followed the infantry troops closely. At Hollandia Airdrome contact was made between CIC agents of the 24th and 41st Divisions. Innumerable enemy documents and huge stores of abandoned Japanese equipment were collected at the airstrips by the CIC teams of "E" and "B" Detachments.

At Ifaar in the Lake Sentani region, personnel of the "E" Detachment recovered important files of the Dutch Administrative Assistant. Agents of the 162d Regiment of the 41st Division entered the town of Hollandia, where the subsequent search of

key buildings yielded many records of intelligence interest. More enemy documents were collected by CIC and assisting troops during the Hollandia campaign than during any prior operation in the theater. After such documents were collected, they were sent to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section and higher echelons. The close relationship between CIC and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section was exemplified by the identification by D-plus-9 of all but one of the enemy units operating in the area. A great deal of valuable information was unearthed on the various Japanese intelligence organizations active in the area prior to the landings.

For the interrogation of individuals either under suspicion of collaboration or those believed to have information of intelligence interest, teams of one CIC agent and one Netherland East Indies Forces trooper were utilized. Scores of interrogations of leading native suspects and of many friendly peoples who had been freed from Japanese prison camps were conducted. Subjects of the Dutch and other Allied foreign governments were turned over to Netherland Indies Civil Administration and other agencies for disposition.[64]

CIC at Aitape

On 22 April 1944, CIC landed with elements of the Persecution Task Force at Aitape. The assault was not heavily contested, and CIC agents attached to battalions were on the beach as early as H-plus-10. Within a few days, 5,000 pounds of enemy documents were recovered. Close liaison was maintained throughout the campaign with battalion S2's. CIC agents searched all combat and reconnaissance patrols for letters and personal papers which might fall into enemy hands in the event of capture or casualty.

CIC Combat Detachment "A", led by Second Lieutenant Jack A. Richards, landed with the 32d Division on 3 May. The following month, ten CIC agents, commanded by Captain Ralph Simms, joined XI Corps at Aitape and assisted CIC personnel of the Persecution Task Force and 32d Division in counterintelligence coverage of the area.[65]

Working night and day during the first two weeks of the operation, agents gathered more than five tons of documents, which were turned over to the proper agencies. CIC's concerted efforts to indoctrinate troops in the importance of captured documents had paid dividends. CIC agents also accumulated great quantities of Japanese equipment. Abandoned enemy supply dumps were pinpointed on overlays for use by intelligence technicians. Items especially vulnerable to looting and destruction, such as airplanes captured intact, were placed under armed guard.

64 Hq I Corps, Operations Report, G-2 Section, Hollandia Campaign (10 Mar and 9 May 1944), (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

65 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48 (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Of a less routine nature, an unidentified CIC agent took to the air in an observation plane searching for a missing patrol boat. He also flew over an area where a pocket of armed Japanese reportedly were isolated and dropped surrender pamphlets.

From D-plus-2 to D-plus-8 the area was divided and systematically searched and all documents were given to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section for classification. On D-plus-8 two large truckloads of documents and materiel were sent to Army headquarters via landing ship tank under armed CIC guard. Netherlands East Indies CIC personnel were used in collecting documents and in locating friendly tribes to obtain information regarding all natives who had willingly worked for the Japanese.

Valuable cooperation was also received from other sections and units, especially the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, which aided in determining the possible location of unidentified enemy units. Important documents recovered by CIC included four Japanese code books, the first time that such were obtained; and documents indicating the location of the 36th Japanese Division in addition to the structure, type of soil, capacity, and condition of all Japanese airfields in Dutch New Guinea, as well as many in the Philippines.

Transportation proved to be one of the greatest problems for CIC personnel. Many documents were located and crated. However, it was physically impossible to transport these documents to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section immediately, and much of the tactical value of the captured documents was lost.

A critique prepared by the G-2 Section in the aftermath of the Hollandia-Aitape landings revealed several weaknesses in the way CIC was employed in those campaigns.

The critique noted that the Corps CIC detachment was unable to determine which areas and what information division teams had secured, or what their plans might be from one day to the next. This resulted in much duplication of effort and the neglect of some work that should have been done. The probable cause of this difficulty was the impossibility of a meeting with the division detachment commanders prior to the operation.

It was suggested that a conference attended by representatives of CIC, G1, G2, and the Provost Marshal should be held prior to an operation to discuss the native situation. It was recommended that all natives upon contact with Allied Forces, be put immediately into a stockade under the control of the Provost Marshal. G2 would then determine which individuals would be released and which would be prisoners of war. G2 would have first priority on the services of all peoples in an occupied area because of their intelligence value as scouts, informants,

d interpreters. At the time of the Hollandia campaign, it was foreseen that the forthcoming operations would take place in thickly populated areas and that the security and success of the tactical mission would outweigh the fact that some loyal and trustworthy people would inevitably be put into a stockade and subjected to some rough treatment.

In the Hollandia landings, the critique pointed out the work of the CIC was valuable during both the planning phase and the operation itself. It was determined, however, that the Corps detachment was not large enough for best results. Security and combat training during the planning phase and the searching of captured areas and security checks on natives during combat were tasks which would have employed to good advantage a detachment of three officers and 30 enlisted men.[66]

Post Operational Phase

With the combat phase completed and the hunt for documents and equipment settling into routine, the I Corps CIC Combat Detachment operating in the Hollandia area turned most of its attention in May 1944, to native policing and control.[67]

Acting in close liaison with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, which had civil jurisdiction over the area, the detachment launched an investigation into the activities of Kempei Tai, Japanese-directed native espionage organization. Evidence indicated that Kempei Tai had been carefully organized in the region.

Investigation revealed that the group was headed by one officer and 14 men, all members of the Japanese army, who maintained headquarters in Hollandia. Numerous subordinate branches were formed throughout the area. Patrols were conducted, and several natives who worked for Kempei Tai were apprehended and questioned about the organization's operations and membership.

CIC was concerned only with the natives who had helped the Japanese army and took only such steps as would lead to their arrest. Netherlands Indies Civil Administration handled the native problem from the economic and political standpoint. Efforts were made not only to capture collaborationists, but to seek native help in ferreting out enemy soldiers and collaborators. The natives were offered a half guilder (26 cents) for every Japanese soldier turned in, more if the soldiers were officers. More than 100 Japanese were turned in during May.[68]

66 Hq I Corps, Operations Report G-2 Section, Hollandia Campaign, 10 Mar to 9 May 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

67 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 44; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

68 Ibid, p. 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

The natives invented their own methods for capturing enemy prisoners. On 9 May 1944, a native patrol at Jefase learned that seven Japanese soldiers armed only with swords were en route to the village. When the Japanese arrived and demanded food and shelter, one of the native police boys advised the village chief to promise to escort the Japanese back to their lines the next morning.

On the morning of 10 May, the seven Japanese soldiers were instructed to board a large canoe. The native then covered the soldiers with a sail, telling them it would keep them from being observed by American planes.

When the Japanese were covered with the sail, the leader of the CIC-recruited patrol entered the canoe and covered the Japanese with his carbine. Meanwhile the native chief had sent a runner ahead to alert the nearest American Military Police. When the canoe arrived at Depapre, Military Police were waiting to receive the prisoners.

Numerous similar incidents were reported.

On 7 May, another police-boy patrol contacted 13 isolated Japanese soldiers and promised to lead them to food. Instead, the Japanese were taken to American troops. One of the prisoners, realizing the group had been betrayed, hurled a grenade which killed himself and one of his companions and injured two natives, but the others were taken prisoner by American Military Police.[69]

CIC Smashes a Collaborationist Ring

Acting on information received from a confidential informant, CIC agents in the Hollandia area arrested a Dutch schoolteacher who had directed activities of six native tribes for the Japanese. Arrest of the agent was believed to have smashed a collaborationist ring which conceivably could have disrupted Allied war efforts in Western New Guinea. The suspect was turned over to Dutch authorities to be tried for treason.

CIC investigation disclosed that the teacher offered his full cooperation to the Japanese when they occupied Hollandia on 6 May 1942. The Japanese permitted him to remain in his position, using him to control the activities of 750 natives over whom he had considerable influence. Japanese Army officers had awarded the man a certificate of appreciation for his work with the natives.[70]

69 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

70 "CI Bulletin" Nr 40, dtd 30 Jan 44, Published by USAFFE G2, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

I Corps CIC Captures First Prisoner

I Corps Detachment claimed the first unassisted capture of a Japanese prisoner by the CIC with the apprehension of one Keiichie Hashiguchi, of the Japanese 8th Naval Construction Company. This man, who claimed civilian status despite his army uniform, was taken during a search of a native village after inhabitants reported that 20 to 30 Japanese were sleeping in their huts every night. Hashiguchi told his CIC interrogators that he was in charge of developing airfields and farming projects and securing native labor.

The report concerning the other Japanese in the village proved to be an exaggeration, but not until after careful plans had been laid for their capture. The occasion was to be a test for the persuasiveness of surrender pamphlets. One of the natives was given several pamphlets to hand to the Japanese when they came into the village at night. A patrol was on hand before daylight the following morning, but no Japanese were found.

In another instance, CIC agents questioned Simon Sibi, a native electrician who had returned to the Hollandia area from Mankowari after working for the Japanese for more than a year. The native revealed a huge store of information regarding enemy fortifications in the Mankowari region.

An I Corps team also interrogated a native named Apitoleh, who was considered to be a leading collaborationist in the area. He was head of all natives in the area under the Japanese 8th Naval Construction Company, an organization for the development of Japanese military projects by native means. Reportedly, he constantly mistreated and abused those serving under him. He was held for trial by Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.

Tips were received on two other important collaborationists. They were Dr. Mohhamet, in charge of native health during the Japanese occupation, and Hoetomoe, post commandant of the police boys under Apitoleh. Hoetomoe reportedly was the first to fire when a Japanese native patrol encountered Allied troops.

CIC maintained a card file of all important natives and results of the interrogations conducted.

More than 100 boxes of documents were collected and shipped to appropriate agencies by the I Corps team before the end of May. Large amounts of new and undamaged Japanese equipment were similarly handled.

Colonel Carl J. Docker, I Corps G2, recommended three members of I Corps Detachment for the Bronze Medal for exceptionally meritorious service while actively engaged in combat: M/Sgt Alexander S. Duncan, T/Sgt John G. Tomlin and Cpl Charles T. Mayfield. At the end of May the detachment's strength was one officer, ten enlisted men and ten men from the Netherlands East Indies Force CIC.

24th Division CIC on Post-Operational Mission

Meanwhile, CIC Combat Detachment "B" with the 24th Infantry Division spent most of May 1944 launching and rounding out its post-operational mission at Hollandia.

Much of this concerned controlling the native population and determining which natives had actively cooperated with the enemy. An extensive search for documents and equipment continued. Here again natives were used as police boys. These natives were paid a definite scale of wages in Dutch currency. Routine patrol duty paid 20 cents a day and clerks earned 30 cents daily. For special achievement, such as bringing in valuable documents, information, or a Japanese prisoner, the natives were rewarded with bonuses up to 26 cents.

By the end of May native patrols supervised by the 24th Division CIC had killed 15 Japanese and were directly responsible for the liquidation of numbers of others. In addition they captured 163 enemy soldiers and secured vital information used later in Allied operations.

For several weeks, the 24th Division CIC Detachment was baffled by reports of a mysterious Japanese known to the natives only as the "Controller of Hollandia." This man, who had told natives he was a vice admiral of the Japanese Navy, awed them with his distinguished appearance and persuaded many natives to assist him and other Japanese. Reports conflicted; informants alternately stated that the "Controller" was still alive, and that he had been killed by American troops. Special patrols were dispatched to search for the "Controller of Hollandia," but he was never found.

Shrewd native traders quickly learned the value of Japanese equipment as souvenirs, and set their prices at exorbitant levels. To prevent this primitive form of war profiteering, CIC suggested to Netherlands Indies Civil Administration that centralized markets be set up where natives could sell their merchandise at stabilized and controlled prices.

A prize CIC discovery during May was a complete Japanese aviation camera, an item which had been unsuccessfully sought by Air Corps Intelligence for two years. An estimated 7,500 pounds of enemy documents were processed by "B" Detachment from the start of the Hollandia operation through May.

One officer and ten men made up the detachment during May. Also attached were two U.S. Navy men, three Netherlands East Indies CIC men and two Chemical Warfare Specialists.[71]

71 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

During June the 24th Division Detachment continued checking and rechecking areas for more documents and equipment. The native police-boy system, with about 30 members representing most of the important villages of the area, continued to function ably, and an effective informant system was instituted to combat Japanese espionage.[72]

"B" Detachment was still located at Weversdorp near Hollandia airdrome during July carrying out routine counterintelligence duties. More than 1,500 pounds of documents were recovered and forwarded to Allied Translator and Interpreter Service for evaluation.[73]

32d Division CIC Operates at Aitape

At Aitape, Combat Detachment "A" with the 32d Infantry Division spent most of May 1944 carefully searching the area just seized from the Japanese. About 500 pounds of documents and a large assortment of equipment were collected and processed in addition to that already taken during the fighting.

Much time was also devoted to inspecting hundreds of souvenirs submitted by troops for clearance. This work yielded a profit as definite as patrol operations. Among the items submitted for clearance which were removed for intelligence analysts were Japanese code-books and maps, a radio set, a compass, film, machine guns and sights, and a parachute.

One member of the detachment became the one-man staff for a regimental newspaper. Issued in mimeographed form, the newspaper consisted of news bulletins summarized from radio broadcasts.

The strength of the detachment during most of May was two officers and nine enlisted men.[74]

During June, "A" Detachment expanded and continued the activities initiated in the Aitape area when Persecution Task Force landed there. Patrols with native police boys produced much of intelligence interest.[75]

72 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for Jun 44, dtd 2 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

73 CIC Det (Formerly 5227th CIC Det (Prov)) Situation Rpt SWPA, Jul 44, Activities and Training, Rdtd 29 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

74 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

75 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of Jun 44, dtd 2 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

July 1944 opened with members of "A" Detachment at Aitape engaged in a program of security surveys. In addition, numerous security lectures emphasized the taking of prisoners and enemy equipment. Small CIC patrols made the rounds of the outer combat posts in delivering these lectures. During July the detachment cleared and returned to the troops over 800 souvenir items. Upwards of 600 pounds of materiel of intelligence interest were forwarded to the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board in July.[76]

CIC in the Wakde-Sarmi Area

While fighting continued in the Hollandia-Aitape areas, the Sixth Army's Tornado Task Force prepared to seize the offshore islands in the Wakde group. On 17 May 1944, the Task Force struck at Arara Village in the Wakde-Sarmi sector of Dutch New Guinea. The next day troops landed on Insoemoar Island in the Wakde group.

Hitting the beach with assault troops at Insoemoar Island, the Tornado Task Force CIC Combat Detachment "G" encountered the most difficult conditions under which any CIC detachment in the Southwest Pacific had yet worked.

For two days, the unit operated under intermittent sniper fire after landing in the face of heavy enemy resistance. Although the situation improved on the third day, snipers were still encountered and single enemy soldiers were met on several occasions as the search for documents and equipment was pressed.

The landing cost CIC its first fatality in the Southwest Pacific. Sergeant Woodrow G. Hunter was killed in action on the Insoemoar Island beach on the morning of 18 May 1944, D-plus-1.[77]

Moving inland, two CIC agents began a search of a Japanese supply dump 150 yards off the beach. Suddenly a small band of enemy soldiers emerged from a camouflaged trench nearby. One agent quickly hurled a grenade, killing a Japanese officer. The other agent and an American infantryman who was with him killed two other enemy soldiers. Other agents had equally close brushes with the enemy.

As the Japanese were driven back, CIC men launched intensive searches of the innumerable caves on the island. More than two tons of Japanese documents were collected during these searches, many marked "Vital Military Secret,"

76 CIC Det (Formerly 5227th CIC Det (Prov)), Situation Rpt SWPA for month of July 1944: Activities and Training, dtd 29 Aug 44 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

77 5227th CIC Det (Prov), Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 June 1944, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility). NOTE: Hunter Hall at Fort Holabird was named for Sergeant Hunter.

"Most Secret," and "Secret." Large quantities of enemy ammunition and equipment were captured. Throughout the first days of the operation, the detachment was forced to confine its operations to Insoemoar Island because of the difficult tactical situation on the mainland. But on D-plus-7, 24 May 1944, agents moved up behind the front lines on the mainland and canvassed headquarters and dumps from which the enemy had just been driven. Japanese snipers were still infiltrating the area.[78]

Early in June the Tornado Task Force was relieved by the 6th Infantry Division. When members of the division's CIC Combat Detachment "F" moved into the Wakde sector from Milne Bay, agents with the Task Force detachment instructed the newcomers in combat counterintelligence techniques. The two detachments functioned as one until the veteran unit finally was relieved.

As action continued, CIC personnel attached to each of the three regiments of the 6th Division advanced with their respective command posts as they pushed toward the airdrome in the Maffin Bay area. Searches and patrols were extremely hazardous because of enemy small arms, artillery, and mortar fire.

During the drive for Maffin Airdrome, several agents, separated from their forces, were pinned down. However, caves, dugouts, installations, and enemy dead were carefully searched. All vehicles enroute to rear areas were examined for souvenirs of possible intelligence value. Passes controlling visitors to operational zones were issued by CIC.[79]

During the first two weeks they were in combat, agents operating with the 6th Division seized more than a thousand pounds of Japanese documents.

One agent, with an advanced battalion moving towards the Maffin Airdrome, reported that heavy shelling forced the unit to withdraw. Later the battalion moved forward again, and the agent found many valuable documents.

Another agent, advancing with a tactical unit, was pinned to the beach for a day and a night by Japanese artillery and small arms fire. When the firing subsided, the agent found more than 20 bullet holes in his jeep. Two tires had been punctured. Unable to carry out his CIC duties because of the bitter fighting, the agent turned his jeep over to the medics and assisted them in carrying litters and evacuating wounded.

78 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

79 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

As the fighting turned in American favor, the Japanese took refuge in numerous caves, with interconnecting tunnels and side passages. Unit commanders were dynamiting the caves, sealing entrances. In most instances, however, CIC agents were allowed to search the caves before the blasting.

In the Maffin Bay sector of the Wakde-Sarmi front, agents took to the air in "cub" planes to search for abandoned enemy command posts. On the ground the detachment encountered sniper fire and booby traps. But agents continued to press the search for enemy documents and prisoners, and more than 100 cubic feet of documents taken in the Maffin Bay area were forwarded to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.[80]

Early in July, the 31st Division relieved the 6th Division in the Wakde-Sarmi area, and agents of Combat Detachment "K", attached to the 31st Division, took over counterintelligence responsibilities from the 6th Division detachment.[81]

The Fight for Biak Island

After its first tactical operation in the Hollandia area, Combat Detachment "E", with the 41st Infantry Division, moved back to Holtekang Bay to rest and await further operations. The wait was short.

On 27 May 1944, the detachment landed at Bosnek Village, Biak Island, with the advance elements of the 41st Division, a part of Sixth Army's Alamo Task Force. Action was heavy, and CIC labored under extreme difficulties.

While tactical troops pushed forward to seize Mokmer and Sorido Airdromes, CIC teams under Lieutenant Canon's command searched abandoned installations and enemy dead. Despite intermittent artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, agents combed the east and west caves in the escarpments above Bosnek for enemy records.[82]

Early in the campaign six native Indonesians were interrogated by Detachment "E", and the names of three natives suspected of disloyalty were discovered. Two of the suspects were Dutch soldiers; the third, a Navy Wireless operator.

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80 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt for month of Jun 44, dtd 2 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

81 CIC Det (Formerly 5227th CIC Det (Prov)), Situation Rpt SWPA for month of July 1944: Activities and Training, dtd 29 Aug 44 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

82 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, pp. 4-5, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

The detachment's combat experience at Hollandia paid dividends. By the end of the first week of fighting, 26 boxes of enemy documents had been seized. Among them were detailed diaries of the activities of the Japanese 36th Division up to the day of the American landings on Biak and reports of action after the invasion. Other prize discoveries were records showing the strength, disposition, and fortification of enemy units on Biak and other Japanese-held islands in the Pacific. Maps showing enemy unit locations, code-books, and casualty reports also were seized by CIC agents with the 41st Division.

After the tactical situation had crystallized, the detachment turned its attention to interrogation of natives, who revealed information on Japanese methods and training, atrocities, collaborationists, and movements of Japanese units and their prisoners of war.

Personnel assigned to the 41st Division detachment at the time of the Biak operation included one officer and 12 enlisted men. In addition, two United States Navy men, three Netherlands East Indies counterintelligence representatives, and an American ordnance officer were attached.[83]

On 18 June 1944, I Corps landed at Bosnek Village, and agents of I Corps CIC Combat Detachment "D" assumed some of the counterintelligence duties previously exercised by the 41st Division Detachment.[84]

I Corps CIC, led by Lieutenant Cook, established headquarters near Bosnek Village and at Mokmer Airdrome. Liaison was maintained with the 41st Division detachment, and areas of jurisdiction were defined.

Activities of I Corps included interrogation of a number of Javanese soldiers who had escaped from the Japanese. CIC patrols also investigated reports of booby traps, but only one crude explosive device was found.

In order to obtain tactical information, a CIC officer, two agents, two Netherlands East Indies interpreters attached to CIC, and a native guide accompanied a seaborne patrol to a small island in the vicinity of Noemfoor. Two natives familiar with the Japanese-occupied islands in Geelvink Bay were brought back to Biak for questioning. The mission was completed just eight days before the Allied invasion of Noemfoor.[85]

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83 5227th CIC Det (Prov), Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

84 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, p. 4., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

85 5227th CIC Det (Prov), Situation Rpt for SWPA for month of May 1944; Activities and Training, dtd 29 Jun 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

On 2 July, I Corps returned to its original location at Joka, Lake Sentani, Hollandia, to begin preparations for the impending Philippine campaign. The 41st Division detachment remained on Biak, continuing searches of former enemy caves and bunkers throughout the area west of Bosnek Village and Mokmer Airdrome.[86]

CIC Lands on Noemfoor Island

Making its fourth landing in as many months, "G" Detachment went ashore with troops of the Cyclone Task Force at Noemfoor Island in Geelvink Bay on 2 July 1944.

Three infantry assault battalions landed on the beach near Kamiri Drome at 0800, while six CIC agents under the command of Second Lieutenant Dean H. Caziarc waited in small landing craft about 400 yards off shore. An hour later, CIC agents left their boats and waded across coral reefs to the beach. Once ashore, agents separated and joined each of the infantry battalions.

Sniper fire peppered the beach, and artillery shells dropped within sixty yards of CIC agents searching enemy dead. But by H-plus-3, the first batch of captured documents and materiel had been relayed back to G2 for interpretation. As the assault battalions pushed inland toward Kamiri Drome, the detachment continued in close support, searching all caves and enemy dead.

Night brought little rest. CIC personnel concluded their first day's work on Noemfoor Island conscious that infiltrating Japanese had been killed twenty yards to the detachment's rear, and within 100 yards in all directions.[87]

To guard against enemy infiltration, CIC supervised the establishment of a counterreconnaissance screen, in effect from dusk until dawn. Sentries at perimeter outposts watched for and reported enemy observation, reconnaissance, and infiltration. The screen was not manned by CIC agents, but was checked daily for its effectiveness.

With the detachment was one agent who spoke Malayan. As Javanese and Dutch subjects were liberated by American troops, this agent questioned them to obtain both positive and counterintelligence information.[88]

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86 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, pp. 3-4, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

87 Memorandum, 2d Lt Frank L. Barbee and 1st Lt Dean H. Caziarc to CO, 441st CIC Det, dtd 9 Sep 1944, Subject: Counter Intelligence in U.S. Task Forces, April 1944, through July 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (CCIC Files).

88 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, p. 5, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Large quantities of Japanese equipment were seized by CIC agents, and much of the captured materiel was later used by American troops. At one ammunition dump, three agents found toxic smoke shells, which were of considerable interest to chemical warfare experts.[89]

As the American forces pushed through Jemanoe and Pieforri villages to the Kornasoren Drome, the detachment searched enemy installations concentrated in the area. Regimental headquarters had ordered troops not to disturb Japanese buildings until after completion of the CIC searches.[90]

At the end of July, Combat Detachment "G" was disbanded, its work with Cyclone Task Force completed. When combat on Noemfoor Island was over, the 158th Regimental Combat Team was assigned to garrison duty. In September 1944, the 904th CIC Detachment under Second Lieutenant Loren Recor was placed on duty with the garrisoning troops. The 904th stayed on Noemfoor until the Luzon campaign.[91]

6th Division CIC with Typhoon Task Force

By mid-summer of 1944, the Japanese had been driven from most of New Guinea and the islands offshore. In Dutch New Guinea, only the Vogelkop Peninsula, jutting to the northwest, remained in enemy control.

For the final thrust against the Japanese forces on the mainland, a special task force was organized in the Maffin Bay area on 10 July 1944. Designated Typhoon Task Force, the force was created for a special amphibious operation. Its mission was to establish a beachhead between the Wewe River and Cape Opmarai, then follow up by seizing the Sansapor area on the northwest tip of Vogelkop Peninsula. Finally, it was to assume control of adjacent areas, including Middelburg and Amsterdam Islands.[92]

89 Memo, 2d Lt Frank L. Barbee and 1st Lt Dean H. Caziarc to CO, 441st CIC Det, dtd 9 September 1944, Subject: Counter Intelligence in U.S. Task Forces, April 44 through July 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

90 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FED, dtd 29 July 48, Appendix 14, pp. 5-6, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

91 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, Appendix 14, pp. 5-6, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

92 A History of the 6th CIC Detachment, with the Typhoon Task Force, Dutch New Guinea, 30 July to 31 August 1944, dtd 11 November 1944, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

The 6th Infantry Division was the core of Typhoon Task Force, and its CIC Combat Detachment "F" was given counterintelligence responsibility for the operation. The mission assigned Captain James R. Webster and his agents was the usual CIC combat mission in the Theater: search for enemy documents and equipment of intelligence value; promote security; investigate rumors and complaint cases; and maintain liaison with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration for control of the native population.

Detailed planning preceded the operation. Intelligence reports indicated that there were only two large Japanese strongholds on the peninsula: Manokwari and Sorong. However, it was believed possible that enemy staging areas and barge hideouts were located at 25-mile intervals between these points. Little opposition was anticipated for at least two days after the landing. Located within the area to be seized were three small villages composed entirely of natives: Sansapor, with a population of 400; Mar, 200; and Kor, 100.[93]

Plans called for one CIC agent to accompany each of the two infantry regiments participating in the initial landing. Captain Webster and another agent were also to land on D-Day and establish CIC headquarters near the division command post to receive reports of enemy locations and arrange for search of those areas after their capture. Agents with the regiments were to channel captured documents and materiel through Captain Webster's makeshift headquarters to expedite their delivery to the Task Force G2. Four agents were scheduled to arrive two days after the landing to begin a thorough search of former enemy positions; the remaining three agents were to arrive on D-plus-12 with the bulk of the detachment's equipment.[94]

Typhoon Task Force struck at dawn on 30 July 1944. The 1st Infantry Regiment landed at Red Beach near Mar and quickly secured a beachhead. There was virtually no opposition; neither naval nor air support was necessary.

A diary taken from a dead Japanese soldier by a CIC agent indicated the haste with which the enemy fled the American invaders:

> "July 30, at daybreak, sighted enemy convoy of 50 ships between Amsterdam Island, Middelburg Island, and the mainland. Convoy consisted of several warships and aircraft carriers. It seems that they entered the bay last evening. Kept observing them while breakfasting. Enemy aircraft first sighted at 0800 hours headed toward Sorong. At approximately 0830, Lockheeds and Consolidateds flew over bay. Cruisers circling at distance of 1,500 to 2,000 meters

93 A History of the 6th CIC Detachment, with the Typhoon Task Force, Dutch New Guinea, 30 July to 31 August 1944, dtd 11 November 1944, pp. 3-5, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

94 Ibid, p. 6.

off shore while landings were made between Middelburg and the Cape. Left seashore for Chicado (Mtn) at 0900 hours. Informed by native of village of Mar. Plan to have breakfast, lunch, and dinner there. Desire to observe enemy activity more closely, but due to anxiety, must leave in hurry."[95]

On D-plus-1, 31 July 1944, the 3d Battalion of the 1st Infantry embarked from its assembly area at Mar near the Wewe River and moved westward to land on the north side of Cape Sansapor, designated Green Beach. Again, no opposition was encountered. Troops seized an enemy bivouac area and ration dump at Sansapor. The next day a CIC patrol searched the Sansapor area.

Patrols killed and captured small parties of the enemy daily. CIC agents helped regimental S2's process documents and equipment taken from enemy dead and prisoners.

Twelve days after the initial landing, the 2d Battalion of the 63d Infantry, along with the 6th Reconnaissance Troop and the 53d Field Artillery Battalion, pushed eastward to Kor Village. For the next three days, CIC-supervised salvage patrols combed the area for items of intelligence interest. A company of men from 2d Battalion, 63d Infantry, was used to carry captured materiel over rough terrain to the 6th Reconnaissance Troop, which in turn transported the materiel across the mouth of the treacherously swift Kir River. More than 2,500 pounds of documents and 10,000 pounds of equipment were captured and transported to CIC headquarters.

One agent of Combat Detachment "F" accompanied a patrol from the 63d Infantry on a small landing six miles east of the Kor River on 16 August. Japanese documents classified "Secret" were taken from five enemy soldiers killed in the skirmish. Among them were code books which were flown to Sixth Army Headquarters the following day by CIC officer couriers.[96]

Interrogation of a prisoner of war by CIC agents led to the discovery on 19 August of a Japanese transmitter and receiver. The prisoner led the CIC patrol to the place where the radio equipment had been buried two days earlier by a Japanese party enroute from Manokwari to Sorong.

By the end of August most of the Japanese forces had been ferreted out of their hiding places, and the Sansapor campaign was officially terminated on 31 August. During the month, Captain Webster reported three disaffection cases and two censorship violations investigated by his detachment. There were no espionage or sabotage cases.

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95 A History of the 6th CIC Detachment, with the Typhoon Task Force, Dutch New Guinea, 30 July to 31 August 1944, dtd 11 November 1944, p. 8, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

96 Ibid, pp. 9-10.

After the operation was concluded, one agent of the 6th Division worked with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration in the supervision of natives of the liberated areas. Another was detailed as Port Security Agent to panel all cargo and troop ships entering the area.[97]

During the height of the Sansapor campaign, the 6th Division CIC Detachment lost its designation as Combat Detachment "F" and was formally activated as the 6th CIC Detachment, assigned to USAFFE and attached to the 6th Division. USAFFE announced the change on 17 August, while detachment headquarters were located at Sansapor.[98]

The 6th CIC Detachment remained in the Cape Opmari-Sansapor sector to stage for the invasion of the Philippines. It departed under I Corps in December 1944 for the Luzon campaign.[99]

Morotai--Last Step Before the Philippines

With Allied forces firmly entrenched on the Vogelkop Peninsula of Dutch New Guinea, the little island of Morotai in the Molucca group remained the last major stepping-stone to the Philippines.

In mid-August 1944, the 31st Division and its CIC detachment began to stage for the assault on Morotai. During the staging period at Aitape and at Maffin Bay, 1st Lieutenant Clarence W. Trout and the ten agents of the 31st CIC Detachment inaugurated a vigorous security training program for the Division's combat troops.[100]

On 15 September, the division made an assault landing on Morotai, meeting little opposition.[101] On 19 September, Sgt William R. Morse of the 31st CIC landed at Kekaibabao, on the northwest portion of Cape Sopi, Morotai Island, with a small assault force of infantrymen, engineers, and radar technicians whose mission was to establish and guard a radar station.

Between 19 September and 2 October, Sergeant Morse, working with two native guides and a representative of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration,

97 A History of the 6th CIC Detachment, with the Typhoon Task Force, Dutch New Guinea, 30 July to 31 August 1944, dtd 11 November 1944, pp. 10-11, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

98 Ibid, p. 2.

99 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, Appendix 14, p. 6, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

100 Ibid, p. 7.

101 The Army Almanac, p. 534.

led patrols of infantrymen to former Japanese bivouac areas and native villages in the region. In the abandoned Japanese areas, the patrol found enemy documents, ordnance, and radar equipment of considerable intelligence value. The captured documents and equipment were returned by barge to 31st CIC Detachment headquarters, then relayed to the XI Corps Detachment, which arrived in Morotai after the initial landings by the 31st Division. Radar technicians estimated the value of the captured equipment at $500,000.

Sergeant Morse also gained considerable information about the Japanese in his visits to the native villages. He spoke the Malay language, and readily gained the respect and cooperation of the natives.

On 17 September, four agents of the 31st CIC began a three-week patrol of Morotai and Naoe Islands to check the security of radar installations on the islands and to question natives about operations of the Japanese Kempei Tai in the area.

During their visits to the native villages, the agents contacted representatives of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, village chiefs and native informants. From the scores of stories told by the natives the agents pieced together a clear picture of Kempei Tai operations.

Kempei Tai members had been stationed in each village visited except one, and natives named dozens of members of the Japanese organization. Most had fled to Halmahera by barge when the Americans landed on Morotai.

Kempei Tai personnel established similar controls in each native village. Natives told of being forced to provide fish, vegetables, and clothing for the Japanese invaders. In return, they were given a daily ration of six ounces of rice. Those who hesitated to obey the Japanese edict were severely beaten; infractions of rules often resulted in imprisonment on Halmahera Island.

Informants in the native villages were eager to tell CIC agents which islanders had befriended the Japanese, and scores of natives were branded by their neighbors as collaborators and spies. In most instances, the tales proved to be fabrications designed to win Allied favor for the informant, or to cause trouble for personal enemies. CIC agents, working with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, found no evidence that natives were channeling information about Allied forces to the Japanese on nearby Halmahera.

While four CIC agents were visiting the native villages on Morotai, other members of the 31st Division detachment were busy with security surveys and lectures. One never-ending job was the counteracting of rumors which spread rapidly among combat-weary troops.

One rumor which alarmed soldiers of the 167th Infantry Regiment of the 31st Division concerned a "new" Japanese hand grenade which was reported to be many times more powerful than any American grenade. CIC agents were asked to trace the rumor to its source. They discovered that a member of the regiment had been killed, his body badly mangled, during an early morning Japanese attack on 22 September. The Japanese were known to have thrown grenades during the attack, and it was assumed that a powerful new grenade had caused the extreme damage to the dead soldier's body. Investigating agents learned that the grenade which had killed the soldier had struck a live mortar shell near him. The combined force of the mortar shell and the grenade gave rise to the rumor that the Japanese had developed a "super grenade" the size of a coconut. Agents explained the incident to the troops and showed them actual Japanese grenades, which immediately quelled the rumor.[102]

At the end of September there were three CIC officers and 25 agents on Morotai. In addition to members of the 31st and 211th (XI Corps) Detachments, two agents of the 449th CIC Area Detachment arrived to assist in the interrogation of natives.[103]

On 18 December the 33d Infantry Division landed on the west coast of Morotai, meeting only token resistance from isolated pockets of Japanese troops.[104] With the division came the 33d CIC Detachment, commanded by Second Lieutenant Bernard Donohue.

Counterintelligence measures in the native villages already had been enforced by the 31st, 211th, and 449th CIC Detachments. On its arrival, the 33d CIC began preparations for the Luzon campaign.[105]

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102 31st CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Oct 1944, 1st Lt C. W. Trout to CG, Army Service Forces, dtd 11 Nov 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

103 441st CIC Det, Situation Rpt SWPA for Sep 44, dtd 1 Nov 44, Lt Col Albert Vreeland to G2, USAFFE, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

104 The Army Almanac, p. 535.

105 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, Appendix 14, p. 7, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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CIC Stages for the Big Battle

With the intense fighting in New Guinea and its offshore islands ended, CIC detachments attached to combat units in the SWPA turned their sights toward the Philippines. Area detachments moved in to assume counterintelligence coverage of liberated areas, and the combat units began intensive security training programs among troops.

In addition to the CIC combat detachments which had already entered battle, several other tactical CIC units were in the Southwest Pacific staging for the next big push to the north.

40th CIC Detachment

On New Britain, the 40th CIC Detachment attached to the 40th Division had been busy since its activation in May[106] with security lectures, inspections, and anti-rumor campaigns among the troops of the division. Although the detachment arrived on New Britain after combat had ceased, agents made occasional patrols to small islands nearby to search for Japanese documents and equipment. Enemy mines and booby traps often hampered their work.

To cover all elements of the division, four agents were attached to a regiment at Talasea and two to a regiment at Arawe. The remainder of First Lieutenant Earl Klein's ten-man detachment worked out of division headquarters in the Gloucester Bay area.[107]

The detachment worked closely with the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit in dealing with natives. Agents also participated in "rumor boards," at which they discussed rumors circulating among the troops. Before departing for the Philippines, the detachment compiled a complete security and intelligence index for unit commanders and intelligence officers to assist them in indoctrinating troops in greater detail with the importance of maintaining security precautions during and after operations. This index was to become the basic reference material for lectures and discussion held by units while at sea steaming toward Lingayen Gulf.[108]

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106 The 40th CIC Detachment was designated Combat Detachment "H" at the time of its organization in May. It officially became the 40th CIC Det in August.

107 5227th CIC Det, (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of May 44; Activities and Training, dtd 29 June 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

108 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of June 44; dtd 2 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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CIC Paratroopers Stage for Philippines

Meanwhile, the Theater's first Airborne CIC Detachment staged at Oro Bay with the 11th Airborne Division.

The detachment, commanded by First Lieutenant George B. Spencer, arrived at Oro Bay in March 1944, but was immediately ordered to Brisbane for further training at the CIC School there. On 1 October 1944, the detachment was reorganized and its complement filled by agents who had volunteered for work as paratroopers.

Returning to New Guinea in October, the detachment went through jump school. The commanding officer and nine agents qualified for paratrooper's wings before the detachment sailed for Leyte in November.[109]

Meanwhile two other detachments also were in New Guinea training for their first combat assignments in the Philippines.

At Oro Bay, First Lieutenant George A. Baldwin commanded the CIC detachment attached to the 38th Division. The detachment arrived in New Guinea in July 1944 and was then ordered to Brisbane for training. It returned to Oro Bay to stage for the Leyte campaign.

The other detachment staging in New Guinea was the X Corps (210th) Detachment at Finschhafen. Activated in early fall of 1944, the detachment, under Captain Joseph P. Hurley, attended the Jungle Warfare School at Canungra, Australia, before staging for Leyte at Finschhafen.

Acquisition of South Pacific Combat Detachment

Transfer of units from the South Pacific Area to SWPA in June 1944 brought several other CIC combat detachments under the administrative control of the 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional), the theater detachment for USAFFE. CIC personnel thus coming into the SWPA included those attached to XIV Corps and the 37th and America Divisions located in the Empress Augusta Bay perimeter on Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. During July and August these detachments attended the CIC Training School in Brisbane, returning to their tactical units in September to stage for the Philippine campaigns.

One officer and three agents attached to the 93d Division (Colored) also were affected in the change of CIC theater command. Personnel of this detachment had been scattered throughout the Solomons, working out of their headquarters on Treasure Island.

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109 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of June 44; dtd 2 Aug 44, p. 7, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Four CIC agents left New Zealand with the 43d Division in June 1944, and later landed at Aitape. From Aitape they went to Brisbane for training. In September 1944, the 43d CIC Detachment was activated and attached to the 43d Division. First Lieutenant Ray W. Hodgson and ten agents returned to Aitape to carry out a full CIC program with the division until it embarked for the Luzon campaign.

Finally, the 25th CIC Detachment was formed in October 1944 and attached to the 25th Division at Noumea, New Caledonia. Second Lieutenant Natt B. Holman and the agents under his command trained at Brisbane during October and November. Upon their return to New Caledonia, 25th CIC personnel devoted weeks to indoctrinating division troops in counterintelligence and security measures prior to sailing for Luzon.[110]

110 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of June 44; dtd 2 Aug 44, p. 8, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 3

CIC IN THE REAR AREAS

While combat CIC detachments pushed through New Guinea jungles and hopped from island to island, there was a constant reshuffling of the administrative structure in rear echelon offices to keep pace with the changing tactical situation.

The increased flow of troops to the north in late 1943 and early 1944 necessitated revision of the theater's administrative machinery. A new advance section headquarters was set up at Lae, New Guinea, to control the Lae and Finschhafen bases. The USASOS advance base, previously located at Milne Bay, was replaced by a new Intermediate Section Headquarters, USASOS, which also controlled the Port Moresby and Oro Bay Bases.[111]

Changes in assignment of CIC and base intelligence officers followed the revision of the administrative structure. Lt Col Jennis R. Galloway left the Advance Base Intelligence Office he had directed at Brisbane for more than a year and became executive officer to Colonel Vreeland, Chief of the Theater CIC organization. Lt Col John W. Schermerhorn was transferred from the Brisbane base to supervise the Oro Bay section. Major Labatt, the former CIC executive officer, became Base Intelligence Officer at Port Moresby.

Because of personnel shortages, CIC officers frequently were detailed as base intelligence officers, and intelligence officers who had no CIC experience were often required to supervise the work of CIC enlisted agents in the various base sections.[112]

CIC headquarters at Brisbane was organized in six subsections at the end of 1943. Lieutenant James W. McColl directed the evaluations and investigations subsection; Special Agent Eldon A. Gray, the ship panelling section; Lieutenant Robert M. Hollings, the countersubversive section; Lieutenant Thomas W. Applegate, the CIC School; Special Agent Daniel T. Malone, the CIC laboratory, and T/3 Lloyd R. Everson, the administrative section.[113]

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111 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 40, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

112 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and United States Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During World War II, prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces Pacific, 1946, p. 122, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

113 Ibid, p. 123.

Troop Build-up Brings Growth for CIC

The tremendous flow of troops into the Southwest Pacific and the corresponding increase in CIC personnel during 1944 were to make further revisions essential.

For the first time since the outbreak of the war, personnel shortages in the theater were not acute. Although the Sixth Army was usually between 4,000 and 6,000 men short of its required strength and the Fifth Air Force and USASOS suffered similar deficiencies, the gap was being narrowed in 1944. In July alone, more than 116,000 troops reached the theater. Personnel problems did not become acute again until the invasion of the Philippines.

An increase in CIC strength paralleled the growth of the combat units in the Theater. Six officers and 38 agents from the United States reported to CIC headquarters at Brisbane during the first two months of 1944. Another officer and 136 agents arrived in March. New agents were recruited locally. CIC strength more than doubled in the first nine months of the year. By the end of September, CIC rosters listed 73 officers and 381 enlisted men. Still, the Theater CIC was under its authorized strength of 122 officers and 420 enlisted men.

The War Department published Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 on 24 January 1944, authorizing the establishment of CIC detachments and teams. On 14 March 1944, all CIC personnel were relieved from assignment to the War Department and assigned to the theater with which they were on duty. This order allowed the organization of provisional detachments only, but the way was now open for establishing a SWPA theater CIC detachment.

On 20 April 1944, the 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional) was created. It operated under the AC of S, G2, USAFFE, and was assigned all CIC personnel in the SWPA, although they remained on a temporary duty status with the units with which they had been working. The Chief, CIC, became the commanding officer of the new 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional).

It was under the provisions of Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 that the combat detachments which participated in the island campaigns around New Guinea were organized and assigned to USAFFE, under the supervision of the 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional) and G2, USAFFE.

Two other types of detachments subordinate to the 5227th were organized: regional and area detachments. Regional detachments, administrative in nature, were created to control CIC activities in large regions. Area detachments were similar to the regional organizations, but were responsible only for specific small areas.

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All CIC operations in New Guinea were first placed under control of the newly activated I Region CIC Detachment (Provisional) at Oro Bay. Later, when II Region Detachment was organized at Hollandia and given jurisdiction over Dutch New Guinea, I Region retained control over British New Guinea. Area detachments were organized in CIC offices at Base Sections in both Australia and New Guinea. As Allied forces drove the Japanese back, area detachments moved in to take over counterintelligence responsibilities from the combat detachments, which in many instances had primarily gathered combat and technical intelligence.[114]

Activation of the 441st CIC Detachment

The provisional status of the detachments was short-lived. On 17 August 1944, the 5227th designation for the Theater command detachment was abandoned with the activation of the 441st CIC Detachment as the Theater command detachment, under G2, USAFFE. At the same time, the 39 combat, regional, and area detachments active in the Theater were given numerical designations and were made subordinate to the 441st CIC Detachment.[115] Throughout the remainder of the war and during the occupation of Japan, the 441st directed CIC operations in the Far East. Colonel Vreeland remained commanding officer of the 441st until January 1945, when Colonel Galloway assumed command.[116]

Move to Hollandia

With most of New Guinea and the offshore islands in Allied hands, the move of USAFFE Headquarters from Brisbane to Hollandia was begun in September 1944.

After advance headquarters had been established at Hollandia, personnel and equipment of G-2 and other offices were moved forward piecemeal. CIC participated in the move. Both the 441st CIC Detachment and the CIC Training School were moved from Brisbane to Hollandia in November. By the end of 1944, Brisbane had been designated "Rear Echelon Headquarters" and Hollandia, "Headquarters."[117]

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114 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, pp. 41-42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

115 USAFFE GO 85, dtd 17 Aug 44, cited in Opns of CIC in SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

116 Opns of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

117 Ibid, p. 57.

Increase in Investigative Activity

The investigative activity of CIC in the Southwest Pacific kept pace with the growing numbers of American troops in the area. The number of cases handled between May and December 1943 more than doubled, jumping from 530 to 1,322.[118] By the end of 1944, these totals again doubled.

In September 1944, when the CIC workload was the heaviest of any time prior to the Philippine operations, the detachments within USAFFE handled 2,511 cases.[119]

Most of the investigations were routine loyalty checks; espionage and sabotage cases were extremely rare. A breakdown of all cases handled within the Theater between May 1943 and February 1944 revealed that more than two-thirds of all investigations were of the personnel type. Approximately 11.5 percent involved disaffection, and another 10.8 percent concerned violations of AR 380-5. Subversive activities, incident cases, espionage, and sabotage investigations combined were barely 10 percent of the total.[120]

These figures do not give a complete picture of CIC operations, however. Many man-hours went into security lectures, ship and aircraft panelling, security surveys, and tracing of rumors--not glamorous assignments, but a vital part of CIC's work.

Security Campaign in Australia

In Australia, the Australian Army and Commonwealth government assumed responsibility for the nation's security. The country was divided into districts by the Commonwealth Security Service and the Military Intelligence Field Security Wing. A Coast Watch Patrol system was begun and observers were placed at strategic points along all except the southern Australian coasts.[121]

However, documents captured from the Japanese in the battles of 1943 indicated that serious leaks of information were coming out of Australia. On several occasions, papers taken from the enemy showed that the Japanese knew strengths of American units and had advance knowledge of plans for Allied attacks.[122]

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118 Opns of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, p. 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

119 Ibid, p. 43; and 441st CIC Det Situation Rpt for Month of Sep 44: Activities and Training, dtd 26 Oct 44, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

120 Opns of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FED, dtd 29 Jul 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Ibid, inclosed Plates 16-17.

121 Ibid, p. 43.

122 Ibid, p. 31.

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CIC joined Australian authorities in an intensive campaign to tighten security measures and to trace the source of the security leaks.

Little was known at that time of the methods of the Japanese intelligence agencies; however, intelligence reports in May 1943 indicated that the Japanese were recruiting Chinese residents of Hong Kong who had once lived in Australia. It was feared that the enemy would attempt to land some of the agents in Australia.[123]

CIC's main concern with this report was to impress upon the thousands of American troops in Australia the danger of revealing even the slightest bit of information to friends or strangers.

By nature the American soldier liked to talk. He made friends quickly among the Australians and he could see little harm in answering their casual questions about his unit, his training, or his job. The troops had received security indoctrination before leaving the United States. But as the threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia waned, the soldiers--and Australian civilians--relaxed their security guards.

Beginning in March 1943, Lt William C. Shelton of G22 USAFFE's security subsection led CIC agents in Australia in a concerted security campaign. Cooperating with Australian authorities, CIC appealed to the public through radio, motion pictures, and posters. Security poster contests were conducted among the troops.

CIC stepped up its program of security surveys. Military installations, debarkation points, post offices, and even small unit command posts in the field were checked.

Special efforts were made to dramatize security lectures and to eliminate the boredom which troops had associated with such talks. At Rockhampton, for example, troops mingling in the crowd at a railway depot were suddenly brought to attention when a loudspeaker blared:

> "Attention all troops! Attention all troops! This is Military Intelligence speaking. This is Military Intelligence speaking. Enemy agents are operating in this area. They operate in every role from bright young newsboys to kindly old ladies. They may be wearing GIs', officers' uniforms, or Australian Army issue. Not all spies are blonde and beautiful nor will they ask you the details of secret plans. Enemy agents piece together their information just as we do a jigsaw puzzle. Here are some of the things they want to know. Remember...this is what the enemy wants to know: The name of your boat...

123 Opns of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, p. 32, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The number of ships in your convoy...The type and amount of protection... The number of men in your unit...The type and amount of equipment...The type and length of your training...and any other information that may give him a clue as to the type of fighting you are trained for and where you may fight. Remember, the enemy will try to gather this all-important information piece-meal because you are all too smart and too loyal to give it to him whole The enemy only one [illegible] giving aid and information to the enemy. And that way is: Don't Talk! No matter who starts discussing military information, from officers down to shoeshine boys, from motherly welfare workers to cute little country girls. Be smart! Dummy up! Change the subject. Don't be ashamed to say, 'I don't know'."

At the request of the USAFFE Chief of Staff, CIC agents staged security raids in the offices of Headquarters, USAFFE. Agents prowled the offices at night, rummaging through desk drawers and filing cabinets and seizing every classified document not properly stored. Other commands received similar treatment to dramatize at higher levels the pressing importance of security.

The security program did not stop at merely denying information to the enemy. CIC fought rumors, sounded out sources of friction between Americans and Australians, attacked racial problems which grew out of the arrival of American Negro troops, and checked possible subversive groups by which troops might be influenced. Allied unity was stressed. "Divide and Conquer," a film depicting the Axis scheme for undermining Allied efforts, received widespread showing.[124]

"The Jungle Network"

Radio spot announcements were used effectively in the security campaign. Agent George Yakobian was recruited into CIC to write and produce radio shows with security themes, and for two years he worked on the radio project at USAFFE Headquarters. The security programs were beamed to the troops over what was popularly called the "Jungle Network."[125]

CIC Lecture Teams

In keeping with the new emphasis on security was the organization of special CIC lecture teams. CIC agents had presented security talks to troops from the first; often, however, the press of other duties resulted in haphazard preparation for the lectures, and the talks were seldom effective. With the pace of the Allied

124 Opns of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, pp. 33, 34, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

125 Interview with George Yakobian, at NCICA Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., 7 Aug 53, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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offensive constantly increasing, the CIC Operations Section decided to devote more attention to the security indoctrination of troops.[126]

After experimenting at the CIC Training School in Brisbane, G2, USAFFE, decided in March 1944 to send CIC agents who were qualified speakers into the field as lecture teams. Operations Section organized two such three-man teams, made up a schedule for each, and the teams commenced touring bases and units in Australia. Upon arriving at a base, arrangements were made to have as many troops as possible gather at a suitable speaking platform, often nothing more than the hood of a jeep. Then each of the three agents presented a brief security talk.

The topic of the first speaker, "How the Enemy Gets Information From and About Us," stressed the danger of not maintaining security defenses. The second speaker warned against "Loose Talk." The third attempted to demonstrate the value of getting "Information From the Enemy," by taking prisoners and searching for and turning in enemy documents and equipment. Since a team visited a unit only once, the lectures were always the same. The lecturers quickly became skillful.

Just prior to the Philippine invasion in October 1944, the lectures were revised with the theme being the Philippines. And after the Allies had reestablished themselves in the Islands, a new series of lectures, known as "The Philippines Show," was prepared for presentation to troops in the Philippines. These lectures remained the same until July 1945, when a new set was prepared, designed for the invasion of Japan.

Lectures were not written in military form, but were organized to be effective and stimulating to the troops. They were designed to impress and convince with hard-hitting, dramatic statements of fact. The success of the style was reflected by the results of evaluation sheets distributed among the audiences. In June 1944 the results were 96 percent favorable.[127] The estimated attendance for twenty lectures given during May 1944 approached 10,000.[128]

In June two new CIC lecture teams were formed for operations at advanced bases. One three-man team, trained especially for New Guinea operations, left late in the month for Base 2.[129]

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126 Interview with James L. Broz, Jr., at NCICA Convention, Philadelphia, Pa., 7 Aug 53, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

127 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, p. 54, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

128 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for the month of May 44; Activities and Training, dtd 29 June 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

129 5227th CIC Det (Prov) Situation Rpt SWPA for month of Jun 44, dtd 2 Aug 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The lecturers worked under Lieutenant Shelton in the Operations Section when they were not in the field, but the area covered by the teams continued to grow. By the end of 1944 ten teams were operating in the theater. More than 100,000 troops had listened to the talks by the time Leyte was invaded in October. Special lectures were delivered to personnel of the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Air Force, the American Red Cross, and the U.S. Navy. In September 1, 200 officers and men at Headquarters, USAFFE in Brisbane heard the security talks; and at the request of Brig Gen Bonner Fellers, G1, who had heard and been impressed by the lectures, they were given to fifty members of GHQ, SWPA.[130]

CIC and Mrs Roosevelt

CIC drew a new security assignment in September 1943 with the announcement that Mrs Franklin D. Roosevelt would visit American troops in Australia and New Guinea. Although the Provost Marshal provided uniformed military police to guard the President's wife, CIC was asked to assign undercover agents to accompany Mrs Roosevelt. Major Labatt and two enlisted CIC agents were selected for the security surveillance. The entire trip was completed without incident, although Mrs Roosevelt spent several days in forward areas of New Guinea.[131]

Ship and Aircraft Panelling

One phase of the security program which assumed enormous proportions during 1944 was the panelling of ship and aircraft crews and passengers.

Started in 1943 as a control over merchant seamen and a method of cutting off possible avenues of entry for enemy agents, ship panelling activities increased rapidly. In 1944, CIC agents boarded and checked 4,621 ships in Australia and New Guinea ports. Papers and effects of 47,553 seamen were examined during the year.

Aircraft panelling, begun in July 1944, was supervised by CIC, although military police made the actual checks of passengers and crews. Control points were established at Milne Bay, Hollandia, Biak Island, and other air traffic centers in New Guinea, as well as at Australian airports. By the end of the year 12,649 planes had been checked and more than 1,002,000 persons examined.[132]

Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, p. 55, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

131 Ibid, p. 35.

132 Ibid, p. 48.

CIC Agents Interview Former Japanese Prisoners

As combat troops surged forward in the summer of 1944, large numbers of Allied citizens interned by the Japanese were liberated and rushed to Australia for medical attention.

Recognizing the possibility of obtaining valuable information from these evacuees, CIC established special interrogation teams to interview the new arrivals from liberated areas. The first such team was organized at Brisbane in May 1944.

Agents spent long hours at an Army hospital in Brisbane, questioning the evacuees and advising them of security regulations. Interrogation teams obtained information of both tactical and counterintelligence value.[133]

This CIC function, valuable at the time, was criticized after the war in the history of CIC in the SWPA prepared under the direction of General Willoughby. This history pointed out that the evacuees first passed through the combat echelon, G2, SWPA, where personnel of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service and the Allied Intelligence Bureau could--and should--have questioned them.[134]

CIC's "Counter Intelligence Area Studies"

Another CIC project which later brought the censure of writers of the history prepared under General Willoughby was the compilation in July and August 1944 of a series of "Counter Intelligence Area Studies."

Prepared by area study teams in the CIC Operations Section, these reports contained information on each of several provinces, islands, and areas which were marked for reconquest. Black Lists and White Lists, names and descriptions of persons known to be either disloyal or loyal, were included along with information about the areas and their inhabitants. Studies on Leyte, Samar, Panay, Negros, and Luzon were completed and distributed to intelligence personnel throughout the Theater.[135]

The Willoughby history complained about the "competitive, duplicatory character" of the area studies:

> "A particularly flagrant example (of duplication of effort) can be found in the publication, by CIC, of so-called "area studies." Hastily assembled,

133 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, p. 47, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
134 Ibid, footnote 20, p. 47.
135 Ibid, p. 53.

mimeograph issues, with old or inadequate map material, these "area studies" were developed by CIC in Sydney or Brisbane within a stone's throw of the AGS (Allied Geographical Section) Headquarters, then successfully engaged in the publication of literally thousands of copies of terrain studies and handbooks that reached staffs and troops well in advance of operations. CIC, as elsewhere, was aware of these publications, which is stupid, or they preferred their own "trade-mark" which is wasteful and inefficient."[136]

CIC's Technical Facilities

In August 1944 the growing need for specialized, technical investigations resulted in the establishment of the first CIC chemical laboratory in the Theater.

The laboratory was opened at Brisbane in conjunction with Headquarters of the 441st CIC Detachment. Agent David W. Walters, a qualified technician, was placed in charge of the laboratory, which in time acquired facilities for many types of chemical analyses. Other investigative agencies frequently requested the assistance of the CIC laboratory. When CIC Headquarters were moved to Hollandia in November, laboratory equipment was moved--into an air-conditioned development laboratory especially constructed for CIC.

Throughout the remainder of the war, the chemical laboratory remained a valuable adjunct to the photographic laboratory which had been established in 1943. Activities of the laboratory technicians ranged from ballistics tests to restoring charred documents and deciphering secret writing. In one instance, laboratory personnel identified by typewriter type the disaffected writer of a letter to General MacArthur; in another, they determined the presence of human blood in connection with a murder case.[137]

CIC in the Rear Areas: A Summation

Such was the work of CIC in the rear areas--a host of duties all revolving around the single word "security." Security lectures, security surveys, travel security--routine duties broken by an occasional interview which netted tactical information of value to the men in combat. There were no glamorous spies to catch, no large segments of the civilian population to control.

In September 1944, while combat troops were poised for the jump to the Philippines, the 441st CIC Detachment's Situation Report listed twelve area detachments which were performing these rear-echelon counterintelligence duties. In Australia there were Base Detachment 2 at Townsville, Base 3 at Brisbane, and

136 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 Jul 48, footnote 36, p. 53, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

137 Ibid, pp. 43-44.

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Base 7 at Sydney. In New Guinea, area CIC detachments were the 440th, commanded by 2d Lt James J. Lynch, with the VI Island Command; the 442d, under Maj Ermall P. Geiss in British New Guinea; the 448th, commanded by Capt Philip O. Roach, at Hollandia; the 449th at Biak, under Capt James A. Bledsoe; the 451st, commanded by 1st Lt Alan S. Geisman, at Milne Bay; the 452d at Oro Bay, under 2d Lt Andrew DeLuca; the 453d at Port Moresby with Maj Charles F. Chenery commanding; 2d Lt [illegible] Wood's 454th at Lae, and the 455th at Finschhafen, with 1st Lt Leonard J. Emmert in command.[138]

CIC's Role in the SWPA

The role of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the early campaigns in the SWPA was unique, dictated by expediency and by the strange circumstances under which agents worked.

In combat the detachments were used extensively to gather information of immediate tactical value to commanders. Emphasis which was placed on the capture of enemy documents and equipment and the search of enemy dead attests to this fact. A second function, that of security indoctrination of combat troops, was equally stressed. In New Guinea and the islands nearby, arrest of collaborationists and establishment of controls over civilians in liberated areas was of secondary interest to the combat detachments. This was true because liberated areas were territories of other Allied powers. Functions which might have belonged to CIC in a different situation went to units such as the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit and the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.

In the rear areas, where the Australian government was responsible for security measures, CIC confined its activities to security measures among American troops and the gathering of information of value to CIC combat detachments.

But most of CIC's work in the Southwest Pacific was still ahead; in the months to come, drastic revisions would be made in the manner in which CIC agents would be employed. In the Philippines, the American forces were to be faced for the first time with the task of driving an enemy invader from United States territory. There, for the first time, CIC would have to investigate persons who had forsaken their allegiance to the United States to collaborate with the Japanese. There, for the first time in the Pacific, CIC agents would have to assist in clearance of natives who could be trusted to restore home government to the islands.

It was a task eagerly awaited by CIC personnel throughout the Theater in the waning months of 1944.

138 441st CIC Det Situation Rpt for month of Sep 44: Activities and Training, dtd 26 Oct 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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Part II: The Fight for the Philippines

Part II: THE FIGHT FOR THE PHILIPPINES

Chapter 1

THE LEYTE CAMPAIGN

Even before fighting in the islands to the south ended, the Counter Intelligence Corps was busy preparing for the invasion of the Philippines.

In the months preceding the first landings on Leyte on 20 October 1944, CIC detachments in the Pacific laid a firm counterintelligence foundation for the impending campaign. CIC agents delivered hundreds of lectures to orient the troops on their security responsibilities before, during, and after combat. Individual agents and special lecture teams with each division, corps, and army detachment maintained constant speaking schedules. The lectures were well received, with troops appearing to welcome the opportunity for a clearer view of their part in the counterintelligence mission.

As the date of the operation neared, the lecture programs were stepped up. An effort was made to refresh the minds of troops with concise summations of the material they had received previously. In many instances, brief lectures were given by CIC personnel on shipboard enroute to the actual landing.

Other media also were used to contact troops in the pre-combat stage. CIC detachments frequently submitted security and counterintelligence material for publication in unit newspapers. Several detachments published weekly "Counter Intelligence Digests," aimed at keeping unit Intelligence Officers abreast of current counterintelligence developments and aiding them in their periodic orientation talks to personnel. Bulletin board notices and posters were prepared to keep constant reminders before the troops.

Immediately prior to actual embarkation of troops, CIC agents directed or assisted in last-minute checks to determine whether any troops were carrying personal items which would disclose their unit identity in the event of capture. Commanding officers and unit Intelligence Officers assisted in making certain that troops turned in diaries, letters, pictures, or any other papers which might prove valuable to the enemy. Spot checks were made to insure that code markings of clothing and equipment had been properly obliterated.

A highly important responsibility of CIC as troops evacuated their quarters to board ships for the Leyte invasion was the survey of bivouac areas. During each move CIC agents were left behind to make thorough searches of the various headquarters and surroundings. In most instances the previous emphasis by CIC on the necessity for complying with AR 380-5 showed results. Bivouac areas had been carefully combed for classified material as the various groups moved out.

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In the few instances where information had been left behind carelessly by the departing units, CIC reports and recommendations brought the matter to the attention of higher headquarters and assured more strict compliance with regulations in the future.

Security surveys were made of those plants or buildings where advance planning was being carried out, and detachments frequently added extra guards and other precautions. Constant checks of cryptographic personnel were maintained. Unit commanding officers were cautioned against revealing too-detailed information in their troop briefings.

To prevent loose talk by personnel departing on furlough or rotation from areas in which they may have learned of an impending operation, CIC detachments established a system of personally warning all such individuals against revealing military information. Before anyone received departure orders, he was required to read and sign a statement summing up his responsibilities under AR 380-5.

CIC Trains for the Philippines

All material necessary to CIC detachments in the Philippines was supplied to detachments as far in advance as possible by the Plans and Training Section of CIC Headquarters in SWPA. Such material included terrain studies, language guides, detailed reports on enemy espionage systems, black and white lists, pertinent reports of previous experiences in action by other CIC detachments, and all area and geographical reports available.

Some detachments organized self-training courses, with agents instructing other detachment members. In addition detachment commanders kept their teams fully informed of the development of operational plans and the CIC mission. Detachment members kept physically fit with calisthenics and periodic patrols and hikes. All detachments maintained regular schedules of practice firing with weapons, including the .45 pistol, .38 revolver, carbine, and Thompson submachine gun.[139]

CIC Organization for the Leyte Campaign

As in the island campaigns to the south, four types of CIC detachments were to be employed in the Leyte operations and throughout the Philippines.

Plans called for a combat detachment with each army, corps, division, or other tactical unit acting as a separate task force. Normal strength of a division

139 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FED, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

detachment was set at two officers and ten enlisted men, supplemented by five qualified Filipino soldiers trained in counterintelligence procedures.

Area detachments, consisting of a minimum of two officers and ten enlisted men, plus five Filipino soldiers, were to be established in territory occupied or [illegible] forces. Initially area detachments were to operate under the direction of the Task Force CIC Commander, with control reverting to the Commanding General, USAFFE, after the combat phase. Flexibility was to characterize the organization of these area detachments; they could be divided into two units if necessary, or the personnel of a single detachment could be doubled or tripled.

After the combat phase, regional detachments consisting normally of three officers and twelve enlisted men were to move into liberated territory to direct the activities of the area detachment.

Finally, the theater detachment, the 441st CIC Detachment, was to coordinate and supervise all CIC activities in the Theater.[140]

New Duties for CIC

Plans for the Leyte operation enumerated the duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps. In addition to the security and document-collecting duties which had been the bulk of CIC's work in the previous island campaigns, agents were assigned far-reaching responsibilities in connection with the civilian population of the Philippines.

Chief among these was the responsibility of "arrest and interrogation of all known enemy agents and collaborationists for detention by Provost Marshal, who will immediately notify Civil Affairs officers or PCAU (Philippines Civil Affairs Unit)."[141]

Punishment of collaborators was to be left with the Philippine Commonwealth government; however, the Army was to assist the government in determining which citizens had collaborated with the Japanese. This principle of having CIC arrest and intern collaborators for punishment by the Commonwealth was in keeping with the announced intention of the United States to grant the Philippines full independence as soon as possible.[142]

140 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theaters During World War II, Prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946 (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

141 Ibid.

142 GHQ, SWPA Staff Memo 35, dtd 30 Aug 1944, quoted in Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, Appendix 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Presence of large centers of population, heretofore unencountered by CIC in the Southwest Pacific, resulted in other new duty assignments for CIC detachments in the Philippines. Among these additional tasks was collaboration with Civil Affairs in maintenance of order, control of civilian movement, communications, and publications; operation in conjunction with the Provost Marshal of reception and interrogation centers for non-Japanese personnel; security of governmental office[illegible] public utilities, report and investigation of atrocities, establishment of pass-systems for the civilian population, and supervision of newspaper censorship.[143]

As the day for the invasion of the Philippines neared, CIC detachments throughout the Theater were told of their new responsibilities and rehearsed their role in the coming operation.

Leyte Invasion: A Tactical Surprise

The invasion of Leyte on 20 October 1944 produced one of the most sensational tactical surprises of the war--thanks in part to indefatigable CIC lecturers who had burned into the minds of American troops the necessity for strict preservation of security.[144]

Original plans to strike first at Mindanao were abruptly scuttled only a month before the invasion. On 13 September Adm William F. Halsey, Jr., recommended to his chief, Adm Chester C. Nimitz, that three projected intermediate operations against Yap, Mindanao, and Talaud and Sangihe Islands be cancelled and that the Allies attack Leyte in the Central Philippines instead.[145]

Leyte was picked because of its potential airstrip sites and extensive harbor facilities. It had a free undefended approach from the east, sufficient anchorage area, and good access to the remainder of the central islands in that it commanded the approaches to Surigao Strait.

Gen Walter Krueger's Sixth Army Task Force, composed of two corps and four divisions, was transported and protected by the Central Philippine Attack Force.

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143 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Theater During World War II, Prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946 (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

144 Appendix 10, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

145 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 227-228.

The 6th Ranger Battalion made pre-invasion landings on Dinagat, Suluan, and Honohol Islands at the entrance to Leyte Gulf on 17-18 October to feel out Japanese defenses in the area and provide a safe approach for the invading forces.

On 19 October the huge convoy approached Leyte's east coast. The next morning troops under General Krueger went ashore as scheduled. X Corps, with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division, hit the beaches in the San Ricardo-Palo area near Tacloban, the Leyte provincial capital. Tacloban Airdrome was seized by the 1st Cavalry Division the same day. About 20 miles south at Dulag, the 7th and 96th Divisions landed under XXIV Corps.[146]

CIC Detachments in Initial Leyte Action

Eight CIC detachments were attached to the original Sixth Army Task Force which smashed into the Leyte beachhead between A-Day, 20 October, and A-Day plus four. More than 70 CIC officers and agents, in addition to attached Filipinos, participated in the initial action.

Maj Blair P. Labatt, commander of Sixth Army's 306th CIC Detachment, directed CIC activities during the Leyte landings. Subordinate to the Sixth Army detachment were six other combat detachments and the 459th Area Detachment, commanded by Capt James W. McColl.

Under X Corps 210th CIC Detachment, led by Capt Joseph P. Hurley, were the 801st CIC Detachment of the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Capt Thomas D. Smith, and the 24th Division's 24th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt David I. Connelly.

Entering the Leyte campaign from the Central Pacific Theater, XXIV Corps brought with it the 224th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt Harold F. Frederick. With the 7th Division was Capt George A. Hanna's 7th CIC Detachment. The 96th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt Federico L. Fernandez, Jr., was attached to the 96th Division.[147]

146 A History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific and United States Army Forces, Pacific Theater During World War II, Prepared by the Office of the Chief CI Officer, GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific, 1946, p. 204, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 229-233, 603-607.

147 Appendixes 10 and 4, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

On the same day, 22 October, Lt Col John N. Irwin arrived as coordinator of all counterintelligence for G2. And in one of the war's most dramatic episodes,

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The Battle in the North

To the north X Corps, with its 210th CIC Detachment, landed at San Pedro Bay near Tacloban. The 801st CIC Detachment made its A-Day landing at Cataisan Point, just south of Tacloban, and the 24th CIC Detachment went ashore in the area just south of the territory covered by the 801st.[148]

While American troops were still on the beaches more than 2,000 natives who had fled Tacloban began returning to their homes. Realizing that espionage and sabotage agents might be mingling with the civilians, the 210th CIC Detachment arranged with the Engineers and Military Police for a temporary compound where natives could be interned until screened.[149]

On 21 October, four members of the 801st CIC entered Tacloban on the heels of 1st Cavalry Division assault troops. Under sniper fire, agents quickly searched the Provincial Capital Building, Kempei Tai Headquarters, Kali Bapi Headquarters, the Post Office, the Municipal Building, and the deserted headquarters of the Japanese 16th Division. However a tactical reverse the following day forced all American troops to leave the city and CIC agents found it impossible to post guards at any of the key targets reduced on 21 October.

Troops moved back into Tacloban on 22 October. At the same time advance elements of the 459th CIC Area Detachment landed at Cataisan Point and moved in to aid the 801st and five agents of the 210th in searching numerous government buildings in Tacloban.

One of the first persons arrested by CIC agents in the provincial capital was Pastor Salazar, the puppet governor of Leyte. Under questioning by CIC agents Salazar admitted he had held secret conferences with Japanese military commanders even after the arrival of United States troops in the capital city.

Vincent Quintero, mayor of Tacloban under Japanese occupation, was removed from office and restricted to his home pending a CIC investigation of his association with the enemy. Arturo O. Reyes, the city's police chief, was arrested and questioned by agents of the 210th and 459th CIC Detachments, but was released temporarily to quell disorders which followed the fighting in Tacloban.[150]

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148 Appendix 4, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

149 210th CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report dtd 30 November 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

150 Appendix 4, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol, VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Six civilians of unquestioned loyalty and integrity, each with a broad knowledge of civilian activities during the Japanese occupation, were selected to constitute a civilian panelling board. As CIC agents made investigations and recommendations they consulted with board members, who were frequently able to supply sources for verification of information or for further checks.

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CIC Recruits Chinese Labor

Shortly after the invasion of Leyte Agent Charles C. Deubel of the 801st CIC Detachment found himself near a unit assigned the task of rebuilding a damaged airstrip--a project hampered by a shortage of native labor.

Noting a large number of Chinese in the area, Deubel sent Humphrey W. Leynse, a Mandarin-speaking agent of the 801st, to try to recruit laborers for the project. Leynse, son of missionaries of Dutch extraction, had spent much of his life in China. Fortunately for the project, he knew how to bargain with the Chinese.

The Chinese were willing to work, but wages alone were not enough inducement; their national pride was at stake. They insisted that their work in rebuilding the airstrip be considered a "representation"--a contribution of the Chinese government. Leynse agreed, promising a colorful ceremony at which the Chinese efforts would be officially recognized. He then set about his recruiting campaign.

The response was tremendous. More than 150 Chinese reported at 0330 one morning for the recognition ceremonies at an Army warehouse. Deubel made a speech. So did Leynse. Several Chinese made impromptu talks. They climaxed the display of patriotism with a colorful parade to the labor office. Marching in a column of twos, the Chinese waved American and Chinese flags and appropriate banners as they made their way to sign up for work.

Before the procession reached the labor office, it was interrupted by a colonel who was in charge of the construction project. In their haste to recruit laborers, Deubel and Leynse had forgotten to tell him of their plans. Deubel quickly explained the situation. Delighted, the colonel himself made a speech of welcome. Then the parade to the labor office continued, and the Chinese were soon at work on the airstrip.

152 Appendix 10, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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A Collaborator Waitress

High on the 801st CIC Detachment's blacklist was the name of _who was accused of causing the death of an American captain.

had been very friendly with the American captain before the Japanese invasion. After the Japanese struck at Leyte, the captain gave a letter to smuggle out in preparation for his plan of escape. Instead, gave the to a Japanese sergeant who found the captain, tied him to a gate, and bayoneted him to death. became the sergeant's girl friend.

At a Leyte village liberated by the 1st Cavalry Division, the chief of police gave a dinner for town officials and three 801st CIC agents who were in the area. turned up as one of the waitresses at the dinner.

Arrested by CIC agents denied giving the letter to the Japanese sergeant. She claimed she had flirted with him only to save the life of her brother, a guerilla. CIC released her to the custody of Philippine authorities.[153]

CIC Agent Killed During Air Raid

CIC suffered its first casualties in the Philippines on 25 October. During an air raid, a Japanese bomb struck an LST with agents of the 306th CIC Detachment aboard waiting to disembark. Cpl Elvin C. Jensen was killed, and Sgt Daniel J. Coakley was seriously wounded by shrapnel.

Initially the 306th operated in the vicinity of San Jose, about four miles south of Tacloban. Five miles farther south, two agents set up an office for screening civilians against their lists of suspected collaborators. When beachheads were firmly established, the 306th moved to San Roque, near the Sixth Army command post about 16 miles south of Tacloban. The detachment's headquarters then was established at a point midway between XXIV and X Corps' areas of operations.[154]

24th CIC Repels Japanese Attack

After landing on A-Day, the 24th CIC Detachment moved inland and established temporary headquarters at Palo. On 25 October all but one agent of the detachment were trapped inside the headquarters building when a Japanese suicide party made a surprise assault on the village.

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153 Interview with Charles C. Deubel at NCICA Convention, Philadelphia, 7 August 1953, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

154 Appendix 10, Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The Japanese, 80 fanatical soldiers who had infiltrated American lines, rushed into Palo at 1400 and attempted to storm the CIC office. Completely surprised, the small band of CIC agents hastily set up a defense and thwarted the enemy raid. The Japanese were repulsed with heavy losses.[155]

As 24th Division troops hammered into the Leyte interior the 24th CIC Detachment advanced to the villages of Santa Fe, Jaro, and Tungo, collecting more than 500 pounds of enemy documents in less than a week.

Enemy infiltration continued to plague 24th CIC agents. Japanese soldiers often remained behind in the guise of natives of the little towns and barrios. Others passed through American lines dressed in women's clothing. Special CIC patrols were formed to guard against such infiltration techniques.

X Corps Drives Toward North Coast

The X Corps campaign toward Leyte's north coast resulted in the capture of the key coastal towns of Carigara and Barugo, where the 210th CIC Detachment quickly set up sub-offices, assisted by agents of the 24th and 801st Detachments. Agents of the 210th also worked in Alangalang, Jaro, San Miguel, Pastrana, and Palo. Close scrutiny was maintained on all fishing vessels along Carigara Bay coast to prevent clandestine landing of enemy agents. Native Volunteer Guards, recruited and supervised by CIC, performed the actual surveillance of the coastline.

Mission to Samar

Early in the Leyte campaign, the 801st CIC Detachment was instructed to gather as much information as possible about the adjacent island of Samar. Particular emphasis was placed on obtaining information about guerilla leaders and activities on the neighboring island.

Four days after the invasion of Leyte several agents of the 801st CIC landed on Samar with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. Agents quickly contacted Capt Pedro Talbo, leader of the guerilla forces around Basey on Samar. Captain Talbo and other guerilla officers turned over to CIC a detailed report of guerilla units on Samar, including names of officers and locations of command posts, message centers, and Japanese troops. Guerillas in Samar's west-coast towns of Basey, Calbiga, Villareal, Wright, and Catbalogan also gave CIC agents considerable valuable counterintelligence information.

155 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 1948, p. 64, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Those agents of the 801st who remained on Leyte operated jointly with the 24th and 210th CIC Detachments in Jaro, San Miguel, and Santa Rosa.

32d CIC Detachment Lands in Leyte

Japanese resistance stiffened as American forces pushed west towards Limon, the northern anchor of the corridor leading to the enemy stronghold at Ormoc. In mid-November the Japanese rushed crack troops of their 1st Division into the fight to defend Ormoc, but the Americans brought in reinforcements, too.

On 14 November the 32d Division landed on Leyte and went into action along the Pinamopoan-Ormoc highway, relieving the 24th Division for duty elsewhere. With the new division came the 32d CIC Detachment commanded by 1st Lt Mark G. Lynch.

Agents of the 210th CIC Detachment contacted the 32d CIC and oriented its personnel on the tactical situation. Then, while 32d Division troops fought for Limon, the 32d CIC Detachment became increasingly active in the Pinamopoan-Carigara sector. Agents kept busy screening civilians and maintaining security of military movements, although the fluid tactical situation made their work difficult.

On 24 November Limon was finally taken, and the Yamashita Line blocking the northern approach to Ormoc was smashed in bitter hand-to-hand combat. The 32d Division's union with the 1st Cavalry Division near Lonoy on 22 December marked the collapse of enemy resistance in the upper Ormoc valley.

The Battle in the South

Meanwhile, XXIV Corps was pushing toward Ormoc from the south. On A-Day, 20 October, the 224th CIC Detachment attached to XXIV Corps landed near Dulag, about 20 miles south of Tacloban. The 96th CIC Detachment went ashore with the 96th Division near Tanauan, north of Dulag. The 7th Division and its 7th CIC Detachment landed on a beach between Dulag and Tanauan. Liaison between the three detachments was quickly established, but in the first days after the invasion the tactical situation made it impossible to effect adequate counterintelligence measures.

In Dulag the civilian problem was critical, and agents of the 224th CIC Detachment spent their first days there interrogating scores of persons in the civilian enclosure. The detachment also searched the Dulag office of Kempei Tai.

As the fighting moved inland the 224th opened sub-offices at San Jose, Barauen, and Abuyog, expanding its coverage to the north, west, and south. Its agents spent considerable time contacting guerillas for information and making numerous surveys of the various towns under the 224th's jurisdiction.

At Tanauan three public officials were interned by agents of the 96th CIC Detachment, who also seized the puppet mayor of Dulag and his family. The 96th fanned out to operate in the towns of San Roque, San Jose, Dulag, Tolosa, and Dagami. From native informants they obtained much information on pro-Japanese organizations and individuals in those localities.

It was the job of the 7th Division to push across Leyte, cutting the island in half in a southwesterly direction from Dulag. Thus the drive toward Ormoc on the west coast was from three directions--north, south, and east. Agents of the 7th Detachment soon established offices at La Paz and Abuyog to the south, and, after reaching the west coast on 26 November, at Baybay, Bato, and Inopacan. CIC organized a comprehensive port security system composed of guerilla Volunteer Guards on the west coast. Evacuees from neighboring islands were interrogated, and infiltration of enemy agents from those islands was reduced to a minimum.

Two New Divisions Arrive

Meanwhile, two other divisions had been committed to the Leyte battle under XXIV Corps.

On 18 November the 11th Airborne landed amphibiously between Abuyog and Tarragona, 40 miles south of Tacloban. From there the 11th pushed inland and cleared the Ormoc-Burauen supply trail, an important lifeline of the Japanese. After being oriented by the 224th and 7th Detachments, the 11th CIC Detachment began to function at Burauen, with other offices at La Paz and Abuyog. The 11th CIC Detachment was composed entirely of paratroopers.

On 6 December the paratroopers of the 11th Division suddenly found themselves defending against a surprise Japanese airborne attack near the San Pablo airstrip. After five days of battle the enemy parachutists were wiped out. During the fighting, 1st Lt Dean H. Caziarc, Commanding Officer of the 11th CIC Detachment, and T/Sgt David Finn, agent-in-charge, were wounded. Lieutenant Caziarc was evacuated, but Sergeant Finn returned to duty.

The 77th Infantry Division, on its way to New Caledonia after capturing Guam in the Central Pacific Theater, had its orders changed and landed on Leyte 23 November. For about two weeks the division underwent training and routine patrol duty in XXIV Corps' rear area.

On 6 December, with the 77th's surprise assault at Ipil, a few miles below Ormoc, the fate of Japanese resistance on Leyte was all but sealed. Ormoc was taken four days later. The 77th CIC Detachment initiated counterintelligence measures there. The next day the 7th Division moved into the city, and the 7th CIC Detachment established its headquarters at Ormoc, replacing the 77th Detachment. The attack continued north along Highway 2 until Valencia was captured on 25 December, and all that remained for American troops on Leyte were mopping-up operations. The 77th Detachment set up its office in Valencia where it continued to operate throughout the month.

At the end of November the 38th Infantry Division reached Leyte. Its 149th Infantry Regiment helped defend airstrips at Buri, Bayug, and San Pablo against Japanese paratroop drops early in December. The 38th CIC Detachment worked under the 210th Detachment, operating around Jaro and opening a sub-office in Alangalang.[156]

Regional and Area Detachments Move In

The 492d Regional Detachment, commanded by Lt Col Paul Hurst, arrived at Tacloban near the end of November to assume jurisdiction over counterintelligence activities on Leyte and Samar. Under this higher echelon served five Area Detachments: the 459th (Tacloban); Capt Gerald E. Gilmore's 480th (Ormoc); the 458th, commanded by 1st Lt William H. Sayers; the 482d under Capt John T. Stapleton; and the 483d, commanded by 1st Lt Denver F. Cook. Effective 26 December 1944, tactical units on Leyte were relieved of assignment from Sixth Army and transferred to Eighth Army, and CIC supervision of the combat detachments was transferred from the 306th Detachment to the 308th, commanded by Lt Col Chapman Turner.[157]

CIC Problems in Leyte

Throughout Leyte CIC detachments faced hosts of problems they had not encountered in earlier landings in the Southwest Pacific.

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156 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and The Army Almanac, pp. 507, 509, 524-525, 534-535, 539-540, 550-551, 565-566, 586, 590-591.

157 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendixes 4 and 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 60, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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In contrast to the comparatively primitive and scattered peoples previously encountered, Leyte's population of approximately one million intelligent and civilized inhabitants, influenced by several years of Japanese administration and propaganda, offered real problems of collaboration and potential subversive activity. To cope with this situation was in itself a full-time task for CIC detachments; in addition there was greater need than ever before to assist G2's through the interrogation of guerillas and civilians for tactical information.

In earlier landings CIC interest in securing documents was chiefly to assist in the expenditious collection of tactical information. On Leyte, however, there was urgent need to search for and secure documents of counterintelligence importance. Records of the Japanese-dominated Bureau of Constabulary, of the local police, of Japanese "trading" organizations used as fronts for espionage and "pacification," and of the Kempei Tai, were potential sources of information about enemy agents.

The guarding of key buildings was difficult, since troops were not available for that purpose; Filipinos pressed into service required constant supervision to see that they held their posts and prevented the entrance of looters. Although coverage could not be complete, it enabled the acquisition of many documents of both tactical and counterintelligence value.

On entering towns, CIC detachments invariably were met with a disorganized and bewildered populace. In cases where a Philippine Civil Affairs Unit had not yet arrived CIC had to establish immediate contact with responsible local citizens and do whatever was possible to assist in the reestablishment of order.

Guerillas, some bona fide and some self-styled, were usually on hand with elaborate lists of "spies" and "collaborators." In several cases, the unfortunate suspects themselves, ranging in ages from 15 to 50, were brought in by zealous vigilantes at rifle's point. Previously compiled lists of personalities were naturally insufficient to provide immediate confirmation or denial of the allegations made by these volunteer peace officers, who were themselves the sole available witnesses and were of unknown reliability.

In the initial and most confused phases, decisions could be based only on common sense evaluation and close interrogation of the informant. It was soon found that most Filipinos had to be pressed for specific details of when, where, how, and against whom the alleged offense was committed. Later CIC interrogators learned that by requesting sworn affidavits, they could discourage many extravagant accusations.

Filipinos were detained by CIC only when believed dangerous to the security of the Allied forces; that is, willing and able to be of active assistance to the enemy through espionage, sabotage, or other subversive activity. The tactical

situation was an important factor in determining the degree of risk presented by a suspect. In forward areas it was often necessary to detain persons on meager evidence, subject to a later investigation. As operations progressed and conditions in an area became more stable, the necessity for physical detention diminished and more complete investigations could be made. Persons who, although whole-hearted collaborators, were physically incapable, indisposed, or otherwise unlikely to act as agents for the enemy could be released under restrictions after the critical phase had passed. Generally these were ordered to remain in their own barrios and to report periodically to the local police or CIC.

"Kangaroo Courts" Pose Problem

There was also, however, the problem of unofficial justice and "kangaroo courts" to be met. After the long Japanese occupation it was natural that those who had been fighting the Japanese in the hills should be bitter towards those who worked with the Japanese in the barrios. As an illustration, several armed guerillas once reported to a CIC office, saluting smartly. Asked their business, they produced a letter which began: "You are hereby directed to liquidate the following traitors."

On another occasion a CIC agent, the sole representative of CIC in a small municipality, was presented with an unexpected emergency when a local guerilla leader with a band of eager and well-armed followers arrived in town and commenced loading more than 50 terrified civilians aboard two captured trucks. Considerable diplomacy, much argument, and several bottles of "tuba" were necessary before the guerilla officer's demands could be revised downwards to three arch-collaborators, these to be delivered to the nearest Military Police stockade and not whisked off to the hills.

Until law and order could be firmly reestablished and the local police reorganized, quite a few civilians with guilty consciences presented themselves to CIC and asked to be locked up for their own protection.

Personal Jealousies Complicate CIC Work

It proved a complex task to establish sufficient evidence to detain or release a suspect. Political and personal jealousies colored the opinions and even the sworn statements of many informants. Those who had suffered under the Japanese occupation suspected the worst of those who had not. Townspeople were suspicious of the farmers, and vice versa, for during Japanese rule, movement between Japanese and guerilla zones of influence was generally difficult and sometimes dangerous. The town dweller who wandered out into the country ran the risk of being picked up and closely interrogated by the guerillas as a potential agent of the Japanese, while the farmer straggling into town had a good chance of being beaten up by the Kempei Tai as a guerilla spy.

Few people knew a great deal of what went on in other localities, except through rumor. From the guerilla point of view, those who had not actively aided them, or those who had somehow offended them, were often considered collaborationists. Opinions and hearsay evidence were as plentiful as facts were elusive.

Informant Systems Established

For this reason, the early establishment of an informant system was an obvious essential. The most reliable and reasonable representatives of the loyal factions, town and guerilla, were sought. Wherever possible, contact was established with a responsible guerilla officer familiar with the locality and capable of separating spiteful allegations from serious ones.

In the towns, likely informants included priests, town officials prior to the surrender, schoolteachers, businessmen, and others with intelligence, a sense of civic responsibility, and close contact with local affairs. Once this preliminary groundwork had been accomplished, names of suspects could be submitted to the members of this informal "panel." If they had personal knowledge of a suspect's activities during the occupation and cleared him of the charges, the need for an exhaustive investigation was removed.

"Collaborators" and "Pro-Japanese" were terms applied so indiscriminately by informants to those whom they distrusted or disliked that they had little counter-intelligence meaning. A member of the Bureau of Constabulary who had betrayed and tortured guerillas was a collaborator, but so was the woman who cooked for the Kempei Tai, the man appointed by the Japanese to a minor position, the girl who lived with a Japanese officer.

Many cases reported to CIC consisted of petty crimes committed without interference from the military, such as stealing from the house of a guerilla. Many persons were suspect ex-officio: the Bureau of Constabulary, the mayor, the city official. Many were opportunists, working with the Japanese for money or position. CIC was concerned only when the degree and character of the association, together with collateral information, suggested that persons might continue to serve the enemy if given the opportunity. The investigation and disposition of collaborationists, as such, was left to the appropriate agencies of the Philippine Commonwealth Government.

CIC Agents Screen Refugees

CIC with forward elements screened refugees entering American lines as thoroughly as the situation would permit. Persons with tactical information of value to the immediate command were interrogated on the spot, and the results were forwarded at once to the G2. Those whose knowledge concerned areas

farther advanced were passed back wherever possible to the headquarters concerned. In this manner much valuable information about immediate and future operational areas were obtained. At the same time suspicious individuals discovered coming into U.S.-controlled areas were detained pending investigation. Guerilla representatives greatly facilitated the interrogation and classification of suspects.

As a result of CIC's close contact with civilians and guerillas, the function of liaison with guerilla units was delegated by many division G2's to their CIC detachments. In all cases CIC worked closely with those who coordinated guerilla affairs, a cooperation which proved mutually beneficial. As previously noted, guerilla blacklists could not be taken at face value; personal conversation with guerilla leaders, however, produced much definite information concerning enemy and collaborationist personalities and organizations.

Japanese intelligence agencies existing on Leyte at the time of the invasion appeared to have been principally concerned with anti-guerilla measures. Japanese trading firms were used for this purpose, as were the Bureau of Constabulary detachments throughout the island. In addition to these, the Kempei Tai established its own informer system, known locally as the Ju Tai. Composed largely of boys too young to realize the seriousness of their actions, this organization acted as the eyes and ears of the Japanese Military Police, informing them when guerillas came into the towns and acting as guides on mopping-up operations.

Among the more interesting cases handled by CIC on Leyte was that of a prominent police officer of pre-war days who was continued in office by the Japanese. To the guerillas and other loyal factions he explained that he kept his job to act as a buffer between them and the military administration. Throughout the occupation he managed to please both sides, gaining the confidence of the guerillas as well as a promotion from the Japanese. After the American landing he was selected to retain his office, including his Japanese-conferred promotion. His energy, military bearing, and organizational ability marked him as an efficient leader and executive.

While keeping him under close but unobtrusive observation, CIC agents uncovered considerable confirmation of these qualities, if not of the officer's loyalty. The division CIC detachment which first entered the town had prudently secured all records from the police headquarters. Censorship uncovered further correspondence of his department. These records disclosed the existence of an elaborate organization of "secret agents," each of whom reported by number on guerilla and pro-American activities. This was not in itself conclusive, for if the officer had expurgated the reports of his agents he would have been keeping his promise to assist the guerillas.

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The discovery of further documents, however, enabled a comparison of reports received from agents and those submitted by the officer to the Japanese; nothing had been omitted. With the reports as a basis, interrogation of his agents themselves added further evidence of his duplicity. Before the investigation was completed, it was found that he had dismissed operatives for failure to apprehend a high guerilla leader who had personally vouched for the officer's loyalty. So confident was the officer of his position that when he suddenly found himself incarcerated in his own jail he had neglected to destroy further damaging evidence in the form of diaries and personal records.

All these activities emphasized the need for CIC detachments to be mobile and flexible. Whereas in earlier operations CIC personnel were allocated to regimental, divisional, and corps command posts, on Leyte the innumerable problems connected with the civilian population required that sub-offices be established in principal towns. Messing arrangements were improvised to enable the bulk of CIC personnel to operate where the need was greatest.

When division detachments had to displace forward on short notice as the command itself advanced, corps detachment commanders had to be ready to take over and continue to operate the offices established by divisions. Similarly, the army detachment, using its own personnel or the area personnel attached to it, relieved corps detachments of responsibility in rear areas. Experience in keeping up-to-date files of reports, suspects, and informants made it possible to make these transfers without interrupting the flow of activity. Leyte gave CIC its biggest job to that date in the Southwest Pacific Theater, but it was perhaps fortunate that the initial landing in the Philippines was made there rather than on Mindanao or Luzon with their greater populations and their large numbers of Japanese civilians. The experience gained by CIC on Leyte greatly enhanced its subsequent, even more complex operations in the rest of the Philippines.[158]

158 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Chapter 2

LUZON: CIC's BIGGEST TEST

Leyte and the subsequent landings on Mindoro were only preludes to Luzon, where the Counter Intelligence Corps faced its most formidable challenge of the war in the Pacific.

Luzon was the center of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. With some eight million inhabitants, the island was the most thickly populated of all the Philippines; moreover, these people were more educationally and culturally advanced than any group previously encountered in the Theater. Manila, the Philippine capital, was located on Luzon and represented the major target as the Allies geared for battle.

Luzon was Leyte greatly magnified. Here, for the first time in the Southwest Pacific, the Counter Intelligence Corps was to discharge both its combat and post-combat missions on a tremendous scale.

The greatest number of CIC agents ever used in a single campaign in the Pacific were assembled for the Luzon operation. Twenty-nine CIC detachments, including 16 combat units, were used during the combat phase and the days which immediately followed.

As in the Leyte campaign, the 441st CIC Detachment at Theater headquarters in Hollandia exercised administrative control over all subordinate detachments in Luzon. Combat operations were again directed by Sixth Army's 306th CIC Detachment, still commanded by Major Labatt. As combat troops passed through Luzon villages and cities, a dozen area detachments moved in to assume counterintelligence jurisdiction over the liberated areas. The area detachments were supervised by the 493d Regional Detachment.[159]

CIC Lands With Assault Troops

As 1945 began, a new Sixth Army assault force was gathering east of Leyte for the invasion of Luzon. The Luzon Attack Force, composed of more than 850 ships of the Seventh Fleet, steamed through Surigao Strait toward Lingayen Gulf.

On 9 January 1945, elements of the Sixth Army invaded Luzon at Lingayen Gulf--at precisely the spot where the Japanese had landed three years previously.

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159 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Although superior in numbers, the enemy was taken by almost complete tactical surprise; the Sixth Army landing caught nearly every major hostile combat unit in motion.[160]

The first CIC operatives ashore in Luzon landed at Lingayen Gulf within an hour after assault troops hit the beaches. One of the first detachments to land was the 201st, which went ashore with I Corps in the Damortis area on the northeast rim of the gulf. Also landing on S-Day, and under the I Corps Detachment, were the 6th CIC Detachment of Capt James Webster, and the 43d CIC Detachment under 1st Lt Ray W. Hodgson. The 6th Division pursued the Japanese eastward into the Cabanatuan Hills and toward the east coast, while the 43d Division fought its way to Lingayen Plain.

Meanwhile, elements of the XIV Corps made S-Day landings on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf. The 37th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt James E. Stilwell, accompanied 37th Division troops inland and south. And as the 40th Division fanned out to occupy the Bolinao Peninsula, Capt Earl A. Klein and his 40th CIC Detachment were close behind.[161]

On S plus 1, the advance echelon of the 306th CIC Detachment landed near San Fabian and was pinned to the beach for two days and nights, first by Japanese mortar fire and later by U.S. Navy bombardments. Later, Major Labatt told of digging a foxhole to water level, using only his helmet for an entrenching tool.[162]

The day after the initial landings, Maj M. C. Goff, Jr., and agents of the 214th CIC Detachment attached to XIV Corps opened an office in Tarlac Province. On S plus 2, agents of the 25th CIC Detachment landed with their commanding officer, 2d Lt N. B. Holman. A few days later, Maj E. F. Geiss brought his 442d CIC Area Detachment ashore.[163]

Subsequent landings at Lingayen were made by the 32d CIC Detachment, under 1st Lt George A. Baldwin; the 1st Cavalry Division's 801st CIC Detachment, commanded by 2d Lt Jerome A. Inwood; the 33d CIC Detachment, led by 1st Lt Bernard M. Donahoe; the 904th CIC Detachment, commanded by 2d Lt Loren E. Recor and attached to the 158th Regimental Combat Team; and the 902d CIC Detachment with the 112th Regimental Combat Team.

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160 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 234-242.

161 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, p. 71, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

162 Ibid, Appendix 21.

163 Ibid, p. 71.

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On 29 January CIC detachments landed at Subic Bay with XI Corps and the 24th and 38th Divisions, which moved out to cut off the Bataan Peninsula. Two days later the 11th CIC Detachment made an amphibious landing with the 11th Airborne Division at Nasubgu Bay.[164]

Initially Lt Col John N. Irwin, as field representative of G2 USAFFE, supervised and coordinated counterintelligence work in Luzon, while Major Labatt, as commander of the 306th CIC Detachment, was responsible for CIC operations.[165]

As soon as possible after landing, CIC teams began screening civilians for tactical and counterintelligence information. Early establishment of liaison with guerillas was a "first" on every CIC agenda. CIC agents followed close behind infantry assault troops as new towns were seized. Once in a town, agents sought reliable citizens to aid in formulating black and white lists. Pre-war officials, when cleared, were reinstated in municipal positions. As in the past, search teams were organized to seize documents and materiel left behind by the enemy in his hasty retreat.[166]

CIC Enters Dagupan

The first important Luzon city entered by American forces was Dagupan, on Lingayen Gulf.

Agents of the 37th CIC Detachment entered Dagupan early in the afternoon of S-Day. They found the city virtually deserted. Most of the population had fled to the hills, where caves offered protection from heavy pre-invasion bombardments. When the town's residents returned the 37th CIC Detachment took immediate steps to curtail movements of possible enemy agents. Curfew and blackout regulations were strictly enforced.

From informants the detachment obtained an extensive list of persons suspected of aiding the enemy. By nightfall of S plus 2, suspects already interned by CIC included an accused spy, a Kempei Tai member, and an arms dealer who allegedly had given the Japanese the names of Filipinos who owned guns.

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164 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

165 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

166 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 10, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Agents of the 37th CIC Detachment soon were joined by members of the 306th CIC, who had opened offices at Dagupan, Calasiao, and Alaminos in addition to the command detachment's headquarters at the Sixth Army command post.

On S plus 2 agents of the 214th CIC Detachment moved into Dagupan with the mission of securing an area for General MacArthur's initial headquarters on Luzon. After a careful study of the city, the detachment designated a Dagupan building as the site of the headquarters. Before it could be occupied, CIC made a security survey of the building and entire area. Agents conducted thorough loyalty investigations on all persons residing within the area.

From its offices in Dagupan the 214th Detachment began publication of a "Counter Intelligence Summary" which was sent periodically to subordinate detachments within XIV Corps. The bulletin contained information on individuals and organizations known to have aided the Japanese, plus a general situation summary.[167]

CIC in Dagupan: A Critique

Lt Col J. N. Irwin, General Thorpe's counterintelligence representative, arrived in Dagupan on 13 January, four days after the Luzon invasion. In an informal note to General Thorpe, Colonel Irwin commented on the effectiveness of CIC's operations in the city.

Although he praised the 37th CIC Detachment for the manner in which it restored order and reestablished civil government, Colonel Irwin was not satisfied with other aspects of the operation. He wrote:

> "One thing that the 37th and 214th Detachments failed to accomplish satisfactorily in Dagupan was the seizing of constabulary, municipal, etc., records. I talked the problem over with Labatt, and he is putting out some instructions. The most positive proof of collaboration is in documents...Papers and records are just now beginning to turn up in Dagupan and mostly from officers or soldiers who find them in their offices or desks; e.g., Gen Marshall handed me a file of the Governor's reports to the Jap Military Police, which Gen Akin found. The reports are by far the most damning evidence vs. the Governor. That is the sort of thing CIC must pick up immediately. Three of the first things a division detachment should do (simultaneously, if possible),

167 441st CIC Detachment Monthly Report of Activities in SWPA, Jan 45, as cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, pp. 72-73, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

are: pick up any known collaborators; seize all municipal and Jap records, newspapers, post offices, and establish municipal government and order."[168]

When the 442d CIC Detachment landed on Luzon in mid-January it established its initial headquarters in Dagupan and relieved the combat units of their counterintelligence responsibilities there. The combat detachments then joined their tactical units in the race for Manila.[169]

Other area detachments which subsequently arrived to assume rear echelon counterintelligence duties were the 440th; the 457th, under Maj Carl H. Goodrick; the 478th; the 481st, commanded by 1st Lt Charles M. Bingham; the 484th, with 1st Lt Beecher N. Clafin in command; the 490th, under 1st Lt Arthur R. Douglass; the 491st, commanded by 2d Lt Robert E. Friedrich; the 953d, 954th, and 956th CIC Detachments. During combat phases, personnel from these units were often placed on detached service with the combat detachments.[170]

CIC in Lingayen and Mangalden

While the first CIC agents were entering Dagupan on 9 January, the 40th CIC Detachment was busy reducing counterintelligence targets in Lingayen, capital of Pangasinan Province.

After searches of key buildings, agents formed a panel of pre-war civil officials to serve as a temporary government for the city. Blackout and curfew regulations were posted, along with copies of General MacArthur's proclamation ordering internment of collaborators.

During its first week in Lingayen, the 40th CIC Detachment conducted more than 700 interrogations.

At Mangalden, in Pangasinan Province, the 6th CIC Detachment took similar steps to restore order and began the long process of weeding out those persons who had collaborated with the enemy.

168 Informal Note from Lt Col J. N. Irwin to Brig Gen Elliott R. Thorpe, included in Appendix 21 to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

169 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 74, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

170 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

William C. Hartnett

On S plus 2, 1st Lt ~~James J. Ripley, Jr.~~, junior officer of the 6th CIC Detachment, took 11 agents from Dagupan to Mangalden to begin counterintelligence operations there.

The mayor, police, and other civil officials were summoned to a CIC-conducted meeting after agents had completed loyalty checks of the officials. The detachment and municipal officers worked together to establish a small defense force at City Hall to ward off any Japanese counterattack. Doctors were located to treat civilians who had been wounded during the pre-invasion bombardment.

Acting under Lieutenant ~~Ripley's~~ Hartnett's instructions, the mayor then called a meeting of past and present city officials, policemen, former Philippine Army personnel, and guerillas. The CIC officer assured the townspeople that the Americans would provide supplies, asked their help in locating enemy agents and collaborators, and told them of their rights and obligations.

Moving south through the little villages in the northern portion of Pangasinan Province, the 43d and 904th CIC Detachments were subjected to combat hazards far greater than those encountered by most detachments. Agents frequently clashed with small bands of the enemy and at times were pinned down by heavy Japanese artillery fire. Despite these obstacles, the detachments instituted security measures in several of the smaller villages.[171]

In Tarlac CIC agents arrested Tarlac Province's three leading collaborators when the city fell to the American troops on 21 January.

were apprehended and interrogated by CIC agents.

The 201st CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt Victor Cook, opened its headquarters at Tomana, in Tarlac Province, and quickly established sub-offices at San Fabian, Alacan, San Jacinto, Bosales, Manaoag, and Urdaneta.

Interrogation teams of the 201st unveiled several pro-Japanese organizations in Tarlac Province. One such organization, whose Filipino members had been carefully trained to gather intelligence for the Japanese, cloaked its true nature under the name "Kikushai Shioji Kaisha, Ltd.," translated to mean "Association for the Growth of Virginia Tobacco." Other leads developed by 201st agents resulted in exposure of the New Philippines Cultural Institute as a propaganda organization and the Ganaps as a pro-Japanese guerilla band.

171 441st CIC Detachment Monthly Information Reports of Activities in SWPA, Jan 45, cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 73, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

* - Letter correction - 24 April 1972 - Emp

At the end of January--three days before the first American troops entered Manila--CIC strength on Luzon totalled 34 officers and more than 170 agents, members of 14 combat and two area detachments. In addition, members of the 2d Filipino Battalion had been trained in counterintelligence procedures and were attached to all CIC detachments.

The second area detachment participating in the campaign was the 450th CIC Detachment, commanded by 1st Lt Kenneth L. Swanson. Originally it did not function as a unit; agents of the 450th were distributed among the combat detachments active during the tactical phase.

On 20 January, Brig Gen Elliott R. Thorpe and his small G2, USAFFE staff, arrived on Luzon to assume overall direction of counterintelligence activities. General Thorpe and other officers in his section frequently visited forward areas to check new developments which might affect CIC operations.[172]

American Troops Race Toward Manila

In mid-January, Colonel Irwin estimated in a report to General Thorpe that it would take 30 to 40 days for American troops to reach Manila. Japanese forces were expected to fight bitterly to retain control of the capital.[173]

The drive on Manila became a sprint in late January, with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Infantry Division racing toward the capital from the north and the 11th Airborne Division advancing rapidly from the south. When it became evident that Manila would be taken sooner than anticipated, Colonel Irwin recommended to General Thorpe that more area detachments be rushed to Luzon from staging areas near Hollandia. The 493d CIC Regional Detachment, commanded by Lt Col Lowell J. Bradford, stepped up its plans to enter Manila to assume control of other detachments in the area and to begin investigations of top-level puppet officials and collaborators.

CIC agents followed infantry units closely in the rapid push across the Central Luzon Plain toward Manila. At each little town along the way, CIC placed prominent and reliable citizens in municipal offices, gathered information on collaborators and enemy agents, and established liaison with guerilla leaders. Special search

172 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, pp. 71-75, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

173 Report, CIC Landings on Luzon, Colonel Irwin to General Thorpe, quoted as Appendix 21 to Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

and seizure teams were detailed to enter all public buildings and former Japanese garrisons to seize documents and equipment of intelligence or counterintelligence value.[174]

Invariably CIC detachments reached the villages well ahead of the Civil Affairs units. By the time the Civil Affairs representatives reached a town, they usually found posted notices which stated that a CIC-appointed mayor was duly constituted by the U.S. Army. Municipal government already would be running smoothly.

CIC occasionally ran into trouble with guerilla bands over appointment of municipal officials. On three separate occasions the 801st CIC Detachment appointed village mayors only to be confronted with heavily-armed guerilla leaders who insisted that they be installed as mayor. One of these guerillas, dissatisfied with CIC's refusal to place him in power, lingered on the outskirts of the village and peppered it with pistol shots throughout the night.[175]

Allies Enter Manila

The 1st Cavalry and 37th Divisions entered Manila almost simultaneously on 3 February, and 11th Airborne troops arrived shortly thereafter. CIC agents attached to those divisions were in the thick of the action when the first American infantrymen penetrated the city.

Colonel Irwin and Major Labatt accompanied agents of the 801st CIC Detachment into Manila as soon as American troops seized a foothold there. At Santo Tomas University, where the 1st Cavalry Division liberated 3,766 Allied internees, the 801st set up its initial operations in Manila. Agents interviewed the former prisoners for information on Japanese atrocities. General Thorpe also moved his G2 USAFFE staff into Santo Tomas temporarily. Two days later, on 5 February, the 214th CIC Detachment established Manila headquarters at Bilibid Prison.[176]

Fighting raged in the city for another month as the Japanese clung tenaciously to their positions. Manila was in shambles. Japanese fire and dynamite brigades and bitter house-to-house fighting reduced the once-proud "Pearl of the Orient" to rubble.[177]

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174 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 75, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

175 Interview with Charles Deubel, 5 August 1955, at NCICA Convention at Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, N.Y., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

176 Operations of CIC in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 75, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

177 Ibid, p. 76.

The majority of early cases investigated by 214th CIC agents in Manila involved sabotage suspects. The Japanese used persons of both sexes and all ages to wreak destruction upon the city. CIC agents questioned one seven-year-old boy who admitted to being one of a gang of youthful firebugs employed by the enemy. The Japanese had paid the boy 350 pesos for tossing grenades into deserted buildings.[178]

Throughout February the 306th CIC Detachment retained control over the several corps and division detachments that entered the city, and personnel of the 493d CIC Regional Detachment and the various area detachments served with the combat units.[179]

Combat detachments, operating with their divisions, concentrated on two phases of CIC activity while the battle raged: searches and seizures, and the screening of countless civilians who were displaced from their homes or freed from Japanese internment. By agreement of all detachments in the city, the 37th CIC Detachment was assigned the task of conducting all interrogations of civilians who crossed from the north side of the Pasig River to the south to seek the shelter of American lines. Between 2,000 and 3,000 persons daily passed through the screening point established by the 37th CIC Detachment.

Search teams from the division detachments made a big haul in combing abandoned Japanese buildings for documents. A wealth of information concerning the activities of pro-Japanese agencies and other national groups was obtained.[180] The amount of documents collected by CIC agents during this phase of the Luzon campaign was measured in tons.

Meanwhile the 306th and the various corps detachments began the investigation of outstanding collaborators. If sufficient evidence could not be found, collaborators often were temporarily cleared and released until the 493d and the area detachments could conduct more extensive investigations after the battle for Manila ended during the first week in March.[181]

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178 Counter Intelligence Corps Information Bulletin Nr 11, June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

179 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 76, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

180 A digest of information which CIC gathered on these organizations is attached as Appendix 2.

181 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Securing Manila

Establishment of adequate counterintelligence controls in Manila proved a more complicated task than anyone had anticipated. New problems cropped up daily as CIC agents set about the tremendous task.

An early problem was to find, among the incredible ruin and rubble of Manila, buildings sufficiently intact to serve as offices. The Commonwealth and provincial capital buildings were either levelled or were burned-out shells, as were most of the other buildings in the city. Late in February three buildings suitable for CIC offices were located. A physician's residence was set aside for the G2 USAFFE staff. Two large buildings a block away became headquarters of the 493d and the 457th CIC Detachments. A short time later the three-story Uy Su Bin Building in the heart of Manila was claimed for headquarters of the 441st CIC Detachment and other sections.[182] The Theater CIC Headquarters and the CIC Training School moved to Manila in March.[183]

But the housing problem was minor compared to some of the operational difficulties agents faced.

Manila's wartime population had reached an all-time high of 1,400,000 persons of heterogeneous races and nationalities. The Chinese colony alone numbered 18,000, and large blocks of citizens of India, Korea, Formosa, the Netherlands East Indies, the Soviet Union, and practically every European country inhabited other sections of the city.[184]

The security problem was further complicated by the presence of many German, Italian, and Spanish agents. The Spanish Falangist movement had acquired many followers among the Filipinos, and an active Nazi Party and a Nazi Women's League functioned in Manila. CIC agents of the 493d Regional Detachment conducted exhaustive investigations to determine which of the enemy nationals had been active Axis agents or party members. Agents interned more than 200 Germans alone in special compounds at Holy Ghost College and Bilibid Prison. Eventually, panels composed of cleared and trusted fellow nationals of

182 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 76, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

183 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

184 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

the internees screened the suspects. Only those known to be guilty of overt pro-Axis activities were held.[185]

Many Japanese agents were present. Enemy agents remained in Manila in the guise of Filipino or Chinese citizens. Scores of disloyal Filipinos were employed by the Japanese intelligence agencies.

The presence of large numbers of Chinese added to CIC's headaches because their resemblance to Japanese resulted in many embarrassing cases of mistaken identity. When guerillas learned that CIC had captured Japanese agents disguised as Chinese, they roamed Manila streets and captured every Chinese they could find. To protect the Chinese--and to lighten its own workload--CIC issued special identification cards to Chinese residents of Manila. Through liaison with guerilla leaders CIC persuaded the Filipino warriors to honor the identification cards which harassed Chinese showed their would-be captors.[186]

Still another vexing problem was the work of screening about 8,500 civilians, mostly Americans, who had been interned by the Japanese. Each of these persons had to be cleared before he could be repatriated. CIC organized panels to screen the internees.

The Counter Intelligence Corps drew bitter--and unjust--criticism from many liberated Americans. After many years of internment, they demanded to be sent home immediately and resented the delay caused by the necessity for clearance. Actually, CIC agents were acting on the request of the American consul in Manila, who refused to issue visas to the former Japanese prisoners until they had been cleared by CIC. Agents were often unjustly blamed when the scarcity of space aboard ships bound for the United States caused further delays.[187]

Destruction of roads, bridges and buildings by the retreating Japanese necessitated the use of large numbers of civilian laborers to assist Army Engineers in reconstruction projects. CIC often was asked to help regulate the hiring of native personnel.[188]

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185 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, pp. 86-87, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

186 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

187 Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 87, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

188 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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CIC Treasure Hunt

Agents of the 801st CIC Detachment went on a treasure hunt after the fighting in Manila had stopped.

During the early days of the war, when Japanese forces threatened to drive the Americans from the Philippines, General MacArthur ordered monies for the payment of American troops placed in bags and sunk in the bay. Certain American soldiers who reentered Manila knew the approximate location of the sunken silver and secretly planned to recover it for themselves.

The plot was discovered by a CIC agent of the 801st Detachment when he overheard a conversation about the treasure hunt in a Manila bar. The agent arranged to join the group of soldiers, who had secured the aid of Navy divers for the search.

When the divers recovered the money, the CIC agent removed his shirt--a signal to other agents waiting nearby. They closed in immediately and recovered the entire treasure. The coins, silver pesos, filled a box six feet long, two feet high, and four feet wide.[189]

The Guerilla Problem

From the time of the first American landings in the Philippines until the cessation of hostilities, the scores of guerilla organizations in the island proved invaluable to the Counter Intelligence Corps as sources of information about enemy agents and collaborators. Liaison with guerilla leaders was one of the most important responsibilities of every detachment.

In Manila, however, especially during the days following the battle for the city, guerilla organizations became an ever-increasing problem to CIC detachments.

During the Japanese occupation many bands of guerillas, motivated by desire for personal gain rather than by opposition to the Japanese, emerged. Some of these bands were bent on looting. In the chaotic days following combat, their search for plunder only intensified the civil disorders which CIC was trying desperately to quiet. Other guerillas dealt extensively in black market activities; a few resorted to extortion of wealthy Chinese.

Another difficulty stemmed from the divergent political views of various guerilla groups. Those who adhered to opposing political doctrines spent almost as much time fighting among themselves as they did fighting the enemy.

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189 Interview with Harold F. Frederick at the NCICA Convention, Chicago, August 1954, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Generally Luzon guerilla forces were divided into two principal camps. On one side were those known as USAFFE Guerillas, well-organized into various geographical commands and generally supported by General MacArthur. Some USAFFE Guerilla groups bore the names of their leaders--Hunter, Ramsey, Boone, Thorpe, Lapham, Straughn. They usually adhered to the political goals of the Nacionalista or Quezon Party.

Sharing the USAFFE groups' hatred for the Japanese, but diametrically opposed to them politically, was the rival guerilla camp, the Hukbalahap, more commonly known as the "Huks." This group was related to the Communist-inspired Popular Front or United Front Movement. Claiming to be "pledged to free the laborer and farmer from the bonds of the near-feudal system under which they had existed for generations," the Huks were determined to accomplish this so-called "reform" by armed revolution if necessary. Originally the Huks were formed as the military arm of the United Front Movement. Later, for purely political reasons, it was ostensibly divorced from its parent organization and presented to the public as a patriotic "people's army" pledged to fight the Japanese invaders. Leaders of the Huks were Luis Taruc, Moscow-trained Communist, and Louis Alejandrino, former mayor of San Fernando.

Adding to the confusion was the difficulty CIC faced in differentiating between the bona fide members of legitimate groups, and those flocks of opportunists who found it expedient to become guerillas once American forces became established in the Philippines. In Manila particularly, the guerilla situation approached farcical proportions. A report of the 306th CIC Detachment concluded "it appeared that anyone who could scrape up an army shirt was, ipso facto, a guerilla captain. If he also had shoes, he became a major." One report stated that a group of pick-pockets organized a "guerilla unit" because it proved more lucrative than their former trade. Such groups seriously hampered the CIC mission; witnesses were intimidated, valuable evidence was destroyed, collaborators were concealed, and priceless time was lost.

Composed of all types, from misguided patriots to outright bandits, these pseudo-guerilla organizations went so far as to make arrests, conduct searches, make seizures, set up courts, and operate jails. CIC agents found it necessary to examine with suspicion statements of guerillas to detect attempts to discredit rivals.

One feature of guerilla activities following the return of American forces was their zeal for revenge. Hunted by Kempei Tai agents for years, by Japanese Army troops operating on large-scale missions, by the Bureau of Constabulary, and by other quisling Filipino forces, the guerillas usually felt no mercy for their now-beaten enemy. Many of their comrades had died. The guerillas often reasoned that the vanquished Japanese should be submitted to the same atrocities which

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captured guerillas had faced. American troops entering a barrio often found the bodies of enemy soldiers and collaborators piled high in the streets.[190]

CIC detachments resorted to numerous devices to gain cooperation of the guerillas. For example, the 37th CIC Detachment disseminated a directive signed by a well-known guerilla leader to all guerilla groups in the area. It urged their cooperation with CIC:

> "Guerilla forces, on entering a town, may apprehend suspected Japanese spies, collaborators, or sympathizers. If this is done, these suspects must not be maltreated or tortured but should be held in custody until the arrival of CIC men in the town. Spies, collaborators, and sympathizers must be turned over only to CIC and no one else. In the event said arrests are made by guerillas, the guerilla force involved must prepare in writing a summary of the charges against the suspect, setting forth suspect's activities; for example, if Filipinos were tortured or killed pursuant to information a suspected spy transmitted to the Japanese."[191]

Disposition of Puppet Officials

Another problem CIC faced on Luzon was the disposition of members of the puppet government, including the Japanese-sponsored Bureau of Constabulary. This concerned a relatively small number of persons, but their treatment involved delicate questions of diplomacy and political expediency.

After the Philippines fell in 1942, rule of the islands was given to a special Philippines Commission, headed by Jorge B. Vargas. A persistent though unconfirmed story at the time was that President Quezon had instructed a number of his followers, including Vargas, to remain behind and take part in the government under the Japanese. The idea was that even though a certain amount of cooperation was unavoidable, they could do more for the Filipino people than by staying out of the government altogether.

The commission was replaced on 14 October 1943 in a ceremony in which the Japanese "granted the Philippines independence." A puppet Philippine Commonwealth Government under President Jose Laurel was formed. A new constitution

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190 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 85, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

191 Report After Action, M-1 Operations, 37th CIC Detachment, 23 March 1945, cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, pp. 85-86, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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provided for important economic and political concessions to the Japanese Government. Throughout the islands puppet officials were installed in governmental posts down to municipal level.[192]

On 23 January 1945 a memorandum defining CIC policy toward puppet officials was issued by the 441st CIC Detachment, as follows:

> "It will be presumed that all persons of the rank of Governor or higher, or mayors of larger cities, who have held office under the puppet government fall in the classification of active collaborationists and as such will be interned. If, after investigation, sufficient evidence is available to warrant their release, recommendation to this effect will be made to this Headquarters. In no case will release be made without written authority of this Headquarters."

The memorandum was changed on 17 March directing CIC detachments not to intern puppet government officials unless investigation disclosed evidence of voluntary collaboration with the enemy. This meant, in effect, they were to be treated no differently than other Filipino civilians.

On 10 May this was again amended to read as originally directed. A clarifying note was added stating that members of the Philippine National Assembly during the occupation were considered below the rank of governor from a political viewpoint.

By 30 June more than 30 key puppet officials had been apprehended by CIC agents. But some of the more important ones, including Laurel and Vargas, had reportedly fled to Japan.[193]

When the puppet government was set up, the formerly efficient Philippine Constabulary was also reorganized and succeeded by the Bureau of Constabulary. Its carefully selected membership totalled about 15,000, with an estimated 7,000 members on Luzon.[194]

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192 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 86, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

193 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

194 Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 86, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Actually the Bureau of Constabulary offered little of a challenge either to U.S. combat troops or to CIC. Its officers were accorded military rank, the commander being Maj Gen Paulino Santos. In the government structure, the Bureau of Constabulary came under the Department of Home Affairs. About [illegible] percent of its officers were believed to be pre-war Philippine Constabulary officers. The remainder were impressed prisoners of war or men recruited after the Bureau's formation. The Bureau was only lukewarm to the Japanese and participated half-heartedly in its attempts to combat guerillas. There were, of course, some Bureau members who hunted guerillas zealously and treated them brutally, but these were in the minority. Many cases of desertions from the Bureau were reported as early as March 1944, and there was so much dissension in the ranks that the Japanese were forced in many cases to disarm the officers and in some instances intern them.

CIC was directed to investigate all Bureau of Constabulary members to determine the degree of their collaboration, before they could be reinstated in the new national police force being organized by the Commonwealth Government.[195]

195 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Post-Manila Operations

During the weeks after the liberation of Manila, the major share of CIC activity on Luzon was shifted from combat detachments to area detachments, which assumed the responsibility of tracking down and interning collaborators, enemy agents, puppet officials, and uncooperative guerilla leaders.

The work of the combat detachments in the assault on the Shimbu Line and the annihilation of the Japanese east of Manila, the investment and fall of Baguio, the protracted Balete Pass and Villa Verde Trail operations, and the final drive up the Cagayan Valley followed the same pattern as the original march on Manila. Searches and seizures, apprehension of immediate security threats, screening of evacuees and establishment of order in liberated areas were the principal concerns of the combat detachments.[197]

CIC Frees a Future President

Before the Americans liberated Baguio, CIC agents learned that Emanuel Roxas, a Filipino general, was there. Conflicting reports stated alternately that the general was a prisoner of the Japanese and that he was a collaborator with the enemy.

Two agents of the 306th CIC Detachment contacted natives in the Baguio area and with their help smuggled Roxas out of Baguio and back to the American lines. The general was taken to San Fernando, where the 306th CIC Detachment had set up headquarters.

General Thorpe had issued instructions that Roxas was to be sent to his headquarters; however, the Filipino general demanded to see General Willoughby instead. Roxas feared that General Thorpe would order his internment on charges of collaboration.

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196 CIC in the Luzon Operation, published by the 306th CIC Detachment, APO 442 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

197 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

At a CIC dinner, General Roxas casually remarked that his collaboration with the Japanese was in the best interests of his people and predicted that he would some day be elected president of the Philippines.

His prediction was well founded. Both General Willoughby and General MacArthur cleared Roxas of the collaboration charges, and the Filipino subsequently was elected to the presidency of the Philippines.[198]

CIC Screens Evacuees

The importance of screening evacuees from enemy-held territory was increasingly evident during the last weeks of the campaign as Japanese agents stepped up attempts to infiltrate American lines. Strict CIC controls on travel and the establishment of screening points resulted in the detention of many of these agents.[199]

CIC detachments limited movement of guerillas as a part of travel control. Guerillas entering American lines were required to surrender their arms at the nearest CIC headquarters. Upon conclusion of their official business they presented receipts, reclaimed their weapons, and moved back into forward areas.

Several detachments noted an increasing tendency on the part of American military personnel to pick up hitch-hiking Filipinos. At CIC's request, unit commanders and provost marshals enforced regulations prohibiting presence of unauthorized civilians in military vehicles.[200]

Key Collaborator Surrenders

On 4 July, Pio Duran, sought by CIC as a leader of the pro-Japanese Makapili, surrendered to 38th Division troops near Sibul in Bulacan Province.

For several weeks previously, reports of his presence with the retreating Japanese had been trickling in to various CIC detachments. Agents from one team induced a captured companion of Duran's to write him a message in Tagalog, describing the good treatment he was receiving from the Americans. The message was reproduced in leaflet form and dropped from a plane in the area where Duran was last reported. This apparently led to Duran's surrender.

198 Interview with Harold F. Frederick, NCICA Convention, Chicago, August 1954 (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

199 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

200 Counter Intelligence Corps Information Bulletin Nr 11, June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

3323

[redacted]

Showdown With the Huks

One of CIC's most troublesome problems during the campaign's last phase was posed by the Hukbalahap group. Soon after the fall of Manila it was evident that Huk activities were interfering with American efforts to restore order, often constituting a grave security threat to both American and Philippine Commonwealth Government interests. The Communist-inspired Huks constantly interfered with local governments. They frequently forced out of office Commonwealth appointees and replaced them with their own. The continual feuding with the rival USAFFE Guerillas resulted in frequent atrocities, raids, and kidnapings. The Huks terrorized the countryside, attempting through violence and force of arms to establish minor Communist communities in many localities. Law, order, and justice meant little to the Huks. Their one aim was power.[201]

Agents Leslie R. Harrison and Charles D. Lindsay of the 40th CIC Detachment were sent to San Fernando in Pampanga Province to assist the 485th Area Detachment in working out some answer to the Huk situation. The agents held many meetings with Huk leaders, including both Taruc and Alejandrino.

At a dinner meeting attended by the CIC agents, Taruc, Alejandrino, and several priests, the Huk leaders criticized the United States Army bitterly for recognizing the USAFFE Guerillas instead of the Huks. Taruc boasted 7,000 followers and insisted that the United States should commission him as a general officer. As the evening progressed, the anti-American comments became so pronounced that Agent Harrison threatened to arrest the Huk leaders. Taruc and Alejandrino stalked out of the meeting.

Later that night 40 American soldiers, including several CIC agents, raided the Huk headquarters. There was a gun fight, and two Huks were killed.

The raid netted a number of important documents. One of the papers seized by CIC agents revealed that Pablo Angeles David, a local judge who had been CIC's main contact in the town, was actually an informant for the Huks. But more interesting to CIC was a Huk list of "wanted persons." CIC Agents Lindsay and Harrison were numbers two and three on the list. Both Taruc and Alejandrino were interned by CIC.[202]

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201 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

202 Interview with Capt Leslie R. Harrison, 16 March 1954, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

3324

[redacted]

CIC Investigates Black Market

Black market activities also occupied CIC's attention near the end of the Luzon campaign. The scarcity of goods and the unrestricted issuance of Japanese invasion currency resulted in a flourishing black market during the enemy occupation. When American forces landed, the already-strained economic situation was further aggravated, and relief was slow in arriving. As a result, the huge supplies of food, clothing, and equipment which the American Army brought opened a new and tempting source to black market operators.

At first CIC was not concerned with the black market activities. However, an acute shortage of fuel for civilians led to sabotage of fuel pipelines in Central Luzon and the removal of thousands of gallons of aviation gasoline destined for Army air bases. When the gasoline thefts reached alarming proportions and constituted a definite threat to the security of American forces, CIC agents were asked to clamp down on black market operations.

Other cases handled by CIC during the last stages of the campaign ranged from teen-aged opportunists who worked for Japanese intelligence agencies for the prestige it afforded them, to vicious murderers who killed and tortured persons who had expressed anti-Japanese sentiments.

Less glamorous was the routine task of the area detachments of clearing civilians employed by U.S. Army units. The procedure usually was limited to a search of CIC files for derogatory information.

In Manila, the 493d CIC Regional Detachment continued to check all new officials of the Commonwealth Government. During the first 45 days after the 493d assumed control of CIC activities, more than 5,000 such checks were completed. CIC was also responsible for cryptographic and loyalty checks of Army personnel--work performed regularly, despite the press of other business.

As combat activity diminished, agents stressed security. Security surveys were made, and security education programs were inaugurated.

Throughout the Luzon campaign, members of the 2d Filipino Battalion contributed greatly to the accomplishment of the CIC mission. Filipinos from the battalion were attached to every detachment. In addition to duties as linguists, they often were used on dangerous patrols. On many occasions they investigated causes of unrest in municipalities.[203]

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203 Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, Appendix 19, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Eighth Army Takes Over

On 1 July 1945, jurisdiction over Luzon operations passed from Sixth Army to Eighth Army. With the change, the 308th CIC Detachment assumed the supervision of the combat detachments in Luzon for the mopping-up operations.

Locations of the combat detachments which were transferred to Eighth Army operational control on 1 July were as follows: 201st CIC Detachment, Tumana, Pangasinan Province; 211th, Manila; 214th, Solano, Nueva Viczaya; 11th, Mataasnakahoi, Batangas Province; 25th, Santo Tomas, Nueva Ecija; 32d, Bauang, La Union; 33d, Baguio, Mountain; 37th, Ilagan, Isabella; 38th, Bayanbayanan, Rizal; 43d, Santa Maria, Bulacan; 801st, Lucena, Tayabas; and 904th, Iriga, Camarines Sur.

In addition three area detachments were supervised by the 308th: the 478th and 954th Area Detachments at Baguio and the 956th at Luna, La Union.

Area detachments operating under the 493d Regional Detachment as of 1 July were the 457th at Manila, the 442d at Dagupan, 481st at Binalonan, 484th at Angeles, 485th at Cabanatuan, 490th at Binan, 491st at Legaspi, 952d at San Pablo City, 953d at Batangas, and the 440th at Bacolar.[204]

204 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 3

OTHER PHILIPPINE OPERATIONS

While Sixth Army was making headlines with its drive to Manila, Eighth Army was far from idle in the islands to the south.

A Western Visayan Task Force of two regiments was organized on Leyte in December 1944, even before that island was fully secure. On 15 December 1944, prior to the main assault on Luzon, this force struck at Mindoro Island's chief southern city, San Jose, 300 miles northwest of Leyte. The city was captured the same day, and within 24 hours American planes and PT boats were operating off Luzon's southern coast.[205]

The 479th CIC Detachment, organized on Leyte for the offensive against Mindoro, landed with troops on U-Day. By nightfall, 2d Lt Charles S. Camp and agents under his command had established offices in San Jose. Agents immediately contacted guerillas and municipal officials, and five suspected collaborators were behind bars before the day ended.

Through interrogations and capture of enemy documents, the 479th gathered a considerable amount of tactical intelligence on its first day in San Jose. Strength and location of Japanese forces on the island were discovered. One agent recovered an enemy estimate of American capabilities dated only a week prior to the invasion of Mindoro. The document revealed that the Japanese had expected the American attack within the week.[206]

Swift action by the 479th in interning suspected collaborators prevented guerillas bent on revenge from taking justice into their own hands. When angry guerilla bands came down from the hills to seize collaborators, they found the suspects they sought already in American custody.[207]

January brought new small-scale invasions on Mindoro and nearby islands for members of the 479th operating with the Western Visayan Task Force.

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205 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

206 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

207 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 77, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

In a thrust at Boagabong, on the east coast of Mindoro, one CIC agent acted as S2 for the operation in the absence of an intelligence officer. Working with an interpreter, he also handled counterintelligence duties. Through contacts with guerillas he learned the enemy strength and disposition in the sector. Maps showing the course followed by enemy planes flying to Mindoro were found during a search of a crashed Japanese plane near Boagabong.

Another agent of the 479th landed with troops at Paluan, on Mindoro's northwest coast. With the enemy garrison still offering faint resistance, the agent accompanied infantrymen in a raid on the garrison commander's quarters. Among the papers seized was a copy of a Japanese plan, dated less than a week earlier, to rush reinforcements to Mindoro from Luzon.[208]

When elements of the task force struck at Marinduque Island on 4 January and at Ambulong Island on 6 January, agents of the 479th went along to enforce the usual counterintelligence measures. In March members of the detachment participated in patrols of Romblon, Cuyo, and Luband Islands.

Meanwhile the intense fighting on Luzon had caused an influx of refugees from Luzon to Mindoro. These refugees posed a serious security problem for 479th agents operating at Mindoro's capital city, Calapan, on the north coast. To counter it, CIC authorized civilian travel only in daylight hours and issued passes permitting travel only when it was absolutely necessary and when applicants had been carefully checked.

By the summer of 1945 the 479th CIC Detachment was operating sub-offices at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and Boac, Marinduque, in addition to its headquarters at San Jose.[209]

Palawan, Samar, Masbate, and Lesser Islands

The beginning of March 1945 found American forces controlling all of Leyte and Mindoro, most of Samar, Central Luzon, and certain smaller islands in the southern Philippines. Substantial areas of Mindanao and the Visayas were held by guerillas.

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208 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility); and 441st CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report of Activities in SWPA, January 1945, cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 77, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility)

209 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

On the last day of February, elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet bombarded Puerto Princesa on the east coast of Palawan in preparation for an assault landing by the 41st Division. When infantry troops went ashore they met no opposition. Puerto Princesa and its two adjacent airfields were quickly occupied, and the Allies were assured virtual control of the westernmost part of the Philippines.[210]

CIC agents attached to the 41st Division and one agent of the 308th CIC Detachment entered Puerto Princesa and opened the only CIC office on Palawan. In March, counterintelligence jurisdiction on the island reverted to the 479th CIC Detachment.[211]

Meanwhile counterintelligence jurisdiction on Samar passed from division to corps to area detachment control.

Originally, the 801st CIC Detachment had sent agents with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to establish CIC work in certain sections of Samar. When the 1st Cavalry Division embarked for Luzon in January 1945, the 210th (X Corps) CIC Detachment took over the counterintelligence mission.

On 27 February, a special task force landed at Allen, Samar, to supplement mopping-up operations on the island. Two agents and one CIC-trained Filipino participated in the landing as an advance echelon of the 480th CIC Area Detachment. Later the 480th assumed jurisdiction of Samar and the neighboring Masbate Islands to the west. Headquarters was established at Catbalogan and sub-offices at Allen and Calbayog on Samar, and at Masbate on Masbate Island.[212]

Mindanao

The next major objective of the Allies in the Philippines was Mindanao, second largest island of the archipelago.

Scattered areas of the island, particularly in the north, already were in the hands of pro-American guerillas. But the subsequent invasion of Mindanao still proved third only to the Leyte and Luzon campaigns in magnitude and in special difficulties faced. Aside from its vast size and rugged terrain, Mindanao presented at least one new and more perplexing problem: the large Japanese civilian

210 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 236-237, 612, and 671-676.

211 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

212 Ibid; and Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 78, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

population. Before the war, Japanese commercial firms had invested heavily in hemp industries, mines, and other business on the island, and a large colony of Japanese lived there.[213]

After two days of naval bombardment by Adm Thomas C. Kincaid's Seventh Fleet, the 41st Division pushed ashore under moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire near Zamboanga, at the southwestern tip of the island, on 10 March 1945. Troops quickly overran Zamboanga City, meeting only slight opposition there and at two airfields near the city.[214]

Agents of the 41st CIC Detachment landed on the beach immediately after the assault elements and at once began a search for enemy dumps, material, and documents. On D plus 1, the detachment's six-man security squad entered the city along with infantry troops. Key buildings, including City Hall, the Customs House, Kempei Tai headquarters, and other Japanese billets were searched and secured.

Capt Lawrence Gluckin led the remainder of the detachment into Zamboanga on D plus 2 and opened CIC offices in the Maritime Building. Long before the landing, the detachment had been organized into five sections. In addition to the security squad, an investigation squad was detailed to detain, interrogate, and investigate alleged collaborators included on a 300-name blacklist prepared before the operation. Actually, most arrests were made by a group of agents known as the "special squad." One section was charged with establishment of an informant net, and another performed administrative duties.

Immediately after the detachment arrived in Zamboanga liaison was established with the 41st Division G2, the Provost Marshal, Military Police, Philippine Civil Affairs Units, and guerillas. A site for a Prisoner-of-War compound was selected and secured.

By D plus 4 the 41st CIC Detachment had completed most of its urgent work in Zamboanga. Nineteen enemy food dumps were seized and turned over to the Civil Affairs units. More than 800 persons were interrogated and cleared. Information on atrocities was gathered, and hundreds of enemy maps and documents were taken from the former Japanese headquarters.

In the first four days after the landing, agents rounded up 158 persons named on the original blacklist. Collaborators arrested and interrogated by CIC included

213 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FED, dtd 29 July 48, p. 78, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

214 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 236-237.

provincial secretary; provincial treasurer; a convicted Filipino murderer who had been released from prison and commissioned a captain by the Japanese, and Filipino mistress of General Hojo, commander of Japanese forces on Mindanao.

As a result of interrogations 48 other suspects were added to the CIC blacklist.[215]

By 22 March a CIC-approved panel of citizens was governing Zamboanga while sub-detachments of the 41st CIC followed tactical elements of the 41st Division as they fanned out over Zamboanga Province. Agents searched abandoned enemy command posts and enforced security regulations in populated sectors.[216]

Second Attack on Mindanao

The second major phase of the Mindanao operation began on 17 April 1945 when, after air and naval bombardment, General Eichelberger sent the X Corps of his Eighth Army ashore at Malabang, Polloc Harbor, Cotabato Province. Participating in the landings under X Corps were the 24th Division, which landed on 17 April, and the 31st Division, which followed five days later.[217]

The 31st CIC Detachment accompanied its division in a drive north up Sayre Highway and the Pulangi River Valley to Kibawa, while the 24th CIC Detachment moved southeast toward Davao City on Davao Gulf.[218]

Three days after the landings the 210th CIC Detachment learned that the unpredictable Moro tribesmen of Mindanao were gathering at Dalican, possibly to oppose the American forces. The task force commander dispatched a message to leader of more than 100,000 Moros, with the demand that the Moro chieftain come immediately to task force headquarters. Three days

215 USAFFE Board Report Nr 156, Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 41st Infantry Division, at Zamboanga, Mindanao, P.I., dtd 16 April 1945, included as Appendix 24 in Documentary Appendixes to Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

216 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 79, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

217 The War Reports of General Marshall, pp. 236-237, 671-676; The Army Almanac, pp. 527, 534-535.

218 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

passed before the appeared with eleven of his followers. After a conference with the commander, the Moro chief agreed to surrender the 400 weapons carried by his tribesmen "as soon as the area was cleared of Japanese."

But reports from informants led CIC to doubt the sincerity. As a result of preliminary information obtained by the 24th CIC Detachment, the 210th CIC Detachment under Capt Joseph P. Hurley conducted an extensive investigation of activities during the Japanese occupation. When evidence indicated that the Moro leader had been an ardent collaborator with the enemy he was arrested and interned at Cotabato. His son, considered by CIC to be more reliable, was appointed temporary leader of the clan.[219]

As the 31st Division pushed north and west, Capt C. W. Trout and agents of the 31st CIC Detachment opened offices at Malabang, Cotabato, Pikit, and other towns in Cotabato and Lanao Provinces.

Capt David I. Connelly and his 24th CIC Detachment expected to encounter an unusually tense situation when they entered Davao City early in May. Known as "Little Tokyo, "Davao City wasthe home of most of the Japanese nationals who resided in Mindanao. However, most of the Japanese civilians had followed the Army into the hills. The few remaining in the city were interned and interrogated by the 24th CIC Detachment. The detachment's work was soon resolved to routine security measures. Personnel of the 476th CIC Area Detachment moved into Davao City during the first week in May to reestablish civil government and continue the investigations of collaborators.[220]

Guerillas Prove Helpful

All elements under X Corps reported excellent cooperation from the well-organized guerilla groups on Mindanao.

On 9 May the 108th Regimental Combat Team landed near the north coast town of Agusan on Macajalar Bay. Advancing from the north, the 108th received considerable assistance from the 109th and 110th USFIP Guerillas under the command of Col W. W. Fertig.

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219 441st CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report of Activities in SWPA, April 1945, cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 79, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

220 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The guerillas provided CIC with long lists of enemy collaborators. Some guerilla units interned large numbers of pro-Japanese natives and turned their prisoners over to the first CIC agents in the area. At Cagayan, Agusan, and other places, guerillas led CIC agents to former Japanese headquarters where many valuable documents were found.[221]

By June 1945 four area detachments were operating on Mindanao in addition to the four combat detachments. Location of the various detachments was as follows: 210th, Del Monte, Bukidnon Province; 24th, Talomo, Davao; 31st, Malabalay, Bukidnon; 41st, Panubignan, Zamboanga; 475th Area Detachment, Cotabato; 476th Area Detachment, Santa Cruz, Davao; 477th Area Detachment, Cagayan, Misamis Oriental; and 489th Area Detachment, led by 1st Lt Frank J. Wathen, Zamboanga.[222]

Panay and Negros Islands

Shortly after the initial Mindanao landings, the 40th Infantry Division, which had been fighting on Luzon, was diverted to invade two of the main Visayan Islands, Panay and Negros.

Five agents of the 40th CIC Detachment splashed ashore in the initial assault on Panay on 18 March. When troops entered Tigbauan the same day CIC seized many Japanese documents of tactical value. Two days later CIC agents accompanied combat troops into Iloilo City, Panay's largest city. They searched and secured public buildings, radio stations, Kempai Tai Headquarters, and former residences of Japanese military personnel. Guards were posted at public buildings to prevent looting and to protect the hundreds of documents left behind as the Japanese made a frantic retreat from the city.

Records discovered in CIC searches at Iloilo City included lists of Filipino collaborators and spies, complete rosters of the Philippine Constabulary, and a file of incriminating letters written by the puppet governor of Panay.

The speed with which the 40th Detachment moved during March was almost incredible. Eleven days after the first landing on Panay the detachment made a second landing at Pulupandan, Negros Island. The next day the entire detachment entered Bacolod, the island's key city, which was quickly secured.

221 441st CIC Detachment Monthly Information Report of Activities in SWPA, May 1945, cited in Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

222 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 45, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Both the Panay and Negros CIC operations were carried out by the 40th CIC Detachment in conjunction with two area detachments which assumed post-combat counterintelligence jurisdiction. On Panay, the 486th CIC Area Detachment, under Capt Howard L. Cuddeback, accompanied the combat detachment and took over when the territory was secured and the situation stabilized. The 486th established its headquarters at La Paz, Panay. On Negros Island, Capt Dudley G. Skinker's 487th CIC Area Detachment opened offices at Bacolod and La Carlota.[223]

Panay and Negros were virtually free of organized enemy resistance by early April 1945.[224]

Cebu and Bohol

Cebu and Bohol were the last remaining major islands of the Philippine archipelago to be invaded by American forces.[225]

On 26 March, troops of the Americal Division stormed the beaches of Cebu near Cebu City. The 182d CIC Detachment followed quickly and established temporary headquarters at Basak by H plus 6. Agents of the 182d, under the command of Capt Albert F. Keenan, were used primarily to gether tactical information during the Cebu operation. As the 182d moved inland, the 488th CIC Area Detachment under Capt Daniel F. McGillicuddy, Jr., followed to handle most of the collaboration cases.

Interrogation teams of the 488th, stationed at civilian internment compounds at Talisay, were given responsibility for complete investigations of suspected collaborationists. Evacuees were screened for counterintelligence data and checked against the detachment's blacklists. Several Japanese undercover agents were detected.

After covering Basak and Mabeling on the southern outskirts of Cebu City, the 182d CIC Detachment entered the city proper. Agents seized and searched the Japanese consulate, the Bureau of Constabulary, Kempei Tai Headquarters, and other important buildings. Like Manila, Cebu City had been burned and sacked by the fleeing Japanese.

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223 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

224 Operation of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 78, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

225 Ibid, p. 80.

The 488th CIC Detachment discovered early in its investigation of the provincial government that a high degree of collaboration with the enemy had existed. The 488th's initial report stated that half of the collaborator suspects on its lists surrendered voluntarily in fear of retaliation by loyal elements. In the first two days following the invasion CIC agents arrested 156 suspects. Some were later released for lack of sufficient evidence.[226]

Bohol Invaded

On 10 April 1945, one officer and four agents of the 182d CIC Detachment joined elements of the Americal Division in the invasion of Bohol Island. There they found that guerillas of the Bohol Area Command had already interned more than 250 suspected collaborators. Agents interrogated, then investigated, each suspect.

After the invasion of Bohol, the 488th Area Detachment set up a sub-office at Tagbilaran and another at Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Headquarters of both the 488th and 182d CIC Detachments remained at Cebu City.[227]

226 History of Counter Intelligence Corps in the Southwest Pacific, 8 April 1942 through 1 July 1945, dtd 1 July 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

227 Ibid.

Chapter 4

THE PHILIPPINES: FINAL PHASE

By the summer of 1945 combat operations in the Philippines had ended, except for skirmishes with small pockets of fanatical Japanese troops who were still hiding in mountain caves. Some combat detachments already had pushed on to Okinawa; those that remained in the Philippines were training for campaigns to come.

After the 441st CIC Detachment headquarters moved to Manila in March, an extensive system of regional and area detachments was instituted throughout the Theater to provide an adequate organization for the static situation.

Regional detachments lost their former numerical designations and were renamed simply Region 1, Region 2, and Region 3. Area detachments underwent a similar change in nomenclature.

The Philippines were divided into three major sectors. Luzon and its offshore islands became Regional, and the detachment formerly known as the 493d CIC Regional Detachment retained jurisdiction. In July 1945 Areas 1 through 16 were located on Luzon, with the area detachments subordinate to Region 1. Leyte, Samar, Masbate, Cebu, Panay, Negros, Bohol, Mindoro, and Palawan were the most important islands in Region 2, which was administered by the detachment previously designated the 492d. Areas 20 through 28 were located in these islands. Mindanao, with Areas 30 through 34, was Region 3.

At the same time area detachments were operating in rear areas at Brisbane, Finschhafen, Hollandia, Tarakan Island, Brunei, Borneo, Balikpapan, [redacted], and Morotai.[228]

Another administrative change was the creation on 6 April 1945 of GHQ, Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC). G2, USAFFE was left intact, however, and maintained the responsibility for counterintelligence. Creation of the new GHQ had little effect on CIC operations.[229]

CIC at Work

Agents remaining in the Philippines were concerned with both the continuing investigations of collaborators and training for Operation OLYMPIC, the proposed invasion of Japan.

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228 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 100 and Plate 41, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

229 Ibid, p. 88.

Region 1 and the subordinate area detachments conducted most of the collaboration investigations. By V-J Day, when CIC files on collaborators were transferred to the Commonwealth's Department of Justice, CIC agents had investigated more than 6,000 persons suspected of aiding the enemy. About half were still interned when the war ended.[230]

In Region 2, composed of scattered islands, CIC agents had to continue landings at the tiny native villages bypassed by combat troops. Although troops had landed only on those islands where Japanese resistance was expected, there were collaborators on every island, and only CIC was authorized to arrest and investigate them.

CIC's "Navy"

Transportation for the island-hopping agents was a problem, since boats were not authorized in the CIC table of equipment. To facilitate access to the relatively isolated islands, Lt Col Paul A. Hurst, Region 2 CIC commander, first obtained the use of three "J" boats for the screening process. Teams of agents were dispatched through detachment headquarters and remained at a given location until the boat returned to pick them up.

In July 1945, with the assistance of General Thorpe, Colonel Hurst obtained a 105-foot Air-Sea Rescue Boat for CIC use. The Transportation Corps provided a crew for the vessel, and Colonel Hurst organized an 11-man "floating detachment" under the command of 1st Lt Jack Y. Canon. The team moved from island to island as a unit, speeding the process of screening the collaborators.[231]

The boats served many other CIC purposes. They transferred agents on short notice, delivered supplies, controlled unauthorized shipping, carried communications, and made contact with guerillas in remote areas. Agents aboard the boats occasionally patrolled inland waterways in search of isolated Japanese.[232]

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230 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 102, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

231 Interview with Col Paul A. Hurst, 17 August 1955, at Office of Special Investigations Headquarters, Washington, D.C., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

232 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 101, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Meanwhile the combat detachments in the Philippines were training for operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of Japan. An alternate plan, "Blacklist," was prepared for use in the event that Japan capitulated before the invasion.[233]

In the Ryukyus Islands to the north, there was little thought of an invasion of Japan. CIC detachments there were facing still another bitter combat test.

233 Operations of Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, Vol. VIII, Intelligence Series, GHQ, FEC, dtd 29 July 48, p. 102, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). Both OLYMPIC and "Blacklist" counterintelligence plans are discussed in the chapter on CIC in the Occupation of Japan.

Part III: CIC in the Ryukyus

Part III

CIC IN THE RYUKYUS

Long before the guns were silenced in the Philippines, CIC agents were aboard ships steaming north toward the Ryukyus Islands to participate in landings almost within the shadow of the Japanese mainland.

What lay ahead they could only guess. That the remnants of the Japanese Army would fight bitterly as the American onslaught moved nearer Japan was certain. But the civilians on the little islands posed countless questions for CIC. What would be their attitude toward the Americans? To what extent would they resort to sabotage and espionage to aid the Japanese who had occupied their lands since 1916?

Most of the questions would not be answered until soldiers and marines had seized the islands. Only after combat troops were ashore would CIC's role in the operations be fully determined.

A part of the uncertainty was answered by field orders for the Ryukyus operations. The orders specified that all the islands' inhabitants were to be considered loyal subjects of Japan and were to be interned in military government stockades throughout the tactical phase of the operations. CIC was instructed to assist in internment and interrogation of these civilians.[234]

Okinawa, largest of the Ryukyus, was the main target. But the Allied offensive in the Ryukyus began on 26 March 1945 with a pre-invasion landing on Kerama Retto west of Okinawa.

77th CIC Detachment First Ashore

For the assault on Kerama Retto and minor islands in the Kerama chain, the 77th Division was ordered into action. Within three days, the division made 15 landings and secured all the islands of the Kerama chain and Keise Shima--all within artillery range of Okinawa.

The 77th CIC Detachment, landing on Kerama Retto with the 77th Division, was the first detachment to see action in the Ryukyus. Augmented by four enlisted men from a reconnaissance troop, 1st Lt Phil H. Mast and the five agents under his command landed on the islands of Hokaji, Geruma, Tokashiki, and Keise Shima between 26 March and 1 April. The detachment's initial assignment could

234 "CIC Experiences World War II, Pacific," prepared in Training Division CIC Center, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

3340

hardly be considered a counterintelligence mission. Agents interrogated Prisoners of War and combed abandoned Japanese positions for documents of tactical value.

The Invasion of Okinawa

On Easter Sunday, 1 April, Lt Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner's Tenth Army launched the assault on Okinawa. Following an intense air and naval barrage, troops of XXIV Corps and the III Marine Amphibious Corps quickly grabbed the Hagushi beaches of southwestern Okinawa.

CIC units participating in the initial landings were the Tenth Army's 310th CIC Detachment, commanded by Lt Col Henry S. Boone; the 224th CIC Detachment, commanded by Capt William R. Gordon; the 7th CIC Detachment under 1st Lt William H. Attwood; and Capt Federico L. Fernandez, Jr.'s 96th CIC Detachment.[235] In addition, agents from the 310th CIC Detachment were placed on detached service with the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions for the operations.[236]

Some CIC agents went ashore on Okinawa a few minutes after the first assault troops landed at 0800 on Easter Sunday. By mid-afternoon, all agents assigned to tactical units subordinate to the 310th CIC Detachment had landed and were at work.[237]

From the beachhead, the Marines and the CIC agents with them moved north. The Army units pushed across the island to the east coast and then moved south, where the Japanese had concentrated their defenses. On 9 April, the 27th Division landed and plunged into fighting on Okinawa, and the 27th CIC Detachment, under 1st Lt Cecil A. Jastram, began operating immediately.

Arrival of the 27th CIC Detachment brought to 69 the number of CIC officers and agents participating in the Ryukyus combat operations.

From the outset of the Okinawa operations, it became apparent that CIC detachments would not function entirely as counterintelligence agencies. Even the 310th worked as a document-collection team around captured airfields, command posts, and other enemy positions for a week after it went ashore on L plus 3. Division and corps detachments did the same.[238]

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235 War-Time CIC History, AFMIDPAC, p. 51, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

236 Interview with Mike Murphy, at NCICA Convention, Chicago, Ill., 6 Aug 54, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

237 "CIC Experiences World War II, Pacific," prepared in Training Division CIC Center, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

238 War-Time CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 51, 52, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

As troops moved inland, military police and military government personnel rounded up hundreds of civilians for internment in hastily erected stockades. In the initial confusion, CIC agents helped to establish security measures at the stockades and made spot checks to determine whether the civilians were being detained as directed. Later CIC set up interrogation teams within the stockades to begin screening the internees for information of intelligence and counterintelligence value.[239]

Detachment Organizations Flexible

The rapid advance of American troops, along with the ever-increasing need for CIC interrogators at the stockades, necessitated reshuffling of the several detachments in the field.

Members of some detachments not actually participating in the Okinawa operation were placed on detached service with the 310th CIC Detachment to form a Tenth Army CIC pool. These agents, along with others regularly assigned to the 310th, formed teams which augmented the smaller detachments at corps and division levels. All detachments worked together closely. That fact, coupled with the constant juggling of personnel, produced a situation in which smaller detachments virtually lost their identity for operational purposes.

When operating as a separate unit a division detachment normally placed an officer and a clerk at the division command post for administration, liaison, and coordination of activities. Another officer, an agent, and an interpreter were stationed at the civilian stockade for interrogations and liaison with military government representatives. Two agents and an interpreter worked at each regiment to search for documents and gather combat intelligence.[240]

CIC Finds Okinawans Cooperative

Before landing on Okinawa CIC agents had feared that long years of indoctrination by the Japanese would cause Okinawans to be openly hostile to the Americans. Yet the Japanese had considered the island's residents inferior, and the firm but kind treatment which CIC accorded the Okinawans quickly won their support.

Agents soon developed a technique which proved quite effective in most native communities. After entering an area, CIC agents first contacted the Hancho, or village chief, to explain their mission and the screening procedures to which the

239 "CIC Experiences World War II, Pacific," prepared in Training Division CIC Center, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

240 War-Time CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 50-52, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

villagers would be subjected. To win respect for CIC, agents often exaggerated their importance or compared CIC to the Japanese Kempei Tai, an organization known and feared by the Okinawans. Next the agents promised the Hancho that the Americans would do much to help the people of Okinawa.

After this preliminary indoctrination, the Hancho then assembled the more prominent and better educated citizens of the community, and the CIC agents repeated the briefing. From this group, agents asked for volunteers to help with the screening program, promising extra rice and "C" rations to those who became "CIC Aides."

Finally, agents directed all residents of the village to report to a central area for screening. The native "CIC Aides" interrogated their neighbors, using questionnaires prepared by CIC. By the middle of May word had passed from village to village that it was "a good thing" to be screened. Agents entering a town for the first time often found natives eagerly awaiting interrogation.

After questionnaires had been completed a Nisei soldier, usually a member of some non-CIC Army organization, reviewed the forms and evaluated their potential intelligence value. Later, agents and interpreters conducted extensive interrogations of persons believed to be sources of additional information.

To identify natives and control their movements, CIC obtained metal identification tags similar to those worn by American troops. Each native was instructed to wear his tag, or "bongo," at all times. In deference to the Oriental concept of masculine superiority, the metal tags were issued to men only. Women received paper or linen tags.[241]

"CIC Aides" Prove Effective

Use of natives as "CIC Aides" during the screening process proved remarkably successful, partly because of the cooperation of the Hanchos and partly because of the competence of the persons selected as aides.

Never before in the Pacific war had CIC relied so heavily upon native help, but a severe shortage of loyal and competent linguists demanded that Okinawans be used whenever possible. Without them, no detachment could have completed the enormous screening task which was the only practical way of identifying individuals. Okinawans were much less reluctant to talk when questioned by their own people.

241 G2, USAFPOA Intelligence Bulletin, "Report on Okinawa CIC Activity," undtd, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Although it was doubtful whether the native aides were always in sympathy with the Americans, their cooperation was beyond original expectations. The screening process proved a fairly accurate means of establishing the degree of reliability, trustworthiness, and loyalty of an individual. It also revealed the presence of strangers and suspicious characters in a particular community.

Despite the importance which CIC placed on screening, it was never considered a substitute for a security clearance. Natives employed by the Army in restricted areas were usually required to submit to a much more extensive investigation.

As a part of the screening program, teachers, business and professional men, and civic leaders often were asked to write short histories of the aspects of their community life with which they were more familiar. Included in the reports were suggestions for the future and names of persons who could be expected to provide further information for CIC.[242]

Natives Not Security Threat

Few cases of espionage or sabotage by Okinawans themselves occurred. The natives were not concerned with who ruled them, so long as they were not unduly restricted in their way of life. The result of this apathy was that on Okinawa, as in New Guinea, CIC combat detachments were utilized primarily as gatherers of tactical information. A 7th CIC Detachment report stated:

> "Since the civilian population of Okinawa is by and large politically apathetic, counterintelligence has not so far been a problem, and no cases have occurred within the jurisdiction of this detachment. The emphasis has been on gathering information for the Division G2, so that the duties of the detachment have fallen into two categories:
>
> a. Searches of caves, dwellings and abandoned enemy installations for documents and material of intelligence value.
>
> b. Interrogation of civilians both in the internment camps and, in cases where they might have information of immediate value, at the time of capture."

The 7th CIC Detachment found that the areas between battalion and company command posts generally contained more documents of immediate tactical value than any other areas abandoned by the enemy.

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242 963d CIC Det Weekly CI Rpt Nr 8, dtd 3 Jul 45, p. 2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and G2, USAFPOA Intelligence Bulletin, "Report on Okinawa CIC Activity," undtd, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Because the search for documents and tactical information carried CIC agents into the front lines, 1st Lt William H. Attwood, commander of the 7th Detachment, recommended that agents be given additional training in combat operations, including map reading.[243]

The 27th CIC Detachment reported similar activities. During May, the detachment and a team from the 310th CIC Detachment screened civilians in compounds at Taira, Jinuza, Soke, and Kanna. A lack of interpreters made the work extremely difficult, however. 1st Lt Cecil A. Jastram, detachment commander, also complained that his detachment was not being properly utilized. "Neither screening of civilians nor gathering of tactical information appear to be CIC functions," he wrote. "Both have been done in an attempt to keep the detachment employed."[244]

77th CIC Lands on Okinawa

Meanwhile, the 77th CIC Detachment landed with its division on 28 April and began similar screening and document-collecting duties.

After its operations on Kerama Retto, the 77th remained at sea from 1 April to 15 April while preparing for an assault on Ie Shima. On Ie Shima from 16 April until the division moved to Okinawa, the 77th CIC Detachment served as a document-collecting team on the little island.

During May, after moving into the thick of the operations on Okinawa, agents of the 77th CIC Detachment worked in teams of two and screened 572 civilians.[245]

CIC Learns Japanese Infiltration Techniques

One of the greatest problems CIC faced on Okinawa was apprehending Japanese soldiers and Boei Tai labor battalion personnel who donned civilian apparel and wandered about behind American lines.

Some such persons were deserters, some members of Japanese Army units bypassed in Northern Okinawa, and others soldiers specifically detailed to slip through the lines to commit acts of sabotage or espionage.

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243 7th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for Apr 45, dtd 5 May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

244 27th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for May 45, dtd 10 Jun 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

245 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 50-52, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

CIC got its first clue of what was happening on 22 April, when 7th CIC Detachment agents discovered a large quantity of discarded enemy uniforms during a routine search of a cave. Numerous similar findings were reported as the campaign progressed.

CIC's suspicions were confirmed on 26 April when a Japanese lieutenant told his CIC captors that soldiers dressed in civilian garb were being sent into American lines as "suicide squads" bent on destruction of equipment and personnel. According to the prisoner, these squads operated only in forward areas and were under orders not to penetrate any great distance behind American lines for large-scale sabotage. After operating in civilian clothing for a day or two, the suicide squads returned to their own units.

An Okinawan woman interrogated the same day confirmed the Japanese officer's story and told CIC agents that the Japanese often obtained the help of natives by giving them money and other inducements.

On 6 May, a small group of civilians was picked up 3,000 yards behind American lines. Under interrogation by CIC agents one member of the group confessed that he was a Japanese soldier.

A week later, on 13 May, another Japanese lieutenant also told of enemy attempts to pass through American lines in civilian clothing.[246] CIC agents working with the 1st Marine Division interrogated a prisoner who claimed that Japanese soldiers were being ordered to surrender to Americans as civilian refugees. He cited one instance of a Japanese corporal who surrendered under similar circumstances and offered to persuade other Japanese to lay down their arms. Americans gave the prisoner extra rations of food and whiskey, then escorted him to the front lines, where he had promised to contact his fellow soldiers. Instead, he escaped to his own unit with information on the number and identities of prisoners in the American stockade.[247]

At the Taira Compound, a CIC interrogation team learned that Okinawans in that area were giving their identification tags to Japanese soldiers disguised as civilians, permitting the enemy troops to wander about unmolested while they gathered food and information.[248]

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246 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Report Nr 1, dtd 13 May 45, Annex 2, p. 1, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

247 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 2, dtd 21 May 45, Annex 2, pp. 1-2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

248 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 3, dtd 28 May 45, Annex 2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

At another civilian compound at Kushi, a man wearing a kimono and carrying an American Marine Corps jacket was killed as he attempted to scale a fence into the compound. CIC agents who investigated the incident concluded that the man was an enemy soldier attempting to infiltrate the compound.[249] A document captured later lent credence to this belief. It revealed that Japanese troops were surrendering with the idea of organizing resistance within Prisoner of War enclosures and the civilian compounds.[250]

Shortly after the first reports of infiltrating Japanese trickled in to CIC, a series of unexplained incidents indicated that the enemy suicide squads might have been successful in their sabotage attempts. On 17 May, a mysterious explosion wrecked a 40th Naval Construction Battalion fuel dump. CIC agents who investigated determined that an improvised box bomb touched off the blast. A day later, a bridge behind American lines was damaged by explosives, and an attempt to destroy a Seabee power-shovel with dynamite was discovered. Agents were unsuccessful in their attempts to locate the persons responsible for the explosions.[251]

Security Measures Tightened

CIC warnings about the danger of infiltrating Japanese were relayed to combat troops and guards at all the Prisoner of War stockades and civilian compounds. Alerted, the guards demanded positive identification of all civilians found wandering in an area.

On 14 May an American sentry killed a suspicious civilian who failed to answer his challenge. When the victim's body was searched by CIC agents a knapsack containing a Japanese Army uniform and personal effects were found which identified the dead man as a member of the Japanese Army.[252]

It was inevitable, however, that the stricter measures against civilians would result in the death of some innocent person. By as early as 13 May, there were several confirmed instances of the shooting of civilians found wandering about after dark near military installations. Frightened, timid, and uninformed natives were

249 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 4, dtd 3 Jun 45, Annex 2, pp. 1-3, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

250 963d CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 7, dtd 27 Jun 45, Annex 2, p. 1, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

251 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 3, dtd 28 May 45, p. 2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

252 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 2, dtd 21 May 45, Annex 2, p. 1, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

killed or wounded when they failed to respond properly to challenges from wary American sentries.[253] Once an American guard was also killed, presumably by bullets fired mistakenly by his fellow sentries.[254]

Infiltrators Ambush CIC Officers

More tragic from CIC's standpoint was the fatal ambush of two CIC officers by infiltrating Japanese soldiers.

On 14 June, 1st Lt Raymond L. Cobean of the 310th CIC Detachment and 2d Lt Glenn S. Dunbar of the 27th CIC Detachment were driving across the Motobu Peninsula in Northern Okinawa for a routine meeting with CIC native aides when they were killed.

That enemy infiltrators were responsible was evident from the investigation that followed. Organized enemy resistance on the Motobu Peninsula had officially ended two months earlier, and there was regular traffic by American forces over the highway on which the CIC officers were travelling. Bullet holes in their jeep were made by Japanese 7.6 mm ammunition, which could have been fired by either a rifle or a machine gun. Several empty clips for the same type ammunition were found on a ledge fifteen feet above the road at the point of the ambush.[255]

CIC Arrests Kempei Tai Agents

During the last three weeks of the Okinawa campaign the Japanese frantically increased their attempts to infiltrate American lines. Large numbers of enemy troops donned civilian clothing and posed as Okinawans. To cope with the problem, the 7th CIC Detachment, augmented by personnel from the 224th CIC Detachment, operated with battalions, regiments, and companies and maintained teams at civilian collection points in the division sector.

Vigilance paid. Agents arrested ten Kempei Tai agents who had made their way to the Chinen Peninsula in civilian clothing. Four of the prisoners were officers.

One of the prisoners later led CIC agents to a house where two other suspects were hiding. These also confessed they were Kempei Tai agents, and gave information which led to the capture of the organization's executive officer.

253 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 1, dtd 13 May 1945, Annex 3, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
254 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 6, dtd 17 June 1945, Annex 2, p. 4, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
255 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, p. 50, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 6, dtd 17 Jun 45, p. 3, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Convinced that Japan was losing the war, the Kempei Tai executive officer furnished CIC considerable tactical information and led them to a cave occupied by the Kempei Tai commander. When 7th CIC agents moved in to arrest the commander, they discovered only his body. He had committed suicide moments earlier.[256]

The problem of Japanese soldiers posing as civilians became increasingly more acute. Out of more than 40,000 persons screened in the nine days following 14 June, 1,285 were Japanese soldiers. During the same period, 87 civilians considered potentially dangerous were taken into custody.[257]

CIC Counters Guerilla Propaganda

Closely related to the problem of infiltrating soldiers disguised as civilians was that of small bands of enemy troops who continued to fight as guerillas long after their larger units had been forced to retreat from the Americans. Particularly in Northern Okinawa, where the rocky, hilly, and wooded terrain was conducive to guerilla warfare, the guerilla problem was serious.

The enemy guerillas did not inflict great damage to the American forces, but they terrorized the natives and tried to intimidate them into fighting the Americans. Often one of CIC's biggest jobs on entering a native village was to counter the anti-American propaganda disseminated by these guerilla bands.

At one native village, ten Japanese guerillas staged a night raid and beheaded the Hancho, who had cooperated with American military government officials and CIC. The leader of the band warned the villagers against cooperation with the Americans and urged them to flee to the south, where Japanese troops were rallying desperately for a final stand against the Allies. When the civilians demonstrated that they wanted to stay in their village, the Japanese lined up approximately 50 of them against a sea wall and hurled hand grenades at them. Thirty-five natives were killed and the rest wounded before the guerillas withdrew.[258]

CIC agents apprehended many Okinawans who had been impressed into service with the Boei Tai labor battalions and had attempted to desert the combat zones for the safer northern areas. Many carried grenades or bamboo spears for self-

256 7th CIC Det Monthly Information Rpt for June 45, dtd 5 Jul 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

257 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 44, 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and 963d CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 7, dtd 27 Jun 45, Annex 2, p. 3, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

258 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 2, dtd 21 May 45, Annex 3, p. 2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

destruction because the Japanese had said that Americans cut off the ears and punched out the eyes of all Okinawans they captured.

Unfortunately, CIC efforts to counter such propaganda in meetings with village leaders were often hampered by misconduct of American troops. CIC reported several cases of native women being molested by American soldiers.[259] Looting of the native villages by service troops and troops above regimental level did even more to destroy the good will which CIC was trying to create. On some occasions CIC officers advised unit commanders of the damage by American troops and urged them to stress to troops the importance of good relations with the islanders.[260]

CIC Establishes Informant Nets

In June large numbers of desperate Japanese soldiers were holed up in the scores of hidden caves of the Chinen Mura Peninsula of southeastern Okinawa. Often they were able to conceal themselves indefinitely by donning civilian clothing only long enough to enter native villages to obtain food and water.

To ferret out these enemy troops who refused to surrender, CIC found it necessary to recruit informants among both civilians and Japanese Prisoners of War.

Four cooperative prisoners who were former Kempei Tai agents were chosen for the nucleus of an informant net. They contacted former civil police officers in the area and persuaded them to clear assigned areas of Japanese soldiers. The CIC informants convinced natives that the search for stray Japanese soldiers was being conducted for the protection of the civilians. Soon the natives were willing to volunteer information concerning the location and movement of Japanese troops.

The informant net was actually run by the Japanese prisoners who had volunteered. CIC exercised only general supervision; however, a Nisei interpreter sat in on all meetings of the informants and reported the gist of their conversations to CIC.

Prisoners who served as informants were normally kept in Prisoner of War stockades except when they were asked to accompany CIC agents on some assignment. Because informants often were needed on short notice, military police were ordered not to use them on work details or to transfer them to other camps without CIC approval.

259 310th CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 4, dtd 3 Jun 45, Annex 2, pp. 1-3, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

260 Ltr, Lt Robyn L. Dare, 7th CIC Det, to G2, 7th Division, dtd 8 Apr 45, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center, Box 25094).

When working with CIC teams away from the stockade, informants were encouraged to feel that they were members of the team. Invariably, the informants were more enthusiastic when treated as colleagues of the CIC agents. Agents seldom used more than one informant on a single case. A CIC report on the use of Japanese informants concluded:

> "If two or more informants are being employed simultaneously they should be kept segregated and should not be used on the same case unless they have been accustomed to working together. Many informants have a prima donna complex and like to feel that they are the U.S. Army's only source of information. An exception to this rule can be made in the case of an officer working with enlisted PW's of his own unit. Such a combination can be effective when properly supervised. A Kempei Tai squad captured almost intact by CIC was used in this manner on Okinawa with excellent results."[261]

Near the end of the fighting in Okinawa, one prisoner informant told CIC agents the location of the cave housing the Japanese headquarters on the island. When the information was reported, CIC received orders to raid the cave and to capture General Ushijima, the Japanese commander, and General Cho, the enemy chief of staff. Agents raided the cave on 22 June, only to find that both generals had committed hari-kiri the day before.

CIC agents captured hundreds of other prisoners, though--900 during the Okinawa campaign. By 15 June, six days before the campaign officially ended, one detachment had taken more prisoners than any single infantry regiment on Okinawa.[262]

The informant system was responsible for many of the captures credited to CIC. Agents sent Japanese informants ahead to act as go-betweens for CIC and the enemy soldiers still in hiding. This plan was especially effective when a Japanese officer was used to contact enlisted men. Assured by the officer-informant of good treatment at American hands, the Japanese soldiers surrendered in droves.

Civilian Informants

Agents also recruited many civilians as informants. CIC particularly sought to use "Okinawans who had traveled or lived in the United States or the Territory of Hawaii; persons who had speaking or reading knowledge of the English language; Christian missionaries; and professional men of liberal opinion."

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261 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 46, 47, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

262 "CIC Experiences World War II, Pacific," prepared in Training Division CIC Center, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

In practice, however, CIC considered using anyone who was in opposition to the Japanese government and "whose character and intelligence was reputedly satisfactory." Ironically, Communist Party members and sympathizers usually were in this category. There were few Communists on Okinawa, possibly no more than seven or eight. But the Japanese government so bitterly opposed the Communist movement that a party member or sympathizer was considered an enemy per se of the Japanese.[263]

Near the end of the campaign officials of the Okinawan government--including Miss Mehara--fled to a cave to hide from the onrushing American forces. While in the cave, she heard Shimada and Abai talking of killing themselves. Before she could report the information to CIC, however, both officials left the cave for an unknown destination. Neither was heard from again.[264]

CIC's civilian informants could hardly be considered "confidential informants." To satisfy the informants' desire for authority and prestige, they were issued brassards inscribed with the Japanese characters which meant "Advisor to U.S. Forces." Informants received preferential treatment. Clothing, cigarettes, and PX items were exchanged for information. One civilian informant was permitted to visit his family in another area twice each week as a reward for his work for CIC. Knowing that the visits would be terminated when his usefulness was exhausted, the informant supplied CIC with valuable information for more than a month.[265]

Area Detachments Take Over

Even after organized enemy resistance was declared at an end in Okinawa on 21 June, there was no rest for either CIC or combat troops. It took weeks and even months to locate all the enemy soldiers still on Okinawa. And for CIC there remained the task of screening thousands of civilians and conducting more thorough investigations of those who were to be employed by the Army on reconstruction projects.

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263 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, pp. 48, 49, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

264 963d CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 8, dtd 3 Jul 45, Annex 2, pp. 3, 4, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

265 Wartime CIC History, AFMIDPAC, p. 47, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Near the end of June the 963d CIC Area Detachment, commanded by Capt Walter L. Pearson, and the 496th Area Detachment landed to assume counter-intelligence jurisdiction as control of the captured islands in the Ryukyus group passed to a newly created Island Command. The combat detachment which had functioned under Tenth Army remained on Okinawa until after the end of the war, but they operated under the supervision of the 963d and 496th Area Detachments.

As the number of Japanese still hiding in hills and caves diminished, agents devoted more time to screening civilians still in compounds and to assisting military government units in restoring order among the populace of the island. By mid-July agents had processed 58,472 civilians and had begun to close some of the civilian compounds.

On 27 June, the 963d CIC Detachment published a list of 77 persons being sought for questioning by CIC. The list, compiled from reports of informants and screening reports, contained names of persons believed to be potentially dangerous, potentially friendly, or of potential value as informants. Agents on Okinawa concentrated on gathering information about various organizations on the Japanese mainland during the waning days of the fighting in Okinawa.[266]

266 963d CIC Det Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt Nr 7, dtd 27 June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Appendix 1

NOTE: The following roster of CIC agents who served in the SWPA theater represents the various units as of 28 February 1945. By this time much shifting of personnel from one unit to another had been made. No complete rosters of any earlier period are available.

Appendix 1

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA THEATER ROSTER OF PERSONNEL

6th CIC Detachment (6th Infantry Division)

Webster, James R.
Hartnett, William C.
Krieger, William D.
Mohr, Leon (NMI)
Shepard, Grant E.
Davies, Davis (NMI)
Michelson, George J.
Hogg, Roy J.
Holm, Leo S.
McGarraugh, Eston A.
Nugent, John H., 3d
Radeloff, Walter A.
Weinstein, Benjamin J.

11th CIC Detachment (11th Airborne Division)

Caziarc, Dean H.
Barbee, Frank L.
Finn, David (NMI)
Charon, George
Wright, Turbutt ML
DuBois, Rene E.
Herrmann, Louis G.
MacDonald, Robert A.
Nye, Harry F.
Powell, Irving L.
McGrath, James H.
Fagan, Frank C.
Francis, Walter G.
Guillet, Fernand P.

24th CIC Detachment (24th Infantry Division)

Connelly, David I.
Hanan, Albert
McQuaid, John G.
Claxton, Robert L., Jr.
Mathews, Elijah R.
Muscolina, Frank A.
Thume, Jack G.
Cassel, Robert D.
Guthoehrlein, Oscar K.
Knapp, Lealand M.
Lambrick, Joseph T., Jr.
Pate, William E.
Slocum, Albert I.
Terry, Ben (NMI)

25th CIC Detachment (25th Infantry Division)

Holman, Natt B.
Schwartz, Lee
Martin, Walter F.
Corliss, John C.
Dickie, Roland B.
Helmken, John C., Jr.
McDermott, Joseph R.
Mallor, Norman M.
Moses, Henry A.
Perko, Kenneth A.
Prout, William C.
Townsend, Paul B.
Woodman, Richard S.

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31st CIC Detachment (31st Infantry Division)

Trout, Clarence W.
Gardner, Hubert C.
Ragsdale, Curtis W.
Redmon, William H.
Perkins, John W.
Ardis, Carlton V.
Bonelli, Rocco J.
Braun, George P.
Conrad, Albert H.
Deckinger, Harold (NMI)
Gunn, William A.
Lamb, William L.
White, John D.

32d CIC Detachment (32d Infantry Division)

Lynch, Mark J.
Weeks, Clarence A.
Baker, Charles D.
Calevas, Harry A.
Hulnick, Robert B.
Parker, Henry C.
Miller, John H.
Naver, Emil M.
Canady, Kenneth M.
Griner, Ellsworth L.
Lebano, Ernest J.
Ryken, Peter S.
Schneider, John B.
Singer, Jerome L.

33d CIC Detachment (33d Infantry Division)

Donahoe, Bernard M.
Sandercock, Vincent R.
Daly, John R.
Brady, John J., Jr.
Cavan, John J.
Horgan, William P.
Kimball, Hiter J.
Lindquist, James J.
Rosa, Oreste R.
Gerow, William L.
Hudson, William O., Jr.
Kroll, George L.
Petty, Estil P.

37th CIC Detachment (37th Infantry Division)

Stilwell, James E.
Duven, Edward J.
Franco, Albert M.
Goggan, Walter H.
Harkins, James I.
Rosenthal, Robert B.
Boggy, Dale H.
Ferguson, George T.
Spalt, Harry L.
Woods, Rudolph A.
Jones, Tilford A.
Luchetti, Lucas R.
McGraw, Edward F.

38th CIC Detachment (38th Infantry Division)

Baldwin, George A.
Schwartz, Murray (NMI)
Rebeck, Henry M.
Batsakis, Nathan G.
Carmody, Frank E.
Binford, John R.
Murray, John R.
Sheridan, Francis M.
Henderson, Marshall J.
Kozak, Alexander (NMI)
Larkin, Joseph C.
Locke, Victor (NMI)
Murray, John J.
Simard, Albert F.

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40th CIC Detachment (40th Infantry Division)

Klein, Earl A.
King, Allyn P.
Ward, Alfred W.
Smith, Theodore B., Jr.
Tauger, Bernard (NMI)
Fusselman, William J.
Houser, Paul W., Jr.
Lynam, Patrick J.
Angle, Rosy S. F.
Chandler, Robert W.
King, James C.
Lindsay, Charles D.
Menchine, William A.

41st CIC Detachment (41st Infantry Division)

Gluckin, Lawrence
Lowry, Clarence W.
Charves, James M.
Jansen, Harold L.
Lawless, John J.
Vodden, Herbert C.
Hedge, Harry C.
Jones, George R.
Bertholet, Frank E., Jr.
Carlisle, James L.
Cramer, Robert L.
Fee, Orville H.
Hogan, Joseph J.
Scranage, William C.

43d CIC Detachment (43d Infantry Division)

Hodgson, Ray W.
Hager, Eric H.
Jackson, Raymond E.
O'Brien, Edward M.
Fabian, Max (NMI)
Holland, Keith E.
Schoepflin, Merle C.
Alajajian, Jerry A.
Housh, Lawrence J.
Macomber, Robert C.
Fleisig, Philip F.
Guiterman, Herbert T.

93d CIC Detachment (93d Infantry Division)

Townsend, Caspar W. B., Jr.
Johnson, William A.
Robinson, Ernest C.
Bivins, Horace P.

182d CIC Detachment (Americal Division)

Keenan, Albert J., Jr.
Stibal, Frank E.
Hoene, Howard F.
Kraft, Clarence A.
Breor, Paul J.
Weber, Eugene F.
Foster, Edward J.
Jones, M. B., Jr.
O'Rear, Cecil G., Jr.
Bowen, Philip F.
Brown, Walter C.
Houda, Eugene W.
Lucht, George R.

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201st CIC Detachment (I Corps)

Cook, Victor I.	Malbuisson, Paul R.	Smith, Paul F.
Rubin, Lawrence A.	Mayfield, Charles T.	Brown, Ralph J.
Wagner, Walter (NMI)	Miller, George W.	Clark, Joseph P.
Goff, Charles D.	Montgomery, Fleet J.	Jewett, Albert A.
Robinson, George M.	O'Shaughnessy, William D.	Korta, Armand (NMI)

210th CIC Detachment (X Corps)

Hurley, Joseph P.	Reed, Sumner C.	Dillman, Francis A.
McLaughlin, Edward F.	Strachan, Henry F., Jr.	Kaps, Charles T.
Colucci, Lucian J.	Kaar, Joseph W.	Lovell, Walter J.
Hurley, James W.	Wilson, Gerald M.	Nerenberg, James W.
Nern, William F., Jr.	Bradford, Philander S., Jr.	

211th CIC Detachment (XI Corps)

Sims, Ralph (NMI)	Johnson, William H.	Aldecoa, Fermin J.
Starbuck, William H.	Myer, John D.	Caston, Homer R., Jr.
Kennon, Clement R.	Dreyer, William J.	Edwards, Paul M.
Beitz, Donald G.	Horne, Archie A.	Hanley, Martin V.
Brechler, Kenneth S.	Majewski, Henry F.	Heaton, Henry O.

214th CIC Detachment (XIV Corps)

Goff, Marvin C., Jr.	Cole, Dan M.	Hill, Warren R.
Edwards, Duvall A.	Lee, Otto C.	Keaton, Clyde H.
Kingsley, John E.	Michod, Charles L.	McMinn, Robert S.
Holeman, Benjamin F.	Mullin, Roger W., Jr.	Schneider, Edward J.
Salomon, Jason (NMI)	Nicholas, Thomas A.	

306th CIC Detachment (Sixth Army)

Labatt, Blair P.	Hoss, Robert L.	Leong, William B. S.
Frederick, Harold F.	Owens, William A.	Bowman, Walter W., Jr.
Norton, John H.	Park, Woonha (NMI)	Cordova, Arthur (NMI)
Ripley, James J., Jr.	Towne, Maurice H., Jr.	Kamerick, Stanley E.
Horwitz, Milton G.	Devenow, Chester (NMI)	Tredway, Paul W.
Ackerman, Thomas R.	Hosinski, Edmund J.	Tuthill, David R.
English, James W.	Jennings, Edmund A.	

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308th CIC Detachment (Eighth Army)

Turner, Chapman	Wright, Arthur W., Jr.	Roberts, Cyrus D.
Alter, David E.	Fair, Fisher A.	Smith, Willard R.
Wilpers, John J.	Heydorn, Howard M.	Stedler, Richard J.
Elsing, William T.	Kaag, Robert L.	Zimmerman, Charles F.
Fenimore, William E.	Lyons, Robert B.	Hourston, Edward M.
Keener, Ulysses G.	Page, Merritt G.	Notaro, Frank R.
Krell, James R.	Reuter, Frederick K.	

440th CIC Detachment (USAF NORSOLS)

Lynch, James J.	Cook, Richmond	McCarthy, Robert J.
Barry, David R.	Little, Allison L.	

441st CIC Detachment (Unattached)

Galloway, Jennis R.	Carlson, Russell F., Jr.	Wilkins, Lloyd H.
Earle, Richard G.	Colbach, Roman H.	Wilson, Alton A.
Bellatti, Walter R.	Johnson, Arthur W.	Warren, Edmund A.
Major, Thomas H.	McCloskey, John D.	Brooks, Walter
Cartwright, Peter C.	Maloney, Peter J.	McNally, Robert W.
Evans, William D.	Bank, Vernon C.	Reyes, Edward (NMI)
Stewart, Roger S.	Hogg, Calvin R.	Wickson, Edward J.
Blackley, Horace A.	Malapit, Mariano S.	Born Harry E.
Corkery, Gerard J.	Murphy, Francis J.	Whitlow, Jos.

442d CIC Detachment

Geiss, Ermal P.	Nicholas, Woodrow T.	Spring, John C.
Boyd, Edgar E.	Genovese, Ernest R.	Weitzel, Walter M.
Hennessy, Charles C.	Strouse, Lynn	
McKenna, James A.	Wendt, Charles	

443d CIC Detachment

Scoville, Joseph (NMI)	Hout, Ernest G.	Trapp, Robert L.
Breckenridge, James W.	McKee, James B.	Krizan, Joseph F.
Andrews, James J.	Thrift, Edgar M.	Pennink, Karel B.

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444th CIC Detachment

Spencer, George B.	Lincoln, David W.	Kelly, John M.
Casey, William P.	Ryan, Lewis H.	Shaw, Ormand B.
Komori, Arthur S.	Casey, Charles J.	Wolf, Charles H.

445th CIC Detachment

Platt, John O.	Keniston, Walter E.	Bley, Robert W.
Hale, Frank C.	Mulligan, Regan F.	Venable, John D.

446th CIC Detachment

Slaughter, Archie B.	Horaitis, George L.	

447th CIC Detachment

Applegate, Thomas W.	Wright, Edwin W.	Hayes, Emery L.
Salevouris, Emmanuel	Carlson, Robert R.	Herzog, Robert E.
O'Hearn, William G.	Koss, Raymond F.	Hicks, William J.
Beasley, Everard J.	Walters, David W.	Katis, Bruno B.
Hedtke, Reuel E.	Cougill, Vernon E.	Lede, Alfred E.
L'Ecluse, William F.	Hackney, Eugene O.	Ruttkay, Louis K., III

448th CIC Detachment

Roach, Philip O.	Messenger, Marshall E.	Riley, Harold L.
Ward, John O.	Zimmerman, William E.	Timmons, William H.
Akers, Lloyd D.	DeVlaming, Daniel L.	Turnblazer, William J.
Turner, Morris (NMI)	Freshwater, Roy L.	Wilson, Benjamin O.
McNee, Wesley D., Jr..	Johnson, Andrew	

449th CIC Detachment

Bledsoe, James A.	Anderson, Robert E.	Leynse, Waldo H.
Guthrie, Wayne L.	Labberton, Helios V. H.	Morrison, William S.
Lee, Powell A.	Oloans, John M.	Sherry, Orville M.
Bertin, LeRoy V.	Savino, Carl F.	Sherwood, William O., Jr.
Jones, Thomas L.	Eidam, Louis C.	Smith, Eldon K.
Solomon, Paul J.	Green, Martin L.	Walsh, Charles E.

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450th CIC Detachment

Swanson, Kenneth L.	Bloss, Edward G.	McCabe, James V.
Guysi, George S.	Davis, Marlin H.	Mathis, Robert W.
Clemons, Willis J.	Fowle, Eliot R., Jr.	Rust, Gordon D.
McQuillan, John J.	Allmond, Roy C.	

451st CIC Detachment

Geismer, Alan S.	Floyd, William N.	McGowan, James P.
Brown, Albert A.	Gravlee, George M.	
Coats, Frederick F.	Larson, Paul E.	

452d CIC Detachment

DeLuca, Andrew A.	Hoffstein, George R.	MacNabb, Malcolm L.
Adamo, Frank (NMI)	Pignatelli, John C.	
Motley, Herman H., Jr.	McIsaac, Neil K.	

453d CIC Detachment

Chenery, Charles E.	Mikaitis, Daniel W.	Schutt, Paul M.
Marcum, Carles P.	Pittman, Paul E.	Small, Keppel O.
Jones, Jack M.	Rath, Paul F.	Spencer, George D.
Claytos, Don D.	Scheper, Henry E.	Wallace, Thomas L.

454th CIC Detachment

Wood, Eugene H.	Holloway, James L., Jr.	Tokos, George M.
Abraham, George J.	Barnes, Stanley L.	
Bean, Truett E.	Thompson, John B.	

455th CIC Detachment

Emmert, Leonard J.	Gibson, Luke M.	Everett, Junius A.
Hance, Young D.	McCann, John C.	Manyo, Peter A.
Screthchings, Homer B.	Timpone, Joseph P.	Westendorf, John R.
Bogert, Regis Z.	Curry, James R.	

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456th CIC Detachment

Canon, Jack Y.
Schmidtchen, Paul D.
Conaty, Francis S., Jr.
Swenson, George W. P.
Wagner, Charles W.
Fletcher, Lindsay Z.
Mignola, Joseph, Jr.
Carlino, Alexander (NMI)
Conway, Carl F.
Tomlin, John G.
Burns, Eugene J.
Cook, Roy L.
Kraft, Lloyd
McCarthy, David H.
Schein, Ellis
O'Brien, George M.
On, Lewis O.
Seckel, William C.
Stanford, Lee R.
Strong, Vinton L.
Vandersluis, Francis J., Jr.
Vaughn, Cleatis L.
Zink, Joseph M.
Cross, James S.
D'Arcy, Stemphen J.
Elledge, Fred (NMI), Jr.
Gray, Harry C.
Phillips, Thomas W.
Tarpley, Harburd E.
Taylor, James E.
Trinidad, Arsenip P.
Castor, Russel E.
Hansen, Jarvis B.
Kendall, Cliford (NMI)
Levitan, Irving A.
Maliaman, Dalmacio
Mikol, Edward G.
Murphy, Edwin A.
Russell, Robert F.
Schulze, Milton J.
Seyler, James A.
Sloan, William W.
Spurgeon, James E.
Barton, Thomas G.
Garrity, Hubert M.
Hall, Charles A.
Jackson, Everett J.
Keller, George A.C., Jr.
Ortega, Fernando B.
Redus, James W., Jr.
Thomason, Karl W.
Bauguss, Oran C.
Brown, William T.
Caulfield, John D.
Cline, Franklin A.
Combs, LeRoy
Thompson, Horace S.
Wilson, Joseph P.
Winchester, George A.
Petersen, Henry (NMI)
Barratt, Peter T.
Brown, Charles A.
Buck, Harold D.
Durkin, James H.
Hopkins, James F.
Hunt, Thomas R.
Kornfeld, Jerome M.
Lester, Thomas C.
Malden, Henry M.
Martin, Arthur R., Jr.
Metcalf, Richard (NMI)
Erickson, Oscar J.
Ferguson, Prescott W.
Jasmine, Harold A.
Kohlman, Jack L.
McConnell, Wilmer R.
Milner, Keith A.
Newville, Donald F.
Redding, William J.
Rudicel, Rex S.
Sampson, Donald M.
Shannon, Robert L.
Small, Loren E.
Winetsky, Morris

457th CIC Detachment

Goodrick, Carl H.
Olbes, M. Z.
Balintong, Flaviano
Beaton, Harold D.
Carey, John H.
Gray, Eldon A.
Girard, George K.
Keys, Oscar W., Jr.
Hower, Alfred (NMI)
Almiranez, Irineo P.
Drye, Richard L.
Kaeser, William H., Jr.
Shoon, Goon Wah
Thomson, Robert B.
Tse, Sum F.
Adricula, Julian D.

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458th CIC Detachment

Sayers, William H.	Hurlburt, Arthur S.	McKeown, Robert J.
McLeod, William J.	Beath, Andrew B.	Nichols, Paul R.
Hannaford, James J.	Hert, James B.	
Kortas, Francis J.	Riffel, Carlyle H.	

459th CIC Detachment

McColl, James W.	Lee, Randall P.	Peel, Robert (NMI)
Myles, Thomas F.	Cappuccilli, Edmund D.	Park, Chauncey C.
Davis, Earl H.	Kapourelos, Anthony G.	Walker, Dow E.
Murphy, John E.	Minet, Edward E.	
Johnson, Harrison H.	Murray, John W.	

473d CIC Detachment

Smith, Thomas D., Jr.	Griffith, Jack C.	Simpson, William B.
Babcox, Reid B.	Anderson, Harry A.	Victor, Robert C.
McCauley, William H.	Jackson, Thomas, Jr.	Willis, Cecil A.
Segrest, Ralph W.	Merrick, Richard L.	
Strobel, Charles E.	Reed, Jefferson L., Jr.	

474th CIC Detachment

Chilton, Walter C.	Ouelette, Orie D.	Mason, Walter A.
Bowler, Michael S.	Anderson, Raymond L.	Massey, Walter B.
Deininger, Eugene H.	Ellerd, Arthur A., Jr.	Scantlebury, John R.
Looney, Jack M.	Hendricks, Fred A.	

479th CIC Detachment

Camp, Charles S.	Schroeder, William E.	Gillette, Hubert J.
Duncan, Alexander S.	Tate, Albert, Jr.	Stern, Charles H.
Hamilton, William B.	Cawthon, Harold C.	Phifer, Nelson L.
O'Connell, Daniel J.	Conners, Eugene M.	Price, Lindsay E.

480th CIC Detachment

Gilmore, Gerald E.	Kimmel, George J.	Shanahan, Timothy J.
Wilson, Robert E.	Powell, William S.	Streetman, Harold E.
Tomlinson, Frank J.	Burress, Charles R., Jr.	Vine, William A.
Collins, Benjamin I.	Canning, Stephen T.	
Debold, Frank P.	Morledge, John W.	

481st CIC Detachment

Bingham, Charles M.	Zinsmaster, Arthur J.	Johnson, Louis W.
Moddemeyer, William O., Jr.	Bihy, Clarence F.	Smith, Harry
Kane, John D.	Hahn, Edmund J.	Sonnichsen, Alex C.
Robb, Fred (NMI) -	Long, Robert C.	
Zimmerman, Charles F.		

482d CIC Detachment

✓ Stapleton, John T.	Lounibus, Edwin C.	Barnes, Richard R.
Palmer, Dorwin L.	Monroe, Richard S.	Janasov, Edward C.
Morrison, Henderson W., Jr.	Morris, Owen M.	Walker, Aubrey W.
✓ Henderson, Derrious W.	Turner, Francis E.	

483d CIC Detachment

Cook, Denver F.	Schneidman, Samuel D.	Taylor, Merton R.
Scott, Harlan (NMI)	Aneda, Joseph R., Jr.	Yeaman, William R.
Moore, Thomas E.	Caudill, Julian T.	
Reichert, George F.	Humphrey, Don G.	

484th CIC Detachment

Claflin, Beecher N.	Noell, Robert M., Sr.	Lisy, Clayton J.
Wittig, Lawrence M.	Peterson, Eldon A.	Matthews, John P.
Day, James D.	Borgman, John H.	Polk, James W.
Anderson, Leland R.	Hoenstine, Garland W.	
Moss, Julius O.	Holloway, John L.	

485th CIC Detachment

Hanna, George R.	Cannon, Samuel S.	Ivers, John P.
Hicks, Charles D.	Furey, Robert J.	Laird, Norman W.
Duncan, Louis C.	Combs, Howard G.	Wishart, John W.
McCourt, James E.	Curtis, Arthur H.	Yenser, Herbert K.

486th CIC Detachment

Cuddeback, Howard L.	Palmer, Cleddie A.	Cochran, Doyce E.
Oakes, John C.	Spilman, William R.	Getzov, Morton J.
Long, Robert E.	Cronan, Frank X.	Smith, James A., Sr.
Meyers, Howard (NMI)	Dangler, Frank J., Jr.	Wilson, Milo D.

487th CIC Detachment

Skinker, Dudley G.	Bailey, James M.	Bergreen, Bernard (NMI)
Levine, Irving L.	Deslauriers, Conrad E.	Farley, Louis W.
Ashmore, Leon E.	Conway, James F.	Quisenberry, Rowland T.
Seiter, Francis J.	Krys, Joseph F.	Schell, Robert M., Sr.

488th CIC Detachment

McGillicuddy, Daniel F.	Simons, Leo E.	McCrary, Walter L.
Campbell, William E., Jr.	Cohen, David H.	Blair, Charles E., Jr.
Nichols, Harry C.	Gibbons, Edward F.	Ketchum, Neal O.
Harrison, Leslie R., Jr.	Greenwald, Willard	O'Grady, William J.

489th CIC Detachment

Wathen, Frank J.	James, Edwin S.	Cullen, John P. M.
Waering, Peter K.	McGrath, Edward J.	Hemphill, Roderick J.
Cook, Robert W.	Furey, Francis S.	Starr, John L.
Brown, Francis T.	Bushey, Mitchell H.	Wood, Glenn

490th CIC Detachment

Douglass, Arthur R.	Ulrich, George W.	Desmond, Robert
Markley, Charles W.	Koury, Louis G.	Smithy, Walter S.
Foley, William J.	Myhan, William P.	Sorkin, Bernard R.
Levesque, Joseph R.	Barendsen, Robert D.	

491st CIC Detachment

Friedrich, Robert E.	Thrasher, William H.	Lemoine, Everett C.
Essiambre, Frank F.	Weiss, Albert L.	Millard, Gerald (NMI)
Rutkowski, Stanley E.	Belinkie, Milton H.	Owen, Claude M.
Shields, James S.	Golden, Philip A.	

492d CIC Detachment

Hurst, Paul A.	Wellspring, Thomas M.	Nelson, Perry A.
Brewster, Carl N.	Burkhardt, Elmo L.	Parks, Philip F.
Hiraoka, William T.	Engel, Regis F.	Sullivan, Homer (NMI)
McDevitt, Frank D.	Gridley, Frederick D.	Bauler, Edgar C.
Coakley, Daniel J.	Kunsler, Albert M.	Cavalierre, Angelo J.
Kruger, Norman R.	Mina, Moises O.	

493d CIC Detachment

Bradford, Lowell J.	Barnhouse, Wilmer E.	Huckaba, Donald L.
Gleason, Roland E.	Chu, Kenneth K.	McVay, Fredrick D.
Ingojo, Jose B.	Hague, Alfred E.	Phillips, Gene K.
Wing, Ernest H.	Harrison, Herbert C.	Urban, Richard L.
Chin, Ching Y.	Shingleton, Everett C.	Whitlow, Jos
Rosa, Jose D.	Best, Vernon A.	

613th CIC Detachment

Lander, William T.	Reilly, James W.	Ward, James A.
Sandalls, William T.	Yakobian, George J.	Gengher, Edward L.
Gorrie, Robert T.	Broz, James L, Jr.	Klerlein, Edward T., Jr.
Kelley, Joseph S.	Kalischer, Murray (NMI) Jr.	
Pridgen, Samuel R.	LaCosta, Thomas (NMI)	

801st CIC Detachment (1st Cavalry)

Inwood, Jerome A.	Reifer, Harold (NMI)	Connelly, John F.
Youker, Malcolm P.	Rollen, Walter R.	Kopcho, Clarence B.
Deubel, Charles C., Jr.	Bradshaw, Horace J.	Walker, Albert E.
Matasavage, Vincent P.	Leynse, Humphrey W.	
Peterson, George W.	Brock, Ruebin C.	

904th CIC Detachment

Recor, Loren E.	Grybos, Anthony N.	Wood, Alvin R.
Creeth, John H., Jr.	Storey, William E.	Smith, Robert B.
Garza, Ray B.	Westrell, Harlan A.	

962d CIC Detachment

Richards, Jack A.	Burgess, Marvin R.	Taylor, Tom H.
Wehrle, Henry L., Jr.	Dunlea, Thomas A.	
Searight, Richard D.	Katzin, Marshall P.	

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Appendix 2

Political Groups Investigated by CIC

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Appendix 2

POLITICAL GROUPS INVESTIGATED BY CIC

CIC agents operating in Luzon investigated three major pro-Japanese or anti-American organizations. Digests of information gathered on these organizations follow.[267]

The Sakdal-Ganap Party

In the early 1930's, Benigno R. Ramos organized the Sakdalista movement. Through his newspaper, the Sakdal (meaning "complaint" in Tagalog), he campaigned for the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines and the redistribution of wealth by abolishing the large land grant and tenant farmer systems. He also sponsored a "Back to the Orient" movement, advocating removal of Anglo-Saxon influence from the Philippines and "rejuvenation of Filipino orientalism" under the guidance of Japan. Although the organizers found a fertile field for their doctrine in the masses of the poor and illiterate, the organization did not receive much publicity or consideration from the authorities until 1933. At that time, the movement, which had been functioning as a series of secret societies, came out in the open as a political party. It grew rapidly and in June 1934 succeeded in electing several representatives, governors, and mayors.

Encouraged by this success, Ramos went to Japan with the avowed purpose of enlisting material aid of the Japanese Government in a Sakdalista-sponsored revolt against the Commonwealth Philippine Government. On 1 May 1935 the Sakdalista revolt occurred. The uprising was quickly quelled, but not without some bloodshed. Ramos remained in exile in Japan.

The Sakdalista party was outlawed after the uprising, but its leaders continued to meet clandestinely and in 1938 announced the formation of the Ganap party. "Ganap" is the Tagalog term for "perfection." With few exceptions, the leaders of the Ganap party were the same men who had sponsored the Sakdalista movement. Ramos returned from Japan late in 1938, was arrested with twelve cohorts the following year and imprisoned.

He remained in prison until the Japanese captured the Philippines, after which he was freed and returned to Manila. The party was renamed Sakdal-Ganap and was placed at the disposal of the Japanese. Its membership then was estimated at 400,000 and was used extensively as a "fifth column" by the enemy.

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In compliance with the Japanese edict abolishing all political parties, the Sakdal-Ganap party reorganized as a semi-military group patterned along Japanese Army lines. This organization, known as the Morisita Butai, with Ramos as the Supreme Leader, undertook the establishment and recruitment of a labor force for the Japanese and an intelligence net to detect guerilla and pro-American elements. With few exceptions, most of the high-ranking Ganaps were Butai members. Later, a second force, the Matsuyama Butai, was organized, identical in purpose and formation with the first, but subordinate to it. The second Butai was chiefly concerned with waterfront activities. These two organizations functioned principally in Manila, drawing their personnel from the Ganaps in the provinces. To meet the demand of the Japanese garrisons for an informer net and labor force in the province, local chapters formed their own smaller Butais.

Early in 1943 a Ganap-sponsored, Japanese-trained military organization came into being. At first called the "Voluntary Unidos," later it was known as the YOIN or United Nippon Army. In 1944 the entire Ganap set-up reorganized, resulting in the combination of the Butais into the Morisita-Matsuyama Butai with the YOIN and YOIN-Reserve a subordinate part of the Butai. The Japanese Army trained and equipped the YOIN, while the Butai retained administrative control and supervised recruiting. Another function of the Butai was to select candidates to attend the Japanese Intelligence Training School at Ft Santiago, where picked men were trained in espionage and sabotage to operate behind Allied lines.

With this vast "unofficial army" at their disposal, the Japanese and Filipino leaders had little difficulty obtaining personnel when the Makapili was organized to offer resistance to American invasion forces. Most of the trained Butai members fled with the Japanese as part of the Makapili army and fought for some time against the Americans. Toward the end of the Luzon campaign, the influx of these men through American lines greatly increased, the shortage of food and a growing conviction of the imminence of Japanese defeat prompting them to seek the safety of American-held territory. Many Ganaps remained behind from the start rather than retreat with the Japanese. CIC's job was to locate and apprehend these Ganaps during the Luzon campaign and to reduce them as a security threat to American forces and operations.

The Makapili

The Makapili--the "Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Philipino," or "League of Patriotic Filipinos,"--was publicly formed as an integral part of the Philippine government in a mammoth celebration in Manila on 8 December 1944, the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. Organized with the full support and recognition of the Japanese as an armed force of Filipinos to fight Americans, it originated as an indirect result of puppet president Jose P. Laurel's declaration of war against the Allies in September 1944. It represented a union of the rabidly pro-Japanese elements with Laurel's more moderate policy.

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Instrumental in founding the Makapili were General Yamashita, General Artemo Ricarte, Benigno Ramos, and Pio Duran. The latter was believed the most important as indicated by his private papers which CIC had seized. Ramos influenced his Ganap and Butai members to join the organization, while Ricarte and Laurel used their popular appeal to induce their followers into the Makapili.

The preamble to the Makapili Articles of Association stated:

> "We, the citizens of the Philippine Republic, ...anxious to live a national existence closely affiliated and interrelated with the other Asiatic nations; and, actuated by the conviction that our country, the Philippines, is in duty and in honor ...bound to shed the blood and sacrifice the lives of her people in one crucible with the lives of the other East Asians in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia, have this day assembled voluntarily in the presence of the hallowed spirits of our ancestors, to form a patriotic and national association to be known as the Patriotic League of Filipinos."

Among the specific aims and purposes of the Makapili, as quoted in the Articles, was the following:

> "To help maintain peace and order within the country and to fight the common enemies side by side with the other Asiatics on any front of the present war.
> "To collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines in such ways and means as may in the joint judgment of the Imperial Japanese Forces and the Association be deemed necessary and fruitful.
> "To propagate throughout the country the principles for which the Empire of Japan and other Asiatic nations are now fighting this great Pacific war.
> "To explain, propagate, and inculcate the idea that the welfare, happiness and existence of an independent Philippines depend entirely upon the victory of the Asiatic nations and close association and collaboration with them."

Duran's original plan called for an army of 60,000 men fully armed, trained, and equipped by the Japanese Army. To accomplish this goal, Duran planned to use the 2,000 graduates of the New Philippines Cultural Institute, men who already had five months of basic training under the Japanese and were indoctrinated in the aims of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as a cadre and shock troops for the army. Effective November 1944, he planned to recruit 20,000 men a month. While Duran fell far short of this goal, his main objectives were accomplished.

Several difficulties beset Makapili leaders. For one thing, there was not enough time to achieve all that was planned. For another thing, the Japanese Army itself offered some opposition, since General Nishimura apparently was reluctant to accept the Makapili as an equal arm. Shortages of supplies, uniforms, and equipment hampered the organizers.

Other difficulties affecting recruiting were met. The followers of Ricarte, already united under the banner of "Bagong Pakakaisa" (New Unity Organization), while agreeing in spirit with the aims and purposes of the Makapili, objected to making a clean-cut break. They eventually withdrew and formed the "Peace Army of the Philippines," a separate and distinct organization pledged to fight the Americans without the aid of the Japanese. Because of this and other troubles, the brunt of the recruiting fell to Ramos.

This was not too difficult a task, for at Ramos' call were his staunch Ganap followers who numbered at the outbreak of the war, approximately 400,000. Although for the most part these were poor illiterates, some 60,000 to 80,000 were fit for combat duty. A good many of these by December 1944 had already received the rudiments of military discipline through employment by Japanese garrisons and from service in the Ganap-sponsored Morisita and Matsuyama Butais. Approximately 10,000 men scattered throughout Central Luzon, Cavite, and Laguna had already received complete basic military training under the Japanese Army in the YOIN and YOIN-Reserve. In late November 1944, prior to the public inauguration of the Makapili, the call to arms had already gone out to the provinces. Key Ganaps were called to Manila, briefed, then sent home to recruit and organize, under the guidance of their local Japanese garrison commanders.

Despite Japanese propaganda claims of Makapili counterthrusts during the actual fighting, the activities of the group were largely limited to sabotage and espionage. Confessions of members definitely established that Makapili members were responsible for burning Tarlac City and Camp O'Donnell and that they carried out espionage activities in Tarlac and Pampanga Provinces.

An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 Makapili were able to organize and retreat with the Japanese from Central Luzon, the largest concentration being in the foothills of the Sierra Madre Mountains. Many cases of the use of Makapili as combat troops and as guards and carriers were reported.

In the final stages of the Luzon campaign, large numbers of Makapili infiltrated into American-occupied territory. A shortage of food and a realization that the cause was lost prompted most of them to sever their connections with the Japanese. Here again CIC was called upon to screen all evacuees from enemy territory and weed out the Makapili. When captured unarmed, most Makapili

adopted a stock story that they were forced by the Japanese to accompany them as carriers. Most evidence, however, indicated that they served the enemy faithfully and well in many ways.

The Hukbalahaps

The "Huks" as they are popularly termed, developed from the United Front Movement, hence an understanding of the latter movement is necessary to evaluate the Huks. When war with Japan broke out, most of the different social, religious, and political groups were at a loss as to how to fight the Japanese.

Nowhere in the Philippines was there any unified resistance movement. Shortly after the war broke out, labor and political leaders began investigating the possibility of forming a United Front against Japanese imperialism. At a meeting on Arayat Mountain, Pampanga Province in February 1942, the United Front was organized. A month later a military branch of the movement was formed. This was called the "Hukbalahap," a contraction of several Tagalog words meaning "The People's Army to Fight the Japanese." Thus the civilian and military aspects of the United Front Movement were seemingly separated, but in actuality the Huks retained control of the entire movement. Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandrino assumed leadership of the Huks. United Front activity was directed by Dr Vicente Lava, Juan Feleo, and Mateo Castillo, plus a representative of the Chinese League of Manila.

At first the Huks were directed by a United Front military committee, of which both Taruc and Alejandrino were members. In October 1944, this committee was reorganized as the Hukbalahap GHQ with the following officers: Taruc, Alejandrino, Dr Adolfo (alias Gasang), Mariano Balgos (alias Tony Collantes), Lazaro Palacio (alias Ely), and the Chinese representative, Mr Lee (alias Justo). It is an interesting reflection on the character of the Philippine people and their love of intrigue to note that nearly all Huks, leaders and soldiers alike, adopted aliases with which to carry on their Huk activity.

The Huk military organization was similar to that of the USAFFE Guerillas. Under Taruc, the supreme commander and his GHQ were Regional Commands, which in turn were organized into squadrons of 90 to 150 men each. A Division of Intelligence was set up headed by Tomas Calma (alias Sol). The function of the Division of Intelligence was to collect information regarding collaborators, puppet officials, enemy spies, and the Japanese-controlled Bureau of Constabulary. This information was put at the disposal of the Huk GHQ which then would issue orders for any action to be taken.

The methods employed by the Hukbalahap in dealing with suspected traitors were brutal and uncompromising, though often effective. Large numbers of Huks would move into towns at night, and under the noses of the Japanese, spirit away

the suspects, most of whom were never heard of again. No accurate estimate of the number of Huk kidnapings and murders that occurred during their reign can be made. Many such acts took place on the initiative of the individual squadrons without waiting for orders from the Hukbalahap GHQ.

The organization was well-armed, largely with American weapons abandoned on Corregidor and Bataan which the Huks collected and transported by small boat across Manila Bay and up the Pasig River to Minalin and Macabebe Pampanga. A military strongpoint where the Huks could retreat, if necessary, and make a powerful defensive stand was created in Pampanga Province. It consisted of two buildings in a remote and nearly inaccessible part of the province, each protected by machine guns in concealed emplacements. The Huks fondly referred to these forts as their "Corregidor" and their "Mariveles."

It was quite probable that the rank and file Huk soldiers were unaware of the revolutionary ambitions of their top leaders. Undoubtedly the greater percentage of its members were recruited because life under the Japanese was unbearable and armed resistance seemed the only course to follow. The average Huk soldier knew little if anything of Communist doctrine. His foremost desire was to rid his homeland of the Japanese invader. Secondly, he wanted all collaborators removed from office and punished. And finally, although less clear to him, he advocated complete independence for the Philippines augmented by a government interested in improving conditions for the masses. They desired guns to achieve their first aim, and possibly the second if the collaborators would not give themselves up; but the average Huk did not contemplate the use of weapons to accomplish the third.

Their principal fault was that they went too far in realizing their aims. In ridding the island of Japanese they took justice in their own hands and conducted a virtual reign of terror in the provinces of Central Luzon where they were strongest--Pampanga, Bulacan, Bataan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija. They also went too far in their desire to have a voice in the government. In many instances after the Americans had liberated a city, the Huks would move in and install an entire government of their own choice.

While, in all fairness, it must be conceded that the Huks rendered valuable service during the occupation by ambushing and killing many Japanese, sabotaging enemy installations, and generally harassing the invaders, their irresponsible and terroristic activities after the American occupation fostered unrest and dissension among the people and seriously hampered the efforts of the U.S. Army to restore peace and order. Many Huks were organized into provisional companies and attached to American units to fight the enemy. But the Huk GHQ opposed this policy, since the radical leadership wanted to keep the Huk army intact as an instrument of force in accomplishing United Front political aims. By the end of

the Luzon campaign the Hukbalahap organization was considerably weakened. Certain elements within the organization had made a clean break with the GHQ and pursued a more conservative course of cooperation with the American forces. But there was no change in the master plan fostered by the top United Front, and Hukbalahap leaders and many Filipinos continued to take their orders from them. At the campaign's close Mariano Balgos (Tony Collantes) was the Huk leader, since both Taruc and Alejandrino were interned by CIC.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXIV

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POSTWAR CIC IN THE UNITED STATES

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November 1959

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Part I: CIC Center, 1945-1950

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of almost five years of war brought important personnel problems to the military. CIC had to meet and face its share of these problems.

The public temperament was inclined toward demobilization and a return to "normal living." This brought pressure to bear on the Congress for the speedy return of troops from overseas areas, a pressure innocent enough in large part, but carefully nurtured and abetted by groups desirous of seeing the United States quickly become a weak and ineffective military power.

Appreciation of the dilemma in which CIC found itself in 1945 demands a short recapitulation of events occurring just before and during the 1945-1950 period. It will be made clear that CIC faced internal problems of the first magnitude which had to be settled before the Corps could function in a truly effective manner and discharge its postwar responsibilities.

It will be recalled that the recommendations of the Inspector General's report relative to his investigation of CIC were adopted and made effective in February 1944. At that time the Office of the Chief, the CIC Center, and the training school were eliminated. CIC functions in the Zone of Interior were relegated to the Security Intelligence Corps under the direction of the Provost Marshal General, and Air Force and overseas detachments were assigned to their respective commands rather than being attached. In short, the Corps was completely decentralized and the strength and effectiveness that had been developed by a close-knit and coordinated structure were in large part sapped.

Primary to discussion of the 1945-1950 period, then, is a study of the redevelopment and recentralization of the CIC as an organization. The study will be undertaken in three parts: the Office of the Chief, the Center, and the School.

The Chief, CIC

Dispersal of CIC by assignment to the commands with which it was serving had eliminated the apparent need for a Chief, CIC. From 5 February 1944 to 13 June 1945 there was no such title. During this period, staff supervision of Zone of Interior CIC had passed from the G2, War Department General Staff to the commanding general, Army Service Forces, and finally to the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces. Overseas detachments had staff supervision under theater G2s.

It became apparent in late 1944 and early 1945 that the decentralized scheme of CIC operation was not working out. Col H. R. Kibler, who had been chief at

the time the office was abolished, and was later assigned as Executive Officer to Col J. M. Roamer, Director of Intelligence, still later was assigned to Army Service Forces, and foresaw the need and eventual request to reestablish the office. In fact, he recalled Maj Edward Bennet from Europe and put him to drafting a staff study recommending revitalization of the Office of the Chief. The memorandum was completed in January or February, but was held in obeyance since it was not felt that the proper time for presentation had arrived.

The memorandum pointed out that the anticipated cessation of hostilities in the Pacific Theater and its accompanying rapid redeployment of troops would leave CIC in occupation areas unable to accomplish its added responsibilities unless men could be trained rapidly to take their places. It was stressed that the abbreviated training which had been instituted at the Military Intelligence Training Center at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, in August 1944 to fill the demands of overseas quotas which had arisen after the removal of CIC from G2 control early in 1944, would not be sufficient for agents who would be going into detachments almost completely depleted by redeployment. This training had sufficed for replacements who were integrated into detachments of trained and experienced agents.

Comparing the present situation with the period from May 1943 to February 1944, designated as the second phase of the Counter Intelligence Corps activities in World War II, in which 3,000 CIC agents were procured, trained and assigned to overseas theaters, the memorandum stated: "It is necessary that War Department Memorandum 350-44, 7 September 1944, be rescinded and that authority be granted to conduct such additional training as will properly prepare Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to perform their duties."

The memorandum specifically recommended that the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, be authorized to establish, on or about 1 June 1945, the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, who would be given the responsibility of training and assigning CIC personnel for overseas replacements, and of operating the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot. The Counter Intelligence Corps, Army Service Forces, would include a colonel, with the title of Chief, 38 additional officers and 31 enlisted men, to be utilized "for no other purpose." The Counter Intelligence Corps Training Group would be allotted a total of 788 vacancies to be filled by personnel procured for CIC and undergoing training prior to assignment. Personnel redeployed or rotated from theaters of operation would be assigned to the Training Group for redeployment training prior to reassignment.[1]

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1 Memo for the Chief of Staff, USA, Subj: Administration, Training and Redeployment Training of the CIC, dtd 18 May 45, from Office of the CG, ASF, /s/ Col J. M. Roamer, Director of Intelligence, (SECRET) contained in Appendix XVIII in "Appendix of Tabs for History of CIC in ASF," on file in Central Records Facility, attached as Appendix 1, this chapter.

About the middle of April, Colonel Kibler learned that the time was approaching when the memorandum would receive favorable consideration and made his plans accordingly.[2] The go-ahead sign was given and the staff study dated 18 May 1945, was started on its rounds in the War Department on 21 May. Concurrences followed rapidly. G2 on 23 May, G1 on 28 May, G3 on 10 June, and Operations Division, War Department General Staff on 18 June.[3]

Colonel Kibler was officially named as Chief on 13 July 1945 and was followed on 15 January 1946 by Col M. C. Noble.[4]

When the Army Service Forces were inactivated on 11 June 1946, Colonel Noble was informed by G2, War Department General Staff, that he was not Chief, CIC, and should not sign his name as such. His official designation was Commanding Officer, CIC. With dissolution of the Army Service Forces, control of CIC passed to the Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff, and a CIC Branch of the Security Group, Intelligence Division, was established.

The CIC Branch, in effect, took over the functions of the Chief, CIC. The Branch handled records, assignments, correspondence, and transfer movements. When in April 1946, control of SIC, and consequent Zone of Interior responsibility was returned to CIC, the job of the CIC Branch became overwhelming. Particular complications arose since by this time the Center had been reestablished at Fort Holabird, Maryland, and the separation of the Center from its policy-making body in Washington, D.C., caused misunderstandings.

Recognizing the need for centralized control, Col L. R. Forney, Director of the Security Branch, recommended dissolution of the Branch and recreation of the Office of the Chief, where overall control of CIC, less operations, could be put in the hands of one man.

When the request was approved, Special Order No. 77, War Department, 18 April 1947, named Brig Gen George V. Keyser as Commanding General of the CIC Center and Chief of CIC. Successive chiefs through 1950 included Brig Gen E. A. Zundel, who served from 10 January 1948 until 9 June 1949 and Brig Gen J. K. Rice who relieved General Zundel and commanded until 20 August 1951.

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2 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler, MI Reserve, Ft Holabird, August 1954.

3 Memo for the Chief of Staff, USA, subj: Administration, Training and Redeployment Training of the CIC, dtd 18 May 45, from Office of the CG, ASF, /s/ Col J. M. Roamer, Director of Intelligence, (SECRET) contained in Appendix XVIII in "Appendix of Tabs to History of CIC in ASF," on file in Central Records Facility, attached as Appendix 1, this chapter.

4 Ltr from Col H. R. Kibler to Col Henry Newton, dtd 26 Jul 51, Comments in enclosure (Central Records Facility).

The CIC Center

The fortunes of the CIC Center paralleled the fall and rise of the Office of the Chief. It was abolished in February 1944, and its functions were vested in the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces. The training functions of the Center were resumed in 1945 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and continued after its move to Camp Holabird, Maryland, in September 1945. Not until 1947 when the Office of the Chief was re-created with powers in excess of a training mission, did the Center begin overall functioning on a basis similar to that it had achieved prior to its abolishment in 1944.

The CIC School

The effect of the Inspector General's report in eliminating a CIC school was not expected to be too serious. Tactical detachments were at full strength for the most part and apparently no plan was formulated to fill the replacement spaces in overseas CIC Detachments. It was contemplated that Zone of Interior SIC would be kept at full strength by processing men through the former CIC School at Chicago under SIC auspices.

In 1944, the month of August saw CIC procurement problems arise. Tactical units being sent overseas needed additional agents and the unavailability of replacements left many detachments in Europe and the Pacific under strength. To meet the demand for agents, a course was set up at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. This measure temporarily satisfied demands.

When the redeployment of agents to the Pacific after V-E day became necessary, a new CIC School was set up on 11 August 1945 at Fort George G. Meade, under a newly designated Chief, CIC. This school was moved to Camp Holabird in September 1945, and has been in continuous existence ever since.[5]

* * *

With this background, we may approach the more specialized problems of CIC and its Center from 1945 to 1950.

5 History of the CIC Branch, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, from August 1941 to 1 September 1945 (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library) and CIC History 1945-1948, Section I-The CIC Center (Restricted)(Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 2

PERSONNEL

By the end of 1945, most CIC personnel, like soldiers in other branches of the "temporary army," had returned home or were in the process of doing so. Since the counterintelligence workload increased markedly with the change from a combat to an occupation mission, it was necessary to recruit agents from any available source, with the result that the Counter Intelligence Corps found itself with many inexperienced and immature agents, and with even insufficient numbers of these.

It was not until the end of 1949, on the eve of the outbreak of war in Korea, that CIC found itself with sufficient numbers; even then, the problem of quality was far from solved. Voluminous correspondence in CIC's official files attests to this continuing struggle for both quantity and quality of personnel.

Decreases in authorized strength of the Army late in 1945 forced upon CIC a 38 percent decrease, although the nature of CIC's mission had increased its workload greatly.[6] Official concern was expressed continuously during the following year, but perhaps the most succinct evaluation of the situation was made in an interchange of communications between Lt Col C. E. Leydecker, Chief. CIC Branch, and Col Lester R. Forney, Chief of Security Group under which the CIC Branch operated, when it was learned, in April 1947, that another reduction was pending.

Colonel Leydecker pointed out that previous reductions in the troop basis of CIC in overseas theaters and in the Zone of Interior commands had been "made at the expense of security." To avoid the loss and its consequent inadequate maintenance of security, he urged that "...any directive...to commands, for the purpose of personnel reduction studies, include therein sufficient statement to forbid any reduction of CIC personnel," since without such a statement cuts would probably be made on a pro-rata basis when a theater troop ceiling was lowered.

Colonel Forney concurred in the memorandum and added a pertinent comment, the substance of which has been expressed by many military leaders in times of combat, but largely forgotten when war threats became less imminent:[7] "...as our positive power to provide national security...is decreased, the efficiency of

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6 Basic History, CIC 1945-1948, Section I, p. 24 (Restricted) (Central Records Facility).

7 Intra-office memo from C.E. Leydecker, Lt Col, GSC Chief CIC Branch to Chief, Security Group, 7 Apr 47, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center) and Indorsement, same document.

our intelligence services must be correspondingly increased in order to insure sufficient advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources."

Colonel Leydecker's warning that reductions in troop ceilings should not be permitted to reduce CIC's strength was particularly pertinent to a situation that had just arisen. Late in 1946 the War Department had authorized 169 new CIC spaces to the six Armies and the Military District of Washington to permit the detachments to "catch up" on the formidable backlog of cases accumulated by that time. It soon appeared, however, that several Army areas had decreased CIC detachment strength below authorized Tables of Organization in order to meet reduced overall personnel strength figures. In a letter written on 6 January 1947, Lt Col E. R. Mitchell, Acting Chief, CIC Branch, Security Group, called the authorization for additional personnel "an illogical and empty gesture, when authorized Table of Organization vacancies remained unfilled."[8]

Personnel Changes Create Problems

By June 1946, the exodus of officers from CIC had reached such proportions that steps to attract at least a partial return were deemed necessary. As a first step, 597 circular letters were mailed former CIC officers asking consent for a recall to active duty. By the end of July, only 62 replies had been received, and none of these 62 was recalled.[9]

The shortage of enlisted personnel was equally acute, but the number of men needed was naturally greater. Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief Security Group, G2, Department of the Army, proposed that the Director of the Personnel and Administrative Division could help to alleviate this shortage by earmarking for CIC those personnel formerly exempt from Selective Service. This group included FBI investigators, detectives, policemen, sheriffs, lawyers, journalists, and other "crime experts." Nothing came of this proposal.[10]

Promotion of Enlisted Graduates

As a partial solution to the officer problem, the Planning and Liaison Division in May 1946, recommended to the Director of Intelligence that the Commanding Officer at the Center be granted authority to promote all enlisted graduates from

8 Ltr from E. R. Mitchell, Lt Col, Acting Chief, CIC Branch Security Group, dtd 6 Jan 47, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

9 Ltr from Hq, CIC Center, dtd 28 Jun 46, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

10 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Security Group, to Director of Personnel and Liaison Division, WDGS, 26 Jun 46, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

the Center School to the next higher grade on completion of the course. The plan provided that master sergeants be appointed warrant officer (junior grade) upon graduation. This plan was not adopted, and records do not indicate the basis for rejection.[11]

Revision of Direct CIC Appointments

In 1947 the appointment policy of warrant officers and second lieutenants to CIC was revised to restrict appointments to persons willing to serve eighteen months, or if overseas, a minimum of one year in the theater where appointed. The change was intended to correct the situation whereby officers were returned to the United States shortly after appointment to CIC, preventing their utilization by overseas commanders.[12]

Attrition and Replacements

By February 1947, it was estimated that the annual replacement figure for CIC would be about 37 percent. Based on a total strength figure of about 5,200 officers and men, this meant that approximately 167 officers and men would have to be pushed through the CIC School every month to keep pace with normal attrition. A program geared to meet these figures was to be inaugurated in July 1947.[13]

Efforts Made to Increase Quality

In an attempt to stem the tide of complaints regarding the quality of new personnel, both officer and enlisted, Col J. M. Roamer, Director of Intelligence, on 5 April 1946 established new criteria for the selection of CIC applicants. According to this criteria, warrant and commissioned officers were required to be 22 to 38 years of age; have two years college or equivalent; have signed Category I, II, or III volunteer statements; and be citizens of the United States. Company grade officers were most desirable and some experience in investigative work was deemed helpful.

Enlisted men had to be between 20 and 38 years of age; have an AGCT score of 110 or higher; be a high school graduate and United States citizen; have completed basic training; and have at least a year to serve after 30 June 1946.

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11 Annual Report of Activities Planning and Liaison Division, 1946, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

12 Report of Col Charles C. Blakeney, GSC, Exec Chief, Security, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

13 Ltr from Director of Intelligence to Director of Personnel and Administration, dtd 21 Feb 47, (SECRET) (Kansas City Records Center).

Regular Army personnel with a background of investigative experience were most desirable. All exceptions and waivers for personnel had to be approved at the CIC Branch level.[14]

The Matter of Quality

The quality of new members of the Corps continued to be a matter of concern. Official recognition of this problem was expressed in a letter sent to all major commands on 7 February 1947 by Colonel Forney in which he acknowledged "...the truth in these reports that the quality of CIC had declined with the end of World War II." He explained that the Corps was receiving the best men available, but that a lowering of standards had been necessitated by the influx of younger men into the Army. He pointed out that most inductees had such a short service tour that their value to CIC was limited. Improvement could only come as the Army itself was stabilized as to strength and functions.

As an immediate solution to experienced personnel shortages, Colonel Forney suggested that detachments limit, so far as possible, participation in noncounter-intelligence functions and profitably employ men as their talents permitted.[15]

Problems at the Center

The Chief, CIC, Brig Gen George V. Keyser, also stressed immediate personnel problems in a letter in July 1947, addressed to Maj Gen Willard S. Paul, War Department General Staff.

General Keyser conceded that complaints by overseas detachment commanders as to the quality of agents had a sound basis in fact. He pointed out, however, that the truly competent agent must be trained and expert in so many skills that to provide the caliber of personnel desired was a virtual impossibility. He said that all steps possible were being taken to improve the general level of CIC officers and men, and that his task would be immeasurably eased if the War Department would make available to him above-average personnel for CIC indoctrination and training.[16]

Col John H. Riepe, answering the letter for General Paul, assured the Chief, CIC, that the War Department was aware of the difficulties which he faced and would cooperate in every way possible to implement and physically man those programs General Keyser deemed best and most necessary for the Corps. This

14 Ltr to All Service Commands, MDW, TC, dtd 5 Apr 46, /s/ J. M. Roamer, Col, GSC, Director of Intelligence, (Unclassified)(Kansas City Records Center).

15 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Sec Group, to all Major Commands, dtd 7 Feb 47, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

16 Ltr from Brig Gen George V. Keyser to Maj Gen Willard Paul, WDGS, dtd 29 Jul 47, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

promise of support was backed up with the forwarding of 450 men to the Center for training in July and August 1947.[17]

CIC Personnel Transfer Procedure

In spite of the acute shortage of CIC personnel, transfers of CIC agents to non-CIC duties continued throughout the Army, contrary to specific rules which had been in effect since November 1944. Maj Gen Edward Witsell, The Adjutant General, in a letter to all commands in January 1947, pointed out that the War Department had a continuing problem in the procurement and training of personnel for CIC and that the practice of transferring trained agents to non-CIC duties "by-passed the control function of the Director of Intelligence and tended to disrupt procurement and training schedules."

He reminded his addressees of the policy established in letter AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) OB-S-B-M, 13 Nov 44, Subject: CIC, and affirmed by book message WCL 45849, 31 May 46. By that policy, once War Department approval was given for CIC assignment, release from CIC was prohibited except for a specific reason. Such "specific reason" releases were to be promptly reported, through channels, to the Director of Intelligence, WDGS.

The General continued that when a request was made for transfer of CIC personnel to non-CIC assignments, the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, would determine whether the overall CIC efficiency would be weakened. Approval or disapproval would be given accordingly, after consideration of the justification presented for such transfers.

General Witsell added that the Intelligence Division, WDGS, interpreted the phrase "for a specific reason" to mean inefficiency, including lack of capability or proven lack of desire to perform CIC duties; character deficiencies; undesirable mental attitude; separation from the service, or prolonged hospitalization; and other than minor infractions of discipline and good order.

Transfers out of CIC "for cause" were to be enumerated briefly in the Monthly Administrative Report of Detachments.[18]

It was later noted that administrative elimination from the Corps should not be substituted for disciplinary or punitive action should the circumstances warrant it. Commanders should not be reluctant to adopt punitive measures because

17 Ltr from Col John Riepe, Acting Chief, Manpower Control Group to Brig Gen George Keyser, 8 Aug 47 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

18 Ltr from Maj Gen Edward F. Witsell, TAG, to CGS of All Commands; dtd 24 Jan 47, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

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of the feeling that possible publicity would be detrimental to the Corps. The respect for the Corps held by the rest of the Army would be seriously affected if infractions of good order and discipline went unpunished. [19]

In concluding, the General said that when CIC personnel were considered surplus to the needs of one theater or Army, consideration would be given by the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, to the transfer of such personnel to other theaters or Army Areas where they might be needed. [20]

In the Manner of Lincoln

Although he granted that the Corps was too small and some of its personnel inexperienced, General Keyser, Chief, CIC, was of the firm opinion that proper appreciation and employment of CIC by high echelon officers would provide at least a temporary panacea for current shortages and shortcomings. His feelings are consolidated and cogently stated in a letter to an Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, drafted in October 1947.

Lt. Col. Richard Roe*
AC of S, G2
APO 123 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

My Dear Roe:

I appreciate very much your taking the time to write me a letter concerning Captain Blank and the manner in which the Blank CIC Detachment is now performing.

Prior to my association with the Counter Intelligence Corps, beginning last April, I had been an Army G2 for about fifteen months during which time I gained some knowledge of the mission and operation of CIC. Prior to my becoming G2, I had practically no knowledge of the CIC. You and I apparently were in the same boat. Now that I am associated with it, I find the entire work most fascinating. At the same time, I encounter more frustrations than in any other activity in which I have ever been engaged. In fact, I think we may say that frustrations and disappointments are the fare of any good CIC Agent. I am convinced that the cause for this, to put it bluntly, is the ignorance

19 Commanders Conference, 1950 (Confidential) (Staff & Faculty Library).
20 Ltr from Maj Gen Edward F. Witsell, TAG, to CGs, All Commands, dtd 27 Jan 47 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).
* All names have been omitted.

of staff officers and commanders concerning CIC, its operations and its mission. We Americans seem to loathe any kind of organization whose operations savor of snooping. Even when we have an organization of individuals who have been subjected to a background investigation of the highest order, seeking to determine their character, their integrity, their discretion, and their loyalty, we still are reluctant to accord them our confidence. I wish that every G2 and every commander, who has a detachment under him, could have received an orienting course in CIC work. Let me give you some examples of misuse of our agents:

An agent on an undercover assignment seeks to avert suspicion of a probable informant by deliberately indulging in a minor black market deal simply in order to gain confidence. He immediately becomes suspect and is picked up by the CID. In the investigation that follows his cover is destroyed and he becomes useless in the area.

In another case, a sergeant has established contact with a foreign official. Operating in civilian clothes under the alias or title of "Mr.", the Foreign official believes him to be at least a Lieutenant Colonel. One day, through pure carelessness, the G2 allows the foreign official to learn that the man who has been contacting him is a non-commissioned officer. Thereafter, the official will no longer provide information.

Still another case. Agents operate daily in civilian clothing. People at their own headquarters believe they are civilian employees and completely innocuous. Suddenly these agents are caused to be put on as duty officer or duty NCO in the main headquarters. They are required to wear a uniform. The G2 makes no intercession. Thereafter, with their identity made known to all, their usefulness had diminished.

I could name dozens of other instances of poor handling which results in decreased efficiency of the Corps. Although we are bound to make mistakes and at times admit inferior personnel into CIC, it must be realized that we are striving to maintain high standards of education, prior service, AGCT score, discretion, character, and loyalty. For these reasons, I think that every agent should be given the benefit of a doubt and in no case should he be rendered suspect in the eyes of the G2 following a perfunctory consideration of his conduct. A conscientious CIC Agent operating in an area which is the center of espionage and intrigue will, in the course of his work, invariably overstep into activities which are prohibited. This must be accepted as normal. If the agent adopts a cautious attitude, always making sure

that there is no chance of violating some order or principle, he will gain the acclaim of many of a G2, but the work he produces will probably be useless. Therefore, I feel that in every case, an incoming G2 who is familiar with CIC should sit down with his detachment commander and carefully discuss the mission and means available. He should then require the detachment commander to show how the results can be produced. If the G2 at this time, or subsequently, feels that the mission must be reduced in order to assure accomplishment, he can issue such an order. I know of no detachment commander who would disobey such an order or seek to prevent its implementation. In a large majority of cases the trouble has been that G2s, by virtue of their position and authority, have been reluctant to disclose their lack of knowledge of matters pertaining to CIC. The old rule in the Army was, an incoming officer consulted with or took advice from the First Sergeant or Stable Sergeant, etc. In our situation, I can see a definite analogy.

Passing now to the question of a G2 getting rid of ineffectuals, this is accomplished as described in paragraph 32 of TM 30-215, of which I am sending you two copies, one being for your detachment commander. Should cause for reassignment fall under one of the five subparagraphs shown, and should the situation demand immediate relief, the latter can be effected as provided in this regulation, in which case the individual should be returned to the United States. My office should be furnished with a complete statement of the facts and events which gave rise to his relief. The same statement should be sent in case he is reassigned overseas. Where an individual's performance of duty is not up to standard but his relief is not urgent, I would like to receive complete information concerning the individual. If the individual himself is not the detachment commander, the statements of wrong-doing, misconduct, or inefficiency by the detachment commander or other CIC officer should be included with the report. Based on such reports and following a reconsideration of his background investigation and other data available, I can, of course, remove him from CIC completely. I note that Captain Blank was transferred from CIC last June. This is rather hard for me to understand, inasmuch as such transfer is prohibited and I am given cause to wonder why, in order to put him in your office, you felt compelled to transfer him from CIC. When I was Army G2, my action would have been to leave him in CIC and, if necessary, attempt to get an increased T/O to cover the need for his replacement. I have written Blank a letter to the Port of Embarkation in which I point out to him the prospects for continued service in the Corps, particularly in the grade of Warrant Officer. At the present moment, the only solid base for the CIC is for enlisted men, but I have assured him that

we will have a quota for Regular Army warrant officers in the forseeable future.

With reference to Colonel Doe, Major More and the other officer you had reassigned, records here do not dispose me to consider them inefficient or lacking in knowledge of CIC. However, I shall watch with interest the reports that I get from them and from the commanders under whom they are now serving.

I do, indeed, thank you for writing me and I hope that you will consider this letter simply as from one red leg to another, neither of whom has been in this game very long.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE V KEYSER
Brigadier General USA
Chief, CIC[21]

Investigation of CIC

While CIC was in the middle of its struggle to acquire higher-quality personnel than were available among the average newcomers, an ex-CIC man, Guenther Reinhardt, submitted to the Secretary of the Army a report entitled "Wholesale Irregularities of CIC in the European Theater." The Chief, CIC, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, immediately launched a full scale investigation. Results of this investigation with full reports are covered in the chapter on the Occupation of Germany. Suffice to say at this point that the conclusion reached was that Reinhardt's charges were "definitely unfair" and "with only limited foundations."[22]

Officer Stabilization

A proposal of Lt Gen S. J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, on 15 October 1948, was designed to stabilize and bolster the office corps of CIC. He suggested that individual officers who had demonstrated a special aptitude for intelligence work be permanently assigned in that field and specifically

21 Ltr from Brig Gen George V. Keyser, Chief, CIC, to Lt Col D. G. McLennan, AC of S, G2, APO, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California, 8 October 47, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

22 See Chapter entitled "Occupation of Germany."

recommended that selected field grade officers be assigned Army Security Agency, CIC, and Strategic Intelligence. He felt that the total number of officers so assigned should not exceed five percent of the authorized officer strength of the activity concerned.[23] Maj Gen H. R. Bull, Director of Organization and Training, concurred in the proposal. He suggested modification, however, to the extent that the number of Regular Army officers assigned not be controlled by a straight five percent policy. It was his feeling that the number should be kept to a minimum dictated by requirements at a given time.

General Bull added that some "...officers have been in the Intelligence field for years, and ...specialization...for some officers is an accomplished fact."[24]

In finally indorsing General Chamberlin's plan, General Bull added another comment. General Chamberlin had provided that the Regular Army officers required for the plan be procured by levy on all the Branches. General Bull made clear his preference for a system whereby the levy would be used only when efforts to obtain the officers on a voluntary basis had failed.[25]

The year 1949 brought added personnel procurement problems. Extra agents were needed in Austria for the displaced persons clearance program,[26] and to speed replacements, the 7970th CIC Detachment in Europe requested that personnel be sent directly to them and not via the European Intelligence School in Oberammergau. Additional spaces at the Army Language School were made available to the Center, but complaints were soon received stating that men without any language aptitude were being sent by CIC to fill quotas.[27]

Career Management for Intelligence Personnel

Progress toward a career management program for Intelligence officers moved slowly but steadily forward in 1949. Although a career management branch for all Intelligence officers was not attained, Military Intelligence reservists not on active duty were provided for in an undated memorandum directed to the deputy Chief of Staff, approved and concurred on by the Director of Intelligence. Observations and comments by the Director in granting conditional concurrence clarify the situation.

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23 Disposition Form, 15 Oct 48 from CSGID to CSGPA (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

24 Ibid, comment 3.

25 Ibid, comment 4.

26 File 337, Staff Conference CIC Center 1949, 15 Nov (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

27 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center, December 1949 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

The Director first noted that the submitted program did not provide for the most important groups: MI Reserve officers on active duty; Army Security Agency (ASA) reserves on active duty; Regular Army officers specializing in intelligence; and reserve officers of other arms and services on active duty with intelligence. He commented that the career guidance programs of CIC and ASA within the limitations of their own organizations, while steps in the right direction, were largely ineffective because of inherent limitations. He suggested that a career management branch similar to that of the Technical Services be established.

Under this concept, the branch would have three sections--CIC, ASA, and Intelligence. The Chiefs of CIC and ASA would offer career guidance within their respective branches, and act as advisors to the Director of Intelligence. Careering would be handled by each respective section, with changes from section handled by the career management branch. A conference for discussion of this plan was later convened.

At the conference, representatives of the Intelligence Division, Personnel and Assignment Division, and Career Management concluded that an Intelligence Career Management Branch under the Chief, Career Management Group, was feasible and desirable. Several provisos were appended to this decision: Procurement, assignment and career management of CIC, ASA, MI and all other intelligence agencies of the Intelligence Division would be handled by this branch; personnel records or transcripts were to be kept by this branch on all intelligence reserve officers whose mobilization assignments were controlled by the Director of Intelligence, and all Regular Army or Reserve officers on extended active duty currently serving with the Intelligence Division; and personnel needed to set up the Branch would be provided by the Intelligence Division.

The Director of Intelligence concurred in these decisions after making it clear that all assignments to intelligence agencies and the Intelligence Division would require his approval, and the new branch, as proposed, would not control MI and ASA Reserve officers not on extended active duty.

Until the proposed program was implemented, the Director of Intelligence requested "compulsory detailing of a certain number of Regular Army officers for tours in CIC and ASA with a view...to a second non-consecutive tour." This was in accordance with the Director's position that the "proportion of Regular Army officers in each intelligence activity should generally be equal to the proportion of Regular Army officers to the total number of officers in the field units of the Army (currently about 20 percent)."[28]

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28 Undated Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration CSGID-PS 903.9 (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

First Postwar Stability

In 1949, the Counter Intelligence Corps settled down to its world-wide, post-war status. Emergency requisitions for personnel had been filled and for the first time in its history the Corps faced an approaching saturation point in the number of enlisted agents.[29] Emphasis shifted from quantity to quality.

Most urgent was the problem of retaining capable CIC personnel. Field detachments removed CIC SSN's (MOS's) and personnel were returned to the states and lost to CIC.[30] CIC personnel were not being returned to the Corps after their Officer Candidate courses. Control was being lost of cleared personnel who did not carry a CIC MOS.[31] Later in the year it became evident that cadre for the CIC Center would have to be trained as CIC specialists if they were to be retained.[32] In February, Brig Gen E. A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, ordered a study made "to ascertain what becomes of CIC personnel, creating the situation that requires such large numbers of replacements."[33]

One of the major efforts of the year was directed toward establishment of a nucleus of Regular Army officers for CIC comparable in proportion to the situation in the rest of the Army. A nucleus of career RA officers was desired for development to higher positions of command and staff and faculty positions where background in CIC was needed.[33a]

Maj Gen G. L. Irwin, G2, DA, supported the CIC request to retain RA officers but it was disapproved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, DA, in February. An alternative proposal was submitted to have Regular Army officers made available on recurring and consecutive three year details, normally from field to Center, back to basic branch.[34] No progress was made, but in October information was received that the Chief of Staff was directing career management to ease up on rigid regulations, particularly with regard to CIC. A paper was resubmitted asking a proportionate percentage of RA officers, but the year ended with no action.[35]

In October an attempt was made to exempt from elimination overage reserve officers assigned to CIC.[36] But in December, Brig Gen J. K. Rice, who had

29 File 337 Staff Conferences CIC Center, 6 Sep 49, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library).
30 Ibid, 14 Feb.
31 Ibid, 5 Jan.
32 Ibid, 25 Oct.
33 Ibid, 14 Feb.
33a Ibid, 12 Oct.
34 Ibid, 16 Feb.
35 Ibid, 14 Oct.
36 Ibid, 12 Oct.

succeeded General Zundel as Chief of CIC on 9 June, was informed that while Department of Army Personnel and Administration Division would not grant blanket authority to retain overage in-grade reserve officers in CIC, a list of key officers the Corps would like to retain could be submitted.[37]

In February, separation of the Air Force from the CIC School was approved and loss of Air Force officers assigned to CIC followed.[38] In the spring it was reported that contrary to the understanding of the CIC Center, it appeared that CIC was sustaining losses through the return of reserve officers to basic branches.[39] Officer losses continued throughout 1949. In September efforts were made to prevent CIC reserve officers from being included in enforced percentage separations.[40] It was hoped that branch losses could be reduced by encouraging transfers to the MI Reserve.[41]

During the year efforts were made to stabilize CIC personnel in overseas assignments. Retention of Niseis in Japan rather than rotating them to the United States where they might not be profitably employed had been requested but not acted upon.[42] In November, General Rice stated that "specialization, particularly in overseas areas, is required for certain selected CIC personnel. No ironclad rule preventing recurring tours should be established as general policy. The Corps, however, must guard against individual 'homesteading' on the part of CIC agents, particularly in the Zone of the Interior...varied duty is desirable, but there is no objection to qualified personnel returning to overseas commands in which they have previously served, provided such a recurring tour has the approval of the overseas commander."[43]

This was an amplification of the basic policy expressed by General Rice in August when he stated, "personnel in CIC must be treated as individuals."[44]

Efforts to improve the quality of CIC personnel encountered many obstacles during 1949. Army recruiting circulars regarding CIC appeared to be contradictory. General Zundel expressed the belief that "CIC is continually being restricted," and stated that he did not desire that "we sit back and be slowly throttled." General Zundel ordered a paper prepared and forwarded to Personnel and Administration Division, Department of Army, indicating "why normal

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37 File 337 Staff Conferences CIC Center, 9 Dec 49, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).
38 Ibid, 14 Feb.
39 Ibid, 9 May.
40 Ibid, 12 Sep.
41 Ibid, 4 Apr.
42 Ibid, 17 Jan.
43 Ibid, 1 Nov.
44 Ibid, 2 Aug.

replacement methods do not apply to CIC. This should include such items as language, continuity of control and operations, etc..."[45]

In March, non-coms arriving at the Center were of such low quality that pre-tests given by Personnel and Administration Division were reinstituted. Deficient personnel were ordered to appear before waiver boards.[46] The policy on waivers was tightened up in August,[47] and in September it was ordered that waivers be granted "only in extreme cases."[48]

In August, a system was organized whereby all CIC School candidates appeared before an evaluation board upon arrival at the Center and those with minimum qualifications were considered on trial for reappearance before a faculty board after the first month in school.[49] Standards had to be raised because "...unless there is a clear-cut reason for reassignment, such as criminality or obvious falsifications, etc, the candidate must go into training in accordance with DA regulations."[50]

It was ordered during 1949 that both examinations and field efficiency be considered in the promotion and selection of enlisted personnel and warrant officers. This decision was precipitated by a report from the European Command that "many of our high level agents were turned down for CIC warrants and were appointed in CID (Criminal Investigation Division of the Provost Marshal)...One field grade officer who made CIC warrant was relieved from duty for inefficiency."[51]

Efforts were made to complete clearances before personnel arrived at the Center. This would facilitate replacement without time loss.[52] Poor quality continued, however, and a survey in July revealed that 21 out of 35 officers in a class at the school were below normal standards.[53]

In September it was reported that enlistment for CIC did not obligate the Center to train a candidate as a 1301. He could be offered 1405 training instead and, if he refused, be reassigned.[54] While this provided a means of solving the 1301 surplus and retaining good men, the next month the Center was informed

45 File 337 Staff Conferences CIC Center, 2 Feb 49, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).
46 Ibid, 16 Mar.
47 Ibid, 2 Aug.
48 Ibid, 12 Sep.
49 Ibid, 5 Aug.
50 Ibid, 2 Aug.
51 Ibid, 9 May.
52 Ibid, 25 May.
53 Ibid, 15 Jul.
54 Ibid, 20 Sep.

that DA was considering the use of master sergeants to fill warrant officer spaces instead of commissioned officers. Since most of these master sergeants were old-time "line" non-coms, their adaptability for CIC work created a new problem.

In March, Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins approved the establishment of a career management branch of the Intelligence Division for CIC and ASA. Lack of personnel spaces postponed actual establishment until November, when CIC would provide officers for its own section of the branch. The branch was officially scheduled for activation on 1 January 1950.[55]

1949 Commander's Conference

Col B. A. Tormey, Director of the Personnel and Administration Division, reminded those in attendance at the 1949 Commander's Conference that the time had come to eliminate inept and undesirable persons from CIC. The granting of qualification waivers had been eliminated for enlisted men and sharply curtailed for officers. The period when CIC would take whatever was available to fill spaces had ended.

In a review of the present situation of CIC, the procurement program at the Center was discussed in some detail. Concern was expressed over the 45 percent attrition rate incurred during screening, education and background investigation phases.

General approval of the assignment program whereby individuals were given maximum information regarding future duty stations was expressed, but difficulties encountered by granting provisional CIC MOS when agents were locally procured were reported. In these latter cases, it was pointed out that malassignment frequently resulted when these men were evaluated at the Center after return from overseas units. Increased precautions were outlined.

Lt Col S. Gruneck, Chief, Career Management Bureau, clarified the shaky status of the CIC officer contingent. About 92 percent of Corps officers held only reserve commissions, and though this raised no great problem so long as an expanded Army system was maintained, any sharp cutback in strength would result in such loss of officer personnel that continuity and perhaps even operation of the Corps would be impaired. Although strenuous efforts were being made to procure more Regular Army officers, this was not a panacea, for such men were committed only for a three-year tour, and part of that time was lost in processing and training. Lt Col G. T. Adair pointed out that reserve officers could remain on duty with CIC almost indefinitely if a request for such duty was submitted with concurrence of the Chief, CIC. However, stability remained contingent upon a large reserve.

55 File 337 Staff Conferences CIC Center, 4 Oct 49, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

The Career Management Section advised the conference that the shortage of warrant officers in CIC would eventually be corrected by a new grant of authority for such appointments.

Overseas assignment policy was summarized for the conference with the statement that all persons with less than 36 months overseas duty were eligible for such shipment.

Strength of the Corps in 1949 was set out at length in the report of the conference. There were 1,125 Reserve officers and 100 Regular Army officers on duty; 452 out of 820 authorized warrant officers were on duty; and 1,690 enlisted men were serving with the Corps. The re-enlistment rate was about 65 percent.

Two important personnel innovations were outlined for the conference. A battery of aptitude tests had been formulated for agent personnel and was in the process of validation. The clearance of men scheduled for training at the Center was being arranged in such a manner that investigation would be completed prior to arrival in Baltimore.

Detachment commanders were reminded of the necessity for submitting personnel requisitions through the Adjutant General in Washington before the Center could meet personnel needs. The commanders were also told that agents on assignments not utilizing a language specialty should be kept in training in case of emergency. It was suggested that detachments have daily language sessions to promote practice and training for such personnel as qualified.

The Director of the Security Control Division reported that a Central Personality Index of two and a half million cards had been completed. The index allowed immediate location of an investigative file, involving an individual.

The conference was closed on the same hopeful note on which it began. Maj George C. Sheldon said that since the Corps was no longer plagued by a shortage of personnel, and undesirables could be weeded out, esprit de corps should be developed. Elimination of substandard personnel was expected to materially aid in the achievement of this end.[56]

Personnel at the Beginning of 1950

At the beginning of 1950, it seemed that many of CIC's major personnel problems had been solved. A new testing and aptitude series was planned to help attain the procurement goal of 1,100 men set for the year. Only the Fifth and

56 Report of the Commander's Conference, 1949 (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Second Army Areas had reacted unfavorably on the request for the institution of this system.

An overseas rotation file was set up for all CIC personnel, and surveys conducted by the Division established the number of CIC officers who were or soon would be overage in grade as well as the various Career fields of AUS warrant officers on duty with CIC.

Establishment of CIC as a separate ladder in the Military Intelligence Career field was scheduled for implementation in November 1950, and the CIC proposal for establishment of MOS 4301 (CIC specialization) was rejected with the provision that CIC would receive a similar MOS to serve the same purpose from the Personnel and Administration Career field.[57] Most requisitions for CIC personnel which came through the Adjutant General to the Chief, CIC, for action, were being filled. Requisitions from ZI Detachments reflected requirements as anticipated for the third subsequent month, while overseas requests were based on the fifth subsequent month.

To maintain equitable rotation of personnel overseas, the Chief, CIC, in filling requisitions was guided by SR 600-175-1, "Foreign Service." Efforts were made to fill all requisitions, and only in a few instances was it necessary to ship short.

The return of officers and warrant officers from overseas commands was announced to the Adjutant General three months before arrival in the U.S. was due. If CIC or Army language school training was indicated or desired, arrangements were made and upon receipt of assignment instructions for the Chief, CIC, the Adjutant General radioed appropriate authority for orders to return the officer or warrant officer to the Zone of Interior.

Information on the return of enlisted men to the U.S. was given the Chief, CIC, through either the Adjutant General or the port of debarkation. Records were reviewed at the Center as in the case of officer personnel, and authority for shipment orders to the U.S. came from the Adjutant General to the port of embarkation, after advice from the Chief, CIC, to the Adjutant General.

Initial assignment of all CIC personnel was based on four factors: needs of the service, special qualifications, special training, and desires of the individual.

Personnel were notified of impending overseas assignments either by an alert letter from the Chief, CIC, or by shipping instructions direct from the Adjutant General. Movement orders for specified dates were requested from the Adjutant

57 Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, Feb 1950 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

General for officers and warrant officers, and in the case of enlisted men, the Chief, CIC, requested that the Adjutant General direct major commanders to publish shipment orders.[58]

Problems Return With Outbreak of War

But with the outbreak of war in Korea, the problem, both of numbers and quality, again became acute.

At the Detachment Commander's Conference late in 1950, Col Ralph Nemo, AC of S, G1, made it clear that his section recognized the imperative need for higher caliber personnel in CIC. He made it equally clear, however, that sources for such personnel were "practically nil" at that time.

Replacement of the monthly levy system on arms and services because of officer overstrength in 1949, with voluntary individual request transfers as the only method of CIC officer procurement, had given only a "limited and steadily decreasing" source of supply. Although careful screening of transfer requests produced a high caliber of men, source material was limited. Quotas from Reserve officer groups recalled to active duty had to be relied upon to meet CIC needs for officers.

Colonel Nemo explained that the CIC warrant officer requirements for 320 available spaces were not being met under present Department of Army policy. Eventual formation of necessary plans was indicated, but no immediate solution to the shortage problem could be found.

It was felt that current enlisted personnel procurement regulations provided quantity but not quality. AR revisions, Colonel Nemo said, had been submitted to the Department of Army for approval and publication, and it was anticipated that this would correct the situation, in spite of increased needs occasioned by the Korean conflict.

General overstrength in late 1949 had allowed raising of many detachments above authorized strength. Even so, the drain on resources caused by the Far East situation raised replacement problems in 1950. Personnel requisitions, unnecessary in 1949, had to be submitted to the Center far in advance of the date personnel were required, and even then many categories were short-shipped.[59]

58 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

59 Ibid.

CIC Clearances

Clearance procedures for CIC personnel underwent a number of changes during the period 1945-1950. In 1947, through liaison with the FBI, all CIC applicants were fingerprinted and the cards processed quickly through the FBI files.[60]

As time went on, the Commanding General, CIC Center, was given greater responsibility in determining the suitability of an applicant for admission to CIC. Under changes instituted in 1950, he was permitted to waive any requirements for clearances except the one for U.S. citizenship. Granting of waivers was limited, however, to personnel who "demonstrated ability, high mental capacity, or outstanding performance of duty to a degree which compensates for the lack of prerequisites." At the 1950 Commander's Conference, the G2 made it clear that the waiver provision did not represent a lowering of CIC standards, but was designed to facilitate the flow of desirable men.[61]

Investigation and Records Control Section

By June 1948, the Investigations and Records Control Section had processed over 4,000 names for clearance under the Career warrants, CIC, Signal Intelligence, and Military Attache program.

The section was informed by the Director of Intelligence that Intelligence Field files would be maintained only where derogatory information was revealed and that appropriate processing was necessary.[62] In this same period, the Section began the processing of all personnel in MI Reserve (CIC specialization) to compile an accurate listing of all CIC reservists and their eligibility for mobilization duty.

In late June 1948, the Investigation and Records Control Section obtained approval from the Commanding General, CIC, for an SOP decreeing disposition and action on information reflecting upon the eligibility of CIC personnel, and distributed the SOP to all agencies concerned.[63]

On directions from the Chief, CIC, background investigations on officers with more than ten years of continuous active service were discontinued under

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60 Memo for liaison Officer to FBI from Col L.R. Forney, GSC Chief, Security Group, dtd 3 Feb 47, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

61 1950 Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

62 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center, June 1948, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

63 Ibid, October 1948.

certain conditions.[64] But tightening of other background requirements in 1948 led to a large number of rejections from the increased flow of personnel through the CIC school.[65]

SOP for CIC Panel

A policy on the transfer of personnel disapproved by the CIC Final Review Panel was established on 29 March 1948, in a memorandum from Col M. C. Noble, Acting Chief, CIC, to all personnel concerned.

The CIC Final Review Panel was the disapproving authority of applicants for CIC duty. As described in the memo, it consisted of the Commanding General, Deputy Commander, Executive Officer, and the Chief, Investigations and Records Control Section. Derogatory cases were submitted by the Investigations and Records Control Section for independent review and final decision.

If the Panel decision was "Disapproved for CIC," or "Disapproved for CIC but approved for housekeeping duties if desired," the case was returned to the Chief, Investigation and Records Control Section, for appropriate action.

In a "disapproved for CIC" instance, the procedure included notification of the individual concerned through personal interview with the Chief, Investigations and Records Control Section. If the individual concerned was a field grade officer, his file was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, for the same action.

After notification, the Chief, Investigations and Record Control Section, initiated an IOM to the G1 requesting that action be taken to effect the transfer of the individual from CIC for noneligibility. The G1 took necessary action to effect the transfer and made appropriate comment on the individual's records. No change in the assignment of the individual was made until transfer orders were published, and no dissemination of information pertaining to the transfer other than to the G1 was authorized except as directed by the Commanding General.

If the Panel decision was "disapproved for CIC but approved for housekeeping duties if desired," the procedure varied.

If operating personnel were affected, no action was taken and the individual remained on assignment. If pipeline personnel were affected, the Chief, Investigations and Records Control Section, notified G1 by IOM of the decision of the

64 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center, November 1948, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

65 Monthly Status Reports for 1948, CIC Center, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Panel and the G1 then endeavored to secure a suitable assignment for the individual according to his MOS.[66]

Complaint Cases Involving CIC Personnel

Several complaint cases involving CIC personnel were cited at the 1950 Commander's Conference. A few of these cases showed involvement with Communist organizations and Soviet interests. A serious impediment to these investigations was the loose talk which seemed inherent in these "in the family" cases. At least one case was compromised by such talk, and it was found that "the most security-conscious people are sometimes guilty." The necessity for CIC to maintain a reputation for integrity was emphasized at the conference, and the dangers of injury to prestige by even the hint of a scandal were pointed out.

The possibility of penetration of CIC by enemy agents was also discussed. This danger was felt to be greatest in overseas areas, and every commander was warned against the assumption that his group was penetration-proof. It was recommended that any agent with detrimental associations, which could under any possibility lead to penetration, should immediately be discarded.[67]

Changes in Primary MOS

Conflicting interpretations of regulations relative to changes in CIC MOS's made throughout the postwar years were cleared up at the 1950 Commander's Conference. Such MOS's could only be gained by completion of required CIC training, or waiver granted by the Chief, CIC, on the basis of field experience. Once a CIC MOS was secured, it was retained so long as the individual was a member of the Corps and could only be changed for specified "cause" or with approval of the Chief, CIC. This applied to both officer and enlisted personnel.

Change in a warrant officer's CIC MOS required Department of Army approval, since warrant officers were appointed in a career field equivalent to an officer's basic branch. The Adjutant General could act upon presentation of sufficient justification.[68]

Personnel Selected for Special Projects

Several new projects were added during the postwar years, each of which required personnel selection on the basis of specific technical abilities.

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66 Memo from M. C. Noble, Col, Infantry, Acting Chief, CIC, dated 29 March 1948 (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

67 1950 Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

68 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

For a polygraph technician, minimum requirements were company grade or warrant officer rank and enlisted men of the first three grades; either a 9302 or 1301 MOS; minimum age of 25 years; and a high school education. It was felt that interest in the work was essential and college training, preferably in psychology, was desirable. A practical understanding of human nature was determined helpful in the work, and a pleasant personality gave further qualification.

For the course in defense against methods of entry, a clearance was demanded as mandatory, and background in the handling of small tools, average intelligence, and interest in the work were listed as additional criteria.

Admittance to the sound course offered at the center required a clearance, some background in radio work, electronics, and electricity, and some basic experience with hand tools.

Eligibility for the photography course necessitated a clearance, experience in basic photography and darkroom techniques, experience with at least two camera types, and interest in the work.

Organized Reserve Affairs

The Far East situation in 1950 aroused considerable interest in organized Reserve affairs on the part of CIC commanders, and the status of reserve forces was clarified at the 1950 conference.

By terms of AR 140-305, issued in 1950, the Organized Reserve Corps consisted of the Active, Inactive, and Honorary Reserves. Personnel in the Active Reserve participated in prescribed minimum training and were broken down into two parts: Organized and Volunteer Reserves.

Organized Reserve personnel were assigned to ORC Troop Program units or had received mobilization designations. Volunteer reserves had not been so assigned.

Five groups made up the Inactive Reserve. The first consisted of those men qualified for the ORC, but unable to participate in training, as well as those men who had requested inactive status pending utilization in the event of mobilization or an emergency. The second group consisted of men transferred from the Active Reserve as overage-in-grade. Group three was made up of men who refused or failed to meet training requirements of the Active Reserve. Group four consisted of men with physical defects, remediable within one year. Group five was made up of enlisted personnel retired with over twenty but less than thirty years service.

In general, the same requirements held for ORC units as those imposed for active or Regular Army duty. Reserve officers were being called to duty in the rank they held in ORC.

Reserve Officers

A new category was created for Reserve officers under the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950. This new category was for officers ordered to extended active duty. Non-regular officers on active duty under Category I might apply for a new category III provided age-in-grade requirements were met, but even if those requirements were not met, the men could be retained by major commanders if desired. Such personnel were placed in Category V with an indefinite expiration date.[69]

The WAC and CIC

With the assignment of four WAC officers to the CIC Center to attend school in 1946, the Counter Intelligence Corps opened its door to members of the Women's Army Corps.[70] This group was followed by a group of eleven early in 1947, at which time a letter was sent to all major commands notifying them of the availability of such personnel.[71] Other groups of varying size also were taken into CIC at intervals. In 1949 a WAC detachment was assigned to the Center to assist in CIC administration.[72]

Negro Agents

The subject of the utilization of colored agents in CIC came up for special consideration at intervals beginning as early as 1944. In some areas, the use of Negro agents was a necessity for undercover operations, and those areas made consistent demands for an increase in such personnel. The Caribbean Defense Command desperately needed such agents and relied on local procurement methods.[73]

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69 1950 Detachment Commanders' Conference (Confidential) Staff and Faculty Library).

70 Ltr from Col L.R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Security Group, to all Major Theaters and Commands, dtd 18 Feb 47 (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

71 Ltr to all Service Commands, MDW, TC, dtd 5 Apr 46 /s/ Col J.M. Roamer, GSC, Director of Intelligence (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

72 1950 Detachment Commanders' Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

73 Ltr from Hq Caribbean Defense Command to TAG, dtd 13 Dec 44 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

On the other hand, detachments in the ETO found so little use for Negro agents even among colored troops that one commander sought permission to return six agents to the United States in the interest of more efficient use.[74]

The shortage of Negro personnel within detachments available for undercover assignment was presented by the commanders at the 1950 conference as a problem. Assurances that such personnel would be procured were forthcoming. The commander of the 113th CIC Detachment, Lt Col John R. Longshore, pointed out that since such personnel was used in large part for undercover work, additional training at the school would be desirable to eliminate authoritative attitudes that often compromised operations. The school acceded to the request for additional instruction, but added that the training period would have to be lengthened.

Marriage of CIC Agents and Foreign Nationals

The 1950 Conference was given the reasons for the drafting and promulgation of the famous and unpopular "Marriage Letter" of 23 March.

The basic purpose, of course, was to reduce the potential security hazard. Many agents had married foreign nationals by 1950, and although stringent enforcement meant the loss of key agents, many of whom had vitally-needed language qualifications, the letter was felt a necessity for overall security. Exceptions could not be countenanced.

The letter provided that an agent who married prior to 1 June 1950 while an agent in the Corps could retain CIC status if transferred from a country to which the spouse was indigenous. Future assignments to that area were prohibited. Marriages after 1 June 1950 to foreign nationals voided previously granted security clearances and retention in the Corps was contingent on waiver from the Chief, CIC. The policy was deemed fair, for personnel taking such a step would be aware of the consequences.[75]

Sponsored CIC Reserve Units

The sponsoring of CIC units in the voluntary reserve force by civilian businesses and industries was urged in 1947 by General Keyser, Chief, CIC. It was

74 Incoming Classified Message, Hq Comm Zone, ETO, US Army Paris, France, for Bissell /s/ Eisenhower, E 70504, 4 Dec 44 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center) and paraphrase of WD Classified (Secret) Message Center Incoming Classified Message, dtd 8 Aug 44, for Bissell /s/ Wilson and paraphrase of WD Classified Message Center Incoming Classified (Secret) Message from CG, AF HQ, Caserta, Italy, 23 Oct 44 (Kansas City Records Center).

75 1950 Detachment Commanders' Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

felt that by arousing the interest of civilian concerns in the program, good will would be promoted and benefits for Reservists obtained.[76]

The program contemplated organization within the framework of a specific concern of a reserve outfit for employees. For example, at a hospital a reserve hospital unit would be organized. With a telephone company, a signal outfit would be organized. With regard to CIC, it was thought that police departments, better business bureau investigative sections, and protective services might form Reserve CIC detachments.

An obvious drawback to the program from a company point of view was that in event of emergency, many employees would be lost at one time. On the other hand, reserve training could produce actual profit to the concern involved and rapport of the employee group was promoted. Cooperating concerns generally allowed employees who participated in the reserve to have time off for summer training which was not counted as against vacation allowances.

76 Memo from George V. Keyser, Brig Gen, USA, Chief, CIC, to Director of Intelligence, 29 Aug 47 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

Chapter 3

PLANNING

The Planning and Control Division was activated on 31 January 1946 by a Special Order of Headquarters, CIC Center. Three officers were assigned to the Division: Lt Col George R. Eckman, Maj Matthew R. J. Guiffre, and Maj Paul T. Wilson. The Division was redesignated as the Planning and Liaison Division on 12 July 1946.

Mission

The mission of the Division was largely one of assistance to the Commanding Officer of the CIC Center. Specifically, the group was to act as an advisory body to the Commander of the CIC Center on plans for future needs at the Center; determine whether maximum use was being made of existing facilities; collect data for presentation of plans and studies requested; maintain liaison with other comparable civilian and service schools; conduct inspections as directed by the Commanding Officer; and accomplish such surveys as were necessary to perform other phases of the mission.

Consolidation Studies at the Center

A survey was run by the Division in 1946 with an eye to reducing the number of housekeeping personnel at the Center. Increasing individual duties and consolidating jobs allowed considerable reductions. A study was run concurrently on possible relocation of the Center and/or a consolidation of housekeeping activities. As a result of this latter study, mess and billeting facilities were centralized and the extreme physical dispersal of training facilities eliminated.[77]

Relocation of the CIC Center

As the importance of CIC's postwar mission became more and more apparent, the inadequacy of physical facilities for the Center at the Holabird Signal Depot began to raise operational and administrative problems. Overcrowding, interference caused by Second Army and Signal Corps personnel on the post, and inadequate classroom and housing facilities led to consideration of relocation of the Center in 1946.

Facilities at Fort George G. Meade were examined but found undesirable because the size of the installation was greater than that needed for CIC, and classroom and dependent housing was less adequate than at Holabird. Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, was inspected, found generally desirable and

77 Annual Report of Activities, Planning and Liaison Division, 1946 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

recommended as a site for relocation. The recommendation submitted for the move did not receive favorable action, however. One important reason was probably the great distance between the Center and Washington, D.C.[78]

TO&E 30-500

The Director of Intelligence in 1946 requested the Center to continue its study of possible changes in TO&E 30-500. He suggested that the study include recommendations regarding personnel and equipment from individual theaters; current needs for grades and ratings; and general provisions for an overall theater unit. At the same time, the Director requested that recapitulation of CIC needs on the basis of a 4.5 million-man Army for emergency mobilization be considered. He recommended that the study embody a number of points.

Among these points was the fact that the study considered only detachments for Ground Force units, and that a merger of SIC under CIC was contemplated, with maximum SIC strength set at 800 and minimum at 600. This merger plan was not to affect detachments with AGF units or strategic striking units within the Zone of Interior. No study of equipment was to be included in the recommendations and "Theater" would be the highest level considered by the study.

The plan was also to urge unit allotments of CIC, at strength of about 2,500 men, as the troop basis for each major theater. It was desired that an operating team of between eleven and fifteen men be placed with the War Department. It was also deemed necessary to include the information that activities in the China theater were increasing, and that while occupational jobs were continuing, the emergency Army would only be required for offensive or defensive actions in a new area. It was to be further recommended that Manhattan Engineering District, Transportation Corps, and Army Air Force CIC units continue operations on a separate troop basis, and that in determining an authorized troop basis, reference be made to the compilation report of CIC strengths world-wide. The recapitulation was to show total Army units organized or planned for an emergency, and personnel were to be broken down into organizations which would supply the personnel needed, including Regular Army, Organized Reserve, AUS, and National Guard. Only total units were to be shown under the first breakdown.

The data requested by the Director of Intelligence was forwarded for his approval one month later.

Proposed changes to TO&E 30-500 retained cellular features but stepped up enlisted and commissioned grades. The recommended number of personnel

78 Report of Inspection of Fort Francis E. Warren, 21 Aug 46 (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

remained generally the same, and the major equipment changes dealt mainly with weapons and armament.[79]

Strength Figures Recommended

During this same period in 1946, Colonel Forney called the attention of the Director of Intelligence to the fact that no provision had been made for CIC in the listed requirements of the Interim Army. He suggested that CIC be provided a total of 5,925 personnel world-wide, breaking down into 1,860 officers, 991 warrant officers, and 3,074 enlisted men. Attention was further directed to the fact that with reductions in occupational forces, there should be a corresponding percentage increase in the coverage of CIC personnel.[80]

CIC and SIC Consolidation

Security and Intelligence Corps personnel were transferred to CIC by authority of WD Circular 108 on 13 April 1946. This removed all traces of the decentralization of CIC occasioned by the Inspector General's report accepted on 1 January 1944. It will be recalled that this report had far-reaching effects on the Zone of Interior function of CIC. A complete analysis of this problem may be found in the chapter covering the years 1940-45.

Practically speaking, the organizations had been merged in August 1945, when the Security and Intelligence Corps was released from control of the Provost Marshal General to control of the Director of Intelligence. From 1945, CIC and SIC had uniform policies and regulations and SIC agents were trained through Fort Holabird.[81]

FBI Courses Studied

The Planning and Liaison Division in July 1946 recommended adoption by the Center of evidence preservation and handling techniques employed by the FBI. Since the facilities of the FBI Laboratory were available to CIC, the Division advised against creation of a laboratory at the Center, but suggested additional technical training that could be offered on an extracurricular basis as funds for the purchase of equipment became available.[82]

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79 Memorandum from Director of Intelligence, dtd 20 Mar 46 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

80 Memorandum to Director of Intelligence from Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Security Chief, undated (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

81 Memorandum dtd 11 Mar 46 to the AC of S, G2, from the Director of Intelligence (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

82 Annual Report of Activities, Planning and Liaison Division, 1946 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

Need for Linguists

Occupation duty further emphasized the always present need of CIC for competent linguists. Colonel Forney in a letter in April 1947 suggested that all Regular Army officers with any talent in foreign languages be given a chance to qualify for language training as a part of career management. With distracting foresight, Colonel Forney expressly mentioned "the need for Korean language instruction."[83]

AFPAC Recommendations Studied

Early in 1947, the Planning and Liaison Division considered recommendations contained in a study made by the AFPAC CIC Committee. Comments by CIC and G2 officers were collected and compiled for the Chief, CIC.

The study recommended that the administration of detachments continue to be the responsibility of the detachment commander. Lt Colonel E. R. Mitchell, Acting Chief of the CIC Branch Security Group, concurred. Lt Colonel Mitchell also agreed with the Committee opinion that transfers in and out of CIC, promotions, redeployment, and temporary duty should be handled by the commanding general of the forces concerned and that transfer within a theater should be made through the commander of the theater concerned. He added that the Committee opinion neglected to mention that transfers in and out of CIC had to be approved by the Director of Intelligence.

Where the AFPAC group felt CIC detachments should advise commanders with regard to CIC employment and policy, Lt Colonel Mitchell made it clear that this could only be accomplished through persistent liaison efforts and effective education of the staff concerned.

A suggestion of the Committee with regard to issuance and control of credentials was already in effect when the Division studied the recommendations. A plan whereby linguists would be substituted for agents in TO&E 30-500 was not well-received by CIC. The general feeling within the Corps was that this would result in a lowering of caliber and efficiency within CIC and that the problem would best be solved through extensive linguistic training for agents or the attachment of qualified personnel for specific missions.

General assent was expressed to the Committee proposition that CIC's TO&E should be changed to authorize housekeeping personnel where detachments operated independently of tactical units, but the integration of CIC as part of tactical commands brought sharp protests. Lt Colonel Mitchell voiced the consensus when he

83 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Security Group, to Chief, Training Group, dtd 3 Apr 47, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

pointed out that this would relegate CIC personnel to any duty assigned by the commanding officer and perhaps defeat the true mission of the Corps.

Two- and three-year enlistments for direct assignment to CIC were suggested by the Committee, but again this had been accomplished prior to receipt of the report.

The Committee's proposal that CIC applicants be required to have basic training in an arm or the Military Police Corps was considered as unwise in CIC circles on the theory that it would cause otherwise well-qualified men to be lost to the Corps. Suggested additions to the Center school curriculum were put aside of necessity, since serious thought was being given at this time to cutting the course from fourteen weeks to eight.[84]

Proposal to Organize an Autonomous CIC Group

Lt Col C. E. Leydecker, Chief of the CIC Branch, proposed in March 1947 a plan for an autonomous CIC group to be utilized by the War Department. Such a plan had been verbally requested by the Chief, Security Group.

The plan proposed the selection of an elite group from the world-wide CIC organization. Personnel selected were to be returned to the Center for intensive specialized training and then dispersed to theater level in detachments under tight ultimate control by the Director of Intelligence.

Language training was to be emphasized and qualifications demanded at least one year of operational experience and superior efficiency ratings, with a Regular Army background preferred.

Centralized control by the Director of Intelligence was to be effected by submission of all reports direct to the Intelligence Division and restriction of activity to policies defined by that Group.[85] The plan was not implemented, and was abandoned in 1948 in favor of an advanced course plan.

Permanent CIC Considered

Col Harry H. Mole, heading a Board of Officers appointed by the Security Group, in January 1947 recommended that CIC be constituted a permanent branch

84 Study of Recommendations of CIC Committee AFPAC, 18 Dec 46 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

85 Memorandum dtd 21 Mar 47 to Planning Section, CIC Branch, from Chief, CIC BSG (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

of the Regular Army. Col Mole pointed to the long and effective period of service of the Corps and urged the obvious vigilance advantages of making it a permanent establishment.[86]

In rejecting the plan, Col Forney cited the development restriction that would be imposed upon officers of such a permanent Corps by the necessarily narrow range of duties. He felt that eventual solution to the permanency problem lay in the creation of a Military Intelligence Corps of which CIC would be only one element.[87]

Internal Improvement of the Corps

General Keyser, Chief, CIC, invited all commands to submit suggestions for improvement of the Corps. Recommendations were summarized in a letter to the commanding generals of various commands in July 1947.

Most recommendations turned on the procurement, caliber, training and use of personnel. Three commands felt that recruitment efforts should be directed at specialized personnel, suited for some facet of CIC employment by previous training. It was submitted that proper publicity and screening by CIC personnel prior to acceptance would act as material aids to accomplishment. Four commands suggested stricter application of current authority for screening out misfits in the Corps as an immediate means for improvement, while eight commands decried the quality of clerical personnel and asked immediate action on this problem from the Center.

Two commands felt a permanent Corps of officers would allow CIC to achieve more professional performance and eight replies listed career management programs for all personnel as essential. At least three commanders felt authority to hold personnel in overseas areas for longer periods was necessary, while eleven commanders described agent training at the Center as inadequate. Four in this latter group felt the proper solution of the problem lay, however, in on-the-job training and refresher courses.

Miscellaneous suggestions included publication of a periodical within the Corps for development of "esprit" and consolidation of all policy directives into a simple, portable volume.[88]

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86 Board Report, "Staff Study on Establishment of a CIC" is attached as Appendix 1.

87 Memorandum for the Director of Intelligence, 1 Feb 47, signed Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Security Group (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

88 Ltr from Brig Gen George V. Keyser, Chief, CIC, to all Commands, dtd 7 Jul 47, and replies (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

1949 Detachment Commander's Conference

Brig Gen John K. Rice, Chief, CIC, speaking at the Detachment Commander's Conference in 1949, voiced the feeling that the time had come to "learn the lessons from the mistakes" that had been made in the last ten years. He felt that many categories of responsibility required immediate attention.

General Rice felt that lessons learned should aid in determination of the degree of centralization or decentralization of CIC control necessary in given conditions; the proper relationship to be developed between G2's, CI officers, and CIC Detachment commanders; and the definition and relationship between positive intelligence and counterintelligence. He added that lessons learned might well be utilized to draft a flexible plan for the handling of confidential funds and informants.

Turning to the matter of a central file facility, General Rice pointed out the possible loss of valuable foreign files in the event of rapid changes in the international situation. The obvious advantages to be gained by central collection of the files extended beyond insurance against possible loss, however. In a single location, the files would allow far more efficient and thorough usage by a larger number of units, and a substantial monetary saving could be effected by having a single staff in custody.

A new table of allowances for CIC expendable supplies was approved in 1949 and provided additional stationery and fingerprint equipment and iodine fumers. At the same time, a letter clarifying TM 30-215 was distributed by G2, Department of Army, covering allowances for special types of clothing needed by agents in the field. The letter was explicit in stating that agents should not be "penalized financially for complying with requirements for civilian clothing." Prior to this time, G2's had been extremely reluctant in supplying funds over the initial allowance for purchase of evening or work clothes.

Government economy was expected from a revision upward of mileage allowances for privately owned vehicles. The need for government cars was expected to decrease when agents were authorized seven instead of three cents a mile, with an additional two cents authorized from intelligence funds.

Vehicle allowances in 1949 provided one vehicle for every two operating agents, and the vehicle was specified as a sedan or personnel carrier except with division type teams where a jeep was provided. When additional vehicles were found necessary, the only possibility for procurement was from the theater or Army administrative allowance.[89]

89 Rpt of 1949 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Physical Changes at the Center

Many changes in housing both for CIC facilities and personnel were made in 1949. Storage sheds were converted into classrooms and a service club, and relief from private housing problems was in sight after completion of plans to build a Federal Housing Project, later to become Cummins Apartments.

In July the Center was informed of a 20 percent cut in its funds, but two additional civilian spaces were allotted. Reorganization of the Center was undertaken to cut down on six civilian spaces by increasing individual's workloads, but a request for a band was refused.

During the year, G2, Department of Army, established a Central Personality Index (later Central Records Facility) and the Center began to organize a Central CIC File. Eventual merger of the two files was contemplated after both were well established.

An SOP on methods of shipment for undercover personnel was drafted in 1949 and distributed to all commands concerned. Arrangements to supply polygraphs and experienced operators to Europe and the Far East were made and it was recommended that civilian vehicles be used by theater and Army CIC teams while division and corps teams retained jeeps. Plans for an Advanced Training Course for senior CIC officers went forward and the school adopted the theory that technical subjects in the basic course should accomplish an orientation and familiarization mission rather than a real training mission.

The feasibility of closing the school at the Center for two months a year because of an overstrength in all detachments was given consideration and abortive attempts were made by the Center for permission to establish its own CIC Extension Courses.

Completion of a driver training course was made a mandatory requirement to CIC assignment and work was begun on a course for qualification in all basic CIC weapons.

Five detachments were deactivated in the course of the year and the Corps was authorized production of three training films for use in the basic course.[90]

Readiness at Camp Holabird

On 29 January 1949, the Chief, CIC, sent to the Director of Intelligence a report on "The State of Readiness at Camp Holabird."

90 Monthly Status Rpt, CIC Center, 1949 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

The Chief pointed out, first of all, that mobilization planning was hampered by a lack of definite authority for allocation of housing and facilities at Camp Holabird in the event of mobilization. The Signal Depot had indicated its own need for facilities being used by CIC, in fact, and proper planning was not possible without determination of available facilities. The selection of alternate facilities had not been made, although an estimate of minimum and maximum requirements had been forwarded to Second Army.

The basic course of study provided at the Center could be condensed from twelve to eight weeks upon mobilization, the memorandum stated. Lack of technical equipment and training aids held readiness at 81 percent satisfactory, 16 percent inadequate, and three percent deficient for the basic course. The two-week refresher course designed for personnel with CIC experience in the event of mobilization, was rated 21 percent inadequate and three percent deficient. An area orientation course, covering the Mediterranean and Middle East, designed for persons completing either the basic or refresher course, had a readiness rating of 45 percent satisfactory and 55 percent deficient, because of a lack of lesson plans, training aids and student texts.

Classroom facilities were such that a total accommodation of 600 students for all three courses could be effected, and rehabilitation of mess facilities would allow a total capacity of 3,900 men, with a wartime emergency capacity of 4,900. Cots and mattresses were available for 3,000 troops, and there was a ten percent standby overage of office equipment. Medical support by a dispensary at Holabird and hospitalization at Fort Meade could meet total mobilization requirements, if service to dependents were discontinued.

Draft requests for necessary funding in the event of mobilization were completed, and other planning and guidance instructions from higher echelons were considered adequate.

A total of 46 percent of the instructors required for the CIC School were on duty at Holabird in 1949. An additional 31 percent had been earmarked for assignment, leaving a 23 percent deficiency in the total requirement.

G4 Activities in 1950

The G4 section at the Center during 1950 was faced with several supply problems unique to CIC.

An all-important task early in the year was to obtain favorable construction and interpretation of a Department of the Army regulation which threatened to compromise undercover CIC operations. The regulation provided, in part, that serviceable equipment could not be replaced "merely for the sake of appearance" by commercial counterparts. Literally, this meant that CIC would be forced to

use equipment clearly marked as government property and identifying the users as Army personnel. In many instances, this would prevent agents from concealing their identity. At the request of the G4, Department of the Army announced that the objectionable paragraph would not apply to CIC insofar as it would interfere with covert activities contemplated as a part of the assigned mission of the Corps.[91]

Training of agents in elements of port security was facilitated by G4 efforts in obtaining a reconditioned T-boat from the Office of the Chief of Transportation, for CIC use. Concealment difficulties with the four-inch barrelled revolver led to G4's replacement of the weapon by one with a two-inch barrel.[92] An information and guidance booklet for use by detachment supply officers was compiled and distributed by G4 in 1950, and action was initiated to obtain new badges and credential cards approved for replacement distribution.

At the end of the year, G4 reported that the Cummins Apartment project, designed for dependent housing at Fort Holabird, was over eighty percent completed.[93]

G3 During 1950

The formulation and implementation of plans for world-wide mobilization took a good part of G3's time in 1950. Training and supervision of CIC Organized Reserve organizations provided another task of major proportions since the closest cooperation and coordination with Army Field Forces was required to prevent conflict of plans and policies.

Miscellaneous activities included a review of the Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms and Joint Usage to determine inclusion and definition of words of CIC interest, the processing of requests for constructive credits in lieu of attendance at the CIC School, studies of mobilization plans of Army branches and the Army training program, the drafting of Army and Special Regulations of CIC interest, compilation and maintenance of all active detachment histories, and the coordination of CIC School activities.[94]

Liaison

A CIC liaison officer was placed in the Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces on 3 April 1950. His dual duty consisted of keeping both CIC and the Field Force

91 Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, April 1950 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).
92 Ibid, July
93 Ibid, December
94 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center 1950 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library) and 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference Report (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chief informed on matters and activities of mutual interest. The officer was also charged with the duty of observing CIC participation in field maneuvers and planning for such participation.[95]

Security Control Division

The clearance of CIC personnel continued throughout 1950 as a major function of the Security Control Division of G2 at the Center. A survey conducted at the request of G1 covered a six-month period and disclosed completion of over 200 such clearance investigations.

Extensive microfilming programs were undertaken by the Division in 1950. Films from Korea were received and indexed. Teams were formed to study and be instructed in the microfilm indexing system utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency. A four-week course of instruction for microfilming was given, and a Standard Operating Procedure for G2 microfilming was drafted.

In June, a basic tabulating plant was acquired by the Division for use in G2 and G3 functions. Training of operators was conducted by representatives of the Remington Rand Company after clearance by the Division was given all candidates for instruction.

Finally, plans were completed by the Division for the recall of old credentials and the issuance of new credentials of an improved design. The process was to be managed through terms of a comprehensive operating procedure.[96]

"The Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment"

Maj Jack B. Cameron, OO&T, set out for the 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference the reasons behind drafting, and the general content of the proposed manual, "The CIC Detachment." The manual was to be composed, in large part, of recommendations and suggestions coming into OO&T from the field. The manual dealt with most phases of detachment organization and operation, and considerable value at field level was anticipated.[97]

New Facilities for Camp Holabird

Contingent upon approval by the Commanding General, Second Army, considerable improvements at Camp Holabird were scheduled for 1950. Allocations

95 Detachment Commander's Conference 1950, (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

96 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center, 1950 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

97 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

included $40,000 for a library; $41,000 for an athletic field; and $6,857 for furnishing the Service Club and Hobby Shop. Plans were made for a swimming pool if funds were allocated by the Department of Army.[98]

The Public Relations Problem

The Chief of CIC, Maj Gen John K. Rice, in his address to the 1950 Conference, stressed the two-fold orientation mission incumbent on the CIC officer corps.

The first part of that task, he said, was acquainting the Army itself with the abilities, needs and mission of CIC. To illustrate his point, he cited the small-scale public relations program he was personally directing, which involved devotion of one day a month to contacting Pentagon officials for as thorough an orientation regarding CIC as he could manage. He suggested that all commanders endeavor to establish favorable liaison contacts with an eye to such orientation.

General Rice defined the second phase of the orientation mission as one involving efforts directed at attracting volunteers to CIC of the caliber and abilities most desired. He pointed out that no one could volunteer for something he didn't know about, and that carefully directed word-of-mouth publicity was best suited to CIC's purpose.

The Chief closed his address with the expressed hope that the Advance Officers Course, initiated at the Center in May 1950, would produce officers for CIC capable of inspiring the confidence necessary to carry out an effective public relations program at high command echelons. He felt that G2s with confidence in the ability of CIC officers and commanders would be far more willing to listen to the ideas and recommendations offered to them. In such a manner, CIC could better discharge its function of command assistance in security and counterintelligence matters.[99]

Public Information

The Center's public information section in 1948 obtained approval of several articles on "Army Life at Camp Holabird," for publication in Baltimore papers. Copy for the magazine Armed Forces Talk was submitted by the section for Department of Army approval, and a publicity campaign directed at clarifying the opportunities for enlistment and reenlistment in CIC was tentatively mapped. The section kept current the History of Camp Holabird and arranged for representation of the Camp in the 1948 Army Day Parade.[100]

98 Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, March 1950, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

99 1950 Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

100 Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, July 1948 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

The CIC Board

Created under special authorization in March 1947, the CIC Board was first charged with the development and coordination of special investigative equipment and techniques, the operation of the Personnel Evaluation Panel and the dissemination of matters of general CIC interest. Various activities which had been performed by other sections were gradually added to the Board's program.

The development and testing function was carried out in cooperation with the Technical Laboratory of the Department of Operations at the CIC School, as well as with other arms, services and agencies.

The Technical Projects Index was published as an informational service by the Board for field units, to keep them informed on testing and development activities.

The Personnel Evaluation Panel, although created before the Board, was put under the Board for the convenience of the Chief, CIC. The long-range aim of the Panel was the gradual upgrading and refinement of CIC personnel through firm entrance controls. The Panel operated in six major areas: screening of personnel reporting to the Center for initial entry to CIC; screening of applications from military personnel for transfer into CIC; screening of applications for transfer to MI, USAR (CIC specialization); determination of constructive credit for CIC school courses; review of derogatory information cases referred to the Panel by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff, or the Chief, CIC; and sitting as a board of officers to examine qualifications for retention in CIC for all personnel.

A study was undertaken by the CIC Board in 1948 to provide a basis for formulation of competitive examinations to be given for the position of a Regular Army Warrant Officer having the classification of Warrant Officer (CIC). The testing plan was eventually accepted by the Intelligence Division.

The first CIC Digest was published in July 1948. The publication was originally suggested by the CIC Board as a means of developing esprit and facilitating an interchange of operational data. The Digest was scheduled for monthly publication and was expected to satisfy "request for information" mail.[101]

In November 1948, in Building 23-12 at the CIC Center, a display of documents, photographs and other materials of operational or historical interest was opened. This display area was the culmination of efforts by the CIC Board to establish a Trophy Hall or CIC museum.[102]

101 Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, July 1948 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

102 Ibid, November

Miscellaneous Work of the CIC Board

As technical projects were completed by the CIC Board, a writeup of the project was entered in the Technical Projects Book. Many entries were made in 1949.

The Audograph recording and reproducing device was approved and distributed for field tests. Sent for similar testing were Brush VM-1 Vibromikes, printed circuit hearing aids, and a small sound pickup device called "Hearsay." Most of these products were improvements over equipment in stock, adopted because of increased efficiency and economy.

A request of the Ordnance Technical Committee for standardization of the Colt .380 automatic pistol for CIC and Military Police Corps use was rejected when Colt halted manufacture of the weapon. The .38 caliber Detective Special was selected as the standard weapon for CIC and MPC.

The Apeco copier was adopted by the Board, since it was cheaper than a photostat machine, was portable, and did not require an experienced operator. Also approved was the Fairchild Copy Roll, which reproduced documents and photographs simply and quickly. The Visual Cast, a daylight projector for use in classroom instruction, was adopted for training use by various sections.

A 75-exposure wrist camera, magazine loaded, with a device that transported the film each time the trigger was tipped, was adopted for CIC use. Tests were run on the feasability of using a telephone dial click counter; eventually it was adopted. The use of the Sniperscope for CIC surveillance and investigation was also examined at this same time.

The Board discharged the task of formulating a new diploma for the school, eliminating any security hazard in later use in a sensitive position.

It was recommended by the Board that the Signal Corps produce a short movie for Army-wide distribution showing the organization and function of CIC. In this same public relations vein, articles were disseminated by the Board for publication in Service periodicals and journals. A technical manual was developed to standard maintenance of detachment files, and a study of the British counterintelligence organization was undertaken to "borrow" from that group methods which CIC might utilize. Other studies of the Board were directed at reducing the incidence of loss of credentials and making the Corps a branch of the Regular Army.[103]

Lt Col Wayne Homan, Director of the CIC Board, informed the 1949 Conference that the Board had initiated action to comply with the Joint Chiefs' of Staff request

103 Monthly Status Reports, 1949 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

that a consolidated CIC file be created. When completed, it would be invaluable for CIC reference and investigation. Extensive microfilming would be involved. He also announced that a pocket-size tape recorder had been perfected and would soon be available for distribution from the Center.[104]

Early in 1950, the first four CIC officers trained in the use of the polygraph at the Keeler Institute in Chicago, began utilizing their training in CIC investigations. Two were sent, with polygraph machines, to FECOM, one to EUCOM, and one to the CIC Center, Fort Holabird.

The Planning Division at the CIC Center had begun studying the possible use of the polygraph in CIC investigations in 1946. Information on the use of the polygraph was obtained from several manufactureres and universities, and various authorities were interviewed concerning its value to CIC. At that time it was planned to send two officers to the Keeler Institute for training, following which the machines would be subjected to a six-month test at the Center. However, although the plan was brought up for consideration upon several occasions, no concrete action was taken until the four officers mentioned above were sent to the Institute in 1949.[105]

During 1950, steps were taken by the Board to create a standard form covering issuance of civilian clothing to CIC enlisted agents. It was anticipated that the forms would remain in a central file at the Center. Staff studies were initiated by the Board relative to personnel procurement and the curriculum at the Center School.

Two microfilming units were tested and ordered for field experiment. Photographic equipment tested and approved by the Board in 1950 included a close focus device, an improved tripod, two telephoto-type cameras, a telephoto lens fitting all 35mm cameras used by CIC, a quick process developer, and a concealed camera device with a wide-angle lens, capable of 24-hour operation.

The orientation booklet for personnel being sent to Japan was revised, and hundreds of pieces of equipment were rejected after testing.

Two briefcase-size radio transmitters were distributed for testing by the Board, and a portable and concealed ultraviolet lamp was adopted for CIC use. Many telephone listening devices were adopted. One recorded the number and phone number of outgoing calls; another device, concealable in the phone base,

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104 1949 Detachment Commander's Conference, (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

105 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center, 1946 and 1950 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library); also, interview with Maj T. E. Witkowski, one of the original four officers, at Fort Holabird, 11 Oct 55.

could channel conversations to either a receiver or recorder; perhaps most remarkable, was a "tap" device designed by M/Sgt Edison M. Cesar, which could be built at the cost of $.29 per unit.

A lock neutralizing device was purchased from the H. C. Miller Co. The Miller Co also submitted for testing a lock that it claimed was tamper proof. An improved telescope was ordered from a Japanese firm, and the Dormiphone, a device which gave language instruction while the student slept, was considered for use by the School.

Close liaison with the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, produced valuable results in 1950. An 8mm projector, a rapid color development process, and a new technique for infrared photography all came from that source.[106]

106 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center 1950 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 4

OPERATIONS

A letter sent to Col J. M. Roamer, GSC, Director of Intelligence, by Lt Col C. E. Leydecker, Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps Branch Office, dated 1 May 1946, set out current CIC operational problems.

After briefly outlining the CIC organizational setup as of that time, Colonel Leydecker moved on to the difficulties CIC was incurring in a static situation. Primary among these troubles was the failure of any attempt to restrict the CIC mission to its defined assignment. The problem was presented through illustration.

In the European theater it was felt that there was no specific understanding of CIC's mission. The 303rd had as its principal task many thousand Jewish infiltration investigations. The 970th was handling criminal cases and the screening of civilians invited to attend social functions. Other non-CIC work being performed in the MTO consisted of screening repatriated personnel, emmigrants, and foreign nationals, as well as procurement of war crime witnesses.

In the Pacific theater, the biggest non-CIC headache facing detachments was the required submission of a weekly domestic intelligence summary. This required the full-time services of three agents in each detachment, and covered everything from reports on school books to the number of feet of fire hose in a local station house. War crime investigations imposed another burden, as did the screening of Japanese officials and educators. Investigation of black market activity, searches for narcotics and liquor, and enforcement of SCAP directives provided further complications.

All theaters faced an insurmountable personnel shortage. This shortage included a lack of linguistic personnel and clerical help.

Relative to the shortage of agent personnel, the Commanding General of the Mediterranean area said, "...for more than three years...there has not been sufficient personnel available at any time to permit attacking the CIC problem in all its various aspects..." The General Board, USFET, reported that shortages "...resulted in an increasingly larger territory of responsibility for the individual agent...often far in excess of his physical capacity."

The shortage of clerical personnel resulted in the placement of agents as typists within detachments to discharge required paper tasks, and the lack of qualified linguists within the Corps presented a continual operational problem that could not be overcome by use of civilian and military intelligence interpreters because of inherent security hazards.

Colonel Leydecker touched briefly on the "...general lack of commensurate rank in proportion to the importance of the work performed by individual agents." He felt this had been partially remedied by promotion to warrant officer of about 20 percent of CIC's enlisted men, but additional study was necessary to determine further action on readjustment of rank based on performance.

Hand in hand with the personnel shortage went the fact that the CIC theater troop basis had been cut 50 percent, and the replacement pool had been reduced to a puddle. It appeared that agent qualifications would drop as a result, for spaces had to be filled. The problem of performing an expanded mission with green replacements below the standards of experienced personnel was obvious.[107]

CIC Duties in the Zone of Interior

General Devers, writing to the commanding generals of the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, in April 1946, outlined the duties of CIC with Army Ground Forces in the ZI.

Primarily, CIC was to investigate and prepare reports on personnel and incidents within the investigative jurisdiction of the unit to which agents were assigned. This included the investigation of military and civilian personnel assigned or attached to AGF units, suspected of disaffection, subversive activity, espionage, sabotage, treason, or sedition, as well as incidents in which security violations were suspected or apparent. CIC was charged, too, with maintaining security of classified information, military installations and offices, and movement of troops and materiel. In addition, CIC was to deliver security lectures to troops and participate to some extent in the training program of the parent unit.

Finally, CIC was admonished to afford full cooperation to Service Command investigative activities, and to "perform such other duties as command authority shall determine to be within the CIC mission..."

Jurisdiction of CIC with Army Ground Forces was sharply defined. It meant, "...the unit itself together with such area or buildings as the unit occupies." If leads developed during investigation lead outside this defined area, the Service Force or Command involved would either take over the case or authorize further work by the AGF unit.[108]

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107 Ltr from Lt Col C. E. Leydecker, Chief CIC Branch, to Col J. M. Roamer, DI, 1 May 46, (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

108 Ltr from Gen Jacob Devers to CGs, First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, dtd 5 Apr 46, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

Processing Policy

Personnel cutbacks and readjustments effective on 1 July 1947, led the Adjutant General to direct the CIC to set up new investigation priorities.

Cases in which there was a suspicion of treason, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or disaffection were to be assigned "Priority I." In justifying this declaration, the Adjutant General explained, "It appears that a vigorous and positive program of identifying potential subversives is needed."

All background investigations to determine loyalty and fitness fell into "Priority II." Within this category however, were several sub-priorities. They were, in order: CIC personnel; cryptographic and cryptanalytic personnel; personnel with access to atomic energy data; persons with access to TOP SECRET and SECRET data; Regular Army officers; investigation of plants handling classified contracts; investigation of persons in the plants mentioned just above who had substantial access to TOP SECRET and SECRET data; clearance of civilian personnel recruited for overseas duty; Army alien personnel; aliens in any plant handling classified contracts who had access to any classified data; and interrogation of war crimes witnesses.

The Adjutant General explained that the subcatergorization was based largely on the element of timeliness. He pointed out that it was taking three and one half months to clear CIC personnel, and that the delay created serious problems. He predicted that the load of atomic clearances would increase, and added that delay in investigation of plants handling classified material could cause the government embarrassment.

Although impending personnel cutbacks were the motivation of the priority directive, the Adjutant General queried all commands on personnel requirements to keep investigation up to date.[109] Typical of replies from the field, First Army answered that seventy-four investigators and office aids, additional funds, and more vehicles would be needed to handle the current case load expeditiously.[110]

In reply to these personnel requests, the Manpower Board, on 22 July 1947, wrote that since TOE were not being fully utilized because of current understrength of the Army, additional authorization was not needed to meet military space requests. With regard to civilians, it was explained that all available spaces had been allocated to field agencies according to priority needs. Although the total number failed to meet minimum civilian spaces desired, no immediate relief was in sight.

109 TAG Ltr, dtd 2 Jun 47 to all Armies and MDW (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

110 1st Ind, First Army, Governors Island, N.Y. to TAG Ltr dtd 2 Jun 47, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

Even though adjustments in personnel accounting under the Appropriations Act might make additional spaces available, it was intended that these spaces be distributed in conformity with policy so that such space allotments to agencies should not be carmarked for specific activities or programs. The Manpower Board added, however, that the War Department could issue guidance to agencies relative to priority to be attached to CIC.[111]

The Mission and CIC

A suggestion by General Keyser, Chief, CIC, in late 1947 raised questions as to the true mission of CIC. General Keyser suggested assignment of limited numbers of CIC agents to advisory groups, military missions, and similar organizations in order to counter operations of foreign powers. Colonel Forney, Chief, Security Group, admitted merits of the plan, but suggested that such activity was outside the investigative purview of the CIC mission.

A writer, identified only by the initials "R. D. L.", appended further comments to the suggestion. It was the writer's feeling that CIC had never confined itself to a strictly investigative mission, even though the War Department statement of CIC's mission indicated such limits. The writer felt that the War Department definition had been altered through field assignments of the Corps and at present amounted to providing security coverage for U.S. Army installations, personnel and operations. He added that the rewriting of the mission was necessary to bring it abreast of current CIC employment, or, as an alternative, that utilization of CIC should be restricted to the limits inherent in the current definition. Finally, he indorsed the Chief's suggestion.[112]

118th CIC Detachment

The 118th CIC Detachment was officially activated on 8 August 1946 by the Commanding Officer of the Center, by General Order #20, Headquarters, CIC Center. The 118th, although geographically within the confines of the Second Army, did not operate under that agency. The detachment performed special assignments for the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army. The detachment was removed from Camp Holabird and relieved of attachment to the Center in July 1950. The 118th was then assigned to G2, Department of the Army and attached to the Military District of Washington.[113]

111 Memo from WD Manpower Bd to D/OT, dtd 22 Jul 47, Comment 2, /s/ Col H. F. Hanson, GSC Exec (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

112 Intra-office Memo from Brig Gen George Keyser to Chief Sec Gp, dtd 14 Aug 47, with comments (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

113 Historical Data Files, 118th CIC Det, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility) and CIC History 1945-1948, Section IV, (Restricted) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Confidential Funds

The Chief of Staff, Far East Command, in August 1947, ruled that confidential funds could not be used for the purchase of commissary and PX merchandise which was used to pay informants, because of a lack of specific authority for such expenditures of confidential funds.

Because of the operational problems this ruling raised, General Keyser, Chief, CIC, immediately made an appeal to the Executive Officer, Intelligence Division, for a change in applicable regulations. He pointed out that the merchandise was far more useful and valuable to CIC than the actual cash involved.[114]

No action was immediately forthcoming, but sympathy for the predicament of CIC under this ruling led Brig Gen Charles Willoughby, G2, Far East Command, to write General Keyser that his office was preparing a staff study for submission to the Chief of Staff directed at reversal of the August decision.[115] The record does not disclose when the study accomplished the General's purpose, but the ban was eventually lifted.

CIC and the Missile Center

CIC coverage for the Guided Missile Center was first provided by detachments under the operational control of the Fourth Army. It had been provided that additional men for this project would be furnished Fourth Army CIC upon request to the Manpower Board. Some consideration was initially given a plan whereby an entirely separate unit would handle coverage of the project. Although this idea had been rejected, Fourth Army experience in serving the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project brought to light certain difficulties.

First of all, the CIC manpower demands for the project strained Fourth Army resources and created serious personnel shortages. Second, it soon became apparent that the mission of the agents serving with the project was at variance with standardized concepts of CIC's function. This caused thinking on this matter to change. By the end of 1947, Col C. M. Noble, Acting Chief, CIC, pointed out two important problems inherent in the present plan.

First, it worked an "unfair hardship" on the officers and men who had enlisted for CIC with the intention of making the Army a career. The transfer to AFSWP and non-CIC duty cut off the elected career in CIC, contrary to Army commitments.

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114 Memo from Brig Gen G. V. Keyser, Chief CIC to Exec Off ID, dtd 7 Aug 47, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

115 Ltr from Brig Gen C. A. Willoughby, GSC, ACofS G2 to Gen Keyser, Hq, CIC Center, Ft Holabird, dtd 11 Sep 47 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

The future of these men became uncertain and a matter of chance, for when and if the men would return to the Intelligence Division, control was an open question.

Second, in supplying investigative equipment to this unit, CIC had no firm basis or authorization on which to plan annual procurement. In addition, changes were contemplated in the Special List of Investigative Equipment, and AFSWP would not have authority to requisition new items and supplies from the list.

Colonel Noble felt that CIC had a real mission with AFSWP. While the Atomic Energy Act gave the FBI jurisdiction in complaint investigations, he pointed out that CIC could assist the command in discharging its security function and work on other types of investigations as well. He added that it was not impossible that a delimitations agreement under terms of the Atomic Energy Act could be worked out with the FBI.

In closing, Colonel Noble recommended that AFSWP be given a CIC detachment. As an alternative, he proposed that all commitments be withdrawn and that AFSWP procure its own personnel for training by CIC and return to the project. Equipment in such a case could be procured from the Technical Services. Colonel Noble favored the first course since this would prevent the formation of an additional agency performing counterintelligence missions. In addition, use of a CIC detachment would enable the project to coordinate Army areas and theaters in investigations which required CIC handling outside the project's jurisdiction.[116]

Confidential Manual TM 30-215

The Office of Operations and Training presented to the 1949 Conference recommended changes in TM 30-215. The principle reason behind the revision was the belief that there was no authority to indicate that a detachment commander was responsible for the operation of his unit. The proposed revision stated that the commanding officer of a CIC detachment was responsible for the planning, supervision, investigative direction, and control of detachment personnel, basing his actions on essential elements of information furnished by the command to which the detachment was assigned or detached.

In discussing the proposed change, it was pointed out that in some commands, the CIC commanding officer had merely become a figurehead, and the commanders of some units to which CIC was attached had gone so far as to personally assign each agent and clerk-typist in the detachment.

No attempt to deny the operational prerogatives of the command to which a detachment was assigned was made, but it was the concensus that a detachment

116 Ltr from M. C. Noble, Col, Inf, Acting Chief, CIC, to the Exec, Intel Division, 30 Dec 44 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

commander should run his detachment in what appeared to him the most expeditious manner of meeting EEI's assigned him.

Some commanders expressed the thought that such revision was needed and cited examples in their own situations. They urged that the CIC commander could accomplish this end by proper orientation as to CIC's mission, but the desirability of having the desired provisions incorporated in an official document appealed strongly to most officers present. It was felt that this provision would tend to standardize detachment formations world-wide.[117]

Central CIC File

Although the desirability of a Central CIC File had long been contemplated and considered, time and personnel limitations seemed always to cause the inception of the project to be postponed.

In 1949, the files were unintentionally begun however, when the Central Registry of the 970th in Europe was microfilmed and sent for safe storage to the Center. The case of this operation and the realization that other areas were in as crucial a state as Europe made it evident that the time had come to set up the Central File. Commanders of all overseas detachments were queried for opinion on the desirability of a Central File and every reply, except one, was favorable. It was finally planned to microfilm the files of every detachment for forwarding to the Center as a basis for the Central CIC File.

It was intended that the file be a service rather than an operational agency and act as a clearing house for information on subversion and subversives. It was hoped that, with a central agency keeping tab on world-wide activities, consolidated material would allow determination of universal modus operandi, and most of all, that the file could furnish consolidated information to all using agencies in the intelligence structure.

It was immediately obvious that the consolidation could be a successful continuing project only if the file systems of the various detachments were standardized. This phase of the project was still being worked on in 1950 and it was contemplated that a process of revision and refinement would probably continue.

At the outset of the plan, it was contemplated that the microfilming process of individual detachment files would continue up to a predetermined cut-off date, tentatively set at 15 October 1950. It was not planned to consolidate and index this initial influx of material immediately, but various indexes would allow a researcher the total wealth of unintegrated information. After the cut-off date, the microfilming at detachment level was to be discontinued and all documents

117 1949 Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

and reports subsequent to that date were to be forwarded to Central files for careful indexing and cross-indexing into consolidated personality and impersonal subject files.

The Center was to get the first carbon copy of all CIC operational reports produced after October 1950. They were to be forwarded to the Center by appropriate G2s, but extremely sensitive reports could be retained or delayed until the case was closed or the cause of sensitivity removed.

When the documents were received at the Center, filing of the papers was planned after indexing and integration. When a file reached such a size that filming was practical, the original documents would be destroyed.

It was planned that the Center would prepare two indexes for forwarding to each detachment. The personality index would allow the file to furnish information by name, party affiliation, and to a limited extent, description. The impersonal subject index was far more complicated.

The Intelligence Subjects Code was adaptable to this information on organizations, incidents, and activities. Machine indexing would allow speedy and accurate preparation of bibliographies by subject and area.

It was estimated in 1950 that within five years the file would contain over 20 million personality cards.

Security Surveys

The Korean conflict brought home to commanders the need for maximum security on all military installations and the consequent need for surveys to check on the security level maintained. The procedure followed by Second Army and presented for discussion at the 1950 Commander's Conference was considered practical and typical.

The G-2 Section of Second Army had drawn, in conjunction with the Second Army CIC Detachment Commander, a schedule for conducting surveys which the G2 deemed necessary. Since all subordinate commanders within the Army area had been informed of the need for security, surveys were not ordered by the Second Army Commander, but originated with a request from the commanders of various installations.

The surveys were initially carried out by CIC, under the direction of the G2, and recommendations were forwarded to the commanding officers who had ultimate security responsibility.

Although it was felt that G2 had primary responsibility for the conduct of surveys, portions of the checks involved G3 and Provost Marshal prerogatives, largely in the field of internal security. To avoid the possibility of internal conflict, a joint security survey team was eventually established with representatives from CIC, the Provost Marshal and G3. As the number of these joint teams increased, over 80 Second Army installations were surveyed.

Comments from Fifth Army CIC representatives at the Conference disclosed a slightly different approach to the security problem. Joint survey teams had not been formed by Fifth Army, but complete cooperation and coordination with the Provost Marshal was maintained. While it was felt that all staff sections had a real interest in the surveys, they were not allowed to participate in actual checks. Fifth Army had also endeavored to standardize the form and format of security surveys and effect a review of the report of survey at the Army G2 level before forwarding to the installation commander concerned. Each of the nine field offices of CIC within Fifth Army was held responsible for the job of conducting surveys within a given geographic area.[118]

118 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Chapter 5

TRAINING

A basic change in CIC training procedure was made in 1946 when anticipated unavailability of military instructors led to the requisitioning of 54 civilian instructors for the Center, to be supplied during the first half of the year.

A six-section system of examinations was set up to provide a more accurate criteria for grading students in the Basic Investigator's course, and new courses were formulated and implemented to give a more rounded curriculum. One such course provided Chinese background and language instruction for agents being sent to the Orient.

A formal graduation exercise where diplomas were presented by the Chief, CIC, was begun during the year, and personnel were provided by the Center for a three-hour orientation lecture at the U.S. Naval Intelligence School, Anacostia, Virginia.

An administrative course was set up in March 1946, and two months later the basic course was lengthened to nine weeks. A six-week course for Air Force agents was created and a four-week course designed for agents scheduled for Zone of Interior duty was instituted. A primary photography course for agents assigned to the Military Attache Service was inaugurated before the close of the year.[119]

State Department Personnel

Funds needed for additional equipment to be purchased from local suppliers were requested in 1947 by the Center. The State Department had requested training assistance from the Center for locksmith and photographic courses for its personnel. It was felt that liaison interests made compliance with the request desirable, and supplies were not available in military channels.[120]

Training Division Survey

The Training Division was the subject of an early survey conducted by the Planning and Control Division. An interim report on the survey submitted on 13 February 1946, recommended changes in instruction methods, curriculum, student flow, student clearance, and redesignation of instructional branches with a regrouping of subjects. An eight-week training program was offered with a four-week basic and four-week advanced course; despite certain efficiency benefits,

119 1946 Status Reports, CIC Center (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).
120 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney, GSC, Chief, Sec Gp to Executive, Intelligence Division, dtd 24 April 1947 (Confidential) (Kansas City Records Center).

the program was never adopted. Some months later, however, a survey of the course of instruction by the Planning and Liaison Division led to the submission of an instruction plan providing a 32-week course of study. Disposition of the plan is not recorded.[121]

General Keyser's Summation

The training situation and certain recommended changes were summarized by Brig Gen George V. Keyser, Chief, CIC, in 1947. Writing the Department of Army Director of Operations and Training, General Keyser explained that while the basic CIC course included many skills and subjects, its purpose demanded that efforts be concentrated to emphasize investigations, interrogations, informants, weapons, report writing, and investigative legal principles.

He pointed out that more time could advantageously be put into the training program without a substantial loss of personnel or money. Completion of background investigations on most students took well over the nine-week training period, and field work could not be performed until the investigation was closed. General Keyser felt that the time could be used to good purpose by both the school and the detachment performing the investigation.

The Chief explained that the administrative course at the Center had been instituted to provide the clerical help necessary to eliminate the large current backlog of case work. Men graduated from the course were not only skilled in typing and Army administration, but had some knowledge of specialized CIC procedures and report writing. Since this group required the same security clearances as agent personnel, the General felt that training at the Center for this personnel could be extended with the same effect and for the same reasons as were given for extension of the agent's course. He added that if delay in completion of the background investigation caused further postponement in assignment, the men could be utilized at the Center in a special duty status.

It was suggested that the Russian, German and Japanese language courses at the Center be extended from five to eight weeks. While the purpose of the courses was not to produce proficient linguists, the courses did give the students confidence and the ability to verify the work of interpreters. General Keyser reminded the Director that his recommendation was supported by constant reports from using agencies overseas asking a longer training period in languages.[122]

121 Annual Report of Activities, Planning and Liaison Division, 1946 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

122 Ltr from Brig Gen George V. Keyser to Director O & T, 7 October 1947 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

Reorganization at the Center and School

The changes in administration and operation of the CIC School and Center from 1945 to 1948, were solidified and standardized by a reorganization program in 1948. With Lt Col Henry A. Veasey as Director of Training, the School reorganization was completed in November 1948, while the Center program was implemented in June of the same year.[123]

A three-day detachment problem and a ten-hour course in communism were added to the basic course in 1948, and increased attention was given to the training of civilian CIC components. Several extension courses were prepared, and a 44-hour ORC unit training program was formulated. A four-week mobilization refresher course for former agents was also prepared.

A bookstore was put in operation during the year and many volumes were added to the School Research library and the Student library.[124]

The CIC School, 1949-1950

During 1949 and 1950, several courses were offered military attaches; students of the Strategic Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., came to the Center for a one-week course. Language courses were expanded and area studies were intensified with increased emphasis being given to Russia and her satellites. The basic course was modified to include supervisory as well as investigative training, and courses in report writing, interrogation, photography, countersabotage and security were revamped to enlarge their scope.

A Faculty Board was created during this period to screen the records of students whose academic averages fell below the required 70 percent. The Board, consisting of the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, Coordinator of Training and the heads of various branches, determined the individual's suitability for retention at the School despite his grades.

New texts and student outlines were drafted and distributed for use in many classes, and the CIC extension courses were rewritten. Plans were made for creation of an ORC Associate Investigators course and an ORC Associate Advanced course.[125] Several training films were completed by the Army Signal Corps

123 Memo on "Organization of the CIC Center and Camp Holabird," attached as Appendix 2; Memo on "Organization of the CIC School" attached as Appendix 3.

124 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center 1948 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

125 Report, 1950 Commander's Conference (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Photographic Center under CIC supervision and many technical devices were approved by the CIC Board for field use. All sections at the school were charged with preparation of comprehensive courses for the Officer's Advanced Course.[126]

TI&E at the Center

The Troop Information and Education program at the Center was accelerated in 1948 when a testing center for the administration of General Educations Development tests was established, and orientation of all arrivals at the Center on the benefits and advantages of USAFI was made a part of preliminary processing.

Army education centers were opened in Buildings 100 and 136. Several men on the post participated in extracurricular language classes and night school courses offered by Loyola College. A post newspaper under the TI&E section began publication in this same year.[127]

The ORC Unit Training Program by ZI Field Detachments

In reviewing the Reserve training program for the 1949 Conference, Maj Albin P. Dearing, OO&T Division, stressed the point that in event of another war, the U.S. would not enjoy the luxury of a long mobilization period. To meet this peril, he explained, the U.S. Army had organized its reserve forces into TO&E units, earmarked with mobilization assignment for which specialized training could be arranged.

He explained CIC's role in this Reserve program. There was to be a ceiling in CIC of the proportionate Reserve detachment strehgth to implement 50 divisions, and all would have mobilization assignments along with augmentation personnel. The project number of MI reservists was about 7,000, and CIC spaces would account for about half of this force. CIC detachments were required to have all officer vacancies filled and be up above 15 percent of enlisted strength within nine months after Reserve reactivation. This meant that detachments would have an undetermined amount of participation in Reserve training. More specifically, it meant that each detachment would have to train its own augmentation personnel and reserves assigned in event of a mobilization.

The CIC Center was charged with preparing the training, by specific subject, for CIC reservists. The training program was to extend over a three year period and include 48 weeks of Reserve training and two weeks annual active duty training, this latter to be accomplished at army level. It was hoped to interpolate virtually

126 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center 1950 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library)

127 Monthly Status Reports, CIC Center 1948 (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library)

the entire Basic Investigator's course. In the active duty period each year, each detachment would be called as a unit, and function as a detachment. This would give further necessary training. It was planned that proficiency with weapons would be developed, and language specialties which reservists brought to the detachments were to be cultivated.

Organization, Operations, and Training Division

Lt Col Hugh S. Sargent, Executive Officer of OO&T, reminded all officers present that the ultimate goal of all military activities, including CIC, was success in combat. This raised, of course, the threefold responsibility of a commander for training.

He stressed that it was the CIC commander's responsibility to prepare the agents to perform his present mission, prepare him to undertake future missions, and ready him for service in a combat situation. Colonel Sargent stated that though the pressure of work might cause commanders to feel there was not time for training, it should be remembered that agents must always be prepared for the unexpected emergency and that achievement and maintenance of a high degree of proficiency could only be maintained within CIC by the training efforts of unit commanders. Colonel Sargent warned against complacency bred by the current static status in the Zone of Interior.

Language Training and Mobilizations

The importance of strategic language training, at a time before it was needed, was stressed by Colonel Sargent. Zone of Interior commanders were warned that their detachment might well be hard hit for personnel should an emergency arise. It was suggested that plans for such a contingency be drafted and filed at detachment level.

The Domestic Intelligence Problem

Several commanders expressed dissatisfaction with the domestic intelligence training which agents were receiving at the Center. In spite of provisions of the delimitations agreement with the FBI, commanders of the 111th and 116th CIC Detachments revealed that they did considerable domestic intelligence work among racial, political, and subversive groups. It was acknowledged that adequate training was not given at the school, but such work being generally considered outside the CIC mission, no ready solution presented itself. The only solution offered in the record of conference was offered by the Commander of the 108th CIC Detachment. He suggested that within current limits, the school give trainees the maximum background possible relative to the subversive groups in this country. He felt that after detachment assignment, it was up to the Army and detachment commander to supervise continued training.

Undercover Operations

The report to the Conference on undercover operations indicated that improved procedures and techniques were needed. Main difficulties turned on faulty selection of personnel and general weakness in cover. Documentation was often imperfect, and administrative details such as travel, billeting, subsistence and orders caused frequent compromise. Recommendations relative to all phases of undercover work and development were requested of commanders present.[128]

1950 Commander's Conference

Korean hostilities caused special stress on discussion of training and mobilization plans at the 1950 Detachment Commander's Conference.

The G2 at the CIC Center explained that his function under current mobilization plans was primarily to request activation of new detachments for field utilization to the G2, Department of Army. This necessitated, as the plan presupposed, a constant "keeping in touch" by the Center G2 with the general status and state of training of all active and Reserve detachments. Upon the Center G2's recommendations, G2, Department of the Army, in coordination with G3 and the Chief, Army Field Forces, actually constituted, activated, and organized CIC units for field utilization.

Augmentation of these detachments, once constituted, was provided for in the mobilization plan, but required requests by the major command concerned. Since these increases were to be allotted to the commands in bulk, it was felt that the commander concerned should determine whether the spaces would be used for CIC augmentation.

Combat Utilization of CIC

Maj Jack B. Cameron, Chief of the Operations and Training Branch of G3, opened the Conference discussion on use of CIC in a combat situation. Major Cameron had commanded the CIC unit with 3d Infantry Division during North African landings in World War II and supported the need for CIC in combat.

Major Cameron cited the early World War II conflict where one faction argued that CIC had no role in combat, on the theory that such field security work would wipe out the specialized counterintelligence role. The other faction had argued that CIC did have a combat mission. While the disagreement continued, this latter group went out and proved its point. Major Cameron's primary premise, then, was, "...combat for CIC is here to stay."

128 1949 Detachment Commander's Conference (Confidential) (Staff and Faculty Library)

Recognizing this fact, he deemed it necessary that every commander, no matter where his detachment was based, be prepared to place that detachment in tactical operation. To assist commanders in training for a possible combat situation, Major Cameron concluded that two highly flexible programs had been drawn at the Center to prepare both the individual and the unit.

Cost of Training

A cost of training breakdown was provided the Department of Defense by the Center in 1950. Based upon a maximum load in each course, the cost per student breakdown for the 12-week CIC investigator's course was $963.35 per man; for the eight-week language and area specialization course, $279.60 per man; for the administrative course lasting two weeks, $169.83 per man; for the four-week technical specialist training, $239.75 per man; for the two-week ORC associate investigation course, $169.83; and for the MA security orientation, $134.88 per man.[129]

129 January, Monthly Status Report, CIC Center, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

Part II

CIC IN THE ARMY AREAS

Postwar counterintelligence in the Zone of the Interior consisted largely of background investigations of personnel slated for sensitive positions. Cases out of the routine were much less frequent than in overseas commands. Nevertheless, the work was essential and often voluminous.[130]

An examination of CIC detachments operating in the six Army areas and the Military District of Washington during this period shows two consistent patterns. By mid-1948, most of the units had accumulated a dangerously high backlog of pending cases, a situation which was generally remedied by the end of 1949. Secondly, throughout the period, Tables of Organization for all units were revised steadily upward. In several instances, this increase more than doubled the original personnel allotment of the unit.

Zone of the Interior counterintelligence was not confined solely to pavement-pounding. A small number of agents were assigned to detachments operating with tactical outfits. These CIC detachments were involved in maintaining the security of the parent division and participating in tactical maneuvers.

108th CIC Detachment Covers First Army Area

The 108th CIC Detachment was officially activated and assigned to the Second Service Command on 10 June 1946. When the Service Command system was revamped and gave way to the Army Area geographic divisions, the 108th was relieved of assignment to the Second Service Command and assigned to First Army, with Headquarters at Governor's Island, New York. The change was in name only, physically speaking, since the Headquarters under Second Service Command had also been at Governor's Island. Important ramifications came with the redesignation, however.[131]

Since the Army Areas were considerably larger than the physical bounds of Service Commands, the detachments with Army Areas found themselves responsible for up to double the amount of work they had formerly handled.

Entering 1948, the 108th had a backlog of 18,000 cases, considerably more than any other Zone of the Interior unit. Although other detachments were able

130 CIC Operation History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

131 Historical Data Cards, 108th & 107th CIC Dets, (Unclassified) (Organization and Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

to diminish their accumulation of cases during 1948 and 1949, the 108th was unable to make any appreciable dent in its backlog.[132]

To assist in discharging this added burden, detachments that had formerly serviced the territory newly included in a given Army Area were called upon. In the case of the 108th, since the area granted it under First Army in the redistricting of nine Service Commands into six Army Areas encompassed both the old Second and Third Service Commands, it was able to absorb and add to its roster the personnel and equipment of the 107th, which had held down Third Service Command Headquarters at Boston, Massachusetts. The 107th was officially absorbed into the 108th with all personnel being retained in grade on 9 August 1946.[133]

Conversion Problems

Although CIC detachments were reshuffled to some extent with the conversion from the Service Command to the Army Area system, it was immediately apparent that the assignment of CIC personnel to the armies was at wide variance with the relative population and caseloads involved. It can be argued with some authority that duties of CIC in the Zone of Interior reveal a relationship between population and the need for counterintelligence coverage. The workload of any organization generally increases with the number of persons involved. This is particularly true of CIC since most of its activities are concerned with personnel, their activities and backgrounds. It should also be noted, as well, that industrial centers, where the security work of CIC is most important, generally correspond to the concentrations of population. Since the 108th had a total strength in 1946 of only 170 spaces to cover an approximate population of 27,000,000, it is obvious that effective and coordinated use of the force available was necessary to provide even a modicum of counterintelligence coverage.[134]

From 1945 through 1948, the principle duties of the detachment consisted of loyalty investigations with a few subversive activity cases. The 108th was able to call on other detachments in the First Army Area for some assistance in discharging the caseload. The 301st CIC Detachment, attached to Headquarters First Army at Governor's Island, New York, provided assistance in various branches of the Counter Intelligence Division, and further help was provided by the 9th CIC Detachment, a small unit attached to the Ninth Infantry Division at

132 Interview with Col Paul A. Hurst, Commander 4th OSI District, former Commander 108th CIC Det, Historical Project Office, Ft Holabird, Md, 3 Oct 55.

133 Hisforical Data Card, 108th CIC Det & 107th CIC Det, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

134 Plan for the Deployment and Use of CIC, unsigned staff study, drafted between 1946 and 1948, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Fort Dix, New Jersey. Yet another detachment operated within the confines of the First Army area, the 117th CIC Detachment, but it was not under control of First Army, since it was assigned for port security work to the Chief of Transportation.[135] The 117th did handle some loyalty cases, however.

Integration

Not the least among the problems of the 108th after the change from the Service Command to the Army Area system, was the integration of two formerly independent detachments, the 107th and 108th, into a smoothly functioning and efficient unit. For a short period after combination of the detachments into the 108th, operations were continued on a separate basis. Each detachment handled its own administration, files, case control, and field office network. When Col Paul A. Hurst took over as commander of the detachment in 1947, one of his first steps was the reorganization and restyling of the unit to bring about centralized control.[136]

As a first step, a standard operating procedure was published on 25 November 1947, and forwarded to all Officers in Charge, District Intelligence offices. The procedure fixed a chain of command direct to the detachment commander and set up direct report channels. Administrative activities in offices other than Headquarters were cut to a minimum, and all official correspondence and development of leads were ordered to be handled through Headquarters, with use of lateral means only in emergencies.[137]

The Headquarters office was completely reorganized on 28 December 1947, to provide for sweeping changes in the field office setup and to establish highly centralized control.[138]

Distribution of Coverage Responsibility

Until 1 July 1948, coverage of the eight state area of responsibility of the First Army Detachment was handled through two field offices and a network of suboffices.

The states of responsibility included Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey. The

135 History of CIC 1945-1948, Section VI, "Zone of Interior," (Restricted) (Central Records Facility).

136 Interview with Col Paul A. Hurst, Commander 4th Dist OSI, former CO, 108th CIC Det, Historical Project Office, Ft Holabird, Md, 3 October 1955.

137 SOP, 108th CIC Det, dtd 25 Nov 47; /s/ Col Paul A. Hurst (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

138 SOP, 108th CIC Det, dtd 29 Dec 47 (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

New York Field Office controlled the activities and coverage of offices in Albany, Buffalo, New York City; Syracuse, Rochester, Elmira, Poughkeepsie, and White Plains, New York; Newark and Trenton, New Jersey; and Wilmington, Delaware. The Boston Field Office performed a similar function for sub-offices in Hartford, Connecticut; Boston and Springfield, Massachusetts; and Providence, Rhode Island.[139]

After 1 June 1948, the status of the Boston office was reduced and new offices were created, putting the whole area under control for operational and administrative purposes of the New York Headquarters office. After 1 July, all men were assigned from the New York office, and the files and administration vested in the Boston office were placed in New York. New territorial allocations of responsibility were made in the hope of attaining a higher degree of efficient coverage.[140]

The centralized setup after 1948 placed a maximum of centralized control in the New York Headquarters. Administratively, the office at Governor's Island managed the 108th. The office was divided into four sections: the personnel section; the supply and motor section; the plans and training section; and the investigation and operations section.

The personnel section was responsible for all administrative records, payrolls, confidential funds, credentials, and operation of the message center and a clerk-stenographer pool. The functions of the motor and supply section are self explanatory, as were the duties of the plans and training section. Most complex was the investigation and operations section.

This latter section had a primary task of screening and processing personnel for assignment control. It was charged with the responsibility for agency checks, special projects, revision and rewrite of reports, and special research operations. Domestic intelligence and investigative files were maintained by the section along with a technical and photographic laboratory.

Operationally, the detachment was handled through the New York City Field Office, which was under direct supervision of the investigations and operations section at Governor's Island. Under this setup, the possibility of duplication and unnecessary activity was cut to a minimum. Suboffices under the New York Field Office included: Mineola, Albany, Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester, Elmira, White Plains, and Poughkeepsie, New York; Trenton and Newark, New Jersey, Wilmington,

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139 Chart dated 1 July 1948, showing organizational structure of 108th CIC Detachment, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

140 Ltr; dtd 18 Jun 48, from Col Paul A. Hurst, CO, 108th CIC Det, to all officers and agents in charge, 108th CIC Det, Subj: Establishment of Field Offices and Reallocation of Territory (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

Delaware; Hartford, Connecticut; Boston and Springfield, Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; Montpelier, Vermont; Augusta, Maine; and Concord, New Hampshire.[141]

Deployment of CIC

Once Colonel Hurst had managed to clear away the administrative tangle that resulted from the Army Area change-over, and attained a proper organization and control in his area, he set himself to the task of eliminating the improper use of CIC agents at intermediate command levels. Upon his arrival to take command of the detachment in 1947, Colonel Hurst had found that approximately 25 percent of the total strength of his detachment was being used by G2 for non-CIC purposes.[142] To eliminate such practices, Colonel Hurst obtained a statement and definition of CIC functions over the command line of Gen Courtney H. Hodges, commander of First Army.

The letter made it clear that administration and employment of CIC agents were the function of the detachment commander, whether in a static, tactical, or [illegible] situation. Strict conformance to regulations regarding the recognition of CIC badges and credentials was ordered, and all personnel were admonished not to interfere with CIC operations. The reasons for wearing of civilian clothing by CIC agent personnel were set forth, and certain duties were specifically listed as not to be performed by CIC personnel. Among the prohibited duties were tactical intelligence missions, prisoner of war interrogations, criminal or [illegible] investigations, and fatigue and staff duties. The letter was directed to all commanders of installations and activities under the supervision of the Army commander.[143]

[illegible] Through 1949 and 1950

Colonel Hurst left the 108th in March 1949 and was succeeded in turn by Maj John [illegible] and Lt Col Frank M. Hosterman. Loyalty investigations continued to be the principal detachment activity, but security surveys, safeguarding of [illegible], and the investigation of subversive activity reports took the greatest share of available man-hours. During the year 1949, a total of 20,703 completed investigations was achieved.

141 [illegible] 108th CIC Det, dtd 29 Dec 47, /s/ Paul A. Hurst, Col, Commanding, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility); and Organizational Chart, 108th [illegible] dtd 1 Jul 48, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

142 [illegible] Col Paul A. Hurst, Commander, 4th District OSI, former commanding officer, 108th CIC Det 1947-1949, Historical Project Office, 3 Oct 55.

143 Ltr, dtd 28 Jun 48, to all Subordinate Commands, from Lt Col D. M. White, ASST, AG, Subj: CIC Functions Within the First Army Area, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

Intra-detachment conferences with Headquarters and all field offices represented were implemented in 1949 in an effort to achieve a better working relationship. The interchange of ideas and problems were deemed so beneficial that plans were made to include such conferences in permanent scheduling. A rating of excellent was awarded the detachment for all activities by the Inspector General for the year.

Supply problems with regard to motor transportation which arose early in the year were eliminated when replacement vehicles arrived just prior to the close of the period. Average strength of the detachment varied between the totals of 168 and 198.

Aside from on-the-job investigative training, detachment members had made available to them the photographic facilities of the organization to experiment and improve techniques. Every effort was made to supervise the education of all agent personnel with regard to current events by dissemination of all Army and civilian publications available.

One hour weekly was devoted to a program of Troop Information and Education, with stress being placed upon skills of particular importance to CIC.[144]

109th CIC Detachment Handles Second Army Security

On 11 June 1946, the 109th CIC Detachment and the 110th CIC Detachment were assigned to the newly constituted Second Army. The 109th, with headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, had been named the CIC unit of the Third Service Command on 24 May 1946; and on 4 June 1946, the 110th, with headquarters at Fort Hayes, Ohio, had been designated the CIC unit of the Fifth Service Command. The postwar reshuffle was not complete after the two detachments had been placed under Second Army. On 12 August 1946, the 110th was deactivated and personnel were transferred in grade to the 109th. Authorized strength of the 109th was established at [illegible] officers, 21 warrant officers and 73 enlisted men. This Table of Organization underwent a gradual increase until in July 1949 it was set at 63 officers, 12 warrant officers and 98 enlisted men.

In the first months of operation under the Second Army, the 109th continued to maintain its headquarters in Baltimore, but in June 1947, a transfer to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, was accomplished.[145]

144 CIC Historical Report, for 1949, dtd 18 February 1950, over signature of Lt Col Frank M. Hosterman (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

145 Historical Data Cards, 109th & 110th CIC Dets, (Unclassified) (Organization and Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

Resident agents of the 109th CIC Detachment were posted in the key cities of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Virginia.

Although the detachment handled several significant subversion and disaffection cases, their main concern was with loyalty background cases. A great backlog of cases had piled up by 1948, but additional personnel assigned late in the year and the assumption of Air Force cases by the Office of Special Investigations in September brought the detachment's work up to date.[146]

Agents Provide Security for VIPs

On numerous occasions during the period, the 109th CIC Detachment was called upon to supply details to provide security for important persons. For instance, on 29 August 1949, the detachment was responsible for the security of Secretary of Defense Louis C. Johnson while he was attending the American Legion Convention in Philadelphia. Another detail furnished security for Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim during the 1949 Army-Navy football game in Philadelphia.[147]

Four Other Detachments Operate in Second Army Area

Four other CIC detachments operated at various posts and installations of the Second Army. The 890th CIC Detachment provided security for Fort Meade, the Second Army headquarters. Activated in February 1949, this detachment had an authorized strength of two officers, one warrant officer and two enlisted men.

In January 1949, the 530th CIC Detachment was activated and attached to the 3d Armored Division, a training unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky. On 25 March 1949, this CIC unit was relieved of its attachment to the 3d Armored Division and attached to Fort Knox, thus becoming responsible for the security of the complete installation.[148]

On 6 April 1949, the 11th CIC Detachment was activated and attached to the 11th Airborne Division at Camp Campbell, Kentucky. For orientation on airborne counterintelligence, the detachment commander made a trip to Fort Bragg, North Carolina to observe the operations of the 82d CIC Detachment. During May 1949, the unit began a preliminary physical conditioning program for personnel preparing for basic airborne training. Throughout the year, individual officers and enlisted

146 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

147 109th CIC Det History, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 49, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

148 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Historical Data Card, 530th CIC Det (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Bldg).

men from the detachment departed for jump training at Fort Benning, Georgia. Except for two officers who were subsequently transferred, the detachment's personnel successfully completed the course. By the end of 1949, the two officers and two enlisted men assigned to the 11th CIC Detachment were qualified parachutists; one officer and both of the enlisted men were qualified glidermen.

With only four members, the 11th CIC Detachment was under strength. The 11th's Table of Organization called for three officers, one warrant officer and three enlisted men. The detachment's history for 1949 concludes: "During the year, the unit strength was never up to authorized level, and on occasion the lack of personnel brought training and operations to a standstill. Personnel shortage is still a major problem."[149]

First WAC CIC Detachment Activated

On 5 January 1949, the first WAC CIC detachment was activated. The 600th CIC Detachment was attached to the WAC Training Center at Camp Lee, Virginia, and authorized three officers, one warrant officer and three enlisted women. Capt Mary E. Herman, transferred from the 401st CIC Detachment in Hawaii, became the 600th's Commanding Officer and thereby the first woman to command a CIC unit.

On 2 December 1949, the attachment of the 600th to the WAC Training Center was revoked and the unit attached to Headquarters, Camp Lee. As the unit's official history for 1949 says: "This attachment has been made with a view to providing the Commanding General, Camp Lee, with CIC personnel not otherwise authorized."

One important aspect of the attachment to Headquarters, Camp Lee was that personnel of the 600th CIC Detachment thereafter delivered security lectures to military and civilian personnel of the post.[150]

Third Army Area Covered by 111th CIC Detachment

Counterintelligence in the Third Army area was the responsibility of the 111th CIC Detachment. The 111th, originally activated on 22 May 1946, had been assigned

149 11th CIC Detachment, Camp Campbell, Ky, Subj: Annual Historical Rpt, To: TAG, Washington 25, D.C., 27 Feb 50 (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

150 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Hqs, 600th CIC Det, Camp Lee, Virginia, Subj: Historical Report of the 600th CIC Det, Camp Lee, from 5 Jan 49 to 31 Dec 49, To: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C., 27 Feb 50, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

to the Fourth Service Command and had maintained headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. On 16 June 1946, the detachment was transferred to the Third Army and in December 1947 moved from Atlanta to Third Army Headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Total authorized strength of the detachment at its activation was 16 officers, six warrant officers and 26 enlisted men. By 1950, the allotment had been increased to 17 officers, 16 warrant officers and 30 enlisted men.[151] To indicate the wide distribution of agents, the unit maintained 20 field offices on 1 January 1949. Offices were located in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, Tennessee; Birmingham, Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama; Jackson, Mississippi; Spartenburg and Columbia, South Carolina; Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina; Atlanta, Columbus, Macon, and Savannah, Georgia; and Marianna, Jacksonville, Orlando, and Miami, Florida.

As with Second Army CIC, the 111th had a great backlog of cases entering 1948. At one time 3,802 investigations were pending, but by the end of the year this number was reduced to 2,367 largely due to the assumption of Air Force cases by OSI.[152]

The pile-up of pending cases was reduced to 866 by the end of 1949, as the detachment completed during the year a grand total of 8,019 cases, or an average of 191 per agent.[153]

Five other CIC detachments operated in the Third Army area. The 316th CIC Detachment operated at Fort Bragg and was responsible for the security of that installation. The other four detachments operated with tactical units. The 3d CIC Detachment was with the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning; the 5th CIC Detachment was with the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson; and the 205th CIC Detachment was attached to V Corps at Fort Bragg.[154]

112th CIC Detachment - The Fourth Army Unit

The 112th CIC Detachment, originally with the Eighth Service Command, was transferred to Fourth Army on 11 June 1946. Concurrently the detachment moved from offices in downtown Dallas, Texas, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. At the time of its assignment to Fourth Army, the total authorized strength of the

151 Historical Data Card, 111th CIC Det, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

152 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

153 "Annual History, 111th CIC Det, "1949, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

154 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

detachment was 16 officers, six warrant officers and 26 enlisted men. By 1950, this Table of Organization, after undergoing repeated increases, stood at 56 officers, 21 warrant officers, and 93 enlisted men.[155]

Counterintelligence coverage of the Fourth Army area involved work in New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. To indicate agent distribution, the 112th in 1949 maintained eight branch intelligence offices and nine resident agencies. Branch offices were in operation in Little Rock, Arkansas; New Mexico; and Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio, Texas. Resident agencies were maintained in McAllen, Austin, Amarillo, and Abiline, Texas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Las Cruces, New Mexico; Fayetteville, Arkansas; and Baton Rouge and Shreveport, Louisiana.[156]

The mission of CIC in a Zone of the Interior Army area, as interpreted by the 112th CIC Detachment, was stated by the unit's commander in February 1948. Writing informally to a friend at the CIC Center, Maj James Hay declared:

> I have emphasized that a CIC detachment is assigned to an Army area to carry out the commander's counterintelligence responsibilities and that they were a factfinding organization designed to produce information upon which the commander could base his domestic measures, particularly pertaining to his personnel and installations. He assigns us a mission, and the CIC, as his technician in the field, digs up the information, and turns it over to the G2 for whatever action he deems appropriate. In certain cases and under certain circumstances, we have directives prescribing our action, but always with the knowledge and concurrence of the commander under whom we have been placed.[157]

Like other Zone of the Interior detachments, the 112th was able to reduce greatly their number of pending cases in 1949. The year opened with 2,560 cases not completed and closed with 948 pending. During the year, the detachment opened a total of 7,010 cases.[158]

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155 Historical Data Card, 112th CIC Det, (Unclassified) (Organization and Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

156 "1949 Annual Historical Report of the 112th CIC Detachment," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

157 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

158 "1949 Annual Historical Report of the 112th CIC Det," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Two Detachments Operate With Armored Divisions

Two combat unit detachments were in operation in the Fourth Army area. The 505th CIC Detachment was attached to the 5th Armored Division at Camp Chafee, Arkansas, and the 520th was attached to the 2d Armored Division at Camp Hood, Texas.[159]

The unit history of the 520th CIC Detachment for 1949 contains the following paragraph describing the unit's activity for the year:

> During the year, the detachment participated in eight days of field exercises for a total of 138 hours as an integral part of Headquarters, 2d Armored Division, to familiarize personnel with living in the field, loading vehicles for combat, field sanitation and march discipline. Due to the mission of a tactical CIC detachment, 88 percent of the time was spent at "on the job training" while 12 percent was spent on subjects common to the Army as a whole and technical subjects peculiar to CIC. In addition, all members were given outside material to read on general CIC matters and were required to keep themselves abreast with current news, both local and international.[160]

113th is CIC Detachment for Fifth Army

After 10 August 1946, the 113th CIC Detachment possessed the sole responsibility for counterintelligence activities in the Fifth Army area. The 113th had been activated on 20 May and attached to the Sixth Service Command. This organization maintained headquarters in downtown Chicago, Illinois. On 11 June 1946, the 113th had been assigned to the Fifth Army. Concurrently, the 114th CIC Detachment, attached to the Seventh Service Command since its activation on 10 May 1946, was also transferred to Fifth Army. The 114th was inactivated on 10 August 1946 and all personnel transferred in grade to the 113th.

Authorized strength of the 113th was gradually increased throughout the period until in December 1950 it stood at 52 officers, 67 warrant officers, and 99 enlisted men.[161]

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159 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "ZI, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

160 Hqs, 520th CIC Det, 2d Armd Div, Camp Hood, Tex, "Unit History, 520th CIC Det 1949," (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

161 Historical Data Cards, 113th and 114th CIC Detachments, (Unclassified), (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

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The 113th CIC Detachment maintained field offices in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri.[162]

The 113th also noted that in 1949 the backlog of cases had been greatly reduced. The unit's 1949 history expressed the hope that the detachment's operations would improve as a result of clearing up many pending investigations:

> During the year the backlog of cases was gradually reduced in the Fifth Army area to a point where it was believed that CIC could take a more active part in other phases of the Army security program... This detachment feels that a closer and more intimate contact should be developed between agents of the detachment and Class I and Class II installations in the Fifth Army area. It was estimated during 1949 that background investigations of both military and civilian personnel (brought CIC in contact with) little more than 3% of (the Fifth Army's personnel), leaving the remainder largely untouched.
>
> While expansion of investigative activity is not particularly desired, it was felt that complaint cases during 1949 were secured by chance information rather than by planned effort and that more attention should be given to this situation. Consideration of the matter by members of the detachment developed the belief that intelligence and security officers in Class I and Class II installations were largely untrained and had such a multiplicity of duties that security was neglected. In attempting to overcome this situation, the detachment developed a short training course for (these officers) to alert them to their responsibilities and to bring them closer to the intelligence field of operations.
>
> It is hoped that in the future more agent time will be available to make periodic calls on these installations with a view to encouraging the intelligence officers in the performance of their duties in the securing of information about personnel in the commands which they serve and to assist intelligence officers in the matter of security surveys and security inspections. By such methods, it is hoped that the detachment can adopt a more positive attitude in the matter of security than merely carrying out our routine background investigations, important as these are and will continue to be.[163]

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162 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

163 Hqs, 113th CIC Det, Fifth Army, Chicago 15, Ill., "Narrative Report, 1949 History of 113th CIC Detachment" (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

113th Finds Flying Saucer

One of the most interesting cases of the 113th CIC Detachment involved not just seeing, but finding a "flying saucer." In October 1948, a farmer had come upon a metal disk about 18 inches in diameter in one of his fields. The "saucer" resembled nothing so much as a metal blade from a farmer's disc harrow. However, spot welded to the center of the blade's convex side in an upright position was a mysterious object which, to anyone with imagination, could have been a part of a rocket projectile.

Investigation revealed that the "flying disc" was a homemade contrivance which had indeed been made from the blade of a disc harrow. The miniature rocket turned out to be an old wartime souvenir, a spent bazooka shell, which had been welded to the disc. The contrivance was the brainchild of a local farmer who had used it as a noise maker at a wedding celebration. The "flying saucer" had fallen out of his truck during a bumpy ride across the fields.[164]

The 10th CIC Detachment was attached to the 10th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, within the Fifth Army area. The detachment reported in its history for 1949 that, "The successful operation of the 10th CIC Detachment, attached to the 10th Infantry Division (Tng), depended upon two basic factors, namely, the complete and wholesome cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies and coordination and cooperation with all units of the command."

In 1949, the 10th CIC Detachment took over responsibility for the security of the Ground General School at Fort Riley from the deactivated 351st CIC Detachment.[165]

Security of Sixth Army Rests With 115th CIC Detachment

In May 1946, the 115th CIC Detachment was organized and attached to the Ninth Service Command. On 11 June 1946, the organization was assigned to the Sixth Army, assuming military counterintelligence duties in Washington, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, California, and Arizona. Like other Zone of the Interior CIC units, the 115th received a gradual increase in personnel allotment throughout the period. At the end of 1949, the Table of Organization authorized 42 officers, nine warrant officers and 82 enlisted men.

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164 "CIC Digest," November 1948, Volume I, Number 6, (Unclassified), (AIC Board Files).

165 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Hqs, 10th CIC Det, Fifth Army, Fort Riley, Kansas, "Historical Report 1949, 10th CIC Detachment, (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

In 1949, the 115th operated four intelligence field offices which directly supervised the work of resident agents. The field offices were located in the Presidio of San Francisco, Fort MacArthur, California; Seattle, Washington; and Fort Douglas, Utah. Headquarters for the detachment were located in the Presidio of San Francisco.

A small number of CIC personnel were retained under the wartime designation of Sixth Army CIC, the 306th CIC Detachment, to supervise security at the Army Headquarters. The 306th was deactivated on 26 September 1949, and its duties assumed by the 115th.[166]

2d and 4th CIC Detachments Operate With Tactical Divisions

Two tactical CIC units were in operation in the Sixth Army area: the 2d CIC Detachment with the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington; and the 4th CIC Detachment with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California. Examples of the training in which CIC division detachments engaged were the activities of the 2d CIC Detachment in the Sixth Army amphibious exercises of 1946 and the 2d Infantry Division's Operation MIKI in 1949.

For the 1946 exercises, the detachment embarked from Tacoma, Washington for San Diega, California, on 10 November. Arriving on 15 November, the unit participated in landing maneuvers at Silver Strand, Coronado, California, until 17 November. The force then sailed to San Clemente Islands for four days of maneuvers at Pyramid Cove. Another amphibious landing was accomplished late in November at Aliso Canyon, Oceanside, California. The agents debarked at Olympia, Washington, on 9 December 1946, after a full month of tactical operations in which the part of many CIC detachments in World War II was reenacted.

In August and September 1949, the 2d CIC Detachment participated in Operation MIKI, the division's major tactical maneuver of the year. CIC's main mission was the security of the operation and the apprehension of aggressor espionage agents.

The 2d CIC Detachment, in reviewing MIKI, noted first the problem of security:

> During the preliminary stages of the MIKI exercise there were many individuals who were prone to place too little importance on the necessity of strong security. However, as CIC measures were implemented, including indoctrination of all troops, much improvement was noted. One of the principal obstacles to the achievement of a proper security attitude

166 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and "Unit History of the 115th CIC Det, Calendar Year 1949," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

was the fact that newspapers carried items of information concerning the maneuver which had been disseminated to the troops as highly classified.

The problems relating to the maneuver's aggressor agents were then outlined:

> The absence of sufficient preparation and briefing of aggressor agents detracted considerably from the realism of the problem and many advantageous training opportunities were thereby missed. Although this situation was dictated by circumstances and not a result of inefficiency, the problem suffered nonetheless.

In conclusion, Maj Kenneth T. Koeber, Commanding Officer of the 2d CIC Detachment noted:

> The necessity of the establishment of a firm CIC combat doctrine can no longer be overlooked. During Operation MIKI, prior planning and the ability to improvise means, measures, and methods as situations arose overcame the effects of having no comprehensive textual material for training and information.

Major Koeber added some remarks on the mission of CIC with an infantry division in a peacetime situation:

> It has become increasingly apparent that the security consciousness of a military organization and its consequent efficiency in the maintainance of same is in a large measure dependent upon the effects and impression made by the CIC personnel in their daily conduct and contacts. Thus, selling security becomes a part of the CIC mission.[167]

116th CIC Detachment Activated in Military District of Washington

The 116th CIC Detachment was activated to assume counterintelligence duties in the Military District of Washington on 31 May 1946. Original strength totaled 15 officers, six warrant officers and 23 enlisted men. By late 1950, the gradual increases in space allotments had led to the authorization of 54 officers, 32 warrant officers and 114 enlisted men.

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167 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Zone of the Interior, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Hqs, 2d CIC Detachment, Fort Lewis, Washington, Subj: History of 2d CIC Detachment (1949), To: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C., 25 Jan 50, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The great backlog of uncompleted cases that piled up in Washington was, as in other cases, considerably depleted during 1949. As the year began, a staggering number of 10,463 cases was pending. To make matters worse, during January an additional 1,929 requests for investigation and 1,679 requests for MDW records checks were received. Night and Saturday work and a detail of Department of the Army civilians from the office of the AC of S, G2, MDW, were needed to keep the number of pending cases from piling even higher. By mid-September, the backlog was down to 7,172 cases, and at the end of the year it stood at 3,335.

The number of individual cases handled by the 116th CIC Detachment far surpassed other Zone of the Interior detachments. However, of the 16,066 cases handled, 11,783 were MDW file checks accomplished for other detachments. Only 576 of the grand total were complete background investigations.[168]

168 Historical Data Card, 116th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building); and "Unit History, 116th CIC Detachment, 1949," (Confidential) (Central Records Facility).

Part II: CIC in the Army Areas

Appendix 1

STAFF STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ARMY TYPE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

A board of officers consisting of Col Harry H. Mole, GSC, Chairman, Lt Col C. [illegible] Leydecker, GSC, Member, Lt Col Robert N. Denniston, GSC, Member, and Lt Col Vincent C. Neeson, MI, Recorder, was appointed on 20 January 1947 by the Chief Security Group, to consider the problem of establishing a Counter Intelligence Corps as a permanent branch of the Regular Army.

This board reported on 31 January 1947:

1. To consider the creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps as a permanent branch of the Regular Army.

2. The authority for the establishment of the present Counter Intelligence Corps stems from the following:

a. The Corps of Intelligence Police (now the Counter Intelligence Corps) was established initially upon the recommendation of the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces, through the War College Division, Office of the Secretary of War by Section II of the Act of Congress, 18 May 1917. The Adjutant General issued a general order for the establishment of a Corps of Intelligence Police on 13 August 1917.

b. Jurisdiction over the Corps of Intelligence Police was transferred from the War College Division, War Department General Staff, by General Order Nr 27, 1918.

c. After expiration of the war powers conferred on the Secretary of War by the Act of 1917, activities of the Corps of Intelligence Police were continued as part of the Regular Army by virtue of the general authority and overall appropriations of the Secretary of War in essential service of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff. The Counter Intelligence Corps was established under Title 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941 as an essential part of the Army of the United States.

d. By Presidential Proclamation in June 1939, the President of the United States gave clear recognition of the counterintelligence functions vested in the Secretary of War. The proclamation placed upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, the responsibility for investigation of all espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The three agencies, designated for such responsibility by the President, drew up plans for the spheres of operation to be recognized by each other for specific authority. This accord became known as the "Delimitations Agreement," which is still in effect.

e. By order of the Secretary of War (WD 320;2 (12-12-41) MR-M-B (13 Dec 1941)), subject: Redesignation of the Corps of Intelligence Police, the Counter Intelligence Corps, as now constituted, was established as a continuance of the Corps of Intelligence Police, and jurisdiction thereover remained vested in the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (now the Director of Intelligence), War Department General Staff.

3. The development of the Counter Intelligence Corps toward a permanent military establishment has been indicated by a natural trend which has set many precedents.

a. War Department General Orders Nr 149, 28 November 1917, increased the initial allotment of 50 men under the original organization order to 300 enlisted men under the original demands in the Theater of Operations and in the Zone of Interior. Subsequent demand for the services of the Corps of Intelligence Police resulted in allotment increases until the strength in World War I exceeded 600 enlisted men. Despite constant demand for increased personnel, and because of limited military appropriations, the strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police was held generally to the level of 50 enlisted men, or less, for the entire army.

b. As early as 1926, it was recognized that in case of emergency, the Corps of Intelligence Police would have to expand rapidly. A "Mobilization Plan for the Corps of Intelligence Police" was published at that time, calling for expansion under a subsection of the Secret Service Section, G2, War Department.

c. Limited personnel available after the Presidential proclamation caused the War Department to take extraordinary steps to fulfill the new responsibility defined by the President by the employment of civilians as investigators, which was authorized in October 1940, until such time as the War Department could have its own force of Corps of Intelligence Police expanded and properly trained. On 20 May 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, held that the expansion of the Corps of Intelligence Police had been such that the use of civilian operatives no longer was necessary.

d. In order to more closely define its broadened objectives and its increased responsibilities, the Corps of Intelligence Police was redesignated as the Counter Intelligence Corps on 13 December 1941.

e. While emergency procurements and allotments had been authorized theretofore, the Counter Intelligence Corps was given recognition as a distinctive unit when authorization of Tables of Organization and Equipment 30-500 was approved on 24 June 1944.

f. Recognition as a specialized service is given the Counter Intelligence Corps in authority granted by the Secretary of War to obtain initial recruitments in the Regular Army, directly for the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Secretary of War recognized the special personnel requirements of the Counter Intelligence Corps by establishing policy under letter, the Adjutant General, AG 322 CIC (31 [illegible] 44) OB-S-M, subject: Counter Intelligence Corps, 13 November 1944, and affirmed by book message WCL 45849, 31 May 1946.

g. A trained Counter Intelligence Corps force of more than 13,000 persons was developed between August 1940 and January 1946. Of that total, more than 9,000 have been returned to civilian life, and more than 4,000 officers and men continue in Counter Intelligence Corps assignments.

4. The proper way to establish and maintain maximum security is to have a permanent professional Counter Intelligence Corps.

a. A permanent body of professionally qualified, career Counter Intelligence Corps specialists will greatly increase the efficiency of the Corps and be more productive than the present organization.

b. A permanent Counter Intelligence Corps will maintain the same personnel over a period of time, who by reason of their contacts in connection with their operations, will be able to continue to exploit these contacts more efficiently.

c. A permanent Counter Intelligence Corps is necessary in order that techniques may be developed and exploited, and that training methods resulting therefrom may be established.

d. The Director of Personnel and Administration, War Department General Staff, has granted authority for experienced Counter Intelligence Corps officers to remain in overseas assignments beyond their normal tours of duty in order that the government may continue to receive maximum benefits from contacts established and orientation received. At the present time there is, and will continue to be, a paucity of personnel until such time as a permanent Counter Intelligence Corps is established.

e. A constant turnover of personnel in the present Counter Intelligence Corps jeopardizes the efficiency of the organization through the loss of competent and experienced personnel and their replacement by inexperienced and uninterested personnel who must be trained. This lack of professional interest interferes with complete operation in conjunction with other Federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and acts to the detriment of the Corps in general.

5. In the establishment of a permanent Counter Intelligence Corps, its organization must be considered.

a. The present strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps as of 31 December 1946, is 3,391, composed of 950 officers, 257 warrant officers, and 2,184 enlisted men. This does not include personnel in training at the CIC Center as cadre.

b. The troop basis for 30 June 1947 is 5,189, based on a total authorization of 1,070,000. This troop basis was established on the request of field commanders.

c. The ratio of officers to enlisted men in the Counter Intelligence Corps is not comparable to ratios in other branches due to the fact that many of the special agents in the Counter Intelligence Corps must be of commissioned grade for the proper fulfillment of their missions and in justice to their personal qualifications.

d. At present, procurement quotas are being made by emergency procedure to fill the troop requirements. These procedures are unsatisfactory because many times the Corps has been used as a dumping ground for a very large percentage of unsatisfactory officers and men from other branches of the service.

e. The experience of established branches and technical services has proven the desirability of maintaining a proper balance between assigned and detailed officer personnel, as well as the establishment of professional branches. Permanent enlisted personnel will raise the quality and maintain the professional standards necessary for the Corps' efficiency and encourage esprit and recruitment.

f. Proper balance will be obtained in the Counter Intelligence Corps by having officer personnel both on assignment and detail from other branches. This type of organization will:

(1) Develop the long-range plans of the Corps.

(2) Maintain a fresh and open point of view.

(3) Keep pace with the progress made by other branches.

(4) Return to basic branches officers who have completed their periods of detail and thus build within all branches a better understanding of the objectives, problems and achievements of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

(5) Maintain a firm foundation of experienced specialists, regardless of further demobilization.

6. The integration of the Counter Intelligence Corps into the unification plan proposed for the Armed Forces of the United States will increase the efficiency of its function and affect a great economy in our coordinated national defense measures.

a. Investigative missions of the Navy, Air Force and Army are generally similar and parallel.

b. The Counter Intelligence Corps always has worked in close harmony with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Navy has intelligence field offices in many cities in the Zone of Interior, but it does not possess an organization such as the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Office of Naval Intelligence has consulted the files of the Counter Intelligence Corps in thousands of personnel cases and other investigations.

c. However, the close liaison between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Counter Intelligence Corps is not limited to the use of the Army's files, but in addition the Counter Intelligence Corps is performing investigations for the Navy.

d. The Army Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps is a component part of the overall Counter Intelligence Corps.

Conclusions

7. Continuing statutory authority, as delegated to the Secretary of War under Title 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941, exists for the creation of the Counter Intelligence Corps as a permanent branch of the Regular Army.

8. The Counter Intelligence Corps has been recognized as a necessary and effective service since its inception in World War I, and its natural development has been toward becoming a permanent branch of the Army.

9. The establishment of a permanent professional Counter Intelligence Corps will insure maximum security within the military establishment of the United States.

10. Constant vigilance must be maintained against infiltration of the armed forces by subversive groups or organizations.

11. Based on the success of the Technical Services type of organization, the organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps should consist of both permanent and detailed officers personnel and permanently assigned enlisted personnel.

12. The Counter Intelligence Corps is readily adaptable to integration into the unification plan of the armed forces. The integration of the Counter Intelligence Corps into the Armed Forces of the United States will effect great economy and increase the overall efficiency of the counterintelligence function.

It is recommended that:

a. The Counter Intelligence Corps be constituted a permanent branch of the Regular Army under Title 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941.

b. The Counter Intelligence Corps consist of, for the interim Army, one Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps with the rank of Brigadier General; such additional officers in grades from Colonel to Second Lieutenant, inclusive, not to exceed two percent of the projected 45,000 Regular Army officers, and warrant officers and enlisted men not to exceed one half of one percent of the strength of the Army. This will not result in any increase in the overall strength of the Army.*

Two proposed Army regulations were included with this study. The first of these dealt with general provisions for the Counter Intelligence Corps:

Corps:

	Paragraph
Composition	1
Duties of the Chief of Counter Intelligence Corps	2

1. Composition. The Counterintelligence Corps will consist of one Chief of Counter Intelligence Corps and other officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men as may be assigned or detailed thereto by competent orders.

2. Duties of the Chief of Counter Intelligence Corps. In addition to such duties as may be prescribed, the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps will be responsible, under the direction of the Chief of Staff, through the Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff, for the following duties:

a. Administration.

(1) The command, administration, and government of the Counter Intelligence Corps installations and of personnel on duty thereat, except as provided in War Department Circular Nr 138, 14 May 1946, as amended by War Department Circular Nr 170, 11 June 1946.

* Report of Board of Officers 31 January 1947 on creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps as a permanent branch of the Regular Army, pp7 (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center).

(2) The general supervision over the procurement and administration of the personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

(3) The establishment of policies and procedures governing assignment and utilization of personnel from the Counter Intelligence Corps for duty in other intelligence units and for duty as faculty members and students in the military intelligence and counterintelligence schools.

(4) The recommendation for assignment and utilization of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel for counterintelligence duty with the staffs of the War Department, theaters of operations, territorial commands, and other commands.

(5) The administration of funds apportioned to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. Training.

(1) The conduct or supervision of all counterintelligence training of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

(2) The conduct of specialized training of selected military personnel in those places of counterintelligence training for which centralized War Department instruction is desirable.

(3) The supervision of the counterintelligence training of military personnel in civilian universities or in foreign institutions. Such training will include, where necessary, such specialized training not primarily of a counterintelligence nature, but required as background for performance of counterintelligence functions.

(4) The maintainance of research and experimentation concerning the peacetime training of personnel in wartime aspects of counterintelligence.

(5) The supervision of the training of personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

(6) The preparation and revision of all training manuals, pamphlets and instructions required by the Army for proper counterintelligence indoctrination.

(7) The supervision of the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps in accordance with current directives of the War Department.

c. Research.

(1) The initiation of study, research, and experimentation necessary to develop counterintelligence equipment, doctrine, and procedures.

(2) Maintenance of research and experimentation concerning the use of technical methods and other advanced techniques, and its application to counterintelligence functions.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BOARD

	Paragraph
Station	1
Purpose	2
Composition	3
Direction and Control	4

1. Station. The Counter Intelligence Board will be stationed at such post or place as the War Department may direct.

2. Purpose. The purpose of the Counter Intelligence Board will be to consider such subjects pertaining to counterintelligence as may be referred to it by the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps. It will submit to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps recommendations for improvement of counterintelligence training, doctrine, techniques, functions and specialized supplies and equipment.

3. Composition. The Counter Intelligence Board will consist of a president, detailed as such, and such other officers as may be designated by the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Such other personnel as the War Department may direct may be employed to assist the Counter Intelligence Board in the execution of its function.

4. Direction and control. The Counter Intelligence Board will operate under the direction and control of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

Appendix 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE CIC CENTER AND CAMP HOLABIRD

Memo Nr 20-2, Headquarters, Camp Holabird, 15 July 1948*, outlined the duties and responsibilities of the personnel at the CIC Center:

Commanding General

The Commanding General, CIC Center, was also the Commanding General of Camp Holabird, and the Chief, CIC. The duties of Commanding General, CIC Center involved those of Commandant, CIC School, which was a part of the CIC Center. He operated under the Commanding General, Second Army, in matters pertaining to Camp Holabird and under the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, in all other matters.

Deputy Post Commander

The Deputy Post Commander was charged with assisting and advising the Commanding General and assuring staff coordination of matters other than those pertaining to the CIC. The Deputy Post Commander worked closely with the Executive Officer assuring mutual coordination of appropriate matters.

Executive Officer

1. General Duties. The Executive Officer functioned as Chief of Staff, was an assistant and advisor to the Commanding General, and acted as the principal coordinating agent of the staff. He was a member of the CIC School Board. His duties included matters pertaining to the CIC Center and School and to Camp Holabird.

2. Specific Duties.

a. Formulated and announced policies for the general operation of the staff.

b. Directed and coordinated the work of the staff groups with respect to the activities and relations within and between the groups, units or agencies.

c. Kept the Commanding General fully informed of the strength, morale, training, equipment, health, and general effectiveness of the major elements under his command.

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* Memo Number 20-2 Headquarters, Camp Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, 15 July 1948 (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center)

d. Received decisions from the Commanding General and took the following action:

(1) Made such additional decisions as might be directed by the Commanding General and gave necessary instructions to the staff in furtherance of the decisions.

(2) Allotted the detailed work of preparing plans, studies, reports, and orders, assured coordination of the resulting drafts and submitted them to the Commanding General for approval.

e. Took steps to insure that all orders, staff recommendations and actions emanating from the Headquarters were in accordance with the policies or plans of the Commanding General.

f. By personal observation and with the assistance of the staff groups, saw that the orders and instructions of the Commanding General were executed.

g. Maintained a continuous study of conditions with a view to being prepared for contingencies.

h. Assembled the routine reports of the staff sections, and after their approval by the Commanding General, made appropriate distribution.

i. Exercised staff supervision of the CIC-GS Liaison Office.

The CIC Board

1. General Functions. The CIC Board was charged with the coordination of overall CIC plans and policies involving two or more staff agencies and with the supervision of developmental activities in the field of special investigative equipment and techniques.

2. Specific Functions.

a. Advised the Chief, CIC, on overall plans and policies affecting the current or future status of the CIC.

b. Interviewed returned CIC personnel and disseminated reports of the information.

c. Assembled and edited "The CIC Digest."

d. Reviewed and analyzed field activities reports and disseminated the information.

e. Initiated or assembled and edited revisions to CIC field and technical manuals.

f. Supervised testing and developing of CIC special investigative equipment making use of CIC technical laboratory, field detachments, and other military or civilian facilities, and made appropriate recommendations based thereon.

g. Searched out equipment, methods, or techniques that might be of use to CIC and made recommendations concerning their further development for CIC.

CIC School Board

1. The CIC School Board was charged with the study, review, and submission of recommandations to the Commanding General on matters pertaining to the maintenance of proper instructional and educational standards and the following of prescribed doctrine in the CIC School.

2. Members of the School Board were:

a. Executive Officer.

b. Chief, CIC Board.

c. Director of CIC School.

d. Director of Intelligence, Organization, Operations, and Training.

e. Chiefs of Instructional Divisions, or other appropriate officers, who might be called before the Board for certain specific information. These were non-voting members.

CIC Liaison Officer

The CIC Liaison Officer with GSUSA insured close coordination between the Chief, CIC and the ID and other GS divisions of the Department of the Army. Procedures are prescribed in WDGS Circular 35-11, 15 August 1947.

Acting Inspector General

1. Received and processed complaints.

2. Inspected and audited funds.

3. Reviewed requests for hardships, dependency, and National Interest discharges and made appropriate recommendations.

4. Conducted special investigations and inspections as ordered by the Commanding General.

5. Supervised and coordinated established routine inspections.

Personnel and Administration Division

1. General Duties. The Personnel and Administration Division was charged with the formulation of policies, preparation of plans, and executive and supervisory functions pertaining to administrative matters and matters relating to manpower as a whole and personnel as individuals through CIC, world-wide, and for Camp Holabird.

2. Specific Duties.

a. Exercised staff supervision and coordination of the:

(1) Adjutant.
(2) Post Exchange Officer.
(3) Legal Officer.
(4) Chaplain.
(5) Special Services Officer.
(6) Provost Marshal.
(7) Clubs.

b. For CIC on a world-wide basis and for Camp Holabird locally, the personnel and administration division formulated and coordinated policies and plans for, and carried out executive or supervisory functions pertaining to:

(1) Personnel matters concerned with procurement, selection, classification, career management, processing for training, assignment, reassignment, or transfer, promotion, separation or retirement.

(2) Morale matters concerned with postal service, recreational activities, citations, honor awards and decorations, motion pictures, Army exchange, leaves of absence, religious activity, pay, insurance, allotments, welfare organizations and Red Cross.

(3) Discipline, law and order, military justice and courts-martial jurisdiction, punishments and rewards.

(4) Troop strength and casualty reports and other personnel records and reports.

(5) Personnel estimate and plans concerned with personnel statistics, personnel economy, headquarters organization and operation and suballotment of grades.

(6) General regulations and routine administration concerning individuals and administration not specifically assigned to another staff division.

Adjutant

1. Processed all official correspondence in accordance with regulations and approved policies. Where no policy had been established, he initiated action to obtain the policies.

2. Prepared, reviewed, authenticated, reproduced and distributed all orders, instructions, and communications passing through command channels.

3. Maintained the office of record for the headquarters.

4. Supervised the operation of the Army Postal Service.

5. Supervised the central procurement, storage, distribution, and issue of DA publications and blank forms.

6. Established office procedure for administrative matters, including recommendations for its extension to subordinate units.

7. Performed all functions of hiring, placement, training, payroll, employee relations, classification and wage administration, and maintained all records pertaining to civilian personnel, paid from appropriate funds.

8. Operated reports control.

9. Maintained all records of military personnel, prepared payroll for enlisted personnel and pay vouchers for officer personnel.

10. Operated reproduction section to include mimeographing and photolithography.

Provost Marshal

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on matters pertaining to control of military and civilian personnel and on matters involving the physical security of the post of Camp Holabird.

2. Provided for the safety and protection of the post and its equipment against all types of hazards, except fire.

3. Provided the necessary police and criminal investigative activities at, and adjacent to, the post.

4. Enforced traffic and other control regulations.

5. Apprehended and received absentees and deserters.

6. Maintained necessary control records of civilians and of motor vehicles.

7. Cooperated with local law enforcement agencies in controlling the conduct of military personnel.

8. Provided ceremonial and honor guards as required.

9. Operated the guard house and controlled prisoners.

Special Service Officer

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on recreational and welfare activities of the command.

2. Organized and supervised athletic and hobby activities of the command.

3. Planned and conducted recreational and entertainment programs.

4. Operated the Army Theater, Service Clubs, Post Library, and other recreational activities.

5. Acted as post children's school officer.

6. Cooperated with the local community and other agencies in arranging for recreational and athletic activities in the area.

Chaplain

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on religious and morale activities of the command.

2. Supervised the spiritual welfare of the command.

3. Conducted religious services.

4. Gave spiritual ministrations to the sick, wounded, and imprisioned.

5. Corresponded with relatives of the post population and of deceased personnel.

6. Coordinated the religious, social, and civic activities of the various welfare organizations.

7. Conducted instruction pertaining to morality and citizenship.

8. Prepared estimates and allotted funds for religious activities not specifically charged to other agencies of the command.

Post Exchange Officer

1. Supervised the establishment and operation of the Post Exchange.

2. Planned for, prepared, and implemented the meeting of the needs of the military population adequately and at a reasonable cost.

Legal Officer

1. Advised the Commanding General, staff, and other members of the command on questions of law.

2. Supervised the administration of military justice within the command.

3. Reviewed and passed on questions of legal sufficiency.

4. Reviewed and recommended the action to be taken upon charges preferred for trial by military courts and the record of trial by such courts.

Intelligence, Organization, Operation and Training Division

1. General Duties. The Intelligence, Organization, Operation and Training Division was charged with the formulation of policies, preparation of plans and supervisory or executive functions pertaining to organization, training, mobilization, operations, CIC specialization of MI reserve, public information, unit histories, general education and post intelligence duties.

2. Specific Duties.

a. Exercised staff supervision and coordination of the:

(1) Troop Information and Education Officer.

(2) Public Information Officer.

b. Carried out the functions of post intelligence officer.

c. On a world-wide basis for CIC and locally for Camp Holabird, the Intelligence, Organization, Operation, and Training Division formulated and coordinated policy, recommendations and plans for:

(1) The organization of the units of CIC and Camp Holabird.

(2) Training of units and individuals of CIC Center and of Camp Holabird.

(3) Implementing established plans and policies in matters specific to the CIC Specialization of the MI Reserve.

(4) Reserve matters specific to CIC Specialization of MI Reserve, to include the preparation of training materials in coordination with the Chief, Training Group, ID, USA.

(5). Mobilization of units and individuals of the CIC and Class I activities at Camp Holabird.

(6) Allocation of priorities for the assignment of personnel and equipment (coordinated with P & A and S & S).

(7) The Army doctrine for the operational employment of CIC personnel and units.

(8) CIC participation in DA operations.

(9) Composition, activation and deactivation of CIC elements in the field.

(10) Training objectives for Army-wide CIC training.

(11) Training inspections.

d. Maintained CIC Center and post histories and coordinated and assembled history of CIC world-wide.

e. Exercised staff policy coordination for the CIC School.

f. Advised the Chief, CIC and staff on matters involving the provisions of AR 380-5.

Information and Education Officer

1. The Information and Education Officer was concerned with troop information and education activities other than those falling under the jurisdiction of the Director of the CIC School.

2. Advised the Commanding General and Staff on matters pertaining to troop information and education.

3. Provided orientation, education, and information material and aids and recommended means and methods of their dissemination and distribution.

4. Coordinated and supervised orientation, education and information activities.

5. Made facilities available for the presentation of films, exhibits, lectures and group instructions.

6. Planned organized, and administered off-duty education programs.

7. Maintained a library of current information material.

8. Conducted Army orientation courses.

Public Information Officer

1. Advised the Commanding General and his staff on questions of public relations, developed and maintained public understanding of the command, prepared material for use by informational media in accordance with established policies, and maintained liaison with representatives of press, radio and other groups.

2. Published the post newspaper.

Director Counter Intelligence Corps School

1. General Duties. The Director of the CIC School was charged with the operation of the CIC School.

2. Specific Duties. The specific duties were limited to CIC School matters and included:

a. Advised the Commanding General and staff on matters pertaining to the CIC School.

b. Prepared and directed training programs and schedules.

c. Formulated and coordinated policies and plans pertaining to the CIC School.

d. Organized curriculars and directed preparation and assembly of instructional materials and equipment.

e. Formulated and maintained training standards.

f. Directed and supervised administrative activities of the School.

g. Directed preparation of School budget and supervised expenditure of school training funds.

h. Directed assignment of staff and instructors.

i. Participated in classification and placement of student personnel with School activities.

j. Supervised the Book Store, the Student Library, and the Faculty Reference Library.

k. Maintained and operated the Technical Laboratory (coordinated with the CIC Board to assist in development activities with regard to technical equipment).

l. Developed and directed instructor guidance program.

Investigations and Records Control Section

1. General Duties. The Investigations and Records Control Section was charged with the control of all investigations of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel; the maintenance of the necessary files and records in connection therewith; and the control of CIC badges and credentials.

2. Specific Functions.

a. Initiated and reviewed background investigations of personnel procured for duty with all components of the CIC, world-wide, including reserve personnel of the CIC Specialization of the MI Reserve and U.S. civilians employed by the CIC; made appropriate recommendations thereon; and took action in accordance with the final decision regarding eligibility of persons for duty with CIC.

b. Maintained control of background investigations of active or potential CIC personnel and of badges and credentials.

c. Maintained central files and records including:

(1) Background investigations,
(2) Badges and credentials.
(3) Personnel strength and reports.
(4) Personnel statistics.

d. Prepared and forwarded CIC Intelligence Field Files on personnel found ineligible for CIC.

e. Conducted special and/or local investigations as directed by the Chief, CIC.

Troop Commander/Headquarters Commandant

1. General Functions. The Troop Commander Headquarters Commandant was charged with the command of all troops at Camp Holabird and for executive functions in the maintenance of local services.

2. Specific Functions.

a. Provided overall supervision and operation of all assigned and attached troop units of the CIC Center and Camp Holabird, including command, quartering, discipline, morale, recreation, military training, supply of clothing and equipment of troops, and routine administration.

b. Operated the consolidated EM mess.

c. Operated the Post motor pool.

d. Assisted the Post Engineer in first echelon maintenance of troop buildings and grounds.

e. Operated the post billetting office.

f. Provided and supervised periodic post area police.

g. Provided and supervised troop janitorial details.

h. In coordination with Director, Personnel and Administration, provides personnel from troops for school and post requirements.

i. Was responsible for the preparation of the CI security plan for the immediate headquarters of the Commanding General.

Services and Supply Division

1. General Duties. The Services and Supply Division was charged with the formulation of policies, preparation of plans and executive and supervisory functions relating to supply, storage, transportation, construction, maintenance overall building assignment, fiscal affairs, hospitalization, salvage, and related logistical matters.

2. Specific Functions.

a. Exercised staff supervision and coordination of the:

(1) Post Engineer.
(2) QM (Post General Supply).
(3) Post Fiscal Officer.
(4) Transportation.
(5) Post Signal.
(6) Surgeon.
(7) Claims and Surveys.

b. Operated the CIC Depot and arranged for local purchase of materials.

c. Prepared budgets and administered expenditures of funds.

d. Maintained and compiled statistics relating to logistical matters.

e. Formulated policies and prepared plans concerning requirements for procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies.

f. Allocated training arms and ammunition.

g. Furnished overall coordination of normal post police.

Fiscal Officer

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff of fiscal methods, procedures and operations involving appropriated funds.

2. Prepared post budgest, including justifications.

3. Maintained files of obligating instruments such as payrolls, orders, and contracts, and determined funds to be charged against allotments.

4. Prepared and issued monthly and annual reports of obligations and expenditures.

5. Maintained fiscal accounting records of various funds and is responsible for audit functions of nonappropriated funds.

6. Prepared post budgets, including justifications.

7. Maintained files of obligating instruments such as payrolls, orders, and contracts, and determined funds to be charged against allotments.

8. Prepared and issued monthly and annual reports of obligations and expenditures.

9. Maintained fiscal accounting records of various funds and was responsible for audit functions of nonappropriated funds at station.

10. Prepared and reviewed correspondence concerning fiscal matters.

11. Requested allotment of funds for fiscal periods and special projects.

12. Maintained fiscal control system.

13. Prepared and issued fiscal reports pertaining to the status of allotments and other fiscal matters.

Post Engineer

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on all engineer matters.

2. Planned and supervised engineer activity of the post including use of engineer personnel.

3. Furnished plans and provided technical supervision of construction.

4. Maintained and repaired buildings except for first echelon maintenance, provided by troop commander, general utility systems, and permanently installed facilities including refrigeration, sewage systems, road, walks, railroads, and target ranges.

5. Operated and/or procured utilities and engineer facilities including water, electrical, garbage and waste and disposal, other routine police functions, gas heating and utility and post general repair shops.

6. Constructed additions, exteriors, alterations, and rehabilitations necessary.

7. Packed and crated household goods and effects.

8. Maintained and operated fire protection equipment and systems.

9. Provided insect, rodent, and vermin control and janitorial services.

10. Directed and coordinated post improvement work.

Quartermaster

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on quartermaster matters.

2. Determined requirements for and procured, stored, and distributed quartermaster equipment and supplies.

3. Was responsible for QM storage, maintenance and repair facilities.

4. Supervised food service program except mess operation.

5. Supervised salvage service.

6. Operated QM Commissary and QM Sales Store.

7. Furnished Post Laundry service.

8. Was responsible for maintenance of proper stock levels.

9. Was responsible for local purchase of QM supplies.

10. Acted as Post Ordnance Officer and Post Chemical Officer.

11. Maintained Consolidated Property Account.

Signal Officer

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on all signal matters.

2. Furnished, installed, and maintained communication facilities for the post.

3. Published phone directory and received phone accounts.

4. Received and sent teletype messages over ACAN net, handled Western Union Service, maintained appropriate records and accounts.

5. Handled post communication funds.

Claims and Surveys

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on all matters involving claims and surveys.

2. Investigated accidents involving military personnel or equipment which might result in claims in favor or against the U.S. Government. Such investigations to include possible claims against the Government, line of duty status of injured military personnel, and need for disciplinary action as well as preparation of reports of investigations and recommendations appropriate thereto.

3. Estimated amount of damage on loss of property.

4. Advised on legal right and obligations as to claims.

5. Processed surveys.

Surgeon

1. Advised the Commanding General and staff on all matters pertaining to the health and sanitation of the command.

2. Provided general dispensary service for the post (and Baltimore area) to include medical and dental care for military personnel and dependents.

3. Conducted necessary evacuation activities.

4. Determined requirements for, procured, stored, maintained proper stock levels and distributes medical, dental, and veterinary equipment and supplies.

5. Provided emergency dispensary service for Headquarters Maryland Military District, Baltimore Signal Depot, and local NG and ROTC units.

6. Was responsible for inspection of meat, dairy products, vegetables and other veterinary activities of the post.

7. Inspected the sanitation and cleanliness of the post.

Appendix 3

ORGANIZATION OF THE CIC SCHOOL

Memorandum Number 1, Counter Intelligence Corps School, Camp Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, dated 10 November 1948, was the authority for the reorganization of the School.

1. Effective this date, the Counter Intelligence Corps School will be organized as shown on the attached organizational chart with functions and responsibilities as enumerated below.

2. a. Director of Training. The Director of Training is charged with the coordination and supervision of the preparation and presentation of all academic material for which the School is responsible and will include:

(1) Organization of the curricula for such courses as are prescribed.

(2) Direction and supervision of the conduct and methods of instruction.

(3) Preparation of training literature and training films as to scope and content.

(4) Preparation of programs of instruction.

(5) Conduct of instructor training.

b. School Secretary. The School Secretary will act as the Adjutant and Personnel Officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps School and will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Registration of students.

(2) Maintaining records of the grades, academic standing, student evaluation and trait scale of each individual student.

(3) Preparation of diplomas and the determination of the eligibility of each student to receive a diploma.

(4) Handling of all personnel matters, including the maintenance of necessary records coincident with this responsibility.

(5) Maintenance and operation of a Message Center for the Counter Intelligence Corps School, including the routing and maintenance of a suspense system on all correspondence.

(6) Act as coordinating agent for the proper preparation and handling of officers' efficiency reports for officers assigned to the School.

(7) Act as coordinating agent for the Assistant Commandant and School personnel in matters not directly concerning training or operations.

(8) Proper organization and maintenance of general correspondence and records files for the Counter Intelligence Corps School.

(9) Coordination and general supervision of Library and Book Department activities.

(10) Coordination and supervision of the required academic efficiency reports.

c. Operations Officer. The Operations Officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps School will have the following duties and responsibilities:

(1) Supervision of design and manufacture of new training aids, supervision of maintenance of training aids, and the replacement of defective or obsolete training aids.

(2) Procurement and training of personnel to be used in the Demonstrations Unit, and materials and facilities used by the Demonstration Unit and their equipment.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of schedules for all types of curricula presently presented or to be presented by the Counter Intelligence Corps School.

(4) Procurement of supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps School, to include T/O equipment, maps, textbooks, non-T/O equipment (through local purchase) and distribution of same.

(5) Through liaison with the proper authorities, condition of classrooms and classroom equipment, with the exception of items of equipment that are signed out to individuals by reason of their intended use within the classrooms.

(6) Preparation of security plans for buildings used generally by the school and the coordination of security plans from individual branches within the school headquarters.

(7) Preparation and coordination of fire and safety regulations in accordance with memoranda published by Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Center.

(8) Establishment of proper liaison within the Counter Intelligence Corps Center to effect the efficient performance of the above duties and responsibilities.

(9) Coordination and supervision of the printing and publication of training literature and training films for which the school is responsible.

3. Instructional Branches.

a. Administrative Subjects Branch. The Administrative Subjects Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in Administration in CIC, Organization of the National Military Establishment, Intelligence Procedures, Typewriting, English, and Investigative Reports.

b. Investigative Subjects Branch. The Investigative Subjects Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in Security, Observation and Description, Interrogations, Informants, Evidence, Countersabotage, Surveillance, Raids and Searches, Undercover, CIC Incidents, CIC in Combat and CIC Detachment Problem.

c. Technical Subjects Branch. The Technical Subjects Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in Security against Surreptitious Entry, Security against Sound Devices, Fingerprinting, Investigative Photography and Weapons.

d. Legal Subjects Branch. The Legal Subjects Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in Investigative Legal Principles and Courts Martial Procedure.

e. International Survey Branch. The International Survey Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in Democracy and Communism.

f. Language Branch. The Language Branch is responsible for the preparation and presentation of all instruction in German, Japanese, and Russian Languages.

4. School Library and Book Department. The School Librarian and Book Department Officer is responsible for the operation of the School Library and Book Department as a service to the faculty, cadre, and students of the Counter Intelligence Corps School, under the supervisory control of the School Secretary.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXV

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OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND ITALY

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of 1 May 1945, a convoy of 15 American Army jeeps inched slowly through the Brenner Pass in the Italian Alps and crossed the border into Austria.

For the 25 CIC Agents who rode in the jeeps, this was the beginning of an adventure into the unknown. They had proven themselves in combat; now they faced the challenge of an occupation, with its new and different problems.[1]

It was an occupation in a land long noted for international intrigue. Austria's reputation as a mecca for spies and conspirators of every nation was legendary; few countries could have provided a more glamorous setting for a counterintelligence mission.

These first CIC agents and those who followed them were to learn in the months ahead that the devastation of a world war and the ensuing occupation did not destroy the espionage nets. New ones sprang up overnight as occupation forces of four nations and displaced persons from many more swarmed into Austria.

Post-war Austria was a hodgepodge of nationalities. Displaced persons by the thousands swelled Austria's population of 7,000,000 making it a simple matter for an agent of a foreign power to slip quietly across a border and lose himself among the multitudes. The terrain, dotted with mountains and lakes, offered cover when the crowds did not.

Divergent political philosophies and organizations further complicated the picture. Remnants of the Nazi Party still held key positions in government and business when CIC moved into Austria, and CIC's first major task was the De-Nazification of the country. Soon it became evident that Communist activities were an even greater menace to freedom and to the security of the American forces in Austria. Even among the displaced persons, particularly the Jews, there were organized efforts to subvert American authority.

By June 1948 CIC was to learn that two out of every 1000 persons in Austria were directly or indirectly linked with Soviet-aligned intelligence agencies. Their total was believed to exceed 15,000. This number was exclusive of Austria's Communists, who were estimated to constitute six per cent of the population.[2]

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1 Interview with Maj Paul Lyon, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).
2 Weekly Intelligence Summary 157, USFA, dtd 11 Jun 48 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

That such a situation would exist was remote in the thoughts of the first CIC agents to enter Austria. In the summer of 1945, it was assumed that CIC would remain in the country only long enough to destroy the Nazi political machine and spirit and to eradicate anti-Allied groups.[3]

By agreement of the four powers, Austria was divided into four occupation zones. The United States, with headquarters first at Vienna and later at Salzburg, controlled the northwest segment of the country. France occupied the western portion, with headquarters at Innsbruck. Great Britian maintained headquarters at Graz to control the southern zone, and the Russians occupied the areas to the northeast, with headquarters at Vienna.

Vienna, the Austrian capital, was under four-power control, although it was located deep within the Russian sector. Each of the Allies was responsible for a zone of the city, and control of a separate international zone rotated among them.[4]

3 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, dtd 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

4 See map attached as Appendix 1.

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE 430TH CIC DETACHMENT

Not until January 1945 was it definitely known to the Counter Intelligence Corps at Allied Force Headquarters in Caserta, Italy, that the United States was to join the Occupation forces in Austria. The exact zones which the four Occupation Powers were to control had not yet been established, nor had the ways and means of entering these zones been determined.

However, Allied intelligence agencies--including the Counter Intelligence Corps--did not wait for the final decisions to begin preparation for their work in Austria. Late in 1944, the British in Italy established an intelligence school at Castellamare to train their agents for work in Austria. Orientation courses, each lasting about two weeks, were conducted in an ancient castle overlooking the Bay of Naples.

American Counter Intelligence personnel tentatively selected for duty in Austria were invited to attend the British school, and CIC agents from base section detachments as well as from front line units came to Castellamare for the classes.

Although the course was short, it was adequate. The curriculum stressed the Nazi Party and its para-military organizations in Austria; German intelligence and police agencies; and the geography, history, and culture of Austria. Special training in proposed travel control operations and a tentative arrest policy were included. In addition, CIC agents slated for Austrian duty attended Berlitz courses in the German language.

Agents for Austria Selected

Senior CIC commanders in Italy met in Rome in February 1945 to make the final selection of CIC personnel for the occupation of Austria. Officers who attended the meeting included Lt Col Ralph W. Powers, Chief of CIC, Allied Forces Headquarters; Lt Col Stephen Spingarn, commander of the 305th CIC Detachment; Lt Col Floyd Snowden, 426th CIC Detachment commanding officer, and Lt Col Thomas Qualters, commander of the 428th CIC Detachment.

Colonel Qualters was designated to remain in Italy as Chief, CIC, Allied Force Headquarters. Colonels Powers, Spingarn, and Snowden were selected to lead the CIC organization in Austria. It was determined that CIC personnel in Italy would be divided equally between Allied Forces Headquarters and the Occupation forces in Austria, with the Mediterranean Theater retaining most of the Italian linguists. The contingent remaining in the Mediterranean Theater assumed the title of 426th CIC Detachment, while the group destined for Austria was to be known as the 430th CIC Detachment.

Ultimately, headquarters of the 430th CIC Detachment would be established in Vienna, with sub-detachment "A" at Salzburg, "B" at Linz, and "C" at Vienna. The process of organization was slow, however, and both the Salzburg and Linz sub-detachments were active at least a month before CIC agents entered Vienna.

Actually, the advance group of agents who entered Austria from Italy did not originally operate as the 430th CIC Detachment. Since the American element of the 15th Army Group at that time constituted the United States forces in Austria, the advance detachment was called the 15th Army Group CIC.[5]

CIC Arrives in Austria

The first group of CIC agents to enter Austria from Italy consisted of 25 men with 15 jeeps and was led by Captain Paul Lyon. The convoy arrived in Innsbruck via the Brenner Pass on 1 May 1945.[6]

These agents had been drawn from all the CIC detachments in Italy at that time: the 85th, 88th, 91st, and 92nd Infantry Division Detachments, detachments with the 10th Mountain Division, II and IV Corps, Fifth Army CIC (305th), Rome Area Command Detachment (426th), Peninsular Base Section (430th), and the Mediterranean Air Force CIC (425th).[7]

Twelve days later, on 12 May, the second group arrived in Innsbruck. They had taken off by plane from Caserta on 4 May, going via Paris, France, since the first CIC group had reported difficulty in travelling from Southern Italy into Austria. Since not all German commands in Italy had signed an official armistice, this larger contingent of agents, 35 to 40 men under the command of Major W. J. Kaufman, took the long way around.[8]

On 9 May, after the end of hostilities in Europe, the group left Paris in high spirits after celebrating VE Day in the French capital. They had been issued jeeps and other equipment from the Seine Base Section in Paris. Enroute to Austria, they stopped at Heidelberg and Augsburg, Germany.

In Innsbruck, both groups first were placed under the command of Major Harry Costello, Commanding Officer of the VI Corps CIC Detachment of Seventh Army. At that time the 103d Infantry Division was the American unit on liberation duty in

5 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
6 Interview with Maj Paul Lyon (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).
7 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
8 Interview with Maj Paul Lyon (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

the Austrian Tyrol, and the division's CIC detachment under Lt Dugard W. Hudson, was in Innsbruck, the provincial capital.

By the middle of May, a third group of CIC agents arrived from Italy under the command of Major Jack B. Cameron.

Innsbruck: Transitional Stage

Innsbruck was not the ultimate destination of CIC agents who arrived for the occupation of Austria, since it fell within the French zone. However, agents operated there temporarily before pushing on toward Linz and Salzburg in the American zone.

Major Cameron was in charge of the 15th Army Group CIC located at the Gauhaus (District House) in the city. Also in Innsbruck was a Seventh Army subsection under Capt Walter E. Greene, and a VI Corps Detachment under Major Costello. Lieutenant Hudson's 103d Detachment teams were located at Schwaz, Seefeld, Tels and Steinach; and 44th Detachment teams under Lt Edward A. De Cindis were located at Imst, Reutte, Landeck and Wenns. Major John Lucas of 15th Army Group was in charge of border control teams at Scharnitz, Nauders, the Brenner Pass and other points of entry.[9]

Since CIC agents were in Innsbruck only a short time, they encountered few operational problems there, but a problem of a different sort resulted in what agents termed the "battle of the border."

Post exchange supplies were unavailable in Innsbruck. To obtain them, agents made regular trips across the border into Italy. A CIC agent would race to the Brenner Pass in his jeep to be there early in the morning when the border control post first opened. After picking up what supplies could be found at CIC offices and outposts down the line in Italy, he would make another dash to the border in order to cross into Austria before the check point closed for the evening.[10]

By 15 July, the Americans had withdrawn from Innsbruck and the Tyrol, leaving the province in French control.

CIC Moves to the American Zone

Early in June 1945, Colonel Spingarn and a small group of CIC agents moved from Innsbruck to Salzburg to open the first office of the 430th CIC Detachment in the American Zone of Austria.

9 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

10 Interview with Maj Paul Lyon (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

Moving into Salzburg, the agents found that the region had received preliminary counterintelligence coverage by CIC combat detachments with Seventh Army, XV Corps, 3d Division, and 101st Airborne Division. The combat detachments turned over their files to the 430th CIC Detachment as the occupation began. The 430th obtained a building within the city for office space, and agents were billeted in a castle seven miles away.[11]

Colonel Spingarn returned to the United States in October 1945, and Maj Kaufman commanded the Salzburg section of the 430th CIC Detachment until June 1946, when he was succeeded by Gerald Weber, a former CIC captain who was retained as a civilian employee. In January 1947, John Burkel, also a former CIC officer in Italy, became chief of the Salzburg office and remained until the summer of 1950.

Shortly after the first office in Salzburg was opened, a small group of agents entered Upper Austria and established an office in Ried, with Agent John D. McDonald in charge. Later in June 1945, Agents Paul Lyon and Francis Looney went to Linz from Innsbruck to find suitable offices for a headquarters. At that time, the exact borders of the American Zone in Upper Austria were not yet determined; in fact, the Ried office had a sub-section at Rohrback on the Czechoslovakian border. This region was turned over to the Russians in August when the demarcation line was moved further south, and the Rohrback sub-section was closed.

The quarters found by Lyon and Looney for Sub-Detachment "B" were on Roseggerstrasse in Linz. The buildings were roofless, windows were broken, and there was no running water. German highway engineers who occupied the buildings moved to other quarters. After repairs, the Linz section, 430th CIC Detachment, moved in. Colonel Snowden took charge on 17 June 1945 and remained until September 1947, when he became Chief, CIC, United States Forces in Austria. Maj Jack Cameron was the first executive officer and chief of investigations. Agent Carl H. Nicholson was adjutant. The Linz City sub-section was headed by Agent McDonald.

The Linz Section was organized on a sub-section basis because it covered so much territory. Small offices were established in the key towns by November 1945, and the Linz Section soon became the largest of the CIC sections in Austria, with 102 agents. Originally the section had twelve sub-sections and two sub-offices; later there were twelve sub-sections and four sub-offices. During the time when there was a dearth of personnel, the section had only ten sub-sections, several of them manned by only one agent.

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11 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

In November, Special Agent John W. Berg replaced Maj Cameron as chief of investigations. Special Agent Thomas Lucid replaced Nicholson as adjutant and later became chief of the Linz Section. In March 1946 Special Agent Allen Robe took over as chief of investigations when Berg went to Salzburg.[12]

430th Headquarters Opened in Vienna

For about a month after offices were opened in Linz and Salzburg, those sections of the 430th CIC Detachment operated virtually as separate detachments. Then, late in July, CIC moved into Vienna, and Colonel Powers arrived from Italy to assume command of the 430th CIC Detachment.[13]

Counterintelligence operations got off to a late start in Vienna because of the failure of the Allies to reach full agreement on the extent of their activities in the Austrian capital. The first agents destined for work in Vienna were forced to wait idly in Linz until the Russians agreed to the presence of US intelligence personnel in the capital.

Policy disagreements between the four powers were settled during the last week in July, and a CIC jeep caravan formed at Linz to accompany the first American troops into Vienna. Russian soldiers with machine guns were posted at regular intervals along both sides of the road through the Soviet Zone. They snapped to attention and saluted as the CIC convoy passed.

In Vienna, a skeleton CIC staff moved into the Steinboeck Hotel, which served as a base of operations until permanent facilities were located. Within two weeks, billets at 70 and 72 Sternwartestrasse and at 21, 23, and 25 Tuerkenschanzstrasse were assigned to CIC. Detachment offices were opened in a building on Roosevelt-platz (Roosevelt Square). Soon the strength of the Vienna staff was increased to twenty-two and eventually to eighty-five.[14]

Both 430th CIC Detachment Headquarters and the Vienna Section of the detachment, later known as Sub-Detachment "C," were located in the same building. As a result, operations of the Vienna section were more closely related to headquarters than were the activities of the sections at Linz and Salzburg.[15]

At headquarters, Capt James R. Gardner became executive officer to Colonel Powers, the detachment commander. When Colonel Powers returned to the United

12 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
13 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
14 CIC History, 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).
15 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

States in November 1945, Maj John R. Rossell became chief of the 430th. He was succeeded in September 1946 by Colonel Snowden.[16]

One of Colonel Powers' first jobs in Vienna was to establish liaison with the other occupying powers, the Austrian Central Government, and the Austrian police.

Colonel Powers quickly established excellent relations with the British Field Security Service and the French Securite Militaire, but the Russians rebuffed his efforts to reach a working agreement with their intelligence agencies. In fact, when Colonel Powers made his official visit to Soviet Headquarters, the Russians curtly denied having any intelligence or counterintelligence organizations in Austria. Repeated attempts at cooperation with the Soviets failed.

Sub-Detachment Organization

Each of the sub-detachments--Vienna, Salzburg and Linz--were organized into four sections: Administration, General Investigations, Police, and Political, of which the Police and Political were generally the most complicated and possibly the most important. Particularly was this true of the Vienna office, the only one on which complete reports are available.

The Police Section quickly established liaison with the Vienna Police organization, including the two most important bureaus which would control the Austrian police in the various Bezirks (districts) scheduled to fall under American jurisdiction. The bureau charged with police work of a political nature was called the Staatspolizei or STAPO. The STAPO had been reconstituted with the approval of the Soviets before the Allies entered Vienna. It was modeled after the pre-Anschluss Vienna STAPO and was headed by Dr Heinrich Duermayer, a member of the Austrian Communist Party. The STAPO was filled with Communists who had been imprisoned in concentration camps during the Nazi regime.

When the 430th CIC Detachment arrived in Vienna, it found that the two largest jails in town and one smaller jail, all within the American Zone of the city, were packed with prisoners. Subsequently a number of cells in one of the jails were set aside for CIC arrests.

The Police Section of the Vienna CIC office proceeded to make a survey of the re-organized Vienna Police Department, and of the police authorities in the Ministry of the Interior.

16 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

By October 1945 this section began screening prisoners who had been arrested by the Austrian Police, and those prisoners who fell within the prescribed "Arrestable categories" were sent to the American internment center at Camp Marcus W. Orr, near Salzburg.

Other duties of this section of the Vienna CIC office included: keeping files on people arrested by CIC in Vienna, collecting statements of denunciations, and other matters of counterintelligence interest brought to the attention of the section either through US Army channels or by direct interview.

Political Section

The Political Section of the Vienna CIC office observed political and economic events and trends in Austria which might affect United States interests, and took remedial action when American interests appeared to be endangered. This mission required careful evaluation of information as to its reliability and accuracy; it involved making a careful choice between what was pertinent to American interests and what was not. To judge the accuracy and reliability of information required a sound knowledge of Austrian politics, past and present, and of Austria's economic framework. To decide on the importance of information for American authorities required a familiarity with the aims of American policy in Austria and constant liaison with those American agencies which made and enforced American policies.

The work of the Political Section consisted largely of providing reports which either emanated from the section directly or were initiated on requests of an American agency for detailed information on a particular subject. Reports originating in the section frequently dealt with anticipated changes in Austria's political structure, such as changes in the government, formation and activities of new political groups, attitudes of Austrian politicians toward important political and economic issues, and forecasts as to what might be expected in the future. Because of the methods employed in obtaining such information, the Political Section frequently was in a position to report in advance political situation changes which otherwise would have remained unknown. The section also conducted surveys of public opinion, including public reaction to methods used by American and other occupying authorities. It checked and reported on the progress of De-Nazification by Austrian authorities.

Often requests for reports came from such US agencies as G2 USFA and from the Political Adviser of the State Department in Vienna. Many of the reports answering these requests were highly classified. They usually concluded with recommendations as to what action should be taken, and in most cases the recommendation made by the CIC Political Section was adopted by the requesting agency.[17]

17 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

The development of a well organized political section within the Vienna detachment of the 430th was a feature in the cop for the detachment throughout Austria. The liaison established in the early days with Austrian and Allied political, economic and governmental personalities was invaluable in establishing and maintaining the premise of the American authorities in Austria. Soon after the arrival in Vienna, the 430th CIC began to gather material on the activities of the provisional government of Austria and on the political parties of the country. The results of their initial efforts were two important and extensive reports for guidance of the American occupation authorities and for the use of the War and State Departments in Washington. These were a report on the Austrian Provisional Government and a general analysis of the anti-Nazi groups.

The 430th CIC Detachment in Vienna was the first American intelligence unit to establish contact with Dr Karl Gruber before he became Austria's Foreign Minister.[18]

Additional Sections Added

By 1947, all three sub-detachments of the 430th had added two other sections--Special Projects and Research.

Colonel Snowden described the work of the Special Projects sections in a letter to the Assistant Commandant of the CIC School at Fort Holabird:

> "Special Projects: Is responsible for the investigation of individuals and situations that have a direct bearing on the Austrian Government and other Allied powers, also for the safe conduct and interrogation of well-known European personalities seeking refuge because of anti-Russian statements made in their respective countries, and who have departed their native lands because of possible threat to their lives."

18 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (National Records Facility).

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Although the Vienna CIC agents technically had no jurisdiction outside the American zone, on rare occasions they requested and obtained consent of British and French authorities to enter those zones on special cases. Before entering another zone, however, clearance with the American Provost Marshal also was required. Seldom did CIC agents venture into the Soviet sector of Vienna.

In the early days of the 430th CIC Detachment, a critical shortage of operational personnel limited the detachment's investigative work.

Because of this personnel shortage, there was little time to channel operational orders for the various sections of the detachment through a central CIC operations office. Both the Salzburg and Linz sections continued to receive requests for investigations directly from the G2 at Vienna. This saved time, especially in cases which required transmittal of information through the message center or by courier. It was deemed inadvisable to transmit operational orders in the clear via teletype or telephone, since American communication lines ran through the Soviet zone of Austria and were vulnerable to wire tapping and the possible compromise of information.[20]

Dearth of Agents Brings Recruiting Campaign

The personnel shortage became acute in the winter of 1945. Virtually all the agents of the 430th were eligible for discharge under the Army's point system, and as many of them began the trek homeward, the detachment's strength dwindled to

19 CIC History, 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

20 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

65 agents, instead of the authorized 235. Only 27 of the remaining agents had been with CIC for more than eight months. Few replacements came from the United States, and prospects for recruiting agents locally were dim.

Authorization of Civil Service ratings for CIC alleviated the critical situation. When, in November 1945, the 430th CIC Detachment was given permission to employ United States civilians as agents, twenty-six agents who had intended to return to the United States applied for jobs as civilian investigators for CIC. Sixteen were approved, and the first contracts were signed on 22 December. Other agents later converted to civilian status.

In January 1946, the 430th vigorously attacked the problem of filling its depleted ranks. The G1 in Vienna advised the detachment that no local Army personnel were suitable for CIC duty, nor was it likely that such men would be available in the near future. Contact with CIC Headquarters of United States Forces, European Theater, disclosed that no help could be expected from that source. The recruiting problem was placed squarely in the hands of the 430th itself.

Each agent was instructed to watch for qualified candidates. Each unit which left Austria, or was inactivated, was screened for personnel with proper educational background and necessary skills. Advertisements were published in unit bulletins to interest candidates. Military government activities were being discontinued, and many military personnel from that section were qualified and available. They had worked very closely with CIC in border control and in screening refugees.

The recruiting campaign was successful. By 1 July 1946 the detachment numbered 117 Agents, despite the fact that 58 more Agents had been redeployed between 1 January and 1 July 1946.[21]

The first outside help came in the fall of 1946, when 115 new agents came from the United States during October and November. While inexperienced, the new recruits caught the enthusiasm of older members of the organization, and in a relatively short time were carrying their share of the work in both administration and operations.

Until the summer of 1947, all CIC personnel in Austria wore uniforms with the US insignia only; and all other CIC personnel, except section commanding officers, worked on civilian status. After the summer of 1947 all personnel wore civilian clothes.

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21 History of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, CIC, 430th CIC Det, City of Vienna, APO 777, 15 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Private Transportation a Problem

There were apparently sufficient jeeps for operations in Austria from the beginning. However, private transportation did become a problem. In Salzburg, for example, billets for all personnel were located in a castle about seven miles from headquarters in the city, and transportation was needed. There was neither civilian nor military transportation in Salzburg area. Linz, with more field offices, had an even greater transportation problem. When dependents began to arrive in 1946, some agents purchased their own cars, thereby partially solving the problem. Practically all the dependent families were quartered in houses which had been requisitioned from private owners, former Nazi Party members.[22]

1950: Year of Changes

The year 1950 brought numerous personnel changes to CIC in Austria--changes in command all the way down the line from the Commanding General, USFA, to the commanding officers of the Linz and Salzburg sub-detachments.

Col Hugh Sargent arrived in Austria to succeed Col George Schrantz as Chief, CIC, USFA. Col Schrantz returned to the United States after serving as chief of the detachment for two years.[23]

Linz and Salzburg changed sub-detachment chiefs, and there was almost a complete exodus of "old timers" from the Detachment during the last six months of 1950.

The death of John McDonald following an automobile accident was a blow to the entire 430th. He had been with the detachment for five years and at the time of his death was Chief of Operations for the Linz Sub-Detachment.

With the new personnel in USFA echelons as well as CIC circles, policies, training programs, administration, and supply all changed. A new training program initiated in all three detachments included semi-weekly classes in German. Technical sections of the three sub-detachments profited by a new directive issued by G2, USFA, in the fall of 1950. All photographic equipment from Military Intelligence Service in Austria was consolidated with the equipment of the three CIC offices, and each of the photo laboratories of the 430th was given the responsibility for all intelligence photographic work in the area. The laboratories, expanded both in space and personnel, served not only CIC, but other Army, Air Force, Military Intelligence Service and G2 agencies in Austria. Each field office of the Salzburg and Linz sub-detachments was given adequate equipment for taking

22 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

23 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

photographs and fingerprints, and the training program included instruction in the use of this equipment."

A succession of promotions for both officers and enlisted men began in October of 1950, and morale took a new hike upward.[24]

24 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 3

DE-NAZIFICATION

CIC's first major responsibility in occupied Austria was the apprehension of war criminals and the removal of ardent Nazis from key positions in government and industry.

When the first CIC agents entered Innsbruck early in May 1945, they already were aware of the complexity of this aspect of the CIC mission in Austria. At the British Intelligence School in Castellamare they had studied proposed policies for arrest and detention of Nazi leaders. When they entered Austria, they carried lists of "Arrestable Categories," which spelled out in detail the groups of persons slated for automatic arrest.

The arrest lists included Gestapo members, all SS[25] men down to and including sergeants, all SA[26] men down to and including majors, and members of the Reichssicherheitshauptant, the combined Nazi Party intelligence agency. CIC was directed to find these people, arrest them, and turn them over to the War Crimes Commission for prosecution.[27]

On 11 July 1945, with CIC offices already functioning in Salzburg and Linz, the G2, USFA, issued a directive further clarifying CIC's role in De-Nazification. The directive was issued "as a guide for the arrest, detention, and documentation of all persons of counterintelligence interest taken into custody by the Counter Intelligence Corps in the United States Zone in Austria." It interpreted previous instructions from Allied Forces Headquarters as they applied to the United States Zone Austria. The directive stated:

> "The mission of CIC in Austria is great and manifold. The arrest and incarceration of certain proscribed individuals does not complete the task of CIC here. The complete destruction of the Nazi political machine, its formations and subsidiary organizations, the dissolution of the German Intelligence Services, the exposure and eradication of anti-Allied groups and individuals, and the prevention of the resurgence of the Nazi principle and the spirit are among the chief responsibilities of CIC in Austria."[28]

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25 The Schutz Staffeln, popularly called SS, was the Protection Guard for the Nazi Party.

26 The Sturm Abteilungen, or SA, were the Nazi Party Storm Troopers, or Brown Shirts.

27 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

28 G2, USFA, directive dtd 11 Jul 45, Subject: Arrest and Detention (Policy and Procedure) (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

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CIC Traps "Dynamite Johnny"

High on the CIC blacklist of persons accused of war crimes was Johann Schanda, better known to CIC agents as "Dynamite Johnny."

Schanda was a minor Nazi Party official in Austria who achieved notoriety--and his nickname--through a one-man reign of terror in which he blithely dynamited public buildings, tossed tear gas bombs into public meetings, beat Jews mercilessly, and tossed priests out of second-story windows.

CIC's first clue to Schanda's presence came from a woman in Vienna who had been severely beaten by the Nazi terrorist in 1938 when she criticized Hitler's actions. The informant reported that she had recognized Schanda on a Vienna street. He wore dark glasses, and his nose had been altered by plastic surgery, but the woman was positive in her identification of "Dynamite Johnny."

Agents immediately launched an intensive background investigation of Schanda in an effort to pinpoint his location. The investigation produced little more than the names of some of Schanda's relatives. One undercover agent who spoke the Viennese dialect cultivated the friendship of "Dynamite Johnny's" kinsmen. The agent soon learned that Schanda had maintained the same mistress over a period of years.

Three CIC agents were assigned to a fixed surveillance of the woman's home. Within twenty-four hours, they determined that Schanda was living there. Police registry checks revealed that Schanda had assumed the name of Johann Stadler, an Austrian who had been killed in action during the war.

A snag developed. The house occupied by Schanda and his mistress was in the Russian Sector of Vienna, and CIC agents were powerless to arrest him.

To lure Schanda into the American Sector where arrest would be possible, a CIC undercover agent requested him to appear at an American office to testify in connection with a black market case. Schanda agreed. The agent led him directly to CIC headquarters.

When Schanda entered CIC offices, agents met him with a startling greeting: "How are you, Dynamite Johnny?" After this greeting, Schanda made little effort to conceal his identity or to deny the charges against him. Growing hysterical, Schanda begged the agent in charge to hang him immediately. He was told he would have to await his turn.

The Eigruber Case

Another prominent Nazi arrested by CIC during the early days of the Austrian occupation was August Eigruber, Gauleiter (District Leader) of the Upper Danube of Austria.

Several days before the end of hostilities, German Field Marshal Kesselring met Eigruber in Graz, Austria, and warned him that the German surrender was imminent. Hoping to evade capture by the Allies, Eigruber assumed an alias and fled to a mountain hideout. His staff, except for a bodyguard named Sachermayr, deserted him. Together the two men shuttled from one mountain hideaway to another in a desperate attempt to save their lives.

Sachermayr soon tired of the incessant moving. More fearful for his own safety than for Eigruber's, the bodyguard secretly contacted CIC and outlined the itinerary Eigruber would take on his next change of hideout.

Major Cameron, then chief of investigations in the Linz office, formulated a plan for Eigruber's capture. Under Cameron's supervision, CIC agents faked a collision between a jeep and a civilian automobile at a sharp curve on the Kirchdorf-Windischgarsten road. The ruse completely blocked the narrow road Eigruber had chosen for his escape route. Eight CIC agents were placed strategically at the accident scene.

When Eigruber's automobile approached the curve, CIC agents wearing American Army uniforms ostensibly were attempting to disentangle the two vehicles. After a time, one agent asked Eigruber's chauffeur to assist them. With the chauffeur out of the car, Agents John McDonald and Henry Feldman walked back and demanded that Eigruber and his bodyguard also get out and help.

No sooner had Eigruber stepped from the car than big John McDonald pounced on him and pinned him to the ground. Feldman took over the task of subduing the bodyguard. Feldman ran into difficulty. After knocking the bodyguard to the ground, he placed his weight squarely on the bodyguard's back and began pelting him with a blackjack. But the bodyguard was tough. Other agents in the arrest party heard Feldman cry out to McDonald, "I'm hitting him on the head with the blackjack and he won't pass out. What do I do now?" McDonald, still pinning Eigruber to the ground, called back, "just hit him harder, Henry!"

The operation produced one casualty. During the few seconds required to complete the actual capture, Major Cameron stuck his finger in Eigruber's mouth to determine whether the Nazi had concealed poison. Eigruber bit the major.

After his capture, Eigruber complimented CIC on the effectiveness of the arrest plan, adding that he would have shot himself had he suspected a trap. The Nazi leader subsequently was convicted by a War Crimes Court and was hanged. Before his execution, Eigruber declared to CIC agents that he was "proud to be executed by the most brutal of the Allies."[29]

CIC Screens Pierre Laval

Sometimes during the early days of the occupation, the 430th CIC Detachment investigated, captured, and interrogated persons whose notoriety was international. For example, Special Agent Thomas Lucid (later Chief of Upper Austria Section) screened Pierre Laval, French collaborator and onetime premier, when Laval landed at Hoersching Airport near Linz on 31 July 1945. Laval had come from Spain in a Messerschmitt piloted by two German fliers.

The United States State Department had put pressure on Franco to expel Laval from Spain, where he had sought refuge after the liberation of France. It was believed that Laval intended to flee to Japan via neutral countries or, that failing, to land in an American occupied zone. He did just that. Laval got as far as Linz, then decided to throw himself on the mercy of the Americans. CIC had no sympathy for the French collaborator, however. After interrogating Laval, CIC released him to French authorities. Returned to Paris, Laval was found guilty of treason and was executed.[30]

Nazi Youth Leader Captured

That part of Austria which constituted the American zone was an area which Hitler had always called his homeland. Hitler was born in Braunau, a two hour trip north of Salzburg, in a house which CIC claimed for office space in 1945. He attended school in Leonding, a little village less than a mile up the road from CIC headquarters in Linz.

Hitler easily won support of people in this area of Austria, particularly among youth groups. The accepted leader of the Nazi youth in Upper Austria was one Johannes List, a graduate of schools which Hitler instituted to develop future leaders for both Austria and Germany.

Even before Hitler seized control of Austria, List was a leader of the Hitler Jugend in Land Salzburg. When the Nazi Party and its subordinate organizations came into power, List quickly gained a reputation as one of the most fanatical

29 CIC Cases MIS ETO, XU-741, undated (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

30 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility); and The Encyclopedia Britannica.

Nazis in the province. He was generally considered the potential leader of any Wehrwolf resistance movement which might develop.

When the Americans entered Land Salzburg, List retreated to the hills. Had his wife been less attractive, his mountain hideout might never have been discovered by CIC. But when CIC learned from informants that List occasionally visited his wife at night, agents baited a trap for the Nazi youth leader. An agent from the Hallein office of the Salzburg sub-detachment secretly entered List's home and hid in a dark hallway. Within twenty minutes, List appeared and was arrested.[31]

CIC Investigates Illegal Organizations

A year after the occupation began, CIC still was forced to devote much of its time to the tedious process of investigations of reports of revivals of Nazism, many of which were merely persistent rumors.

On 25 June 1946, a CIC team from the Linz detachment operating in Wels received a report that mysterious meetings were taking place in the vicinity of Buchkirchen, in Upper Austria. Investigation disclosed that on several occasions lights had been seen in the meeting places until around midnight, and swastikas were found cut in nearby trees.

Two days before, about 100 members of the "League of Democratic Fighters for Freedom" had held an unauthorized meeting in the Liedertafelsaal in Wels. In view of the fact that most of the men present were former members of the Heimwehr, it was felt that the movement might be a fascist organization operating under a democratic label. Investigation, however, indicated that the meetings were social rather than subversive.

Letters of Retaliation to Austrian Females

CIC at Tamsweg, near the British occupation zone, reported that threatening letters were received by several girls friendly to US troops. The letters, all similiar in tone, accused the girls of being traitors to the fallen Austrian soldiers and warned that "the day of reckoning will come." They were threatened with having their heads shaved.[32]

31 CIC History 1945-1948, attached to Letter, Headquarters 430th CIC Detachment, USFA, dtd 17 Mar 48, Subject: Outstanding CIC Cases (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

32 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #58, 13 Jul 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Nazi Rumors

Badgastein CIC Section reported on 9 November 1946 that it was investigating a rumor that propaganda spread by former Nazis had gained new heights. The propaganda reportedly had four main targets: the Jewish Displaced Persons, the Austrian Government, the Occupational forces, and the differences between the Western Allies and the USSR. Much of this propaganda, it was reported, was spread by female members of Nazi circles on their daily shopping trips and while in beauty parlors and other places where women congregated. Available records do not show the results of this investigation.

Persistent rumors were reported by the St. Gilgen CIC Section concerning the existence of an illegal organization referred to as the "Gray Ring" or "Gray Wolf," whose chief function was the collection of funds from Nazi sympathizers for the support of families of persons interned in Camp Marcus W. Orr. The group was rumored to have branches in all of Land Salzburg and Upper Austria.

Attempt at Sabotage

On 4 November 1946, a 24-pound box of US Army Engineer explosives was discovered in the ventilator of an ammunition bunker at an American Ammunition Depot in Stadl-Paura, Bezirk Wels. It appeared that the explosives were to be detonated by a time fused charge dropped into the ventilator. The bunker contained 300 tons of US Army ammunition.

An attempt was made to sabotage the American military grain warehouse at Ranshofen, Bezirk Braunau on 10 December. An unidentified person threw into the conveyor two sacks of grain tied together. One sack was filled with binder twine and wire; the other was converted into an apron and was saturated with petroleum. Had the sacks entered the conveyor system, they would have jammed the wormscrew and halted operation of the warehouse for at least three days. The prepetrator of this attempted sabotage was not apprehended.[33]

De-Nazification of Business

A CIC survey conducted during the week of 23 November 1946 revealed the extent to which key businesses in the American Zone had been removed from Nazi control.

At St. Gilgen, 113 private businesses with 324 employees were in operation. Thirty-seven businesses, approximately 35 per cent of the total, were owned or managed by persons registered as former members of the Nazi Party or its

33 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #76, 16 Nov 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

affiliates. In Strobl, the managers of 20 per cent of the village's 153 businesses and 29 per cent of all employees were persons with Nazi backgrounds.

The Steyr De-Nazification Committee had placed fourteen businesses under public control and one firm under an appointed administrator. De-Nazification committees in Bezirk Wels had closed 124 shops and placed 275 under trusteeship.[34]

Agents Nab a War Criminal

As late as 1947, some war criminals on CIC blacklists still had not been apprehended. One who had evaded capture was known only as Spatzenegger, a non-commissioned officer of Hitler's SS. Despite his low rank, he was high on the wanted list because of atrocities at Dachau and Mauthausen concentration camps.

A concentration camp guard for 13 years, Spatzenegger was accused of participating in the murder of approximately eight hundred Americans, Jews, Germans, and Czechs. He reportedly had forced many of his victims to leap from a steep cliff into a stone quarry.

Early in February 1947, a CIC informant gave agents a vague account of an unidentified person hiding in a farmhouse in the mountainous region north of Salzburg. On 20 February, two agents from the Salzburg office, accompanied by the informant, set out to locate the farmhouse. After many weary hours of mountain climbing, the informant pointed out the house in which Spatzenegger was hiding.

Faced with capture, Spatzenegger displayed none of the courage that might be expected of a war criminal of his stature. As the two agents closed in on the house at a dead run, they saw a man scuttling into the hay loft. When they confronted him, he was so unnerved that he blabbered, "Ja, Ja, Spatzenegger, Nicht schiessen (don't shoot)." After conviction by a War Crimes Court, Spatzenegger was hanged at Landsberg Prison, where Hitler had written "Mein Kampf" years before.[35]

The US Army Cleans House

On 27 March 1947, the US Army launched a final clean-up of Nazis among its indigenous employees. Finance officers were directed to place on every payroll a certificate to the effect that each employee had filed a personal history statement attesting to the fact that he had never been a member of the Nazi Party. It was

34 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #77, dtd 23 Nov 46, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

35 Outstanding CIC Cases, 21 March 1948 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

estimated at this time that approximately ninety per cent of the persons in the mandatory removal category had already been dismissed from key US jobs.[36]

It was not as easy, however, to purge former Nazis from key business, professional, and Austrian government jobs. According to official statistics from Upper Austria, the strict application of the De-Nazification Law would make sixty per cent of the medical doctors subject to registration and probable removal from their positions. The Upper Austria Dentists Organization faced the loss of 111 of its 164 members.[37]

Nearly all persons accused of false registrations made the same excuse. They claimed that in filling out questionnaires back in 1938 or 1939 they lied about or exaggerated their Nazi activities in order to insure their acceptance as members of the Nazi Party. In most cases, local police were reluctant to arrest such persons. The Austrian police contended that the accused, if arrested, might remain in jail for months before being called to trial. Authorities felt it was better for the community to let the former Nazis continue working until they could appear in court. Such persons were arrested immediately only when it appeared likely that they would run away or try to influence witnesses.[38]

Of all cases submitted by the Hallein police authorities up to May 1947, the Linz People's Court tried only two cases.[39]

Many anti-Nazis complained about the appointment of public administrators for Nazi-owned enterprises. It was argued that while small officials and employees who were party members had been ousted and left without means to provide for their families, Nazi businessmen had succeeded in getting close relatives to administer their property. They not only continued to profit from their former enterprises, but often played an important part in the economy of Austria.[40]

A preliminary investigation of the Salzburg Landesgendarmeriekommando Headquarters to determine the extent of the Nazi Party affiliations of its officials and employees disclosed that out of 58 gendarmes and higher officials, 28 persons, or 48 per cent, had had Nazi affiliations. In mid-May 1947, Land Salzburg

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36 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #95, 28 Mar 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

37 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #98, 18 Apr 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

38 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #106, 14 Jun 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

39 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #107, 21 Jun 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

40 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #106, 14 Jun 47 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

gendarmerie was the least de-Nazified organization in the entire land.[41]

Adding to CIC headaches was the refusal of Austrian reviewing commissions to make full use of the information available to them. Leaks in the security of investigations against former Nazis by the police were frequent and kept the CIC busy building up a security dam.[42]

In September 1947, CIC reported that throughout most of the US Zone, Austrian officials were reluctant to insist upon strict enforcement of the De-Nazification Law. They argued that further arrests and trials of small Nazis would only hamper the Austrian economy and overburden the Austrian Courts.[43]

41 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #107, 21 Jun 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

42 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #109, 5 Jul 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

43 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #121, 27 Sep 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 4

THE DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM

Even before the beginning of the Occupation, CIC had foreseen that the presence of extremely large numbers of displaced persons in Austria would constitute a grave security problem. By July 1946, investigations involving displaced persons represented about 73 per cent of the work load of the 430th CIC Detachment.[44]

Many types of persons were lumped together in the DP category--liberated inmates of concentration camps, people who had been imprisoned by the Germans for political, religious, or racial reasons, and forced laborers from many nations who had been impressed into service in German camps and factories. These persons came from every nation in Europe, and deep-rooted prejudices which touched off riots among the various DP groups complicated the work of screening these people and returning them to their homelands.

Screening and repatriation of the thousands of displaced persons as soon as conditions permitted was a necessity for several reasons. Besides purely humanitarian aspects, the continued presence of the displaced persons on Austrian soil created political and economic problems for Austria and for the forces of occupation.

Jewish Displaced Persons a Major Problem

Much of CIC's work with displaced persons involved the thousands of Jewish persons who had been freed from concentration camps.

Intensely nationalistic, the Jewish people were impatient either to return to their homelands or to migrate to Palestine. The Jewish DP Camp in Bad Gastein, for example, contained approximately 1,500 Jews from Eastern Europe who were moving westward with Palestine as their ultimate destination. Among them was an active core of fanatical Palestinian nationalists, or "Revisionists," who did not accept the borders of Palestine as then recognized by the world. From time to time, the presence of uniformed members of the organization's special "honor guard" was noted, both at Bad Gastein and at the Bindermichl Jewish DP Camp in Upper Austria. The group was a constant source of agitation at Bad Gastein. At the slightest provocation, it aggravated civil disorder; its leaders were continually engaged in underground political and para-military planning for revision of the status of Palestine. CIC maintained a constant check of the activities of this group.

On one occasion, a former Russian Army officer told CIC agents that Jewish displaced persons had tried to persuade him to accept a commission in the

44 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #103, 23 May 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Palestine Army. The Russian said he was offered a two-year contract as a "military expert" to train small groups of Jews in military science and tactics. The ex-officer was told he would be paid in any currency he preferred; an extra reward after two years of service in Palestine would be a passport to any desired destination.[45]

Bad Gastein presented a greater concentration of displaced persons of all varieties than any other area in Austria. Once a resort center, its hotels in the days following the war were crowded with a mixture of displaced persons from Southern and Eastern Europe. Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian nationalist groups were predominant. Many feared to return to their homes because of prior political opposition to regimes in power; particularly was this true in the case of Yugoslavian officers billeted in a camp at St. Johann, Bezirk Bischofshofen.

Displaced Persons in the Black Market

Although CIC was not directly concerned with black market activities, the 430th CIC Detachment occasionally was forced to investigate black market operations among displaced persons because of the security threat involved. Virtually every group of displaced persons was associated with the flourishing black market. The black market among the DP's was not a matter of small-time trading of cigarettes or items from Red Cross packages, but a vast commerce including silks, textiles, jewels, and wholesale lots of staple food items. The chief operators of this commerce appeared to be Yugoslav and Croatians, though all national groups were involved.[46]

Travel Control of Displaced Persons

By 6 July 1946, illegal crossing of Austrian borders by groups of Jewish refugees was one of CIC's greatest problems, since it was considered possible that infiltrating enemy agents might hide among the refugees.

Official arrangements were in effect to funnel refugees from Austria to various DP Camps in the American Zone of Germany; however, small groups of refugees persisted in circumventing the authorized channels for travel. Moving by night without semblance of travel authority, they often coordinated their plans with organizations whose self-appointed task it was to arrange transportation for refugees who could successfully bypass frontier posts. Most of this traffic represented idle journeys by displaced persons in Austria to visit friends in German camps, but CIC considered any unauthorized movement potentially dangerous.

45 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary, 16 Nov 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

46 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #57, 6 Jul 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

On 19 November 1946, a CIC representative from Linz conferred with the assistant police chief of Bezirk Schaerding on travel control measures. They discussed the possibility of an agreement with the Public Safety Office in Passau to facilitate the exchange of illegal border crossers prior to sentence by respective German or Austrian Military Government courts.

After several meetings, an agreement was reached. It was determined that German citizens and displaced persons lacking Austrian identity cards would be turned over to German police with an arrest report for prosecution by the Passau Military Court. All foreigners stopped for unauthorized border crossing would be turned over to the Schaerding Military Court. Local police were ordered to surrender to the Schaerding District Court for Military Court trial all Austrians and displaced persons apprehended by German border police or customs guards for unauthorized border crossing from Austria to Germany.[47]

One CIC investigation uncovered a ring of Yugoslav displaced persons who were selling forged travel permits. An agent at Bad Gastein discovered one of the forged permits during a routine investigation. The Yugoslav who held the fake permit admitted purchasing it from displaced persons at Bludenz, Vorarlberg. Improper completion of one portion of the travel permit branded it as a forgery.[48]

Riot at Camp Haid

Jewish displaced persons at Camp Haid, in Upper Austria, rioted on 14 November 1946 following an inspection of the camp by the military commander of Upper Austria. While the inspection party was at Camp Haid, Jewish delegates insisted they needed more fuel and clothing and urged the removal of invalids, children, and pregnant women to more suitable camps. Shortly after the inspection team left, small groups of demonstrators began smashing property at the camp.

Six military policemen who were rushed to Camp Haid to halt the destruction immediately arrested eleven riot leaders. As the eleven were loaded on a truck for transport to jail, a mob of 1000 more displaced persons stormed the military police in protest. One of the demonstrators grabbed a carbine. When an unarmed member of the camp staff attempted to retrieve the carbine, it was accidentally discharged, and the bullet struck a displaced person. Immediately the demonstrators pounced on the military policemen, beating and stoning them severely. The mob refused to permit the camp commander to remove the injured men to a hospital. Military Police riot squads soon arrived, dispersed the mob, and arrested four ringleaders.

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47 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #84, 11 Jan 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

48 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #82, 28 Dec 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

CIC investigation of the Camp Haid riot revealed that the youth element of the camp was responsible for the demonstration. There was no evidence that the riot was Communist-inspired, although Communist agitators were known to have touched off lesser demonstrations in other camps.[49]

Jewish Underground Organization

Extensive underground activity developed in Austria through the work of Brycha (Escape), the overall Jewish organization guiding the mass of Jewish emigration out of Europe toward Palestine. Organized about 1939, Brycha was unable to function effectively until after the end of the war. Young members of the Jewish Home Guard in Palestine volunteered for one-year periods of duty with Brycha, and the organization succeeded in infiltrating numbers of the volunteers into the Jewish Brigades on the fighting fronts in Europe. Equipped with false papers and identities, the volunteers never formed part of the normal table of organization. At the end of the war, when the brigades were recalled, the Brycha volunteers merely stayed behind and proceeded to form other units of the Jewish underground throughout Europe.

As a cover for their activities, many Brycha leaders obtained positions of responsibility within the Jewish Agency for Palestine, created by the League of Nations and later authorized to assist the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in work among Jewish displaced persons in Europe.

Brycha members also obtained key positions at Jewish Displaced Persons Camps created by the Allies, and the camps soon became important stopover points for refugees being smuggled from behind the Iron Curtain to Palestine. Because Brycha functioned underground, its escape routes were not generally known. The result was that espionage agents bound for the Allied occupation zones rather than for Palestine began to utilize the Brycha network for their covert activities. CIC consequently was keenly interested in Brycha, its leaders, and its activities. Too, the organization reportedly had connections with Jews in intelligence networks of every Central and Eastern European nation.[50]

A report dated 2 May placed the number of displaced persons in the American zone at 164,932, plus 21,244 Jewish refugees.[51]

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49 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #77, 23 Nov 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

50 "The Jewish Underground in Austria," annex to USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #108, 20 Jun 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

51 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #100, 2 May 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

With the approach of warm weather in April 1947, the refugees began to move slowly toward Italy with the hope of ultimately reaching Palestine. Once more their failure to comply with travel regulations added a burden to the CIC work load. On 13 June 1947, a head count at the Wegscheid Jewish Refugee Camp, Linz, revealed 1000 surplus registrations. The extra registrations provided an excellent cover for illegal transients and represented a major security problem.[52]

But the Jewish displaced persons were not the only ones who violated travel regulations. In July, 20 Yugoslavs illegally entered the American Zone through the Boeckstein-Mallnitz tunnel. CIC agents at Bad Gastein immediately apprehended five of the group and returned them to the British Zone. A check with British authorities at Mallnitz revealed that all passenger trains were closely watched; the only method of illegal entry into the American zone was by freight train, and with the help of Austrian railroad employees. The Austrians willingly assisted authorities in enforcement of travel control rules where Jewish displaced persons were involved, but they often were sympathetic towards Yugoslavs travelling without proper travel papers.[53]

Communists Stage Anti-Semitic Demonstration

Austrians were openly hostile toward many of the displaced persons in their midst. On 4 January 1947, the Salzburg CIC office reported an alarming increase in the number of incidents involving Austrians and Jewish displaced persons, particularly on tramways and buses. There were indications that the incidents were the result of systematic provocation by certain Austrian elements.[54] At Bad Gastein, where residents depended on the tourist trade for a living, there was considerable resentment toward displaced persons who were able to live comfortably without being required to work.[55]

The hostility between Austrians and displaced persons was watched closely by CIC as a potential source of trouble. On 20 August 1947, the ill will erupted in a vicious anti-Semitic demonstration at Bad Ischl, in Upper Austria. In late evening, a crowd of 300 gathered in the streets to protest the recent cancellation of a special milk ration for women and children and the substitution of American powdered milk. The anger was aggravated by Communist statistics that local farmers were 37,000 liters delinquent in milk deliveries.

52 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #112, 25 Jul 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

53 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #112, 25 Jul 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

54 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #83, 4 Jan 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

55 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #57, 6 Jul 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

City officials appeared and promised conferences to settle the milk ration and call delinquent farmers to account, but the mob was not placated. Shouts of "Hunger! Hunger!"; "Out with the tourists!"; and "The Jews are growing fat!" mounted to a high pitch.

A local Communist leader led the crowd to the Hotel Goldenes Kreuz, Bad Ischl's Jewish Refugee Camp, where a minor Communist official made a shrill, anti-Semitic speech. One of the demonstrators hurled a rock through a hotel window. When the camp director appeared, he was clawed and threatened with bodily harm. Jewish refugees inside the hotel were enraged by shouts of "Down with the Jews!" and "Jewish Pigs!"

Local police, prodded by CIC agents, reluctantly dispersed the crowd. When CIC investigation showed the Communists had inspired the demonstration, five leaders were arrested.[56] Convicted by a Military Government Court, the ringleaders received sentenced ranging from a six-month suspended sentence to fifteen years imprisonment. The Communist press made a field day of the trial and the sentences.

Displaced Persons Sabotage British Train

On 12 August 1947, an Austrian Gendarme stationed at Boeckstein, near the Boeckstein-Mallnitz tunnel between the British and American Zones of Austria, arrested a displaced person who was travelling without documents. A routine search revealed that he was

He carried two loaded pistols and spare ammunition. claimed that he was carrying the pistols through the railroad tunnel for a third person. Shortly after his arrest, he attempted to flee along the track and was recaptured, after receiving a slight flesh wound in the thigh.

When interrogated by CIC repeated the story that he was carrying the weapons for a third person. He was turned over to the military court in Salzburg on a charge of illegal possession of firearms.

Later the same day, the Medloc, a British leave train, enroute to Klagenfurt with about 200 military and civilian passengers, was derailed at the Doesenbach-Luessen tunnel. A bomb, constructed of explosives packed in a tin biscuit container and placed between the railroad ties, exploded under the baggage car, causing the engine and several coaches to tilt to the left side of the tracks toward the mountain. A second charge placed near the first failed to detonate. Had this charge exploded simultaneously with the first, it could have caused the train to plunge into a steep abyss on the right side of the track.

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56 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #117, 29 Aug 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

On learning of the derailment, CIC Agents re-interrogated . It was learned that he was a member of BETAR (Revisionist Jewish Youth Organization) and had been implicated in the distribution of "Irgun Zwai Leumi" literature. After a long and intensive interrogation, admitted his complicity in the sabotage of the Medloc train and implicated two other Jewish displaced persons. He was turned over to the British authorities in Austria for prosecution.[57]

Project DP-48

Although the 430th CIC Detachment had been involved with the problem of displaced persons from the beginning of the occupation, it was not until 1948 that the screening of displaced persons became an official part of the CIC mission. The Displaced Person Act of 1948 gave the Army the responsibility of conducting investigations to determine the character, history and eligibility of persons applying for admission to the United States under provisions of the Act. Only CIC was qualified or prepared to conduct such investigations, and the 430th CIC Detachment was assigned the mission of screening from Austria.

To expedite the mission, the 430th CIC created a special section known as the Displaced Persons Screening Project, or DP-48. A special memorandum fixed the responsibility of the 430th as to the DP-48 Project. Originally the project was given a target date of June 1950, but a congressional amendment to the act extended the screening to include German Ethnic groups, and termination date for the entire project was set at June 1952.

Henry Fuchs, a former CIC officer employed in the Salzburg CIC office as a civilian, organized the DP-48 Project. He developed an assembly-line technique for processing the applications for visas. Agency checks plus neighborhood checks were considered sufficient investigation for clearance of most applicants.

At the beginning, a few officers and key personnel from the 430th Detachment were chosen to form the nucleus of DP-48 personnel. In addition, enlisted personnel were procured and assigned to the 430th CIC Detachment on a temporary basis. Three agents from the Linz Detachment of the 430th screened enlisted personnel awaiting assignment in the replacement battalion at Camp McCauley, near Linz; forty men were chosen here. Other officers from Vienna and Salzburg detachments journeyed to Zell-am-Zee, near Salzburg, to choose qualified non-commissioned officers from a pool. These two groups of enlisted military personnel were sent to Vienna for a week's indoctrination course. They were then assigned to the sub-detachments of the 430th for duty with DP-48 Project. In practice, these troops often were used in clerical positions to release CIC agents for work with DP-48. Some officers from other branches of the military services in Austria

57 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #121, 26 Sep 47 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

were also placed on detached service with DP-48, Some officers from other branches of the military services in Austria were also placed on detached service with DP-48 until personnel earmarked for the project arrived from Fort Holabird. Austrian personnel for the project were from those sections of the 430th Detachment which were in the process of being discontinued or had already been closed--visa, border control, and De-Nazification. Each of the three DP-48 offices set up a supply and transportation section of its own, apart from the 430th motor pool and supply sections. Liaison was established with Austrian officials, various displaced persons organizations, the Berlin Document Center, and American agencies, as well as with French and British authorities in their respective zones of Austria.

The first year saw great progress made in screening, although with every change of American DP-48 commissioners, there was usually a new DP-48 Project director who was an officer of the 430th Detachment. By 1950 most of the temporary military personnel were replaced by trained CIC Agents. However, a handful of the original enlisted men's group remained with the project until its completion. Two of them were accepted for training at the CIC Center, Fort Holabird, and successfully completed the Basic Agent's training course.

When USFA Headquarters moved from Vienna to Salzburg in 1949, DP-48 went along with 430th CIC Detachment Headquarters.

Agents assigned to the Linz branch of DP-48 uncovered and neutralized a ring of smugglers and forgers who were selling blank registration certificates to displaced persons ineligible for emigration to the United States. The smuggled certificates were forged by entering false data and used by displaced persons in an attempt to prove residence in Lower Silesia in 1945.

The polygraph was used in several interrogations involving murder, narcotics charges, and aggravated cases of questionable political activity among the displaced persons. The results proved an aid in establishing the veracity of misrepresentation of statements made by applicants for emigration.

To comply with a directive from the CIC Center, effective 1 January 1951, reports of investigations of all applicants for emigration under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act were made and submitted to Central CIC Files. At first, this added work caused a considerable drop in the number of cases completed, but Vienna and Linz offices soon developed a system which made the CIC report an integral part of the procedure of completing case reports. By the end of 1951, the Vienna and Linz offices had eliminated the backlog of reports. The Salzburg office and its branches at Innsbruck in the French Zone, and at Graz and Klagenfurt in the British Zone were lagging behind. By April 1952, when the Ethnic German phase of DP-48 was completed, all Holabird reports on the DP-48 Screening Project had been completed.

"The workload for CIC continued to grow right up to the end of the program because of the Commission's reliance upon CIC as the basic investigative agency."[59]

Displaced Persons Problem Diminishes

By the end of 1949, the displaced persons problem, particularly insofar as Jewish refugees were concerned, had diminished considerably. Beginning in May 1949, monthly quotas of 2000 Jewish displaced persons were shipped to Israel.[60] By the end of the year, 10,476 Jews had been transported to Israel from Austria.[61]

59 The DP Story, "The Counter Intelligence Corps" CIC Reports, Final Report of US Displaced Persons Commission, pp. 146 and 147.

60 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #188, 14 Jan 49 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

61 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #245, 6 Jan 50 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 5

CIC VS. COMMUNISM

Although it was not stated in official directives, CIC quickly realized that the primary mission of De-Nazification soon would be replaced by the Soviet problem. The "cold war" was on in Austria.

As early as July 1945, a paragraph from a sample form for situation reports prepared by G2 USFA for CIC indicated CIC's concern with Communist activities. The sample read: "The Communist Party held a secret meeting in the city of Linz. CIC did not interfere with this meeting, as two of our agents were present as members."[62]

General Mark W. Clark, first American High Commissioner for Austria, described the difficulties which his command had with the Soviets in his book, Calculated Risk. Despite General Clark's efforts to establish working agreements with his Russian counterpart, relations steadily deteriorated.

From the moment Washington instructed General Clark to permit a Russian Repatriation Mission to enter the American Zone, the 430th CIC Detachment was deeply involved with the Soviet problem. The Russian mission caused nothing but trouble. General Clark finally informed Marshal Konev, his Soviet counterpart in Austria, that the mission was no longer welcome. Konev agreed to send the mission home, but requested permission for a new one to take its place. General Clark relented and agreed, with some misgivings, to permit another mission to enter the American zone.

Shortly before the first mission departed, however, CIC received a tip that the Russians would attempt to kidnap an Austrian citizen who was a key counter-espionage agent for CIC. The 430th quickly prepared a trap for the would-be kidnappers.

On the night of 23 January 1946, several automobiles without lights crept close to the CIC employee's home. Several men armed with pistols got out of the car, entered the house, and threatened the CIC employee. At that moment, American Military Police who were hiding in key positions near the house switched on powerful floodlights and moved in to close the trap. Several members of the Soviet Repatriation Mission were among those arrested. One officer wore the complete uniform of the US Military Police, and the lining in his helmet was

62 Weekly Sitrep Report - Land Salzburg, for period June 23 to June 30, 1945, Hq, Salzburg CIC Detachment, dtd 30 Jun 45 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

marked to show that it had been stolen from the 250th Military Police Battalion in Salzburg. Another officer wore a civilian overcoat, but his hat plainly was a Red Army cap. An enlisted man driving one automobile wore the Red Army uniform.

The following day, General Clark officially notified the Soviet Marshal that his men had been arrested and that they would be sent across the line into the Soviet Zone at Linz.[63]

Communist Long Range Plan Reported

On 14 December 1946, the Bad Ischl local police reported to CIC that the Communists had, in at least one case, successfully completed a long range program of placing members in businesses formerly controlled by Nazis. Alleged NKVD Agent , formerly of Lengau, Berzirk Braunau, had moved to Bad Ischl with the announced intention of managing the firm owned by . had been arrested in September 1945 by CIC upon the information of Communist , a member of the self-appointed Political Police of Bad Ischl. purportedly received the aid of who, the local police asserted, was forced into the affair by clever Communist pressure in Linz.

at this time was under consideration for release from Camp Orr, where he was interned for his Nazi activities. When arrested, had been charged with beating displaced persons. Local police refuted the charge. They said they had sworn testimony that was innocent and that the charges were faked by so that the Communists might later control the business, with its high value as a potential Communist courier network throughout Austria.[64]

Operation "Highboy"

One early Communist tactic was to attempt to confuse CIC and to create friction between the Americans and the Austrians through the dissemination of false, or partially false, information. One case which developed out of such a Communist effort was known as Operation "Highboy."

On 29 January 1947, the Vienna police reported an underground resistance movement composed of former Hitler Jugend officers operating within the American zone, with headquarters at Salzburg. Investigation by Special Agents Carl H. Koch and Stephen A. Eckardt convinced CIC that the persons named in the Vienna police report were bound together only by social bonds. The agents felt that the purpose

63 General Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 476-477.

64 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #76, 16 Nov 46 (SECRET); (Central Records Facility).

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of the police report was an attempt by Communist elements with the Staatspolizei to mislead CIC and to alienate Austrians and American Occupation authorities. Apparently the Communists also hoped CIC would take action which might cause some of the former youth leaders to flee to the Soviet Zone where, through pressure, they could be used to exert a Communist influence on Austrian youth.

John B. Burkel, chief of the Salzburg CIC office, had assigned only two agents to the case instead of tying up his entire detachment as the Communists had hoped.[65] Actually, Communist activities in the Salzburg area were few compared to industrialized areas such as Linz.[66]

Part of the Communist deception activities involved passing false information in deliberate attempts to create rumors or to plant stories with specific authorities. Misinformation was generally passed on by two methods.

Communists deliberately discussed false plans in the presence of People's Party or Socialist Party members. These discussions were generally in subtle allusions, couched in language which convinced the listeners that they were hearing conspirators talking in guarded terms. The Communists felt, apparently, that they had been successful in sucking in the opposition on many occasions.

Manufactured and false information was deliberately passed on to the Western Powers, and especially their intelligence services. According to one report, the Communists claimed great success in this field, expressing a low opinion of all Western intelligence services in the cases with which they were misled.[67]

The Mayer Case: Political Intimidation

Political intimidation was a method used frequently by the Communists in Austria. A typical incident was the kidnapping of Josef Mayer on 23 March 1947.

Mayer, an Austrian citizen, was the Werk Meister (Shop Manager) of the Central Railroad Repair Shop in Linz. His job with the State-owned railroad was not too important, but he had long been influential in railway trade union affairs. He was in a position to oppose the Russian proposal to establish a Railroad Trade Union in Upper Austria, and it was expected that he would do so.

65 430th CIC Detachment Case S-S-11372, S-L-927, 22 Apr 47 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

66 Interview with Henry Fuchs, 3 October 55 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

67 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #187, 7 Jan 49, (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

When Mayer left the trolley at the Urfahr end of the bridge between Linz and Urfahr at about 1545 hours on Sunday, 23 March 1947, he was detained by the Russian guard. A short time later an automobile containing two Russians picked Mayer up and drove away.

On 12 April 1947, CIC was notified that Mayer had been returned to his home in Urfahr on the previous day. Mayer would give agents absolutely ... ...formation on the reason for his arrest or his release, and would not state where he had been held. He stated only that he was interrogated continuously during his entire arrest. He was determined to continue to live in Urfahr and remain active in politics.

Mayer attended the April meeting of the Trade Union in Vienna, but independent Linz papers noted that his opposition to the Communists had weakened.[68]

Interrogation of Russian Deserters

Interrogation of Russian Army deserters and other individuals who had fled Russia or its satellite nations was an important CIC function in Austria by 1947, according to a report by Colonel Snowden on 3 November 1947.[69]

The desertion rate in the Russian Army was high, and the 430th CIC Detachment found that most Russian deserters were willing informants on military and economic matters. Literally hundreds of deserters were questioned by CIC Agents in Austria.

Lev Durow was one. Durow in 1947 was a twenty-three-year-old former Soviet Signal Corps lieutenant who said he had served in the European campaigns and had participated in the liberation of Berlin and Prague. He claimed he was wounded four times and, after the European campaigns, served in Kazwin, Iran, until 22 May 1946, when the Russian Sixth Army left Iran. Durow said he returned to Moscow but fled the country after becoming dissatisfied with conditions there. He told of being arrested, then escaping, as he crossed through Czechoslovakia. Durow said he crossed the Danube in a stolen boat and arrived at Linz on 7 August 1947. At Linz, he was taken into "protective custody" by CIC.

Interrogated at length on phases of Soviet Army, civilian, political and industrial life, Durow talked freely. He told of Russian searches for oil in Iran, of Soviet efforts to industrialize the Middle East, of reconstruction of railroads, and of the Russian massacre of 10,000 Polish officers at Katyn, Poland.[70]

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68 MVD Arrest and Kidnapping of OeVP Bundesrat Mayer, Josef, April 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

69 Operations of the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria, Dated 15 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

70 430th CIC Detachment Case of Russian Army Deserter Lev Durow, undated and unsigned (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

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Russian Pilots Defect

Two other Russian lieutenants, both pilots, fled to the West on 9 October 1948, when they crash-landed their Soviet plane at the Hoersching Airstrip at Camp McCauley, Austria.

A CIC Agent who lived at Camp McCauley recognized the plane as a Russian aircraft as it circled above the airstrip. Knowing that Soviet military planes were not permitted to land at Hoersching, the agent telephoned his headquarters at Linz, then rushed to the scene of the crash. The CIC agent arranged for guards to protect the plane from souvenir hunters and prevented anyone except authorized personnel from talking to the Russian fliers and a Russian sergeant who accompanied them.

Agents from the 430th soon arrived from Linz, seven miles away. With G2 personnel, they questioned the three Russians. The sergeant and the airplane were returned to Soviet control the following day, but the Russian officers, 1st Lts Peter Pirogov and Vladimer Barsov, remained in the American Zone. At Linz, the defectors were billeted in the CIC Compound. Agents furnished them with clothing.

After several days of interrogation, the two lieutenants were flown to Germany, then to the United States, where a joint Federal Bureau of Investigation-Central Intelligence Agency team took control.

In the United States, Pirogov wrote several articles for national magazines and authored a book entitled, "Why I Escaped." Barsov became a pants presser, but soon grew dissatisfied and was contacted by the Soviet Embassy. He then urged Pirogov to return with him to Russia, but Pirogov refused.

US agents who had kept themselves informed of Barsov's desires eventually placed him on a plane for Frankfurt, Germany, where he was met by three CIC agents from Salzburg. The agents droved Barsov to a "safe house" in St Gilgen and placed him in the custody of the Salzburg sub-detachment commanded by Lt Col Robert S. Seaver. For nine days, the 430th CIC Detachment maintained the strictest security measures over the Russian flier. The former flier hardly uttered a word throughout the period.

Finally word came from Washington that Barsov was to be taken to the middle of the Uhfar Bridge and turned over to the Russians. The order specified that no intelligence personnel would be involved in the action.

Russian authorities were notified by telephone that a Russian would be released to them. At the American end of the Uhfar Bridge, opposite the guard home, Colonel Glenn L. Schmidt, the G2, walked to the center of the bridge. Colonel Schmidt asked

for a receipt for Barsov. The Russian officer refused. When Colonel Schmidt demanded a receipt, the Russian reluctantly gave him one.

Three weeks later informants told CIC that Barsov had been interrogated continually since his return to the Soviet zone. Finally, informants said, Russian troops were assembled to watch the execution of Barsov by a firing squad as a lesson to anyone else who might decide to defect to the West.[71]

Communists Increase Intelligence Activities

In mid-January 1949, CIC informants reported that Soviet intelligence services were exploiting Austrian Communists both to speed the flow of intelligence into Russia and to serve as counterintelligence agents.

Under the new program, a Counter Intelligence Committee was to be elected within the Austrian Communist Party, informants reported. Party chiefs were to submit lists of members with particular qualifications for counterintelligence services, and special training courses were to be conducted at district and city levels. Reports by the Counter Intelligence Committee were to include the identity of persons seen in the company of Americans, British, and French. High bonuses were promised to English, French, and Russian linguists among the Austrian Communists who were successful in obtaining employment with occupation authorities in the western zones.[72]

Soviet Kidnappings Reach Alarming Proportions

By 13 August 1948, Soviet kidnappings had reached such alarming proportions in Austria that CIC found it necessary to compile an extensive report analyzing the kidnapping pattern.

Although the kidnappings could be grouped into several categories, CIC concluded that most of the abductions involved persons suspected of espionage or of association with the United States or other Western intelligence activities. Such kidnappings usually were the result of Soviet counterintelligence activity, primarily out of considerations of military security.

Indications were that the Soviets considered the kidnappings only a form of legitimate, if clandestine, arrest. The CIC report pointed out that there were few kidnappings during the early days of the Occupation, when the Communists were in firm control of the Staatspolizei, and the Soviets could pressure the Vienna police into making arrests for the Russians. Later it was the Economic Police which,

71 Interview with Lt Col Robert S. Seaver (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

72 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #189, 21 Jan 49 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

because of its Communist penetration, was for some time able to make "legal" arrests for the Soviets. After the purge of the Economic Police, the kidnappings took a sharp rise.

Actually, the first kidnappings were reported immediately after the Russian Army moved into Austria. As early as 22 January 1946, the Soviets seized and imprisoned a railroad engineer accused of being responsible for a railway accident which resulted in the death of several Russian soldiers. CIC insisted the engineer was innocent.

A separate program of kidnappings was detected by CIC in May 1947, when it was learned that the Russians were seizing former residents of Soviet satellite countries. One incident involved a woman who was carried from her apartment rolled in a rug. Another concerned a Hungarian repatriation commissioner who disappeared after being invited to take a brief ride in the automobile of another party of Hungarian repatriation officials. Former Soviet employees also were kidnapped during this phase of the clandestine arrests by the Russians.

Unconfirmed reports indicated that the Soviets also were abducting Austrian scientists, linguists, and other specialists and impressing them into service behind the Iron Curtain. Shortly after Russian agents penetrated the University of Vienna, several students from the university were whisked away into Russian territory.

Early in 1948, public sentiment against the Soviet kidnappings caused the Russians to modify their activities slightly. Soviet authorities began reporting some of the kidnappings and attempted to justify them as "arrests for cause."

However, the rash of kidnappings for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes continued unabated. Former German intelligence personnel were added to Western agents on the Soviet wanted lists. For example, Col Felix von Tarbuk-Sensenhorst, a former German intelligence officer, was taken from his Vienna apartment by Russian agents in civilian clothes. Unconfirmed reports stated that his brother also was seized by the Soviets and required to serve as an instructor in a Soviet intelligence school in Czechoslovakia.

At least three Austrian secretaries employed by CIC were arrested and released after three days of extensive interrogation by Russian agents.

A special objective of the kidnappings was to destroy networks of Austrian informants employed by CIC. Shortly after the kidnapping of , three other informants known by disappeared. Only stringent security precautions by CIC prevented further abductions. The Russians were relentless in the abduction of their own informants who were believed to have doubled as agents for the West.

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Finally, the Soviets frequently kidnapped minor Austrian officials, apparently for purposes of political intimidation of other members of the Austrian government.[73]

Soviet Agents Harass US Military Intelligence Personnel

The most spectacular kidnappings, from the American point of view, involved US personnel. During the first two weeks of June 1948, one CIC agent was kidnapped by Soviet authorities, and another agent and a civilian employee of Military Intelligence Service were arrested on pretended charges.

The arrested agent, who had inadvertently wandered into the Soviet zone of Vienna, was physically manhandled and given no food during the more than twenty-four hours he was held before being released, without his personal papers, in a city about an hour and a half's drive south of Vienna.

The agent who was kidnapped had been assigned to guard from possible abduction a civilian employee of CIC. The Soviets attempted the abduction, but the British Military Police intervened and arrested one of the Soviet agents and the CIC agent and took them to an Austrian jail; the Austrian CIC employee managed to escape. Within twenty minutes a group of armed Soviet soldiers arrived and took both the CIC agent and the Soviet agent away by force. Inadvertently the Soviet agent's papers had been left behind; these were traded the following afternoon for the CIC agent, who had been so badly beaten that he was confined to a hospital.

The next evening, 4 June, a civilian employee of Military Intelligence Service was arrested in a Russian district of Vienna by the Soviet authorities. The Russians explained that the civilian was driving a US Army vehicle while in civilian clothes and was arrested only to ascertain whether the car had been stolen. He was well treated, but was detained for three and a half hours.

All three of these intelligence personnel were carefully interrogated by the Russians on the organization and mission of Military Intelligence Service and CIC and the personnel in the organizations. These and other indications pointed to increased Soviet activity and interest in US intelligence services. The primary target at that time apparently was CIC. The Soviets evidenced considerable interest in photographs of CIC agents, and the campaign seemed to be to relate names and jobs with the photographs.

It was also known that the Soviets were attempting to penetrate US troop units throughout Austria, using female operators to gain information from enlisted and civilian personnel.[74]

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73 Appendix A, USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #161, "An Analysis of Soviet Kidnappings in Austria," 13 Aug 48 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

74 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #157, 11 Jul 48 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Project Snatch-Counter Snatch

One series of kidnappings from the Allied Zones of Austria led to one of the most extensive investigations ever conducted by the 430th CIC Detachment. Combined, the cases became the project known as "Snatch-Counter Snatch."

In September 1949, a CIC informant at Linz, was reported by his wife as missing. Although he frequently was away from home for short periods, he never had been absent more than twenty-four hours without some message to his wife.

On the second day of the investigation of his disappearance, wallet was found on the street a few yards from CIC Headquarters. Austrian Security Police were asked to help locate the missing man.

Two days later, informants reported that was being held in the Russian Zone of Vienna. He had been abducted, informants said, by unidentified persons driving a black, 1938 Buick sedan. Shortly afterwards, CIC Agents halted a 1938 Buick on Landstrasse as it headed toward the Uhfar Bridge. They apprehended two men and a woman who were passengers. Arrested were a man known as , his mistress, and a black market operator named Later the same day, agents arrested , a close friend of

broke quickly under questioning. He admitted pointing out for the kidnappers, but accused and of the actual abduction. also talked freely. He said the trio had delivered the CIC informant to the Russians in return for the privilege of selling cigarettes on the black market in the Russian Zone. On the night of the kidnapping, they had approached on the street of Bad Aussee, slugged him with a hammer, tossed him in the automobile, and carried him across the Danube into the Russian-controlled village of Uhfar.

A few weeks later, two displaced persons approached a CIC informant in Salzburg for the use of his car in another kidnapping. The CIC informant secretly reported the incident to his control agent and was instructed to go along with the plans. The victim was to be a Russian Army deserter who was then a patient in the Salzburg Displaced Persons Hospital.

When all the plans had been revealed, CIC arrested the two men who said they were working for a man in Vienna named Benno Blum. They thought Blum was a Russian Army Major, although he always wore civilian clothes and claimed to be a Polish displaced person. They alleged that each month Blum delivered a specified number of persons to the Russians in Vienna through a network of professional kidnappers. For these deliveries Blum was given permission to black-market American cigarettes. Blum's agents would buy cigarettes on the open market in the United States and ship them via air express to Holland or Switzerland. From these points,

to Hungary, then brought by Soviet Ar
...n Zone of Austria, for sale in Austria and Bavaria.

From the interrogations, CIC gradually determined Blum's methods of op
tion for the kidnappings. When he struck again, CIC agents were waiting.

Blum's next victim was CIC informant , a former Rumanian
, a Hitler-anti-Communist, had fled Rum
after the Putsch. When word was received that was to be kidnapped, h
was placed under close surveillance.

At the Central Cafe, in Linz, just across the Danube from the Russian Zone
was approached by a , who suggested that they get together, ge
some girls, and do some serious drinking. , frightened out of his wits,
ran all the way home. The next morning he reported to his control agent. After
much persuasion, was convinced that the thing to do was to go ahead with
plan.

On the night set for the kidnapping CIC moved in to arrest
the driver of the kidnap car who was also a CIC informant, and a man named
Richter as they came from the Central Cafe. Under interrogation,
admitted that he had been hired by Benno Blum.

CIC next learned of activity by Blum's agents on 10 January 1950, when an Italian displaced person, a cook for an American unit, reported seeing two strange cars, one containing two men and the other a beautiful blonde who spoke Russian fluently. It was then learned that the blonde had, two weeks previously, approached another displaced person, Viktor Marjiv, and made a date with him to help her with her luggage at the Steyr railway station, near the border of the Russian zone on that date, 10 January.

CIC was notified only minutes before the scheduled meeting between the blonde and Marjiv. Agents quickly called Austrian police, then dashed for the railroad station.

Two Chevrolet automobiles were parked at the station. The blonde stood nearby. As the CIC agents moved in to arrest her, she screamed for help. Two men who ran to her assistance were quickly arrested. The three were taken to CIC Headquarters for questioning.

En route to the CIC office, the woman tried to destroy an identification card which described her as Gisella Sell, 20, a native of Berlin. She also carried another identification card which bore a different name. Later, the blonde told agents that Gisella Sell was her true name. She said she carried the other card to save her mother embarrassment in the event of her arrest. She claimed she

had purchased the fake identification papers from a Jewish displaced person in Vienna.

In searching the two cars, CIC agents found two pistols, a full bottle of Cherry brandy well laced with Chloral hydrate knockout drops, and two sets of Soviet Army license plates.

In a thirty-five page confession, Sell stated that she had been employed by the Russians since the end of the war. She had lived with a Russian Senior Lieutenant for two years and continued to work for the Russians after his return to Moscow out of fear of exposure to the Western authorities. Her previous assignments had been small ones, but for this kidnapping she was to receive 5,000 Shillings and a new fur coat.

Her confession implicated a Captain Orlov of the Russian Army. It was he, according to Sell, who had put the chloral hydrate in the cherry brandy. The intended victim was known to be fond of cherry brandy. Benno Blum had accompanied the kidnap crew as far as St. Valentin and was to meet them there on the return trip.

Michael Berger and Rudolph Weichselberger, the two men who had been arrested with Sell, were sentenced to eight years in prison. Sell received only seven years due to her cooperation with the authorities.

In Vienna, meanwhile, the Blum gang had been penetrated by the defection of one Meyer Stoessel to the West.

Immediately following the arrest of Gisella Sell, Blum and most of his associates were arrested by the Soviets and held for several weeks. When Blum was released on 22 April 1950, he went to the apartment of his mistress, Margararete Hochegger, in the French Zone of Vienna.

Two CIC agents teamed up with one French agent to close in on Blum. As they entered the front door of the third-floor apartment, Blum scrambled through a kitchen window. Agents caught him and pulled him back inside the apartment. Desperate, Blum pulled a knife and attempted to wrest a pistol from one of the agents. During the scuffle, the agent managed to place his thumb between the hammer and the firing pin and kept Blum from shooting. Both the French agent and the other CIC Agent fired their weapons, wounding Blum. He died in a hospital a short time later.

The Soviets denied any knowledge of Blum or his activities. Blum's body was unclaimed. He eventually was buried in Potter's Field.

In the break up of the Blum gang, CIC had stopped one of the Russians' most powerful weapons of the cold war.[75]

The "Rover Boys" Case

Closely related to Project Snatch-Counter Snatch was the case of the "Rover Boys," United States Military Police who got into the kidnap-for-pay racket by snatching a CIC informant for the Russians in Vienna. Eventually a dozen members of a Military Police battalion were implicated in the kidnapping, either by participation or by knowledge. Few cases handled by the 430th had such far-reaching repercussions.

75 Source materials for this account of Project Snatch-Counter Snatch were the following 430th CIC Detachment documents, all classified SECRET and filed at the G2 Central Records Facility, Fort Holabird: SOI, Vienna, 18 Jul 49, "Jewish DP Ring Operating for the RIS"; MOIC, Vienna, 17 Mar 48, "BALABANOFF, Stefan Krestoff, Interrogation"; MOIC, Vienna, 9 Sep 49, "Abduction of Personalities of Intelligence Interest by RIS"; IRS, Vienna, 5 Nov 49, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Vienna, 10 Nov 49, "Abduction of Personalities of Intelligence Interest by the RIS"; MOIC, Linz, 9 Dec 49, "MUCHOV, Major (fnu)"; Memo for files, 6 Jan 50, "Soviet Kidnapping Organization"; MOIC, Salzburg, 12 Oct 49, "Attempt to Abduct Personalities of Interest, Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Linz, 17 Jan 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch--Michael Berger, Confessed Participant in Attempted Abduction of Russian DP in Steyr"; MOIC, Vienna, 7 Mar 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Vienna, 9 Mar 50, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; IRS, Vienna, 29 Mar 50, "BLUM Gang Status"; MOIC, Vienna, 15 Mar 50, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Vienna, 17 Dec 49, "Interrogation, etc., of Civilians Resident in British District of Vienna"; CIC Memo, 11 Apr 50, "Snatch-Counter Snatch"; SOI, Linz, 17 May 49, "Polish Ministerwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicanego (Ministry of Public Safety)"; IRS, Vienna, 27 Sep 49, "Arrests"; SOI, Vienna, 28 Sep 49, "RIS Confidential Employees"; MOIC, Vienna, 26 Oct 49, "Abduction of Personalities of Intelligence by RIS"; MOIC, Vienna, 4 Jan 50, "Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Vienna, 20 Jan 50, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Salzburg, 20 Jan 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Vienna, 25 Jan 50, "Abduction of Personalities of Intelligence Interest"; MOIC, Salzburg, 14 Sep 49, "Attempt to Abduct Personalities of Intelligence Interest"; MOIC, Linz, 28 Oct 49, "WOLF, Dr. Karl"; MOIC, Vienna, 10 Feb 50, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Linz, 1 Feb 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC, Linz, 1 Feb 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch--Michael BERGER"; MOIC, Linz, 7 Feb 50, "Operation Snatch-Counter Snatch--Gisella SELL"; SOI, Linz, 21 Feb 50, "Snatch-Counter Snatch"; IRS, Vienna, 4 Apr 50, "Shooting of Benno BLUM"; SOI, Linz, 9 Mar 50, "Snatch-Counter Snatch"; MOIC Vienna, 28 Jun 50, "Project Snatch-Counter Snatch."

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The Rover Boys Case had a simple beginning when an American soldier short cash, decided to steal and sell an Army radio transmitter which did not appear on any of his battalion's supply records.

With the aid of two other members of the loaded the transmitter into a jeep and drove to the home of an Austrian woman with whom he was acquainted. She directed him to a man known only as "Sajzeff" who she thought might purchase the radio. Sajzeff was not interested, but he called three Russian friends to examine the transmitter. They also refused to buy it.

Unable to sell the transmitter, returned it to the battalion radio shop and was ready to forget the incident when Sajzeff phoned to say that his Russian friends wanted to talk with . One of the Russians, known to only as "John," arranged a meeting with the soldier in a Vienna bar.

John, who spoke English fluently, offered to pay several thousand shillings for kidnapping Red Army deserters from American and British zones of Vienna and turning them over to Soviet authorities. said he was interested, but wanted time to consider the proposition. The Russian suggested that try to persuade another Military Policeman to join him in the project.

discussed the proposed kidnappings with several members of his battalion. One of them, , was interested. Together they met secretly with the Russian known as John and received their instructions. They were to kidnap one , described as a Russian deserter who had given information to the Germans during the war. was to be turned over to the Russians at an abandoned factory on the Tullin Road outside Vienna. and agreed. They promised to deliver to the Soviets on the first Saturday in November.

When the day for the kidnapping came, the soldiers obtained a jeep from the battalion motor pool and drove to apartment in the British Zone of Vienna. was drunk. The would-be kidnappers circled the block four or five times, then decided to postpone the abduction until both were sober.

After reporting to the Russian agent, and agreed to make another attempt the following Saturday. The plan of action was the same.

When they reached apartment on 12 November 1949, went inside while waited in the jeep. did not answer knock. Instead, an old woman came to the door of the next apartment and told that probably was still asleep. The two soldiers drove to the factory on Tullin Road and told John what had happened. He instructed them to return to home and try again.

This time, both soldiers entered the apartment. When appeared they told him an American officer wanted to talk with him. assuming that the Military Police had been sent by his CIC employers, agreed to accompany them. He did not suspect what was happening until and turned off the road and into the deserted factory. John and four other Russians appeared, searched , then handcuffed him and carried him away. The American soldiers were paid 7,000 shillings.

That night, and celebrated their success with a party at the home of the Austrian woman who had originally directed to the Russians. Several other Military Police were present and were aware that and had kidnapped a man for the Russians.

In the weeks that followed, John outlined other kidnapping missions to and and gave them smaller amounts of money as advance payment for future abductions. One proposed kidnapping was cancelled after the soldiers learned the victim had moved. Several others were planned.

But newspaper accounts of the arrest of persons who had participated in kidnappings for the Russians frightened both and Each secretly contacted CIC in Vienna and told agents that he had been approached by Russian agents. At first, neither told of the kidnapping.[76]

CIC investigations soon revealed the entire story, however. One of neighbors identified and as the soldiers she had seen entering the CIC informant's apartment on the day of the kidnapping.[77] A painter who was working in the building also remembered seeing two Military Police enter apartment.[78]

Other members of the 796th Military Police Battalion revealed after questioning that at least seven of them had heard and tell of kidnapping a man for the Russians.

Confronted with the evidence against them, both and made full confessions of their part in the abduction of the CIC informant. They subsequently

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76 Statements of and to Special Agents Joseph P. Denove and John E. Loftus, CID, and Carl Koch and F. K. Richter, CIC, 21 Jan 50 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility, Dossier X8 000 786).

77 Statement of to Agents R. Clark and Thurston I. Benson, 8 Dec 49 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility, Dossier X8 000 786).

78 Statement of 25 Nov 49 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility, Dossier X8 000 786).

were convicted by a General Court Martial on charges of kidnapping, dealing with agents of a foreign power, and Lesbianism.[79]

Ten other members of the 796th Military Police Battalion were granted immunity from prosecution for failure to report the kidnapping in return for their testimony against the principals in the case.[80]

The Verber-Ponger Case

On 11 January 1953, newspapers all over the United States headlined the arrest of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger on charges of conspiring with Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to commit espionage against the United States Government. Novikov, already known by American intelligence to have controlled Valentin Gubitchev in the latter's contacts with government girl Judith Coplon, was declared persona-non-grata. Both Verber and Ponger confessed, pleaded guilty to the indictment and waived trial, becoming two of the few Americans ever convicted of espionage. Verber was sentenced to a penitentiary term of forty months to ten years; Ponger, five to fifteen years. Both Verber and Ponger, Viennese brothers-in-law who fled from Nazi oppression to the United States in 1938 and later became citizens, had served in US Army intelligence units during the war, and later were on the investigative staff of the Nuremberg War crimes Trials. Both were ideological Communists.

79 Summary of Information prepared by Operations Section, Requirements Branch, Intelligence Division, AC of S, G2, Department of the Army, dtd 26 Mar 51, Subject: Pvt Thomas L. Pilley, Cpl David E. Duncan, Cpl Victor M. Griffin, Pvt Aubrey Lowry, Cpl Daniel M. Markly (CONFIDENTIAL); (G2 Central Records Facility, Dossier X8 (P) 786).

80 Cable from Commanding General, USFA, to Deptar, Washington, D. C., for G2, 12 Apr 55 (SECRET), (G2 Central Records Facility, Dossier X8 (P) 785).

When the Washington case was finally ready and the alert was given: Verber, Ponger, and three others were arrested in widely scattered parts of Vienna within a twenty-minute period. Verber and Ponger were landed in Washington and presented for indictment twenty-four hours later. Until their arrest, they were completely unaware of CIC's interest in their activities. The wealth of evidence against them convinced the two that their best course was to make full confessions, plead guilty to espionage, and waive trial.

One of the other men picked up was Walter Lauber, a naturalized American citizen who lived in the American zone of Vienna. After a short while he was released, but later was again taken into custody.

After the arrests of Verber and Ponger, dozens of their contacts among USFA personnel were interrogated and removed from government employment as poor security risks.[81]

81 Interviews with Capt K. E. McDougall, Maj Henry Windmoeller, and Lt Col Robert F. Seaver (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 6

MISCELLANEOUS CIC OPERATIONS IN AUSTRIA

Less dramatic than tracking down Nazi war criminals or foiling Communist kidnappers were the routine security measures which agents of the 430th CIC Detachment practiced daily. Security surveys and lectures and countless personnel checks also were a vital part of the CIC mission during the occupation of Austria.

One of the first assignments agents received on entering Vienna in July 1945 was to conduct a security survey of the villa to be occupied by Gen Mark W. Clark, the first US High Commissioner for Austria. That task completed, the detachment made similar security checks of all office buildings slated for use by American forces in Vienna.

Agents of the 430th CIC Detachment also provided security surveillance of distinguished persons visiting the American zone of Austria. When General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower toured Austria in the fall of 1946, he was closely guarded by CIC agents in Salzburg, Linz, and Vienna. Other 430th agents accompanied General Eisenhower on his inspection trip to Italy. CIC also maintained security of the special train, the A-300, used by General Clark for his travels in Austria.

The king and queen of Greece visited Austria in 1950, and agents of the Linz sub-detachment guarded them day and night for two weeks, under the supervision of the chief of the Gmunden field office. Three agents received special awards and commendations from the Greek royal family for their part in the operation.[82]

Other routine duties which required numerous personnel and a considerable amount of time included clearance of military personnel for cryptographic duties and the screening of Austrian civilians employed by the United States forces. In November 1945, the latter task was handled by a special branch of the Public Safety Division, with the exception of G2 file checks conducted by CIC. Agents also investigated persons who claimed United States citizenship and made appropriate reports to the State Department.

When the ban of fraternization with the Austrians was lifted and American soldiers were permitted to marry Austrian girls, the 430th CIC Detachment was requested to investigate the moral and political backgrounds of the prospective brides. At first, CIC made recommendations to appropriate authorities regarding the advisability of the marriages, but in 1949 the Salzburg office discontinued the practice of recommending action on the marriages. Soon the Linz and Vienna offices also discontinued the recommendations.

82 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Because there was no other American investigative intelligence agency in Austria, the 430th CIC Detachment often received assignments from G2, Unites States Forces in Austria, which ordinarily would not be in the detachment's geographical jurisdiction.

One such case involved the discovery of irregularities in lateral mail communications with the US Military Attache in Moscow. These irregularities involved security requirements of Army Regulation 380-5, "Safeguarding Military Information." At a conference in the G2 office in April 1947, two agents of the 430th were assigned to conduct an investigation of the security violations. The agents traveled to Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Munich, Vienna, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Paris to check postal agencies and procedures. Their report blamed six agencies for the violations. The agents recommended preparation of a single directive that would adequately cover the needs of all US military agencies in the Balkans.[83]

One case investigated by the 430th in the summer of 1946 created an international furor and, before it was closed, contained elements of espionage, sabotage, black market, and theft.

Several Yugoslav vessels were anchored on the Danube in the Linz port area. The ships, together with their crews, were being held by the United States in retaliation for the seizure and nationalization of American property by the government of Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1946, a CIC informant reported a plot to sabotage the vessels. Agents quickly raided and searched the ships. Although a half-pound block of Army explosives was the only evidence that sabotage was planned, agents confiscated large amounts of propaganda materials.

Interrogation of crew members revealed that the Yugoslav sailors were members of an intelligence network which financed its espionage activities through black market activities and widespread pilferage of US Army equipment. Two days after their arrest, the sailors were released to the custody of the Yugoslav liaison officer who subsequently banished them from Austria.

On 28 September 1946, Yugoslavia protested the CIC action in a note to the State Department charging violation of Yugoslav sovereignty, damage to that nation's property, and violation of the personal freedom of Yugoslav citizens. On 9 October, the Linz sub-detachment refuted the charges and marked the case closed.[84]

Another black market investigation shared by all sub-detachments of the 430th turned up an extensive Nazi underground movement.

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83 430th CIC Detachment Monthly Report of CIC Activities for June 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

84 CIC History 1945-1948, undated (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

The case, known as "Operation Sugar," opened in Salzburg in 1946 when CIC discovered a large-scale blackmarket ring which was smuggling saccharin into Austria from Switzerland. Agents seized a list of names of all dealers and consumers involved in the ring's operations. A check of the names revealed a startling peculiarity: almost every name was a prominent Nazi on CIC's wanted list.

Investigating further, Agents learned that the black market operations were only a minor phase of the ring's activities. The Nazis on the list held secret meetings in Linz to plot illegal underground operations. At one of these meetings, no less than four county chiefs were present. Members of the group were scattered all the way from Vienna to Innsbruck.

Eventually, when CIC had gathered sufficient evidence, key members were arrested, including SS Gen Walter Raffelsberger.[85]

Occasionally CIC cooperated with Austrian police in the apprehension of persons accused of criminal actions. However, the crimes had some relation to the counterintelligence mission.

On 14 December 1946, the Hallein Section of the Salzburg sub-detachment reported that local police had arrested a gang of smugglers who had carried weapons across the Austro-German border. Further investigation by CIC resulted in the arrest of five more persons believed to be members of the same gang. They were charged with illegal sale of weapons, house breaking, robbery, unauthorized possession of ex-Wehrmacht property, and illegal border crossing.[86]

85 CIC History 1945-1948, attached to Letter, Headquarters 430th CIC Detachment, USFA, dtd 15 Mar 48, Subject: Outstanding CIC cases (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

86 USFA Weekly Intelligence Summary #82, 28 Dec 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 1

CIC OPERATIONS IN ITALY

The end of war and the beginning of occupation found CIC facing a host of operational problems in the Free Territory of Trieste and the adjacent areas of Northern Italy.

Italy had been the enemy country; even after the Italian surrender, a sizeable portion of the country remained under German and Republican Fascist control. As a result, CIC found it necessary to adopt procedures regarding the arrest of persons accused of war crimes. In keeping with Allied policy, CIC established certain "arrestable categories," but delegated much of the responsibility for such arrests to Italian authorities.

Movement control, always a problem in combat, was no less a concern of CIC during the static occupation phase. Refugees and displaced persons still roamed the countryside, and their movements had to be closely regulated to neutralize the activities of Fascist or Communist agents who cloaked their activities by posing as refugees. Identity cards, Military Government travel permits, hotel and boarding house checks, refugee collection points, road blocks--all these were wartime measures which were carried over into the occupation era as a part of CIC's movement control program.

Security was a problem in occupation as in war. Screening and clearance of civilian employees, security surveys and lectures at military installations, and port security were among the most important tasks of CIC agents in post-war Trieste and Northern Italy.

Relations between the occupation forces and the civilian population became an even greater problem as Allied troops settled down for an occupation of undetermined length. CIC had to be constantly alert to the temper of the natives. Investigating incidents between troops and civilians, tracking down anti-American propaganda, political reporting--all these became a part of CIC's occupational mission, and close cooperation with Allied Military Government was an absolute necessity.[87]

Espionage Investigations

The change over from war to occupation duties was rapid for Agents of the 10th CIC Detachment who had uncovered enemy spies until the last desparate days of the war as German Intelligence Services made their final bids for information.

87 Report on Counter Intelligence, Officer in Charge, 10th CIC Det to G2, 10th Mountain Div. 21 Jun 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center).

One of these German agents, a beautiful blonde named was arrested on 30 April 1945, two days before the surrender, by 10th Mountain Division Military Police as she was walking south on the Lake Garda road, near Malcesine, and was brought to the office of the 10th CIC Detachment. Her first story was that she was trying to return to her husband in Rome, after her German lover, with whom she had come north, had tired of her. After several hours of interrogation about her lover and about the eleven new one-thousand lire notes, in series, that she was carrying, she admitted that she had connections with the German Intelligence Service, through a Dr. Kroll whom she and her husband had met in January 1945 in a Venice cafe. Although she claimed that this was a chance meeting, she admitted that her husband, a former Italian Air Corps Lieutenant, had offered his services to the Germans after the Italian Armistice in September 1943 because he needed money.

On 11 February 1945, as a result of the "chance" meeting with Dr. Kroll, husband left to attend an informant's school in Northern Italy. accompanied him as far as Verona, but remained there with Alfredo, a chauffeur who had been sent to meet her husband and direct him on his way. Wishing to remain there with Alfredo, she requested Alfredo's employer, a for employment with the German Intelligence Service. kept postponing his answer, but in the meantime turned her over to a Lieutenant Schmidt of the Gestapo in Venice. She performed one Gestapo mission against the partisans in the Chioggia-Loreo-Cavalzaro-Piove-di Sacco area, for which she received 1000 lire.

After her husband completed his training, claimed, they both became disillusioned with the German Intelligence Service and decided to travel separately--she to Rome and he to Naples--in order to escape their connections. On the way met another German Intelligence Service employee, Anna Marie, who warned her that she had been considered suspect by the Service for two months because she had been overheard saying that she expected Germany to lose the war. In spite of this, claimed, the woman gave her 15,000 lire on the following morning and told her to go to Naples, join her husband and assist him in his assigned missions.

whole story was so vague and so contradictory that CIC was led to believe that she actually had been returning from a short mission when she was captured. Through information sent to Naples, the husband was arrested. Both were turned over to Military Government for prosecution.[88]

88 10th Mountain Division CIC Report, 2 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Depot).

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Appendix I

Map Showing CIC Sub-Detachments in Austria in 1949


C S R
GERMANY
SOVIET ZONE
HQ 430TH CIC DETACHMENT
LINZ
VIENNA
SUB-DETACHMENT "B"
SUB-DETACHMENT "C"
66TH CIC DETACHMENT REGION IV ; BERCHTESGADEN FIELD OFFICE
SALZBURG
BERCHTESGADEN
INNSBRUCK
SUB-DETACHMENT "A"
BRITISH ZONE
FRENCH ZONE
SWITZERLAND
GRAZ
KLAGENFURT
ITALY
HUNGARY
SUB-DETACHMENT "A" DP-48 SECTION
JUGOSLAVIA

Part Two

OCCUPATION OF ITALY AND TRIESTE

Chapter 1: CIC Operations in Italy

Chapter 2: CIC Operations in Trieste

Appendix 1: Roster of 428th February 1947

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Post-Armistice Target Reduction in Milan

Counterintelligence target reduction continued after the unconditional surrender of the German armies in Italy. CIC task forces were still active in late May and June arresting enemy intelligence personnel and capturing German intelligence documents. Typical of these target reductions was the uncovering by IV Corps CIC agents of a large stay-behind sabotage network which operated under the commercial cover of a cosmetics distributing firm called Gibim Prodotti Corporation.

On 16 May 1945, Allied counterintelligence in Italy had captured and initiated interrogations of Dottore Reme, a senior Abwehr officer, GIS, Italy. Although Dott Reme was not cooperative, Allied counterintelligence agents were able to deduce some valuable leads to Abwehr II agents with the address of the Gibim Prodotti Corporation: Via Rosales 4, Milan; and members of the CIC task force in Milan were alerted.

On the morning of 20 May, IV Corps agent John Marino was searching among the political prisoners of San Vittore prison, Milan, and found the names of Amado Torres, a zone inspector of the Gibim Prodotti and suspected Abwehr agent, and Franca Pasquali, Torres' female companion and fellow Abwehr agent. Agent Marino obtained an immediate confession from Franca Pasquali. Both she and Torres had been apprehended by partisans on 3 May and interned as political prisoners. Torres was also willing to make a preliminary confession of his intelligence activities as a member of Abwehr II, Trupp 211 under the direction of Dott Reme.

Torres had been an administrative assistant and reculter for Dott Reme from 1 December 1944 to May 1945. In January 1945, Abwehr Agent Guido Belloni formed the Gibim Prodotti, as directed by Reme, and Torres became a zone inspector of the firm. Although Belloni had been a cosmetics dealer and knew the trade, Torres and many other Abwehr agents were placed on the Gibim Prodotti payroll as inspectors and sales representatives of the firm but actually did no work for it.

After leaving San Vittore prison, Agent Marino proceeded to Belloni's residence on Corso Como, Milan. From a check in the neighborhood, Marino learned that Belloni and another Abwehr agent, Vincenzo Sacchi, left the area on the night of 24 April 1944 and were last known to have been at Belloni's cosmetics laboratory near Genoa. Agent Marino placed Belloni's mother under arrest for interrogation and organized an informant network in the neighborhood so that he would know if Belloni returned to Milan.

Accompanied by SIM Agent Invernezzi, Agent Marino entered the offices of Gibim Prodotti, Via Rosales 4, on the afternoon of 20 May. They conducted a complete search of the premises and examined all the company's documents and records.

They seized the personnel files of the firm and lists of all employees. At the completion of the raid, a partisan guard was placed on the offices, with instructions to apprehend any person attempting to gain entry.

With the personnel records in hand, Agent Marino returned to San Vittore prison and again interrogated Torres concerning each employee of the firm. Torres identified nearly every name as that of an Abwehr agent, trained in both sabotage and espionage. The records contained twenty-four names of which only two were those of unwitting and innocent persons.

Late in the afternoon of 20 May, Agents Emery W. Seymour and Marino made the first two arrests of Gibim Prodotti undercover agents, Ermanno and Silvio Bernasconi. The brothers were taken to San Vittore prison and interrogated separately. Their stories proved to be substantially the same. They had been recruited by Torres in November 1944 and they had also attended a sabotage school in Milan. From December 1944 until May 1945, they had been idle, their only activity being to report occasionally to Gibim Prodotti to receive their pay. They had not had a chance to perform any sabotage missions before their capture by CIC.

On the afternoon of the following day, Agent Seymour arrested and interrogated Alfredo Bernabe who was listed as a sales representative of Gibim Prodotti. Bernabe had been recruited and trained by Dott Reme's staff. He claimed, truthfully it was believed, that he had not performed any sabotage missions. Agents Seymour and Marino interned Bernabe in the security wing of San Vittore prison.

During the next week, these agents apprehended and interrogated eight more members of the Trupp 211 sabotage network. On 24 May, the two agents went to the address listed for Belloni's administrative assistant, Vincenzo Sacchi, who had last been seen leaving Milan with Belloni late in April. The residents at the listed address proved to be relatives of Sacchi's, who gave the agents the telephone number of Sacchi's female companion and suggested that they contact Sacchi through her. Agents Seymour and Marino discovered that Sacchi usually visited the girl's apartment at lunch time. They picked him up that noon, and interrogated him only briefly before he confessed that he had been recruited the previous November by Torres and had served as an administrator with Gibim Prodotti.

Through lists which were disseminated to Allied intelligence and security units, the remaining personalities were apprehended and forwarded to higher echelons for final interrogation and disposition. No acts of sabotage were reported

to have been committed by any of the network's members who had been apprehended by CIC.[89]

War Criminals, Fascists, Hunted

Of immediate concern to CIC at the close of the War was the apprehension of war criminals hiding in Trieste and adjacent areas of Northern Italy. Agents were guided by lists of "arrestable categories" published by higher headquarters and distributed to CIC Detachments.

On 8 May 1945, an informant reported to the 10th CIC Detachment that SS Obersturmfuerher, Horst Edler, who had participated in the killing of three Italian partisans after the surrender of the German Army, was hiding at a home in Merano. After his arrest by CIC Agents, he revealed the location of the Gestapo in Merano along with the information that they had hoarded all kinds of supplies and stolen goods which they hoped to trade to the International Red Cross in exchange for help in getting to Switzerland.[90]

On the same day, the Japanese Embassy staff, consisting of 20 Japanese with their Italian and German employees, and the staff of the Manchurian legation, consisting of three Japanese, were placed under the protective custody of the 10th CIC Detachment.

On 9 May, Baron Gabor Kemeny, Hungary's Secretary of the Foreign Office, his secretary, Mathias Kallay; and the former Austrian Nazi Leader, Baron Fuchs Vittoria; were arrested by CIC at Obermeis and transferred to the civil jail at Marano. Kemeny, leader of the Hungarian Nazi Party, had written many propaganda books which vilified the United States, Great Britian, and the Soviet Union and had organized strong armed resistance against these Allied nations.

89 Memo for OIC re FOSI TOMMASIO, 29 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re BERNASCONI, Ermanno, BERNASCONI, Silvio, 26 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re GRANIERI Evaldo, 25 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re PASQUALI Franca, 25 May 45, Hq IV Corps; Memo for All Concerned re MARCHESE Allesandro , 24 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re BOCCALETTO Amerigo, 24 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re SACCHI Vincenzo, 24 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re BRIOSCHI Renato, 24 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re TORRES Amadeo, 22 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re GIBIM PRODOTTI, 22 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; Memo for OIC re BERNABE Alfredo, 21 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps; G2 Rpt No 352, undtd, App "A," Sec 1: 204th CIC Det Reports and Personalities File 8/44-6/45 (S), Kansas City Records Center Nr BX25096. Arrest Report re PASSEGINI Vitaliano, 2 May 45, CIC Hq IV Corps: 204th CIC Det Arrests fr Oct 44-June 45 (S), Kansas City Records Center Nr BX25096.

90 An undated, unsigned document in the 10th CIC Det files (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Depot).

CONFIDENTIAL

He had become regent when Admiral Horthy, former Regent of Hungary who tried to make an armistice with the Allies in October 1944, was overthrown by the Hungarian Hitler, Ference Szelesi. Kemeny had then fled Hungary, taking with him vast treasures of gold, diamonds, and jewels, including the Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen, and had hidden them in various banks. Kemeny then requested the protection of the International Red Cross as a means of keeping his hoard. In searching Kemeny's home, CIC Agents found many import[illegible]ocuments. He was turned over to the Soviets, who had him on their list of war criminals.[91]

One other war criminal investigation by the 10th CIC early in the Occupation resulted in the arrest of Guiseppe di Massimo Redelli. Redelli had been taken prisoner by the Germans at the time of the Italian armistice on 8 September 1943. Given the choice of internment in a concentration camp or service in the Republican Fascist Navy, Redelli had chosen the Navy, with which he had served until 8 September 1944. On that date he transferred to the Guardia Nazionale Republican and was assigned to duty at the Questura of Udine and later at Cividale.

In spite of the fact that Redelli had collaborated closely with both German and Italian Fascists at Cividale, when the Italian village was liberated by the Allies, he managed to become a member of the police force (Patrioti Dell'Ordine). As a member of the Patrioti Dell'Ordine, he effected numerous arrests of alleged Fascists and German collaborators. The fact that many of the police arrests were based upon personal hatred caused a general resentment in Cividale against the Patrioti Dell'Ordine and particularly against Redelli, who abused and beat the prisoners he arrested.

Agent James P. Furniss recommended in his report that Redelli be suspended from any public office and placed under town arrest in Udine. Further action against Redelli was left to a local "Epuration" committee in Udine.[92]

CIC Organization for Trieste

After a brief period from early May until 26 June 1945, during which the 10th and 91st CIC Detachments operated with their divisions in the Trieste area, responsibility for counterintelligence in the Free Territory passed to the 428th CIC Detachment, which was on occupation duty in Italy under the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Six zones of operations were established by the 428th CIC Detachment. Each zone was further divided into sub-sections.[93] Trieste and the adjacent areas in northern Italy fell into Zone One.

91 An undated, unsigned document in the files of the 10th CIC Detachment. (UNCLASSIFIED), (Kansas City Records Center).

92 10th Mountain Division CIC Report, 1 June 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center).

93 Interview with Maj Leo W. O'Leary (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

In May 1947 the 428th CIC Detachment left the Mediterranean Theater, and the 17th CIC Detachment was sent to Trieste to provide counterintelligence coverage for the Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), at that time the 351st Infantry Regiment.

The 17th CIC Detachment, commanded by Major Wadie Giacobbi, was composed of thirty-three officers and enlisted men who had previously served in Italy. In addition, eleven civilian investigators were employed by the 17th CIC.

Since Trieste was a fairly small area, the organization of the 17th CIC Detachment was never complex. Detachment headquarters was located in the heart of the actual city, and a small sub-office was maintained in the area occupied by American troops on a hill overlooking the city.[94]

Dual Control of 17th CIC Operations

Operations within the 17th CIC Detachment were handled and controlled by a confusing system of dual command. The Commanding Officer of the 17th CIC Detachment was responsible to the G2, TRUST, and had direction of all military activities within the unit.

The other key figure was Chief, CIC, TRUST, who was responsible to the Commanding Officer, 17th CIC, for all operations.[95] This dual control of CIC operations was apparently at the request of the G2 TRUST.[96]

For operational purposes, the detachment was organized into four sections: Port Security and Investigations; Political-Economics; Combined Counter Espionage and Positive Intelligence; and Interrogations.

The Port Security and Investigations Section was responsible for port security measures and general troop and installation security in the Trieste area. Functions of this section also included military and civilian security clearances, security surveys, security indoctrination lectures, investigations of violations of Army Regulation 380-5, and frontier control. The section maintained two offices, one in the port area and one in the city proper.

Primary aim of the Political-Economics Section was to report political and economic conditions and trends in the United States-British Zone of Trieste, but

94 Interview with Maj Demetri Vignovich, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Md, on 12 Oct 55 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

95 Returnee Report of 1st Lieutenant John Skvarna, dtd 10 December 1948, Army Intelligence Board, Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Md.

96 Returnee Report of Major Wadie Giacobbe, dtd 6 December 1948, Army Intelligence Board, Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Md.

it also made similar reports on Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav-occupied area of the Free Territory. Coverage of political parties, labor organizations, demonstrations, and strikes and the preparation of detailed economic studies were among the functions of this section.

The Counter Espionage-Positive Intelligence Section was further divided into Counter Espionage and Research (Positive Intelligence) sub-sections. The Counter Espionage division was concerned with foreign intelligence agencies operating within Trieste and with Yugoslav and Italian information services within Yugoslavia and Italy. Basic work of the section included detailed investigation of commercial firms and consulates suspected of providing cover for espionage activities. The Research, or Positive Intelligence Division, directed efforts of both long- and short-range line crossers who gathered information from within Italy and Yugoslavia. Through key contacts in Trieste, the Research Section developed sources of information among anti-Communist nets operating in Yugoslavia. This section maintained an office separate from detachment headquarters.

The interrogations section worked closely with British personnel in operation of an interrogation center.[97]

The Trieste Interrogation Center

The Counter Intelligence Corps was not the only Allied intelligence agency in Trieste. French Intelligence operated on a limited basis, working through the Chief of the French Mission. British Field Security Service agents provided coverage for British units in the area.

In 1948, CIC and the Field Security Service established a joint interrogation center in Trieste, first at the displaced persons camp and later in a downtown office. Designed as a field collection agency for all types of intelligence, the center was staffed by two CIC agents and two British personnel. Each person brought to the center was photographed and fingerprinted, and the interrogation center soon developed an identification bureau of some value. However, by 1950 the primary work of the center was the collection of order of battle information. In 1950, Military Intelligence officers relieved CIC of its work at the center.

While much of the intelligence work was done on a cooperative basis, the rivalry between the Allied intelligence agencies was intense. As a result, most suspects were milked of any information by the capturing agency before they were taken to the interrogation center. Such practices reduced the worth of the center considerably.[98]

97 Debriefing Interview of Edward W. McGettigan by CIC Board, 21 Dec 48, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Army Intelligence Board files).

98 Ibid., an Interview with Maj Leo W. O'Leary, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

Another example of the rivalry between the Allied agencies was a penciled note which appeared on a CIC report on British intelligence activities in Trieste:

> "I suggest this information or any other information (on British intelligence) be forwarded to Washington to show them what is going on. It would be good for Bert while he is there. Also suggest we blow the thing just to be mean."[99]

Despite the rivalry on some occasions, strict cooperation was a necessity on others. In the spring of 1948, the TRUST G2 Section was integrated with British Intelligence, and all Allied intelligence activities in Trieste came under the control of the combined section.[100]

CIC Gets a New Commander

In October 1948, Maj Demetri Vignovich relieved Major Giacobbi as commander of the 17th CIC Detachment. Major Vignovich held the post until January 1952, when he was replaced by Col Pete Derzis.

After Major Vignovich's arrival, the 17th CIC Detachment stepped up its training program for agents and civilian investigators. Weekly training sessions at detachment headquarters were held on Saturday mornings and featured such subjects as report writing, investigations, counter espionage, and counter sabotage. Several agents attended Berlitz classes in Italian and Yugoslav languages.

As a part of the training program, agents often participated in counterintelligence field problems in connection with the 351st Infantry.[101]

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99 Report, "British Intelligence in Trieste," 25 Apr 49 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

100 Debriefing interview with Maj Wadie Giacobbe by CIC Board, 6 Dec 48 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Army Intelligence Board files).

101 Interview with Maj Demetri Vignovich, (Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Md, on 12 Oct 55), (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 2

CIC OPERATIONS IN TRIESTE

A Mistaken Arrest

One arrest by CIC agents created a public furor in Trieste. Alfi- -abrici, a lieutenant with the Italian Alpine Troops, had returned to his home in Trieste after the capitulation of Italy, since he had no desire to fight with the Fascist Republican armies. In Trieste he lived with his father, an official at the Monfalcone shipbuilding yards. His Yugoslav wife had been persuaded to return to fight with the Yugoslav partisans.

But CIC Sub-Section "A" did not know Fabrici's full story when agents arrested him on 4 May 1946 on charges that he had served with the SS. Upon interrogation by Agent Arthur Henning, Fabrici said the Fascists had given him only two choices: serve with the SS or be sent to a concentration camp. He unwillingly selected the first alternative.

Immediately after CIC arrested Fabrici, a great number of persons came to the CIC office to protest. Italians, Yugoslavs, and Austrians--some of whom were partisans, others Communists--all pleaded for Fabrici's release.

CIC Agent Henning soon discovered that, although Fabrici had been a member of the SS, he had actively aided the partisans. He had given them the troop strengths of the various Axis organizations and had requisitioned materials for partisan use. Without the knowledge of his German superiors, Fabrici had issued a permit for the Partisan leader Di Antoni to carry a weapon. He also engineered the surrender of SS General Globoonik, supreme commander of the Litorate, to the local partisan leader--an act which invoked the Nazi wrath. Just before he was scheduled to be arrested by the Germans, Fabrici had gone into hiding in the hills of Tarvisio.

Agent Henning in his report concluded: "While it is true that Fabrici was an SS member, he used his position in the organization for the benefit of partisan groups whose ideals were close to those of his own. He risked his life in helping these organizations. He was not a believer in the principles of the SS. While atrocities and the like are generally attributed to the SS, he used his position to help people against the harsh policies of the organization. It is recommended that the Subject be given his discharge and that he be exonerated."[102]

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102 Case A-94.1 Sub Section "A" Folder 50-000324, 21 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

Although rounding up war criminals was an important counterintelligence mission, CIC realized early in the occupation of Trieste that a threat was posed by Communist espionage attempts, principally those inspired by the Yugoslavs. Records of the CIC Detachment in Trieste contain numerous cases that reveal these attempts to be continuous. One case involved a man named who had been active in Communist agitation in Zone "A." He was arrested by Agent Henning on 14 June 1946, and when a search of his home revealed an extensive supply of military maps of the region, he was charged with espionage. Preliminary interrogation disclosed that was employed by the Yugoslav Espionage Service and also worked for another espionage agency in the Tarvisia area, supervising Italian Communists. He appeared to be well informed on the Slovene Communist underground organization and the overt activities of the Italian Communist Party in the Trieste area.[103]

A Swiss citizen of United States parentage, was arrested by CIC in Venice on suspicion of being involved in several "shady" operations and because of his general lack of moral character. But when further investigation revealed that he had been dealing with a suspected Yugoslav intelligence agent, he was placed in jail to await further action by the Allied Military Government.[104]

Rumors of illicit radio sending sets cropped up from time to time. One persistent rumor in May 1946 pinpointed such a radio, said to be operating in code, in the Cave del Predil area, but careful investigation failed to locate it.[105]

CIC Under Surveillance

was arrested on 17 October 1946, when it was discovered that she had been reporting the agents' activities to the sister of a suspected operative of a Yugoslav agency. Investigation revealed that this information had been forwarded to the Yugoslav government.[106]

CIC suspicions that surveillance was being kept on their activities were heightened when a reliable Italian agency reported that an unidentified man, armed with a German light machine gun was seen within fifty yards of the CIC billet on

103 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
104 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 1 July 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
105 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 May 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
106 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 23 October 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

the evening of 19 August 1946. The man could not be found; security precautions were increased.[107]

Although little activity of the Yugoslav Military forces as such came to the attention of CIC in Trieste, CIC frequently was concerned with the National Security Police (OZNA) Intelligence. An informant reported on 23 January 1946 the presence of a division of National Security Police in Zone "B," along with 60,000 Yugoslav troops.[108]

One of the few CIC investigations which directly concerned the Yugoslav military forces was a security survey of a former Yugoslav hospital in Gorizia.

On 29 August 1947, Yugoslav army authorities vacated the military hospital which they had occupied in Gorizia for the past two years. No incidents occurred either during or after the actual evacuation. Troops formerly stationed in the hospital proceeded unmolested to the Yugoslav Detachment Area in Zone "A." On the same day, agents of Sub-Section "G" conducted a security survey of the building and the immediate vicinity. Nothing of counterintelligence interest was discovered. Information obtained from members of the Italian monastery located on the hospital grounds revealed that on 26 August the Yugoslav soldiers were engaged in transporting large boxes out of the building and onto waiting trucks. It was believed the boxes held a cache of arms and ammunition which had been stored in the hospital.[109]

Sabotage Investigations Numerous

Although numerous incidents in which the possibility of sabotage was involved required CIC investigation, few such investigations resulted in actual proof of sabotage. One exception was a bridge at Uccea, which was inspected by Agent Rosmino N. Barengo in late February 1946, on the basis of information received from the Italian Forestry Service. The agent discovered that seventeen large bolts holding the planking had been removed at various intervals and that a clevis pin anchoring one end of the bridge had been driven out of position in such a manner that any heavy traffic would cause the bridge to collapse. It was obviously sabotage, but the perpetrators were not discovered.[110]

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107 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 August 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

108 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008, 23 Jan 46 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

109 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007 1 September 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

110 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report, 50-000007, May 46 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

The ever-present danger of sabotage or revolts against the occupying forces led to numerous raids conducted by CIC, accompanied by local police and military units, to recover arms and ammunition hoarded in Italian homes.[111]

Two such raids occurred during the week of 5 December 1945, when Special Agent Charles J. Rubacky of Sub-Section "B," Zone One CIC, led searches in the town of Sammardenchia, which netted twelve heavy machine guns, [illegible]ght machine guns, one automatic rifle, one rifle, 155 hand grenades, and 8760 rounds of ammunition.[112]

A large raid was staged at Buia on 29 October 1946. CIC, Italian police, a battalion of the 350th Infantry, and the 350th Infantry's Special Police participated in the raid. Troops quickly established roadblocks, effectively sealing off the village. Entering the town, the troops and police seized large quantities of gunpowder, fuses, ammunition, hand grenades, and military automotive parts. One villager was arrested when agents found a Sten gun in his possession. Discovery of a large antenna touched off a hunt for a clandestine radio operation in the area, but a thorough search failed to turn up the radio.[113]

Border Crossers Pose Problem

From the outset of the occupation, border crossers--persons who illegally passed international boundaries--plagued CIC in Trieste and in Northern Italy.

As early as 25 May 1945, Special Agent James O. Braly of the 10th CIC Detachment reported that hordes of persons were attempting to cross the border from Austria into Italy. The Italian-Austrian frontier had been closed to all but military personnel and vehicles. Nevertheless great numbers of civilians attempted to pass through control points into Italy.[114]

CIC Detachment Zone One, Sub-Section "A," reported on 23 October 1945 that most of its border control work concerned the screening of applicants for American Military Government Travel Permits, disposing of displaced persons, and the enforcement of regulations governing the frontiers around Venezia Giulia.[115]

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111 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 1 Mar 46 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

112 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 8 Dec 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

113 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 25 Nov 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), Central Records Facility).

114 Memorandum for the OIC, 10th CIC Detachment, 25 May 45 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Kansas City Records Center).

115 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008, dtd 23 Oct 1945 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

CIC's main concern with border crossers was based on the possibility that enemy agents were slipping into Allied territory to commit espionage or sabotage. But the agents discovered that the black market was the motive of the illegal movement.

In June 1946, CIC broke up a ring of cattle rustlers and smugglers operating in Northern Italy and Southern Austria. The thieves had stolen horses and oxen in Austria, then driven them across the border for sale in Italy. CIC began an investigation when the thieves were found to be smuggling cocaine as well as cattle. Ringleaders were arrested and turned over to Military Government for prosecution.

The arrest of by Agents of Zone One Sub-Detachment "A" brought out important information regarding illegal border crossing for black market operations. Questioned by CIC agents, told how black market organizations had extensive connections on both sides of the Austrian-Italian border. Members of the organization possessed travel papers authorizing movement in either country. said the usual route of the black market operators was from Klagenfurt, Austria, through Feistritz, Sella Bartolo on the border, Ugovizza, Camporossa, and then by train south.

Austrians Apprehended

Four Austrian youths who crossed the Italian-Austrian border illegally were picked up in the vicinity of Malborghetto and interrogated by CIC at Tarvisio on 20 February 1946. The youths had in their possession four German pistols, one Italian pistol, and several hundred rounds of ammunition. They also carried maps of the area. They stated upon interrogation that many Austrian civilians had not turned in their weapons, and that a great many small arms were hidden in the forests. The youths were turned over to the British Field Security Service.[117]

Displaced Persons Cross Borders

During September 1946 an excessive increase in illegal border crossers was noted by all security authorities in the area of Sub-Section "A" Zone One CIC.

Most of the border crossers were well organized Jewish displaced persons who were attempting to migrate from Middle European countries into Italy en route to Palestine. The first group of illegal travellers filtered past British authorities in Austria and eventually reached the vicinity of the Italian border. Here they purposely attracted attention by their suspicious movements and were apprehended by

116 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-0C008, 23 Jun 46 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

117 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 23 February 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

security agencies. Claiming to have recently arrived from Italy, they said they desired to return to their homes in Middle Europe; consequently, they were escorted to the Italian border and advised not to return to Austria. Once in Italy, the Jewish Displaced Persons contacted waiting trucks and were transported to Udine.

Another group, which attempted the same ruse at a later date, was closely and individually interrogated by British Field Security Service authorities until it was definitely ascertained that the people in question had started from Austria or further north. As a result of these questionings Field Security Service was able to apprehend several of the local leaders and obtain information on other important organizers. It was also revealed that the displaced persons used a similar ruse with Italian authorities. Jewish DP's would effect a successful illegal crossing of the frontier, journey several miles south of the border, then board a train bound for Austria. As was to be expected, these individuals would be required to produce documents prior to reaching the Austrian-Italian border. At this point they would claim that they were attempting to return to their homes in middle Europe and would be escorted out of the area, back into Italy.[118]

Adding to the movement control problem was the fact that whenever American military units changed locations, their indigenous employees were allowed to follow. This complicated CIC's security task in several ways: The moves brought new civilians into new areas; prostitutes, always a security threat, followed the troops into each new area; and, until the units were well established in their new locations, there were no effective border patrols to control movements of persons not authorized to travel. Particularly was this true along the Yugoslav border, where both Italians and Slavs attempted to leave Zone "B" after it became part of Yugoslavia.[119]

Women border-crossers caused their share of trouble by moving back and forth in the Trieste area. Typical of the female travellers were two girls who crossed the Austrian border in British trucks to visit British troops in Trieste. Upon their return to the Austrian border they were halted and turned over to CIC. They were referred to Military Government officials for disposal.[120]

American officers who had girls friends outside of the Venezia Giulia border caused an additional CIC problem. CIC reported that the guards who controlled the check post on Route 54, Venezia Giulia Border, had on at least two occasions

118 MOIC Illegal Border Crossers Folder 50-000393 dated 10 October 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

119 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 23 July 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

120 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

had difficulty with American officers who were transporting their lady friends across the Venezia Giulia lines.

On 28 July, a military vehicle driven by an American lieutenant was halted at a road block, and guards requested that the officer's civilian female companion produce a travel permit. The girl did not possess one and agreed with the guard on duty that she could not cross the boundary lines. The lieutenant insisted that his friend and the vehicle be allowed the proceed, stating that he was an officer and would vouch for the girls's conduct. Eventually the frightened guard allowed him to pass.[121]

Civil Movement Control

CIC Sub-Section "A" reported on 23 February 1947 that the general exodus of troops from the Tarvisio area was accompanied by a lack of discretion in revealing the date and destination of the proposed movement. Many transient civilians desired to follow the troops. While a few of these persons possessed legitimate claims to proceed to Trieste with the military units, a large majority appeared to be habitual trouble makers, both male and female, who would congregate in any region where soldiers were present. Neither AMG nor division authorities took any preventive measures against the mass imigration to Trieste, but rather in certain cases appeared to encourage it. The influx of additional people, among whom were many undesirables, into an already impoverished area, forboded discontentment and all types of covert activity.[122]

CIC Stresses Security

The numerous security measures which CIC supervised at military installations was an important phase of Trieste operations. At the end of the war, troops tended to relax their security guards, and CIC found it necessary to increase their efforts to promote security-consciousness.

CIC had to begin at home. In June 1946 CIC Sub-Detachment "A" of Zone One staged a surprise security raid to check up on its own agents. Numerous military documents were found in unlocked containers in agents' homes. The condition was attributed to lack of security or carelessness.[123]

Another example of lack of security during the same month was the compromise of information concerning the departure of the 351st Infantry Regiment and

121 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Sitrep 50-000006 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

122 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 Feb 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

123 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 Jul 46 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

the 88th Division from the Tarvisio area on 11 June 1946. Within hours after the alert for the evacuation of the troops, the local populace knew when the movement was to take place, what units were to leave, the sequence of departure, and what units were to remain in the area.[124]

To control the security weaknesses, CIC agents presented a lecture of an hour's duration to each cycle of replacements trained by the 351st Infantry Regiment. Agents attempted to impress new personnel with the obvious necessity of strict military security in Venezia Guilia and adjacent areas. In addition, the lecture included information on policies and duties of CIC in order to insure maximum cooperation and understanding between troops and CIC.[125] But some security lapses persisted. In one regiment, the 350th Infantry, security safeguards were so inadequate that agents from CIC Sub-Section "B," Zone One, found a pin-point order of battle map of the regiment posted on a public bulletin board in the center of Tricesimo, on Highway 13 north. The map was removed.[126]

A year later, in March 1947, Company L of the 350th Infantry was under secret orders for a move to Pola. One member of the unit told his domestic servant about the coming move, and within twenty-four hours the entire Tarcento-Tricesimo populace knew of the "secret move."[127]

On 13 June 1947 the Gorizia CIC Office received a report from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, stating that a breach of security regulations had been discovered in the Office of the AC of S, G3, Trust. While investigation failed to unearth the military personnel responsible for the leakage of classified information, CIC agents cautioned all individuals in the office against further unauthorized disclosure of the contents of official documents.[128]

CIC Guards VIPs

A different type of security assignment was the security surveillance of important persons visiting in Trieste. Among the personalities that CIC guarded in the post-war years was General Mark W. Clark, who visited Trieste in May 1947. Agent Joel J. Hobson in his report of 10 May said:

124 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
125 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 Sep 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
126 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
127 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 20 March 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).
128 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 1 July 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

"It is the opinion of this Agent that the secrecy of General Clark's visit was very well kept by the 88th Division personnel. CIC Agents were on duty at all danger spots along the route followed by the official party. It is believed that the use of the dummy car preceeding the General's car worked satisfactorily, and should an attempt have been made against the General's life, protective measures could have been taken in time to prevent serious consequences.

"It was noted that the personnel in the General's party were unaware of the security measures being taken, so it is recommended that all personnel connected with the visitor's party be informed of the need for their cooperation in the security measures."[129]

Agents Dominic Rossow and Aloysius J. Majszak were less fortunate while performing as security escorts for General C. H. Lee. On 12 July 1947, as the General's convoy approached a fork on Via Miramare, a civilian jeep driven by an American officer cut into the convoy. Special Agents Rossow and Majszak asked the officer to drop behind the convoy, since he was interfering and preventing them from doing their duty. He refused to get out of the convoy and said he would turn when he was ready. The officer asked who the agents were to be giving orders to an American officer. He finally turned off the highway, and the agents resumed their positions.

On 16 July 1947, William W. Tyng, Chief CIC Trust, wrote G2 TRUST: "It is requested that action be taken by your office to properly indoctrinate the officer concerned and if deemed advisable to initiate an official reprimand. [130]

Port Security in Trieste

Because Trieste had one of Europe's busiest harbors, port security became a vital part of CIC's work in the Free Territory. Trieste CIC's Port Section was small, but exceedingly busy. A large percentage of the goods of Europe and Asia were channeled through the "Free Port" city.

Smuggling was a common trade. Although CIC was not directly concerned with the apprehension of smugglers, agents often found themselves investigating pilferage of army cargo and enforcing measures designed to halt the illegal commerce.

More important to CIC was the smuggling traffic which attempted to move aliens in and out of Trieste without proper authority. On one occasion, agents in Trieste discovered a ring of smugglers who had been illegally ferrying aliens into the United States for several months.

129 CIC Guard Details Folder 50-000196 10 May 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

130 Report of CIC Guard Details Folder 50-000196 14 July 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

Special Agent Wiltz Evans reported on 21 November 1949 that the gang transported the aliens from Trieste to the United States aboard the Italian steamship Maria Bibolini. A specially constructed room in the bow of the ship, between the anchor chain locker and the water tank, was used as quarters for from twenty-five to thirty-five persons on each ocean crossing. They were debarked at Baltimore.

The ship's master, the chief engineer, the second in command, and the storeroom men all were involved in the racket. Prices for the voyage ranged from 1,700,000 to 1,900,000 lire per person.[131]

In July 1947, CIC investigated the sewer system of the port of Trieste. Some of the larger sewers were thought to run under dock warehouses where valuable American supplies were kept, and it was believed that villagers might use the sewers for the purpose of evacuating pilfered supplies.

As another port security measure, CIC formulated a plan for issuing badges to authorized dock employees. The badges were collected at the end of the working day to insure that no worker overstayed his working hours and that no unauthorized persons entered.[132]

Constantly on the alert for the illegal shipments of arms and war materiel, CIC port Security agents became well informed on transport conditions in and out of Trieste.

Typical of methods to avoid the ban on sale of armaments to the satellite countries was a ruse used by one Italian manufacturer to sell ball bearings to Czechoslovakia. The Milan manufacturer would sell a shipment to a dealer in Zurich, Switzerland--a legal transaction. The shipment went by rail to Trieste, since no duty was charged for shipments from the free port. More important, while the ball bearings were enroute to Trieste, they were resold to a dealer in Czechoslavakia.

The sale of strategic material by the Swiss to Czechoslovakia was legal as far as the Swiss government was concerned, but the United States and British security forces were ordered to find and impound all of these shipments to await the decision of the proper authorities. Much CIC manpower was expended in the search for this contraband.[133]

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131 Summary of Information dtd 21 Nov 49, Folder 50-000390 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

132 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008 1 July 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

133 Interview with Maj Leo W. O'Leary (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

CIC and the Local Population

CIC investigations in Trieste led to many problems in dealing with the native population. Sometimes the problems were easily resolved, involving no more than efforts to placate a crackpot inventor disgruntled because the Americans did not recognize his genius. Often the problems were serious and required delicate handling to prevent outbursts of anti-American demonstrations.

Of particular concern to agents in Trieste was the propaganda situation. Post-war Trieste was a hodgepodge of nationalities--Italians, Slavs, Austrians. Each faction tried to out-do the other in matters of propaganda.

CIC Agent W. A. Berlin reported on 22 February 1946 that a wave of propaganda and pro-Slav rumors had flooded the Tarvisio area in January and February. Reports of threats against anti-Tito Slovenes were becoming more and more numerous and pro-Tito groups were holding many small clandestine meetings throughout the area.[134]

During the latter part of October 1947, the Yugoslav radio station in Ljubljana organized a propaganda service directed toward Yugoslav refugees in Italy and Austria in an attempt to persuade these individuals to return to their homes. Preliminary programs included a short talk by a prominent Slovene novelist and priest, Franc Sebastijan Finzgar. All refugees were invited to establish communication with Radio Ljubljana for any additional information which they might desire.[135]

Anti-American Propaganda Circular

In the fall of 1948, an informant gave Special Agent Gabriel B. Celetta a copy of an anti-American propaganda circular being distributed among middle-class Italians. The document, purportedly a report of an intelligence agent, was not traced to its source, although it was believed that the circular was distributed by Russian agents.

The leaflet praised the military superiority of the Soviets over the United States and condemned the Americans for robbery, rape, and other crimes against the people of occupied Germany. Morale and discipline of US troops were said to be very poor.[136]

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134 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008 22 Feb 1946 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

135 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 5 Nov 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

136 Summary of Information Folder 50-000714, 6 Oct 48 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility). The propaganda leaflet is reproduced as Appendix 1.

Propaganda by Dollars

On 2 October 1950, a communication from the AC of S, G2, TRUST, advised CIC that propaganda was being disseminated in the form of a photographed United States dollar bill.

The investigation conducted by CIC disclosed that a copy of a fake dollar bill had been given to a Corporal Jackson by one Giovanni Pirozzi, an employee of the American Forces in Trieste.

Pirozzi claimed that he found the counterfeit American dollar rolled up on the top of a trash can on the ground floor near the entrance to his home.

On the front of the bill was a photograph of an ordinary one dollar bill, United States currency. On the back was a circled atomic bomb with the words "Terrore Atomic Morte" (Terror, Atomic, Death) and a circle enclosing a hooded figure labeled K.K.K. and two persons hanged by the neck. In the inside border were these words in Italian: "With this money they have not bought the Koreans. With this money they will not buy the Italian people."

Special Agent Dino Mernone in his report stated that there were no laws in the Free Territory of Trieste which prohibited the photographing of United States currency, so no further action could be taken.[137]

Reporting on the Trieste Situation

Propaganda studies were but one phase of a system of reporting developed by CIC in Trieste and Northern Italy.

Reporting on the Trieste situation proved a complicated process. It required a thorough knowledge of Italian politics--intricate in themselves--and employment of vast informant nets to cover the more than two hundred Italian political parties.

As a part of the political reporting task, agents filed reports on attitudes of the people in Trieste and surrounding areas towards the United States, the Italian government, Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, Communism, and a host of other subjects. Some typical examples of CIC political reports emanating from Trieste follow.

CIC Agent W. A. Berlin of the Tarvisio office reported on 22 February 1946 that increasing numbers of Yugoslavs were fleeing Yugoslavia because of oppression under the Communist regime. On the other hand, a number of local Slavs were

137 MOIC Photographs of American Currency used as Propaganda, Folder 50-001098, dated 13 October 1950 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

attempting to enter Yugoslavia because relatives, friends, or propagandists had convinced them that they would find ideal conditions under the Tito government.[138]

The arrival of a United Nations Organizations Commission on 2 April 1946 touched off a wave of propaganda by both Slav and Italian elements in Trieste. Long before the arrival of the commission, the Yugoslavs had been busy with the preparation and dissemination of pro-Yugoslav propaganda designed to impress the visitors. But when the Commission arrived, the Slavs played a secondary role to the Italians. The Italians put on a tremendous demonstration, and on the night of 2 April went so far as to threaten the Slav leaders with violence. Following the commission's visit it became clear that the Austrians were also leading opponents of the Italians, and the Italians united for the forthcoming elections against a possible Austro-Yugoslav block.[139]

In the days preceeding 1 May 1946, the political scene became tense in the Free Territory of Trieste. In the Tarvisio area, rumors of a Yugoslav invasion were received with mixed emotions. CIC personnel worked around the clock to keep track of the situation. The agents found tense Italians making defense preparations while the enthusiastic Slavs appeared to be spirited and boastful.

Aside from the prolific amount of rumors and stories, however, 1 May 1946 passed quietly.[140]

Surveys of political sentiment were an important part of CIC's reporting mission in Trieste, as the countries surrounding the Free Territory fluctuated between Communism and democracy. According to a CIC report of 23 June 1946, at least 80 per cent of the people in Trieste opposed the Tito regime. At Sonzia, no one except actual party members supported him. At Baucizza, all citizens but one were against Tito, and the people said "Come what will, but not the Yugoslavia of Tito."[141]

CIC Sub-Section "A" reported on 23 July 1946 that the people of the Tarvisio area were eagerly awaiting the Big Four decision on Trieste since their future also was at stake. The results drifted in rather quietly. People on the whole were satisfied with the disposal of Trieste, but dissatisfaction soon developed concerning the rest of the area involved.

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138 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008 23 Feb 1946 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

139 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008 23 April 1946 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

140 Zone One MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-000008 23 May 1946 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

141 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-000008, 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

It soon became apparent that the Italians blamed the United States and Great Britian for the unsatisfactory agreement. Hostility toward the Americans became more open, and Italians hurled obscene remarks at Americans who passed them on the streets.[142]

Roman Catholic opposition to Communism was the subject of another political report prepared by Zone One CIC Sub-Section "G."

On 26 October 1947, Archbishop Margotti of Gorizia warned the town's inhabitants that Catholics were forbidden to participate in the Fronte della Gioventua (Youth Front) and the Unione Donne Italiane (Union of Italian Women), both Communist-dominated political organizations. Communist teachings were declared to be contrary to doctrines of the Church.

The Gorizia Provincial Committee of the Fronte della Gioventua reproached the Archbishop for his declaration and directed its representatives in Rome to investigate the circumstances which resulted in the pronouncement.[143]

CIC Meets the Press

Another aspect of CIC's political reporting involved coverage of party meetings and the countless patriotic demonstrations staged by the various factions within Trieste.

At one such demonstration on 21 March 1948, however, the political aspects became secondary to an encounter between CIC agents and members of the press.

Agents Don Braun and Alesander Galli, assigned to cover a political demonstration in front of the Army Exchange Service "Sugar Bowl," Piazza Unita, Trieste, were interrupted by a Mr. Green, an Associated Press correspondent, who wanted to know what action the police were going to take to curb the demonstration. When the agents refused to answer, the newsman became offensive in his language.

Moments later, the agents noticed a female photographer posing an American soldier and sailor in a manner which made it appear that they were participating in the demonstration. Agent Galli approached the woman, a part-time photographer for United Press, and asked her not to make the picture. When she refused to cooperate, the agents asked her to leave the scene. Again she refused. Meanwhile, another photographer, one Vitrotti, also photographed the soldier and the sailor as participants in the demonstration.

142 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-000008, 23 July 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

143 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 5 Nov 47 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

Believing that the woman photographer was abusing her press privileges by tricking American military personnel into posing for photographs with definite political implications, the CIC agents telephoned their office for further instructions. The agents were instructed to bring the woman to the CIC office. After considerable argument, she finally accompanied the agents, but refused to surrender her exposed film to the G2 duty officer. She was released when she promised to show the prints to intelligence officers before publication.

Meanwhile, agents were sent to locate Vitrotti, the other photographer who had made pictures of the Americans at the demonstration. They found him at his laboratory, where he surrendered the negative. As the agents left the laboratory, they met Green, the Associated Press correspondent. Green demanded that the agents give him the film they had taken from Vitrotti. When they refused, the reporter assailed them bitterly, accusing them of restricting freedom of the press. Both Green and Vitrotti accompanied the agents to the CIC office.

When the group reached the CIC office, Green was permitted to examine the negative for the first time. He immediately announced that it was not suitable for publication. Green apologized for his bitter words, and the case was closed.[144]

Reporting on Army-Civilian Relations

The reaction of the local population to the army forces was of CIC interest because the temper of the people was often an indication of events that might affect security. A typical survey of civilian sentiment was reported by a reliable CIC informant, on 12 June 1946, when American troops were preparing to leave the Tarvisio area. This departure was greeted with mixed feelings among the local populace.

Many small businessmen and laborers expressed disasspointment on seeing their main source of income disappear, but the leaders of parties and partisan organizations were pleased with the mass departure. They quickly formulated plans to punish those who had cooperated with American troops.[145]

Troops and Civilians Clash

Reporting on army-civilian relations was not always the end of CIC's responsibility. At times, CIC agents were called on to investigate disorders resulting from clashes between troops and civilians.

144 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Port and Security Section, CIC, Trieste, dtd 24 Mar 48 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

145 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 23 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

At 0100 hours on 5 June 1946, agents of the Cividale office investigated a clash between Italian civilians and soldiers of the 313th Engineer Battalion at Prestento. Investigation revealed that right wing elements in Prestento had requested Dino Comelli, commander of an Ossopo Partisan Company, to distribute arms to frightened inhabitants, who feared a Slav attack that evening. This arms distribution was reported to certain anti-Ossopo individuals in the Cividale Civilian Police, who raided the Benati home, assisted by two men from the 313th Engineer Battalion. Tense with fear, Teresa Benati mistook the American soldiers for Slavs, cried for help, then hurled nine grenades at them.

CIC agents ordered the Carabinieri to surround the house while they themselves returned to Cividale to obtain assistance for a raid of Prestento. The raid was carried out between 0600 and 0900 prior to the arrival of units of the 350th Infantry Regiment and the 752nd Tank Battalion. All Partisans in Prestento voluntarily surrendered their arms.[146] Following the arrival in the small Italian city of Padua of the General Headquarters, British Forces, Central Mediterranean Forces, the civil population became increasingly annoyed and disturbed by the traffic conditions and the number of serious accidents involving British military vehicles. Special Agent F. Sanders Washburn reported on 12 December 1946 that certain elements made capital of the situation for propaganda purposes.

At about noon on 10 December the driver of a British motor vehicle ignored the signal of the Italian traffic policeman at a principal intersection, crossed the opposing traffic, and struck the policeman, continuing at increased speed until he rammed the wall of a cafe. This event proved to be the match which ignited an already tense situation. Crowds in the streets administered a beating to the driver, then turned on all British personnel or property in sight. A Military Police squad rescued the driver, but were themselves attacked. Several other vehicles were overturned. Officers were assaulted. One of these was reported by the newspaper "Gazzattino" to have used abusive language toward the crowd.

The rioting continued throughout the day and into the early morning hours. Twenty persons were injured and fifty vehicles were burned, overturned, or otherwise damaged.

The next day was calm until well after dark, when approximately one hundred British troops moved out from their quarters in military formation, apparently without orders. The group marched through the main streets of Padua molesting any civilians in their way. A few taxis and private cars were damaged, and windows were shattered.

The Communist press made capital of the situation.[147]

146 Weekly Situation Report Sub-Section "D." Zone One, 7 June 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

147 Disorders at Padua, Folder 50-000407 Dec 18, 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), Central Records Facility).

CIC Agents Attacked

CIC agents of Sub-Section "G" were attacked on 5 June 1947 while searching for documents pertaining to Communist Party activities in the area. An informant had reported the presence of such documents on grounds surrounding a building previously occupied by Allied troops in San Pietro di Gorizia.

While searching the grounds, the agents were approached by Max di Ivan Nemec and Ivan Isidor Forcessin, who threatened to overturn the agents' vehicle. At a signal, thirty other persons rushed in and attacked the CIC agents.

Civil and Military Police rushed to the scene and arrested the instigators of the demonstration.[148]

Miscellaneous Investigations

CIC assignments in Trieste occasionally fell outside the counterintelligence mission. Among the more unusual CIC encounters with civilians were the contacts agents had with the local inventors who claimed their products would be of value to American military forces.

In September 1950 Special Agent Ely S. Matteri investigated the claim of that he had invented a new type anti-aircraft projectile which he desired to sell to the American government.

said he had developed the projectile while engaged in research work for the Italian Army during World War II. explained that the normal anti-aircraft shell spread fragments in a conical pattern after the projectile exploded, leaving that part of the target inside the cone unharmed. claimed that his projectile first spread in the form of a cone, then gradually changed to a cylindrical shape after the explosion saturating the entire area within the cylinder with fragments.

According to the shell had proven satisfactory in tests for the Italian Army, but Italy's military collapse had prevented further development. He said he had destroyed all the documents and plans of this projectile after the Italians surrendered, but that he could reconstruct them for a sum of $50,000 and a place in American intelligence.

When questioned about other engineers who had worked with him on the project, said he had done all of the work himself. Records of the 17th CIC Detachment do not show the outcome of the proposal.[149]

148 Zone One MTCUSA Weekly Situation Report 60-000007, 9 June 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

149 MOIC, Interview Concerning Anti-aircraft Projectile Folder, 50-001098 14 September 1950 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

CIC again [illegible] the receiving agency for scientific material when a confidential CIC source for [illegible]ied copies of written correspondence and reports of the [illegible] which indicated that Engineer [illegible] had invented a new and successful method of transmitting secret messages, both by telegraph and radio.

All tests run by the [illegible] were positive, and the system was declared to be foolproof from the viewpoint of detection, reception, transmittal, mobility, efficiency, durability, maintenance, and range. The system was reputedly effective on any wave length and under all radio and telegraphic conditions.

The Italian government had turned down the purchase of the instrument because of the lack of funds, the report stated. [illegible] had offered it to the United States for $1,000,000 and to the British for 350,000 pounds.[150]

CIC Investigates Criminal Cases

Occasionally, CIC agents in Trieste investigated purely criminal cases. Black market activities and smuggling most frequently came to CIC attention, although agents investigated other types of crimes ranging from petty theft to murder.

Black Market Investigations

On 27 November 1945, a representative of the 62d Field Security Service contacted Sub-Section "A" CIC and requested assistance in a raid on the home of [illegible] suspected along with his son of being the biggest wine smuggler and black marketeer in the area.

The raid took place at 1400 hours on [illegible] with Carabinieri, Guardia di Fineza, Austrian Civil Police, British Military Police, and CIC participating. In the cellar of the house agents found between fifty and seventy-five bottles of wine and about 200 empties. In other parts of the house they found three shot gun shells and four rounds of 7.65 Mauser ammunition.

In one of the [illegible] found in his room was a loaded German Dreyse pistol, and a clip of seven rounds. Also in his room were old German and Italian uniforms and a large sum of money in Reichsmarks and Italian lire.

A 27-year old man was hiding in one of the upstairs rooms. He carried an AMG travel permit from Gradisca to Ferrara and return, made out to [illegible]. He was held for being in a prohibited 20 km zone without proper permission. While the raid was in progress, two teenagers appeared at the [illegible] house with the

150. [illegible] (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

Austrian civil police. They had been stealing chickens in Austria and trading them to for wine.

The Carabinieri took the uniforms, the British held the chickens, and CIC claimed the pistol, ammunition and the money.[151]

German Prisoners of War in The Black Market

While CIC was not directly responsible for investigating black market activity in the Tarvisio area, the black market did constitute a security threat. Reports had reached the Tarvisio CIC office early in 1946 to the effect that German Prisoners of War were carrying on extensive black market activity in wine and tires. The people in the area felt the Allies condoned the POW in their illegal activities. The populace also felt that should there be an outbreak between the Yugoslavs and the Allies, the POW would be enlisted to fight against the Yugoslavs.[152]

Black Market in Tires

In mid-May 1947, CIC agents of Sub-Section "B," Zone One, arrested two American soldiers and two Italian civilians for selling US Army tires on the black market.

Acting on a tip from an informant in the 788th Ordinance Company, CIC undercover agents followed all loaded trucks leaving the company area. On one of the surveillances, agents followed a pick-up truck loaded with tires. Soon the soldiers in the truck stopped and began unloading the tires. One agent went ahead to notify Agent Eric H. Delling, Jr. of the action. As Delling came from Cividale, he met the truck, now empty. He arrested the soldiers and took them to Torreano, where one of the prisoners identified the Italians to whom the tires had been sold.

The soldiers were court martialed, and the Italians were turned over to Military Government for prosecution.[153] In January 1947, a black market case led to the arrest of a US Army deserter, when CIC agents apprehended for black market activities.

Interrogation revealed that was a deserter from the United States Army who had left his unit in 1944. Born in Trieste, had been commissioned in the Italian Army, but had been exiled during Mussolini's regime because

151 Blackmarket Activities Folder 5-000165 19 May 1947 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

152 Monthly Activities Report 50-000008 23 April 1946 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

153 Black Market Activities Folder 50-111065, 19 May 47 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Central Records Facility).

he was a Jew. After migrating to the United States was drafted into the US Army and shipped to the Mediterranean Theater. He deserted his unit in Naples, Italy. After interrogation, CIC turned him over to the Provost Marshal of the 88th Division for disposal.[154]

CIC Breaks Up a Confidence Racket

Often agents in Trieste were accidentally drawn into criminal investigations. In February 1948, for example, agents assisted in the destruction of a confidence game which preyed on American military personnel.

Agent Peter Gordon was strolling along a Trieste street on 9 February 1948 when he noticed a young woman who seemed to be trying to attract the attention of Allied soldiers and sailors. A closer observation revealed that the woman was exchanging occasional glances with a man who followed her at a short distance. Gordon watched the pair for fifteen minutes without approaching either.

Moments later Gordon was startled when the man accosted him in a loud, arrogant voice and accused the CIC agent and other American officers of molesting his wife. Convinced that the man was trying to provoke an incident, Gordon summoned the nearest civil police patrol to arrest the pair and take them to a Military Police Station for identification and questioning.

At the police station, the man, Mario Sidi, insisted that the agent was attempting to molest his wife. Sidi claimed to be a well-known journalist and said he could obtain innumerable witnesses to the incident. The woman was identified as Lidia Canciani. When the couple produced a marriage certificate, they were released.

Further investigation revealed that Canciani lived with her mother and was unemployed. She had given birth to an illegitimate child in 1945, and at the time of the incident was the mistress of an unidentified individual who frequently visited her home. She was often seen in the company of Allied soldiers and maintained close connections with Sidi. Neighbors and the Municipal Guard stated that Canciani was a prostitute.

A check on Sidi's background convinced CIC that the man had made false statements regarding his identity, occupation and marital status. The investigation produced one startling result, however; Sidi apparently had good friends within the Allied command. Within thirty minutes after Sidi's release, two different military sources called to request a detailed explanation for Sidi's arrest.

154 Zone "A" MTOUSA Monthly Activities Report 50-00008, 25 February 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

CIC concluded that Sidi and Canciani were engaged in a confidence racket. They enticed inexperienced Army and Navy personnel into compromising situations, then blackmailed them.[155]

CIC Solves a Triple Murder

Another case that fell outside the normal CIC mission was the investigation of a triple murder in May 1949. The case indicated clearly what type of cooperation CIC could expect from the Venezia Giulia Police.

Giusto di Giusto Trevisan, a jeweler in Trieste, occupied a villa at Muggia with his mistress, Lidia di Giovanni Ravasini, and a maid, Edvige Pia Odonocini. On 15 September 1946 when Trevisan's parents arrived at the Muggia villa for a visit, they discovered the bodies of Trevisan and the two women in the cellar. All had been shot.

Venezia Giulia police officials from Muggia, who investigated the murders, ruled out theft as a motive, since the killers had failed to take objects of considerable value located conspicuously throughout the house. It was apparent, however, that the house had been searched. Every room was in utter disorder.

A CIC informant brought in the clues which ultimately led to the solution of the crime. The informant claimed he was present in a bar one evening when one Umberto Picca revealed to companions that he had had a part in the triple murder. Picca reportedly had said Trevisan's murder originally was intended only as a robbery to replenish empty Communist Party coffers. Party intelligence agents in Trieste had instructed four bandits to raid Trevisan's home and steal ten kilograms (twenty-five pounds) of gold believed to have been in the jeweler's possession.

Under arrest, Picca related the following account of the murders:

Upon arriving at Trevisan's home, Picca and three assistants, all of whom concealed machine-guns under their overcoats, ascertained that the jeweler was not at home; consequently they waited for his arrival, not informing Ravasini or Odoncini of the nature of their visit. When Trevisan eventually returned, Picca requested him to surrender his gold, but Trevisan denied possession of such a sum. Picca and his associates then searched the house. Finding no gold, they finally decided to leave. First, however, Picca informed Trevisan, Ravasini, and Odoncini that they would be bound and placed in the cellar of the house so they could not notify police before the robbers could escape to Zone "B." Trevisan, believing that the intruders were Communists and desiring that they leave as quickly as possible, permitted himself to be tied up and escorted to the cellar. Once the group arrived in the cellar, however, Picca shot Trevisan and the two women and returned with his associates to Capodistria.

155 Incidents US personnel--Italians, 12 Feb 48 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility, Folder 50-000407).

Picca stated that he killed the three because he did not want to leave any witnesses to his attempted theft.

It was of interest to the CIC to find that all photographs taken by the Police during their investigation of the incident had disappeared from the Police Scientific Laboratory, the Police Museum and the Central Files. Agents also ascertained that the names of the individuals assassinated were not contained in the Homicide and Murder Book of the Venezia Giulia Police Scientific Laboratory.[156]

Available records do not show the final disposition of the case.

A Crackpot Comes to CIC

Investigative organizations are frequent targets of crackpots and people desirous of getting their names in the news, and CIC was no exception. One of the most fantastic tales which came to CIC's attention was the story told in August 1946 by Diki Cernja.

CIC received from Cernja a confession that he and two other men had kidnapped the son of Charles A. Lindbergh in the United States.

Cernja told a rambling, incoherent story, first to the Royal Police and later to CIC. He gave a "souped up" movie version of the kidnapping, including the shooting of the driver of the pursuing police car. He claimed among other things that the child was wounded and died from the police bullets.

Cernja also claimed that the child was buried in a New York cemetery under the name of Cernja.

A motive for the confession was never established, but it was thought that Cernja hoped to get a free trip to the United States.[157]

Police Agent Aspirant

Another crackpot who plagued CIC agents in Trieste was a man who wanted to be a detective.

In mid-December of 1947 the self-styled investigator stalked into the CIC office and boasted that he, Enrico Schueller, had information on a counterfeit money and narcotics ring operating in Trieste and headed by a Commander Kelly.

156 Summary of Information dated 28 May 1949 (SECRET) (Folder 50-000513 Central Records Facility).

157 Translation of an undated "confession" of Diki Cernja made to the Regia Questura (Royal Police) (SECRET), (Folder 50-000513 Central Records Facility).

The information given by Schueller was so sketchy and incomplete that it offered no basis for further investigation. Whenever the agent attempted to elicit detailed facts, the informant changed the subject and discussed other investigations he would like to perform. Schueller claimed that he would have to arrest or at least hold for questioning several persons of whom he had heard, but whose names or addresses he did not know. He repeatedly referred to a restaurant in Trieste where all principals in the narcotics ring gathered. The CIC agent checked with other members of the detachment and found that this restaurant had been under surveillance for a long time. They were convinced that none of the habituees of the place could be members of a narcotics ring.

Schueller was extremely vague in his description of the persons involved. He mentioned an American soldier who came from Chicago, an American officer whose name was Montgomery, and an Italian civilian from Udine who drove a big car. He could not give the license number of the car or the organization to which the two Americans belonged.

In return for his assistance, Schueller demanded that he be granted the power of arrest, a weapon, Post Exchange privileges, and a room in a good hotel. Without these privileges he was not willing to work. On the other hand, he refused to give essential information which would have warranted the granting of any of these demands.

During an interview with agents of the CID, it was learned that the CID accused Schueller of ruining two cases on which he had offered help. Schueller appeared unreliable and seemed to be a shifty individual who wished only to obtain personal privileges.[158]

CIC Investigates Attempted Kidnapping

In Zone A, CIC agent Hugh E. Harvey investigated an attempted kidnapping when a peasant reported on 5 July 1946 that Yugoslav soldiers had tried to abduct him the day before.

Stanislav Gaberscek, a farmer, claimed that he was working with his two brothers and a girl in the family fields near Ursina on 5 July when two Yugoslav soldiers armed with machine guns appeared. The soldiers accused Gaberscek of being the leader of White propagandists in Ursina. Gaberscek denied the charge, but voiced his opposition to the communist government. One soldier asked whether the farmer had forgotten his twenty-eight months of service as a Partisan. The man replied, "no." Pointing his machine gun at Gaberscek, the guard dared him to repeat the answer. The peasant vowed he would say no a hundred times. Still the soldier did not fire.

158 MOIC, Purported Counterfeit Currency and Narcotics Ring-FTT Folder 50-000396 dated 15 December 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

Gaberscek refused the soldiers' order to accompany them to Monte Nero for questioning by their superior officer. The three brothers and the girl interlocked their arms and told the guards if one went, all would have to be carried.

Perplexed, the soldiers held a hurried conference. One then left to obtain help, while the others remained to guard the four peasants. Several hours later, a Yugoslav captain and five enlisted men appeared, and the officer began questioning Gaberscek. He threatened to shoot all four if the farmer did not accompany him to Monte Nero. Again, the group locked their arms and refused to budge. Four of the enlisted men attempted to pull them apart. Unsuccessful, they began battering the peasants with fists and gun butts. After more than twenty minutes the stubborn peasants were subdued and the officer and three enlisted men departed, leaving three soldiers to guard the four prostrate bodies. Five hours later, the guards deserted their posts, and the peasants escaped.

CIC investigation failed to disclose the identities of the soldiers responsible for the attempted abduction, or the motive, and the case was closed without solution.[159]

CIC Plots Arrest of Kidnappers

By the fall of 1947, a wave of kidnappings had terrorized a large segment of the Trieste population. It was believed that four key members of the Communist Party were behind most of the abductions, and all persons involved were thought to be either Communist Party members or agents of OZNA, the intelligence agency of the Yugoslav Central Police.

CIC, working in cooperation with the British Field Security Service and both American and British Military Police, carefully plotted a raid aimed at seizure of the persons responsible for the terrorism. A TOP SECRET memorandum dated 11 September 1947 listed addresses and detailed physical descriptions of the suspects and outlined plans for the raid.

Ten agents were to direct individual projects and searches with the aid of twenty-four other agents who were to participate in the searches. Ten persons were designated for interrogation and document-analysis duty in connection with the mass arrests. Sixty-eight Military Police and thirty security guards were to participate in the operation.

To counter the reaction of the Communist press, the following press release was prepared for handout on the day of the raid:

159 Kidnapping of Zone "A" Civilians, Folder 50-000452, 5 July 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

"To meet a serious threat to public safety, peace and order, which is the result of recent kidnappers, threats of kidnappings, and terrorization, a number of arrests have been made this morning by Allied Military Authorities.

"The persons arrested are believed to be, and in some cases are known to be, responsible for inciting, planning, and directing terrorist actions based upon political considerations which are foreign to peaceful and ordered society. The principals in these acts have used their positions of responsibility and prominence in the Communist Party and Julian Partisans Association to hide their actions. This abuse of political freedom and activity represents a direct threat to the Trusteeship Administration of the Trieste Free Territory in its mission of obtaining and securing public order and safety."[160]

Available records do not show the final results of this project.

Russian Rocket Sites Reported

On 12 November 1947, Sub-Section "G," CIC Zone One, reported that Italian authorities had received what they considered definite proof that a rocket launching track had been constructed by a specialized engineer company of Russian troops in the Cepovan (Chiapovana) area. According to reports, the track was directed toward the city of Udine. However, the presence of rockets or other similar types of missiles had not been detected. Other reports indicated that the engineer company stationed in Postojna (Postumia) was constructing another rocket track which would cover the Trieste area.[161]

160 MOIC dated 11 September 1947 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility) Folder 50-000513.

161 Zone One MTOUSA Weekly Situation Report 50-000007, 12 Nov 1947 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXVI

PROPERTY OF
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CIC IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

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March 1959

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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PART I ···PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

PART I

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

The collapse of the vaunted German forces had been rapid once the Allied Armies quelled the last enemy offensive in the Ardennes and Alsace and poured across the borders of Germany. By 4 May, Armies of the Wehrmacht began surrendering en masse, and three days later, on 7 May, Field Marshal Jodl agreed to unconditional surrender on behalf of all the German forces.

Long before V-E Day, American intelligence officials had recognized and prepared for the huge counterintelligence mission that the occupation of Germany would entail. Even in the waning days of combat, the importance of CIC operations had begun to overshadow almost all other intelligence efforts. Teams from IPW, OB, MII and other G2 units had been assigned to help CIC wherever and whenever possible.[1]

Pre-Surrender Planning for CIC in the Occupation

The initial planning for CIC operations in Occupied Germany dated back to the fall and winter of 1944 when Allied troops were still emerging from the hedgerows of northern France and battling across the muddy fields of the Low Countries.

To the Administrative Section of the 418th CIC Detachment, serving at Headquarters, 12th Army Group, fell the task of planning the organization for an overhead CIC Detachment for Germany, to go into immediate action once the combat phase was over. The requirements were not easy to meet; counterintelligence operations would require an extensive CIC network. They would also require a high degree of flexibility.

It was immediately evident that the 12th Army Group CIC Detachment, the logical organization for such an assignment, lacked sufficient strength to be converted into the Occupation Detachment. It was decided that personnel would be drawn from combat CIC Detachments being inactivated and by the reduction of other division detachments. This would bring the 418th to a strength of 323 officers and 1,100 agents, organized in appropriate teams in accordance with TOE 30-500. Although the plan called for the reduction of division detachments, the strength of the corps and army detachments was to remain unchanged.

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1 See "Germany Overrun", Chapter 10, Series 1, this History

This pre-planning meant that CIC operations could continue, virtually uninterrupted, once the combat phase was completed. Accordingly, on 25 April, Organization Order Nr 276, published by Headquarters, European Theater, activated the 970th CIC Detachment, effective 10 May 1945, and reorganized 55 divisional CIC units as teams, with surplus personnel to be transferred to the overhead detachments.

On 10 May, the large-scale paper transfer of CIC personnel took place. The 418th CIC Detachment was inactivated and the 970th CIC created in its stead. Consisting of approximately 300 officers and 1,100 agents, the 970th CIC had its personnel split into units which were referred to unofficially as "slash teams" since their numerical designations were always preceded by the figure "970" and a slash mark, e.g. 970/88. The teams were assigned to duty with the American Armies, the 6th Army Group, and, in the Bremen Enclave, Norway, the Berlin Military District Headquarters, and Communication Zone. The entire US Zone of Occupation, including the frontiers, was covered by CIC personnel. Static CIC teams functioned in every city of reasonable size; border teams arranged controls along the frontiers; and other teams operated at numerous headquarters, providing internal security for these installations.[2]

CIC units, that continued to operate with their combat components, were permitted to retain one team type A-1 and one team type B-1 or two officers and five enlisted agents each. Extra personnel were frequently retained, in fact, if not in theory, by assigning them to the 970th CIC and simultaneously attaching them on detached service to the division detachment. These "paper transfers" permitted current operations to be performed without interruption, and the men on detached service were ordered to remain physically with their unit even though their records were sent to the 970th CIC.[3]

Commanders and Location of the Overhead Detachment

When the 970th CIC Detachment was initially activated at Wiesbaden, Germany, Lt Col Norman J. Hearn became the first commanding officer . By mid-July, it was necessary to transfer the headquarters of the 970th CIC to Frankfurt, where, after several shifts, the Detachment settled down to a four-year stay at the

2 Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, Volume IV, p 114-115 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

3 Ltr to CO, 94th CIC Det, from CIC Hq, ETO, Subj, "Orders," dtd 14 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center.)

I. G. Farben Building. Lt Col H. E. Wilson, who at the end of the war had been Chief, CIC, ETOUSA, succeeded Colonel Hearn as Detachment Commander until 31 October 1945, when Lt Col R. D. Stevens was designated as the Commanding Officer.[4] It was on the date of Colonel Stevens' appointment that the first major change in the Occupation Detachment took place.

CIC Organized on Regional Basis

Until the directive of 31 October 1945 had been issued, operational control of the CIC teams had been vested in the ACofS, G2, of the area in which the agents operated. For the initial counterintelligence operations, which consisted largely of wholesale roundups and interrogations of individuals on the automatic arrest lists, this decentralization was practicable. However, after the first four months, the number of automatic arrests took a sharp decline, and the result was that CIC manpower, already depleted by constant redeployment of personnel to the United States, was being wasted.

Intelligence officials at United States Forces European Theater Headquarters, concluding that the organization for security in Occupied Germany should be patterned after the structure in the United States, entrusted the occupational counterintelligence mission to the 970th CIC Detachment at CIC headquarters in Frankfurt. Operational considerations that dictated this major shift included the change in CIC assignments to highly specialized investigations, the necessary lifting of certain civilian control measures, CIC assistance in the War Crimes operations, the increased importance of the non-identification of CIC agents with local troops, and the greater dependence in counterintelligence operations upon a central clearing point with adequate files and direct communications.[5] The reorganization and the personnel shortage resulted in the withdrawal of CIC teams from Theater Service Forces and establishment of regional and sub-regional CIC offices.

Under the new plan, which was formally initiated on 30 November 1945, placement of CIC units was based on geographic and demographic considerations rather than the location of American military forces. Regional CIC offices were established in order that key cities in the US Zone could be given complete and continuous coverage.

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4 History of 66th CIC Detachment, Udtd, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

5 Weekly Intelligence Summary No 16, dtd 1 Nov 45, Hq USFET, office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

However, the CIC units with Seventh Army (Western Military District), Third Army (Eastern Military District), several tactical divisions, and the Bremen Enclave were maintained. The relationship between army CIC and the regional offices was somewhat complex; the situation in the Third Army area serves as an example.

Under the revised organization, the Third Army and Eastern Military District were divided for CIC coverage into three regions, corresponding to former corps areas. Regional headquarters were established in Munich, Bamberg, and Regensburg and given the responsibility for coordinating CIC activities, regrouping and consolidation of CIC personnel, and the establishment of working communication network within their respective areas.

The three regions were further divided into sub-regions. The sub-regions were then covered by from one to four former "slash teams" of the 970th CIC, each of which had been consolidated administratively and operationally into single sub-regional detachments. The commanders of these detachments were responsible for supervising the work in the field and maintaining liaison with higher echelons.

Within the Eastern Military Districts, CIC units attached to Third Army and to the First and Ninth Infantry and the Fourth Armored Division continued to function. Their responsibilities were largely security of troops and installations, with Kreis coverage limited to the immediate area in which their tactical headquarters was located.[6]

The situation within the Seventh Army area (Western Military District) was similar, but records do not indicate the relationship between tactical and regional CIC units.

Problems of the Reorganization

The initial effect of the transfer of most CIC operations in the Third Army area to USFET was "confusing." No provision had been set up for an operational headquarters, although in December, the CIC Central Registry at Frankfurt began to take over control of all CIC operations. Problems of liaison, channels, personnel, and numerous small details plagued CIC throughout the first month of changeover.

But the principal matter of concern to the Third Army CIC Detachment Commander, Major Anthony Lobb, was the "....many 'investigating' agencies running around Germany, one delving

6 Monthly Information Report from Hq Third US Army, 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 10 November 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Central Records Facility)

into the other's case, each doing a part of a case, and leaving it half done. The most important thing facing CIC is coordination at the top."[7]

The CIC Mission in Germany

The 970th CIC grew from a small force to a linked organization of 2,500 officers and men that had an overall mission "to protect the interests of the United States in the European Theater against espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, to prevent the reorganization of ex-enemy intelligence services and secret police, and to locate and apprehend specified war criminals, suspects, and witnesses." All this was in addition to the continuing work of locating and apprehending persons in automatic arrest categories. Specific CIC duties, that were outlined during the late months of 1945, included the responsibility of screening all persons in Germany, claiming American or British citizenship, to check for possible traitors; the compilation of reports on the loyalty of all United States civilian employees (including those working for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the Office of Strategic Services, and Camp Shows; and the screening of German brides of American servicemen prior to issuance of visas by the American Consulate General. Army personnel engaged in the formulation of policies for the Information and Education Branch were added to the list of individuals who required a loyalty clearance for their work.[8]

Counter Intelligence Directive For Germany

The principal document upon which the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was based, during the first year of occupation in Germany, had been published at Headquarters, 12th Army Group, before the combat ended. The Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, dated 10 April 1945, laid down the basic policies that governed operations. A special section dealing with the Counter Intelligence Corps listed 16 different functions to be performed by CIC agents during the occupation.

1. To arrest any person who constitutes a threat to the security of the Allied armed forces, including leaders

7 Monthly Information Report from Hq, 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 3 January 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

8 Law, Order and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, from Officer of the Chief Historical, European Command, Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations.

2. To investigate cases of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

3. To search buildings, billets and installations which are known to, or may contain documents of CI value...

4. To search for documents which the Germans consider important as a basis for creating a new military machine or for the continuation of the Nazi Party.

5. To contact the civil authorities initially with MG if practicable.

6. To establish informant systems among local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information of CI interest, particularly that information relating to underground, anti-Nazi, or anti-Allied activity.

7. To locate and seize enemy sabotage equipment....

8. To coordinate with MG in the discovery and collection of any hidden armament, radio transmitters or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with MG proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices or orders.

9. To cooperate with MG and PM regarding security requirements involved in marshalling refugees and the screening of refugees for individuals of security interest.

10. To coordinate with MG in the establishment of check points for travel security control and to recommend to MG approval or disapproval of requests by applicants for travel permits.

11. To conduct security surveys and make continual security checks for protection against sabotage of military, public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the Allied armed forces.

12. To coordinate with AAA to secure information indicating the dropping of parachute agents.

13. To check, in coordination with MG, the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and orders issued by MG and to make recommendations

to MG for added measures or for improvements in the enforcement thereof.

14. To recommend to MG the removal of unreliable officials. Civil officials will be arrested by CIC without consulting MG only when immediate apprehension is necessary for security reasons.

15. To investigate civilians employed by the army in capacities which might endanger classified information or equipment.

16. To report all trends of civil dissension to the appropriate G2 (CIB).[9]

The provisions of this directive, modified by subsequent changes and additions, remained in effect throughout the first year until superceded in July 1946 by a new counterintelligence directive.[10]

The Security Situation During the First Ten Months

Although the Counter Intelligence Directive had been drafted with the expectation that the Germans would actively resist the Allied occupation, this resistance failed to materialize in any organized form. For the first ninety days after the surrender, the security picture was obscure. No major difficulties were encountered, despite the fact that there were continual boundary changes between army units, thousands of American troops were being redeployed, displaced persons crowded Germany, and an influx of refugees poured in from the east to escape the Russian occupation.

The docility and cooperation of the German population during these first months surprised the American security officials, and several possible explanations were offered. CIC experiences showed that the collapse of Germany had been so rapid that Nazi plans for underground activities against the Allies had never progressed beyond the formulation stage. The hasty roundup of SS, SD, and Gestapo[11] personnel by CIC also

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9 Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, from Hq 12th Army Group, dtd 10 April 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

10 Law, Order, and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, from office of the Chief Historical, European Command, Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

11 The Schutz Staffeln, popularly called SS, was the Protective Guard of the Nazi Party: the Sicherheitsdienst, or SD, was the Secret Service of the SS; the Gestapo was the State Secret Police; and the Abwehr was the overall military intelligence agency.

robbed any incipient resistance movements of their backbone strength.

Other conclusions were ventured, based upon certain generalizations of the German national character. The traditional German acceptance of strong authority was cited, as well as an overall resignation to the fate of having lost the war. But some cautious security officials viewed the passiveness of the German population as a deceptive lull before a storm. The German experiences in France, where resistance had not developed against the Nazi conquerors until the shock of defeat had worn off and weaknesses in the military administration were spotted, was offered as a warning.

This latter viewpoint was justified several months later. In October 1945, the German population, faced with an intensified program of denazification, the approach of winter and its acute economic problems, and the removal of non-fraternization barriers with attendant incidents between occupying troops and German youths, began to react. Indications of increased unrest dropped up frequently. The number of incidents of counter-intelligence concern, which had dipped steadily through August and September, swung sharply upwards. Minor disorders, such as violations of curfew orders and infringments of travel and border regulations, increased. Numerous instances of illegal possession of American goods were uncovered. A sudden epidemic of wire cutting broke out, apparently unorganized, but widespread. But more significant and dangerous were the frequent reports of isolated attacks on American soldiers, thefts of American supplies, and possible acts of sabotage.

This unfavorable situation prevailed through the months of October and November and was somewhat aggravated by measures that were implemented by MG. Public Law Nr 8, which called for the denazification of all commercial enterprises and relegated all confirmed Nazis to manual labor, provoked "strong and bitter resentment."[12] The Germans seemed particularly fearful that this law would wreak further havoc with their economy and reduce the amount of available goods. Only a small segment of the population applauded the Allied effort to purge all Nazis from places of importance in industry.

The inability to inforce fully, the provisions of Public Law Nr 8 resulted in a growing disrespect and attempted evasion of MG rulings. A number of reports revealed that many ex-Nazi businesses were functioning smoothly after a change of title

12 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 13, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 11 October 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

and the installation of a front man. One party member was overheard stating: "We must act quickly to transfer the business, only the stupid get caught." From Third Army, in northern Bavaria, came the statement that "there is much feeling against complete de-nazification. It is particularly manifest in regards to withdrawing the licenses of professional men. It is felt that at this time, when certain professional skills are so badly needed, it is wasteful to force these men to work as common laborers."[13]

A sudden stabilization of the security situation occurred during December as German thoughts centered on obtaining enough food and fuel to endure the winter.[14] This improvement of attitude among the civilian populace held fairly well until the middle of March, 1946. Even the beginning of large-scale withdrawals of American troops, under the redeployment plan, did not encourage the Germans to disregard security controls.

Another adjustment of the American forces, that was expected to produce repercussions in civil security, was the severance of MG from the field forces, which took place on 1 January 1946, and was followed by the centralization of MG activities in three offices of MG (OMGUSZ), located in Bavaria, Wuerttenburg-Baden and Greater Hesse.[15] But the gradual transference of certain military government operations failed to result in lawlessness, although the customary civilian grumblings about restrictions and ordinances persisted. After the winter period had ended, American intelligence sources concluded:

"The German people, on the whole, have tended to cooperate with MG. This does not imply any great degree of popular enthusiasm for MG for it is incompatible with the many reported instances in which Germans twist and squirm in their efforts to evade MG control. In the end they must all knuckle under to get anything done. They have no other choice.

"A note of exasperation is beginning to creep into the more vociferous German complaints about MG. Over and above the hardships often caused by the inevitable delays and inconsistencies attending MG operations, many Germans appear to

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13 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 18, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 dtd 15 November 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

14 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 dtd 27 December 1945 (SECRET) (Central) Records Facility)

15 Frederikson, Oliver J., The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-53, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe 1953 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

find themselves baffled when confronted with the, to them, utterly strange American mentality.

"Most of the standard criticisms of MG run chiefly to two points--the selection by MG of German officials and employees generally considered inferior, opportunistic or bureaucratic, and the application of denazification in such a way that harmless small fry are caught, while shrewd "big shots" allegedly escape."[16]

New Concepts for Re-Occupation

By the end of March 1946, the initial phase of occupation in Germany had clearly come to an end. Although the European Theater could not yet be established on a long-term occupational basis, definite moves had been made to restore certain governmental functions to the Germans. Political parties had been authorized to organize on Laender level. (There were initially three Land areas in the US Zone) under close American supervision as early as 23 November 1945. On 5 March 1946, General Lucius Clay, the Deputy Military Governor and Commanding General, Office of Military Government (SS) met with the three Laender minister presidents to sign a "Law for Liberation from National Socialism," which placed a measure of responsibility for de-nazification upon German authorities. Also during March, US consulates were opened in six key German cities. Finally, by 1 April, the extent of the revival of the German state could be gauged by the fact that all German courts, up to and including superior appellate courts, had been opened.

Concurrent with the increasing responsibility vested in the German government, was a revised distribution of American military forces. By 2 January 1946, the mass redeployment of ETO soldiers to the Asiatic theater and to the United States ended. The need for a small, but highly mobile, zone-wide security force, carefully trained for occupation duties, led to the establishment of Headquarters, US Constabulary, on 15 February 1946 at Bamberg. Training for "search and seizure" operations, police policy and procedure, and other security functions was given to prospective members of the Constabulary throughout the spring, but the organization did not become fully operational until 1 July 1946.

Meanwhile, the Seventh Army was inactivated at the end of March and its personnel transferred to the Third Army or the

16 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 35, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 14 March-1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

Constabulary.[17] The American military forces were being streamlined for increasingly stable occupation duties.

17 Frederikson, Oliver J., The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-53, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe 1953 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

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PART II

CIC OPERATIONS, MAY 1945 - FEBRUARY 1946

Against this ten months' background of American military occupation of Germany, CIC operations can be grouped largely under a single heading: De-Nazification.

CIC work in ferreting out former Nazis had started with the US entry into Germany during the combat phase, and the Occupation simply gave detachments and teams a stable situation in which to conduct their activities. The arrest lists bulged with the names of Abwehr officials and agents; SD operatives including members of the Gestapo and Kripo;[18] Nazi Party officials; war criminals of counter-intelligence interest; and other Germans who had roles in the Nazi regime. During a typically busy period, the week of 5 July to 11 July 1945, there were more than 6,500 arrests,[19] and by the end of 1945, more than 120,000 counterintelligence personalities had been apprehended.[20]

A Typical Round Up: CIC in Heidenheim

Although the situation facing CIC teams, and the manner they confronted it, varied from area to area during the Occupation, the experiences of the 970th team operating in Heidenheim were more or less typical. The agents comprising this team had been drawn from disbanded CIC units and were under the operational control of Seventh Army G2.

The agents set up two residences for CIC: one in a villa outside the town, used also as the agents' billet; and the other in Heidenheim, itself. CIC was "deluged" with denunciators, and the agents often found it necessary to intern both the denouncer and the person he had denounced until they could check on the reliability of the two individuals.

The agents in Heidenheim adopted a firm attitude in dealing with Germans, and this "always the master" appearance paid dividends. No real resistance was encountered from the Wehrwolf or other subversive groups. Letters received at the CIC office were frequently addressed to the "American Gestapo" or the "American SD," a clear token of German respect for the Americans' authority.

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18 Near the end of the war, the Gestapo and Kripo had been placed under the SD with Kaltenbrunner at the head.

19 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 24 July 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

20 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 10 January 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

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Although overt resistance to the Americans did not crop up in Heidenheim, there were occasional threats. One, in particular, was addressed to CIC. Passing the bulletin board outside the town hall one morning, Agent Paul Funk noticed a tacked-up message signed with the Wehrwolf emblem and stating that all CIC men would be shot. A hurried conference followed, and the team commander, deciding that the best answer to this threat would be a show of nonchalance, selected Agent Funk to play the role of the self-assured American intelligence man. Funk was detailed to drive an open jeep, clearly emblazoned with the letters "CIC," down the main street of Heidenheim for a period of several nights. The agent was somewhat taken aback by this mission, but he carried out his orders. Nothing unusual occurred; the threat, fortunately for Agent Funk, was an idle one.

During the months of June and July, the CIC agents in Heidenheim set about the arduous task of gathering and reviewing Fragebogen (personal history questionnaires) from the populace, at the rate of about 150 per day. The diligence of the agents was rewarded. It was possible to open local schools in July and August, far ahead of most areas. Military Government, a unit that had been "cooperative" with CIC in Heidenheim, selected a native German to serve as "education officer" and CIC supplied teachers for the school.

Meanwhile, the agents also attended to the matter of automatic arrests. In general, they discovered that little dependence could be placed on lists and name cards that had come down from higher headquarters. (In the city of Darmstadt, prior to the Occupation, Agent Funk and another agent had been assigned to alphabetize a jumbled pile of 80,000 personality cards that had come down from SHAEF. This proved to be an "impossible task" and a forecast of the difficulty to be faced during the occupation.)

Instead of relying heavily on information from higher headquarters, the agents used their own initiative in Heidenheim. Lateral communication and personal liaison with teams in adjoining detachment territories furnished additional leads. Once the team was well established, arrest procedures became standardized in the case of petty Nazis. CIC sent a note to the wanted person, stating that he should report to Room 13 (the CIC office) in the city hall on a specified data at a specified time. The procedure was much like "issuing a draft notice" to a prospective American service man. Most of the suspects appeared, however when an appointment was not kept, the CIC team in Heidenheim spread an alert for the wanted person, throughout the Seventh Army area.

In this manner, without unusual incidents, the American occupation of Heidenheim was effected.[21]

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21 Interview with former S/A Paul J. Funk, New York, New York, at the NCICA Convention Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N. Y., 5 August 1955.

Larger Scale Operations

Coverage, by CIC detachments and teams, of the areas assigned by tactical commanders provided the chief and continuing source of apprehensions of former Nazis. It was also the theater commander's policy, as expressed in the Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, to schedule unannounced check-and-search operations on civil communities. The main purpose of these operations was to uncover illegal and subversive activities; confiscate illegally-possessed weapons and vehicles; disband black market activities; check identification and travel papers; and impress the Germans with the vigilance, sternness, and determination of the Occupation forces. Individuals apprehended during these raids were turned over to screening teams of CIC and MG personnel, and, through interrogation, automatic arrestees were often discovered among the prisoners.

Since the large scale search and seize operations depended, primarily, upon the element of surprise, they were planned with as much secrecy as important tactical undertakings. The usual procedure was to seal off a given area with road-blocks covering all primary and secondary roads leading into and out of the zone. As soon as the area had been isolated, parties of from three to six soldiers conducted house to house searches for wanted individuals and personnel. After the screening of arrestees by CIC, security threats were detained, and violators of existing civil regulations were turned over to MG for trial.

Although at theater headquarters, there was recognition of the fact that these hasty and comprehensive operations laid the German population open to possible looting by the American troops, the actual need for the searches outweighed this consideration. Participating troops were amply warned against improper conduct while engaged in the searches, and some commanders ordered "show down" inspections for evidence of looting, once the operation had been completed.

In the US Zone, there were two principal types of unannounced search and seizure operations. On the largest scale were zone-wide and army-wide maneuvers; on a smaller scale, and more frequent, were the so-called "Swoop" operations which were restricted, both in aims set forth and area covered.[22]

Operation TALLY HO

The first zone-wide security check and search operation was initiated upon the special request of the commanding general, 12th Army Group, who asked for a thoroughly coordinated operation within the US Zone, prior to the redeployment of a great mass of American troops. Weeks of careful planning preceded Operation TALLY HO, which took place from 21 to 23 July 1945.

22 Law, Order, and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, from Office of the Chief Historical, European Command, Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

Three general objectives governed the planning for the operation:

a. "To effect a meticulous check of credentials of all persons, including not only civilians, but also United States or Allied military personnel.

b. "To uncover, by search of all premises and individuals, the possession of prohibited articles and the illegal possession of property of the United States government, and to insure suitable confiscation and disposition thereof.

c. "To uncover evidences of black market operations and to initiate appropriate prosecution of violators."

At daybreak on 21 July, TALLY HO was initiated throughout the US Zone. In the Seventh Army area alone, more than 160,000 troops were detailed to the operation. Frontier and travel security control was highly intensified, and every effort was made to keep secret the objectives of the operation.

The initial reaction, from the civilian population, was one of utter surprise, mixed with fear that was largely due to ignorance of what was taking place. Rumors circulated madly: among them such reports as that the operation was being conducted because of a large-scale SS jail break; that the Americans were searching for items which they believed worth taking before turning over their occupation zone to the Russians; and that the operation was a security measure in preparation for President Truman's anticipated visit.

However, the initial reaction wore off quickly, and the civilian populace became resigned and generally cooperative with the search. There was little manifest resentment, and most persons accepted the operation as a normal procedure in an occupied country. Few complaints of pilfering by troops were based on more than hearsay.

Forty-eight hours later, amazing totals of apprehensions and confiscations had been recorded. More than 85,000 German apprehendables had been detected; their misdemeanors ranged from violation of travel and curfew restrictions to suspicion of being automatic arrestees and other security threats. More than 310,000 items of contraband were confiscated, including panzer fausts (bazookas), radio transmitters, coffee, and miscellaneous items of clothing and equipment. Although no evidence was developed that pointed to an organized black market in the US Zone, individuals were found in possession of as much as 1,000 pounds of sugar, 100 gallons of gasoline, and other large hoards.

In assessing the value of Operation TALLY HO, it was noted that in addition to the tangible results, the psychological effect on the German people was highly beneficial. TALLY HO made apparent the need for further implementation of existing MG policies. One decided drawback, from a CIC viewpoint, was that the participating

troops had been insufficiently schooled in examining documents and detecting persons of counterintelligence interest.

The chief post-operational recommendations brought forth were that the area to be covered should be limited, thereby lessening the time consumed and maintaining a higher degree of secrecy; and advanced training, in such matters as examining and certifying identity documents, should be given.[23] However, it was felt, in retrospect, that the final results of the operation fully justified the weeks of preparation and the large number of troops involved.[24]

Operation DOUBLE CHECK

The second zone-wide security operation in which CIC took part was ordered by the theater commander on 18 October 1945 and code-named Operation DOUBLE CHECK. The order was disseminated a full month before the raid was to take place in order to give commanders ample time to ready their troops. The objectives of DOUBLE CHECK were similar to those of TALLY HO, with stress on searches of premises and individuals, along with a tightening of frontier and travel control. The operation was divided into two phases, the first beginning at 0730 hours, 18 November 1945, and continuing for 36 hours.

Again the psychological effect upon the German people was considered good. At this time, American troops were spread thinly across the US Zone, and the show of strength resulted in a greater respect from the civilian population towards the Occupation forces.

The factor of surprise, which had been important to the success of TALLY HO, was somewhat diminished in DOUBLE CHECK, Phase I. Troops involved in the search pointed out that telephone security was lacking, and civilians frequently telephoned their next door neighbors as soon as Americans had completed their search.[25] There were also some indications that a security leak had occurred prior to the operation.[26]

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23 Final Report on "Operation TALLY HO" in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 10, Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 20 September 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

24 Law, Order, and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Historical Division, Hq, US Army, Europe, 1953 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library) (A typical CIC detachment's experiences during Operation TALLY HO are covered in this chapter under the heading "45th CIC Detachment."

25 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 19, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 22 November 1955, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

26 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 20, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 29 November 1955, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

However, the results of the first phase were good, if not as impressive in figures as Operation TALLY HO. Considerable quantities of American canned rations were uncovered as well as large supplies of gasoline. But, again, there were no signs pointing to the existence of any organized black market rings. Individual Germans had apparently managed to secure American goods with varying degrees of success.

The second phase of DOUBLE CHECK caught the Germans completely off guard. This operation consisted of a 24 hour check, beginning on 25 November, of all persons, for the possession of proper identifying documents. Road blocks were formed, and all persons on foot or in vehicles were stopped and checked for the proper papers. The operation proceeded smoothly, but there was one major hitch; guards found that there was a wide disparity in the identification documents, and it was recommended, in retrospect, that the issuance of a standard quadralingual paper would ease such checks in the future.

From a CIC standpoint, Operation DOUBLE CHECK was not as fruitful as Operation TALLY HO. Only 150 security suspects and/or automatic arrestees were uncovered, a fact which indicated that, while vast numbers of former Nazis had already been interned, many of those who were still free had managed to slip through DOUBLE CHECK.[27]

"Swoop Operations"

In the Third Army area, during the months of September and October 1945, more than 50 of the coordinated security checks, dubbed Swoop Operations, were carried out. Although conceived on a far smaller scale than TALLY HO and DOUBLE CHECK, these operations entailed the use of some 10,000 American troops and netted more than 100 persons of counterintelligence interest.[28]

Operation LIFEBOUY

Far different in intent and procedure from the large scale security raids was Operation LIFEBOUY, a thorough purging of Nazis holding public office in the Seventh Army area. Beginning on 24 July 1945, the aims of LIFEBOUY as outlined by the commanding general of Seventh Army were:

1. To carry out the United States Government's announced aim of removing Nazis from positions of responsibility in Germany.

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27 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26, Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 dtd 10 January 1946, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

28 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 16, Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 dtd 1 November 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

2. To remove from the German people any fear, inspired by the Nazis, of cooperation with the Allies.

3. To remove fear from retribution in the reporting of Nazi activities.[29]

From its inception, LIFEBOUY was the primary mission of all static CIC teams in the Seventh Army area.[30] The initial reaction of the German populace was reported as "good," at least from those who sincerely desired to be rid of the Nazis. But numerous complaints were voiced that American authorities failed to distinguish between old time Nazis, those who had joined the Party under compulsion, and those who had resisted joining to the last possible moment.[31]

As the Operation proceeded, CIC encountered successively fewer automatic arrestees still holding public position, but the screening process often eliminated so many officials that replacements for vacancies in the civil administration became a problem. In the Kreis of Esslingen, for example, CIC team 970/98 estimated that fifty per cent of the office holders would have to be removed.[32] Often the individuals who could not pass CIC screening were the most efficient and best suited for their positions; but the American forces had to carry through with their full-scale De-Nazification Program.

When LIFEBOUY neared the goal of complete purging of the public offices, CIC teams gradually turned their attention to the professions, trades and industries, where many important and once-powerful Nazis still lurked. Bank employees, insurance workers, teachers, manufacturers and countless others had to prepare Fragenbogen that would guide CIC in its screening.[33]

In determining which individuals should be dismissed, CIC had to establish a date, before which, membership in the Nazi Party would be considered automatic grounds for removal. All party members who had joined after this date would be scrutinized for their reliability and removed largely at the discretion of the CIC agent who carried out the investigation.

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29 Law, Order, and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, from Office of the Chief Historical, European Command, Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

30 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 5, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 16 August 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

31 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 7, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 30 August 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

32 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 8, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 6 September 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

33 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 10, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 20 September 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

After much discussion 1 May 1937 was selected as the guide date, a fact which upset many anti-Nazi Germans who claimed that often the more recent recruits into the Party had been the fiercest advocates of the Nazi line. The attitude of the intelligent Germans towards the dismissal of petty Nazis was typified by the remark of a school teacher to CIC Team 970/16 in Giessen:

> "It is a pity for the Americans to discharge thousands of people, many of whom are old and have worked all their lives in one position. They will have no money, and where can they find work? Most of them are loyal to the Allies. Much suffering will ensue next winter, and it may encourage underground activity for which the Americans will be partly responsible. It could be avoided by a more common sense policy. I approve--and most Germans approve--of the general idea, but the Americans are making a mistake in its application. Too much emphasis is placed on nominal memberships (in the NSDAP) and titles. Military Government should have an advisory anti-Nazi commission to assist in weeding out the real Nazis and thus avoid injustice.[34]

In the final stages of LIFEBOUY, a consolidated report indicated that CIC screening teams had recommended the dismissal of about 36 per cent of MG-approved employees as mandatory or discretionary removals. On the whole, response to CIC recommendations was swift, and close cooperation between the two groups was reported throughout the operation.

The replacements that CIC screened to fill the vacated positions proved far more satisfactory than had been predicted; about 85 per cent were declared fit for civil service. Although operational efficiency of local governments was undeniably hampered by the LIFEBOUY cleansing, a majority of CIC teams felt that in the long run, new administrations would provide greater progress towards the achievement of Allied objectives.[35]

Operation NURSERY

Although most of the large CIC operations during the De-Nazification phase of the Occupation were overt raids and searches, Operation NURSERY was a

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34 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 11, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 27 September 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

35 Consolidated Progress Report on Operation LIFEBOUY, in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 20, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, dtd 29 November 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

NOTE: For specific activities of a CIC Detachment during Operation LIFEBOUY, cf, 36th CIC Detachment, this Chapter.

clear break with this pattern. For this was a highly classified, long-range penetration of subversive organizations which had the aim of keeping alive the National Socialist ideal.[36]

37 The only available report of Operation NURSERY does not explain the lack of planning implied by the use of the word "happened." It seems probable, from the general conduct of the Operation, that this was merely an error in phraseology, and that this change was the result of a change in plans.

These arrests formed the start of a mass clean-up in the south. One by one, figures on the underground lists were trapped by the CIC agents. So skillfully had the agents covered their moves that not one person on the primary arrest list managed to escape.

Planning for the final phase of Operation NURSERY consisted of the evaluation of all available lists, the preparation of a master target sheet, and the transmission, to field units, of this target list together with the details of a coordinated swoop operation that would take place simultaneously in the British and US Zones Germany and Austria. Each person marked as a target was to be screened, his house searched for information, and, if either the screening or the search produced incriminating evidence, the man was to be interned. 1 April 1946 was established as the swoop date; 0200 was designated a "H" Hour.

The core of the underground movement had been destroyed. Many of the funds which had been hoarded for the long range subversion had been impounded. Devoid of its key personnel and its financial support, the remaining portion of the underground, that had not been obliterated, was considered helpless.

gained the added dividend of lists containing the names of men to watch as potential subversives and members of contemplated future moves against the occupation.[38]

CIC Finds Hitler Documents

On 26 December 1945, CIC personnel in Bavaria received information from Major Trevor-Roper of British Intelligence that a Wilhelm-Zander, alias Paustin, one time adjutant to Martin Bormann, was in the vicinity of Tergernsee.

Together with Major Trevor-Roper, the CIC agents raided the suspected house only to learn that Zander had departed from the area to visit his fiancee near Passau. CIC kept on the case and, on 28 December, discovered from informants in Tergernsee that Paustin had left a suitcase with his prospective sister-in-law.

When the agents seized the suitcase, they found inside it some key documents of the last days of the Hitler regime. Bormann's former adjutant had secreted the original marriage license of Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun, witnessed by Goebbel and Bormann, Hitler's signed political testament, Hitler's private will, and a letter of transmittal covering the documents from Admiral Doenitz to Bormann.

All these documents were shipped to the United States where a laboratory test performed by the FBI confirmed their authenticity. The documents were then sent for storage in the National Archives.[39]

Although available records do not indicate whether CIC ever caught up with Zander, the agents had made one of the prize document discoveries of the post-war period.

Operation CHOO-CHOO

A counterintelligence search operation that was somewhat unusual occurred on 2 February 1946 on the crowded passenger train that ran from Bamberg to Nurnberg.

The Operation was instigated at the suggestion of agents of the Bamberg CIC Sub-Regional office who had noted the increasingly great amount of passenger travel

38 Report on Operation NURSERY from 970th CIC Detachment, Undtd, (Unclassified), (Central Records Facility); and
Law, Order, and Security, from Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, from Office of the Chief Historical, European Command, Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

39 Unsigned Letter to Mr. Thad Page, Administrative Secretary, National Archives, dtd 4 April 1946, (Unclassified), in MID 314.4 GERMANY, G2 Repository, Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Virginia.

on the rail line. Conferences with commanders of local troop units resulted in the coordinated formulation of Operation CHOO-CHOO. The target was the train that left Bamberg at 1245 hours on 2 February.

In order to seal off the train completely once it was loaded and to allay suspicion, the counterintelligence operatives decided to permit it to depart from the Bamberg station on schedule and halt it a slight distance from the city, where a complete inspection could be made. An officer from an army unit was designated to ride in the locomotive cab and order the engineer to stop the train at the point selected for the operation. Ten CIC agents, ten military police personnel, and 15 tactical security troops were named to participate in the search. In addition, armed tactical troops were to be deployed along both sides of the track in the area. The cars were numbered, and one CIC agent and one military policeman were assigned to each car; the agent responsible for examining personal papers and brief interrogation of all passengers, and the military policeman responsible for searching these individuals as they detrained.

On 2 February, the Operation was accomplished as smoothly as planned. An estimated 1,200 persons had jammed into the ten delapidated passenger cars at Bamberg--individuals who formed a representative cross section of the post war population shuttling about the American zone of occupation. When the train was halted outside the city, each person was searched, along with his accompanying luggage, as he dismounted. Identity documents were scanned, and each individual was asked his destination and reason for travel. Following this examination, the passenger, if cleared, was taken to an empty field bordering the railroad tracks and kept under guard. All persons for any reason suspect (a group which totaled twenty-four) were segregated, also under guard. When the train had been completely emptied of civilians, each car was thoroughly searched for concealed or discarded contraband. No weapons or other prohibited materials were discovered.

Seventy minutes after the train had been halted, the principal part of Operation CHOO-CHOO was over. Except for the small group of suspects, who were transported back to the Bamberg CIC office, all passengers were permitted to reboard the train and continue on their way.

But Operation CHOO-CHOO still had a final phase. When the train had left Bamberg at 1245 hours, two CIC agents in civilian clothes had mingled with the crowd. Their mission was to ride as "disgruntled" passengers to a town 20 kilometers distant from Bamberg and to eavesdrop on civilian conversations. When the train was stopped, these agents presented identification cards and were submitted to a complete search. The military police had been alerted, in advance, to the presence of these undercover agents and "overlooked" the weapons that the men were carrying. At the conclusion of the search phase of CHOO-CHOO, the agents were returned to the train and continued on their way. Nothing unusual,

either preceding, during, or after the search, was noted by the agents. For the most part, the civilians took CHOO-CHOO in stride.

Although no tangible evidence of counterintelligence interest was uncovered, CHOO-CHOO was a successful operation. It offered an insight into the generally satisfactory civil security situation, and indicated that the great preponderance of travellers were engaged in personal enterprises of a totally innocent character. CHOO-CHOO had the additional benefit of leaving an impression of the US Army's thoroughness and efficiency on the minds of the civilians. CIC expected that further benefits would be derived when word of CHOO-CHOO spread among the populace via "grapevine" channels.[40]

40 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 31, from Hq USFET, Office of AC of S, G2 dtd 14 February 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

PART II CIC OPERATIONS, MAY 1945 - FEBRUARY 1946

Part III CIC WITH TACTICAL UNITS

CONFIDENTIAL

PART III

CIC WITH TACTICAL UNITS

Although the bulk of counterintelligence personnel were transferred to "slash teams" of the 970th CIC upon the cessation of hostilities, numerous CIC detachments, which had operated with tactical units during the war remained with their divisions, corps and armies until redeployment. Some of the "slash teams" served on detached service with these detachments. The work of most of these detachments was similar and localized; apprehending automatic arrestees was the first order of the day. At times, the detachments participated in zone-wide counterintelligence operations, but the CIC agents continued to function as the security specialists for the military force to which they were attached.

To recount the activities of all these detachments would be repetitious and too lengthy for inclusion in this volume. As a result, representative units from various geographical sectors of the US Zone of Occupation and various command echelons have been selected to illustrate the problems besetting counterintelligence in the first phase of the occupation and the manner in which these problems were faced.[41]

41 Report of Operation, 12th Army Group, Volume IV, p 114-115 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Staff and Faculty Library)

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CHAPTER 1

CIC IN WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT

The key CIC Detachment in the Western Military District was the 307th CIC, attached to Seventh Army, with headquarters in Augsberg until 22 July 1945, and then at Heidelberg until its inactivation on 13 May 1946.[42]

307th CIC Detachment

The situation in Germany had scarcely changed from combat to occupation when agents of the Seventh Army CIC received the man who had perhaps been Allied Intelligence's prime adversary during the war, Otto Skorzeny. The renowned SS Obersturmbannfuerher and Chief of AMT VI/S (Sabotage) of the German Intelligence Service was taken into custody on 16 May 1945 at the headquarters of a Third Infantry Division component, when he presented himself with a letter requesting permission to gather his agents and be taken to intelligence headquarters.

The American forces allowed the wily Skorzeny his request, and the following day escorted him to the 307th CIC Detachment for interrogation. Special Agents Alan Dinehart, George A. Perper, Victor S. de Guinzbourg, and William N. Bower questioned Skorzeny and discovered that he apparently had a limited knowledge of the names of agents employed by the AMT VI/S. But the arch saboteur was willing to talk freely about new sabotage techniques, his personal leadership of combat missions of the Jagdverbande (sabotage divisions which he had headed), and political action that he had fomented against the Russians through insurrections in the Ukraine and the Balkans.

The CIC agents had Skorzeny outline the organization of the AMT VI/S. In an affable manner, he described the troubles he had selling the "Army Brass" on the potential usefulness of his operatives. Wehrmacht officials had promised all Skorzeny's recruits commissions, but rarely issued them. If an officer vacancy occurred, instead of promoting an agent, a commissioned man from some other branch was brought in to fill it. Skorzeny explained how the agents never had enough to live on, and how their expense accounts were not paid until six weeks later, unless disapproved. His agents had been ordered to wear civilian clothes but were never given sufficient funds to purchase them. For the CIC agents, many of Skorzeny's complaints had a familiar ring; CIC had experienced some of the same difficulties throughout the war.[43]

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42 Historical Date Card, 307th CIC Detachment, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Organization and Directory Section, AGO, The Pentagon)

43 Interview with former S/A Alan Dinehart at 39 Ingram Street, Forest Hills, New York on 7 August 1955.

The agents also elicited, from Skorzeny, information on Wehrwolf training. They were told that, contrary to other reports, no provisions had been made to continue German Intelligence Service sabotage activities from a resistance headquarters. However the 307th agents avoided detailed and lengthy interrogation of Skorzeny, since higher headquarters were eager to receive him for final questioning.

Although Skorzeny was the most impressive figure that the 307th CIC Detachment handled in the early stages of the occupation, agents found that the section of Bavaria where Seventh Army was located had numerous smaller officials of the once vaunted German intelligence. Several former German espionage agents were apprehended when they presented themselves to CIC headquarters voluntarily, posing as friendly informants and offering to provide information on Gestapo and SD agents. By the end of May, the 307th CIC Detachment issued a serious warning: "Experience has shown thorough permeation of German intelligence in fields of industrial espionage, on the theory of "total spying." This should be borne in mind by counterintelligence personnel for occupational work. German agents have consistently followed the pattern of offering their services as informats and seeking employment at key information spots, such as hotels and military government offices. [44]

Occupational Espionage Plans

During the month of June 1945, 307th CIC agents continued to receive information from interrogations of German intelligence operatives that supported the theory that occupational espionage would not proceed in any organized manner. Apparently, most of the German Intelligence Service's resistance plans had been predicated on the assumption that, at least, parts of Germany would not figure in the complete collapse that had come with such devastating swiftness. The report of Friedrich Bermes, a former Abwehr Captain was typical.

According to Bermes, the Gestapo chief of Munich had been informed, in April 1945, that a National Redoubt was to be formed in the Bavarian mountains, under the cover name of "Sigrune." RSHA, [45] Berlin, had asked for an intelligence set-up that could inform the Redoubt concerning the morale of the civilian population in occupied Germany. Stay-behind agents were hastily organized and equipped in Munich, but the steamrolling Allied advance prevented them from carrying out their plans.

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44 307th CIC Detachment, Monthly Information Report, dtd 7 June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25099. Kansas City Record Center)

45 Reichssicherheitshanptant (RHSA), main office for Security, under Himmler.

Outwitted

So rapid was the round-up of German intelligence agents that 307th CIC operatives were principally occupied with interrogations, but there were moments at which all the varied skills of a counterintelligence agent had to be brought into play.

Members of an MIS team and agents of the 307th CIC, screening POW at the detention cage in Furstenfeldbruck, encountered an SS non-commissioned officer by the name of Gruber who tried to bribe them into discharging him under the demobilization plan. Gruber offered considerable information about the RHSA, and, playing along with the attempted bribe, the interrogators were led to treasures and money belonging formerly to German intelligence. But some of Gruber's confidants told the American intelligence men that the German had not revealed everything: Gruber, in actuality, was a fanatical Nazi named Joseph Spacil who was purported to have information that could lead to the discovery of Hitler's body and diary, the whereabouts of the gold crown and scepter of Charlemagne, and other riches. The confidants also stated that Spacil-Gruber possessed some poison, and any open attempt at arresting him as a Nazi would result in his suicide.

The CIC agents decided that if what the confidants claimed was true, the only means of obtaining the information would be through direct interrogation of Spacil, but a ruse had to be constructed to prevent him from committing suicide. All arrangements were made for Spacil's discharge, the CIC men pretending to consider him still merely an SS non-commissioned officer. However, prior to being given the discharge, Spacil was told that he would be given a physical examination by German doctors. Special Agent George Perper, posing as a German physician, together with a bona fide native doctor from a nearby military hospital, examined the trusting Spacil in a routine manner, guarding especially against his alleged possession of poison. While the Nazi was receiving the examination, his clothes were carefully searched, and a vial of poison was located. Spacil was immediately placed under arrest and subjected to intense interrogation.

As it developed, Spacil had no knowledge of the hidden caches. In his better days, he had apparently tried to exaggerate his importance by claiming this special knowledge. His confidants had been fooled and so, in turn, were the CIC agents. But Spacil did prove of some counterintelligence value after all; he was used as a source of information about former SD members.[46]

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46 Monthly Information Rpt from Hq 307th CIC Det, dtd 12 Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center)

CONFIDENTIAL

"Bonjour, Monsieur

Late in the afternoon of 24 June, Special Agent Victor de Guinzbourg and Commissaire Jean Ambrosi, a member of the French Surete aux Armies attached to the 307th CIC, were driving through a wooded area about five kilometers from Augsberg. The two counterintelligence men, wishing to engage the services of a civilian for assistance in barbecuing a sheep, approached a slightly built man who was picking berries in the woods.

The data on the passport and the physical appearance of the man were instantaneously linked in Ambrosi's mind, and he suddenly greeted the man, "Bonjour, Monsieur ."

What Ambrosi had perceived was that the alleged was actually the handling agent of many German espionage figures who had been captured in Alsace. Ambrosi, who had participated in these Alsace arrests, had recalled that was the name that , a former in had taken to mask his activities on behalf of the German Intelligence Service. This, plus appearance, which Ambrosi had seen several times on photographs, served to convert the apparently harmless berrypicker into one of the men most wanted by Allied counterintelligence.

feeling that Providence must have been set against him, broke down completely on Ambrosi's salutation, and declared that he would willingly provide information. After fully revealing his own personal history, admitted that he had been hiding out with the main object of establishing new contacts for espionage operations against the Allies. He subsequently revealed the names of other German Intelligence figures.

The case of illustrated to CIC the importance of tracking down and arresting the more intelligent leaders and organizers of espionage groups and networks, since their continued circulation left them free to recruit for future resistance operations.[47]

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47 Monthly Information Rpt from Hq 307th CIC Det, dtd 12 Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center); Hq 307th CIC Detachment, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject, Re: Final Report of Interrogation submitted by George A. Perper and Peter Regis, Special Agents, CIC, dtd 3 October 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility); and Interview with Major Victor de Guinzbourg, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, at Library Building United Nations Hq, New York, N.Y., on 8 August 1955.

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED

Seventh Army CIC operations against former German espionage agents continued through the summer of 1945. Frequently, individual opportunities presented themselves to the CIC offices, proferring their services and attempting to take advantage of any situation. One of the principal arguments used by professional espionage agents was that their aid could be enlisted against the Russians. So [illegible] that CIC concluded it might well be a well-defined pattern of enemy propaganda.[48]

Tennis, Anyone?

On 22 May, agents of the Securite Militaire unit attached to Seventh Army CIC apprehended a man named a native of Estonia, who had performed several espionage missions for the German Intelligence Service. It was not until 31 July that the CIC interrogation of was completed.

The account of this man's life was dramatic enough to fashion into a novel. A physician by profession, had come to Germany in 1920 to continue his medical studies. Lack of funds led the young man to abandon this training and drift into the life of an itinerant tennis instructor. As the tensions of approaching war increased, started to run missions on behalf of the French Intelligence. But in July 1940, while stranded in Talinn, Estonia, by the Campaign Armistice, took advantage of the Nazi rise in fortunes by contacting a German representative of the RSHA, and, subsequently, accepting the mission of gathering political intelligence in Morocco. His motive for this change of allegiance was partly to find a way out of the precarious situation in Estonia, and partly the venting of disappointment with the defeatist attitude of the French. But did not relinquish entirely his French connections. He contacted French Intelligence and volunteered to furnish information on both German Intelligence Service personalities and the attitude of French political refugees in Spain. He continued as a double agent throughout most of the war.

As the collapse of Germany appeared imminent, was ordered by the RSHA to lay the groundwork for a stay-behind intelligence mission in the city of Munich where he was to operate as a bogus Russian agent. was to propagate among the Western Allies the idea of an anti-Soviet front with Germany aligning with the Western Powers against Russia.

was the first of a number of former " turned professional espionage agents, that the 307th CIC Agents interrogated.[49] On 8 August, Special

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48 Monthly Information Rpt from Hq 307th CIC Det, dtd 22 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center)

49 Monthly Information Report from 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 22 August 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center)

Agent George Meisel, together with members of the 99th CIC Detachment, arrested agent who listed his occupation as His adult life had been spent largely in flitting from one international tennis tournament to another, and he rose to the captaincy of a German tennis team that toured the world in 1937. But during the war, used his tennis and social connections to bring information to the Germans from such neutral nations as the principality of Monaco, and Switzerland. It became readily evident, to the CIC agents who interrogated that the friendships formed, on the tennis courts of Europe prior to the war, had often continued to flourish in the more serious game of espionage during the conflict.[50]

University Screening

As the CIC mission of screening civil service employees began to taper off, agents of the 307th CIC were able to focus their attention on the personnel of Heidelberg University, which was scheduled to re-open in the fall of 1945. The entire faculty of the famed university had been effectively under the control of the SD and the Gestapo during the war, and it was necessary for CIC to ascertain, from a counterintelligence standpoint, which professors and instructors were eligible for re-instatement as active members of the university.

After intensive screening, with each professor receiving individual treatment, the medical and theological schools were opened in November 1945. However, it was not until January 1946 that the remaining facilities of the school could be opened. Thorough checks were made on each professor's background to determine his political stand from 1930 to 1945, but the questions of academic capability were left entirely to the university board.

Potential students who applied for admission to Heidelberg University were checked first by the school's officials. All doubtful cases were then referred to CIC[51]

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50 Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, 307th CIC Detachment from Special Agent George M. Meisel, Subj: Report of Interrogation, dtd 8 October 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

51 Monthly Information Report from 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 13 September 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center) and Rpt, Accomplishments of this Detachment since V-E Day, from 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 7 February 1946, signed by Lloyd G. Baysdorfer, S/A, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center)

A New Phase of CI Activities

By the end of September, 1945, the per diem haul of automatic arrestees, which had been large in the first months, began to dwindle appreciably. Agents of the 307th CIC had to search for individuals in automatic arrest categories who had established themselves in communities away from their homes, with a degree of certainty that they had dodged Allied counterintelligence. Denunciations, offered voluntarily to CIC by informants, often exposed these transplanted individuals. Yet 307th CIC found an ever-increasing need for the development of "positive sources of information to procure apprehension of arrestable individuals who have so far evaded capture and to keep abreast of activities of potentially subversive elements."[52]

Reassignment

During November, operational control of the 970th "slash teams" that had been assigned to Seventh Army was transferred to US Forces, European Theater (USFET), and the operations of the 307th CIC Detachment were restricted to activities concerning the security of Seventh Army, Western Military District, performance of the counterintelligence mission within the Heidelberg enclave, and "certain special cases."

Included in the revised mission of the 307th CIC was the presentation of semi-weekly lectures to candidates for the military police about the CIC role in the area. The necessity for close cooperation between the two units was stressed, and certain CIC methods of operations were discussed.

CIC agents also conducted a complete security survey of the Seventh Army Headquarters and submitted recommendations regarding the physical security of installations, employment of alien civilians, and safeguarding of classified information and documents. Numerous screenings of individuals proposed for access to Top Secret material had to be undertaken as well.[53]

Where is Bormann?

Even as CIC was rounding up thousands of automatic arrestees, it soon was evident that one of the most important war criminals had slipped through Allied counterintelligence nets: Martin Bormann, Deputy to Hitler and Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, became established as the Number One wanted personality of the Nazi regime, a position that he was to hold unchallenged until virtually all hope of ever apprehending him had been abandoned.

52 Monthly Information Report from 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 19 October 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center.)

53 Monthly Information Report, 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 10 December 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center.)

In December 1945, while there still seemed a definite possibility of snaring Bormann, intensive interrogation of a man named started a new search. contended that Bormann was hiding in the Garmisch-Partenkirchen area. On 16 December, a party that included two CIC agents, an Alpine expert, a CIC informant, and entered the Oetz valley in an unmarked car. The pretense of their journey was that they were looking for mountain goats.

pointed out the spot in the mountains where he had seen Bormann and the approximate location of a lodge. Then, to avoid arousing suspicion among the inhabitants of the valley, the CIC agents dispatched their informant to sound out local inhabitants about the possible presence of the Nazi leader. The informant returned without any clue to Bormann's whereabouts, and the party decided to set up an observation post opposite the suspected location of the lodge. For five days, no trace of human habitation was noticed. Finally, on 21 December, a team of two men was sent to approach the lodge. Under the cover of darkness, the men entered the mountain-chain, climbed the peak, and followed the ridge to a point presumed to be above the lodge. When the mountain hideout was reached, the climbers found it abandoned. They searched several other huts in the vicinity, none of which appeared suitable for winter use. The team returned to the base camp.

A second team was dispatched, after again pointed out the area in which he believed the lodge to be located. No building was discovered. Finally, discarding the pretext of searching for mountain goats, the entire party participated in a general and thorough combing of the indicated area, without success. The agents apparently began to doubt story and reinterrogated the German. He maintained that his original account was true and that the changed winter conditions may have caused him to lose orientation. The agents were inclined to believe but abandoned the search for Bormann.[54]

Trouble Among the Troops

In January 1946, CIC agents of the 307th CIC Detachment faced a problem of great and sudden urgency: unrest, real or simulated, among the Seventh Army troops was reportedly rising. On 9 January, the detachment was alerted by army headquarters that an unauthorized mass demonstration of military personnel would take place. Investigation failed to disclose specific instigators, although a plan, "primarily of spontaneous generation," was being circulated to commandeer city transportation for a parade to the home of the commanding general. Agents were spotted over the alleged route of the demonstration, and, while signs of intent were discernible, no overt march on the general's house took place.

54 Monthly Information Report, 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 31 January 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL; [illegible], Kansas City Records Center)

Three days later, the detachment was handed a copy of a telegram that had been dispatched to four American columnists by an American soldier. The telegram, purporting to have 800 co-signers (their names were not listed), was a long harangue condemning the handling of the redeployment program, and, specifically, the Secretary of War. CIC made an intensive check of the Machine Records Unit files without discovering any person of the name and serial number appended to the telegram.[55]

New CIC Personnel

Like all CIC units, the 307th found that during the first year of occupation, there was a rapid turnover of personnel as agents were constantly redeployed to the United States. The detachment remained on the alert for potential agents among the occupation troops and as waves of replacements arrived, likely candidates were tapped for CIC service. By February, 1946, more than fifty new agents had been recruited and trained in CIC methods of operation by the detachment; some were subsequently assigned to teams in the Seventh Army area, others were retained at the Detachment's headquarters.[56]

But the new agents did not remain long with the 307th Army CIC. Plans for the inactivation of Seventh Army and dispersal of its personnel to the new constabulary and other occupation CIC units were realized by the end of March. Personnel of the 307th CIC were merged with agents from the 303d CIC or released to the 970th CIC and the detachment was officially inactivated on 13 May 1946.[57]

223rd CIC Detachment: CORPS CIC in the Occupation

As the Allied forces took over occupation duties in Germany, the 223d CIC Detachment attached to the XXIII Corps split its area of responsibility in western Germany into sub-areas, the principal ones being Koblenz, Trier, Saar and Pfalz. Screening of German nationals and persons of Allied nationalities to be employed in German civil governments throughout the corps area was the prime concern of the Detachment. However, CIC also concentrated on cultivating, throughout the Corps area, informants who could furnish information on the security conditions among the populace and on political trends in general.

Like all CIC units, the 223d Detachment tracked down personality targets listed by all echelons. Suspects were interrogated and, where data was sufficient,

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55 Ibid.

56 Rpt, Accomplishments of this detachment since V-E Day, from 307th CIC Detachment, to AC of S, G2, CI, Hq Seventh Army, dtd 7 February 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center)

57 Monthly Information Report, from Hq 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 1 April 1946, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Central Records Facility)

interned.[58] The task was sizable; one CIC informant who had helped the agents that arrived in Alsey during the combat phase, remarked, at the end of May, that "the CIC team that entered the town during the active period did a fine job of cleaning out Nazis and their sympathizers, but in order to do a thorough job, the remaining Nazis, who hold power, should be removed. Today, these men are trying to forget that they had been active Party members and they bend over backwards to provide American authorities the maximum possible aid."[59] Locating these former Nazis was not always the end of the task. Some suspects, when apprehended, feigned heart attacks and other illnesses to avoid internment.

The agents of XXIII Corps CIC helped divisional CIC units in their area with investigations of MG and German civil government employees. The hiring of pro-Nazis in Koblenz and Saarbrucken was halted, and immediate steps were taken to substitute cleared persons for unsatisfactory incumbents. In addition, the Corps agents checked German church services in the area to ascertain if Nazi doctrine was still being preached from the pulpit, as some informants had claimed.

Liaison activities claimed a good share of the agents' time. Since part of the Corps area was due to be turned over to French control, liaison with Securite Militaire officials was necessary to acquaint them with special security problems. CIC files were revised and condensed to meet the needs of the incoming French security units.[60]

Whitewash

On 17 May, a major in the MG organization in Mainz was notified by the Oppenheim field office of the 223d CIC Detachment that his secretary and interpreter, had been a leader of the Bund Duetchesmaedel (BDM). The same day, an agent of the Mainz CIC office contacted the major to determine what action had been taken against the woman. The major replied that she had been previously screened and cleared by CIC.

The CIC agent was not satisfied with this reply and, on the following day, he contacted the Burgermeister of a nearby town where had allegedly served

58 Memorandum, Hq 223d CIC Detachment, Synopsis of 223d CIC Activities Schedule, dtd 11 June 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 25099 Kansas City Records Center)

59 Memorandum to the Officer in Charge, 223d CIC Detachment from Anthony Pickett, S/A, CIC, Subj: Background of public officials in Alsey, (Cont) dtd 29 May 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center

60 Report After Operations Against the Enemy, Narrative--Activities of the 223d CIC Detachment, XXIII Corps, for the period 1 June 1945 to 30 June 1945, inclusive, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box #25099, Kansas City Records Center)

the BDM. According to the Burgermeister, the MG major had approached him the previous evening and warned him that "no information should be given to any [illegible] political activities. The Burgermeister was extremely hesitant to speak, but admitted to the agent that belonged to one of the most ardent Nazi families in the town and had been a BDM leader as alleged.

Further inquiry led the agent to , a young man of the town who was under house arrest, at the order of the MG major. claimed that the major had warned him not to mention connection with the Nazi Party. The warning was backed up by a threat that would be put in jail for two or three years if he failed to comply. On the night of 17 May, the major had discovered the addition of and her family on a list of Nazi Party members and accused who completely denied the deed. When the youth's parents consulted the major, they were told that their son would be put in jail for the rest of his life and that the youth was to stay away from CIC in Oppenheim.

Several more inquiries led the CIC agent to conclude that "Major... is misusing the authority invested in him by the US Army. It is apparent that he is cognizant that and her family were active in the Nazi Party and with this knowledge, by retaining the subject as his interpreter and secretary, is violating the purposes of the American Military Government.[61]

This was not the end of the case. A full background investigation supported the previously-offered evidence against but on 30 June, more than a month after the initial investigation, the woman was still serving as the major's secretary, despite repeated recommendations to her employer.[62]

On 4 July 1945, the commander of the CIC unit at Kaiserslautern forwarded a complete report of the major's failure to comply with CIC suggestions to the commanding officer of the 223d CIC Detachment. The report used the following strong language: "In view of the fact that Major ... has allowed himself to become so solicitous of the interest of his German secretary as to threaten imprisonment to at least one person, as to intimidate others, and as to completely ignore, for more than one month, a recommendation made by a CIC detachment that the woman be not only removed from employment by the Military Government Detachment at Mainz but also be barred from employment by any installation of the

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61 Memorandum to the Officer in Charge, 223d CIC Detachment, from S/A David F. Powers, Subj [illegible] dtd 24 May 1945. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25099, Kansas City Records Center)

62 Rpt from 223d CIC Detachment, Team One, to Co, MG Detachment, Mainz, Germany, Subject: [illegible] Records Center)

RECOMMENDED RELEASE

Allies...," The CIC officer recommended that the major be transferred from Mainz "immediately."[63] Records do not indicate disposition.

36th CIC Detachment: Varied Duties

Immediately following the German capitulation, the 36th Infantry Division assumed occupation in the Kaufburen-Memmingen-Landsberg area. The 36th CIC Detachment, composed of 15 special agents, under command of Lt William R. Marh, accompanied its parent unit.

The agents discovered a general willingness on the part of the Germans to comply with MG regulations. On the whole, these natives appeared cooperative, and civil security within the area was reported as "very good." Restrictions had to be placed on civilian travel; the military check points at strategic locations throughout the division area, which had been a necessity during the combat phase, were still employed. Local MG authorities issued passes that permitted necessary travel and clamped a strict curfew on the populace.

The CIC teams set about screening local police and civil authorities, removing undesirable members and supplanting them with reliable individuals. In general, the indigenous officials were actively cooperative with the CIC agents.

But there were problems. Automatic arrests were being carried out at such a brisk rate, and in such quantity, that people within the automatic arrest category became increasingly aware that their past behavior or positions left them open to apprehension. The most common method to avoid capture was flight to out-of-the-way farms and small towns, and some key individuals were discovered in strange guises and strange places.

On 27 May, a CIC agent found the former German-appointed Oberburgermeister of Colmar, Haute Rhin, France, taking refuge in a sanitorium under the guise of being a Wehrmacht Lieutenant. Several days later, agents traced down a doctor, at a Reserve Hospital, who had performed an operation removing an SS tattoo mark. They also found a nun who, at the request of an SS soldier, had changed his rank on the hospital records from "Unterscharfuhrer" to "Unteroffizier." These attempts at evasion made the CIC task more than a simple matter of ticketing and shipping suspects to internment areas.

In addition to their other duties, CIC agents maintained a survey of the effectiveness of the non-fraternization ban. With the memory of war still fresh in his

63. Rpt to Co, 223d CIC Detachment, from Captain Loran L. Elliott, Kaiserslautern CIC, Screening of Persons for Military Government Detachment, Mainz, Germany, dtd 4 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25099, Kansas City Records Center)

mind, the average GI was not bothered by any desire to violate the ban. However, the German women, at first hostile to the conquerors, soon gave "every indication of wanting to become acquainted with American military personnel." In spite of this shift in attitude, CIC found only rare cases of "overt acts of friendliness,"[64] during the early days of occupation. After several months had passed, CIC noted that the non-fraternization policy was beginning to be unpopular with Americans in all ranks, and a CIC report took cognizance of this gradual transformation:

"The natural gregarious urge of the American soldier is beginning to assert itself and is expressed through numerous complaints among military personnel that since fraternization is allowed in the Russian Zone of Occupation, there is no reason to continue the policy in this sector... All ranks still feel animosity, of a greater or less degree, towards German males of military age, but do not feel this animosity towards children and girls. The attitude of the German population is apparently in favor of fraternization. They freely state that the war is now over, that they are trying to reconstruct a new country for themselves without the taint of Nazi-ism, and that they and their children want to learn more of the American system of democracy which can only come about through learning to know Americans first-hand. This reasoning and the sincerity behind it can be readily questioned since the attitude of the German is still one to place highest importance on German welfare, forgetting, completely, past crimes.[65]

Arrests Begin to Slacken

The initial days of the occupation had featured a continual parade of informants and denouncers arriving at the 36th CIC offices; their motives ran the varied gamut typical of any group informants. But after the first month, the ardent anti-Nazis began to come forward at a far slower pace. CIC attributed this decline to the fact that the persons denounced by these individuals could not be arrested in wholesale numbers. Higher priorities of arrest often had to be accomplished before CIC men could investigate the informants' reports. In addition, there were not enough agents to conduct investigations into cases that lacked sufficient importance, from a security viewpoint, or where personal animosity seemed to be the basis of a denunciation.

Despite its limitations, the CIC anti-Nazi campaign continued to produce desired results: no cases of subversive activity were reported through the middle of July, and agents surmised that the internment of former Nazi leaders was depriving resistance groups of potential organizers.

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64 Periodic Counter Intelligence Report covering period from 14 May to 15 June 1945, from Hq 36th CIC Detachment (CONFIDENTIAL) dtd 15 June 1945 (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

65 Periodic Counter Intelligence Report for period from 15 June to 15 July 1945, from Hq 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 15 July 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

CIC Keeps a Steady Flow of Reports

Since the number of arrests made by 36th CIC agents often exceeded ten a day, the detachment prepared daily reports for the VI Corps CIC. These summaries, which listed the personalities apprehended, towns covered, and unit locations, formed the basis for a weekly counterintelligence report that was sent to the division G2. These weekly reports replaced the periodic counterintelligence report that had been previously sent to the division G2 and then forwarded to the corps G2. Through the steady flow of reports, 36th CIC kept all echelons informed of the activities and maintained a full picture of the early weeks of operations.

An Underground Movement

On 28 May, 36th CIC agents took into custody Dr Wilhelm Irion, who had been a Stammfuhrer of the Hitler Jugend, and Helmuth Brunisch, who had served as a Sturmfuhrer of the SA.[66] Only after the two men had been interrogated at length, did CIC realize what an important catch had been landed.

On 2 April 1945, Brunisch and Irion had been summoned to Augsberg by a secret order which instructed them to bring bicycles and two days rations on their journey. Upon arriving in Augsberg, the men proceeded to the Kreisleitung where they were told of a special mission for which they had been selected: membership in the "Sonder formation ADOLF HITLER," a rabid resistance organization that CIC believed to be a branch of the Wehrwolf. So crucial was their assignment that they were recruited by Dr Robert Ley, Reichsorganizationleiter, in the name of the Fuehrer.

The formation consisted of only 100 Nazi leaders, upon whom was bestowed the highest trust. From 2 April to 14 April, the recruited fanatics received training along military lines: firing of rifles, panzerfausts, pistols, machine pistols and hand grenades; sabotage methods using high explosives; and techniques of attaching mines and setting booby traps.

Following this military training, the class was broken up into groups of seven men each and received clothing bundles that included such items as caps, windjackets and camouflage suits, all of which could be rapidly discarded in an emergency. The units were then dispatched in various directions. Brunisch and Irion travelled through most of Bavaria, joining with elements of the Wehrmacht. Upon the collapse of the German Army, these men were immediately provided with vehicles, gas and food to return home. This special issuance was considered, by the CIC agents, as an unmistakable sign that the two men were acting under orders of a "very superior authority" which held precedence over even the Wehrmacht.

66 The Sturm Abteilung, popularly called SA, was the Nazi Party Militia or "Storm Troopers."

By coupling the statements made by Lieutenant Brusterly in the course of several interrogations, with information gathered from other sources, the agent concluded that the ultimate mission assigned the two men was to hamper Allied MG by terrorizing Germans who demonstrated any willingness to set up a new government in collaboration with the Allies.

Before sending Bronisch and Brion through POW channels, the CIC agents probed the Nazis for the names and descriptions of other operatives of the resistance formation.[67] The apprehension of these two men had provided 36th CIC with the first hint of a serious threat to the security of the occupation troops.

The Communist Menace

During the early months of occupation the most persistent rumor spreading through the civilian populace in the 36th Division area was that the Communist Party had begun to organize all over Germany. Accompanying this rumor were individual predictions that America was eventually going to war against Russia.

By the end of July, CIC agents were able to report that although Communist propaganda was still being felt, there was no proof that the Communist Party had been formed in any part of the 36th Division sector.[69]

Operation TALLY HO at Division Level

During the month of July 1945, agents of the 36th CIC Detachment, along with operatives from other units of the MG and tactical troops, participated in the

67 Periodic Counter Intelligence Report for period from 15 June 1945 to 15 July 1945 from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 15 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #23075, Kansas City Records Center)

68 Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 25 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 23075, Kansas City Records Center)

69 Weekly Counter Intelligence Rpt from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 29 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 23022, Kansas City Records Center)

zone-wide raids and screenings that were code-named Operation TALLY HO.[70]

This operation was designed to speed up the apprehension of war criminals and other security risks, and its effect on the population was electrifying. Rumors circulated wildly that the operation was being held because an American soldier had been murdered or Allied supplies had been looted or the Americans were at last retaliating for the losses suffered in the war.

However, the civilians' confusion of the aims of TALLY HO failed to hinder the efforts of 36th CIC. Numerous arrests were made of persons classified under SHAEF counterintelligence automatic arrest lists, arms and ammunition were collected by the box load, and displaced persons camps were thoroughly searched. In the course of a week, the 36th CIC, and attached units, made a total of 80 arrests of people listed in the automatic arrest category. As the security vice was tightened by American MG, the Germans came to feel the presence of occupying troops far more strongly than in the first days of the occupation.

How TALLY HO Was Carried Out in the 36th Division

Typical of the organization and implementation of Operation TALLY HO were the 36th CIC activities between 0430 hours 21 July and 0430 hours 23 July. Thirteen agents from the 36th CIC Detachment and 970/68 CIC Detachment, 15 agents from territorial CIC teams, two members of the 36th Infantry Division IPW, and four interpreters were briefed together.

These men were told that each Kreis in the Division area was to be placed under the command of a regiment, with the town of Geislingen and its surrounding territory assigned to the supervision of Special Troops, Headquarters Company, 36th Infantry Division.

Screening centers were established in each Kreis with the main screening center located in the regimental command post town. Battalions were ordered to channel all suspects and information of counterintelligence interest to the main screening center, where CIC agents would segregate the suspects into three categories: those who had been guilty solely of MG violations, those who were of definite counterintelligence interest, and POW.

CIC turned the first category offenders over to the MG Detachment for trial. The second group was detained for intensive interrogation and, where necessary, investigation. The POW were delivered to the Division enclosure.

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70 The zone-wide plans and results of this operation are discussed in Section 2, this Chapter; the accounts of 36th CIC's participation in this operation and in Operation LIFEBOUY are given as examples of a divisional detachment's activities.

The two day operation was deemed "satisfactory considering the short time permitted for planning and organization" Many POW who lacked valid discharge papers were caught, a number of automatic arrest personalities, who had been bypassed in previous searches, were apprehended, the CIC gained a clear picture of the areas in which to concentrate future counterintelligence activities.

In addition, the operation proved an "eye opener" for the average GI who participated in the raids. He came to understand the significance of MG regulations more clearly, and he obtained a more certain knowledge of the aims of counterintelligence.

Civilian reactions were less pleasing to counterintelligence officials. At the outset of the raids, most of the population was thoroughly bewildered and frightened, and the Germans became submissive and cooperative. As in other large scale operations, rumors circulated freely, in order to justify, in the civilian mind, the reason for the sudden crackdown. Some people claimed that an army truck had been ambushed, plundered, and the American driver shot; others held forth that Germans were being sought for forced laborers; still others announced that two officers had been shot. In almost all cases, the Germans missed the mark in their speculations.

By the end of the Operation, the fright had dwindled somewhat, but the bewilderment remained. Only in one town had 36th CIC agents found resentment openly voiced. The citizens in Kircheim had gathered around the jail, which was being used as a screening center, and as fellow townsmen were brought into the prison, had assumed an air of defiance, disregarded orders of the military police, and cheered their compatriots, who had been arrested.[71]

Weapons Uncovered During TALLY HO

One of the important sidelights of Operation TALLY HO was the discovery of a considerable number of weapons within the homes and buildings that were searched. Among the items of contraband were swords, pistols, bayonets, panzerfausts, grenades, tear gas, radio transmitters, and large amounts of wire cutters. These implements did not seem to be the arsenal of a resistance group, but the 36th Division G2 had no intention of leaving them around as souvenirs for the Germans.[72]

71 Final Rpt on Operation TALLY HO, from Hq CIC Det, 36th Inf Div, dtd 24 Jul 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

72 G2 Periodic Rpt, Hq 36th Inf Div, dtd 23 Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095 Kansas City Records Center)

Death by Strangulation or Lightning

The intelligence mission of the CIC investigators was, at times, misinterpreted. On 29 July, CIC was advised of the possible murder of an American soldier in the vicinity of Ulm. The CIC agents who examined the body of the victim noted that 1,500 marks in the soldier's possession had not been disturbed, and robbery was temporarily ruled out as a motive. The investigators listed strangulation or possible accidental death by lightning, and then forwarded the body to the 1st Medical Laboratory in Darmstadt for a detailed pathological examination. Meanwhile, the case and initial reports were turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division, the agency that should have handled the investigation originally.[73]

Security Along the Interzonal Border

The 36th Division area of occupation bordered, in part, along territory occupied by the French, and frontier security became a responsibility of both commands at these lines. The major problem was the passage of civilians in both directions across the boundary. Lack of instruction of the local population in the travel restrictions, and the failure of the MG authorities in the French and US zones to achieve a uniform pass policy were the principal causes of the confusion. Local arrangements with individual French units relieved the difficulty in certain areas, but there were still violations, many of which were unintentional.

After a northbound train had been halted at the border, and a quick survey of the 1,058 civilian passengers had revealed that only 320 of them possessed proper passes, arrangements were made for the future checking of all trains crossing from one zone into another.

A program of further orientation of the civilian populace in both zones was put into operation, and French and US authorities met to standardize and coordinate their travel control activities.[74]

Displaced Persons

The displaced persons within the division area frequently became involved in breaches of the peace, and CIC agents were called in to investigate the disturbances. On 1 August, four Polish displaced persons were caught in the act of stealing an MG vehicle.

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73 Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 29 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center

74 G2 Periodic Rpt, from Hq 36th Inf Div, dtd 30 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

Just the previous day, two Poles, a boy four and one half years old and a man, were injured by an exploding American anti-tank rifle grenade. Agents of the Ulm CIC Territorial Detachment, attached to 36th CIC, went to the scene of the disaster, a displaced persons camp at the east end of Ulm. After a thorough investigation, the agents found no reason to suspect sabotage. But the presence of the grenade in a garbage pail could not be accounted for, unless the boy had unwittingly placed it in the pail, or some other inmate of the camp had done so ignorantly. The agents noted that garbage in the displaced persons camp was collected on a regular schedule by two Germans who, at the time of the explosion, were in the immediate vicinity and were soon to have emptied this particular pail. There was nothing that suggested the Germans were responsible for the explosion, but CIC arranged for a thorough search of the camp to be made by American military personnel to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents.

Other reports of misdemeanors involving displaced persons filtered into CIC offices. Three farmers claimed to have been attacked by a group of from eight to ten displaced persons who were carrying pistols and knives. A search of the surrounding area yielded about 30 displaced persons, three of whom resisted arrest. All were jailed pending investigation. Other incidents concerned looting of farmhouses by persons alleged to have been displaced persons.[75]

The displaced persons continued to prove the main source of unrest and the principal threat to the security of the division area during August. However, preventive measures, that included the arming of civilian police and the addition of a Displaced Persons Auxillary Police Force consisting of trustworthy Polish and Lithuanian displaced persons, reduced the number of incidents considerably.[76]

Although 36th CIC Detachment agents were kept busy apprehending former Nazis and establishing the measures necessary for civil security, the responsibility for military security was still lodged with CIC. No cases involving the loss or compromise of classified documents or information were received at the detachment, but some minor sabotage incidents did occur. Telephone wires were occasionally cut, and CIC investigations, while failing to bare the actual perpetrators, indicated that these were isolated deeds and not the work of an organized subversive effort. Preventive measures were taken by publicizing, through posters and town criers, the penalties that would be incurred for cutting wires, and placing the responsibility for sabotage on the owner of the property where it should occur. No recurrences of the activity were reported for some time.[77]

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75 Ibid.

76 Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt, from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 4 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

77 Periodic Counterintelligence Rpt, from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 15 Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

Surveys of military installations in the 36th Division area during the month of August indicated that the posts were adequately manned with guards. But the agents encountered a tendency towards "Personal relaxation of the guards while on duty, particularly during night hours." This nonchalance was more apparent at the small unit dumps and unit command posts than at larger division installations.[78]

36th CIC Detachment Reduced in Strength

The recall to USFET of the 970/68 CIC team that had been on duty with the 36th CIC Detachment since March 1945 reduced the detachment to five agents, one member of Division Military Intelligence Service Detachment, and one interpreter at the end of August. All personnel under this revised T/O worked out of the detachment headquarters which was located in the Rathaus, Geislingen/Steiger, Wurttemberg. A new plan of operation designed to fit in with the personnel reduction was instituted.

The 36th CIC assumed as primary duties: (1) division headquarters security, which consisted of handling all cases of counterintelligence interest within the division headquarters area and counterintelligence coverage for the Geislingen Military Government Detachment; (2) Liaison with regimental S2's concerning matters of counterintelligence interest; (3) Liaison with permanent Seventh Army CIC detachments in matters concerning their work within the division area e.g. automatic arrest; and (4) investigation of cases of special counterintelligence interest where troop security was directly or solely concerned.[79]

De-Nazification Program Continues

Although the revised T/O altered the mission of the 36th CIC Detachment from operations of a territorial nature to matters of coordination and liaison with elements of the division, the agents continued the De-Nazification Program. An important aspect of this program began in August when CIC was assigned a key role in Seventh Army's Operation LIFEBOUY, the removal of Nazis from public office. Agents of the 36th CIC Detachment were required to screen all government officials and employees; they started with the members of the proposed Civil Courts of Geislingen and then began screening personnel of the city administration and police force. In addition to the actual interviewing of the individuals in public employ, CIC reviewed hundreds of Fragebogens (Questionnaires) filed by people who wanted civil service positions. Numerous rejections of applicants were made on the basis of unfavorable data in investigations, but CIC reported that the greater percentage of civilians approved the aims and actions of Operation LIFEBOUY.

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78 Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt, from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 4 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

79 Weekly Counterintelligence Rpt, from Hq 36th CIC Det, dtd 25 Aug 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

Particularly pleased with the program were anti-Nazis already working in public positions, since they were now able to work without lingering fears of the Nazi cliques that had controlled the government.[80]

As Operation LIFEBOUY progressed into September, CIC agents became more and more aware of the extent to which members of the Nazi Party had manipulated local governments. In one town, the Land Survey Office had to be temporarily dissolved when CIC discovered that the removal of personnel had virtually emptied the office. The success of Operation LIFEBOUY in ridding the civil service of Nazis prompted CIC to expand its investigative efforts to private industries in the division area.[81]

By October, the review of the Fragebogen of civil government and public utilities employees was practically completed, and CIC focused its attention on German industry and schools. The reaction of the German businessman to this program was basically fearful. There was also considerable confusion among the former industrial leaders because MG failed to announce the program of the future for those businesses owned by Nazis.

The matter of screening school employees was critical. Almost from the start of the occupation, the Germans had been complaining about the MG's delay in providing education for the children. Agents of the 36th CIC surmised that the opening of schools would keep the youth of the country busy and reduce the idle bands that had been roaming aimlessly. But there were serious problems attendant upon the revival of Germany's education system. In the town of Geislingen, removal of all Nazis from the school system would virtually exhaust the faculty since every teacher had been compelled to join the Nazi teacher's organization, Lehrverband. The replacements for unsuitable mentors would have to come from among the young discharged soldiers. But these men hardly had an ideal background for inculcating democratic principles in the German youth. Their past training had been largely in the principles of Nazi-ism and the militarism of the Wehrmacht, even though most of them never had a chance actually to join the Nazi Party.

CIC suggested that each potential teacher, whether old or young, be investigated individually. The reasoning behind this suggestion was that many older teachers, who had taught under the Nazis, at least had had the opportunity to instruct and think ideas permitted prior to the Nazi regime. These individuals would be in a better position to teach democratic ideas than some non-Party members who had never known democracy in their lifetimes, and CIC recommended

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80 Weekly Counterintelligence Reports from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 11 August and 18 August 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

81 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 1 Sep 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

that the general policy--"All Nazis out, whether active or nominal party members"--be waived when a calculated risk seemed advisable.[82]

Among Those Present

The individual round-up of automatic arrest personalities continued alongside Operation LIFEBOUY. As time progressed, it became increasingly difficult to find the few key individuals who managed to escape apprehension. In some cases, CIC instituted a police and private informant dragnet; one Untersturmfuhrer of the SD was "fingered," for CIC agents, by an informant as he was crossing a bridge. Another Nazi was apprehended at a farm, where CIC agents found him working as a hired hand. Denunciations by local civilians, of this "widely-hated" individual, had led to his capture.

CIC discovered that defeat had not humbled all the former Nazis. An officer who had served with an SS Police unit in Poland was captured with two loaded pistols and a German command car still in his possession. Despite his background, the agents found, among his papers, a pass issued by a lieutenant colonel of the MG. The prisoner explained away his ownership of the firearms of his personal theory that, as a former officer, he should have been permitted to retain his weapons. He flatly denied any knowledge of orders to the contrary and even claimed to have worn the pistols before an MG colonel in Munich.[83]

The automatic arrest situation gradually underwent a change as the 36th Division area of occupation was cleared of former Nazis. No longer could CIC agents enter a town, contact a few informants, arrest the wanted individuals and load them into a truck. Apprehension of the remaining automatic arrestees was often a matter of detailed investigation; the agents had to sift out false identification documents and piece through involved cover stories and cover positions that had been assumed by the evaders.

Large scale operations involving tactical troops were still used in some areas to apprehend hidden Nazis. In August, Operation GOTHIC, a spot checking, by battalions, of the 36th Division, was undertaken and 4,500 persons were screened for identity documents. Five persons including one automatic arrestee were turned over to CIC for further investigation.[84]

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82 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 6 October 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

83 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 1 September 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

84 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 25 August 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

At irregular intervals, Operation GOTHIC was revived, and several hundred soldiers were dispatched in a given battalion area to search out MG offenders and former Nazis. CIC teams along with teams from Military Intelligence Service handled the screening after these unannounced searches but, in general, failed to find personalities of counterintelligence interest. Violators of MG ordinances were channeled to the proper authorities for disposition.[85]

Civilian Voice Resentment

After several months of placidity towards the occupation forces, some German civilians began to complain about certain MG policies. A former leader of the Centrum Partei, pre-Hitler, Catholic Centrist party, told CIC agents that Germans felt the arrests were being made without proper investigation, and that it was impossible for a "blanket arrest policy to be considered just." The informant stated that apprehension of individuals who held smaller, non-paying positions as "leiters," even though they were not Party members, was unfair. He left the CIC office with the warning that a "policy of persecution, and not prosecution, will aid greatly in the formation of a Communist Party when the people recoil from the highly touted but unpracticed American democracy." After reviewing this informant's report, CIC noncomittally stated, "This information is passed on for what it may be worth."[86]

Fraternization Incidents

The lifting of the fraternization ban occasioned several incidents between German civilians and American soldiers. In the town of Goppingen, a group of about ten youths made remarks about a certain girl who was walking along the street with an American soldier. After bidding the girl goodbye, the soldier returned to the Germans and ordered them to move on their way. When they made several replies which he did not understand, the American struck and knocked down two of the boys. The remainder of the youths left hurriedly.

Almost all similar altercations were caused by German youths resentful of the preference shown to American soldiers by the German girls. CIC received reports of a group of individuals, signing themselves as "The Black Hand," that had been "feebly active" in one town. This organization composed anonymous notes to girls who had been seen with American soldiers, warning them that they were being watched. CIC decided, in turn, to watch the young men who were watching the girls.[87]

85 Weekly Counterintelligence Review from Hq 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 2 Sept 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

86 Weekly Counterintelligence Report, from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 11 August 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

87 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from Hq 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 18 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

In their dealings with civilians, CIC agents were careful to note prevailing opinions about the future of Germany. In mid-September, a CIC report summed up recent observations as follows:

"The German majority has no clearly defined political outlook. Its primary concern is its day-to-day problems. Many individuals, even former Nazis, [illegible] primarily could not form an independent state in the near future, and they would like to see it become a protectorate of the United States for some time to come."

This attitude pointed unmistakably to the fact that the German lot under the American occupation, was not an unhappy one. Despite the occasional grumblings, from one side, that the Americans were too hasty in their apprehension of Nazi Germans and, from the other, that the process was too slow, members of the 36th CIC Detachment found that the occupation was proceeding satisfactorily in the month of October, less than half a year since the unconditional surrender.[88]

100th CIC Detachment

Following the German surrender, agents of the 100th CIC Detachment were assigned coverage of the division area centering around Ulm, approximately 70 miles long and 30 miles wide and containing about 350 cities and towns. Liaison with corps and army "pinpoint" (i.e. territorial) detachments was essential, and maximum security was obtained through frequent coordination with unit S2's and IPW personnel.

The size of the counterintelligence task in the division area necessitated thorough indoctrination of all intelligence personnel in automatic arrest and detention policy. CIC agents briefed these personnel and soon found that civilians, apprehended by a unit, could be interrogated at that unit level by IPW personnel, and then channeled either to CIC or MG. This system relieved CIC of the interrogation of people who had no counterintelligence importance.

Another boon to the CIC agents was a carefully developed informant network that kept them aware of any resistance groups, organized or contemplated, in the area. One confidential informant, posing as a Wehrwolf member, approached two fanatical members of the Hitler Jugend, [illegible] The CIC informant requested explosives and ammunition, and the resistance men not only delivered hand grenades and ammunition but told him where further arms were cached near Geislingen. CIC lost no time apprehending the fanatics and committing them to the stockade for trial by MG.

88 Weekly Counterintelligence Report from 36th CIC Detachment, dtd 15 Sep 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

The whole-hearted cooperation of local authorities and police further aided CIC in its De-Nazification Program. At times, this cooperation was "overenthusiastic" as the authorities strove to "arrest individuals simply because they have been local Nazis or because of petty jealousies."

Communications Security

As late as 15 June, agents of the 100th CIC Detachment continued to hold tight rein on civilian communications. Telephone communications were barred except in a few instances where intra-city lines were operated under the direct supervision of MG. Post offices were kept under lock and key, and all incoming mail was impounded while MG debated the advisability of resuming mail service on a strictly local basis.89

Stuttgart Gestapo

Agents of the 100th CIC Detachment found that the capture of wanted persons could be speeded up if key persons in Nazi organizations could be prompted to talk at length. Such was the case with Willie Seeger, formerly "N Referat" of the Stuttgart Gestapo and, by 10 June, a prisoner of the 100th CIC. Under interrogation, Seeger revealed the organizational plan of the Stuttgart Gestapo office and provided a list of employees and their respective positions within the different departments.

As a direct result of Seeger's information, 100th CIC arrested 11 members of the Stuttgart Gestapo and disseminated the names of other members, still at large, to nearby CIC units.90

New Responsibility

On 8 July, the 100th Division assumed command of a new sector that embraced the Kreise of Stuttgart, Esslingen, Weiblingen, Boblingen, Leonberg, Pforzheim, and Vaihingen. Since four 970th "slash" teams and agents of the 307th CIC Detachment were assigned areas within the division boundary, a large part of 100th CIC's efforts were concerned with liaison. Agents of the detachment were named to sit on a sabotage board consisting of representatives from specialist branches. They also participated in Operation TALLY HO, the mass screening of local civilians by all troop elements. CIC's principal mission in this operation was determining to which interested agency, arrestees were to be sent, but TALLY HO indicated

89 Monthly Counterintelligence Report #11 for Period from 15 May to 15 June 1945, from 100th CIC Detachment, dtd 15 June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

90 Monthly Information Rpt for 100th CIC Det, dtd 4 July 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

to 100th CIC agents that "there is little to be gained by CIC in operations of this kind. Of necessity, the searches and on-the-spot interrogations conducted by the troops are too superficial to reveal many cases of counterintelligence interest."[91]

511th CIC Detachment: Periodic Raids

Agents of the 511th CIC Detachment attached to the 11th Armored Division participated in periodic raids in the vicinity of Ulm during the month of November 1945. These raids, in addition to uncovering minor "gifts" of American goods, brought to "the attention of the local populations that they were citizens of an occupied country... something which many civilians, in their increasing boldness, are often apt to forget."

The searches occasionally netted sizeable caches of contraband. In one house, eighteen cans of gasoline were located; in another, two foot lockers crammed with cigarettes, soap, and other small commodities. The usual excuse for the possession of American goods was that they were payment for having washed clothes or done other chores and were being stored for use as Christmas gifts.

Aside from these hoarded items, Nazi propaganda leaflets and books were found in a great many homes, and CIC warned that "the products of the printing press are very often more important to a budding underground than more lethal weapons."

Checking the Success of SWOOP Operations

In order to sound out the real German reactions to the series of American SWOOP Operations that had been carried out, two agents of the 511th CIC circulated around the town of Geislingen in civilian clothes, posing as Germans in order to overhear local comments. Among the remarks that were addressed to the undercover agents or to other Germans were:

"Look at the American guard there--he looks like a typical Bavarian drunkard."

"Look how they are going from house to house searching and checking; it reminds me how we did exactly the same thing in France."

"Gosh, I wish I was back in the British occupied zone. I have been living in Westfalen all this time, and for the past eight months the Tommies haven't raided our town once. Those Ammies certainly are a bother."

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91 Monthly Information Rpt from 100th CIC Detachment, dtd 1 August 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25095, Kansas City Records Center)

Some of the "man-in-the-street" remarks were not as temperate as these, for the speakers had no idea that CIC was listening.

The undercover mission actually served a dual function, since it placed the agents in a good position to observe American as well as German conduct. What they noticed was not always complimentary to the efficiency and thoroughness of the raids.

One agent walked through the main streets of Geislingen for 45 minutes during curfew without ever being stopped by US personnel passing in vehicles. Only a German policeman warned him but did not make a check for papers. At one roadblock, a civilian trudging on foot carrying two valises and a cardboard box tied to his back, asked the guard if he could enter the town. He was refused but not questioned or searched. A woman in the crowd, clustered at the roadblock, then suggested that he enter the town by a roundabout route that would skirt the block. The man liked the suggestion and conveyed his intention to the guard in broken English to which the American replied, "OK, then, go ahead. I am looking the other way." The nearby civilians were much amused by this exchange.

The other CIC agent donned an American officer's field coat over his civilian suit and set out by jeep on the road between Gmund and Kirchheim. Using a trip ticket that bore an entirely different number from the figures stenciled on the hood of the jeep, the agent experienced no difficulty passing a number of check points. None of the guards ever noted the fact that the collar and trousers of his civilian garb protruded outside the military coat.

Once in the town, the agent walked freely on the streets during the curfew without encountering a single US patrol. He was finally arrested by German police and questioned thoroughly. His lack of authentic identity papers was spotted, and he was turned over to MG. Unaware that the man was a CIC agent, the MG operatives searched him and placed a suspicion of black marketing upon him when an American-made lighter was found in his possession.

No conclusions had to be made at the end of the agents' report on their undercover assignment. It must have seemed obvious that lax enforcement of even the most stringent rulings was hurting the American forces.[92]

A report on another raiding operation, code-named BLACK SATCHEL, that took place in Mannheim in February, 1946, revealed a considerable improvement in the conduct of the mass search. This time an undercover agent of the 511th CIC was able to report, "locations for roadblocks were well chosen, at positions

92 Special CIC Report from Hq 1st Armored Division, CIC Detachment 511, to G2 1st Armored Division, dtd 26 November 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25104, Kansas City Records Center)

where the by-passing would offer great problems and dangers to anyone attempting it... there was some confusion as to who was allowed to pass and who was not, but by 1500 hours, the official starting time of the operation, everybody knew his duties well. From then on, strict adherence was noted in all cases, although there was some reluctance to use weapons against unruly pedestrians." The agent was stopped and kept from leaving the area at each roadblock, but he was never searched. He noticed that searches in buildings appeared to be well organized and were completed in the allotted two hours. "The orderly dismounting from trucks and marching in platoon columns made very favorable impressions on the population... efficiency of guards remained steady throughout the operation." As the agent circulated among the civilians, he gathered fragments of conversations that indicated the Germans were accepting the searches more as a matter of course. The remark of one woman seemed fairly typical: "I don't see why these stubborn people (pedestrians) don't stop bothering the guards. Those soldiers have their orders and just can't let anyone pass. Why don't the people resign themselves to the fact that they just will have to wait till the thing is over?"[93]

93 Special CIC Report on Operation 2 "BLACK SATCHEL, MANNHEIM," from CIC Detachment 511, to AC of S, G2, 1st Armored Division, dtd 11 Feb 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box #25104, Kansas City Records Center)

Chapter 2

CIC IN EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT

Complementing the work of the Seventh Army CIC and subordinate units in the West was the 303d CIC Detachment and its subordinate units attached to Third Army and the Eastern Military District.

303d CIC Detachment

At the close of the ETO campaign, elements of the Third US Army were spread over the eastern reaches of what was to be designated the US Zone of occupation. This area was crammed with displaced persons; approximately two million individuals of varied nationality had been swept into the region by the tides of war.

The problem of displaced persons was of pressing importance to the 303d CIC Detachment. Over a three-month period, which had started prior to the end of the war and continued into June 1945, CIC controlled special counterintelligence personnel engaged in the screening of these refugees. The special screening teams were composed of members of the Polish, Russian, French, Belgian, and Dutch Armies, supplemented by sixty-two displaced civilians who functioned as interpreters. The teams were dispatched to various displaced persons camps, and, while it was impossible to screen each individual, informant systems and other special operations kept the teams alerted about potential subversives in the camps.

303d CIC Field Operations

From the start of the occupation, the 303d CIC with headquarters at Freising had planned for long-range coverage of the Third Army area. Local offices were established in major cities throughout the area, staffed by agents on detached service from the 970th CIC. Informant systems were instituted on a local basis and diligent efforts undertaken to apprehend all individuals in the automatic arrest categories.

Coverage of the Army Occupational Zone was maintained on a landkreise basis; each 970th team covered from one to ten landkreise, depending on population density, counterintellgience problems, and the availability of corps and division CIC units for temporary assistance. By the end of June, 1945, a total of 43 "slash" teams from the 970th CIC were on duty in the Third

Army area.

But the principal problem for the 303d CIC Detachment remained the same as during the tactical phase: lack of sufficient personnel. The detachment was permitted to augment its staff with fifty additional enlisted personnel, but even the satisfactory efforts of these men did not fully alleviate the shortage.

A valuable addition to the counterintelligence forces was the establishment of a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the 303d CIC Detachment "for the purpose of handling cases involving alleged or proven traitors of US nationality and the disposition of counterintelligence information pertaining to the Western hemisphere."

As the CIC mission in DP camps began to wane, CIC formed special teams to serve as interrogators in army internment centers. Headed by CIC agents and staffed by the attached Allied army personnel, the teams engaged in detailed interrogation of arrestees. Based upon the recommendations of these interrogators, internment camp commanders could determine the ultimate disposition of the arrestees. A continued shortage of clerical aid forced many trained interrogators to double as clerks, a situation which had plagued CIC throughout the War.[94]

To facilitate the dissemination of leads through the Army area, a CIC Operations Section was established at the Third Army Intelligence Center. All leads that extended outside the confines of a single operational team's assigned area were cleared through this Operations Section and routed to Research for any additional information on the subject in the files.

But CIC operations were still impeded by the lack of adequate teletype, radio and telephone communication systems that would permit the development of leads before they became unusable. The need for such communications had been recognized in principle in the various counterintelligence plans submitted prior to V-E Day; but execution lagged considerably behind planning.[95]

The CIC personnel shortage in the European Theater which

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94 Monthly Information Report, Hq Third US Army, 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 10 June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

95 Monthly Information Report, 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 12 July 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

had been felt from the start of the occupation in Third Army area became even more severe as "critical" (Adjusted Service Rating) scores were lowered and increasingly large numbers of men were rotated back to the States.

The detachment commander of the 303d CIC noted with dismay that by the end of November, the number of agents in his area had been reduced to fewer than 175 enlisted men and 50 officers. Recruitment of suitable personnel to take the place of redeployed Agents had met with "unexciting results." Some candidates for CIC appointment were funneled out of other military intelligence agencies, but the loss of experienced counterintelligence Agents was still felt.[96]

Perhaps most significant was the observation in the November Monthly Information Report that a glaring weakness in Third Army CIC units was "the lack of adequate coverage due to personnel shortages, the poor quality of the CIC agents who make up the present CIC, and the need for better, older trained personnel to continue the CIC operational job."[97] The fact that at this time of personnel difficulties CIC had to relax its standards in order to fill existing gaps was to have repercussions in later years of the Occupation.

Even in the early months of 1946, when CIC Agents trained in the Zone of the Interior began to arrive, the personnel situation was not cleared. The enlisted men came without prior training for occupational duties. They had completed a five weeks course in "detective" type work and lacked a background in such matters as "German political history from 1918 until the present, the history of the NSDAP, party ranks, the arrest categories and the geography of Germany." This problem was remedied to a degree by sending the "green" Agents to the European Theater Intelligence School at Oberammergau, Germany, for a ten day "blitz" course.[98]

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96 Monthly Information Report, from Hq 303d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, dtd 10 October 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

97 Monthly Information Report, from Hq 303d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, dtd 10 December 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

98 Monthly Information Reports, from Hq 303d CIC Detachment, dtd 4 February 1946 and 1 March 1946 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

208th CIC Detachment: Security...Before the Russians Moved In

The 208th CIC Detachment, reorganized after the German surrender, took over responsibility for an area vacated by First Army. The VIII Corps Command Post, located in Weimer, and its area was covered by one CIC team while other teams operated in the sectors assigned Corps Artillery and the 6th Cavalry Group. The Americans were not required to prepare for a long stay; as a result of Four Power agreements, the area was soon to be turned over to the Russians.

In general, conditions were well settled in the extensive VIII Corps region. The large cities of Weimer and Eisenach had police forces that "gave an appearance of willing cooperation." But a problem was posed from the start by a heavy influx of refugees coming from the direction of the Russian lines. There seemed to be widespread fear of mistreatment by the Russians, and rumors that the Russians would occupy Thuringen circulated widely.[99]

On 7 June, a mass exodus of civilians from Eisenach was threatened after some of the civilians had heard a radio broadcast stating that the proposed Russian occupation was soon to begin. But the anxiety subsided somewhat, and civilians were overheard making such statements as "we are glad that the Americans have our car, now the Russians will not get it."[100]

9th CIC Detachment

The 9th CIC Detachment was one of the few CIC units to remain with its tactical command well into the Occupation. While other CIC detachments were phased out or transferred to Regional CIC office six months after the Occupation began, the 9th CIC held onto its mission of providing security for the 9th Infantry Division and its area for almost two years.

Headquarters Security

On 10 May 1945, the official team composition of the 9th CIC detachment was reduced by two officers and five enlisted men; and nine days later, the remaining four officers and six

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99 Weekly CI Report #4 from 208th CIC Detachment for Week Ending 2400 hours, 20 May 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25097, Kansas City Records Center).

100 CI Weekly Report No. 3 for the week ending 9 June 1945, from 208th CIC Detachment, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25097, Kansas City Records Center).

enlisted men were transferred to operate as a team of the overhead 970th Detachment. By October 1945, the remaining members of the detachment under the command of 2d Lieutenant Harold Nadel had accomplished thirty-three investigations and apprehensions of persons in "automatic arrest" and "wanted" categories and completed ten cases of suspected sabotage and thirteen cases of espionage. But the customary routine of checking headquarters and vital installations for security, screening civilians for employment, and investigating military personnel occupied most of the agents' time.

Throughout this period, the strength of the detachment constantly varied as problems of CIC organization were being discussed at higher headquarters in Germany and back in the United States. This instability carried over into 1946, and it became increasingly difficult to obtain men with linguistic backgrounds and investigative experience. The period of reorganization and readjustment continued until September 1946 when personnel from the CIC center began to arrive to fill vacancies. By this date, the counterintelligence mission of the detachment was gradually defined and narrowed to include enforcing security regulations, safeguarding US property, investigating security violations and threats, and screening for employment all persons within the command jurisdiction of the 9th Infantry Division. The Agents performed another service for the Division by assuming responsibility for the security of all DP, civilian internment, and POW enclosures. In addition they were called on to investigate disorders and unlawful acts that occurred within these compounds.

On December 1946, the 9th Infantry Division was deactivated, and the members of the CIC Detachment were reassigned to the First Military District. A revised mission accompanied the shift in responsibility: CIC Agents became primarily concerned with the investigation of all acts--subversive, criminal, and otherwise--committed by displaced persons. Close liaison was maintained with all G5, UNRRA, and military government agencies within the Military District, and an informant net was established to help the agents keep a close watch over the military and civilian populations, and to gain information relative to DP incidents.

This modified detachment continued to operate for four months. On 20 April 1947, the unit was formally deactivated and the agents were reassigned to serve with Constabulary CIC Detachments.101

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101 Report from Ninth CIC Detachment, Stuttgart Military Post, Subj: Unit History, dtd 28 April 1947, (UNCLASSIFIED) Kansas City Record Center Box 25094).

45th CIC Detachment - In the Nazi Heartland

Members of the 45th CIC Detachment in excess of TOE allotments were assigned to the 970th CIC and then immediately placed on detached service with the 45th CIC during the administrative reshuffling that followed the German surrender.[102] The number of Agents was augmented to sixteen, and Captain Rupert Guenthner remained in command of the Detachment, which operated with the 45th Infantry Division in and around the city of Munich. On 18 May, the Division was ordered to establish Area Commands in the regions of Dachau, Munchen and Furstenfeldbruck, and CIC Agents were deployed to provide coverage for the areas.[103]

The problems facing CIC in Munich and its environs were considerable. Here, in the virtual birthplace of Hitlerism, were hundreds of Germans who had played important roles in the Nazi regime. Over three hundred enemy personalities including members of the Gestapo, SD, Abwehr, and SS, as well as other party officials (among them the Oberburgermeister of Munich) were rounded up by the end of May. CIC could not expend all its efforts gathering war criminals; the massive concentration camp at Dachau, where some of the most brutal crimes of the Nazis had been committed, had to be thoroughly covered for evidence of the atrocities; and the usual watch over military security had to be maintained. Aid was given to the hard pressed Agents in the city of Munich by members of the Advance Third Army CIC during the early weeks of occupation duties.

A Typical Opportunist Group: The FAB

Most CIC units in Germany were concerned lest a revival of Naziism occur through the medium of resistance organizations. But the 45th CIC had, in addition, the problem of a self-styled, pro-Allied group of Germans who fancied themselves the leaders of a New Germany.

The history of the Freiheits Aktion Bayern (FAB) (Freedom Action Bavaria) apparently commenced about seventy-two hours before the Americans entered Munich. In the confused turmoil of the final days of Hitlerism, a Dr. Rupprecht Gerngross, with a small coterie of friends, attempted to implement a plan that must have been lurking in their minds ever since the doom of Germany had been sealed, so detailed was the organization which they had prepared.

On 28 April, the FAB made its first appearance. On that

103 Operations of the 45th Infantry Division, Germany, 11-31 May 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

45th CIC Detachment - In the Nazi Heartland

Members of the 45th CIC Detachment in excess of TOE allotments were assigned to the 970th CIC and then immediately placed on detached service with the 45th CIC during the administrative reshuffling that followed the German surrender.[102] The number of Agents was augmented to sixteen, and Captain Rupert Guenthner remained in command of the Detachment, which operated with the 45th Infantry Division in and around the city of Munich. On 18 May, the Division was ordered to establish Area Commands in the regions of Dachau, Munchen and Furstenfeldbruck, and CIC Agents were deployed to provide coverage for the areas.[103]

The problems facing CIC in Munich and its environs were considerable. Here, in the virtual birthplace of Hitlerism, were hundreds of Germans who had played important roles in the Nazi regime. Over three hundred enemy personalities including members of the Gestapo, SD, Abwehr, and SS, as well as other party officials (among them the Oberburgermeister of Munich) were rounded up by the end of May. CIC could not expend all its efforts gathering war criminals; the massive concentration camp at Dachau, where some of the most brutal crimes of the Nazis had been committed, had to be thoroughly covered for evidence of the atrocities; and the usual watch over military security had to be maintained. Aid was given to the hard pressed Agents in the city of Munich by members of the Advance Third Army CIC during the early weeks of occupation duties.

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102 Monthly Administrative Rpt, from Hq 45th CIC Det, dtd 31 May 45, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

103 Operations of the 45th Infantry Division, Germany, 11-31 May 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

date, Gerngross, a Wehrmacht captain of an interpreter company, attempted a military putsch on a small scale by leading his men against the German armed forces in Munich. The only aid Gerngross received was from a band of civilians from an organization known as C-7.

The mutiny was successful to a degree. Gerngross's men seized the radio station and broadcast to the people of Munich and the military garrison, calling them to surrender. Another group from the company kidnapped Reichstatthalter Franz Ritter Von Epp, the governor general of Bavaria, from his residence near Munich and attempted to convince him that he should surrender the city.

Gerngross, failing to receive the approval of Von Epp, did not hesitate to broadcast that the Governor General was a co-leader of the revolutionary movement. But Von Epp's positive refusal to aid the FAB and the approach of SS troops to the radio station caused the members of the cabal to flee without defending their position. With the failure of this one-day revolution, the FAB split up, and its members went into hiding in Munich and at various points in the south of Bavaria.

On the evening of 23 April, after the reseizure of the radio station by Nazi authorities, the local Gauleiter addressed the populace, denouncing the attempted putsch and ridiculing Gerngross. This was the first time that Gerngross' name had come before the people of Munich.

The next appearance of the FAB was after the occupation by American forces. The FAB had contacted an American air officer who had accompanied the first wave of troops into Munich. They were referred to the subsection of the 45th CIC Detachment that had arrived in the city. The Adjutant of the movement, a Dr. Leiling, proposed that the FAB serve as an initial liaison unit with the American authorities, apparently intending to gain the support of the occupation forces through this offer of assistance, and the FAB soon set up office and commenced operations on a pseudo-offical scale. Their activities began despite the fact that CIC Agents explained that the American authorities neither sanctioned nor sponsored the movement, but would welcome any cooperation in the procurement of counterintelligence information.

The FAB was not satisfied with the idea of simply serving as informants for the Americans, and they began to represent themselves as the saviours of Bavaria and as members of a long term underground movement. To the people of Munich, the FAB declared that they were the prime ministry and advisers of the Military Government as well as the dispensers of patronage to

local Bavarians.

Convinced of their own importance, the members of the FAB moved into successively more pretentious quarters to accommodate their mushrooming organization, and they began to requisition vehicles and additional premises in the name of the second senior Military Government officer without his authorization or consent.

The FAB extended its activities to arrest subjects whom they considered leading Nazi officials. On 14 May, an individual was apprehended at his house by FAB men and committed to a local prison for the night. On the following day, interrogation by CIC Agents disclosed that the individual had been wrongly held, and the FAB personnel concerned were severely reprimanded.

Other misdemeanors by the FAB included the issuance of a warrant of authority to a member which delegated to him certain prerogatives and executive powers that should have been exercised by the local Burgermeister, the receipt of monetary contributions for the support of the movement, and the posting of printed proclamations in close proximity to public writs of the Military Government, thus gaining prominence by association.

An example of the operations of the FAB was given by one CIC informant, an actor in a municipal theater. Shortly after the Occupation, a member of the FAB paid a call on a director of the theater and informed him that any efforts to have the theater opened would have to be mediated through the FAB. A virtual spy system was set up within the staff of the theater and through this system, the FAB sought to exert pressure on members of the staff to affiliate with FAB or lose their positions.[104]

The wide license that the FAB had assumed was climaxed in a letter to the Military Government, dated 15 May, which was reproduced in such quantity that CIC could only conclude it had been intended for distribution as an open letter. The FAB stated its concept of the occupation program that the Military Government should initiate, closing with the note:

"We submit this immediate program and ask for the opportunity to collaborate with Military Government in carrying out that program. We are able to nominate experts of unimpeachable character who are able to work out the necessary detail

104 Investigation Report from Lt Holger E. Hansen from "T" Force, Headquarters 6th Army Group, dtd 18 May 1945 (UNCLASSIFIED), (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

plans for the immediate program " (italics from the FAB original)

Since the FAB had far exceeded the role which Military Government had granted it and had violated the order calling for the dissolution of all politcal movements and cessation of all organizations having a political motive in the area, CIC Agents decided to interrogate the FAB leaders and investigate the organization thoroughly.

Investigation disclosed that the FAB had represented itself as the sole organization sanctioned by Allied authorities and the most effective approach to American Military Government and the CIC. Although FAB claimed that its membership was devoid of former Nazis, at least one Nazi follower worked in the organization's office. More disturbing was the discovery that the FAB had never shed the vestiges of its military form. Correspondence of the organization revealed, both in context and by constant reference to members of the movement by rank, that the nucleus of the FAB was still the military company of interpreters that had participated in the unsuccessful mutiny.

Special Agents Russell B. Frizzell and Timothy Reis who interviewed Gerngross concluded that he was primarily an opportunist without basic principles of belief other than a certain enjoyment of the power and influence that he suddenly had come to wield. It was particularly apparent to the Agents that Gerngross had invented accounts of his having been a long-term resistance leader, since he could not cite any act of positive resistance prior to the attempted putsch, nor was he able to give details of any aid he had offered to Allied Agents in the Munich area before the Occupation. His immediate goal was clear; Gerngross hoped to gain such ascendancy in Bavarian affairs that the FAB could not be disregarded by the Military Government or the Bavarian people.

On 17 May, as a result of the potentially dangerous situation caused by the FAB, the Allied Military Government informed the movement that it would have to "voluntarily disband" and cease further political activity. Gerngross and the other key figures in the FAB were required to file personal history statements with CIC so that these opportunists could be kept in check.[105]

105 Information on the FAB contained in Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Hq 307th CIC Detachment, dtd 17 May 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

Others Get Into the Act

The FAB was not alone in its attempt to convince the Bavarians that the Military Government bestowed special privileges on certain organizations. On 17 May, Special Agent Charles G. Ewing noticed a door of an office in Munich that bore the legend National Komitee FRIES DEUTSCHLAND (National Committee 'Free Germany'). Inside the office, a man was seen interviewing a weeping woman, and in an outer office, a staff of employees were at work. The chief of the organization, Josef Urban, was found to be posting placards that claimed his office was an intermediary between complainants and the Military Government.

Following interrogation, the CIC Agent concluded that Urban was probably operating a racket and receiving fees for his self-claimed official advice. But Agent Ewing did not rule out the possibility that Communist or other political backing was behind the operation.106

Compiling Data on Berchtesgaden

The big question near the end of the war in Europe had been: where would the Nazis choose to make their last stand? Most answers seemed to point to one place: Berchtesgaden, high in the Bavarian Alps. Fearing that the Germans were going to turn this mountain retreat into a National Redoubt manned by the finest SS troops, General Eisenhower had decided to direct the southern Allied Forces towards this objective. The rapid conquest of Berchtesgaden by elements of the Seventh Army indicated that Intelligence estimates of the "National Redoubt" had been far wide of the mark. But some key Nazis apparently had fled to Berchtesgaden, and 45th CIC Agents developed leads on personalities that might be hidden near this Alpine hideaway after the occupation.

On 1 June, Special Agent Frederick J. White located and interviewed the president of an organization known as the Alpine Rescue Service, that had a membership of 500 mountaineers familiar with the Bavarian Alps in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden. According to the president, the Alpine Rescue Service was at the disposal of any units of the Allied Armies that wanted to search for Nazis believed to be hiding in the mountains, and Agent White recommended the use of this service to VI Corps CIC.107

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106 Memorandum to Public Safety Branch, Military Government, from Special Agent Charles G. Ewing, dtd 17 May 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED), (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

107 Information Report to Commanding Officer, 206th CIC Detachment from 45th CIC Detachment, dtd 1 June 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121) Kansas City Records Center).

CIC Agent Uncovers Nazi Party Documents

Although the Germans had attempted to destroy records and documents of the deeds and personalities of the Nazi regime, both nationally and locally, they had not always succeeded in finishing their work before the Americans entered a town. In the village of Freimann, Agent Francesco S. Quaranta was advised that 68,000 kilos of party documents had been left for the Reichsleitung SA in a paper mill by Gestapo guards.

When Agent Quaranta went to the mill on 20 May, he discovered that the owner had been ordered to accomplish immediate and total destruction of the documents as the American forces neared Freimann, but had not carried out the command. The entire second floor of the mill was covered with papers that included all the Party membership cards of Germany with identification photos on the back, documents of the highest party court and highest SA court, and many other papers that concerned high level Gestapo figures and actions. Agent Quaranta, aware of the extreme importance of these documents to the Occupation, posted temporary guards around the mill, designated the area as"Off Limits," and hastily prepared a report for the AC of S, G2 so that immediate action could be taken to remove the papers to a safe repository.[108]

Round Up of War Criminals Continues at Rapid Pace

Although agents of the 45th CIC were called upon to perform many counterintelligence functions, their prime mission remained the apprehension of Nazi leaders. Daily reports indicating the persons apprehended by the Detachment were forwarded to Corps CIC, and a pattern familiar to all detachments began to emerge: the "automatic arrest categories" made detention of hundreds of Germans a necessity.

Among the key individuals that the 45th CIC found in Munich and its environs were a Major General of the Wehrmacht, the former head of the Bavarian police forces, the chief of the SD Austenstelle of Munich West, and a Kriminal Inspektor for the Gestapo.[109] But the case that most interested the agents dealt

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108 Rpt from 45th CIC Det to AC of S, G2, Seventh Army, Subj: "Discovery of Party Documents in Freimann, dtd 20 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center). NOTE: These papers were later transferred to Berlin where they formed the backbone of the Berlin Document Center.

109 Monthly CI Periodic Report from 45th CIC Detachment, dtd 18 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

with a naturalized American citizen whose past was thickly spotted with espionage efforts on behalf of the land of his birth.

, a Preserver of German Culture in America

On 12 June, Agents of the 45th CIC working in Munich tracked down a man named who had spent most of his life shuttling back and forth between Germany and the United States. Interrogation at detachment headquarters resulted in numerous and varied statements from as he tried to coat his entire life with a series of alibis. But the central core of his activities was clear enough to the CIC agents. had been a leading Bundist and apologist for Hitler in America during the pre-war years.

If pre-War activities had a possible ambivalence, there was no disputing the record he compiled on behalf of the Nazis during the War. In 1940, passport was extended through 1944 by the American Counsel General, and he enrolled in the Party. His addresses to the Germans continued in schools and universities, and the Propaganda Ministry employed as a speaker at selected meetings. He also gained prominence as a lecturer throughout Germany for the Verein fur Das Deutschum in Ausland (Society for Furtherance of Germanicism in foreign countries), generally known as VDA. In 1944, as the accelerated Allied bombings of the Reich forced to abandon his cultural efforts, he became the liaison man between the SD, Gestapo the VDA, in charge of clearing information that passed between the three agencies.

Although made every effort to convince his CIC interrogators that his activities had been prompted by a desire to organize German life in the United States, not from a political but from a commercial and intellectual point of view, the agents remained skeptical and turned him over the 303d CIC Detachment for further interrogation, with the recommendation that he be brought back to the United States for trial for his anti-American activities.[110]

45th CIC Agents at Dachau

As the Allies overrun Germany, they came across many con-

110 Special Report from 45th CIC Detachment to AC of S, G2, 45th Inf Div, Subj: dtd 14 June 1945 (UNCLASSIFIED); and "Notes made by of his activities here and abroad."(undtd) (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

centration camps where some of the worst Nazi atrocities had been committed. Sights were seen there that caused men as inured to the horrors of war as General Patton to sicken.[111]

The concentration camp at Dachau, several miles outside of Munich, was one of the worst. Special Agent Earnest T. Gearhart from the 45th CIC Detachment was detailed to aid the International Prisoners Committee that was investigating the situation at Dachau. The order, given by the Division G2, was for Agent Gearhart to determine the status of prisoners being held by American authorities and to classify these prisoners for future disposition.

There were already CIC agents from the 970th Detachment at the camp when Gearhart arrived on 22 June and, in a special report, the 45th CIC agent had some choice remarks to make:

"There seems to be something fishy about the set-up there at DACHAU. I haven't been able yet to determine whether it's just the normal jealousies that arise between different armies, or 'brass politics,' or CIC vs. CIC criticism, or just a plain snafued situation arising out of lack of continuity and liaison of all agencies that may have had anything to do at the Camp. I don't believe there is anything critically wrong in the whole set-up; there's just been a lot of bucking back and forth with nobody taking the ball."[112]

A great deal of the CIC confusion stemmed from the failure of the Seventh Army command to settle on one group to carry out the investigations. Agents of the 307th CIC were the first on the scene and were soon followed by a specially designated team from the overhead 970th CIC. In this change of responsibility, there was a total neglect of transferring reports, and the new detachment had no basis for continuing the investigations. Resentment was voiced that Gearhart had been sent in to "check on their work," and the 45th CIC Agent found himself limited in "sources of information and cooperation."

Despite the problems, Agent Gearhart was able to effect liaison "of a rather unsatisfactory nature" with the CIC team at the Camp. The Commanding Officer of the Camp informed Gearhart that there were still people in the Bunker and that he

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111 Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, New York, 1951, Henry Holt p. 539.

112 Memo for the Officer in Charge from S/A Gearhart, Subj: Interim Reports on investigation of Prisoners in Bunker at Dachau Concentration Camp, dtd 22 June 1945 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

wanted CIC to evacuate this area and process the prisoners as quickly as possible. Another high-ranking officer, representing the Commanding General of the Dachau area, held views almost diametrically opposite. He felt that there was nothing unhealthy in the situation at the Bunker and that charges against prisoners and channeling of foreign nationality prisoners back to their respective countries could be handled for the most part by the International Prisoners Committee. But this man failed to specify who would deal with the German and Austrian prisoners--CIC or the War Crimes Commission.

Agent Gearhart and another CIC man started the task of compiling individual cards on each prisoner found at the Bunker and gathering all information that records in the Camp revealed. On 23 June, Agent Gordon B. McPherson relieved Gearhart at Dachau and continued the processing and investigations until 29 June.

A total of eighty-one Prisoners, most of whom were accused of brutality towards other inmates of the camp, were screened. Fifty-seven of these were designated either for transfer to their own governments for trial or for investigation by the War Crimes Commission, the Dachau MG and CIC units; or for review by the Dachau Camp Review board. The 45th CIC Agents had managed in a single week to eliminate a great deal of the mismanagement that had existed among the authorities at Dachau.[113]

"The Butcher of Dachau"

The barbed wire enclosure at Dachau did not contain the whole story of the atrocities that had been committed at the Concentration Camp. Scattered among the inhabitants of occupied Germany were the guards and executioners who had helped make Dachau a place of bones.

On 7 May, Agents of the 45th CIC Detachment arrested who had been denounced as an executioner at Dachau. had been sent to Dachau in 1940 as a prisoner, but in August 1943, he applied for the job of cremating corpses "in order to get more food." He received the position in the crematory, and gradually began to acquire other duties such as whipping inmates

113 From Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, from Special Agent Earnest T. Gearhart, Subj: Interim Report on Investigation of Prisoners in Bunker at Dachau Concentration Camp, dtd 22 June 1945 (UNCLASSIFIED); and Report to AC of S, G2, 45th Inf Div from 45th CIC Detachment, Subj: Classification of Prisoners at Dachau Camp, dtd 29 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL), (both in Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

CONFIDENTIAL

during Gestapo interrogations, and hanging captives. declared, "In the beginning I was very satisfied with my work as I had only to burn the corpses," but he claimed that his other activities were not so pleasing. Reports from prisoners who had known and his brutality failed to support his professed dislike of the additional tasks. He acquired professional ability in hanging prisoners in record time, averaging twenty to twenty-five executions per week. His zeal for the positions he held was exemplified in one instance when he first hanged three inmates, removed the ropes after twenty minutes and placed the corpses in kneeling positions like marionettes before giving them a violent kick. Nicknamed the "butcher of Dachau," was denounced to the CIC Agents as a sadist, a coward, and a bloodthirsty individual who had no compunctions about his grisly employment.[114]

Remorse of Fear

On 12 June, 45th CIC Agent MacPherson arrested a man accused of mistreating an American pilot who had parachuted into the Munchen-Solin area in July 1944.

Transported to CIC headquarters in Munich, was confronted by a detailed interrogation from Agents Fausto Molinet and Herman Kristeler. He admitted to having mishandled the downed flier by beating him in the back until the pilot was in bloody condition.

After receiving confession, the Agents turned him over to a photographer in the building to have his picture taken for the records. On the way back from the photographer's studio to the interrogation room, broke without warning and dashed out a window, plunging to the ground two floors below. He was removed from the scene to a nearby hospital in critical condition.

The CIC Agents had taken all possible precautions to prevent a suicide attempt to stripping of a considerable number of sleeping tablets, a knife, and glasses. But the prisoner, overcome either by remorse in having his past crimes brought in the open or fear for his future, had managed to foil his captors' precautions.[115]

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114 Rpt to AC of S, G2, 45th CIC Det, Subj, Executioner in the Dachau Concentration Camp," dtd 13 May 45 (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

115 Report from 45th CIC Detachment to AC of S, G2, 45 Inf Div, Subj: dtd 12 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).

5th CIC Detachment Winds Up Operations

The month of June in the Munich area was marked by a decreasing number of Occupation problems for the 45th CIC Agents. Collection of former Nazis was proceeding at a steady rate, and civil disturbances such as looting had decreased with the evacuation of a large number of displaced persons. Traces of Wehrwolf activity were reported; some informants found threatening messages glued to their doors. But no overt action against civilians aiding the Allies was reported.

Military security during this period was considered excellent. The troops of the 45th Division remained wary of all Germans "since the testimony of Dachau was witnessed by them first hand."[116]

In the middle of June, the detachment headquarters were moved to Maisach, and one month later the unit was transferred to an assembly area in France for return to the United States. The 45th CIC Detachment, which had been activated in Italy, landed in Southern France, and had fought with the Division through Rhineland and Central Europe had now completed its European operations.[117]

79th CIC in Czechoslovakia

During June, the 79th CIC Detachment moved with the Division reassigned from Northern Germany to the Third Army's area of occupation in western Czechoslovakia. This new location brought the agents into an area heavily infested with former Nazis; it also afforded them an opportunity to operate close to the forces of the Soviet Union.

Working with agents of the 1st Division CIC, the 79th CIC agents, during June, apprehended a total of 1349 automatic arrest personalities as follows:

Civilian Automatic Arrests, all nationalities.....290
Wehrmacht Automatic Arrests, all nationalities.....384
WAFFEN SS Automatic Arrests, all nationalities.....250
WAFFEN SS Totenkopfverband Automatic Arrests, all nats.....399

116 45th CIC Detachment, Monthly CI Periodic Report Nr 1 for the month of June 1945, dtd 18 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 45121, Kansas City Records Center).
117 Historical Data card, 45th CIC Detachment, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Organization and Directory Service, AGD, The Pentagon).

Female Automatic Arrests--SS Women..... 7
Political.....19

Among this large group of arrestees was an American from Chicago who had returned to Belgium, the land of his parents, prior to the war, and who claimed that his only alternative to joining the SS was shipment to a concentration camp.

CIC Agents found several procedures effective in their search for former SS men. Hospital patients were subjected to careful scrutiny, and suspects were examined for blood type tattoing that could usually be found under the arms. In many instances, these tattoos were partially removed or fairly faint as a result of amateurish operations. The Agents also encountered numerous cases of forged identity documents, but the round up continued at a steady pace.[118]

Is It Authentic?

During June, 79th CIC Agents received a translation of an instruction sheet supposedly issued by the Russians to members of a select group of their operatives in Germany a short time prior to the end of the war. According to the German who supplied the translation, the original instruction paper was written in Russian but had been lost.

The paper set forth a model of organization. Russian agents were ordered to carry out Soviet agitation in "such a way that resistance by the Germans becomes purposeless. They were directed to stimulate sabotage efforts in the camps of eastern workers, give aid to Red Army parachutists, liberate POW, procure weapons, and take other steps to guarantee a successful insurrection against the Germans. The goal was clear: "We won't have to rule for more than a week as the Red Army will be there by that time. We will have smoothed their path so that they can occupy as much of Germany as possible."

But the portion of the letter that most interested the CIC agents was the concluding paragraph:

"Remember this: The English and Americans will be our enemies in the near future. We must not help them; we must beat them as far as possible. Only the one who conquers the greatest part of Germany is going to win the war. We are serving the toiling masses."

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118 Monthly Information Rpt from 79th CIC Det, dtd 1 Jul 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

The CIC agents who read this document could render no evaluation of this final paragraph. Whether the remark was a spurious statement composed by the Germans to promote anti-Russian feelings or whether it was an authentic translation of the original document was a matter for open speculation. The paper had been lost and only its recovery could have proved the accuracy of the version that CIC possessed.119

The "SS Zeppelin" Schools

Not all the efforts of the 79th CIC agents were directed to problems of the present. Upon receipt of information from the 516th CIC, the agents began on 21 June to investigate the history and operations of a former Nazi espionage unit known as the SS Zeppelin Schools.

One of these schools, located in Kynsvart, Czechoslovakia, had been opened in October 1944 as a military institution whose mission was kept secret. About forty Russian and Ukranian girls, some wearing Red Cross and Wehrmacht uniforms, attended the school, presumably to receive training in wireless transmission. In the opinion of CIC informants, the school was designed to develop low level agents to function behind Russian lines. But little was actually accomplished. The students, for the most part, were uneducated laborers from Russian lagers, and they failed to apply themselves seriously to training for espionage.

Further CIC investigations revealed other schools for training male agents to accomplish similar missions, but all the units of SS Zeppelin were dissolved prior to the arrival of the American troops.

Current Sabotage Efforts

The 79th CIC Agents also had to deal with a currently operating resistance group, designated as Organization SCHAEFER. This group was formed originally in Sudetenland to combat the return of the Czechs whom the Germans feared would exact revenge. Organization SCHAEFER was composed wholly of Nazi Party members, who were to be instructed by SS and other men experienced in the methods of propaganda and sabotage. The control of the SCHAEFER Group was delegated to a Kressleiter who had to designate a well hidden area in the vicinity where members could live and receive training.

The first known meeting of the group was on the night of

119 Monthly Information Rpt from 79th CIC Det, dtd 1 July 45 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

Hitler's death when the members gathered for a"pep talk." The entire organization was told to remain inactive until the sector had been occupied for several months. Then, after the initial caution of the occupying troops was relaxed, Organization SCHAEFER would be poised to strike. Direct cooperation betweer Wehrwolf and SCHAEFER forces was to be maintained; the crucial difference between the units being that SCHAEFER members were all adults.

Early in the Occupation, SCHAEFER and Wehrwolf signs appeared on sidewalks and walls in the towns within the division area. But during June and July, CIC arrested all known members of the organizations, and evidence of this subversive activity disappeared.

The Blood Type Tattooes

CIC Agents had arrested many suspected SS members and discovered partial eradications of the blood type tattooes that had been customarily inscribed under the trooper's arms. Rumors added to the CIC suspicions that these removals were being accomplished by former medics, and, on 10 July, the 79th CIC Agents conducted interrogations of all medical personnel within the 79th Division Concentration area. All doctors in the camp denied any knowledge of the operations having been performed.

The CIC Agents were not satisfied with the blanket denials. More extensive investigation indicated that a German medical officer in the camp, had performed such an operation on an SS man named whom CIC had under arrest. After re-interrogation, admitted that he had removed some tattooes but stated that was not one of his patients. The Agents continued to gather witnesses and informants until they had enough material to confront a third time.

This third investigation left with no alibi, and he confessed that the man was among those on whom he had operated. The doctor explained that when he made the incision to remove the tatto, he also cut into the outer side of the SS man's arm to give the impression that had been wounded. also admitted that he had falsified military records to remove all evidence of SS membership.

This confession along with the physical evidence in the person of the former SS man and the statements of witnesses provided CIC with enough material to recommend for Court

proceedings.

Capture in the Mountains

Immediately after the German surrender, rumors began to pour [illegible] 80th CIC offices in Vocklabruck, Austria, concerning the whereabouts of Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the Nazi chief of Gestapo, Kripo, and all German intelligence. Few Nazis were more important than Kaltenbrunner, who had worked his way up in the Nazi Party until 1943 when Himmler appointed him to succeed Heydrich "the Hangman" as the chief of the Gestapo, the Krip, and the SD. While Kaltenbrunner was in power the little known and super-secret SD was enlarged to include the Abwehr (German military intelligence) with a major mission of keeping "constant supervision of all open and secret enemies of Nazidom in closest cooperation with the Gestapo, its executive agency."

The rumors pointing to the hideout of Kaltenbrunner suggested that the arch-Nazi was somewhere in the area of Alt Aussee. Generally, this area was further delimited to the Totes Gebirge range of the Austrian Alps. On the morning of 11 May, [illegible] in Alt Aussee, came to the 80th CIC office with some startling information pertaining to a forester. Kaltenbrunner and his adjutant, Scheidel, along with two SS men, had been seen in a cabin at a spot [illegible] Wildensee which crowned the Totes Gebirge.

Agent Robert E. Matteson, who had previously captured and arrested Ernst Kaltenbrunner, hastily negotiated with [illegible] for a group of reliable mountain climbers to accompany him up to the cabin retreat. The Commander of the American Task Force in the area [illegible] agreed to supply a patrol of ten men and two officers to accompany the searchers.

Agent Matteson decided to wear native Austrian clothes with the intention of thereby facilitating the approach to the cabin and negotiation with the Nazi leader, hoping to capture Kaltenbrunner alive. Consultation with the Austrian guides led to the selection of midnight as the departure time. Three advantages were to be gained at this time: semi-darkness would prevail [illegible] arrival at the cabin (the trip was calculated to take five hours); the men would probably still be in bed; and there would be a hard crust of snow until approximately three hours after sunrise.

Information Rpt from Hq 79th CIC Det, dtd 1 Aug [illegible] (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

All four men were interrogated briefly. None admitted being either Kaltenbrunner or Scheidel, and Matteson had no concrete evidence to establish their identities. One man presented papers certifying that he was a Wehrmacht doctor by the name of Unterwegen; another brought forth papers that also seemed authentic.

At 0730, the patrol with its four prisoners started the long trek down the mountain, not certain if they had apprehended the persons whom they had sought. By 1130 the town of Alt Ausse was reached, and the party proceeded to the house of Scheidel. When they arrived, Frau Scheidel rushed out and planted a kiss on one of the men. This settled the identity of Scheidel; shortly after, Kaltenbrunner's mistress and other acquaintances identified the phony "Dr. Unterwegen" as the Intelligence Chief. But neither man was willing to admit his true identity until later in the day despite the conclusive evidence. Under renewed interrogation, Kaltenbrunner was confronted with a picture of his wife and two children which had been taken from his billfold. He then saw the futility of holding out further against the American interrogators. Kaltenbrunner's confession was followed by a similar statement from Scheidel, and the capture of "two of the three worst war criminals at that time still at large in Europe" was ended.[121]

83d CIC Detachment: Aid From Civilians

The agents of the 83d CIC Detachment were operating in the vicinity of Bad Harzburg when the Germans officially surrendered. At the time, the agents were responsible for security in the large area that had come under divisional control. The pressure of the tactical campaign had lifted, and counterintelligence work assumed a long-range aspect, with the detachment reporting that it had now found it possible "to spend more time and to exercise a greater discrimination in investigating cases."

The detachment was bolstered by the addition of teams from the overhead 970th CIC, and the divisonal area was partitioned into six sectors with a CIC team assigned to each. Agents in these sectors cultivated their own informants and found generally that the civilian attitude was one of "reserved cooperation." Agents noted that the ordinary German civilian was willing, "temporarily at least," to cooperate in the apprehension of former political and Nazi Party leaders. Information concerning

121 Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, 80th CIC Detachment, from S/A Robert E. Matteson, Subj: The Capture of Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Nazi Chief of GESTAPO, KRIPO and all German Intelligence - and his Adjutant Scheidel, dtd 13 May 1945, (UNCLASSIFIED) (Box 25099, Kansas City Records Center).

such physical security targets as ammunition dumps and stores of grenades was easily obtained and, where records of interest to CIC had been found, there was no attempt by civilians to break into the sealed buildings. The 83d CIC attributed the favorable attitude of the civilians, in part, to the fact that no organized resistance movements had gained ground in the division area.

Military Government and Officers Pro Tem

Since the 83d Division area was crowded with towns, it became necessary to supplement the trained military government officials with officers from various tactical units. CIC received complete cooperation from these "pro tem" military government officers. Relatively permanent arrangements were made to regulate curfew hours and travel; at the start of the occupation, civilians were restricted to their homes between 2100 and 0500 hours and permitted to travel without passes only within their residential Kreis. Civilians living in the immediate area of a command post were ordered to move elsewhere, and all civilian access to critical military installations was denied.

Along the Border

On 13 June, the 83d Division officially relieved the 5th Infantry Division of occupational responsibilities in the Passau-Degendorf area, close by the German-Austrian and German-Czecholslovakian borders. This sector of Bavaria proved a hot bed of rumors, many of which were caused by the proximity of Russian and American forces. Citizens claimed that the area was to be relinquished to the Russians by 25 June, a rumor which persisted until after the expected date. The Germans also contended that the Russians and Americans would enter into conflict "in the near future."

Two of the attached CIC teams from the 970th CIC were assigned border patrol duties exclusively. The Austrian border control team made a detailed survey of the conditions existing along its sector and discovered that traffic consisted largely of three types of persons: Fronteliers, discharged German prisoners of War with appropriate papers, and groups of DP's who were being transported home under Military Government supervision. This survey revealed that mass screening of all the inhabitants would be impracticable.[122] But the CIC team selected appropriate points for screening personnel who were permitted to remain near the borders in areas designated as "prohibited."

122 Counter Intelligence Periodic Report (For the Period 13 June - 30 June 1945) from 83d CIC Detachment, dtd 10 July 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL)(Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

ırgermeisters in the border region helped in the compilation of omplete lists of the residents of the area. The team operating along the German-Austrian border received additional aid from the geography of their sector: he Danube and Inn Rivers formed part of the border and served as a natural protective barrier against any attempted crossing.

The Austrian border southwest of the Danube River was well sealed. Roads were closed either by physical barriers or blocks manned by personnel of the artillery units in the area. The port of entry at Passau was examined in detail and found to pose a serious frontalier problem. Commanders of the border CIC teams recommended that all frontaliers be given special authorization so that they could be checked by guards manning the control points.[123]

The portion of the Austrian border running from the Danube northeast to the Czech border opposite the Russian occupation zone was laced by nine principal roads, all of which had to be closed to unauthorized persons. But complete "sealing off" was made extremely difficult because of the numerous trails and footpaths that crossed the border. CIC agents developed informants in the area to serve as a further check on the existence or non-existence of illegal border crossers.

The control problem along the Czech border was less difcult. Occasional illegal crossings occurred, but all violators who were apprehended were turned over to CIC. If screening proved negative, the offenders were sent to Military Government for disposition. Regular crossings were permitted to frontaliers whom local guards allowed to pass either upon personal recognition or the possession of frontalier identification issued by the local unit.[124]

After more than two months of border control measures and improvisations, the commander of the 83d CIC detachment presented a recapitulation of the situation in the critical area under CIC supervision.

The segment of the border fronting on the Russian zone in Austria was found still to be a source of considerable trouble. Both the Austrians and Russians appeared to be taking every

123 Weekly Intelligence Report from Hq 83d Inf Div, dtd 2 July 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

124 Weekly Intelligence Report from Hq 83d Infantry Division dtd 9 July 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

means available to shunt discharged Wehrmacht soldiers across to Germany without regard for the existing regulation which closed the border to all traffic except frontaliers. In one instance, a group of three hundred discharged Germans were apprehended by an American patrol. They had been told by the Russians to cross at a point where there were no American guards. As a temporary expedient, the American forces made arrangements to accept the Germans in exchange for three hundred Hungarians that had been stranded in Germany.

The confusion befogging the handling of these German soldiers was attributed to a failure of higher headquarters in both the Russian and US camps to disseminate information concerning the exchange of nationals to the units actually engaged in the transfers. CIC suggested that, since the soldiers were given bona fide Russian discharge papers, they could revert to American control while still in Austria. Such a plan could be implemented by proper liaison between the Russians and the US Occupation forces in Linz.

Some coordination did exist with the Russian troops along the border. Twelve guard posts were manned jointly by Russian and American personnel, but Austrian burgermeisters managed to add to the confusion by issuing passes to Germans without notifying the Russians. When the recipients of these phoney passes arrived at the guard posts, the Americans had no choice but to refuse them entry to Germany and turn them over to the Russians.

Frontaliers in this sector posed another thorny problem. Since there had been no uniform pass developed for all persons who needed to cross the border as part of their daily activities, the approximately four hundred frontaliers had to be screened by CIC in coordination with Military Government.

The situation along the segment of the 83d Division's border facing US occupation troops in Austria was far simpler. There were no international difficulties here, and the aforementioned geographical features kept crossings at a minimum. At Simbach, Germany, an Austrian named Alfred Watzinger was arrested for operating an illegal ferry across the Inn River; and, at Passau, two Germans were arrested for attempting to smuggle mail from Czechoslovakia across the nub of German territory to Austria. Both men were sentenced by Military Government to six days imprisonment.

Controlling the Division sector, the southern Czechoslovakia-German border was apparently the least troublesome. The only two recognized ports of entry were guarded on one side by personnel of the Czech Army and on the other, by personnel of the 83d Division. The few frontaliers in the region were allowed to

cross freely, as were the small number of German dischargees if they possessed British, French or German discharge papers. All other persons were turned back at the border.

In addition to the two official ports of entry, there were about twenty guard posts along the Czechoslovakian border on subsidiary trails and roads. The few persons captured trying to enter Germany illegally were turned over to Military Government for trial; the usual sentence imposed amounted to a fine of 100 marks and return to Czechoslovakia.

Reviewing the border situation, Captain Oliver A. Vietor of the 83d CIC Detachment recommended two measures that he felt would effectively seal the border: the dissemination of clear and definite instructions to all guards manning border posts and the issuance of a standard pass to all frontaliers which would remove any doubt whether an individual had the right to cross from one country into another.[125] By 1 September, Captain Vietor was able to report that "on the whole frontier security .....was satisfactory."[126]

CIC Along the Northern Czechoslovakian Border

The CIC Border Control Team assigned to the northernmost stretch of the common border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia was composed of 12 agents drawn from the 970th CIC, the linguist pool of the American Division in the area and new CIC arrivals in the European Theater. The team was substantially aided by the division commander who placed virtually all the division's services at CIC's request. This high degree of cooperation was prompted by the fact that the division was entrusted primarily with maintaining the security of the border, and the CIC team was placed under the operational direction of the divisional G2.

The terrain that CIC had to control had no commanding natural features to delineate the boundary between the two countries. There were many open fields through which the border ran a jagged path. Only occasionally did a stone marker or a brief distance of fencing serve to point out the division. The area had a history of petty smuggling from one country to the other, since civilians had little difficulty in crossing the line.

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125 Weekly Counter Intelligence Report from 83d CIC Detachment, to AC of S, G2, 83 Inf Div, dtd 25 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

126 Weekly Counter Intelligence Report from 83d CIC Detachment to AC of S, G2, 83d Inf Div, dtd 1 September 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center).

When the CIC team arrived in Wieden, the agents quickly selected positions for establishing check points. Roads, paths, and towns were the principal spots to be guarded and initially this scutiny was to be airtight. Orders from higher headquarters stated that everyone attempting to cross the border would be stopped and turned back. The CIC agents were too few in number to man the check points, but all offenders caught by the border patrols were brought to the CIC office for questioning. CIC found that in order to keep a close control of the border, it was necessary to supplement the stationary check posts with roving patrols that cruised along the border in jeeps, keeping an outlook for violators.

A week after the original non-crossing order had been issued, CIC was informed that frontaliers who had daily business that required their presence on both sides of the border would be permitted to travel back and forth.

Besides the supervision of border controls, the CIC team was charged with clearing officials in towns along the border for Military Government positions. Lists of suspects sent down from higher headquarters generally proved helpful to the Agents. Occasionally the demands of security caused an upset to the community. In one town, the only doctor available for miles around was on a suspect list received by CIC, and the agents had no recourse except to remove the man, leaving the area without a physician.

After the initial weeks of occupation, border control work became routine. Coordination with Czech Army units patrolling the opposite side of the line was easily effected. There were no insurmountable language problems since almost all the Czech guards spoke German. But, in July, the Russians arrived to occupy the Czechoslovakian area across the US Zone. Although it was not until August that the Russians made themselves particularly evident, certain immediate effects of their occupation were felt.

Sudeten Germans who had been living in Czechoslovakia decided that it was high time to return to Germany, and the Czechoslovakians were eager for these people to move. CIC interposed no restrictions to the re-entry of the Germans provided that they could prove their citizenship. Individuals who lacked passes and "suspicious acting" civilians were detained for careful interrogation.

For the most part, CIC control of the border from May to November 1945 was unmarked by major incidents. Paul Braden, one of the agents who served on the CIC team, remarked, in retrospect

that "border control was a good mission for CIC. It required men intelligent and flexible enough to use their own judgment."[127]

103d CIC Detachment: Suggested Training for the Occupation

The German surrender occurred while the 103d Infantry division was carrying out semi-occupational duties in Innsbruck, Austria. The 103d CIC agents remained at Innsbruck, although 10 of the 14 men were transferred on paper to the 970th "slash team"88. Under command of Lieutenant Dugald W. Hudson, Team 970/88 and the 103d CIC acted as a single unit operationally.

Lieutenant Hudson immediately found that his agents could profit from additional training and drew up a list of suggested training procedures. He felt that all non-linguists should be given a six weeks' intensive course in written and oral German. Although some of the agents picked up the language while carrying out their assignments, they did not learn the grammar and could not become reasonably fluent linguists in this manner.

The detachment commander also noted that the "average agent does not have much information at his fingertips regarding Nazi organizations and organizational structure, especially regarding the German Intelligence Service." As a remedy for this lack of knowledge, 103d CIC agents were given reading material on the German organizations and were tested periodically to insure that the material had been studied.

Shortcomings in professional knowledge of "investigative techniques and equipment" were apparent among the agents. Lieutenant Hudson suggested that at least one man from each CIC detachment in Germany take a training course in installing and operating speaker phones and successfully installing wire taps. Other technical training that was considered important involved the use of cameras with telescopic lens, a familiarization course in the classification of fingerprints, examination for secret writing on documents and comparison of handwriting for the purpose of making identifications.

In making these suggestions, Lieutenant Hudson was coming to grips with an important problem: the adjustment of men used to performing investigations "on the run" to the careful procedures of occupation investigations. To supplement the additional training of his agents, Lieutenant Hudson recommended that the TOE be enlarged to include civilian type vehicles "due to the fact that military vehicles are very conspicuous when used on certain missions where discretion is necessary," a speaker phone, and additional hand cuffs.[128]

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127 Interview with former S/A Paul R. Braden, Shely, Ohio, at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, New York, 5 August 1955.

128 CIC Monthly Information Report from 103d CIC Detachment, dtd 1 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL)(Box 25096, Kansas City Records Center).

The Case of the Threatening Notes

On 26 July, an Agent of the 103d CIC was faced with a situation that required exercising his best investigative abilities. Tacked up next to the billboards displaying the military government rules and regulations for the town of Gennach were eight to ten handwritten notes stating that certain CIC informants were traitors, low grade persons, whores and swine.

The investigating agent hastily placed the entire town under a strict curfew with the cooperation of Military Government. He then began to question an 18-year old boy who had first brought attention to the notes by telling the agent that there had been a threatening message pinned on the door of his family's house. The agent found no reason why the boy, a former Hitler Jugend member, or his family should have been threatened. But comparison of the youth's handwriting with the script on the notes eliminated the possibility that the boy himself had written the notes in an effort to confuse CIC.

The CIC agent brought the notes to the local school teacher who examined them and concluded that they had been composed by a young person, probably a teenager. The letters were almost drawn, which ruled out the likelihood of composition by an adult who would be prone to write more hurriedly and with more individuality than was displayed in the script on the notes.

Fifty young men from the town were soon given handwriting tests. Not one of the specimens matched the handwriting on the notes. But the CIC Agent did not admit defeat. The following day, as he left the site of the billboards, the agent noticed a young lad who lowered his head when the Agent glanced at him. The Agent crossed the street towards the youth who started to walk away hastily. This heightened suspicion, and the agent decided to question the boy.

After a brief interrogation, the agent determined that this boy, another former Hitler Jugend member, was a friend of the youth who had first drawn CIC attention to the notes. When asked to provide a sample of his handwriting, the boy wrote in Latin letters. The Agent decided to let the case wait for several days.

The boy was later retested on his handwriting and, caught unawares, composed the sample in his usual German script. Many of the words and letters checked with the letters on the denouncing notes. The boy was questioned at length without success, but three days in jail and close interrogation drew out the admission that he had composed the notes. His friend, the

youth who had reported the incident, had posted the notes, carefully remembering to place one on his own house to serve as a "blind." Both the boys were turned over to Military Government for disposition.[129]

Trapping a Black Marketeer

The urgency behind Lieutenant Hudson's need for civilian vehicles was demonstrated in the investigation of Joseph Weis, a German who had been heard to make derogatory remarks about the Americans. In order to make the investigation as detailed and discreet as possible, a German-speaking agent was equipped with civilian clothes and a civilian car. It was learned that Weis had been selling black market gasoline, and the best means of striking up an acquaintance with the man seemed to be by posing as a prospective buyer. The agent followed this course of action. When encountered by the agent, Weis was extremely cautious and questioned the undercover agent at length about his previous history. The agent, who had formerly served as a POW interrogator before joining CIC, had an extensive knowledge of enemy order of battle and was able to concoct a likely account of activities as a member of the Wehrmacht. He also produced a discharge paper as authentication. Weis fell for the cover story.

While Weis and the agent were conversing, an American soldier approached the German. Weis procured some gasoline from this soldier and immediately sold it to the Agent. The conversation between the two men was then resumed. Before leaving, the Agent had obtained enough information from Weis to show that he was not really anti-American, but "merely a pessimistic sort and of no counterintelligence interest, having joined the Party in 1942 to save his hotel business." Since CIC was not concerned with black market matters at this time, the case was turned over to Military Government.[130]

No More Civilian Cars

Although the use of a civilian car had aided the covert agent in effecting his disguise as a German, this was one of the final times that a 103d Agent was permitted such a vehicle. Lieutenant Weimer, the new commanding officer, reported at the end of July that "the problem of using civilian cars has been cleared up by the Army order forbidding their use. The division commander has ordered that all civilian cars be turned in and this order specifically included CIC."

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129 Monthly Information Report from 103d CIC Detachment, dtd 1 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

130 Ibid

There was good reason for the 103d CIC Agents to find this prohibition a severe curb on their operations. For several months, Agents dressed in civilian clothes, driving civilian cars, and carrying German discharge papers had circulated in the towns in the division area posing as natives. They had been able to keep their true identities well hidden and were always believed to be Germans. The most successful technique for gathering local rumors and sentiments was to pick up hitch-hikers along the road and engage them in conversation. At other times, an undercover agent would obtain ration stamps at a Military Government office and, while eating in a local restaurant, strike up conversations. Beer halls, barber shops, and street cars were also utilized for this type of news gathering. But the ban on CIC use of civilian vehicles was feared by the 103d CIC as a serious curtailment of these profitable undercover ventures.131

131 Monthly Information Report from 103d CIC Detachment, dtd 1 August 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL). (Kansas City Records Center).

Chapter 3

CIC IN THE NORTH

CIC detachments that were attached to American forces which were mopping up in northern regions of Germany remained in this sector for the most part until the boundaries of the British Zone of Occupation were fixed and US troops within this area were transferred or redeployed. The United States did retain occupation responsibilities in and around the port of Bremerhaven, a sector designated as the Bremen Enclave since it stretched southward to include the city of Bremen.

29th CIC Detachment

On 19 May 1945, when the 29th Infantry Division was assigned occupational duties in the city of Bremen and vicinity, the 29th CIC Detachment under command of Captain Ellis O. Mayfield accompanied the combat troops. Agents were assigned down to Regimental level and immediately began the task of apprehending the wanted persons in their areas.

To aid in the CIC mission, MII personnel were attached to each team, bringing the overall strength of the detachment to four officers, seven agents and seven attached personnel.

At the outset, the most pressing problem was to set up a reliable informant system which would keep the detachment aware of activities within the area at all times, and to aid in the apprehension of persons in automatic arrest categories. Many Germans, eager to associate with the Allied occupation, appeared at CIC offices to volunteer information. To the agents fell the task of weeding out the opportunists from among the people who actually wanted to help the occupying forces and work for the future of Germany.

The area proved to be saturated with personalities of counterintelligence interest, but locating them was a far harder problem than merely knowing about them. Since many of the refugees who had been bombed out of their homes had moved to farms and small villages where they were not known, CIC requested refugee lists from all the burgermeisters to enable agents to check the names against available black lists.

Since the area encompassed by the Bremen Enclave Military District had been liberated by British forces that failed to keep records of investigations among the civilian population, CIC Agents had to start operations without prior information.

Each team maintained card indexes of personalities in their respective areas, giving them fingertip knowledge of the trustworthy and unscrupulous civilians around them.

The 29th CIC Detachment held firm to a policy that prohibited Agents from revealing themselves as members of a "Geheimstaatspolezei" (Secret Police). The men were instructed to introduce themselves as representatives of the American Occupational Authority and no more. But despite the efforts to cloak the true CIC mission, the public soon became aware of the detachment's aims. This knowledge, contrary to previous theories, failed to hamper the work of the Agents.[132]

Where to Find the Nazis

SS men attempting to conceal their identities by wearing civilian clothes frequently confessed when confronted with an intense CIC interrogation. Nazi party leaders were often uncovered after Party lists were confiscated; the German penchant for neat orderly records proved valuable to CIC time and again.

There was no particular stratum of society that CIC could isolate as largely responsible for carrying out the programs of the Hitler regime, nor could the blame be traced to only a few doorsteps. Agents of the 29th CIC included among their arrestees a physician and nerve specialist who was believed to have been responsible for the extermination of patients in an asylum; a former member of the embassy in Rome who was considered a "fanatical Nazi;" Bremen's chief salesman of "Kultur Propaganda;" a school teacher and organist who had been a Party group leader; the chief cook for IG Farben Works who had been denounced as a brutal guard for the SS; a female SD agent; and a butcher who had beaten a captured airman. By the middle of June, 175 persons had been arrested or detained by the CIC Agents, almost all on incontrovertible evidence.

Each arrest was potentially a clue to further arrests. A captured Gestapo official turned over a list of his agents to the CIC interrogators, who forwarded the document to the Counter Intelligence Branch, G2, of the division where the personalities could be indexed for wide distribution among American counter-intelligence units.

Other names were brought to CIC attention as a result of

132 Report from CIC Detachment 29, Detachment History During Operations in the Bremen End, dtd 23 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL), Box #25094, Kansas City Records Center)

planned investigations. On 16 June, agents entered the Marine Lazarett, a hospital in Wesermunde, and discovered that many of the patients were people in the arrest category. They had been issued false Soldbuchs to disguise their past records.

Other CIC Duties

Even as the CIC agents were occupied in uprooting the most fanatic remnants of the Hitler regime, other security missions were delegated to the detachment. Civilians had to be cleared to work on military installations and vital civil structures such as grain elevators; surveys were required of telephone systems essential for communication among civilian officials; and countersabotage surveys for the regiments serving within the 29th Division had to be accomplished to prevent hostile Germans from venting their rancor upon US installations and equipment.

The Watch for Resistance

A major CIC concern was keeping track of the various organizations, resistance and pro-Allied, that had sprung up in the Bremen area following the German surrender. Most notorious of the resistance groups was the Wehrwolf. Many instances of this organization's activity were reported but CIC investigations pointed consistently to a single conclusion: None of the aims of the Wehrwolf had been carried out, and there was no present indication of underground activity.

CIC also found danger signals being flashed from another quarter. The Bremen area was noticeably infiltrated by Communists, and reports were delivered to CIC offices of several well organized groups and their leaders who were interested in promoting Communist political ideas and policies. Agents conducted complete investigations of all these cases and made sure that the offenders complied with the Allied Military Government regulations concerning political activity.[133]

29th CIC Detachment continued to apprehend Nazi "big shots" and "small fry" through the month of July at a rapid rate. Denunciations by responsible civilians of the most dangerous individuals provided CIC with the bulk of names, but records and confessions obtained from interrogations still could be exploited.[134]

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133 Report from CIC Detachment 29, Detachment History During Operations in the Bremen End, dtd 23 June 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Box #25094, Kansas City Records Center)

134 Personality Index from Hq 29th CIC Detachment, 19 May to 31 July 1945 (UNCLASSIFIED), Folder 18, Box 25094, (Kansas City Records Center)

On 21 October, after six months of service in the Bremen area, the 29th CIC Detachment was formally inactivated, and its members were assigned to various teams operating out of the 970th CIC.[135]

79th CIC Detachment: Atrocity Uncovered

Members of the 79th CIC Detachment under command of 1st Lt Richard M Gonzales who had followed their division from Alsace through Belgium and Holland during the early months of 1945 [136] themselves located in the vicinity of Dortmund for the first months of occupation duties before they moved to the Third Army area in Czechoslavakia.

On 10 May, the day of the German capitulation, 79th CIC Agents operating in Bochum heard that the bodies of eight women and six men had been discovered in a nearby bomb crater. Investigation disclosed that the victims all were Russians who had been executed by members of the Volkssturm. The CIC Agents acted quickly and soon had gathered a total of eleven persons, one of whom was the man who had given the order for the massacre and three of whom were among the actual murderers.

The interrogation of a former Kriminalkommisar of the Gestapo, shed light on the cause of the atrocity. Orders had been given to execute all foreign workers who were under investigation before the arrival of Americans to eliminate the problem of transporting the prisoners to the rear.

also stated that all Gestapo personnel had been provided with false identity papers, a fact which was proven on 14 May when Agents of the 79th CIC reported that they had apprehended and forwarded through Prisoner of War channels 46 Gestapo agents. Most of these Gestapo agents possessed white Kennkartes, and they had been instructed to list their professions as merchants. Among the arrestees were some personnel who had participated in a mass killing of political prisoners in Dortmund just prior to the Allied liberation of the city.

The Sterilization Courts

Another aspect of the Nazi regime was revealed to 79th CIC agents with the apprehension of on 18 May in the town of Frendenberg. When the "Law of Heridity" was promulgated by Hitler in 1935, had recommended that special courts be established to order sterilization for various categories of physically and mentally unfit persons.

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135 Historical Data Card, 29th CIC Detachment, (UNCLASSIFIED)
136 Ibid

CONFIDENTIAL

acknowledged his own role in the formation of these courts and admitted that he had served as a special judge in this pseudo-judicial system. He further stated that political prisoners may have been sterilized by SS Doctors in concentration camps, since the courts usually complied with the recommendations of these practitioners. Following the interrogation, was forwarded to a POW camp for internment.

A Method for Snaring SS Men

On 28 May, Agent Herbert Boksen, in a routine check in a bank in the town of Neheim-Husten, discovered that a part of the salary of every SS man from the town had been credited to his bank account, complete with rank. This seemed to be a standard SS policy. From the examination of other papers held in the bank, Agent Boksen surmised that it would be possible to obtain the station and organization responsible for the deposits.[137]

CIC in Bremerhaven

In the key port cities of Bremerhaven and Bremen CIC agents functioned along with security personnel from the US Navy. A port CIC detachment, consisting of two officers and eight agents, was at work in Bremerhaven; while five officers and fifteen agents handled security in and around the docks of Bremen.

Among the critical matters affecting the security of dock areas were the following:

1. Physical barriers and dock perimeter fencing
2. Adequacy of gate and perimeter control personnel
3. System for issue of passes
4. Shore leave policy
5. Control of harbor craft
6. Control of fishing
7. Countersabotage precautions [138]

Until the fall of 1945, shipping operations in the port of Bremerhaven were extremely limited, and CIC faced few problems of travel control. A tight check on all fishing vessel personnel was maintained, since the boats often remained at sea for several days at a time.

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137 Monthly Information Rpt from Hq 79th CIC Det, dtd 1 June 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL), (Box 25095, Kansas City Records Center)

138 Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 2, dtd 24 July 1945, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The fisheries were located on the north side of the Bremerhaven harbor, and CIC worked with the German harbor captain to maintain security of the area and the fishermen. During the early days of the Occupation, many Germans, not knowing what to expect from the Allied forces and "sick of the war and its aftermath," tried to leave the country. One of the means most accessible to these would-be refugees could have been the fishing boats. CIC could not prevent the boats from sailing, since fish became the main source of food for the hungry populace, but they could and did establish controls. Each boat was inspected at the fishery, and only a limited number of persons were cleared to sail on the vessel. A bulletin board containing the names of all persons allowed to man the fishing boats was maintained, and a careful record was kept of the individuals out in the fishing waters at all times. When the fishermen returned, they were required to report to the office and have their names checked off.

When a fisherman signed out, he had to indicate the length of time he expected to be gone. If CIC discovered that a vessel was more than 18 hours overdue, the Agents were prepared to dispatch search draft. But there were no major security breaches. At one time, when a fishing boat failed to report in at the required time, CIC sent out a patrol after the vagrant, but discovered that no intent to elude the authorities was involved. The pilot was a "wrong way Corrigan" who had become hopelessly lost in the waters of the North Seas.[139]

In addition to scrutinizing persons boarding and leaving the fishing craft, a Navy patrol spotchecked the vessels for proper papers as they sailed out the Weser River.[140]

Protecting the "Europa"

One of the most important "installations" at Bremerhaven during the summer of 1945 was the one-time German luxury liner, "Europa," which was undergoing repairs on a dry dock prior to re-commissioning as a troop transport for the US Navy. A CIC Agent was given the specific assignment of handling any counter-intelligence matters that might arise in connection with the liner. So important was the vessel considered that as the date for its trial run neared, a Marine detachment of two officers

139 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kansas, at the NCICA convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 August 1955.

140 Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 3, dtd 2 August 1945, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

and ninety-six men was established as a guard.[141]

Late in August a series of fires broke out on the "Europa." Sabotage was immediately suspected, but investigation revealed that they had been started by a "psychopathic US Navy seaman," and were not of counterintelligence interest.[142]

Despite rumors that circulated claiming the "Europa" would never sail from Bremerhaven, on 11 September the ship departed from Southampton, England, to be used in the redeployment of US Forces, as scheduled.[143] But the apprehension later proved valid when the "Europa" failed to perform as a fully seaworthy craft.[144]

Security of the Dock Area

Since the port of Bremerhaven handled many thousands of tons of American military supplies and lend lease food, security of the dock area and the harbor remained vital. A perimeter fence fifteen feet high was constructed around the docks, and lookout posts were set up at frequent intervals.

In the beginning weeks of Occupation, control of the Bremerhaven port was divided between the British, the US Navy, and the CIC. Responsibilities were eventually delineated among the agencies at work. The British, for example, maintained supervision over the German Navy in clearing the harbor of mines, but CIC handled the security of the laborers from an office established in the old customs building. Before a dock worker was permitted to begin his day's work, he had to clear through the CIC office enroute to the dock. All dock workers filed Fragebogen with CIC; and insofar as possible, CIC attempted to judge a person's suitability for work on the basis of "who he was rather than whom he had been forced to be." Almost all the laborers had been at least nominal Nazis during the Hitler regime. CIC had to determine which were nominal Nazis and which had joined the Party out of sincere conviction.

141 Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 6, dtd 23 August 1945, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

142 Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 8, dtd 6 September 1945, from Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

143 Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 10, dtd 20 September 1945, from Hq USFET Office of the AC of S, G2 (SECRET), (Central Records Facility).

144 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kansas, at Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 August 1955.

The 970th CIC Team assigned to Bremerhaven also was responsible for selecting municipal government officials and for general security in the port city. Although agents of the 29th CIC were also present for several weeks in Bremerhaven, their duties revolved primarily around the 29th Infantry Division, leaving the small band of agents in the port detachment to handle the CIC mission in Bremerhaven without assistance.

For the most part, the Port Security Detachment had to proceed by trial and error. They received no specific directives or card files, although their reports were sent to the G2, 29th Infantry Division. Since there was so little coordination of the port detachment with 970th CIC, supplies, paychecks, and other administrative matters were handled personally by one of the agents who travelled to Frankfurt from time to time.

Personnel from the port security team were rotated back to the States during the summer and fall of 1945, and the individuals sent to replace them were often picked up at replacement depots. Some of the worst of these hastily recruited fill-ins were characterized by one CIC agent as "drunken no-goods, generally lacking qualifications for CIC and bent on having a good time for themselves."

Not until November 1945, when CIC in Germany was re-organized on a regional basis, were some of the serious liaison and administrative problems ironed out. Up to this time, the port security detachment had been on its own to "sell itself" to local commanders. Public relations was, for this period, one of the biggest problems that CIC had to overcome. But when Bremen was designated a region and Bremerhaven a sub-region, administrative and operational matters were given some direction. Channels of communication were opened, and the port security agents began to fit into the overall picture of American counter-intelligence in Europe.[145]

The Man from "British Intelligence"

One day, late in November 1945, the Military Government public safety officer at Wesermunde told members of a nearby CIC team that an automobile assigned by the civilian motor pool to an operative of British Intelligence had not been returned. It was already several days overdue.

Special Agent James M. Olsen and other CIC agents went to the motor pool where records showed that the missing vehicle, a Mercedes, had been charged to a

145 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita Kansas, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N. Y. on 17 August 1955.

A local address in Wesermunde was given as his current residence. A Military Policeman stationed at the motor pool said that had been accompanied by a girl on several previous occasions when he had requisitioned a vehicle.

The agents checked the address that had given and established it as the home of a family named the parents of the girl with whom the intelligence man was travelling. Questioning the girl's parents disclosed that had been living in Wesermunde for about three weeks before his disappearance. They knew nothing of the whereabouts of their daughter and willingly supplied a picture of the 19-year old girl who appeared to be an attractive brunette. Further conversation with the indicated that they were convinced that was working in the area for British Intelligence and was a man of importance.

The agents next checked at the British liaison offices in Bremen where they were assured that Intelligence had no man of that name or alias on any assignment, open or covert, in the area.

Since the family had stated that moved continually in his duties from Hamburg to Bremen and Wesermunde and that he was expected back at any time, travel check points were alerted. Within a day, the Mercedes, and the girl were apprehended and brought to the CIC office. Both individuals were greeted cordially but they were soon separated.

The agents chose to question first. Maintaining a tone of deference, they asked his mission in the area (which was under the jurisdiction of US Army forces), his unit, his reporting office, and other details which he should have been able to supply readily. answers were vague. He hinted at a top secret assignment and continually dodged the CIC agents' straightforward questions by darting off on tangents.

Before the "pleasant conversation," the agents had checked credentials," which consisted solely of a pass issued by the British Field Security Police at Flensburg, authorizing him to be out after the 2100 hour curfew. possessed no duty orders issued by that or any other office. In the course of the questioning, when an Agent reached for a telephone on the pretext that he wanted to verify the validity of the pass, hastily interrupted and said that he was actually working out of London. Nonplussed, the agent prepared to put through a call to London (which was a fairly simple procedure at that time). Again, shifted his story to stall the Agents.

Only fifteen or twenty minutes had elapsed, but the CIC interrogators were convinced that was a fraud. But just

who he was and what were his aims were another matter.

The agents left and went to the room where his girl friend was being held. It did not take long for them to find out that she had known only for the short time he had been in Wesermunde. She obviously had been thoroughly entranced by his tall tales of secret ventures, and her relation to the 30-year old seemed to be a "good case of teen age infatuation for an older man." She was furious and indignant that the CIC Agents could doubt the man's integrity.

Convinced that the girl had no real knowledge of background, the agents realized it would be futile to play her against the man, claiming that she had "spilled." In fact, such an approach might have completely backfired. Instead the agents returned to interrogate further. As they began to pick holes in his conflicting accounts, became increasingly evasive, and yet he never showed indignation or raised his voice. In a completely detached manner, he glided from one story to another, ignoring inconsistencies with a shrug of his shoulders as if the agents were the real culprits.

Acting on a hunch, the agents checked their files on a complaint of stolen credentials that had been recently lodged by the United Seaman's Service at Wesermunde.[146]

The pilfered credentials belonged to the assistant manager of the club and were almost identical to those carried by US Army officers. On some pretext, a man fitting description had stayed at the club, and his actions were such that when the assistant manager found his credentials missing, he suspected this guest. He had revealed his suspicions to Military Government who in turn relayed them to CIC.

Using the "when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife" technique, the Agents asked bluntly where he had placed the stolen credentials. The surprised adventurer blurted out:

"I flushed them down the toilet."

But the Agents retorted:

"No, they were too valuable for you to go through the trouble of stealing them merely to throw them away."

---

146 This organization was the USO to the Merchant Marine and provided rooms, meals, and recreation ashore for crews of American and British ships docking at the port.

And they continued to press to reveal where he had hidden the credentials. He named a place in his room at the home of his girl friend. The agents shook their heads, telling him that the credentials were useful in his personal possession, not in his room. Again named an improbable location.

Disgusted with the evasiveness of the impersonator, the agents used threats and, in substance, warned him that he was to be given one last opportunity to indicate where he had placed the credentials. Taylor replied very evenly:

"The credentials are under the floor mat of the car I was driving."

Leaving him under guard of other CIC agents at the office, the interrogators hurried to the motor pool, spotted the car, and removed the floor mat. The credentials were there. had already torn out the identification photograph of the assistant manager of the Seaman's Service but had not yet substituted his own picture.

Back at the office, the agents complimented for his single trace of honesty and continued the questioning to learn his true identity. insisted on his original line: he was a member of British Intelligence. He claimed to have made several secret submarine trips to the Continent from England during the war and to have been dropped twice by parachute behind enemy lines.

It was at this point that the agents asked to describe in detail one of the missions he had performed. claimed that he had parachuted behind the German lines near Rheims and made his way back to Paris, thence further westward and through the German lines to the American forces. The city of Paris, he affirmed, was still in German hands, and the date of this escapade was September 1944. The agents had him repeat the account, then lowered the boom. The impersonator was told that Paris had fallen to the Americans on 25 August 1944 and that if he had come through the city in September, he would have encountered no German forces.

This was the thrust that punctured entire cover. He then began to admit what he said were "truths" and gradually a new story developed. The man's correct name was and he was a German citizen. He had travelled widely as a seaman to South America, Panama, and the United States. He had acquired a good command of the English language and some French, but early in the war, the authorities had determined him to be politically and emotionally unstable, and the Gestapo arrested him and shipped him with a labor battalion to work in

occupied Norway. He escaped from Norway, crossed the border into Sweden and went to the British Embassy in Stockholm. There he persuaded the British he could do Intelligence work for them in Germany and was flown from Stockholm to London. After checking into past, the British sensed his instability and sent him to the Isle of Man for internment with other German nationals for the duration of the war.

He remained on the Isle of Man until the fall of 1945 when all internees were loaded on boats and brought to the port city of Flensburg in Germany. It was late October when reached his native land, and he immediately contacted the British Field Security office at Flensburg offering his service. He then received the after-curfew pass which the agents had found in his possession. Until the CIC Agents picked up he had moved freely about the Flensburg, Hamburg and Bremen area.

With this confession from CIC took him to the civilian jail and internment center, where he was lodged in the temporary custody of Military Government.

The next morning, CIC received a call that had been sprung from the jail by his girl friend, who had seduced the cooperative MP guards. The two had escaped together, taking along a Thompson sub-machine gun, and two clips of ammunition. Road blocks were immediately notified and the German Police alerted to relay the news to their informants.

Early the following morning, the German Police were tipped off by one of their contacts that had been in a house at the south end of the city with the girl. He still had his tommy gun.

Military Police were notified and arrived at the house ahead of CIC. By the time the agents arrived at the scene, the shooting was over. had answered a call to come out of the house and surrender by firing a burst from the tommy gun. In the ensuing exchange, he emptied the two clips in wild, unaimed rounds fired from a first floor bedroom window. The Military Police could not return heavy fire, since there were innocent people trapped in the ambushed house.

After the frantic shooting, there was a pause, two well-spaced individual shots, and then silence. The Military Police entered the house to find the girl stretched out on the floor, a bullet hole neatly placed through the center of her forehead. had apparently shot her as she walked through the bedroom door.

[redacted]

As for he had turned the gun on himself and, placing it under his chin, blown the top of his head off. Judging from the workings of the Tommy gun, the agents concluded that had kept two shells out of a clip before embarking on his shooting spree. When the clips were emptied, he had apparently inserted one shell in the chamber and shot the girl, then loaded the last shell and pulled the trigger on himself.

But, even in death, had left the CIC Agents with a parting teaser. In one of his pockets was a scrap of paper containing some strange coded writing. This was sent to the cryptographic section at Frankfurt and the case of alias was considered closed.[147]

Special Investigations Squad at 970th CIC

During the early days of the occupation, Allied counterintelligence realized that there was a widespread use of the Wehrmacht uniform by members of the German Intelligence Service and SS in order to conceal their real identities. To counteract these disguises, the 970th CIC stationed at Hq, USFET, set up a special investigative squad which was used to infiltrate confidential informants into prisoner of war enclosures where they could detect automatic arrestees who had taken a military disguise.

The operation proved a great success. In the period from 24 June to 7 July 1945, one CIC informant uncovered 25 German Intelligence and SS personalities in a single POW enclosure. Another undercover informant found a man who was able to lead CIC investigators to a cache of SS records and files that listed approximately 43,000 members of the SS.[148]

CIC at SHAEF: Security Preparations for the Potsdam Conference.

In June 1945, two weeks before the scheduled Potsdam conference between the heads of the four nations that were to occupy Germany, counterintelligence officers at SHAEF in Frankfurt were alerted to accompany the group under Major General L. Parks that was to make preparations for the American staff in Potsdam.

147 Letter from former Special Agent James M. Olsen c/o A. Landauer and Son Inc, 214 Jackson St. Wausau, Wisconsin, to Historical Section, Fort Holabird, Md, dtd 21 February 1955, (UNCLASSIFIED).

148 Annex "C" to Weekly Intelligence Summary Nr 2, Hq USFET, Office of the AC of S, G2, for week ending 24 July 1945 (SECRET) (Central Records Facility)

The CIC personnel selected for this special assignment were Col H. G. Sheen, Lt Col James F. Foothorap, Maj Thomas A. Gagen, and two CIC Agents, Daniel W. Montenegro and Edmund X. Klipa,[149] one of whom was a German linguist; the other spoke fluent Russian. For almost a week, these men remained in Frankfurt while preliminary arrangements were made with the Russians for the arrival of General Parks and his party. Poor weather also hampered the group from flying out of Frankfurt on schedule.

Finally, about one week before the date of the Potsdam Conference, the party embarked for Berlin. At Tempelhof Airport, the Americans were met by a delegation of Russian officers, and after a flurry of saluting and official greetings, they were parceled into cars for the trip to Potsdam.

The party proceeded along a carefully picked route through Berlin which was obviously not the most direct way to Potsdam. Apparently, the Russians had specially prepared the route to prevent the Americans from viewing the true nature of the occupation of Berlin.

The Americans arrived at dusk at the wire-surrounded enclosure where the conference was to be held and where all the members of the delegations would be housed. The Russians escorted the group to their rooms, stating that dinner would be served later.

At about midnight, the promised dinner was held and the Americans were treated to a lavish banquet complete with a bountiful supply of vodka. The following morning, the CIC agents set about their mission of checking the security arrangements with the Russians.

The Russian security officers took the Agents about the entire site of the conference. They pointed out that the houses around the enclosed area had been completely cleared, that the area was blocked off, and that all the delegations could be housed within the enclosure. Both security groups toured the barbed wire perimeter fence and inspected the guard positions. When the CIC agents stated that they wanted American guards present, the Russians countered with the proposal that Red Army guards should man the posts. The eventual solution was a plan for having guards from both armies.

149 Letter Order No. F-991, from Hq SHAEF, dtd 17 June 1945 (RESTRICTED), (Personal records of Lt Col James F. Foothorap).

The Russian security officials who accompanied CIC were not drawn from the top level, for they could make few decisions without first consulting higher officers. They apparently had been selected because they spoke English. They proved to be friendly but unyielding in their dealings with the Americans.

This Russian inflexibility was grossly displayed during the succeeding days. The Americans had planned to bring about 100 vehicles with supplies by the land route to Potsdam. The Russians meticulously counted the number of trucks and made all those in excess of one hundred turn back. In many other official dealings, the Russians proved technical to the point of obstructionism, and managed to tie up many negotiations with red tape.

On the return to the enclosure at Potsdam, the agents discovered that the Russians had blocked off the road along which they had made their exit. Russian guards, unable to understand English at first stood menacingly around the jeep and refused to let it pass, until at last the agents made clear that they were with General Parks' party.

After supervising the arrangements for several days, Colonel Sheen and Lieutenant Colonel Isothorap returned to Frankfurt. Security responsibility was left in the hands of Major Gagen and a group of about 15 CIC agents who had arrived with the supply convey.150

150 Interview with Lt Col James Foothorap US Military Intelligence Reserve, at Room 3-1, Building 2, Fort Holabird Maryland, on 16 September 1955.

[redacted]

HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXVII

CONFIDENTIAL

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

Phase II

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CONFIDENTIAL

* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

[redacted]

Auth: AR 381-100

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Part I: CIC Organization

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Part I

CIC ORGANIZATION

Initial planning for the military Occupation of Germany had been made on the basis of expected conditions. By March 1946, the real conditions could be seen and understood; the situation in Germany required a tightening of the Occupation forces for a long haul. Mass redeployment of troops that had fought in the European Theater of Operations Campaign was virtually at an end and the individual military units that remained were settling into more or less permanent stations.

Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who had assumed in November 1945, was both Theater Commander and Military Governor of Germany. To assist in the occupation mission was a Political Adviser from the State Department, Ambassador Robert Murphy, who was attached to the Theater Commander. The official functions of the Political Adviser included furnishing advice regarding the general U.S. civil policy for Germany, U.S. relations with other countries, and the processing of political intelligence. Much of this was of immediate interest to CIC.

The third key official at the top of the structure was the Deputy Military Governor and Commanding General, Office of Military Government for Germany, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay. Under the Theater Organization Plan of 1 March 1946, the individual offices of Military Government that administered the three laender areas (Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hesse), the equivalents of American states, were separate military commands under the direction of the Theater Commander. This left the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) as a strictly policy forming and supervisory group, a situation that was "extremely unclear and....leading to great confusion."[1]

Accordingly, on 1 April 1946, an amalgamation of the individual Military Government Offices and OMGUS was effected, and there was a substantial separation of Military Government responsibilities from the over-all theater occupation responsibilities. The European Theater then consisted essentially of a headquarters and two subsidiary commands, one the military occupation forces, the other the military government. The commanding general of the theater headquarters was responsible for administering both the military forces and military government. He himself was mainly engaged in the former activity and his deputy in the latter. The main mission of the military forces was the security and support of military government.[2]

1 Frederiksen, Oliver J., The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1053, (Uncl) (Staff & Faculty Library).

2 Frederiksen, Op Cit, p 31.

[redacted]

This redefinition and shifting of Military Government command lines simplified the Occupation picture somewhat. No major changes in Theater organization occurred until 15 March 1947 when United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) was nominally replaced by European Command (EUCOM), with Gen. L. Clay designated to relieve General McNarney as Commander in Chief EUCOM and Military Governor (US). By November 1947 a clear distinction was made between ground and service forces who were grouped under U.S. Army Europe (USAFEUR) and personnel assigned to Military Government. This arrangement made possible the eventual transfer of the governing function to the State Department and its representative, the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), an office which was established on 21 September 1949.[3]

The Basic Pattern of CIC Organization

After the initial months of Occupation, during which CIC agents had been attached to the Divisions, Corps, and Armies as well as "slash teams" that were under operational control of area G2s, the establishment of CIC on a regional basis with operational and administrative headquarters in Frankfurt set a pattern which weathered later changes in CIC of Germany.

CIC organization in 1946 was designed to give the fullest possible geographical coverage of Germany. Headquarters of the 970th CIC Detachment was located at Frankfurt. In addition to the direction of CIC efforts throughout the U.S. Zone of Occupation, the 970th Headquarters operated the extensive Central Registry which contained dossiers on all persons who had come to CIC attention in Germany.

Regional and Sub-Regional offices with their subordinate field offices and resident agents formed a network that gave CIC coverage of the U.S. Zone as well as the Berlin and Bremen enclaves. Headquarters for each region were established as follows:

Region I-------Stuttgart
Region II------Frankfurt
Region III-----Bad Nauheim
Region IV------Munich
Region V ------Regensburg
Region VI------Bamberg
Region VIII----Berlin
Region IX------Bremen

There was no Region VII during this early period of CIC organization. The basis for location of CIC sub-regional headquarters were the Military Posts that

3 Frederiksen, Op Cit

[redacted]

had been established in the U.S. Zone of Germany. Within the area of each Military Post was a sub-regional CIC office as well as a seat of Military Government. This arrangement permitted close lateral liaison between CIC and the Military Posts and provided for the exchange of counterintelligence information of mutual interest at these lower levels. CIC Regions embraced several Military Posts; command channels from the Regions led directly to the 970th Headquarters and then on to the Counter Intelligence Branch and the Director of Intelligence.[4]

Organization of 970th CIC Headquarters

The functions at the headquarters of the 970th CIC Detachment were placed under three sections, S-1, S-3, S-4, for administration, operations, and supply, respectively.

The S-1 Section was responsible for the administration of all 970th CIC Detachment personnel. All administrative reports from the Region levels were consolidated by this section, and all requests for personnel to fill the requirements of the 970th CIC were made by this section to the Theater G1.

The S-4 Section was charged with supplying all units of the 970th CIC Detachment. In effect, the S-4 operated a theater "sub-supply depot," procuring Special investigative equipment from the CIC Center at Fort Holabird. Because of the failure of T/O and E 30-500 and the List of Special Investigative Equipment authorized for CIC to provide the necessary personnel and equipment for the operation of a static detachment as large as the 970th, a modified list consisting of cells of existing T/O and E's of other organizations was authorized.

In addition to the supply function, the S-4 Section was responsible for the operation of the 970th CIC Detachment Headquarter's motor pool, billets and messes.

Operations of the 970th CIC Detachment were handled and coordinated by the S-3 Section located in the EUCOM Headquarters building in Frankfurt. The Chief, S-3 Section, was directly responsible to the Commanding Officer of the 970th Detachment for all phases of operations and, through the Commanding Officer, for keeping the Deputy Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, informed on all matters pertaining to counterintelligence with the Command. This mission entailed the receiving, recording, coordination and dissemination of all counterintelligence information that was channeled up to the 970th CIC from the Regional offices. Final recommendations, based on existing Theater directives, were prepared by

4 Organization Chart of 970th CIC Det as of May 1947 attached as Appendix 1, NOTE: Although, by 1947, some changes in Regional designations had been made, the organizational structure remained essentially the same.

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the S-3 Section on all counterintelligence cases before they were submitted to an action agency. To carry out its functions, the S-3 Section was divided into two sub-sections: Case Direction and Central Registry.

All counterintelligence information emanating from subordinate echelons of the 970th CIC Detachment was received at the Case Direction Section where it was evaluated, checked against information already on file, recorded and passed on to other interested agencies. To expedite the processing of this information, the Case Direction Section was sub-divided into the internal, and external desks.

Among the activities handled by the internal desk were the following: active subversions, security control, operation "Mesa" (the location, exploitation, and protection of scientists), war crimes and automatic arrestees, political subversion, and a historical section (which collected information on VIPs among former Nazi officials, searched for data on the German Intelligence Service, and screened repatriates for counterintelligence information).

The external desk kept abreast development involving the Russians and their satellites and involved separate divisions responsible for covering Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, Roumanian, Polish, Ukranian, White Russian, and Jewish activities. The activities of each group were broken down into specific categories: for example, the Soviet Activities section gathered information on MVD, MGD, Courier liaison to German Communist Party, Soviet Reparations Mission, Soviet Repatriations Mission, Soviet Displaced Persons Propaganda, Soviet Army Intelligence, Soviet Illegal Wireless Transmissions, Soviet Mass Briefing of Returning PWs.

The other major sub-section of S-3 at 970th CIC Headquarters was the Central Registry. Organized to catalogue and preserve all information of counterintelligence value, the Central Registry maintained files that were elaborately cross-indexed to make possible the compilation of details on an individual or an organizational case on the basis of even meager leads. Among the other duties of the Central Registry were the operation of the network of teletype installations that linked all echelons of the 970th CIC, control of photostat facilities and photographic laboratories and Top Secret Control.[5]

Organization of a Regional Detachment

Regional headquarters of the 970th CIC Detachment was charged with certain administrative and supply functions, an arrangement designed to leave Sub-Regions,

5 Hq CICC, Holabird Signal Depot, Balto., Md, Memo to Chief, CIC, Subj: "Liaison with the 970th CIC Det and the EUCOM Intel School (26 April - 26 May 1947) sgd C. E. Read, Maj, Inf, dtd 5 Jun 1947 (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Field Offices, and resident agents a maximum amount of time to attend to operations. Each Region had S-1 and S-4 sections, mirroring on a limited scale the responsibilities of the parent section at 970th Headquarters. The S-3 section, which coordinated operations, was composed, at a typical Regional headquarters, of a Production group that concentrated on target spotting on long range projects, an Eastern Internal Desk, Western Internal Desk, a Records and Research unit and a Reports Section which prepared weekly, top secret, arrest, and spot reports.[6]

Sub-Regional and Field Organization

Under the "Standard Operating Procedures for Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Forces, European Theater," which was issued in June 1946 and continued to govern CIC operations in Germany into 1948, the ground level of CIC activities took place at the Sub-Regional and Field Offices. Kreis (county) Field teams and Special squads could be formed at the discretion of the Sub-Regional Chief "and/or in accordance with specific instructions from the Regional Chief" to insure maximum counterintelligence coverage for each area.

The Sub-Region chief was charged with responsibility for "all functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps within his Sub-Region, paying particular attention to the direction of operations." The Sub-Regions were restricted to investigations within their own territories unless specific clearance was obtained to extend an investigation to another Sub-Region. But headquarters of the 970th CIC Detachment authorized "maximum latitude for lateral communications between..... (lower echelons).....to maintain operational efficiency."

Each Operations Officer at Sub-Region level was required to maintain a Records and Research Section responsible for a master "Personality" file, a master "Arrest" file, and a reference library, and other reference information necessary for the operational efficiency of the field agents.

Subordinate to the Sub-Regions were the "Resident Agents," each of whom was assigned to a Kreis (county) where he kept abreast of the local counter-intelligence picture and maintained liaison with local officials. The Resident agents were required to check German Police blotters daily for any cases of counterintelligence significance.[7] Weekly meetings of all Resident agents were held at the Sub-Region office to exchange information and to brief the field operatives on new EEI's.

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6 Ibid

7 Headquarters, CIC, European Theater, Standard Operating Procedure for CIC, USF, European Theater, To: Regional CIC Chief, dtd 11 Jun 1946 with changes dtd 27 Jun 1946 (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

In this manner, the 970th CIC coordinated the collection of intelligence by the agents in the field with its processing at several higher echelons.[8]

Major Changes in CIC Organization

In an effort to determine the most effective organization for the long term occupation of Germany, CIC underwent changes from 1947 through 1949 that were designed to streamline operations and to economize on personnel. The concept of providing target coverage rather than strictly geographical coverage also prompted some major revisions.[9]

Redesignations

The 970th CIC Detachment, which had been constituted as a Table of Organization unit, was redesignated as the 7970th CIC Group in June 1948. This new CIC detachment was listed as a Table of Distribution[10] unit with control of strength under Headquarters, European Command, whose personnel requirements were subject to annual change. In the fall of 1949, a request was initiated to restore CIC in Germany to its Table of Organization and Equipment status, primarily to enable it to receive a personnel allotment on a more permanent basis direct from the Department of the Army. This request was approved and the change became effective on 10 November 1949, after European Command General Order 102, dated 4 November 1949, had redesignated the detachment as the 66th CIC.[11]

New Alignment of Lower Echelons

While the Counter Intelligence Corps was being realigned in the European Command structure, the CIC detachment attended to certain changes in its own internal organization. By September 1948, steps toward a major reorganization of channels and coverage had been implemented when Region III adopted an experimental plan. The Regional operations office was deleted in the flow of operational reports from Sub-Regions to headquarters at Frankfurt. The result was that 7970th CIC Headquarters assumed direct operational control of the four

8 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson, Room 2E 453, Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955.

9 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr., in the Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955.

10 Table of Distribution is a table which prescribes the organizational structure and personnel of a military unit to perform a specific mission for which there is no appropriate T/O and E.

11 Hq European Command and Hq U.S. Army, Europe, "Annual Narrative Rpt from 66th CIC Det, 10 Nov 49 - 31 Dec 49." R.G. 207.03 A 52 - 345 (Secret) Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Va.

[redacted]

Region III Sub-Regional offices. The trial plan was successful, and the new system was expanded to other Regions. By 1 October 1948, the two Sub-Regions of Region IV were transferred to headquarters operational control. Sub-Regions of Region IV were added a month later, and by December 1948, one Sub-Region of Region VI came under Headquarters direction.[12]

This gradual reorganization was completed on 15 April 1949, and the CIC picture in Germany took on a new appearance.[13] No longer was there a lengthy chain of Regional, Sub-Regional, and Field offices. Instead, the 66th CIC Detachment served as a headquarters for 12 CIC Regions with areas of primary responsibility in the U.S. Zone of Germany, the U.S. Sector of Berlin, and the Bremen Enclave. These functioned as the basic CIC field units and no smaller units based on geographical definitions were permitted. Most of the new Regions were commanded by lieutenant colonels with two majors assigned to cover the positions of executive and operations officer.[14]

When the former Regional headquarters had been completely phased out administratively as well as operationally, the CIC coverage corresponded with the original Sub-Regional boundaries, except in regard to the new Region X which had been fashioned out of two former Sub-Regions. Under the new alignment, CIC Regions and their headquarters were as follows:

Region I	Stuttgart
Region II	Heidelberg
Region III	Frankfurt
Region IV	Munich
Region V	Regensburg
Region VI	Nurnberg
Region VII	Bayreuth
Region VIII	Berlin
Region IX	Bremen
Region X	Bad Wildungen
Region XI	Wurzburg
Region XII	Augsburg

This over-all reorganization of the field echelons was accompanied by the standardization of job titles, investigative units, and utilization of operational personnel. Although there had been general schemes of regional organization

12 Quarterly Historical Rpt of Opns, Hq 66th CIC Det, European Command for period 1 Jan 49 thru 31 Mar 49, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

13 General Org Chart of 66th CIC Det attached as Appendix 2.

14 Quarterly Historical Rpt of Opns, Hq 66th CIC Det, for the period 1 April - 30 Jun 1949, contained in "Unit Histories, 1949," (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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during the previous years, each Region headquarters had been given the prerogative of establishing a set-up deemed most suitable to local conditions. This wide jurisdiction had resulted in various solutions to such problems as control, management of agents, and staff titles, and these often conflicting solutions caused delays in operational matters and rendered such administrative details as replacement and transfer difficult.

Under the new standardization, which came into effect during the summer of 1949, investigative personnel at Region level were divided on a fourfold team basis--Political Team,[15] Counter Espionage Team, General Investigation Team and Visa Screening Team. These teams served as the "primary working tools" of the Regional commander. Eliminated from the picture were the case officers at Regional level who had formerly often duplicated the work done at headquarters. In their place were team commanders charged with the primary responsibility "to supervise team members, guiding and stimulating them to better work." The team commander, whenever possible, was to handle personally some key informants and work on high level cases. He had to know, in general, everything that occurred in his specialized field of activity and to approve all reports before they were sent on to headquarters.

The teams were charged with clearcut missions that were standard throughout all the Regions. The Political Team was assigned targets dealing with "right and left wing political activity, all Zones of Germany." The Counter Espionage Team had a four-faceted target area to cover:

1. Non-German national groups within the U.S. Zone
2. All foreign missions
3. Potential and suspected espionage
4. Exploitations of positive intelligence from sources located in territory under U.S. Control.

To the General Investigative Team fell a variety of targets, grouped as follows:

1. All security matters pertaining to personnel and installations information and to include suspected sabotage.
2. All screenings other than visa.
3. Surveillance of scientists.
4. Apprehensions.
5. Active subversion (other than political).

15 This team later became known as the Counter Subversion Team to distinguish this coverage from the political coverage, which was a State Department responsibility. (Interview with Lt Col F. E. Jorden, Inf, who was with the 66th CIC Det at the time.)

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6. Any special projects or missions assigned the Region not falling within the fields of activity listed above for the Political or Counter Espionage Teams.

The Visa Screening Team was established only in those Regions where the visa load was particularly heavy. When the volume of visa work was low, no permanent Visa Screening Team was set up, and agents from the General Investigative Team were temporarily assigned to the control of the Visa Officer to handle cases as they arose.[16]

This organization of CIC for field operations at Region level was considered more effective than the original and varied approaches to the problems of providing thorough counterintelligence coverage for a given geographical area. Except for the change of title of the Political Team to Counter Subversion Team, this system was still in effect at the close of 1950.[17]

Field Resident and Day Offices

Although, under the broad standardization of CIC in Germany that was completed by September 1949, there were no echelons beneath the Regional offices, some provisions had to be made to insure the continuance of adequate CIC area (as opposed to target) coverage.

As a result, Regions were permitted to establish field offices and resident agents. A Field office was defined as "a permanent CIC office, maintaining a Charge of Quarters and files of its own activities" and could be placed "in those areas within a regional boundary which, because of geographical separation and/or because of high CIC interest, require the physical presence of three or more CIC agents in order to provide adequate area coverage, local liaison and/or appropriate target coverage."[18]

Each Field office was placed under the direction of a Field office commander, generally the most qualified resident agent assigned to the area. The commander was assigned a sufficient number of additional resident agents to fulfill the mission of his office. In addition, any member of a Regional Team who happened to be located in the area on a particular mission came under the direct administrative command of the Field office for the duration of his assignment. The team agent had to keep the Field Office commander informed about his operations, and process reports and information through the Field office to be forwarded to the

16 Exhibit "A", Quarterly Historical Rpt of Opns, 30 Jun 1949 - 30 Sep 1949, from Hq 66th CIC Det (undtd) (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

17 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intel School, Fort Holabird, Md., on 16 Sep 1955.

18 Exhibit "A", Quarterly Historical Rpt of Opns, 30 Jun 1949 - 30 Sep 1949, from Hq 66th CIC Det, undtd, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

team commander at Regional headquarters. But the Field Office commander was denied authority "to approve, disapprove or hinder the flow of information from the team agent."

A Resident office was similar to a Field office in mission; the distinction between the two hinged around the fact that only a single agent staffed the Resident office.

The least formal of the CIC offices was the so-called Day office which was generally established in the same building as the local Military Government representative or other U.S. Agency. No CIC personnel were assigned to the Day offices, but resident agents and Field Office commanders were responsible for making periodic visits to these offices to further their mission of providing area coverage and maintaining liaison.[19] By the end of 1949, CIC had in operation 11 Field offices, 30 Resident offices, and 24 Day offices.[20]

New Internal Organization at Headquarters

While readjustments were being made at lower echelon levels in 1949, the internal organization of the headquarters of the 66th CIC Detachment took on a somewhat new appearance.[21] The function of each section or office was comparable to that of the corresponding section of any standard military installation, but there were some notable features of the 66th CIC under the reorganization.

A staff position of Inspector was created, and quarterly tours of inspection for the 12 Regions were supervised and coordinated by this office. The inspections were performed by teams composed of staff members of the detachment headquarters, one each from administrative, operational, supply and automotive sections.

The S-1 Section handled all matters pertaining to personnel, both civilian and military, for all 12 Regions as well as headquarters. There were no longer S-1 sections internal to the organization of the Regions.

The S-4 took over the assignment of vehicles to all Regions and the issue of investigative equipment and photographic supplies for the entire detachment. This supply section continued its control over supply, mess, and motor pool for the detachment headquarters.

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19 Ibid

20 Hq European Command and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from the 66th CIC Det, from 10 Nov to 31 Dec 1949, (Secret) RG 207.03 A 52-345, (Departmental Rec Br, Alexandria, Va).

21 Chart showing internal organization of 66th CIC Det attached as Appendix 3.

The organization of the S-2/S-3 Section was considerably changed under the new plan. Headed by the 66th CIC Operations Officer and his assistant, this section was divided into seven sub-sections:

1. Case Section - Previously broken down into desks on the basis of nationality groups and geographic areas, the Case Section was reorganized to place greater emphasis on fields of investigation and to align collection efforts of the 66th CIC more nearly with those of both higher and lower echelons. Four desks were created to handle, respectively, countersubversion, counterespionage, security, and positive intelligence.

2. Technical Specialist Section - This section was "responsible for the supervision and control of the informant program."

3. Screening Section - The primary responsibility of this section was the supervision and control of the loyalty and integrity investigations conducted in the U.S. Zone of Germany, for the Displaced Persons Commission, under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. But the section also assisted the Commission in the completion of investigations conducted in the British and French Zones of Germany and in Austria and Italy. A further responsibility was the dissemination of information from the Central Registry to the U.S. Consuls and other interested agencies.

4. Training Section - Responsible for the formulation, promulgation, and supervision of training policy in accordance with directives of higher headquarters and with operational needs, for all personnel assigned to the 66th CIC Detachment.

5. Reports Section - Responsible for the preparation for such operational publications as the Bi-Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary Orientation and Guidance Report, and the CIC Target Survey.

6. Central Registry - This was the central file of the 66th CIC Detachment. By the end of 1949, under two indices, the Central Personality Index of 1,350,000 cards, and the Impersonal Files which contained 42,000 titles, information from some 275,000 dossiers was available to the detachment and other governmental agencies, subject to the approval of detachment headquarters or the Intelligence Division.

7. Services Section - Included in the duties of this section were Top Secret Control, the Photographic laboratory, and the Drafting Section, which prepared charts, posters, and other illustrative material.[22]

22 Hq European Command and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from 66th CIC Det, 10 Nov 49 - 31 Dec 49, RG 207.03 A 52-345, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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Movement of Headquarters, 66th CIC Detachment

Accompanying the streamlining of CIC organization throughout Germany was the physical transfer of the headquarters of the 66th CIC Detachment from Frankfurt to the modern Wallace Kaserne in Stuttgart. Logistical planning for this shift had begun as early as April 1949. During the period 1 to 10 September 1949, the actual move was completed by motor transport. The headquarters remained constantly operational over these 10 days, although it had to be maintained on a two echelon basis.[23]

Commanders of the CIC Detachment in Germany

From the time of its inception until June 1950, the CIC Detachment in Germany had eight different commanding officers. Lt. Col. Norman Hearn assumed duties as the first commander of the 970th on 10 May 1945. He was succeeded in July by Lt. Col. H. E. Wilson who, in turn, was replaced by Lt. Col. Richard D. Stevens on 31 October. From December 1945 until April 1946, Lt. Col. Harold E. Marr, Jr., was acting commander, and Col. C. M. Culp took command from April to June 1946. Col. J. L. Inskeep served as the 970th CIC's commanding officer from June 1946 until January 1948, although Lt. Col. Louis M. DeRiemer was acting member for six months (April - October 1947) during this period. Col. David G. Erskine headed CIC in Germany during its period of major revisions; designated commanding officer in January 1948, Colonel Erskine remained in this position until November 1950.[24]

Other CIC Detachments

Although the 970th CIC (and later the 7970th CIC Group and the 66th CIC) was the principal detachment in Germany throughout the occupation, CIC maintained small units with the 1st Infantry Division and the United States Constabulary. Their missions were essentially the same as CIC had carried out during combat: to perform security work and investigations as requested by the division G2.

During a typical year, 1949, the 1st CIC Detachment closed 37 investigations, gave 14 security lectures and accomplished 36 security inspections of battalion units. In addition, the agents performed three special guard missions and four other special missions. Liaison was maintained with the 7970th CIC Group and other agencies.

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23 Quarterly Historical Rpt of Opns, 30 June 1949 - 30 Sep 1949 from Hq 66th CIC Det, undtd, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

24 Hist of the 66th CIC Det, undtd, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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The seven members of the detachment also participated in seven tactical field exercises that were held by the 1st Infantry Division in 1949.[25] The 427th CIC assigned to the United States Constabulary was organized into teams and sub-teams, and the agents of the detachment provided security for all Constabulary units in Germany.[26]

In 1949, activities performed by the 427th CIC included 34 investigations of personnel on duty with the Constabulary, 147 security lectures, 1,561 surveys "conducted to determine the security of Constabulary troops, installations, material or communications or to determine compliance within the Constabulary of the provisions of AR 380-5," and 21 "search and check operations" in conjunction with Constabulary troops.[27]

25 Command and Unit Historical Rpt, 1st CIC Det, 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, undtd, (Conf) "In Unit Histories, 1949" (Cen Rec Fac).

26 Historical Rpt from Hq 427th CIC Det, US Constabulary, undtd, (Uncl) in "Unit Histories, 1949" (Cen Rec Fac).

27 Ibid.

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Part II: Personnel and Training

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Part II

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

At the outset of the Occupation, the 970th CIC Detachment had an authorized strength of 300 officers and 1,100 agents[28] but losses in strength were felt almost immediately as wartime agents piled up enough points for return to the United States. The steady depletion of CIC personnel through 1945 was noted with concern by counterintelligence staff members and commanders alike,[29] and the reorganization of CIC on a regional basis in late 1945 was prompted as much by personnel as by operational considerations.

The loss of experienced CIC agents was a serious deterrent to CIC operations; the new agents which CIC received from replacement depots and troops already in the Theater often proved more of a hindrance than a help.[30] By March 1946 when new CIC agents trained in the Zone of the Interior began to arrive in the Theater, one detachment commander noted that they had come without prior training in occupation duties. Schooled in "detective type" work during a five week course, the new agents had little or no perspective on the situation which was facing the security officials in Occupied Germany.[31]

The Need

The requirement for a CIC agent, once the long range nature of the Occupation had been recognized, was summarized in the report of an officer who visited the 970th on a liaison trip from the CIC Center at Fort Holabird, during April and May 1947.

Under the heading "intellect and maturity," the report stated that "the present day CIC agent should be of more than 'just average' intelligence. He must be of sufficient intellect to thoroughly comprehend the complex political and economic situation which exists in the European Theater during the present quad-powered, partitioned, occupation of Germany." According to the observer, the fact that a CIC agent was, in many localities, the sole representative of the United States Army made maturity and judgement prime requisites. In dealing with informants, for example, it was necessary that an agent inspire confidence or his "people" might come to fear compromise of the information they had

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28 Rpt of Opns, 12th Army Group, Vol IV, p 114-115, (Uncl) (Staff and Faculty Library).

29 of, This Chapter, Part I

30 Interview with former s/A Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kansas, at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 Aug 1955.

31 Monthly Info Rpts from Hq 303d CIC Det, dtd 4 Feb 46 and 1 Mar 46, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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volunteered. He reported the opinion of many counterintelligence officers in Germany was that a number of agents who were simply "bodies" filling vacancies could be sacrificed in favor of a lesser number of qualified personnel.

Tact and diplomacy were cited as two traits essential to a CIC agent in Germany; the absence of these qualities in some of the agents had led to some "embarrassing situations" for CIC.

The observer pointed out that the CIC mission also clearly required qualified linguists; the minimum need was "sufficient knowledge of the language so that he (the agent) may protect himself against misleading information by an interpreter." But there was no adequate substitute for an agent who could speak German fluently, and, in highly sensitive assignments, for qualified agents who could speak local accents in order to maintain their covers.[32]

The demand for agents of maturity and intellect, tact and diplomacy, and at least a basic familiarity with the German language was considerable. In addition, training in such investigative techniques as interrogation, use of informants, report writing, and basic principles of conducting an investigation, was needed to turn an individual who possessed the character and personality qualifications into an effective field agent.[33]

The Supply

The authorized strength of the 970th did not fluctuate widely during the Occupation of Germany. On 18 April 1947, almost two years after the surrender, the detachment was allotted 318 officers, 167 warrant officers, and 607 enlisted men under T/O & E 30-500, and an additional allotment in non-T/O Grades of 22 officers, 33 warrant officers and 225 enlisted men, making an aggregate of 340 officers, 200 warrant officers and 832 enlisted men. This total of 1,372 spaces was close to the figure of about 1,400 spaces with which the 970th CIC had started operations on 10 May 1945.[34]

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32 Memo to Chief, CIC, Subj: Liaison With the 970th CIC Det and the European Command Intel School, Hq EUCOM (26 April-26 May 47), from C.E. Read, Maj, Inf, Hq CIC Center, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, dtd 5 Jun 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

33 Ibid

34 Memo No. 57, Personnel and Organization, General, from Hq 970th CIC Det, European Command, dtd 30 Apr 1947, (Conf) used as Exhibit "B", to Memo to Chief, CIC, Subj: Liaison With the 970th CIC Det and the European Command Intel School, Hq EUCOM, (26 Apr - 26 May 1947) from C.E. Read, Maj, Inf, Hq CIC Center, Holabird Signal Depot, dtd 5 Jun 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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But the agents that CIC had in Germany by 1947 simply could not all measure up to the standards of quality either desired or previously obtainable. There was no single doorstep to which the unsatisfactory personnel situation could be traced. Limited sources of manpower for the Army from a nation which was relaxing in a post-war wave of unconcern was the fundamental factor. Men of the caliber demanded by CIC operations in Germany were not entering the Army in sufficient numbers.

Young, inexperienced boys were sent over to the 970th CIC for short periods of duty. By the time these agents had gained the experience and understanding of the Occupation mission, their tour of duty often had ended, and only a small number chose to remain in the service.

Three general factors have been cited as contributing to the poor quality of personnel in the 970th CIC at this time: immaturity, inadequate linguistic background, and a lack of technical training for intelligence. The problem was not the adequacy of the training which these agents received at the CIC Center, but the "raw material," the agents, themselves, who could not adapt to the demands of counterintelligence operations in Germany.[35]

The inadequacy of new agents coming to CIC in Germany was not the only factor contributing to the unfavorable personnel situation: agents who had remained in Germany after the war often used their familiarity with the conditions and citizens of the occupied country to their own advantage; some became lazy in carrying out their assignments and allowed informants to perform investigations, prepare reports, and virtually conduct operations which had been assigned to CIC. The one bright aspect of the picture was that CIC possessed a sizeable nucleus of hardworking, competent and experienced agents on whom headquarters and Regional commanders could rely. The effectiveness of these agents was maximized at all levels. Regional commanders shifted their key personnel about to meet special demands and occasions. Many of the best agents in Germany were sent to Berlin where counterintelligence work often proved the most difficult and involved, requiring the "know how" of men with considerable Intelligence background.[36]

The "top quality" CIC agents, of which there was a substantial number during 1947-1948, were capable of carrying out complex assignments, but they could not cover the entire counterintelligence field. As a result, the deficiencies among the less satisfactory counterintelligence personnel were bound to take their toll on CIC operations.

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35 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det, from Jan 47 thru Aug 49, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 55.

36 Ibid

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Survey of the Personnel Situation

Shortly after the assignment of Maj. Gen. R. L. Walsh as AC of S, G2, for the European Command in May 1947, General Clay ordered him to make a thorough survey of CIC. Since "high principle and talented men" in all echelons of CIC ranks were accomplishing important work, and there was a need to maintain proved sources of contact, it was decided that the realignment of CIC should be arrived at through steady rather than drastic changes. Constructive criticism was sought by General Walsh from all Regional commanders.

One of the initial suggestions concerned plans for the poor quality CIC personnel. Reports indicated that approximately 20 percent of the agents were unqualified for counterintelligence duties, and the European Command gave directions for the removal and transfer of incompetent personnel. This program was tied up somewhat by administrative delays because the normal personnel assignments originated in Washington.

A major measure designed to improve the personnel situation came during June 1947 in the form of an order from General Clay requiring CIC agents to don uniform indicating rank and to live in military kasernes, former German Army barracks. This order was aimed at separating operational necessities from luxuries; the "need to live independently of military control, extensive use of civilian clothes, living in private homes, and operating their messes" were all cited as CIC prerogatives which had been abused.[37]

In the opinion of the Operations Officer at the time this order did not substantially interfere with CIC operations.[38] Reasonable latitude was given so that during the normal working day, the field agent was permitted civilian attire when operational missions would be jeopardized by the wearing of a uniform with rank. An exception to the requirement that off duty time be spent in uniform was made for those agents whose place of duty was in a small town where the change into and out of mufti would be apparent. Agents were also permitted to wear civilian clothes in the evening for duty, with the approval of the Operations Officer.[39]

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37 Rpt to Sec of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, from Orville J. Taylor, Special Asst to the Sec of the Army on personnel policies and general conditions in the European Theater, from the Dept of the Army, Public Info Div, Press Sec, dtd "for release May 6, 1948." (Uncl) (Kansas City Records Center)

38 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det, from Jan 47 thru Aug 49, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 55.

39 CIC History 1945-1948, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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The enlisted agents were billeted in kasernes with other troop units, but they were usually grouped together in a separate wing or corner. They were required to eat in enlisted mess halls instead of the separate CIC messes which had previously been utilized.

This change of status hurt morale among the enlisted CIC agents at the outset.[40] There was some nostalgis for the "good old days," but the less experienced agents realized that their duties permitted them to "live openly." CIC clerks, who had previously been allowed to wear the CIC civilian uniform with "US" insignia on the collar, were not generally involved in operations where the indication of their rank could possibly compromise a mission.[41] The order had the immediate advantage of reaccustoming some agents to the fact that they were basically soldiers and members of the military Occupation forces.[42]

Another measure designed to improve the quality of the performance of the agents was the "swoop inspection," conducted by teams of officers from the 970th headquarters at lower echelon CIC offices. This system of unannounced internal inquiries kept agents properly prepared at all times. There was no chance to prepare for these surveys, which covered all matters that an Inspector General might consider. Personal relationships, complaints, investigative procedures, files and operations were all scrutinized.

Security of personnel and information within CIC was a constant problem that was partially remedied by these inspections. Breeches such as the careless handling of documents had been committed too often for an organization whose mission was to protect security. In one instance, an agent left a list of highly classified EEI's in his parked jeep. When he returned, the papers had disappeared. Other security slips had been made through lack of discretion in revealing information to unauthorized sources.

The hampering of morale within CIC brought on by the internal inspection system was a decided disadvantage. But it had to be weighed against the unquestionable gains of standardizing operations and improving agents' behavior.[43]

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40 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at BOQ, Fort George G. Meade, Md., 26 May 1955.

41 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 thru Aug 49, at the Pentagon.

42 Draft of Memo from Orville J. Taylor, Special Asst to Sec of the Army, to Kenneth C. Royall, Sec of the Army, dtd 29 Mar 48, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Center).

43 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, former Opns Officer of the 970th CIC Det, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955.

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An Attack on CIC in Germany

Even as the 970th was putting into effect these self-corrective measures, some former agents, returning to the United States, voiced their criticism of the CIC situation in Germany; one man, in particular, chose to list his complaints about affairs in the European Command in a document submitted to the Secretary of the Army about 1 January 1948. Entitled "Black Market Activities and Other Irregularities in Germany," this undated, unsigned report consisted of 50 pages of allegations concerning personnel policies, and conditions in Germany. It was supplemented on 28 January by another document labled "Wholesale Irregularities in the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theater." Like its predecessor, this report was unsigned and undated by the former agent who had submitted it.[44]

The charges against CIC were contained in the first three pages of generalizations which included "moral corruption, professional incompetence, indifference, and laziness of most of the agents and supervisory officer personnel all due...to local rivalry and complete lack of coordination of five different and overlapping Intelligence agencies." Following these broad allegations was a report on certain indiscreet and illegal operations of a CIC warrant officer and the citations of 47 cases which were to support the general allegations. The remainder of the report dealt with discussion and recommendations regarding:

a. Selection and training of personnel
b. Replacement of inefficient commanders
c. Tightening of discipline
d. Institution of a special inspection service
e. Supervision of CIC by Director of Security Group, Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

On 4 February 1948, Orville J. Taylor, a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, started a two months tour of the Occupation forces in Germany at the request of Secretary of the Army Royall "to personally examine among other things, miscellaneous criticisms re security, crime record, immorality, drunkenness and general demeanor and conduct of the Army of Occupation by various critics, male and female."

A substantial part of Mr. Taylor's survey concerned the role of CIC and the criticism which had been leveled at its personnel. In general, Mr. Taylor concluded that the former agent's report "has only limited foundation, is presumptuous in the knowledge and experience which it apparently claims on behalf of the reporter...is susceptible of proof in a few particulars only, is a mass of glittering generalizations emanating from the fantastic imagination of which the reporter

44 Exerpts from CSGID 201, [redacted] Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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must be possessed." This withering blast at the charges of the former agent was concluded with the observation that no facts had been brought to light which were not known "to those excellent and efficient officers in command of CIC who are doing a magnificent job in study and research to the end of correcting such weak spots as may be present in this organization and in making of it a strong and effective arm of the Army."[45]

In the press release of Mr. Taylor's remarks which was distributed on 6 May 1948, the need for continual scrutiny of all intelligence personnel was stressed "because of the tremendous temptations for wrongdoing and because of possibilities of damage to the security, interest, prestige, or operational effort." It was noted that the requisite of high principled agents had not always been met, a failure that was largely attributed to "the immediate need of large numbers of linguistically qualified personnel and of personnel familiar with the background attitudes and culture of inhabitants." The emergency selection of these agents had inevitably accounted for the "presence of some individuals with ulterior motives and questionable ethics."

But the observations of Secretary Royall's investigator relative to CIC in Germany were ended with the statement: "I am satisfied that there has been a year-to-year, month-to-month, week-to-week, and almost day-to-day improvement and correction, where necessary, of the organization."[46]

The investigation of the CIC situation by Mr. Taylor was coupled with a tour of the 970th by the CIC Chief, Brig. Gen. E. A. Zundel, in February 1948. At this time he reviewed the allegations lodged against CIC by officers from the Inspector General's office, European Command. These inspections brought the personnel situation into sharp focus, and General Zundel observed that, "despite the fact that more than 50 percent of perspective CIC candidates were rejected prior to field duty, some undesirable personnel passed through the 'preventative screening'." But the CIC Chief noted that "this fact is recognized and authority is granted to all field detachment commanders to relieve personnel from CIC without further reference to the Chief, CIC, for inefficiency, character deficiency, undesirable mental attitude, lack of desire, or failure to perform CIC duties properly or for infractions of discipline and good order."[47]

45 Draft of Memo from Orville J. Taylor, Special Asst to Sec of the Army, to Kenneth C. Royall, Sec of the Army, dtd 29 Mar 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen).

46 Rpt to Sec of the Army Kenneth C. Royall from Orville J. Taylor, Special Asst to the Sec of the Army, from D/A, Public Info Div, Press Sec, dtd May 6, 1948, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen).

47 Draft Memo from Brig Gen E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, to CofS for the Dir of Intel, 26 Feb 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen).

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Despite the series of inspections during the early months of 1948, CIC operations proceeded without undue hampering. By 1949, the quality of the average individual agent had improved perceptibily[48] and the over-all detachment strength reached 361 officers, 107 warrant officers, 760 enlisted men, and 163 civilians.[49]

Although the personnel picture for CIC in Germany was far brighter than during the early days of the Occupation when replacement depots had been combed for likely agents, the "top quality" had diminished somewhat. New security rulings which made for stiffer clearance requirements, particularly in the matter of foreign birth, eliminated some key agents, and a general Theater policy to curtail the use of civilians cut into the CIC ranks. Some agents who had been permitted "to Civilianize" on the job after the war left CIC in Germany.[50]

The Use of European Personnel

In carrying out its mission in Germany, the 970th CIC had to use indigenous personnel as informants, linguists, assistants in visa screening investigations, and in other capacities where an intimate knowledge of the country, its people and customs was essential.

Outlined in the CIC Standard Operating Procedures of 1946 were the conditions upon which indigenous personnel could be utilized by CIC: "German civilian personnel will not be used in any administrative or operational capacity, except upon specific authorization by this Headquarters. Such personnel are normally hired only as manual laborers, such as cooks, servants, housecleaners, and garage attendants. In certain instances they may be hired as interpreters etc., and be used under the control of a CIC agent as an informant or undercover agent. Extreme caution will be exercised to insure that such personnel have the appropriate security clearances and do not have access to any classified information other than what those individuals connected with operations may have produced themselves."[51]

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48 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 55.

49 Hq European Command and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from the 66th CIC Det, from 10 Nov to 31 Dec 1949, (Secret) RG 207.03 A 52-345 (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

50 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 55.

51 Ltr from Hqs, CIC, European Theater, Standard Operating Procedure for CIC, US Forces, European Theater To Regional CIC Chief, dtd 11 Jun 1946 with changes dtd 27 Jun 1946, (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

It often was necessary for a CIC Operations Officer to fall back on the "escape clause" in this statement because many key operations hinged upon the use of German informants.[52]

In some areas, CIC also employed European personnel as intelligence "leg men." The Sub-Region of Widen near the Czechoslovakia border, where language problems were particularly abundant, had several Polish nationals on the payroll as full time employees. These Poles had served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or the equivalent British Intelligence organization during the war and were well versed in Intelligence procedures. They also could speak several languages.

The Poles' association with CIC was kept in the open. They were issued Post Exchange cards but had no credentials that identified them as members of Intelligence. Although they were not briefed on operational matters, these men were used to drive undercover cars with the regular CIC agents, to translate and interpret for the nonlinguists in the Sub-Regional office, and to confirm or refute information listed on personal data forms by potential immigrants to the United States. In screening visa applicants, the Poles could question the displaced persons closely; for example, if an applicant listed employment at a certain factory, the Polish interrogator could ask him for details of the factory's location and check the displaced person's description against his own knowledge of the area.

The Poles were also sent on missions to various Displaced Persons camps in the Wieden area to bring CIC information which would have been difficult or impossible for the agents to procure themselves. But the Poles were warned that if they got into trouble on any assignment, CIC "had never heard of them."

Assistance to the CIC agents in Weiden was also provided by the local Kripo (German criminal police). As a means of insuring liaison, CIC paid the salaries of two detectives on the police force. However, CIC neither selected nor knew which men on the Kripo were receiving this sponsorship.

Since liaison with the German police was essential to CIC operations, there was usually at least one member of the local police force who "belonged" to CIC.[53]

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52 Memo to Chief, CIC, Subj: "Liaison with the 970th CIC Det and the EUCOM Intelligence School (26 April - 26 May 1947) sgd C.E. Read, Maj, Inf, dtd 5 Jun 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

53 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Training

CIC during the Occupation of Germany never operated a permanent zone-wide school for the training of its agents. For the most part, the agents had to receive their grounding in the special problems of Germany through courses at the Regions to which they were assigned and through on-the-job training.[54]

Although there had been some local recruitment of CIC agents from among the troops in Germany, the new agents generally came to the Theater after completing the basic investigative course at the CIC Center at Fort Holabird.[55] The problem which beset the CIC commanders in Germany was not the adequacy of the training that these men had received in the Zone of the Interior but the quality of the personnel![56]

Early in the Occupation, the European Theater Intelligence School (later the European Command Intelligence School) at Oberammergau established vacancies on a quota basis for CIC agents.[57] The men selected to attend this school received area background and language training.[58] But it often developed that the agents who could best profit from the Oberammergau training could not be spared from their duty assignments.[59]

In May 1947, a survey of the training needs for each potential CIC agent stressed that "language training should be given a high priority on the training agenda...and should not be considered as something that can be covered in the agent's field training program." Another "prime essential" was instruction in the "phases of geopolitics...dealing with the political and economic tendencies (in Germany) during the present century to enable the agent to evaluate intelligently the information he receives."

Some of the investigative subjects which were taught at Fort Holabird were pointed out as requiring supplementation for the special conditions of Germany. The case with informants was typical: "The instruction in the recruitment of informant nets should stress the proper approach to a likely prospect; the time

54 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.
55 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles, at BOQ, Fort George G. Meade, Md., 26 May 1955.
56 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 thru Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 55.
57 Monthly Info Rpt, from Hq 303d CIC Det, dtd 1 May 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).
58 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 thru Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 55.
59 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, Fort Holabird, 10 Oct 1955.

[redacted]

involved in determining whether an individual should or could be recruited as an informant; testing a prospective informant for dependability; preparation of a cover story for the informant to assist him in recruiting his supplementary chain; means of compensation for the informant; treatment of the informant so that his continued loyalty will not be dimmed by the agent's attitude toward the informant; means of preventing the "burning out" of an informant; methods of exploiting the informant to the fullest extent without jeopardizing the informant or the mission of the agent; methods of eliminating an undesirable informant without incurring his disfavor...and methods of using informants to assist in the performance of a mission without divulging...the primary mission. All instruction now given which tends to lead the potential agent to believe that his informant net should be recruited among the lower strata of society should be eliminated and stress placed on the use of informants in the middle and upper strata...."

Deficiencies of the agents in Report Writing and other fields were noted and considered correctable only through "the procurement of a higher grade personnel."[60] In addition to grading the CIC students on their academic performance, the instructors made evaluations of their potentials as CIC agents, based on their conduct, attitude and participation in the academic activities.

Although CIC quotas permitted few agents to attend the Oberammergau Intelligence School, those who were sent in 1947 took the seven weeks long "Occupational Intelligence Transition Course," designed to acquaint the CIC agent with conditions in the U.S. Zone. Among the subjects studied at some length were Naziism, Eastern Europe (largely concerned with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party), Legal Investigative Procedures, and Military Government.[61]

Since most of the agents did not attend the Oberammergau Intelligence School, the individual Regions had to give incoming agents an introduction to their future duties. There was no unified concept as to what this "introduction" should contain, and the program in Region I in 1949 can be cited as representative. The new agents assigned to Region I received a brief orientation as to the CIC mission, regional structure and area, and then were sent to the file room for several weeks of reading. After completing this study, they were assigned for a tour conducting investigations under an experienced agent with the General Investigative Team. After this seasoning period, the new agents' qualifications were weighed

60 Memo to Chief, CIC, Subj: Liaison with the 970th CIC Det and the European Command Intel School, Hq EUCOM (26 Apr - 26 May 47) from C. E. Read, Maj, Inf, Hq, CIC Center, Holabird Signal Depot, Balto. 19, Md, dtd 5 Jun 47, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

61 The full curriculum of the European Command Intel School's course for CIC agents is included as Appendix 4.

[redacted]

and they were selected for duty either with one of the Regional teams or in one of the Field offices.[62]

Instruction in the German language based on the "Berlitz conversational method" was also provided to agents at the Region level. Under provisions of the Troop Information and Education program, CIC units were authorized use of the native Germans as hired as language teachers. CIC vetted all these instructors, since they taught inside the CIC kasernes, and paid them out of the funds allotted by the Information and Education Division. When operational duties permitted, the agents received their language schooling during the daytime, but classes were also held during off duty hours.[63]

By the end of 1949, additional training at unit level included "a required amount of military training and marksmanship, recruit training, administrative training, and other training as specified in current directives."[64]

In 1950, the training at Region level was supplemented by special courses established at 66th CIC Detachment headquarters. Each course was attended by one agent from each of the 12 Regions. A five-day school in general investigative subjects was held from 14 to 18 February and a 10-day school in countersubversion, from 17 April to 27 April. Later in the year, an eight-day course in counterespionage and another course in general investigations were given. But these courses did not represent an effort to begin a permanent school for CIC agents newly arrived in Germany.[65]

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62 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

63 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

64 Hq European Command and Hq US Army Europe Annual Narrative Rpt from the 66th CIC Det, from 10 Nov to 31 Dec 1949 RG 207.03 A 52-345 (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

65 Ibid, 1950, RG 207.03 A 52-345.

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Part III: Mission, Operational Policies, and Channels of Communication

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Part III

MISSION, OPERATIONAL POLICIES, AND CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

The initial planners for counterintelligence operations in Germany had composed a mission for CIC without knowledge of what security conditions would prevail. The actual conditions required continual revision of specific CIC responsibilities as new threats to security arose and older ones disappeared. By 1949 the basic mission had envolved to the point where it could be described as follows:

"The basic mission of the 66th CIC Detachment is to protect the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany against espionage, sabotage and subversion, and to discharge such other investigative duties as may be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, EUCOM. The detachment is responsible for all counterintelligence operations of a zone-wide nature... The 66th CIC Detachment is an information gathering agency as well as an investigative agency. The primary function of its operating personnel is the collection, collation, evaluation and classification of information of counterintelligence interest for further analysis and dissemination by higher headquarters."[66]

In the fulfillment of its basic mission, the 66th CIC Detachment was charged with the following specific responsibilities:

" 1. Discover, prevent, and counter the activities of foreign intelligence services, secret police and dissident or resistance groups.

" 2. Protect U.S. interests against sabotage and investigate sabotage incidents.

" 3. Detect, prevent and neutralize subversion.

" 4. Prevent the reorganization of ex-enemy intelligence services, security and secret police and para-military organizations.

" 5. Support and assist the U.S. occupational government agencies as directed.

" 6. Conduct investigations when so directed.

" 7. Conduct security investigations when so directed.

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66 Hq European Command and Hq US Army Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from 66th CIC Det, 10 Nov 49 - 31 Dec 49, RG 207.03 A 52-345 (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

[redacted]

[redacted]

" 8. Perform interrogations and render reports with regard to scientists within the U.S. Zone.

" 9. Conduct security surveys of U.S. installations.

"10. Conduct background investigations.

"11. Furnish spot reports and coverage on any situation, incident or personality of potential security interest.

"12. Report positive intelligence information coming to CIC attention in pursuit of its normal mission.

"13. Collect and evaluate positive military order of battle intelligence outside the US occupied areas of Germany as directed."

It was on the basis of these requirements that CIC formulated primary operational objectives at headquarters.[67]

Operational Objectives

The four desks under the Case Section at headquarters were given specific objectives in addition to their role in the over-all mission of the 66th CIC. The Counter Subversion Desk, in 1949, had as primary objectives, "Activities and personalities of left wing political parties, with special emphasis on the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD) and its counterpart in the Soviet Zone of Germany, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED)."

Attention of the Positive Intelligence Desk was centered on gathering order of battle information with regard to Soviet ground forces stationed in the Russian Zone of Germany.

The Counter Espionage Desk had, as primary targets, the detection and neutralization of Czech and Soviet espionage agents and nets that had been established in the U.S. Zone.

The continuing primary objectives of the Security Desk included hidden arms caches within the U.S. Zone, as well as gliding and glider pilots and scientists, who had been listed by the Joint Intelligence Objective Agency.

Besides the objective of the desks in the Case Section, the 66th CIC had as a primary goal in 1949, the screening of applicants for immigration to the United States

67 Ibid.

[redacted]

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under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. Under control of the Screening Section at Headquarters, a total of 61,122 visa applications had been screened by all units of the 66th CIC Detachment by the end of 1949.[68]

CIC Operational Policies

In May 1947, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center requested clarification from CIC in Germany on certain practices and policies which were followed by agents in Europe. The answers provided by the 970th CIC furnished a good view of CIC operations in general, near the midpoint of 1947.

Arrests

CIC was allowed to arrest "any person in the European Command against whom there is sufficient evidence to support a charge of espionage, sabotage, or subversion and any person within the automatic arrest categories, except such persons as enjoy diplomatic immunity." But the power of arrest became increasingly curtailed as the Occupation progressed. While initially the mere charge of "security suspect" was sufficient grounds for holding a person, by 1947, CIC was required to possess evidence that could be reasonably expected to stand up in court. The agents were required to clear with Military Government the arrest of any prominent German and had to have a "very strong case" against an American or Allied civilian employed by the Army.

At most Sub-Regional offices, the Commanding Officers required agents to submit the names of potential arrestees for their approval in advance, except under emergency conditions when a fugitive or suspect might escape during the time between request and approval.[69]

In the instructions governing arrests, each Sub-Regional chief was designated as responsible for the collection of prisoners at a central location in the Sub-Region and the evacuation of these prisoners to an Internment camp. Spectacular or over-dramatized arrests were discouraged, and all arrestees were permitted to contact their families or kin within 24 hours of arrest unless this contact would endanger the security of an operation.[70]

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68 Ibid.

69 Ltr to CO, CIC Center, Baltimore, from Hq 970th CIC Det, sgd J.H. Ratliff, Capt, MI for Earl S. Browning Jr., Maj, Inf, S-3, Subj: Directives and Information Requested by Training Division, Holabird Signal Depot, dtd 28 May 47, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

70 Ltr from Hq CIC, European Theater, Standard Operating Procedure for CIC, USF, European Theater, To: Regional CIC Chief, dtd 11 Jun 1946 with changes dtd 27 Jun 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

Such restrictions resulted in a tremendous decrease in the number of arrests made by the agents as compared with the denazification period. Automatic arrest categories, which still included the leadership corps of the Nazi Party, members of the SS down to low noncommissioned officer levels, and former agents of the Gestapo and SD had been fairly well depleted of arrestees. With the exception of rare swoop operations designed to break up underground organizations in one synchronized seizure, CIC made "only a handful of arrests."

Limitations on the length of time any arrestee could be detained were fairly loose. Warrants and Habeas Corpus had not been introduced in Germany in 1947, and it remained for intelligence authorities to keep a close check on detention reports to see that prisoners were held only during the period of investigation and preparation for their trials. A special arrangements with the Russians, known as the Clay-Sokolovsky Agreement, specified that citizens of the United States and the USSR would be turned back by arresting authorities of either country to their own countries within one week of the apprehension. But no CIC prisoners could be held incommunicado more than 24 hours unless special permission to do so had been received from 970th headquarters.

Surveillances

Within Germany, the "loose" type of surveillance was most generally used by CIC with an agent trailing a suspect by automobile or on foot. Due to the shortage of CIC personnel and the fact that Germany was a foreign country, a great deal of the routine surveillances were performed by informants. The CIC agents, however, had to be thoroughly familiar with surveillance methods so that they could brief their "shadows," mingle with them to give further instructions, and take over the surveillance at a crucial point when a break in the case was expected.

Surveillances of houses and offices, generally from a building across from the target area, were common, since CIC agents could enter houses in Germany without a search warrant to establish their coverage. Used to a lesser extent were technical surveillances through telephone taps and microphones planted in strategic places.

Covert Operations

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Interrogations

In the interrogation of German civilians, CIC agents were strongly advised to assume a friendly rather than a militant attitude. The reasoning behind this advice was based on several observations:

"Use of psychology in interrogating Germans is enormously important because of their generally uniform behavior. They all tend to feel very sorry for themselves, thus paving the way for disarming them by clever sympathy; they love to be flattered with their success in obtaining positions of importance; and their characteristic of dog-like obedience makes it possible for the interrogator to shift from them to someone higher, thus eliciting from them (in their innocence) the true story of their past. Their obedience also invariably makes them succumb to any order to tell their story and once they are started talking one of the important battles of interrogation is won. Rare indeed are the Germans of the 'I-ain't-sayin'-nothing-see-my-lawyer' school. Once they have become confused the injection of firm orders will often start the obedient German on the way to 'breaking.' Thus the militant approach may be held in reserve for certain types of Germans and for occasional psychological opportunities which present themselves during an interrogation."[71]

Informants in Germany

The informants that CIC utilized in Germany did not differ in type or employment from the informants used by any intelligence agency anywhere in the world. During the first ten months of the Occupation, when the agents were concentrating primarily on rounding up automatic arrestees, the average CIC informant was a denouncer, who would reveal the names and addresses of local Nazis. CIC, in general, had little difficulty finding these denouncers; in almost every community, there were malcontents from the Nazi regime who were only too glad to assist the organization which they believed to be the "American Gestapo." When opportunists

71 Ltr to CO, CIC Center, Baltimore, from Hq 970th CIC Det sgd J. H. Ratliff, Capt, MI, for Earl S. Browning, Jr, Maj, Inf, S-3, Subj: Directives and Information Requested by Training Division, Holabird Signal Depot, dtd 28 May 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

and embittered individuals failed to come forth in a given area, CIC could usually locate a churchman or an individual who had been blacklisted by the Nazis.[72]

But when the American forces in Germany settled into a long range occupation role, it became apparent that CIC would have to maintain informants in every sphere of activity which even remotely affected the security of the Occupation. This meant that CIC needed coverage not only of German groups and organizations, but also of the Displaced Persons camps which had become breeding grounds of Soviet espionage.

Wherever possible, CIC selected its informants from the higher economic and social levels. Business and professional people with a good educational background could often be used with more flexibility than informants drawn from the lower classes. But again the governing factors in the selection of an informant for a particular assignment were the conditions that the assignment entailed.

The CIC agents found that there were some informants who were sincerely interested in working for the Americans and that the idea of helping to build a new Germany attracted sincere idealists. Frequently, the motive of the "ideological" informant was a negative one: an intense hatred of the Communists and the Soviet Union rather than any particular fondness toward the American Occupation. The average German liked the Russians "not at all."

But the run-of-the-mill informant chose to assist CIC because of the compensation he knew would accrue from his efforts. Living conditions for the Germans during the early years of the Occupation were lean, and the thought of obtaining food, coffee, cigarettes, soap, and other precious commodities lured many potential informants to the CIC offices.

In selecting informants, CIC agents had to adopt the rule of thumb of the "right man for the right job." At times, this meant that former Gestapo agents and other individuals with Nazi backgrounds had to be utilized, since they were the only ones who could develop the desired information.

When an individual informant who had been of considerable service to CIC found himself in jeopardy as a result of giving aid to American Intelligence, CIC made every effort to help the erstwhile informant to emigrate to the United States or South America. But CIC could issue no blanket guarantees to its key informants that they could be extricated from the difficulties which might develop.

In dealing with informants, CIC agents usually maintained direct contact. Only the tried-and-true informants could be met in safe houses; the less trusted

72 Interview with former Special Agent Paul Funk at NCICA convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 6 Aug 1955.

[redacted]

One criticism of CIC operations in dealing with informants was made in a Bremen hospital by a Communist Party leader to a man who later reported the comments back to CIC. This leader stated that CIC agents were rotated too speedily for any continuity of operations. After a given CIC agent had built up a circle of informants, he was frequently transferred or replaced by another agent who had never worked with the particular informant net. The breach in continuity of operations gave a decided advantage to the group under surveillance.



73 Interviews with Lt Edward H. Quarles at BOQ, Fort George G. Meade, Md, on 26 May 1945; and Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 7 Aug 1955.

(C) 74 File on Potrykus, Folkert, KPD Leader in Bremerhaven, Dossier No. 65653, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

Technical Specialist Section

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75 Ltr to CO, CIC Center, Baltimore, from Hq 970th CIC Det, sgd J.H. Ratliff, Capt, MI, for Earl S. Browning, Jr, Maj, Inf, S-3, Subj: Directives and Information Requested by Training Division, Holabird Signal Depot, dtd 28 May 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

76 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 55.

[redacted]

77 Returnee interview with Capt Maurice J. Kennedy, who served with CIC in Germany from 1947-1951, undtd (Conf) Army Intell Board, Army Intell Center, Ft Holabird.

[redacted]

78 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former Opns Officer of the 970th, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955.

[redacted]

79 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., 7 Aug 1955.

[redacted]

Channels of Communication

[redacted] Although the 970th's collection effort was largely directed from the headquarter's Operations Officer's desk, there was a staff section at Theater G2 which supervised the activities of CIC in Germany. Variously labelled the Counter Intelligence Branch and the Operations Branch during the reorganizations of the Theater Command structure, this staff section controlled CIC target selection in specifics only.[81]

[redacted] Members of the 66th Detachment in 1950 had criticized the lack of guidance from the staff section, whose members seemed to have no uniform or purposeful concept relative to how G2 should employ the capabilities of CIC. CIC targets were selected for the most part by case personnel at 66th CIC headquarters, with Theater G2 only confirming its interest in these targets. Frequent requests for collection guidance were unanswered by G2 or replied to with vague instructions.

[redacted] Since CIC was in no position to evaluate the over-all intelligence requirements of the Theater command, this situation has been characterized as "leading to effort," and as a result, certain target emphasis by the 66th may have been out of proportion to the actual needs of the command.[82]

[redacted] Despite the lack of clear cut collection requirements from Theater G2, a constant and heavy flow of reports was maintained by CIC in Germany.[83] These reports were "processed" at CIC headquarters only insofar as CIC's case personnel could review, collate and check them against CIC files and dossiers. The large volume of "raw" reports that were sent to Theater G2 could have been cut

80 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, 7 Aug 1955.

81 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former Opns O of the 970th, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

82 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intel School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

83 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

considerably, if CIC had been better informed on the intelligence needs of the command. Limiting the volume would have allowed the G2 analysts at Theater headquarters to concentrate their attention on important reports rather than having to screen piles of relatively insignificant material.[84]

Intra-CIC Dissemination

Within CIC, itself, communication and dissemination of information was a two-way affair. Target lists and leads were sent down from headquarters to the regions where Sub-Regional and Resident agents were told to participate in those targets which pertained to their area of coverage.

Prior to 1947, the 970th headquarters had organized key agent personnel into a unit known as the Production Group. These agents were given wide jurisdiction, since their principal mission was to locate potential targets and to work on long-range counterintelligence projects. Early in 1947 officers of the 970th CIC concluded that the Production Group tended to develop an elite group within the detachment that hurt CIC morale and was wasteful of the limited number of experienced agents. The Production Group was soon phased out.[85]

But CIC target coverage continued to be extensive. The regions had special squads, composed of experienced agents and good linguists, who handled penetrations, neutralizations and other assignments on a zone-wide basis.

More information was dug up at Regional and lower levels than the requirements of headquarters specified, and these echelons were allowed to develop new findings to the point where a case became clearly indicated. At this point, headquarters was notified and a request was made for full scale coverage, including personnel and funds to carry out a major investigation.[86]

Although lateral communication between regions was permitted by CIC headquarters, situations had developed in the early years of the Occupation where the tendency of some Regional commanders to rule their areas as autonomous units had throttled this lower echelon communication. Cases of informants passing the same information to several CIC regions were not unusual, and coordination of operations was seriously impaired. With the revisions of CIC

84 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intel School, Fort Holabird, 26 Sep 1955.

85 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former Opns O of the 970th, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

86 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson, Ibid.

[redacted]

operations in 1947, lateral communications among lower echelon units was strongly encouraged, and this policy helped to remedy the previously unsatisfactory set-up.[87]

Communications from Sub-Regional and Resident agents that were intended for CIC headquarters always passed through Region, but there was considerable exchange of information between Resident agents and Sub-Regional offices on matters which were strictly local in character.[88]

Reporting

CIC in Germany carried out its information gathering and reporting mission like a newspaper office. Three major forms of written communication were used by Resident agents and Sub-Regional agents to forward collected information.

Spot reports were prepared on meetings, border incidents and similar matters of immediate interest. These reports were sent to Region and then CIC headquarters when the subject covered was of sufficient significance to zone-wide CIC operations. Since dissemination of information to other American agencies such as State Department was an integral part of the CIC mission, a standard question to be answered on spot reports was "Who else has been notified?" The spot reports required a follow up from the original source.

Agent reports were the standard form of communication and were used, in ordinary circumstances, to report the results of investigations and other CIC actions by agents in the field.

A third form of report was the sub-regional weekly summary which pointed up indications on trends, security problems, and cases of interest to Regional headquarters. These weekly summaries were based on reports prepared by the Resident agents on the situation in their respective Kreise. Once a week, a meeting was held at Sub-Region of all these Resident agents for the exchange of information.

In addition to the written reports which CIC agents prepared, communication from Sub-Regional offices could be made via the extensive teletype system of the 970th. Telephones were also utilized for hasty communication between Sub-Region and Region. Classified information could be transmitted over telephones through the use of codes that were frequently changed to prevent compromise. Key CIC

87 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former Opns O of the 970th, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

88 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson, Ibid.

[redacted]

personnel were given code names in order to baffle potential wire tappers and these aliases were switched at short intervals.[89]

From Region to Headquarters

The reports which were received at Regional offices were passed on to headquarters with an indorsement and, at times, a Summary of Information attached. Armed CIC couriers gathered the reports from Regions and took them by train to CIC headquarters.[90]

In addition, headquarters was kept informed by the Regions through Weekly Reports that covered principal counterintelligence news which could be reported under protection of a "Secret" classification. On 26 December 1946, a letter from 970th headquarters ordered the Regions also to prepare tri-weekly Top Secret summaries dealing with highly sensitive cases. Among the topics considered in these summaries were "Soviet Intelligence Which Affects U.S. Interests in the U.S. Zone of Germany," "Intelligence Activity of Other Countries Which Affects U.S. Interests in the U.S. Zone of Germany," and "Pro-Soviet German Activity Which Affects U.S. Interests in the U.S. Zone of Germany."[91]

Processing the Reports at Headquarters

Reports from the Regions arrived at the headquarters Operations Section and were parcelled out to the various desks for processing. Typical of the headquarters' handling of the reports was the procedure at the Counter Subversion Desk in 1950.

Each of the case officers assigned to the Counter Subversion desk specialized in a particular element of the German political spectrum. CIC coverage was divided along Left and Right Wing lines, the predominant backing of the parties determining to which political wing they were allotted. When a case officer received a report, he studied its contents and drew up an initial check sheet, indicating what to extract from file checks of dossiers that pertained to the subject matter to the report. He also suggested possible cross references of the material to other dossiers.

89 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.
90 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan at Fort Holabird on 6 Oct 1955.
91 Top Secret Tri-Weekly CIC Region I Rpt from Hq CIC Region I, 970th CIC Det, dtd 29 Apr 1947, (downgraded to Conf) (Cen Rec Fac). Examples of other Tri-Weekly and Weekly CIC Reports from Regions in Germany are contained in the Central CIC Files, (Cen Rec Fac).

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The Case noncommissioned officer who worked with the Case Officer was responsible for the "look up" on the dossiers that had been indicated. He also could follow through on other file material which he believed to bear on the information in the report. When the raw material had been assembled, the Case Officer would draft a complete report and, when necessary, submit new EEI's for collection in the field. From this point, the cycle of information gathering and reporting would begin again.

Counter Subversion team commanders at Region level received reports and requests directly from the Counter Subversion Desk at headquarters. Similarly, spot reports forwarded from Region received immediate, direct replies from headquarters containing the information required for further investigation.[92] The well-defined channels of communication within the 66th CIC Detachment which had been achieved by 1950 enabled CIC to perform political reporting of a highly professional character.[93]

Publications at Headquarters

Some of the problems that beset the 970th during the first two years of Occupation could be traced to the lack of firm direction from headquarters. In an effort to raise the level of knowledge and technique among the agents, headquarters began to publish an Orientation and Guidance Report. Issued periodically, this Top Secret publication was intended to help the less qualified and experienced personnel discharge routine CIC responsibilities, freeing the highly qualified agents for sensitive operations.[94]

These Orientation and Guidance Reports covered current operational missions in detail, providing background material to fill out the picture for the agent. They eventually were divided into six sections: Political Subversion, Active Subversion and Security Control, and Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern European Activity.[95]

Another publication designed to establish and enforce uniform operations and discipline within the 970th was the Standard Operating Procedures, Operational,

92 Interview with CWO A. E. Wolfe, Army Intel Center, Fort Holabird, 21 Sep 1955.

93 Interview with Maj William Fedor, former Chief, Counter Subversion Office, Hq 66th CIC Group, Army Intell School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

94 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former Opns O of the 970th at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

95 Hq European Command and Hq, US Army Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from the 66th CIC Det, from 10 Nov to 31 Dec 1949, RG 207.03 A 52-345, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

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which was first issued in June 1946, and was completely revised in March 1948 and again in November 1949. Field CIC personnel were given detailed information in this secret publication on such subjects as investigation, liaison, informants evidence, correspondence, and the preparation and use of files.[96]

Both the SOP and the Orientation and Guidance Report contributed significantly to the centralization and standardization of CIC operations in Germany that was initiated in 1947.[97]

In December 1948, the Operations Section at the detachment headquarters first prepared a CIC Target Survey to expedite efficient coverage in the Regions. Classified Top Secret, this publication contained the specific targets of the detachment within the major field of activity, the priorities assigned by headquarters, and a list of Regions to which each target pertained. Revised in June 1949, the Target Survey came to include, as an annex, the priorities for CIC coverage requested by the Research and Analysis Branch, Intelligence Division, which were to be used in conjunction with the EEI's in the Orientation and Guidance Report.

A new publication was issued from headquarters on 18 March 1949 when the Bi-Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary made its first appearance. Prepared by the Reports Section, this publication replaced the Bi-Weekly Counter Intelligence Reports which previously had been drawn up by each Region.

Classified as Secret, the Summary contained from 30 to 50 mimeographed pages of carefully edited and condensed items, culled from bi-weekly Regional reports for their timeliness and counterintelligence interest. Each item was given a headline caption, a Region credit line, and an evaluation. The Bi-Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary was divided into sections as follows:

General Summary
Political--left wing, right wing
Soviet--intelligence activity, counterintelligence
European--Czech, Polish, Yugoslav, and/or other
Security--internal security, US Zone counterintelligence, rumors
Annexes--screening statistics, case statistics, personalities
Special articles

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96 Ibid.

97 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns O, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

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One hundred twenty-five copies of each Bi-Weekly Summary were published; 48 were distributed to field echelons of the detachment for information, guidance, and training; 58 went through EUCOM to non-CIC agencies; and the remainder were retained by headquarters.[98]

Central Registry in the Communication System

Since CIC's reporting function in Germany was performed like a newspaper service, the role of the Central Registry was similar to a newspaper's 'morgue' where records are maintained.

By 1950 the files in the Central Registry had considerable information and dossiers on all persons and organizations that had come to the attention of counterintelligence agencies. Among the subjects on file in the Central Registry were: subversion, sabotage, espionage, Naziism, criminality, U.S. interest, war crimes, border violations, and black market involvements.[99] The Central Registry proved to be one of CIC's greatest assets in Germany. Without it, the Corps would have been unable to operate with any significant degree of success. It came to be utilized, under CIC control, by all U.S. intelligence agencies in Germany.[100]

Berlin Document Center

Besides the CIC Central Registry, the members of the CIC had access to records at the Berlin Document Center. Early in the Occupation, a Military Government officer in Berlin, upon receipt of a message that valuable papers were stored in a Munich paper mill,[101] hastened to Munich where he discovered a great quantity of water soaked documents which proved to be the individual records of the members of the Nazi Party and its auxiliaries.

The records were shipped to Berlin, and the Document Center was established for the specific purpose of sorting out and indexing the papers. The file in Berlin made it virtually impossible for Military Government registrants to falsify Fragebogens, and gave CIC an invaluable source for background checks. The

98 Hq European Command and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt from the 66th CIC Det, from 10 Nov to 31 Dec 1949, RG 207.03 A 52-345, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

99 "First and probably last draft, Process of CIC Investigations of Displaced Persons for inclusion in Program," prepared for Congressional Committee Hearing, unsigned, undtd, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

100 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intel School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

101 These papers had been found by a CIC agent; See this Chapter, Part I, 45th CIC Det.

records indicated the "careful Nazi search for evidence of loyalty, including investigation of ancestry which was convincing proof that few were forces to join the Nazi Party; that, in fact, it was difficult to become a member.[102]

CIC also gained valuable help from local police files which, due to the German penchant for official records, provided extensive background reports on individuals, particularly in reference to criminal activities.[103]

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102 Clay, Lucius D., Decision in Germany, Garden City, New York, 1950.
103 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intelligence School Bldg, Fort Holabird, Sep 1955.



104 Returnee Rpt of Maj George L. Wilson, who served with CIC in Germany from Sep 1946 until Sep 1950, dtd 3 Oct 1950, (Conf) (Army Intel Board, Army Intel Cen, Fort Holabird).

105 Returnee Rpt of Capt William E. Larned, Jr, who served in Germany from Nov 1946 until Apr 1950, dtd 5 Jul 1950, (Secret) (Army Intel Board, Army Intel Cen, Fort Holabird).

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Part IV: Major CIC Operations

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Part IV

MAJOR CIC OPERATIONS

To chronicle all CIC operations during the Occupation of Germany would require a multi-volumed history. During the years of the "cold war" in Europe, the activities of CIC reached into many fields, from the gathering of positive intelligence about the USSR and its satellites among the Baltic and Balkan countries to the investigation of black market activities within the U.S. Zone. Throughout this period, CIC had to maintain a close watch over the maneuvering of foreign espionage agents and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) which often served as a thinly-veiled front for subversion.

Certain aspects of the CIC operations in Germany were performed without major variations during the period from 1946 through 1950. Relatively few investigations, other than those involving American military and civilian personnel, were undertaken personally by CIC agents. The obvious barriers of language, customs, and appearance ruled out direct investigation by the American agents in many operations. The bulk of the information relative to the attitudes of the German people, the economic, political, social, and labor situations, the development and spread of unfavorable propaganda, and the organization and objectives of subversive or potentially subversive groups was received through widespread informant networks that reached into all levels of the German society. The role of individual agents was primarily the directing of informants' activities towards the established targets and the checking and evaluation of the information which was produced against the data received from other sources.

In matters dealing with the internal security of the Occupation forces, CIC agents handled all phases of investigations. A thorough screening of all indigenous personnel who were to be utilized by the Army in positions which could involve access to classified information was a key responsibility. Frequent security surveys of vital installations within the U.S. Zone had to be performed in order to keep commanders advised about the adequacy of their safeguards, and Army personnel were kept abreast about the security requirements through lectures and demonstrations given by CIC agents.

Somewhat more specialized missions given CIC in Germany included the screening of "War Brides" and, later, Displaced Persons seeking admission to the United States. Although these activities could be classified as "routine," the number of cases involved taxed heavily the limited group of CIC agents available to handle them.

While the largely quiet struggle against Russian espionage was a most persistent and time-consuming CIC mission, the position of American troops as occupiers of a once hostile country could not be forgotten. On the whole, the

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U.S. Zone appeared to be "unusually apathetic and docile;" to what extent this lack of resistance to the Occupation was due to a sense of futility cannot be determined. But the presence of an alert American security force certainly deterred those Germans whose will to "carry on the fight" had not been crushed by defeat. In those instances where latent Naziism was demonstrated, CIC took quick action to apprehend the guilty persons. But a greater proportion of CIC effort was expended to prevent hostile acts from being committed, by dissolving conspiracies before they had jelled. Meetings were broken up, contraband arms were confiscated, and suspect underground leaders were kept under close and constant surveillance.

The scope of CIC activities inevitably resulted in a huge case load for the 970th CIC and its agents. During a typical three-month period, January through April 1948, the 1100 agents of the 970th CIC turned out 24,000 cases of all varieties, a performance which was lauded as "an outstandingly high production average for any investigative agency...attained not through use of E. Phillips Oppenheim methods, but through the intelligent exercise of routine controls, the exhaustive searching of available documents, and the vigorous exploitation of informants as well as a complete disregard for the conventional 40-hour week enjoyed by the bulk of the Army."[106]

106 Lecture given by Maj L. C. Hill, Strategic Intell Sch, 16 Jun 1948, (Conf) Copy of text in Staff and Faculty Library.

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Section 1

DE-NAZIFICATION

Although counterintelligence operations in Germany were geared for a long haul by mid 1946, there were still numerous "mopping up" operations to be completed.

Automatic Arrests

The prime CIC mission still remained the apprehension of former Nazis who were on automatic arrest lists. Many Nazis had slipped through the original CIC screening operations; the vastness of the undertaking, the shortage of CIC agents, and the confused CIC structure before the reorganizations of late 1945 all contributed to the situation. But more significant than any of these factors was the inherent difficulty of trying to locate persons who had taken advantage of the upheavals and dislocations in Germany which followed the war.

Records furnished by the Berlin Document Center proved invaluable in the search for individuals who had gone into hiding in the small villages. CIC in Stuttgart furnished local German police with the names of former Nazis. Prime considerations in determining the importance of a wanted individual were Party rank and position.

The majority of informants who wished to expose former Nazis went directly to the German police, although some denouncers came to CIC. Neighbors did not hesitate to inform on suspicious persons in their home areas, a habit which has been attributed to the "German instinct for legality." The average German did not consider the ethical basis of his action so much as the legal principle behind it. But the informants provided a number of false leads; one estimate placed the number of suspects actually proven to be Nazis as low as 10 percent.[107] The actual motive for denunciation ranged widely, but the hope of rewards such as food, cigarettes, and soap was usually present.

In the actual arrest procedure, CIC agents generally accompanied the German police. Suspects were apprehended at their homes, and H-Hour was generally designated as 0300 hours, a time at which the individual was most likely to be in bed, surprised, and unprepared to offer resistance or attempt to escape.

The search for former Nazis was not bounded by any set deadline. CIC had to trace down the merest rumors concerning the whereabouts of individuals like Martin Bormann who seemed to have vanished entirely. In late 1947, high on the

107 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at BOQ, Ft George G. Meade, Md, on 26 May 1955.

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list of Nazis still at large were Gertrude Scholz-Klink and SS Obergruppenfuehrer August Heissmeyer. Frau Scholz-Klink had been the leader of Nazi women, carrying the title of Reichfrauenschaft while Heissmeyer had been the director of several special schools of the Nazi Party and had been directly responsible to the chief of the SS, Heinrich Himmler. For some time, it had been believed that these two individuals had been killed in the bomb-proof shelter of the Chancellory near the end of the war. But, in August 1947, a CIC agent in Stuttgart was informed of persistent rumors that Scholz-Klink was still alive and had been recognized by some of the townspeople.

Other CIC contacts were tapped. The rumors seemed to swell. But a CIC informant assigned to discover the source of the rumors was stymied for several months. In early January, the first break in the case occurred. The informant discovered that a woman in Stuttgart had been visited by a "Mr. and Mrs. Stuckenbrock," whom she believed to be, in reality, Frau Scholz-Klink and a Bernhard Rust, former Reichsminister of Science, Education and National Culture.

On the basis of this scant lead, CIC instituted a widespread dragnet for the couple. Cities in Southern Germany were combed for clues. The closest CIC could come to the heart of the case was determining several places in the French Zone which had been visited by the daughter of Scholz-Klink. Investigations of these residences failed to produce any additional leads to Scholz-Klink, herself.

On 27 February 1948 a CIC informant who had been assigned to the case reported that a woman believed to be Scholz-Klink had visited a former Franuenschaft official in Internment Camp No. 75 near Stuttgart. Through an informant in the internment camp, this report was verified and CIC was told that Scholz-Klink was living in Castle Bellingen, near Tuebengen, in the French Zone of Occupation.

This was the most precise information CIC had acquired, but a search of the designated castle failed to reveal even a trace of the missing woman. CIC hurriedly returned to the internee-informant to recheck the date. This time the agents learned that the informant had overheard Scholz-Klink describe the house in which she had been living. The description matched the appearance of a small house located on the grounds of another Castle near Tuebingen.

After midnight on 28 February CIC agents, accompanied by French and Stuttgart police, went to the house and knocked loudly upon the door. At first, there was no response. Finally, after prolonged rapping, a woman answered, but told the agents that she would not open the door. When the woman was informed that a party of police officers was outside, she realized that any further stalling would be useless. The door swung open, revealing a woman garbed in disheveled peasant's night clothing. Her face was haggard and lined; her hair

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spread in disorderly fashion over her shoulders. She appeared to be a woman of 60, far older than Scholz-Klink who was only in her mid-forties. But, based on photographs of Scholz-Klink, a CIC agent recognized the woman despite her appearance.

Without pausing to confirm Scholz-Klink's identity, the agents inquired about her husband. Scholz-Klink, unaware that she had been spotted, pointed out a room in which a man was still sleeping, undisturbed by the noise about him. Expecting to find Bernhard Rust, the agents were surprised when the man in the bed did not match Rust's description. Instead, "Mr. Stuckenbrock" was August Heissmeyer, who, when awakened and questioned, admitted that he had been Scholz-Klink's husband since 1940.

The agents returned to Scholz-Klink and began a brief interrogation. The woman violently denied her identity until confronted by a photograph of herself. Both prisoners were subjected to a careful search. Frau Scholz-Klink possessed several pieces of fine jewelry, and the cash assets of the two amounted to about 1,200 Reichmark. More important was the search of Heissmeyer. This revealed, hidden in the lining of his vest, a brass cartridge containing a glass ampule of potassium-cyanide poison. A further search of the house disclosed two knapsacks packed with heavy clothing and other necessities, evidently kept in readiness for a hasty departure. The speed with which CIC had acted once the agents had caught the trail of Scholz-Klink had prevented the couple from burying themselves even more deeply from counterintelligence view.[108]

"Axis Sally" is Caught

Among the Americans who had sided with the Nazi Regime during the war was Mildred Gillars, known to American troops who had heard her broadcasts for the German Rundfunk as "Axis Sally" and "Berlin Gerty." Gillars had come to Germany in 1934 and had remained there throughout the war, presenting her services to the Nazi propaganda machine. Her broadcasts consisted of programs designed to weaken the morale of the American forces in the European Theater; among the titles of her talks were "Home Sweet Home," "Christmas Bells," and "Easter Bells."

Representatives of the Department of Justice in Berlin were assigned the task of gathering data on which to prosecute Gillars for treason. The problem, by the Spring of 1946, was to locate the woman. On 4 March 1946, Berlin Region

108 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles, at BOQ, Ft George G. Meade, Md., on 26 May 1955; also, "Case of Scholz-Klink," 7970th CIC Group, as reported in CIC History, 1945-1948, Section III, Germany, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

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CIC was asked by the Justice Department men to accomplish the job. Rumors had been intercepted that she had been seen in Berlin-Wedding on 1 March.

CIC agents started on the case. Indications soon developed that Gillars was indeed in the Berlin area, residing illegally without identification papers under an assumed name and securing her livelihood from black market activities. As a means of obtaining money, Gillars was purported to be selling her property which she had formerly distributed in the homes of her friends who lived in almost every sector of the city.

The CIC men working on the case felt that as soon as places could be found where such property was stored for safekeeping or for sale, the trail would lead directly to Gillars.

A neighborhood check was run at Gillar's former residence in Bonnerstrasse. The agents discovered that Gillars had left there in May 1945, just before the fall of Berlin. Several manuscripts, phonograph records, pictures, and Gillars' American passport were found and retained for trial evidence. But there were no clues as to the woman's whereabouts.

The next step was to interview former colleagues of Gillars from her Rundfunk days. These interrogations disclosed that Gillars had visited some of these ex-colleagues since May 1945 and picked up or deposited items of property which she intended to sell. From the questionings, CIC learned certain aspects of the woman's strategy, behavior and habits. Gillars made a point of never revealing to her acquaintances data on her residence or even the names of other people she visited.

By this time, it became apparent to CIC that Gillars might have to be caught in the act of calling upon a person holding her property, and German police were placed in the homes of all her friends.

The fact that Gillars lived in Berlin was further substantiated during CIC's investigations by reports that she had been in restaurants, beauty shops, and other stores. The places she most commonly visited were purported to be in the Kurfurstendamm area. Accordingly CIC decided to intensify its coverage of this district. With thoroughness agents combed the commercial shops in Kurfrustendamm until an antique store was located which contained a piece of furniture believed to belong to Gillars.

A witness familiar with Gillars' furnishings was brought to the store and definitely established the piece in question as Gillars' property. The name and address of the person who had left the piece for sale was determined from the dealer, and this person was picked up for questioning. It was obvious that this seller knew Gillars' address but considerable "coaxing" was required to make him reveal it.

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On 15 March, a Special agent and a member of the Zehlendorf Kriminalkommissariat Liaison went to Gillars' apartment. When they arrived, Gillars was not in and the two men waited. After three hours, the erstwhile "Axis Sally" returned to her apartment and was immediately placed under arrest.[109]

Gillars was eventually tried, convicted of treason, and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for her activities on behalf of the German Propaganda Ministry. In a press interview following her arrest, Gillars remarked, "I will take off my hat to U.S. investigators. They certainly knew a lot about me."[110]

109 "Annex A" to CIC Weekly Rpt No. 17 for Week Ending 23 Mar 1946, Region VIII (Berlin), (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac)

110 Case of Mildred Gillars, 7970th CIC Group, as reported in CIC Hist, 1945-1948, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

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Section 2

INTERNAL SUBVERSION

The work of rounding up former Nazis proceeded slowly and painstakingly with occasional dramatic discoveries as in the Scholz-Klink and Heissmeyer case. But the vigilance against the rebirth of German nationalism had to be continuous. In general, the attitude of the Germans was "resigned" and "not too friendly," and as the winter of 1946-1947 approached, the civilians became apprehensive. The storehouses of basic supplies had been emptied, the lands were not yet producing new foodstuffs and famine was feared.[111]

Two major CIC cases that developed in the late fall of 1946 could be classed as signs of Neo-Nazi subversion.

The "Deutshe Ringpfadfinder Case"

In August 1946, a local German official appeared at the CIC field office in Hof, Region VI, and showed an agent several letters which he had received from a Munich resident by the name of Karl Jochheim Armin. From his writings, it appeared that Armin was unhappy with the present situation in Germany and wanted to revive an old organization, known in the 1930's as the Swarze Front.

The CIC agent forwarded these findings to Region IV, so that agents in the Munich office could open an investigation of Armin's activities. By October 1946 it had been determined by CIC that Armin was a former inmate of the Dachau Internment Enclosure, but that he was now free and residing in Munich. CIC also discovered that Armin was currently co-chief of an organization entitled "Die Vergessenen," composed of former concentration camp inmates who had been confined for criminal rather than political reasons.

Through a background investigation conducted by a German private detective agency, it was learned that despite Armin's claim to have been placed in concentration camp for political activities, he had been sentenced six times between 1933 and 1946 for theft, embezzlement, illegal possession of weapons, fraud, violation of traffic laws, forgery of documents, and concealment of stolen goods. In addition, Armins had served nine days in jail in September 1946 for failure to obey a Military Government order to cease his activities in "Die Vergessenen," for which Military Government had not granted a license.

This brought the records of Herr Armin up to date. Although nothing of counterintelligence interest appeared in the man's past, CIC decided to keep him

111 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, 26 May 1955.

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under periodic surveillance. By early November, agents discovered that Armin was organizing a youth group known as the "Deutsche Ringpfadfinder" (German Boy Scouts). Armin applied to Military Government for a license for this group, but the request was denied and Armin was told to discontinue his youth activities, under pain of legal action. CIC soon learned that Armin intended to disregard this order.

At this point, the agents decided to insert a penetration informant into the organization. A reliable informant, briefed by CIC, gained membership in the Ringpfadfinder without difficulty. On 12 November CIC received the first report from the informant; the organization consisted of about 180 members of ages ranging between 10 and 24 years, broken down into groups of from 10 to 20 youths each. The leaders of the groups had weekly meetings in a small beer hall near the Munich railroad station. Financial support for the organization was gained from the sale on the black market of items which were obtained by Ringpfadfinder members through petty thievery.

The undercover CIC informant gained the confidence of Armin, who told him that, since the license for the group had been denied, he planned to carry on without Military Government sanction. He intended to select about 40 members from the organization, with the minimum age of 14 years to form an elite group known as "The Assault Commandos." Their special mission would be to beat up enemies of the Ringpfadfinders, with their number one target the Youth Commissioner of Munich.

It was clear to CIC that any pretensions the group might have had of being a Boy Scout movement were fast disappearing and the Ringpfadfinder was becoming an underground, subversive organization. On the night of 19 November, the penetration informant attended a meeting of the top leaders of the movement when plans were discussed to ready the group for armed battle against the Occupation troops on the theory that the time was approaching when there would be a revolution, hunger strikes, and the inevitable collision between the Western Powers and Russia. Armin revealed his plan for a secret laboratory for preparing bombing materials and forging papers.

The informant noticed that several of the leaders at this secret meeting were armed with small caliber automatic weapons, and were told by the "weapons ordnance man" for the Ringpfadfinder, a man named Alois Lechardt, of a quantity of weapons and blasting material concealed by the gang. This arsenal, alleged Lechardt, consisted of machine guns, rifles, hand grenades, fragment bombs, and bazooka shells which were buried near a restaurant in a Munich park. Lechardt further claimed there were about 20 Stuka bombs concealed near Augsberg.

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(U) On 23 November the activities of the Ringpfadfinder rose above the petty thievery scale. Four armed members of the organization attempted a burglary on a factory office in Munich. The men were surprised by a German watchman, several shots were exchanged, and the next day, police, acting on descriptions of the would-be robbers, rounded them up. Among the prisoners was Lechardt, the "weapons ordnance man" of the Ringpfadfinder.

CIC decided that this would be an ideal opportunity to determine the location of the weapons caches, and the informant, whom Lechardt still thought to be a loyal member of the group, contacted the prisoner in jail and secured a detailed drawing from him of the hiding places. CIC agents immediately attempted to locate the caches from the map; they were unsuccessful, but they did learn that Armin's men were also trying to find the arsenals.

The penetration informant, who continued to develop reports for CIC, learned that Armin possessed about 100 blank detective identity cards, carrying a fictitious organization's name and signed by a "J. Johnson." Armin apparently distributed these cards to his most trusted lieutenants and sometimes sold them to men he hoped to bring into the organization. The card holders, posing as detectives, were able to raid black marketeers operating in Munich and to relieve them of their merchandise. This contraband was then resold on the black market for the benefit of the Ringpfadfinder.

On 7 December, German police arrested a man in Munich for the possession of two of these false identity cards. Under CIC interrogation, the prisoner admitted that he was a member of the Ringpfadfinder. He also stated that Armin had moved his headquarters to a new office and was operating under a cover name. The CIC web around the Ringpfadfinder drew closer when the penetration informant discovered that Armin and his gang were preparing an open letter to be sent to all important German and American authorities. In the letter was a broadside attack against the United States program for the German youth and a vicious denunciation of the chief of the Military Government-sponsored youth program in Munich. Armin apparently intended this to be the first of a series of letters, criticizing German and American agencies.

The movement was kept under close surveillance for several more weeks. On 14 January 1947, in another attempt to locate the cached weapons, a CIC agent took the "weapons ordnance" man Lechardt and another imprisoned member of the gang with him. After considerable digging, the arsenal was located. One of the bombs and all of the hand grenades were tested and found to be "alive" and usable.

CIC decided to use the weapons as bait in a trap for Armin. The agents intended to bury the weapons at a place where their penetration informant could lead Armin and his men, so that the conspirators could be arrested with the most

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incriminating evidence in their hands. But at this critical moment in the case, the Ringpfadfinder members discovered that the informant had been working for CIC. His cover was blown.

CIC still had a chance to close in on the Ringpfadfinder. Prior to his compromise, the informant had learned that Armin and his associates had planned a major robbery on 15 January. At 1730 hours on that day, a truck which was to be used to take the men to the scene of the robbery was scheduled to arrive outside Armin's residence. A CIC agent appeared at the rendezvous at the appointed time and, when the men went inside Armin's house, managed to remove the distributor cap from the truck engine. The Ringpfadfinders returned to find their vehicle stalled and had to call off the robbery.

The next morning, CIC decided that it was time to arrest the gang. Since their informant had been compromised, further undercover penetration of the movement would be difficult to arrange. Besides, Armin was undoubtedly becoming suspicious of the mysterious turn of events against the Ringpfadfinders. CIC had gathered sufficient evidence to prove conclusively the subversive nature of the organization before a Military Government court. On 16 January, CIC agents, reinforced by German police raided the Ringpfadfinder's headquarters and arrested Armin and his six top aides.

Using information which had been provided by the undercover operative, CIC had little difficulty in obtaining confessions from all the prisoners. Armin, himself, admitted to a series of robberies, possession and knowledge of weapons, and anti-American activities.

All members of the organization were turned over to the Military Government court in Munich and were tried in September 1947 on counts which included conspiracy to organize a subversive, anti-occupation group. Armin was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with lesser punishments meted out to other principals of the defunct Ringpfadfinder. Only one of Armin's key lieutenants managed to evade the tribunal; he had escaped to the Russian Zone before he could be arrested.[112]

The Spruchkammer Bombings

Another case of Neo-Nazi subversion began on the night of 21 October 1946, when CIC agents in Stuttgart received a phone call from the German police headquarters, informing them that, a half hour previously, two explosions had occurred within a 10-minute period and that sabotage was indicated.

112 "Deutsche Ringpfadfinder Case," prepared by the 7970th CIC Group, undtd, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

3758

[redacted]

CIC teams were dispatched to the scenes: one a Stuttgart Spruchkammer[113] Building; the other, an American Military Police jail. Initial investigation of the Spruchkammer building revealed that a bomb of an undetermined type had been placed outside one of the Spruchkammer rooms which was used to store records. Considerable damage to the room had been effected, but the documents were intact and no casualties had occurred since the room was empty when the bomb exploded.

After surveying the damage, CIC men interrogated, unsuccessfully, persons who had been in or near the scene at the time of the explosion; no clues as to the person or persons responsible for the blast were gained. A search of the grounds about the building yielded only a few metallic fragments which were turned over to a German ballistics expert for testing. If the culprit had left any footprints in the vicinity, they were impossible to locate because a heavy rain had soaked the ground after the explosion.

While the agents at the Spruchkammer Building were faced with a discouraging lack of evidence, CIC agents at the Military Police jail were not faring much better. Inspection of the scene of this second blast indicated that the explosives had been placed on the ground against the corner of the jail which was at the intersection of two busy streets. Little material damage had been caused by the blast and the inmates of the jail had remained quiet. A careful search of the surrounding area produced several metallic fragments similar to the pieces which had been discovered at the Spruchkammer Building, but interrogation of persons in the jail and the vicinity of the building netted no concrete clues or leads.

The morning after the explosion, while agents in Stuttgart were still puzzling over an investigative plan, another call was received from the German police. CIC was informed that at approximately 1900 hours on the previous evening, an explosion had occurred in the nearby town of Backnang at the local Spruchkammer building. Again, the small metallic fragments were scattered about the grounds, little damage to the building had occurred, and no casualties were inflicted. Several suspects, whose names had been supplied the police as being anti-American, were interrogated. All had unshakeable alibis.

The same day, a report was received by CIC from the ballistics expert to the effect that the metallic fragments found at the scene of the three explosions were pieces of a German .75 millimeter high explosive shell which, from the quantity of fuse that had been found, had evidently been rigged as a grenade. This was the only lead that CIC had to follow. The agents alerted all their informants in the Stuttgart area to join the search for any information which might bear on the case and publicly offered a reward of 100 cartons of cigarettes

113 The Spruchkammer was a German de-Nazification board, administered and operated by Germans.

[redacted]

for any clue that would lead to the arrest and conviction of a perpetrator. The German police, at the same time, held out a reward of 25,000 Reichemark for the apprehension of persons responsible for the blast.

Almost from the start, CIC had surmised that all the explosions were caused by the same person or group. The time interval between explosions had been sufficient for a single group to perform all three bombings, and there were definite similarities in modus operandi and sabotage materials. The manner in which the bombs had been placed, the type of targets selected, and the apparent aim of causing little material damage and no casualties suggested that the explosions were intended as demonstrations, presumably against the Spruchkammer proceedings.

The CIC dragnet was spread over a wide area. Army civilian censorship was placed on the alert for any suspicious communications that might give a clue to the men behind the bombings. Suspicious characters of strong nationalistic tendencies who had been brought to CIC's attention prior to the explosions were reinvestigated. CIC and German police offices were flooded with reports from well-intentioned Germans who were anxious to see the criminals brought to justice.

But all leads ended in blind alleys. On the night of 27 October, six days after the original explosions, CIC agents were upset to hear of a fourth bombing, this time the Esslingen Spruchkammer Building which was about 15 miles from Stuttgart. Immediate investigation of the scene revealed the same pattern as before; the metallic fragments left by the exploded bomb matched those of the previous blasts. But this time, two sets of footprints were found that led away from the scene, and trained police dogs were secured to follow the tracks. One set led to the Esslingen railroad station, and the other ended at the home of an individual who was able to account for every minute of his time during the period of the explosion. The agents were no nearer a solution to the case.

A number of false and frustrating leads followed for the next couple of days. At one point, the agents felt that a major break in the case had come when a farmer found two .75 millimeter shells buried beside a tree outside Stuttgart. Investigation revealed that the explosives had been placed there by an individual who was intending to use them in clearing a field of stumps. Other clues, equally unproductive continued to come to CIC's attention, but the agents moved no closer to a solution.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

At about the same time, the Chief of Police in Stuttgart received a letter from an individual claiming that he was acquainted with the mother of a man named Siegfried Kabus whom he regarded as a suspect in the bombing case.

[redacted]

Choosing to close an inescapable trap on Kabus, the agents persuaded Hummel to rejoin the Kabus organization. He was equipped with a false letter obtained from the Spruchkammer which classified him as a man accused of pro-Nazi sympathies because of his activities in the Waffen SS. Hummel then approached one of Kabus' confederates and asked to be readmitted to the organization. He was informed that Kabus was in Munich "for a rest" and would contact him at a latter date.

Immediately, the other source to Kabus was tapped. The man who had written to the Chief of Police was called in for questioning. He explained that, although he did not know Kabus' mother personally, he could bring CIC his girl friend who was acquainted with the woman. The informant's girl friend agreed to work with CIC, provided her identity was protected. She was given some money to aid Kabus' mother financially and thus gain her confidence.

The girl proved effective. She informed CIC that Kabus had an "unusual attachment" to his mother and that they met several times a week. She also had discovered that Kabus had met someone recently whom he did not trust and expected to be betrayed by this man. He had planned to leave Stuttgart for a while.

CIC could afford to wait no longer. They had hoped to gain more information about Kabus' confederates before making the arrest, but the news of the man's imminent departure from Stuttgart convinced them to act quickly.

On the night of 19 November, teams of CIC agents surrounded the house in Stuttgart where Kabus had been living. On a signal from the raid commander, the men, with guns drawn, broke into the house through doors and windows. Ranged along a dining room table were Kabus and some of his collaborators, taken completely by surprise. They were caught in the act of manufacturing more of their homemade bombs.

Later interrogation revealed that the conspirators were planning two more bombings. CIC had managed to act at an opportune moment. When the round-up of all members of the gang was complete, a total of 12 persons had been apprehended. The arsenal spread among the houses of the collaborators included 11 pistols with 200 rounds of ammunition; 4 German .75 millimeter shells, two of which were complete with fuses; several lengths of delayed action fuses; and a number of detonators.

An agent who participated in the arrest of Kabus did not consider the man to be a representative voice of Germany. He was a Nazi fanatic whose avowed intention was to intimidate the Spruchkammer in the hope that the Americans would take over the de-Nazification proceedings since he considered it "a criminal disgrace for Germans to be the servile tools of an enemy who had conquered them by foul means."[114]

Another Fanatic

CIC agents in Stuttgart encountered few other diehards like Kabus. On one occasion in early 1947, the CIC office received a report on a man who had been seen walking the streets in broad daylight wearing an SS colonel's uniform. An agent was dispatched to the man's home where he found a one-armed individual who arrogantly demanded an explanation for the arrest of a man of his importance. When questioned about the uniform he had worn, the man stated it was specially

114 "Stuttgart Bombings" from 7970th CIC Group, as reported in Basic CIC History, 1945-1948 and Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at Fort George G. Meade, Md, on 26 May 1955.

tailored for him after the Occupation had begun. The interrogating agent succintly summed up the case by stating the man was "nuts."[115]

German Communist Party Subversion

Under the Four Power agreements concerning Germany, the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland), commonly known as the KPD, was one of the four parties authorized to resume political activities throughout the four zones of Germany.

As the U.S. Forces in Germany settled into a long-term Occupation role, it became clear that counterintelligence coverage of the KPD, which was again being used by the USSR to further the aims of International Communism in Germany, was essential. CIC's concern with resurgent communism in Germany began in different areas at different times. Late in 1945, an agent in the port city of Bremerhaven began to receive many reports from informants about the German Free Trade Union which was operating in the dock area. The head of the local Socialist Democratic Party in Bremerhaven, who also served as chief of the Military Government labor office there, and an anti-Communist leader presented considerable data to CIC, revealing a positive Communist attempt to gain control of the port workers through this union. When this information was passed on to the CIC Operations Section in Frankfurt, the agent in Bremerhaven was reminded that CIC efforts were to be directed towards de-Nazification and not surveillance of Communist activities. At this early date, the capabilities of the Communist against the security of the American Occupation had not been recognized.[116]

KPD Background

KPD had never been a large party; even at its peak in 1932, when Germany was in the throes of a severe depression, it had numbered only 400,000 members. But it had commanded a support at the polls far out of proportion to its numerical strength during the days of the Weimar Republic and had to be recognized as a significant political entity.

By 1946, it became apparent to the Soviets, who maintained more than a passing interest in the activities of the Communist Party in Germany, that the KPD would never regain the relatively strong position it had held during the last years of the Weimar Republic. Besides, in the Soviet Zone, the Socialistische Partei Deutchland (SPD) was fast out-pacing the KPD in popular support, and the Russians, in classical Communist fashion, forced the merger of the SPD with the

115 Ibid.

116 Interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, on 7 Aug 1955.

KPD, purging the more independent elements of the SPD until those that remained were mere puppets of the Communists. The resulting party, the Socialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED), became the Communist Party of Germany and the KPD, in the Western Zones, was completely controlled by the SED from East Berlin. The SED, in turn, was under the direct guidance of the Soviets in Berlin.

But KPD popularity in the Western Zones failed to soar, despite the aggressive tactics of its members. Postwar membership dropped below 200,000 in these zones, and in the Bundestag elections of 1949, the KPD was barely able to command the five percent of the total popular vote which entitled it to representation in the West German legislative council.

The Soviets apparently realized that the KPD did not represent a sufficiently strong enough political force to gain control or even exert a significant influence upon the West German government. As a result, the purpose of the KPD in West Germany was largely to subvert, to propagandize, to disrupt and to confuse the German government and its citizens at every possible turn.[117]



CIC Notes KPD Weakness

Continued coverage of the KPD under Operation SUNRISE indicated to CIC that, while the Party was entrusted with the mission of supporting the Soviet objective of destroying the West German government and forcing the withdrawal

117 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intel School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

118 Interviews with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, former CO Region IX and former Opns O of the 970th CIC Det, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955; and with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at the NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 Aug 1955.

[redacted]

of Allied forces from Germany, there was little evidence that the KPD possessed either the means or the potential to accomplish these ends through violence. No leads pointed to ammunition-storage points or hidden weapons caches. The KPD had no underground comparable to the apparatus it had maintained during the Hitler regime. Its most significant potential for violent action was in provoking mass demonstrations and labor unrest.[119]

The Propaganda Mill

Members of the KPD proved to be tireless propagandists, even from the early days of the U.S. occupation of Germany. Among the papers that CIC came across in its initial coverage of the KPD was the following declaration signed by the "Communist International, U.S. Zone:"

> We are to take notice of the fact that with the Allied Occupation, Germany, according to the Allies, is freed from Nazi tyranny and its people restored to liberty. A despicable trick without parallel to force democracy, of which the democratic-capitalist countries are so loud in their praise, on the German people. This new born German democracy cannot come near doing what a national socialist people's state accomplished in its beginnings, although the selfish policies of its rulers were nefarious. Germany, as presently constituted, is a helpless slave state of the democratic-capitalist powers.....
> The final result of the second World War shall not be the triumph of one country over another but the destruction of all national states.
>
> **********
>
> I. We aim at the equalization of the masses to avoid unjust differentials in life and to raise the living standard of the masses of the nations.
>
> II. Destruction of nationalist economies.
>
> III. Nationalizing (Communizing) of the national wealth for all people on earth.
>
> IV. Combatting absolute dictatorships.

119 Interview with Maj William Fedor, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, 16 Sep 1955.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

V. Elevation of the standard of living by communizing nationalist-totalitarian finance of all levels.

VI. Sufficient basic countries for existence for all people according to the status of civilization."[120]

In such *garbled* phrases, the Communist in Germany tried to spread the "word" to the German people and undermine the U.S. Occupation.

Strikes: A KPD Weapon

CIC discovered that the fomenting of strikes was a favorite Communist device in the KPD effort to disrupt the American Occupation. A good example of the use of this tactic occurred in the late winter of 1947.

Food and coal shortages which had persisted through the winter helped to create a situation ripe for subversion, and the KPD planned a campaign of strikes based on such issues as insufficient food for the workers, political conflicts of U.S. and Soviet policy, and criticism of German Civil Administration.

CIC informants in Bremen, which bordered on the British Zone, intercepted letters designated for the KPD in Hanover. Included in these messages was a report on plans for an overt protest against the dismantling of docks in Wilhelmshaven to be used as reparations to the Soviet Union. The KPD realized that this protest would have no effect on the proposed reparations, but intended to win the support of the dockworkers by creating the impression that the Party was a nationalistic group, and not subservient to the Russians. Other plans for strikes in the Ruhr area were disclosed in the messages: again, an attempt to hide the fact that the KPD had anything to do with the unrest would be made by having people who were members of non-Communist trade unions play leading roles in the demonstrations.

Strikes engineered by the KPD were often used as the basis for a Party membership drive. Great masses of propaganda material, several radios, and several public address systems, were assembled to aid the Communist in hawking the Party's line to the Germans in the strike area.

But the inescapable feature of even local strike movements was the fact of coordination from Berlin. In a CIC intercepted letter routed from Hanover back to the Bremen KPD was included the following paragraph:

120 Ltr from Secret Central Administration, Communist International (Germany), dtd 1 Apr 1946 (Secret) in file No. 137891, Operation Sunrise, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

"We have come to the conclusion that 25 or 26 February will be the best date for a few sporadic strikes. However, we will have to wait for an OK from Berlin. I will inform you of this matter completely. See to it that the transmitters are brought here immediately. The loan in Wilhalmshaven is good. Be careful in the organization itself, don't let it be known that the protest meetings were organized by us. See to it that more people from other parties are included."

The fact that the KPD was covertly involved in triggering demonstrations and strikes was further justification for CIC's extensive penetration of the Party at all levels and in all areas within the U.S. Zone. As the Special Intelligence Summary of 30 April 1947 concluded:

"Unrest in Germany over the food situation has been noted for a long time, and the KPD has used the situation to KPD advantage by encouraging strikes and demonstrations. This course may be legitimate from a political viewpoint, but it is worthy to note that, whereas the other parties appear to understand and abide by their moral obligations to the people, the KPD is anxious to exploit the situation not so much for the benefit of the people as for the benefit of the KPD. The complaints and basis for the strikes have been primarily the food and coal situation during the winter months. In many cases, the KPD has been the overt instigator of agitation, and it is believed that KPD influence has been active in all cases. The KPD is certainly responsible and is the inspiring factor in most cases of the demonstrations and strikes reported."[121]

KPD and the Youth Groups

The German Communists were eager to find valuable spots in labor for penetration; they also hoped to use the German youth movements as a vehicle for increasing the Party control over the younger elements in the German political scene.

The United States program of orienting the German youth in the basic principles of democracy, allowing the young people to form their own ideas and opinions, had been stated by General Clay to be the "most important contribution to the growth of democracy in Germany." In the pattern of KPD attempts to undermine the Occupation, it seemed more than likely that the Communists would attempt to upset this program.

Although there were some uncoordinated attempts to establish Communist youth groups in the U.S. Zone, the greatest danger came from the placing of

121 Annex B-2, Pro-Soviet German Activities, "KPD Activities in Strikes," in Special Intel Summary No. 33, from Office of the Dep Dir of Intell, Hq European Command, dtd 30 Apr 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

young Communists in youth organizations already accredited by Military Government. The U.S. Occupation authorities prohibited political parties from controlling, directing or giving financial aid to these groups. But reports of KPD activities designed to assume control among properly licensed organizations were received from CIC informants in many cases of the U.S. Zone.

In February 1947, Region I CIC agents heard of a meeting planned by a Karl Weingart, an adherent of the KPD, to which invitations had been sent to such Military Government recognized groups as the Boy Scouts, Trade Union Youth, Falcons (Social Democratic Youth), and the Naturfreunde (Friends of Nature). CIC informants who had attended the meeting reported that some of the visitors became aware of the fact that the Communists were attempting to run the meeting, and one youth strongly criticized Weingart for not inviting the Protestant and Catholic youth groups to attend. This same spokesman pointed out that he recognized among the groups represented several that had not been authorized by Military Government.

Although Communist attempts to organize the youth on such pretexts at local level were significant, CIC coult not overlook zone-wide efforts to establish KPD functionaries among the German youth. In the Soviet Zone, a well-established organization known as the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend or FDJ) was the only authorized youth group and was controlled behind the scenes by the SED.

A movement under the same name was founded in the U.S. Zone. At a Congress of the Free German Youth of Land Hesse held in January 1947, a U.S. Army captain who headed the Youth Activities Center in Griesheim acted as host to the meeting and addresses were given by the Frankfurt oberburgermeister and the Regierungsdirektor to the Youth Affairs Department of the Hesse Ministry of Culture. While these non-Communist guests were present, the meeting was confined to greetings and general discussion of the aims of the organization, but when these "outsiders" had left, the tenor of the speeches and remarks became more overtly Communist. One of the delegates rose and spoke in phrases laden with unadulterated Party material: "It is in direct connection with the demands of the FDJ that we must reject the decadent western dancing and the western culture, because it makes one unpolitical, shallow, weakens the power of spiritual conception, defiles the working force as expression of work, the ethical measure of human existence, and, in a word, simply belongs to the outmoded world of capitalism."

An interesting twist was given to this part of the meeting when the representative of the Hesse Ministry of Culture was attacked by one speaker for not helping the Free German Youth in its effort to procure a license from the Military Government.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Since militant German youths within the U.S. Zone were clearly working for the KPD under the transparent guise of providing "culture" for the young Germans, CIC coverage of the Left Wing had to include these activities.[122]

KPD Schools

One area in which the linkage between the Communist efforts in the East and West Zones was most apparent was in schools run by the Party. It was a matter of record that the SED conducted training schools for its functionaries and that these schools were attended by KPD leaders from the British and U.S. Zones.

The U.S. Zone graduates from these schools frequently returned to become KPD Kreis secretaries and instructors to spread the Communist gospel. Surveillance was maintained on known SED graduates and it was noted that in many cases, they returned to the U.S. Zone for periods ranging from a month to a year before being sent to the highest level training schools in the USSR.

CIC probings into the Communist school apparatus included the gathering of information of curricula, instructors, and selection of students as well as the location of Party schools.

Although the presence of these schools to train workers for efficient management of the Party might, in itself, represent no violation of Military Government strictures, CIC had to determine whether the material taught in these schools could prove detrimental to the best interests of the United States occupationsl mission.

Finding from reliable sources pointed to the fact that the students were largely drawn from the younger KPD members who had shown more than a passing interest in the Party and aspired to Party leadership. The general pattern of the KPD was to establish an echelon of schools, starting with elementary schools, operated at Kreis of Unterbezirk (sub-district) level, and progressing to advanced schools at Land level. In addition, the KPD maintained a network of evening and correspondence schools.

Typical of the KPD schools was an elementary unit operated in Fuerth, Bavaria, at sub-district level. Courses at this school lasted seven days with emphasis placed on political ideology and history of Marxism and Communism. Classes consisted of 28 to 30 students who were quartered in private homes and attended instruction from 0800 hours to late afternoon. The school staff was

122 Annex B-1, Pro Soviet German Activity, "German Communist Party Activities in Youth Groups," in Special Intel Summary No. 33, from Hq EUCOM, Office of the Dep Dir of Intel, dtd 30 Apr 1947, (Secret)(Cen Rec Fac).

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[redacted]

composed of seven teachers, believed to be KPD functionaries, and was headed by the KPD secretary of sub-district Nuernberg.[123]

KPD and Clubs

A popular facet of German life that the KPD hoped to find suited for its subversion campaign was the hundreds of hobby and sports clubs which had long been a national tradition. By infiltrating members into these groups, the KPD could extend its propaganda to a wide audience.

[redacted]

"Dear Comrades:

I would very much appreciate it if you could let me know if any magazines for small animal breeders, especially rabbit breeders, are being published where you are?....

Here, in the British Occupied Zone[124] a rabbit publication is being planned. We working men, however believe that a nation-wide publication of an anti-fascist nature for rabbit breeders must appear. I was elected the director of thirty eight rabbit breeders clubs.... We have over six thousand members, about 90% of whom are workers and employees. It would therefore be very good if you could send me material so that I should know I am conforming with your policies. I assume that you do not underestimate the significance of these clubs because if the rabbit breeders see that we are interested in them, they might under certain conditions commit themselves for us. I expect therefore a quick reply from you.

With Communistic greetings,

(Signature)

123 Annex C, Pro-Soviet German Activity, "KPD Schools in the United States Zone," in Special Intel Summary No. 34, from Hq EUCOM, Office of Dep Dir of Intel; dtd 30 Jun 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

124 Since the Bremen Enclave in which Bremerhaven was situated was surrounded by the British Zone, this Communist leader would have had ready access to this Zone.

By managing to get himself elected as chairman of Rabbit Breeders clubs throughout the British Zone, this Bremerhaven leader had suddenly found himself in a position where he could affect a sizeable number of people with Communist propaganda![125]

It was against maneuvers such as this that CIC had to be constantly alert and watch the growth and backing of the groups in Germany which had been formed, originally, for recreational purposes.

KPD Couriers

The passing of communications by a courier system was one of the established techniques of International Communism: CIC agents in Germany found that keeping track of suspected couriers was an important aspect of the surveillance of the KPD.

The port of Bremerhaven was a particularly sensitive spot, and the CIC mission from the Bremerhaven Field office included interviewing the captains of every American ship that put into the harbor. These interviews were designed to determine if any incident of counterintelligence interest had occurred on the voyage and to find out if possible Communist couriers were among the seamen.[126]

The seaman stated that he had arrived in Bremerhaven on an Army transport and that he had been asked by the New York Communist Party to deliver some packages of Communist literature to the local KPD leader. When he had tried to pass the gate around the dock area, a Military Policeman had informed him that he could not take the bundles without a permit from the Provost Marshal. The seaman, on his first mission to Germany, became confused by this demand, and turned over the packages to some German repatriates from Spain, giving them instructions to take the bundles to the Communist Party headquarters in Berlin.

The seaman revealed that he was a member of the New York Communist Party and active in Party affairs in the United States. He was advised by the KPD man that, in the future, he should notify the local KPD of his arrival so that

125 File on Potrykus, Folkert, No. 65653, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
126 Interview with CWO A.E. Wolfe at Fort Holabird, on 21 Sep 1955.

arrangements could be made for the removal of packages from the ship and out of the dock area by some KPD members who were working in the port.

[redacted]

Information gathered on the seaman during the subsequent trips confirmed the previous report and an additional fact was discovered: the seaman had a special room which he kept locked at all times. No duplicate key to this room was deposited with the Captain, in direct violation of ship regulations.

CIC felt that the time had come to make an on-the-spot investigation. By arrangement with the ship's master, all hands were given port leave with the exception of several officers. An agent boarded the ship and was taken to the steward's "secret" room. He picked the lock and the door swung open on a private library of about 10,000 pamphlets and books. This material this seaman-courier had been transporting consisted of Communist literature printed in many languages. The question of how some Communist literature had been getting into Bremerhaven was clearly answered.[127]

The Case of [redacted]

Not all the couriers for the KPD were as incidental to the Occupation forces in Germany as the [redacted]. In the early winter of 1945, a CIC informant in Bremerhaven brought word that a prominent member [redacted] had been operating secretly with German Communist contacts to set up labor unions which could be manipulated by the KPD in the U.S. Zone. The informant was able to produce a slip of paper, signed by the American, [redacted] on behalf of the [redacted] approving the creation of a laborers union in Bremerhaven.

About this time, the Civil Service Commission in Washington was requested to review the security standing of [redacted], a former CIO leader. Considerable question as to the man's Communist background appeared among the testimony but a letter from his superior on the [redacted] stated that he was

127 Dossier of [redacted] File No. 137779 (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac); also interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 Aug 1955.

128 Interview with former Special Agent Canfield.

[redacted]

"industrious, intelligent and loyal," with "no indication that he was a party member or that he has any leanings or desires to be one."[129] On 31 October 1945, the Review Board of the Commission cleared [redacted] in light of the testimony of two members of the [redacted]

(C) One year later, in October 1946, a letter from the Assistant Adjutant General, USFET, to the Chief, Overseas Branch, Personnel and Training Division at Washington reopened the question of [redacted] suitability for the important position he held in the reconstruction of the German economy. Examination of [redacted] case history lead to "substantial doubt concerning his loyalty to the United States," and the recommendation that [redacted] be declared "ineligible" to hold his position was supported by allegations that the man had been a member of several "front" organizations as well as a member of the Communist Party. Informants had attested to [redacted] adherence to the Communist Party line, and one former member of the Manpower Commission had stated that it was generally believed that [redacted] was a courier for the KPD. The reason for this belief was that immediately after [redacted] visit to a given area, the local branch of the KPD started agitation along the latest Party lines. In addition, it was held that Army personnel who had previously testified on Wheeler's behalf were, "by and large" members of various Communist front organizations, themselves.[130]

In January 1947, a Character and Loyalty Investigation Committee was appointed from the staff of the office of the Military Governor, United States (OMGUS) to evaluate the unfavorable reports that had been lodged against [redacted] This panel arrived at the conclusion that [redacted] "is loyal and suitable for employment by the United States Government." It was notable that the committee refrained from passing on the question of whether [redacted] had been a Communist or Communist sympathizer in the past.[131]

The [redacted] case came out in the open during the summer of 1947. On 10 July, U.S. Congressional Representative George A. Dondero (Republican from Michigan) named [redacted] as one of several Communists who held significant posts with the Occupation.[132]

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129 Ltr from Frank J. McSherry, Manpower Div, OMGUS, to Arthur R. Fleming, Civil Service Commission, dtd 17 Oct 1945, [redacted] (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

130 Ltr to Chief, Overseas Branch, Personnel and Training Div, Washington, from Lt Col George M. Weir, Asst Adj Gen, Hq USFET, dtd 1 Oct 1946, (Secret) [redacted] Cen Rec Fac).

131 Ltr from Hq OMGUS, To: CG, Hq USFET, sgd by Karl P. McCann, 1st Lt, AGD, dtd 26 Feb 1947, (Secret) [redacted] (Cen Rec Fac).

132 Stars and Stripes, dtd 11 Jul 1947, Article datelined 10 Jul from Washington, (Uncl) [redacted] (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

The question of what to do with [redacted] was eventually settled by [redacted] himself. Upon the termination of his contract with the [redacted] in November 1947, [redacted] left Berlin and travelled to Prague, Czechoslovakia, with the avowed intention of teaching at the University of Prague. Three months later, in February 1948, the "bloodless coup e'etat," which saw the Communist regime come into power in Czechoslovakia, took place. Whether [redacted] flight to Czechoslovakia had been planned with foreknowledge of the impending coup was and remains a mystery. But the man has never returned to the United States.

One sequel to the [redacted] case came to CIC in an issue of the [redacted] dated 14 April 1950. [redacted] wrote an article for this Communist organ in which he claimed to have come to Czechoslovakia "to study and get to know the structure of a planned economy in a country which in respect to its advanced industrial development most closely resembles my own country."

In the same article, [redacted] took a parting shot at CIC, the organization which had spotted his activities on behalf of the KPD in Germany: "The powers of CIC are not secret. In fact, it is a criminal organization which does not stop short of using any means, employing for its dirty work, murderers and Gestapo agents and, in order to hide these facts, tries to put on a mysterious face."[133] In the police state of Czechoslovakia there was no voice that would be raised to contradict [redacted]

133 Prague News Letter, A Survey of Czechoslovak News and Comments, dtd 14 Apr 1950 (Translation) [redacted] DOB 22 May 1908 (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac); and interview with former Special Agent Daniel C. Canfield, Wichita, Kan, at NCICA Convention, Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N.Y., on 7 Aug 1955.

Section 3

EXTERNAL ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION

(U) The primary threat against the security of the U.S. Zone of Germany and the rehabilitation of the German nation under American direction came not from dissident elements among the native populace but from the Soviet Union.

(U) The division of Germany into areas under the control of Western Powers and Russia made it a logical ground for intense Soviet subversive activities. East Germany, under sway of the powerful Red army, fell swiftly to the Communist Party while Communist groups in West Germany lost little time swinging into action. Week after week during the summer and fall of 1945, Intelligence Summaries from USFET G2 noted the increasing strength of the Communist Party (KPD) with such observations as: "The Communist Party is at present the best organized of the four parties," "The Communist Party..../ is /the most active political group in Germany," and "Communist activity continues as a dominant political feature."[134]

(U) For the Soviet Union, this sudden burst of activity by German Communists fitted neatly into the normal sequences of Russian penetration and subversion. The first stage in most Soviet coup's involved the creation of a propaganda machine "for the purpose of stirring up dissatisfaction with the existing order of things," and the West German Communists with their avowed aims of the eradication of Naziism and rehabilitation of the German people could clearly further the Soviet cause.

(U) Early Soviet attempts to perform espionage and subversion in the U.S. Zone of Germany fell into three general types. The first involved flooding the area with low level agents who could supply small bits of information which, when compiled from many sources, rendered a full picture of the American Occupation. The second espionage technique involved the extensive exploitation of legitimate Russian liaison, reparations, and repatriation personnel for medium level intelligence gathering. The third technique was the infiltration throughout the U.S. Zone of large numbers of Soviet-indoctrinated persons, including returning prisoners of war and displaced persons, together with a steady flow of Communist propaganda.

(U) This last type, more nearly subversion than espionage, was aimed directly at fomenting unrest and labor troubles and breaking down respect for the occupying forces. The propagandists served to magnify uncertainties in United States policy

134 Compiled from Weekly Intel Summaries, 2 through 10, published by Hq USFET, O of the AC/S, G2, ranging in date from 24 Jul 1945 to 20 Sep 1945, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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(U) and to import and distribute Communist propaganda material, while other Soviet workers of the third type were active in black market and illegal currency operations, bribery of American and German personnel, and organization of disaffected groups.

(U) The over-all effect of these groups was to impede the restoration of German economy and to foster a contempt for law and order, all of which were distinct aims in the Soviet timetable of subversion.[135]

(U) A detailed accounting of the CIC's struggle against Soviet espionage and subversion in the U. S. Zone is not possible within the scope of this history. But some of the aspects in this struggle can be indicated to show how CIC acted to maintain security within Germany.

An Early Attempt

(U) Although CIC agents in Germany were largely engaged in de-Nazification investigations during 1945, a possible Soviet agent cropped up among the arrestees of the CIC team situation in Traunstein, Southern Bavaria.

(U) On 3 November, an alleged German national was arrested after he had been found posing as a CIC agent. Upon interrogation, he claimed that he had been a lieutenant in the Luftwaffe, and Obersturmfuhrer of the Waffen SS, and a member of the Jagverbande Skorzeny. But apparently that was not the whole of his story.

(U) While confined in a civilian internment camp at Altenstadt, this man tried to become appointed camp commander. While on supply trips outside the compound, he represented himself as an American colonel, and people noted that he seemed more fluent in the Russian language than in German.

(U) On 15 December 1945, the man escaped from solitary confinement, in which he had been placed following his escapades. The significant fact to CIC was that prior to his escape, this prisoner had asked another inmate, who had been working for a Soviet liaison officer, the location of the nearest Russian official. The prisoner was not recaptured and CIC could only surmise that a Russian agent had been within their midst.[136]

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135 Special Intel Summary No. 31 from Hq USFET, Office of the ACof S, G2, dtd 26 Feb 1947, "The USSR and Nations Under Russian Control," (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

136 Excerpt from Special Intel Summary No. 13, Hq USFET, O of AC/S, G2 dtd 20 Feb 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac)

[redacted]

Operation BINGO

(U) The first major overt move that CIC made against the Soviet espionage rings in the U.S. Zone of Germany occurred on 22 July 1946. Code named Operation BINGO, this was a coordinated swoop operation designed to apprehend low grade espionage suspects.

(U) Maximum security precautions were taken for this "Top Secret" raid, in which a total of 407 agents were arrested and placed under interrogation. Initial evidence gained from the questioning of the prisoners confirmed the American Intelligence concern about the tie-in of Russian liaison officers' activities in the U.S. Zone with Soviet espionage. Many of the apprehended suspects were released after interrogation without charges; a smaller number were turned over to Military Government for trial under criminal charges.[137]

(U) Since BINGO was specifically designed to pick up low level Soviet agents and not tamper with the more critical Soviet espionage apparatus, an evaluation of the operation labeled it from 70 to 80 percent successful. Notice had been served upon the key Russian operatives that CIC was not prepared to sit back while the Soviets flooded the U.S. Zone with its agents, and CIC had confirmed some of its impressions of Soviet espionage techniques.[138]

Report from Berlin

(U) Although Soviet espionage methods were not everywhere identical, a report from Berlin summarizing U.S. counterintelligence findings from July 1945 to July 1946 was prepared to illustrate what seemed to be key Russian concepts and methods.

(U) The report observed that "the western world may have tended generally to over-rate average Soviet intelligence techniques," and went on to claim that "the vast majority of Soviet soldiers and officers are ignorant of Western European customs and even geography. As a consequence, the average Soviet commits what we consider certain security errors in his handling of German agents."

(U) The Russians apparently subscribed to a course of planting vast numbers of untrained agents--many of them under pressure--in the U.S. Zone. This use of mass informants had one appreciable advantage to the Soviet: it was possible for an exceptionally skilled operator to escape detection in the smoke screen created by many low-grade agents. There was the possibility that the numerous low level agents, through their clumsiness, would attract the attention of CIC, while the more skilled operatives might be overlooked or relatively unhindered.

137 Hq, USFET, Special CI Rpt No. 20, undtd, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
138 Ibid, No. 22.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) The Soviets extensively employed petty thieves and common criminals as informants. In general, the lower the caliber of the informant, the more likely he was to be given some routine "public opinion" mission such as: "What do the Germans say about the American military government?"

(U) At least one case was on record in Berlin by July 1946, where a Soviet case officer had instructed one of his higher level agents to be recruited by CIC for an assignment against the Russians, with the obvious intention of playing him back as a double agent. But American intelligence had found no evidence of Soviet attempts to redouble an already doubled agent.

(U) A favored Soviet technique, and one that received much publicity in Western newspapers, was abduction of individuals, even for routine questioning, from one of the Western Zones. In the initial days of the Occupation, armed MVD agents appeared in broad daylight in uniform to snatch their victims. Strong American protests to these actions led to a slight modification in Russian tactics. The abductions continued, but were performed only at night or by the MVD agents in civilian clothes. In the face of strong U. S. opposition to these continued MVD operations, the Russians again changed tactics by sending agents in police uniform to make the arrests and by increasingly attempting to entice their victims out of the American sector, instead of abducting them on the spot.

(U) Soviet Intelligence operatives were aided in their activities in Berlin by aggressive Communist tactics instriving for the domination of local police, press, and education groups. After the Communists had wrested virtual control of the Berlin police, the MVD assigned special liaison officers to the German police presidium. This situation had three-fold benefits for the Russians. It gave them a camouflage for unauthorized arrests in the U. S. and British sectors, an investigative agency to obtain intelligence on persons in any part of Berlin who had come to the Russians' attention, and a source of trained Germans to serve as Soviet agents while still wearing the German police uniform.[139]

(U) But Soviet penetration techniques also took more direct forms. In the course of a two-week period in August 1946, CIC in Berlin encountered four cases where a Red Army officer in uniform or civilian clothes had presented himself to the United States Consulate, Military Police, or a CIC agent, and requested contact with the Counter Intelligence Corps or the Counter Intelligence Branch. The cover story was either that the suspect was a deserter, that he was awaiting court martial, or that he was fed up with the Soviet Union. In all instances, the suspect made the suggestion that he possessed valuable intelligence information and would be willing to give it to the Americans.

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139 Ibid, No. 20.

[redacted]

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(U) The apparent scheme behind these actions was to gain information about American counterintelligence techniques, personnel, and EEI's. There also was a possible Soviet motive of establishing a basis for protest and propaganda, if CIC displayed any interest in the information. But CIC was directed, in general, to convey to these phony deserters the impression that the United States was not interested in intelligence concerning the Soviet Union and that the Americans' concern was solely with the Germans and those agencies attempting to develop discord among the Allies.[140]

Soviet Military Missions: Centers of Espionage

(U) The Russian military missions in key cities of the U.S. Zone of Germany were soon recognized by CIC as centers of Soviet espionage and they became automatic intelligence targets. Since these missions were allowed privileged communications, they proved extremely difficult to penetrate, but CIC kept a surveillance of the Russians and attempted to catch the military mission personnel off guard. For example, the Russians were required by USFET circular 136 dated 27 September 1946 to wear uniforms whenever on the street or in public places.[141] If they chanced to appear in mufti, CIC could detain them, under threat of reporting the Russians to their superiors, and extract some information from them. But the opportunities for such questionings were few and far between. The Russians rarely did anything alone. They seemed to move in pairs, partly to have constant witnesses to attest to their actions and partly so that individuals could not commit the very misdemeanors for which CIC was on the alert.[142]

Catching the Russians Off Guard

(U) CIC agents in all parts of the U.S. Zone participated in counterespionage activities. Some of the experiences of Region I agents can be recounted as typical of CIC actions against the Russians.

(U) Although the Stuttgart Region was not the focal point of Soviet espionage, there were two authorized Russian groups in the Region that proved troublesome to CIC: a refugee camp consisting solely of Russians and under Russian administration and management, and a Russian military mission.

(U) The official purpose of the refugee camp was to feed, clothe, and house Russian refugees in Germany prior to their repatriation. Because of existing

140 Ibid, No. 22, 13 Sep 46.

141 Top Secret Tri-Weekly Summary No. 5, for period ending 25 Apr 1947, from Hq CIC Region I, 970th CIC Det, European Command, dtd 25 Apr 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

142 Interviews with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955, and Ibid, Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson.

[redacted]

theater directives, CIC was compelled to turn over all Russian nationals they encountered in Displaced Persons camps and elsewhere to this camp. In many cases, this was equivalent to a death sentence since some of the Russians taken to the camp had fled the Soviet Union.

On one occasion, two CIC agents visited the Russian camp to locate a man suspected of spying on the U.S. troops in Stuttgart. They were met by the camp commander, who doubled as a member of the Russian military mission, and were barred from access to the suspect. One of the agents remained at the camp, attempting to convince the commander, while the other slipped away, only to return several minutes later with three jeeploads full of Military Police. Entering the camp with guns drawn, the CIC agents managed to find their man.

Baiting a Trap

At least one member of the Russian Reparations Mission in Stuttgart during early 1947 was a known espionage agent. Of this, CIC was certain. The problem that confronted the CIC agents was how to neutralize the man.

The USFET law requiring all members of foreign missions to wear uniforms whenever in public in the U.S. Zone of Germany, provided the solution.



On the evening of 17 April 1947, the Russian, dressed in a blue civilian suit and carrying a camera, was observed by CIC agents leaving his quarters with his mistress. They permitted him to walk for some distance before they stopped him and asked for his kennkarte (identity card). The Russian was unable to produce the identification and was greatly disturbed when he was informed that his wearing a civilian suit was an offense against a USFET regulation. The agents told the man that he would have to be turned over to the Russian Mission at Frankfurt. This further upset the Russian, and he begged the agents not to report the matter as he would be in "hot water" if the incident became known to higher headquarters in Berlin and Moscow.

At this point, the agents treated the Russian in a friendly manner. Holding a decided advantage over the man, they were able to elicit considerable information about the Russian's mission in Stuttgart, his activity in Berlin, and the

[redacted]

organization of which he was a member. He admitted that he would have to file a complete report of his observations in the U. S. Zone to his chief in Berlin on his return, that the Russian liaison officer to the Stuttgart Military Post was a MVD officer who was "very severe" in his views, and that the Reparations Missions in the U. S. Zone maintained a courier system for transmitting information back to Berlin.

After 45 minutes of questioning, the Russian was released. Before CIC let him go, however, the agents secured a signed statement from the man that he had been arrested by American Counterintelligence for wearing civilian clothes and that he had made statements concerning his organization. This statement was presumably held by CIC as a protection against any possible misrepresentations the Russian might make about having been unlawfully detained.[143]

Keeping Track of the Russians

As part of the quiet struggle against Soviet espionage, CIC in Stuttgart placed all desk clerks at Allied hotels under instructions to report the presence of any Russians when they arrived.

One day, a call was received at the CIC office that two Russians, accompanied by an American Military Government officer, had checked into a hotel. An agent was sent to check. When he arrived at the hotel, he went directly to the room, asked for and received the Russians' credentials, indicating that they were members of the Military Mission. All their papers were in order.

The agent had scarcely returned to his office when the telephone rang. The caller was an incensed Military Government officer who berated the agent for daring to offend such important visitors to Stuttgart. The CIC man took the tongue lashing calmly and replied that Russians were no doubt used to such checks, which probably took place all the time in Moscow, and that the visitor had accepted the paper screening as a matter of consequence.

CIC continued its scrutiny of new Russians arriving in Stuttgart.[144]

Soviet Satellite Intelligence

CIC agents in Germany discovered that espionage efforts within the U. S. Zone were not limited to the Russians. A favored device of the Soviets was to

143 Tri-Weekly CIC Region I Rpt, from Hq CIC Region I, 970th CIC Det, EUCOM, dtd 29 Apr 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac). Also interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at Fort George G. Meade, Md, on 26 May 1955.

144 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at BOQ, Fort George G. Meade, Md, 26 May 1955.

[redacted]

(U) use intelligence nets of its satellite nations to develop information.[145] When Czechoslovakia fell under the Communist sway, it became apparent to CIC that Czech agents already established in the U.S. Zone would be utilized by the new regime.[146]

(U) The chief of Czech Intelligence, a man named Rejoin, held dual citizenship in Czechoslovakia and Russia. He proved a hard taskmaster for his operatives, and many Czech agents voluntarily confessed after crossing into the U.S. Zone with refugee groups. Data on other agents expected to enter West Germany was secured from these defectors, and the denunciations formed a pattern which made the job of rounding up these additional agents easier.

Operation LITHIA

(U) The mass of leads which were gained from interrogations of the Czech agents had gone through the collation stage when it became apparent that CIC was gaining a good enough picture of Czech espionage in the U.S. Zone to make a zone-wide counterespionage operation. Code named LITHIA, the operation developed slowly, since much peripheral material was gathered that did not pertain to its principal aim. So widespread was the information which had been uncovered that the collection effort developed to a point where a swoop on the Czech agents might not have been successful, if possible at all.

(C) The central core of information of Operation LITHIA revolved around an

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145 Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, 28 Sep 1955.

146 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns O, 970th CIC Det from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 55.

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(U) Advance notice of the intended swoop was withheld from the field CIC agents until the last possible moment. For example, Region V men were called into the office one night in November 1948 at about 2000 hours. They were informed that a swoop was to be made as soon as Top Secret orders arrived via teletype. The agents sat around the office waiting for the message that would send them into action; some finally went to sleep on desk tops. At 0300 hours, the message came through. It consisted of the names and addresses of the Czech agents in Region V who were to be rounded up. The CIC men were sent out in teams to perform the arrests; by the following morning, all the target personalities who were still in the area had been apprehended. Some of the Czech operatives had left prior to the swoop, although not from foreknowledge of the operation. Security of Operation LITHIA had been excellent, and the leads proved to be absolutely accurate. In one case, a CIC team went to a designated address to apprehend a female agent only to discover that the woman had been taken to a hospital suffering from pneumonia. The men immediately drove to the hospital where they discovered that the woman was bedridden and incapable of being moved. Some last minute changes in address such as this were inevitable in an undertaking as extensive as Operation LITHIA, but the degree of success attested to the extent of CIC penetration of the Czech intelligence nets.

(U) The apprehended agents were shipped from all regions to Region IV, Munich, where they could all be subjected to interrogators especially selected for this assignment.[147]

(U) In March 1949, 11 of the Czech espionage agents were sentenced by a military tribunal to terms ranging from one to 20 years.[148]

Neutralization Versus Conviction

(U) In the effort against Soviet-inspired and directed espionage, CIC generally preferred to neutralize and defect agents rather than to bring them to trial. In this respect, the culmination of LITHIA differed somewhat from other counter-intelligence operations in Germany.

(U) Targets for possible defection or neutralization were picked by the 970th headquarters, but permission always had to be obtained from the Theater G2 before any major attempts were made. Defections required careful planning and could be made only when all doubts about the target's intentions had been

147 Interviews with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955, and Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, on 28 Sep 1955. Also, "The Czech Espionage Case," in Examples of Operational Cases prepared by Capt W.E. Larned for CofS, Hq CICC, dtd 3 Aug 1951, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac)

148 Hist of the 66th CIC Det, undated, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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removed. In one case, against CIC advice, British Intelligence defected a Soviet agent in Bremen and gave him asylum in England. Shortly after, the man became the center of considerable diplomatic concern when he claimed that the English had "kidnapped" him.

Among the more effective defections that CIC engineered was that of the German General Von Einsiedel, a grandson of Bismarck, who had been captured by the Russians at Stalingrad. Heavily indoctrinated while in captivity, Von Einsiedel returned to East Germany after the war as a propagandist for the National Kommitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD). During frequent propaganda trips to the U. S. Zone to peddle the Communist line, he was kept under surveillance by CIC agents. After studying Von Einsiedel's activities, CIC caught the general on a technicality and found a basis for defecting him. Although he was only tacitly on CIC's side after the defection, Von Einsiedel had been effectively neutralized as a pro-Soviet propagandist.[149]

The great disadvantage of bring Soviet and satellite espionage agents to trial was that considerable CIC operational techniques and information would be aired in public. Secret trials were prohibited, and from a counterintelligence standpoint, the value of a conviction was not necessarily greater than the value of neutralization. Even if a known agent was not prosecuted, his usefulness to Soviet Intelligence was at an end once CIC had neutralized him.[150]

Espionage....a la Francaise

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149 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, former OO of the 970th at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 1955.

150 Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Md, on 28 Sep 1955.

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151 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at Fort George G. Meade, Md, 26 May 1955.

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Section 4

DISPLACED PERSONS

From the start of the Occupation of Germany, the vast numbers of displaced persons within the United States Zone had proved a serious menace to the security of the American forces and the area in general: Within the various Displaced Persons camps were people of many nationalities: homeless, hungry, demoralized, and frequently intent on wreaking revenge upon the nation that had disrupted their lives.

UNRRA organizations tried to alleviate the conditions of the displaced persons by establishing camps where the individuals could be clothed, fed and sheltered. But many of the displaced persons refused to submit to any forms of authority. Vagrants wandered along the roads, looting, stealing, murdering, raping. Sometimes personal gain was the motive, but often the crimes were committed shearly from vengeance.

Repatriation Trains

The tangle of refugees and displaced persons in Germany from many European countries was gradually unravelled after the war. As individuals were gathered into nationality groupings, repatriation trains were formed to carry them back to their homelands.

Frequent journeys were made to Soviet satellites such as Poland, and the repatriates were provided with several months food rations and other supplies by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officials. Some of the erstwhile refugees developed into "professional repatriates," who gathered their UNRRA food, travelled to their home countries, and, shortly later, returned to the U.S. Zone of Germany to make another try for the free provisions.

A serious security threat was posed by these professional repatriates, who tended to branch out into smuggling items from Germany to their native lands. CIC participated with Constabulary troops and German police in periodic shakedowns of the repatriation trains, since there was counterintelligence interest in the possibility of the trains being used as transportation for espionage agents.[152]

Refugee Influx After Czech Coup

Despite repatriation trains and other measures designed to return displaced persons in the U.S. Zone to their native lands, the flow of refugees in Germany

152 Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Ft Holabird, Md, on 28 Sep 1955.

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was a two-way affair. While Poles, Russians, Hungarians, Rumanians and many other nationality groups left Germany, Sudeten Germans who had been living in Czechoslovakia during the heyday of the Third Reich and internees from England and other countries were among those who came back to post war Germany. This influx of refugees was swelled considerably in February 1948 after the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia.

Czechs streamed across the border into Germany following a radio announcement by General Clay that refugees would be granted asylum in the U.S. Zone. The burden fell on the U.S. Army post commanders to provide food and quarters for the new arrivals, and all Army requisitioned buildings in towns near the border were hastily converted into shelters for the Czechs.

To Region V CIC fell the major problem of screening the refugees as they crossed into the U.S. Zone. The assignment proved too much for the region to handle alone and emergency requisitions were sent to other CIC regions for interrogation teams to help with the screening. More than 50 additional agents were sent to Region V and spotted in houses all along the border where they could process the refugees who were brought to them by border patrols.

The screening program involved such large numbers of people that CIC detained for more than cursory interrogation only those individuals of interest to intelligence. Agents were also kept busy procuring buildings for the processing to take place: CIC literally went into the real estate business.[153]

Operation RUMMAGE

The presence in Germany of thousands of Jewish refugees and former concentration camps inmates posed a special counterintelligence problem. Plans for the creation of a national state in Palestine for the Jewish people had started soon after the war but had become entangled in difficulties of defining the bounds of the projected state of Israel.

While the negotiations proceeded on the thorny problem of separating Arab from Jewish land, a steady stream of Jews from all over Europe moved illegally to Palestine. Most of these refugees had been drafted into the several illegal armies which had formed to fight for and defend the right of the Jewish people to a national homeland.

The 970th CIC came into the picture when it was discovered that secret draft orders were being issued in the name of the yet-to-be-created government of Israel

153 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955 and Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Ft Holabird, on 28 Sep 1955.

[redacted]

to the Jewish people still in Germany. The "draftees" were told to report to a certain Displaced Persons camp in the U. S. Zone of Germany which served as a gathering point for the perspective journeyers to Palestine. Trucks arrived at this camp, picked up the Jews, and smuggled them out of Germany, by devious routes to Italy. In Italian ports the emigrees boarded leaky freighters that were often unseaworthy for the trip across the Mediterranean Sea to Palestine.

(U) CIC's mission in regard to these illegal proceedings was to keep track of the movements of the refugee groups through surveillance and penetration. When Jewish attempts to purchase German weapons stocks were discovered, surveillance had to be extended to the shipment of arms to Palestine.

An interesting phase of Operation RUMMAGE developed near Deggendorf. Training activities for the young Jews in this area included a course of instruction given on a barge in the Danube river. The purpose of this training was to enable the young men to operate the illegal freighters that were plying the Mediterranean. As in other phases of RUMMAGE, CIC only observed and reported these activities. The agents made no attempt to break them up.

Operation RUMMAGE was ended with the birth of the state of Israel in May 1948, an event which brought an end to the covert preparations that CIC had been watching.[154]

CIC and Displaced Persons Investigations

In the years preceding June 1948, CIC had tried to restrict its dealings with displaced persons strictly to matters relating to counterintelligence. But this picture changed radically after Congress passed "an act to authorize for a limited period of time the admission into the United States of certain European displaced persons for permenent residence and for other purposes." The measure passed both houses of Congress and became public law on 25 June when it was signed by President Truman.

Before the legislation had been approved by Congress, it had become apparent that one provision of the bill could seriously effect CIC operations in Europe. In the initial wording, this provision read:

"No eligible displaced person shall be admitted into the United States unless there shall have first been a thorough investigation and written report made and prepared by such agency of the Government of the United States as the President shall designate, regarding such person's character, history, and eligibility under this Act."

154 Ibid, Brand.

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Realizing that the investigative burden would more than likely fall upon the heavily taxed members of CIC in the European Command, Colonel Forney, Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch in Washington, sent forward a memo stating in part:

"There are some six hundred thousand or more displaced persons in existing DP camps, and it is entirely probable that a large majority of them will apply and will have to be investigated. The investigative load will be enormous. It appears highly probable that unless some action is taken to prevent such a contingency the Army will be designated to conduct the investigations. This supposition is based on the fact that the Army in Europe is now screening visa applicants for the State Department. The screening process now in practice is proving a serious burden to the European Command, although both the scope and number of such investigations is on a very modest scale compared with what will be required under S 2242.

"If the Army is designated to conduct these investigations, a serious problem will be presented in recruiting and training personnel within the Army Establishment. A rough estimate is that at least 1,000 investigators, linguistically qualified interviewers, and clerks would be required. In addition, no really satisfactory investigation can be made of persons in DP camps since their backgrounds lie in areas which cannot be reached."[155]

The assumptions in this memorandum proved well founded. Under Executive Order 10003 issued by President Truman on 4 October 1943, it was clearly stated that "the Department of State, the Department of the Army, and such other agencies of the government as the Displaced Persons Commission may request, shall in accordance with arrangements agreed upon between the Commission and any such department or agency, furnish the commission such assistance as it may need in carrying out its responsibilities under Paragraph 1, this order."

Accompanying this Executive Order was a supplementary letter from the President addressed to the Chairman of the Displaced Persons Commission in which the role of the Department of the Army was cited as furnishing "all the foregoing assistance (i.e., investigations, and reports) to the Commission in all overseas areas affected by the DP program except that the Commission will look to the Department of State for such assistance in any area where the Department of the Army is unable to furnish it."[156]

In Europe, it was apparent that CIC was the only agency which had the machinery for these investigations; but the already short-staffed 970th was

155 Memo to C/S from Col Forney (Copy), Legislation on Displaced Persons, CSGID 918, undtd, Uncl, (Cen Rec Fac).

156 Outgoing Classified Message from Civil Affairs Div, Mr. Fisher, to OMGUS, Hq, EUCOM, COMGENUSFA, dtd 9 Oct 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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[redacted]

desperately in need of additional personnel to handle this new time consuming mission, and the sources of experienced investigators were limited. Some attempts to secure additional personnel ran into trouble from higher headquarters, as a letter from the Director of Intelligence, European Command to the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, Department of Army indicated:

"You will remember first that you indicated you understood General Clay's point that he wanted the screening done by the CIC. We then made a number of estimates of the additional American and indigenous personnel which would be required and some of the figures were very high. When General Clay found out we were trying to get additional personnel for CIC for this purpose he was quite concerned and told me that he expected us to do the job with the thousand or so personnel CIC now has here. Afterward, I again worked with CIC to get some conservative figures to present as an appeal and General Clay has now, again, said the CIC will do the work with the personnel it has here, with such additional personnel as can be made available in the Theater to assist them, and with an increase in indigenous personnel. We are now endeavoring to find enlisted personnel, who, through interpreters, can assist with the neighborhood checks, which is the most time-consuming operation for the personnel. How well this will work out we don't know, but we will do our best."[157]

While the effort to procure CIC agents to handle the Displaced Persons screening mission was being carried out at higher headquarters, the 7970th CIC Group prepared an operational SOP for the program. Under the heading "Personnel," provisions were made for a Regional Visa Section staffed by "no less than one officer or warrant officer with one enlisted assistant." This severe shortage of CIC agents made it essential that indigenous personnel be utilized in all phases of the Visa Section operations which did not infringe on other CIC matters.

The Regional Visa Section officer was responsible for "the speedy and efficient handling of registration forms, maintenance of the message center records, and the review of completed CIC work sheet." He was to be aware of the causes for denying visas to applicants and to be available to investigating officers to counsel them in their investigations.

Wherever possible, the Visa Section was to be separate from the operational offices of CIC, and no indigenous employee, whether used as an investigator or linguist, was to be issued credentials or any type of documents that revealed his employment by CIC. Although it appeared necessary to risk that derogatory information would fall into the hands of indigenous interpreters during the course of interrogation, the SOP stated that "where the derogatory information is of

157 Ltr (Copy) from Maj Gen R. L. Walsh, Dir, Intel Div, Hq EUCOM, to Lt Gen S. J. Chamberlin, G2 Army, Washington, dtd 24 Sep 1945, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

current CI interest, the interrogation should be brought to a close and the investigation resumed so that subsequently developed information will not be compromised."[158]

DP Screening Becomes "First Priority"

The volume of the investigative load which the Displaced Persons program dumped upon an already busy CIC in Germany was enormous, and CIC had to work quickly and efficiently to prevent this new responsibility from smothering its other operations.

Due to difficulties encountered by other organizations which had to cooperate in implementing the provisions of the Displaced Person Act, the screening program got off to a slow start. In the original plans, it was anticipated that approximately 10,000 screenings could be accomplished each month so that the goal of more than 200,000 new entrants to the United States could be reached in about a year and one half.

CIC had adjusted to this rate by committing from 60 to 70 percent of its agent personnel to the program. But the delays in preparing the machinery for the complete handling of the program meant that CIC had only to employ 30 percent of its personnel in the Visa Screening. For the most part, agents of lesser experience were assigned to the Visa Screening teams because of the routine and relatively simple investigations involved.

A typical CIC processing of a displaced person's application ran as follows: The Regional commander received from the local consulate an application prepared by a displaced person for emigration to the United States. This application included a completed personnel data form which would serve as the basis of the CIC investigation.

The personal data provided by the displaced person was then screened and analyzed before being submitted to verification through checks at the following points:

1. CIC Registry (for persons 13 years of age and over)
2. Local Intelligence and criminal files
3. Neighborhood interviews
4. Berlin Document Center (for persons 25 years of age and over)
5. Provost Marshal criminal file

158 Ltr from Hq 7970th CIC Group, EUCOM, Subj: "Procedure for Investigations of Immigrants," dtd 8 Nov 1948, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Through these checks, the investigating agent could make a fairly accurate appraisal of the validity of the statement. But, due to the confusion which clouded many displaced persons' pasts, it was necessary for CIC to interview each applicant and compare the accounts he made under pressure of interrogation with the statements on his personal data form.

The CIC role in the screening of displaced persons went no further than fact finding. CIC made no decisions regarding acceptance or rejection under the program. The information that had been uncovered was presented, without comment, to the Displaced Persons Commission representative. However, in any cases where derogatory information sufficient to eliminate the alien appeared, CIC stopped the investigation, reported the matter to the Commission, and awaited further instructions regarding the possible reopening of the case.[159]

One factor that CIC was particularly concerned about in the Displaced Persons program was the desirability of including persons who had been of considerable value to Army Intelligence and "whose removal from the Theater was indicated because of compromise or extreme danger to the individual." CIC was assured that these persons would be accepted provided that they could qualify as displaced persons.[160]

As the principal investigative agency in Germany, CIC became responsible for the processing of a large share of the 12,500 persons per month permitted to immigrate to the United States until the total of 205,000 was met in the middle of 1950.[161]

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159 "First, and possibly last, draft of Process of CIC investigation of DPs for inclusion in program," prepared for Congressional Committee hearing, undtd, unsgd, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

160 Procedures for Implementing the DP Program in Europe, sgd by R.D. Stevens, Lt Col, Inf, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac), (Undtd).

161 Hq EUCOM and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt of the 66th CIC Det, 1950, RG 207.03 A 52-345, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

[redacted]

Section 5

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS

The mission of maintaining security within the U.S. Zone of Germany presented CIC with a variety of miscellaneous investigative duties. Special operations, demanding the participation of CIC agents, arose from time to time, and the CIC men had to be taken off other assignments to participate in them.

Activities of the Special Squad

During the first two years of the Occupation, headquarters of the 970th maintained a group of agents designated as the "Special Squad" to handle miscellaneous special investigations and "hot projects."[162]

The Special Squad had no files of its own and, as a rule, the agents were not assigned to lengthy or coordinated investigations. Typical of the spot assignments carried out by members of the Special Squad was the transfer back to Germany of war criminals who had been apprehended in France, Belgium, and other countries. Special Squad agents usually retained custody of these prisoners until they were safely lodged at the Uberrurssel Interrogation Center.

In February 1947, Special Squad agents were dispatched to conduct a series of security checks at U.S. installations in various European countries, including lands behind the Iron Curtain. This mission had resulted from a conference between high officials from USFET G2 and the State Department in which it was agreed that the security measures in effect at U.S. embassies, consulates, and other buildings could bear inspection.

[redacted]

The Special Squad gradually developed into a unit for the use of the AC of S, G2, at USFET headquarters. Indicative of the more routine investigations that G2 headquarters assigned to the Special Squad was the probe of a strike of waitresses in Frankfurt. The strike had been occasioned by the restaurant manager's decision to search all his employees for a quantity of stolen butter. One girl protested that decision and refused to be searched. The rest of the

162 See this Chapter, Part I.

[redacted]

waitresses, siding with the girl, went on strike. The Special Squad found no Communist influence behind the action.[163]

By early 1947, the Special Squad's usefulness to CIC in Germany had waned considerably, and it was phased out during the reorganization of the 970th Headquarters that was taking place at this time.

Operation "GRAB BAG"

One of the most dramatic CIC activities in 1946 was an operation entitled "GRAB BAG." Intelligence information during the early months of 1946 had indicated that a "tin can" fleet of the Hungarian navy, totalling some 375 vessels which had anchored in the Danube River between Passau and Deggendorf might be the nexus of a widespread smuggling ring and an important link of an "underground railway" that was being utilized by former SS troops escaping from Germany.

The ships were inhabited by several hundred members of the Hungarian navy and their families who had fled from the Black Sea near the end of the war and sailed up the Danube for safety behind United States lines. This mothball fleet became the subject of considerable discussion between U.S. and USSR officials; the two nations could not agree on such matters as which nation should take the vessels as reparations, whether the ships should be dismantled, and who should have the responsibility of moving them. The crews were left on board to keep the vessels in repair, and the Hungarian naval personnel maintained their own administrative set up.

Since the ships and their crews represented a serious security hazard and Intelligence sources had reported illegal activities, the Theater commander directed that the Hungarians be interned and processed for repatriation as prisoners of war.

The operation which developed was coordinated by the Theater G2 and code named GRAB BAG. It involved troops that were in training for the District Constabulary, elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 90 Wasserschutzpolizei from the Inland Waterways Division who were brought secretly from the Rhine River, 120 CIC and 20 Criminal Investigation Division agents.

At 0500 hours on 21 May 1946, members of the Constabulary initiated the raid. They sealed off the 25 mile stretch between Passau and Deggendorf and acted quickly to prevent the destruction of any loot or escape of any persons aboard the boats. The Wasserschutzpolizei sealed off the boats from the river side, and with all members of the fleet bottled up, CIC and CID men boarded the

163 Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, 28 Sep 1955.

3795

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ships to carry out the search, accompanied by troopers of the Constabulary units, who served as guards, and members of the Wasserschozpolizei whose technical knowledge of vessels proved a considerable asset.[164]

Coordinated with the search was a thorough screening of 1,949 individuals discovered aboard. Of this number, 232 persons were arrested and held for further interrogation, including Admiral Trunkwalter, erstwhile commander of the flotilla, and two of his chief assistants.

Uncovered in the search operations were considerable amounts of clothing, including Wehrmacht and Hungarian army equipment; small arms and six machine guns; machine pistols and an anti-aircraft gun in working condition but without ammunition; seven radio transmitters which could be put into operation in minutes; explosives, including land mines; and one counterfeiting net for forging various documents and producing processing papers. Of the 397 ships that the investigators searched, 26 had to be impounded because the mass of materials on board precluded a thorough search during the raid.

The security of the entire operation had been well guarded from the start, the raid and search completed, and a potential source of counterintelligence trouble neutralized.[165]

Operation SPARKLER

On 10 September 1946, CIC agents in Germany were assigned to serve as jewelry specialists for 48 hours.

At the request of Military Government, the 970th Detachment entered on Operation SPARKLER, a coordinated raid of 373 specified targets in the U.S. Zone, to recover precious stones and metals which had been transported to various banks and businesses by the Nazi Government shortly before VE Day and had not been declared to Military Government authorities as required by regulations.

In addition to this primary objective, the apprehension of individuals who had harbored the gems was an additional aim of Operation SPARKLER. Working closely with officials from the British Field Security detachments, Military Government Property Control and Public Safety, U.S. Constabulary, and German police, CIC performed preliminary reconnaissance of all targets before the Operation was started, so that those targets which had been destroyed by bombing or removed to other locations could be eliminated from the raiding plans.

164 Hq US Forces, European Theater, O of the C/S, G2, Weekly Intell Summary No. 45, dtd 24 May 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

165 Ibid, No. 46, 31 May 1946.

[redacted]

The results of Operation SPARKLER were deemed "highly successful," for within the allotted 48 hours, CIC succeeded in accounting for the disposition of a major portion of all precious stones and metals in the United States Zone of Germany. Of the total of 373 widely scattered localities designated by Military Government as targets, 245 proved remunerative and the estimated value of materials uncovered was as follows:

Diamonds.....	$ 946,688
Gold	$ 496,510
Silver	$ 768,231
Platinum.....	$5,093,600

These figures were supplemented by the untotaled values of such precious metals as palladium, ruthium, iridium, and cadmium which were also discovered. CIC confiscated property only when concurrence was received from local Military Government representatives. In other cases, the agents carefully inventoried the articles and delivered copies of these records to Property Control officers.

Aside from the speed and efficiency displayed by the CIC agents taking part in Operation SPARKLER, the "careful and businesslike manner" in which each target was checked drew commendation. There was not a single instance where subsequent accusations were made against any member of CIC concerning the improper transfer of valuable wealth of inventory, impolite treatment of persons interviewed, or any type of misconduct.

A sidelight of Operation SPARKLER which was of interest to counterintelligence officials came after study of these results of the undertaking. In no case were there indications that the stored valuables had been earmarked, for use by subversive groups.[166]

Operation PAPERCLIP

A great deal of the German war might had been dependent on the research and inventions of German scientists, who were widely recognized as pre-eminent in such fields as physics and chemistry. The Russians lost little time in scanning the rolls of scientists in their zone of occupation for potential use by the Soviet Union. It soon became apparent that the Russians intended to extend their quest for scientists to the U. S. Zone.

Among the Soviet moves to attract scientists to Russia was the establishment of a "recruiting office" in Frankfurt which was under the direction of Soviet

166 Hq USFET, G2, Weekly Intell Summary No. 67, Annex "A" to Part "C", Counterintelligence, dtd 25 Oct 1945, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

repatriation officers. CIC kept this office under surveillance and gathered leads which showed that German technicians and scientists were being directed to this office to obtain employment by the Soviets.[167]

In October 1946, instructions were received by the USFET command from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to institute a program for "the denial and exploitation of scientists and technicians of the U. S. Zone of Germany and Austria."

The field work for this program was assigned to the 970th by the Theater G2 and consisted principally of two activities: location and surveillance of the key specialists.

The operation was variously labeled at its outset as MESA and FLYPAPER and eventually code named PAPERCLIP, and the mission outlined by the G2 to CIC as follows:

1. To report any specialists designated by the Operations Branch, G2, as potential candidates for emigration to the United States.

2. To investigate and report any cases which came to the attention of G2 or CIC of individuals earmarked for exploitation in the United States who were contemplating migration from the U. S. Zone in Germany or who were approached by representatives of other nations.

3. To report the presence of any specialists whom the United States desired to neutralize but not employ and whose residence was known so that restriction could be imposed upon them by G2 through local Military Government authorities.

CIC Regional offices were supplied with the names of scientists that fell under this program, and instructions were given, denoting the EEI's which the Theater G2 had requested. The report filed on each scientist was to show: 1) age and educational institutions attended, 2) professional affiliations, 3) lists of works and publications by the scientist concerned, 4) type of research with which the scientist had been connected during the war years, 5) a statement as to party affiliations, and 6) a brief appraisal of the scientist from the view of the agent submitting the report.

The initial list of scientists was supplemented from time to time, and CIC agents in the field kept "undesirables" under surveillance to prevent them from defecting to the Soviet Union. The agents persuaded a large number of the

167 Special Intell Summary No. 31, Hq USFET, G2, dtd 26 Feb 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

German scientists and technical experts to emigrate to the United States, and PAPERCLIP was considered a highly successful operation.[168]

Operation ANYFACE

The Chief of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA), the strongest Anti-Soviet group in Russia, was a man named Stefan Bandera, who ranked at the top of the Soviet list of wanted persons. He was alleged to have escaped to Germany after the war. When his importance to the Russians had been noted by American Intelligence, the 970th ordered its subordinate echelons to start Operation ANYFACE, with the aim of denying this key figure to the Soviets. The Operation was named after the Dick Tracy comic strip character; the elusiveness of the mystery man Bandera more than justified the monicker ANYFACE. Although, in the years 1946-1948, all CIC units had to submit monthly reports on the progress of Operation ANYFACE, Bandera's whereabouts were never discovered.[169]

CIC and the Black Market Investigations

In Germany, the black market grew steadily during the occupation years until it was far too large for investigators of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Military Police to handle. Considerable concern was expressed at high USFET levels that a serious intelligence problem was posed by the rapidly spreading illicit dealing, and, on 28 December 1946, the Theater commander directed, through his G2, that CIC investigate and report all black market activities which came to its attention during the primary pursuit of its mission. Such activities were defined to include the evasion of price and rationing controls, and traffic in articles supplied for the use of U.S. Forces, contrary to German laws and Military Government ruling.[170]

In performing its investigations, CIC concentrated on the large scale individual operators and the operators of illegal rings. Close cooperation was maintained with other law enforcement agencies and, when feasible, all CIC collected evidence was turned over to Military Government, German police, or the Criminal Investigation Division for arrest and prosecution of the offender.

After two months of investigations in this field, CIC was able to draw certain conclusions. The centers of black market activity were the centers of population

168 Interview with Lt Col Earl S. Browning, Jr, Opns Officer, 970th CIC Det, from Jan 47 through Aug 49, at the Pentagon on 26 Sep 55.

169 Interview with Capt Alex M. Brand, Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird on 28 Sep 55. File Number 65587, Operation PAPERCLIP, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

170 CIC History, 1945-1948, Section III, Germany, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

(U) and displaced persons camps. Some activity existed in rural areas, but consisted largely of illegal slaughtering, trading food stuffs for clothes for farm tools, or small scale bartering for personal property.

(U) The main commodities that figured in investigations were currency, scrip, gold and silver, drugs and narcotics, automobiles, liquor, cigarettes, government property, counterfeit, ration stamps, and post exchange items.[171]

(U) For many CIC offices, already hard pressed by heavy case loads, the black market investigations proved frustrating. It was difficult to locate the "big operators" behind black market dealings, although the "smallfry" could be spotted easily enough. Many of the "big swoops" which CIC participated in were unsuccessful in getting to the heart of the black market dealings.

(U) In addition, the assignment of countering black market operations was often dangerous far beyond its value, and it placed CIC agents face-to-face with some of the worst criminal elements in Germany. One instance of the danger involved in these investigations was experienced by two CIC agents in Stuttgart.

A Narrow Escape

(U) The greatest center of black market activities in Stuttgart was a Jewish refugee camp where homeless displaced persons were quartered in a block of houses operated by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). The members of this camp were allowed to circulate freely in Stuttgart, a fact which accounted for their great success in black market dealings.

(U) Word reached CIC of one member of the refugee camp who allegedly would sell anything "from a pin to a Cadillac" in exchange for American dollars. At the time, it was strictly forbidden for any civilian to possess American currency, and two agents were selected to investigate the case.

(U) The agents chose a woman informant to accompany them to the refugee camp, and, after providing her with several dollars, sent her inside to negotiate with the suspected black marketeer. After a few moments, the woman came back to the waiting car with lingerie that she had purchased. Without hesitation, the CIC men entered the building in order to arrest the man. In a dirty apartment, the refugee and his wife were located and informed that they were under arrest. Without warning, the woman began to cry out at the top of her lungs in an unintelligible language. The shrieks alerted all the people nearby, and the small apartment was rapidly jammed with refugees who poured in from every conceivable opening. When these people learned what the agents had come for, they began to assault

171 Intell Summary No. 3, from Hq, USFET, G2, dtd 14 Mar 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

the CIC men with their fists. One agent glanced out into the camp street and saw that it was thronged and blocked by refugees. The agents drew their guns but could not fire for fear of creating a panic.

Both CIC men realized that the refugees could kill them, bury them, and leave no traces of what had occurred. Fortunately, the UNRRA police stationed nearby heard the commotion and arrived just in time. They forced their way through the milling refugees and formed a protective cordon around the beleaguered agents, enabling them to make their way to safety. The CIC men were never able to locate the man they had sought in the confusion. Nor did they attempt to search the apartment. There was no question of the man's guilt if they could have located him.

As a result of this incident, a Standard Operating Procedure was established by CIC forbidding any arrests within the refugee camp. Future CIC investigations of black markets in Displaced Persons camps were carried out with far more organization. The raid on a refugee camp in Heidenheim serves as an example.

A raiding party consisting of tactical troops, Military Police and Constabulary personnel was coordinated under the direction of CIC. The force was divided into 20 search teams with a CIC agent heading each team.

At the appointed date, the troops, accompanied by armored cars, moved into the camp at 0300 hours. By 0400 hours, the entire area to be searched was ringed by about a thousand troops posted with fixed bayonets, and the search teams entered the buildings. Every apartment in the refugee camp was systematically covered. All inhabitants were subjected to a careful search. The raid uncovered thousands of dollars and black market items ranging from livestock to food and soap.

The planning and execution of the raid had been so precise that the black marketeers were taken completely by surprise; the only fatality resulting from the raid was one refugee who tried to bolt from the area and was struck by a soldier's bayonet. Some 60 persons who had carried on extensive black market operations were found and jailed as a result of the raid.[172]

A Routine Black Market Investigation

Most of the CIC investigations of black market activity did not follow such dramatic courses as the Stuttgart affair or the Heidenheim raid. A typical example followed the theft of over 1,200 watches from the Butzbach Ordnance Depot.

172 Interview with Lt Edward H. Quarles at Fort George G. Meade, Md, 26 May 1955.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CIC investigators received a tip that led them to a former German employee of the depot. Under questioning, the suspect admitted that he hid in the storeroom where the watches were kept, and intentionally allowed himself to be locked in when the other employees went home. Later in the night, he gathered the watches, broke the lock on the door, and carried his loot outside. He then distributed the watches to men who could push them on the black market in exchange for goods and Reichmarks.

CIC was able to round up men involved either in the buying or selling of the watches, and some of the watches were traced as far as the Netherlands border. A month after the thief had been apprehended, more than 900 of the missing watches were recovered.[173]

173 Intell Summary No. 3, from Hq USFET, G2, dtd 14 Mar 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

[redacted]

Section 6

POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

Twelve miles from the border that separated the U. S. Zone from the Soviet Zone of Germany was the largest Russian Army maneuver area in East Germany. When Col. David Erskine became EUCOM Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence in 1949, he decided that CIC was the logical agency to gather information through its sources on the number and disposition of Russian troops in Thuringia and this mission was carried on until 1954.

Operation DEVOTION

In March 1949 the Soviet Desk at headquarters received this positive intelligence mission which was code named Operation DEVOTION. No additional funds or personnel were supplied for the new operation; as a result, CIC took some of its key informants off their normal assignments and sent them across the border in quest of the information.

Positive Intelligence Teams were created in Regions VI, VII, X, XI, and Berlin, and agents were dispatched from all these areas. A favored practice was the so-called "pyramid coverage" in which agents from two Regions and Berlin were sent to the same point. Three separate reports were gathered and compared so that CIC could be certain of the accuracy of the information which was being brought in.

As the border controls tightened under stress of the Cold War, it became difficult for CIC to send informants into East Germany from any regions other than Berlin. Informant nets were established to replace individual forays for intelligence, and contacts in the Soviet Zone passed information back to the U. S. Zone. CIC recruited men whose business took them across the interzonal boundaries to serve as informant net organizers, and these men were paid for their own efforts and the work of their sub-sources.

This relaying of information proved a slow process for obtaining order of battle information, and, when CIC had to answer urgent requests, a wire was sent to Berlin for a fast spot check of a given area. An informant was immediately dispatched into the Soviet Zone, which lay all around the four-power island of Berlin, and within 24 hours, the desired information was procured.[174]

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174 Interview with Lt Col LeRoy C. Pierson, former Chief, Positive Intelligence Desk, Hq 66th CIC Det, at the Pentagon, 26 Sep 1955, (Conf).

[redacted]

The intelligence which CIC received on the Russian forces was compiled into mimeographed workbooks which contained detailed information on certain targets. The workbooks were classified "secret" and had a limited distribution to intelligence agencies.[175]

CIC in Germany continued to obtain Russian order of battle until June 1954 when this mission was transferred to another agency.[176]

Looking Forward

On 27 June 1950, United States forces were committed to help the Republic of South Korea repulse the invasion from North Korea. This was the first flame in the Cold War. Whether other flames would burst out was a matter of speculation but CIC in Germany, like all Army units, had to adjust to the possibility that the battle in Korea might trigger a full scale war.

175 Hq EUCOM and Hq US Army, Europe, Annual Narrative Rpt, 66th CIC Det, 1950, undtd, (Secret) RG 207.03 A 52-345 (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

176 Historical Rpt, 66th CIC Group, Jan 1953-30 Jun 1954 prepared by William H. Kubicek, CWO, USA, Historical Officer, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

[redacted]

Appendix 1

ORGANIZATION CHART, 970th CIC DETACHMENT

3805

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970TH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT



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Appendix 2

ORGANIZATION CHART, 66th CIC DETACHMENT,
GENERAL ORGANIZATION

[redacted]

GENERAL ORGANIZATION, 66TH CIC DETACHMENT



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Appendix 3

ORGANIZATION CHART, 66TH CIC DETACHMENT,
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

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INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF 66TH CIC DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS



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Appendix 4

CURRICULUM FOR CIC COURSE

3811

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CURRICULUM FOR THE OCCUPATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TRANSITION COURSE (CIC) AT EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

Subject

GERMAN HISTORY
1. History before 1870
2. The Second Reich
3. The Weimar Republic I
4. The Weimar Republic II
5. The Third Reich

GERMAN GEOGRAPHY
1. Physical Geography
2. Economic Geography
3. Political Geography
4. The German Economy

NAZZISM
1. Growth of the Nazi Party
2. Organization of the Nazi Party
3. Affiliared Organizations I
4. Hitler's Second Army
5. SS
6. Nazi Police System
7. German Intelligence Services
8. Affiliated Organizations II
9. Application to Counter Intelligence Tasks

WESTERN ZONES OF OCCUPATION
1. British Zone
2. French Zone

ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATOR
1. Problems of Intelligence Agencies

SECURITY
1. Military Security

ENEMY DOCUMENTS
1. General Documents Information
2. Past Identity Documents
3. Current Identity Documents
4. Miscellaneous Documents

LEGAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES
1. Courts System and Jurisdiction
2. Courts Martial
3. Crimes, Offences, Incidents
4. Arrest Policy in US Zone
5. Rules of Evidence I
6. Rules of Evidence II
7. Preservation of Evidence

GERMAN PEOPLE
1. German Mentality
2. German Youth
3. German Trends of Opinion

GERMAN EDUCATION AND RELIGION
1. Elementary, Intermediate and Vocational Schools
2. Secondary Schools and Universities
3. German Churches

POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY
1. Political Terminology

GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES
1. Leftist Parties
2. Rightist Parties

GERMAN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
1. Internal Administration in the US Zone

[redacted]

CURRENT EVENTS

1. Current Events

EASTERN EUROPE

1. Soviet Union: Land and People
2. Soviet Union: Development of the Soviet State
3. Soviet Union: Constitution and Government
4. Communist Party of the Soviet Union
5. Soviet Union: Foreign Policy
6. Soviet Trends in the USSR
7. Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces
8. Soviet Intelligence Agencies
9. Ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces
10. The Ministry of State Security
11. Communist Activities at Large
12. Communist Party of America
13. Soviet Zone of Germany
14. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. Objectives and Policy I
2. Objectives and Policy II
3. General Organization of Military Government
4. Special Organization of OMGUS
5. Headquarters and Regional MG Offices
6. Military Government Regulations
7. Denazification
8. Economics

U.S. OCCUPATION FORCES

1. Organization and Mission of the European Command

REPORTS

1. Introduction to Report Writing
2. Fundamentals of Report Writing
3. Details of MOIC and SRI Reports

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXVIII

PROPERTY OF
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CIC IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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(August 1945 - June 1950)

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Section 1

CIC'S FIRST MONTHS IN JAPAN

When the Japanese Empire surrendered to the Allies on 14 August 1945, there were four regional and 66 area CIC detachments operating in the Philippines and Okinawa, in addition to 36 combat detachments attached to ground units. The 441st CIC Detachment, activated on 17 August 1944, exercised central control of operations and personnel of these units, which, on the date of surrender, consisted of 196 officers and 874 enlisted men.

Two alternate plans had been drawn to guide CIC operations, and all other military intelligence activities, in occupied Japan. "Olympic" had been formulated for a full-scale military invasion, while "Blacklist"[1] had been written as a guide if the Japanese should surrender the homeland without combat.

"Blacklist" Proves Prophetic

Some of the statements in "Blacklist" proved to be quite prophetic. The plan noted: "The surrender of Japan will alter the general mission of Counter Intelligence operations. In addition to insuring military security by denying information to the enemy, Counter Intelligence personnel will be confronted with the problem of suppression of organizations, individuals and movements whose existence and continued activities are considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan."

CIC Training School Works Overtime

Upon surrender of the Japanese, tasks of unit consolidation and training, and the quick completion of pending cases in the Philippines and Okinawa necessarily proceeded simultaneously with the immediate implementation of "Blacklist." While units attached to tactical groups quickly revamped their organization, a large proportion of 441st personnel was sent to a brief CIC Training School session at Manila for orientation on the Japanese occupation. Where personnel could not be spared from assignment for the school, they studied in the field. Officers and men read Joint Army-Navy Intelligence summaries, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) research documents, specific intelligence studies and map-talk supplements.

To fill gaps in personnel, the Manila School worked overtime. A special three-day basic course was run for 32 Nisei students who had arrived from the Zone of the Interior. All had CIC assignments awaiting them upon graduation on

1 That portion of "Blacklist" dealing with counterintelligence is attached as Appendix 1.

15 August. Fourteen enlisted men, gleaned from theater replacement depots, entered the school on 28 August for an "Abbreviated Agent's Course."

308th CIC Detachment Moves Into Yokohama

Some CIC detachments, particularly the 308th, attached to Eighth Army, had no time for extra indoctrination and training. Except for closing out prominent cases, the 308th abandoned all normal operations in the Philippines, to prepare for water shipment to the Tokyo-Yokohama area. On arrival, a temporary office was set up in the G-2 Section of Eighth Army headquarters in the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama.

The 308th and 306th CIC Detachments, attached to Sixth Army, supervised the moving in and setting up of tactical CIC units throughout the islands. Twenty-two CIC combat unit detachments were attached to the two armies, although under administrative control of the Advance Echelon of the 441st CIC Detachment, commanded by Lt. Col. Jennis R. Galloway.[2]

Armies Relieved of Counterintelligence Functions

As communication channels were improved and the 441st became better organized, combat detachments were gradually relieved of counterintelligence duties. The 441st assumed responsibility for the counterintelligence situation in northern Honshu on 16 October 1945, and took over Hokkaido on 1 November, in both instances relieving Eighth Army personnel of these duties. The Sixth Army was relieved of counterintelligence work in the southern part of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu on 1 December.[3]

The northern half of Japan, formerly under Eighth Army CIC, became the Sixth CIC Region of the 441st with headquarters in Yokohama, and the territory

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2 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, General Staff, "Opns of The Civil Intell Sec," Vol IX of "Opns of The Intell Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Part I, Chap I, p 1-11, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

3 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" (Sep 1945 to 1948), p 6, (Uncl) (Kansas City Records Center, Box C3743). This document is not an official history, but a "rough draft," parts of which eventually were incorporated in Vol IX of "Operations of The Intell Service in the Southwest Pacific Area." NOTE: The following combat unit detachments were in Japan in Oct 1945: 11th, 24th, 27th, 32d, 33d, 41st, 77th, 81st, 98th, 182d, 201st, 209th, 210th, 211th, 214th, 306th, 308th, 403d, 468th, 496th, 498th, and 801st. (See: GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, (Opn of the Civil Intell Section," Vol IX of "Opns of The Intell Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," plate #19, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

that had been covered by Sixth Army CIC was designated the Fourth CIC Region with headquarters in Kyoto. Under the Regional offices, Area and Metropolitan units were established as the 441st strove to organize a large network of offices throughout Japan.[4]

Regional commanders determined personnel requirements of the Area and Metropolitan units under their command. Personnel were assigned the Regions by the headquarters of the 441st. Regional commanders were authorized to reassign personnel to subordinate offices and to transfer personnel from one office to another as circumstances required.

Regional offices coordinated all investigations of their Area and Metropolitan units, evaluating and correlating information prior to forwarding to 441st headquarters. Files on investigative activities were maintained by the Regions for the use of subordinate units.[5]

Command of CIC Changes

Before the unit was fully organized in Japan, the 441st underwent a change in command. Colonel Galloway was rotated back to the Zone of the Interior and Col. (later Maj. Gen.) A. W. Stuart assumed command on 10 October 1945.[6]

At headquarters level, the 441st was divided into five sections: Adjutant, Assignment, Investigations and Operations, Supply, and Plans and Training.

It was the responsibility of the Investigations and Operations Section to supervise and coordinate the investigation and reporting of all matters within CIC jurisdiction.

However, it was the Plans and Training Section that fell heir to the biggest difficulties which may confront a detachment in a period of transition. Aside from

4 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" (Sep 1945 to 1948), p 6-8, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) NOTE: In October 1945, during the transition from combat unit detachments to Area and Metropolitan Units, CIC operated 13 Area Units: one in Kyushu, one in Hokkaido and 11 in Honshu. The following Metropolitan units were in operation: 80th (Tokyo), 81st (Yokohama), 82d (Hakodate), 92d (Kobe), 93d (Shimonoseki), 94th (Fukuoka), 95th (Yawata), 97th (Nagoya), and 83d (Sapporo).

5 GHQ, US Armed Forces, 441st CIC Det, Adv Echelon, Subj: "Administrative and Operational Jurisdiction of Regional Commanders," 23 Nov 45, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box 25103).

6 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" (Sep 1945 to 1948), p 15, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

preparing periodical reports, controlling confidential funds and supervising a training school, the section was charged with general planning for efficient operation of all units in the field. In this capacity, the section recommended and initiated new investigative techniques and procedures for all field units.

Although the sections at headquarters were shuffled frequently and the Regions and subordinate offices were relocated and redesignated on several occasions, the skeleton of the 441st CIC Detachment's organizational set-up established in the first few months of the Occupation was to remain.[7]

Counterintelligence A Separate Staff Section

Responsibility for counterintelligence and general security functions for the Occupation rested ultimately with a special staff section, the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS).[8] Formally established on 2 October 1945, by General Order No. 13 from Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), the Civil Intelligence Section was designed "to advise the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, on policies relating to civil public safety agencies in Japan and Korea and to conduct such investigations relating to compliance with orders and instructions to the Japanese government as may be directed."[9]

Brig. Gen. Elliot R. Thorpe was designated Chief of CIS and Chief Counter Intelligence Officer, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. The Civil Intelligence Section controlled, in addition to the 441st CIC Detachment, two other field agencies, the Civil Censorship Detachment (CDD) and the Public Safety Division (PSD).

With the creation of CIS as a special staff agency, positive intelligence and counterintelligence were set up completely independent of one another. It was not until May 1946, that these two operations were placed under a single staff section, the Office of the AC of S, G-2.[10]

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7 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" (Sep 1945 to 1948), p 7-8, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

8 The Civil Intelligence Section was known throughout the Occupation of Japan by its initials, CIS, and will generally be referred to by that title throughout this chapter.

9 GHQ, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Gen Order No. 13, "Civil Intell Sec," 2 Oct 1945, (Uncl) (See: GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intell Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," plate #7, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

10 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intell Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Part I, Chap I, p 1-14, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

CIC Assigned Various Activities

While those at the top were making organizational plans and setting up policies, the first CIC agents in Japan were engaged upon a number of special tasks, some of which were not too closely related to CIC's recognized mission. Apprehending war criminals; deactivating the Japanese intelligence framework; unearthing caches of weapons, money and precious metals; gathering historical material to show Axis connections; investigating Nazi agents in Japan; and ferreting out U.S. citizens suspected of treason while prisoners of war or residents of Japan during the war were among the mission performed.

In original planning, CIC was designated the action agency for apprehension of major war criminals - those appearing on a list of Class "A" suspects compiled by General Thorpe, Colonel Galloway, and Maj. Robert M. Hollings of the Operation Section of CIS.

As it developed, CIC had physically arrested only two of the top Japanese war criminals before a Supreme Commander Allied Powers' (SCAP)[11] directive ordered the Japanese Government to apprehend war crimes suspects.[12]

CIC Seeks Tojo

On 11 September, the day that the list of Class "A" suspects was finished, a radiogram from General MacArthur's headquarters directed the arrest and imprisonment of Gen. Hideki Tojo, former Prince Minister, former Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the number one war lord of the Japanese Empire. In spite of Tojo's resignation as Prime Minister on 18 July 1944, he was considered the one man above all others responsible for Japan's aggression and brutality.

Maj. Paul Krause and Agent James Ward of the Yokohama 81st Metropolitan CIC Detachment, and Capt. William T. Hiraoka, Lt. John Wilpers, Jr., and Lt. James Wood of the 308th CIC Detachment, proceeded to Tokyo from Yokohama to contact an informant who had learned Tojo's whereabouts. At 1600 hours, the contingent arrived at the general's residence - a small, one-story, Japanese-style

11 SCAP, although an abbreviation of General MacArthur's title, also came to refer to the collective Occupation command. These four letters became a synonym for "Occupation Authorities," and the various Occupation agencies were called SCAP agencies.

12 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of Opns of the Intell Service in the SWPA," Part I, Chap II, p 35, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac); and "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan (Sep 1945-1948)," p 53-54, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

home under guard by several native policemen. Seven newspapermen, four photographers and several U.S. Army enlisted men, the last group acting on a tip that they had received privately, were in the vicinity. Several newspapermen had attempted to interview the long-sought war lord, but had been ejected by Tojo's two private secretaries. Two minutes after the agents' arrival, the secretaries were told through the locked front door that officials from CIC wished to speak to Tojo. The secretaries soon returned to ask the agents if they possessed official credentials. When told that the Americans did indeed have credentials, the two returned to their master with the information. Tojo then sent word that he would receive only those officers in charge.

A minute later, he appeared at an open window on the opposite side of the house. Apparently expecting to be apprehended by more lofty representatives of the Allied Command, Tojo asked Major Krause several times if he were under official arrest. Tojo was answered in the affirmative and told that he should get ready immediately to leave for Yokohama. Tojo agreed and closed the window. Twenty seconds later, a shot was heard inside the house.

Action - A Little Too Late!

Major Krause and Lieutenant Wilpers broke the lock on the front door and entered the house. Wilpers kicked in the door to Tojo's room, and found the former military leader in an over-stuffed chair, bleeding from a self-inflicted bullet wound just below the heart.

The general was still conscious and leveled his pistol at the arresting party; after a command to drop the weapon, Tojo did so. Lieutenant Wilpers picked up the .32 caliber Colt automatic and, this relic, along with a loaded .25 caliber Bedguque automatic pictol, an unsheathed hara-kiri knife and documents which included Tojo's "Last Statement," were confiscated.

Tojo's secretaries were placed under guard, the room of the general sealed off, and civil police were ordered to maintain a guard on the house. Major Krause left the premises to obtain medical aid for the still-breathing Tojo and Military Police to replace the civil police.

Fifty-eight minutes after the general had shot himself, a Japanese doctor arrived on the scene. Tojo refused treatment, but Wilpers ordered the doctor to do everything in his power. An hour later, a U.S. Army doctor, Capt. James B. Johnson, arrived. By 1920 hours, Tojo was on his way to Yokohama in an Army ambulance under CIC guard.

Tojo's recovery and eventual trial as a war criminal are matters of public record.[13]

An Admiral is Next

The only other Class "A" war criminal on SCAP's list with whom CIC became involved was Shigataro Shimada, retired admiral of the Japanese Navy and a member of the Tojo cabinet. Following vocal orders from the Commander-in-Chief, personnel of the Tokyo CIC unit, Metropolitan unit 80, proceeded to arrest the admiral on 15 September 1945.

Once again, Major Krause directed the arresting party which included Capt. James K. Reitz, Lt. Alexander S. Duncan, Lt. Hugh F. Daly and Lieutenant Wilpers.

In an effort to prevent a second "Tojo incident," two squads of Military Police, a doctor, and an ambulance accompanied the CIC agents. The group arrived at the Shimada residence in Tokyo at 1620 hours. No forceful entry was made, but the group identified itself and gave the admiral 15 minutes to get ready for the trip to CIC headquarters in Yokohama. Granted a request for a few extra minutes to eat a light supper, Shimada appeared at 1650 hours and by 1800 hours was in Yokohama.

Shimada was thoroughly interrogated by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service and interned in Omori Prison to await trial.[14]

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13 The story of Tojo's arrest has received a number of treatments in the press with each account possessing its own peculiar variations. This presentation of the story is drawn from the running account kept by one of the CIC agents while the arrest was in progress - probably in recognition that complete details would be of interest later. The agent's account, not now available in its original form, was reproduced entirely in "Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. 15, Apprehension of Hideki Tojo," a narrative prepared by the 441st CIC Detachment in compliance with a request for details on outstanding CIC cases, dtd 4 Feb 1948, from Brig Gen E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC. The cases submitted by the Far East Command, together with similar narratives from other theaters, were to have formed the basis for a history of CIC to be written by two civilians authorized by the Army especially to do this job. This history was never completed. However, all 20 cases forwarded from the Far East Command are to be found in - GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

14 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan (Sep 1945-1948)" p 54-55 (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Kempei Tai Found Insolvent

Since a primary element of CIC's mission is the neutralizing of enemy intelligence, another early activity involved the tracking down and dismantling of the Japanese Empire's all-purpose intelligence agency, Kempei Tai. In addition to being the closest Japanese parallel to CIC, the Kempei Tai handled functions which Americans allot to agencies such as FBI, Provost Marshal, Military Government and civil police.

By the time the occupation forces arrived in Japan, the Kempei Tai had for the most part disintegrated without help from the outside. The brigadier general who had commanded the organization committed suicide and the majority of high ranking officers under him followed his lead. Generally, the personnel of the organization who preferred to remain alive had quit their offices and become lost in the crowd. In some cases, CIC uncovered Kempei Tai agents, and utilized them as informants.[15]

War Cache Policy Devised

CIC was aware of the probability that groups of Japanese, either with or without official sanction, had hidden large caches of materials and equipment which might be used to sustain elements planning a revolt against American Military Government. However, there was also an awareness that investigations for hidden stock piles might lead CIC on numerous searches and seizures that were actually the responsibility of local Army units.

It was decided that reports of caches of (1) all types of armaments, weapons, ammunition and explosives; (2) tangible wealth such as precious metals or jewels; and (3) large stocks of food were to be investigated by CIC only to the extent of determining actual existance and location to a degree sufficiently definite to warrant sending out troops to conduct the necessary search and seizure. Only under unusual circumstances was CIC to investigate reports of material not in the above three categories.[16]

Searches, organized after preliminary CIC investigation, yielded a fortune in diamonds, platinum, gold and silver buried in secluded areas by Japanese military leaders prior to the Occupation. One cache of 11 crates of platinum was uncovered in a chicken coop on top of a mountain 160 miles from Tokyo. A CIC agent with the searching party made a quick check of records of this hidden fortune.

15 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan (Sep 1945-1948)" p 51-3 (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

16 GHQ, US Army Forces, Pacific, 441st CIC Det, Advance Echelon 24 Dec 45, Subj: Hidden Caches of Japanese Material, /s/ Alan S. Griemer, Capt, Investigations Officer, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box 25103).

He noted a reference to jewels and questioned the custodian of the cache about them. In a few minutes, the custodian produced a bucket full of diamonds, and when asked why he had not previously surrended the gems, he pleaded no criminal intent. After all, no one had asked him about diamonds.[17]

"Butcher of Warsaw" Turns Himself in to CIC

In dismantling the structure of Japanese aggression, CIC sought information on representatives of Nazi Germany who had held diplomatic positions in Tokyo. The prize catch, Gestapo Police Attache to the German Embassy, Col. Josef Albert Meisinger, turned himself in to Metropolitan unit 81 (Yokohama). The man who had been "The Butcher of Warsaw" in the early days of the war was interrogated for five consecutive days by Yokohama CIC agents. Eventually, Meisinger was returned to Germany for final disposition.[18]

CIC also investigated Gestapo agent Gerhard Kahner whose activities in Kobe during the war placed him in a class with Meisinger. Kahner, in collaboration with the Kempei Tai, had been directly responsible for the imprisonment and torture of 12 persons, one of whom had died as a result of cruelties inflicted. Kahner had accused 11 Germans and one American citizen of engaging in espionage activities for the United States. He beat confessions out of the "agents," but nothing was ever proved and there was a complete lack of even circumstantial evidence. A Japanese warrant officer, formerly with the Kempei, testified that his organization had not investigated or suspected any of the persons before Kahner's allegations. The warrant officer recalled that Kahner had frequently stated his theory of counterespionage - "In investigating spies, one must torture and beat people in order to get the truth."

Information gathered on Kahner was forwarded to the SCAP War Crimes Section.[19]

CIC Looks Into German-Japanese Relations

In the early months of the Occupation, the Special Operations "desk" of the 441st CIC Detachment compiled a collection of documents written by Nazi diplo- which tended to unravel the complexities of German-Japanese relations from 1936 to 1945.

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17 Operational Hist of Theaters, "CIC Hist, 1945-1948, Japan," (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

18 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," (Sep 1945-1948), p. 55, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

19 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. 9, Gerhard Kahner, Gestapo Agent, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Three major documents were included in this collection: "The Nazi Party and Japan;" "Japanese Policy from 1936 to 1945 Under the Aspect of German-Japanese Relations;" and the personal statement of Maj. Gen. Eugen Ott, former German ambassador to Japan. The remainder of the collection was made up of remarks by Ott and H. G. Stahmer, Ott's successor, on the two first-mentioned papers, written by former German diplomats. This series of documents offered insight into the early German-Japanese negotiations, the effect of the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on these relations, the eventual feeling in Tokyo that the Germans were invincible, the failure of the Japanese to attack Russia, and the internal tension of the Axis.

Although it was off the beaten path of its mission for CIC to collect historical material, the collection of these documents afforded Intelligence Division, the State Department and authorities concerned with the prosecution of war criminals valuable insight into the complex relationship between the two major enemies of the Allied Forces in World War II.[20]

The Confessions of Doctor

In addition to rounding up fragments of the Japanese war machine, CIC in the first months of the Occupation began investigation of several "shady" characters with international reputations whose devious paths during the war led to Japan.

One was who first came to the attention of American authorities through his own actions. Either fearing discovery by Allied Intelligence or wishing to hop on the winners' bandwagon, authored "A Report To The Allied Commission Concerning My Secret Activities in Japan During World War II," and forwarded the document to the Allied Commission on 2 September 1945. Concurrently with this action, the wife, presented the 308th CIC Detachment with a copy of the statement.

During interrogation by CIC, and his wife volunteered their services to the Allies for "intelligence work." The doctor desired to obtain a monopoly on the importation of Swiss publications into Japan. felt he would have access to certain individuals whose knowledge and movements would be of interest to the Americans. Further, suggested that his wife be given employment with whatever organization was being set up to control foreigners in Japan, so she could have access to files providing information on the whereabouts of such persons. Both the seemed to put much emphasis on information concerning foreign nationals.

20 Special Opns, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Adv Ech, Subj: "German-Japanese Relations from 1936 to 1945," TO: CO, 441st CIC Det, 29 Jan 1946, /s/ Thomas Sheehan, Jr, Maj, Special Opns Officer, (Conf) (Departmental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

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The Outlines His Personal History

in his report had outlined his wartime activities. Coming to Japan to accept a the doctor watched his job disintegrate, as a result of unfavorable Gestapo reports. claimed he had sought connections with the German Embassy and had infiltrated Nazi ranks to obtain intelligence for the British and French. A review of report gave CIC the impression that his principal occupation had been selling information to the highest bidder.

bold request and some questionable features of his report caused CIC to open a background investigation on 21 September 1945.

Among the first persons interviewed was in Tokyo, who answered yes to the direct question: "Did work for Gestapo Chief in Japan?"

and another German national, both told interviewers that while working for German Intelligence in 1926 had been given a mission to the USSR. Caught by the OGPU and sentenced to death, had been loosed on the espionage stage once more in an unorthodox German-Russian trade of captured spies. The had then giving an account of his Russian experiences. econded CIC's impression of by calling him the "lowest form of wine" - a man who could be purchased by the highest bidder.

On 25 October, CIC's investigation had progressed sufficiently to warrant the arrest of on the ground that he had been a paid operative of the Gestapo. Concurrent with arrest, a search of the home uncovered letters and documents linking him to high Nazi officials, including Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels and the infamous Meisinger. Two days after arrest, was interrogated at Sugamo Prison by CIC.

The proved remarkably adept at dialectic maneuvering, due no doubt to the fact he had undergone interrogation by the notoriously efficient OGPU. He began by stating he would gladly tell of his great devotion to the ideals of the United States and Great Britain. He dwelt on trivia to avoid giving facts which might implicate him - a tactic which CIC recognized as that of an experienced professional spy. spent much time telling of a certain spy in Russia. Cross-examination revealed that the spy had been in the USSR in 1904.

When confronted with CIC's knowledge of his wartime Gestapo connections, discounted his activity by stating again he had been gathering information for the Allies.

CIC Seeks British Contact

CIC attempted to locate British contacts to whom claimed he passed information. Particularly sought was a formerly with the British Information Office in Tokyo. On 2 January 1946, a cable from the British Foreign Office informed CIC that had been located and had stated that had transmitted information which had not been valued too highly. It was also reported that the British Naval Attache had received data from but had considered him unreliable.

Accepting as factual trip to the USSR as a spy, CIC nevertheless was stuck on one question. Why did the Gestapo employ, in an undercover status, a man who was publicly known to have been a German espionage agent, and whose name was probably on file in intelligence offices around the world? It seemed likely had come to Japan in a "free lance" status with the tacit approval of the German government, but had been given no financial assistance. Forced to sell information by the pound, rather than working on a steady salary, apparently had broadened his market to include all takers.

On 1947, his wife and children were deported to Germany as objectionable persons.[21]

A Rose by Any Other Name...

To American and Australian fighting men in the Pacific, the most familiar radio voice was that of the infamous "Tokyo Rose." Calling herself "Ann" (short for announcer), but given her reknowned nom de kilocycles by GI's, American-born had broadcast enemy propaganda from Radio Tokyo.

Many Allied soldiers were familiar with the greeting: "Good evening, my dear boneheads! This is your favorite enemy, Ann, broadcasting the 'Zero Hour' over Radio Tokyo, to listeners in Australia and the South Pacific..."

Initial investigation of "Tokyo Rose" was begun by the 80th Metropolitan unit of the 441st early in the Occupation. The essential elements of information, usually evasive at the start of an investigation, seemed patently clear in this instance. Investigation had to reveal whether "Tokyo Rose" had made her broadcasts with deliberate intent to lower troop morale or had been forced to do so by the Japanese authorities. If the former proved the case, then "Tokyo Rose" could be tried for treason against the United States.

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21 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations. (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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Under the surface, the investigation was not so simple. It was generally conceded that several individuals might have been "Tokyo Rose." From the outset, however, was closely associated with the broadcasts, and her life and activities in Japan called for scrutiny by CIC investigators. Between September 1945 and February 1948, many persons, including Allied prisoners of war and Japanese nationals, were interviewed in connection with the case.

was stranded in Japan at the outbreak of the war, having failed, allegedly, to obtain papers necessary to leave. To support herself, she took various odd jobs in Tokyo and, in August 1943, became a part-time typist at Radio Tokyo.

Three prisoners of war, had been ordered under threat of physical violence and torture to write and conduct an hour and a quarter program for Radio Tokyo designed to lower the Allied troop morale. The officers decided to control the program to minimize the propaganda effect. They needed an announcer who would not inform on them and who could not possibly give the program a fatal "sentimental" touch. suggested The prisoners felt that unfeminine voice and manner would arouse no sentimental feelings, and that she might possibly develop into an entertaining personality. Above all, it was felt that she would remain loyal to them when she became aware of their intention to "tone down" the effect of the program.

accepted the job in November 1943 and within a few weeks learned of the prisoners' motives. Later statements of revealed that she not only cooperated with them, but began to furnish news items from America which she secured on her own initiative from the Domei News Agency.

After June 1944, when physically collapsed, began to write her own material. In April 1945, she became the wife of a Portuguese citizen.

was taken into custody on 17 October 1945 and remained in prison until October 1946 when voluminous correspondence on her case was exchanged between Japan and the United States.

By early 1946, the Far East Command came to the conclusion that it did not have enough evidence to warrant a military trial and that the ultimate decision in her case had to rest with the Department of Justice. was released and allowed to return to her home in Tokyo.

- SCAP was notified in March 1948 that the Department of Justice had decided to re-examine the case. After investigations by Justice Department representatives in Japan and FBI agents in the United States, formal charges were pressed against although the evidence uncovered by the most recent investigations had not done much to alter the story CIC had pieced together in 1945. In September 1948, "Tokyo Rose" was transferred to the United States to await trial.

Convicted, sentenced and turned down an appeal, she was jailed on October 1949 for treason against the United States.[22]

The One Who Wrote Poems

Among the group of prisoners of war liberated in Japan were a number who required CIC investigation. Many had been placed on General MacArthur's War Criminal List as a result of alleged subversive activity in Japanese camps. Prominent among these was

who held a position with a civilian construction company on had been taken prisoner when the fell on 1941. From the first, had been a trouble-maker. In an effort to ingratiate himself with the Japanese, he openly exhibited a pro-Japanese sentiment - at the same time claiming to have allegiance to no nation, being a "citizen of the world."

"An Ode to President Roosevelt"

On his own volition produced a considerable amount of treasonable literature - including two books the Japanese exploited for propaganda purposes. One of the volumes contained an opus titled "An Ode To President Roosevelt." One stanza will suffice.

> To One of faith, in whom we placed the same
> Giving Power and Glory to YOUR name.
> Believing that then you would be,
> A Good example of Humanity.

22 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS", Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, selected CIC Investigations, Case (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac)

Washington, D.C., 1950, pp 382-388 (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

At Camp Bunka, like the other prisoners there, was supposed to write propaganda and work for Radio Tokyo. Allegedly he also was put in charge of prisoners; was friendly with Japanese in charge of the camp; received special privileges; was insubordinate to American officers; and cooperated whole-heartedly with the Japanese propaganda program which other prisoners, led by were trying to sabotage. Prisoners interrogated by CIC felt that had informed on the officers who were undermining the broadcasts. Many declared that tales to Japanese authorities had resulted in the removal and possible execution of who resisted the Japanese program more strongly than other prisoners.

Thirty-Nine Interviewed by CIC About

Among 39 men whose testimony was recorded by CIC, were enlisted men present in the mess hall at the time of the incident; high-ranking officers who had contacts with at the Manila and Taiwan prisons; fellow broadcasters from Bunka; a Japanese Army sergeant stationed at Bunka; and Kaji Domoto, a Japanese civilian, who succeeded the Only and gave testimony that reflected favorably on claimed that many improvements at Bunka could be attributed to the efforts of

According to his own testimony and that of others, was extremely upset emotionally during his stay at Bunka. His confusion over whether or not to act with the group that was "fixing" the broadcasts was greatly complicated when "fell in love" with a lieutenant in the group.

When was replaced by Domoto, an American-born Japanese, as head of Bunka, things took a turn for the worse for Domoto sympathized with the prisoners' objectives and, in a general meeting, denounced as a "stool pigeon," and privately told others that was an informer for the Japanese.

Just before the surrender, placed under arrest. Liberating American troops took him into custody and CIC's investigation began.[25]

During December, was diagnosed by psychiatrists: "Psychopathic personality (emotional instability and sexual psychopathy)." So serious was his

25 Hq CIC Metropolitan Unit #80, Summary Rpt, Title: Date: 5 Feb 1946, Office of origin: H2 441st CIC Det, Case Classification: Treason (TREASON) (Cen Rec Fac) (X7134682).

condition that it was believed at times was not totally responsible for his actions.[26]

statements regarding CIC's initial questioning are available. In a letter to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, labored through 51 pages in an attempt to clarify his position. "Some CIC officers came, after several days, and took me into a small room where they questioned me about . I am loyal to my officers: and I always represent things as they should have been, when people's reputations, honor and integrity are questioned. The CIC men used a disrespectful, accusing tone in reference to asking me what did I know about 'that guy,' etc., 'Did he broadcast?' etc. It was apparent that their interpretation or attitude toward what we did was decidedly unfavorable. I felt that there was a possibility of public scandal and that everyone was in jeopardy. I refused to make any derogatory statement about any officer."

Then, about a later interrogation - "Then a man from CIC came and questioned me... (He) showed me a sentimental note of apology I wrote in the Bunka Camp, made innuendoes, veiled threats, and left me practically irrational. He questioned me about the Japanese taking the mess officer to the stockade on Corregidor and about the radio activities. The man came two or three times, and I told him, I believe, that I did everything wrong and asked him to write a statement for me, if it was my last, as I want the record to read that I did the best I could, regardless."

And later - "different men came from CIC (three of them) and asked many questions: and when I started to talk, I began to remember where I had been since taken prisoner of war on Corregidor. They told me to write. At first I could not connect happenings in sequence, and a great deal I have pieced together from what others told. As the truth is, the period following our capture, and some months at the Bunka camp are confused and vague in my mind. They were at the time, so the memory is likewise. I do not want to escape responsibility, as I understand it goes hand in hand with freedom."[27]

Conduct Characterized as "Unbecoming a Soldier"

Contrary to claims that he never made derogatory remarks about officers, testimony characterized conduct at Bunka as "unbecoming a soldier." stated that attempted to undermine the

26 42d General Hospital, Subj: Report of Neuropsychiatric Consultation, To: Capt Lloyd G. Edwards, Sugamo Prison, /s/ David Rothchild, Lt Col, Chief, Neuropsychiatric Section, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac) (X71344682).

27 Ltr to CG, Eighth Army, Yokohama; /s/ from Sugamo Prison, 20 Mar 46, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac) (X71344682).

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authority of the officers, and went so far as to suggest to the "front office" that officers be removed entirely and writing be left in the hands of enlisted men.[28]

The SCAP Legal Section gave CIC's evidence close scrutiny, but in view of the probability that had been mentally defective during his capture, recommended that no charges be preferred.[29]

Although the Army continued to collect evidence against it was not until 3 September 1949, when he was discharged after another enlistment, that definite action was taken. Immediately upon discharge, was arrested by the FBI and arraigned on the charges of treasonably dealing with the Japanese in time of war.[30] He was convicted on 11 February 1953, and given a life sentence and $10,000 fine. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the verdict on 28 August 1954, ordering the case sent back for retrial, on the ground that the trial should have been held in New York, but at the place of original arrest.

On 14 March 1955, in Baltimore, Maryland, was set free by a Federal judge who ruled that had been denied his Constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that it was impossible to give a fair trial at such a late date.[31]

CIC Seeks SCAPIN Violators

Early in the Occupation, CIC became charged with a responsibility peculiar to the situation in Japan.

SCAP's policy for controlling the Occupation had developed into a procedure of directing the Japanese Government to accomplish and enforce the physical operations American authorities deemed necessary. SCAP directives to the Japanese Government became known by the short title of "SCAPINS" (SCAP Instructions).

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28 Hq, CIC Metropolitan Unit #80, Summary Rpt, Title:
Date: 5 Feb 46, Office of origin: Hq, 441st CIC Det, Case Classification: Treason, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac) (X7134682).

29 GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: From: Legal Section, To: OCCIO Thru: JA Section, AFPAC, 14 Mar 46, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac) (X7134682).

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CORREGIDOR VET AS HAW HAW OF PACIFIC) (Cen Rec Fac).

31

Rec Fac).

To determine the degree of compliance with SCAPINS, the American agency most closely related with the purpose of the particular directive maintained a surveillance of Japanese enforcement.

In the early days of the Occupation, GHQ turned out SCAPINS faster than surveillance agencies could be organized to check Japanese accomplishments of the orders. Situated in offices scattered throughout Japan since the first weeks of Occupation, CIC drew the responsibility of working with skeleton staffs of such organizations as Civil Information and Education, Military Government and the Provost Marshal to determine SCAPIN violations. Eventually CIC was limited to surveillance of SCAPIN's emanating from the Civil Intelligence Section.

As far as CIC was concerned, the most important SCAPINS were issued on 4 January 1946. Number 550 was titled "The Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office," and Number 548, "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations." These directives, generally classified as the "purge directives," were aimed at reduction of militarists and ultra-nationalists in the Japanese population.[32]

32 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" (Sep 1945 to 1948), pp 37-40, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Section 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE 441ST CIC DETACHMENT

As an operational unit of the Civil Intelligence Section, the 441st CIC detachment, as did detachments in all theaters, "contributed to the successful operation of the U.S. Army through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, disaffection and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage."

"The Eyes and Ears of the Occupation"

In Japan, however, "this mission was further developed into that of detecting and reporting to the proper authorities conditions inimical to the Occupation, where subversive activities were involved." It was by the collection and transmission of "spot reports" - news flashes from sensitive areas and points of future difficulty - that CIC earned the title, "Eyes and Ears of the Occupation."[33]

CIS Placed Under G-2

On 3 May 1946, Civil Intelligence Section was placed under jurisdiction of the AC of S, G2, Armed Forces, Pacific (AFPAC). With this move, counter-intelligence and positive intelligence were merged under a single staff section, ending, from the G2 point of view, an "obviously artificial division" that had "severely crippled" intelligence operations for four years - first in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and then in AFPAC.

At the direction of Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the new chief of the Civil Intelligence Section, as well as the AC of S, G2, AFPAC, immediate and sweeping changes were made to tighten the control exercised by CIS over CIC.[34]

Charged under the specific directives of General Willoughby with the strengthening of CIS operations was the deputy chief of CIS. At the time of the transfer to G2, Col. Harry I. T. Creswell held this position. From 10 June to 1 October 1946, Col. W. S. Wood was deputy chief and after Colonel Wood's departure was Col. Rufus S. Bratton.[35]

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33 Inter-office Memo, From: 441st CIC Det, To: Lt Col Homan, Subj: Draft of CIC 15 Minute Brief, 1 Nov 1947, (Uncl), (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

34 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, "Opn of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Part I, Chap VI, p 61-62, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

35 Ibid, p 63.

CI Division Organized in 1949

On 15 June 1949, the Counter Intelligence Division was instituted and placed in the organizational chart between CIS and the 441st CIC Detachment. The Counter Intelligence Division performed intelligence processing, formerly the duty of CIS. Colonel Bratton, Deputy Chief of CIS since 1946, was given the additional position of Director, Counter Intelligence Division.[36]

Four CIC Commanders From 1946 to the Korean War

Concurrent with the assumption of control of CIS by the G-2 Section, Lt. Col. Wayne E. Homan was appointed chief of the 441st CIC detachment. In July 1947, when Colonel Homan assumed direction of the CIS Operations Division, former Deputy Commanding Officer of the 441st, Lt. Col. L. L. Martin became acting commander. In January 1948, Col. Russell G. Duff, Colonel Homan's predecessor in the CIS position, was given command of the 441st. Colonel Duff was reassigned in September 1949, and from that date until early in 1952, Col. L. G. Smith commanded CIC in Japan.[37]

Name Headquarters for Captain Norton

After December 1945, CIC maintained its headquarters at the former Kempi Tai Headquarters building in Tokyo.[38]

On 7 December 1947, this headquarters was officially given the name Norton Hall in honor of Capt. John Norton, a West Point graduate, who commanded the 11th CIC detachment during the war. Norton and four agents of his command were killed on 13 August 1945, when the B-29 carrying them to Okinawa preparatory to the flight to Japan crashed in landing.[39]

Headquarters Divided into Three Branches

By the beginning of 1946, headquarters, 441st CIC detachment was composed of three branches: Administration, Plans and Training and Operations.

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36 GHQ, FEC, Office of the AC of S, G2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap II I, Part I, pp 21-22, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

37 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, "Opn of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap VIII, p 90, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

38 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945 to 1948, p 51, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

39 Ibid, p 5.

Until November 1946, the only investigative portion of the Operations Branch was the Investigations Section, which was responsible for coordination and supervision of all investigations in the field. As such, the Investigations Section acted as the connecting link between CIC field units and the chief of the Civil Intelligence Section.

The Operations Branch was split into two investigative sections in November 1946, with the creation of the Special Projects Section. The new section succeeded a special unit which had operated as the "Hongo House Group." The mission of the "Hongo House Group" had been to counter the efforts of Soviet Intelligence in Japan, and the group had been headed by Maj. Thomas Sheehan, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services in Germany.

With the advent of the Special Projects Section, the Investigations Section's largest fields of activity became security investigations of personnel and installations along with SCAPIN surveillances.

Broadly speaking, the Investigations Section handled those cases dealing with rightist activity, while the Special Projects Section concerned itself with the many-sided aspects of communism: both Japanese and foreign varieties. Any cases concerning or believed to be concerned with communism were directed immediately to Special Projects. Initiating and coordinating the majority of the Special Projects Section's cases was the "CP Desk," a division concerned with the doings of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Lt. Col. Robert M. Reese, a veteran of CIC operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, and former commander of Tokyo's Metropolitan CIC Unit, headed the Special Projects Section.[40]

Two Sections Combine in 1948

On 1 May 1948, the two investigative sections of the Operations Branch were combined into the Special Investigations Section in an attempt to make the detachment more efficient. The change decreased report processing time to a point where the 441st CIC was forwarding reports to CIS twice daily. By centralizing control of reports, the detachment found the confusion and inefficiency inherent in the old procedure for routing of operational correspondence was eliminated.

From the beginning, sections of the Operations Branch were sub-divided into "desks," meaning that a specified officer within the section handled all cases within certain classifications.

Several months after the centralization of operations under the Special Investigations Section, it was deemed necessary to make one further change.

40 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945 to 1948, pp 25-29, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Up to mid-1948, the investigation of the Soviet Mission and the colony of Soviet nationals in Japan had been in the hands of the Special Investigations Section at headquarters[41] with almost all of the field work accomplished by the Tokyo-Kanagawa District.[42] In mid-1948, the Tokyo office set up a new "desk," the Foreign Section, to handle cases involving Russian nationals.[43] Near the end of July, orders were published designating this unit, now referred to as the Zed Section, as a section of Headquarters, 441st and naming Maj. Jack Y. Canon as Chief.[44]

In actuality, the Zed Section worked directly for General Willoughby and CIS although maintaining case coordination with 441st headquarters. Investigations were also coordinated with similar operations in Hokkaido which were under the supervision of Maj. George G. Gargett, commanding officer of the Sixth CIC District. Shortly after its formation, the Zed Section mission was broadened to include all sensitive investigations of special concern to General Willoughby.

One of the major problems created by the establishment of the Zed Section was the ill-feeling that arose between men of the Tokyo-Kanagawa District and the agents of the new group.[45]

During the years of the Korean War, the Zed Section was deactivated and the investigations of Russian nationals returned to the Tokyo office.[46]

Plans and Training Section has Varied Duties

The Plans and Training Section was responsible for a number of activities, some verging on the administrative and others semi-operational. Duties included: the dissemination of all regulations and field manuals to field units; over-all planning for operation of all field units; preparation and publication of all periodic

41 441st CIC Det, Subj: Monthly Rpt of Activities, Special Investigations Sec, To: Policy & Rpts Section, 441st CIC Det, 1 Jun 1948, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

42 Inter-office Memo, From: Chief, Zed Section, To: 441st CIC Det, Subj: Assignment of Translator, 14 Aug 1948, /s/ J.Y.C. (Jack Y. Canon), (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

43 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, Bldg #332, Ft Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, (Conf).

44 Inter-office Memo, From: Dep CO, 441st CIC Det, To: Exec Officer and Adjutant, 441st CIC Det, Subj: Canon, Jack Y., 26 Jul 1948, /s/ L.L.M. (Lt Col Martin) (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

45 Interview with Col Frank M. Hosterman, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, Ft Holabird, 19 Oct 1944, (Conf).

46 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, Ft Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, (Conf).

reports required by higher headquarters; preparation of the counterintelligence portion of the monthly CIS Periodic Summary; and the operation of the CIC Training School.

On 20 February 1948, the Plans and Training Section was redesignated the Policy and Reports Section and a Training Section created to take over operation of the CIC Training School and the general military training of enlisted men within 441st Headquarters and the Tokyo office.[47]

CIC Widely Distributed in Japan

The wide geographic distribution of CIC units in Japan gave CIC a greater coverage for surveillance purposes than any other agency of the Occupation. In November 1947, for instance, while the Military Police maintained 34 detachments, CIC was manning 61 posts - with less than one-fifth of the Military Police strength.

In maintaining so many offices, CIC was thinly spread throughout the islands and active in areas far removed from the main cities. Especially during the first few years of Occupation, coverage of events of interest to GHQ outside metropolitan areas rested almost completely with CIC. The coastline of northwest Honshu and western Kyushu, along which Koreans were frequently smuggled into Japan, were covered only by CIC units.[48]

In the early days of the Occupation, the 441st's far-flung units operated directly under two regional headquarters, the Fourth and the Sixth, which had counterintelligence jurisdiction over areas corresponding to territory under control of the Sixth and Eighth Armies respectively. On 31 December 1945, the Sixth Army was relieved of its occupational duties and CIC began to reorganize along the lines of jurisdiction of the I and IX Corps - the two components of Eighth Army. In September 1946, the Sixth CIC Region was redesignated the Second CIC Region and headquarters was established in Sendai in northern Honshu. Second CIC Region's area of jurisdiction corresponded to that of IX Corps.

Meanwhile, in the I Corps Area, the First CIC Region, supplanting the old Fourth Region, was established with headquarters remaining in Kyoto.

47 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, p 27-28, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743), and "Functions List," attached to Inter-office Memo, Subj: G-2 Functions and Organization Folder, From: CIC, To: CIS, undtd, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

48 Inter-office Memo, From: 441st CIC Det, To: Lt Col Homan, Subj: Draft of CIC 15 Minute Brief, 1 Nov 1947, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Concurrently with redesignation of the Regions, Metropolitan and Area CIC units became things of the past. A network of 30 Area offices, each designated numerically, was established. Generally the jurisdiction of an Area office extended over a prefecture, and Area headquarters were located in the prefectural capitol.[49]

Thirteen Area offices were originally under First Region: Area 1, Kagoshima; Area 2, Kumamoto; Area 3, Kokura; Area 4, Yamaguchi; Area 5, Kure; Area 6, Takamatsu; Area 7, Okayama; Area 8, Kobe; Area 9, Osaka; Area 10, Kyoto; Area 11, Tsu; Area 12, Nagoya; and Area 13, Kanazawa.

The 17 Area offices under the Second Region were: Area 20, Nagano; Area 21, Shizuoka; Area 22, Katsuyama; Area 23, Yokohama; Area 24, Chiba; Area 25, Tokyo; Area 26, Urawa; Area 27, Maebashi; Area 28, Isohama; Area 29, Utsunomiya; Area 30, Niigata; Area 31, Fukushima; Area 32, Yamagata; Area 33, Sendai; Area 34, Akita; Area 35, Morioka; Area 36, Hachinohe; and Area 37, Sapporo.

Most Area offices maintained sub-detachments in the territory of their jurisdiction. Area 37, with eight sub-detachments, easily outstripped the other offices in number of subordinate units. Area 4 was next with four.[50]

Several Changes Made in Area Designations

On 21 January 1947, Area 23 in Yokohama became part of Area 25 which, in turn, was redesignated the Tokyo-Yokohama District. Directly responsible for counterintelligence coverage of this highly-sensitive area, the newly-designated district, reporting directly to 441st headquarters, joined the two Regions in becoming a main field unit of the 441st.

At the same time, jurisdiction over Area 21 at Shizuoka was transferred from Second to First Region, and the office redesignated Area 14.[51] In 1948, the Shizuoka office again became Area 21 and returned to Second CIC Region.[52]

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49 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, p 14, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

50 GHQ, AFPAC, MI Section, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 7, dtd 1 Dec 1946, p 50 & 55, (regional location maps), (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

51 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, p 19, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

52 Inter-office Memo, From: Col Bratton, To: General Willoughby, Subj: Relationship CIC to Tactical and MG Units, 21 Jun 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743). (A chart accompanying this IOM lists CIC Areas as of that date.)

Generally, CIC Area offices were instructed to locate their headquarters in the prefectural capitol. With Area 36, this principle was violated, since the capitol, Aomori, had been almost obliterated by war-time bombings. In October 1947, after operating since late 1946 in Hachinohe, Area 36 headquarters moved to Aomori.[53]

Districts Replace Regions in Late 1948

In September 1948, the 441st CIC detachment's system of office distribution underwent another major revision. First and Second Regions were each subdivided into three districts. Districts one through three were located in the First CIC Region Area and four through six were subdivisions of the Second Region.

The First District was the island of Kyushu; Second District the island of Shikoku and the southern tip of Honshu; and the area of the Third District was that of the 25th Infantry Division in south central Honshu. That area of north central Honshu under the jurisdiction of the 1st Cavalry Division comprised the Fourth District while the 7th Infantry Division Area of northern Honshu was designated the Fifth District. Sixth District covered the whole of Hokkaido.

Headquarters for the Districts were: First, Kokura; Second, Kure; Third, Osaka; Fourth, Camp Drake; Fifth, Sendai; and Sixth, Sapporo.[54]

53 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, p 19-20, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

54 In late 1948, the 441st maintained 54 area dets and sub-dets. They were: Under 1st Dist - Fukuoka, Saga, Oita, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Miyazaki and Kagoshima ares Dets and Tsushima and Sasebo Sub-Dets; Under 2d Dist - Tottori, Okayama, Shimane, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Kagawa, Tokushima, Ehime and Kochi Area Dets; Under 3d Dist - Toyama, Ishikawa, Gifu, Aichi, Fukui, Shiga, Mie, Nara, Wakayama, Osaka, Kyoto and Hyogo Area Dets and Nanao and Maizure Sub-Dets; Under 4th Dist - Tochigim, Ibaraki, Gumma, Nagano, Saitama, Chiba, Shizuoka and Yamanashi Area Dets; Under 5th Dist - Aomori, Iwate, Yamagata, Myiagi, Fukushima and Niigata Area Dets and Hachinohe and Hirosaki Sub-Dets; and Under 6th Dist - Wakkanai, Kushiro, Asahigawa, Haokodate and Sapporo Area Dets. (See: GHQ, FEC, Office of the AC of S, G2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949-31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part IV, plate #37 (Map of locations of CIC Offices in Japan, dtd 4 Oct 1948) (Secret)(Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.))

On the same status as the six districts, 441st Headquarters maintained the Tokyo-Kanagawa CIC District, covering the areas of those two prefectures, under the same arrangement as the old Tokyo-Yokohama District.[55]

After 1 October 1948, Regional offices no longer functioned in the CIC command echelon. Their responsibility was limited to liaison at Corps level and certain staff inspection duties delegated by the Commanding Officer, 441st CIC detachment. On 18 August 1949, the Regional offices were discontinued and their former liaison responsibilities taken over by liaison officers attached to I and IX Corps of the Eighth Army.[56]

During 1949 and 1950, the functions of the District CIC offices were: coordination of all field investigations within their area of jurisdiction; maintainance of master files on all investigations within the district; forwarding of all required investigative reports to 441st headquarters; maintainance of liaison with Division G-2, Provost Marshal units of tactical organizations, Civil Affairs and Japanese authorities; and supervision of confidential funds. Area detachments conducted field investigations within their zones of jurisdiction; maintained files on all investigations conducted in the area; forwarded to District headquarters agent reports covering all investigative activities; maintained liaison on the prefectural level; and organized and maintained an informant network.[57]

As had been the case when Regional offices were in operation, all personnel were assigned to the Districts from 441st headquarters, and then "farmed out" by the District to fill openings in Area offices.[58]

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55 GHQ, FEC, Hq, 441st CIC Det, "Det Order #133," "Redesignation of Units and Command Responsibilities," 5 Aug 1948, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) and GHQ, FEC, Office of the ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part IV, p 95 and plate #37 (Map of locations of CIC Offices in Japan, dtd 4 Oct 1948, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

56 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Gen Order No. 1, Section One, "Discontinuance of Regions," 18 Aug 1949, (Uncl) (See: GHQ, FEC, Office of the ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Supporting Doc #50) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

57 441st CIC Det, Functions List, undtd, (Secret) (See: GHQ, FEC, Office of the ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Supporting Document #49, Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

58 GHQ, FEC, Hq, 441st CIC Det, "Det Order #133," "Redesignation of Units and Command Responsibilities," 5 Aug 1948, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

The last major organizational change before the outbreak of Korean hostilities occurred in September 1949. The Tokyo-Kanagawa District was discontinued and the Tokyo and Kanagawa CIC Areas were established. Operational control over these two areas went to 441st headquarters.[59]

441st Works to Limit Jurisdiction

In the helter-skelter of the first months of the Occupation, CIC became tied up in a number of unusual operations. Later, under the watchful eye of General Willoughby, the 441st took steps to limit the range of CIC activities by determining definite jurisdictional boundaries.

In many rural areas of Japan, CIC was the sole representative of the Allied Occupation. There had developed a practice of local CIC offices establishing and dictating policies to prefectural and municipal branches of the Japanese government. In some instances, these verbal directives had exceeded the limits of SCAP directives.[60] On 26 June 1946, an order from CIC headquarters directed the cessation of these extra-curricular activities. In part, the order read: "While the zeal of the officers responsible for this practice is to be admired, nevertheless, it is desired that before local CIC officers put out directives whose scope and purview are of such moment as to be considered on a policy-making level, drafts thereof be submitted through this office to G2/CIS for approval.

59 GHQ, FEC, 441st CIC Det, Gen Order No. 3, Sec One, "Tokyo-Kanagawa District" and Section Two, "Establishment of Areas," 9 Sept 1949, (Uncl) (See: GHQ, FEC, Office of the ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Supporting Document #51) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va) NOTE: In May 1950, the 441st CIC Det maintained 53 Area Det and Sub-Det. They were: Under First District - Shimane, Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, Sagem Oita, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Miyazaki and Kagoshima Area Detachments and Tsushima and Sasebo Sub-Detachments; Under Second District - Hyogo, Tottori, Okayama, Hiroshima, Kagawa, Tokushima, Ehime and Kochi Area Detachments; Under Third District - Toyama, Ishikawa, Gifu, Aichi, Fukui, Shiga, Mie, Nara, Wakayama, Osaka and Kyoto Area Detachments and Maizuru Sub-Detachment; Under Fourth District - Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gumma, Nagano, Saitama, Chiba, Shizuoka and Yamanashi Area Detachments; Under Fifth District - Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata, Miyagi, Fukushima and Niigata Area Detachments; Under Sixth District - Wakkanai, Kushiro, Asahigawa, Hakodate, and Sapporo Area Detachments. (See: GHQ, FEC, Office of ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt (Part I)" 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part II, plate #18 (Map of Locations of CIC Offices in Japan, dtd 23 May 1950) (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

60 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 37, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

This, especially with regard to those matters in which one common rule or criterion should be applied universally throughout the entire country."[61]

Headquarters Publishes SCAPIN Guide

Since the 441st's case load included many investigations that were not within even the broadest interpretation of CIC's mission, the Office of the AC of S, G2, in a letter to the commanding officer of the 441st, dated 1 October 1946, issued instructions designed to limit CIC activities within proper jurisdictional boundaries.

All CIC units were advised to review open cases in the light of CIC/CIS jurisdiction. If the investigation did not come under categories outlined in War Department directives, theater regulations or specific instructions from the G2, CIC was to halt the investigation and turn facts over to the agency responsible (i.e., Military Police, Military Government, Civil Information and Education, etc.)

Since many investigations outside the CIC mission involved SCAPIN violations, a bound booklet of all CIS - promulgated SCAPINS, the only ones with which CIC was concerned, was published and distributed to all units in November 1946.[62] In regard to the distribution of this SCAPIN Guide, Lt. Col. Wayne E. Homan, Commanding Officer of the 441st, informed General Willoughby: "A good 75 percent of the trouble we have gotten into in the past has been because we were trespassing on some other agency's territory." Homan noted further: "Where the other agency was not aware of this (trespassing), bad feeling resulted. When they were aware of it and were willing for us to go ahead, it was usually for one or two reasons: (a) the case was too hot for them to handle and they were willing for us to stick out neck out, or (b) the job was impossible to accomplish and they were willing for us to take the blame for failure, rather than assume it themselves."

Colonel Homan concluded: "We have now reviewed all cases in the field and have eliminated those that have overstepped the boundary of our authority. This should give us more time to complete our job."[63]

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61 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, Subj: Local CIC Officers Establishing Broad Policy Matters, To: All CIC Units in Japan, 26 Jun 1946, /s/ A.W. Stuart, Col, Commanding, (Conf) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

62 GHQ, SCAP, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Subj: CIC, To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 1 Oct 1946, /s/ Rufus S. Bratton, Col, Deputy Chief, CIS, (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac) and "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1946-1948, p 38, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) (Uncl).

63 Inter-Office Memo, From: CO, 441st CIC Det, To: Gen Willoughby (Thru: Col Bratton), Subj: CIC Activities, 12 Nov 1946, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

After publication of the SCAPIN Guide, when alleged violations of SCAPINS over which another agency exercised supervision came to the attention of CIC, facts and information immediately available were transmitted, through channels, to CIS and from there to the agency responsible.

In an emergency, when the agency of prime jurisdiction was not available, CIC was authorized to take that action deemed immediately necessary. At the earliest possible moment, however, CIC contacted the responsible agency and turned over the investigation.

Realizing that some incidents, while not wholly under CIC jurisdiction, might contain elements requiring CIC investigation, G2 issued instructions that CIC was to concern itself only with those elements within its jurisdiction. Other portions of the incident were to be handled by the proper SCAP agency. In an instance where an investigation involved a criminal act and disaffection, CIC, therefore, was authorized to collect only those facts having to do with disaffection.[64]

CIC Instructed Not to Act on SCAPIN 550

Prior to the imposition of rigid limits on the matters within CIC's investigative jurisdiction, an equally important, but less knotty, problem of jurisdiction was eliminated. CIC field units, without specific instructions from headquarters, 441st, had been taking direct action to remove public officials holding positions in violation of SCAPIN 550, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office."

On 5 August 1946, CIC ceased to be even an unofficial action agency for violations of SCAPIN 550. Removals from office, unless accomplished voluntarily by the Japanese government, became the duty of the Compliance Branch, CIS, G-2.[65]

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64 GHQ, SCAP, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS, Subj: CIC Jurisdiction, To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 1 Oct 1946 (Uncl) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac) and GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the Civil Intel Section," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Part I, Chap VII, p 92, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

65 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: Direct Action on Removal From Office Taken by Local CIC Dets, To: All Units in Japan, 5 Aug 1946, (Conf) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

By the end of 1946 a more integrated CIC resulted from the clearing up of most problems of jurisdiction. CIC was no longer concerned with the seizing of textbooks and the purging of teachers (a Civil Information and Education Project), blackmarket investigations (under the jurisdiction of the Provost Marshal) and the freezing of organizational funds (the responsibility of the Office of the Civil Property Custodian).

SOPs Coordinated Into CIC Policy Guide

To assure all CIC units that they were operating in an approved manner, texts and documents pertaining to CIC responsibility and mission were collected in a bound volume, the CIC Policy Guide, and distributed to field offices in November 1946. This more for the first time supplied field units with a coordinated Standard Operating Procedure.[66] Under one cover were what Colonel Homan referred to as "the tools of the trade."[67]

Meanwhile, machinery was established in the Policy and Reports Section of 441st headquarters to continually supply each holder of the Policy Guide with revisions and new directives published after initial issuance.

In subsequent months, the Policy Guide grew into a bulky, awkward manual, tending, as a result, to defeat its purpose. Since many letters and orders in the Policy Guide were outdated and no longer pertinent, Capt. A. M. Wilcox was assigned the task of reorganizing and condensing it. By 1 August 1948, the

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66 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, pp 38-40, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

67 Inter-Office Memo, From: CO, 441st CIC Det, To: Gen Willoughby (Thru: Col Bratton), Subj: CIC Activities, 12 Nov 1946, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) NOTE: The CIC Policy Guide
NOTE: The CIC Policy Guide contains directives under the following 19 headings: I. CIC Basic Policies; II. CIS Basic Policies; III. Employment of CIC; CIC Opn Procedures; V. Investigative Principles and Methods; VI. Loyalty Investigation of Military Personnel; VII. Loyalty Investigation of Civilian Personnel; VIII. Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Personnel; IX. Jurisdiction of Japanese Government; X. Establishment of Military Occupation Courts; XI. Repatriation; XII. Safeguarding Military Info; XIII. Conf Funds and Informant Networks; XIV. Interrogation; XV. Report Writing (for CIS); XVI. Report Writing (for CIC); XVII. Spot Intel Rpts; XVIII. By-Weekly Report; XIX. Credentials. (See: CIC Policy Guide (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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volume was cut to about one-half its former size and contained condensed versions of those CIC directives still effective.[68]

Headquarters Works to Coordinate Field Activities

Concurrent with attempts to establish definite boundaries for CIC activity, steps were taken by headquarters to better coordinate CIC units in the field. Until 20 August 1946, field units had frequently opened investigations on their own initiative, sending reports to headquarters only when the investigation was completed. It was possible that headquarters would not know of a particular case until the complete report from the field was received. In the same vein, field units frequently instituted investigations upon the request of a local tactical unit or Military Government team without notifying headquarters.

In such circumstances, it was possible for an explosive situation to arise and even to pass before headquarters was aware of any danger. It was also possible for neighboring Area offices to investigate the same case, unknown to each other or headquarters. This situation, it was felt, called for immediate action.[69]

First steps were taken on 20 August 1946. All units received a letter from headquarters outlining "uniform practice in regard to the forwarding of investigative reports" from Regions to Detachment headquarters. Among other things, Regions were advised that in particularly important investigations, headquarters was to be immediately informed of all developments. Regions desiring coverage of leads in areas outside their jurisdiction were ordered to route Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) through headquarters where they would be transmitted to the proper office in the field.[70]

This directive was only a beginning. The next step was taken on 3 October 1946, when a letter from headquarters outlined new practices to be "effective immediately." All CIC Area units were to submit through Regional offices to headquarters, lead sheets on pending cases except those opened at the request

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68 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the Civil Intel Section," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Part I, Chap VII, p 92, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

69 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, p 43, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) and Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Progress of the 441st CIC Det Since the Transfer of CIS to G-2, To: CIS/G-2, 29 Jul 1947, (Secret) /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

70 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Forwarding of Rpts, To: All CIC Units in Japan, 20 Aug 1946, (Conf) /s/ John C. Oakes, 1st Lt, Chief Investigations Office (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

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of headquarters. In future cases not emanating from headquarters, lead sheets were to be submitted in a similar manner. The lead sheet was to indicate the agency requesting the investigation.[71]

Area office compliance with the directive of 3 October 1946 made it possible for headquarters to keep an accurate tabulation of field investigative activity. To insure that this tabulation was kept current, headquarters, on 12 February 1947, ordered that units notify headquarters within 24 hours after a case was opened.

EEIs Determined at CIS Operations Division

In February 1947, the process for determination of EEIs of investigations originating in the field was fully outlined. It was recognized as a virtual impossibility for field units to establish completely the EEIs of an investigation.

Therefore, headquarters, upon notification of a new case, forwarded available information to the CIS Operations Division. Here the EEIs were determined and disseminated to investigating units.

Under this system, field units had a measuring stick by which to gauge work required to complete a case and all energies could be directed toward gaining data of definite value to higher headquarters.[72]

Priority System Revised

A revised system of case priorities, established on 25 February 1947 further enabled area units to operate in accordance with the desires of headquarters and CIS.

Under the original priority system, set up in April 1946, the Area detachment which opened the investigation assigned it one of three priorities, without direction

71 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Submission of Lead Sheets in Cases Originating and Opened in the Field, To: All CIC Units in Japan, 3 Oct 1946, (Uncl), /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

72 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 45, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) and Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Progress of the 441st CIC Det Since the Transfer of CIS to G-2, To: CIS/G-2, 29 Jul 1947, (Secret) /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

from headquarters. The April 1946 communication merely outlined the definition of each priority "for the guidance of all units."[73]

The new system, as explained in a letter to all field units, provided that all priorities would be established by CIS. Priority I was given to cases requiring immediate action by CIC to comply with requests from the Chief of Staff or the AC of S, G2, as well as those investigations which would lose intelligence value if not undertaken immediately. Only Chief of Operations, CIS, had the power to allot priority I.

Priority II cases involved a time element too, because completion was essential for action or study by CIS. Priority III cases were those deemed important enough to require an interim report four weeks after dissemination of the initial lead sheet. All other cases were Priority IV.[74]

To insure operational efficiency in subordinate units, headquarters in 1947, instituted the "tickler" system which called for review of pending cases at headquarters every 30 days.

Report Writing Standardized

To further coordinate field activities, a uniform and approved system of report writing was developed. A six-class course in report writing, taught by Maj. Clarence Reed, an instructor on TDY in Japan from the CIC School at Holabird Signal Depot, was given many of the detachment's investigative personnel.[75]

Coordination Completed by Mid-1947

By mid-1947, the work of consolidating and coordinating the 441st CIC detachment's operations was virtually completed. Field units had been told precisely how to operate in the manner desired by headquarters and CIS. The SCAPIN Guide set limits on what was to be investigated. The CIC Policy Guide told subordinate CIC units how to get the information desired. The procedure for EEI dissemination made it possible to tell field units what data to collect to

73 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo No. 41, "Priorities of Investigation, 2 Apr 1946, /s/ A. W. Stuart, Commanding, (Conf) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

74 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Priorities of Investigations, To: All CIC Units in Japan, 25 Feb 1947, /s/ George K. Anderson, Capt, Adj, (Uncl) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

75 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Progress of the 441st CIC Det Since the Transfer of CIS to G-2, To: CIS/G-2, 29 Jul 1947, (Secret) /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

complete investigations. The priority system was utilized to tell units what to collect first. The standardized report writing procedure told them how to report what they found.

Staff Visits Aid Field Units

To further guarantee that field units were aware of what was expected of them, headquarters in late 1946 began a series of staff visits. In October 1946, Colonel Homan personally visited the two Region offices. Important and outstanding cases were discussed with Regional commanders and Colonel Homan put in motion the review of all pending cases called for by previous directives.

A major concern of both Regional commanders was liaison with the Corps in its area. Colonel Homan visited Corps G2s and briefed them on what they could expect (and what they could not expect) from CIC.

Colonel Homan wrote, in reporting his visit to I Corps G2: "I used the illustration of the FBI which is a central-controlled police agency (national) but must work with and for the U.S. Attorney in each judicial district. I said we considered the situation comparable, since the U.S. Attorney for the FBI and the tactical commander for CIC are action agencies; that we are merely the investigative and reporting agency." Colonel Homan also discussed with his Regional commanders the problems of liaison with tactical units below Corps level. A major difficulty appeared with the realization that most Division G2s were not trained intelligence men and often were burdened with additional duties. It was agreed that Division G2s should be completely informed on "goings-on" within their area, but that CIC should be reluctant to seek or accept direction from these lower levels.[76]

Staff visits and inspections continued throughout the Occupation at fairly regular intervals. To illustrate the nature of these visits, the field trip of Lt. Col. Bazil L. Baker to seven Area offices of the Second CIC Region in May 1948 has been selected as an example. Colonel Baker's reports to the Commanding Officer of the 441st upon his return indicates that he was concerned with both administration and operations. Billets, messing facilities, office facilities and motor vehicles were inspected, all from the standpoint of both maintainance and adequacy. Colonel Baker also checked the day-to-day administration of each unit.

76 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo, Subj: Visit to First CIC Region (I Corps), To: Gen Willoughby (Thru: Col Bratton), 21 Oct 1946, (Secret) and Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo, Subj: Visit to Second CIC Region (IX Corps), To: Gen Willoughby (Thru: Col Bratton), 14 Oct 1946, (Secret) both /s/Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Operations were reviewed with particular regard to informant networks and operational files. In one instance, where an Area commander was felt not to have a sufficient grasp of what CIC operations should entail, the officer was invited to join the visiting party to see what was being done in other Areas. At CIC Area 34 in Akita, this officer was able to learn the steps necessary for penetration of the Japanese Communist Party by informants.

One Area office, particularly strong in operations, was found deficient in administration because the commanding officer spent his whole effort in attaining operational efficiency. Operations in several offices had suffered repeatedly from frequent change of commanders. At Area 35, Morioka, Colonel Baker was able to make many helpful suggestions to a commander who had had the misfortune to take over a fairly slipshod unit a few days prior to the staff visit.[77]

Spot Report System Instituted

As both political groups and labor unions became more active, CIS and the G2 recognized the great importance of being instantly aware of sensitive areas and possible points of future trouble. Obviously the system whereby Area detachments gave headquarters information only on cases as they were closed, was not sufficient to keep GHQ informed of the latest happenings. Even the more efficient measures later instituted were not considered adequate to cover extreme emergencies.

At the direction of General Willoughby, a system of spot intelligence reports was initiated in August 1946. All unusual occurrences which might have an immediate or potential effect on the Occupation were to be reported as soon as possible to headquarters and then transmitted to CIS.[78]

As the system of spot-reporting developed, CIC's came to be the rough equivalent of a news-gathering agency, not unlike a press wire service. CIC units throughout Japan covered incidents out of the routine which might have an effect on the operations of SCAP, subordinate commands or any phase of the over-all Occupation program. Generally, spot reports were concerned with riots, strikes, political or religious conflicts, threats of assassination, and

77 Inter-Office Memo, Subj: Rpt of Field Trip, From: Lt Col Baker, To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 18 May 1948, (Conf) /s/ B.L.B. (Lt Col Baker) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

78 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan," Sep 1945-1948, pp 41-42 (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743) and Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: "Spot Intel Rpts," To: All Units in Japan, 2 Aug 1946, (Uncl) (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

mass demonstrations. Eventually, occurrences reported came to include sabotage, fires, explosions, spreading epidemics and wide-spread food poisoning.

These rapidly-transmitted reports gave information on who was involved in the incident, where it occurred, when it took place, how and why it happened, what corrective action was taken or what action was contemplated, and what time higher headquarters could expect another report.[79]

The directive establishing the spot report system stated:

> "It is considered that the above requirements do not alter the current CIC mission. They do, however, require that emphasis be placed on speed of reporting 'incidents' and emphasize the absolute necessity of maintaining close contact with and obtaining the cooperation of other U.S. agencies (e.g. - Provost Marshals, MG units, tactical units) and local Japanese authorities as well as making increased use of informants."[80]

CIC became the "pulse takers" - "the eyes and ears of the Occupation" - as a result of their efficient, speedy reporting of unusual occurrences. From the beginning, the Tokyo office was equipped with mobile radio equipment, although out-lying areas used the telephone for spot reporting.[81]

Teletype Network Established

By the end of 1946, CIC had taken the first steps toward setting up a teletype network. Conferences with AFPAC and Eighth Army Signal officers had ironed out most details.[82]

Teletype machines were installed in the Investigations Section at headquarters and in 10 major cities in Japan.[83] In other locations, teletype facilities of the

79 Inter-office Memo, From: 441st CIC Det, To: Lt Col Homan, Subj: Draft of CIC 15 Minute Brief 1 Nov 1947, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

80 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: "Spot" Intel Rpts, To: All Units in Japan, 2 Aug 1946, (Uncl) /s/ C.H. Silvester, 1st Lt, Adj, (See: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

81 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 42, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743.)

82 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: Progress of CIS Since Its Transfer to G-2, To: CIS/G-2, 31 Dec 1946, (Conf), /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

83 CIC offices in the following cities were equipped with teletype facilities - Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Sendai, Nagoya, Kure, Kobe, Okayama, Kokura, and Sapporo. (See: "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 42, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).)

Eighth Army were made available to CIC offices. By 15 March 1947, the network was completely functional. During March, 113 on-the-spot reports were transmitted by this means.

With the teletype network, a problem arose over the sending of Japanese names, since Japanese words, when not accompanied by the corresponding kanji characters, were subject to misinterpretation. CIC sought a means whereby kanji could be sent by teletype. Capt. Junichi Buto, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services in the China-Burma-India theater, solved this problem. Using the Arthur Rose-Innes "Beginners' Dictionary of Japanese and Chinese Characters"[84] as a key, each kanji character was given a numerical designation dependent upon its location in the dictionary.

All CIC units were immediately supplied with the Rose-Innes dictionary. After April 1947, no misunderstandings with regard to Japanese names sent by teletype were encountered.[85]

1949: About 5,000 Spot Reports Processed

Figures on spot report volume for the year 1949 indicate the tremendous task accomplished by CIC. During the year, approximately 5,000 spot reports were transmitted from the field and processed at headquarters. September proved to be the peak month with about 520 reports processed and forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Division. In December, more than 210 reports concerning labor activities were processed in contrast to about 60 such reports in August. Communications classified as dealing with foreign activity were more consistant, ranging from 70 to 130 per month. Spot reports on complaint cases numbered under 10 in February and March, but shot up to 95 in June. Spot reports involving political activity ranged from 15 to 40, except for September when there were 90 such items. The remainder of the communications were categorized as miscellaneous with the number usually hovering around 120, except in August when 220 such reports were transmitted and processed.[86]

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84 Beginners' Dictionary of Japanese and Chinese Characters and Compounds, by Arthur Rose-Innes, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1945.

85 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 42, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

86 GHQ, FEC, Office of the ACofS, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part IV, p 100 and plate #45 (a line graph entitled "Breakdown of CIC Spot Rpts Forwarded to CI Div by Case Classification in 1949") (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

The Problem: Is Spot Reporting a CIC Mission?

Initial establishment of the spot report system contemplated no alteration of the CIC mission. Nevertheless, observation of all meetings and demonstrations with the rapid transmission of minutely-detailed reports on these incidents was considered by some a non-CIC function - or at the least, an inefficient use of CIC personnel. It was General Willoughby's demand that he receive from CIC advance information on riots and meetings and detailed periodic communications while these incidents were in progress; so a considerable quantity of CIC personnel were tied up satisfying the request.

Lt. Col. Joseph Wright, formerly Operations Officer for the Tokyo-Kanagawa District, recalls one instance where 25 CIC agents were required to cover a Tokyo movie studio riot in the precise manner desired by the G2. The actors, spurred by their Communist-led union, had taken possession of the studio, boarded it up, and started a riot inside. Japanese Police, reinforced by members of the 2d Cavalry Regiment, surrounded the plant. The actors utilized wind machines to blow ashes at those who came close to the building.

CIC was present with five radio vehicles to report the event. Just when the riot was reaching its peak, Japanese communications workers, in sympathy with the actors, refused to accept CIC's phone calls from the scene, thereby halting coverage. General Willoughby had demanded a report on the riot every 30 minutes and CIC was determined not to disappoint him. Although the riots were taking place nine miles outside of town and radios could not reach headquarters at that range, vehicles were spotted along the road back to Tokyo, and on-the-spot communications relayed into headquarters.[87]

Liaison With Other Agencies Essential

It was essential to the success of the whole Occupation that CIC maintain the cooperation of other military agencies - particularly Military Government, the Provost Marshal and all tactical units.

In the course of normal CIC activity, units of the 441st frequently gained information of events coming under the jurisdiction of other agencies. Most often this information was passed to the responsible agency in the form of a Summary of Information; however, until June 1947, in those instances where close liaison was in effect, the transmittal was often verbal. On 18 June 1947, orders directed the use of Summaries of Information only. CIC units were instructed to request reports of the action taken by the agency as a result of leads forwarded. The order

87 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945 - 1950, Ft Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, (Conf).

stressed that CIC was not checking on the action agency, but only seeking information for the record. No steps which might jeopardize liaison were to be taken to gain the data.[88]

Much Information Forwarded to Military Government

The closest of liaison was maintained by CIC headquarters with Eighth Army Military Government. Frequent meetings and conferences helped to maintain a spirit of cooperation. The CIC Liaison Officer with the Eighth Army transmitted through the Eighth Army G2 to the Army Military Government staff that information felt to be of value to Military Government. Regional CIC offices, and later the District offices, supplied necessary information to the Military Government Regional commanders; liaison and reporting of pertinent data to Military Government units on the prefectural level were handled by CIC Area detachments.

Because of the 441st's nationwide coverage and its far-reaching informant network, it was inevitable that CIC would gather much information of value to Military Government. CIC was able to help Military Government keep tab on developments within the Japanese Government by furnishing information on officials and personalities. CIC frequently had reports of SCAPIN violations to channel to Military Government, and all Military Government commanders were given access to CIC files on ex-military personnel and rapatriates.

Information collected by CIC concerning labor activity was transmitted for use in Military Government's labor reports. Although CIC's concern with labor theoretically involved only a surveillance of subversive elements, in some prefectures it became the practice of Military Government commanders to obtain all the information for their labor reports from the local CIC Area detachment.[89]

...And Occasional Spats

Although CIC liaison with Military Government was generally untroubled, points of conflict were bound to arise. Indications are that in some instances, Military Government officials looked with jealousy upon "special privileges" granted CIC by the War Department and Theater as necessary for the accomplishment of CIC's mission. There were also instances where CIC was perhaps "oversecret" about certain administrative matters, resulting in misunderstandings.

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88 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Investigative Info Passed to Other Agencies, To: All Units, 441st CIC Det, 18 Jun 1947, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743.)

89 Inter-Office Memo, From: CIS, To: G-2, Subj: Relationship of Military Government and CIC Units in the Field, (prepared for G-2's transmittal to G-1 Function & Control Committee), 21 Sep 1948, /s/ R.S.B. (Col Bratton) (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

One CIC Area commander refused to supply troop strength reports needed by the local Military Government unit to support CIC's drawing of rations. There were also complaints that CIC personnel were not displaying proper military courtesy in their contacts with Military Government officers. There was a feeling that agents, both in uniform and in civilian clothes, were often negligent in their personal appearance.

Apparently Military Government officers were also concerned with the possibility that CIC might be investigating them, particularly their individual blackmarket dealings. CIC units were urged to reiterate that they were not the agency responsible for criminal investigations.[90]

One struggle with Military Government came to a head in June 1947, when the Shikoku Military Government Region, then under fire from the Eighth Army Inspector General for questionable practices, sought to divert attention from itself by making charges against CIC.

The major accusation was that CIC had been investigating Military Government officers, presumably with an eye to black market activities. Actually CIC had investigated only one Shikoku Military Government officer - a lieutenant who was the subject of a complaint investigation initiated as a result of a Civil Censorship Detachment lead sheet which alleged that he was gathering information to write a book adverse to the Occupation. Concurrently, the Criminal Investigation Division was investigating the lieutenant's black market operations, a case that eventually led to a court conviction. CIC had no part in the Criminal Investigation Division investigation, but Military Government officials were convinced that CIC did.

Military Government further charged that CIC had been informed by the Shikoku Military Government Region that ammunition had been stolen but had done nothing with the report. CIC's investigation of the theft was limited to determination of whether the ammunition had fallen into subversive hands and a report of this investigation was made verbally to the Shikoku Military Government Commander. CIC was remiss in not reporting by Summary of Information, but the charges against CIC were unfounded.

There was also a charge that CIC Area 6 (Takamatsu) had repeatedly investigated Military Government affairs. In actuality, the only Area 6 investigation involving Military Government had been conducted after a request from the

90 Hqs, First Region (I Corps), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Relationship Between Military Government and CIC Units in the Field, To: All CIC Area and Sub-Det Commanders, First CIC Region, 1 Aug 1947, /s/ C.N. Coleman, Lt Col, Commanding, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

Takamatsu Region Military Government Commander and concerned an accident involving a Military Government vehicle.

CIC rendered interrogation assistance during the Inspector General's investigation of Shikoku Military Government, but only as specifically requested by the Inspector General. The CIC Regional Commander was "interrogated" by the Commanding General, I Corps, concerning the Military Government situation on Shikoku.

Headquarters, 441st detachment, searching for the roots of the charges, decided that the whole situation might have been a reaction to Case 200-300, Subject: "Utilization of Occupation Forces by Communist Party." This case was initiated when it was reported to CIC by Lt. Col. William A. Nunn, Commanding Officer of the Yamagata Military Government team, that his Labor Officer had been seen at a party with a known Communist leader and had given speeches to Communist-controlled groups. On the basis of this information, CIS had initiated an investigation throughout Japan, this being Case 200-300. All CIC Areas informed the Military Government officer in their prefectures of the initiation of the case. CIC, upon reflection, decided that possibly Military Government personnel, unaware that their commanders had been informed, had decided that CIC was conducting uncontrolled investigations of their activities. CIC was able to report that this investigation was the only one on file where Military Government personnel, other than those receiving purely loyalty clearances, had been under CIC investigation.

CIC Seeks Remedy

In an attempt to remedy the situation, CIC changed Commanding Officers in Area 6, although it was felt that this was somewhat unfair to the officer replaced. The change was accomplished in recognition of possible conflict on a purely personal basis. Region CIC commanders were ordered to consult within 24 hours with Corps Military Government chiefs to ascertain if there were any reason to suspect liaison problems in other prefectures. Although both Regional commanders made weekly visits to Military Government as a matter of course, they were instructed to make "an immediate call solely on this item of business."

Eighth Army Military Government was invited to send a liaison officer from each of their Regions to the next class at the CIC Training School. This offer was accepted enthusiastically.

As a physical means of improving liaison, Regional CIC commanders were directed to resurvey every unit in their command to determine if more CIC units could be billeted and messed with Military Government units.

In this manner, CIC took steps to alleviate a localized misunderstanding, to ferret out other areas where similar problems were existant, and generally, to improve relations with Military Government throughout Japan.[91]

No Major Liaison Problems With Provost Marshal

Unlike CIC detachments in many theaters, the 441st CIC detachment experienced no major liaison troubles with the Provost Marshal's Office. Because the 441st made it obvious to Provost Marshal units that CIC had no desire to compete with them in their areas of jurisdiction, relations remained cordial.

Lt. Col. Joseph Wright recalls a working arrangement whereby CIC agents on official business were given latitude by the Military Police "to be where they (as soldiers of the U.S. Army) were not supposed to be." Military Police were willing to go along with CIC as long as adequate justification for the operational latitude was presented.

Equally important, CIC made it plain to the Military Police and to the Criminal Investigations Division that if irregularities occurred in the operations of the 441st, or if individuals of the command violated existing regulations, CIC would not hesitate to "wash its own linen."

Such agreements formed the basis for a fine spirit of cooperation between the Far East Command's law enforcement agency and the 441st CIC detachment.[92]

Liaison With Tactical Units Begins Immediately

As early as September 1945, CIC was seeking to establish liaison with the tactical units stationed in Japan. Early in 1946, liaison with every tactical outfit became the assigned responsibility of a specific CIC unit. 441st headquarters maintained liaison with Eighth Army. The First CIC Region was charged with liaison with I Corps headquarters, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, and the 24th and the 25th Infantry Divisions. Second CIC Region took the same obligations in regard to IX Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 11th Airborne Division. CIC Area 25 (Tokyo) acquired liaison responsibilities with the Eighth Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division.

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91 Inter-office Memo, From: 441st CIC Det, To: Col Bratton, Subj: CIC-MG Relations, 20 Jun 1947, /s/ W.E.H. (Wayne E. Homan), (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

92 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, Bldg #332, Ft Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, (Conf).

The territory covered by the two CIC Regions correspond with the areas under the jurisdiction of the two Corps of Eighth Army, greatly easing the problem of liaison at this level. In connection with efficient liaison, Second CIC Region made a 24-hour physical move on 29 September 1946 from Yokohama to Sendai, location of IX Corps headquarters.

441st headquarters, on 14 August 1947, directed the appointment of liaison officers to various tactical organizations. Of prime importance was the Eighth Army Liaison Officer, because the Eighth Army had given irreplaceable logistical support to the widely-scattered CIC units.[93]

What Did You Do About It?

Agencies receiving CIC leads were requested to keep CIC posted on the progress and eventual outcome of the investigations initiated on these leads.

One of the many instances of CIC's providing information to other agencies began when the Yokohama office of Area 25 learned on 16 May 1948 that the master, first mate, and radio operator of a U.S. Tanker were all engaged in blackmarketing American cigarettes. The information was transmitted to Second Port Criminal Investigations Division detachment. Their investigation eventually led to the arrest of the three men.[94]

In another case CIC informants reported to Area 34 (Akita) on 12 February 1948, that huge stores of Japanese Army goods were believed hidden in a warehouse in Akita City. On the same day, Akita Military Government was notified and supervised a search of the suspected warehouse. Quantities of Japanese Army Quartermaster supplies valued at over three million yen were uncovered. Further investigation was conducted by Military Government in Akita to determine responsibility for the illegal stores.[95]

The major category of information turned over for action to tactical troops involved hidden arms and weapons caches. CIC determined the actual location of such caches with sufficient definiteness to warrant transmitting the information to a tactical G2 who sent out troops to conduct the search and seizure.

For example, information reaching CIC Area 33 (Sendai) on 28 July 1948 revealed that a considerable quantity of Japanese arms and ammunition, including mortar and anti-aircraft shells, had been hidden in caves and holes around the

93 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, pp 21-22, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3743).

94 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 29, dtd 15 Jun 1948, p 37, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

95 Ibid, Issue No. 26, dtd 15 Mar 1948, p 44.

base of two mountains on a peninsula southeast of Ishinomaki City. Initial evidence and leads were in the form of photographs of some of the material and two maps showing the locations of the caches. This information was furnished to the G2 of the 11th Airborne Division Rear, who supervised the confiscation.[96]

96 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 31, dtd 15 Aug 1948, p 38, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

97 Hq 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo No. 35, 14 Dec 45, /s/ A.W. Stuart, Col, Commanding, (Conf) (Sec: CIC Policy Guide) (Cen Rec Fac).

98 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 23, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3437) and GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 29, p CCD-42 (and chart opposite this page), (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

99 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, Fort Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, (Conf).

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Section 3

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

As of December 1945, several months after operations had begun in Japan, the 441st CIC detachment had an actual strength of 192 officers and 604 enlisted men compared to a Table of Organization authorization of 241 officers and 795 enlisted men.[100] By August 1946, revised authorized strength permitted the 441st a total of 344 officers, 286 warrant officers and 640 enlisted men. Actual strength of the detachment was 181 officers, 22 warrant officers and 726 enlisted men.[101] By July 1947, total personnel strength of the 441st had increased to more accurately reflect the Table of Organization.[102]

"Call Me Mister"

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to getting the personnel strength to properly reflect the T/O was the return to the Zone of the Interior for discharge of a great number of agents who had served their enlistment. The returning agents formed a more or less steady stream that became a rampaging flood in late 1946 when a revised discharge criteria made a number of men suddenly eligible for release. In one week in November, 78 enlisted men departed from the Far East and approximately 200 returned to the United States in December.[103]

Many Replacements Not Satisfactory

Basically there were two reasons by which the 441st CIC could obtain new personnel. The War Department furnished on requisition the bulk of the replacements, but a limited number were also obtained through a local procurement system.

Except for a handful of isolated cases, the CIC personnel coming from the United States had been given the usual counterintelligence schooling at the CIC

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100 GHQ, AFPAC, 441st CIC Det, Adv Ech, Subj: T/O and Actual Strength, 441st CIC Det, To: CG, Service Troops, 8 Dec 1945, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, C3743).

101 Inter-Office Memo, From: CO, 441st CIC Det, To: Lt Col B. L. Baker, Office of the G2, AFPAC, Subj: Local Procurement of Replacements for CIC Duty, 15 Aug 1946, /s/ A.W.S. (Col Stuart).

102 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the Civil Intel Section," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," p 94, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

103 Ltr from Gen Willoughby, AC/S, G2, AFPAC, To: Director of Intel, WDGS, Subj: Replacement Personnel, 20 Nov 1946, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, C3743).

School, Holabird Signal Depot. Reports after the Occupation had been in swing for about a year indicate that the standards of CIC recruitment had suffered drastically. Among those received by the Far East Command in the first year, only 10 percent had completed college. Another 10 percent had received some college training. The ages of the new agents ranged down to 18 and most were under 22. The majority of the replacements had no previous CIC field experience. And then, altogether too many of the new agents became eligible for redeployment just about the time they had become seasoned investigators and of use to the 441st.

Among the officer replacements most had had at least two years of college, but with few exceptions, they had no investigative experience. About 10 percent were Regular Army officers and about 20 percent had some training in Japanese and customs.[104]

The root of the problem of suitable replacements from home was outlined by Maj. James T. Reitz from his position with the Military Intelligence Division in the Pentagon. Major Reitz, a member of the 441st until a few months after the war, wrote to Colonel Stuart: "As you probably realize, the replacement problem has been a rugged one, due principally to the enormous number of replacements required practically all at once and the fact that few people, if any, who are being inducted have the qualifications originally required for CIC agents. The services of these few are being bitterly contested for by a half-dozen investigative and intelligence agencies."[105]

Local Recruitment Instituted

General Thorpe told General Willoughby in early 1946 that the effectiveness of CIC in the Far East "will be seriously impaired if sole reliance is placed upon the War Department to furnish adequate replacements." Reminding the G-1 that counterintelligence was a command function, General Thorpe recommended that AFPAC institute a "limited recruitment program to insure a nucleus of qualified personnel to guarantee continued accomplishment of the CIC mission, regardless of the type of replacements furnished by War Department."[106]

GHQ, on 22 January 1946, initiated a letter to the various troop commanders in the Far East outlining the local recruitment program for CIC agents. The

104 Memo to Col Stuart, Subj: Type of Personnel, /s/ W.L.F., 20 May 1946, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

105 Ltr to Col A. W. Stuart, CO, 441st CIC Det, /s/ James T. Reitz, Maj, 13 May 1946, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

106 Inter-office Memo, From: OCCIO (CIC), To: C/S (Thru: G-1), Subj: Recruitment of CIC Personnel, 11 Jan 1946, /s/ E.R.T. (Gen Thorpe) (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Cen, C3743).

letter noted that CIC needed 100 officers and 200 enlisted men and listed the qualifications for acceptance.[107]

In regard to the locally procured agents, the 441st in May 1946, noted that these men were "better qualified" than those received from the Zone of the Interior. In accordance with the provisions of War Department Circular 379,[108] the original authorization for world-wide local procurement, personnel within the theater who desired to transfer to CIC had to submit applications to the G-1. These applications were screened closely by CIC representatives and "for this reason only the best qualified personnel were selected."[109]

By mid-August 1946, the 441st detachment had locally procured 74 officers and 225 enlisted men. All had approached CIC with a view toward transferring into CIC, with the exception of three officers and 25 enlisted men obtained from the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service on the basis of a specific need for well qualified Japanese linguists.[110] It was estimated in November 1946 that by the end of the year, the 441st would have procured 27 percent of its total strength through its own efforts.[111]

On 30 March 1948, by which time it was felt in Washington that an adequate number of CIC agents were being trained to fill available slots, the War Department "strongly suggested" that direct procurement of personnel on a local level be discontinued. But the 441st had anticipated of the War Department. Local procurement in the Far East had ceased in November 1947.[112]

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107 GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: Procurement of CIC Personnel, To: CG's, Eighth Army, PACUSA, AFMILPAC, AFWESPAC, XXIV Corps, Special Troops, 22 Jan 1946, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

108 War Dept, Washington 25, D.C., Circular No. 379, 19 Sep 1944, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, BX25094) (See: this series, Chap 7, Part I of ETO Sec for an account of the implementation of WD Circular No. 379 in Europe).

109 Memo to Col Stuart, Subj: Type of Personnel, /s/W.L.F., 20 May 1946, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

110 Inter-Office Memo, From: CO, 441st CIC Det, To: Lt Col B. L. Baker, G2, AFPAC, Subj: Local Procurement of Replacements for CIC Duty, 15 Aug 1946, /s/A.W.S. (Col Stuart) (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

111 Ltr from Gen Willoughby, AC/S, G2, AFPAC, To: Dir of Intel, WDGS, Subj: Replacement Personnel, 20 Nov 1946, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

112 Dept of the Army, GS, USA, Subj: Procurement of CIC Personnel, To: Commander-In-Chief, FEC, 30 Mar 1948, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

Special Unit Established for Linguists

Appended to the 441st CIC detachment was an organization composed entirely of CIC personnel fluent in the Japanese language. Established on 28 December 1946, this unit, the 319th Military Intelligence Company, was a "paper organization" in the true sense of the phrase. The organization was created to circumvent the ruling that Niseis could not be assigned to CIC. Prior to the creation of the 319th, these men had been with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) and the great majority had been performing CIC agent duties. With the creation of the linguist company, their ATIS credentials, which emanated from the War Department, were called in and replaced by special CIC credentials issued by the office of the AC of S, G2, FEC. At the time of its implementation, the 319th MI Company was authorized a strength of 80 officers and 239 enlisted men.[113]

While the creation of the 319th MI Company cleared an immediate hurdle for the 441st CIC detachment, a problem of long-range consequence was created by the move. The personnel assigned to the 319th MI Company, when their tour of duty in Japan was completed, were lost to CIC and usually transferred to an MI outfit, because their records did not readily reveal counterintelligence investigative experience.[114]

A letter from Brig. Gen. E. A. Zundel, Chief of CIC, to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, outlined the problem. "At present when CIC personnel are transferred from a CIC detachment to any other organization, this headquarters deletes their names from all CIC rolls and consequently has no means of following their subsequent careers. This results in the loss of many agents whom it is desired be retained in CIC. All personnel now serving in the Counter Intelligence Corps are doing so because of an expressed desire for such service; and the majority of them, except RA officers, have planned to spend the remainder of their military career in CIC. Therefore it behooves us to do all in our power to insure that their careers are not altered due to circumstances beyond their control."[115]

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113 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, pp 15-16, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

114 Interview with Capt S. A. Koyama, Ft Holabird, 22 Jul 1955, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950.

115 Dept of the Army, GS, USA, Intel Div, Office of the Chief, CIC, Subj: Transfer of CIC Personnel, To: Commander-in-Chief, FEC, 1 Mar 1948, /s/ E.A. Zundel, Chief, CIC, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

Nevertheless, the 319th Military Intelligence Company continued to function up to and into the Korean War. On 1 January 1950, assigned strength of the company was 31 officers and 248 enlisted men.[116]

What the Well-Dressed Agent was Wearing

For the first year and a half of the Occupation of Japan, Department of the Army civilians were authorized to wear Army uniforms with no insignia other than a triangular-shaped blue shoulder patch marked "US," designed to distinguish civilians from military personnel. To allow the freedom of movement essential to a confidential investigator, CIC enlisted agents were allowed to wear this civilian uniform. On 19 May 1947, a SCAP order directed that civilians no longer be permitted to wear uniforms and CIC was forced to seek elsewhere for means of retaining the cover of their agents.

Arrangements were completed with G2 to permit all enlisted agents who had served in a civilian capacity prior to 19 May 1947 to dress in civilian clothes to maintain their nonmilitary cover. The original authorized allowance was $125 with $144 per year accruing at a rate of $12 a month granted for maintenance and replacement.[117]

Officers and warrant officers, by Department of the Army policy, were not authorized to receive a civilian clothing allowance. All officers wearing "civvies" did so at their own expense.

Each CIC unit was authorized a specific number of enlisted persons eligible to wear civilian clothes. Provided that there was room in this quota, any enlisted agent, upon approval from his immediate superior, could apply to wear civilian clothing. The following questions had to be answered before the conversion was authorized: (1) Was the agent known to Allied personnel sufficiently that putting him in civilian clothes would be futile camouflage? (2) Could the change of clothing be adequately and logically explained to those Allied personnel familiar with the agent? (3) For what reasons would the agent have more influence on Japanese and Occupation personnel as a result of wearing civilian clothing?[118]

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116 GHQ, FEC, Office of the AC/S, G2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part II, p 65, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

117 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 48, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3743), and Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Memo No. 22, 19 May 1947 "Civilian Clothing Record," (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

118 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, pp 48-49, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

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In early 1948, General Willoughby called for a review of the justification and necessity for expenditures on civilian clothing for CIC agents. Alarmed by the fact that for the last six months of 1947, a monthly average of $3,400 had been spent for "civvies," the general called for closer scrutiny and control of the whole procedure.[119]

Maybe a Kimono!

General Willoughby continued to press for action on the matter and eventually questioned the whole purpose of having CIC agents in mufti. "I still do not know the real basis of getting into civvies out here. The agent is conspicuous as an American, whether he wears civvies or uniform. If he were to wear a kimono, the point might be arguable. Once in civvies, is he going to pose as a Japanese? Or a foreign national? What is the purpose and benefit to be derived?"[120]

Colonel Bratton replied: "It is true that an agent is conspicuous as an American, even though he is a Nisei wearing civilian clothes. It is intended that Nisei agents pose as Department of the Army civilian employees and not as Japanese Nationals. In isolated cases, a Caucasian agent might pose as a foreign national. CIC agents appearing as DA civilians have proved valuable in numerous instances where it was necessary to conduct surveillances on or have close contact with U.S. civilian employees. In the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces Zone, enlisted agents wearing civilian clothes can readily meet and talk to British and Australian officers; however, if these same men were wearing the Army uniform and enlisted rank insignia, it would become practically impossible for them to approach these officers concerning intelligence and administrative matters.

"It has been determined during recent months that the wearing of civilian clothes by some Nisei personnel does not facilitate operations dealing with Japanese civilians; instead they are afforded more prestige by wearing the Army uniform. For this reason, CIC Area Commanders have had many of these men wear the uniform. However, for the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph, it is believed that the authorization for certain selected enlisted men to wear civilian clothing enhances the efficiency of these men in gaining counterintelligence information."[121]

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119 Inter-office Memo, From: Gen Willoughby, To: Col Bratton and Maj Ohman, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothes, 31 Jan 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

120 Inter-office Memo, From: Gen Willoughby, To: Col Bratton and Maj Norberg, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothes, 3 Mar 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

121 Inter-office Memo, From: Col Bratton, To: Gen Willoughby, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothing, 5 Mar 1948, /s/RSB (Col Bratton) (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

New Program Reduces Clothing Expenditures

After a review of certain statistics, General Willoughby noted "inexplicable differences between population density (the basis for the number of agents assigned to an Area) and monetary expenditures for clothing." The general proposed a tentative list of nine metropolitan areas where agents would be allowed to wear "civvies" and recommended that agents in other Areas all work in Army uniform.[122]

Shortly thereafter, the use of enlisted agents in civilian clothes was limited to the nine metropolitan areas he had suggested. However, agents assigned to other Area detachments and already in "civvies" were allowed to continue use of their cover.[123]

Estimated expenditures for 1949 were drawn up on the basis of the new policy limiting agents in civilian clothes to metropolitan areas and requiring that agents receiving clothing allowances have at least nine months duty remaining in the Far East Theater. Under these regulations, the monthly average of clothing expenditures was expected to reach $1,573.50. It was assumed, based on past experience, that 20 percent of this total would remain unspent.[124]

CICTS Opens in Tokyo on 12 November 1945

On 12 November 1945, the first class of the Counter Intelligence Corps Training School (CICTS) in Tokyo was opened. The course was actually an extension of the old CIC Training School established in Melbourne, Australia on 3 August 1942. After island-hopping during the war, the school had finally settled more or less permanently on the top floor of CIC's headquarters in Tokyo.[125]

Class No. 24, as the first Tokyo group was designated, consisted of 29 enlisted men, most of whom only recently had arrived from the United States.

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122 Inter-office Memo, From: Gen Willoughby, To: Col Bratton, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothes, 15 Mar 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

123 Inter-office Memo, From: Col Bratton, To: Gen Willoughby, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothes, 21 Mar 1948, /s/R.S.B. (Col Bratton) (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

124 Inter-office Memo, From: Col Bratton, To: Gen Willoughby, Subj: Purchase of Civilian Clothes, 25 March 1948, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, C3744).

125 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 62, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

The course was 15 days duration. At the conclusion of Class No. 24, nine of the key personnel of the school, including the commandant and his executive officer, were ordered to replacement depots for return to the United States and discharge from the Army. The school virtually had a new faculty for Class No. 25.[126]

The curriculum of the CIC Training School that had operated in the Southwest Pacific during the war was revamped to meet the needs of the Occupation. Combat CIC courses were dropped and in their place came courses pertaining to the social, political and economic situation in Japan. The Japanese court system was explained; studies on Japanese intelligence agencies were presented; and the structure of Japanese newspapers was taught.

Extensive courses in report writing, jurisdiction and limitations of CIC operations, and CIC investigative procedures were held over from the wartime school. As had been the case during the war, the CIC Training School presented a series of guest speakers on subjects related to the counterintelligence mission.[127]

Few other changes were made in CICTS subject matter until late 1946. At that time, a course in basic English, designed as a supplement to the report writing course, was instituted. Beginning in February 1947 with Class No. 41, 20 hours of instruction were devoted to English. A new eight-hour course in surveillance, which included a four-hour field problem, was also added. The entire school program was extended to four weeks.[128]

Cessation of Local Procurement Affects CICTS

Until November 1947, the classes at the CIC Training School contained many men locally procured from non-CIC assignments for work as agents. Since the four-week course was the only CIC training these men received, it was essential to begin at the most basic level.

Upon graduation of Class No. 49, on 1 November 1947, all future students, with the exception of guests from local tactical units, were graduates of the CIC School at Holabird Signal Depot. Local procurement of investigative personnel was discontinued after that date. Cut out of the course were such subjects as Searches and Seizures; Legal Aspects of Espionage and Sabotage; Observation and Description; Countersabotage; Counterespionage; Security and Basic Informants. In place of these courses, the CICTS was able to institute the study of matters

126 GHQ, AFPAC, 441st CIC Det, CICTS, Subj: CICTS Activities (1 Oct 1945 to 30 Nov 1945), To: CO, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, 10 Jan 1946, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, C3744).

127 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 63, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3743).

128 Ibid.

pertaining especially to Japan. Included were field trips to CIS, G2 and the Civil Censorship Detachment offices, lectures by Japanese government officials, lectures by naval intelligence representatives, and studies of Japanese labor, economics, health and welfare, education, geography and natural resources. A letter from 441st headquarters to the CIC Center at Holabird dated 26 September 1947, outlined the proposed changes and noted that if the CIC Center placed more emphasis on certain other subjects pertinent to CIC world-wide, the school in Japan would be able to devote even more time to those matters that were peculiar to the situation in Japan.

It was felt that the 20-hour Basic English Course might be given at Holabird. The shortage of .38 ammunition in the Far East prompted a request that agents sent to FEC be qualified in the .38 weapon. Motor Maintenance and driving tests, Undercover Techniques, the Communist Party and Surveillance were other fields that were felt should be included in the stateside school.[129]

In December 1947, the Tokyo CIC Training School initiated a one-week Agent's Refresher Course. To attend, personnel were required to have spent at least a year with CIC field units in Japan and to have at least six months of their tour in the Far East remaining.

In November 1947, the school operated, for a brief time, a two-week administrative CIC course with the emphasis on counterintelligence investigative and administrative report forms and procedures.[130]

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129 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: CIC Tng, To: CG, Holabird Signal Depot, 26 Sep 1947, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

130 "Representative Hist of CIC Activities in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 64, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

Section 4

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Stray Bits From all Over

131 "Representative Hist of CIC Activity in the Occupation of Japan" Sep 1945-1948, p 69-70, (Uncl) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3743)

132 Hqs, First Region (I Corps), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Use of Informants, To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 14 Apr 1948, /s/ For the CO: William F. Hancock, Maj, Special Projects, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

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CIC Utilizes "Sleeper" Informants

A Friend of a Friend...

A Man Who Read the Newspapers. . . And That Was All

Informants were not always a source of "extremely valuable" information. There was always the danger that an informant would not over-exert himself seeking information, preferring to rely on sources more or less public, such as the daily newspapers. One such individual, a small businessman, was able to double-deal with the 441st for quite some time. Under some suspicion by his handling agent, this man was brought in for interrogation. The informant's business ledgers had fallen into CIC's hands. It was noted that the informant had printed all Japanese names, naturally enough, in Japanese characters. However, the names of the CIC agents who had supervised his work were written out in English, although these men were Nisei and their names could readily be written in Japanese. The agents interrogating the informant questioned him on this discrepancy. Flustered by his inability to supply any reasonable answer, the informant eventually was led to admit that he had been paid for information that was public domain and that he had not actively sought data that could not be gained through overt means. The question that led to his breaking had no relation

136 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Fort Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, (Conf).

to his inactivity. It was a query to which he could not supply a suitable answer and so was used as a lever to his confession.[137]

Japanese Police Prove Extremely Helpful

The Japanese Police proved to be a prime source of information for CIC. Full cooperation between the individual Area office and the local police unit was an essential to complete CIC coverage.

137 Interview with Capt S. A. Koyama, Fort Holabird, 22 Jul 1955, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, (Conf).

138 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Fort Holabird, 10 Aug 1955, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, (Conf).

No Open Investigation Permitted

139 Ltr from Second CIC Region Hqs, To: All CIC Areas, Second Region, Subj: Informant Networks, undtd, attached as Appendix II to Hqs, Second Region (IX Corps), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: to CO, of 441st CIC Det, 10 Apr 1948, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

140 Hqs, First Region (I Corps), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Use of Informants, To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 14 Apr 1948, /s/ for the CO: William F. Hancock, Maj, Special Projects, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3744).

141 Appendix IV to Second Region (IX Corps), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 10 Apr 1949, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, C3743).

Section 5

THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT

For the first few months of the Occupation, the agents of the 441st CIC detachment had been mainly concerned with rounding up and investigating an assortment of characters ranging from Hidiki Tojo to the self-styled poets and play wrights of the Bunka Prisoner of War Camp.

The majority of CIC's investigative activity in the remaining years before the Korean War can be divided into two unequal parts.

SCAPIN Violators and the Reds

By the beginning of 1946, surveillance of SCAPINS had become the prime CIC duty. Gradually throughout 1946, the emphasis shifted from violators of SCAPINS, which the command designed to hold in check the elements of the old regime, to the newly-reorganized and menacing Japanese Communist Party.

CIC's surveillance of SCAPINS generally involved the two known unofficially as the "Purge Directives." SCAPIN 548 dealt with "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies, and Other Organizations," and SCAPIN 550 dealt with "The Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office."

With the issuance of "The Purge" SCAPINS on 4 January 1946, the Japanese public rushed forward to furnish information to the 441st. Hundreds of unsolicited "tips" of varying reliability came into CIC field offices. The reason for the willingness of the general public to provide information to CIC is open to question. Perhaps it was a result of a feeling of relief after the downfall of the militarists. Some felt it stemmed from the Oriental tendency to wish to be on the winning side. At any rate, CIC was never short of information.[142]

Compliance Branch Established

The evaluation for cases involving "purge" SCAPIN violations was the Compliance Branch of the Civil Intelligence Section's Operations Branch. Established in January 1946, the Compliance Branch studied CIC and Civil Censorship Detachment reports and other information to determine whether or not prima facie cases of SCAPIN violations existed. When available evidence indicated probable violations, two alternatives were open. The case could be

142 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Part I, Chap III, p 34, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

turned over to the Occupation Military courts for prosecution, or the Compliance Branch could draft appropriate memoranda to be forwarded through channels to the Japanese government directing them to remedy the situation. The Compliance Branch also recommended interpretations of policy and issued clarifications when questions arose as to the exact meaning of a SCAPIN.[143]

Investigations of Rightest Activity Gradually Decline

CIC's investigations of subversive activity of a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic nature slowly began to take a back seat by mid-1946. In their report for the last half of August 1946, Area 25 (Tokyo) observed: "It continues to be true that organizations investigated for subversive activity of a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic nature prove, generally, to be harmless... Cases involving suspected subversion by rightist groups continue to be far more numerous than cases involving radical activity. It is emphasized that the former category almost invariably results in information of a negative nature."[144]

Reporting for the last half of September, the Tokyo office further stated: "Large scale opposition to occupation policies is not apparent. Right wing or ultra-nationalistic activity is sporadic and disorganized so that none of the investigations into this type of activity in the Tokyo Area has yielded a positive result. All such investigations have resulted in a failure to substantiate the allegations."

In the same report, the Tokyo office predicted that the movements of the Communists and their many sympathizers "will continue and perhaps increase in the future..."[145]

By the end of 1946 and the first few months of 1947, the emphasis of CIC investigations had completely shifted from cases involving vestiges of the old regime to concern with the Japanese Communist Party.

Of the projects completed in the last three months of 1946, 371 were labeled "militaristic and ultra-nationalistic" and 550 were labeled "radical," of which 262 were less routine investigations of various Communist activities supervised by

143 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS" Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Part I, Chap V, pp 49-50, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

144 GHQ, AFPAC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 1, dtd 1 Sep 1946, p 51, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

145 Ibid, Issue No. 3, dtd 1 Oct 1946, p 73.

the Special Projects Section during the latter part of November and the month of December.[146]

Communist Situation Grows "Steadily More Critical"

The statistics by this time show a large gap between efforts spent on investigations involving extreme rightists and the radical elements of the population. In the report of the Special Projects Section for the month of April 1947, note was taken in the great increase of investigations of Japanese Communist activity. "Within the last several months, the Communist situation in Japan has grown steadily more critical from the Special Projects Section viewpoint. With the failure of the Communist Party in the national elections held last month and the increasing opposition toward communism by the Japanese labor movement, the Communist trend is toward an open hostility to the Occupation forces. Communist leaders have frequently been reported as having delivered speeches with a recognizable avertone of criticism against the Occupation. For this reason, the CIC Areas have been directed to place many prominent Communist leaders on what amounts to a constant surveillance for the purpose of ascertaining any derogatory statements made against the Allied Occupation Forces and any subversive activity on the part of the Communist surveilled."[147]

Even though probings into radical and more particularly Communistic elements now claimed the greatest portion of CIC's efforts, cases concerning extreme right wing activities continued in a minor way throughout the years preceding the Korean War. Two cases have been selected to show CIC in action against these elements officially referred to as "militaristic and ultra-nationalistic."

CIC Searches for Remnants of Black Dragon Society

Among the early investigations falling into the ultra-nationalistic category was an attempt by CIC to piece together the history and post-war activities of the renowned Black Dragon Society (Kokuryu Kai), for many years the most powerful Japanese patriots' organization.

In the first few months of the Occupation, each Metropolitan and Area unit conducted a series of interviews in an effort to gain data on the Society. For instance, in Osaka, beginning on 24 October 1945, Metropolitan Unit 90 questioned

146 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Subj: Progress of CIS Since its Transfer to G-2, To: CIS/G-2, 31 Dec 1946, /s/ Wayne E. Homan, Lt Col, Commanding, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C3744).

147 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Monthly Rpt of Activities, Apr 1947, To: Plans & Training Section, 1 May 1947, /s/ Robert M. Reese, Lt Col, Chief, Special Projects Sec, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

the Deputy Mayor of Osaka City, the managing editor of a leading newspaper, a former special policeman; and a former municipal office holder and newsman concerning the Black Dragons. The Society's local history, its organizational set-up in Osaka at the war's end, and a list of past members were gleaned from these sources.[148] Similar inquiries were made in other zones.[149]

From these local investigations, the Special Activities Branch of the Operations Branch of the Civil Intelligence Section compiled an over-all report on the Society. CIS revealed that many CIC sources felt that the once-powerful organization was operating underground. One individual was quoted as saying that a member in China was sending information to Black Dragons through demobilized Japanese servicemen who were then urged to spread rumors in Japan of an impending US-USSR war. The hope was that such a conflict, if properly exploited, would afford Japan a chance to come back militarily.

However, in regard to the Society's restoration, the report concluded: "The chances for a revival of the Black Dragon Society are deemed minute." It was noted that such a revival would face, in the first instance, all the obstacles placed in the way of militaristic groups by SCAP. Based on the knowledge that in the pre-war years, the Black Dragon Society was completely dominated by a few powerful leaders, the CIS report further stated that "the would-be leaders (of a revival) would be faced with converting people who are for the first time permitted to hear more than just one side to an issue."

"The real danger," continued the report, "comes from the...demobilized and bewildered remnants of the Army... These returning servicemen will not prove a threat if Japan is permitted and manages to maintain a stable economy and political structure... In the absence of these factors a recrudescence of militarism may be expected, albeit under a new and more modern leadership."[150]

Possible Revival of "Dragons" in September 1947

One of the infrequent reports of a reinstitution of the Black Dragon Society came to CIC two years after the original inquiries. Based on scanty indications that a revival was taking place in Tokyo, a lead sheet on "The Reactivation of the Black Dragon Society" was disseminated on 6 September 1947. The leaders of the

148 CIC Metro Unit No. 90 (Osaka City), Memo for the Officer-in-Charge, Subj: Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society), 30 Nov 1945, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

149 Cen CIC Files, AIC, has a dossier on the Black Dragon Society which contains the reports of all these local investigations.

150 Rpt on the Black Dragon Society, prepared by GHQ, FEC, Civil Intel Sec, Opns, Special Activities Branch, 20 Sep 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

revival, their war-time connections with the Society, and the Society and its political affiliations, future plans and sources of funds were to be determined by CIC investigations.[151]

Early investigation, including reports from informants and a questioning of various police officials, produced no signs that the organization was reactivating.[152]

It was 2 February 1948 before specific information reached CIC on the revival of the Black Dragons. Informants supplied the names of the two leaders, Minagawa Sanroku and Takagi Sakuma, neither important in the war-time version of the organization, and the basic scheme to be followed in the reinstitution. The organization reportedly planned to establish a hard core of Emperor-loving and patriotic men within the labor unions, stimulate anti-American sentiment by emphasizing the suppression of rightists by SCAP and prepare to take immediate action against the Communists as soon as the Americans left.

Society Peddles Military Equipment

Informants further pointed out that a considerable amount of money was being accumulated through the personal solicitation of former members of the Society and through the sale of property released from Japanese Army and Navy sources. The organization's new leaders had, for instance, obtained a mechanical shovel from the Chiba Naval Air Base and were attempting to market it at three million yen.[153]

After several more weeks of investigation, Area 25 unofficially summed up the situation much as the CIS report of 1946 had done. "Unlike in former days, since the people are now inclined to express their frank opinion about anything, it would be next to impossible for the Society to enjoy the support of the general public... (This) Society has (never had) immediate contact with the masses of people."[154]

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151 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Lead Sheet, Subj: Reactivation of the Black Dragon Society, 6 Sep 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

152 CIC Area 25 Tokyo, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Report of Investigation, Subj: Reactivation of the Black Dragon Society, 6 Oct 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

153 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 27, dtd 15 Apr 1948, pp 4-5, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

154 CIC Area 25 (Tokyo), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Rpt of Investigation, Subj: Reactivation of the Black Dragon Society, 20 Feb 1948, (Cen Rec Fac).

Meanwhile reports reached Area 25 that another "Dragon," Kanbayashi Torao, was attempting to market art objects and jewels that he had acquired in China. The Black Dragon Society expected to realize about 12 million yen from the sale of these items.[155]

On 26 April 1948, in an attempt to get the word "straight from the horse's mouth," Area 25 agents questioned Minagawa Sanroku, one of the leaders of the new organization. This man claimed he found it hard to believe that the Occupation authorities were interested in his organization. He vehemently claimed that his group was still weak and underdeveloped.[156]

For all their mechanical shovels and art objects, this attempted revival of the Black Dragon Society was stalemated "for lack of operational funds," according to an Area 25 report of 28 May 1948. Even such a modest attempt to reinstitute the former king-pin of the Japanese nationalistic societies had failed.[157]

CIC Scrutinizes "Current Events Club"

A typical CIC investigation of a suspected violation of SCAPIN 548, prohibiting the existence of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations, was instituted by CIC Area Unit 45 in May 1946. Information was sought on the "Young People's Current Events Club" (Yamata Mura Seinen Jiji Doshi Kai) reportedly founded on 15 April 1945 in the village of Yamata, Ibaraki Prefecture.

The "Current Events Club" was brought to the attention of Unit 45 by a Japanese citizen who claimed to have been violently attacked by members of this innocent-sounding society. According to sketchy information received from the initial source, Matsuo Arase, a former naval lieutenant, had organized 300 men into a club with the aim of harassing Occupation troops, and at the end of the Occupation, of establishing a local government by force of arms. Initial CIC investigation revealed that many members of groups previously disbanded under SCAPIN 548 were in the "Current Events Club." Apparently the backer of the organization was Shunsuke Takao, a man of about 50, who had served in the Japanese Army in Manchuria in 1919, and had been a member of three SCAP-banned organizations.

On 21 May 1946, was interviewed by CIC. He stated that the villagers had originally looked upon the group with favor.

155 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 28, dtd 15 May 1948, p 5, (Secret) (Central Rec Fac).

156 CIC Area 25 (Tokyo), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Rpt of Investigation, Subj: Reactivation of the Black Dragon Society, 26 Apr 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

167 Ibid, 28 May 1948.

However, when it became evident that the leaders were using the full weight of their following to back questionable activities, the organization began to lose many members, and felt that more would have resigned but for fear of retaliation. It was the belief that the "Current Events Club" was actually a hard-bitten group of demoralized soldiers seeking to terrorize the village and force their demands on the municipal officials.

On the same day CIC contacted Keiichiro Hatsumi, who late in April had succeeded Arase as president of the club. This change in itself made the organization suspect, since it appeared that the club had felt its success would be jeopardized if reports reached SCAP that a former naval lieutenant was president. Hatsumi readily admitted that the "Current Events Club" contemplated taking over village government, but only if irregularities in the government were discovered. The change was to be accomplished by the forced resignation of officials. All intent to hinder the Occupation was denied.

On 22 May, ten of the organization's more prominent members were placed under house arrest to facilitate the investigation. Arase, the first man interrogated by CIC, steadfastly declared the purpose of the society was "the betterment of the community and the dissemination of education and democracy to the village of Yamata." However, Arase admitted his group had done little in regard to such high-minded goals, spending most of their time investigating alleged irregularities in the village administration. Arase said if irregularities were uncovered, the "Current Events Club" was prepared to take over the government by forcing the resignation of officials and installing acceptable persons - presumably themselves.

Takao Denies Responsibility for Club's Actions

Also on 22 May the organization's original backer, Takao, was questioned by Area Unit 45. Like the parent of a juvenile delinquent, Takao admitted having assisted in the founding of the "Current Events Club," but repeatedly denied any responsibility for its subsequent actions.

A review of the organization's records, on file at the municipal offices, showed a membership of 533, with 106 demobilized servicemen on the list. The leaders of the organization were all former servicemen. Arase was more than just an ex-naval lieutenant. He had been a Kamikaze pilot.

It was subsequently learned that both Arase and Takao had violated their house arrest to attend a meeting of the "Current Events Club." The Commanding Officer of CIC Area Unit 45 recommended the disbandment of the club as a violation of SCAPIN 548. As was customary in the breaking up of such organizations,

the names of the members were carried on the watchlist of Area Unit 45 so that a continuous check on their activities might be made.[158]

Number One Target: The Japanese Communist Party

The one greatest troublemaking group for the Occupation authorities was the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), described by the official history of the Civil Intelligence Section as a "menace to all duly constituted democratic authority... (as a result) of its varied and continued attempts to nullify, discredit and embarrass the program of democratization."

From the outset of the Occupation, it was recognized the Communists represented less of a political party and more of a fifth column, seeking to introduce an alien ideology into Japan.

In one respect, SCAP itself opened the doors to the Red deluge in 1945 with the release of all political prisoners of Japan's wartime regime. Even then it was recognized that this essentially democratic, and completely necessary, gesture was releasing a group of well-trained obstructionists upon the general public. The Communist leaders, all of whom had been imprisoned by Tojo's regime, wasted no time in reorganizing. In December 1945, the Japanese Communist Party began a program of anti-democratic activities which found unexpected support from disorganized sections of the post-war population.[159]

As noted earlier, late 1946 and early 1947 saw a gradual shift in the emphasis of CIC's investigations. As the Communists became better organized and consequently more vocal, concern with militaristic groups and individuals declined, and most of CIC's activity was directed against the Reds.

The Tokyo CIC office reported the status of Communist activity in August 1946. "While it is true that anti-American activity of great scope and scale is not evident, there are certain indications of a propaganda campaign directed against what is referred to as the 'colonization of Japan' by American capital. This has been a device adopted principally by leftist and labor groups, usually those identified with the Communist Party of Japan. There is continued evidence

158 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff,"Operations of the Civil Intel Section," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Supporting Document 27 (GHQ, AFPAC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section, CIC Monthly Info Rpt, 441st CIC Det, Jun 1946), (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

159 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, p 109, (Secret)(Cen Rec Fac).

that radical groups are attempting to gain the sympathy and support of workers' groups, Korean groups, and the general public by financial support, intimidation, public demonstration and similar devices."[160]

Politically the position of the JCP was that of an opposition group. CIC was soon aware that directives from the Central Committee of the Party, its supreme governing body, instructed lower echelons to take advantage of every possible opportunity to attack the government and convince the people the JCP was their only real friend. By creating chaos and confusion, the JCP hoped to undermine drastically the popular support of the Japanese government and assume power at the height of the confusion.

JCP Polls Over Three Percent of Vote in First Election

In the first election under the Occupation, the Japanese Communist Party elected eight members to the Diet and polled 3.7 percent of the popular votes, in spite of the fact that the Home Ministry registration figures showed only 16,144 JCP members.[161]

By January 1949, JCP strength was estimated at approximately 180,000, half of whom could be classified as dues-paying members; the other half as unofficial or "secret" members. In the latter part of 1948, the rolls of the JCP were considerably augmented by an influx of well-indoctrinated repatriates from Soviet territory and the entry into the JCP of many left wing Socialists not previously identified with communism. If anyone doubted the power of the Japanese Communist Party at this point, the elections of 23 January 1949 should have been the convincer.

Far exceeding even their own optimistic expectations, the JCP placed 35 condidates in the House of Representatives, receiving almost 10 percent of the popular vote.

Analysts with CIS sought to explain the Communist success. It was noted that the vast majority of the people of Japan existed in marginal poverty even though 1948 had seen an economic upswing. The JCP had successfully presented itself as the champion of the downtrodden. The JCP had successfully spread its influence and control far out of proportion to its numerical strength.[162]

160 GHQ, AFPAC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Report, Issue No. 1, dtd 1 Sep 1946, p 51, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

161 GHQ, AFPAC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Summary, Issue No. 21, dtd 15 Oct 1947, p SUM-9, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

162 Ibid, Issue No. 37, dtd 15 Feb 1949, p SPA-3, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Anti-Communistic Elements Appear in Mid-1949

The smooth ride of the Communists became somewhat rockier in the summer of 1949. At long last, there began to appear in strength anti-Communistic elements in the population. Several reasons were noted for this unfortunate time lag. Conservative parties apparently had feared being labeled ultra-rightist if they attacked the Reds too vigorously. The Social Democrats, although uncooperative with the Communists, had not been willing to risk, because of internal weaknesses, an anti-Communist offensive. Laborers, unused to union techniques, had found themselves from the beginning under the domination of Communist leaders and had been misled by the JCP's apparent championing of their cause.

After their election success, the JCP intensified agitation, aiming to reach a peak in August 1949 when government workers were to resign in mass in hope that Occupation authorities would be forced to take drastic remedial steps. The failure of this "August Offensive" and a firmer attitude toward the Communists on the part of the Japanese government signaled a downward trend for the JCP.[163]

Cominform Links Apparent in Early 1950

The JCP suffered further in the very first days of 1950 when the fiction that they were a "purely Japanese" party was publically demolished. On 6 January 1950, the Cominform "suggested" that the JCP take a firmer stand against the "imperialistic" Allied Occupation and forget completely about a peaceful revolution through the ballot box. The JCP promptly stepped up their anti-Occupation movement under a thinly disguised "peace" program and proceeded religiously to hue to the world-wide line.

If the Japanese people had begun to doubt and even actively oppose the JCP prior to May 1950, the sentiment against the JCP was increased by public censure by General MacArthur on 2 May.

On 30 May, the Japanese Communist Party inspired intensive rioting throughout the country. The Occupation authorities had the leaders of the demonstrations immediately arrested. On 6 June, SCAP issued instructions to the Japanese government requesting the dissolution of the JCP Central Committee and the "purging" of all 24 of its members. The following day, the 17 editors of the Communist organ "Akahata" were ordered "purged." In spite of a nationwide dragnet and continual investigation, the Japanese police, by the beginning of the Korean War, had apprehended only one of the "purged" individuals.

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163 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Report, Issue No. 44, dtd 15 Sep 1949, p SPA-3, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

At the time of the Korean conflict, the JCP was beginning to entrench underground to survive the wrath of SCAP. The JCP, in regard to popular support, was at its lowest ebb since the December 1945 revival.[164]

Orthodox Communist Holds Secretary General Position

The JCP had no president as such. The Secretary General came the closest to being "top dog," for he coordinated the work of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat. A man described as a was Secretary General of the JCP. When he was released from prison in October 1945, few Japanese, except ardent Reds, remembered him. It is small wonder, for had been imprisoned for 18 years.

Back in the public eye, a highly gifted orator, soon became the strongest power within the JCP.

was thoroughly Marxist in his philosophy, hueing to the orthodox line since his early twenties. Uncompromising in his aggressive promotion of the class struggle, took the position of prime exponent of revolutionist technique within the Japanese Communist Party.[165]

Holds Number Two Position

Number two man in the JCP was a member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. had returned to Japan after 16 years in exile, becoming almost overnight a prime factor in JCP reorganization. Soviet-trained, and the only Japanese ever to serve on the Executive Committee of the old Comintern, was uniquely a "peaceful revolutionist."

Not only because of his associations in the international scheme of communism, but because he commanded the respect of many non-Communist liberals and intellectuals, was of great value to the JCP. An intelligence report dealing with stated that "in spite of his deviations, within the JCP he is too important for other members to oppose or ignore." This was true in spite of the ascendency of the and the advocates of more violent means.

164 GHQ, FEC, Office of the AC/S, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part I, pp 27-32, (Secret) (Alexandria Rec Depot, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

165 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 28, dtd 15 May 1948, p SUM-11, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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The intelligence report elaborated on a position. "Not only has seen more of the world than any of his Japanese Communist Party colleagues, but he has been outside of prison in contact with the world more than any of them. With his air of the detached philosopher, is in many respects in a far better political position than any member of the Central Committee. Not committed to a narrow interpretation of the class struggle, he can sway other political groups with logical arguments for a 'socialistic' type of government."

CIC was constantly seeking information on a possible JCP split over Marxist interpretation spurred on by basic differences between Numerically, had the upper hand. All but 14 of the 53 persons holding positions at Party headquarters were members of the more violent faction. The group was less entrenched in the all-important labor unions which the JCP utilized to spear-head its campaigns. CIC noted that however, had been far more successful in the rural areas. appeal also attracted a group of intellectuals to the JCP; on the other hand, had direct influence over important youth groups.

Never was it assumed by intelligence authorities in the Far East that action by would not result in essentially the same end as action by It was concluded: "To assume that ... would not be as willing as... ('mild' Communists in other nations) in championing the handing over of his country, Japan, to his spiritual fatherland would be only to perpetrate a misconception."[166]

Considered Third in Importance

Generally recognized as third in importance in the JCP was who was, among other things, cut a handsome swath between the two factions. Intellectually he belonged to the historically he had been aligned with from the early days of the Japanese Communist Party. His personal loyalty usually went to with whom he shared a prison cell in the years before the Occupation.[167]

In the subsequent pages, there will be considerations of CIC's investigations of JCP links with the Soviet-guided Cominform, of organized JCP espionage in Japan, and of mass demonstrations, riots and agitation perpetrated by the Japanese Communists.

166 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Report, Issue No. 27, dtd 15 Apr 1948, p SUM-24, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
167 Ibid, Issue No. 21, dtd 15 Oct 1947, p SUM-11.

CIC Probes for Links Between JCP and World-Wide Communism

On 6 October 1947, Moscow announced the revival, in the shape of the Cominform, of the old Communist Internationale, dormant since its official abolition in 1943. Although representatives of the JCP did not directly participate in the revival, it was known that the Japanese Communists had communicated with the Comintern before its 1943 demise. For one thing, and his wife had worked for the organization while they

CIC immediately initiated an investigation to determine the reaction of Japanese Communists to the revival of the Communist Internationale. Evidence was sought to show efforts by JCP leaders to participate in or maintain liaison with the new Cominform and any attempts of the Cominform to communicate with the Japanese Reds.[168]

By January 1948, fragmentary reports from Area 25 indicated the JCP members generally favored the Cominform.[169] A Japanese Communist Party directive dated 6 October 1947, and uncovered in Fukuoka by CIC units under First Region, exalted the existence of the new organization. "The Cominform will be revived. Our efforts have bloomed into flower. Without allowing the flowers to scatter, let them bear fruit. Fellow JCP members, rise up again and again to overwhelm all American ideals."[170]

In spite of considerable evidence to the contrary, in late January 1948 issued a statement to the effect that his party was interested solely in the liberation of the Japanese people and was not concerned with foreign issues. claimed the JCP was capable of dealing with the local situation "without the guidance or support of the Communist parties of foreign countries."[171]

Indications of Far East Cominform Received

A new angle to this investigation cropped up in December 1947 when CIC began to receive news of a Far East Cominform. Early reports indicated the JCP was not officially associated with this group but was showing an interest in future participation in its affairs.[172] While was proclaiming no interest in foreign matters, reports reached Second Region CIC from the Gumma Area

168 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Monthly Rpt of Activities, Oct 1947, To: Plans & Training Sec, dtd 1 Nov 1947, /s/ Robert M. Reese, Lt Col, Chief, Special Projects Sec, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

169 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 24, dtd 15 Jan 1948, p 6, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

170 Ibid, p 16.

171 Ibid, Issue No. 26, dtd 15 Mar 1948, p 9.

172 Ibid, p 6.

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that the JCP had selected two Central Committee members as delegates to a Far East Cominform convention and was arranging illegal transportation for these men.[173]

Reportedly, two different conferences of the Far East Cominform had been held in Harbin, Manchuria, and in Vladivostok in November 1947. Investigations conducted in CIC areas in Japan indicated that no official representatives of the JCP had attended either of these meetings. However, effective liaison between the JCP and these conferences had resulted in transmittal of records of the proceedings to the Japanese Communists.[174]

By the end of February, the Special Projects Section announced that six names of JCP liaison men to the Far East Cominform had been uncovered. One was supposedly in Vladivostok already, three were in Hokkaido awaiting departure, and two had just recently been selected by the Central Committee. In addition, a Korean Communist, who had been arrested by the Japanese police, had been virtually designated as a key liaison man by JCP bulletins referring to his apprehension. A constant surveillance was kept on all individuals suspected of serving as links between the Japanese Communist Party and the Far East Cominform.[175]

Moscow Directive to JCP Intercepted

In late March 1948, the Tokyo-Kanagawa District, through an informant considered by his handling agent to be reliable, acquired the text of a Moscow directive to the JCP and Communists around the world. In CIC's evaluation of the report, it was stressed that the informant had not seen the original document. Generally the JCP was directed to agitate international disputes, foster conflicts by utilization of fanatic nationalists, cultivate persons of influence to obtain support or at least friendly neutrality, foster strikes, hinder food distribution and flood the market with counterfeit money.[176]

New EEIs to Investigation of JCP's Foreign Connections Established

In communications dated 11 and 13 May 1948, the Special Projects Section consolidated the investigation of JCP interest in foreign situations and its possible

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173 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 26, dtd 15 Mar 1948, p 38, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

174 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Monthly Rpts of Activities, Dec 1947, To: Plans & Training Sec, dtd 2 Jan 1947, /s/ Robert M. Reese, Lt Col, Chief, Special Projects Sec, (Secret), (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

175 Ibid, Feb 1948.

176 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 28, dtd 15 Mar 1948, pp 9-10, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

direction from foreign sources. A new list of EEIs was established incorporating "the more salient and significant points of previous EEIs." Information was sought on the general reaction of JCP members to the establishment of the Cominform, attempts of the JCP to establish liaison with the Cominform, contents of communications concerning the Cominform, general Cominform organization, personalities involved, policies and purposes, and Cominform involvement in espionage, propaganda and the repatriation program.

Ties With Far East Cominform Appear Questionable

Concurrently with revision of EEIs, the Special Projects Section reported with less certainty than they had in previous months on the JCP's supposed contacts with the Far East Cominform.

"While numerous reports have been received from various CIC areas concerning JCP plans for sending representatives to the Far East Cominform, some even indicating that three such persons had actually departed from Japan, investigation has failed to substantiate the fact that the reported three or any other JCP members have left Japan for that purpose. Since the reports originated in scattered areas this seems to indicate that either (a) our informants have jointly cooked up a false story to impress us, or (b) all have access to a common source of information. It is entirely possible that the JCP has penetrated this fountainhead of information and has attempted to discredit our informants."[177]

CIC informants described as "not necessarily in close contact with official circles," reported a new Far East Cominform conference in Harbin scheduled for some time in June 1948. In subsequent months, lists of delegates were submitted to CIC by a fleet of informants. However, there were equally numerous reports that the individuals concerned were actually still in Japan at the same time that they were supposed to be at the Manchurian meetings.[178]

Throughout the remainder of 1948 and 1949, CIC continued to accumulate information on the possible existence of the Far East Cominform and its influence on JCP policies. The G-2 "Historical Report" for 1949 describes this data as "voluminous but entirely lacking in documentary substantiation." It was added, however, that the JCP adherence to the Soviet line indicated close liaison between the JCP and Moscow. But again substantiating evidence was virtually non-existent. The "Historical Report" admitted that research up to the end of 1949 had

177 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Monthly Rpts of Activities, May 1948, To: Plans & Training Sec, dtd 1 Jun 1948, /s/ Robert M. Reese, Lt Col, Chief, Special Projects Section, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

178 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 30, dtd 15 Jul 1948, p 16, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

established only the nature of the Soviet Cominform as an information organ. This was felt not enough to warrant the assumption that the Cominform was acting as a policy-making and policy-directing body in the Far East.[179]

Cominform Connections Proven in 1950

The Japanese Communist Party's close affiliation with world-wide communism was established as a fact in January 1950. On 7 January 1950, a Cominform press release from Bucharest accused certain Communists in Japan, particularly of a "bourgeois attitude" toward the Occupation and of being a "servant of Japan's imperial occupiers." Reportedly, the Cominform based its charges on a thesis, written in 1947, which advocated the establishment of a "People's Democratic Regime" through parliamentary means and under the conditions of Japan's occupation.

At first, branded the press release as "activity of the enemy aimed at smashing the unity of the Japanese Communist Party." Then there was apparently a serious reconsideration of the matter. submitted publicly to the charges and the JCP proceeded to step up the tempo of its subversion as if to show one and all they were certainly not bourgeoisie.

Party Changes Traceable to Cominform Criticism

Policy developments in the JCP and its subordinate organizations in early 950 were "directly traceable to Cominform criticism," according to the G-2 "Historical Report" for the period. The Eighteenth Expanded JCP Central Committee Meeting in January decided the JCP should conform to the larger international commitments of the Cominform by means of an over-all "peace policy" under which all Communist Party struggles could be united.

The portion of the G-2 "Historical Report" prepared by the Counter Intelligence Division stated: "The double aspect of this 'peace policy,' 'pro-peace and anti-war,' enabled the JCP to support at will the international Communist 'peace' line, or to cloak its increasingly violent attacks on Occupation policies under the guise of protest against 'militarization and colonization.' Thus, official JCP policy in the first ten months of 1950 was characterized by notable uniformity and close adherence to the aims of Moscow."

It was also noted that the untiring efforts to follow closely the Cominform's policies had resulted in two effects adverse to the JCP. There was an intra-Party

179 GHQ, FEC, Office of AC/S, G-2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part I, p 31, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

cleavage on the interpretation of the internationalism demanded by the Cominform and considerable loss of prestige from the Party's obvious toeing of the Moscow line.

However, while establishing the fact of JCP subserviance to the Soviet Cominform, CIC was, by October 1950, still without conclusive proof of the existence of a Far East Branch of the Cominform through which supervision from Moscow might be channeled. A great mass of conflicting, slanted and misleading information on this subject circulated throughout Japan and appeared in the public press after the JCP's acknowledged adherence to the Cominform in January. A careful shifting and screening of data on the Far East Cominform at Counter Intelligence Division in early 1950 produced no confirmation. In fact, it was determined that much of the sensational "information" involving foreign sponsored underground groups, guerilla forces and uprisings was being peddled deliberately to all buyers by professional information networks.[180]

CIC Seeks Data on Possible Espionage Net Within JCP

The 441st CIC detachment was particularly alert for any indication that the Japanese Communist Party was operating an active espionage network. In early March 1948, Tokyo Area received reports that the JCP at its Sixth National Convention had established four so-called Liaison Bureaus. The Second Liaison Bureau was purported to have as its mission the collection of information concerning the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.[181]

Although nothing more was heard about the Second Liaison Bureau, within several weeks there were reports of another JCP espionage net, called the Urban People's Department. On 24 March 1948, a lead sheet on this innocent-sounding bureau was disseminated to all CIC Area offices. CIC was to seek rosters of the organization, its office locations, evidence of nation-wide operations, the channels of communication, evidence of espionage against the Occupation, the types of information collected and the names of persons directing the espionage operations.[182]

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180 GHQ, FEC, Office of AC/S, G-2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part I, pp 32-33 and Chap III, Part II, p 73, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

181 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 28, dtd 15 May 48, p 5, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

182 The particular lead sheet on this case is not available. All memo dealing with the investigation, including those subsequently given as footnotes in this section, give the EEIs of the case. See: Dossier on the Urban People's Department in Cen Rec Fac.

Early reports from the Areas tended to conflict somewhat. Area 1, the office in Kagoshima, reported that the Kagoshima Prefectural Committee of the JCP had received no espionage orders from the Party's Central Committee.[183]

Area 29, Utsunomiya, received reports that the Urban People's Department was not conducting espionage. But it was noted that the JCP had set up in the towns, cities, and villages of Tochigi Prefecture a Citizen's Consulting Office. It was felt that this wide-spread network of offices could be ideally used to gather information from all over the Prefecture.[184]

From both Shiga and Saga Prefectures, a different story was reported. There the Urban People's Department was seeking information on the Occupation and was channeling the data through the main levels of the Communist command. Information from these Areas hinted at nationwide operations. Information on the Japanese police, local Military Government policies, public sentiment regarding the Japanese government and the Allied Occupation Forces, organizations and personalities bent on crushing the JCP, and possible violations of the Potsdam Agreement by the Americans was being sought by the bureau.[185]

Bureau Becomes Security Conscious

Yamagata office, Area 32, reported a secret meeting of delegates of the Urban People's Department in Tokyo. The main problem of the bureau seemed to be that certain members had betrayed the JCP "by working as informants for the organs of the Occupation in charge of communism." Yamagata CIC also obtained the organization chart of the Urban People's Department. The agency was divided into the ubiquituous "Liaison Sections," with Section No. 1 in charge of intelligence relative to the Allied Occupation Forces.[186]

The increased security consciousness of the bureau was also noted the following month by the Tokyo office. A speech of one of the bureau's leaders was quoted. "At present, the spies of the enemy are bribing Japanese Communist Party members and low-paid clerks working at headquarters with money and goods to obtain information and secret documents." Considerable shuffling of personnel within the Urban People's Department, designed to confuse CIC, was also reported.[187]

183 Hq, Area 1, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Memo for the Officer-in-Charge, Subj: JCP Espionage Net, 27 May 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

184 Hq, Area 29, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Memo for the Officer-in-Charge, Subj: JCP Espionage Net, 28 Apr 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

185 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 30, dtd 15 Jul 1948, p 25, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

186 Ibid, p 25.

187 Ibid, Issue No. 31, dtd 15 Aug 1948, p 4.

Generally Evidence is Negative

However, reports from the Area detachments generally tended to correspond to this one from Nagasaki, Area 2. "The Urban People's Department is mainly charged with the responsibility of executing party propaganda and campaigns directed toward the ordinary citizens of Nagasaki, such as the anti-tax campaign, opposition to the introduction of foreign capital,. opposition to the Emperor, the anti-Ashida campaign and the like. In order to carry out these campaigns, the department is also charged with the responsibility of gathering certain information in order to be able to lay the groundwork preparatory to the execution of a particular program or campaign... There is no indication presently that members of this department or any other department with the Nagasaki District Committee are engaged in any espionage activity against the Allied Occupation Forces installations or personnel in Nagasaki. The members are aware of CIC's interest in their movement, and are particularly on the lookout for CIC informants within their ranks."[188]

Meanwhile, Yamagata CIC continued to receive reports of a more serious nature. Directives from an organization known as the Special Urban People's Department, which indicated that that agency was a nationwide JCP espionage net interested in all aspects of the U.S. Army Establishment, fell into CIC's hands.[189]

Reports of the Special Urban People's Department directives continued to flow from the Yamagata CIC office for the remainder of the year. Concluding that the data from the other Areas did not reveal evidence that the original Urban People's Department directed espionage activities for the Japanese Communist Party, CIS closed the investigation on 15 November 1948. At the same time, an investigation of the organization, which apparently had no relation other than the similarity of name to the older bureau, was directed throughout Japan.[190]

Plight of Japanese Worker Exploited by Communists

A mainspring for Communist agitation in Japan was the plight of the Japanese worker. Released from the grip of the totalitarian war machine, the workers of the country sought to better their lot by organization into unions which mushroomed almost immediately after the war. With the consent of the Occupation authorities, the government set up a wage scale based on the existing cost of living, with the monetary variations for different jobs. Had the spiralling inflation been brought

188 Hq, Area 2, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Memo For The Officer-In-Charge, Subj: JCP Espionage Net, 28 Jun 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

189 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 32, dtd 15 Sep 1948, p 5, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

190 Inter-office Memo, From: 441st CIC Det, To: CIS Special Investigations, Subj: JCP Espionage Net, 15 Nov 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

to a halt, this wage scale would have been sufficient; but such not being the case, the Japanese worker still found it difficult to provide for himself and his family.

At the outset of the labor unrest, the major demand was for increased wages to compensate for the rising cost of living. In these early disputes, an honest attempt was made to reach an equitable solution.

As the Occupation progressed, it became apparent to CIC that many Communists had wormed their way into the unions. The tactics of these trouble-making elements may be summarized under seven points:

(1) To gain entrance into the union as a member and reach a responsible position.

(2) To spread discomfort among the workers harping on their low standard of living as compared to that of management.

(3) To accuse the company of profiteering.

(4) To engage in strike agitation, presenting demands out of proportion to any inequities which might exist, thus forcing management to refuse them.

(5) To refuse to abide by the decisions of the arbitration boards.

(6) To denounce the political party in power.

(7) To promote strikes for political rather than economic objectives.[191]

In late 1946, a wave of strikes hit vital industries in Japan, and Communist agitators were found to be at the bottom of many of these actions. One of the several strikes linked directly to the Communists was in Kanagawa Prefecture where the Seamen's Union strike, terminated in September 1946,[192] was traced to the Seinin Kodo Tai (Youth Action Unit) of the union. This unit, at the completion of the strike, received a congratulatory note from Tokuda Kyuichi. Tokuda loudly proclaimed that the strikers had "conquered the government with the power of the general strike."[193]

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191 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 23, dtd 15 Dec 1947, pp 2-3, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

192 Ibid, Issue No. 4, dtd 15 Oct 1946, p 58.

193 Ibid, Issue No. 5, dtd 1 Nov 1946, p 46.

SCAP Order Ends Threat in Early 1947

By mid-January 1947, with a general strike in the country a distinct threat, SCAP put out a "No Strike" order which was met with general compliance. CIC, seeking public reactions to the order, found many workers were displeased with the labor leaders for taking away valuable hours of pay for useless agitation. The general populace seemed to be relieved that the strikes had been cancelled.[194]

"Akahata" Announces "October Offensive"

In August 1947, "Akahata," Communist Party newspaper, announced plans for a large scale movement for wage increases to be spearheaded by the unions of the communications, railways and electrical industries. CIC learned three steps were proposed by the Communists for this new offensive.

Stage one, to be completed by about 20 August 1947, was to consist of getting labor's demands lodged with management. The next month the unions were to half-heartedly negotiate their demands with the owners. Between 20 September and 20 October, all participating unions were to separately and individually call a strike so that by mid-October a state of general strike would exist. The Communist program called for a general shut down through apparently independent actions, an effort to hide the fact that the strikes were actually coordinated and interdependent.

CIC compiled a collection of statements by various Communist leaders predicting great things for the coming offensive. Tokuda declared that if everything went as planned the new revolution would be well on its way by 7 November, the commemoration date of the Russian Revolution. In anticipation of SCAP demanding a wholesale housecleaning, Tokuda issued instructions for regional offices to conceal party funds, destroy documents and rosters, and prepare to go underground. An officer of the Youth Communist League was quoted as saying, "Blood will flow this fall, for whoever heard of a bloodless revolution?"[195]

In some industries, the JCP quickly had to acquire leadership of unions to institute the strikes, combatting labor leaders who firmly stood for democratic processes and proven union techniques. Quick infiltration jobs placed leadership of these unions in the hands of a violently radical minority.

Skilled party speakers traveled widely, lecturing and holding workers' forums. Everywhere there was talk of violence to condition the general public to the fact that fighting might be necessary to accomplish labor's ends. One

194 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Summary, Issue No. 12, dtd 15 Feb 1947, p 48, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

195 Ibid, Issue No. 20, dtd 15 Sep 1947, pp 9-11.

speaker, Kasuga Shojiro of the JCP Central Committee, stated, "Some party members are explaining a peaceful revolution. This is a mistake. Marx and Lenin denied the advocation of a peaceful revolution. A forceful revolution will be boldly led. In our coming October struggle, the peaceful revolution will change to violent revolution if the United States uses force to oppose us."

Another Central Committeeman, Konno Yojiro, speaking publicly in Kumamoto Prefecture on 22 August 1947, stated that armed power would be necessary to accomplish the aims of the "October Offensive." Later in his speech, Konno was bold enough to suggest that help from the USSR be requested.

Confidential informants told CIC that the immediate purpose of the strikes, far from an increase in wages for workers, was to create sufficient chaos to allow the JCP to take control of the Japanese government and cause international confusion because of the certain involvement of the United States in the action. So confident were the planners of their eventual success that in Fukuoka Prefecture the Communists were reported to have selected candidates to replace local officials.

Not all reports painted so bleak a picture. First CIC Region reported that some of the Communists were getting cold feet, deciding that the offensive was not too well timed. The conditions upon which popular support of the action rested were changing. Most important, a timely arrival of food shipments from America had gone a long way in alleviating a food shortage which the Communists had been harping on for some months. The cautious elements of the JCP recommended that the "October Offensive" be postponed until February 1948 when winter weather was expected once again to create a food shortage.[196]

CIC Area 25 also determined that the instructions of the "October Offensive" must have been altered. The unions, now planning to strike at no prearranged time, were to begin action governed by three factors: (1) adverse living conditions due to accelerated inflation; (2) industrial readjustment following the institution of the Industrial Reconstruction Readjustment Law (expected to result in many lay-offs); and (3) disintegration of companies following the institution of anti-trust measures.[197]

"October Offensive" Dies on the Vine

The "October Offensive" lost momentum and petered out. While the strikes of February 1947 had been called off as a result of a SCAP directive, the Occupation authorities had wisely used more oblique tactics this time. Not only were

196 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Summary, Issue No. 21, dtd 15 Oct 1947, p 13, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

197 Ibid, p 9.

large quantities of food released, but a concentrated program to educate the Japanese laborers in the proper practices of democratic unions had been instituted.[198]

CIC information on advance planning for the "October Offensive" had been voluminous and apparently complete. One member of the Japanese Communist Party paid CIC the highest of compliments. He was quoted as moaning, "In GHQ there is a group called CIC which makes our work in Japan most difficult."[199]

JCP Labor Program Suffers With Party in 1949-1950

Throughout the Occupation, the Japanese Communist Party continued to regard infiltration into labor unions, control over the labor movement, and agitation over matters pertaining to labor a prime activity. JCP labor policy became increasingly militant immediately following their important election triumphs in January 1949. But by September 1949, the mounting strength of the anti-Communist elements within labor and a public reaction against JCP-instigated violence brought about a rapid swing of labor organizations away from Communist leadership.[200]

The many blows felt by the JCP in 1950 directly influenced its strength among the unions. Police restrictions in Communist-led labor rallies and the "purging" of the Central Committee and "Akahata" put the crimp in JCP labor activity. The Civil Intelligence Section "Historical Report" of January to October 1950 summarized the situation in saying: "...by the end of October, the JCP found its control over organized labor vastly decreased, with a majority of its leading labor organizers and agitators among the ranks of the unemployed."[201]

JCP Tries for Support of Farmers

When the Communist Party decided to go after the support of the Japanese farmers, they chose to base their appeal on complete opposition to the SCAP program which enforced delivery of rice under a quota system and a fixed legal price. The farmers objected to selling at a lawful and established price then they had to buy fertilizer, equipment and other supplies from black market sources. Also, if the prices had to be fixed, the farmers would have preferred to have their agriculture associations instead of the government establish the levels.

198 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Summary, Issue No. 23, dtd 15 Dec 1947, pp 4-5, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

199 Ibid, Issue No. 21, dtd 15 Oct 1947, p 13.

200 GHQ, FEC, O of AC/S, G2, "Historical Report" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part I, p 27, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

201 Ibid, 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, p 35.

As soon as the quotas for 1947 were announced, the Communists began an all-out program of agitation to win support for the coming election. CIC was able to obtain photographs or copies of the JCP directives establishing rice delivery agitation. JCP directive 60 of 5 January 1947 stated, "The success of our struggle focuses on the reduction of quotas and the sabotage of individual deliveries." The document, in elaborating of the political objectives behind this activity, clearly indicated that it was part of the JCP effort to precipitate a nationwide crisis that could be exploited at the polls.

In the months before the 1947 election, Communist agitation on the rice delivery issue was reported by CIC in all but 11 of the 47 prefectures. Agitation was particularly heavy in the rice-producing areas of Hokkaido, Okayama, Fukuoka and Yamagata Prefectures. Those areas in which CIC noted a concentration of Communist activity were, by no mean coincidence, the fartherest from meeting their quotas of rice.

Reds Hit Vulnerable Points

CIC noted a marked uniformity in the Communist methods of aggravating farm issues. Speeches by Communist members at meetings of farmers' unions, personal contact with individual farmers, presentation of resolutions to government officials, and the sponsoring of mass demonstrations were the usual means employed.

Urging farmers to hold up rice deliveries, the Communists harped on the vulnerable point of the high cost of fertilizer and farm implements. Farmers were advised to hold 30 percent of their crop for sale on the black market, or to demand, before delivery, that the government furnish the vitally needed equipment at legal prices.[202]

To attain JCP domination of the farmers, the Communist members of the various agricultural unions and associations strived to attain leadership positions. Reports from CIC Area offices in March 1947 indicate that the JCP had reaped an uneven degree of success in their attempts to subvert the agricultural groups.

In Kagoshima Prefecture, only two of the 73 farmers' organizations were reported under Communist leadership. One-fourth of the associations in Nagasaki Prefecture were under JCP influence. In Tottori Prefecture the only important farmers' union was heavily dominated by the Reds.

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202 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the Civil Intel Sec," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Invest, Case No. 22, Communist Party Activity in Rice Delivery Sabotage, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

CIC in Osaka reported Communist members of agricultural societies were forming separate committees, seeking to promote internal disputes. The Communists felt if their actions were vigorous enough, eventually their committee would be able to acquire control of the whole organization.[203]

JCP Backs Down

Suddenly aware that they were inviting the wrath of SCAP by their actions, some of the Communists began to back down on the agitation of the rice delivery program. Fear of investigation and prosecution by the Occupation authorities was undoubtedly behind the order of 1 April 1947 from Ito Ritsu, the Central Committeeman in charge of farm agitation, to the Kumamoto Regional Committee. The local Reds were ordered to "round up reports of the Japan Farmers' Union and burn them."

The Occupation authorities also felt they might have a case for prosecution. On 12 April 1947, documents pertaining to the JCP's alleged sabotage of the rice delivery program were presented to the SCAP Legal Section to determine whether the marshalled evidence was sufficient to warrant trial in military courts.

The Legal Section believed there was no question that the directives, which purported to have emanated from the JCP Central Committee, were designed to sabotage the rice delivery program. The authors of the orders, the lawyers felt, could be justly apprehended and tried. However, it was concluded that CIC's investigation had failed legally to identify the true instigators of the plan to wreck the food program.

Unfortunately, further investigation by CIC failed to obtain the required evidence to link members of the Central Committee with the documents directing the 1947 farm agitation.[204]

JCP Continues to Seek Following in Rural Areas

Throughout the Occupation, the Communists, although concentrating their major effort on the ranks of labor, continued to seek support among the farming population. By August 1947, Tokyo Area and First CIC Region concluded that the JCP was gaining little backing among the rank and file of the farmers. In Kyoto, Communist membership had become a stigma; many farmers' groups formerly

203 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 14, dtd 15 Mar 1947, pp 43, 44, 50, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

204 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. 22, Communist Party Activity in Rice Delivery Sabotage, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

assertive in matters of the left were claiming no Communist connections. In the Second Region there had been more response to the Communist line and considerable criticism of the Occupation from agricultural associations.

In the subsequent months, CIC continued to conduct surveillance of malcontents and potential subversives in farmers' organizations and probe for indications that these persons had successfully gained leadership positions and were planning to thwart the government's programs.

Generally, the Japanese Communist Party was not as successful in gaining rural support as it had been in the ranks of labor.[205]

Broad Appeal in JCP Anti-Taxation Propaganda

One of the Japanese Communist Party's major instruments of propaganda - and probably the one with the broadest appeal - involved agitation against the Japanese Government's tax program.

In April 1947, the JCP Secretariat issued Directive 80, initiating a concerted nationwide campaign against increased taxation. JCP members were to organize disgruntled tax-payers from all walks of life, particularly attempting to coordinate the otherwise united labor and farming elements. The Communist Party believed a successful anti-tax campaign could be expected to attract the support of the masses to the "cause."

Although agitation against taxation initially produced only lukewarm results, the JCP stepped up the program in November 1947, and popular response was on the increase by the early months of 1948. Anti-tax demonstrations and round table discussions became the order of the day throughout the country. Generally an average of 500 persons took part in the rallies, but sometimes up to 15,000 were involved. Members of the JCP-dominated labor unions and agrarian groups led the majority of these demonstrations.

To attest to the seriousness of the situation, the Japanese Finance Ministry reported a deficit of 50 billion yen at the end of 1947. A large share of the amount was accounted for by non-payment of individual income taxes.

Early in 1948 the Japanese government clamped down on the tax agitation with numerous arrests of trouble-makers, reducing the program to a stand-still by the end of the year.

205 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 19, dtd 15 Aug 1947, pp 5, 19, 28, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fae).

Tax Campaign Given Much Credit for Election Successes

But the JCP was not easily discouraged. Their campaign for the January 1949 elections again included anti-tax agitation. More than ever before, according to CIC reports, the elements of the class struggle were stressed. The workers were told they were robbed of hard-earned wages to support a Fascist government which failed to function in their interests. JCP communications hinted strongly that much of the money was given directly to already wealthy capitalists.

The anti-tax campaign spearheaded a membership drive which won many ordinary citizens to momentary support of the Communist cause. Taxation agitation was credited by American Intelligence as a major reason for the JCP election successes of January 1949.

A Civil Intelligence Section summary of the anti-tax program concluded: "Anti-tax agitation is setting an obvious pattern of incitement for other economic issues. By stirring other individual grievances and developing 'livlihood' movements, the JCP hopes to create a super 'united front' to be used in achieving the JCP ultimate goal, the control of Japan."[206]

206 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 39, dtd 15 Apr 1949, p SPA-3, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Section 6

THE COLONY OF KOREAN NATIONALS

After the first year of the Occupation, the majority of CIC investigations, if not concerned directly with the activities of the Japanese Communist Party, had indirect and usually important connections with communism, both in Japan and on a world-wide level. CIC's prolonged investigation of the large colony of Korean Nationals in Japan was necessary since the discontented Korean minority, always a major source of civil disturbance, proved futile ground for Communist agitation.

Trouble-Makers From the Start

As early as the summer of 1946, First CIC Region declared, "Much of the crime in Japan has been attributed to Koreans."[207] Concurrently, CIC found the Japanese police showing reluctance to apprehend and prosecute Koreans, thereby openly inviting Koreans to enlarge their illegal activities.[208] Apparently the reluctance stemmed, not from fear of retaliation, but from a belief that activities of Korean nationals were not the jurisdiction of local police.[209]

Uniquely enough, some Koreans attempted to take matters into their own hands in assuming police power over their own kind. During the first week of September 1946, a Korean organization was observed in Hiroshima maintaining their version of peace and order among Korean nationals. Four instances of imprisonment and five cases of assault of men adjudged by the Koreans to be law violators were noted by CIC. The Japanese police had not been informed, and in one instance a policeman attempting to interfere was given a severe beating.[210]

Ideological Disputes Split Colony

This bellicose minority became more of a problem when an ideological struggle within the colony developed. The Korean minority had always been sensitive to changing conditions in their homeland. On 16 October 1945, Koreans from all over Japan met to proclaim their common cause and more specifically to free themselves from Japanese manipulation and control. Men of varying political beliefs joined together in the League of Koreans Residing Japan (Zai Nichi Chosenjin Renmei). Such a spirit of unity was possible because it was felt Syngman Rhee and Lyuh Woon Hyung, leaders in Korea of the right and left

207 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 1, dtd 1 Sep 1946. p 46, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
208 Ibid, p 49.
209 Ibid, Issue No. 3, dtd 1 Oct 1946, p 71.
210 Ibid, p 67.

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respectively, were working together for a unified Korea. But with evidence of an irreconcilable split in Korea, there soon appeared a similar division in Japan.

This internal struggle, originally apparent in Tokyo, had clearly reached national proportions by the fall of 1946. On 3 October 1946, the lines of battle were drawn.

The League of Koreans Residing in Japan had come under the control of leftists and pro-Communists, who were in the majority among the Koreans in Japan. Realizing they had no voice in the organization, the rightists convened on 3 October 1946 and established their own group, The Korean Settlement Corporation (Chosenjin Kyoryu Mindan).

Divided by political differences and racked by internal strife, the Korean minority in Japan came to mirror in minature the plight of the entire Korean nation.[211]

CIC did note scattered efforts to reunite the Korean population in the months that followed, but the powerful internal differences had overridden any general impulse to unite for the common good. One Korean who had tried to unify his people was quoted as saying, "Major differences in ideology would preclude the possibility of complete unification for some time to come."[212]

JCP Exploits Korean's Condition

The great discontent of the Korean nationals was seized upon by the Japanese Communist Party. CIC, beginning in October 1947, sought information on this maneuver. Frequent reports from informants indicated that the JCP was attempting to enlist young Korean Communists into JCP cells. There were also numerous claims that Koreans were performing extensive liaison missions to North Korea for the JCP. One informant in Kyoto learned that the Russians were making an effort to utilize the League of Koreans Residing in Japan as a medium for soliciting potential Soviet citizens.[213]

Later in 1947, CIC learned of JCP schools set up to instruct youthful members of the League and of regular liaison contacts between the League and the JCP.[214]

211 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec Periodical Rpt, Issue No. 5, dtd 1 Nov 1946, p 76, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
212 Ibid, Issue No. 9, dtd 1 Jan 1947, p 41.
213 Ibid, Issue No. 22, dtd 15 Nov 1947, p 13.
214 Ibid, Issue No. 24, dtd 15 Jan 1948, p 28.

5,000 Riot in Osaka

One of the major riots involving Koreans took place in Osaka City on 23 April 1948, when 5,000 Koreans staged what was officially termed an "extremely disorderly parade." A mob of Koreans succeeded in breaking through a police cordon and stringing up a Red flag over the Osaka Prefecture building and in preventing the departure of the Prefectural Vice-Governor. For several days, a situation bordering on anarchy prevailed in Osaka and the neighboring city of Kobe.

Meanwhile JCP members circulated through the mob with handbills bearing the following sentiments:

Oppose the closing of Korean schools
Oppose suppression
Release our jailed victims immediately
Oppose oppression of the minority races
Long live Korean and Japanese Democrats
Expose the traitors to our race
Breakup our enemy, the Ashida Cabinet
Breakup the national parliament
Join the JCP

By 28 April a total of 1,558 Koreans, including some leaders of the League, had been arrested for participating in the Osaka-Kobe riots.[215]

The Osaka demonstrations served as a public pronouncement of the common cause of the League and the JCP. Japanese Communist Party Instruction 71, issued by the Central Committee on 19 March 1948, had ordered JCP and League activities combined. Korean problems were to be considered JCP problems also. A document emanating from Osaka JCP officials on the day before the big riots had outlined specific duties for JCP members in the demonstrations. Another Osaka JCP communication had been more general: "It is our glorious task to organize the Japanese reinforcements against the common enemy. You must make propaganda concerning the Korean oppression. Organize strikes and mass action against the common enemy and bring masses to protest rallies."[216]

The Special Projects Section at CIC headquarters, responsible for coordination of investigations of Korean activity, concluded, "It appears that the majority

215 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: "Monthly Rpts of Activities, Apr 1948, To: Policy & Rpts Sec, dtd 4 May 1948, /s/ Thomas A. Harris, Maj, Chief, Special Projects Section, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

216 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 29, dtd 15 Jun 1948, p 15, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

of those involved in the disturbances at Osaka are members of the Korean League, and the JCP members have been actively lending support and leadership whether the JCP itself is actually responsible for instigating the riots or not."[217]

By September 1948, CIC had uncovered the complete courier route utilized by the League of Koreans Residing in Japan for obtaining directives and propaganda materials from the government of North Korea. In addition, a source of information in Osaka came up with the news that directives to the League were also being transmitted by encoded messages from Radio Pyongyang.[218]

Rightist Koreans' Position Improves in 1949

Up to 1949, the plight of the right wing Koreans, represented at this time by the Union of the Greater Korean Republic in Japan, was acute. They were in the unfortunate position of a minority within a minority. Under the leadership of the sincere but incompetent Boku Retsu, the rightists found themselves numerically weak, financially insolvent and faced with the task of resisting leftist efforts to destroy them. Boku's ambassador in Japan, Dr. Chung Han Pum, marked an upsurge in rightist fortunes. Then, on 9 September 1949, an order from the Japanese Attorney General dissolved the League of Koreans Residing in Japan and its associate youth organizations. Properties and assets of the groups were confiscated and leaders placed on the "purge" list, prohibiting them from being active in any organization. The leftist Koreans were stuck without an association to voice their attitudes.

The right wingers bided their time while the initial shock of the dissolution died down. Then those Koreans known to be free of radical ideologies were invited to join the principal labor union. This action greatly increased union prestige in Japan. At the end of 1949, the organization was actively engaged in assisting the Republic of Korea Ambassador to register, mostly for information purposes, all Korean nationals in Japan. This registration, while meeting some leftist opposition, proceeded smoothly.[219]

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217 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: Monthly Rpt of Activities, Apr 1948, To: Policy and Rpts Sec, dtd 4 May 1948, /s/ Thomas A. Harris, Maj, Chief, Special Projects Sec, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Depot, Box C3744).

218 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS Periodical Summary, Issue No. 32, dtd 15 Sep 1948, p 11, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

219 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, G2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Supporting Doc #24 (GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Summary of Korean Situation in Japan, 1949" dtd Dec 1949, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

In the G-2 "Historical Report" for January through October 1950, written after hostilities had broken out in Korea, a backward look was taken at the confused status of Korean nationals in Japan from the beginning of the year to the war's start. "The chaos among leftist Koreans following the dissolution of the powerful League of Koreans Residing in Japan and its affiliates; the ideological waverings of the rightist organizations and the influence of the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, all acted to obscure the intelligence picture of the largest foreign minority group in Japan."[220]

220 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, G-2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part I, p 45, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

Section 7

REPATRIATES FROM THE SOVIET ZONE

For many years after World War II, the Soviet Union, at a painfully slow rate, repatriated their Japanese prisoners of war. Beginning in November 1946, CIC and the command's positive intelligence agencies were involved in the interrogation and screening of these returnees.

CIC Informants Roam Dock Areas

Eight Army intelligence officers supervised the interrogations of all repatriates at the port of debarkation. CIC provided personnel to coordinate with Eighth Army in port interrogation and to cover port customs stations. CIC employed trusted Japanese informants to circulate through the crowds coming off the ships. The stray bits of information picked up by these men often put the finger on suspicious individuals for CIC. Those repatriates appearing to be of most counterintelligence value were interrogated by the CIC Area office nearest the eventual residence of the returnee. From the repatriates, many of whom were potential informants, CIC worked particularly to compile information on Soviet indoctrination and possible Soviet plans for large scale subversion of their prisoners.

CIC's part in the repatriation program was specifically defined in January 1948 when the 441st was charged with screening out three types of returnees: known or suspected Soviet agents; collaborators in Soviet-held areas; and potentially active Communist Party members. It was standard procedure in interrogating repatriates to question them on persons still in prisoner of war camps possibly falling into these classifications.[221]

Later Returnees More Indoctrinated

By the end of 1948, the returnees were bound to be more heavily indoctrinated with Soviet ideals than those arriving in the first shipments. The Russians not only had had more time to "brainwash" these men, but had probably saved until last those heavily indoctrinated. This trend continued into 1949. CIC found the prisoners of war returning in 1949 had been subjected to "the most intensified indoctrination program yet employed."[222]

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221 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, pp 100-103, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

222 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part I, p 38, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

Statistics compiled by the 441st showed that in September and October 1948, repatriates signifying an intent to join the JCP had ranged from 9 percent to 35 percent on the various boatloads. By July 1949, the percentages varied from over 60 percent to nearly 80 percent. In eight boatloads of repatriates received that month the percentage of those "opposing communism and the USSR social structure" was well below 8 percent in each load.[223]

CIC Makes a Survey

Between the end of 1948 and the beginning of the Korean War, 329,505 Japanese were repatriated from Soviet zones. The general behavior of this group, as well as statistics on their political beliefs, indicated they had been steeped in Soviet propaganda.

In an effort to determine how far the Red indoctrination had sunk into the repatriates, CIC was given in 1950 the task of conducting interviews of 100 specially selected "Red repatriates" from the 1949 shipments. The men interviewed had signified an intention to join the JCP and had exhibited a militant and belligerent attitude upon their arrival in Japan. CIC interviews, supplemented by information received through more confidential sources, showed many instances where individuals had "cooled off" after a year at home. Of the total, 11 had joined the JCP, 16 could be classified as Communist sympathizers, and the remainder were anti-Communist. One of the last group exclaimed, "It is like a nightmare, the days we danced to the melody of 'soren-Bushi' (Soviet music). I feel as though I returned to the society of justice and respect and I am no longer a menace to anyone."[224]

The Case of

As might be expected, the repatriation docks were ideal places for one with cosmopolitan tastes in acquaintances. Intermixed in the jumble of humanity returned by the Russians were bound to be men with instructions from Soviet intelligence agencies. Such an individual was

At the end of the war, was under Russian lock and key in Karafuto. On 24 February and 26 March 1946, attempted to escape to Hokkaido. Both times the Russians nabbed him and brought him back to the prisoner of war cage. In April, was questioned by the Soviets and informed he could return to his homeland if he would promise to collect some information. On 10 July, he was briefed on his mission and included in the shipment of repatriates to Hokkaido.

223 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, G2, "Historical Rpt," for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part I, plate #13, p 38, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

224 Ibid, 1 Jan 1950 - 31 Oct 1950, Chap III, Part I, pp 55-56.

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was to determine the uses being made of the largest buildings in Hokkaido, report on the economic situation, survey the transportation facilities, and gain information on various local publications. This information was to be collected within a month's time.

was given an address in Manchuria to which he was to send his information. The letter containing the data was to be given to some person returning to Karafuto and would be recovered by Soviet officials searching the passengers at their port of debarkation. The Russians told if they did not hear from him, he would be visited by a contact man who would pick up the information.

It is not recorded in available documents how came to CIC's attention at the port of debarkation, but his interrogation by agents from the Sapporo Area office was not particularly difficult. readily supplied the full story of his mission. He was instructed to return to his home and report immediately if a Soviet contact man paid him a call.[225]

Several months' surveillance by CIC revealed no evidence that was engaged in espionage activities. Nor was he contacted by a Soviet agent. Nevertheless, CIC continued periodical surveillance of and his name remained on the Civil Censorship Detachment Watch List.[226]

Twice Is Too Many

Repatriation channels afforded the Communists excellent "cover" for Party liaison personnel as well as espionage agents. was fresh from a series of conferences in North Korea on 18 December 1946 when he was detained by agents at the Sasebo Repatriation Port "for suspected illegal entry into Japan." The main trouble with was that records indicated that he had been repatriated once already.

The day following detention, First CIC Region initiated an investigation to ascertain all the facts surrounding his past activities. had been captured by the Chinese Communist Army in August 1940 while serving with the Japanese Imperial Army in North China. The Communists proceeded to give him a course of instruction in communism. Apparently got good grades at

225 GHQ, AFPAC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Section Periodical Summary, Issue No. 4, dtd 15 Oct 1946, p 51; and Hqs, CIC Area 37, Subj: To: Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Det, 21 Sep 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

226 Hqs, CIC Area 37, Subj: To: CO, 441st CIC Det, 13 Dec 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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school, for he was eventually placed under the tutelege of and at the same time prepared propaganda pamphlets for dissemination to less advanced students.

In March 1946, was repatriated. Following instructions left him by he reported to the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. The Communists informed him that he was to have no formal party connections. was "assigned" to the National Federation of Repatriates and spent his time nullifying the efforts of "opposing parties" to attract repatriates.

was included in a plan to contact Russian military personnel in North Korea and, on 17 September 1946, left Japan on a hospital ship for Pusan, South Korea. Able to avoid incident in South Korea, proceeded across the 38th Parallel and made the required contacts. Passes from the Soviet Army and the North Korean Labor Party facilitated his movement in North Korea. On 12 January 1947, departed from Genzan, North Korea, through normal repatriation channels.[227]

Extensive investigation and interrogation were needed to piece together this information on On 26 May 1947, CIC obtained a written statement from testifying to the truth of his story. To furnish complete evidence on travels, First CIC Region obtained immunization records showing that he had received shots at his various ports of call. The immunization dates fortunately coincided with the dates of departure and entry as given in testimony.[228]

For security purposes, was not tried for his subversive activities, but only for illegal entry into Japan.[229] He was sentenced by Eighth Army Provost Court on 27 October 1947 to two years at hard labor.[230]

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227 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

228 Inter-office Memo, From: Special Projec s Section, 441st CIC Det, To: CIS Opns, Subj: 11 Jul 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

229 Inter-office Memo, From: CIS, To: AC/S, G-2, Subj: 8 Jun 1948, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

230 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Volume IX, "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

SECRET

Section 8

SIX OTHER INVESTIGATIONS

Six prominent cases have been selected to exemplify 441st operations in investigations of other than political movements and organizations. These cases illustrate a wide range of investigative activity.

, The case of concerns a Caucasian woman who claimed American citizenship but acted in a most un-American manner. A suspected Communist courier, was the subject of a highly unusual surveillance. The case of the "Seven Persons" began with a Civil Censorship Detachment intercept of a letter in which a man named was termed a Soviet spy. A Japanese public official, asked too many questions, and CIC was brought in to find out why. Information relayed to CIC from China led to the apprehension of two nationalist espionage agents - and In the last case, a leak of classified information from the SCAP Government Section led CIC to a Department of the Army civilian with apparent pro-Communist sympathies.

Apparent Pro-Communist Reported to CIC

first came to CIC's attention through a lead submitted to the G-2 Section from the Office of the Inspector General, FEC. The c of the transport Marine Falcon had reported to the Inspector General that during her voyage from San Francisco on that ship, had constantly made utterances he felt could only be classified as pro-Communist. According to had "given the Russians credit for having all the answers."

CIC quickly learned that a Caucasian women who claimed American citizenship, had married a Japanese citizen, on 30 July 1939. During the war, she had remained in Japan with her husband. In October 1945, under a Swiss Protection passport, she had left Japan for her "native" America. One year later, on 15 October 1946, she landed in Yokohama from the Marine Falcon. It was never ascertained exactly how she had received passage to return to Japan.[231]

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231 Hqs, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Summary Rpt, Subj: , dtd 16 Dec 1946, Period covered: 16 Oct - 18 Nov 1946, Case Classification: Subversive (Communist), (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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Crew of Ship Quizzed

CIC sought out the of the vessel. He was persuaded to sign an affidavit that read in part: spoke in a general way, but at all times she had praises for the Soviet Union. However, at no time do I recall of her making any direct derogatory remarks regarding the United States."[232] CIC also talked to other members of the crew concerning The chief steward, the chief store-keeper, and the night pantryman remembered the woman and had gained the impression that she was pro-Communist.[233]

Six-Week Surveillance Inconclusive

On 18 November 1946, CIC instituted a surveillance of [234] an activity that was curtailed on 31 December when it became obvious to the agents on the case that the subject was aware of being followed. At the conclusion of this six-week surveillance, CIC was forced to report, "There is a cloud of uncertainty and indecision hovering over the many contacts was seen to make in the surveillance of her activities. Her frequent contacts were identified and placed under investigation, but no derogatory information concerning them was uncovered. During the six weeks, she had visited several Army installations and taken frequent trips by rail to Tokyo. At one point, on 7 December 1946, she entered the Tokyo Correspondents' Club carrying a three foot long package, but came out empty-handed. Nothing more about this incident was uncovered.

While no concrete counterintelligence information was uncovered during the surveillance, CIC did gain information to indicate that was utilizing Post Exchange and Commissary facilities to which she was not entitled.

Goes Calling

On 7 January 1947, the Marine Falcon returned to Yokohama and was granted permission by port authorities to board the ship to visit a member of the crew. CIC was notified of intentions. A check of the crew list revealed no person under the name she had given to the port authorities. CIC quickly established that her contact was actually a known radical. After a two-hour visit, left the Marine Falcon and was immediately apprehended by the Military Police.

232 Affidavit signed by "Mar South Pier, Yokohama City, 17 Oct 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac)

233 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo For the Officer-In-C... 24 Oct 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

234 Ibid, 27 Nov 1946.

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told the Military Police she was a newspaper correspondent. When asked why she did not carry the registration-identification required of newspapermen, she blamed "red tape in Washington" for holding up her application. An immediate search of her hand bag revealed several CIO publications, the personal card of a Pravda correspondent, and detailed notes on political affairs in Japan. After brief questioning, was released.

The cabin of the was searched with the result that labor pamphlets similar to those carried by were uncovered. The admitted he had passed some CIO literature on to the women. This information was transmitted to CIC with the Transportation Corps at the port of San Francisco with a request that the 441st CIC detachment be notified on all occasions when this man was a crew member on a ship expected to dock in Japan.

On 20 January 1947, the Military Police searched home. Newspaper clippings and diaries enough to indicate an ardent adherence to the Communist cause were confiscated. Many violations outside of CIC's concern were uncovered in the raid. Evidence that she fraudently used Post Exchange and Commissary facilities as well as indications that she was illegally using U.S. Army mail channels were obtained.[235]

CCD Establishes Mail Cover on

Meanwhile, on 25 November 1946, CIC had requested the Civil Censorship Detachment to maintain a mail cover on the subject to obtain information on her political activities.[236] Through this mail cover, CIC first learned of the woman's contacts with the Further investigation revealed, working under of this news service, had meticulously covered a hunger strike at a Tokyo electric plant, criticizing the conduct of the Military Police during the strike. Although she was not a registered correspondent it was learned that intended to write and disseminate a series of articles derogatory to the Allied Occupation.[237]

Citizenship Status Settled

Up to this point in the investigation, there had been considerable concern over the citizenship status of the subject. Although Fujikawa frequently claimed she was an American citizen, this fact could not be fully established by the CIC.

235 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: , 4 Mar 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

236 Hq, CIC Area 23, Subj: Request for Mail Cover, To: Civil Intel Sec, G-2, 25 Nov 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

237 Hq, 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Subj: 4 Mar 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

The problem was solved by a series of events that began on 19 May 1947 when two Criminal Investigation Division agents were called to her home to check on a reported burglary.

The investigators were drawn into a conversation with the woman who, for reasons that could never be uncovered, told them about inadvertantly voting in the Japanese elections of 20 and 25 April 1947. claimed she went to the polls to seek information for a book she was writing. She informed the Criminal Investigation Division agents that she had voted in complete ignorance of exactly what she was doing.

Prior to the elections, a notice had been published on several occasions in the "Nippon Times" and "The Stars and Stripes" to the effect that American citizens voting in the Japanese elections would be subject to loss of their citizenship.

CIC contacted and queried her on the details of her voting. The woman claimed she had registered on 9 April and then proceeded to cast her ballot on election day. She had been asked by a Japanese friend to vote and had done so "without giving it a thought."

Prior to her CIC interrogation, had called on Mr. V. A. Johnson, State Department representative in Yokohama, to explain that she had voted out of ignorance of the law. On 10 June 1947, Johnson requested CIC to obtain documentary evidence that could be used to deprive of her citizenship, whether she possessed it or not.

Affidavits were secured from election officials who recalled that a woman of description had voted. Her name was found on the list of registered voters. But most important, the signed slip of paper that had been exchanged at the polls for a ballot was uncovered.[238]

On 22 December 1947, Johnson reported to the Office of the AC of S, G-2 that the Department of State had approved loss of American citizenship. Regardless of the tangle over citizenship early in the investigation, it was now settled once and for all.[239]

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238 Hq, Area 25 (Yokohama Branch), 441st CIC Det, GHQ, FEC, Memo for The Officer in Charge, Subj: , 24 Jun 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

239 Check Sheet, From: Yokohama Div, Dept of State, To: G-2 FEC, Subj: 22 Dec 1947, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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Political Status Settled Also

While her citizenship status was unraveled, political views also became patently clear. She appeared at nearly every labor demonstration held in Tokyo and frequently spoke to the mob in rather halting Japanese. To quote one CIC officer, "She made no bones about her Communist activity." Generally, although the Communists thought well enough of her, had a poor reputation with the Japanese public.[240]

While could have been apprehended for criminal offences, the policy as outlined by General Willoughby was to "lay off arrest." The Japanese police kept under surveillance in an effort to uncover other illegal activities.[241]

had one more flurry of publicity. On 3 May 1950, General MacArthur spoke out against the Japanese Communist Party in no uncertain terms. As an act of protest against the general, announced through the that she was joining the JCP to become the Japanese Communist Party's first "American" woman member.

On decision, quoted her as saying she had never renounced her American citizenship. The reporter had asked her if she ever intended to do so. replied she would if pressed; and then, the reported, "She trailed off in a series of qualifications that left the issue somewhat confused."[242]

CIC Watches Suspected CP Couriers

SCAP, through strict censorship, was able to keep Japan substantially free of outside Communist propaganda except for that sent into the country by radio. If was known, however, that Communist or Communist-sympathizing seamen, most of them on ships of U.S. registry, were smuggling Red-inspired literature into the islands. Gradually, through the combined efforts of the 441st and CIC in the Zone of the Interior, a master list of seamen suspected of acting as couriers was compiled. To maintain a world-wide check of the activities and movements of these alleged Communists, ports of call throughout the Far East and in the United States were forewarned of vessels enroute carrying seamen under suspicion. Extensive investigations and surveillances accounted for the activities of the

240 Interview with Lt Col Joseph Wright, Re: CIC During the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1950, (Conf)

241 Check-sheet, From: Provost Court, To: G-2, Subj: Unauthorized Use of APO Mails, 25 May1949, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

242 Newspaper clipping from Cen Rec Fac (Conf).

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suspects during shore leave. All positive information uncovered was forwarded to authorities at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation and to the Director of Military Intelligence in the Pentagon.[243]

Crew Member of "SS Cleveland" Watched

On 18 July 1949, a crew member of the SS President Cleveland, suspected by intelligence authorities of being a courier for the Communists, landed with his ship at the Yokohama docks. The 441st was prepared for him. At 1340 hours, when left the ship, of the Yokohama office began what was intended as a surveillance of the suspect.

During the first few minutes, the seaman walked briefly with a Japanese woman, but could not get close enough to identify her. Observing closely moves, had to conclude that his subject was "testing for trail." When the subject suddenly called out to , the only other Caucasian in the crowd, and asked him the location of the Japanese Travel Bureau, the agent was certain the surveillance had been compromised. After escorting to the travel agency, called his office for relief. When relief arrived, he retraced the subject's steps, searching some of the localities where had stopped during the half-hour before their conversation. Meanwhile had been lost in the crowd by the new surveilling agent.

At 1900 hours, again spotted and trailed him into the Yokohama Seamen's Club. A few minutes later, hailed the agent, came over to his table, and exhibited several books on Japanese ceramics. in his report wrote: "The agent, still believing he had been compromised, decided a close surveillance was better than none and stayed in close conversation with the subject."

was with his subject until returned to his ship at 2038 hours. Arrangements were made for the two to meet again the next day.

On 19 July, resumed his close surveillance of at the check point of the dock. For transportation, supplied his personal automobile, equipped with ficticious license and registration, and the two men were off on a curio hunt. purchased a big urn and being completely agreeable, transported it back to the Cleveland for him. While was taking his recent purchase to his quarters, the agent examined the motion picture camera the suspect carried, but no unusual features were discovered.

243 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, "Historical Rpt," 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Chap III, Part I, pp 40-41, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

By 1313 hours, the agent and the suspect were off on a joy-ride through the city. Several hours later they stopped at the Oshiro Hotel where intimated by his actions and conversation with the hotel help that he had been there the previous afternoon, accounting for some of his activities while not under surveillance.

had, by this time, established himself as a welcome and trusted comrade and began to discuss politics. When the two men returned to the ship, was invited to quarters. There he was given some Communist-inspired pamphlets to read.

later reported his recollections of line of conversation. The seaman had declared, "China is now liberated! The heroic efforts of Madame Mao, the mother of the great Mao Tse Tung, have finally paid off in freedom for the mass of Chinese people. Only those who have been in China regularly can appreciate the vast difference between the real democracy of Mao and his Communists and the phony democracy of the Fascist Chiang and his 'money-grabbing wife's family'."

turned to the American attitude toward Red China. "Americans must realize that there is a great 'People's Movement' sweeping the world. We must awaken to the words of our progressive leaders lest we be overwhelmed. Look at the taxes we all pay now because of the money we have poured down Chiang's rathole."

It was inevitable that should discuss the investigations into communism being conducted on many fronts. "Real patriotic Americans are contemptuous of the Fascist groups like the House Un-American Activities Committee and Tenney's California Un-American Committee. They are contemptuous, likewise, of the goals of the FBI and Military Intelligence, but not, however, contemptuous of their methods."

indicated he was aware of the possibility that he might be under investigation. He declared to "To speak of these matters in the present police state in Japan is dangerous. You must not repeat what I have said. Don't speak of these things unless you are alone with a friend you trust implicitly and then swear him to absolute secrecy. If some spy should overhear these things discussed, an immediate investigation would result. I have been through the 'mills'. I was pulled off my ship at the beginning of the war by Military Intelligence. They thought I had Fascist connections or leanings because of my birthplace... Me, of all people, Fascist! If they only knew the truth! I almost laughed in their faces. Young man, I remained silent. Silence is the best policy. Communism is the People's Movement that is sweeping the world. People in all the dark corners of the world are becoming enlightened to its truths."

made arrangements to meet the next time the Cleveland docked in Yokohama. Ostensibly the agent was to receive more indoctrination in communism and some new Communist pamphlets from the seamen. After a bad start, the surveillance had produced valuable counterintelligence information.

CIC files contain no indication that was ever again investigated by the 441st. It is highly possible that 's surveillance uncovered enough derogatory information to end career as a Communist courier.[244]

Espionage: The Case of the Seven Persons

On 25 August 1948, the Civil Censorship Detachment intercepted a letter with the following passage: "According to stories I hear from in Shiga, it appears as though Assistant of General Affairs Section, Soga, was formerly a spy for the USSR. As soon as I investigate and find out who has been doing us harm, I will take proper steps..."

The receipt of this letter touched off a CIC investigation that was to cover five prefectures and take a period of nine months to complete. CIC worked to discover not only who Soga was and what he was doing, but also to obtain background information on the other persons mentioned or involved in the intercept. CIC was also concerned with why this apparently private investigation was taking place.

The writer of the letter, Yamaoka Kan of Osaka Prefecture, also mentioned two other persons identified only as residents of Kyoto. The writer requested the addressee, Nakamura Koji of Fukuoka Prefecture, to notify if he happened to run into what was nebulously referred to as the "seven persons."

CIC began the investigation by seeking information on the various personalities involved. investigated in Shiga Prefecture where he had worked in railroad construction in Manchuria from 1920 until the date of his repatriation, 19 October 1946. The investigation established that did not have Soviet contacts, was not a Communist, and was reputed to be of sound character.

244 GHQ, FEC, O of the AC/S, G-2, "Historical Rpt" for 1 Jan 1949 - 31 Dec 1949, Supporting Docu #30 (Office of the AC/S, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Summary of Info, Subj: Suspected Communist Courier, 19 Aug 1949) (Secret) Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va); and Hq, Tokyo-Kanagawa CIC District, Subj: Suspected Communist Courier, 5 Aug 1949 /s/ P. L. Haggard and T. P. O'Neill, Special Agents, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

"Seven Persons" Had Been Nabbed by NKVD

The investigation of the author of the letter took place in Osaka. [redacted] had joined the Manchurian Railway Company in 1942 as a railway track maintenance technician. He served briefly with the Japanese military forces in Manchuria, but returned to his original work when his unit was demobilized at the war's end. In January 1946, [redacted] and six other company employees, the "seven persons" of the letter, were arrested by the Mukden NKVD, charged with being escaped prisoners of war, and interned in Soviet Russia. The seven vowed to find out who informed on them. Originally, [redacted] was a prime suspect.

When Yamaoka was repatriated to Japan in 1948, he went to [redacted] home and questioned him about his part in the arrest. [redacted] disclaimed responsibility for the act, but pointed to a man named Sota (not Soga). According to [redacted], Sota had signed a pledge to cooperate with the Soviets to gain his own release from the NKVD. Yamaoka announced that he planned to visit this Sota to discover the truth for himself. As a passing thought, Yamaoka informed the CIC agents who questioned him that he intended to join the JCP, but only because they could find him a job.

To Shimane CIC fell the job of locating Sota. Once found, this mystery man told another side to the story.

Sota Unaware he is Sought by "Seven Persons"

Sota had also been employed by the Manchurian Railway Company. He had been head clerk in the Mukden office, a position which placed him in charge of personnel records. Upon taking over the railroad, the Russians had immediately confiscated these records. Shortly thereafter, the "seven persons" were arrested. The general impression given the remaining workers was that Sota had turned informer.

Sota did admit that the Russians, under threats of violence, had ordered him to report on certain of the railway employees. Sota stated his reports were usually negative. When he did supply information, it was when he felt reasonably certain the Soviets knew it already.

Sota had received a personal letter from Yamaoka asking for the particulars of the records confiscation, but he had otherwise been unaware of being sought by the "seven persons."

Sota's superiors at the Shimane office of the Commerce and Industry Ministry were contacted by CIC. Generally Sota was spoken of as a mild-mannered man of good reputation. He had no apparent political connections although it was felt his

views were somewhat leftist. Since his return from Manchuria, had been active in relief work for other repatriates.

The backgrounds of and the two men from Kyoyo were similar to the writer of the letter. They were among the "seven persons" and also sought as the man responsible for their troubles.

At this point CIC felt the EEIs were answered. was obviously seeking revenge with no clear facts concerning the supposedly guilty party. It was felt that rash actions and his motive for joining the JCP indicated a degree of irresponsibility and tended to discredit his information. When compared to the background and character of the man he accused, was entirely discredited. The case was closed officially on 16 May 1949.[245]

Series of Letters Touch Off CIC Probe

In early August 1946, First CIC Region began a lengthy investigation of possible espionage agents within the

A letter sent by the asking for the strength of Occupation Forces in Ishikawa aroused the curiosity of CIC. The officer, under CIC questioning, claimed to have sent only the letter to Ishikawa; but it soon developed that similar letters, all bearing the had been mailed to every prefectural government in Japan. Each communication had requested "the number of Allied troops in your prefecture as well as activities, condition, situation and state of Military Government and CIC." This information so closely resembled the EEIs of an enemy intelligence agency that CIC began a probe into the circumstances surrounding the requests.

The explained he needed the information to enlarge the liaison office commensurate with the corresponding growth of the Allied Occupation Forces. He claimed the portion about Military Government and CIC had not been in the original draft when it had been forwarded to for approval and mailing.

CIC promptly took its questions to The stated that to better serve the enlarged Allied Occupation Forces in , it had been decided to enlarge and reorganize the liaison office. To accomplish the reorganization, the query had been sent to other prefecture offices for ideas and suggestions.

245 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. 19, Purported USSR Spy, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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He denied adding the fatal last words, but admitted responsibility for its since the letter had been sent out under his seals.

"A Mistake Based on Poor Judgment"

For two weeks, held vigorously to his story. When confronted with a draft of the complete letter in his own handwriting, he confessed and then proceeded to minimize the importance of the last sentence. He claimed to have made a "mistake based on poor judgment" and pointed out that he had been a very poor student in school.

Nationwide, this case was from the outset handled with a view toward possible subversive elements within the which had direct control over the governors and vice governors of the prefectures.

CIC was unable to come up with evidence of subversive elements within the Nevertheless, it was felt would not have added the request for data on Military Government and CIC without apparent motive or considerable appreciation of the grave nature of his act. His experience in 1942 as an official with the Investigation Section of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association indicated to CIC that he knew basic intelligence operations and therefore could not have been totally ignorant of the nature of his request.

was held pending trial for violation of the SCAPIN dealing with falsifying information in the course of an official investigation. He was released from custody when an investigation into the possibility that his actions might have been the result of a "foreign" request produced negative results.

Subsequently resigned as The Occupation authorities arranged to make his resignation permanent by "purging" because of his former contacts with the SCAP-banned Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

As is often the case, this investigation had no sharply-defined conclusion. The 441st wrote: "A careful review of the strenuous efforts made by and his to thwart CIC's investigation, even to the extent of deliberate and admitted lying by the indicates that despite unshakable alibi that the whole affair was simply a 'mistake based on poor judgment,' there is a strong possibility of a deep ulterior motive which he was prepared to hide even at the cost of sacrificing himself."[246]

246 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, Selected CIC Investigations, Case No. (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

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441st Picks Up Two Chinamen -

On 25 November 1946, an External Survey Detachment of Central Intelligence Group in China reported to G-2, FEC, that two Chinese Nationalist Army officers posing as Japanese were enroute to Japan on a repatriation ship from Hulutuo, China. The two officers, were apprehended by CIC agents at the Sasebo Repatriation Center as they disembarked from the SS Haruki two days later.

At first the two Chinese officers, traveling under Japanese aliases, denied all allegations except that they had entered Japan illegally. Subsequent investigation in Japan supplemented by more information from the External Survey Detachment, pieced together a story the two men had to admit was factual.

was a captain in the Chinese Nationalist Army under orders from a colonel in Manchuria. apparently a civilian, was his friend and interpreter. They had been assigned an undercover mission in Japan which involved contacting 58 repatriated Japanese Nationals, all former employees of the Chinese Nationalist The contacts were to be made with an eye to establishing a net of "sleeper" informants.

carried a letter signed by his colonel and addressed to the in Japan." The letter identified the two men as "special representatives" and solicited cooperation from The two men also carried a large quantity of lighter flints, which, they later admitted, were to be sold on the Japanese black market. From the flints they expected to get one million yen to finance their mission.

Additional communications from the External Survey Detachment in China gave the 441st the information that in September 1946, He had also been active in "special investigation work" which required travel between Mukden and Changchun. Among his close associates was the head of the which had offices all over the Orient. The Tokyo Branch was reported to be the contact point for Chinese Nationalist intelligence agents in Japan. CIC learned the exact address of this office and proceeded to investigate activities there.

"Changchun emphasizes that all persons mentioned are not isolated cases, but are part of a large highly organized Chinese Nationalist plan for agent operations in Japan."

Although it was believed they would have carried out their assigned mission had they not been immediately apprehended, it was only possible to prosecute for illegally entering Japan and smuggling black market commodities into the country. The sentence imposed was a fine of 25,000 yen and deportation to China.

The 57 persons were to seek out in Japan were all formerly connected to the They remained under periodic surveillance for any evidence of further connections with underground organizations.[247]

Disaffection Group Handles DAC Investigations

One of the more sensitive areas of CIC operations in Japan involved investigation of subversive and disloyal members of the Army Establishment with particular emphasis on Department of the Army civilians. As early as January 1947, within the Special Activities Branch of the Civil Intelligence Section, a special section known as the Disaffection Group had been established to supervise the surveillance of individuals under investigation for activities inimical to the Occupation, activities ranging from disaffection to downright subversion

Department of the Army civilians slated for sensitive jobs in the Far East Command were cleared on the basis of Zone of the Interior investigations. The 441st CIC detachment routed all reports of these security investigations to the

247 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Civil Intel Sec, Summary of Info, Subj: 27 May 1947, (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va); and GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, CIS, Summary of Info, Subj: 18 Aug 1947. (Secret) (Departmental Rec Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va).

Disaffection Group. If the report of the stateside investigation indicated possible disloyal tendencies, a set of EEIs were drawn up by the Disaffection Group and sent to the 441st. When necessary Military Intelligence Division in the Pentagon and other Zone of the Interior contact were alerted for further investigation in the United States.

In cases involving Department of the Army civilians, where disaffection, disloyalty, subversion of communism were established beyond a reasonable doubt, the information was summarized by the Disaffection Group and sent to the GHQ Committee on Loyalty Investigations of Civilian Personnel for review and eventual disposition.

In its initial action, the Disaffection Group set up personality card files on the nearly 4,000 Army civilians in the Far East Command and SCAP agencies. Earmarked in files were the cards on those with Russian or Russian satellite backgrounds. Until the individual committed some overt act which indicated disloyalty, his name and personal history remained in this carded file. The employee became the subject of a dossier only after derogatory information had been received, usually from CIC or the Civil Censorship Detachment.[248]

Cleared DAC Comes Under CIC Scrutiny

The following is cited as an example of an investigation of a Department of the Army civilian who came under CIC scrutiny after the uncovering of derogatory information. The subject was initially investigated in the Zone of the Interior. Her statement of personal history is stamped with the notation: "Nothing Derogatory. Adequate investigation, including check of appropriate confidential files, has been completed. The investigation disclosed no reason to question the loyalty or character of the subject." The notation was made by the office of the Director of Security and Intelligence, War Department General Staff, on 9 January 1946.[249]

The subject, a government employee since 1939, had appeared before a special hearing on 7 July 1943 to answer questions on her membership in the Washington Bookshop Association, a group listed by U.S. Attorney General as subversive. The subject had claimed she had attended one meeting of the organization and paid a dollar in dues, but otherwise had not been an active participant.[250]

248 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of the CIS," Vol IX of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Chap IX, pp 127-129, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

249 Personnel Security Questionnaire (WDAGO Form No. 19-105, 7 Oct 1944) dtd 19 Nov 1945, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

250 Fourth United States Civil Service Region, Investigations Division, Rpt of Partial Interview and Special Hearing, dtd 7 Jul 1943, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

Although the clearance of the subject for sensitive duties with the Department of the Army was approved on 9 January 1946, she had begun working as a research expert for the SCAP Government Section in November 1945. She was transferred to the Policy and Planning Unit of Civil Information and Education on 8 April 1946. On 3 July 1946, CIC initiated an investigation that brought this woman under suspicion.[251]

Leak to Press From Government Section Investigated

In the 3 July 1946 edition of the Christian Science Monitor there appeared an article under the by-line of the paper's chief Far East correspondent headlined: "Democracy Levied On Japan After Own Fumblings by Tokyo." The article asserted that the new Japanese constitution had been "prepared by the Government Section of the Allied Headquarters and imposed upon a reluctant Japanese government" and "through skillful manipulation of the Japanese press it was made to appear that the initiative ...had come from within the ...Imperial Palace."

To lend credence to statements such as these, the Monitor quoted a speech made at a closed planning session by the Government Section's chief, Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney. The disclosure of the contents of this speech and, more particularly, the general policy of the Government Section, was considered to constitute an unauthorized release of classified information - a violation of AR 380-5.

Who Was There?

From the executive officer of the Government Section, Lt. Col. H. E. Robison, CIC obtained a list of the 22 persons attending General Whitney's closed planning session. It was felt anyone able to provide the Monitor with the information which was printed must have attended that meeting. Colonel Robison further added that the article did not include the complete story of the drafting of the constitution, being concerned only with the initial stages. This led the colonel to conclude the information was supplied to the Monitor by someone who had left the group working on the draft prior to its completion.

Colonel Robison noted that a woman, employed as a local government analyst by the Government Section and in attendance at the meeting described by the Monitor, had been transferred at her own request to the Civil Information and Education Section on 7 April 1946, a date prior to the completion of the constitution's draft. The woman was known to be interested in labor problems and had often given her view on labor to the press although such matters were outside her

251 GHQ, AFPAC, Opns Div, CIS, G2, Memo for Info CI&E Section, GHQ, 23 Sep 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

official field. Persons in Colonel Robison's office were able to tell CIC that the woman had been seen at lunch with the Monitor correspondent.

Interview Woman's Boss at CI and E

CIC contacted Lt. Col. D. R. Nugent, Chief of the Civil Information and Educatio. Section, in an attempt to gain information on the woman, now a subject of CIC investigation. Colonel Nugent remembered the woman had been recommended to his section by the former chief of the Planning Division, Civil Information and Education. This man has since returned to the United States after a security check revealed he was of questionable loyalty. In regard to the subject, Nugent felt she tended to talk to the press without authorization on matters which were not connected directly with her work. The woman was cited as being of leftist tendencies, and the colonel felt she was slanting some of her material in that direction.

CIC requested Colonel Nugent to ascertain discreetly from employees in his section the extent of the subject's association with the Monitor correspondent and the identification of her most frequent social contacts. To further glean information on the woman's activities, CIC enlisted the aid of trusted female employees of the Civil Intelligence Section who resided in the same billet as the subject. CIC sent a radiogram to the FBI in Washington requesting a file check on the subject.[252]

Further CIC investigation in Japan revealed the subject had listed among her references for employment in Far East Command a of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.[254] the prime figure of a highly controversial CIC investigation in occupied Germany, later defected to the Soviets.[255]

252 CIC Area 25, 441st CIC Det, Summary of Info, Subj: Info Leak to the "Christian Science Monitor," 26 Jul 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

253 United States Dept of Justice, FBI, Tokyo, Japan, Re: Government Sec, Unauthorized Disclosure of Info, 23 Aug 1946, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

254 GHQ, AFPAC, Opns Div, CIS, G2, Memo for Info CI&E Section, GHQ, 23 Sep 1946, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

255 See Chapter on the Opns of CIC in The Occupation of Germany, this series.

Subject's Translator Believed a Communist

The subject's place of employment in Far East Command changed for a third time in December 1946 when she was transferred to the Research and Statistics Division of the SCAP Economic and Scientific Section. Among her close associates after her transfer to this job was a Japanese national, employed as her personal translator and advisor during field trips. On several occasions these two had met socially during off duty hours. The Japanese national was closely connected with the JCP and was known to pay frequent visits to Communist Party Headquarters, entering the building without being challenged by the guards on duty. He was known to be in close contact with both American and Japanese individuals under investigation by CIC for Communist sympathies.[256]

Subsequently, the subject's Japanese interpreter was released from his job for security reasons. He promptly obtained employment with the Tokyo Branch of the Tass News Agency.

Subject Linked With Many Others Under Investigation

Reports from informants and a series of surveillances by CIC linked the subject with many other Department of the Army employees in the Far East suspected of Communist sympathies.[257] An FBI full field report from the United States indicated contacts with a galaxy of Communist sympathizers had preceded her assignment to the Far East.[258]

On 16 February 1950, the Committee on Loyalty Investigations of Civilian Personnel met to consider the case. A review of CIC and FBI reports led the committee to conclude that "Subject's association with Communists, her affiliation with Communist front organizations and the fact that she was strongly suspected of being responsible for divulging confidential information to a newspaper correspondent, constitute Subject as a security risk in the Far East Command, and above facts can be construed as disloyal."[259]

256 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, Summary of Info 11 Dec 1947, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

257 Rpt of Investigation (WD Form 342, 1 Jun 1947) Investigation Made by: Tokyo-Kanagawa Area; Control Office: 441st CIC Det; date submitted: 27 Jul 1949; (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039); and Ltr from Investigation Sec, 441st CIC Det to Dir, FBI, 23 Nov 49 (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

258 Personnel Opns Br, Dept of Army, 7 Oct 1949, To: G2 FEC, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039). This letter covered the transmittal of the report of full field investigation of the Subj by the FBI.

259 GHQ, FEC, Subj: Action of Committee on Loyalty Investigations of Civilian Personnel, Thru: AC/S, G1, To: Commander-in-Chief, FEC, 21 Mar 1950, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

On 15 August 1950, before action was taken on this case, the subject departed by plane to the Zone of the Interior. Her Intelligence Field File was transmitted to the Fifth Army CIC since the subject's listed forwarding address was in [260]

Some Evidence That Investigation Had Been Compromised

This investigation - like so many of its type - could not produce legal proof of Communist affiliations. Yet there were significant enough indications of Communist belief uncovered to warrant continued investigation of the subject.

Unfortunately this case - again like so many others of its type - was compromised in spite of efforts to handle discreetly the inquiry into the subject's background. The modus operandi for the investigation-surveillance, the establishment of an informant net among trusted persons who would be able easily to associate with the subject, and the questioning of the subject's superiors - was such that the dangers of compromise were high.

Two reports reflect the compromise of this investigation. A document dealing with one of the male associates of the subject stated this man had told a CIC informant he was aware of the "Red baiting" investigation being conducted on the subject.[261] Just prior to the subject's leaving Japan, another informant reported a conversation in which the woman indicated she knew of at least one person in the United States who had been questioned about her activities. Furthermore, she had been told by a Nisei friend of CIC's surveillance and later had been able to identify the jeep following her.[262]

Postlude: A Screeching Halt

On 25 June 1950, the North Korea Communist Forces invaded the Republic of Korea. With that blow, the Far East Command underwent an immediate and drastic change and CIC was no exception. The period of peacetime operations in Japan had come to a halt.

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260 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, To: AC/S, G2, Fifth Army, Chicago, Ill., 29 Sep 1950, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

261 Ltr from Investigations Sec of the 441st CIC Det to Dir, FBI, Washington, D.C., 23 Nov1949, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

262 Written statement of G2, 6 Jul 1950, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac X5155039).

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Appendix 1

THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTION OF "OPERATION BLACKLIST"[263]

263 GHQ, FEC, MI Sec, Gen Staff, "Opns of CIC in SWPA," Vol VIII of "Opns of the Intel Service in the SPA," Appendix 22, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac)

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Operation Blacklist:

1. The surrender of Japan or substantial part thereof will alter the general mission of Counter Intelligence operations. In addition to insuring military security by denying information to the enemy, Counter Intelligence personnel will be confronted with the problem of suppression of organizations, individuals and movements whose existence and continued activities are considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan. The nationwide character of organizations and movements within this category, and the dislocation of population which may precede our occupation will necessitate coordination and control of Counter Intelligence activities by General Headquarters, USAFPAC.

2. Personality Cards containing names of persons constituting a menace to Allied security should be compiled from Counter Intelligence files, to be supplied to Armies. Counter Intelligence staffs in the field will seek out and arrest all persons in Annexes A, as qualified thereafter by CinC AFPAC, especially members of the KEMPEI TAI, TOKUMU KIKAN, KOKURYU KAI, NISSHO and other extremist societies; see also Section 1, paragraph 4.

3. Internment camps, for apprehended persons, will be established in accordance with local requirements; the Intelligence control remains the responsibility of Intelligence staffs, to be allocated for this purpose by Commanders; armies will provide for interrogation facilities at Internment camps, as necessary; further particulars regarding interrogations are in Section VI.

4. Lists of Headquarters of KEMPEI TAI, TIKUMU KIKAN, the KOKURYU KAI and other extremist societies are being supplied to Armies, covering towns and districts on their axis of advance. Commanders will arrange for seizure of such premises. All persons found therein will be detained pending the arrival of Counter Intelligence Officers. All documents will be seized and preserved for expert-examination. (See Section V; also Annex A of this Section).

Elimination of Extremist Societies and Prevention of Their Rebirth:

5. The KEMPEI TAI, TIKUMU, KIKAN, the KOKURYU KAI, other extremist societies such as NISSHO, and all affiliates will be dissolved. See Annex A and B, this section.

Disposal of the Japanese General Staff:

6. G2 GHQ will collect lists of all officers of the General Staff, to be furnished Naval Commanders, Armies and Air Staffs for coordinated action.

7. GHQ AFPAC will be responsible for the control and disposition of Japanese Imperial Headquarters. Army Commanders are charged with the control and disposition of subordinate headquarters and echelons of command within their respective areas of responsibility. Certain elements of these headquarters and echelons of command will be retained in being for the period necessary to disarm and demobilize the Armed Forces of Japan.

8. All General Staff Officers who have not been taken into custody as Prisoners of War, Officers who have adverse records, or are on Counter Intelligence Personality Cards, or listed as War Criminals, and any officer who is regarded as potentially dangerous, will be detained. In cases of officers functioning in headquarters temporarily retained in being as outlined above, they will retain such liberties as are essential to performance of their assigned duties, subject to surveillance arranged by Counter Intelligence in consultation with military authorities concerned.

Prevention of Japanese Espionage, Sabotage, and Subversive Activities:

9. Normal Counter Intelligence activities against enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be continued vigorously and intensive education programs will be instituted to alert the troops to the vigilance necessary while present in enemy territory. The employment by Japanese or foreign nationals for espionage must be balanced by an adequate counterespionage service coordinated with the theater G-2 on matters of theater level interest.

Responsibilities of GHQ, AFPAC:

10. This Headquarters will be responsible for the following:

(i) Direction of Counter Intelligence policy in Japan.

(ii) The supply of all necessary Counter Intelligence information. In order to discharge this function, Counter Intelligence will undertake the maintenance of a Central Card Index of suspect personalities. It will also maintain a central record of all persons arrested and their locations.

(iii) Establishment of a policy regarding disposal of arrested suspects.

(iv) The setting up of a joint C.I. and O.I. organization for interrogations. For particulars, see Section VI.

(v) Technical research on sabotage and advice concerning preventative measures.

(vi) Coordination of Counterespionage on Theater level.

Responsibilities of Armies:

11. Armies will be responsible for the following:

(i) Measures to implement the policy of GHQ.

(ii) Execution of Counter Intelligence measures in their respective areas.

(iii) Build-up and organization of Army and Corps (District) C.I. Staffs.

(iv) Organization of central registry and record system.

(v) Coordination of the interchange of information between subordinate units.

(vi) Report to GHQ.

Navy and Air:

12. For particulars of Naval and Air Counter Intelligence, see Section VII and VIII respectively. These staffs will work in close cooperation with Army C.I. staffs.

Lists of Arrested Persons:

13. It will be necessary for a record of all persons arrested and their locations to be held centrally, so that immediate information is available to ascertain whether a suspect has already been arrested and where he is held.

ANNEX "A" SECTION X:

1. When the American Forces occupy Japan it will be necessary to arrest and detain a considerable number of persons in order to achieve the two main objects of safeguarding the security of the American Forces and accomplishing the destruction of Japanese organizations.

2. In addition to the Black List, the following categories of suspects will also be arrested and detained: (See Notes Below)

*a. Imperial Household

b. Supreme Military Council: All personnel

*c. Privy Council

*d. Cabinet Ministers

*e. Vice Ministers

*f. Regional Superintendents - General of the 8 Administrative Districts

**g. General Staff (Army and Navy)

**h. Staffs of Military Districts in occupied countries and territories (Army and Navy)

i. Staff of Staff College (Army and Navy)

j. Staffs of Military and Naval Academy

k. Staffs of Training Establishments (Army and Navy)

l. Kempei Tai

m. Tokumu Kikan (Army and Navy)

n. Koku Sui-to (Extreme Nationalist Party)

o. CHIZAKURA (Connected with Manchuria)

p. Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society)

q. NISSHO and other extremist or terrorist societies.

r. Administrative Officials of the TEIKOKU ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imp. Reserve Assn.)

s. Administrative Officials of SOTEI DAN (Union of Able-Bodied Men)

t. Administrative Officials of SEINEN DAN (Young Men's Assn.)

*Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives on Military Government, to be issued.

**Subject to such limitations and detailed instructions as are specified in directives covering disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, to be issued.

ANNEX "B" SECTION X:

Offices and organizations which will be disbanded and cease to function at once, and in the case of which no problem of the disarmament and disbandment of para-military formations arises. Dissolution must cover all branch offices.

1. Political Association of Greater Japan (DAI NIPPON SEIJI KAI).

This association extends through Regional Prefectural and City or County levels down to District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations. For the purposes of Military Government by means of Hoko it may be desirable to preserve the lower levels of the above organizations such as the District Group or City Ward Branches and Neighborhood Associations.

a. Political Affairs Committee.

b. Headquarters, sub-divided into the following sections.

(1) Propaganda and enlightenment.

(2) National Defense.

(3) Civilian Life.

(4) Increased production.

(5) Youth movement.

(6) Party organization section.

(7) House of Representatives Section.

2. Nation-Wide Associations.

a. Combat Corps.

b. People's Volunteer Corps.

c. Student Corps (GAKU DO TAI) succeeds Young Men's Association (SEINEN DAN).

d. Industrial Patriotic Service Association.

e. Agricultural Patriotic Service Association.

f. Patriotic Service Corps.

g. Mechanized National Defense Association.

h. Maritime Transportation Total Superintendence Section (with control offices at Kobe, Niigata, Fushiki, Tsuruga, Funakawa).

i. Shipping Management Association.

3. Organizations of Scientists.

a. Technical Board.

b. Japanese Technical Board.

c. Science Mobilization Association.

d. All-Japan Science League.

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ARMY Ft Holabird

BOX NUMBER: 110

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXIX

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US ARMY

POST-WAR CIC OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC ISLANDS AND THE CARIBBEAN
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* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

[redacted]

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Part I: Operations in the Philippine Islands

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Part I

OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

In the summer of 1945, when the last Japanese gun was silenced in the Philippine Islands, General MacArthur's promise to return had been fulfilled. Long after the fighting had ended, American troops remained on the islands - first to prepare for operations in Okinawa and Japan, and then to act as a protective force.

When the war in the Pacific came to an abrupt halt with the capitulation of the Japanese Empire, the Philippines were "home" to 74 CIC units, all operating under the 441st CIC Detachment.[1] The majority of these units were moved into Japan with the 441st Headquarters in the weeks immediately following the surrender. On 14 November 1945, counterintelligence in the Philippines was coordinated under the First CIC Region of the 441st CIC Detachment.[2]

Jurisdictional Boundaries Established

Under a Memorandum establishing jurisdictional boundaries, issued by 441st Headquarters in Tokyo on 27 August 1945, CIC activities were greatly curtailed after "official VJ Day," the date of the signing of the armistice with Japan. Under this directive, Memorandum 31, CIC was to cease investigation of wartime collaborators and turn over all records to the Department of Justice of the Philippines Commonwealth Government. After that date, CIC would not even be permitted to make record checks in regard to collaborators at Commonwealth agencies.[3]

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1 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," plate #1, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

2 "Counterintelligence Corps in Philippines and Okinawa," booklet prepared by the 1135th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

3 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume VIII of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Appendix 36 (GHQ, AFPAC, 441st CIC Detachment, Memorandum Nr 31, "CIC Activities in the Philippine Islands After VJ Day," 27 August 1945, Unclassified, /s/ Jennis R. Galloway, Lt Col, Commanding), (Central Records Facility).

Beginning on 2 September 1945, CIC relinquished reports on a grand total of 6,047 proven or suspected collaborators.[4] About half the persons covered in these documents were already under lock and key.[5]

Investigation of U.S. Army personnel and the security of U.S. military installations remained CIC's responsibility. Espionage investigations under CIC jurisdiction were limited to those involving civilian or military personnel violating the Articles of War.[6] Cases of civilians violating espionage statutes of the Philippines or the United States Penal Code were not CIC's concern.

In addition to maintaining military security, First Region was to "keep appraised of the local situation." The memorandum stated: "CIC detachment commanders will remain cognizant of developments in their respective areas. Activities of organizations and political developments which may physically endanger the remaining American force in the Philippine Islands will be noted and immediately reported to this headquarters. It is to be noted that information in this connection will be discreetly obtained through the use of trusted informants in all possible cases."[7]

CIC Continues Several Collaborationist Cases

Up to the end of 1945, First Region's main activity involved the transfer of collaborationist cases to the Commonwealth authorities. In a few important investigations, CIC continued to probe for evidence, aiding local agencies in an attempt to bring the cases to a successful conclusion.

One of the cases that CIC continued to investigate involved [redacted] a Philippine citizen, frequently named as a prominent economic collaborator in the war years. Even while the Americans were still liberating Manila, allegations

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4 "Counter Intelligence Corps in Philippines and Okinawa," booklet prepared by the 1135th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

5 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Chapter IX, p. 102, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

6 The Articles of War cover "any person...acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters or encampments of any of the armies of the United States."

7 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume VIII of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Appendix 36 (GHQ, AFPAC, 441st CIC Detachment, Memorandum Nr 31, "CIC Activities in the Philippine Islands After VJ Day," 27 August 1945, Unclassified, /s/ Jennis R. Galloway, Lt Col, Commanding), (Central Records Facility).

and accusations concerning sifted into CIC. was accused of making millions in Japanese occupation currency ("Mickey Mouse" money) through the sale of automobiles and automotive parts to the Japanese. Most sources claimed he invested heavily in real estate with these profits. There were several allegations that had supplied Filipino laborers to the Japanese.

The investigation in its initial stages looked simple enough. Accusations against were so extremely easy to obtain that CIC expected no difficulty in getting evidence for conviction. When it came to a show-down, however, CIC ran into a general reluctance among Filipinos to testify against the suspect.

CIC's interrogation of produced an admission that he had indeed grown wealthy during the Japanese regime. He admitted investing in real estate and jewels with his profits. claimed, however, that he frequently contributed large sums to the support of those who had been maltreated and imprisoned by the invaders.

The agents investigating were forced to set up an informant network and to employ several undercover agents to seek confirmed information. These operations eventually uncovered several persons willing to testify against .

It was confirmed that openly expressed pro-German sentiments during the war, going as far as to display a swastika flag on his automobile. Unconfirmed allegations accused him of claiming German citizenship and of planning to return to the Reich. had been allowed to license his automobile, a privilege accorded only those who strongly endorsed the invaders. Former employees of were checked and interrogated. The great majority had been ardent Nazi sympathizers and outspoken in their opposition to America during the war years.

One informant emphatically insisted that had been one of the first merchants in the Islands to come forth and offer to sell to the invaders. A check of financial assets at the Philippines Trust Company in Manila showed the suspect had managed to accumulate 17 property titles, 45 stock certificates and a considerable amount of cash.

While many of fellow Philippine citizens had also traded heavily with the Japanese, one important distinction was established. While most merchants had donated much of their profits to the guerillas, in spite of his claims to the contrary, had clearly kept all of his loot for himself.

Several months after VJ Day, CIC had collected enough affidavits confirming the original allegations to turn the case over to local authorities for prosecution.

was found guilty of treason by the People's Court of the Philippine Republic and sentenced to a lengthy prison term.[8]

Information Transmitted to Commonwealth in Unevaluated Form

Unfortunately, few of the collaborationist cases were completed in the same manner as the case. The files that CIC gave the Filipino government contained a preponderance of unsubstantiated allegations, gossip, rumors and even malicious political intrigue. Mountains of information had been gathered, but there had not been enough time to evaluate or substantiate most of it. Some of the reports concerned persons who were to reach powerful government positions and command financial prestige in the Commonwealth. The release of the information to the Philippines government in an unevaluated form was unfortunate and in subsequent months led to several embarassing incidents for CIC.[9]

1135th CIC Detachment Activated

Until early 1946, CIC operations in the Philippines were closely directed by the 441st CIC Detachment Headquarters in Tokyo. On 23 January 1946, First CIC Region was disbanded, and counterintelligence in the islands became the responsibility of the newly activated 1135th CIC Detachment. The CIC redesignation was part of a general military reorganization in the Far East, where the Army had operated in the first months after the war as one command, United States Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC). In January the Army command in the Philippines was designated United States Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC). In March the Ryukus Islands were added to the command. Ultimate control of AFWESPAC rested with AFPAC which remained the supreme command in the Far East.[10]

Just as Army operations in the Philippines under AFWESPAC were freed from complete control from AFPAC, so the 1135th CIC Detachment, although subject to some supervision from the 441st, operated more independently than had the old First CIC Region.[11]

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8 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Chapter IX, Selected CIC Investigations, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

9 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Philippine Islands, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

10 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Philippine Islands, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

11 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

In January 1947, AFWESPAC was renamed the Philippine-Ryukyu (PGILRYCOM).[12]

With the establishment of the 1135th CIC Detachment, the number of CIC offices in the Commonwealth was greatly decreased. In addition to the Manila Headquarters, offices operated on Luzon at Baguio, Tarlac, Cabanatuan and San Fernando. Elsewhere, CIC offices were maintained at Cebu City on Cebu; Iloilo on Panay; and Davao, Zamboanga and Iligan on Mindanao.

The great distances involved made communications a major problem. CIC had the use of a C45 plane for four days a week to make a round trip to the various offices. The 1135th also utilized a QS6 boat for monthly supply runs to agents at Cebu and Zamboanga. An FS17 boat stationed at Zamboanga serviced the Davao and Iligan offices.

A Table of Organization drawn up at the time the 1135th was activated provided for 24 officers, 22 warrant officers and 58 enlisted men. In contrast to these 104 spaces, actual strength of the detachment was 51 officers and men.[13]

1135th has Eight Different Commanders

During its three years of operation, the 1135th CIC Detachment had eight different commanders.

At its inception, the detachment was commanded by Lt Col Carl E. Winkler. On 11 February 1946, 1st Lt Malcolm P. Youker assumed command. With the discharge of Lieutenant Youker on 15 May 1946, 1st Lt Peter K. Waering and 1st Lt Richard A. Holman each commanded the detachment for several weeks with Capt William F. Lorenz taking over on 11 June. The detachment's sixth commander for 1946, Lt Col Ronald E. Hobbs, assumed the position on 2 October.

The next command charge was on 13 August 1947, when Capt Arthur Litton replaced Colonel Hobbs. Capt Clifford L. Sawyer relieved Captain Litton on 13 March 1948.[14]

Mission Falls into Two Categories

The operational mission of the 1135th CIC Detachment was divided into two broad categories as originally outlined for First CIC Region in Memorandum 31

12 Historical Data Card, 1135th CIC Detachment, Unclassified.

13 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

14 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, "Annual General Inspection Questionnaire," 20 April 1948, Incl #2, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Record Center, BX45845).

from the 441st. Like detachments all over the world, the 1135th was entrusted with maintaining the security of the Army Establishment. The usual CIC activities, probing for disaffection within the Army and espionage against the Army, and conducting security surveys and clearance investigations, comprised most of the cases in this general category.

The second broad classification of CIC operations involved "keeping appraised of the local situation" - reporting information on the political, social and economic situation in the Philippines. This part of the mission made the 1135th, in its own words, the "listening post of the Occupation." Although AFWESPAC authorities were not permitted to take action on whatever information CIC dredged up, it was still essential they be informed of developments in the Commonwealth. The great bulk of CIC reports were devoted to fulfilling this second mission.[15]

Average 200 to 300 Clearance Investigations Per Month

The greatest number of cases in the first general category were security clearance investigations. During 1946, the 1135th CIC Detachment was concerned with from 200 to 300 such cases each month, closing an average of 90 monthly. Cases of disaffection averaged around 20, but most of these were pending from month to month. Throughout the year, the 1135th rarely had more than five espionage cases under investigation at one time.[16]

Demobilization Movement Among GIs Claims CIC Attention

A strong movement among U.S. military personnel urging rapid and immediate demobilization claimed much of the 1135th's attention in the first months of 1946.

First hints of trouble came when an advertisement purporting to be the voice of ten thousand GIs stationed near Batangas on Luzon appeared in 15 newspapers in the United States during January 1946. The advertisement vigorously protested the slow demobilization of American troops. In part it read, "There is no military necessity for the maintainance of hundreds and thousands of troops in nonhostile areas such as the Philippines, Australia, Guam, Saipan, and countless others."

Shortly after this advertisement appeared in the newspapers in the United States, U.S. soldiers staged a mass demonstration in Manila "which caused the

15 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

16 These statistics on average monthly case loads are drawn from "Summary of Investigations" tables of the 1135th CIC Detachment. These tables are found in the detachment's "Monthly Reports" for the months January 1946 through November 1946. (Central Records Facility).

U.S. Army much embarrassment and the United States to lose some of the respect it had enjoyed in the Philippines."

CIC agents were dispatched to circulate through the crowd and determine the identity of the ring leaders. One of the more prominent of the instigators was a sergeant from Sub Base "R" in Batangas. The agents on the scene reported that this sergeant exhibited "tendencies toward radicalism and Communism."

Agents were immediately dispatched to Sub Base "R" where they learned from interviews that the sergeant had been directly responsible for the advertisement as well as the incitement of the personnel of the installation.

Radiograms to the Zone of the Interior for information on the sergeant were answered with the news that he had been a CIO organizer and the president of a United Automobile Workers local, prior to entry into the Army. He had been a member of the Proletariat Party and the Proletariat Youth League during the early 1930s, and had reportedly joined the Socialist Party.

Interviews with the soldiers and officers who had served with the sergeant indicated he had always been an excellent soldier, performing his duties in a superior manner. There had never been any hints that he was a potential trouble maker. One of the interviewees felt the sergeant might be a Socialist, but no one doubted his loyalty to the United States.

In the belief that transferring the sergeant out of the Philippines might lessen the movement for rapid demobilization, he was sent to Okinawa and appropriate notation made in his Intelligence Field File to limit his future Army assignments to those of a nonsensative nature.[17]

under CIC Scrutiny

Another important case dealing with disaffection and possible subversion within the Army Establishment involved the "communistically inclined"[18] CIC agents attended this organization's meetings in Manila and reported in detail all proceedings. On one level this group was a sounding-board for soldiers' gripes particularly about discharge regulations; but the meetings usually went outside this province and dabbled in world affairs. The

17 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Selected CIC Investigations, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

18 Hqs, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Office of the AC of S, G2, To: AC of S, G2, Sixth Army, 17 December 1947, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

organization went on record as favoring immediate withdrawal of the U.S. Army from China and the sending of UNRRA supplies to Northern (Communist-held) China.[19] Speakers at the group's meetings dubbed United States pre-war policy in the Philippines "imperialistic" and criticized the Army for "sentencing no collaborators."[20]

In July 1946, the took an important step toward becoming a Communist mouthpiece when they began planning an official publication, ' Angered over the censorship policies of the "Daily Pacifican," the Army newspaper for Philippines personnel, the soldiers took matters into their own hands. Their first step was the hiring of a civilian to edit their newspaper. This civilian was also appointed Chairman of the Membership Committee of the Manila Chapter and became a frequent speaker on current events at the organization's meetings. His statement at the 15 August session that the United States always managed to do the wrong thing when problems appeared is typical of his ravings.[21]

The first issue of the "Bulletin" contained an editorial condemming AFWESPAC's censoring of the "Daily Pacifican." It was charged that: "News on demobilization, on constructive criticism of Army policies, on fundamental questions of American policy in the Philippines, and on the reasons for maintaining so large a force of American troops in the Philippines was almost totally eliminated."[22]

A Letter From the Editor

The editor and recruiter was already well represented in the 1135th's files when on 10 September 1946, he dashed off a letter to CIC, requesting information on four women who were seeking to work as traveling representatives of the editor's import-export firm.[23] CIC politely

19 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject: dtd 9 August 1946, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

20 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject: dtd 16 August 1946, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

21 Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Summary Report Re: From: AC of S, G2, PHILRYCOM, Dates of Investigation: 7 August 1946-12 February 1947, dtd 15 December 1947, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

22 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Summary of Information, Subject: 2 October 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

23 Ltr from and Company to CIC, Manila, 10 September 1946, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

replied that they were not authorized to provide information to private citizens.[24]

A records check on the four women turned up indications that at least one was an ardent Communist.

Meanwhile the Military Intelligence Division in the Pentagon had been digging into the past of the editor's wife; their Summary of Information, dated 31 October 1946, stated she carried a Communist Party membership card. Sometime between 22 November and 1 December 1946, the editor headed back to the United States via Hong Kong and Shanghai. Reports of CIC's investigation were forwarded to the proper agency in the states. His comments and speeches at Committee meetings, and his wife's Communist Party membership constituted the most significant of the facts transmitted by CIC.[25]

Meanwhile, the influence of the had faded. At the session, with the scheduled to speak, seven persons were present in the auditorium. Two GIs, the editor, two Filipinos, an unidentified woman, and CIC's representative attended.[26]

Explosions Rock Depots in Batangas

Early in the afternoon of 14 February 1949, a muffled roar, accompanied by a series of lesser explosions rocked the 13th Air Ammunition Depot and the Sub Base "R" Engineer Depot at Batangas. Immediate efforts succeeded in keeping the resultant fire from spreading and personnel of the depots returned to their normal routines.

Then at 1400 hours, an electric current seemed to charge the atmosphere: buildings rocked, windows shattered, the ground shook, and a gust of wind swept through the area like a practicing midget typhoon. Then there was a great roar. A huge black cloud rolled up over Sub Base "R". One of the depot's 26 magazines, containing 28 tons of dynamite, had exploded.

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24 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Ltr to 12 September 1946, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

25 Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Summary Report Re: From: AC of S, G2, PHILRYCOM, Dates of Investigation: 7 August 1946 - 12 February 1947, dtd 15 December 1947, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

26 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject: dtd 7 September 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

The two installations, covering several square miles, contained a vast amount of weapons, engineer equipment, and explosives, once slated to be used for an invasion of Japan. Now the explosives were waging a war of their own.

When 1135th CIC Detachment Headquarters learned of the explosions, two agents were dispatched to the scene, equipped with Speed Graphic Cameras and with M-209 Convertors for communication with the home office.

Upon first inquiry, no one was able to supply a complete picture of what had happened. The agents were still conducting their initial survey of the situation when an alarm alerted the depots, and another revetment spewed incendiaries, rockets, cans of napalm, antiaircraft shells and sheet metal into the air. Small fires began to threaten other dumps. Realizing that they alone could not investigate the catastrophe, the two agents, put in a call for reinforcements. Soon the 1135th's Assistant Investigations Officer and several other agents appeared on the scene.

While the area was still threatened by small fires, CIC deployed to determine the cause of the explosions. A Filipino agent was instructed to go under cover in the city of Batangas and the neighboring Barrios to determine if any members of the Communist-inspired Hukbalahaps (Army of the Country Against the Japanese) had been seen in the area recently. Another agent talked with residents of the city to learn what they knew of the explosions and seek possible motives for sabotage. The mayors, police chiefs, detectives and civil officials of Batangas and nearby Bauan were contacted. Two agents circulated through the bars and cafes of Batangas hoping to overhear conversations which might give clues on the case.

Looting of Explosives by Filipinos Common

From police officials CIC learned that looting of the depots by the natives was an everday occurance. Filipinos, who wanted only the shell cases to sell to Chinese merchants, had developed the practice of dumping highly inflammable powder from the shells within a dangerous proximity of the ammunition and explosive magazines. TNT and dynamite caps had been stolen in profusion by Filipino fishermen. The police officials pleaded that they had been powerless to halt the looting.

While agents circulating in the town decided the Hukbalahaps were not involved, CIC at the scene of the explosions learned that depot personnel and guards had been collaborating with those natives stealing and black marketing explosives and ammunition. It was considered possible that the fires had been started to destroy evidence of the pilfering.

To CIC, it looked as if efforts had been made to make the looting easier. The various revetments, magazines, and dumps were in a horrible state of

disrepair and many were never guarded. Thick bushes provided natural cover, and the close proximity of native houses made pilfering a simple matter.

Guard Makes Three Mile Run to Report Fire

Interviews with 13th Air Ammunition personnel brought to light another shocking factor. The fire which touched off the stack of bombs causing the first explosion had been discovered by a guard soon after it started. For lack of immediate communication of any sort, the guard had been forced to run three miles to report the fire. By the time the fire truck had arrived, the revetment containing the bombs was already in flames. The firemen sprayed water on the blaze until their supply ran out, and before they returned with more water, the blaze was out of hand.

Agents also discovered fires had been started in the past as a ruse to draw guards to one section of the depot while natives pilfered another section.

CIC and Ordnance Inspectors Review Scene

When the initial furor had passed, an inspection was made of the facilities by an AFWESPAC Ordnance inspector, an Ordnance explosives expert, and one of the CIC agents. It was recorded that 25 of the 26 magazines were open storage sites protected only by barbed wire enclosures. A well-worn path, utilized by looting natives, led to the rear of nearly all the magazines.

Looters had scattered loose blocks of nitro starch and TNT within the magazines' perimeters. The inspectors learned that a month before the explosions, some 60 tons of dynamite had been declared unserviceable but comparatively little had been removed for destruction. Instead it had been allowed to simmer in the sun, exuding the deadly sweat of nitroglycerine.

The inspectors noted that fire brakes around the magazines were nonexistant. The fire-fighting apparatus of the depots was found most inadequate. One of the two fire trucks had been totally inoperative on the day of the explosion. Had it been able to spell the other truck, there would have been a chance of extinguishing the fire before the initial explosion.

It was decided that negligence rather than deliberate sabotage was the most likely cause for the explosions.

CIC and Ordnance inspectors made their report to the Commanding Officer of Sub Base "R". It was recommended that fire brakes be constructed around each magazine, shelters erected over the magazines to protect them from the sun,

and dunnage used between layers of boxes of explosives. It was recommended that the munitions be moved to a more isolated region, or that the area around the depot be evacuated of Filipinos.

The military and civilian personnel responsible for the negligence and those involved in blackmarketing were replaced. Defective ammunition and explosives were destroyed. Serviceable material was stocked in new magazines with adequate security as well as fire and weather protective measures.[27]

CIC Hunts Sources of Rumors and Slander About the Army

A minor part of CIC's mission of maintaining the security of the military involved tracking down the source of rumors and slanderous statements about the U.S. Army.

Rumors were likely to concern troop movements. In April 1946, agents in Davao and Zamboanga hunted down the source of a rumor that 20,000 American troops were being moved into the Del Monte area. CIC traced the rumor to several wholesalers who apparently hoped to ignite a business boom. The fact that local businessmen were eagerly awaiting this influx of troops indicated the rumor had accomplished its mission.[28]

Slanderous statements about Army policy printed in local publications were reported to AFWESPAC authorities. A typical article attracting CIC attention involved charge in the Manila Courier that AFWESPAC was discriminating against Filipinos in policies applying to civilian employees. The article declared, "AFWESPAC is sabotaging American-Filipino friendship born on the battlefields of World War II."[29]

CIC: The Listening Post of AFWESPAC

The 1135th's major activity, the one that earned it the accolade, "The listening post of AFWESPAC," centered around coverage of the Commonwealth's political-

27 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the Southwest Pacific Area," Selected CIC Investigations, Case Nr 27, "The 13th Air Ammunition Explosion-Sabotage or Arson?," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

28 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 4, 1 April 1946 to 30 April 1946, dtd 14 May 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

29 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 6, 1 June 1946 to 30 June 1946, dtd 18 July 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

situation, developments in the field of economics, and activities of subversive elements in the indigenous population.

In collecting data on developments within the Philippines, the 1135th relied heavily upon informants. Throughout 1946, CIC policy was to seek information from open sources. Attempts were made to contact persons from all walks of life, people "representative of all segments of society and public opinion." The detachment's aim was "to record the events of the day from an impartial and 'panoramic' viewpoint," a tall order in view of the confusing political tangle of the Commonwealth after the war.

Informants of the undercover variety were utilized in two areas. In Central Luzon, where the activities of the nomadic Hukbalahaps called for careful investigation, an effective net of confidential informants was maintained and guarded with great secrecy.

Confidential informant networks consisting of 500 men were maintained in Manila. In particular, the coverage of inaccessible groups like the Chinese and other foreign elements and "spy conscious radical organizations" necessitated undercover work in the capital city.[30]

Later in 1946, the 1135th began to make greater use of individual paid informants, especially in sensitive areas where the language barrier seriously hampered the work of Caucasian agents.[31]

By mid-1947, the 1135th's policy called for large scale utilization of full-time paid informants. The high cost of living in the Philippines made it possible to get reliable Filipinos to work as "uncredentialed civilian agents." These full-time informants were generally selected from the best of those who had volunteered their services for patriotic reasons.[32]

In regard to the detachment's use of informants, an agent, who served in the Philippines from December 1946 to October 1948, wrote: "Informant nets in the Philippines seemed quite successful. Nets were rather easily established even among the higher class of Filipinos. A lot of Filipinos seemed as eager to help the United States Government as they were their own. You can tell many of them

30 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 9, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

31 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 9, 1 September 1946 to 30 September 1946, dtd 14 October 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

32 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 6, 1 June 1947 to 30 June 1947, dtd 5 July 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

that you are from CIC and still get their cooperation, while there are others who have to be handled differently. Once an American establishes friendship with a Filipino, it is usually a solid affair."[33]

First Post-War Elections Observed

In the first half of 1946, a major CIC effort was directed at collecting data on campaign activity for the national elections of 23 April. The elections were being held to name a government to take office on 4 July, when the Commonwealth was to be given full independence.

CIC particularly focused on the activities of the two main rivals, President Sergio Osmena and Senate President Manuel Roxas. These two men, both allied with the Nacionalista Party, had split that organization into two factions in January. Osmena, who led the liberal faction of the Nacionalista, made news more startling than the split when he organized a coalition between his group and the militantly radical Democratic Alliance, described as a front for the Communist Party.[34]

Just before the election, the 1135th CIC Detachment compiled statistics on the frequency of particular charges and promises made by each faction. The Roxas claim that Osmena was "practicing terrorism, intimidation, and fraudulent electioneering" was by far the most frequent charge of either party. Roxas was most often accused of being both an opportunist and a collaborator. Both factions most often made the promise to raise the standard of living.

When returns were in, Roxas had won the presidency, and Osmena officially promised his support to the new administration. Not the least bit satisfied, the Democratic Alliance "pledged itself to continue its struggle against Fascist tendencies on the part of the government."[35]

In the months following the election, CIC sought public reaction to Roxas' election and to the new administration's most significant bill, the Philippines Trade Act known popularly as the Bell Act. The most controversial portion of this bill gave American citizens and U.S.-owned businesses equal right with

33 Returnee Interview of Sgt Stephenson O. Kirtpatrick, 17 January 1949, Interviewer: Captain Bagot, CIC Board, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

34 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

35 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 5, 1 May 1946 to 31 May 1946, dtd 13 June 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Filipinos to the exploitation of the island's natural resources and in the operation of public utilities. It goes without saying that the Communists sounded loud and clear against this act.[36]

Laurel Returns to Prominence

By May 1947, CIC reported a significant rise in the political activity of extreme right wing elements, spearheaded by Jose P. Laurel, the wartime puppet president of the Philippines. Laurel, although arrested as a war criminal by the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan, had been granted his freedom by General MacArthur. It was generally recognized that Laurel had cooperated with the Japanese only when it had been absolutely necessary and had otherwise worked for the benefit of his country.

Laurel's return to prominence was a matter of great concern to CIC. In 1947, it was felt he had about a three-to-one chance of landing the presidency in the 1950 election. The 1135th warned: "Should he become president, Laurel would spare no effort to rid the Philippines of every vestige of U.S. Army intelligence, with first emphasis on the CIC."[37]

Data on Reds Crucial to Command

Far more crucial to the command than information on right-wingers Osmena and Laurel, was data on the rising Communist menace. The Philippine Communists outlined their demands in a letter from Pedro Castro, General Secretary of the Communits Party, to High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt on 9 January 1946. The basic Communist demands were:

(1) Removal of the US Army from the Philippines.
(2) Independence at all costs.
(3) Removal of all US military, naval, and air bases.
(4) Rehabilitation designed to stabilize Philippine economy.
(5) Abolition of free trade with the US.
(6) Breakup of large estates.
(7) Ouster and trial of collaborationist officials.
(8) Reorganization of Osmena Cabinet to purge those of Fascist or reactionary tendencies.
(9) Remove US troops from China.

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36 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 6, 1 June 1946 to 30 June 1946, dtd 18 July 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

37 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 5, 1 May 1947-31 May 1947, dtd 6 June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Nine days later the Communist Party of the United States outlined a Philippines policy greatly similar to this in a 1,500 word article in the Daily Worker.

Action Speaks Louder than Words

But action speaks louder than words, and the Communist Party leaders had at their disposal a healthy guerilla force which acted in a highly positive manner. The Hukbalahap, known popularly as the Huks, had been organized as a Communist guerilla band in 1942 to fight the Japanese, but their wartime record showed that most of their attention was directed toward surviving as comfortably as possible. With the liberation, the Huks seized the power of government in Central Luzon, totally ignoring the existance of the Commonwealth.

The leaders of the Huks were all staunch Communists, and the chief, Luis Taruc, was on the directorate of the Philippine Communist Party. It was estimated that from 80,000 to 100,000 Huks possessed a grand total of 40,000 weapons.[38]

Responsibility for quelling the Huks went to the Philippine Army's Military Police, who began their campaign in January 1946. CIC agents were dispatched to witness and report on the attempt to subdue the bandits.[39]

In spite of the Commonwealth's continual efforts, an elusive enemy forced the Military Police into scattered small-scale conflicts. Rarely was anything approaching a battle waged.

Indicative are CIC reports for early September 1946. Only sporadic clashes were noted. Even an attempt to surround the Huk headquarters in Pampanga, the campaign involving the greatest number of men, saw the Huks suddenly vanish when it seemed the Military Police were ready for a final assault. Apparently six to seven hundred Huks had been in the area, and according to remors Supreme Commander Taruc had been among them. Although the Huks were on the defensive at this time, their nocturnal raid for supplies were still unchecked. The 1135th report for September 1946 concluded, "CIC estimate of the situation is that the

38 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), and Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, "Communism in the Philippines," dtd October 1946 with supplements dated January 1947 and June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

39 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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reticent attitude of the Huks should not be misinterpreted as a weakness since a Communist sponsored revolution will be propagated openly and secretly until the very last leader has been tracked down."[40]

Huks Lose Control of Central Luzon

By January 1947, the Philippine Army's Military Police had been successful enough for CIC to predict the Huks would be little more than remembered bandits by January 1948. But the 1135th's observers were over-optimistic. The Commonwealth's campaign did not succeed in totally wiping out the Huks. It was successful only in breaking them up into small gangs forced to move frequently to avoid extinction. However, with the Huks disorganized and on the run, the Commonwealth was able to regain control of Central Luzon.

As more and more data on the outlaws reached CIC, it became apparent that while the principal leaders were avowed Communists, the rank and file numbered only about two percent party members. Whether men joined the Huks for the easy life of a bandit, for adventure, or because of political ideology made little difference. In spite of the Huks' failure to hold the reigns of government in Central Luzon, they had succeeded in watering the seeds of agrarian strife much to the advantage of the Communists.

Communists Turn to Agitation of Labor Situation

The presence of an active Communist guerilla force in a non-Communist country must be recognized as a deviation from the usual Red efforts at subversion. When the star of the Huks dimmed, the Philippine Reds stepped up a campaign more in line with world-wide Communist tactics. Labor was made the prime target. The Reds sought to gain control of individual unions and eventually consolidate these unions into one large body. Feeling that labor was bound to rise to a dominent position once it was highly centralized, the Reds figured to rise with it. The majority of Filipino Communists, either directly or indirectly, turned their attentions to enlarging the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). CIC summarized the CLO objectives as "to organize, indoctrinate and bring into power the easily led masses of laborers who will serve the dictates of Moscow."

Shielded by the Democratic Alliance, backed up with force by the Hukbalahap, and supported by contributions from the CIO in America, the CLO had corraled fifty-four unions with a total of 80,000 members by the end of 1946. In spite of this great degree of success, CLO-instigated strikes met with general failure in 1946. The most important CLO-inspired dispute was the Manila City Laborers

40 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 9, 1 September 1946 to 30 September 1946, dtd 14 October 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Strike. The CLO managed to tie up Manila refuse collection, power, water and transportation facilities, but a failure to provide the basic needs of the strikers doomed this bit of agitation.[41]

CIC covered all labor disputes and demonstrations with a particular emphasis on indications that the CLO was involved. For example, agents and informants of the 1135th kept close tabs on the strike of the Philippines Match Factory in Manila in June 1947. Strikers from this plant were prominent in a general demonstration before the offices of the Court of Industrial Relations, a mediation group. Placards denouncing the Court as an "agent of the scabs" were carried by the mob. One of the strikers was heard by a CIC informant to say, "We can't depend on Roxas or Truman now. They are imperialists. We must call on Stalin, the real defender of democracy." The strikers of the Philippine Match Company, after three weeks away from the job, met in front of the Court of Industrial Relations to hold a plebiscite. They voted by the slim margin of nine ballots to form a union to be affiliated with the CLO and to reject the establishment of a company union. Several days later the 300 striking workers of the Philippine Refining Company, who had joined the match-makers in their placard carrying demonstration, voted by a narrow margin to throw in with the CLO.

Spurred on by the vocal element of Communists within their ranks, striking workers had done just what was desired of them. By hooking up with the CLO, the two groups, whose membership was not totally Communistic, added their weight to the Communist movement.[42]

Reds Hide Behind "Respectable" Front

The Philippine Communists were also adroit at infiltrating once-respectable political groups. Whereas the Democratic Alliance was Communist-organized from the start, the Civil Liberties Union, which by 1946 was Communist-dominated to the core, had sprung from more innocent beginnings. Organized at the inception of the Commonwealth in 1934 by a band of progressive intellectuals, the Union was pledged to the defense of the principles of the American "Bill of Rights." Dormant through the Japanese occupation, the Civil Liberties Union was revived after the liberation and immediately became a front for the Communist Party. When the Red agitator, Jesus Barrera, was elected chief, the purposes of the organization were clearly evident. To sum up the Union's position, CIC quoted a "competent observer of Philippine Communism." It was said of the organization "that though it wields but slight inherent power, its buffer potential has secured the safety of the Communist Party of the Philippines."

41 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, "Communism in the Philippines," dtd October 1946 with supplements dtd January 1947 and June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

42 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 6, 1 June 1947 to 30 June 1947, dtd 5 July 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

CIC Observes Foreign Nationals

Foreign nationals active in Communist affairs also came under CIC scrutiny. Although the number of Chinese Communists in Manila was greater, CIC saw more potential danger from the Russian colony of three hundred. The tie-up between some of these Russians and the American and Philippine Communists had been firmly established by the end of 1946, although there was some question as to whether the group was being directed from Moscow.[43]

The Russian colony was well populated with "night life" characters, and the CIC agent in charge of reporting their activities wrote in a style befitting his subjects' backgrounds. No account of the activities of the 1135th CIC Detachment would be complete without liberal quotes from the "Cholly Knickerbocker" of counterintelligence.

> "The Cozy Club continues to be the leading center for Russian hostesses in Manila. At least ten Russian girls, most of whom appear to be politically inclined when intoxicated, specialize in American customers."
>
> "The Blue Elephant night club, once the center for the Manila Russian community, has lost its last white hostess and appears to be losing money for the owners."
>
> "Vera Veronic Cohen, formerly with the Blue Elephant, has transferred to Ye Olde Mansion. Veronica is currently considering a trip to Hong Kong to secure a divorce from Jack Cohen of the El Cairo Club. The incentive for this move appears to be an American Army Ordnance captain."
>
> "Jenny Veinerman, also formerly of the Blue Elephant, tried the life at Ye Olde Mansion briefly, but soon shifted to partying around town with various groups of American officers and civilians and receiving her commission from the clubs visited by the parties. Most recently, Jenny has accepted a secretarial position in the Wilson Building which may or may not curb her nocturnal activities."[44]

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43 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, "Communism in the Philippines," dtd October 1946 with supplements dtd January 1947 and June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

44 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, Information Section, Semi-Monthly Activities Report, 16 April 1947 to 30 April 1947, dtd 3 May 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

"Vera Konvicki, Russian ex-hostess at the Cozy Club, recently moved out of the club after six years of residence with the owners, Mariana and Eugenie Morozava. Konvicki, who is reported to be the widow of an American Naval officer and appears to have an independent income, has been seen recently in the company of L. "Tex" Hunt, who will soon open a new night club and cabin camp at Tagaytay under the styling 'Hunt's Lodge'."

"Two of the stateless who freely predict an early war between the United States and Russia, recently moved to a new apartment in the though supposedly 'unemployed' at the time. Meanwhile another formerly a is announcing her coming marriage to an American lieutenant with whom she has been living for several months without benefit of clergy. makes no mention of her supposed spouse, an American now in the United States."[45]

has been identified as the former wife of espionage expert and author formerly living in Shanghai. She has also been identified as a wartime 'hostess' in a Russian bar who was well known to Japanese officer patrons as allegedly because of her nymphomaniacal tendencies."[46]

Nothing escaped the "Listening Post" !

Counterintelligence Only Secondary in

The most spectacular case handled by the 1135th CIC Detachment involved counterintelligence only as a secondary feature. Except for a rather flagrant violation of AR 380-5, the Case properly should have been the responsibility of the Criminal Investigation Division.

On 5 May 1947, Capt Oliver B. Fulton, Chief of Investigations of the 1135th, received a phone call from the 10th General Hospital in Manila. in the hospital for medical observation, impatiently requested a conference with Captain Fulton. As a for the Manila had come into possession of some explosive information. He was certain

45 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Information Section, Semi-Monthly Activities Report, 16 July to 31 July 1947, dtd 1 August 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

46 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Information Section, Semi-Monthly Activities Report, 16 June to 30 June 1947, dtd 1 July 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

his life was in danger. He felt CIC was the only organization he could contact without jeopardizing his life and compromising his information.

When CIC agents arrived at his bedside, related the immediate cause for his hospitalization. That night, shortly after left the home of his girl friend, something hit him on the head, and the vehicle he was driving crashed into a wall. had revived him and brought him to the hospital..

Then haltingly informed Captain Fulton he would relate a long story containing derogatory information on leading personalities with the Philippine Base Command (PHIBCOM) and the Manila Engineer Depot. Before he could say another word, passed out in exhaustion. Captain Fulton left the hospital with no idea what the knew that placed his life in jeopardy.

"Larceny on the Loose"

The following morning Captain Fulton, while scanning the Manila Evening News of 5 May, noticed an article on blackmarketing in the Philippines. The meat of this article, entitled "Larceny on the Loose," consisted of paragraphs supposedly quoted word for word from an official Army document of 7 March 1947. It seemed to Fulton the quoted report was much too "hot" for release to the general public. The publication of the data smaked of a rather serious security violation.[47]

The document quoted by the Evening News read in part: "Information compiled...pointed out that certain key American civilian and military personnel, as well as their business associates, had been trafficking in falsely-requisitioned government property from Base Depots. This information was substantiated.... It had been proven that entire convoys of critical engineer supplies, loaded at Base Depots on false requisitions, have been side-tracked and purposely unloaded by civilian concerns and organizations in Manila. Estimates of property lost through false requisitions had been placed at approximately $50,000 a week... Total loss of government property through all PHIBCOM depots has been placed at $500,000 a week....

The Evening News also quoted the rather desperate final paragraph of the report. "It is generally felt that if higher backing from PHILRYCOM can be obtained, that investigations will break blackmarket activities now under way in Luzon....To further cite pressure being brought on investigator forces at this time, it is pointed out that in the case of (name deleted) certain high authorities

47 1135th CIC Detachment, narrative account entitled, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

in PHIBCOM, and possibly in PHILRYCOM, are interested in protection of persons involved in blackmarkets."[48]

Another Call From

Captain Fulton's musings over the possible security violation were interrupted by a phone call from He too had seen the Evening News. The document quoted in "Larceny On The Loose" was a report he had compiled and signed. Now certain his life was in danger, the requested CIC to supply a body-guard.

Arrangements were made with the Manila Provost Marshal's Office to provide a body-guard 24 hours a day. In addition, CIC instituted a constant surveillance of Agents posing as patients, ward personnel and visiting enlisted men kept a continual watch on all persons coming in contact with the All phone calls to were monitored. The Commanding Officer of the hospital was persuaded to permit no visitors for except those the personally approved. Food intended for was examined and tested before being served.

When was well enough to talk, he was given a three-day pass from the hospital and taken to 1135th Headquarters. Under constant CIC guard, dictated a twenty-page report dealing with the various personalities involved in the blackmarket operations.

Seek Source of Security Leak

Meanwhile Captain Fulton had instructed one of his better agents to drop everything and concentrate on tracking down the breach of security that had permitted the information on blackmarketing to be released to the public.[49]

On 8 May the agent interviewed the Manila Security Officer, at the time he was hospitalized. This officer asserted that the information printed in the Evening News had not been authorized for public release. He added that had compiled the quoted report and classified it "Confidential." To the Security Officer's knowledge, three copies had been made and disseminated. The woman who typed the copies concurred on the last point. The agent obtained a copy of the 7 March document and found that it matched word for word the quotes in "Larceny On The Loose."

48 Clipping from The Evening News, Manila, Philippines, Monday, 5 May 1947, (LARCENY ON THE LOOSE - A REPORT ON THE SURPLUS SITUATION), (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

49 1135th CIC Detachment, narrative account entitled undated, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

To his dismay, the CIC agent learned the Security Office had no measures for the security of its own documents. Manila investigators informed the agent that case files were carried in their personal brief cases to insure protection. There was no accounting system for classified papers. This haphazard security set-up left innumerable openings for a leak of confidential information.

From the Major, who had been Security Officer at the in March, the time of the dissemination of the document on blackmarketing, it was learned that many more than three copies of the report had been made. He revealed that the PHIBCOM Commanding Officer, the commander, and personnel with the PHILRYCOM Criminal Investigation Detachment, the Judge Advocate General and the Inspector General Section and the G-3 offices were acquainted with the contents. He confessed the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Veterans Administration in the United States and an correspondent in Manila had also received copies. By now the security leak looked more like a flood.

Any attempt to uncover the security violation was dropped at this point. So extensive was the report's distribution that a complete listing of all the persons who had seen it would have had little value. The damage had been done. About all CIC could do was recommend security measures for the Manila Security Office and hope they would undertake the corrections.[50]

CIC Given Job of Confirming Report

Normally CIC would only have been concerned with the security violation at the Security Office. Confirming information should have been the responsibility of PHIBCOM Criminal Investigation Detachment. However, since the list of persons involved in the blackmarket ring included a number of it was decided during a conference with the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, the AC of S, G2, and the Manila Provost Marshal Commander that CIC should conduct the investigation to its full conclusion.

To confirm charges, the agents contacted individuals the claimed had knowledge of the blackmarketing operation. It was necessary to interview all of these people surreptitiously so that CIC's concern with the case would not be compromised. One of the Deputy Chiefs, a lieutenant colonel, was

50 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject: Compromise of Classified Document, 17 June 1947, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

interviewed behind a pile of engineer equipment where there would be no danger of observation or eaves-dropping. Other informants were casually offered rides and interviewed while enroute to their destinations. Midnight rendezvous in remote bars were the order of the day.

CIC had four good reasons to believe they were chasing something hot. One of the men on list was ambushed and killed, while driving along a highway in Pampanga Province near San Fernando. Another potential informant was waylaid on a Manila side-street and beaten unconscious. Two U.S. Army men, alleged to have information, were hastily transferred out of the theater before 1135th agents could get to them.

So great was the pressure on that eventually he cracked under the strain. About a month after his phone call to Captain Fulton, he suffered a complete nervous breakdown. He was returned to the United States as a serious mental case.

The pressure was on CIC too. While the investigation was still in progress, Captain Fulton received a call from an unknown individual. The voice on the other end of the line issued a warning: "Fulton, keep your nose out of this if you want to stay healthy." After this threat, investigation was immediately intensified. The agents were sure they were striking home. On the other hand, the call also indicated that CIC's concern with the case had been compromised.

Two Extensive Rings Uncovered

Attempts were made to follow the progress of individual pieces of engineer equipment that had disappeared. In one instance, an item was traced to Shanghai, but there the trail ended. It was learned that discrepencies in three contracts had cost "Uncle Sam" $450,000 more than should have been paid.

To gain documentary evidence, agents surreptitiously entered various offices to search file cabinets. Under cover they entertained people known to be acquainted with the suspects. Plied sufficiently with alcohol, some of these men blurted out important facts.

It was learned by the agents that there were at least two well established, cunningly operated, blackmarket rings in the Philippines. These rings included among their operatives clever lawyers, influential politicians, military personnel, wealthy business interests, depot guards, and plain ordinary thugs. The rings were so well organized that they had informants in every major office or organization of PHILRYCOM. The rings' tactics included bribery, coersion, blackmail, and murder.

CIC worked night and day to piece together the complete story of the two [illegible]market rings. On the morning the investigation was completed, the facts were taken to the theater commander. As a result of CIC's findings there was a complete turnover of personnel in many units. PHIBCOM was completely deactivated, many of its personnel were discharged "with prejudice," and its mission given to PHILRYCOM.

The 1135th's summation of this case concludes, "(CIC) itself gained some prestige and reputation for reliability during the course of this investigation."[51]

Strength of 1135th Drastically Reduced

On 15 December 1947, the 1135th CIC Detachment's authorized strength was drastically reduced. In contrast with the former Table of Organization of 104 spaces, CIC was authorized only 27, 10 officers, two warrant officers, and 15 enlisted men. Concurrent with the reduced T/O, the 1135th lost counterintelligence jurisdiction over Okinawa as PHILRYCOM was split into two commands - the Philippines Command (PHILCOM) and the Ryukyus Command (RYCOM). The Ryukyu office of the 1135th became Headquarters, 526th CIC Detachment.[52]

Such personnel cuts were also in line with the diminishing CIC mission. Throughout the last months of 1947, CIC's collection of civil intelligence had been gradually cut back and by mid-1948 the overall mission was almost completely confined to security of military personnel and installations. During this period considerable controversy centered around different interpretations of the phrase "keeping appraised of the local situation." Between June 1947 and August 1948, there were three different theater G2s, and each had his own version of the role of CIC's responsibilities. For instance, the second in this line of staff supervisors deemed that CIC should not seek data on Manila's foreign element. His successor wished CIC to start this operation again in spite of the difficulties of reestablishing a discarded informant net.[53]

229th CIC Detachment Activated

On 20 September 1948, CIC in the Philippines underwent both a redesignation and another cut in authorized strength. The new 229th CIC Detachment was to

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51 1135th CIC Detachment, narrative account entitled [illegible]ated, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

52 Historical Data Cards, 1135th, 229th, and 526th CIC Detachments, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

53 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Philippine Islands, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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consist of only two officers and six enlisted men. The 229th limited its activities solely to military security.[54]

At the time of the activation of the 229th, Maj Clifford L. Sawyer was the commanding officer. He was succeeded on 28 December 1948 by Capt John M. Davis, who was in turn relieved on 9 January 1949 by Capt Paul R. Lutjens.[55]

Laundry Manager's Complaint Opens Case

One of the 229th CIC Detachment's investigations was initiated after a complaint to PHILCOM authorities by the manager of the Luzon Commercial Laundry Company of Manila. The irate businessman had been told by two friends that derogatory information in CIC's files had kept him from getting Fort McKinley laundry contracts. Since CIC files were not supposed to be public knowledge, the 229th opened an investigation of the matter. Attempts to determine if the business man had been wrongly treated were also initiated.

A check of the 229th's outgoing correspondence file revealed that there had been no transmission of CIC's information on the laundry manager to other PHILCOM agencies. Any leak of classified information would have had to come from within the 229th. Furthermore, no decision to reject the subject's application for Army contracts could have been based on CIC reports.

CIC interviewed the laundry manager on 3 and 7 December. In January 1948, he had informally discussed a laundry concession with a colonel in the PHILCOM Quartermaster Section. The subject claimed he eventually got around to submitting his plans to Fort McKinley authorities. He had received no answer, but two friends, a market owner and the manager of a bar, had tipped him off that derogatory information in CIC files had blocked the application.

On 7 December, CIC quizzed the bar manager and learned that three months before, an American civilian, about whom nothing else was known, had been talking at the bar about the laundry manager. According to this mystery man, the subject had not received Army contracts because CIC knew he had collaborated with the Japanese.

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54 Historical Data Card, 229th CIC Detachment, Unclassified, (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building); and CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Philippine Islands, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

55 Hq, 229th CIC Detachment, PHILCOM, "Annual General Inspection Questionnaire," 1 September 1949, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center BX45845).

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The market owner admitted he knew the subject, but he denied he had told him about any derogatory information in CIC's possession. The market owner confessed he had once associated with a CIC agent no longer in PHILCOM.

Two Pertinent Facts Unearthed

After a series of somewhat unproductive interviews on Fort McKinley and in Manila, CIC landed on two pertinent facts through records checks.

A check of the PHILCOM CIC files implicated the subject in the theft from the U.S. Army of a large power crane valued at nearly $50,000. This bit of information would have been enough to block an attempt to get an Army contract.

Then CIC took a look at the files of the Fort McKinley Central Exchange Service, where applications for Army concessions were supposed to be submitted. There was no record that CIC's subject had ever made such an application. No one in the office recalled even a visit to inquire about correct procedure for gaining a laundry concession. Apparently all the laundry owner had done was make verbal arrangements with his contacts at the Quartermaster Section without filing the correct application through the authorized section.

CIC closed its investigation on 16 February 1949, feeling that further probing would produce little information of value. Although the source of the security leak had not been uncovered, CIC was assured that the laundry manager had not been unjustly deprived of Fort McKinley concession.[56]

Deactivation of 229th Terminates Philippine Activity

CIC's post war activities in the Philippines were terminated when the deactivation of the 229th CIC Detachment was ordered on 29 August 1949 to be effective on 15 September 1949. CIC's always diminishing mission in the Philippines had become nonexistent.[57]

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56 Report of Investigation (WD AGO Form 342), Investigation Made By: 229th CIC Detachment, Subject: , Date Submitted: 21 February 1949, Dates of Investigation: 10 December 1948 to 16 February 1949, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

57 Historical Data Card, 229th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

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Part II: Operations in the Ryukyus Islands

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Part II

OPERATIONS IN RYUKYUS ISLANDS

For a short time after World War II, the counterintelligence coverage of the Ryukyus, the important chain of islands stretching from Kyushu to Formosa, rested with the Fifth CIC Region of the 441st CIC Detachment.

On 1 March 1946, concurrent with the switch of the islands from AFPAC to AFWESPAC, the three officers and four agents representing CIC in the Ryukyus were transferred to the 1135th CIC Detachment and operated as a field office of that headquarters. CIC activity in the Ryukyus was almost entirely confined to the largest of the islands, war-torn Okinawa.

No Regular Newsgathering on Okinawa

Especially in the first years, the activity of the Okinawa Field Office differed somewhat from postwar operations in the Philippines. CIC on Okinawa was not regularly involved in "the gathering of news regarding sociological developments and trends, but concerned itself with work more closely related to the military, such as espionage, sabotage, and security investigations." Although regular newsgathering was not attempted, CIC did make periodic studies of civil affairs during subsequent months.

Use of individual paid informants in Okinawa was particularly essential because of the language barrier, the great number of islands to cover, and the small number of agents to cover them.[58] Probably for the same reasons they were so operationally essential, informant networks on the islands were not properly established during the first three years of CIC activity.[59]

Surveys Hunt Potential Elements of Discontent

It became the practice of the Okinawa Field Office to dispatch agents to areas in the islands to survey local conditions. By circulating among the people, CIC sought to uncover points of discontentment and potential elements of subversion.

For instance, in August 1946, a survey of local government was conducted in the northern region of Okinawa. Thirty-one villages were visited. CIC found that all but three had mayors elected by the people. In these three villages, the

58 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1946 to 31 January 1946, dtd 17 April 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

59 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Okinawa, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

"honcho" of the district had selected the mayor from a list of prominent citizens approved by the people. CIC reported: "All of the mayors, as well as the vast majority of the natives, stated that they prefer the present form of government because they have more freedom than they did under the Japanese."[60]

In late November 1946, agents journeyed to the same area for another look. It was observed that the people in the north were generally contented in contrast to the war-torn and unhappy populace of southern Okinawa. The northern half of the island which was "off limits" to American troops, had been largely unaffected by the war. Military government had provided rough lumber and considerable gasoline for use in saw mills, with the result that there were many buildings under construction. Military government had also provided boats for the native fishermen. A good crop season had combined with other factors to keep the situation in the north untroubled.[61]

Surveys of the southern half of the island showed the natives were greatly concerned about rebuilding war damage. Many ruined homes were still being reconstructed in December 1946. Getting the land in proper condition to plant rice was also noted as a major reconstruction problem in the area.[62]

Although periodic area surveys were the main method utilized to collect civil intelligence, the Okinawa Field Office occasionally dispatched agents to cover potential danger spots. In April 1947, an agent was sent to Yaeyama Island to investigate a so-called "labor union" of 100 demobilized and repatriated men that had been causing trouble for the local government. First and foremost on the agenda for this "union" was a May Day demonstration. Civil authorities summoned the leaders two days before the scheduled demonstration, and issued a warning that they were violating Military government regulations. The leaders were cautioned to observe the military government regulations in their actions, speeches and writings. On 29 April, one of the leaders began disseminating posters "detrimental and disrespectful" to the government, and the "union" continued to plan for a big time on May Day. On the next day the two men were arrested.

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60 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 8, 1 August 1946 to 31 August 1946, dtd 17 September 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

61 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Month Report Nr 11, 1 November 1946 to 30 November 1946, dtd 26 December 1946, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

62 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Month Report Nr 12, 1 December 1946 - 31 December 1946, dtd 10 January 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

On 2 May, the "union's" leaders were tried, found guilty of violating military government regulations and sentenced to six months in prison.[63]

Personnel Shortage Hampers Port Security and Travel Control

Port security and travel control were also part of the activity of the Okinawa Field Office. A shortage of CIC personnel made a thorough accomplishment of this mission difficult. By 1947 CIC agents were inspecting all vessels docking at Naha, Okinawa's principal port, and checking passenger and crew lists against a rather lengthy black-list. In July 1947, a conference attended by the theater G2, the A2 of the 1st Air Division, and a representative of the Okinawa CIC Field Office resulted in a plan to strengthen travel control procedures in spite of the personnel shortage. In conjunction with the training of various air force units in the Ryukyus, an aerial reconnaissance of the island chain was planned. All surface craft in nearby waters were to be listed and their locations pin-pointed on a large map of the islands. All strange or suspicious patterns of travel were to be investigated immediately. It was hoped that this and subsequent aerial observation would either confirm or disprove the frequent reports of illicit traffic in individuals and materials in the East China Sea area.[64]

As an additional security measure, the Okinawa Field Office received permission to give a counterintelligence briefing to all individuals being transported by sea or air to China. Upon the tourist's return to Okinawa, he filled out what was called an "interrogation of returnee" form and submitted it to CIC.[65]

One instance of illegal entry into Okinawa occurred on 25 July 1946. CIC agents and civil police investigated a small boat that docked at the Itoman Harbor in the southern part of the island. On board were 40 Okinawans who had been in the Japanese Army on Formosa. For fifteen hundred yen they had been given passage, believing they would be free to return to their homes upon arrival on Okinawa.

According to the returning Okinawans, a rather chaotic condition existed on Formosa in respect to ex-Japanese soldiers. Apparently there had been no measures taken to intern these men. As far as authorities on Formosa were concerned, they were free to leave whenever they could arrange transportation.

63 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 5, 1 May 1947 - 30 May 1947, dtd 6 June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

64 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 6, 1 June 1947 - 30 June 1947, dtd 5 July 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

65 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 3, 1 March 1947 - 31 March 1947, dtd 8 April 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The crew of the boat admitted they planned to make a regular business of transporting the ex-Japanese soldiers home to Okinawa. Although in this instance there was no indication of infiltration of subversives into the group of returnees, agents saw that such unregulated procedure left the door wide open to all manner of undesirables. Recommendations were made to the military government in the Ryukyus for a controlled repatriation of those Okinawans left on Formosa.[66]

Security: Everything Wrong at Headquarters

Routine security surveys and inspections formed a necessary part of the Okinawa Field Office's activity. On 24 and 25 February 1947, for example, agents thoroughly inspected Army headquarters in the Ryukyus for violations of AR 380-5. Almost everything was wrong. The offices were unlocked and unattended during nonworking hours, and documents classified up to "Secret" were improperly stored. CIC made plans to continue security inspections of headquarters "in an effort to gain adherence to AR 380-5."[67]

In January 1947, CIC was called in to investigate the disappearance of two "Top Secret" documents from the Adjutant General Section of the 1st Air Division. The last transfer receipt of each of the documents was dated in April 1946, and in both instances the officers last signing for the papers had been transferred to the United States for discharge. Other than uncover these facts and transmit them to CIC in the Zone of the Interior, the Okinawa Field Office could do nothing. The two violations of AR 380-5 had occurred too far in the past for agents to locate the exact causes.

Another violation of military security was uncovered in January 1947, when an Okinawan civilian arrested by civil police was found to have a bundle of "Restricted" booklets in his possession. CIC asked to be allowed to interrogate the Okinawan. The suspect, who could neither speak nor read English, pleaded that his intentions were to use the booklets for toilet paper. It was impossible to prove otherwise.[68]

66 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 8, 1 August 1946 - 31 August 1946, dtd 17 September 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

67 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 3, 1 March 1947 - 31 March 1947, dtd 8 April 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

68 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 1, 1 January 1947 - 31 January 1947, dtd 12 February 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Checking the Army's Popularity Rating

In maintaining military security, it was important to know of the conduct of the troops was alienating the otherwise friendly native Okinawans. Consequently, a small portion of CIC's time was devoted to reviewing incidents which reflected adversely on the U.S. Army and endangered friendly relations with the indigenous population.

The majority of these incidents involved criminal acts by American soldiers. While the provost marshal's office dealt with the aspects of illegality, CIC defined what effect the criminal act had on the Army's public relations.

For example, reports from October 1946 reveal that some American military personnel were engaged in "surreptiously obtaining valuable souvenirs" from the civil population to the great detriment of the attitude of the natives toward the Army.[69]

The frequent instances of rape of Okinawan women by American troops were also felt to effect adversely Army public relations. In April 1947, a peak total of 11 rape cases were noted by the Okinawa Field Office.[70]

It was recognized that closely linked to the Army's popularity rating with the native population was troop morale and discipline. In September 1946, CIC reported that morale had soared with increased utilization of native labor and the expected arrival of dependents.[71]

But by July 1947, CIC had to report that morale of both officers and enlisted men was "not high." Poorly prepared food and the Army's failure to ship over many of the families were given as the prime reasons for the decline.[72]

Although troop discipline was reported as constantly improving, CIC noted that in April 1947 there were five incidents of soldiers and marines attacking civil policemen. Typical was the instance of 7 April when five marines, two

69 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 10, 1 October 1946 - 31 October 1946, dtd 19 November 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

70 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 4, 1 April 1947 - 30 April 1947, dtd 2 May 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

71 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, AFWESPAC, Monthly Report Nr 9, 1 September 1946 - 30 September 1946, dtd 14 October 1946, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

72 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 7, 1 July 1947 - 31 July 1947, dtd 10 August 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

armed with bayonets, had jumped a policeman. The patrolman was robbed and his police insignia ripped off for souvenirs. The policeman was left with two severe cuts on his head.

CIC interest in such affairs was explained at the end of the report dealing with the five assaults of April 1947. "While no disaffection, subversive activity or security violations are involved in these incidents, they are pointed out because poor discipline tends to promote disaffection, subversion and lax security." Although not mentioned directly in this report, poor discipline in general and attacks on civil policemen in particular figured also to hurt the Army's popularity with the natives.[73]

CIC Goes Grave Hunting

One investigation that can hardly be called within the counterintelligence mission began with reports from troops stationed on Taira Island that the natives had knowledge of U.S. Army personnel buried there.

The military government Intelligence Officer and an agent from the Okinawa Field Office journeyed to Taira on 11 January 1947 to investigate these reports. A search located the graves of four American soldiers. On three of the bodies there was enough evidence of physical beating to call in a War Crimes investigator from the Far East Tribunal. He accompanied a second party to Taira on 16 January. All possible information on the four bodies and possible atrocities was gathered and forwarded to the proper agencies.[74]

Statistics Show Security Investigations of Personnel Most Frequent

Okinawa Field Office case load statistics, while not indicating the relative importance of individual investigations, do offer clues to what was being accomplished. In a typical month, May 1947, the office dealt with 76 security investigations of personnel, of which 41 were closed. There were three pending and one closed subversion cases. One sabotage case was pending and four probes of security violations were closed. There were no cases reported in other categories (i.e., espionage, sedition, etc.). During the month, the office was involved in 15 cases classified under "miscellaneous." Cases dealing with war crimes, blackmarketing, prostitution and narcotics along with investigations into economic and industrial conditions in the Ryukyus were all lumped into this catch-all category.[75]

73 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 5, 1 May 1947 - 31 May 1947, dtd 6 June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

74 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 2, 1 February 1947 - 28 February 1947, dtd 6 March 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

75 Hqs, 1135th CIC Detachment, PHILRYCOM, Monthly Report Nr 5, 1 May 1947 - 31 May 1947, dtd 6 June 1947, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

526th CIC Detachment Activated

On 15 December 1947, the 1135th CIC Detachment was absolved of counter-intelligence responsibilities in the Ryukyus. The 526th CIC Detachment was activated to take the place of the 1135th's Okinawa Field Office. At the time of activation, the 526th was authorized a strength of four officers, four warrant officers, and nine enlisted men. This Table of Organization was increased by one warrant officer and ten enlisted men on 15 September 1948.[76]

More Time Spent Observing Okinawan Politics

An increased amount of CIC's time in the Ryukyus was spent delving into the twists and turns of Okinawan Politics, particularly probing the increasingly prominent Communist elements. Volumnous staff studies and monographs on the political situation appeared with some regularity. On 15 October 1947, the field office of the 1135th had published a "Monograph on Okinawan Politics." The 526th printed an up-to-date study under this title on 15 April 1948. Another volume, the first volume devoted exclusively to the Communists, was "An Analysis of Communist Influence on Ryukyuan Politics," dated 17 August 1948.

This volume on the Communists concluded: "...in the Ryukyus Islands there exist four Communist factions sufficiently trained and organized to control the major geographic subdivisions of the Ryukyus once the status of the islands is determined or in the event the military government lessens the present system of control."[77]

Another important contribution to RYCOM intelligence was a three volume study entitled "Third Year of Ryukyuan Politics," published in August 1949. Part I dealt with the civil administration, legislative assembly, and political parties of Okinawa, while Parts II and III concerned similar matters in the Northern Ryukyus and Southern Ryukyus respectively.[78]

Who Cut the Cable?

Statistics and reports from Okinawa show that sabotage cases, especially those reaching any concrete conclusion, were few and far between. One of the

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76 Historical Data Card, 526th CIC Detachment, Unclassified (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

77 Hqs, 526th CIC Detachment, RYCOM, Subject: An Analysis of Communist Influence on Ryukyuan Politics, To: Commanding General, RYCOM, 17 August 1948, (SECRET) (Staff & Faculty Library).

78 Hqs, 526th CIC Detachment, RYCOM, "Third Year of Ryukyuan Politics," Three volumes, 15 August 1949, (SECRET) (Staff & Faculty Library).

more conclusive sabotage investigations began on 8 January 1948, when the 526th CIC Detachment received information that an important telephone and radio cable had been almost completely severed.

Mechanical devices designed to locate the exact spot of the trouble were utilized. Investigation in the locale of the incident put the blame squarely on a group of school boys. Just before leaving classes for winter vacat[illegible]he children had been instructed to practice handicraft over the holidays. Apparently they decided to make small brooms from a kind of grass known as "Susuki." While looking for the grass, they discovered an abandoned piece of cable. They decided to use it to bind the grass in their brooms. Needing more cable, the children dug in the area of their initial discovery. A foot beneath the surface was another cable and the boys eagerly attempted to cut out a piece. The job was nearly complete when sparks began to fly. The boys realizing they were tampering with a cable still in use fled the area.

CIC was forced to conclude there was no deliberate intent to sabotage Army communications.[79]

CIC Seeks to Control Potentially Subversive Seamen

One important aspect of the 526th CIC's effort to maintain the security of the Ryukyus was the control of potential subversives on the crews of merchant vessels docking on the islands. One such individual was the Third Assistant Engineer of the USAT Sgt. Jack J. Pendleton, which arrived in Naha from Yokohama on 26 February 1949. An "associated government agency" had reported this seaman to be a member of the Communist Party in San Francisco.

Under verbal orders of the Commanding General, RYCOM, CIC requested the ship's captain to restrict the seaman to the ship for the duration of the stop at Okinawa.

On 4 March 1949, the seaman, growing weary of his restriction, put through a call to CIC Headquarters. He claimed he had no Communist connections and wished to set the record straight on the matter. He told CIC, "Somebody must have misunderstood some remarks I have made, but I cannot think what it could be." CIC politely informed the seaman the restriction order had come from a "higher authority" without any reason given for the action.

The same day, Agent Nicholas L. Gustin informed the ship's captain that the restriction on his Third Assistant Engineer had been lifted for the 12-hour period from 1000 to 2200 on 5 March. Gustin was allowed to speak to the seaman who

79 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Okinawa, 1945-1948," Unclassified, (Central Records Facility).

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Part III: Operations in the Marianas and Marshall Islands

proceeded to explain his position. Although once again CIC pretended not to know the reason for the restriction, the seaman assumed that he was a "Communist or subversive suspect." The subject explained his position: "I am Jewish and have a persecution complex; whenever there is a bull session aboard ship on politics and labor I side with the minority...I think that all capitalist governments could borrow ideas from the Communist ideology."

When the suspect left the Pendleton at 1235 hours on 5 March, CIC had him under surveillance. A visit to 526th CIC Headquarters to further discuss his restriction was one of the stops on his itinerary. His contacts at various bars in Naha were all subjected to a long disertation on his restriction by CIC. At one point he told a fellow drinker he read Communist literature for the same reason people read authors like Hemingway and Shakespeare. The seaman returned to his ship at 2346 hours - one hour and 46 minutes later than the pass allowed. CIC's surveillance ceased at this point.

"I Know More About Communism Than the Goddamn CIC"

But for sheer coincidence the case would have ended when the suspect returned to his ship.

At 0100 hours, 6 May, Special Agent Frank T. Hughes of the 6001st CI Squadron, returning to his headquarters from Naha Air Force Base, was hailed by a civilian on the road north of the Naha port area. When his passenger climbed into the jeep, Hughes noticed that he seemed intoxicated. The passenger began to tell Hughes about being unjustly treated by CIC, explaining that he had been restricted to his ship, the USAT Sgt. Jack J. Pendelton, by an order from CIC, since someone somewhere had the mistaken impression he was a Communist. The seaman told Hughes: "I am a student of world affairs. I know more about Communism than any of those people in the Goddamn CIC." In their one-sided conversation, he also told Hughes that he had jumped ship for a night on the town. When he had dropped off his passenger, Hughes immediately reported the incident to the 526th CIC Detachment. From his description of his rider, agents of the 526th concluded it must have been the Third Assistant Engineer of the Pendelton.

Early the following morning, the seaman was roused from his slumber and brought to CIC Headquarters for interrogation. In regard to his political convictions, the subject continued to profess a degree of sympathy with Communist ideals but stoutly refused to admit he belonged to the party. He called his violation of the restriction order "very poor judgement" on his part.

While the seaman was being questioned, his quarters were searched and agents made a list of the many leftist publications in his possession.

The remainder of CIC's investigation consisted of interviews with crew members of the Pendelton and some of the subject's casual contacts in the various bars he visited in his brief stay ashore.

When the Sgt. Jack J. Pendelton left Naha port on 8 March, CIC forwarded to the proper stateside agency the information collected on the suspect, trusting the complicated channels of communication would function properly and the subject would either be restricted or surveilled at future ports of call.[80]

80 Report of Investigation (WD AGO Form 342), Investigation Made By: 526th CIC Detachment, Subject: Date Submitted: 18 March 1949, Dates of Investigation: 17 February 1949 - 16 March 1949, SECRET, (Central Records Facility).

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Part III

OPERATIONS IN THE MARIANAS AND MARSHALL ISLANDS

Essential to the United States postwar defense establishment were the 15 Marianas Islands. Guam, with an area of 225 square miles, v[illegible] group's major island and the largest point of land in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and the Philippines and between Japan and New Guinea.[81]

After the cessation of hostilities, Guam became a U.S. mandate under Navy control. The Navy had complete jurisdiction over the civil employees on the island, including those of the Department of the Army.[82]

Only Air Force CIC on Guam Until Mid-1947

Sub-detachment "G" of the 607th CIC Detachment, the Far East Air Force CIC unit, was the only CIC organization in the Marianas from the end of the war to mid-1947. Sub-detachment "G" operated in conjunction with Headquarters, 20th Air Force on Guam.

The situation on the Marianas at the end of 1946 posed no cause for alarm. The 607th reported: "The counterintelligence situation at this base presents no unusual problem. The morale of the troops is good and cooperation with the natives excellent."[83]

502d CIC Detachment Activated

On 10 May 1947, the 502d CIC Detachment was activated as a unit of the Marianas-Bonin (MARBO) Command. Authorized strength was three officers, one warrant officer, and three enlisted men. On 5 June 1948, this Table of Organization was increased by two warrant officers and three enlisted men.[84] Like other CIC units in the Far East, the 502d obtained personnel and investigative

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81 Hqs, 502d CIC Detachment, MARBO, Subject: Orientation Material, To: Chief, CIC Center, Camp Holabird, 21 February 1949, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

82 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Guam, 1945-1948," Unclassified, (Central Records Facility).

83 Hqs, 607th CIC Detachment, PACUSA, Monthly Information Report (covering June through December 1946), dtd 31 December 1946, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

84 Historical Data Card, 502d CIC Detachment, Unclassified, (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

supplies from the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan. The 441st was also the office controlling the issuance of agent badges and credentials.[85]

Of principal concern to CIC on Guam were security matters pertaining to military personnel and Department of the Army civilians. The one year tour of duty for civilians meant a constant turnover and provided considerable clearance work. When it happened that persons holding sensitive jobs on Guam were still under scrutiny by CIC in the Zone of the Interior, it was necessary to maintain "some sort of surveillance" over the uncleared employee.

The 502d CIC Detachment dealt with only scattered instances of suspected sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

The Man Who Asked Questions

One of the more significant complaint-type investigations handled by the 502d CIC Detachment originated when a civilian engineer was asked to answer a list of questions by a fellow employee. The engineer became suspicious and reported the incident to the security office of his construction company. From there the matter was referred to CIC.

A search of the suspect's quarters uncovered four rolls of film showing airstrips, coastline features, and the central water supply system of the islands. There were documents giving details on all the construction work being done by the suspect's employers as well as information on numbers of workers and their morale. The suspect was brought into CIC Headquarters for interrogation. He claimed he had compiled the information for his own personal interest.

While it was impossible to prove espionage, CIC suggested that the engineer be relieved of his position. The suspect was returned to the United States with the recommendation that he never be employed by the Army in any position involving contact with classified material.[86]

A Ham on Guam!

While counterintelligence on the relatively isolated Marianas was usually a matter of routine, there were exceptions to this generalization.

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85 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the South West Pacific Area," Part I, Chapter VIII, pp. 95-96, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

86 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Guam, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

At 2330 hours on the night of 30 December 1947, an amateur short wave radio operator using facilities provided by Special Services, MARBO, was contemplating turning in for the night. He lingered for one more twiddle of the dials. Out of the rainy night came the call letters of station W9PD. The operator knew these had to be the call letters of a station in the United States. He brought the signal in clearer and answered with the call letters of the Guam Special Services station. W9PD turned out to be a ham operator from Southport, Indiana. The stateside operator had been trying to raise Guam for several hours and had nearly given up hope. He poured out an urgent message.

> "There is an American soldier in North China hiding from the Russians in a cave. He is an amateur operator - call letters ACIT - and wishes to talk to Army authorities on Guam."

The message was repeated several times to make sure the Guam operator received it correctly. The Guam radio ham signed off and took the message to the Special Services officer. Immediately a call was put through to Capt Charles H. Silvester, commander of the 502d CIC Detachment. Captain Silvester and the radio operator spent the rest of the night trying to raise ACIT. The two gave up the ghost at 0400 hours, but agreed to try again after catching some sleep.

At 0800 hours, 31 December, Captain Silvester reported the message to MARBO G2. It was the G2's suggestion that all ham radio operators on Guam be requested to attempt to pick up the North China station. A check of a ham operators' guide book showed that ACIT was not listed, indicating that it was unauthorized and operating in an emergency.

Captain Silvester and other members of the detachment contacted every ham station on Guam. They commenced an immediate monitoring of the airwaves. The monitoring continued throughout New Year's Eve and New Year's Day. At 1500 on 1 January 1948, a station in the Navy Joint Communications Commission area picked up a call identified as ACIT, but before any message could be received, the station faded from the air.

The AC of S, G2, FEC, in Tokyo was notified of the incident and he directed that efforts be continued to locate ACIT. Every short wave station on Guam monitored the airwaves throughout the month of January, but no further contact with ACIT was established.

However, the month-long activity was not a total wash-out. As a result of the short wave monitoring, CIC learned that three stations, operating in North Korea under Soviet auspices, were beaming great quantities of Communist propaganda into Guam. Ham operators were encouraged to make contact with these

stations and report the messages received to CIC. In the remaining months of its operations, the 502d CIC Detachment continued to enlist the aid of ham operators in the collection of Red propaganda.[87]

Quarters "Second to None"

Although other than routine investigations were scarce, agents of the 502d were never lacking for something to do. From mid-1948 to April 1949, officers and men of the detachment constructed their own offices and billets. Unhappy with their old unpainted, unsanitary quonset hut, the men assembled "the necessary equipment and materials from various contacts" and put up facilities "second to none" in the MARBO theater.[88]

On 14 March 1950, CIC ceased to operate in the Marianas with the deactivation of the 502d CIC Detachment.[89] (Records fail to indicate who requisitioned CIC's "second to none" offices and billets.)

Agents From 401st CIC Detachment Handle Security of SANDSTONE

In November 1947, the 401st CIC Detachment in Hawaii sent four agents to Eniwetok and Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands with the advance parties for Operation SANDSTONE, the atom bomb tests. To this group were added two agents from CIC with the Hawaiian Air Force Department.

By February 1948, Task Force 7-5, the security group operating under the J2 of Joint Task Force Seven and composed of agents of the 401st CIC Detachment, was activated under the command of Lt Col Philip R. Cibotti, Jr.

Task Force 7-5 CIC agents delivered security lectures to all Operation SANDSTONE personnel when they reported for work on the project. In essence this lecture took pains to indicate what persons could and could not do from a security standpoint.

87 GHQ, FEC, MI Section, General Staff, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section," Volume IX of "Operations of the Intelligence Service in the South West Pacific Area," Selected CIC Investigations, Case Nr 29, "Radio Station ACIT, North China," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

88 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Guam, 1945-1948, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

89 Historical Data Card, 502d CIC Detachment, Unclassified, (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

Weapons and cameras owned by individuals assigned to the project were taken into CIC custody and returned at the conclusion of the tests.[90]

Although CIC was suspicious that many home made cameras were constructed by the more inventive members of the test party, enough proof for prosecution was collected in only one instance. In this case, the photographs showed [illegible]n Hawaii. They were traced back to a member of the SANDSTONE group on Eniwetok. Although the pictures had been taken strictly for personal pleasure and there was no indication of intentional espionage, the individual was arraigned before a courts martial for his serious security violation.[91]

Throughout the operational area, agents regularly conducted a type of security check they called a "sweep." At unannounced times, agents checked the passes and identification cards of all individuals in the area.[92]

369th CIC Detachment Activated

Security of vessels participating in the SANDSTONE tests rested with the 369th CIC Detachment, activated at Camp Holabird and composed of agents drawn from assignments in the Zone of the Interior. This group commanded by Capt Eugene J. Kolb, arrived at Eniwetok on 22 February.[93]

Case load statistics for March through May, the three months the 369th was actively engaged in investigative activity, show the detachment handled 23 cases. Eight were violations of AR 380-5, five were security surveys and five were security inspections. There were two cases of disaffection and one each of espionage, sabotage, and subversion.[94]

Although investigative activity ceased after May 1948,[95] the official date of deactivation for the 369th CIC Detachment was 1 October 1948.[96]

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90 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Eniwetok, 1945-1948," Unclassified, (Central Records Facility).

91 Interview with Lt Col C. F. Munn, Bldg #12, Fort Holabird, 13 October 1955.

92 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Eniwetok, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

93 Historical Data Card, 369th CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

94 369th CIC Detachment, Monthly Report of CIC Activities (DA AGO Form 395), for months of March, April, and May 1948, dtd respectively 2 April 1948, 10 May 1948, and 14 June 1948, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

95 369th CIC Detachment, Monthly Report of CIC Activities, (DA AGO Form 395) for June 1948, dtd 14 July 1948, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

96 Historical Data Card, 369th CIC Detachment, Unclassified, (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

Part IV: Operations in the Hawaiian Islands

Part IV

OPERATIONS IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The security of the Army Establishment in the Hawaiian Islands during the years after World War II was the responsibility of the 401st CIC Detachment with Headquarters in Honolulu, Oahu, T.H. The detachment maintained a branch office at Hilo, Hawaii, to handle the large volume of work encountered there. Leads and cases on the other islands were handled by agents dispatched from Headquarters on temporary duty.

Immediately after the war, the 401st was commanded by Lt Col Philip R. Cibotti, Jr., with Maj Gero Iwai serving as Executive Officer. Major Iwai, whose total service with CIP and CIC in Hawaii came to 15 years, was appointed commander of the 401st on 23 September 1947. On January 1948, Lt Col John W. Ehrle took command to be succeeded by Maj Thomas E. Smullin in June 1948.[97]

T/O Strength Decreased During Period

Authorized strength of the 401st CIC Detachment immediately after the war stood at 19 officers, 9 warrant officers, and 27 enlisted men. On May 1947, this was decreased by seven officers, three warrant officers, and seven enlisted men. A further reduction in November 1949 placed authorized strength at nine officers, six warrant officers, and 20 enlisted men.[98]

The first priority of CIC investigations included background checks of an extremely large number of Hawaiian-born Japanese, who were receiving intelligence assignments with the Army in the Far East. Their linguistic ability was urgently needed. Investigation of subversive activities within the military was also considered a first priority CIC activity.

Travel Control A CIC Responsibility

By virtue of a working agreement with the ONI and the FBI, CIC was the operating agency for travel control. Particular emphasis was placed on surveillance of suspected subversives coming into Hawaii by air. CIC was able to acquire lists of air passengers from San Francisco in advance of their arrival in Honolulu. A lack of cooperation from the Far East nations made it impossible to acquire similar lists of passengers flying in from the Orient. When a passenger was on

97 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Hawaii, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

98 Historical Data Card, 401st CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

CIC's rather bulky black list, a discreet investigation into all his activities during his visit was made by the 401st.

The 401st's work at the Hawaiian airfields was conducted notwithstanding the presence of Air Force CIC Detachment 700-H which was concerned strictly with the security of air installations.

CIC Watches Labor Movements

Because of the great strength of labor unions on the islands, CIC kept tabs on the movements in order to insure the general security of the military. Exemplary of CIC's part in coverage of labor groups was activity in connection with the intra-union disputes which crippled the Honolulu transportation system in July 1946 and on occassions in 1947 and 1948. During transit tie-ups, the Army had to provide transportation for its civilian employees. On the occasions of these strikes, CIC was able to notify the appropriate military commanders in sufficient time to place an Army bus system in operation, preventing a bog-down of Army administrative facilities.

Utilize Surprise Security Checks

When the 401st CIC Detachment conducted a security inspection of an Army unit, it was usually a surprise check. Available CIC agents attempted to gain possession of classified documents from the organization either through subterfuge or outright pilferage. The collected documents and a complete report of CIC's survey were sent to the commander of the unit inspected. Usual procedure was for agents to return delinquent units to inspect corrective measures about two weeks after the original check.

The Case of the "Sure Victory" Group

One of the 401st's investigations in the immediate postwar period concerned an element of the local Japanese population that was certain the sons of Nippon had emerged victorious. This group formed into an organization known as the Hissho-Kai - the "Sure Victory" group. These die-hards, mostly elderly persons, spread rumors and propaganda to the effect that Japan had really won the war. They claimed newspapers were spreading lies about an Allied victory to lead the public astray. The Hissho-Kai collected money from its members for the purpose of defraying the expected expenses in welcoming the Japanese fleet and royalty when they arrived in the territory.[99]

99 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Hawaii, 1945-1948," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Interview with Lt Col C. F. Munn, Bldg Nr 12, Fort Holabird, 13 October 1955.

One of the leaders of the Hissho-Kai was

Under custodial detention during the war, was released in September 1945 and immediately began speaking on behalf of the doctrine that the Japanese had really won the war. CIC worked to compile the evidence that led to the prosecution of on charges of violating the revised "disloyalty statutes" of the Territory. The indictment of on ten counts was believed to set a record for the longest indictment in the history of Hawaiian jurisprudence. However, demurrers filed for the defendent in May 1947 were su[illegible]d and part of the "disloyalty statutes" were declared unconstitutional. continued haranguing his ultranationalistic doctrines to his fanatical followers until his departure for Japan in late [100]

100 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Hawaii, 1945-1948," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Part V: Operations in the Caribbean

Part V

OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN

At the end of World War II, counterintelligence operations in the Caribbean were performed by four detachments. The two ground forces units were the 470th CIC Detachment in the Panama Canal Department and the 471st with the Antilles Department. Two other CIC units, attached to air commands, were the 606th CIC Detachment with Sixth Air Force and the 472d CIC Detachment with the Antilles Air Command.

Superimposed over these four detachments was a small headquarters unit, the 369th CIC Detachment. Initially this unit supervised the activities of the field detachments and disseminated broad policy decisions to the field. It soon came to operate only as a "paper" detachment and in early 1947 was deactivated.

Headquarters, 470th CIC Detachment was at Quarry Heights, C.Z. Detachment commanders in the 1945-1950 period were Capt Glenn E. Curry, Maj Victor Trask, Capt Harold R. Aaron, and Maj Lloyd L. Hanes.[101]

470th's T/O Sharply Increased During Period

The Table of Organization at the war's end gave the 470th three officers, six warrant officers, and 13 enlisted men. In December 1947, a revision in authorized strength added three warrant officers and six enlisted men to the Table of Organization. A sharp increase in personnel was allotted in September 1948 when the T/O was set at ten officers, 13 warrant officers and 25 enlisted men. Another increase in March 1950 gave the detachment 19 officers, 18 warrant officers, and 37 enlisted men.[102]

About 50 percent of the 470th's personnel were of Latin extraction. While their linguistic ability in Spanish was essential to operations, too many of them were found to be extremely deficient in English. Often case reviewers found that the reports of these men were difficult to comprehend and required considerable revision.[103]

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101 CIC Operational History of Theaters, "Caribbean, 1945-1948," (Central Records Facility).

102 Historical Data Card, 470th CIC Detachment, Unclassified, (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

103 "Reports by Returnees From the Panama Area," a compilation of returnee reports to the CIC Board during 1949, (undated), (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

Primary Mission is Safe-Guarding Canal

The primary mission of the 470th CIC Detachment remained the security of "the entire Canal Zone from Balboa to Colon against the dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage both from United States personnel and Foreign Nationals crossing the canal."

Cargoes and passenger lists of merchant ships crossing the isthmus were checked by agents of the 470th. On numerous occasions, surveillance of suspected foreign national passengers was maintained during their entire trip across Panama.

The 470th accomplished security investigations on all personnel employed in key positions with the Panama Canal Department. References to the CIC Center reported a unique problem to the CIC Board: "Because the preponderance of the personnel comprising our Armed Forces stationed in the Canal Zone are of Puerto Rican extraction, of which many are influenced by political philosophies contrary to the best interests of the United States, the loyalty clearance functions of this detachment are voluminous."

All Agents Operate in Civilian Clothes

The local situation in mid-1946 was summed up as follows: "The political situation of Panama is characteristic of all small Latin American countries, constantly turbulent, disorderly, restless and agitated. There have been incidents in which the opposition parties have attempted to gain power of the

Government by violence, but these attempts have been promptly repelled by the Government through its police department as Panama has no army."[104]

Returnees from Panama had several standard complaints and problems to put before the Center's CIC Board.

Investigative supplies, particularly film, were extremely scarce. In some instances, outdated film was received; and in others heat exposure on southern docks took its toll. Arrangements to receive film from local Signal units were made to partially correct this difficulty.

Detachment vehicles were reported in 1949 to be in "very poor condition." Many had been in use since 1942. Their state of repair was such that frequent surveillances were failures because the subject's car was simply too fast for CIC's vehicle.[105] All detachment personnel put in long hours. One returnee reported a 60-hour work week was average. Indications are that the heavy work load had no adverse effect on the morale of the detachment.[106]

Personnel Allotment of 471st CIC Detachment Decreased

The 471st CIC Detachment had its headquarters in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Authorized strength at the war's end was three officers, six warrant officers, and 13 enlisted men. In subsequent years, this allotment underwent a considerable reduction. By September 1948, the 471st was authorized two officers, one warrant officer and five enlisted men.[107]

In mid-1946, the functions of the Detachment were described as consisting of "routine personnel investigations (clearance by agency check of FBI, ONI, G2 and Insular Police files of applicants for WD jobs); special investigations of disaffected

104 Hqs, Counter Intelligence Corps Center, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., Memorandum For: The Commanding Officer, Planning & Control and the Director of Training, Subject: Interview of CIC Returnees - Capt George F. Bentley, Sgt Emerson W. Read, and Cpl Munroe C. Swenson, 13 June 1946, /s/ Frank J. Galvan, Capt, Investigations & Control, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

105 "Reports by Returnees From the Panama Area," a compilation of Returnee reports to the CIC Board during 1949, undated, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

106 "Returnee Interview," James W. Todish, Sgt, 4 August 1949, Interviewer: Major Kluckhohn, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files); and "Returnee Interview," Alfred F. Ballou, 1st Lt, 20 June 1949, Interviewer: Major Kluckhohn, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

107 Historical Data Card, 471st CIC Detachment, (Unclassified) (Organization & Directory Section, AGO, Pentagon Building).

personnel and violations of AR 380-5; undercover coverage of subversive and disaffected elements in the Army; coverage of political meetings and rallies; security surveys of installations in the Antilles Department; screening of inductees for possible derogatory information; and all types of investigations which are directed by the AC of S, G2, Antilles Department." Under the last named category came the 471st extensive coverage of the political, labor and economic situation in Puerto Rico.[108] All domestic intelligence coverage was done in accordance with the Delimitations Agreement.

To indicate the type of incidents demanding CIC coverage, the 471st in 1949 reported that its major domestic investigations involved the strike of the Puerto Rico Paper Company; a strike of the sugar workers which paralyzed the industry; a vehicle drivers strike that tied up transit service; Red May Day demonstrations and other Communist rallies; activities of the Communist infiltrated General Workers Union; and the Lykes and Bull Steamship Lines employees and dockworkers strike.[109]

108 Hqs, Counter Intelligence Corps Center, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., Memorandum For: The Commanding Officer, Plans & Control and the Director of Training, Subject: Interview of CIC Returnees - Capt George F. Bentley, Sgt Emerson W. Read, and Cpl Munroe C. Swenson, 13 June 1946, /s/ Frank J. Galvan, Capt, Investigations & Control, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AIC Board Files).

109 Hqs, 471st CIC Detachment, United States Army Forces Antilles, "CIC Unit Historical Report," Period Covered: 1 January 1949 to 31 December 1949, dated 15 March 1950, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME III

THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
WORLD WAR I, 1917 - 1918

Classified by C.D.R., USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1, 2 + 3
DECLASSIFY ON

March 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

WORLD WAR I - 1917-1918

I. THE FIRST AEF UNIT

Army Intelligence Organized

The Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army had its inception as the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I, and in the following fifteen months proved itself worthy of being a permanent part of the Army. This achievement is especially remarkable when it is recalled that at the outbreak of World War I the United States Army did not have an intelligence service.*

When the Military Information Section of the War College Division of the War Department General Staff was re-established on 3 May 1917, one of its functions was "The supervision and control of such system of military espionage and counter-espionage as shall be established by authority of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, during the continuance of the present war...."** Three months later a system for counterespionage was authorized.

"Inclusion of the words' supervision and control reflected the initial intelligence concept that this general staff agency should have centralized control and handle operations instead of being solely a policy and planning division."*** Differences of opinion on this concept were to result in numerous reorganizations and consequent confusion for nearly forty years. It was not until 1 September 1954 that an Army Intelligence Center was created and became a step toward taking the Army G2 out of operational activities.****

Colonel (later Major General) Ralph H. Van Deman, who had pioneered the establishment of an Army intelligence service, was named chief when the Military "Information" Section was established in 1917. One of his first organizational problems was the designation of various intelligence terms to define the mission and scope of the new service.*****

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* History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff 1917-1919, Vol. II, draft by Bruce W. Bidwell, Col, Inf, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954, Ch V-2 (S). (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "History MID.")

** History MID, V-11.

*** Ibid., Ch. V, p. 12

**** Department of the Army GO 65, 1 Sep 54.

***** History MID, Ch. V, pp. 4, 36.

0401

[redacted]

While Colonel Van Deman was in the process of organizing this section,* a British military mission arrived in the United States. One of its purposes was the establishment of a more intimate British-American military intelligence collaboration in London. Since it appeared likely that the United States Army would operate very closely in Europe with units of the British Army, it was decided "...to base the organization of the American departmental intelligence agency on that of the British." The British term "intelligence" came to replace the word "information" as the name of the section although no official change was authorized.** Later some of the titles adopted turned out to be misnomers such as "Field Intelligence" which was actually "Field Training."***

Colonel Van Deman had preferred the term "secret service" to denote the American military organization to hunt down subversive influences within the United States Army, but Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo claimed sole right to this title for his service. Consequently the continental army terms of "espionage" and "counter-espionage" were adopted.****

From the British, Colonel Van Deman derived the terms "positive" and "negative" intelligence which simplified organizational problems by making a functional division between collecting military information about other nations in contrast to preventing other nations from collecting unauthorized military information about the United States.***** Unfortunately, in practice, intelligence refused to be accurately defined by these simple, convenient labels and many problems resulted in the years that followed when attempts were made to operate strictly within arbitrary divisions, of positive and negative intelligence.

AEF Requests a "Secret Service"

Overseas, Major General John J. Pershing, accompanied by his advance party of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), had arrived in England on 3 June 1917, and had reached France five days later. With him was Major Dennis E. Nolan in charge of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff.******

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* History MID, Ch V-3.
** Ibid., Ch V-26.
*** Ibid., Ch V-33.
**** Ibid., Ch V-27.
***** Ibid., Ch V-35.
****** Ibid., Ch V-18.

During the following month Major Nolan held a number of conferences with officers of the British Intelligence Service of the War Office at London and a study was made for him by a Captain of the British Intelligence Service on the organization of a secret service division of the Intelligence Section of the AEF Staff.*

On 11 July 1917, Major Nolan requested the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to send the AEF fifty company grade officers for counterespionage work in cooperation with the English and French at various ports in France and "in the zone of advance with the troops." These officers were requested from the groups which would be graduated from United States training camps on August 15th. Of these officers twenty-five fluent in French and twenty-five speaking both French and German were desired.**

Secondly, he asked "that fifty secret service men who have had training in police work who speak French fluently be enlisted as sergeants of infantry in service in intelligence work and sent to France at an early date. As these men will be in intimate relation with the French people it is a matter of great importance that they not only speak the language but are men of high character."***

Third, Major Nolan requested "...that four specially selected men, who have had some training in secret service work, of unquestioned character and capacity, --such that they can be trusted with considerable funds--be sent here for training in espionage methods with a view to their use later in charge of counter-espionage work in neutral countries...." Major Nolan concluded, "It is a matter of great importance that these men are of proved experience, courage and unquestioned probity."****

This request provided for both officers and high-grade enlisted men in a "Secret Service division" and assumed that the American counterespionage system would follow the British and French procedures in having counterespionage agents working directly with espionage activities in neutral countries.*****

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* Corps of Intelligence Police Correspondence Files (Photostats), CIC Historical Project (CIP Basic Data File), Ltr fr Maj Nolan to Chief of Staff (WDGS), 11 July 1917, Document #142. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "CIP Records.")

** CIP Records, Document #142.

*** Ibid.

**** Ibid., Ltr #142, 11 July 1917, Maj Nolan to Chief of Staff.

***** History and Critical Analysis of Functions and Operations of G-2, SOS, AEF, Prepared by the ACofS, G-2, SOS, 15 May 1919, National Archives; Box 8200, Case 71-1, p 132. (Hereafter referred to as "History G-2, SOS.")

Plans for Intelligence Officers

Colonel Van Deman had anticipated the need for Intelligence Officers and on 7 July 1917, the Adjutant General had alerted all Department commanders that 160 specially qualified men were to be commissioned First and Second Lieutenants and assigned as Intelligence Officers to be "attached to the larger units sent abroad." These officers were to be employed in collection and examination of information relating to individuals in the military service and in the preparation of statistics and data relating to personnel."*

Qualifications for this assignment were clearly stated: "A high degree of intelligence and a capacity for painstaking work are essential. A working knowledge of French is most desirable. A working knowledge of German is desirable, but in less degree. There are no age limits...." The alert stated, however, "It is believed that young college professors and instructors are best suited for this character of work." On 13 August 1917, the Chief of Staff authorized selection of fifty of these officers for immediate service in France to fill the AEF request.**

Authority for the enlistment of fifty secret service men as sergeants of infantry was found under Section 2 of the act passed 18 May 1917 which authorized the President of the United States to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States. This law provided that "the President is authorized to raise, maintain by voluntary enlistment or draft, as herein provided, special and technical troops as he may deem necessary and to embody them into organizations."***

By WCD 10155-3 Par 6 of the Memorandum for the Adjutant General from the Acting Chief of Staff, Tasker H. Bliss, dated 13 August 1917, a "Corps of Intelligence Police," National Army, was authorized "to consist of fifty men with the rank, pay, and allowances of sergeants of infantry, for duty under the direction of the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces...."****

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* CIP Records, Ltr AGO 7 July 1917, to all Dept Cmdrs, File WD 9153-90 (WD 10155-3) Document #141b.

** CIP Records, Memo, 13 Aug 1917, fr Actg Chief of Staff to AGO, File 10389A-1, Document #139.

*** CIP Records, Memo 13 Aug 1917 fr Col R. H. Van Deman to Corporation Consul, City of New York, File 10389A-1, Document #119.

**** Ibid., Document #141.

[redacted]

Thus in less than a month, Major Nolan had been authorized the officer personnel and the men he desired for his "secret service division." Unfortunately, however, some organizational difficulties were involved which were to result in a number of immediate problems and problems that continued for many years to come. One of the first was that the draft of a General Order to establish the "Corps," which was forwarded with the Memorandum, was not published, and authority for the creation of the Corps was based only on the approved Memorandum.*

The General Order draft was intended to authorize a Corps of Intelligence Police "for service under the supervision of the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force." "...the enlisted strength therefor being raised and maintained by voluntary enlistment or draft...." Quite obviously, officers as well as enlisted men were intended.** Another significant phrase was that the men were not designated "sergeants," but "with the rank, pay, and allowances of sergeants of infantry" -- a simulated rank for pay and allowance purposes. Apparently this distinction, which appeared in both the draft order and the Memorandum, was not recognized, and the assumption that these men were actually sergeants contributed to the problems of the years that followed.

Existing records do not reveal how the title "Corps of Intelligence Police" was derived. "Intelligence" obviously came from the British and "Police" from Nolan's request that the men have been trained in police work. But the choice of the word "Corps" remains a mystery. Major Nolan had asked for a "secret service division of the Intelligence Section" of an Expeditionary Force staff. However, the term "secret service" was not permitted and, in addition, there was the problem that at the War Department, Intelligence was only a section of a division, even though strong efforts were being made to attain divisional status.***

Since Intelligence was not a division or corps and had none of the prerogatives of an arm or service, officers had to be "detailed" for intelligence work, and commissioned in existing arms or services.

Enlisted personnel were at first recruited specially for the CIP and discharged if found unsuitable, but within a few months this procedure was changed and men

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* CIP Records, Document #119.

** CIP Records, Draft of Unnumbered General Order, File 10389A-1, Document #140.

*** History of MID, Ch V-13.

[redacted]

were transferred in from other Army units, and transferred out if found unsuitable.* CIP service was in effect a "detail" with enlisted personnel handled as infantrymen until after World War I when they attained the status of the Detached Enlisted Men's List (DEML). In the original request for officers for intelligence it was implied that they would be in the Adjutant General's department and the War College recommended that the Adjutant General commission them.** Still later, the problem arose of assigning officers with "service" commissions to work with "line" outfits.***

In practice, Colonel Van Deman and his staff had to "beg" for officer commission vacancies anywhere they could find them, and this situation continued to a large extent even after World War I when a Military Intelligence Reserve was created. In one instance, a limited number of civilian specialists were commissioned by a personal agreement made with the Chief of the Signal Corps to use unfilled allotments established for the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps.****

Major Nolan's request for counterintelligence personnel to work in neutral countries met with a flat disapproval from the Secretary of War with the statement, "All matters pertaining to the collection of military information in neutral countries in Europe are in the charge of our military attaches who are in close cooperation with British and French attaches in counter-espionage work. Our attaches have been instructed to send direct to the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force, all matters of military importance to that command."*****

This decision was based on the opinion of Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn, Chief of the War College Division of the General Staff, who advised the Chief of Staff that Major Nolan's request for the four men "is not considered either necessary or desirable."******

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* History G-2, SOS, p. 101.

** CIP Records, Document #141; Memo for the Chief of Staff fr Chief of War College Division, 11 Aug 1917, Document #123.

*** Royden Williamson, Col, Memoirs, 11 Aug 53, CIP Basic Data File, CIC Historical Project, p. 5. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Williamson.")

**** History MID, Ch V-40.

***** CIP Records, Ltr AGO to CG, AEF, Aug 1917, File 10155-3, Document #124b.

****** CIP Records, Document #124.

Unfortunately, Major Nolan had not given any justification in his request for these four men, and General Kuhn's decision was based on the assigned mission of the Military attaches "to collect military information."* No inquiry was made to determine to what extent military attaches, who were recognized as espionage agents, and also circumscribed by diplomatic protocol, could fulfill their respective counterespionage requirements, and whether supplemental coverage was essential. Instead, this purely jurisdictional decision set the precedent. Negative intelligence was to be confined to operations in areas under control of the United States or its lines of communications. Efforts to keep within this concept caused complications for decades although its adverse effects were clearly evident by the end of World War I. In his "History and Critical Analysis of the Functions and Operations of G2, SOS, " its Chief, Colonel Cabot Ward, had described what he termed "the unfortunate results of the complete divorce between G2, SOS, and all Intelligence work in enemy and neutral countries."**

Officer Procurement Problems

Intelligence officer procurement encountered its first problem from lack of Corps status in connection with the commissioning of officers at the various training camps in the United States who had been selected for intelligence duties. First Lieutenant (later Colonel) Royden Williamson of New Rochelle, New York, first commanding officer of the Corps of Intelligence Police, has written, "... If a man, apparently suitable, was not a rookie, but already commissioned in the Reserve, he was invited to resign such commission by signing a form submitted to him, which bore the phrase: 'In consideration of a new commission in Intelligence...' etc., etc., or words to that effect. When the new commissions were received, the officers were perplexed when they found themselves commissioned as 'First Lieutenant, Statistical Section, Adjutant General's Department'."***

This confusion was only the start. On arrival in Washington in mid-August 1917, some eight or ten of these "new" First Lieutenants reported to the Officer Section of the Adjutant General's Department at the State, War and Navy Building as their orders directed. They were promptly assigned to a newly created "Information Section" of the AGD and put to work filing papers. Since one of the officers was a Rhodes Scholar, another an ex-embassy official, another a world-traveler and prominent socialite, and the others all had backgrounds considerably above file-clerk level, after a few days the suspicion dawned that this assignment might be a mistake, and not one of the mysterious ways intelligence moves its wonders to perform. With the permission of the Major in command, who was as

* History MID, Ch V-11.
** History of G2, SOS, p. 138.
*** Williamson, p. 3.

puzzled as they were at his high-caliber help, the group went en masse to the "Information" Section at the War College where Captain A. B. Coxe, Colonel Van Deman's executive officer, said the section had been looking for them for several days. Coxe agreed that things were confused.

The officers realized they were more than confused when Captain Coxe continued by saying that they were all wrongly commissioned, and would have to wait a few days until they could be recommissioned as "line" officers. He explained that the first problem was to find which line branch could provide the commission vacancies.* Shortly the group were commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, USA, and enrolled as students at the War College for about a month in a newly organized course in intelligence duties.

The "borrowing" of officer spaces from the arms and services had a highly adverse effect on intelligence officer procurement. The caliber of officer wanted for intelligence represented the best type of any arm or service, and quite naturally the arms and services desired to retain such officers. An officer who volunteered for intelligence risked disfavor with the branch he was assigned to. Later, when officers were drafted from the branches for intelligence, all too frequently the officer selected was the one the branch could best spare, and this usually was not top quality.

This situation continued through World War II and into the Occupation Era that followed. Commenting on it in 1950, Major General Van Deman, then retired, wrote, "There is one point in connection with the matter of officer personnel which I feel it my duty to call to the attention of all of the intelligence officers who may read this memorandum. This is: It is my careful considered opinion after being closely associated with Military Intelligence matters over a period of some fifty-five years that the Army will never have a really efficient intelligence service until it is made into what is known as a 'career' service. In other words, until the officers who have proved themselves to be competent and efficient intelligence officers are allowed and encouraged to make military intelligence their army careers. This should, of course, only apply to the higher ranking officers since the efficiency of all intelligence officers must be based on the thoroughness of their training in the military service and this requires years of both study and actual experience."**

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* Williamson, p. 5

** Maj Gen R. H. Van Deman Memoirs, 5 June 1950, CIC Historical File, Vol. 2, Introduction, p. "b". (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Van Deman".)

A survey made at a number of army installations in 1918 by a Military Intelligence Section officer revealed that line officers were "greatly disappointed to receive an intelligence officer appointment and had little interest in their work; that they felt hopelessly lost in attempting to learn." Moreover, the survey revealed that local military authorities seldom appreciated the importance of counterintelligence operations and displayed little knowledge of the qualities desirable in an intelligence officer.

Due to this lack of understanding on the part of higher authorities, the intelligence officers "were often given many tasks which had no connection with military intelligence and seriously interfered with the execution of their primary mission." The result was that in many cases, these officers "usually carried out their counter-espionage mission in a perfunctory manner only."*

Recruiting the "Sergeants"

To obtain the fifty CIP "sergeants" authorized, Colonel Van Deman called in the heads of the three largest and most important detective agencies in the United States to give him the names of men who would fill the personal, character, language, civilian skill and military qualifications desired. Describing the conference many years later, after his retirement, General Van Deman wrote, "The results were not promising; in fact, Mr. Pinkerton, the old gentleman with one eye, said, when told the qualifications required, 'There ain't no such animal.'"**

So the recruiting problem was turned over to a Lieutenant Vella with instructions to get the fifty men in about as many days.*** Since men with police experience could not be obtained, Vella concentrated on language. During a month at New Orleans and then three weeks at New York, he inserted advertisements in the newspapers which stated that men who could speak French were needed for intelligence work to go overseas quickly. Unfortunately, the statement that it was "intelligence work" and promised a trip overseas attracted a number of men of questionable backgrounds, and resulted in the recruitment of a miniature French Foreign Legion. None had experience in police work, but one had a police record.

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* History MID, Ch VIII-22.

** Van Deman, 8 April 1949, Vol. I, Preface, p. 2.

*** Gilbert Elliot, History of a Portion of the Corps of Intelligence Police in France, CIP Basic Data File, CIC Historical Project Files, p. 1. Written for MID by this former agent in August 1919. File #10309C-211. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Elliot.")

One was mentally unbalanced. One was a French deserter. One was suspected of German sympathies; several were just morons.* Colonel Williamson describes them as " a delegation of 'Cajuns' from Louisana, a sprinkling of French Canadians, a number of Europeans, a coterie of Harvard men; and their professional antecedents ran the gamut of occupations. If there were any 'Secret Service' men among . . . well, I didn't meet them. And I knew each and everyone of them."**

Several Belgians were included among this motley crew of adventurers. Since at that time Belgians and those Belgium-connected were not considered trustworthy unless they had been "examined", they consequently were not accepted when the unit reported to the AEF.*** Notes of the Recruiting Officer reveal some of the characteristics of these men. One was "in building construction" and "hot tempered." Another was a "sharp Creole." One "at times exaggerates situations." Comments on other men included "needs democratization," "Hebrew, very shrewd " "needs pep," "Englishman with all characteristics appended," "bears watching," "peculiar psychology," "good mechanic," "average," "business man, understands supplies".****

Forecasting the future, a suspected communist was among the group. Shortly after the group was assembled at Fort Jay, New York, in early October, Lieutenant Williamson learned of the suspicions. It was rumored in the detachment that this man had served time in Blackwell's Island penitentiary for Red demonstrations against the property of John D. Rockefeller at Tarrytown, New York.

Lieutenant Williamson has stated that he reported the allegation to the War College Division at Washington, and to Headquarters, Fort Jay, but started no investigation of his own. From the results it appears that no one at Fort Jay knew what to do. So the Commanding Officer of Fort Jay appointed a board of officers from the 22d Infantry to investigate. Williamson states that all this board did was to meet and call in the accused to answer the charges, which he quite obviously did as the board reported five days before the unit sailed that "no reason had been found why said person was in any way disqualified for service overseas." However, just before sailing, the Intelligence Officer at Fort Jay ordered that the man be left behind. Presumably, word had come from the MIS at Washington.*****

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*Williamson, p. 1.

**CIP Records, Ltr fr Williamson to Deputy Chief of CIC, 24 June 53, filed with Williamson memoirs.

***Van Deman, Vol. I, Preface 2.

****Williamson, p. 15.

*****Ibid., p. 15.

Obviously this first CIP unit consisted mainly of "bodies" to fill spaces, a situation again disasterously repeated following World War II. It is remarkable that so many of these men made outstanding records. The requirements of investigative experience and French fluency were ignored. Any kind of French went--Cajun, Canadian, or French with any foreign accent. All the Recruiting Lieutenant did was to ask a few simple questions in French. References were required but apparently these references were not called upon in most cases. There was only one firm requirement--passing an Army physical examination. Even for that, minor physical defects that would not interfere with duties as intelligence police were waived.*

While these men were being assembled at Fort Jay, Lieutenant Williamson was completing his thirty day course at the Military Intelligence Section of the War College. Included in the instructions was orientation on the "Suspect" Files at MIS where thousands of cards were set up on tables in the hall opposite the War College Library. These cards, Williamson said, named people whose loyalty should not have been disputed. He continued, "Their implication was an index of what hysteria can possess a public under the bane of war, but to see this served to impress us with how judgment should be joined with discernment if one is to be a competent intelligence officer."**

Most of the course consisted of lectures by Major Charles H. Mason of the War College Staff, but occasionally intelligence economic research problems were given. Little material was available on any of them. Williamson's topic was, "What are the resources of the Central Powers in raw materials?" Visits to many government agencies including the Geological Survey, the Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior Departments, failed to turn up any valuable information. There was none***

First CIP Unit Organized

Williamson's course ended on 8 October 1917. The next day he reported to Colonel John C. F. Tillson at Fort Jay and took over the CIP unit which was under canvas in the Overseas Casual Camp Area, shivering in its summer clothes at the "brisk mid-autumn wind" whipping across New York harbor.****

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* CIP Records, Document #123; Elliot, p. 1; Williamson, p. 10.
** Williamson, p. 5.
*** Ibid., p. 6.
**** Ibid., p. 9.

Here again the future was forecast as supply problems were frequently CIC headaches. In a few days Williamson solved this supply shortage, and the men had all their infantry equipment including overcoats, extra blankets, and three-chevron grade patches. The .45 Colt automatic was issued in lieu of the rifle and bayonet. On the campaign hat of each man was the green cord which had been authorized for the Corps. "With all this new gear," wrote Colonel Williamson years later, "the organization was soon making a showing on parade."*

During the month before the unit sailed there was no intelligence training, but Colonel Williamson stated, "Our paper work was efficiently and punctually accomplished.... Colonel Tillson was a soldier of the old school, the type of exacting disciplinarian it was a privilege to have served under....Any doubt that the Corps of Intelligence Police was anything but infantry while under Col Tillson's authority and would be trained strictly as a military unit was dispelled by the drill schedules posted at his headquarters." The CIP schedule included daily calisthenics, close order drill, school of the soldier, camp policing and instruction in interior guard duty, and similar subjects.**

On mid-afternoon of 12 October, the CIP sailed for Europe on the S.S. Powhattan, formerly the S.S. Hamburg of the Hamburg-American Lines, saying "good bye" to America and their civilian clothing which they had been told to leave behind.*** During the thirteen day trip to Saint Nazaire, the CIP unit took its part in the usual ships chores, and in addition, while Williamson and his supply sergeant, Sabin J. Dalferes of New Orleans, interviewed each member of the unit to complete their personal records, Sergeant Gabriel Martin, whose mother lived in Rouen, France, taught French to the casual officers.****

Troubles began on arrival at St. Nazaire. Waiting were orders sending one-third of the force to a duty assignment elsewhere and the remaining two-thirds were to go to AEF General Headquarters at Chaumont.***** While Lieutenant Williamson was straightening out this problem and getting orders for all to go to Chaumont, the unit had debarked and been mistakenly arrested by the Marines.******

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* Williamson, P. 10.
** Ibid., p. 12.
*** Elliot, P. 5.
**** Williamson, p. 19.
***** Ibid., p. 18.
****** Elliot, P. 2.

Released, the group left for Paris en route to Chaumont, but found no billets available at Paris. They were quartered at various hotels for the four days it took Williamson to arrange their fiscal matters with the US Military Control unit. At the Hotel Quai d'Orsay, where several of these enlisted men were billeted, a high French officer nervously inquired if it was a custom of the American Army to billet its enlisted men in hotels.*

On 5 December, the Corps left for Chaumont-en-Bassigny, Department de la Haute-Marne, and late in the evening formed ranks beside the deserted station to march under a cold winter moon to an unfinished barracks-without shutters, flooring, or heat.

In the morning, Lieutenant Williamson reported to Major Moreno, Chief of G-2-b, the Secret Service Division at GHQ. Meanwhile the CIP unit was kept busy digging latrine foundations behind the GHQ.** Shortly the Corps was settled into place with the other troop units. Here the Corps had the first of its rivalries with the military police. Its green hat cords served to provoke, now and then, hostile demonstrations. "What prompted such rivalry," wrote Williamson, "whether it was design or native antipathy of some 'orangemen' for the color was never revealed."***

Major Moreno's section was under Colonel William O. Reed, Chief of the Service of Security of G-2, AEF. Major Nicholas Campernole was Chief of G-2-a, the Information Division, which handled order of battle and economic intelligence as well as interrogation of prisoners of war, enemy artillery locations, radio monitoring and codes.****

The Secret Service Division, G-2-b, included diversified sections, of which tactical zone activities was the first, dissemination of ciphers and handling "accounts" the second, and the Counter Espionage Section the third. The Counter Espionage Section not only included a counterespionage personnel subsection, but included files, civilian controls, passes, censorship, liaison, dissemination, and "invisible inks" subsections.*****

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* Elliot, p. 2.
** Ibid., p. 2.
*** Williamson, p. 25.
**** Ibid., p. 24.
***** Ibid., p. 24; History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #2.

[redacted]

Division G-2-c was Topography, and Division G-2-d, Censorship; Division G-2-e, Intelligence Personnel was the administrative division for the personnel handled operationally by G-2-b.3.*

When Colonel Cabot Ward became G-2 of the SOS and organized his headquarters at Paris in January 1918, his first order defined the mission of that command into two functions, "Prevention" and "Detection."**

Intelligence Training started for the CIP unit under the supervision of Commandant Walter of the French Surete, commencing with orientation on the civil system of the French State.

At the same time, Commandant Walter conducted a screening of the Corps with particular reference to the antecedents of the European-born members who included Englishmen, Frenchmen, Swiss, Belgians, Spaniards, Yugoslavs and Turks. Several French members were jailed as a result of this screening as they were suspected of having evaded conscription with their own forces.***

Overseas Training

Following this screening, ten CIP men were selected for training with the British at Le Havre under the command of Captain Arthur Campbell-Turner, an American officer who had previously been a Lieutenant in British Intelligence, with station at Le Havre, and recently transferred into the AEF.**** Captain Priestly, the British Intelligence Officer or "IO" at Le Havre, had prepared the text, a "Syllabus for Instruction of Intelligence Police," which covered twenty-one major topics including such items as "Recognition of the boundary between Military Police and Intelligence Police work" and "the use of tact" in dealing with French officials.***** About seventy-five men were trained at Le Havre including members of the original CIP unit and men transferred to the Corps from other branches of the AEF during the following months. Intelligence training had become so important by mid-1918 that plans had been made for a four-week intelligence school at Bourdeaux which was scheduled to have opened on 12 November 1918.******. However, on-the-job training was started at Bordeaux in addition to the training being given at Le Havre.

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*Williamson, p. 24; History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #2.
**History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #1.
***Williamson, p. 2.
****Elliot, p.3.
*****CIP Records, Syllabus, Documents #24, 25.
******History G-2 SOS, p. 97; Exhibit #2.

[redacted]

As the war progressed, the replacements and additions to the CIP, selected in a probationary status from units of the AEF, were sent to Le Havre for a four to six weeks course. Because of the British and French officials' requirement that American personnel be in civilian clothes to train with them, the first step was application for the civilian clothing allowance. While waiting approval and issue, candidates went out in uniform on "Morale" surveys of arriving troop units to obtain facts for the basis of counter propaganda programs. This only took a few days and then the men were each assigned for ten days to the three types of travel control: Cross Channel Ship, Railway, and Merchant Seamen. Graduates of the course were then transferred to the CIP with the rank of sergeant.*

On-the-job training with both the British and French and including the Military Police and French Morale Police was interrupted by a great deal of typing and indexing as the young Corps started building its card file or fitche as the French called it. Names and data from British intelligence circulars and summaries was copied. Names were checked at the French fitche at the Hotel de Ville (city hall) and at the British Consulate where visas for passports were issued.** Training continued in other types of travel and communications control such as "Garnis Control," the registration of guests and lodgers in hotels and other rooming places; Civilian Labor Control by registration; Frontier and Road Control; and Censorship of Telegraph, Telephone, Mail and Press.***

Cross Channel Ship Control consisted of checking passengers of the morning and evening Southampton Packet, the only civilian travel route between England and France. Although CIP agents solemnly declared that enemy submarines never sank the packet for fear of drowning valuable agents,**** Colonel Ward stated after the war, "It is doubtful if any genuine spies presented themselves unless they were provided with very carefully prepared papers." However, Colonel Ward said that occasionally suspicious papers were seized from travellers, and that the control kept track of the movements of "an enormous number of people who were considered suspect or undesirable."*****

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*Watkins, John B., Lt Col, "Some Intelligence Missions 1918-9 and 1941-5," written 15 April 1948, CIC Historical Project File #1, pp. 4-5. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Watkins.")

**Elliot, p.3.

***History G-2 SOS, pp. 49-70.

****Elliot, p. 3.

*****History G-2 SOS, p. 46.

[redacted]

Control of Merchant Seamen was the most difficult assignment since Le Havre was a huge port with scores of fishing, passenger, and cargo ships as well as many army personnel and supply ships all spread out over several miles of docks. While shore passes could be refused suspects on "black lists," Major Ward reported, "In practice, it was almost impossible to prevent landing or communications with persons on shore....The best method of supplementing this control was by having the most intelligent of the Intelligence Police personnel frequent the water-side cafes and seaman's resorts."*

Le Havre continued to be the instructional and replacement base for all G-2, SOS personnel until the end of the war, and in that connection Major Ward wrote, "It is impossible to overestimate the assistance the British Intelligence Service afforded, G-2 not only through their records and the information they communicated, but also in lending the benefit of the experience which they had gained previous to America's entry into the war and which was indispensable as a basis for the establishment of the American Service...."**

Principles for the conduct of the Corps of Intelligence Police which were prepared for training purposes in mid-1918 remained essentially the same through the period of peace and two wars that followed. The primary mission of the Corps was providing "a force of specially trained men to be employed in Counter-Espionage work. This means detecting enemy agents and preventing them from communicating to their superiors any information obtained. It also contemplated the surveillance of suspects and undesirables who may be enemy agents, engaged in collecting information concerning our troops, prospective military operations, locations of camps, ammunition depots, relief of troops from first line trenches, etc., and other information of military importance...."***

Travel control was the basis for checking activities of suspected persons. The Instructions stated, "It is difficult to charge a person with espionage and deal with him as a spy but even if he be clever enough to operate so as not to commit any overt act which would render him open to arrest, his movements while circulating can be controlled so as to render impossible further espionage on his part. In this manner the enemy has one agent less and, therefore, the same result is attained as would have been the case had he been convicted of espionage and faced the firing squad."****

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 48.

** Ibid., p. 15.

*** CIP Records, "Syllabus for the Corps of Intelligence Police," Documents #26 and 27.

**** Ibid.

[redacted]

CIP agents were to determine if a suspect had the right to travel, if the particular trip was legitimate, and whether the person really was the person named on the pass. CIP agents were required to thoroughly understand the pass system in use in France. "It is the duty of the members of the Intelligence Police to detect enemy agents by systematic, painstaking, and energetic effort and to prevent their operation."*

With this end in view, agents were told to cultivate the friendship of reliable citizens and "persons of affluence," as in many cases "enemy agents seek just this class of society for the purpose of operating unmolested."**

Continual liaison with the French authorities was mandatory. Except in cases of American military personnel and militarized civilians, Intelligence Police had no power to arrest or to search private premises. Arrests or searches, except in cases of urgent military necessity, had to be made with the assistance of a member of the Surete Generale, an NCO of the Gendarmerie or the village garde-champetre.***

Continual cooperation with the Military Police also was ordered. The Military Police was an absolutely independent organization and "unless specially directed, the Intelligence Police were not to make inquiries respecting larcenies or desertions and the MP's were to report to the Intelligence Police the movements of all doubtful or undesirable persons. Intelligence Police were not to concern themselves with supervision of cafes, sale of liquor to troops, watching houses of prostitution or violation of regulations by military personnel. Military Police were to report incidents of intelligence interest. "When the urgency of the case demands arrest, the Military Police is the proper agency to receive the report and take action."****

CIP personnel were told, "It is not the part of the Intelligence Police to administer the regulations for the control of the military or civil population...." "It should be borne in mind continually that executive power in France is vested in the French military and civil authorities." CIP was reminded that "the Maires and other officials should be informed that you ask only for information or assistance and do not give instructions...When making a joint investigation with a French agent, and satisfactory results are obtained, give him the fullest praise in your report...."*****

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* CIP Records, "Syllabus for the Corps of Intelligence Police," Documents #26.
** Ibid.
*** Ibid.
**** Ibid., Document #27.
***** Ibid., Document #28.

[redacted]

The members of the Intelligence Police, owing to the nature of their duties, were not always under the supervision of an officer. So self-discipline became essential. CIP personnel, the instructions stated, "...enjoy greater freedom of action than other soldiers and it is very important that their conduct and demeanor be worthy of the confidence placed in them. Any violation of confidence or breaches of trust on the part of an Intelligence Police will receive summary treatment and will be considered sufficient grounds for removal from the service."*

Agents were never to lose their tempers, "no matter how great the provocation or how just the cause for indignation...avoid the use of slang and profanity...also tobacco should not be used while on duty, especially in the presence of ladies....The greatest care must be used in selecting associates. Although it will be necessary to keep in touch with undesirable people in the course of duty, association with prostitutes or women of immoral character on other occasions is dangerous. It is part of the duty of the Intelligence Police to try and prevent American soldiers from associating with persons of this character who are under suspicion....The work devolving upon Intelligence Police will leave no time to take part in social life. Therefore private associates should not be cultivated. Your entire time will be occupied with your duties. Except on duty requiring it, do not frequent military messes or canteens. In this way you will not be susceptible to attempts to interrogate you as to your duties....Attend strictly to business."** "...A great deal of the work of the Intelligence Police will of necessity be of a routine nature. This routine is essential as preventative measures; but initiative, constructive work and departure from routine in order to obtain definite information as to the enemy agent and to convict him as such.."***.

Intelligence Police assigned to duty with the SOS were ordered attired, usually, in civilian clothing, but were to wear the uniform while serving with armies. The instructions added, "Although all Intelligence Police have the rank of Sergeants of Infantry, in many cases the absence of chevrons or other insignia of this rank will facilitate the work of obtaining information, especially when on duty with troops, as soldiers will not discuss matters with the same freedom with non-commissioned officers as they will with a soldier of their own rank."****

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* CIP Records, "Syllabus for the Corps of Intelligence Police, "Document #27.
** Ibid., Document #28.
*** Ibid., Document #36.
**** Ibid., Document #40.

[redacted]

The Magnitude of the Job

By the time the first fifty members of the CIP had arrived in early December 1917, the Intelligence Section of the AEF had gained some concept of the magnitude of the job ahead. The execution of Mati Hari, the Dutch dancer and spy, by the French in September had dramatically called the attention of the world to the ever-present German espionage and sabotage workers, but G-2 AEF was concerned with the less spectacular and more deadly German "army" of low level espionage agents infiltrated into every section of France. One German organization, which was ostensibly a mutual benefit employment association for hotel employees such as managers, waiters, interpreters, porters, cashiers, etc., had some fifteen hundred agents in France, and this was only one of several German "front" organizations.* In Madrid, German agents were recruiting Spanish laborers who were being imported to France to work on the construction of dozens of American depots. French and British intelligence were regularly reporting on Belgian and Dutch citizens suspected of working for the Germans.** Another danger not then recognized had come into being at this same time. Lenin and his Bolsheviks had just taken over Russia. But "Instructions for the Corps of Intelligence Police," published in 1918, was concerned only with the Germans. It stated that, "It is necessary to bear in mind constantly that the enemy has a very highly organized espionage service, as a result of years of preparation by experienced managers and that their agents undergo most careful training."***

The nature of the enemy had been officially recognized almost as soon as the first contingent of the AEF arrived in France. General Order Number 10, dated Paris, 9 July 1917 and signed by Lieutenant General James G. Harbord, Chief of Staff, opened with the words, "It is no secret but we are prone to forget that in this war the United States is pitted against an enemy with a splendid spy system..." This order stated flatly that no military personnel would discuss orally or in writing any military matters except in line of duty. It was directed that the order be read in every unit.****

*Johnson, T. M., Our Secret War, Bobbs Merrill, 1929, p. 81. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Johnson,")

**History G-2 SOS, p. 61.

***CIP Records, "Instructions for the Corps of Intelligence Police," 1918, Documents 26-41.

****History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #13.

By late January it was obvious that the original authorization for fifty CIP agents would be only a cadre for the organization required, and on 24 January 1918, by cable number 513, General Pershing requested authority to increase his CIP to 750 men. With the high percentage of unsuitables of the original group in mind, authority was asked for local recruiting from units overseas, on a gradual basis of need. Although this request was approved, the CIP, AEF, never reached its quota. By the time of the Armistice, it had 418 agents, and 34 men on probation to make a total of 452.* On 1 January 1919, it totaled 405.** Of these agents, approximately one-third were in the Front Zone, and two-thirds in G-2, SOS.

Gradually as the scope of the problem emerged, the counterintelligence organization of the CIP and the Intelligence Officers assigned to lead them evolved as follows:

1. Front Zone, under Col L. A. Sigaud, territory contiguous to the 400 mile fighting front, 100 miles of which the United States was to become responsible for, and, in addition, including about 400 miles of Swiss frontier with two "key" frontier control centers. This Front CIP Zone kept its headquarters with the GHQ of the AEF at Chaumont, and had a branch with the First Army. Another branch opened a few weeks before the war ended at Second Army Headquarters at Toul. CIP men under Col Willey Howell of the First Army, were sent to many of the thirty combat divisions of the AEF before the war ended.***

2. Rear Zone, under Major (later Colonel) Cabot Ward, of New York City, with headquarters at Paris, and a sub-headquarters at Tours under Capt Frederick Henrotin at the headquarters of the SOS, was established to handle only counterintelligence work,**** and finally a sub-headquarters at London for England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.*****

This zone had four major missions--port, frontier, depot, and recreational area security. There were fourteen major ports in France, England, and Scotland. There was more than 400 miles of frontier of Spain and Italy, and thirty-one French cities where there were American supply, service or training depots in the immediate vicinity. This counterintelligence coverage was spread out over some 80,000 square miles of Northwestern France. Finally, there was the security at seven important leave centers.******

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* Lester, J. A., Lt Col. Address at CIP School, Washington, DC, 24 Feb 41, p. 3. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Lester.")

** Origin and Organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-23 October 1943, CIC Historical Project, Basic History Files, p. 7. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Origin, CIC.")

*** Lester, p. 3; Johnson, p. 35; Army Almanac, 1950, pp. 437, 38.

**** Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 19.

***** History G-2 SOS, pp. 12, 29, Exhibits 3, 3a.

****** Ibid.

3. Special Projects were handled by GHQ. They included the assignment of Sgt Charles C. Crosby, of New York City as the first CIP for VIP work. He was assigned to General Pershing's private train. Other CIP agents became specialist supervisors of various technical phases of counterintelligence, and were consulted by everyone regardless of rank.*

Among the officer specialists were 1st Lt John Hoar who specialized in Relief Society cases and 2d Lt Robert S. Cauvin, AG, of Nashville, Tennessee, who specialized in labor, socialism and Bolshevism cases.**

At Bordeaux, Sgt Harold A. Purcell became an expert on counterespionage aspects of civilian labor, and set up a control system with ten sub-offices. Civilian security control was a tremendous task. The Army employed more than 7,000 American civilians; the Relief Societies nearly 6,000 Americans; and there were more than 8,000 Americans working or living in France and not connected directly with the AEF. Laborers hired by contractors to work on Army construction including French, Belgian, Spanish, Greek, Russian, Portuguese and Chinese workers totaled in the tens of thousands. German espionage agents were infiltrating these groups. They were known to have 200 stolen French labor authorization cards carte verts, of which only 96 were ever located.***

There were a number of other CIP specialists. One of the original group was Sgt Philip Paleri of New York City, who became an expert on German-Spanish espionage modus operandi. Sgts Beaulieu, Bocher and the Ward brothers (no relation to the Colonel) became experts in surveillance, as did Sgt Percival W. Whittlesey of Middletown, Connecticut, another of the original group. Several became specialists in undercover. Sgt Jesus F. Loren, who was born in Tallers, Spain, was trained for a special job on arrival, but available records give no other details. Sgt Pedro Padilla was recommended for the Distinguished Service Medal for his undercover work.**** At the Paris G-2 SOS Headquarters, Walter J. Goedeke of Baltimore, Maryland, an expert on passports and files, was borrowed from the State Department, and commissioned a First Lieutenant to handle the organization for the Paris office.*****

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*Elliot, p. 5.
**History G-2 SOS, p. 23, Exhibits 8, 9, 90.
***Ibid.
****Elliot, p. 5; History G-2 SOS, pp 29, 61.
*****History G-2 SOS, p. 12.

In the Front Zone

In the Front Zone, Colonel Sigaud had three missions for his approximately 150 men. First, he supplied such CIP personnel as was needed at G-2, GHQ, at Chaumont and at First Army Headquarters. Secondly, he supplied personnel for Frontier Security on the Swiss border with two offices--one at Pontartier on the Western end and one at Belford on the Eastern end. Remaining personnel were available for combat counterintelligence among the combat divisions on the fighting lines.*

The Swiss border was a special problem as it flanked the fighting front, and Johnson quotes an allied authority of 1917 as saying, "There is hardly a single place on the Swiss frontier from Basel to the extreme southeastern shore of Lake Constance which has not been occupied and organized by the Germans for espionage purposes."** A practice which was still in operation thirty-five years later was advertising in newspapers of neutral countries for agents under the guise of interesting work, travel, etc. During World War I, the German espionage service advertised in the Neue Zeitung of Zurich for "ladies and gentlemen for practice in French conversation."***

While most of the CIP work was at Belfort and Pontaliers, other agents were stationed at Anne-masse and Evian-les-Baines.**** Belfort, headquarters for the frontier service, had less counterintelligence interest, but Anne-masse just east of Geneva was the station through which all the Repatries came from Germany into France. General Van Deman noted that "a great deal of information is gotten from the 'Repatries' which is freely interchanged among all three services. Also the Boche frequently attempted to get his agents through in this way and has to be checked."***** When Van Deman arrived in Bern, Switzerland, he found it so "loaded with German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish spies it was thought best that I keep as quiet as possible."******

This Franco-Swiss border control was considered of vital counterintelligence importance. General Foch stated that he felt its work was mainly responsible for the fact that the Germans had not been able to even get a hint of the Franco-American offensive in July.*******

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*History G-2 SOS, p. 18; Army Almanac, 1950, p 427.
**Johnson p-231.
***Ibid, p. 218.
****Van Deman, Vol I, p. 308.
*****Ibid., Vol II, Appendix H-2.
******Ibid., Vol II, P. 36.
*******Ibid., Vol II, Appendix C-2.

By the time the Corps of Intelligence Police began working with the combat troops, a serious misuse of intelligence personnel had been corrected. At the start of American participation in combat, intelligence personnel had suffered heavy losses, particularly at battalion level. Investigation revealed that commanders were making up their raiding parties almost exclusively of intelligence personnel. This resulted in an order limiting intelligence personnel in any raiding party to not more than two men.*

First to work with the combat troops was Sgt Eugene Sieffert of the original group of CIP's, who was sent to the First Division at Toul where it had just completed its overseas move on the 22d of December. Already two of its earlier arrivals had been killed in action--among the first American soldiers to be killed in World War I, and a grim forecast of its future in which it suffered 22,320 casualties out of an average strength of some 25,000. Sergeant Seiffert was not killed, but may have been among the several unidentified CIP agents wounded during the war.**

This first American sector north of Toul facing St. Mihiel salient was near enough to German Lorraine to have a mixed civil population, speaking both French and German, and with equally mixed loyalties. Crossing "No Man's Land" was rather safe since the country was wooded and rough and the front quiet. Consequently spy stories were common in the division,*** and the first work of the CIP agent was to make certain that the system of travel controls resulted in every person not properly identified being brought in for questioning. This meant screening scores of refugees and line crossers.

This screening reached gigantic proportions just before the St. Mihiel drive started on 12 September 1918, and continued until the start of the Meuse-Argonne campaign on 26 September when thirty American divisions massed for the final offensive that terminated in the Armistice on 11 November. To "clean" these areas of suspects, all the CIP's of the front zone were massed, and the SOS area drained of all possible CIP agents. Colonel Lester has stated, "This was done so effectively that the movement of the troops was unknown to the enemy until it was too late."****

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*Van Deman, Vol II, p. 62.
**Elliot, p. 2.
***Johnson, p. 98.
****Lester, p. 3.

German agents in American uniforms provided problems from the time the 2d and 28th Divisions entered the lines at Verdun. There is an unverified story that in the Argonne Forest the Germans established a stay-behind agent in an American uniform hidden in an underground dugout, and connected by secret telephone to a listener behind the German lines.*

In all events, there was ample CIP work to be done. For example, a tactical security problem resulted from the delivery of packages to soldiers in the front lines. As often happened, when the wind blew the discarded outer wrappers into the German lines, the German Intelligence officers had handed to them from the soldier's address, his company, battalion, regiment and division.**

Instructions for the Corps of Intelligence Police, issued in late 1918, included duties when accompanying advance troops, duties which remained essentially the same during World War II and the Korean Conflict.*** Agents were given "Black" and "White" lists. Upon entering evacuated or recaptured cities or towns, suspects on the "Black" list were to "be sent under escort for examination to the Surete, who will be established in one or more posts..." Reliable people of the "White" lists were given questionnaires to fill out. For security reasons names of both suspects and reliables were furnished on one list without identification of status, and CIP agents were ordered not to make any notations thereon. A duplicate list was deposited with the Assistant Provost Marshal, but the instructions specifically stated that this list was not to be furnished to the Military Police.**** Records do no reveal how an agent was to distinguish "Black" from "White" on this unmarked list.

Prior to entering a city or town, CIP agents were instructed to find the former residents of the place who were now within our lines and from them select guides to the districts known to them. These guides, who were to advance with the first line of troops, were then available to help check on reliable and unreliable persons who remained in the place. CIP agents were ordered to replace the Maire (Mayor) should he be suspect. All inhabitants were to be examined and crossexamined for any enemy order of battle information. Proprietors of cafes which continued in business during the time of occupation by the enemy were to be carefully examined, and the building searched, in conjunction with the French since the CIP did not have search authority.*****

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*Johnson, p. 101.
**History G-2 SOS, p. 122.
***CIP Records, Documents #26, 41.
****Ibid., (39)
*****Ibid., #(40), (37).

The chief function of the Intelligence Police with Armies was "control of the civil population and the detection and prevention of espionage...in conjunction with the French authorities...." CIP agents were ordered to have a thorough knowledge of the local topography, and of the passes used in travel control, and to establish such control immediately. A population census was to be made, and regular checkups of all hotel registration and railway control lists conducted.*

CIP agents were ordered to become familiar with the reputation and history of the persons residing in that area, with no class of society omitted. CIP agents working discreetly with reliable sources, were able to identify enemy collaborators, and, if advisable, make arrangements with the French gendamerie or other officials for their arrest. Search was to be made for any possible signalling apparatus, and any hidden wire taps until their source was located.

Laundry employees were to be kept under careful observation because of the information they could easily acquire from clothing that they handled. In addition, agents were to watch laundry laid out on the grass as a signal to aeroplanes. Special attention was directed to gypsies and "other persons of this character." Their travel was to be limited to specified hours and prescribed areas. They were to be required to report to the authorities at specified times and places.**

First Soviet Conflicts.

On 6 July 1918, World War I was extended to two Russian fronts when President Wilson, against the recommendations of his Secretary of War and Army Chief of Staff, yielded to British and French pressure for a joint Allied Northern Russia Military Expedition, which was not finally terminated until 31 March 1920 when the AEF, Siberia evacuated Vladivostok.***

For details of this "Russian Adventure" which reflect several vital intelligence problems, and America's first real encounter with the subversion tactics of the communists, readers are referred to Col Bruce Bidwell's "History of the Military Intelligence Division," previously cited.

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*CIP Records, Document # (37).
**Ibid., (38).
***History MID, Ch IX-1, 28.

[redacted]

Maj. Gen. W. S. Graves, Commanding General of the AEF, Siberia, received his original troops from the Philippines, and landed at Vladivostok on 16 August 1918. Of his eventual force of about 9,000, there was an Intelligence Section of 34 persons, of which four officers and four clerks handled counterintelligence. Unfortunately, General Graves and Major D. P. Barrows, his G2, clashed, and as a result Barrows was forbidden direct communication with the Military Intelligence Division or the Intelligence Division at Peking.*

In spite of the G2 Commander, conflict in AEF, Siberia, counterintelligence measures were successful, and the final report stated, "Attempts on the part of the Russians to spread Bolshevik propaganda among our troops were promptly discovered. At no time were the Americans found to be influenced by Bolshevism. There were a few cases of desertion to the Russian partisan or Bolshevik forces, but in every case the soldiers were found to be Russians who had apparently enlisted in the United States for that purpose."**

The AEF, Northern Russia, was organized from troops that were in England and assigned to the AEF, France. This force was not an independent command, but operated under the British Army. It arrived at Archangel on 4 September 1918. In March 1919, Maj. Gen. W. P. Richardson took command of the United States contingent which consisted of about 5,000 men.*** "The Intelligence Section of this AEF unit, the American Military Mission to Russia at Archangel, and the American Embassy there merged into one GHQ Intelligence section which handled the counterintelligence organization, although it was financed by British funds."****

In Northern Russia the British were actually fighting the Bolsheviks in support of the White Russian government of Admiral Kolchak; so the American troops were committed with them, and consequently were subjected to an intensive barrage of Soviet-inspired revolutionary propaganda of every conceivable type. This penetrated into fertile fields of mental response, conditioned by a number of adverse factors. Young American draftees wanted to go home just as their companions did who were in France when the war ended. They could not see that the Bolsheviks were just as much their enemies as the Germans. They did not like the isolation, or the severe arctic conditions, or the normal friction engendered by close association with unfamiliar nationalities of British, French, Poles, Serbians, Finns, Karelians, Lithuanians, and anti-Bolshevik Russians. They especially disliked the British because of being under their command.*****

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* History MID, Ch IX-23.
** Ibid., Ch. IX-27.
*** Ibid., Ch. IX-29, 30.
**** Ibid., Ch. IX-29, 33.
***** Ibid., Ch. IX-36, 37.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Thirteen mutinous incidents occurred among the British, French, Russian, and American units. The most serious American incident involved a company of the 339th Infantry. On 30 March 1919, the entire company refused to pack sleds for a movement order. Investigation revealed that this was instigated principally by a disaffected agitator working for the Soviets. Questions by the mutinous men to their officers were identical with the questions suggested by the Soviet propaganda. The Soviet policy of treating Allied prisoners well, and trying to persuade them to enter their propaganda schools in the hope that these PW's could be sent back through the lines to assist in the further breakdown of troop morale had apparently paid off.

The final unfortunate aspect of this Russian adventure took place when the American troops returned home, and the American attache at Tokyo requested authority to retain the branch intelligence service at Vladivostok under 2d Lt John R. Northrup, who was particularly well qualified linguistically "to secure correct information." As soon as Secretary of War Baker heard of this proposal, he cabled, "Secretary of War prohibits intelligence personnel from operating in Siberia or Vladivostok...Relieve them at once!"*

Colonel Van Deman was quick to see the importance of counterintelligence measures to control the influx of Bolsheviks and other undesirables into the US through Port Security offices in the areas of origin. On 4 September 1918, only two weeks after the arrival of the American forces at Vladivostok, he wrote the Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch in Washington, "Now the Western and North-western situation needs looking after. If we had proper control at Vladivostok and the Chinese ports, it would not make the situation quite so bad. But, barring a British Port Control officer at Yokahama and one at Shanghai and Hong Kong, we have no control at Asiatic Ports. The British have only recently put in their man at Yokohama, and did so with a good deal of fear and trembling as to what the Japanese would say. As a matter of fact, it pleased the Japs to death. Now if we can get one of our own men at Yokohama working with the British and one of our own at Nagasaki, Vladivostok, Chin-kiang-tao and Tientsin (or Tang-Ku) I think we could stop this influx...These port control officers might be created as I suggested for men of the consular offices in the various cities... take Reserve or National Army Officers and have the Secretary of State give them a commission as a vice-consul or consular agent and put them into the Consular offices as cover..."** The record does not show what happened to this proposal.

*History MID, Ch IX-41.
**Van Deman, Vol. II, Appendix C, p. 3.

[redacted]

Meanwhile, in the United States, a young anarchist was sentenced to fifteen years in the Federal Penitentiary for inciting violence in her protest against American military intervention in Russia.*

*Max Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (New York, 1950) William Sloane Associates, Inc., p. 110.

THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918

II. G-2, Service of Supply, AEF

G-2, SOS Headquarters

On 26 December, Major Cabot Ward was instructed to open the Headquarters from G-2, SOS at Paris, and by the first of the year 1918, the staff was functioning on the fourth floor of the old Hotel St. Anne. By the time of the Armistice, the G-2, SOS numbered 58 officers, 305 enlisted men, 14 field clerks, and 54 civilians. These field clerks were the forerunners of warrant officers. A few weeks after this Paris office was opened Captain Campbell-Turner was transferred from the Le Havre training school to handle operations.*

Liaison was immediately established with the Surete Generale, the French civilian secret service of the Ministry of the Interior; and the Bureau Central des Renseignements of the Ministry of War, the French Military Intelligence; and the Intelligence Service, Line of Communications of the British Expeditionary Force in France.** Through frequent conferences with these experts, the organization of the service was worked out.***

Liaison with M.I. 5b, the British counterintelligence service, was not difficult since there was much in common in the problems of operation on the line of communications of an expeditionary force in a foreign country. Even though the British War Department was only a day away, it was still away. The French, of course, were operating in their own country, and consequently had law enforcement agencies at many levels of government and in many departments. Colonel Ward reported in October 1918 that while the Surete Generale was supposed to handle all counterespionage, there were actually six different French agencies handling it, and all were acting independently.****

Liaison with American military units frequently posed problems. In February 1918, G-2, SOS, was ordered to investigate and recommend action to AEF GHQ in the case of any undesirable civilian subject to deportation. In May 1918, Colonel Ward reported that Army Provost Marshals and some Commanding Officers had handled cases without consulting the G-2, SOS. Deportees had arrived in the United States with no accompanying papers, and authorities there had not known what to do with them. Consequently, the Judge Advocate General's Office at Washington had written JAG, SOS to the effect that if there was not enough evidence to try the case in France, at least the existing information should be sent forward as an aid to the receiving officials.*****

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* History G-2 SOS, p.13.
** Ibid., p. 13.
*** Ibid., p. 13.
**** Ibid., Exhibit #24.
***** Ibid., Exhibit #10.

It was soon evident that to accomplish its mission, the CIP would have to be assigned out of the Paris area. CIP agent Gilbert Elliott stated, "It evolved like a large concern with many branch houses which reported to and received instructions from the home office in Paris. The Police (CIP's) were the agents of this concern, the salesmen, the drummers, the officers, the office managers. They (CIP's) were attached to each office in numbers varying from 60 at Bordeaux (part of whom were new men in training) to three or four in places like Calais, Hendaye or Cerbere (on the Spanish frontier). The success of the work depended almost entirely on them (the CIP's) as the officers could do little more than direct, and the success or failure of the case at hand depended largely on their initiative and presence of mind at the moment--the officer could not be at hand to instruct them what to do. In these circumstances the men took hold to the best of their ability and developed all sorts of expedients for getting results and overcoming difficulties."*

Major Ward, in his critique, mentioned a fear, which he did not share, on the part of some American authorities that too much weight would be given British Intelligence because of their training our men. Ward pointed out, however, that after training by the British officers, men were generally sent to areas not covered in any way by British Intelligence, which only covered about one quarter of France. Ward also added that he insisted on opening American offices in places of need, and rejected the theory of some high British officers that the American intelligence should not enter any territory covered by the British. He also rejected a British counter-proposal which suggested that if an American office was opened, the British should handle all our contacts with the French. The British argued that if the two services operated separately, the French might withdraw some of the privileges which it had taken British Intelligence so long to get. Ward said that, in spite of this difference of opinion, relations remained friendly. In practice, it worked out in many cases that the Americans were able to establish even closer relations with the French than the British had, so all profited.**

Elliott, as an enlisted agent, agrees with this conclusion, and in his account states, "Many conditions arose in other parts of France which the British had not had to meet at all in their portion of the country, and new methods were evolved to meet these...(CIP agents) became isolated post men and took care of large districts, traveling about on bicycles or motorcycles, many miles from their officers."***

*Elliott, p. 5.
**History G-2 SOS, p. 96.
***Elliott, p. 5.

Port Security

In this Rear Zone, called by the British the Line of Communications, the first CIP problem solved was port security. Germany had declared unrestricted warfare. Two or three transport convoys of the First Division of the AEF had been attacked off the coast of France. Germans were using the island coves of Western France to aid their submarines with signals from the coast.* The problem of policing this Atlantic coast was further complicated by uncontrolled fishing fleets.**

The first CIP office, with 2d Lt Howard M. Robertson, of Folkstone, England as officer-in-charge, was functioning at Le Havre by the time the first group of the CIP had graduated from the British training there. This office continued to grow until by the end of the war it had about forty agents.*** Shortly after this office opened, conferences with Lt Charles A. Munn, the American Naval Intelligence Officer at Nantes, disclosed that an acute need for surveillance existed in the many small towns and villages in the Nantes vicinity and along the Loire River mouth to St. Nazaire and vicinity. By February 1918 offices were functioning in both ports. Road controls and mail and telegraph censorship were in operation. Lt Robertson was transferred from Le Havre to head the Nantes office, and 2d Lt William H. Brevoort, of New York City, was placed in charge of the St. Nazaire office.**** One of the important cases of this office resulted in the conviction of three men for three to ten year terms for making disloyal remarks.*****

On 18 March 1918, 1st Lt Henry S. Otto opened the Bourdeaux office, which, because of the transfer of all transatlantic shipping there, became the largest CIP branch office, and in addition, handled some of the CIP training. Bordeaux also operated Resident Agencies at Biarrity, Bayonne, and La Rochelle. In April, an office was opened at Calais. Finally offices at Brest and at Marseille completed the chain of port security in France.

In May, Captain A. Campbell-Turner was sent to England to open a district office to supervise port offices at Southampton, Liverpool, London, and Cardiff. The London office had supervision of counterintelligence activity at twelve American camps in the United Kingdom and five troop docks at London. Plans for offices at Glasgow and Edinburgh had not been completed by the time of the Armistice.

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* Nicolai, Colonel W., The German Secret Service, 1924, London, Stanley Paul & Co., p. 108. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Nicolai.")

** History G-2 SOS, p.15.

*** Watkins, p. 4.

**** History G-2 SOS, p. 15; Exhibit #86.

***** Ibid., p. 33; Exhibit #86.

There was night and day work at these various CIP port offices. The Liverpool office ran interrogations on sixty-eight seamen in addition to its other work. In all, the English CIP port offices refused permission for 189 undesirables to land in England.*

At Bordeaux, twelve agents were required to handle "controls," later known as "ship panelling," for arrivals and departures of transatlantic passenger steamers.** The work on port controls at Le Havre has already been described.

Counterespionage work in a combat division was supposed to be coordinated with the SOS intelligence branches while the division was in the line of communications, and part of the port security work consisted of attempting to keep track of all arrivals. Unfortunately, no standard operating procedure had been worked out, and contacts were frequently missed. As a result of the war experience, it was recommended that while the division was en route, and its headquarters often difficult to locate, it should be the responsibility of the divisional intelligence personnel to get in touch with the SOS office, which was in a fixed place.***

One of the early port problems, according to Colonel Ward, was an "immense confusion and duplication of efforts resulting from a lack of coordination of the various United States Intelligence services which were in a half-hearted and ill-directed way attempting to cover the field. For example, at the Base Ports, the Navy maintained an intelligence service which frequently at such a point seemed to be serving no useful purpose on strictly intelligence lines but on the contrary prevented the I.O. of G-2 SOS, from extending his activity into maritime matters which we were able to handle, and later handled exclusively, because of our intimate relations with the French."****

An important phase of port security was guarding against sabotage, of which there were no major incidents, and only a relatively small number of minor incidents. A timely tip from Army intelligence in the United States averted disaster by causing an intensive search of certain vessels at their arrival at the French base ports, and further examination of their cargoes when loaded for shipment by rail. Explosives were found cleverly concealed in the bulky cargoes.***** Unfortunately, the record does not reveal how intelligence cracked this case. Significantly, however, it was about this time that Dr. Walter T. Von Scheele, who had been one of Germany's pre-war spies in America, and

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* History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #86.
** Ibid., P. 16.
*** Ibid., p. 73.
**** Ibid., p. 84.
***** Ibid., p.112.

had worked with German Agent Franz Von Rintelen in placing incendiary devices on Allied ships, was apprehended in Cuba, and extradited through the efforts of our Military Attache there, Captain Thomas F. Van Natta.*

In his eager attempts to secure immunity from a death sentence, Scheele freely betrayed German secret formulas for poison gas, incendiary bombs, liquid air bombs, high explosives, and dye stuffs.

Scheele stated that the bribed dock hands in New York had placed on the ships only about 25 percent of the incendiary bombs he had made. Those bombs, he said, had destroyed $10,000,000 in cargo in thirty-six ships. Scheele also described how he managed to smuggle oil out of the United States by solidifying it with magnesium carbonate, and impregnating it with fertilizer. In this form it was then shipped to Denmark where the oil was extracted, and reshipped to Germany.** Denmark was already on the suspect list of biased neutrals because of intelligence reports from US Military Attache Col O. N. Solbert, who had discovered that while the Danes were proclaiming to the world that they were starving, they were actually engaged in a brisk trade with Germany.***

Colonel Van Deman states that Scheele was placed in a small laboratory near Washington, and required to produce the same sort of incendiary bombs he had made for use against Allied ships. In one of his experiments an explosion injured him rather severely, but he recovered. Scheele was never tried--"for what reason is not known"--but he was kept a prisoner of the Department of Justice until months later when he died of pneumonia.**** G-2, SOS, encountered few other sabotage attempts except at one port where sand was placed in the gear boxes of several locomotives.*****

CIP agents were told in their Letter of Instructions that a spy, "wants to tell his General Staff the strength of our troops opposing them. This is the object of all identification obtained in trench raids, aeroplane observations and all spying...information as to troop movements renders it possible to ascertain where the line is being reinforced and where it is being weakened...."****** This assumption that the German Intelligence service was primarily interested in Order of Battle data had a sound foundation. Germany had collected a comprehensive amount of strategic intelligence prior to the war, not only through the hotel "association" previously mentioned, but by many other means. Among these was an ostensible commercial statistical firm with world wide branches that collected data on production and industrial potentials, including the financial, economic, and military resources of various countries.*******

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* History MID, Ch VII-28.

** Landau, Captain Henry, The Enemy Within, New York, 1937, G. P. Putnam Co., pp. 50, 51. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Landau.")

*** History MID, Ch VII-31.

**** Van Deman, Vol. I, p. 47.

***** History G-2 SOS, p. 112.

****** CIP Records, Document #29.

******* Johnson, p. 80.

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Safeguarding Order of Battle information required much CIP time. Measures had to be taken to counter the large amounts of indiscreet talking by members of the AEF. Regiments had to be stopped from parading through Base ports to their rest camps with regimental colors flying, and with all their equipment from vehicles to big bass drums bearing the regimental numbers.*

For more than a year, Intelligence called attention to the markings on railroad cars bound for the front. On each car loaded at a port was tacked a label showing its point of origin and its destination--the latter usually some regulating station behind the front. Generally, this was Is-sur-Tille, a major railway junction about ten miles north of Dijon and forty miles south of GHQ at Chaumont.**

This "key" distribution point was a major intelligence headache. It was established and operating for a long time before any intelligence protection was authorized. Colonel Ward reported that even when an officer was sent, "his work was rendered most difficult by lack of cooperation from the officers in charge of the plant. These defects were eliminated toward the closing months before the Armistice, but the large body of alien laborers concentrated there was a serious danger during the months before any intelligence control was effected."***

The unresolved security problem at Is-sur-Tille was that the railroad cars were carded anew, and clearly marked with the name of the railhead destination. Since these railheads were only ten kilometers (seven miles) behind the actual front lines, any one walking past the cars in the loading area or en route could easily determine the destination. As a result, Colonel Ward stated, "For a period of at least four or five weeks before the American attack at St. Mihiel, it was common talk through France, both among the American AEF and the civilian population, that the American Army was concentrating or about to concentrate a large army at St. Mihiel to cut off the salient which the Germans had occupied so long." Colonel Ward concluded, "We may be certain that the Germans were not ignorant of this fact and equally certain it was in a large part due to this method of railroad car markings."**** Apparently, however, as Colonel Lester was previously quoted, "The movement of the troops was not known to the enemy until it was too late." The counterintelligence controls against conveying information were more effective than Colonel Ward realized, and this is further substantiated by Johnson's research conclusion that the Germans lacked definite and detailed information about either blow (St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne). Johnson further quotes the German General von Gallwitz as saying that the Meuse-Argonne offensive was at least a partial surprise.***** Colonel Ward's final comment in his critique was, "The British Army was at first guilty of such careless practice, but this was pointed out by their Intelligence Service which in cooperation with the Transportation organization

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 120.
** Ibid., p. 121.
*** Ibid., p. 143.
**** Ibid., p. 121.
***** Johnson, p. 101.

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worked out a simple system for labeling rolling stock of all kinds."* But it was not until World War II that America applied this lesson.

CIP agents were instructed in detail on the various means used by espionage agents for conveying information. Invisible inks and where to look for them were explained as were telegraphic codes. "Information has been discovered," said the Instructions, "written on the inside of envelopes, underneath a photograph, underneath a postage stamp and on the gummed edges of envelopes...instances are known where messages have been written on the back of a woman in invisible ink." This last had been discovered by British Intelligence at Gravesend, England. Hiding places for papers included "double collars or ties, hollow heels...hollow buttons and shoe laces....Information has been discovered in the hollow stem of an artificial flower placed in the middle of a bouquet of real flowers or in a woman's hat...."**

Other hiding places, agents were warned, included messages "...rolled up very small and carried in a gelatine sheath in the mouth or other parts of the body, in newspapers by marking certain words with a pinhole, written on parcels or boxes and the label pasted over the messages, written on bandages, indicated by stitches in embroidery or in a hem, enclosed in coins which are sawed in half, hollowed out and soldered together again with the message inside...."***

Agents were instructed to "observe closely all foreigners, repatries, persons in French uniform in American areas, or persons in American uniform in French areas, and those generally supposed to be half-witted. All persons claiming the following occupations should also be closely observed: Horse-dealers, commercial travellers, wine merchants, caravan traders, fruit and other peddlers, owners of canal boats and barges. All prostitutes are potential suspects...."**** Instructions directed that when a person was suspected he or she should be watched and added, "Successfully shadowing a suspect is very difficult." Nearly one-eighth of the sixteen pages of instructions was devoted to details on how to shadow.

Frontier Security

Frontier security involved special problems, and agents were warned to watch for signals such as flashing lights, intermittent smoke, windmills, church clock faces, devices in haystacks or corn shocks, hidden wires or radios of any kind, movements of cattle, sheep or stray dogs and pigeons. Agents were to watch commercial vehicles, railroads, and automobiles on scheduled border crossings where messages could be hidden by pre-arrangement.

CIP agents of G-2, SOS, were responsible for the security of about 400 miles of frontier along the Spanish and Italian borders. Offices were opened on 13 August 1918 at Hendaye on the Atlantic side of the Franco-Spanish border and at Cerbere on the Mediterranian side, but it was not until the fall of 1918 that permission was received to open an office at Modane on the Franco-Italian

* History G-2 SOS, p. 122.
** CIP Records, Document #32.
*** Ibid., Document #32.
**** Ibid., Document #36.

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border. Tens of thousands of border crossers were screened at the Spanish offices. The Cerbere office screened some 3,000 laborers a month. At Modane more than 3,000 were examined in six months.* Control of the Swiss frontier by G-2, GHQ has already been described. "In this work," said Colonel Ward, "cooperation of the French and British authorities was of the greatest assistance."**

Commenting on the Franco-Spanish border control, Colonel Van Deman wrote MID in Washington in September 1918, "Of course the situation is not particularly good in connection with travel to and from Spain. Just how that is being handled I don't know, but if undesirables are allowed to get to Spain by sea, the possibility of getting into France across the Franco-Spanish frontier is pretty good, due to the laxity of the French control. This is something which we and the British are up against all the time, and it is necessary to back up the French in their control of circulation, not only on the Frontiers but within the SOS areas as well. We have lately put our own officers at four points along the Franco-Spanish frontier, working with the French, and things ought to be better shortly. If we can get it tied up as tightly as the Franco-Swiss frontier, I feel we will be in pretty good shape. However, an efficient control at U. S. ports over people going to Spain would help enormously....While we are on the subject, don't forget the control of passengers sailing direct to France. While we have Port Control officers working with the French ports, control at U. S. ports would help...."***

Border control brought out the differences between the British and French concepts of intelligence security. The British believed firmly in prevention; that is, if fixed controls were efficient, no espionage agents could operate. The French had no faith in this concept. Their border controls were perfunctory and often lax. They believed in detection; in "secret service" methods, and they had the execution certificates of twenty German saboteurs to prove their efficiency in this type of operation.**** They agreed with Colonel Nicolai, chief of the German Army Intelligence Service, who after vainly trying to seal off the Belgian border concluded, "Everything therefore went to show there are no means of effectively sealing a land frontier in any enemy country."*****

American counterintelligence followed both British and French methods. The four-fold official mission given G-2, SOS, was preventing enemy agents from entering France, preventing them from circulating, preventing them from transmitting their information, and finally detecting those who had entered.******

During World War I the G-2, SOS checked 10,388 passports, and refused visas for 323.******* Frontier travel control was facilitated by limiting the

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 18.
** Ibid., Exhibits 83, 86, 88.
*** Van Deman, Appendix C, p. 2.
**** History G-2 SOS, p. 44; Exhibit #90.
***** Nicolai, p. 174.
****** History G-2 SOS, p. 3.
******* Ibid., Exhibit #86.

points of travel to a few railroad stations and roads. "The value of this type of control," Colonel Ward stated, "is that it is an excellent method of picking up persons who have been signalled from other points....But a genuine spy would never attempt to go through a regularly established and known frontier railroad control unless provided with carefully prepared papers."*

To improve frontier control and apprehend well documented enemy agents, Colonel Van Deman proposed to revise American passport and visa controls in the neutral countries, and thus eliminate a lack of coordination between the Army and the State Department. In October 1918, he wrote Leland Harrison of the State Department security service, giving a detailed analysis of the problem. He said, in part, "To allow unrestricted travel of enemy agents is to aid the enemy in the prosecution of the war and therefore to add to the number of killed and wounded of our forces, and to the prolongation of the war. The control of travel is, therefore, imposed as a military necessity...."

Of the Passport Control office authorized by the State Department in France, Colonel Van Deman said, "In this office the Military representative is an officer detailed from the counterespionage service of the Services of Supply of the A.E.F., and the duties of the Military Attache in this connection pass to him although the Military Attache is in close liaison with the office...The establishment of this office has facilitated very much indeed the passport control work."

"After studying the question personally in France, England, Switzerland, and Holland, and talking at length to both civil and military officers from several other countries, I have come to the conclusion that the safest, quickest, and best way to handle this question is to establish a Passport Control office in each country on lines similar to the one established in Paris. The office should not be located at the Embassy or Legation. I believe it should be in a separate building not too distant from the offices of the Military and Naval Attaches.."** Colonel Van Deman recommended such offices in all the countries of Europe, and also in Cuba, Greece, China, Japan, and Siberia.

Need for Neutral Coverage

Colonel Ward pointed out that Spain posed a critical counterintelligence problem. The American Expeditionary Forces needed a large number of civilian workers to build the scores of depots to supply its two million soldiers. French labor had already been conscripted, and Spain was the nearest available source of supply. American officers of the Labor Bureau of the General Purchasing Board of the AEF spent months in Spain attempting to secure laborers, ***but German agents in Spain sabotaged this recruiting so successfully that the AEF never received as many laborers as was hoped for or needed. Many potential espionage cases came to the notice of the CIP in connection with Spanish laborers "actually in the employ of the AEF who had come from Spain without passing through any control, and there were at many points on the Spanish frontier guides willing to show any person across the frontier for a small fee."****

* History G-2 SOS, p. 63.
** Van Deman, Appendix I, p. 3.
*** History G-2 SOS, p. 128.
**** Ibid., p. 63.

0438

The most effective means of apprehending illegal border crossers was having undercover personnel in the villages adjoining the frontier, men who could mingle freely and undetected with the local civilian population. Colonel Ward stated, "Despite the lack of sufficient personnel our Spanish border control was notably successful in intercepting those who sought to cross the frontier in the vicinity of posts."*

Detecting German agents after they had left the border became a difficult undercover job for a number of CIP in the Interior Security areas. Much of this difficulty could have been eliminated had Major Nolan's repeated requests for undercover agents to work in neutral countries been approved. While the American Military Attache went about his business in Madrid, 300 miles to the northeast; in Barcelona, and 250 miles to the northwest in San Sebastian, German intelligence units operated with impunity.** Others operated elsewhere in Northern Spain. They not only slowed down American labor recruiting, but they sabotaged American-Spanish war purchases. They raised prices to prohibitive figures; they stirred up strikes in Spanish factories; they put ground glass in canned goods; and they poisoned a number of mules Americans had purchased?*** In one instance they were believed to have poisoned a group of Portuguese laborers of which one died, and twenty-five were hospitalized.****

CIP agents watched over the border while their superiors argued for permission for them to cross and uncover the evidence that would halt this threat in the American rear. Not only were CIP agents denied permission to cross, but they were also denied permission to recruit any indigenous agents for this work which thirty-five years later was known as aggressive counterintelligence. SOS Headquarters was in daily and intimate contact with American business concerns with head offices in Paris and agencies in many cities and small towns of Northern Spain. Through officers of the Purchasing Board, contact could be made with many Barcelona agencies. All Americans, civilian and military, proceeding from France to Spain cleared through SOS, Paris, but G-2, SOS, was "limited to obtaining information from them upon their return, and this was purely a matter of chance, as they were not compelled to check with G-2 upon return."*****

The Military Attache in Madrid had no contact with any of these agencies as he confirmed during a visit with G-2, SOS, officers at Paris. As a result, G-2, SOS, requested that it be authorized to serve as an agency for the Attache

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 64.
** Ibid., p. 129.
*** Ibid., Exhibits #55, 81, 86.
**** Ibid., Exhibit #83.
***** Ibid., pp. 130, 31.

in Northern Spain with all information submitted through the Attache.

The disastrous consequences of divided and uncoordinated handling of a counterintelligence operation were grimly illustrated in the failure of a "double" agent operation which offered a high degree of probability of trapping a number of German submarines into unexpected encounters with Allied destroyers. This was the unfortunate Soto case.**

Jamie Soto was a tried and tested French "double" agent who had proved his loyalty to France again and again; yet he was so trusted by the Germans that they selected him for assignment in the United States.

While apparently collecting information on troop ships, Soto could be given dates and routes that would bring the German submarines to an area where Allies destroyers were waiting. The French immediately got in touch with the American Military Attache at Madrid, Major John W. Lang, who enthusiastically endorsed the plan and made the covert arrangements that enabled Soto to book passage from Spain to the United States via Cuba.

Soto sailed in May. The next word Major Lang heard was in October when the French Military Attache asked him to explain Soto's arrest in New York and advised Lang that Soto's family was taking the matter up with the Spanish government. When Major Lang cabled MID he was merely told Soto was being held at Governor's Island by the Department of Justice.

Soto had been promised protection by the Military Attache provided he did not double-cross the American authorities. In Havana, he dutifully

* History G2 SOS, Exhibits, 90 82.
** Ibid., p. 131; Exhibits 81, 83.

reported to the Military Attache there and on 20 June 1918 arrived at Washington, D.C. where he reported to the Military Attache section of the Military Intelligence Division. The next day he was turned over to Lieutenant Vella of the New York Intelligence Office, and Major Biddle, chief of that office was "put in possession of all the facts." Vella was the lieutenant who had recruited the first CIP agents.

In New York, Soto, according to all evidence, lived up to his agreement. He contacted German agents and arranged meetings so that Lieutenant Vella could monitor the conversations. He consulted with MID in furnishing misleading information; he reported his contacts and telephone calls.

But Soto was a mystery to the New York officials. He was a physician by profession, well bred and well educated; yet Major Biddle, who was the scion of a prominent society family, reported that Soto's life and habits in New York were "thoroughly disreputable and immoral and a source of constant expense."* Lt. Vella mistrusted Soto from the start and, although it was the Department of Justice that actually arrested Soto and wrecked the case, the record shows that as Soto's handling agent Vella could have prevented the arrest if he had so desired.

Since American counterintelligence agents were not in this era familiar with European "double agents" and their methods of operation, particularly the many low type contacts they made, Soto would have had a better chance of success if the more worldly-wise M.I.5 Section of the Military Intelligence Division had furnished its own handling agent to protect its agreement with Soto. Unfortunately, this section was the one which Colonel Bidwell, in the History of the Military Intelligence Division stated, "It...started existence under the pronounced handicap of a badly jumbled functional assignment and after material alterations ended up in the same unsatisfactory state...." This section was originally given the assignment of conducting counterespionage among the civil population abroad, but just about the time Soto left for the United States, this system had broken down completely due to many serious difficulties which kept emerging in respect to the achievement of prompt and adequate coordination between counter-intelligence operations of the American Military Attaches and those conducted in the United States by M.I.4, section (Negative Branch) Counter Espionage Among the Civilian Population..."** Soto's case was proof of this.

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* AEF 1918 Correspondence Files, Historical Project #1-1.

** History of MID, Ch VII-21.

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The record reveals that Soto was brought to the attention of the Department of Justice by a letter report furnished it by the New York office of MID and that Major Biddle concurred in the plan of the Department of Justice to arrest Soto although he had been informed by MID that the Military Attache had promised protection and that it had been "impossible to fasten any enemy alien activity" on Soto.

Soto was arrested on 23 August. The next day the Military Attache section at Washington telephoned Major Biddle and informed him that the French Commission did not want Soto arrested. Major Biddle said he would arrange to have Soto let out shortly.

Eight weeks later Soto was still in detention at Ellis Island, and it was not until 24 October that Soto was released and allowed to sail back to France. Biddle was now a colonel and Vella a captain. Their last act of the case was to report Soto to the French intelligence liaison officer at New York as some one who should be put under surveillance as soon as he reached France. Only the pressure of the French Military Attache and the threat of action by the Spanish government appears to have precipitated Soto's release. The New York office of MID went smugly on its way blaming the Department of Justice so, as it reported to MID Washington, "...our skirts will be clean in regard to any arrangements made by the Military Attache."*

While September and October were going by, some 100,000 American soldiers in six divisions sailed through the U-boat infested waters, with no decoy information to lead these subs to destruction.

Soto landed at Bourdeaux on 7 November and on 9 November 1918, two days before the Armistice, he was at the American Counterintelligence office at Hendaye on the Franco-Spanish border. While completing his papers for re-entry into Spain, Soto poured out his hate and rage to the Officer-in-Charge, First Lieutenant Leo J. Careaga of Annapolis, Maryland. Careaga immediately realized that if Soto crossed into Spain feeling as he did that he might expose the entire operation to the Germans and the Spanish.

How Lieutenant Careaga pacified Soto the record does not show, but he had the support of 1st Lt. S. P. Robineau of Miami, Florida, Officer-in-Charge at the time in Bourdeaux, who reported the case to Colonel Ward at G2, SOS. Robineau labeled the American handling of the affair "puerile and amateurish." Soto's story was reconfirmed, but by that time the war was over. To show that there were no hard feelings, Soto was then hired by G2, SOS, and used on several successful missions.*

* History MID, Exhibit 31, 88.

Depot Security

The Corps of Intelligence Police had a number of cases besides the Soto affair that "illustrated the unfortunate results of the complete divorce between G-2, SOS, and all Intelligence work in enemy and neutral countries." Another such instance told by Colonel Ward was the Diaz case, which like many others arose out of Depot Security measures. "The CIP Sergeant who ran down Diaz and his friends was urged by Diaz to go to Spain and to put himself in touch with the agents of German espionage there, to whom Diaz gave our man letters of introduction. It would have been a simple matter for our Sergeant, who was born an Italian, had lived for a long time in South America and spoke Spanish and Portuguese fluently, to have proceeded to Spain and put himself in touch with these German agents, to have gone to the German Barcelona Headquarters, to have found out what they were trying to do and thus to have rendered immensely valuable services. Permission to do this was specifically requested and was not approved by GHQ."*

This case had started at Beaune (Cote D'Or) about twenty-five miles south of Dijon where several hundred laborers were employed constructing barracks for an American Army hospital. Among these laborers were two Spaniards, Alvaro Carlos Diaz and Pedro G. Ochoa, and a Frenchman, [redacted] whose identity papers were in order, and whose employment was approved by the French Commissaire de Police prior to the institution of our labor control at this point. The men were good workmen, but an intelligence informant reported that they were conducting an active defeatist propaganda program in favor of the enemy.**

When this report reached 1st Lt Ernest Angell, of Cleveland, Ohio, Intelligence Officer at Dijon, he consulted with 2d Lt Robert S. Cauvin, the G-2, SOS, specialist on socialism, labor and bolshevism. They selected [redacted] of the CIP to go undercover to Beaune posing as a civilian interpreter since he spoke five languages. He carried a letter of recommendation from the Red Cross identifying him as a civilian interpreter and by secret arrangement with a Captain of the Engineers, he was hired. In this manner he came in contact with Diaz, Ochoa and [redacted] and over a period of weeks gained their confidence, and discovered that they were attempting to obtain information for German secret service agents in Spain.

Before the CIP agent had completely won the confidence of Diaz, and been introduced to his companions, Diaz proposed a scheme that could have cost the agent his life. To establish friendship with Diaz, the undercover agent had

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 131.

** Ibid., Exhibit #55.

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hinted he would like to go to Spain and contact German espionage agents. Diaz had then offered to give his birth certificate and labor permit as a means of identification to cross the border. learned afterward that had he accepted, he would undoubtedly have been arrested and shot since Diaz was wanted for prison break after a death sentence for revolutionary activities in Cuba. Diaz then would have been legally dead, and free to start a new life.

Diaz abandoned this idea as the undercover agent won the confidence of all three conspirators with his skill and the five francs a week "entertainment" funds authorized by G-2. Not only did succeed in obtaining important information regarding the enemy's organization among the foreign laborers working in American camps in France, but he "so ingratiated himself with his 'pals' that they enlisted his aid in an attempt to send important military information they had gathered..." to the German consul, "Senator Fraudenthal," at Zaragoza, Spain, who was operating a photographic studio as a cover. Diaz boasted that the Germans would pay them from 1,500 to 2,000 francs a month for information.*

The official report states that "displayed unusual qualities of resourcefulness, initiative and quick-thinking under circumstances of great personal danger." This included taking an oath in blood to "death to the Americans."** Diaz described codes and secret inks used by the Germans. However, as time went on, the undercover agent came to the conclusion that Ochoa, whom he identified as a Spanish deserter, gambler and cheat, was the real leader of the three.

Shortly, it was necessary to take the French counterintelligence service into confidence as its agents were beginning to suspect It was also concluded that the sources had been milked dry; so Diaz, Ochoa and were arrested and tried before a French Conseil de Guerre, and convicted of attempted intelligence with the enemy. They were sentenced to long terms at hard labor.***

For this signal service, was recommended for the Distinguished Service Medal. Author Johnson states that while never got the medal, he did get a reward as a result of the mission. He fell in love, and married the daughter of the owner of the cafe where he ate his meals while on the job.****

Similar types of suspected espionage were under investigation at many intelligence offices in the interior of France where scores of American replacement depots, hospitals and supply depots were being constructed. These bases were natural espionage targets and, once across the border, agents headed for

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* History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #55.
** Johnson, P. 122.
*** History G-2, SOS, p. 61.
**** Johnson, p. 123.

them like bees after nectar. This is why in his critique, Colonel Ward argued that all the frontiers should have been under one command, and not split as "there were no adequate reasons for the arbitrary division of territory at the imaginary line between the Intermediate Section of the SOS and the Zone of the Armies."*

In contrast, Colonel Ward pointed out that "the British Intelligence Service of the Line of Communications operated as a unified service right up to the actual fighting front and handled all civilian cases whether at base ports or in the areas immediately behind the trenches."**

During August 1918, CIP intelligence offices were opened at a number of French cities including Toulouse, Limoges, and Tours. Other offices were opened at Dijon, Nevers, Orleans, Gievres, Lyons, Angers, Vieszon, Soumer, Macon, Blois, Caetguidaux and Le Mans. Resident agencies were opened at Melur, Bourges, and Is-sur-Tille.*** The district office was opened in London on 1 July 1918. Almost immediately there was a serious counterespionage case involving a code clerk in the American Military Attache's London office.**** Among other cases, this office handled eighteen "disloyal sentiments" convictions and twenty-one cases of persons having contact with enemy aliens.*****

Great difficulty was experienced in setting up the scheduled offices in England because of the limited number of intelligence officers available, and the trouble experienced in securing suitable men for the CIP. Through the Recruiting Officer in London, names of a number of Americans living in England were obtained, and as a result Gilbert Miller was contacted and commissioned a First Lieutenant and placed in charge of the London office.****** Later, counterespionage officers were stationed at aviation camps in England and in Ireland.******* In September 1918, Captain Turner informed all aviation camps that the branch office in London was functioning.********

Personnel were always in short supply all over the SOS, and only three or four men were available for most offices, which covered vast areas. Some idea of the size of supply bases that had to be covered is shown by a partial list of munitions bought from the French, which included five million cannon shells, three million bombs, two million mortar shells, 40,000 automatic rifles, nearly 10,000 machine guns, nearly 5,000 cannon, 514 tanks, and 135,000 horses and

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 134.
** Ibid., p. 134.
*** Ibid., pp. 17, 27, 30, 31
**** Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 52.
***** History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #86.
****** Johnson, p. 34.
******* Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 19.
******** History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #18.

mules. From the British were purchased more than 3,000 mortars, 21,000 horses and mules and 334 heavy cannon. From Spain 18,000 horses and mules were obtained.*

Bases included supply depots, refrigerator plants, storehouses, remount stations, prison camps, hospitals, convalescent camps, training centers, replacement depots, casual camps, quartermaster depots, repair depots, railway depots and tank depots, the latter important because of the foreign labor required, no American-made tanks being used on the Western Front. Field Artillery schools presented the same problems since no American-made cannon or shell was used by the American First Army during World War I.**

Civilian labor control was one of the most important controls, and subcontrol offices were established at Bourdeaux, Beau-Desert, Bassens, St. Sulpice, LeCorneau, Limoges, Perigneaux, Bayonne, and Sourges. In the AEF every civilian was presumed to be examined or the name at least submitted to the Intelligence Section, but as "the importance of this procedure was not generally appreciated and no adequate provision was made and enforced by General Orders, the success of the control depended to an undue degree upon the influence which local Intelligence Officers were able to exert over the local commanding officers."***

Inspectors in charge of the labor control offices were members of the Corps of Intelligence Police, "in civilian clothes and known merely as the joint representative of the Army agencies employing laborers at that point; their connection with intelligence being carefully concealed. Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the 'carte vert' system [the French labor security clearance] and the impossibility of successfully establishing the identity and reliability of many workmen, particularly the foreigners, the work of the Labor Control Offices had to be supplemented by other members of the Intelligence Police acting in close, though unknown connection, in the guise of interpreters, foremen and even laborers."****

The Diaz case was one example of this undercover work. A similar case occurred at Selles-sur-Cher near Gievres where the AEF was building one of the largest refrigerator plants in the world. First Lieutenant Joseph R. Shriver, working at Gievres, had learned through an informant that there was something wrong at the Spanish laborers' camp. CIP agent Pedro Padilla volunteered for assignment to an undercover position after being warned it

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* Army Almanac, 1950, p. 438.
** History G-2 SOS, p. 29; Army Almanac, 1950, p. 438.
*** History G-2 SOS, p. 57.
**** Ibid., p. 60

would be tough and dangerous. He had lived in Madrid in the Calle Zorrilla section for seven years as a boy, and his Spanish was native. With the recommendations furnished to support his cover story, he had no trouble in becoming hired as a laborer, but on arrival at the camp a glaring defect quickly aroused suspicion. Padilla's tender hands belonged to anyone but a laborer. Quickly, he complained loudly that he was no day laborer, and had been told that there was painting to be done. But the suspicions were not allayed. That night two of the Spaniards took him to a cellar for an interrogation Padilla never forgot, consisting of questions concerning intimate details of his section of Madrid which only someone who had lived there could possibly know. Fortunately, Padilla's childhood memories were good. He was accepted and taken into the confidence of the gang. From the leads he supplied, several espionage routes were neutralized, and agents jailed.*

Control by "Reserved" Zones

An important means of Interior Control was the use of "Special Reserved" zones, which later became known as "Restricted" areas. The most important one in the AEF was at Tours, headquarters of SOS, AEF where Captain Frederick Henrotin, Deputy AC of S, G-2, SOS, on 26 August 1918, persuaded the French Commanding General of the Area to make the city a "Reserved Zone." The results obtained during the first few months more than justified the precautions taken to protect the area in question. Almost daily, suspects were stopped by the control stations. On several occasions the vigilance of the control brought about the expulsion of undesirable persons or resulted in such a careful watching of subjects that "they were probably defeated in the purpose of their visit."**

Sgt Isadore J. Naccarri, of New Orleans, one of the original fifty CIP men, organized and directed the Franco-American police bureau at Tours which conducted an effective travel control of the SOS headquarters area. An important part of travel control at these interior points in France was Garnis control, or registration of all visitors at hotels, pensions, etc., as a check on any persons missed at docks, rail stations or road blocks or who had entered by any uncontrolled means.***

However, Garnis control was started at the ports. At Le Havre, two CIP agents were assigned to work with the two French Garnis inspectors. Initially, the assignment required much tact because the habit of the French inspectors had been to accept drinks and bribes and make no report of irregularities. Control was simplified at Le Havre because the French required all

* Johnson, p. 119

** History G-2 SOS, pp. 28, 32.

*** Elliot, p. 5; History G-2 SOS, Exhibit 7.

neutrals to report at the City Hall, and by stationing a CIP agent there, many examinations could be made. Two agents were required for file checks, and another for inquiries at these transient residences. While a report late in the war stated that the presence of spies in Le Havre for any length of time was "thought very doubtful," Lieutenant Clancy, in charge of this CIP operation, felt that seven more CIP agents were needed. Five would be assigned to ride bicycle patrols with the municipal police of five towns adjacent to Le Havre and two others assigned to handle their file checks. Garnis control at Marseilles was a different problem since there were some 150 to 200 arrivals a day compared to 20 to 50 at Le Havre, but the French did not feel that the "convocation of neutrals" was necessary there, so instead of being able to examine many arrivals at the Hotel de Ville, it was necessary to have several pairs of French and CIP agents inspecting lodgings in various parts of the city. The report modestly stated, "The probability is that spies can be found at Marseilles."*

While scores of undesirable individuals were refused employment, or discharged, and their reemployment prohibited, the system of classification of positions according to degree of sensitivity was recommended but was not adopted except in the Tours area. However, this recommendation from the AEF days did not become accepted practice until after World War II.**

Control of the military was not such a problem, and was effectively handled by the Military Police. No enemy agents were detected in the SOS in American uniform, but numerous cases of enemy agents posing as officers or men of the British or French Armies were brought to light. In France the principal problem in connection with control of the military concerned the use of civilian mail after its use had been prohibited. Those using the French post were automatically suspect, but the intelligence problem was complicated by the fact that many perfectly loyal military personnel used the civilian post in violation of regulations merely because it was faster. Thus it was important to intelligence that army mail censorship and the postal services be operated to compete in speed with the civilian post.***

Letters mailed through the French post led to the internment of an Austrian enemy alien who had enlisted under a false name with false papers, claiming his parents, who actually lived in Budapest, Hungary, were Norwegian. Ten hours of interrogation at the District of Paris CIP office, of which 1st Lt C. G. Paulding was in charge, resulted in a confession. The soldier was sent back to the States for internment.****

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* History G-2 SOS, Exhibit 7.
** Ibid., p. 61.
*** Ibid., p. 67.
**** Ibid., Exhibit #8.

Depot Security, which concerned the military, almost inevitably involved civilians. The most obvious espionage suspects were persons deliberately cultivating the friendship of officers and men. In most cases these persons were prostitutes, gamblers, and black-marketeers, known in that era as smugglers or bootleggers. The counterintelligence problem was to distinguish between those using these criminal activities as a cover and those who were purely of Military Police interest.

"G-2 Circular #15," reporting information from the Intelligence Office at Nevers, France, illustrates the problem. One of the cities in its area was Vichy, a popular attraction for officers and men. One suspect was "Bertha" a refined, attractive and very intelligent woman, who made the acquaintance of many American officers, but refused to accept any money from them, saying that she was "liberally supplied with cash by a young man at Marseilles."

Two men were on the Vichy suspect list. One was a former professional boxer who was a "pal" of a professional gambler at Vichy, and the other was an American of Alsatian birth with no visible means of support.

Wanda, who signed herself in letters as "Contesse," was another prostitute on the espionage suspect list. She was noted for attempting to establish relations, recherche des amants, with Allied officers. The report stated that she was operating an opium den, and "making good use of it." She was well known in Germany, and had been deported from Paris some months before. She was reported as "expensive," and as having charged "1500 francs for a single night."

Intelligence of interest to other offices was reported also. A Belgian was reported as en route to England from Holland. He had been condemned by the Germans in 1916 to ten years in prison for espionage, and was released on condition that he "double." A Spaniard at Barcelona was suspected of working for the German Secret Service. His dossier reported him as having given a dancing exhibition in Paris in 1917, as having the drug habit, and as living by gambling.*

Rest Area Security

Rest Area Security at hospitals, convalescent camps, and leave areas was primarily concerned with "loose talk." A variety of posters, placards, and reminders were issued, and "vigorous action was taken" in many areas, which resulted in "a better appreciation of military necessity of preventing the operation of enemy agents along these lines." The same was equally true as to the unjustified, and therefore dangerous criticism of the efforts of the

* History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #8.

Army which often led to misleading rumors, harmful to our relations with our allies.*

CIP agents working out of intelligence offices in the vicinity of these rest areas discovered that loose talk warnings were not enough. Special efforts had to be made, and as a result branch intelligence offices were established at Nice and Clermont-Ferrand, with resident agencies at Chambrey, Aux-Les Bains, Chally Les Eaux, Veumille and La Courtune, the principal hospital and leave centers.** From these offices, such leave areas as Savoie, Dauphine and Auvergne were covered. Brittany, Gironde and Pyrenees areas were handled directly from the Brest and Bourdeaux offices.***

CIP agents found that it was easier to control loose talk in hospital areas than in leave areas by screening hospital personnel and visitors, and then confining a soldier from the front to the hospital for three days so that any information of military value which he might unintentionally disclose would be outdated.****

In leave areas the problem revolved around the inability to impose a sufficiently rigid system of control on the civilian population. Hotels, casinos, and amusement places, and the entertainment troupes that traveled these circuits provided special opportunities for espionage agents. This was fertile ground for the agents of the German's "hotel mutual benefit association." "Counter-espionage work in leave areas," said Colonel Ward, "is not so much a matter of controls as of continuous observation and following up small bits of information and leads gathered in every possible way from many different sources."*****

Many cases evidenced the fact that loose talk was not confined to any area. Taisez-Vous, "shut your mouth," posters were printed and distributed by the thousands, and several varieties developed before the war ended. But loose talk continued. At Le Havre, acting on a complaint of the British base commander, officers and Corps of Intelligence Police, in civilian clothes, posed as insurance agents, and traveled about the port area. Their report stated that they "...had not the slightest difficulty in procuring practically all the information that transient officers have at their disposal--convoy routes and even ships' names."******

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 24.
** Ibid., p. 18.
*** Ibid., p. 33.
**** Ibid., p. 113.
***** Ibid., p. 114.
****** Ibid., Exhibit #16.

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Air Service CIP Missions

In April 1918, the American Air Service had three squadrons at the front; less than six months later this had grown to forty-five squadrons with 740 planes operating, of which twelve squadrons had American built planes equipped with the famed Liberty motors. At aviation camps at Issoudun, Romorantin, Chateauroux, Avord, Pruniers and St. Maixent, a thoroughly and absolutely secret counterespionage organization was established, chiefly to guard against sabotage.*

Damage to aeroplane motors and delicate parts of machines, which had at one time occurred with disturbing frequency, stopped, but not before a number of cases had been found where the struts had been almost completely sawed through. No great disasters occurred anywhere.**

Although the CIP consistently fought all attempts to divert its activities into criminal investigative fields, the close tie-in between criminal activities and intelligence was revealed by enemy efforts to sabotage American aviators through drug addiction. Colonel Watkins has reported that there was "an 'Untouchable' international ring known as the 'Dope' ring which was at the bottom of the stealing of American supplies and much incidental espionage."***

While the ring may have been "untouchable" to the French authorities working alone, it was attacked by Allied teamwork. The Surete Nationale asked the CIP to determine whether there was a deliberate attempt to spread the use of cocaine among American soldiers. Details of what must have been highly dangerous undercover assignments are lacking, but after several weeks, evidence of such an organized attempt at a number of aviation centers was produced and handed over to the French, who then could act because of the actual evidence furnished by the Americans. The result was the arrest and conviction of a notorious band of cocaine dealers.****

Fires and explosions are always border-line problems between crime and intelligence. There is always, in wartime, a presumption of sabotage in any fire or explosion until proven otherwise. The CIP investigated the few explosions in AEF plants and investigated several incendiary fires. Colonel Ward stated that in investigating the early fires, they were so successful in tracing the culprits "that it is believed the few cases of this kind in later months was due to a great extent to prompt action by G-2. Furthermore, the results of each case enabled us to suggest new restrictions."***** Significantly,

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* History G-2 SOS, pp. 30, 32; Army Almanac, p. 438.
** Ibid., p. 112.
*** Watkins, p. 7.
**** History G-2 SOS, p. 27.
***** Ibid., p. 112.

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[redacted]

an almost identical conclusion was reached on the work of CIC agents with the Air Corps during World War II.*

Growth of the Paris Office

The phenomenal growth of G-2 in the provinces involved corresponding developments in the Central Office at Paris where liaison was maintained with the American Embassy and Consulate General, the American Passport Bureau, the French Ministry of War, the Surete General and the Prefecture de Police in Paris, the French Naval Intelligence Service, the British Intelligence Section, L of C, the British Mission Paris, and the Belgian and the Portuguese Intelligence Services.** The title of the section became for a brief period "Intelligence Section, Service of the Rear," but for obvious reasons it was renamed G-2, SOS.

Separation of the administrative functions from operations soon became necessary, and Captain Dudley M. Cooper took over the duties of adjutant, leaving matters of direct intelligence interest to the operations officer. Captain A. Campbell-Turner served as operations officer until he was succeeded by Lieutenant Robertson on 27 May 1918. Captain Campbell-Turner then took over the English branch of G-2, SOS.***

Cooper relieved the Operations officer personnel from all questions of Army organization and procedure, and took over responsibility for the automobile and courier service, assignment of security guards and orderlies, and the operation of the personnel, funds, filing, and photographic sections.****

Possibly the most important feature of the Paris office was its Central Files which had grown steadily from the time Lieutenant Goedeke had taken over on 18 January 1918. A card index of 160,900 names had been assembled; over 3,500 dossiers had been opened on persons and subjects. Some 7,800 American, British and French lists were filed, and completely coordinated with nearly 22,000 names in the American Registry Bureau which listed 7,221 Army civilians, 2,800 Red Cross workers, 2,700 YMCA workers, 175 Knights of Columbus and 104 Salvation Army workers. In addition there were 8,400 Americans in France not connected with the Army. There were many problems in connection with these Americans in addition to loyalty cases of which 3,760 were investigated. One problem was that 7,560 of these Americans were of draft age, and the Bureau serviced the Provost Marshal who was interested in the reasons for their exemptions or deferments. This registry

* (Cross reference later)
** History G-2 SOS, p. 19.
*** Ibid., p. 20.
**** Ibid., Exhibit #4.

with its up-to-date listing of names and addresses, was one of the factors that gave many outsiders the impression that the G-2, SOS, office was also a public information bureau.*

At the outset, it was realized that intelligence filing in the headquarters, and the district offices should be standardized. By the end of the war, plans were being made to file all records at Paris, and to issue lists of names and file numbers to all the offices. These offices would cut the lists apart, and paste them on cards, which would then be filed alphabetically. When a name came to the attention of a local office, and a file check revealed a card of that name, the case would automatically be further investigated until data was obtained from Paris.**

The Paris file section classified intelligence information under 20 major divisions and 108 subdivisions. It not only indexed and filed all documents, papers and reports, but it was responsible for the proper follow-up on all counterespionage cases, and attended typing and mailing of all correspondence. Colonel Ward has said, "These records have been invaluable in enabling this service to keep in touch with the movements and actions of all undesirables and others who might seek to gain information concerning the activities of the American Army in France."***

Comparative office statistics between a week in June 1918, and at the end of the war in November 1918 give some indication of the workload:****

ITEM	JUNE 1918	NOVEMBER 1918
New dossiers made	64	67
Dossiers worked	354	270
New File cards	2,966	6,040
File checks	341	940
Correspondence mailed	833	2,437

As finally organized, the Operations Division, G-2, SOS included a Circulation Section with a Passport Bureau, the American Registry Bureau, and Relief Society Control as subsections. This Circulation Section supervised arrivals and departures of civilians in France, the Postal and Telegraphic censorship services, and Information service to all offices. The Labor Bureau, Visitors' Bureau, and Civilian Investigations were separate sections.*****

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* History MID, p. 22; History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #9.
** History G-2, SOS, Exhibit #5.
*** Ibid., p. 21.
**** Ibid., Exhibit #7.
***** Ibid., pp 19, 21.

When Headquarters, SOS, AEF was established at Tours it was proposed that G-2, SOS, at Paris, be moved to Tours, but that Major Ward be left at Paris to handle counterespionage. Colonel John C. Gilmore at Tours was named G-2, SOS, on 20 February 1918, and Ward was named Deputy. This arrangement, however, lasted less than three weeks, until Colonel Gilmore was relieved, and Capt Frederick Henrotin, who had been sent by Major Ward from Paris to assist Colonel Gilmore was named Officer-in-charge of the Tours District and G-2, SOS liaison officer to GHQ, SOS.*

The necessity of keeping G-2 headquarters at the French capital where the heads of all the Allied services as well as the French national authorities were located was recognized as being of vital importance. "...Much of the work of the central offices at Paris consisted of establishing and maintaining these relations...."**

By March the office had grown so large that it had to move to more suitable quarters at No. 11 Avenue Montaigne, Paris. This move was heralded by a large explosion as an eight-inch shell from the German's "Big Bertha," seventy-two miles away, landed in the street outside, but fortunately did no damage to the office.*** This was probably an accident, but some suspicion that it might not have been arose after the war when Colonel Nicolai, chief of the German Intelligence Service, boasted how his service directed the firing of this gun by reporting within twenty-four hours the exact location of each hit.**** Incidentally, American Intelligence was not surprised by this long-range gun. They had learned of it months before, and had dispatched agents to the Krupp works at Essen, Germany to obtain a description of it.*****

CIP, AEF Achievements

World War I ended before the overseas counterespionage service had opened all its scheduled offices; before it had established adequate informant nets; and before it had secured many of the trained and skilled personnel it would have required to adequately perform its mission.

Statistically, the 363 counterintelligence officers and agents of G-2, SOS, AEF made an excellent security record during the ten months of war operations. Out of 3,706 cases handled, enough legal evidence was secured to permanently neutralize 229 suspects. Of these, three were convicted of

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* History G-2 SOS, pp 12, 27.
** Ibid., pp. 77, 78.
*** History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #4.
**** Nicolai, 181.
***** Johnson, 211.

espionage, 107 interned, and 119 expelled from the SOS.* Referring to these statistics, Colonel Ward stated, "The impression should not be gained that the total value of these efforts can be measured by statistics, as no one will ever know how many enemy agents were turned back, nor to what extent we succeeded in preventing the leakage of information, the dissemination and influence of propaganda and similar enemy activities."** Johnson stated that enough enemy agents were apprehended in critical positions to have kept the German Secret Service completely informed.***

One match is all that is needed to wreck a powder magazine. The 229 permanently neutralized suspects represented an entire box of matches. Moreover as the Witzke case**** in the United States proved, apprehension of one espionage agent will neutralize many more, and frequently merely the suspicion that counterintelligence is investigating will neutralize an agent, his contacts, and his associates for many months. Add to these, those turned back or deterred by effective circulation controls, and the value of G-2, SOS is evident. And, the ultimate value was demonstrated by the fact that after the war the Germans admitted that, in spite of their extensive espionage system, they were surprised not once, but several times, and their sabotage in areas under jurisdiction of G-2, SOS was negligible, particularly in contrast to their sabotage successes in Spain where G-2, SOS could not touch them.

Agent Elliot summed up CIP's overseas achievements: "It happened that just at that time[the Armistice] also the German money began to run out so that one might say the Intelligence Police never had a real chance at the enemy such as their British and French brothers had had in the first three years of the war. What chances they had, however, they utilized to the utmost with the facilities they had, and I am convinced that nobody in the AEF ever remained and worked more loyally in the face of real grievances or accomplished more in the face of great handicaps."*****

Major General Johnson Hagood, writing of the CIP twelve years later and opposing the maintenance of a Corps of Intelligence Police in the United States during time of peace, added however, "As Chief of the Services of Supply in France, the whole organization of counter espionage in the back areas came under my immediate jurisdiction, and I fully realize the importance of this service in time of war and in a country like France."****** This was only one of many indications that the Counter Intelligence service had won its place with the American Army overseas in time of war.

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* History G-2 SOS, Exhibit #86.
** Ibid., p. 163.
*** See Section III, this Chapter.
**** Johnson, p. 106.
***** Elliot, p.6.
****** CIP Records, Document #65.

THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918

III. CIP in the United States

III. CIP IN THE UNITED STATES

Organization For CIP Work

In any study of the development of the Counter Intelligence Corps, it is soon obvious that until World War II when the Corps had its own officers authorized, the majority of the Intelligence Officers of the Military Intelligence Division were an integral part of counterintelligence work. They directed and supervised all the work of the Corps of Intelligence Police agents and performed many of the most important counter investigations themselves. They were, in fact, Corps of Intelligence Police officers, except in name. In August 1918 a guidance circular was issued by MID for "all officers in command of Corps of Intelligence Police Detachments. " *

However, since they were Intelligence Officers (or I.O's as commonly referred to) their work went far beyond strictly counterintelligence concepts. They directed the CIP agents and frequently gave these agents non-CIP duties. In view of this situation, it is remarkable that the CIP history of this period revealed so little misuse of CIP agents.

One reason may have been that there were less than 700 CIP agents on duty during World War I; of these, 450 were overseas leaving only about 250 agents for use in some 500 Military Intelligence Offices in the United States. Commanding these offices, and offices overseas and at the various headquarters in Washington, Paris and Chaumont were close to 1,000 officers. **

When Major Van Deman started organization of Army Military Intelligence he felt the principal problem was counterintelligence. There was a large body of German-Americans in the United States openly hostile to the nation's war aims and constituting a potential source of subversion. There was ample evidence that the enemy had many agents in operation throughout the country. Consequently, counterintelligence expanded and developed, until in the opinion of Colonel Bruce Bidwell, author of the History of the Military Intelligence Division, "it began to overshadow many other normal intelligence activities which were soon badly neglected. This proved to be especially true in regard to intelligence training responsibilities." ***

This is shown clearly in the growth of the Military Intelligence Division Headquarters in Washington. By the end of the war its original seven assignments had

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* CIP Research Circular "Corps of Intelligence Police", August 17, 1918. By Order of Colonel Churchill, Documents 115-118.

** Lester, P-3; CIP Records; History MID, V-47, V-5.

*** History MID, X-5.

developed into forty-eight sections and subsections of which only six were under the Positive Branch and forty-two were under the Negative or Counterintelligence Branch. In this branch 60% of the sections were concerned with counterintelligence investigative work and only 40% with censorship. * Of the six sections assigned to the Positive Branch, half of them performed large numbers of negative branch activities. The Corps of Interpreters, which was established 4 July 1917 with 130 officers and men, ** participated in many counterintelligence activities.

At MID headquarters this growth was essentially a Reserve Officer and specialized civilian one as the division grew from three officers and two civilians in April 1917 to a force of 282 officers and 1,159 civilians by the time of the Armistice. Of the total officers, General Van Deman stated that there were never at any one time more than six officers of the Regular Army assigned to MID during the entire World War I period. *** More regular officers were requested, again and again, but their release from other duties was never approved.

Some CIP agents were at the headquarters. For example, in 1918, M.I.3 (Counterespionage in the Military Service) had thirty-four CIP agents on duty. **** However, it was in the field that most of the CIP entlisted personnel were stationed. At the New York Branch Intelligence Office at the time of the Armistice there were fifty-two CIP agents on duty or about one-fifth of the total strength of CIP in the US. About two dozen CIP agents were at the District of Columbia Intelligence Field Office; another dozen in Chicago and some one hundred other enlisted agents were scattered among the more important twenty-eight of the 500 intelligence units in the Army's six geographical departments.*****

Civilian agents made a large number of the counterintelligence investigations in the United States during World War I. From the start of the War until 28 November 1917, a matter of some seven months, together with the Intelligence Officers, they handled all "CI" work. With the authorization on 28 November of 200 CIP agents for use in United States, many of these civilians were enlisted but large numbers of other civilians remained. In the New York office, for example, of the 103 investigators fifty-one were civilian. A number

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* History, Index.
** Ibid., VII-1, V-11, and V-46.
*** Ibid., V-4, 5, & 6.
**** Ibid., VIII-6
***** CIP Records, Documents, #36-44; History MID, V-31, & VIII-12.

of civilians remained among the forty-one agents at the District of Columbia office at the end of the war.*

Economy was the primary factor for the authorization of Corps of Intelligence Police for use in the United States. In his request to the Chief of Staff on 15 November 1917, the acting Chief of the War College Division stated that it was becoming difficult to get competent civilian agents at the rate of only $4 a day and expenses. Detailing qualified enlisted men to CIP duties was not satisfactory because after the expense of training they were subject to removal with their outfits. The Memorandum stated it was believed that a large number of these investigations "could be successfully made by enlisted men at a fraction of the cost required if made by civilians."**

Back of the desire for military personnel was another feeling besides economy which was summarized by Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, who succeeded Colonel Van Deman as G2 in August 1918. Writing after the war, General Churchill said, "...although the idea of any investigation of individuals in the military service is repugnant to most military men, I am sure they all agree that if a state of war makes such investigations necessary we want it done by agencies under our control and not by unsympathetic civilian bureaus."***

The request to increase the CIP from fifty to 300 men with the additional 250 men "for duty under the direction of the Chief of the War College Division," was approved on 20 November 1917 and published as GO 149 eight days later. By September 1918, 210 of these men had been obtained, but the needs were growing faster than the personnel and an increase of 250 Corps of Intelligence Police for service in the United States was requested. On 4 September, the Adjutant General approved this request.****

Neither the Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch, which was then part of the Executive Division of the General Staff, nor the Adjutant General recalled that in January they had authorized 750 CIP personnel for the AEF and so this September request was approved for an authorized strength of 550 with only fifty for the AEF. Actually, it made the total authorized strength of the CIP 1,250 men of which about half had been obtained at the time of the Armistice.

In the original request for CIP personnel to work in the United States it was stated that they were to replace civilians in the Intelligence Section at Washington and at Intelligence offices in Washington, New York, Boston, Charleston, S. C.,

*History MID, V-38 & VIII-12.
**CIP Records, 17, #6a.
***History MID, VIII-2.
****CIP Records, Documents, #38-44.

Chicago, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, San Francisco and other offices as opened. In November an office was opened at Philadelphia; in January at St. Louis; in February at Seattle; and in July 1918 at New Orleans.*

Agents were not only needed for various district offices but for many specialized units. A small branch office was established in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in June 1918. Port of Embarkation units were stationed at Hoboken, N.J., and Newport News, Va.** Special Counterintelligence units were furnished the Signal Corps, the Aviation Corps, the Chemical Warfare Service and the Medical, Dental and Veterinary Corps.*** In September 1918 a special subsection was formed to handle counterespionage in the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, the Motor Transport Corps, the Adjutant General's Office, the Judge Advocate General's Office and the General Staff. This applied not only to the staff sections in the War Department, but included personnel in field units not under the jurisdiction of I. O.'s at the divisional cantonments of geographical Army departments.****

Many agents were needed for liaison. From the beginning of its activities, the Military Intelligence Division cooperated with all of the various investigative agencies of the government and particularly with the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice under A. Bruce Bielaski. This Bureau, later to be known as the FBI, was under Attorney General Thomas Gregory. One of his young law clerks was J. Edgar Hoover.*****

Much of the work of the Bureau during World War I was enforcing prohibition and apprehending draft evaders, but in the arrest and internment of potentially subversive civilians the Bureau worked closely with the MID. Immediately following the declaration of war, sixty-three German sympathizers were arrested, and within the next two and a half months, two hundred ninety-five more were interned.******

MID also worked with the secret service section of the State Department"... although," Colonel Van Deman later wrote, "the Department has always denied that it possessed any such section."******* It worked closely with its Naval counterpart, the Domestic Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which was activated on 3 May 1917 at the same time MID was authorized.********

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*CIP Records, Documents, #38-44, and History MID, V-39.

**Ibid., V-39.

***Ibid., VIII-13-14

****History MID, Ch. VIII, p. 23.

*****Lowenthal, The FBI, pp. 2, 84.

******Editors of Look, The Story of the FBI, (New York, 1947), E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., p. 11.

*******Van Deman, Vol. I, p. 44.

********Office of Naval Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Feb 1946, CIC Library, (C).

Intelligence Officers in the various Port Control organizations worked side by side with Immigration and Customs Bureau agents. * In all, MID maintained regular liaison with seventeen War Department agencies and thirty-three outside agencies many of which had several important subdivisions. The full time services of twenty-one officers of MID were required for this work. **

The only investigative organization of the government which did not cooperate was the United States Secret Service which was specifically forbidden to take part in any such activity, "much to the chagrin of the then head of this service." ***

First Counterespionage Cases

The Military Intelligence Section of the War Department was authorized on 3 May 1917, and before the Washington, D.C. field office could be opened a month later, the section was involved with a number of local counterintelligence cases. Colonel Van Deman discovered that the demands on the new service "in many instances had really nothing to do with military intelligence matters. However, they were matters which needed immediate and serious attention, and there seemed to be no other organization in the War Department to handle them. The first of these questions to come up was the subject of guarding various offices of the War Department.... 'It would seem that this situation was one which would have appealed to the authorities of the Army as needing correction, but this was far from the case. It required considerable pressure from the highest authorities in the Army to accomplish this objective...." ****

Meanwhile, the first wartime espionage case occurred. A young man disguised as a Captain, U. S. Ordnance Department, asked at an Ordnance Department office in the War Department for its records of locations and amounts of high explosives in Western United States. When the civilian refused to give the information until he had called the Colonel in charge, the officer left the office. When called, the colonel said there was no one of the name or description of the young man in the Ordnance Department and further he had not authorized anyone (as the "Captain" had claimed) to get this information. The colonel called the Intelligence section and with the aid of the Army and Washington police a cordon was placed about the city, but no one resembling the young man's description was ever located. Colonel Van Deman said, "There is little doubt but that this young man was an enemy agent." *****

The information this young man wanted was probably intended for use of Germany's saboteurs who had fled to Mexico at the declaration of war and were

* Van Deman, Vol. I, p. 55.
** History MID, Ch. VI, p. 5.
*** Van Deman, Vol. I. p. 44.
**** Ibid., Vol I, 40.
***** Ibid., Vol II, 41-2.

waiting for orders to return. At the same time, the German Secret Service was making efforts to furnish them supplies.

While the Danes were not averse to doing business with Germany as mentioned previously, they had no desire to see the United States sabotaged. In the early summer of 1918, they forwarded to the United States a large number of objects they had discovered in shipments en route to the United States. These objects consisted of imitations of lumps of coal, dispatch cases, field glass cases, fountain pens and other such objects all loaded with TNT and ready to go except that the Danes had defused them. There was also carborundum in the shape of crayons for putting axles and engines of vehicles out of commission. *

The disguised "American Captain" may have been one of the German agents obtained by the "blackmail" recruiting technique. One of these cases was disclosed about this same time when a young American reported to the U. S. Embassy at Copenhagen. He said he was enroute to the United States under orders of the German Secret Service, and suspected he was under surveillance by another German agent. He explained that he had been caught in Germany by the declaration of war and that his mother was still in Europe. He said that when he asked to leave Germany he was refused permission until, finally, he was told he could go if he would furnish reports. He was given handkerchiefs and shoe strings impregnated with a secret ink.

American officials at Copenhagen forwarded the handkerchief to the Military Intelligence and notified New York Customs that the young man was enroute. At New York, he was turned over to the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, who in turn released him to the Military Intelligence Section, where he produced the shoe strings and handkerchiefs. An attempt was made to analyze the secret ink but the college chemical laboratory which had volunteered its services to MID reported that the fluid was only pure water and a few grains of starch. Later Colonel Van Deman learned that a sample sent the British had been analyzed and its true chemistry determined. The British called it the German's best ink, and it figured prominently in the case of a very noted German agent later executed in the Tower of London. **

The attempted espionage in the Ordnance Department should have been enough to convince Army authorities of the necessity of adequate security measures, but it took another "incident" before guard systems were established over War Department Offices. Two carefully selected officers of the Intelligence Branch spent one night searching various War Department offices for classified information not properly safeguarded. Next morning they had scores of documents,

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* Van Deman, P-50.

** Ibid., Vol I, P-47-50.

including many from safes they had opened from combinations written on cards and left in unlocked desks. * This type of surprise search was conducted by the Corps of Intelligence Police at the start of World War II with similiar results.

Early in the war, Counterintelligence personnel discovered that certain suspected persons were using the "Army List and Directory" as a source of information for Central Powers espionage. This monthly directory listed by name, rank and address every officer and gave considerable information on the locations and duties of various army organizations. Colonel Van Deman states it was finally suspended for the duration of the war, but not before "very determined opposition on the part of the Adjutant General" was overcome. **

Enemy agents were shipping overseas fancy Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years menus of various Army organizations. Counterintelligence soon discovered why. These menus, in many instances, carried complete rosters and in some cases photographs of all the officers and non-commissioned officers. When the Military Intelligence Division recommended that publication be stopped, it was found large sums of money were involved, and the matter settled by allowing preparation of the menus but withholding distribution until the unit was safely in Europe. ***

Specialized CIP Missions

One of the first zone of the interior counterintelligence problems was port security. On 2 July 1917, General Pershing lodged a strong protest against the careless methods being followed by the War Department in the transmission of secret data covering ship sailings to and from France. **** One of the first cases of the New York Branch Intelligence Office after it was opened in 1917 was the investigation of a small Brooklyn exporter who was sending business telegrams to Amsterdam which, upon analysis, revealed that the dates and quantities of goods corresponded with amazing accuracy to various transport sailings. ***** The exporter was "imported" to an internment compound in the mid-west. The initial problem at ports was one of jurisdiction. Not until May 1918 was the State Department given adequate control of passports and visas for American citizens.

Port control was of deep concern to Colonel Van Deman. Even when he had been assigned to Intelligence with the A.E.F. in Europe, he continued to urge

* Van Deman, P-43.
** Ibid., P-45.
*** Ibid., Vol. I, P-45.
**** History MID, VIII-2.
***** Johnson, P-24.

improvements in the United States. His pleas for better control of persons destined for France and Spain has been mentioned previously. In September 1918 he wrote Colonel Churchill, Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch at Washington, "The weakest link in the whole chain now is the U. S. - Canadian situation. The British tell me that they have never been able to get the Canadians to establish anything like an effective control because they said that until the U.S. did so, it was useless to attempt it, which of course is true. What is happening now is that people are coming to Canada from the U.S. and then sailing to England without any sort of control. Of course the British can send them back, but a proper control would be much more satisfactory from every point of view." *

With the State Department in control, the problem became one of coordination and liaison. This passport control by the State Department was in direct contrast to the system in force in France and England whereby the military authorities held full power to exercise any restraints on civilian travel they felt advisable, and up to the end of the war Military Intelligence Officers were advocating such military authority. As it was, MID merely furnished a liaison officer and file checks and investigations as requested. However, Intelligence Officers were detailed to various ports to examine incoming and outgoing passengers and establish the rudiments of what in World War II was known as ship panelling. By November 1918, M.I. 11 (Passports and Port Control) was checking 9,500 names a month for the State Department. **

Counterintelligence work for the Staff Corps units started in early 1918. Prior to 15 January 1918, the Signal Corps had always insisted on maintaining its own intelligence service because of the peculiar opportunities for enemy agents to secure valuable information from such a highly technical organization. On that date, however, it was abolished and MID took jurisdiction. This action apparently resulted from an independent investigation of the Photographic Division of the Signal Corps which had revealed four officers of pro-German sympathies, two of whom had been previously connected with the Hamburg-American line and had engaged in the dissemination of German propaganda prior to the entrance of the United States into the war. All four officers were promptly separated from the service. ***

Aircraft production was covered as part of the network of the Plant Protection Service and through its contacts, the CIP agents received a steady stream of suspects. Some 4,500 cases were handled by MID up to the signing of the Armistice.****

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* Van Deman, Appendix C, P-1.
** History of MID, VIII-56/7.
*** Ibid., VIII, 12-13.
**** Ibid., VIII, 13.

Washington Field Office

As the necessity for undercover investigations of individuals and organizations grew, particularly in the Washington, D.C., area, it became evident that an organization composed of men who were experts in this sort of work should be set up. To meet this need a number of men whose work in civil life was along these lines, the majority of them selected from the Metropolitan Police Department in New York City, were brought to Washington and quartered in a private dwelling in Southeast Washington. These men wore civilian clothing and every precaution was taken to see that their presence in Washington was unknown. The only members of the Military Intelligence Branch who knew of their existance was the officer in charge of the Branch, the executive officer, and the officer who handled the finances of the branch.*

Colonel Van Deman states, "This was probably the beginning of the organization later known as the Counter Intelligence Corps." However, it was not until November, when members of the Corps of Intelligence Police were authorized for work in the United States, that investigators of this unit were established.**

The first of the Military Intelligence Field Offices, quite naturally, worked closely with the MI headquarters and in December 1917, it was made a subsection of the division and titled M.I. 3C (District of Columbia). However, when Captain Henry A. Taylor arrived in June 1917 to establish it, he had with him only two agents who had been associated with him in the New York Police Department, Detective Bureau.***

Taylor, who later in the war became the Intelligence Officer for the Newport News Port of Embarkation, established a "blind" office at 310 "E" Street, NW, in Washington under the name "Personnel Improvement Bureau." Originally, the personnel "improved" were civilian employees of the War Department, but this mission was extended to military personnel and then to applicants for service.**** Eventually, it functioned as a large scale detective bureau including graft and fraud cases among its investigations.

James E. Henry, Sr., a former agent, has furnished an account of the Washington, D. C. office which at the height of the war had some eighty-five persons mainly CIP but including a number of civilian investigators, who either were not physically qualified or who did not desire to accept the opportunity

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* History MID, P-56.

** Ibid., P-56.

*** Manuscript of James E. Henry, Sr., former agent of the Washington Field Office, World War I, Historical Project Files. (Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Henry")

**** CIP Basic Data, Ibid., 40, #38-44.

to become CIP Sergeants at $50 a month and a $30 allowance, which is what Henry recalls they were paid. Later, when Henry bought his own automobile to save riding street cars, he was paid for his gasoline and auto expense and his car was used when automobile surveillances were necessary.*

Henry's qualifications for the work consisted of volunteering for intelligence and graduating from Harvard thus answering the prevailing requirement of Intelligence for "young college men."** On arrival in Washington in May 1918, Henry was told he was to work as a civilian with the CIP until his army papers were processed. This took six weeks.

At the "Personnel Improvement Bureau", Henry discovered that the experienced portion of the unit consisted of former associates of Captain Taylor of the New York Police Department. The first Sergeant was the old "regular" type. "How he happened to get into the organization in the first place," said Henry, "I do not know." There were some older civilian agents and a score of CIP agents. There was one group of prominent New England socialites from an old-line Boston concern. "Apparently," Henry reports, "the wool business was nil on account of the war...None of these men had any training for intelligence work, as far as I know, yet Blake and Crimmins received commissions..."*** American Intelligence Officers were in agreement with their counterparts in the German Intelligence Service as its Chief Colonel Wilhem Nicolai wrote after the war, "The Intelligence Service is a service for gentlemen. It inevitably breaks down where ever it is placed in the hands of other persons..."****

There was one woman agent in the office, Miss Anna W. Keichline of Bellefonte, Pa., an architect by profession, and there were also two regular army enlisted men, one about fifty years old and the other about thirty-five. Henry states, "How they happened to be transferred to the C.I.P., I don't know. I believe they acted as front-door guards at the main office of the Military Intelligence Division in the Hooe Building at 1330 F St., NW., where it had moved after being three months at the Monroe Courts Building, 15th and "M" Streets, NW.*****

"Except for the members from the New York Police and two or three others who had done some investigative work, we were all without experience or special training for the work we were doing," Henry said. "My first job was to read over what seemed endless piles of applications for civilian employment in Government Offices. I was to try to spot any that would be...now called 'a poor security risk'. I thought then, and still think, that anyone trying to get into

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* Henry, File.
** CIP Records, Documents, #40.
*** Henry, P-3.
**** Nicolai, P-252.
***** Henry, P-3 and History MID, V-19.

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Government employment, for nefarious ends would not put any information in an application that might defeat this true purpose."*

From screening reports, Henry was assigned to file checks and spent considerable time in the Adjutant General's office looking up service records of people being investigated.

This "training" was interrupted on 9 July for Henry's induction into the service which included issuance of a full uniform as Sergeant of Infantry, which he wore only on the one occasion he was required to take target practice with his .38 caliber revolver. The important thing was that he was issued his Intelligence pass to gain access to places where his normal government civilian employee pass was not honored. The target practice completed his formal training except for one occasion later when a "judo" expert was sent to the unit to teach the "fine points" of mayhem. Henry said he never recalled any of the agents using it.**

Jurisdiction of this office was generally limited to Washington and vicinity, although Henry stated that he remembers agents being sent as far as the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Daily typewritten progress reports were required and final reports were written in regulation "Subject, To, From" form. On surveillances no matter how late a subject went to bed, agents had to go back to the office and type their reports in either triplicate or quadruplicate of which one copy was kept for the agent's personal reference file.

All agents had a turn as Night Duty Agent which included watching the janitor collect and burn the classified waste. The files were locked and then guarded by a home made burglar alarm that accidently went off one night and brought the duty agent and the janitor face to face across loaded revolvers, which fortunately they didn't shoot.*** Presumably, foreign agents of a crude sort did appear on the scene in the summer of 1918, when three Japanese men were observed loitering openly across the street from the office part of the time for two or three days. Henry states the agents were forbidden to take any notice of their activities "for fear of causing international complications." Although the CIP agents were never certain, Henry says, "the assumption was that they were spying on our headquarters."****

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* Henry, P-3, History MID, V-19.
** Henry, Ibid., P-5.
*** Ibid., P-7.
**** Ibid., P-8.

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As part of his induction, Henry was ordered to Ford's Theatre, where some of the Adjutant General's files were located, to be fingerprinted. Henry adds that he does not recall ever having any experience while in the CIP with fingerprinting or fingerprints in any of the cases on which he worked. The unit did, however, develop some specialists. One agent had stenographic experience that enabled him to record microphone conversations while another agent demonstrated skill in "planting" hidden microphones.

Surveillances were the common duties of the agents. One case involved a man with a German name who worked as a salesman for a big steel company and made many calls at Army Ordnance Department offices. This man had "two Mercer sport cars, a lame colored chauffeur and an attractive girl with whom he spent considerable time." He also rented two apartments some distance apart, in one of which a covert search revealed forty-six cases of liquor which was always welcome in "dry" Washington, boxes of ladies' silk stockings, white kid gloves and other items. It was suspected that he was bribing ordnance officials and a "mike" was planted in one of the suspect's apartments. Just as the case became interesting Henry was transferred to another case and suffered the usual fate of agents in never learning of the outcome. In another "mike" case, however, Lieutenant Robert Dawson, the "mike" technician, Sgt Thomas Cummings, the shorthand expert, and Henry exposed a leather salesman involved in graft in connection with the Quartermaster Corps. As Henry recalls a dishonest serviceman was mixed up in the case.

Tracing down malicious rumors was part of the job, and on one occasion Henry was assigned to locate the source of a rumor supposedly started by pro-Germans that colored people had tails like monkeys and were always put in the front battle lines. Henry found colored people who had heard the story but its source remained undetected.

After the Armistice, the District Office continued on until early 1919 handling for the most part fraud and graft cases; in all, some 6,500 cases were processed. The only job of importance Henry remembers in that period was on a very cold night when he was detailed with another CIP sergeant to guard two or three truckloads of documents that President Wilson was having sent to France.

The New York Branch

A month after the establishment of the Washington, D.C. office, the branch Intelligence Office was opened in New York, at 302 Broadway, and Mr. Nicholas Biddle, a deputy police commissioner, was chosen by Colonel Van Deman to head it. Biddle was eventually commissioned as a Major on an authorization which Colonel Van Deman borrowed from the Signal Corps, but only after the commission had been disapproved by the Secretary of War who could not see how Biddle was a qualified Signal man and after Van Deman, by enlisting the help of his close friend Felix Frankfurter, (who was on duty in the Secretary's office at the time) had explained how Intelligence had to beg, borrow or steal its officer spaces.*

The New York office was located in the hub of material war effort with many of the most urgent plant and port counterintelligence problems centered there. From 1914, when the war started in Europe, until nearly three years later, when we entered the war and either deported or interned some of the most notorious of the German agents, the city was the center of German espionage and sabotage.

In his book, "Throttled," Inspector Thomas J. Tunney of the New York Police Bomb Squad, lists twenty-three members of his squad who became CIP agents in a group on 14 December 1917, and continued their anti-sabotage investigations, many of which had started months before, such as the Hindu bomb plot investigation which had been started in February 1917 on a tip from Scotland Yard. This eventually became one of the big cases of the New York Office, and the plot was completely neutralized. West Coast Intelligence offices also dealt with ramifications of Hindu subversion.**

By the time of the Armistice, the New York Office had twenty-five officers, fifty-two CIP agents, fifty-one civilian inspectors and thirty-six clerical personnel. At this office was located the New York District Office of the Plant Protection Service under the management of Patrick Curry. J. A. Kilpatrick was resident agent at Albany.***

In addition to espionage and sabotage cases, the New York office, with its heavy police element, covered a wide variety of cases ranging from arrests for thefts, smuggling, burglary, misuse of Allied uniforms, desertions from

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* History of MID, V-41.

** Thomas J. Tunney, Throttled, Boston 1919, Small Maynard. P-4, 70.

*** History MID, V-38 and Provisional Instructions For Civilians Under Military Control, M.I. 3, War Department, June 1918.

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United States, British and French forces, and draftdodgers to violations of the Immigration, Enemy Alien and Postal Censorship Laws. One of the most important espionage cases of the office was that of Mme Maria de Victoria, which culminated in her arrest on a presidentalwarrant in April 1918 while she was living at the Hotel Nassau at Long Beach, Long Island. Madame de Victoria, who was also known as Marie de Vussiere, came under suspicion in 1917 when her husband, Manuel, an Argentine citizen, was arrested by the French. Soon the New York Intelligence office learned that both the French and the British were interested in the woman who had been called "the beautiful blonde of Antwerp."

Surveillance resulted in securing a number of letters addressed to Madame de Victoria which were forwarded to the Military Intelligence laboratory which was in the process of being organized under Lieutenant Herbert O. Yardley at Washington. Messages in invisible ink were found under various "cover names" and the codes were broken and read. A federal grand jury indicted Marie de Victoria for conspiring in espionage in time of war, but more than two years afterward she died in prison without ever having been brought to trial.

Some 500 arrests were made between 14 December 1917 and 11 November 1918 by the CIP agents of the New York office. Impersonation cases required much work. Among the impersonators was Fritz Joubert Duquesne alias Frederick Fredericks, who had escaped from life imprisonment at Bermuda where he had been sentenced by the British for espionage in the Boer War. In New York, Duquesne was posing as Captain Claude Stoughton of the Light Horse Brigade of the British Army. When arrested as an imposter by the CIP agents, Duquesne's readiness to plead guilty to minor charges led to further investigation disclosing that he was wanted by the British for an explosion on a ship which had killed three British sailors. *

In the spring of 1918, CIP agents arrested a larcenist who was posing as a Captain in the Medical Corps and who claimed his facial scars were from shrapnel wounds. The agents discovered the scars came from cuts by a beer bottle in a barroom brawl. Among the deserters caught was a Sergeant Major of the Canadian Army and an Army Lieutenant who was posing as a Captain. The largest "haul" of deserters, thirty-five in all, was gathered when three CIP agents broke up a seven man gang that was obtaining sweaters and comfort outfits from the Red Cross by having the deserters apply for them to the Red Cross, using fake orders.

Five enlisted men were apprehended stealing ordnance supplies and six civilians in another gang were apprehended for stealing sugar. Sgt. Valentine Corell of the CIP broke a highly difficult case involving two York Germans who were smuggling rubber to the enemy. An official of a local draft board was apprehended by Sgt Randolph of the CIP for shaking down registrants on the promise of getting

* Records of the New York Office of the MID by 1st Lt W.L.Moffat, 21 Jan 1919.

them safe and easy details. Investigation revealed this "official" had been arrested many times before but released each time. This time, he got two years in the penitentiary. *

Frequently, the office proved that an apparent sabotage act was not enemy-inspired as in the case of the two million dollar explosion on 26 March 1918 at the Jarvis Warehouse in Jersey City. CIP Sgts. Jenkins, Barth and Cavanagh following an all night investigation, arrested a checker in charge of a gang working in the vicinity of a large quantity of chlorate of potash and at 5 A.M., brought him to the New York Intelligence Office where he was interrogated by Colonel Biddle and finally confessed that he had accidentally caused the explosion by means of a lighted cigarette after being repeatedly warned not to smoke. **

America's leading "Reds" provided one of the most important cases of the New York office. Following the conviction of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkmann, anarchist leaders, a number of seditious circulars were issued from time to time identified only by the words "Underground Press", printed at the bottom and distributed by being thrown in handfuls from upper windows of buildings in sections inhabited largely by the foreign born. On 23 August 1918, early in the morning a particularly vicious circular was distributed, violently denouncing the government, called upon citizens not to support the Liberty loans and vituperated the President. It was printed both in English and in Yiddish. Three boys passing a loft building at Lafayette and Houston Streets saw the circulars floating down. Because of the violent wording of the circulars the boys took them at once to Police headquarters. The police immediately notified the New York Intelligence Office. There Major Fuller Potter, assistant to Colonel Biddle, who had been disturbed by the number of times these circulars had been successfully distributed, was ready for action. In a matter of minutes, CIP Sergeants Barth and Jenkins were on the case, and within an hour they had arrested one of the anarchists and obtained a confession that implicated six others. With the aid of six additional CIP agents, Sergeants Barth and Jenkins apprehended these other six anarchists that night.

The "Underground Press" printing plant was located at 1582 Madison Avenue, and the evidence obtained resulted in the conviction of five of the seven. Corps of Intelligence Police encountered in this case the typical communist "smear" tactic when one of the anarchists died of pneumonia during the trial. Harry Weinberger, attorney for the anarchists, charged that his client had been killed as a result of third degree methods used by the Sergeants who effected the arrests.

Weinberger claimed that he could prove this, but all the evidence contradicted him, and CIP agents Barth, Jenkins, Meagher, Hastings, Santaniello, Murphy,

* CIP Records, 21 Jan 1919, New York Office.
** Ibid., 21 Jan 1919, 3.

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Caddell and Dillon received written commendations from Judge Henry Clayton and District Attorney Francis Caffey. *

Before the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the Russian Czarist Government had purchased a number of rifles and bayonets which her agents had attempted to ship to Russia. This was well known, but the place of storage was not. After the revolution every effort was made to discover what had become of these rifles and bayonets. So intensive was the search that Colonel Van Deman concluded that it was improbable that they were shipped out of the New York. He added that it was possible that a Soviet agent got them out of the city and shipped them through another port.

After war was declared, investigation was made in New York for a German arms cache. A search of the building in which "The German Club" was located, revealed that a considerable number of packing cases had been stored in the basement, but had been removed. There was certain evidence that these packing cases had contained arms. Whatever became of these rifles was not known, although it was rumored that they had been shipped to the Middle West and hidden there. ** This cache may have been connected later with the Witzke case of the Western Department, although the connection was never revealed.

Other District and Divisional Units

Corps of Intelligence Police activities in other district offices were similar in many ways to those of the New York District Office with the nationalities and motivations involved varying according to the sections of the country along the "case" divisions as established "Geographic Departments" of M.I. 4B.

Personnel procurement differed from office to office, but "except for the New York office where the Corps was largely recruited from the Detective Bureau of the City Police Department, it was not customary to enlist the services of former policemen or detectives...." However, most of the offices were built around a cadre of experienced investigators from various civilian occupations. In the Chicago office, one CIP sergeant had been in the Intelligence Service of the British Army; another a Deputy Sheriff of King County, Washington; and two had been successful lawyers. College graduates included alumni from Harvard, Yale, Michigan, London University and private schools in Rome and Florence. All had had military training and were transferred from other branches of the service because they possessed special qualifications for intelligence work. The work of

* CIP Records, 21 Jan 1919, New York Office.
** Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 2.

the Chicago office was primarily concerned with subversion cases arising out of the huge German-American population centered in that area. In addition, the mid-west mills had attracted many radical labor organizations that provided many problems. * The day after war was declared the Socialist Party in convention at Chicago passed resolutions against participation in the War. In July 1917 two persons were killed in race riots in St. Louis. In June 1918 Eugene V. Debs was arrested in Cleveland on a charge of interfering with recruiting. In August 1918, at Chicago, one hundred International Worker of the World leaders were found guilty of conspiracy against prosecution of the War. All these cases involved work for the Midwest CIP agents.

Although the New York and Boston areas were centers of Irish agitation, during the entire war, certain Irishmen in all parts of the United States engaged in operations which they hoped would hurt Great Britain. Interception of a secret ink letter describing plans to sabotage one of the largest copper mines in the Western part of the United States led to a nation-wide counterintelligence search for the leader of the plot, who was head of one of the Irish organizations of the country. He was arrested in Buffalo just as he was boarding a train. This was the same type of secret ink that figured in the German-inspired Irish attempted revolution which ended with Sir Roger Casement's execution at the Tower of London. **

In the Southern Department, which handled problems of border control along the Texas-Mexico frontier, a woman was picked up in early 1917 attempting to cross into the United States. It was strongly suspected, as a result of counterintelligence investigation, that she was attempting to get in touch with the German Secret Service. A search revealed a blank sheet of paper in the heel of her shoe. When forwarded to Military Intelligence at Washington, the message was brought out by simple heat treatment. This suggested to Lt. Yardley the necessity of having a detection laboratory available, and it was this organization that paid off in the Madame Victoria case. ***

In connection with negro subversion and "political demagoguery," problems of the Southern Department, the first two negro intelligence agents were recruited after careful selection and investigation. It was evident that agents of the Central Powers were using word of mouth propaganda to encourage subversion. One of these rumors spread in Washington was mentioned previously. Counter propaganda was required. These agents traveled from community to community, investigating the local situation and, through informal conversations and public addresses, exposing the enemy's propaganda. They traveled alone and during the war covered most of the United States. It was soon evident that their principal work lay in the North and not the South. ****

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* CIP Records, Document #41.
** Van Deman, Vol. I, Pg. 59-60.
*** The Spy, Pg. 232.
**** Van Deman, Vol. I., P-56.

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Racial problems were not confined to negroes. When the United States entered World War I it had a population of a little over one hundred million persons of which twenty-eight and a half million were either foreign born or American children of foreign born parents. More than a million enemy aliens registered in the draft, but for every alien there were several times as many persons who, although they were Americans by birth or naturalization, had family ties with the enemy nations. Out of the millions of Germans who had immigrated to the United States, there were only 159,000 who were still aliens of draft age when registration was required. * Many of these naturalized citizens, however, felt a "dual" loyalty to their old country.

For the Intelligence Officers with the 42 Army Divisions organized in the United States during World War I, ** the sentiments of some of these foreign born and foreign connected draftees resulted in many cases of suspected disloyalty and a number of cases of actual disloyalty. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the 752,000 Austrian-Hungarians who registered for the draft were not declared enemy aliens until six months after the war started and that it was not until 24 October 1918 that the State Department completed a lengthy investigation of the status of Turkish and Bulgarian aliens and decided they were enemy aliens. By that time about 102,000 of them had registered and many had been drafted. ***

Most of the potentially disloyal cases were discovered in the United States since more than half of the two million soldiers of the AEF did not arrive overseas until less than four months before the war ended, and more than half the AEF divisions trained from ten months to fourteen months at sixteen camps in the United States before shipment. **** Files of the 31st Division which trained at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, from October 1917 until it went overseas in September 1918 reveal a large number of these disloyalty investigations. *****

Among the new Army camps established during World War I was a Motor Transport Depot on 153 acres of land at Colgate, Maryland, and activated in December 1917 as Camp Holabird. ******

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* History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, Vol. I, Colonial Period-World War I, by Marvin A. Kreidberg, Lt. Col., Inf, Office of the Chief of the Military History Department of the Army, pp. 517, 378.

** Army Almanac, 1950, US Government Printing Office, p.436, 517-563.

*** History of Military Mobilization in the USA, Vol. I, pp. 517 and 378.

**** Army Almanac, pp. 436, 517-563.

***** ASI Gen. Hqs. G-2B, 31st Division Files, Box 6041, Case 61-3, Natl Archives.

****** Holabird Herald, Vol. V, No. 5, March 14, 1947, CIC Historical Project Files.

CIP in the Western Department

In the Army's Western Department, counterespionage in the "neutral" countries was put into practice. At the Nogales, Arizona office, under Captain Joel A. Lipscomb, Special Agent Byron S. Butcher was authorized to recruit an informant (A-1) to report on espionage activities in Mexico, where German agents in the United States had fled when war was declared and were being organized under the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt. *

Mexican border activities had been of particular counterintelligence interest since early 1916 when British Intelligence decoded a top secret proposal of German Secretary of State Zimmerman to President Carranza of Mexico that Mexico join the Central Powers and declare war against the United States. At that time, American Immigration Officials at Nogales, Arizona, arrested two men and a woman trying to enter the United States and found coded messages sewn into their garments which, when deciphered, confirmed the British interception. Moreover, it was learned that President Carranza not only received the message but knew of the attempt to get it into the United States. **

The case that resulted from the important decision to work in a neutral country is reported here in detail for several reasons. First, the amount of evidence obtained by this method was so conclusive that the German agent apprehended was the only one condemned to death in the United States during World War I. *** Secondly, because this German agent was considered one of the first and one of the most effective enemy saboteurs, his "modus operandi" deserves study by counterintelligence personnel. Finally, because the selection of the informant and the entire handling of this case by the CIP Special Agent represents exceptionally skillful counterintelligence work, it is worthy of emulation by future agents. Particularly significant is the fact that the counterespionage informant in the neutral country was able, over a period of time and wine, to obtain derogatory admissions to which the suspect would never confess after apprehension even when he realized that the evidence against him was conclusive.

Butcher chose his informant well. Dr. Paul Bernardo Altendorf, a 42 year old Pole and soldier of fortune, at the time was a Colonel in the Mexican Army on the staff of General Calles, Military Governor of Sonora, who was as pro-German as Altendorf was anti-German. Altendorf had studied medicine and surgery at the University of Cracow and was called "Dr." He was an

* Landau, p. 112.
** Van Deman, Vol. I, p. 62.
*** Landau p.114.

accomplished linguist speaking English, Spanish, German and Polish fluently. Of a roving disposition, he had traveled extensively in South America and in the British colonies, before settling in Mexico. When Butcher sent him to Mexico City it took little time for him to become enrolled in the German Secret Service. *

Cooperating with this MID informant was a negro undercover agent of British Naval Intelligence and an undercover agent of the Department of Justice Investigation Unit in Texas. One of their first contacts was Kurt A. Jahnke, who, with Lothar Witzke, had been a saboteur under Franz von Bopp, German Consul General in San Francisco. Jahnke was a naturalized American citizen and had served some time in the United States Marines. **

While in the United States, Jahnke had established cover for himself by becoming a member of the Morse Patrol, a night watchman agency in San Francisco (later identified as a pro-German organization). To display his patriotism and divert suspicion, he had boldly walked into the office of the Secret Service in San Francisco in February 1916 and reported he had overheard a plot to blow up the Navy Yard at Mare Island. Since he claimed the source of his information was a conversation he had overheard between two alleged German agents, whereabouts and identities presently unknown, the authorities paid little attention to his warning until shortly afterwards when a magazine at the yard did blow up. By then Jahnke had disappeared. ***

With Jahnke in Mexico City was his saboteur companion, Witzke. These two, Captain Henry Landau, formerly of British Intelligence, termed in 1937, "the most deadly sabotage team in history." **** Witzke was a German Naval Lieutenant who was interned in Valparaiso when the German Cruiser Dresden was captured and sunk off Chile. Witzke, with his fondness for wine, women and song, did not like internment and soon escaped and as a seaman reached San Francisco under the first of many aliases and reported to von Bopp for duty in early 1916. *****

Jahnke and Witzke had been two of the saboteurs in the fourteen million dollar Black Tom Island explosion in New York Harbor on 30 July 1916. Two

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* Landau p.114
** Ibid., p. 34, 115
*** Ibid., p. 34.
**** Ibid., p. 102.
***** Ibid., p. 34.

million pounds of munitions blew up in a series of explosions, some of which were heard in Philadelphia and Camden. * Jahnke had been linked with the seventeen million dollar Kingsland, New Jersey, sabotage on 11 January 1917, in which a four hour detonation of half a million three-inch high explosive shells completely wrecked the plant. **

An informant report from Mexico City early in 1918 stated "...the present task of promoting a mutiny in the U.S. Army has been entrusted by Berlin to one of their star agents, one K. A. Jahnke of Mexico City. This event is scheduled for Autumn. Jahnke also has taken under his wing the general supervision of sabotage in the U.S., the Panama Canal and American possessions generally, including especially sabotage of ships transporting war material and material for ship construction. His program covering the foregoing ambitions has been approved by the German Government with available credit of 100,000 marks per month and an additional large commission on results accomplished... He has already had some experience in control of German agitators, defeatists and International Workers of the World agitators in this country and is regarded as the ideal man for the job. Jahnke's official appointment seems to be that of sole naval confidential agent in Mexico... Intelligence Officers will probably never have the pleasure of meeting Mr. Jahnke personally, but it is not unlikely that he will give them something to think about. Hence this note in advance." ***

The accuracy of this informant report was revealed during the postwar investigations of the Black Tom and Kingsland explosions when Admiral W. R. Hall, wartime chief of British Naval Intelligence, made available to the investigators copies of 10,000 German cables, radio messages and letters which the British had intercepted and decoded. **** A German General Staff radio message dated 29 April 1918, sent from Berlin via Madrid to Mexico, stated, "Jahnke has been made sole Naval Confidential Agent in Mexico." Also found in this file was a Berlin telegraph to Madrid, dated 8 December, instructing Madrid Intelligence to transmit to its Mexico courier orders for Jahnke to send an agent from Mexico to U.S.A. The messenger was ordered to take a wireless-telegraph code as well as Spanish covering addresses for letters to Jahnke. Directly after this, Jahnke sent Witzke on the trip to the United States which was to culminate in his arrest. *****

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* Landau p.117.
** Ibid., p. 87
*** Ibid., p. 141.
**** Ibid., p. 166.
***** Ibid., p. 174, 171-2.

Meanwhile, Witzke had made several trips across the border to the United States, but the trip on 16 January 1918 was the vital one. It was less than six months since Altendorf, MID's A-1, had arrived in Mexico City, but he had completely won the confidence of Jahnke. Consequently Jahnke asked Altendorf to accompany Witzke and introduce him to General Calles at Sonora. Witzke was to ask Calles to forward any coded telegrams he would send from the United States or elsewhere and to supply him with a revolver and a permit to carry it in Mexico. *

During the trip Witzke started drinking and, growing confidential. He told Altendorf (as A-1 reported it to Special Agent Butcher), "There is something terrible going to happen on the other side of the border when I get there...I will have saved Germany...you will see it in the papers...I do not know whether I will come back alive from this trip or not, as I may be killed..." **

Earlier Witzke, who was using the alias of Pablo Waberski and traveling on a Russian passport, had told A-1 that he was going to Nogales to kill someone. Efforts to secure more definite information failed except that A-1 was led to believe that an American officer at Nogales, Arizona, was booked to be assassinated, because the German said that this American through influence with Mexican officials had seriously injured German plans in Mexico. ***

Witzke told A-1 that he had blown up a black powder magazine of 250,000 pounds near San Francisco one morning about five o'clock and that sixteen lives had been lost, including six children. He asserted he was working for the American Government as a mechanic on the "Island" at the time of the explosion and laid wires to accomplish his designs. Obviously, this was the Mare Island explosion Jahnke had warned U. S. Secret Service about. Witzke said he had started fires in Oregon logging camps the previous fall.

Witzke continued, "...I also did work in New Jersey with Yenky (Jahnke) when the munitions barges were blown up and the piers wrecked... The German Ambassador and Yenky think very highly of me for my work and I am proud to have done it...I have many lives on my conscience and I have killed many people and will now kill more." ****

At Mazalan en route where Witzke stopped at a bawdy house, Altendorf had a chance for a covert contact with the American Consul, through whom he sent

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* Landau p.116, 119.
** Ibid., p. 117.
*** Ibid., p. 117.
**** Ibid., p. 117.

a message to Special Agent Butcher that he was en route to Hemosillo with two German agents, one (whose name was garbled in the coded transmission and may have been someone else) was called "Nuding," and would stay there one day. He asked to have another American informant (M-2) meet him there at the Cohen Hotel. In the message as sent by Consul Chapman, A-1 said, "Both (agents) are plotting assassination of some officials in Nogales...catch Nuding if possible. Use care he is dangerous..." Chapman added his own comment at the end of the message. He said, "I have corroborated evidence as to the danger of Nuding..." *

While traveling to Hermosillo, Witzke told Altendorf that he had six men going North with him and that the work was moving "splendidly." One of these men was later identified by the British informant as Dietz, a German agent who intended crossing the border to the New Mexico coal fields, where the Germans had a large following among miners who belonged to the International Workers of the World. At Hermosillo, Altendorf introduced Witzke to General Calles, who appeared to be expecting him and quickly complied with all the requests. At this point Altendorf had to appear to stay behind to avoid suspicion. The British informant, who had been sent on the trip with Witzke from Mexico City supposedly to work up a revolt among American soldiers on the border, left for Nogales with Witzke. The following night Altendorf arrived in Nogales secretly by freight train. Meanwhile at the Central Hotel, Nogales, M-2 had located Witzke and from then on kept a close surveillance until his arrest.

CIP in a Neutral Country

Meanwhile, Special Agent Butcher had crossed into Nogales, Mexico, and was posing as an official of the American Consulate the following morning when Witzke came in and, as Paul Waberski, presented Russian passport #435. On his questionnaire he stated that he was "22 years of age, mechanic and automobile engineer, resident of New York City and San Francisco for the last seventeen years, returning to the United States." In his "Declaration" he stated he was born in Russia but had lived in San Francisco from January 1905 to November 1917 and in Mexico City since then. His references included the Russian Consul General at Mexico City. He said he would probably go to San Francisco. **

All Russian-type passports were regarded with suspicion, and "Waberski's" story was unlikely but Agent Butcher requested the Immigration Office to "pass" him and that day Witzke made two trips across the border. Butcher states, "In view of the fact that he left his baggage on the Mexican side, I did not molest him, awaiting the opportunity to secure his baggage and him together." ***

* Landau p. 118.
** Ibid., p. 119.
*** Ibid., p. 119.

When Altendorf arrived at American headquarters that night he reported to Butcher that Witzke always carried his papers on his person; so when M-2 reported that Witzke expected to cross to the American side the next morning to do some banking business, Butcher set the trap.

On 1 February 1918, Witzke stepped over the border into the United States and into the muzzles of revolvers of Special Agent Butcher and Captain Lipscomb. He was handcuffed, bundled into an auto and taken to camp and searched. Approximately $1,000 in American currency and Mexican gold was found on him as was a "Selective Draft" registration card issued at San Francisco 9 June 1917; an "Able Seaman" certificate issued in San Francisco 27 June 1917 to Pablo Waberski; a motor car operator's license issued at San Francisco to Paul Waberski on 17 October 1917. A memorandum book showed travel expenses; the names of several girls in towns along the way; and an amorous letter addressed to one of his conquests in Berkely, California. Witzke's U.S. alien Head tax receipt, which Altendorf had seen on route, was not found on him. This had shown Witzke's destination (when he arrived at Laredo, Texas, on 5 June 1917) as Portland, Oregon, the forest fire area.

The most important find on him was a second passport -- Mexican passport #396 issued at Laredo, Texas, on 15 November 1917. This was in the name of Pablo Waberski, Russian, age 22, en route to Mexico. He was described as a bachelor but "accompanied by his wife," an entry representing either Mexican inefficiency or sense of humor.

The biggest find was still to come. That afternoon, Captain Lipscomb and Agent Butcher crossed the border into Nogales, Sonora, and with a little bluffing and "greasing of palms" managed to take possession of Witzke's baggage in which was found a letter in code and a cipher table of words and phrases for sending telegrams. But unfortunately the cipher did not apply to the letter code and the coded letter was sent to the Military Intelligence Division.

Meanwhile, the negro British informant discovered that Witzke and Altendorf had mysteriously disappeared and after a couple of days in desperation he got in touch with the American Consul at Nogales, Sonora, and was put in touch with Special Agent Butcher. His story confirmed all of Altendorf's reports and, in addition, explained presumably the terrible things that Witzke said were going to happen. They were to meet delegates of the International Workers of the World from New Mexico, Arizona, and California and make plans whereby "Hell would break loose in the United States" sometime in April or May with strikes and blowing up of mines, factories, railroads, bridges, telegraph and telephone systems.*

* Landau p. 122.

The British informant said that the six other German agents who had accompanied Witzke to the border had left in the direction of Naco with the intention of crossing into the United States at some point on the Arizona line. Since all track of them was lost, it is quite possible that with the disappearance of Witzke they abandoned their plans. One thing is certain -- none of the planned sabotage occurred. This was an excellent example of the fact that the apprehension of one espionage agent usually neutralizes several others -- in this case, at least six others.

Witzke was imprisoned at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In the several months before his trial he was repeatedly interrogated by MID under the direction of Major Robert L. Barnes but even the knowledge that his coded letter had been decoded and that he was positively identified as a German agent did not shake him, and he would not talk. He once remarked, "You know all the details all right and I think that it was Dr. Altendorf who told you, as I told him a lot of things in conversation." *

Many years after the war was over, General Van Deman became acquainted with the pre-war German assistant Military Attache to the United States, who by that time was an American citizen and whose son had become a reserve lieutenant in the United States Army. This ex-German official confirmed the suspicious that had existed that Germany was planning an uprising in the United States, to be handled through German agents and organizations in the United States. It was this suspicion which led to the search for hidden arms which disappeared into the mid-West as previously mentioned. ** Witzke's drunken boasts to Altendorf that "something terrible is going to happen" had a strong basis in fact.

When, on 16 August 1918, Lothar Witzke was tried before a Military Commission, the surprise witness was Captain John M. Manley of the Cryptographic Bureau of MID. Captain Manley described how he solved the transposition cipher which was written in German and then the letters mixed up by a prearranged diagram, and then read the decoded message:

"15-1-18. To the Imperial Consular Authorities in the Republic of Mexico. Strictly Secret! The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent. Please furnish him on request protection and assistance, also advance him on demand up to one thousand pesos Mexican gold and send his code telegrams to this Embassy as official Consular dispatches." ***

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* Landau p. 123.

** Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 2.

*** Ibid., p. 125.

Witzke was the only defense witness. He was prepared with the trained espionage technique of the story-within-a-story, stating that he was born in Russia but had lived in the United States as a child, and then went to sea. He had become a member of a Mexican bandit group, fled to San Francisco where he had registered for the draft and then on being robbed returned to Mexico. He said he had refused efforts to work for German agents, but had gone to Sonora to spy on Mexican rebels there and had been given the coded letter and a code as part of the work. En route North he had decided to go to San Francisco as he did not want to be posted as a deserter. Also en route he had met Altendorf who was down and out and as a result Altendorf and a hotel man with whom he had left $2,000 in gold in Mexico City had had him framed.

The Commission sentenced Witzke to be hanged and he was returned to his cell at Fort Sam Houston waiting its review. Twice he attempted escape and once got out but was caught the same day emerging from a Mexican shack. Upon return, a razor blade was found in his cell, and, since suicide was feared, his top clothes were removed. On 2 November 1918 his sentence was approved by the Department Commander. On 27 May 1920, President Wilson commuted it to life and Witzke went to Leavenworth Prison. Meanwhile German officials were exerting every possible pressure to have him released. On 30 April 1923, the German Ambassador asked for his release on the grounds that other countries, including Germany, had since released all their prisoners of war including those sentenced for espionage. At the same time a prison report showed Witzke had performed an act of heroism and had prevented a disaster by entering a prison boiler room after an explosion. * On the basis of the above, Witzke was released on 26 September 1923. Back in Germany, Naval Lieutenant Witzke was decorated with the Iron Cross, First and Second Class. Six years later, when Investigators for Mixed Claims Commission on the Black Tom and Kingsland explosions, interviewed Witzke, he firmly told them that he fully believed in the code of honor of the German Army and Naval officers of the old regime and intended to stick by it. He spoke in the greatest contempt of those witnesses who, as he termed it, had "squealed" on Germany. His only regret was that once when he had had Altendorf at the point of a pistol he had not pulled the trigger. **

Thus, although a dangerous German agent could never be made to confess, the Intelligence Police neutralized his activities for nearly half of World War I and prevented the accomplishment of a major sabotage mission, all by crossing a border and carrying on counterespionage activities in a neutral country. The importance of this is further emphasized by the fact that the transmission route of German Intelligence was through "neutral" Spain to "neutral" Mexico to agents working in the United States.

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* Landau p.128.

** Ibid., P. 185.

THE INCEPTION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918

IV. Problems and Lessons of World War I

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IV. PROBLEMS AND LESSONS OF WORLD WAR I

CIP MID Organization

In World War I there was no separate Counter Intelligence Corps Center or its equivalent. There was no one Counterintelligence branch of the Military Intelligence Division, and policy, planning and processing of Corps of Intelligence Police activities in the field were handled by two major sections of the Negative Branch of the Military Intelligence Division and their assorted subsections.

Intelligence Officers working on counterintelligence activities were frequently referred to as "counter espionage officers", * although no such title was officially authorized. For work in the Office, Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff during World War I, a request stated, "Sergeants of the Corps of Intelligence Police are considered most desirable. . . ." ** CIP agents were assigned to numerous branches, sections and subsections where CIP work from the field was processed. There were 34 CIP agents in one section; two dozen in another.

During World War I, a number of activities which later came to be considered part of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission were performed by other organizations, such as the civilian plant protection service, although both CIP and investigators of the Plant Protection Service apparently worked interchangeably on occasion.* ** Consequently, to understand the development of the Counter Intelligence Corps it is necessary to trace the history of many of its functions through the "M.I." organization of World War I under other names or under the jurisdiction of personnel of other units where CIP administration and operations were intermingled.

M.I.3 (Counter Espionage in the Military Service) had a phenomenal growth from 3 officers to 279 persons, including 69 officers, 12 "volunteers", 18 civilian agents, 34 Intelligence Police and 146 clerks. For Colonel K.C. Masteller, M.I.3 was the "key" element of his Negative Branch. In the M.I.3 section, three subsections were of particular interest to CIP agents because of their direct dealings with the field. They were M.I.3A (Executive)*** M.I.3B (Line Troops) and M.I.3H (Investigation of Personnel). In the M.I.4 section, CIP agents were concerned with the M.I.4B (Geographical Departments), M.I.4E (Propaganda), and M.I.4F (Foreign Countries). M.I.4 may have had two other subsections of particular interest to CIP. These were M.I.4D and M.I.4K which, if ever organized, were so "hush-hush" that research of several historians has failed to reveal any record of them.* ****

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* CIP Records, Documents #115-118.
** CIP Records, Documents #38-44.
*** Henry, p. 11.
**** History MID, VIII-6.
***** Ibid., VIII-30, 34.

M.I.3A (Executive) subsection was established in March 1918 and prepared the official instructional material concerning counterespionage for use by Intelligence Officers (I.O.'s) in the field. Eleven manuals were published, progressing from a few simple procedures issued in July 1917 to the "Instructions and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service Within Military Units" which was issued as of August 1918 but by the time the manual was distributed to the field it was too late for any value in the war. Recognition of specialized problems was shown by the issuance in October 1918 of "Supplementary Instructions for Air Flying Fields." The importance of proper orientation and guidance was shown by the publication in November 1918 of "Notes On the German Spy System in Europe." By the time it reached the CIP agents in Europe, the system had collapsed.*

Of the three periodicals published by this subsection, the important one as far as the CIP was concerned was the "Weekly Bulletin for I.O.'s" with an over-all classification of "Secret" and much of the information intended for the eyes of the I.O. only.**

M.I.3A also supervised special operations not sufficiently developed to require activating a special subsection. These operations included cases of food sabotage, propagandists working as chaplains, lecturers, conscientious objectors, negro subversion and antisabotage measures for army construction projects.***

M.I.3B (Line Troops), which was formed in March 1918, became the largest element of M.I.3, and collected and disseminated counterintelligence information to all the field, operating as a "case control" office for investigations of suspects and taking action on suspects returned from overseas because of possible disloyalty. Actions consisted of continuing surveillance, internment, courtmartial, or early discharge except for regular Army officers who were to be assigned to "posts where their opportunities for mischief might be reduced to a minimum." This subsection processed approximately 10,000 cases during the war.****

M.I.3H (Investigation of Personnel), which was formed in May 1918 for checking the loyalty of applicants for Army commissions, increased in scope until it included "key" enlisted and civilian employees of the War Department. This subsection directed the first of the counterintelligence participation in Immigration and Naturalization investigations after Congress authorized "naturalization of all aliens, including enemy aliens, in the military service provided they could produce satisfactory evidence of loyalty." The six officers, two "volunteers", and

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* History MID, VIII-8, 9.
** Ibid., VIII-9.
*** Ibid., VIII-7.
**** Ibid., VIII-11.

twenty-three (23) clerks processed nearly 10,000 personnel security investigations and some 4,000 naturalization cases by the end of the war. Essentially, this was a "case control" office sending out leads for CIP agents in Field Offices to investigate. *

M.I.4A (Executive) was concerned with policy and the selection of personnel. Major Ernest Parsons, his executive officer, Major Henry T. Hunt, and a small group of officers with him were pioneers in civilian counterintelligence work and, consequently, had the additional duty of liaison for the section. **

One important step in the control of Corps of Intelligence Police was achieved for this section on 14 August 1918 when Major General Frank McIntyre, Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff, signed a Memorandum for the Adjutant General as follows:

"1. The Secretary of War directs that the Commanding Generals of All Territorial Departments be informed that transfers to or from the Corps of Intelligence Police will be made only when authorized by the Adjutant General of the Army."

"2. The Secretary of War further directs that the Adjutant General of the Army authorize such transfers only upon recommendation of the Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division, General Staff." ***

M.I.4B (Geographic Departments) which was the civilian counterpart of M.I.3B served as a case control "in all matters of civilian counterespionage dealing with the field through the six geographical departments, with twelve (12) officers directing the flow of reports from Intelligence Officers in the field and coordinating them with reports from nine other government investigative and record agencies and with information from volunteer individuals and organizations. This subsection was not only the largest in personnel assigned but was the primary element of the section.****

This subsection introduced the modern CIC "case" officer who specialized in counterintelligence activities both in areas and by categories. The six departments were consolidated into five groups as follows:

Eastern and Northeastern Departments -- Foreign racial groups and enemy aliens.

Southeastern Department -- Negro subversion and political demagoguery.

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* History MID, VIII-17, 18.
** Ibid, VIII-28.
*** CIP Records, Documents, 115-118.
**** History MID, VIII-28, 29.

Central Department -- Pro-Germanism and various radical organizations.

Southern Department -- Border Control and the Mexican racial problems.

Western Department -- Labor unrest (I.W.W.) and Hindu and Japanese racial problems. *

M.I.4E (Propaganda) processed what came to be called in World War II, "Political Intelligence" and was called in the Occupation Era in Europe "Counter Subversion". This subsection, which was headed by Major J.E.Spingarn, compiled reports on patriotic societies used as "fronts", German-American and other potentially subversive racial groups, Luthern Church propaganda, the International Workers of the World, and Russian Bolshevism. **

M.I.4F (Foreign Countries) was intended to supervise counterintelligence activities conducted in foreign countries. This authority had been repeatedly requested during World War I by Intelligence Officers of the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Their requests were unheeded, however, and the Military Attaches had complete jurisdiction over all intelligence activities in the neutral countries exclusively to themselves, and this subsection, which consisted of three officers, fifteen specialized civilians, and fourteen clerical personnel was confined to securing what information it could from existing sources, and processing it for use by other government agencies to assist in "preventing undesirable individuals from entering the United States." ***

Civilian Agents and Informants

For the most part during World War I, plant protection was a civilian responsibility which originated in July 1917 when the Signal Corps received a large appropriation to speed up American aircraft production. At the suggestion of the Chief Signal Officer, a plant protection service was organized among the civilian employees in various factories with Edmund Leigh in charge. Mr. Leigh divided the United States into fifteen territorial districts for convenient grouping of the 5,000 plants engaged in war production. In addition some 30,000 other plants were circularized to encourage security measures. By 1 July 1918, the Plant Protection Service was so large its supervision was incorporated into MID as a special section. ****

By August 1918, Military Intelligence Plant Protection had fifteen district agents and five resident agents, and in addition had special investigative units at New York, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, Fort Worth and Portland, Oregon, and a total operative force of three-hundred-seventy-two (372) persons. This was

* History MID, VIII-29.
** Ibid., VIII-30.
*** Ibid., Ch. VIII, p. 31.
**** Ibid., VIII-63.

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a truly undercover intelligence organization with secret agents in every plant quite apart from the security guards who were furnished by the plants themselves. *

Another big civilian problem concerned the auxiliary organizations of the Army including the Red Cross, the YMCA and half a dozen smaller organizations, with tens of thousands of members which, without adequate security protection, provided an exceptional opportunity for infiltrating enemy agents into army activities. Both the Red Cross and the YMCA established special bureaus to investigate their own personnel but by May 1918, M.I.3I of MID was organized to handle these investigations -- both complaint cases and loyalty investigations, of all such personnel of this category going overseas except Army nurses. **

During World War I, the embryonic counterintelligence service had the assistance of a number of well organized informant networks. Those in the industrial plants and auxiliary services have already been mentioned. The initial intelligence organization had provided for a system among the military, and for other civilians there was the American Protective League -- the APL. This was a voluntary association of patriotic citizens acting through local branches established in cities and counties all over the country. It was formed on 22 March 1917 and designated an auxiliary of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, which later became the FBI. Actually, the APL worked closely with Army Counterintelligence and in November 1917, the headquarters was moved to Washington. Charles Daniel Frey, who with its founder, Mr. A.M. Briggs, served as one of its national directors, was commissioned a Captain and handled liaison between the League and the Division. The League was officially dissolved 1 February 1919. ***

In the official "C.E. Instructions" for the military counterespionage service issued on 31 August 1918, Intelligence Officers were told that the American Protective League was ". . . a body made up of three hundred thousand citizens covering every locality in the United States who have volunteered to make local investigations for Military Intelligence. Intelligence Officers will do well to get in touch through D.J. (Department of Justice) with the local representative of the League, if such there be, and make use of his organization in cooperation with D.J. for local investigations not requiring finesse." ****

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* WDOC/S: ED-MIDB, 20 Aug 1918, "Intelligence Instructions for Civilian Personnel Under Military Control", p-17; History MID, VIII-64.

** History MID, VIII-19.

*** Ibid., VIII-24, 27.

**** Confidential Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service Within Military Units, War Department, August 31, 1918. (M.I.D. 9104-92) p-35. (Van Deman Vol. 1, p-51 states that the League only had 65,000 members.)

Overseas, counterintelligence officers were expected to be familiar at all times with the general attitudes, sympathies and antipathies of the civilian population, of propaganda by enemy agents and agencies, and the relations between the American Expeditionary Forces and the French population and of the position of the civilian population towards Bolshevism and radical socialism which might be a source of danger to the ultimate success of the Allies.* A good civilian informant net was needed for this work. However, up to the last few months before the Armistice, the Intelligence Service of SOS lacked a sufficient number of informants to work among the civilian population. In the military ranks a volunteer system was organized and provided a number of leads. Paid informants, called in World War I "civilian agents", were needed for civilian areas, although Colonel Ward stated that the need "was not clearly recognized by the central office until April 1918". Even then Colonel Ward did not believe it was safe or wise to embark green personnel too extensively on a wide spread system of such "agents". It was only a month before the Armistice that Colonel Ward felt local Intelligence Officers had "enough preliminary and control work thoroughly established as to direct them to go extensively into the agent phase. Therefore the relatively small numbers of local civilian agents carried by each field office was not so much due to a failure to realize their value in a well developed system as to the necessity of the local Intelligence Officers devoting their efforts during the early months to establishing and maintaining the primary controls and beginning to cover the entire field entrusted to them."**

These informants would have contributed to the ability of the CIP to provide espionage agents. Colonel Ward summarized it as follows: "G2, SOS, covering a large area and central points, was naturally coming in contact with all kinds of agents and potential agents from day to day. This included constantly meeting agents of the Allied Services. We had, therefore, a much more extensive field to draw from in the matter of finding that 'rare bird', a good spy agent, than was the case with G.H.Q., which was far removed from centers where such agents could be picked up and equally far removed from the sources from which they could be investigated and checked up before being finally chosen for their difficult missions. Even after choosing, a closer contact would be most beneficial since a study of German methods in France, contact with counterespionage officers of G2, SOS, and their methods of dealing with their agents would have been most helpful in many cases for the training of spies. Counterespionage brings one in touch with a large number of persons....Very frequently a suspect of an important character, who has been decided to be a spy, can be handled with great success by telling him he is liable to be shot, but if he will do this or that, his life may be spared and a lighter sentence imposed after he has performed what he agrees to do.

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* History G2, SOS, p. 115

** Ibid., p. 118

This method has been used by some of the Intelligence Services of our Allies with great effect, but it can only be used to full advantage where there is little or no distinction and no 'air-tight compartment' theory in practice as regards espionage and counterespionage." *

The espionage service should be so closely coordinated with the counterintelligence service that while the actual agents of one service frequently should be quite unknown to those of another, these espionage agents ". . . will be assumed to discover much about what the enemy are attempting to find out concerning our own activities. This information should in many cases be the starting point for the so-called negative purposes of counterespionage agents. . . ." **

Crime and CIP Missions

Civilian informants inevitably reported many criminal offenses as well as purely intelligence matters. In "C.E. Principles", which was published in May 1918, and which the War Department said, taken with "C.E. Instructions", "constituted a working library for the Negative Intelligence Officer", the relationship of counter-espionage work to military offenses and civil crimes is clearly defined. The Instructions stated that offenses and crimes "are of interest to Intelligence Officers only when possibly connected with enemy activity . . . avoid the dissipation of energy in following cases of vice, liquor selling, fraud, draft evasion and desertion unless these are traceable to enemy activity. Important police information often is obtained by the C.E. service as an incident of its investigations. This will be promptly communicated to the proper authorities as a reciprocal courtesy for the assistance constantly afforded to Intelligence Officers by police and provost officers. But this practice must not lead to extended operations which usurp the functions of provost authorities and interfere with the proper performance of strictly Intelligence duty. The fact that the C.E. Service functions secretly, and the further fact of its close cooperation with D.J., which is interested in criminal cases as well as cases of counter espionage, has tended to confuse the issue in some minds and therefore it must be emphasized that the Military Intelligence Service is not a police force. The tendency to refer to the Intelligence Service matters which should be handled by the Military Police or other office of equivalent duty, is contrary to the best interests of the service." ***

These instructions while clear in theory were otherwise in practice. In wartime there is a presumption of sabotage in nearly any crime that affects the Army as, for example, the cocaine selling to aviators, or the theft of such huge quantities of army

* History G2, SOS, p. 126, 7.
** Ibid., p. 139
*** Principles of Counter Espionage Organization and Control Within the Military Establishment, War Department, May 1918 (M. I. B., ED 9104-92 M. I. 3) P-5.

supplies that operations are handicapped. Crime has been frequently used as a "cover" for espionage and sabotage and to finance enemy agents. To avoid conflicts between MP's and CIP's at working levels, a directive establishing primary jurisdictions was needed. To many a conscientious Military Police Investigator there seemed to be no logic in the sudden surges of interest of the CIP agents in what appeared to be purely criminal affairs.

Further, Military Intelligence seemed unable to stay out of criminal investigations. While the "C. E. Principles" was being written in the Spring of 1918, CIP agents in France were called upon time and again to assist in criminal work and this continued right up to the end of their stay in Europe. In the first three months of 1919, the CIP agents at Le Havre rounded up a gang that was said to be stealing supplies valued at about $50,000 a month between wharves and railroad terminal warehouses a mile away. From this experience, Colonel Watkins, who was there, said he was convinced that "criminal investigation and intelligence work can never be mixed." * Colonel Ward in his critique stated, "Particularly during the early months of the service we were called upon, in fact all too frequently, to help the A.M.P. in running down crimes by the Americans committed upon the civil population, in investigating drinking places and low-class hotels." **

The Military Intelligence Division in the United States assigned an officer in the Spring of 1918 to the Quartermaster Corps to form a Graft and Fraud investigative unit, but after three months the officer reported that a unit could not be formed because of a lack of Quartermaster funds and a lack of available qualified personnel. At this point, the director of Military Intelligence, the Chief, War Plans Division, the Inspector General, and the Adjutant General all concurred on having M.I.D. operate such a unit, and on 6 August 1918, Section M.I.3 had "Graft and Fraud" investigations as an added responsibility. This soon grew to a separate section (M.I.13) as of 23 September. ***

Colonel Bidwell in his historical summary states, "The excuse presented in support of this unprecedented functional expansion was to the effect that the departmental military intelligence agency at that particular time happened to be the only staff organization having the personnel and funds required for their successful conduct." **** This was only the first of a number of instances in the three decades following in which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were recognized as highly capable fact-finders and consequently were diverted to non-counterintelligence

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* Watkins, Ibid., p-5.
** History of G-2, SOS, p. 82.
*** History of MID, VIII-22.
**** Ibid., X-14

tasks. Unfortunately, there were few situations in which, until proven otherwise, some remote connection between crime and counterintelligence did not exist. Captain-Lieutenant Franz von Rintelen, Germany's principal American saboteur director had left for the United States after boasting, "I'll buy up what I can and blow up what I can't".* So it was obvious that any fraud in American supplies assisted the German sabotage plans and could have presumably been encouraged by the Kaiser's agents.

There seems to have been even some justification for investigating graft. Colonel Van Deman has related how, before the German Ambassador and his entourage were put out of the United States at the beginning of World War I, informant was able to extract a few cards of a German file on American Army officers. These cards contained a fairly full personal and military history of the officers and a brief history of the married officers' wives and families. The informant could only "borrow" a dozen or so cards at a time, but he assured the Colonel that there were many more which covered at least all the officers of the grades of captain and above who were in the regular Army of the United States at that time. Included on each card was a notation by the reporting agent on whether he believed the officer could be bribed.**

The bulk of the Graft and Fraud cases were handled out of the District of Columbia field office. From 1 August 1918 until June 1919, this section, which from the record must have started five days before it was authorized, handled 1,128 graft and fraud cases which resulted in 617 arrests and 206 convictions. It recovered material or arranged for restitution for nearly half a million dollars worth of property.***

Operational Problems

Securing trained personnel was an operational problem throughout the war. Seven months elapsed before a two week divisional I.O.'s course was started at the War College. In December, the AEF cabled, "Trained Intelligence officers are an absolute necessity for each organized Division and Corps. Opportunity for technical instruction of these officers does not exist in the United States. Recommend that intelligence officers of each organized division be sent here to learn duties and await arrival of his division." So I.O.'s were dispatched three months in advance. The special training consisted of a brief visit to the front and attendance at the AEF General Staff College at Langres, France. This system deprived the divisions of their I.O.s just

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* By Nathaniel Weyl, The Battle Against Disloyalty, 1951, Thomas Y.Crowell. N.Y. pp. 100-03.

** Van Deman, Vol. II, p. 4.

*** History of the MID, Chapter VIII-58.

at the time when they should have been occupied in developing their own intelligence sections and becoming efficient members of a divisional general staff team. To straighten out this adverse situation, Colonel F.L.Dengler was returned from France in June 1918 to establish a training section (M.I.9) and act as a general liaison officer between MID and G-2, AEF.*

This brought to a head the conflict between the War Plans Division and the Military Intelligence Division on training jurisdiction. Brigadier General Lytle Brown informed MID that it could act only in an advisory capacity, and on 13 August 1918, Colonel Dengler was attached to the Training Branch, War Plans Division so that MID could be kept informed.** However, Colonel Dengler continued to direct MI 9 which had been organized on 29 July 1918 to handle "Field Intelligence" which was part of the Positive Branch and actually combat intelligence. Colonel Dengler's first act had been to tour the eleven divisional training camps in operation in the United States and this, too, became part of the conflict with War Plans as General Brown claimed that it was his responsibility not only to train but also to inspect and to see it was properly done. This conflict continued throughout the war.***

Enlisted men interviewing officers was another operational problem. Gilbert Elliot, one of the original CIP agents, wrote, "men found it very difficult sometimes to do the work they were required to do properly with the rank of a sergeant. They were often forced to question officers of as high rank as that of colonel about various matters and were very often dealt with very shortly and unable to get the information they required. This led to the custom of interviewing all officers whatever in civilian attire which seemed to inspire a certain amount of politeness and awe. The matter was, however, a big hinderance to the very end.****

Operating in and out of civilian clothing created security problems. "Lieutenant Colonel Ward might well order that it must not be generally known among our officers and men that we are conducting a counter-espionage service but how could this be prevented if, in order to collect our pay, draw our clothing, travel, investigate etc., we were constantly obliged to reveal our identity to Quartermaster, R.T.O. men etc....on arrival they were usually greeted by R.T.O. men with 'What outfit you in buddy, Secret Service?'"*****

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* History MID, V-36.
** Ibid., VI-38.
*** Ibid., VII-56.
**** Elliott, p. 6.
***** Elliott, p. 7.

In his memoirs, Colonel Watkins wrote, "One thing was abundantly clear from the Le Havre experience and that is that for purposes of concealment of identity an agent cannot be in uniform one day and mufti the next, at least in the same community, neither can men in uniform and mufti eat and live in the same place and remain incognito...."*

The need for civilian clothing created an initial problem. The original CIP group was refused a suggestion that it should bring civilian clothing to Europe. When the British refused to train American agents in uniform, weeks went by while men were securing permission to buy them. ** Finally, an allowance of $40 and a $5 monthly maintenance was obtained, but even this was inadequate at French wartime prices and Elliott reports, "Men who could not augment the allowance soon took on the appearance of tramps, cheerfully of course, for the sake of their country. ***

Colonel Cabot Ward who was G-2, SOS, AEF, in his postwar critique states it not so cheerfully, "The clothing allowance of Frs. 250.00 at the outset and Frs. 28.50 per month for repairs was likewise found to be in the long run grossly inadequate. The initial allowance of Frs. 250.00 was generally sufficient to purchase the required clothes but the monthly sum was necessarily consumed in laundry expenses and repairs. At the end of six months the I.P., therefore, found himself badly in need of additional clothes especially if the type of work to which he was assigned and was fitted to carry out required him to mingle with well-dressed people. Winter came on and there was no money to buy overcoats. This latter difficulty was finally overcome but only after interminable dealings with the Chief Quartermaster which resulted in such a delay that many of the men were actually suffering from cold and inadequately equipped for the performance of their special duties or were compelled to buy overcoats out of their own money...." **** The same held true for agents in the United States who were authorized up to $8.00 a month for clothing maintenance, but lacked sufficient initial allowance. *****

This was not the only financial burden of the CIP agent, who as a Sergeant had a base pay of $38 a month. With allowances the agent got about $100 a month. Allowances in the United States in July 1918 were $15 quarters; $38.75 rations; and $4.72 light and heat. ****** However, agents stationed in Paris and other large French cities found that the overseas commutation

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* Watkins, p. 7.
** Elliott, p. 5.
*** Ibid. p. 5.
**** History, G-2, SOS, p. 104.
***** CIP Records: Circular, "Corps of Intelligence Police, August 17, 1918 By order of Colonel Churchill Documents 115-118."
****** Ibid.

of quarters allowance of Frs. 75.00 per month even with the small addition for light and heat was not adequate. Wartime prices soon made the special allowance of $2.00 a day (Frs. 12.00) highly inadequate "unless the I.P. made weekly boarding arrangements which confined him to a single eating place and even then it was practically impossible to feed himself upon this allowance." "An I.P., however," Colonel Ward continued, "should not be confined to a single eating place but should have sufficient money to be able to eat in any place where it seems likely he will pick up information of value. Furthermore, if he is compelled to eat at the same place continually he tends to become known and his identity is thus more easily disclosed."*

Transportation was another problem that beset the CIP. Because of the war, traveling by French railways was a matter of exasperating slowness and delay, and often 24 hours would be required for a trip that was only a few hours by automobile. "Increasing difficulties were experienced in obtaining the necessary automobile transportation notwithstanding the fact that local Intelligence Officers had such large areas to cover...It was equally difficult to obtain bicycles for the use of the I.P.s who frequently had to go to nearby towns and villages not served by any railway or who for want of any transportation had to spend many hours every week walking to and from remote parts of large camps when their time might have been otherwise far more profitably employed. Intelligence funds could not be used for the purchase of civilian bicycles as these were theoretically supposed to be furnished on demand by the Q.M.C. The result was that the I.P. went without a bicycle or purchased one out of his own pocket or if he did get an army bicycle it revealed to every casual observer the fact that he had some connection with the army because he was riding one of the peculiarly shaped and painted bicycles which the Q.M.C. saw fit to provide..."**

Officers were not given the enlisted men's freedom in wearing civilian clothes. It was not until June 1918 that they were even permitted to wear mufti.*** Colonel Ward wrote, "In the British and French Intelligence Services, Intelligence officers wore civilian clothes freely in the exercise of their own judgment as the circumstances required. In the American Intelligence Service in the AEF, however, Officers were permitted to wear civilian clothes only in cases of absolute necessity and were then submitted to the requirement that they must report monthly on every occasion upon which they wore civilian clothing stating the case upon which they were working and why such a necessity was considered to have arisen. It should be realized that plain clothes are valuable not merely for working upon a case already inauguarated but even more so as a means of

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* History, G-2, SOS, p. 103.
** Ibid., p. 120.
*** Ibid., Exhibit 69.

mingling freely with the civilian population and with the real military status of the wearer thus concealed, acquiring information and overhearing conversations which could never be done if the officer must always appear in uniform.." *

While passes were provided all officers and men, Colonel Ward said experience showed they were deficient in that on many occasions CIP agents were not allowed to interrogate officers and frequently the passes were not recognized as authority to travel without specific orders. Colonel Ward recommended that in the future such authority should be specifically stated on the Intelligence pass. **

Private telegraph codes, exclusively for Counterintelligence proved "exceedingly valuable." Instead of having to refer analytical investigations to outside photographic and chemical laboratories, Colonel Ward recommended that G2 have its own in the future and make early plans since "they could not be installed overnight". ***

In Europe, Intelligence Officers were not actually staff officers under the Instructions issued to the Commanding General of the SOS for setting up his G2. The order stated, "These officers are to be regarded as Staff Officers of the Commanding Officer of the Base to which assigned.. You will issue instructions to have a touring car assigned to the Chief of the Intelligence Section...and to have a light car placed at the disposal of Intelligence Officers in ports or interior bases..." ****

One G2, SOS problem Colonel Ward said was to find out what happened to a suspect after the case report had been sent forward for action. However, at G2 AEF, GHQ Sigaud wrote after the War that he had personally handled practically all the suspects referred to G2, AEF by G2 SOS and had always informed G2 SOS "as soon as we had any data to give them." On the other hand, Sigaud said he recalled that an appreciable portion of his time was spent writing G2, SOS for progress reports on cases assigned by G2,AEF. *****

While many American commanders knew little about the Corps of Intelligence Police, its numerous military requirements, particularly those that necessitated going in and out of uniform, made it relatively easy for an enemy agent to identify any CIP agent. The importance of continuity was recognized by Intelligence executives, and efforts were made to keep agents working in the

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* History, G-2, SOS
** Ibid., p. 106.
*** Ibid., G-2, SOS p. 118-119.
**** Ibid., p. 111 (Italics ours).
***** Ibid., Preface; also p. 147.

same areas as long as possible; yet all agreed that no agent could keep his military status a secret in one area for any length of time. And when the agent was moved to another area it was a mathematical certainty that sooner or later some one from the former area would arrive and recognize him and reveal his identity to unfriendly persons.

Lack of Rank in CIP

Lack of rank was a general handicap to officers. The great number of local intelligence officers were First and Second Lieutenants. "Every British intelligence post of any importance was in charge of a Captain, a member of the General Staff... The corresponding French officers in charge of Military Intelligence activities or important controls were always a Major or a Captain. The G-2 Staff head of an American combat or SOS division was in every case a Major or Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff. Our Intelligence Officer, therefore, found himself outranked on every side. As his dealings within AEF were for the most part with general officers or those nearly always of the rank of colonel, he found himself at a marked disadvantage and under a very serious handicap." *

Second Lieutenant Howard Robertson wrote Colonel Ward that at Tours the British had a Colonel and at Nantes, a Captain. The French, he said, consider the chief of a service as outranking in protocol officers of higher rank but subordinate positions. Thus on one occasion, Robertson found himself seated next to the Chief of Staff (a Colonel) at a dinner attended by many other officers who outranked him. On another occasion, he had to decline an invitation for a dinner because it was for Captains and above and he was invited only because of his position. If he had done otherwise, there might have arisen jealousies which would have handicapped his work. **

Colonel Ward recommended that "in the future the Intelligence Officers should be given adequate rank at the outset or that promotions be readily accorded as recommendations are made." Colonel Ward also pointed out the problem of utilization of ability when a junior officer was much better fitted for a postion but an officer senior to him was in the same detail. In such cases, he said, "The British system of giving officers, with special duties of importance requiring rank, an acting rank sufficient for the purpose would have been extremely useful..." ***

* History, G-2, SOS, p. 99.
** Ibid., Exhibit #58.
*** Ibid., p. 99

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Most serious was the lack of promotions that would have provided some of the needed rank. Up to late in 1918, promotions in the Corps were extremely few, and morale suffered accordingly since members of the CIP felt that their services, even though highly meritorious, were going unrecognized. They saw their fellows in the line being promoted for no longer or better service and naturally considered themselves out of luck. Comment on this condition was made by several of the Department and Special Intelligence Officers who were not backward in calling attention to the excellent work of their agents and recommending them for commissions. *

Agent Elliott has written, "Another difficulty which arose almost immediately was the question of promotions. The British had Sergeant-Majors of Intelligence Police and occasionally these men were commissioned. Our men naturally expected similar treatment, but as the months rolled by and all new posts continued to be filled by green men either transferred from some other branch of the service or more frequently commissioned directly from civil life in France, to whom veterans of many months service were ordered to report and teach them their duties, a very sullen spirit developed which naturally was not in the best interests of the service. When it later appeared that for some occult reasons there were to be no sergeant-majors either, matters only became worse and a flood of applications for transfer began to flow in, all of which were refused." **

When the CIP was inaugurated, an enlisted man was taken in with the rank of Sergeant--a rank he had not fairly won and one to which he might never be entitled from the quality of service he rendered. This was quickly cured by creating a probationary period of six weeks with the rank of 1st Class Private and only awarding the sergeancy if the man passed his probation. ***

But promotion above sergeancy was considered impossible because the order that created the Corps only authorized the rank and pay of sergeants. Colonel Ward states, "This was both unfair to the man and unfair to the service. Every man, no matter how high an ideal of duty and service he may entertain, looks forward in varying degree to the possibility of obtaining recognition of faithful and useful service by promotion and the fact that no promotions were possible in the CIP inevitably tended to affect adversely the work of many I.P.'s. The best and worst

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* CIP Records: Resume of G-2 Records of Corps of Intelligence Police Compiled from a History of the MID and the CIP file for use of War College Students. 8 January 1926. Documents #38-44.

** Elliott, p. 6.

*** History, G-2, SOS, p. 100.

held the same grade. For administrative purposes men were informally appointed acting sergeant-majors but this was all that could be done. All grades of non-commissioned officers should be provided in the future from 1st Class Private to Regimental Sergeant Major and the number of higher grades in the CIP should not be too strictly limited as many I.P.'s are often called upon to perform work which is quite as important as that done by the average First and Second Lieutenant in numerous other branches of the Army. The number of commissions granted to the I.P.'s in the intelligence service is felt strongly to have been wholly disproportionate to the value of the services rendered by many of them and to the needs of the service. Much more valuable work could often be done by a man who had been through a period of successful training and work in the field as an I.P. and promoted to a Lieutenancy than by getting in a Lieutenant or Captain from some other organization who had no such practical experience." *

Similarly the CIP's in the United States felt this discrimination. The Intelligence Officer of the Western Department in writing the history of his office stated, "The sergeants, CIP, have for the most part been men of unusual ability, who in the line would have been commissioned but only three commissions were given to these sergeants in this department. I believe the latter was partly owing to the rule requiring six months service before commissioning which unquestionably worked an injustice and partly to difficulty in getting papers through Washington. There is a widespread feeling in this department and a similar feeling is found among officers in Intelligence work in the field that a detail to Intelligence work is a serious obstacle in the way of recognition and advancement. It is believed that in another emergency more careful attention will need be given to the personal interests of men in Intelligence Service." **

This lack of consideration is difficult to understand in view of the strict standards of character, devotion to duty and high intelligence required of intelligence personnel, and the dangers of disaffection in work about which no less an authority than Colonel Wilhelm Nicolai, chief of the German Army Intelligence Service in World War I, stated, "in the secret service there are serious dangers for anyone who comes into contact with it. They lie in the uncontrollable nature of the work and the information received and also the temptation which money offers." ***

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* History, G-2, SOS, p. 102.

** CIP Records, Documents #38-44.

*** Wilhelm Nicolai, Col, The German Secret Service (London, 1921), Stanley Paul & Co. Ltd., p. 252. Hereafter referred to as "Nicolai."

Command Problems

Unfortunate decisions at many command levels mark the history of the Counter Intelligence Service. All army organizations realize that adverse command decisions are an inevitable part of military endeavor but, in the case of counterintelligence, there are a number of reasons why it is more likely to incur an above average number of adverse decisions.

First and foremost is the inherent dislike of Americans for any type of "police" organization, and this feeling was strong among military officers in World War I.* This feeling was easily rationalized by the opinion that security threats in the Army were being exaggerated and that no serious need for a counterintelligence service existed. Because of the secrecy of the Service, there was little outward evidence of accomplishment and no means of proving how many enemy agents or potential subversives had been neutralized by security controls or frightened away because of investigating activities before they were detected. Instead, to many, CIP appeared to be "empire" building.

Secondly, ignorance was an important factor. For nearly a decade before the war, there had been no intelligence service. There had been no staff studies; no planning and no training. Neither regular army officers nor reserve officers had had any opportunity of learning why a counterintelligence organization was necessary or what its mission should be.

After World War I started there was no time to learn. An intelligence unit was only one of several services which commanders were told they needed and since it was intangible it seemed far less important than personnel, training and logistics problems. Intelligence officers were too busy attempting to organize and operate at the same time to be able to devote any sizeable amount of time to orientation of commanders and staff officers. With the publication in May 1918 of "Principles of Counter Espionage Organization and Control Within the Military Establishment," and effort was made for the "information and government of the Army...."** Unfortunately, this manual, which was supposed to give commanders and key staff members a sound understanding in regard to various counterintelligence methods, was almost entirely concerned with procedures to be followed by Intelligence Officers in setting up secret informant networks and only contributed to the confusion of commanders.

Wartime haste resulted in a number of instances of procurement of personnel unsuited for the work. Little time for training was provided. Scant organization and published doctrine prevailed when there was time. While Intelligence Officers

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* See Section III, "CIP in the United States."

** History MID, VIII 8, 9, and the actual manual located in CIC Historical Project files.

at policy levels were convinced of the necessity for counterintelligence, they were far from agreed on the scope of its mission or the procedures of accomplishment. At lower levels, the lack of desire among officers for intelligence assignments has been previously mentioned. When this resulted in inept Intelligence Officers, commanders felt they had evidence at hand that Intelligence did little to justify its existence.

Many other new wartime services of the Army suffered from haste and ignorance but the practice that aroused the most resentment by commanders was the continual demand of Intelligence for exceptions from command jurisdiction. Intelligence demanded direct communications outside command channels; Intelligence wanted to train its own men; Intelligence wanted control of personnel assignments; Intelligence wanted operational control of its personnel; Intelligence wanted special privileges for its men for uniforms, pay and passes.

Direct communication outside command channels was particularly resented. This was true not only in the lower echelons but in SOS itself. At the organization of G-2, SOS, the Commanding General required that all intelligence communications go through command channels and it was some time before the AC of S, G-2, could convince him that he should rescind this order. * This contributed to the "deep-footed feeling in some quarters that this organization, since it was operated secretly, might be reporting on the doings and inefficiency of some particular army unit and its officer in charge." **

Frequently enough to give this feeling a basis in fact, the Corps of Intelligence Police did concern itself with the doings and inefficiency of a unit when "operations were hampered or paralyzed."*** Commanders did not always realize the importance of security. "The frequency with which intelligence reports were not treated as confidential by officers of higher positions in their dealings with the Intelligence service was astonishing... There were many instances of the kind where higher authority and general officers, despite all warnings, would forward confidential reports direct to those involved and thus paralyze, in the locality affected, much of our work besides engendering dislike of this service and unpopularity of the G-2 Officers making the original report..." ****

Intelligence Officers at local levels were well aware of the problems that arose because of their dual responsibilities to the local commander and the G-2, SOS. G-2, SOS had the same dual responsibility to G-2, GHQ, AEF, and the

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* History, G-2, SOS, p. 5(a).
** Ibid., p. 146.
*** Ibid..
**** Ibid., pp 85-86.

commanding general, SOS. * Commanders could not see why they should grant special favors to CIP agents when top level commanders required these agents to travel in uniform, stand in military pay lines and comply with many other army administrative regulations. The result was, Colonel Ward said, "..that it required superhuman efforts and endless waste of time to procure any facilities..." ** As a result of these delays, the United States had been at war nine months and some 175,000 American troops had landed in France before the counter-espionage service was able to establish an effective "protective screen". ***

Security controls of necessity slow down operations and produce some friction within a command that adds to a commander's problems. On top of all this was the request by Intelligence for some of the best of the commander's men, obtaining the "consent, forced or otherwise..."****

All too often resentful commanders felt that with all their "freedom", CIP personnel needed to be reminded they were in the army. It was not difficult for a commander to convince himself that these secretive men were not catching any enemy agents and might be better employed handling "police" work as their name implied. Busy at that, he would know what they were doing and no embarrassing types of investigations would be carried on. In view of all the temptations, it is to the credit of commanders that they generally accept Intelligence on pure "faith" and let it operate.

Not all commanders, however, recognized the need for confining CIP units to strictly counterintelligence work. Colonel Ward said that in the early months they were called upon "too frequently...A certain amount of this assistance was gladly given both to gain and preserve the good will of the commanding officer and in the general interest of the good will of the service, but it became increasingly necessary to establish a firm line beyond which I.O.s could not in justice to the Intelligence service expend their efforts... It is believed that in the future this line of demarcation should be established even more clearly by official action..." *****

The Police Experience Problem

Corps of Intelligence Police personnel procurement was at first confused because of a police experience concept. The prerequisites of civilian experience for CIP work were debated during World War I as a result of this original concept. The New York branch Intelligence Office was predominantly police. While it ran up an amazing number of convictions, the cases it cited in its history as outstanding were primarily criminal rather than counterespionage or sabotage.

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* History, G-2, SOS, p. 5(a).
** Ibid., p. 8.
*** Ibid., p. 5.
**** Ibid., p. 87.
***** Ibid., p. 82.

A "Resume of the Records of Corps of Intelligence Police," compiled for use by the Army War College in January 1926, stated, "It was found that lawyers, newspapermen, and business men with wide experience were the most successful agents. Newspapermen, in particular, whose professional training had given them a nose for news, were apt at following up leads and at employing the ruses necessary to get evidence. Men who had been conducting confidential investigations for insurance companies and other large corporations were, of course, well qualified. Except in the New York office, where the corps was largely recruited from the Detective Bureau (Bomb Squad) of the City Police Department, it was not customary to enlist the services of former policemen or detectives. A police detective, while useful for obtaining legal evidence leading to a conviction in a criminal court, is inclined to disregard all other kinds of information as irrelevant, although from an intelligence point of view such information might be of the utmost value." *

In a request to the Chief of Staff for more men, the Military Intelligence Division, in September 1918, said a number of young college men were wanted for the headquarters office as assistants to the officers on duty. "It is not desired to use commissioned officers for this work. Sergeants of the Corps of Intelligence Police are considered most desirable for work of this nature." **

There were exceptional men, of course, among agents with former police experience. Several made brilliant records. However, overseas the adverse factors were as evident as in the United States.

Commenting on the value in Europe of this police experience for CIP agents, Agent Elliott wrote, "No attempt was, I understand, made to recruit professional detectives. In my opinion this was wise. Lt. Hornblow, for a number of months intelligence officer at Brest, wrote several memorandums on the advisability of trying to recruit men from professional ranks, but I remember seeing a paper in which Major Lamb, one of the heads of the British service, stated that he had secured very poor results from British professionals and thought it better not to try them. In view of the fact that he had a better class of personnel than we had, I think his opinion should have considerable weight. Also, I remember a certain ex-Burns Agency man who was transferred to the Corps and attached to Tours for a time. He could not speak French and was found of very little use anyway, so was transferred out again." ***

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* CIP Records Documents #38-44.

** Ibid.

*** Elliott, p. 2.

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Lt. Col. John B. Watkins, who was with the Corps of Intelligence Police at Le Havre toward the close of World War I, wrote afterward concerning men who had come from police positions in civilian life, "Invariably, they had great difficulty in adjusting themselves to the intelligence complex. They always wanted to 'get somebody' or stage spectacular raids -- or in some instances developed the phobia that some one was trying to 'get them.' Victims of this phobia had to be sent home sooner or later. To 'get somebody' an overt act must first be committed, and the good intelligence agent, overseas at any rate, is there to see that no overt act is committed." *

By 31 August 1918, the Military Intelligence policy for the selection of personnel had adopted this view and in the "C.E. Instructions" for Intelligence Officers it was stated, "The selection of personnel is the most difficult part of the task of organizing the Counter Espionage Service. The system stands or falls on the ability of its individual executives and operatives. Since each executive is to be charged with the organization of the echelon of which he is to be in control, the greatest care must be exercised in selecting the executives. They must be officers of ability, common sense and, above all, of unquestionable loyalty. Former experience as organizers and directors of organized activities is a valuable asset; officers of political experience have been found especially apt. In selecting operatives, the personal attributes of the man are more important than his former experience. In fact, former employment as a policeman or detective may actually render a man undesirable as an operative since he is likely to be suspected by his fellows. Moreover, police methods of handling criminals are quite out of place in the C.E. Service and he may sacrifice transmitting information quickly to a desire to secure evidence sufficient to convict. Operatives, it must be remembered, are informants--not private police. No man is more essentially out of place in Intelligence Service than the one who fancies he is a born Sherlock Holmes or 'gum-shoe' artist. He at once lays himself open to suspicion by his pussy-foot manner and is always tempted to make a case at the expense of the service...." **

CIP Selection and Status

Colonel Ward was deeply concerned with the inexperience and lack of quality of his intelligence personnel. "Reserve officers and men," he said, "who were sent over from Washington after several weeks of 'Intelligence' training were, in general, found not to be of the desired type, nor had the 'Intelligence Courses' they had received at Washington had any relation to the

* Watkins, p. 5.
** CIP Records, "C.E. Instructions," p. 12.

[redacted]

needs of the situation in France... It was, therefore, necessary to find officers and men of the type and qualifications required in other organizations of the AEF.. Any other course would have been suicidal for, as has been said, one serious blunder on the part of an Intelligence Officer might at any time have ended the usefulness for the time being of the whole organization. *

"Selection," Colonel Ward went on to say, "had to be done by taking the men one by one and in every case it was necessary to obtain the consent, forced or otherwise, of the particular commanding officer of the individual in question. As men were only picked because they seemed to be gifted with special qualifications, it was but natural that their commanding officers should strenuously oppose the desired transfer. This opposition was in part due to the very general misconception of the importance and functions of the Intelligence Service... It will be almost necessary on another occasion to prepare and publish at the outset a general order authorizing the transfer of any desired officer and man to the Intelligence Service, giving the head of the Intelligence Section absolute right to take anyone by merely showing that he has that all too rare combination of qualities, languages, business experience, etc., required.

"The Intelligence Officer must be able not merely to speak the language of the country in which he is operating but should have a real familiarity with the customs and national temperament and it is greatly to be desired that he should have some practical experience and ability in handling considerable masses of detail work, with all that this requires in the way of office management. So far as possible the Intelligence Officers should not be of the line as, if so, the Service is apt to be continually called upon for transfer of its officers to combat units. G-2, SOS, lost some excellent and well trained officers in this way... Continuity of service is absolutely essential in Intelligence work as such a large proportion of results depend upon the personal relations formed, relations which cannot be handed on wholly to a successor. It follows that not only should the entire personnel be maintained in continuous service throughout the period of the emergency but that transfers from one office to another should be effected as little as possible.

"As the overwhelming majority of the AEF were very young, both as to officers and enlisted men, it was almost unavoidable that the great majority of the Intelligence Section personnel should have likewise been young. This, of course, has its advantages in that the young man generally adapts himself more easily to new conditions and is full of activity and ability to learn things quickly. But so much of the results of Intelligence work depends upon the personal relations which are established by the local Intelligence Officer-in-charge, that older men of wide experience in dealing with their fellows are greatly to be

* History, G-2, SOS, p. 87.

desired. The average officer in charge of the local post in the British Intelligence Service was ten years older than his American confrere...."*

Two regulations enforced at the outset handicapped the procurement of CIP personnel. To obtain the right kind of agent it was soon necessary to create vacancies by eliminating unsuited personnel. At the start, it was not authorized to transfer an unsuitable CIP sergeant to another organization or even back to his former organization. He had to be sent home for discharge. This loss of manpower was soon stopped.**

The other regulation was equally serious. All CIP men were required to be native born citizens of the United States. Colonel Ward's conclusion was that, "The very exigencies of the Service required that this rule be abrogated as it was rare to find a native-born American citizen who could mingle freely with the mixed civilian and foreign population, particularly among the foreign civilian laborers, and apparently be one of them. Much of the best work of the CIP was done by foreign-born soldiers who spoke French, Italian, Spanish, etc., exactly as did the people with whom they were to mingle. These initial mistakes were, of course, a handicap to the Service in its early months, and it is to be hoped that they will not be repeated under similar circumstances."*** Unfortunately this problem with foreign-born personnel came up again in World War II.

The fact that many civilians preferred to remain with the Corps as civilians and not convert to the CIP when the opportunity was offered, has been previously mentioned. In his critical analysis of G-2, SOS, AEF, Colonel Ward wrote, "The military status of the non-commissioned personnel of the American Intelligence Force, doing counter-espionage work, is a question on which the opinion of the ablest officers attached to this section has greatly differed."****

Colonel Ward said that while he had never had an opportunity to give sufficient study to the matter, he was of the opinion that "the present use of enlisted men, and hence the Sergeant of Intelligence Police, is the most satisfactory basis for an intelligence organization. However," he added, this implies that conditions of service of such an intelligence force should be modified so that certain portions of the military routine be simplified for the special needs of this service and certain military requirements be done away with."***** Ward concluded, "In reality, the Intelligence Service stands midway between civilian and military status, and such military character as it should have must

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* History G-2, SOS, pp. 88, 89.
** Ibid., p. 107.
*** Ibid., p. 101.
**** Ibid., p. 106.
***** Ibid., p. 106.

not be regarded as an end in itself, but merely a means to the performance of its functions. Where these functions are not served by military status and military regulations, no a priori principle of absolute consistence should be allowed to stand in the way of practical results. On the other hand, the military principle and status is equally important, useful, and necessary since this is a definite and important branch of any modern Army...."*

"The men doing this service should have all the advantages that accrue to them as regular soldiers and non-commissioned officers. They can better in this way have an esprit de corps so essential to our work; they can be more easily disciplined and better permeated with a high sense of responsibility in their work. This is all the more important, for a member of the Intelligence Police is obliged in his work to be given a good deal of individual discretion and therefore it is all the more important that he be well knit into an organization which, being military in its purpose and ends, should be thoroughly military in its fundamental purpose and organization."**

Colonel Ward's former agent, Gilbert Elliott, in his history of the CIP, wrote that to "conduct a secret service of maximum efficiency, the military laws and rules must be relaxed still more in the case of Intelligence. One has only to turn to the elaborate methods employed by the German Service to make their system leakproof to realize this ...."*** Elliott felt that perhaps some latitude could be arranged for the CIP "without forcing them to retain a civilian status."

Elliott, in his histroy, quotes Lieutenant Chalmers Clifton, whom he terms one of the brightest and most intelligent officers in the service, as not agreeing with having the men remain soldiers under modified rules. He says Clifton believed that the agents should be neither officer nor civilian but militarized-civilians under contract. These agents should be paid by mail from some central point and get enough money to buy their own civilian clothes. They should be furnished with all the uniforms, insignia, and passes they need.****

In his report Colonel Ward recognized the differences of opinion on this question and summarized the views of Captain Ernest Angell, whom he labeled one of the most efficient officers of G-2, SOS. Ward quotes Angell, "While Intelligence Officers should clearly, in the future, continue to be commissioned officers of the Army, the non-commissioned personnel should be divided into two branches,

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* History G-2, SOS, p. 89.
** Ibid., G-2, SOS.
*** Elliott, p. 7.
**** Ibid., p. 7.

(a) enlisted men, and (b) militarized civilians. This latter class should take the place of the present Intelligence Police Sergeants. Every Intelligence Officer needs a certain number of enlisted men for office work and the simpler type of controls. It is believed, however, that the great bulk of the real work of any Intelligence office could be far better performed by individuals who are subject to all restrictions of a soldier's life. The chief reason for this conclusion is the necessity of concealing the real identity and Army connections of the Intelligence personnel, whom it is assumed are to be employed in the more responsible type of work. This demands unlimited freedom, subject, of course, to the proper restricting influence and necessary disciplinary control of the local Intelligence officer. It is my experience that it is impossible to preserve the apparent civilian character of Intelligence personnel if they are enlisted men. Wearing civilian clothes and eating about town are not sufficient for this purpose. A Sergeant of the Corps of Intelligence Police, even though he always be in civilian clothes, nevertheless, is still a soldier and should be, and has been, required to perform many acts which unavoidably reveal the fact that he is an American soldier."

Captain Angell then cited the requirements of Finance, Quartermaster, Medical, Rail Transportation, and Personnel sections that necessitated revealing his true identity which, because of the "glamor that surrounds the Intelligence Service," becomes rapidly known to various office personnel. Receipts for clothing required that the name and rank be placed on them by the merchants. He continued, "It is extremely difficult to continue to conceal military status over a period of months in the same place; yet continuity of service in the same place is exceedingly important, and continued concealment of military status is vitally necessary...." *

Elliott's comment on the status of agents was that if the men were to remain soldiers, commissioned grades should be provided for the proficient without losing their civilian clothing rights, which enable them to do police work. As was mentioned previously, in the United States, Intelligence Officers felt that more CIP sergeants should have been commissioned. **

Three months before the end of World War I, all recruiting of CIP agents was suspended for men less than forty-five years old. Waivers were required for recruiting those over forty-five years old, and CIP agents obtained by induction

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* History G-2, SOS, p. 109.

** Elliott, p. 7.

were restricted to those classified for limited or special service. To prevent the procurement of unsuitable CIP men by transfer, prior approval of MID, War Department was required. *

It is not surprising that under these conditions the CIP, AEF ended the war 40 percent below its authorized strength.

Proposed Counter Intelligence Corps Organization

Many questions regarding the mission of the CIP arose during World War I. The fundamental question was whether it was to be solely the secret investigative service as first anticipated or was to have an equally important role as an agency supervising our security controls. By the end of World War I, Colonel Ward believed that there should be a definite division of a major counterintelligence organization into five branches. The first branch would be security control or "Circulation" control as it was then known. The second branch would be labeled, "Secret Service;" the third, "Information"; the fourth, "Army Morale"; and the fifth, "Administrative." **

In the first branch there would be no concealment of military status, as these personnel would operate openly under local Intelligence Officers as inspectors, and be "...chiefly engaged in examining papers and asking questions." Colonel Ward believed that this branch should include circulation control of the entire military, and that this function should be taken from the Provost Marshal, and returned to Intelligence where it "properly belongs."

The Secret Service branch, Colonel Ward said, would be occupied solely with investigations, and all its personnel would be in plain clothes. "Concealment of identity is the fundamental requisite, and in certain cases and places it is advisable that the Inspectors of the 'Circulation Control' and the agents of the 'Secret Service' should be unknown to each other...." ***

The Secret Service branch, Colonel Ward proposed, would have three types of detachments -- fixed, mobile and foreign. The fixed detachments would be stationed at Ports, Frontiers and other centers, Ward continued, "It is merely a matter of convenience and administrative detail whether each local office be supplied with a sufficient number of 'Secret Service' agents so that when the

* CIP Records, Documents #115-118.
** History G-2, SOS, p. 155; Exhibit #84.
*** Ibid., p. 156, Exhibit #84.

necessity arises one or more can be detached immediately for travel purposes to any other point or whether there be constituted a separate so-called 'mobile detachment in a few of the most important centers....' "

"The agents of the mobile detachments would, as the necessity arose, be in touch with those of the third subdivision of this branch of the Service, i.e., those located in the principal centers of the neutral countries. The necessity for the establishment and maintenance of foreign detachments has already been demonstrated...."

Colonel Ward's recommendation for the mobile unit was based upon the results of a small mobile unit of experienced Intelligence Officers that he formed late in the war, to "go to points where cases of special importance and difficulty were being handled, to advise the less-experienced Intelligence Officer on them, as well as to cooperate in the cases themselves. At the same time they could give advice and particularly instruct the local Intelligence Officer regarding the difficult matter of securing and operating his agents (Informants). This was a feature of great value and would have been further developed if the war had continued longer." *

The third branch, "Information," would furnish the Secret Service branch with many leads and recorded data just as it did in World War I through censorship of electronic communications, postal, press, and supervising visitor control. It would supervise dissemination of intelligence through reports and liaison, including material for propaganda. Army morale including civilian relations and War Relief Societies would constitute the fourth branch, and the fifth branch, "Administration," would handle as much administration as possible on Colonel Ward's premise, that "The local Intelligence officer has no time and should not be expected to devote his efforts to purely administrative matters but should have all this paraphernalia of his work furnished him in practical form from the central administrative office." **

Administration would include records, personnel and accounts. Of accounts Colonel Ward wrote, "The system of accounts officially prescribed for the handling of the special funds which were supplied to local Intelligence Officers was found to be a cause of great wasting of valuable time, which otherwise could have been spent on Intelligence duties. It was rare that an Intelligence office had sufficient personnel for anyone in the office to be specially detailed to devote himself for several days each month to making up accounts and familiarizing himself with the frequent changes in the system directed from GHQ except at the expense of his regular duties."

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* History, G-2, SOS, p. 144.

** Ibid., p. 160.

This Counter Intelligence Service was based on Colonel Ward's firm conviction that counterespionage activities behind our own lines and in neutral or enemy countries should be directed by one head, although in order to keep the "Inspectors" and "Agents" apart "it would be necessary for the Intelligence Officer, who has both Circulation Control and Secret Service branches under him to maintain two offices, one of which would be entirely unknown as such. It might be necessary to camouflage this office as a news agency or commercial house or it might be more desirable to have the Secret Service agents report to the Intelligence Officer at night at his quarters. This will depend entirely on local conditions and it is useless to attempt to do more than outline the general principle."*

Colonel Ward stressed that Intelligence and Counterintelligence should be closely related. "Some of the Allies therefore had separate counter espionage and secret service buildings in the same city although working in reality under the same chief in closest harmony.... In any case each service should act as a feeder to the other and the information which is gathered by one should be quickly and readily available to the other...." **

"Intelligence personnel should be allowed wide scope and given full responsibility for the performance of their duties and the administration of their offices, that they should not be subjected unduly to red-tape. At the same time they should be held to strict accountability for any abuse of their wide privileges." ***

To insure non-abuse of privileges, Colonel Ward believed that frequent inspections should be made by the central office of all local and branch offices. Moreover, Colonel Ward advocated that the central office organization "provide one or more officers whose chief duty shall be to travel almost continuously from one local office to another, familiarizing themselves with the work which is there being done and at the same time keeping in touch with the new material which flows in constantly to the central office from scores of points in the field. Letters and circulars are exceedingly helpful, but such a traveling inspector, who studies the actual problems at the point where they arise, can give suggestions of much more specific value than can the overworked officers of the central office who have no time or opportunity to become familiar with the local problems at first hand." ****

Pointing out that advance preparations would solve many of the counterintelligence problems of the future, Colonel Ward concluded, "The protective screen should be built up concurrently with the commencement of military activities in the country to which our troops are sent. The first detachments of the military to be sent abroad should include a half dozen Intelligence Officers and the necessary

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* History G-2 SOS, p. 156.
** Ibid., p. 137.
*** Ibid., pp. 110-111.
**** Ibid., p. 161.

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personnel to make a beginning and these to be followed rapidly by an increasing number of Intelligence Officers and Intelligence personnel so that the Intelligence Service may be always kept ahead of the rapidly growing number of troops and manifold activities which follow in their wake...".*

"It is strongly recommended that plans be prepared in advance, in view of another possible similar emergency for the recruitment of adequate Intelligence personnel... It is also felt that the Service could have been much improved could its chief have obtained the authority to bring certain officers from the United States who had special qualifications to France in order to increase the effective force. The general rule against sending for officers by name was no doubt wise and necessary, but an exception should have been made for this Intelligence section in view of the few having necessary qualifications and the small amount of material available...".**

"There developed at certain times a lack of appreciation in the other services of the need of advance information on the part of the Intelligence Section. For example, G-2 should have always had advance information as to the new bases it was proposed to open so as to have taken up at a sufficiently early date the questions of arranging for all the Intelligence functions to be carried on at the new base...." ***

Finally, Colonel Ward said, it was essential that we establish "early and close cooperation with all Services of our future Allies which can possibly furnish our Intelligence Service with the information already available and can thus put our Service into immediate touch with the local problems and local authorities..." ****

In discussing the local level situation, Colonel John B. Watkins summarized his conclusions that CIP agents should learn the peculiarities of local populations to help identify unusual activities and "secure all the information possible from your allies." But, said Watkins, "give sparingly and get your ally to arrest and try the enemy agent if you can." *****

Summary of Lessons Learned

In the gay celebration of 11 November 1918, there was a natural feeling that it was not merely an "armistice" but that the "war-to-end-all-wars" had

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* History G-2 SOS, p.162.
** Ibid., p. 145.
*** Ibid., p. 44.
**** Ibid., p. 162.
***** Watkins, p. 7.

been fought. Nearly four decades and another World War later, it was evident that 11 November 1918 had been truly an Armistice and that the weapons and organizations of World War II had been spawned in World War I -- the armed forces; the air forces; the chemical forces and even the long range artillery. Research reveals that the Counter Intelligence Corps was no exception and that the lessons provided in its 15 months as CIP in World War I had vital significance 35 years later.

The outstanding counterintelligence lesson of World War I is obviously that any counterintelligence organization must be as flexible as the sources of the intelligence it is countering. This lesson was recognized, in principle, 33 years later when SR 380-320-10 was published, and Paragraph 32 stated in reference to command consent agreements that: "These agreements should be sufficiently flexible to insure that the investigative work in the field is not hampered by lines of jurisdiction which are binding on Army personnel but invisible to the enemy agent..."

Practical application of this principle would have solved many of the problems of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I, but as Colonel Bruce Bidwell concluded following his analysis of intelligence training in World War I, "Theoretically this difficult problem might be worked out in a satisfactory manner on the basis of intimate staff coordination and collaboration by all concerned. In reality, however, this particular solution has consistently failed to satisfy indicated needs. A decided improvement could possibly be secured by means of a determined educational campaign aimed at assuring that all key commanders and staff officers were made fully aware of the vital importance of adequate intelligence training to the success of the all-inclusive military effort. Some practical solution to the problem must be found, however, particularly since history has demonstrated that ignorance and misunderstanding on the part of both sides have contributed regularly to many important military intelligence training failures observed." *

Prerequisite to realizing the importance of training is recognition of the importance of the mission and its accomplishment. As far as counterintelligence is concerned, it is evident that its operations cannot depend upon individual interpretation in each command area and at each command level. Flexibility of operations must be insured at top level to prevent arbitrary regulations on scope and method of operations from defeating the mission of the Corps. Following World War II, the army was to a large extent decentralized to various Army Commands but in 1954, after seven years trial, the Army went back to a centralized Continental Command.

An equally important lesson of World War I was the impossibility, as a practical working arrangement, of separating all intelligence into positive and

* History MID, VII-60.

negative branches. Efforts to enforce this arbitrary division deprived both branches of valuable information and assistance. Nearly two score years later, the concept of "aggressive" counterintelligence was recognized, and in 1954 the creation of the Army Intelligence Center embracing both intelligence and counter-intelligence paved the way for practical and effective coordination.

The Corps of Intelligence Police suffered many of its problems of World War I merely because of its inappropriate title. It was a "Corps" that was not a "Corps." It was a "Counterintelligence" organization but called an "Intelligence" organization and it was called "Police" when it had no interest in crime, as such, and had no police powers. Nearly a decade after World War II it was still not a Corps.

Had the Corps of Intelligence Police been a "Corps," many of its personnel procurement, training, assignment and control problems would have been eliminated. It would not have had to "beg, borrow and steal" its rank and commission spaces. It could have better attained its prerequisites of maturity, education, ability and character.

Had the Treasury not claimed the title "Secret Service" exclusively, both Colonel Van Deman and Major Nolan would have obtained the name they requested for the service and the European term "Intelligence" would not have confused the meaning. Many later problems between the investigative and the security services of the work would not have arisen. There were still questions on the scope of the CIC mission three decades later.

Had the word "Police" not been used, much of the confusion that resulted in misuse of the CIP on purely criminal matters might have been eliminated. After it was evident that former police experience was less desirable for "fact-finding" counterintelligence agents than several other types of civilian experience, the CIP would not have been so frequently referred to as "militarized detectives." * Air Force and Naval counterintelligence gave up the crime vs. intelligence conflict in the years that followed and consolidated forces as "fact-finders," but Army counterintelligence retained its independence despite much confusion.

No conclusions could be drawn from the CIP wartime experiences relative to the most desirable status and rank of Counter Intelligence Corps agents, and this remained one of the most widely discussed problems of the service.

* CIP Records-Documents, 1926, 38-44.

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Peacetime Status To Be Won

To the French and British, American Army Intelligence, and particularly counterintelligence, owes a lasting debt of gratitude. From them, Corps of Intelligence Police agents learned many lessons that would otherwise have been acquired only through costly and time-consuming experience. Colonel Watkins says they learned everything from the fact that "an intelligence agent is never off duty" and "any conversation may contain bits of useful information" to "Cherchez la femme (sometimes)." However, World War I experiences taught most CIP agents that "femmes" were a very incidental part of effective counter-intelligence activities, and that it was hard, unglamorous and painstaking work that earned for the Corps of Intelligence Police a permanent and honored place in all the future wartime plans of the United States Army.

As World War I ended with the armistice so many thought was peace, the Corps of Intelligence Police could be justly proud of its record. Its achievements were remarkable from the number of outstanding agents in the first hastily recruited and ill-trained little group to the smooth functioning organization attained by the time of the armistice.

Its status in peace had yet to be won. This status was already recognized by its able opponent, Colonel Nicolai, wartime chief of the German Army Intelligence Service. In 1923, he wrote, "The war freed military I.S. (Intelligence Service) in the competition of the various nations.... The war took counter-espionage from the hands of the police and remitted it into those of the highest state authority. The future will put it in the hands of a whole people. But only a nation with sound national sentiments is capable of this self-defense, and only those governments which sustain these sentiments in the people will be doing their duty and will achieve success in the fight against the secret service... But when today certain circles still put their faith in reconciliation as the way on which to go, they should see to it that this road is illuminated by a good intelligence service, even at the risk of losing their own illusions... Never before was the time more favorable for its work. This particularly concerns England and the United States. The structure of the British Empire and the immigration and race problems in North America call for the use of the arts of the intelligence service. Far greater than in the past and the present will the secret power of this service be in the future." *

With this bit of honest advice to his former enemies, Colonel Nicolai proceeded to rebuild the German intelligence and counterintelligence service which later gave Hitler the necessary knowledge to make his bloodless conquests of

* Nicolai .

the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the same era, the Communists created their high-level nets of espionage and subversion in the Americas. And at the same time the United States placed its faith in reconciliation and disarmament, with its army intelligence service virtually out of business and its army counterintelligence service down to sixteen (16) men. The lessons and the conclusions were there -- gathering dust on the shelves of history.

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME XXX

PROPERTY OF
US ARMY

CIC DURING THE OCCUPATION OF KOREA

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March 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers; there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather
RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Section 1

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA

The sudden collapse of the Japanese Empire presented many problems to the Allied powers who were to occupy the far flung realms of the "land of the rising sun." Not the least of these problems was the fate of Korea, the densely populated peninsula that had been the most important Japanese territory beyond the home islands. On VJ Day, the only comprehensive plan for Korea was contained in a single sentence from the Cairo Declaration of 1942: "The aforesaid three great powers (Great Britian, Russia, and the United States), mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

When the XXIV Corps, part of the TENTH Army on Okinawa, was designated the Occupation Force for Korea, it had no directives, no plans, no trained military government personnel, and less than a month to prepare for the accomplishment of its mission. Shortly before embarking for Korea, the XXIV Corps military government officers did receive instructions that were to prove more confusing than helpful. These orders placed the XXIV Corps in Korea in the same position as the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies in Japan by instructing the XXIV Corps to "supervise the functioning of those agencies of the Japanese Imperial Government within the areas of their commands." These instructions proved useless when the XXIV Corps, upon arrival in Korea, found few if any functioning Japanese government agencies.*

USSR Gets The Jump

The American Army was charged with liberating the area of Korea south of the now renowned 38th Parallel of latitude. This operation began on 8 September 1945, about two weeks after forces of the Soviet Union had moved into the area north of the 38th Parallel. Since this arbitrary geographical line had been established merely to facilitate the original liberation of the peninsula, the Americans tended to take it for granted that soon after liberation, the dividing line would disappear in favor of a unified military government.

During the first two months, CIC agents, like the remainder of the occupation forces, were engaged in disarming the Japanese Troops; assembling all Japanese Nationals preparatory to their repatriation; and maintaining law and order. Soon a directive from Washington outlined the basic mission of the MG in Korea: Korea was to be completely separated from Japan, and MG was to pave the way for the earliestpossible establishment of an independent Korean

* American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, by Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, Rinehart and Co., NYC, 1948, pp. 356-8, Chapter XVI, Military Government Experience in Korea, by Philip H. Taylor.

government.* Although no one suspected it at the time, the first of these objectives proved to be relatively simple while the second became and remained a problem of world-wide importance for more than a decade of turmoil.

Capable Korean Leaders Lacking

The Japanese were moved out of Korea without incident. No sooner had the Japanese left than the first big obstacle to Korean independence became painfully obvious. During the years of Japanese occupation, the Japanese, without exception, had held all positions of responsibility in government and industry. After the American liberation, Korean hatred for all Japanese prevented keeping of the ablest of the Japanese in responsible positions. Thus, when the last of the Japanese left Korea, the last Oriental with any administrative background also had departed.

As an example of the degree to which the Japanese had assumed all positions of responsibility, engineers on all railroad trains were Japanese; there was not a Korean capable of operating a locomotive.**

This lack of skilled and trained Korean personnel was actually a secondary obstacle in the way of Korean independence. The 38th Parallel solidified into a permanent border and the Russians quickly set up a Communist-dominated state in North Korea. That the North Koreans and their Russian masters intended to settle for nothing less than Communist control of all Korea may not have been apparent to most MG officials in 1945, although it soon became evident to CIC. These intentions formed a far greater obstacle to an independent Korea than the lack of native Korean administrators.

MG and Tactical Units Separated

Because CIC's work in Korea was so closely related to Military Government, MG's organization was of vital concern to CIC. For the first few months, Military Government teams like CIC Detachments were attached to the tactical on the local level. The lengthy channels of communication created by this set-up led to the establishment of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) which took over control of the MG units while the tactical troops including CIC were placed under the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). This step immediately increased the authority and enlarged the position of Military Government in Korea, and at the same time,

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* American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, By Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, Rinehart and Co., NYC, 1948, p. 359, Chapter XVI, Military Government Experience in Korea, by Philip H. Taylor.

** Interviews with CWO John R. Dilworth, 17 September 1954, Fort Holabird and Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

provided for much closer coordination between MG units as a result of the shortened channels of communication.*

USAMGIK was under the authority of the Military Governor whose responsibilities gradually increased throughout the years that American forces were in Korea. Major General Arthur Lerch and later Major General William Dean held this position. The Commanding General of USAFIK and the XXIV Corps throughout the occupation was Lieutenant General John R. Hodge. Although Hodge's relation to USAMGIK was never clearly stated, his rank made him virtual commander of both USAMGIK and USAFIK.

This use of direct military government in Korea, in contrast to the indirect control established in Japan, led to an efficiently functioning military government organization once the problems that resulted from the lack of preliminary planning had been solved.**

The separation of the tactical troops and the Military Government units created, however, an unfortunate rivalry. Each province had an MG unit and a tactical unit of about a battalion in strength. The ill feeling between the two in some provinces was so intense that separate women's clubs and separate Sunday worship services had to be instituted to keep an air of peace on the social scene.***

The American occupation of Korea officially ended on 15 August 1948 when the Republic of Korea, with Syngman Rhee as president, became recognized as the Government of South Korea.

American officials did not desire to remove troops from Korea immediately, and leave the new government and its small army exposed to stronger forces from the north. It was only when the Russian announcement that they would be out of North Korea by 1 January 1949 forced America's hand, that U.S. forces began to leave. The Russians could (and did) pull their forces back to the Manchurian border, state that they were out of North Korea, and shout that America should get out too. American forces had no nearby Manchuria. Thus, when U. S. forces left, the South Korean government had to be left to fend for itself.

Pressure from South Korean Nationalists, budget-cutting officials in Washington, and just plain GI's, whose morale was slumping badly, encouraged the withdrawal of U. S. forces. By 29 June 1949 the last of the American forces had left the peninsula.****

* American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, p. 362.
** Ibid., p. 363
*** The Korea Story, by John C. Caldwell in collaboration with Lesley Frost, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago 1952, p. 25.
**** The Riddle of MacArthur, Japan, Korea and the Far East, by John Gunther, Harpers & Brothers, 1950, p. 186-189.

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Section 2

ORGANIZATION OF CIC

On 9 September 1945, the first agents of the 224th CIC Detachment, many of them veterans of the campaigns of Leyte and Okinawa, arrived in Inchon, Korea, on the USS Chilton.* The Commanding Officer during these first few weeks was Lt. Col. Byron M. Meurlott.

The 224th CIC Detachment was attached to Headquarters, XXIV Corps, located in the capital city of Seoul, a city of nearly a million persons. This detachment coordinated the activity of a long list of other combat unit detachments, metropolitan units and area units.** The 85th and 86th Metropolitan Units operated out of Seoul with the latter on temporary duty in the area of Kunsan.*** The 78th Area Unit also operated out of Seoul with suboffices in Kaesong,**** Inchon,***** and Chongju.****** The 84th Metropolitan Unit was located in Pusan******* along with the 77th Area Unit, which had suboffices at Taegu,******** Masan********* and Chinju.********** The 58th Area Unit was located at Taejon*********** and the 59th Area Unit at Kunsan. All metropolitan and area units were attached to Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

The 7th CIC Detachment was attached to Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division and located at Seoul. The 40th CIC Detachment, with offices in Pusan, was attached to the 40th Infantry Division, and the 6th CIC Detachment, attached to the 6th Infantry Division, was located in Chonju.************

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* 224th CIC Detachment Historical Data Card, Unclassified.

** The organization and significance of metropolitan and area units in Korea is not documented.

*** Kunsan is on the West coast of Korea, 110 miles south of Seoul.

**** Kaesong is located just south of the 38th Parallel, 35 miles northwest of Seoul.

***** Inchon, the major port city on the west coast of Korea, is 20 miles southwest of Seoul.

****** Chongju is 80 miles south of Seoul.

******* Pusan is the major port city on the east coast of Korea, 220 miles southwest of Seoul.

******** Taegu is 155 miles southeast of Seoul.

********* Masan is 190 miles southeast of Seoul.

********** Chinju is 180 miles south of Seoul.

*********** Taejon is 100 miles south of Seoul.

************ Chonju is 130 miles south of Seoul.

Hqs USAFIK, Hq XXIV Corps, 224th CIC Det, Subject: CIC Detachments in Korea, To: Director of Counterintelligence, Hqs USAFIK, 21 October 1945, (Confidential), (Kansas City Depot, BX 25099) (41)

Administration of all these units was under the jurisdiction of the 441st CIC Detachment in Tokyo, Japan.

This confusing organizational set-up was further complicated by numerous personnel changes in these early months. The 441st which sent agents to the 224th was just as likely to take them away. Many of the agents were due to be separated from the service and others were long overdue for a stateside assignment. Actually few of the men who originally came to Korea with the 224th stayed for any length of time. Meurlott was soon returned to Tokyo and replaced by Captain William R. Gordon, who was replaced later by Captain Van C. Holmes.

On 13 February 1946, CIC in Korea was reorganized in an attempt to simplify the situation. The 224th remained in Seoul and kept control over all operations. The 6th, 7th, and 40th remained attached to their combat units and were located in Pusan, Seoul, and Taegu respectively. New units were set up as follows: 1034th in Taejon, 1035th in Songdo,* 1036 in Inchon, 1110th in Kwangju** and the 1111th in Chonju.*** At this time there were 57 CIC agents in Korea.****

971st CIC Detachment Organized

On 1 April 1946 all the above units were replaced by the 971st CIC Detachment with Major Jack B. Reed, who had been sent from the Philippines, as Commanding Officer.*****

The 971st operated under the G2 Section, XXIV Corps, with some degree of administrative jurisdiction still resting with the 441st. Personnel were to come from the 441st, and the 971st was to channel all reports headed for the United States through the 441st.

Immediately under the Commanding Officer were the Operations, Administrative and Liaison Officers. The Operations Officer was responsible for the following sections: Espionage, Sabotage, and Miscellaneous; Political; Reports and Analysis; and Security. Administration was divided into the

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* Songdo is located just south of the 38th Parallel, north of Seoul.

** Kwangju is 170 miles south of Seoul.

*** 224th CIC Det, Subject: Assignment of CIC Dets, To: ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps, 13 February 1946, /s/ Van C. Holmes, Captain, Commanding, Unclassified, Kansas City Depot, BX 25099.

**** Hqs, XXIV Corps, 224th CIC Det, Subject: CIC Monthly Administration Report, To: Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, Washington 25, D.C., 11 March 1946, /s/ Maurice D. Sergeant, Captain, CAC, Adjutant (for the Commanding Officer), Unclassified, (Kansas City Depot BX 25103) (58).

***** Hqs, XXIV Corps, General Order #58, Activation of the 971st CIC Det, 30 March 1946, (Secret), (Kansas City Depot, BX 25099). (41)

following sections: Confidential Funds and Informants; Translators and Interpreters; Billets; Motor Pool; Supply; and Detachment Administration.

The original plan specified that the Liaison Officer was to travel as field representative of the Commanding Officer among the following District Offices: Seoul, Songdo, Inchon, Kangnung,* Taejon, Pusan, Kwangju, Chonju, and Taegu. Three District Offices has suboffices as follows: Kangnung in Chunchon,** Taejon in Chongju, and Pusan in Chinju.

The total authorized strength of the Detachment was 126, but the 971st never reached its full T/O. Total actual strength in September 1946, when the above organization was in effect, was 89.*** Although the T/O called for a Lieutenant Colonel as Commanding Officer, it was not until February 1948 that an officer of this rank was assigned.

Shortage of personnel and the fact that CIC had come to Korea without much preparation and with little idea of what to expect, made frequent organizational changes necessary. This was particularly true in the Operations Sections and subsections. It was not until 29 March 1947 that a permanent SOP for the organization could be drawn up. 1st Lt. Harry H. Dow, one of the handful of men who had come to Korea with the 224th and remained with the 971st, was responsible for this SOP. Lieutenant Dow was Operations Officer of the 971st until leaving Korea in mid-1947. His work in adapting CIC organization and operations to the peculiar situation in Korea earned for him an Oak Leaf Cluster on the Army Commendation Ribbon and a Letter of Commendation from Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General, XXIV Corps.****

The provisions of the SOP made the Commanding Officer responsible to the ACofS, G2, USAFIK, for "the administration and operations of CIC in Korea and for the employment of personnel to insure the maximum Counter Intelligence Coverage for Korea."

The Executive Officer acted "in the stead of the Commanding Officer to supervise and be responsible for all administrative matters including the

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* Kangnung is located 115 miles east of Seoul on the east coast of Korea.

** Chunchon, located just south of the 38th Parallel, is 55 miles northeast of Seoul.

*** 971st CIC Detachment Organizational Chart, dated 7 September 1946, drawn up for ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps, (Confidential), (Kansas City Depot C3743) (122).

**** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for March 1947, dated 2 April 1947, thru: Commander-in-Chief, USAFFE, To: Director of Intelligence WDGS, Pentagon, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

preparation of the Monthly Administrative Report...."*

Major Reed was the Commanding Officer of the 971st until February 1948. When Major Reed left Korea, Maj. Theodore J. Roberts served as interim Commanding Officer until the arrival of Lt. Col. Joseph Huckins late in March 1948. The 971st was without an Executive Officer until early 1948, after which Capt. Marion R. Panell and Major Roberts held the position.**

The Operations Officer was responsible for the training and proficiency of all agents, procurement of personnel, supervision of the seven sections under Operations, planning necessary CI coverage, and dissemination of information.***

Lieutenant Dow served as Operations Officer until April 1947 when he was replaced by 1st Lt. James K. Patchell. In June 1947, Captain Orlando A. Molina, a former OSS man, assumed the position and held it until late 1948 when he was relieved by Captain George I. Hessevick.****

The duties of the first five of the seven sections under the Operations Officer will be outlined in full in the later sections devoted to their operations. It need only be mentioned in passing that two of these sections dealt with matters usually outside the mission of CIC. The Political Section acted as a reporter of all political activity in South Korea, and the Information Section gathered positive intelligence on the situation in North Korea.

The Liaison Section was responsible for maintaining liaison with Military Government, tactical units and Provost Marshal units for collection of information and with CIC District Offices for administrative matters.*****

The overall shortage of CIC personnel in Korea forced the Liaison Section to exist only on paper. Around the middle of 1947, Headquarters, 971st CIC Detachment, created the position of Detachment Supervisor, best described as a "traveling representative" of the Commanding Officer to facilitate contact between Headquarters and the District Offices. The position

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for CIC, USAFIK, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea, 29 March 1947, (Secret), p. 15, (Staff & Faculty Lib.). NOTE: The SOP is attached as appendix 3 to this chapter.

** Numerous interviews with former agents of the 971st CIC Detachment.

*** USAFIK, CIC Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for CIC, USAFIK, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea, 29 March 1947.(Secret), p. 16, (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** Numerous interviews with former agents of the 971st CIC Detachment.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for CIC, USAFIK, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea,(Secret). p. 22, 29 March 1947, (Staff and Faculty Library).

was first held by Captain Panell and later by Capt. Arthur Biestel.* In no way, however, did the creation of this position take the place of the ideal Liaison Section outlined in the SOP. That the Liaison Section never existed is unfortunate especially since CIC badly needed an officer specifically charged with maintaining liaison with Military Government units.

The Reports and Analysis Section usually consisted of only one officer who was responsible for preparing the Monthly Information Report for the Director of Intelligence in the Pentagon, the semi-monthly situation report required by the 441st CIC Detachment, and the daily periodic report required by the ACofS, G2, USAFIK. The District Offices were required to submit a daily summary of all investigative activity from which the daily periodic reports for the G2 were compiled.**

Later this section also prepared the Weekly Information Bulletin which was sent to all District Offices and suboffices in an attempt to keep CIC's far-flung agents aware of the overall situation in Korea.

The five men who held the position of Officer-in-Charge, Reports and Analysis Section, were 2d Lt. Albert R. Moses, Capt. Ellis A. Ream, 1st Lt. Kenneth E. MacDougall, 1st Lt. A.B. Cassidy, and Capt. George I. Hessivick.***

971st Provides Wide Coverage

No other intelligence agency in Korea could claim more complete coverage of Korea than CIC. Changes were made in the location of District Offices and suboffices as dictated by shifts in the current situation. By the end of 1948, District Offices were in operation in the following thirteen towns: Seoul, Inchon, Kangnung, Taejon, Pusan, Kwangju, Chanju, Taegu, Kaesong, Ongjin,**** Chunchon, Chongju and Cheju Do.***** These District Offices controlled the following suboffices: Seoul in Uijongbu,****** Kangnung in Samchok,******* Pusan in Masan, Kwangju in Mokpo,******** Chonju in Kunsan and Taeju in

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* Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure, for USAFIK, CIC, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea, 29 March 1947, p. 22, (Secret) (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** Ongjin is 80 miles west of Seoul.

***** Cheju Do is an island in the East China Sea about 50 miles from the southern most part of Korea.

****** Uijongbu is 20 miles northeast of Seoul.

******* Samchok is 120 miles east of Seoul on the east coast of Korea.

******** Mokpo is 180 miles south of Seoul on the west coast of Korea.

Pohang.* The greatest coverage was reached during 1948 when CIC maintained 21 field offices. At this time the Criminal Investigation of the Provost Marshal operated offices only in Seoul, Pusan, and Inchon.** CIC's mission of covering the ever-changing political situation in Korea made such a widespread network an absolute necessity.

The District Offices performed investigations in their areas for the various sections at Headquarters. The results of these investigations were reported to the proper section and Daily Periodic Reports and Semi-monthly Situation Reports were submitted to the Reports and Analysis Section.***

The Seoul District Office, located adjacent to the Headquarters building, was the largest with an average of 20 military personnel assigned, in addition to 8 to 10 Korean civilian interpreters and three Korean typists. Much of the work of political reporting fell to this District Office because the important political leaders spent most of their time in the Seoul area. There were usually several agents specifically charged with interviewing key Korean political leaders, while several others specialized in covering political meetings and rallies in the area. Still other specialists worked almost exclusively on background checks of American personnel. Since the majority of the Department of the Army civilians were stationed in Seoul, these agents handled a large number of cases.

Near the end of the occupation, three officers and three enlisted men were assigned exclusively to attend social functions and places of entertainment in Seoul in order to check the comments and activities of the guests.

Operations in the Seoul District Office were on a larger scale than in other areas because more significant developments took place in Seoul. The Officers-in-Charge were, in turn, Capt. Jay Harbin, Capt. Elbert Eller, 1st Lt. Carl Eberlein, 1st Lt. Kenneth E. MacDougall, and Capt. Ellis A. Steiner.****

Those District Offices which were in areas without CID***** representatives drew many assignments which technically fell within the mission of the CID.

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* Pohang is 180 miles southeast of Seoul on the east coast of Korea. 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for USAFIK, CIC, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea, 29 March 1947, p. 23, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington.

***** CID is now known as MPCI - Military Police Criminal Investigations.

For instance, the Chonju District Office handled many violations of regulations concerning Military Government's petroleum distribution program. CIC also investigated several cases of opium smuggling that should have been handled by CID.* In one instance, the Taejon District Office did the preliminary investigative work on the murder of an American soldier on guard at the Taejon railway yards.** As a result of this particular case, two CID agents were placed on duty in Taejon for several months. These men worked in close cooperation with CIC and even utilized CIC offices, billets, and mess facilities. For the moment CIC offices in the central area of South Korea were relieved of many investigative duties which should not have been theirs in the first place.***

Because of the extensive network of District Offices, CIC came in contact with more people who knew about the situation in North Korea than any other military agency in Korea, a fact which influenced heavily the decision to give the 971st the added mission of collecting positive intelligence.****

The broad coverage of South Korea through District Offices made good communications an essential of CIC organization. As noted in this section, the District Offices all reported daily to Headquarters; and, beginning in March 1947, Headquarters sent out a Weekly Information Bulletin to the District Offices. The Weekly Information Bulletin grew out of the Weekly Political News, a periodical prepared by 1st Lt. James K. Patchell, OIC of the Political Section that was designed to orient the District Offices on the Korean parties and politics.***** The Weekly Information Bulletin not only dealt with political developments but included reports from all the sections of the 971st. These reports outlined important cases, discussed specific problems and operational weakpoints, backed up important orders, and commended particular agents or District Offices for good work. It proved the best means of keeping each District Office briefed on activities of all segments of the 971st. In May 1948, the Weekly Information Bulletin became the CIC Monthly Bulletin, but no changes, other than the frequency of publication, were made.

The District Offices were able to contact Headquarters in a number of ways. Civilian telephone, police telephone and Army radio were used for the routine reports; more important messages were hand-carried by agents; and air travel was available for matters requiring immediate action. Many District Offices ran a daily Korean courier to Seoul. All reports were stored at

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* Interview with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for April 1947, dated 30 April 1947, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, Pentagon, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Headquarters with the District Offices keeping only skeleton files. All file-checks were made at Headquarters.*

The 971st also developed special communication channels through the use of "traveling agents," who were highly mobile trouble shooters, drawing special assignments in out-of-the-way areas and reporting directly to Headquarters. The most noted of these was Special Agent Harold Hummel whose biggest case was the investigation of sabotage in the Yongwol-Machari coal mine in March and April 1948. Later during the Korean War, Hummel's extensive knowledge of the terrain around Kwangju saved his life when he found himself in enemy territory unable to traverse main routes to safety.**

The outstanding feature of CIC organization in Korea was the cumulative, largely unpremeditated, growth of the 971st Detachment. Sections and positions were created as needs arose. The men who originally came to Korea with the 224th had little or no idea what to expect. No precedents for CIC from previous occupations were available as guides for action. Consequently, organization was in a state of flux for a long time. As CIC acquired special missions and unusual situations developed, the organization of the 971st was changed to meet the new conditions. Due largely to Lieutenant Dow's early work and the SOP of 29 March 1947, the 971st had a firm organizational base on which to make the necessary changes.

Language Barrier Poses Major Problem

The greatest problem CIC faced during the Korean occupation can be stated in a single word: language. Because the 971st never had more than a handful of Korean-speaking agents, far too much reliance had to be placed on native Korean interpreters and translators. Many of these men were motivated by strictly mercenary impulses and could not be trusted to any great extent. Since procurement and supervision of indigenous personnel was the responsibility of the Special Squad, the problem will be fully discussed when that section's activities are considered.

Obviously those agents who could speak Korean were of extreme value. S. Sgt., later 2d Lt. Gordon W. Avison, Jr., and T. Sgt. Donald P. Whitaker, who continued to serve the 971st as a civilian after his discharge, were the only non-Orientals who spoke Korean fluently. Avison was the son of a missionary in Korea before World War II and had spent most of his life on the peninsula.***

* Interview with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

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CIC also had about twelve Korean Nisei agents, most of whom were from Hawaii.* Francis Tanka worked in the Political Section of the 971st and Yukinobu Fujioka, known to everyone as "Roy," was in charge of the 971st's files. Harry Ahn, a WOJG, worked out of the Seoul District Office; he later served as an agent for the 441st in Osaka, returning to Korea and the 705th CIC Detachment in 1953. Lee Yong Soon (or Y. Lee and hence Anglicized "Wylie") was born in Korea, but had spent twenty years of his life in New York City. Wylie came to Korea with the 224th after serving with OSS during World War II. Wylie was a particularly valuable operative, since he was related to the Korean royal family and could gain access to many "closed circles." Other well-remembered Nisei with the 971st included Stephan Yang, Cho Kee Nam, Daniel Pang and Peter Kang. Kang was allegedly the judo champion of one of the provinces.**

Unfortunately, the dialect of the greater number of the Nisei was unintelligible to many South Koreans. When Korean failed, it was often possible to conduct discussions in Japanese, since many native Koreans had learned the language during the Japanese occupation.***

The Nisei were sufficiently valuable to CIC to lead to the recommendation in April 1948 that the 971st T/O include forty Nisei personnel, the absolute minimum required to maintain a check on Korean personnel and keep up liaison with Korean agencies.****

Every operation under the 971st had, as its first and major problem, overcoming of the language barrier. A CIC operation was stymied unless an interpreter or translator could be found. Too often, the linguist who was found proved to be a man of questionable motives.

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* Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interviews with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and Lieutenant Colonel Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of CIC Activities for April 1948, dated 1 May 1948, To: Chief, CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Md., WDAGO Form 395, (Secret), and Interview with Captain Wilber T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

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Supplies: Never Enough

As much as the language problem plagued the personnel of the 971st, it was not their only woe. CIC, like all military organizations in Korea, was at the tailend of the USAFFE supply line. The 971st was the unhappy recipient of much wornout equipment that should have been tagged for the salvage-heap.*

The jeeps used by the 971st were scarred veterans of the Pacific fighting, rescued from scrapping operations on Okinawa. According to agents with the 971st, much of the credit for keeping the 971st on the road should go to the Motor Sergeant, Sgt. Dalton Clark, who searched diligently for parts to keep these jeeps running.**

Supplies of all sorts were scanty. Paper, an essential for any intelligence agency, was particularly scarce. The USAFIK supply people did not seem to understand why a CIC District Office needed more paper than the orderly room of an infantry company.*** In early 1948 for a short period there was no .38 caliber ammunition available in South Korea, and the 971st had to dispatch 1st Lt. Wilbur T. Measley to Japan to beg some from the 441st.**** Every conceivable supply item was short the greater percentage of the time.

T/O Never Filled During Occupation

The 971st suffered continuously from a shortage of personnel. The actual strength of the organization in September 1946 was 89 men, 37 less than the T/O. Later the T/O was raised to 182,***** but usually there were about 100 men assigned to the 971st and the organization never achieved full strength. The 971st, unable to get agents trained at the CIC Center, had to develop a system of procuring agents from local military units. Virtually no agents were forthcoming from Camp Holabird until 1948 when operations in Korea were nearing completion. At that time, the CIC Center was having difficulty in obtaining men qualified to meet CIC standards, and the 971st found that some of the school-trained agents were simply not satisfactory. CWO John R. Dilworth recalls that one of the newly-trained agents admitted to him that he was only fifteen years old. This young man proved to be excellent at washing jeeps.

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* Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interviews with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, and Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of CIC activities, for April 1948, dated 1 May 1948, To: Chief, CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

***** Monthly Report of CIC Activities for April 1948, dated 1 May 1948.

The system of local procurement by the 971st in Korea brought many men into CIC who remained with the organization after their assignment in Korea was completed. These men since have received the benefit of formal counterintelligence schooling, but in Korea their training came from actual experience in the field. Dilworth, one of the locally procured agents, recalls that he spent several days reading various documents, received a brief orientation from Capt. Jay Harbin, Officer-in-Charge of the Seoul District Office, and then received his first assignment in the field.*

The normal Army pipeline for obtaining CIC agents in Korea went through the 441st Detachment in Japan. This was hardly a satisfactory arrangement. The 441st usually faced a critical shortage of personnel itself, and was understandably reluctant further to deplete its forces by sending agents to Korea. Nevertheless, the T/O for the 441st was 970 agents as compared to the 182 agents allotted the 971st.** This great disparity reflected what those in Korea felt was the all too prevalent belief of the military planners in the United States that operations in Korea were relatively unimportant in the world-wide scheme of things.

The severe lack of personnel in the 971st clearly hampered the activities and operations of the Detachment.*** Case priorities took on added significance, and general security checks which carried the last of five priority ratings had to be neglected.****

The 971st also suffered from a lack of personnel trained in the many investigative specialties. Particularly needed was an agent who could operate and fully understand a radio. When a Communist operator was captured, it was impossible to double him back on the North Koreans because of the lack of a trained radioman to supervise the operation.***** DAME and DASE specialists were non-existent and specialists in investigative photography were scarce. Practically nothing in the way of investigative equipment ever reached the 971st.******

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* Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of CIC Activities for April 1948, dated 1 May 1948, To: Chief, CIC, Camp Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., WDAGO Form 395, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** This is the opinion of all the agents of the 971st interviewed in connection with this chapter.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence (SECRET), (Staff and Faculty Library).

***** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

****** Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

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Agents of the 971st were required to work long hours to achieve their excellent coverage of the situation in Korea. A tremendous unit spirit and a deep interest in their work saw the agents through their long working hours.*

G2 And General Hodge Appreciate CIC

The obstacles that CIC had to overcome or bypass in the Korean occupation were multifold. But there were some compensations. The 971st was fortunate that the two men who served as XXIV Corps G2, Col. John N. Robinson,and Col. Thomas M. Watlington, understood the problems and recognized the value of CIC.

The degree to which the XXIV Corps G2, in this case Colonel Robinson, appreciated the performance of CIC was shown by his statement: "The 971st CIC Detachment serves as a valuable contact between this headquarters and various political factions in South Korea. Political studies prepared by this unit have been well done and are of great value to the Commanding General, USAFIK, as well as to the American members of the Joint Commission presently meeting in Seoul. In accordance with its basic mission as a security agency, the 971st is following a vigorous security campaign to reduce to a minimum the number of security violations at a time when leakage of information or cases of actual espionage could seriously effect the occupation."**

Praise for the work of the 971st was also found at the top of the USAFIK chain of command. Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge's high opinion of CIC throughout the occupation was mirrored in a letter of appreciation that he wrote after a year of operations in Korea: "I wish to take this opportunity to express to the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment in Korea my thanks and appreciation for the splenddd work it has done. The task of the CIC has been as difficult as it has been important. The missions of our army of occupation have brought new concepts of counter intelligence operations. The CIC in Korea has met each new problem with an open mind with a perception of the requirements of the occasion. All of this has been accomplished under the additional handicaps of reduced strength and rapid turnover of personnel. The fact that much of the work of the CIC unit must remain obscure because

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* Comments on the unusually high morale of the 971st were made by Lieutenand Colonel Elbert H. Eller, Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, CWO John R. Dilworth,and Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of Activities, 29 July 1947, From: Office of ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps, Thru: Commanding Officer 441st CIC, To: Chief, CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., /s/ John N. Robinson, Col, GSC, ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

of its confidential nature, in no way lessens its importance. Timely information is just as important in making sound decisions during the occupational phase as it was during combat. The contributions of your organization to a proper understanding of the political situation, the supression of espionage, subversive activity, and illegal organizations, have been major factors in the establishment of an orderly and peaceful administration for South Korea. Please pass this on to each member of the CIC in Korea."*

General Hodge took a personal interest in the operations of CIC in Korea. It was probably CIC's coverage of the political situation in South Korea that the General valued most, since these political reports were often the only source he had to use as a basis for important decisions.**

Poor Liaison With Provost Marshal

Unfortunately CIC liaison with other areas of the command, particularly the Provost Marshal's office, was far from what it should have been. From early 1946 on, CIC had all the prerogatives of a police agency, including search and arrest. Consequently there were increased opportunities to tangle with the Provost Marshal's office over matters of jurisdiction. A considerable amount of jealously grew up on both sides of the fence and the situation was greatly worsened by the personal differences between Major Reed and Col. John E. Baird, XXIV Corps Provost Marshal.

According to Maj. Marion R. Panell, liaison at the Headquarters level between CIC and the Provost Marshal's office was the poorest he has ever known anywhere.*** However, in Pusan, far away from the squabbles at higher levels, the two organizations were able to establish the liaison essential to their individual missions.****

Liaison with the Provost Marshal in Seoul was hindered by the Military Police's refusal to honor CIC Credentials which should have allowed agents

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* Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Office of the Commanding General, 1 July 1946, Subject: Appreciation of the work of the CIC in Korea, To: Commanding Officer, 971st CIC Detachment. /s/ John R. Hodge, Lieutenant General, Commanding, Unclassified, (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, Fort Holabird. This opinion was seconded by Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall and Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley.

**** Interview with Master Sergeant Richard I. Hammond, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

into areas out of bounds to soldiers. A special Provost Marshal pass was required to enter any off-limits area.*

Other military units and individuals in Korea failed to understand CIC and its mission. Some officers, rather than helping CIC, did their best to steer clear of the organization for fear that their own black market operations would be investigated. Liaison with other units was somewhat improved when Lt Col Joseph Huckins, the Commanding Officer after March 1948, adopted a policy of periodic visits to various local commanders.**

There was also considerable friction between CIC and Military Government officials. Military Government was touchy about allowing CIC to investigate its personnel, and not particularly interested in maintaining tight security, claiming that they disliked such "police state" activity. Often their fears led them to thwart necessary counterintelligence activity. Agents who were in Korea at the time have expressed the opinion that if USAFIK had been able to maintain a tighter control over Military Government, this lack of interest in security matters could have been overridden and CIC's work made easier.

A typical instance of Military Government's obstinacy was the denial to CIC of a boat to patrol port areas in an attempt to cut down smuggling and prevent entrance of espionage agents through the harbor. In spite of General Hodge's approval of CIC's activity in this matter, Military Government felt it smacked of "police state" methods.***

The Danger of Compromise

It is the feeling of many of the men formerly with the 971st that the organization operated too much in the open. Part of this problem stemmed from the regulation that kept agents in OD uniforms without any insignia at all.**** At first CID wore the same uniform, but soon CID received permission to go into civilian clothes. Since CIC was outfitting its men in a uniform worn by no other organization, agents were open to compromise on all occasions.

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* Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with William J. MacTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Operational Policy and Procedure, To: All CIC Personnel in Korea, 25 June 1946, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

A few specially selected agents, who were investigating Military Government and Army personnel, were allowed civilian clothes. Attempts to get all agents into "civies" were hampered by the misconduct of the first few agents allowed the privilege.*

The distinctive uniform of CIC agents in Korea was only one factor contributing to the unsought notice given to CIC operations in Korea. The police prerogatives and functions given CIC endowed the organization with power never intended for a confidential investigative organization. Some of the members of the organization have described the 971st as a rough and ready outfit that probably interpreted this unusual power too liberally,** and have stated that, especially early in the occupation, operations were too "high, wide, and handsome".***

The failure of some of the agents to recognize the unusual position of responsibility of their Detachment was noted by CIC officers in Korea. In the Monthly Information Report of January 1947, a special recommendation to the CIC Center stated: "Agents should be indoctrinated in the responsibility of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Since CIC is a powerful organ in occupied countries; since because of political activity in such countries, agents and confidential informants are imperative; and further, since CIC has almost unlimited powers of arrest, searches and seizures, CIC is too frequently in the public eye. Many individuals in an occupied country like Korea look upon CIC as the one agency to bring them relief from their many grievances. It is therefore essential that each member of the Corps be fully aware of his responsible position, and of the fact that any untoward act that he commits will be known by the populace, reaching those persons upon whom he must depend for valuable information."****

Command Weaknesses

Some agents who served in Korea have noted that the 971st suffered from a lack of leadership during the early period of the occupation. They

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* Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interviews with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and Lieutenant Colonel Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington.

*** The words of Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Monthly Report of Information, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, The Pentagon, 20 January 1947, /s/ Jack B. Reed, Major, CAC, Commanding, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

have described the Commanding Officer from April 1946 to January 1948, as a man of insufficient intelligence experience for this important post. Generally it was his policy to let subordinates take care of all operations. However, because of men like Lieutenant Dow, who was responsible for organizing the Detachment and virtually commanded it from his position as Operations Officer, the inactivity of the CO was not fatal to the organization. It was when the 971st needed someone of high rank to perform liaison functions at upper levels that the Commanding Officer's inexperience was most detrimental.*

Inspections Show Neglect

In the early years of the occupation, the housekeeping and administration of the 971st were not up to military standards. With the arrival of Colonel Huckins, steps were taken to correct the situation.** During March and April 1948, Colonel Huckins personally visited the District Offices to discuss operational problems and inspect local facilities.*** Throughout the remainder of the year, the offices were frequently inspected and rated on condition of buildings and grounds, fire prevention measures, mess management, operational security, condition of unit files, liaison, management of confidential funds and vehicle and motor maintenance.**** That numerous discrepancies were uncovered is hardly surprising in the light of earlier neglect.

The District Offices, because of the personnel shortage, were never completely caught up in their investigative operations. Consequently there had been an almost universal neglect of the housekeeping and administrative matters on which the inspection team from Headquarters rated the local offices.

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* Numerous interviews with former agents of the 971st CIC Detachment

** Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps Monthly Bulletin #1, To: All District Offices, CIC-K, 5 May 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library) and subsequent Monthly Bulletins for the year 1948.

Section 3

ESPIONAGE IN KOREA

In many respects, the armed conflict that broke out in Korea in June 1950 was simply a new phase of a war that had been going on silently, insidiously, for five years. In its earlier phases, this war made few headlines and drew little attention. But CIC agents in the Korean occupation had known the quiet struggle. It was a war of espionage.

The Communists in Korea tapped two sources of personnel for their espionage activities: reliable sympathizers in the south and ardent followers in the north. The numerous members of the South Korean Labor Party and other Communist organizations in South Korea were already well-placed for clandestine operations, and a group of agents from North Korea were easily smuggled into the US Zone. Although many individuals performed espionage missions on behalf of the Communists, their activities were always controlled by agencies in the Russian Zone.

For initial penetration and continual communication, the Communists exploited the difficult-to-guard, rugged terrain along the 38th Parallel and the lax security in the port areas in South Korea. Agents and messengers found it easy to slip into the American zone on foot or to travel on the numerous small boats that toured the waters near the boundary.

Once the espionage agent was in South Korea, access to information valuable to the Communists could be gained with ease. Espionage could be perpetrated by Koreans hired to work on United States installations as interpreters, boiler men, kitchen help, laundry help and houseboys. The Korean Constabulary and Coast Guard were heavily infiltrated by the Communists, and both organizations were somewhat slow to conduct investigations to rid themselves of these undesirable elements. The Korean Police, in spite of heavily rightist leanings, was also infiltrated with some success. It was not until 1947 that steps were taken, with the constant aid of CIC, to free these organizations of their Red members.

Pass systems at military installations were lenient and were, therefore, exploited by Communist agents. At one time there was a rash of counterfeit passes to military establishments sold through the black market.*

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-32, (Secret), and 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 18-22, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Many espionage agents did not attempt to penetrate the Military Government of South Korea organizations, but merely wandered throughout the peninsula keeping their eyes and ears open. There were practically no travel restrictions to hinder their movement. Camps, billets and headquarters buildings were in full view and basic order of battle information was relatively easy to gather. For example, on 24 April 1947, CIC agents arrested a fourteen year old boy who had in his possession a detailed sketch of an Army installation which he had drawn himself within easy view of military authorities.* It was also a simple matter to gain information through friendly conversations with American soldiers.

Soviet Officers Brief North Korean Agents

In most cases the agents who came from North Korea were briefed on their missions by Soviet officers. Although there is definite evidence that the North Korean Communists sent a flood of low level agents to South Korea, the bulk of information was gathered by an estimated one hundred highly trained individuals operating directly for the Soviets.** Many of the low level agents, especially the "wandering" type, were capable of collecting rudimentary Order of Battle intelligence, but could not be given a mission to furnish information about political occurrences, industrial and economic conditions, and highly technical matters.*** Experience proved that many of these Koreans turned in reports that were biased, vague and generally incomplete; and much of their work was of slight value.

The ready and willing supply of potential espionage agents in the various Communist organizations south of the 38th Parallel complemented the efforts of the agents from the North. Through diverse means of communication, the information that these men gathered was sent to the Soviets and North Korean Reds. The trading companies in South Korea in contact with the government-controlled North Korean trading companies were almost certainly utilized for transmission of positive intelligence. CIC had valid reasons to suspect groups in the Russian Consulate and the Russian Orthodox Church in Seoul of serving as contacts and messengers. The activity of these probable Soviet operatives was not confined to espionage; their subversive role in South Korea is discussed in Section 5.

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* USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum", Subject: Actual and Suspected Espionage Agents in South KOREA, 27 March 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 18-22, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

Espionage Schools Operated By Communists

Communist efforts to train espionage agents excelled any American attempts to train agents to work in North Korea. The Communist espionage schools were not permanent installations, but appeared in different places at different times. At these schools the students went through a period of indoctrination in Communism, and those who demonstrated a strong feeling for the cause qualified for missions.* Generally all schools required that applicants gain the recommendation of some party leader and possess definite pro-Communist leanings. Educational requirements were usually high.

The courses generally lasted six months, although some were as short as four weeks. In most schools, enrollment was between three hundred and six hundred students, but CIC learned of one school in Pyongyang that enrolled fifteen hundred.**

Reports received by CIC indicated that the major espionage schools were located in Manchuria and operated under strict supervision of the Russians. The curriculum of the school at Tunghua, Manchuria, included Korean language, political science, social science, philosophy, military training, Russian history, communism, materialism, and the world situation, with special training in agitation, terrorism and propagandizing.*** This curriculum was as extensive as any uncovered by CIC. Generally, political science, communism, and techniques of agitation formed the basic courses of the schools.

The impermanence of these espionage schools was remarkable. As soon as one class had finished, a school was likely to be closed and never to be heard about again.

CIC had to search continually for information on these schools to keep abreast of the current situation. All espionage agents picked up and interrogated were questioned at length concerning their training and schooling under the Communists.

An indication of the mobility of the Communist espionage schools may be gained from that fact that the big school at Tunghua, Manchuria, split into two groups when Chinese Nationalist forces began to threaten its existence.

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* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 18-22, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum", Subject: Soviet-Communist Inspired Espionage, 28 July 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-31, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

At some of the schools, graduates were given enough identification to allow them to pass through the North Korean border patrols without trouble. The school at Hyesanjin, North Korea, tattooed their agents with small blue dots on the left buttocks and inside the left forearm for this purpose. When CIC learned of these distinguishing marks, this particular identification system obviously became a hindrance to successful operations for the Communist agent.*

Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section Handles Counterespionage

Counterespionage was the responsibility of the Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section.** Until March 1947, 1st Lt. Wallace K. Wittwer served as Officer-in-Charge of the Section. When Wittwer took charge of the Information Section, his assistant, William J. McTigue, a Department of the Army Civilian, became chief of ES&M. 1st Lt. Thomas R. Carmen served as McTigue's assistant. In addition to the Officer-in-Charge and his assistant, two clerks were assigned to the section. The Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section controlled and coordinated cases which were investigated by agents out of the various District Offices.

The first step in counterespionage normally would have been some sort of movement control within South Korea, but Military Government officials considered such control measures to be "police state" methods and prohibited their use.***

However, movement into South Korea was denied to all persons without passports or special permission by USAMGIK Ordinance #49. This ordinance was interpreted to prohibit entry into South Korea by members of the North Korean Police, Constabulary, Coast Guard, and other People's Committee-sponsored groups.****

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-31, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standard Operating Procedure for CIC, Korea, To: All Personnel, CIC-Korea, 29 March 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Legal Opinion, Unauthorized Movement into Korea To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 28 January 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

In spite of these legal restrictions, it was virtually impossible to stop all entry into South Korea from North Korea; because the rugged terrain along the 38th Parallel could never be guarded adequately.

Border Offices Screen Refugees

CIC agents from the District Offices of Ongjin, Kaesong, Chunchon and Kangnung, all on the border, were allowed to screen persons at refugee centers in order to weed out possible espionage agents. In the ideal situation, the screening consisted of obtaining all important personal information on the subject through rapid interrogation. Usually the information obtained was not checked upon immediately. Except in cases of extremely suspicious persons, the subject's word had to be accepted as truth since there was no evidence available to contradict him. All information was written up in a Summary of Information and forwarded to Headquarters and from there to the District Office nearest the destination of the refugee. Here a check could be made on the activities of the subject, his name submitted to local police to be placed on their watch list, and checks made to verify the statements made in the original interrogation.*

All persons deemed suspicious in their original interrogation were sent to the Seoul District Office for a detailed interrogation.**

A shortage of CIC personnel meant that native Korean detectives, supervised by CIC, often had to handle the routine preliminary screenings. The Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section eventually compiled a personal history form for the refugees to fill out, a device which speeded up the operation considerably.***

Travel by boat was a convenient means of entering South Korea, and the District Offices in Inchon and Pusan were instructed to screen, in the same manner as the border offices, all people who came in through these ports. This difficult task could have been performed more thoroughly had CIC been authorized a PT boat to intercept vessels coming in from North Korea. General

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #37, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 5 January 1948. (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #37, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 5 January 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Hodge, at one time, approved CIC's request for a PT boat, but Military Government refused to allow CIC permission for this extra harbor control measure.*

Koreans Useful In Counterespionage

CIC could not perform its counterespionage mission alone, partly because of the language barrier and partly because of the scarcity of qualified agents. Of particular value to CIC were the members of the North West Young Men's Association, NWYMA, a youth organization composed of men who had fled from North Korea. All members had to have suffered personally at the hands of the Communists. Unfortunately this organization was heavily inclined toward brutality in its attempts to even the score with its enemies; but the members knew enough about the top North Korean Reds to make it imperative that they be utilized in counterespionage operations under strict CIC supervision. Often investigations would be initiated when an NWYMA member would spot a man he recognized as a North Korean Red on the streets of South Korea.**

CIC District Offices were ordered to divide their cities into sections and assign trusted members of the NWYMA, other rightist youth groups or local police to patrol the areas. As these men became acquainted with the activities of almost every individual in their areas, they soon were able to spot strange persons. In this manner CIC maintained an informal check on travel within South Korea.*** CIC also had informants in all the many refugee organizations on the lookout for suspicious persons.

When the report of a suspected espionage agent was received by CIC, the usual investigative procedures were followed with the exception that Korean personnel were used for surveillance.****

Liaison With National Police Important

Liaison, especially in a strange country like Korea, forms an important part of any counterespionage system. CIC's most valuable contact was the

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* Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

** Interviews with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington, and Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #37, To: All District Offices, 5 January 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #29, To: All District Offices, 6 November 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 18-22, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Korean National Police, who had been given autonomy by Military Government with only advisory powers left to the Americans.* Early in the occupation when CIC investigative duties tended to awe all Koreans, good liaison with the police was almost a matter of course, and all cases of suspected espionage were turned over to CIC immediately. Later, the rising tide of nationalistic feeling brought a degree of opposition to all Americans and liaison with the police inevitably suffered somewhat as the months wore on. But throughout the occupation they remained generally cooperative.**

A major block to complete cooperation was the police awareness that CIC was constantly checking their activities in order to assure the command that justice was being done. Occasionally they tried to avoid CIC supervision and balked at the necessity of cooperation. In this respect, the police were unwittingly protected by the American Police Advisors, who, without a full understanding of the situation, assumed a protective attitude toward the Korean police.***

In view of the fact that CIC was investigating the police, it seemed perfectly reasonable to the Koreans that they should begin to investigate American activities in turn. On several occasions the Korean Police were discovered in the process of collecting positive intelligence on the American forces.**** One particular instance occurred in the Chunchon area where the local US Army unit reported that the Korean police were gathering all available information on American troops and installations. When questioned about this activity, the police claimed that there had been a serious misunderstanding of an order and that overzealous policemen had extended their duties too far.*****

At times, the police also became over enthusiastic in their treatment of leftist espionage agents. It was not rare for the police to turn over to CIC men who had confessed under physical duress. One such case came up in February 1948, when investigation revealed that the Yohyondong police had beaten confessions of espionage out of two men who had recently crossed the 38th Parallel.

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-31, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library)

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

*** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detactment, pp. 22-31, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #34, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 11 December 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

It was established that these two men were simply refugees seeking to live with relatives in Kaesong.* Although such strong arm tactics by Korean Police hindered CIC's counterespionage activities, the fine cooperation of the National Police in bringing innumerable espionage agents to the attention of CIC more than balanced their occasional excesses.

Although the information that units of the Constabulary, the South Korean military force, could supply CIC pertained to strictly local matters, liaison with this organization was a necessity. The Constabulary itself was a prime target for infiltration by espionage agents. Eventually, with the aid of CIC, some of the Communist elements in the organization were eliminated. However, the great number of leftists in the Constabulary and a conflict over jurisdiction between the police and the Constabulary hindered CIC attempts to establish a working liaison with both organizations at the time.** The Weekly Information Bulletin of 10 July 1947 lists seven instances where the police had deliberately given CIC false reports concerning subversion within the Constabulary. District offices were urged to trace all reports on the police and the Constabulary to their sources and to be on the alert for signs that the rivalry was becoming more intense. There was at this time some concern over the possibility of open conflict between the two organizations, and CIC had to tread a narrow path in trying to maintain important liaisons even while investigating the unhealthy rivalry of the two Korean agencies.***

The problems of liaison with local agencies were not restricted to CIC's counterespionage campaign. But it was in this effort and the detection of subversion that liaison paid off its dividends.

A significant weapon against the Communist espionage moves proved to be the relative economic abundance of South Korea. Well-indoctrinated agents from the north often did not get a decent meal until they arrived in South Korea. Some North Korean agents came south with every intention of spying, but after sizing up the situation, chose to use their funds to get a long-sought vacation or set themselves up in business.****

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #41, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 2 February 1948. (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-31, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #12, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 10 July 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 18-26, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

Some Offices Slow To Establish Networks

A major problem for the men who worked at Headquarters was the fact that, in several instances, District Offices were laggard in establishing effective counterespionage systems.* Some District Offices merely relied upon the information volunteered by their informants and failed to set up a counterespionage network using rightist youth groups, including the NWYMA.** At the other end of the scale, the District Office foremost in "catching spies" was the Kangnung District Office, with Capt. Donald H. Egan as officer-in-charge. An extremely efficient counterespionage network coupled with an advantageous location for trapping spies just south of the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea, made the Kangnung office a leader in counterespionage. The majority of the agents picked up by the Kangnung office were not professional spies, but were persons engaged in other businesses whose travels between North and South Korea enabled them to pick up information of value. Of course, such espionage was considered potentially as dangerous as that performed by professionals.***

The problems that CIC faced in its counterespionage operations were numerous and varied. Some of the principal difficulties were listed in the document, "Soviet-Communist Inspired Espionage: language barriers; the hostility of the populace toward the occupation; the confused political situation; insufficient confidential funds;**** freedom of movement across borders; the police-Constabulary rivalry; the shortage of American personnel; and the rapid turnover of Occupation personnel.*****

During 1947, the only year for which statistics are available, 339 espionage agents were reported by name to CIC. Of the 149 apprehended, thirty five were cleared, thirty were proved guilty, forty three were pending further development, and the investigation of forty one carried over to 1948.******

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* Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #29, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 6 November 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** Ibid., #43.

**** Procurement of confidential funds was the responsibility of the Special Squad and is discussed in Section Nine.

***** USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum", Subject: Soviet-Communist Inspired Espionage, 28 July 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

****** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 22-32, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

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To illustrate Communist espionage techniques in Korea and CIC's counter-espionage activities a number of specific cases are outlined in detail here. In passing, it should be noted that several of the cases presented in the Section on subversive activity also involved espionage as well.

* A detailed account of the work for CIC is not available.

** "Specific Case No. 8" , From USAFIK, CIC, SUBJECT: Soviet Espionage Agent, 29 February 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library). This document was prepared in Korea and sent to the CIC Center in compliance with a request for informal summaries of interesting and important cases.

Has Unusual Motive

A majority of espionage cases in Korea involved low-level agents sent into South Korea with vague and general assignments. The motives of these agents covered the full-range of human feeling and were frequently somewhat bizarre. motive for espionage was, at the least, unusual.

*Monthly Report of CIC Activities, To: Chief, CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., 1 June 1948, from the 971st CIC Detachment, /s/ Joseph Huckins, Lt Col, QMC, Commanding, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and USAFIK, CIC, Inchon District Office, "Memorandum For The Officer In Charge", 14 May 1948, Subject: _ Interrogation of, (Confidential), Log Number 00001523, CICCF Document number 1463584.

On 7 April 1948, a policeman, who had been befriended by CIC agents, picked up a border crosser named Kim Sung Ki. In Kim's possession was a document written by one Shizui Kato in Seoul to the North Korean People's Committee Information Section concerning the disposition of United States troops in South Korea. The policeman notified the Seoul District Office and Shizui Kato, an attractive Japanese housemaid in the home of a South Korean government official, was arrested on charges of espionage and turned over to CIC for questioning. The investigation was handled by S/A James G. Villyard.

When arrested, Shizui carried a letter with her addressed to a young man in Seoul with whom she had apparently consorted. In part the letter read: "Anyway, I shall never feel ill toward you.... I know too well that a man's temporal passion is always too strong to control. Nothing follows it. I am wandering around uncertainly, looking for the ideal husband and happiness. Even if I am a pitiable woman, I cannot throw away my beautiful ideas. Indeed real happiness in this world comes only when a man and a woman are one."

Shizui was not the least bit interested in telling CIC of her espionage activities, preferring to dwell on a sentimental account of her past lovers. She had been married to a poor Japanese who had died in the war, leaving her two children to support. Shizui, then living in North Korea, had to obtain North Korean citizenship before she could go to work. She had no interest in returning to Japan "to live in a defeated country." The North Korea People's Committee Information Section promised Shizui North Korean citizenship, a good job, and a good husband if she could first prove herself by spying in South Korea. This offer from the Communists was enough to set Shizui in motion. She crossed the 38th Parallel in March 1948 and soon obtained employment in the household of Chi Chul Keun, Head of the Fisheries Section of the Department of Commerce and Industry. Her general mission was to gather information on American Intelligence agencies.

She often met her contact man in Seoul's Pagoda Park. After the encounter, they would go to a nearby Chinese resturant where she passed on her information and received further instructions. The contact man was never located by CIC.

Shizui knew surprisingly little about her employers. Her instructions and methods of contact were not unusual, but her attitude toward her spying activities forced the interrogation to last two days. Shizui cried when she signed her confession, realizing that she was twenty-six and another attempt to get a husband had failed miserably.*

* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, /s/ Joseph Huckins, Lieutenant Colonel, QMC, dated 31 December 1948, (Secret), pp. 20-21, (Staff and Faculty Library).

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Kim Su Min And His Mission

Recognizing that knowledge of the enemy's prime intelligence targets is always a sound basis for establishing security measures, CIC agents in Korea made certain that captured enemy agents were interrogated at length concerning their specific missions.

Particularly valuable in this respect was an interrogation of Kim Su Min in January 1947. Kim was an eighteen year old agent whose mission had covered such an extensive range of intelligence targets that it was used as an example by the Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section of what the North Koreans considered important.

Kim Su Min confessed that he was to seek information on the following subjects:

(1) The organization of the United States Military Government.

(2) The people's opinion of the Military Government.

(3) Details concerning employees of the Military Government.

(4) Location of Military Government warehouses.

(5) Location of United States Army units.

(6) Information on military equipment, especially electric cars, rapid fire guns, and airplanes.

(7) Markings on United States Army trucks.

(8) Kinds and number of weapons being imported from the United States.

(9) Sea and land transportation.

(10) Whether food was being shipped from South Korea to foreign countries.

(11) System of food distribution and its result.

(12) List of manufactured products and conditions of the factories.

(13) Capacity for producing important products.

(14) Popularity of Communism in South Korea.

(15) Activities and working conditions of anti-Communists who escaped from North Korea.

(16) Articles printed in newspapers concerning the situation in North Korea.

(17) Addresses of high political officials.

(18) Whether or not there were any political parties for the organization and education of young men.

(19) Information concerning the children's education system.

(20) Whether Koreans coming south were smuggling any Soviet Army material such as arms, etc.

(21) Whether any passport was required for travel.

(22) Whether spies had been sent to North Korea; if so, their number and political affiliation.

(23) Information concerning any conditions that were different from those in North Korea.

Kim Su Min believed this information was to be collected for the time that the north and the south would fight, although he said this subject was never talked of by officials in North Korea. Rumors, Kim stated, were current that the presence of South Korean spies in the north prevented official mention of the coming war.

The Life And Travels Of A Communist Spy

Kim Su Min had six years of primary school education from 1937 to 1943. He attended a Communist political school in Hakoso, North Korea, in December 1945 and upon graduation joined the Democratic Young Men's Association. Soon he was recommended for espionage work and briefed in a group which contained eight other young men, all of whom received targets identical to Kim Su Min's. The young men were to explain that they had come from North Korea because conditions in the south were better; to try to get jobs; and to make friends with Military Government employees.

After crossing the 38th Parallel together, the group split up, with Kim heading for Seoul where he arrived on 18 August 1946. During his subsequent travels, Kim covered the length and breadth of South Korea. He had trouble finding employment, his longest job being in November 1946 when he worked about a month in a leather factory in Seoul.

It was during this time that Kim decided to forget his mission and not return to North Korea, at least until he had earned some money. During December 1946, he continued his vagrant ways until he was finally apprehended at the railroad station in Chonan on 15 January 1947 by a policeman who thought him suspicious looking and, upon searching him, found a travel map of South Korea.

The case of Kim Su Min has been selected primarily to illustrate the intelligence targets of the North Koreans that were included in the typical agent's mission. But the account of Kim's travels is highly significant since it demonstrates the ease with which people could and did circulate in South Korea. The lack of adequate travel control was a serious defect in the American counter-espionage system; in Kim's case, it ironically proved a boon. The freedom allowed in the South and the hope of economic success had encouraged this agent to forget his espionage task. Kim had apparently made up his mind to stay.*

Comes By Sea

The Communists in dispatching agents to South Korea were little concerned with the mode of transportation their operatives selected. What did matter was that the agents arrived safely. Most of the agents crossed the 38th Parallel on foot, a few came by sea.

A typical case of a sea-faring agent began on 12 April 1947 when a confidential informant of the Mokpo Sub-office brought information that a ship recently arrived from Dairen, Manchuria, was hiding in a cove along the coast near Mokpo. CIC discovered the ship exactly where it was reported, took it to Mokpo harbor and arrested the six crew members. Investigation revealed that of these six only one man, , was actually engaged in espionage activities. The remaining members of the crew were Chinese who spoke little if any Korean. gave CIC a list of seven other Koreans, who like himself, were agents working directly for the Soviet NKVD.

It is interesting to note that several months later, on 20 October 1947, CIC agents from the Mokpo Sub-office arrested two espionage agents who had

*"Memorandum For The Officer In Charge," From USAFIK, CIC, 7 February 1947, Taejon District Office, Subject: Kim Su Min, 540 Wal Kun Tae Ri, Hakoso Myun, Puk Chung Gun, Ham Kyung Namdo, (Confidential), file number 4-130, and "Memorandum" from USAFIK, CIC, 28 July 1947, Subject: Soviet Communist Inspired Espionage, (Secret), file number 14-00, (both documents from Staff and Faculty Library.)

recently been smuggled in aboard a boat from Manchuria. These two men were suspected of working for the Soviet Naval Intelligence Office.*

In Section 5 (Subversive Activity in Korea) there is a discussion of illegal Communist trading activities. The smuggling in of espionage agents by sea was closely linked with the trading companies in North Korea and their leftist contacts in the American zone.

South Korean Communists Involved In Espionage

Up to this point the specific cases outlined have involved espionage agents from North Korea. Espionage was also conducted on a large scale by the various Communist organizations in South Korea, whose work eventually was relayed to Soviet agencies in the north. CIC had strong reason to believe that the major contacts between the Soviets in the north and the Communist organizations of the south were the Russian Consulate and the Russian Orthodox Church both located in Seoul, and the South Korean companies involved in trade with North Korea.

A major case of espionage conducted by South Korean Communists began to unravel in August 1946 when four Koreans, including two lieutenants of the South Korean Constabulary, were apprehended as they attempted to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea with charts containing much information on the Constabulary in South Korea. When subsequent investigation disclosed the name of Kim Sei Young, head of the political affairs section of the People's Party, CIC raided this individual's house ostensibly searching for concealed weapons. The raid uncovered five pistols, but more important were the numerous documents picked up. Kim had gathered lengthy but not too reliable information on United States Army installations and units; and detailed information on the Constabulary and Coast Guard, Military Government and the police.

The home of Lee Kang Kook, a member of the general standing committee of the Communist Party, was also raided on a similar pretext. This raid uncovered a map of harbor and naval installations in South Korea, reportedly prepared by an official of the Korean Coast Guard. This finding led, in turn, to a raid on the Communist party headquarters where more evidence of espionage work was found. CIC had been unable to apprehend either Kim Sei Young or Lee Kang Kook during the raids, but on 8 September 1946 warrants were published for their arrest as well as the arrest of Pak Heun Young, the head of the South Korean Communists. All indications were that this espionage ring

* "Memorandum" from USAFIK, CIC, Subject: South Korea, Actual and Suspected Espionage Agents in, 27 March 1948, File number 14-00-L-1, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

was reporting to Kim Il Sung, the Soviet's puppet ruler of the North Korea People's Government.

Evidence that South Korea Communists had heavily infiltrated the Constabulary quickly became "old hat" to CIC. Perhaps the most positive indication was obtained in Pusan on 8 September 1946, when captured documents revealed that the Communist Party had a fairly complete list of Constabulary members, many of whom were indicated as Communist party members.

In May 1947 seven members of the 3rd Regiment of the Constabulary were convicted for divulging classified information to an unauthorized source and also on the charge of forming a secret Communist cell within their regiment.* Cases of this sort were numerous.

Some Frustrating Experiences

The romance with which story-tellers surround espionage is lacking in the vast majority of actual cases. In the specific cases already outlined here the drudgery of interrogating often reluctant individuals tended to dull the interesting story that the suspects eventually got around to telling. But not every lead pointed to an espionage agent; not all people interrogated were spies; sufficient proof was often lacking to convict persons suspected of spying; and enemy agents often managed to escape before CIC could apprehend them. A few of these frustrating experiences appear below.

The MP's of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, on 16 October 1947, arrested Pak Ro Sun and Shin Hyun Jung of Onyang when they uncovered some classified documents during a routine search for stolen American equipment. The documents apparently had been taken from a trash pile in the vicinity of the American billets. Investigation revealed no evidence of intentional espionage on the part of the two Koreans.

CIC also spent considerable time investigating Lee Yung Chun who had been arrested on 7 June 1947 for using a forged pass. While suspicious of anyone in possession of a forged pass, CIC could prove nothing in regard to espionage activity in this instance.

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* "Memorandum" from USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Soviet Communist Inspired Espionage, 28 July 1947, File number 14-00, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.) This study was prepared by the Special Squad, 971st CIC Detachment.

Koreans were naturally curious people and questions by bonafide espionage agents were not readily discernible from friendly questions about troop disposition.

Kang Mong Kwi of Yosu was arrested on 6 August 1947 for asking a guard of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, how many guards there were on the post. CIC investigation failed to disprove Kang Mong Kwi's statement that he was conversing with the guard to improve his English.

In the same vein, on 21 August 1947, Chung Yung Chai was apprehended as he was taking pictures of road construction equipment belonging to the 2d Engineer Construction Battalion. There was nothing to contradict his story that he was taking a picture of a rock-crusher to test a new camera.

In a more humorous light, on 4 December 1947, Yoon Chong Tam, an employee of the mess hall at Kimpo Air Base, was arrested by police for singing the "Red Flag Song" while at work. Interrogation brought to light the fact that Yoon Chong Tam was singing the "Red Flag Song" because he liked the tune, but had no real sympathies with the words that had been put to the melody.*

CIC files became full of complaints concerning people who could not be located or were known to have escaped. Many complaints turned out to have no foundation other than a personal grudge. While CIC apprehended many espionage agents in Korea, there remained the unanswerable questions: "Who got away with how much?" and "Of what value was it?" Any conclusions here would be mere conjecture.

* "Memorandum" from USAFIK, CIC, 27 March 1948, Subject: South Korea Actual or suspected Espionage Agents in, File number 14-00-L-1, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

Section 4

SABOTAGE IN KOREA

During the Korean occupation, CIC never had to contend with an active and intensive sabotage campaign, established with long range objectives. The sabotage which occurred was on a local level and little more than an accompaniment to leftist uprisings, demonstrations, and protests. As such, it could be considered merely one phase of the Communists' subversive activity. The overall history of the Korean occupation clearly shows that outbreaks of subversion and sabotage usually occurred at about the same times and in similar proportions.

In some cases, sabotage attempts seemed designed to show strength and gain support rather than to cause great destruction. This modified sabotage effort had strange consequences. In one case, a railroad track was no sooner damaged than the saboteurs reported the deed to the authorities. The actual damage had been a secondary consideration.*

The One Major Sabotage Plan

Insufficient planning and a shortage of sabotage materials made Communist thoughts of serious destruction impractical. No large scale schemes progressed beyond the theoretical stage, and the one major plan for organized sabotage uncovered by CIC was never put in operation. This program of organized sabotage was to have been one of the activities of the People's Liberation Army, an underground group that CIC squelched before it had taken shape.

According to the plans, orders for sabotage would have been initiated at the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army. The aim was to inflict damage at different times on certain sensitive areas greatly removed from one another, so that the sabotage acts would not seem to be the work of a closely-knit group. Immediately after completing his mission of destruction, each saboteur was to make his escape to North Korea along previously mapped routes. When all the saboteurs had completed an assignment, the first would have then returned and the cycle would be completed. Such a procedure would have made it difficult for any investigating agency to tie all the acts together and lay suspicion on the army.**

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p.p32-38, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** USAFIK, CIC, "The People's Liberation Army", Specific Case #6, 28 February 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

[redacted]

The People's Liberation Army was uncovered by CIC long before they could begin such operations. CIC was never able to detect any organization using plans similar to these proposed waves of sabotage.

Sabotage of Communications Most Successful

The major targets for sabotage by the Communists were communications, bridges, power, rail lines, locomotives and roads. Sabotage of industry, usually a prime consideration, was not essential to the Communist cause. Since most of the power plants were located in North Korea, the Communists could easily put a damper on South Korean industry without resorting to explosives.*

On the whole, sabotage of communications proved to be the most successful of the Communists' efforts. Numerous telephone and telegraph lines were cut or poles supporting these wires were sawed down. CIC experienced considerable difficulty with investigations of sabotage of telephone lines. Korean people, without any intent to sabotage, frequently stole the poles, a ready source of firewood, and lengths of wire, which they could use as a substitute for rope. When a wire was cut, sabotage was a safe conclusion; but when considerable yardage was cut away, there was always the possibility of theft.**

Sabotage of bridges was confined to small structures that were located in rural areas and was accomplished by sawing supporting timbers or setting fire to the bridge. The action was usually perpetrated by mobs.

In a few instances, roads were sabotaged by digging ditches or large holes or by placing obstructions over them, but most such attempts were ineffective.

In an effort to disrupt power, arson attempts, mostly unsuccessful, were made at transformer stations. Occasionally sabotage of switches caused power to go off for a few hours.

Most railroad sabotage was accomplished by loosening spikes and disjoining rails. In one instance, during the Yosu Rebellion in late 1948, a train was derailed by this method.*** On 1 March 1947, a train was derailed

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* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp 37-40, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Interview with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), pp 37-40, (Staff and Faculty Library).

[redacted]

in Okku Gun when it struck a concrete block that had been placed on the track.*

In February 1947, a railroad worker found a rock wedged in a signal switchbox near Taegu, in such a position that the switch would neither open nor close, a malfunction which caused a clear green signal to flash to all trains on the track. Fortunately the switchman removed the obstruction before any damage resulted. The CIC agent who investigated the case reported that this could only have been the work of an experienced saboteur who was familiar with railroad signals. On 27 July 1947, a railroad switch in Inchon was surreptitiously opened and a train crossing the unaligned tracks was wrecked. The saboteur was never apprehended.**

In a pre-election disturbance on 8 May 1948, a band of North Korean-directed Communists completely destroyed two locomotives by deliberately driving them together in the Taejon Railroad Yard.*** Other attempts to sabotage locomotives were generally amateurish and highly ineffective. In most cases, small, essential parts were removed, but the parts could easily be replaced and the locomotives quickly put back in operation. Sabotage methods included the mixing of foreign matter with the oil used in the locomotives to cause engine wear and stoppage.****

CIC Investigates Faulty Workmanship

Faulty construction and poor operation and maintenance by Korean employees of Military Government may have been in some cases deliberate sabotage. An interview with Lt. Col. Hans J. Waller, Director of Post Engineers, USAMGIK, on 28 December 1946, disclosed that long-range, minor acts of sabotage were being committed through faulty boiler installation, and that boilermen probably were being paid for causing breakdowns. He also thought that contractors were being bribed by subversives to construct weak and dangerous buildings for the U. S. Army. No proof of sabotage existed, but there were many instances of barracks fires that resulted from imperfect

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* Memorandum from USAFIK, CIC, 22 September 1947, Subject: Sabotage Since 1945, File number 1-00, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library).

** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp 37-40, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

*** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of CIC Activities for May 1948, dated 1 June 1948, To: Chief CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore 19, Md., WDAGO Form 395, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp 37-40, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

acceptance of the presence of these subversive groups has added greatly to the work of this office. Add to this the fact that at any time, so as to further their own ends, groups not usually considered subversive have employed a bit of sabotage (of the occupation mission) in order to obtain some desired effect, you will account for the added burden on this office. *"

Like everything else in Korea, sabotage had at all times an important political aspect. The Political Section's reports brought into focus areas of future riots and terrorism; acts that were likely to be accompanied by attempts at sabotage. Often Korean informants were able to brief CIC on possible problem areas.

Gasoline and Cigarettes Don't Mix

CIC investigated any disaster which had the slightest appearance of being the work of saboteurs. Of all the disasters that CIC investigated, only about twenty per cent were clearly cases of sabotage, but the pseudo-sabotage incidents required as thorough consideration as the small percentage that actually were premeditated sabotage. **

One case where a CIC investigation led agents to a "reasons other than sabotage" conclusion occurred in September 1947 in Pusan. In the search for the causes of an explosion and burning of a gasoline lugger in Pusan harbor, agents of the Pusan District Office learned that, while fuel drums from the boat were being unloaded, the captain of the ship had tossed a cigarette overboard. Some of the drums had been leaking gasoline, and the fumes were suddenly ignited by the cigarette, causing the explosion. *** At least this case reached a conclusion. Many others were inconclusive and frustrating, since sabotage often could neither be proved or disproved.

Other cases reached conclusions that were discouraging to the investigating agents. In October 1947 at the Post Engineers on Camp Sobinggo in Seoul, a truck was put out of commission when someone slipped sugar into the gas tank, an occurance which could hardly be accidental. This investigation turned up the fact that the sabotage was the work of a neighboring outfit with considerable dislike for the engineers. ****

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), p. 37 (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #24, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 2 October 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library).

**** Ibid., #25.

CIC Checks Production Slowdowns

All sabotage investigations, however, did not involve physical disasters. Major strikes were always investigated as symptoms of "psychological sabotage." When production rates in an industry dropped to a great extent, CIC was often called in to investigate the possibility of deliberate slowdowns by the workers. One particular case was initiated as a result of a personal request from the American advisor of the Korean Electric Power Company who wanted to know the reasons why the Yongwol-Machari coal mine was suddenly not producing enough coal to operate the electric power plant near the mine.

S/A Harold Hummel, the 971st's traveling trouble shooter, was sent to investigate on 27 February 1948. His inquiries were not completed until early April. There were numerous reasons for the slowdown, and interference by subversive elements was only one cause. Hummel found dissension between the mine superintendant and his assistant, low wages and other typical worker complaints, lack of equipment, interference from the National Police, and either a lack of supervision or interest on the part of the American advisors to be equally important causes for the production lag.*

The Koreans, with years of experience in sabotaging the Japanese, were able to conduct a considerable number of minor sabotage efforts which apparently were isolated rather than the work of a special organization. CIC had to remain alert to keep acts of saboteurs and vandals at a minimum. At the same time, the 971st main concern was to prevent any organized sabotage program from gaining solid footing in South Korea. The four year record of CIC operations in Korea indicates that this aim was realized.

* USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Bulletin #1, 5 May 1948, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

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Section 5

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN KOREA

Investigation of subversive activity in Korea was primarily the responsibility of the Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous (ES&M) Section. The domain of this section spread over the wide range of "acts inimical to the Command or to American aims in Korea." Only one major category of investigations for subversive activity was not completely within the jurisdiction of the ES&M Section; some cases that involved US Military and civilian personnel suspected of subversion were handled by the Security Section.

The 971st's investigations of subversive activity centered around attempts to discover the Communist plans and operations designed to lead eventually to Red domination of all Korea. CIC was particularly interested in uncovering the South Korean Communists' connection to the "World revolution."

South Korean Reds Linked to Cominform

Investigation of the Cominform and the overall Communist design for Asia was initiated as a result of reports from the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan. Attempts were made to connect Communist activities in Korea with the party's operations in all Asia.

During May 1947 a meeting of the top Communist party members of the various races and small nations of Eastern Asia was held in Harbin, Manchuria. South Korean representatives were present at this parley and the 971st CIC Detachment spent considerable time looking into the results. The following quote from a CIC report, written a year later in May 1948, serves to point up Korean Communist connections with Moscow: "Korean Communists have welcomed the formation of the Asiatic Cominform and are impressed by its decentralization of power. Representatives of the South Korean Labor Party and the North Korean Labor Party attended the Cominform meeting in Harbin. Several members of the Korean Communist party have been sent to Moscow for liaison duty. A liaison section has been established between North Korea and South Korea by Pak Heun Young.* As a result of the Harbin meeting, the best tactics to be used to further the influence of the Communist Party of the Far East were formulated. It was also decided to enlarge and reinforce the Communist intelligence service throughout the world. Closer coordination between the Communist Parties of

* Pak Heun Young was at this time in exile in North Korea, having escaped in 1946 to avoid arrest by CIC.

the Far East with regard to collection of reports and the exchange of viewpoints has been established. The SKLP has established an intelligence service in South Korea as a result of the Harbin Conference."*

Although tangible evidence of the Korean Communist Party's participation in the Cominform was notably scarce, CIC was able to piece together a Cominform policy for Korea that seemed to possess the following six components:

(1) In view of the insufficiency of training and discipline of Korean Communists, retraining and stricter discipline is called for.

(2) In order to dissuade the Korean people from the anti-Soviet feelings instilled under the education system of the Japanese, an extensive education program will be launched.

(3) With a view to replacing revolutionary intellectuals, who constitute the core of the Korean Communist Party with class-conscious laborers and farmers, every effort will be made to imbue the working class with class-consciousness.

(4) The Korean Communists will be indoctrinated with the Marx-Lenin teachings in order to discourage the tendency toward factional strife.

(5) In order to promote mutual defense, military alliances between Korea and other Communist dominated countries in the Orient will be encouraged.

(6) A Communist economic bloc will be established by fostering closer economic cooperation among the Communist dominated countries of the Cominform.**

There were indications by 1948 that some of the Korean Communists had come to feel that Korean independence should precede world revolution. These men tended to disapprove of the Cominform, feeling that it interfered too strongly with domestic affairs. This minority also apparently looked with fear on the eventuality of Korea becoming a Russian republic should the Cominform be given too much control over KCP operations.***

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* Hqs, 971st CIC Detachment, Title: The Cominform and the Korean Communist Party, File no. 4-214, 9 May 48, (Secret), /s/Orlando Molina, G2 files.

** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), pp. 24 & 25, (Staff & Faculty Library)

*** Ibid., pp. 24 & 25.

CIC Uncovers "Master Plan"

The Communist master plan called for ultimate domination of all Korea. Early in the occupation, in one of their most important discoveries of the whole occupation, * CIC acquired the sketchy outlines of this master plan. The source considered as "reliable," was a Korean undercover operator in a leftist organization with connections that included the top Red leaders. CIC, in the report dated 29 June 1946, evaluated the information as "possibly true."

In North Korea within a period of two and not more than three years, a minimum of 500,000 Koreans were to be given thorough military training. This was to be done not only in the various "armies," but also in police organizations. As many as possible of these trainees were to be infiltrated into various government agencies and the National Police in South Korea. The Communists in South Korea were to build up membership and achieve a tight organization. Then small groups planned to publicly dissociate themselves from the party and go underground. The general Korean public and the Americans were to learn of various Communist party factions. The party was to seem to be losing strength, thus making the Americans willing to compromise and leave South Korea confident that all was well. Once the Americans had left, the Reds were to revolt and soon take over the government. **

This master plan was frequently referred to by the ES&M Section during the occupation and it is the feeling of William J. McTigue, chief of the section, that it was fully carried out as intended. *** If true, the faction of the KCP that stood against the Comintern was "smoke" to deceive the Americans.

Whatever the actual inner workings of the Communist party may have been, the war that eventually came to Korea was not a surprise to the CIC agents who had been stationed there. Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall stated that a conservative estimate among the agents in Korea during the occupation was that six months after the Americans left, the north would invade the south. All during the occupation there were border skirmishes of a minor nature. Reports that the Reds were

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* This is the opinion of William J. McTigue expressed in an interview on 23 November 1954, Washington.

** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Joint Soviet-Communist Master Plan for Korea, 29 June 1946, file no. 4-44-503, (Secret), G2 files, and USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum for the Officer In Charge," Subject: Activities of the Communists in South Korea, 22 July 1946, File No. 4-44, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library.

*** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

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going to attack were frequent. U. S. intelligence had all the information on the North Korean army except their planned date of attack which the Communists themselves did not know. This information went back to the United States in periodic reports from General MacArthur's G2.*

CIC Investigates Activities of Russian and Foreign Nationals

Indications were so strong that the Soviet Consulate in Seoul was a contact point between the Russians and the South Korean Reds that the agents of the Seoul District Office, under case control of the ES&M Section, conducted a full time surveillance of the Russian Consulate. This surveillance, headed by First Lieutenant William Walter, kept a "tail" on the Russian officers serving at the Consulate and members of the Soviet delegation to the US-USSR Joint Commission.**

One tangible result of Surveillance of the Russian Consulate (SRC) was the removal of a Soviet liaison officer, Major Forma Fillipovich Korneshev, in July 1947 because of his persistent attempts to gain classified information. Korneshev was caught taking photographs of the 1st Constabulary Training area, which led to his recall from Seoul.***

On another occasion SRC revealed that Anatole Ivanovich Shobshin, a member of the Soviet Delegation of the US-USSR Joint Commission and allegedly the Soviet "expert" on Korea, was a liaison man between the Political Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces in North Korea and the leaders of the South Korea Labor Party, The Democratic People's Front and the Laboring People's Party, all Communist front organizations. This expose resulted in the sudden departure of Shobshin for North Korea.****

Another prime suspect was Sergei Zudin, the caretaker of the Consulate compound, suspected of work similar to Shobshin's.*****

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* Interview with Capt Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library, p. 39.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Foreign Nationals in Korea, 11 October 1948, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library, p. 39.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Foreign Nationals in Korea, 11 October 1948, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

A Russian Colonel Visits CIC Headquarters

One of the more unusual incidents of the occupation occurred in connection with SRC investigations. On 21 September 1947, the surveillance team picked up a USSR jeep leaving the Consulate with three occupants, a Russian soldier and two Koreans. At several points during their journey, the jeep stopped and the Russian driver lifted the hood of the vehicle, apparently to make repairs. Meanwhile his two Korean friends got out and wandered into the woods where they made contact with Koreans who had been loitering in the area. Each time they concluded their business quickly, rejoined the Russian, and continued the journey. When the two Koreans left the jeep after its return to town, the CIC agents apprehended them and took them to Headquarters. The two Koreans, Pak Gerasimovich and Yan Ke Hen, claimed to be interpreters for the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission, but a Russian-speaking Korean in the employ of CIC claimed that Pak was actually a Captain in the Russian Army. After the two had been interrogated, they were taken to the Soviet Consulate to verify their claim of being interpreters. Immediate attempts were made to arrest the CIC agents, but cooler heads prevailed and the Russian Colonel who had ordered the arrest decided to take the matter up at the "police station" where he insisted that his men had been "brutally beaten." The agents sped back to Headquarters, arriving about a minute and a half ahead of the Russian Colonel. Quickly the Headquarters was darkened. Lieutenant Walter stationed himself by the door, loaded to the teeth with a variety of weapons. Several other agents stood behind a one-way glass where they could see the impending scene but not be seen themselves.

The Russian Colonel was told that he could not enter the building; after a lengthy argument, he gave up his attempt to see the inside of CIC Headquarters. The Colonel warned that he would tell his General who would be sure to see that justice was done.

The Russians, flushed with the success that they had previously experienced in entering American military installations, had apparently seen an excellent opportunity to gain access to the CIC building by using verbal intimidation.*

Orthodox Church Also Under Surveillance

Concurrent with SRC CIC investigated the activities of the small Russian colony which lived near the Russian Orthodox Church and the Consulate building

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* USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum for the Officer In Charge", Subject: Incident Involving CIC-K and USSR Personnel, 21 September 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library and CWO John R. Dilworth, interview, 17 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

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in Seoul. Nominal head of the colony was Archimandrite Policarp (Kondrativitch Georgi Primax), who was not actually an ordained priest and who never possessed a united congregation. Policarp, however, was dominated by his mother, Evfimia Primax, and a well-educated high-born woman named Madame Anna Pavlovna Yakovlov. The latter was especially instrumental in keeping him installed in his position in spite of much opposition from church members. This colony was first brought to the serious attention of CIC during an investigation of the disaffection of an American soldier who had close contacts among the Russians.* It developed that the church colony was probably serving as a contact and coordinator of activities for Communists in the south and their masters in Pyongyang and Moscow.**

Policarp was eventually arrested by South Korean authorities in 1948,*** and Madame Yakovlov was declared "persona non grata" by Seoul authorities in October 1949 and forced to leave for North Korea.****

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* USAFIK, CIC, "Memorandum for the Officer In Charge," 11 October 1947, Subject: (SRC) Russian Personalities Affiliated, and Associated With Soviets in Seoul, Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

*** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** "Cross Reference Sheet", Main Subject: Clipping From the N.Y. Times "Persona Non Grata to Government in Seoul", 11 October 1947, (Unclassified), from CRF X8630618 (Helen Myers).

***** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

****** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Foreign Nationals in Korea, 11 October 1948, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

Counterfeiting Case Hurts Communists

The first major indication of the truly vicious nature of the Communists in Korea came in May 1946 when police and CIC agents broke the Chung Pan Sa counterfeiting case.* For financing party activities, the Communists had resorted to counterfeiting Bank of Chosen notes. The currency was printed in the building that housed the Communist headquarters and on plates from a Communist controlled shop, the Chosen Chung Pan Sa. Investigation by CIC implicated Lee Kwan Sool, head of the Finance Department of the Communist Party, and Kwan Oh Jik, editor of a Communist newspaper.** CIC investigation of the counterfeiting case did not cover its purely illegal aspects. CIC's interest stemmed from the fact that the operation was financing Communist subversion.

The Communist Party received much adverse publicity when the results of the case were made known. They lost a sizable number of valuable sympathizers, and found themselves not trusted by MG from that time on.*** In the face of these harmful effects, the Communist denial of guilt could be expected to be strong. One document claimed that the counterfeit case had been "composed... for the purpose of having the Communist Party lose its prestige," and the subsequent trial was labeled "black and unfair."**** The Communists were right about one thing. The exposure of the case did result in a considerable loss of public prestige.

Continued investigation indicated that the South Korean Communists had given up their counterfeiting as a result of the adverse publicity. A logical conclusion, especially since new counterfeit currency continued to appear on occasion, was that the Communists had transferred their operations to North Korea with the bills being shipped into South Korea.*****

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* Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Monthly Information Report, 9 July 1946, To: Commanding Officer, Army Service Forces, Director of Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C., (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library, /s/ Jack B. Reed, Major, CAC, Commanding.

*** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, Subject: Representative Communist Documents, 21 September 1946, File No. 4-44, p. 16, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

***** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

This case which pointed up the unscrupulous nature of Communists operations in South Korea led to the verbal request of the G2, USAFIK, on 22 July 1946, for a complete chronological listing of all illegal and destructive activities of the Communist Party in South Korea since the beginning of the occupation.* In bringing to the attention of everyone the fact that the Reds would not stop at illegal acts to further their ends, the exposure of the counterfeit activities served as a catalyst in formulating a powerful case against the Communist party.

Currency Smuggled Into South Korea

While counterfeiting was basically a problem of the early years of the occupation, CIC, in the later years, found itself concerned with cases involving smuggling of currency. When the government in North Korea instituted a currency conversion, the Communist party acquired a wealth of Bank of Chosen notes, no longer legal tender in the north, but still perfectly acceptable in South Korea. The North Koreans hoped to finance some of their operations in the south with this currency and consequently began a large scale smuggling operation.**

The following case will serve as an example of CIC findings concerning currency smuggling. On 6 February 1948, investigation was initiated by the Songdo District Office upon information received by the Chunchon city police that North Korean leftists were attempting to smuggle 1,000,000 yen to Chunchon from North Korea. The Chunchon city police had recovered the money and five men involved in the case were being held for further investigation.

CIC interrogations of the five men revealed that the money was sent from North Korea by a former member of the Democratic Peoples' Front who had left South Korea two jumps ahead of an arrest order in March 1946. The money was smuggled across the border in a knapsack by Kim Jung Lim, former chief of the Propaganda Section of the Farmers' Association, who had evacuated to North Korea in August 1947 when CIC and local police were rounding up trouble makers to forestall riots during the annual independence celebration.

The money brought by Kim was transferred to an ox cart loaded with wood and delivered to the Democratic Peoples' Front representative in Chunchon.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Activities of the Communists in South Korea, 22 July 1946, File No. 4-44, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library.

** Monthly Report of CIC Activities, 971st CIC Detachment, February 1948, To: Chief CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Md, WD-AGO Form 395, /s/ Theodore J. Roberts, Maj, MI, Commanding, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library and Interview with Maj Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and Weekly Information Bulletin #36, 29 December 1947 of 971st CIC Detachment (Staff and Faculty Library)

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Part of the money was to be used to get merchandise in the south which could not be purchased in the north and the rest was earmarked for propaganda purposes in South Korea.*

Currency outdated in the north but legal tender in South Korea was also smuggled through the major ports. CIC's breaking up of one such attempt in Kunsan netted over 1,500,000 yen.**

The smuggling of money became one of CIC's biggest problems in Korea. Money from North Korea in the hands of Communists in South Korea was used to further espionage, subversion, propaganda, and other disturbances inimical to the occupation. Much CIC activity was directed toward eliminating the source of funds of the leftists in the south. Obviously if their funds could be cut off, the leftists would face a serious handicap in their operations.

Dangers of Trade with Communist Zones Exposed

Early in 1947, as a result of leads obtained in several espionage cases, CIC began to investigate for subversion the South Korean companies engaged in trade with North Korea and Communist North China. Informants were quickly placed in the suspect companies and in the crews of ships sailing between North and South Korea. A force of Korean detectives was hired to gather information on the executives of these companies and their business contacts. These Korean informants and investigators compiled an astonishing volume of evidence to prove the initial suspicions.***

The North East Enterprise Company and the North Korean Enterprise Company were the major firms exposed as subversive organizations by this investigation. These two organizations were found to be supplying capital for both the North Korea Labor Party and the South Korea Labor Party, smuggling goods from South Korea for the North Korea Labor Party, and supplying North Korea with information on South Korea.

Through cooperation with the Army Criminal Investigation Division, The Korean Coast Guard and the USAMGIK Bureau of Customs, it was possible

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* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, " Subject: Chunchon, NK Leftists Attempt to Smuggle 1,000,000 yen Through, Songdo Do, Chunchon Sub-Office, 12 February 1948, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library

** Interview with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case No. 7, 29 February 1948, Subject: Trade Between South Korea and Communist North Korea and North China, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

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to prosecute and jail many of the executives and employees of these organizations.*

MG Encourages Trade with North Korea

Military Government encouraged trade for South Korea with North Korea and North China as a means of supplementing the economy of the American zone. Any company engaging in trade with these areas was merely required to submit applications for a license with Military Government and agree to abide by regulations governing controlled commodities and customs tax and other miscellaneous regulations.

Trading companies were strictly private concerns in the south, but in the area north of the 38th Parallel, harsh government control was exercised over all commercial activity. With such a grip on commercial ventures, the northern government set about to trade with the south. The next step was to set up in the south trading companies which could be directed by the Communist-dominated political groups of South Korea, giving the North Korean government indirect control. Rightist businessmen were frozen out and those politically noncommittal were never able to trade to any considerable degree.

In most cases the leftist businessmen in South Korea trading with the north tried to appear uninterested in politics and were especially careful not to connect themselves publicly with any leftist movement. Investigation was further made difficult by the fact that branch offices of the companies in South Korea used different names in every province.

Communists Gain On Both Sides Of The Parallel

The Communist-controlled trading companies in the south marketed in South Korea goods they had purchased from the North Korean Communists. The profits from these sales in South Korea were channelled into the coffers of the South Korea Labor Party. A report dated 9 September 1947 stated that, of the twenty-five million yen needed to run the South Korean Labor Party for one month, ten million yen came from trade profits.

The value of these trading activities to the North Korean Communists may be seen from a report dated 29 August 1947 which stated that up to that time

* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum, Subject: Trade Between South Korea and Communist Dominated States, 4 December 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

approximately thirty million Bank of Chosen notes had been delivered to North Korea in payment for goods sent south since November 1946.

The growth of Communism in Korea was substantially aided and abetted by the financial outcome of these trade agreements. However, monetary gains were only one aspect of the trade set-up. Within some companies espionage agents were detected and apprehended and entire companies were, in other instances, found to be engaged in intelligence collection.

In the section on espionage, the ease of entry by sea into South Korea was noted. In a report dated 30 July 1947, a captured espionage agent stated that on every boat coming into South Korea there was at least one espionage agent. In addition, he admitted that individual sailors on these vessels made it their business to collect intelligence information. Many merchants and sailors served as contact men and couriers in addition to their espionage activities.

Smuggling of embargoed products, narcotics running, and trafficking of Korean and foreign nationals were among the other illegal activities engaged in by the North Korean trading companies. CIC was not concerned with whether these operations were legal or illegal in themselves. If these activities aided the growth of Communism, they were considered subversive, and hence within the jurisdiction of CIC.

Among the goods that CIC discovered had been shipped to North Korea against customs regulations were railroad equipment, military shoes, gasoline, light motor oil, tires, coke, arms and flour. A report dated 6 October 1947 revealed that a leftist trading company in Cheju Do had shipped seventy million yen worth of fuel to North China. Another representative instance appeared in a report dated 19 September 1947 which stated that one thousand pairs of military shoes manufactured in Seoul were on their way to North Korea for use by the Constabulary there.*

From Humble Beginnings....

One of the most revealing of the trading company investigations began 1 December 1947 with an informant's tip that Ko Ryo Enterprise Company in Seoul was smuggling embargoed goods to North Korea. A check of the company's

* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum, Subject: Trade Between South Korea and Communist Dominated States, 4 December 1947; (Secret); Staff & Faculty Library and 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 65-68, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library.

accounts and transactions and a discreet surveillance of its officials led to the apprehension for interrogation of the firm's major officials.*

In December 1945, an apparently legitimate organization, the Seoul Free Market, was set up by Lee Yong Sam and Pak Kil Yong. In April 1946, Lim Joong Kil bought storage space in the Seoul Free Market warehouse for goods from North Korea. Shortly afterward, Lim invested rather heavily in the Seoul Free Market.

With Lim's promise that it would be possible to bring down more goods from North Korea, a sister organization to the Seoul Free Market, The Ko Ryo Enterprise Company, was set up to deal with North Korean goods. Lim returned from one of his periodic journeys north with the necessary capital for this new company. Around August 1946, Lim brought Kwun Young Kyu in to meet his two partners. Kwan was introduced as a prominent merchant from Hamhung, North Korea, with innumerable business contacts. Lim spoke at length of the possibility of bringing down to South Korea approximately five million yen worth of produce from North Korea.

Kwan Young Kyu soon became a financial backer of the Ko Ryo Enterprise Company with the responsibility of bringing goods to and from North Korea. Lim took on the responsibility of disposing of the goods once they got to South Korea. The two original partners were to receive a five percent commission merely for arranging to ship the goods after their arrival in South Korea. Kwan Young Kyu was president of this new organization and Lim Joong Kil served as manager.

So with the more or less respected name of the Seoul Free Market behind it, the Ko Ryo Enterprise Company began trading operations with the North East Enterprise Company. Lim, during a later CIC interrogation, admitted that both the Seoul Free Market and the Ko Ryo Enterprise Company were in fact subsidiaries of the North East Enterprise Company.

Ninety percent of all proceeds from sales of goods in South Korea were remitted to the North East Enterprise Company and undoubtedly channelled into Communist coffers from there. During the operations, some sixty million yen in Bank of Chosen currency were smuggled to the North East offices in Hungman, North Korea. The money had been concealed in rice bags and taken on board ships outbound from South Korean ports with cargos of both legal and illegal

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* USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case No. 7, 29 February 1948, Subject: Trade Between South Korea and Communist North Korea and China, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library.

merchandise. One hundred drums of American diesel oil, among other contraband, were admittedly smuggled to North Korea by the Ko Ryo Enterprise Company. *

Much evidence was uncovered to indicate that the Ko Ryo officials had been transporting propaganda literature and orders for subversive activity into South Korea for the Communists, and in turn collecting information of intelligence value for the Reds in the north. Proof that the firm was doing liaison work for the Communists was inconclusive, however, and the Ko Ryo Enterprise Company officials were tried on a charge of illegal currency exportation. **

CIC Breaks Up A Communist Underground Army

Generally, the leftist parties of the South operated in the open, exposing the identity of their hierarchy, although frequently keeping certain of their members covert. However, CIC did find several organizations of considerable size whose entire operations were clandestine.

The discovery of this most extensive of the South Korean underground groups, The People's Liberation Army, was made by CIC on 5 November 1947 after the daring assassination of a detective of the Pusan City Police on the main street of Pusan in broad daylight. Fired on by one of his four assailants without warning, the detective lived long enough to return a shot that brought down one of the fleeing men. Upon receiving news of the assassination, the CIC District Office in Pusan dispatched an agent to the police station to investigate the killing for political ramifications and possible subversive intent against the American Military Government. The agent managed to interview the assassin who had been shot and was then dying in the hospital. With a mixture of pride and guilt, he answered rather willingly all the agents questions.

The weakened condition of the dying man made a long interview impossible, but the assassin did confess to Communist party membership. The murder of the detective had been committed to get his weapon for use in a Communist underground army, newly organized and greatly in need of equipment and arms. The orders for the assassination had come from Chang Sei Moo, one of the leaders of the subversive group.

CIC Raids Chang's Home

Through informants, some of them working covertly among the Communists, CIC learned the location of Chang Sei Moo's home. The night following the

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* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, 10 Jan 1948, Subject: North East Enterprise Company (Tong Puk Ki Up Hwei Sa) of Hamhung, North Korea, an Official Organ of the NKLP & NK People's Committee, in South Korea, Activities of, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case No. 7, Subject: Trade Between South Korea and Communist North Korea and China, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

assassination, three CIC agents visited the home, awoke Chang and his family and searched the premises. Documents which seemed to be of considerable importance were confiscated, and Chang Sei Moo was held for interrogation.

Subsequent translation of the confiscated documents showed that they were reports on South Korean police, Constabulary and Coast Guard and drawings indicating the location of American installations and warehouses around the Pusan and Agasaki port areas. Much more important, however, were organizational charts of the People's Liberation Army, a subversive group previously unknown to CIC. Confronted with these revealing documents, Chang Sei Moo began to talk.

Chang Sei Moo related that the People's Liberation Army was a Communist underground army of which he was vice provincial commander, and Kim Kap Soo was provincial commander. Kim Kap Soo was arrested on 15 November 1947, but refused to commit himself until Chang Sei Moo convinced him that it would be to his advantage to cooperate with the CIC. Both men from that time on willingly answered all questions concerning the Army, and offered to assist in the location and arrest of Han In Sik of Seoul whom they named as the Commander-in-Chief.

CIC learned that the Army was instituted to create an effective intelligence system, to instigate acts of sabotage, and to work in conjunction with the North Korea invasion Army when the Communist military thrust came.

Intelligence gathering was, at this stage, the Army's prime mission. As yet it was not operating in the majority of the provinces, but plans were afoot for a complete expansion throughout South Korea. Those branches of the organization in operation were proving to be quite effective.

Information was gathered from well placed sources and turned over to Han In Sik in Seoul. Han then entrusted the material to delegated subordinates who hand-carried the information to North Korea. Intelligence reports pertaining to the social, economic and political conditions in South Korea, the strength, disposition and equipment of the National Police, Constabulary and United States forces, with particular emphasis on the latter, were gathered. Since the Police, Constabulary and Military Government were infiltrated by Communists many of the reports resulted from first-hand observations.

The People's Liberation Army's intelligence men were told to give special attention to CIC; the number of persons employed, their names and personalities, their vulnerabilities, and the ways in which they could be imposed upon.

The importance of the espionage work of the Peoples' Liberation Army could not be underrated, for many of the confiscated documents were intelligence reports which would have been of great value to the North Koreans.

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The Peoples' Liberation Army had apparently formulated extensive schemes for the future overthrow of the South Korean government. When the time was ripe for conquest, the travel routes, then being mapped for the use of escaping saboteurs, would be used for the entrance into South Korea by the North Korean invading force.

CIC obtained detailed organizational plans for the Peoples' Liberation Army. These drafts were based upon the U. S. Army TOE with full strength regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. Included at headquarters were G1, G2, G3 and G4 Sections handling duties similar to those in the U. S. Army divisions and higher echelons.

Numerous arrests in other parts of South Korea indicated that the Army was at least on the way to achieving workable organization. The exposure of the group around Pusan, the most advanced according to all indications, prevented further expansion.

Seek Contact Man

Once the aims and personalities of the PLA were disclosed, CIC turned its efforts to the apprehension of the Army's contact man. When questioned about the chain of command, Chang Sei Moo and Kim Kap Soo mentioned that they had heard of orders coming from the Russian Political Section in North Korea, but that they had not seen any of these orders. It was their claim that Han received the orders verbally and in turn passed them on to the lower echelons in the south. But the two talkative captives could not divulge more extensive information about the tie between the Army and the Soviet Union, and the necessity of locating Han In Sik became even greater.

Kim and Chang offered to go to Seoul and "finger" Han In Sik for agents of CIC. Both men were released in Seoul, accompanied by trusted detectives, in an attempt to locate Han at many of his old haunts. Although this procedure was continued for a week, the results were negative. Kim and Chang cooperated to the fullest, but Han had made good his escape to North Korea. Apparently he had learned of the round-up and had taken advantage of the travel routes that his men had so carefully selected for successful saboteurs and invading armies.

Thus the major Communist underground organization that came to CIC's attention was smashed before it had a chance to function to its full effectiveness. This clandestine army with control in North Korea was an integral part of the extensive Communist aims and plans for Korea.*

* USAFIK, CIC, Special Report, 28 November 1947, Subject: South Korean Liberation Army, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library and Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

Illegal Possession of Weapons a Constant Threat

The possession of firearms, under the Japanese regime, had been expressly forbidden by law. When the occupation forces of the U. S. Army assumed the reigns of government, this law was retained as essential for successful government, and ownership of weapons and explosives by Koreans was considered an action inimical to the command. As such it fell in the category of subversive activity and the investigation of illegal possession of weapons became a task of the ES&M Section.

The crackdown on illegally owned weapons was, in one respect, a step toward the day-to-day maintenance of law and order, a measure designed to lessen the terrorism that accompanied all Korean political activities. From a long range viewpoint, the measure was aimed to lessen the possibilities of the Communists organizing an effective underground Army in South Korea. *

A major violation of the law against weapon possession occurred during the large scale riots of October 1946. In the course of these riots, an estimated two thousand weapons fell into the hands of the rioters. Most of these firearms were stolen from the Police. ** CIC and the Police had just completed the nationwide roundup of weapons, and consequently the operation had to begin all over again.

There was always the danger that the Communists could smuggle in weapons from North Korea to arm leftists in the south. CIC put into operation all the precautions that MG's insufficient security system would permit.

CIC's efforts to counter the circulation of firearms within Korea often bore fruit. In October 1947 at Inchon harbor, six weapons were found. The weapons were covered by permits issued by the Chinese police, but possession was still a violation of the MG law against bringing weapons into the port area. CIC recommended that regulations be drawn up so that the Korean police could take custody of weapons licensed by foreign governments during the period that the owners of the weapons were in South Korea. Otherwise it was feared that licenses from foreign governments could easily be used to mask gun-running operations. ***

Sometimes CIC or Korean Police raids turned up violations of the weapons law. One of the largest caches of weapons and explosives was uncovered by the police during a raid on the home of Song Kyu Whan, a member of the leftist but

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* 971st CIC Detachment, Annual Progress Report, 1947, (Secret) pp. 79-80.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for October 1946, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library, p. 4.

*** USAFIK, CIC Weekly Information Bulletin No. 26, 16 October 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

not wholly Communist, Social Democratic Party. Buried near his home were six pistols, sixty-four hand grenades, five Japanese rifles, thirty-seven hundred rounds of ammunition, twenty-one Japanese swords, seven officer swords and twenty-three bayonets. Examination of the weapons by CIC agents revealed that they were rusty and long beyond use. The owner claimed that he had intended to turn in the weapons when the Americans first began collecting them, but had procrastinated. Fearing that if he turned them in late, he would be looked on with suspicion, Song decided to bury them. In view of the condition of the weapons when CIC recovered them it was more than likely that the Korean was telling the truth.*

Border Incidents Frequent

CIC offices periodically received reports of a North Korean invasion. The numerous small incidents that did occur along the 38th Parallel demanded CIC investigation for fear that they might be forerunners of an all-out war. Both the Russians and Americans ran frequent border patrols, and since the actual boundary was not precisely defined in many localities, trouble was inevitable. Later on in the occupation, the Russians substituted the North Korean Constabulary for their units and the Americans in turn left border patrolling to the South Korean Constabulary. CIC investigated all border incidents to attempt to determine their true nature, causes, and the persons responsible. In most cases, investigation revealed that the North Korean Constabulary was responsible for provoking the incidents. Often the incidents involving the opposing Constabulary units turned into minor battles which lasted for several hours.**

For example, on 19 October 1947, fifty North Korean Constabulary men and several Russians crossed the 38th Parallel and attacked a South Korean outpost near Chunchon. They killed one man and wounded another before hurrying back over the border.***

Especially in the Ongjin area, Russian and North Korean sorties bent on robbery and terrorism were frequent occurrences. American forces around Ongjin lost considerable face because of their unwillingness to drive these raiding parties off.****

For most Americans stationed in South Korea these minor skirmishes along the border were daily reminders of the ever-present possibility of a North Korean invasion.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin No. 20, 4 September 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

** 971st CIC Detachment 1947 Annual Progress Report, (Secret), pp. 76-78.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin No. 28, 31 October 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** Ibid., No. 24, 2 October 1947

Subversion Against the Army Rarely Violent

The Korean leftists were intelligent enough not to use terrorism and violence against United States Army installations; they relied mainly on subtlety and underhandedness. Nevertheless, rumors and reports of possible violence against the Army occasionally cropped up, requiring CIC investigation.

Such a case began in December 1947 when Headquarters, 971st CIC Detachment initiated an investigation of a raid believed to be impending on the 111th Signal Company near the town of Whayangni during the holiday season. Since the activities of the Signal Company were highly classified, the case took on a high priority.

The investigation began when agents interviewed the Company's First Cook who had reported rumors of the impending raid to his Commanding Officer. The cook had received his information from Lee Tuk Chun who had told him that a great number of leftists had been imported to take part in the raid. Subsequent interviews around the Signal unit implicated the Company's barber, a native Korean, who was alleged to have offered money to soldiers for information on guard reliefs and the location of supplies. But the agents sent to interview the barber discovered that he spoke no English whatever, and therefore would not have been likely to approach American soldiers for the information.

After considerable inquiry there were indications that Lee Tuk Chun had been guilty of spreading rumors which had no basis in fact. Christmas and New Year's came and went without event. CIC came to regard the story as a device of Lee Tuk Chun's to hide his probable black market activities, although no absolute proof could be obtained along these lines.*

Investigations often are stymied before all the loose ends can be gathered, and the inconclusive results of this case were not unusual, but the Monthly Report of CIC Activities added this heartening note to the brief report of the case: "Noteworthy is the fact that much valuable experience was afforded the investigating Agent."**

Leftist propaganda directed toward the American soldiers was a more frequent and probably more successful type of subversion than the use of violence. The following excerpts from a handbill written in English and found in a CIC vehicle will illustrate the most common themes of this propaganda.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, 8 January 1948, Subject: Possible Impending Raid on 111th Signal Company, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

** 971st CIC Detachment, Monthly Report of CIC Activities for January 1948, 31 January 1948, To: Chief, CIC, Fort Holabird, (Secret), s/ Jack B. Reed, Major, CAC, Commanding, Staff & Faculty Library.

"MG does not want you to meet with Koreans and become friendly with them. One of the questions that the CIC asks when it investigates a soldier is 'Does he have Korean friends?' Why is that? It is because if you went among Koreans and saw how they lived and heard their stories, you would soon begin to doubt the shiny words of your officers. You would begin to wonder. Does the Army keep me here to help the Korean people or oppress them? Does the Army keep me here to guard against the Russians or attack them? Does the Army keep me here to open a market for Freedom and Democracy or for Ford cars and DuPont munitions?

"American soldier: In your home sweet home, your wife or sweetheart, your brothers and sisters, and your parents are waiting for you day and night! That your occupation here is not good for the benefits of your people and mankind so long as General Hodge pursues his present reactionary policies, please appeal to your country. And tell the workers, farmers and students of the United States that your Korean people are also one of the people who love peace and prosperity, and that we wish to be real friends with the American people. Then our future generations will remember you as glorious liberators who made Korea free forever."*

CIC Investigates

The two major cases of subversion within the Military establishment centered around personnel of the Information & Education Section. The first case concerned a group which maintained close contact with the members of the Russian colony, military and civilian, in Seoul, and whose main spokesman was a corporal who was an [redacted] The other case involved a long-time Communist organizer whose many contacts with the Reds in the United States left him open to great suspicion.

Headquarters, 971st CIC Detachment, initiated an investigation of the corporal "to substantiate or disprove allegations that the subject was pro-Russian and disaffected toward the United States."**

[redacted] The allegations were that he attempted to lead the discussions to a conclusion that favored the Russians and was often able to accomplish his purpose. The corporal was described by his associates as a good speaker with a compelling personality.***

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* USAFIK, CIC, Seoul District Office, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, Subject: Communist Posters Defaming United States, 21 Nov 1947, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library.

USAFIK, CIC, Seoul District Office, Memorandum for the Officer In Charge, File No. 5-35, 7 May 1947, Subject: [redacted] Central Records Facility

*** Ibid., 12 June 1947.

From this slim beginning, CIC developed a case that uncovered a number of suspects. It was soon discovered that the soldier was close to most of the Russian nationals mentioned earlier in this section. This group included Major Korneshev, the Russian liaison officer, and Madame Yakovlov and Primax Policarp, leading members of the colony functioning within the Russian Orthodox Church. It developed that the corporal was giving Major Korneshev lessons in English and was attending many parties given by members of the Russian colony.*

According to the testimony of the men who lived with him in the barracks, the corporal made many remarks that had a definite pro-Russian slant. When called a Communist, the corporal usually replied to the effect that he was proud of it. The corporal and his roommate often quarreled over the former's Russian contacts and the two men had been forced to set up a line dividing their room in half. They called it their 38th Parallel and each man's activities was limited to his own zone.**

(*C) USAFIK, CIC, Seoul District Office, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, File No. 5-35, 12 June 1947, Subject: (Secret), Central Records Facility.

** Ibid., 30 July 1947.

*** Ibid.; 28 May 1947.

* Interview with George Henderson on 22 October 1954 at Fort Holabird.

** USAFIK, CIC, Seoul District Office, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, 12 June 1947, File No. 5-35, Subject: Theodore Pick, T/5, (Secret), Central Records Facility.

(B) Interview with George Henderson on 22 October 1954 at Fort Holabird, and USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, 10 March 1948, Subject: [redacted] (Secret), CIC Central Files (B)

**** Operations Division, GHQ, FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, Summary Of Information, 10 July 1947, Subject: [redacted] (Confidential) Staff & Faculty Library. (C)

***** (C) Letter of 1 May 1950 to ACofS, G2, DA, Washington, D. C. Subject: [redacted] (Secret), dossier Central Records Facility.

****** (C) Letter of 27 April 1950, To: J.B. Wilcox, S/A in Charge, FBI, 407 Court House Building, Seattle, Wash., s/F.W. Hein, Col, CSC, (Secret), dossier, Central Records Facility.

Further investigation revealed that this soldier had served with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Loyalist Army for ten months, had worked as an organizer for the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA) for over five years and spent a year on the staff of the "Daily Worker." He was in contact with many Communists in South Korea, and a mail cover disclosed that he was writing frequently to Pak Heun Young, the leading South Korean Communist.

On 7 March 1946, under the guise of a shakedown weapons inspection, CIC searched the barracks and the personal belongings of the suspect. Proof was obtained that he was transmitting information on the occupation to the CPUSA, and was distributing Communist publications to the Korean Communist Party through Pak Heun Young.

Other information indicated that the soldier was supplying information to the "Korean Independence," a Communist publication which was published and distributed from Los Angeles. This publication had the main aim of discrediting the American Military Government in Korea.*

The Company He Keeps

The soldier was sent to the zone of the interior on 26 March 1946, but before he left Korea he was interrogated and searched by William Ward Chief of the 971st's Security Section, along with Agents John Anderson and Charles Weatherholt. The soldier admitted that most of the findings of the investigation were true but he would not concede to any subversive activity in Korea. However, a letter to him from Pak Young was found among his belongings. This document which spoke for itself, reads as follows:

"On your departure from Korea, we are deeply grateful to you for your activities as a sincere and enthusiastic comrade during your stay in Korea.

"Especially we express our wholehearted greetings and gratitude for your activities in offering important literature and information to us.

"Moreover, we value highly your persistent investigation on the Korean situation.

"We wish you play an active role when you return to the U.S.A., informing the present situation of Korea and our party in detail to the CP of the U.S.A.

USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case No. 3, 25 February 1948, Subject: [redacted], (Secret); Staff & Faculty Library.

"We send our best revolutionary greetings through you to all the comrades of the CP of the U.S.A."*

The soldier was permitted to continue home. Shortly after his arrival in the United States, an inflammatory article appeared in the Los Angeles Daily News, dated 10 May 1946, written by one Vern Partlow, which demonstrated that the soldier and several of his Communist comrades had acquired information while in Korea for use against Military Government.**

The article was headlined: "Vets Say U.S. Backs Collaborators; Feudal Groups To Rule Over Koreans." The article was definitely pitched toward the Korean colony in Los Angeles and the main charge seemed to be that the United States was backing quislings and Japanese collaborators in Korea.***

This Communist's time in Korea was well spent. There was evidence that he had organized a Communist cell within the XXIV Corps to insure a continuous flow of information on MG and USAFIK to the CPUSA and to assist the Korean Communists in discrediting the American Military Government.

On 22 April 1946, the soldier was discharged at Camp Beale, California, and the case was turned over to the FBI.****

On 14 August 1953, this man was arrested in Boston, Massachusetts and held on seventy-five thousand dollar bail on charges of conspiring to overthrow the United States government.*****

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* Letter from Pak Heun Young to [redacted] 20 March 1946, Seoul, Korea, confiscated by CIC, Inchon harbor, 26 March 1946, (Unclassified) [redacted]. Central Records Facility.

** Memorandum for the File, 11 June 1946, Subject: [redacted] (Secret), Central Records Facility.

*** Los Angeles Daily News, 10 May 1946, clipping in dossier [redacted], Central Records Facility.

**** Letter from Colonel S.V. Constant, Chief, Area Intelligence Division, Subject: [redacted] 2 August 1946, To: Mr. E.E. Conroy, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, 234 U.S. Court House, Foley Square, New York 7, N.Y., (Confidential), Central Records Facility.

***** G2 Cross Reference Sheet, filed under: [redacted], from 6th Army, extracted from a document filed under: Hqs First Army, Summary of Domestic Intelligence File #182, 21 August 1953, (Confidential), Central Records Facility.

At the time this new informant made his penetration, the SKLP was extremely active. Monthly raids on police boxes were resulting in the deaths of many Korean policemen, and riots and disturbances were all too frequent. So successful was the informant in gaining the confidence of the SKLP, that he was soon head of the Organization Bureau for the whole province, and was able to attend the clandestine planning meetings held for the party higher-ups in the rice paddies outside of town. It was during these meetings that the SKLP made its plans for raids and disturbances.

On evenings when a meeting was scheduled, the informant would pass in front of the CIC office on his way and give a pre-arranged signal to indicate that he would be in later that night. After his meeting, the informant would slip into the darkened CIC offices and leave the detailed plans of the SKLP -- plans which had been formulated only a short time previous. Most often the information was written in minute script on onion skin paper and rolled into a ball which the informant hid in the spring of his flashlight. After receiving this information, CIC would rush the informant to the outskirts of town in a covered jeep to allow him to return on foot and thus avert suspicion.

Immediately calls were put through to Seoul. Most often Captain Ulibarri spoke to Orlando Molina, the Operations Officer, and relayed the information in Spanish. If it was felt that the information was too highly classified to be sent over the phone, Ulibarri took a plane or made the long drive to Seoul in a jeep.

Attempt to Confuse Communists

When the SKLP came to realize that there was an informant in their ranks, measures had to be taken to see that they did not put the finger on the right man. Local Koreans, sympathetic to the occupation, were used to spread false reports. The usual procedure was for one of these men to drink heavily with a local member of the SKLP and after the evening progressed, to tip the Communist off that so-and-so was an informant for CIC. This innocent man would be kicked out of the party and for awhile the SKLP would be content that they had plugged the leak.

* Interview with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

* Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 Oct 54 at Fort Holabird, Md.

** Interviews with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 Sept 54 and with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 Oct 54 at Fort Holabird, Md.

*** Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 Oct 54 at Fort Holabird, Md.

**** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 Oct 54 at Fort Holabird.

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CIC's political coverage was termed extremely thorough and complete, and most agents who served during the Korean occupation felt, in retrospect, that little happened of which CIC was not aware.

503 Parties to Cover

In 1947, when the US-USSR Joint Commission required all political parties in Korea to register, there were 503 organizations of various political stripe that announced their desire to have a hand in governing the peninsula. These organizations had to claim at least ten thousand members to merit the consideration of the Joint Commission. That many of the parties faked the necessary ten thousand is reflected by the fact that the total claimed membership of all the 503 parties was seventy million while the Korean population was only 21,000,000. Despite all this confusion, the Political Section persisted in its mission of keeping current information on every party on General Hodge's desk. In this light, the fact that the Political Section turned in the greater bulk of CIC reports was not surprising.*

The political situation that CIC faced was not hopelessly tangled. Generally in Korea the middle of the road parties wanted land reform, free elections, and top-notch leadership, but were otherwise neutral. Off the middle there were varying degrees to the right and to the left with extreme parties on either side. It was these extreme ends of both right and left that were the most dangerous, for they would usually not allow bloodshed to prevent them from accomplishing their purposes.

Attempts For Coalition Fail

If CIC felt prior to their arrival in Korea that their main concern would be operations against the remaining vestiges of the Japanese occupation, they soon found that they were wrong. Original agreements had called for the Soviet Union to accept the Japanese surrender in the north and the United States to do likewise in the south, with the dividing line being the now-famous 38th Parallel. The Russians arrived about two weeks earlier than the Americans and by the time the American Military Government arrived, the north was fairly solidly in the hands of the Communists. Gradually the lines hardened until the 38th Parallel, intended only as a convenient division for the early days of the occupation, became a most significant border of our era.

Original agreements called for a US-USSR trusteeship of Korea to last for five years. To the Americans, this meant supervising a Korean government, but the Koreans interpreted trusteeship as something akin to the

* Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954 and with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954 at Fort Holabird, Md.

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Japanese occupation. At first all parties were against trusteeship with equal vigor, but the Soviets quickly informed the Korean Communists that they should be for trusteeship. This set the "Party Line" on the issue.

Soviet-American conferences in 1946, attempting to set up a joint trusteeship for Korea and to thus reunite the country, all ended in stalemates. Soviet delegates took the stand that all Koreans opposed to the trusteeship should be excluded from any administration that would be set up, thus assuring that only the Communists would be eligible, since the rightists all over the nation were still campaigning against trusteeship.

The trenchant rightist opposition to trusteeship might seem unreasonable, since the Communists proved so willing to come to some agreement, but North Korea was already in the iron grip of the Reds and no opposition was tolerated. In South Korea, the Communists were greatly in the minority and any "coalition" government would be a move in their favor.

Actually the American Military Government was working toward setting up a coalition government designed to include representatives of all the stronger parties. Overall American policy at that time precluded mention of Communism as either an enemy or a potential enemy. Ways and means were to be devised to reconcile differences with the Russians and Communists everywhere. Human nature, and certainly Korean stubbornness, probably would have made such a coalition government a total fiasco. The rightists were strong enough to resist the MG attempts at coalition. In the general elections in South Korea in May 1948, the rightists took over the government in the south with the Communists excluded.

Violence Accompanies Korean Politics

CIC learned that Koreans took their politics very seriously. A man and his brother, perfectly friendly in every way, would split into fighting animosity if they disagreed politically. Violence and terrorism on the part of political groups was an accepted technique of getting things done. Any political party which lacked a strong-arm youth group, fiercely loyal to the cause, to do its "dirty work" really could not be expected to worry any other political organization. These youth groups were hardly akin to the Boy Scouts, since a youth in Korea could be close to forty, such were the demands of the old custom of extreme reverence for the elder men. The case of Kim Doo Whan, reported at the end of this section, will provide an excellent illustration of typical antics of Korean youth groups.*

* This statement of the Political Situation in Korea is drawn from The Annual Progress Reports of 1947 and 1948, 971st CIC Detachment and interviews with Major Panell, 18 October 1954, Captain Measley, 30 September 1954 and Captain MacDougall, 5 October 1954 at Fort Holabird, Maryland and with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington, D.C.

It All Began With the "Tuesday Meeting"

The Korean Communist Party (Chosen Kong San Dang) was organized underground and operated throughout the period of the Japanese occupation. In the early 1920's, Pak Heun Young and Lee Tan Ya, who stayed in Siberia during the years American forces occupied Korea, and a few others formed an organization called, fancifully enough, "The Tuesday Meeting." It was this organization that later became the Korean Communist Party. During these early years, Pak Heun Young was alleged to have made a trip to Russia where he was officially recognized as the leader of the Communists in Korea by Betchinsky, the head of the Far East Division of the Comintern. At the time of the American occupation, Pak's serious rival for the position was Kim Chul Soo, who was reportedly not as extremely fanatic as Pak.*

During the year 1946, there was considerable opposition to Pak in the ranks of the party. Although he controlled the Central Executive Committee, Pak was severely criticized by his opponents who said that he and his followers were too self-righteous to accept opinions from others. The opposition was also unhappy with the oft-repeated idea that Pak was the only leader recognized by the Comintern.** Matters became serious enough for a faction to approach rightists for funds for propaganda to help overthrow Pak.*** Pak took quick action by indefinitely suspending Kim Chul Soo and his other important opponents from the party.**** Although shortly afterward he was forced by a CIC arrest warrant to flee for North Korea, Pak successfully weathered the storm and continued to head South Korean Communists.

During the period from August 1945 to late 1946, the Korean Communist Party operated openly, but after this year of activity it was publicly dissolved. On 23 November 1946, at an inaugural meeting in Seoul, the South Korean Labor Party was set up, and Communists living south of the 38th Parallel were funnelled into it. Although not all members of the SKLP were Communists, the Reds organized and controlled the party to such an extent that it was logically considered to be the successor of the Korean Communist Party.*****

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* USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, File No. 4-44, 10 August 1946; Subject: Communist Party, (Confidential), Central CIC Files.

** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Record of Joint Round Table Talk of Communists from Central and Provincial Districts, 21 September 1946, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Lib.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Communist Party, Split Within, 22 August 1946, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Lib.

**** Ibid., 9 August 1946.

***** 1947 Annual Progress Report, pp. 125-131, and 1948 Annual Progress Report, p. 70, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Lib.

Long-range Communist planning, according to the "Master Plan" uncovered by CIC, called for the appearance of seeming factions and the public dissolution of the party in an attempt to pretend great weakness internally and to make opponents overconfident. CIC considered that the organization of SKLP was part of this long-range plan, and there is a great possibility that the growth of the anti-Pak faction was also. *

The SKLP was thoroughly Communist dominated with Pak and his sidekick, Huh Hun, in the top positions.** Rules of the SKLP were merely a translation of the rules of the old Korean Communist Party.***

Pak, who was always the number one target personality for CIC, became even more important when the extent of the SKLP espionage became evident in August 1946. When CIC got a tip as to Pak's whereabouts, a large scale raid was planned for 6 September 1946. Unfortunately, the raid was made about an hour later than scheduled, and Pak had managed to escape although several other target personalities were apprehended. On 8 September 1946, CIC put out a warrant for the open arrest of Pak.

Pak went to North Korea and never returned, as far as CIC knew, although rumors that he was in the south cropped up periodically. Several times CIC tried to lure Pak into the area south of the 38th Parallel, but these operations were unsuccessful.****

The South Korean Labor Party was not the only Communist-dominated organization in South Korea, although it certainly was the most important. Other left wing groups fostered by the Communists which had to be observed by CIC included the Democratic Peoples' Front, The All Korean Farmers General Union, The Korean Peoples' Republic Party, The South Korea Women's Democratic Union, and the Democratic Young Men's Association. Seemingly non-political organizations including cultural, business, refugee and propaganda groups were found to be excellent targets for infiltration with design to eventually subvert them into Communist fronts.*****

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* USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Joint Soviet-Communist Master Plan for Korea, 29 June 1946, (Secret), Central CIC Files.

** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Rules and Regulations of CP compared with Rules and Regulations of SKLP, To: Commanding Officers, all CIC Detachments, Korea, 3 Dec. 1946, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for September 1946, dtd 16 January 1947, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library and interview with Captain Measley, 30 Sept. 1954 at Fort Holabird, Maryland.

***** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 70, (Secret) Staff and Faculty Library.

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Communist-Inspired Terrorism Hits Peak in October 1946

Communist-inspired riots, disturbances and strikes were closely connected to the day-to-day political situation. These acts of terrorism were also considered inimical to the command and as such fell under the investigative jurisdiction of the ES&M Section.

Most of the Communist inspired violence during the first year of the occupation was sporadic and isolated, but during October 1946, a wave of terrorism, later known as the October Riots, spread throughout the peninsula.

The major disturbance began at 2400 hours on 22 September 1946 when eight thousand employees of the railroad system in Pusan declared a total strike in that area, voicing opposition to the daily wage system, demanding wage raises, improved food distribution, and a reinstatement of the government food rationing system. In short order, the other large rail centers, Taegu, Seoul and Inchon, followed the example of Pusan. Indications of a strike at the large Seoul Electric Company were noted and printers' unions ceased work in many areas. Some factories went on strike in sympathy with the rail workers. Additional demands were made, including the release from jail of certain political figures and strike agitators.

At this stage, CIC and MG felt that the strikes were for purely economic reasons without any political significance. This belief was dispelled when the strongly leftist Chung Pyung Labor Union members were cited as the agitators and evidence piled up to the effect that the Communists were behind the disturbances. The presence of right wing youth groups at the scene aiding police in quelling the disturbances and riots further placed the strike on political grounds.

As certain groups of the strikers saw that no economic gains were forthcoming from their strike, they began to realize that they were being used as tools by the Chung Pyung and other Leftist and Communist groups. By October, the locomotives had begun to run again and the first phase of the disturbance was at an end.

The Communists turned to another plan. They inspired the unusually excitable Korean populace to stir up riots and attacks on the police. The police methods in Korea were frequently brutal, and the Korean people, seeing the police in action during the strike-breaking, fell easy prey to Communist troublemakers.

Rioting Heaviest in Taegu

On 1 October 1946, a crowd of about 4,000 strikers from factories and railroad yards stormed a police box near the Taegu railroad yards, shouting that

they were starving and that the police were trying to kill them. In the subsequent disturbance, one police lieutenant and at least one striker were killed. The following morning, the body of the dead striker was carried through the streets of Taegu by a mob estimated at two thousand by CIC agents on the scene. Eventually the police station was overwhelmed, and the rioters were not dispelled until three U.S. Army tanks advanced on the station. Thirteen rioters were killed and many more were injured.

The situation became worse in Taegu until eventually martial law was declared. By 8 October, the disturbances had spread to the neighboring provinces. By this time, the strikes were subordinated to a general desire to get even with the police.

During the trouble in the southern provinces, there were almost no anti-American feeling demonstrated. Minor incidents such as the detention of a U.S. Army patrol at a roadblock were reported, but no violence was directed at American personnel.

Things calmed down a bit when the U.S. Army and many right-wing groups came to the aid of the harassed police. Nevertheless, raids on police boxes and homes of prominent rightists continued.

Communists Responsible for Riots

The strikes had been prompted by left-wing labor unions with the Chung Pyung most in evidence. However, it came to the front that the violence against the police had been initiated by the In Min Dang (People's Party) and the Min Chung (Democratic Young Men's Association). Both of these organizations were closely allied with the Communist Party and were probably taking orders from the Communists.*

Translations of leftist documents received from the District Office in Seoul and Pusan tended to show that the strikes were planned by leftists with the hope that they would lead to general disorder and eventually leftist control of the South Korean government.

The following are excerpts from a translation of a typical Communist Party propaganda leaflet taken by CIC agents from a courier in Chunchon. The document was titled "An Order from the Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party" and dated 29 September 1946.

"TO WORKERS OF THE SEOUL ELECTRIC COMPANY:

"Those who are the bravest fighters for our country and democracy are the laborers. The present railroad strike shows their heroic love for our country!

* USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report, 17 Jan. 1947, s/Jack B. Reed, Major, CAC, Commanding, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

"All workers of the Seoul Electric Company!

"You should be mobilized with the fighters!

"You must fight for our country!

"Compromise means failure only!

"TO POLICEMEN

"After liberation the reactionary policeman became the leeches of American imperialism by arresting the true patriots and putting them in prison.

"Policemen! You must fight the battle! You must support the fight of the laborers, farmers, citizens and students with all your heart.

"Stop armed interference in the strike fights!

"Stop unlawful arrests and cross-examinations!

"Hurrah for the democratic police."*

Riots against the police continued to spread north, and by the end of the month had reached Seoul. On 31 October 1946, about five hundred people, eighty per cent of the students, gathered outside the Capitol singing leftist songs and waving Red flags.** There was much open criticism of the American occupation during the demonstration. It was determined that the Democratic Young Men's Association, the well-schooled youth organization of the leftists, had sponsored the demonstration.***

Meanwhile, disturbances continued to flare up in the south. Gradually, however, the rioting ran its course, and by the middle of November, a comparative calm replaced the riots throughout South Korea.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Summary of Information, Subject: Communist Party, Propaganda and Orders to Students, Workers, Police, USAMGIK Employees, Issued by, 17 October 1946, (a translation from Korean), (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report, 17 January 1947, /s/Jack B. Reed, Major, CAC, Commanding, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Lib.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Democratic Young Men's Association, To: All Commanding Officers, CIC Detachments, Korea, 14 December 1946, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

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Occasionally during the October Riots, CIC was called upon to help dispel the rioters, but generally CIC's prime function was that of reporting the location of the riots and other pertinent data. Attempts were made continuously to link the responsibility for the disturbances to the proper individuals and organizations.*

The Chung Pan Sa counterfeiting case discussed in the previous section and later the October Riots clearly implicated the Communists as organized opponents of the Americans in South Korea. But United States attempts to reach a compromise and set up a coalition government continued for nearly a year. As mentioned before, U.S. foreign policy at that time refused to consider the Communists as enemies or potential enemies. U.S. policy everywhere was reconciliation and cooperation, and the Russians were willing to play along with the game as long as it suited their purposes.

A further burden fell on CIC because of the failure of MG officials to interpret accurately the local situation. Terroristic methods were customary in all Korean politics, with the rightists as well as the leftists prone to use violence. Many MG officials failed to recognize the fact that the leftist-inspired violence was part of a large revolutionary scheme with implications on a world wide scale, while the violence of the right took on an immediate and isolated aspect.

Communist disturbances and terroristic activities continued, although at a lesser rate, after 1946. Informants kept CIC aware of possible trouble spots, and quick action, applied at the right time, kept the fever pitch of the October Riots from being reached again.

On 22 March 1947, a one-day strike throughout Korea inspired by the South Korea Labor Party and the Chun Pyang, was generally believed to have had the dual purpose of gaining pay increases and of testing the power of leftist labor. There were scattered acts of violence against the police mostly in Cholla Pukto province.**

CIC Raids Nip Impending Violence

CIC received many and varied reports of expected trouble from leftist elements on 15 August 1947, the day that was to be observed as the second

* USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report, 17 January 1947, /s/Jack B. Reed, Major, Commanding, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Lib.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for March 1947, 1 April 1947, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

anniversary of Korean independence. These disturbances were to be staged on this date to take advantage of the confusion that would result from the mass gatherings during the celebration.

On 5 August 1947, Headquarters, 971st CIC Detachment, fearful of a recurrence of the October Riots, sent a letter to all District Offices and Sub-Offices directing these units to execute raids on all leading leftist headquarters on 12 August 1947, and to arrest twenty-one key leftist leaders.

Although only a few leftist leaders were arrested by CIC, a great bulk of documents were seized and eventually translated. Apparently the SKLP and other Communist-controlled groups were impressed that CIC meant business, since there was no trouble during the independence celebration.*

It should be noted that shortly before these raids, the US-USSR Joint Commission had ended its meetings without being able to set up a coalition government for all of Korea. The August raids therefore were the outright, formal recognition of the Communists as enemies and the failure of the Commission to set up a workable coalition.**

The mass CIC raids of August 1947 did not totally crush the SKLP. Most of the party higher-ups escaped, and although many documents had been captured, the SKLP was still very much alive.

With the arrival of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) and the announcement from North Korea that the "People's Republic" would boycott a general election for the country, the SKLP initiated a reign of terror directed at sabotaging the American efforts in South Korea. Between 7 and 13 February 1948, Communist violence, accompanied by a renewed propaganda campaign against the Americans, shook South Korea. Transportation and communication facilities were attacked and sabotaged. Police and rightists were attacked, property was destroyed and a fresh set of handbills and posters was disseminated to the public. The reaction of the general public against this display greatly aided UNTCOK in deciding to run an election for South Korea. Throughout April, leftist propaganda flowed against the election, but attempts to disrupt the election met with failure. After the election, the SKLP had to depend more and more on direction from North Korea, because their failure had resulted in a mild party split. By the end of the year, it was apparent that all operations of the SKLP were initiated and controlled from the north.***

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* USAFIK, CIC, Special Report, 29 August 1947, Subj: Search Raids on All Leading Leftist Headquarters, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library and Interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 12 Oct. 1945, Fort Holabird.

** Interviews with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954 and Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, at Fort Holabird, Maryland.

*** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), pp. 70-71, Staff and Faculty Library.

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Constabulary Revolts

Shortly after the South Korean government was organized, but before the Americans had left the peninsula, there occurred another major disturbance. Officially CIC did nothing more than observe the events that are recounted in the next few paragraphs.

The South Korean Constabulary had long been a prime target for Communist infiltration. Some estimates placed Communist membership as high as forty per cent of the forces. In October 1948, the 14th Constabulary Regiment was assigned to duty on Cheju Do Island and were in the port of Yosu waiting to embark. With passes in their hands, the men set out for a night on the town. When they had had their fill of sake and had been prodded by local Communists and the Communists within their ranks, the soldiers mutinied against their officers and killed most of them. The port of Yosu was completely taken over by the Constabulary enlisted men, who then proceeded north to Sunchon where their terroristic activities seemed to increase in intensity. Soon they were able to locate the arms and ammunition being shipped to Yosu for their use on Cheju Do. It was not long before most of Cholla Namdo Province was in the hands of the Communist rebels. The brutality of the rebels rose unabated and scores of rightists were publicly executed.

Meanwhile, in Taejon, countermoves were being organized, and a Constabulary brigade was sent to meet the rebels. Several times the rebels were surrounded only to slip easily through Constabulary lines weakened by the heavy infiltration of men in sympathy with the cause of the rebels.

The rebels with plenty of arms and ammunition then broke into small groups, never over three hundred men, and scattered to work as guerrillas. They headed for the Chiri Mountain range located along the border of Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo provinces. Their future operations were based from this impenetrable range of mountains.*

The estimated number of fatalities included 138 men of the Constabulary, 286 from the National Police, 672 civilian rightists and 228 rebels.

Politically the Yosu Rebellion had the effect of uniting the officials of the newly-organized Republic of Korea. The Rhee cabinet and the National Assembly, previously at odds, put aside many of their petty differences to form a solid

* Interviews with Major Prudencio D. Ulibarri, 9 October 1954 and Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954 at Fort Holabird.

block of opposition to the menace of Communism. The rebellion also started a movement of greater cooperation between the National Police and the Constabulary, long rivals in spite of their common interests.*

It was also significant that the Yosu Rebellion brought the great masses of people closer to the rightist government. The rough techniques of the National Police had alienated many people who consequently were tempted to turn to organizations that spoke strongly against the police. If the Communists had not been even more brutal than the police, they might have won great favor with large segments of the public. As it turned out, the Reds merely showed to one and all their true character, and managed to lose much prestige.**

And In The Other Corner

The greater portion of South Koreans were basically rightist in their political sympathies. However, the right wing was never able to present a truly unified front against Communism, mainly because political attachments tended to polarize around various leaders who disagreed among themselves, the basis of the disagreement being personal as often as it was doctrinal.

Syngman Rhee, absent from Korea from 1919 to 1945 and extremely "Westernized," was eventually chosen to be President of the Republic of Korea in the general elections of May 1948. Rhee's road to the presidency, however, was a rocky one. His principal opponent was Kim Koo, who had weathered the Japanese occupation in Chunking, China, where he was boss of a gang of professional thugs and somewhat of a follower of Syngman Rhee. Gradually the frictions that develop among a group in hiding split the exiles into two factions, the followers of Rhee and the followers of Kim Koo. Coming back in small groups after World War II, these elements made up the extreme right wing, with the older people, more settled in their way, tending to follow Rhee, and the young men, often terrorists and youth group leaders, falling in line behind Kim Koo.*** For purposes known best to himself, Kim Koo was reported to be training his own army in Manchuria.****

Right-wing policy generally held against trusteeship through thick and thin, although Kim Koo never actually committed himself, preferring to let

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* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp.61-62, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

** Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

*** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #8, 12 June 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), CIC Central Files.

Rhee do all the talking.* The less extreme among the rightists, like Kim Kyu Sik and Ahn Jai Hong, shifted during 1947 in favor of trusteeship and thereby aligned themselves with the Middle-of-the-roaders. The reconvening of the US-USSR Joint Commission on 20 May 1947 brought forth considerable propaganda from Rhee.** Rhee was quoted in CIC reports as saying that "more good can come to Korea if the Joint Commission breaks down than if it comes to an agreement."*** Rhee was often quoted as saying that anyone expecting harmony between the United States and the USSR is dreaming.**** It was at this time that Rhee first made his demands for a general election for South Korea, a plan which was in direct opposition to the MG proposal of a coalition government for all of Korea.

However, right-wingers, motivated by a desire to keep Korea intact, continued to show some interest in the efforts of the Joint Commission, and Rhee, at least according to CIC observers, reached a low point of popularity.***** To CIC it appeared that Rhee was about to lose the support of all the right-wing parties and drop out of the picture completely. Rhee's big anti-trusteeship demonstration in Seoul on 23 June 1947 drew only three to four thousand people after a great amount of advance publicity.****** Rhee began to argue his case in a series of letters to General Hodge a few weeks later.*******

But Rhee Continues Strong

Yet in spite of their refusal to take part in his demonstrations and a conflicting desire to keep the nation intact, the major rightist parties apparently continued to support Rhee. It was the opinion of Kim Seung Soo, Chairman of the Korean Democratic Party and a leading rightist, that a free election at this time for all of Korea would have resulted in the election of Rhee. Kim added that it was for this reason that the rightists desired no part of any coalition program that would involve part of the power going to the left.********

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* USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #9, 19 June 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea (Secret), CIC Central Files.

** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), pp. 114-121, Staff and Faculty Library.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #6, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 28 May 1947, (Secret), CIC Central Files.

**** Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #9, 19 June 1947.

***** Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #8, 12 June 1947.

****** Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #10, 26 June 1947.

******* Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #11, 3 July 1947.

******** Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #12, 10 July 1947.

The Joint Commission could never unravel all the problems inherent in the Korean political situation. The Russians finally put the axe to the Commission by continuing to demand that those rightist leaders opposing the principle of coalition government be excluded from the new administration. The Russians and Americans had failed to set up a coalition government.* The coordinated CIC raids on leftist headquarters on 12 August 1947 was an act of formal recognition of the Communists as MG opponents and a sign that there was no longer hope for a coalition.**

By the end of July, CIC reports indicated that Rhee was once again considered to be the top rightist.*** Rhee continued to insist upon a South Korean election, but Kim Koo surprisingly enough turned in favor of a national election to unify the country. During the latter part of November 1947, the Korean Independence Party, headed by Kim Koo, sponsored a Unification Conference with members from seventeen political parties sending representatives. However the Korean Independence Party and the Chosen Democratic Party, made of North Korean refugees and headed by Cho Man Sik who had long been in Russian custody, were the only rightist parties participating in the movement. All the other parties at the conference were either leftists or middle-of-the-roaders. This group favored the Russian proposal for a joint withdrawal of the occupation forces from Korea and a unified general election. The conference failed to reach its objectives, partly because the Korean Independence Party walked out. But the issue was far from dead.****

Two Kims Go North

On 25 March 1948, Radio Pyongyang announced plans for a North-South conference of political leaders. The North Korean proposal met immediate favor with the Communists and moderates in the south. The North Koreans also ventured to send an invitation to Kim Koo and the Korean Independence Party. Kim Koo left in early April and a few days later, the most important moderate, Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, also headed for the north. This was great fuel

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 113-122, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC Special Report, 29 August 1947, Subject: Search Raids on All Leading Leftist Headquarters, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library and interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #14, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 24 July 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 113-122, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

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for the Communists who stepped up their anti-Rhee campaign, for now they could claim that rightists and moderates also wanted a unified Korea and were opposed to the "sell Korea to the Americans" plan of Rhee. But the Communists were playing a losing game. The Communists had counted on public lethargy, so essential to their operations, and this lethargy just was not present. When a month-long Communist campaign against the elections proved more than futile, ninety percent of the South Koreans cast their ballots in the special South Korean elections for the National Assembly. The National Assembly met in May and elected Syngman Rhee as president.

Kim Koo's game of "footsie" with the Communists was partly a result of his sincere desire to unite Korea. He probably also saw a chance to stop Rhee, who had become increasingly popular since the total failure of the Joint Commission.

At any rate, on 6 August 1948, Rhee notified UNTCOK of the formation of the government of the Republic of Korea. Rhee took a great risk when, in picking his cabinet, he chose men who met his personal favor rather than the favor of other rightists, and for a while, there was rather severe factionalism within the right-wing ranks. After the Constabulary rebellion in the south, the tendency was for the rightists to set aside petty differences and form a solid front of opposition to the Communist menace.*

And The Winner

Syngman Rhee, the eventual president, had survived a period of opposition to MG policy to gain political ascendency in Korea in 1948. Always a prime point of interest in CIC's political reports, Rhee remained long after the occupation a controversial figure.

Rhee, born in 1875, was educated in the Chinese classical tradition, but sought also Western education in the Pai Jai Mission School. In the nineties, he became a leader of the democratic forces in Korea. He was founder and editor of the first newspaper published in Korea. When the Japanese murdered the great Korean Queen Min in 1895, Rhee declared personal war against them. Two years later, the Japanese arrested the young rebel and for the next seven years, Rhee was in the Kamoksu prison in Seoul. Upon release from prison, Rhee decided to carry on his fight for Korean independence from outside the country. His intermittent returns to Korea after this time ended in 1919; and from that date until the American liberation, Rhee did not visit his native

* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 57-64, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

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country. Many times in the intervening years, Rhee wrote and spoke for Korean independence.*

In Washington, Rhee had a considerable number of connections that helped work in his favor during the crucial occupation years. This "Rhee Lobby" worked for Rhee in the inner circles of the State Department and attempted to mold a good press opinion of Rhee in America. Louise Yim, Ben C. Limb and Robert T. Oliver were the major leaders of the "Rhee Lobby." Rhee often worked to discredit General Hodge in official Washington circles during the period that he opposed the MG policy.**

During a CIC interview in September 1947, Rhee outlined the history of his dispute with General Hodge. Rhee stated that he had blindly supported Hodge for a year and a half, but decided to go his own way when "it became evident that Hodge was following a suicidal policy." Rhee was quoted as saying: "There will be a clash between Hodge and the Korean people. Hodge thinks that because he has an army he can do what he wants. He has something else coming. If he only knew." Rhee conceded that he did not blame the General completely for the situation in Korea. He said that he was aware that "experts on the Far East" in Washington were dictating the policy. "This policy," said Rhee, "must be fought with every ounce of energy, and even with blood itself, if necessary."***

More slanderous against General Hodge, however, was Mrs. Rhee, an Austrian-born woman. Many shrill denouncements of General Hodge and MG policy were, CIC discovered, written on her typewriter. At least if she did not compose these pieces, she accepted their contents.****

CIC maintained a close check on Rhee as it did all top political leaders in Korea. Naturally the agents involved came to have their own opinions of Rhee. The opinions were diverse enough to indicate Rhee as one of the more controversial men of the time.

One CIC agent felt that although Rhee was an extremist in his approach to all his political opponents, MG would have done well to listen to him from

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* "Why War Came to Korea" by Robert T. Oliver, Fordham University Press, N.Y., 1950, pp.200-205. It must be remembered that the author was a leader in the Rhee lobby in Washington.

** Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #22, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 18 September 1947, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

**** Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

the start. This man felt that MG and the State Department were naive in their belief that a working coalition could be set up in Korea, particularly in the light of the Koreans' inclination never to compromise.

Another agent felt that Rhee was an opportunist who brought to bear all the energy he could muster on a favorable situation to further his own ends.

Still another felt Rhee was both arrogant and treacherous. Rhee once told this man that if given the Korean government, he could wipe out the nation-wide black market activities first by issuing a proclamation and then by executing several thousand black marketeers as examples. Rhee was quoted as saying that this might not be the techniques of an American-type democracy, but that it was the democracy that Korea would need to have.*

Rhee was not unusual among Korean political leaders in his complete unwillingness to compromise. Nor was he above the use of youth groups and mass demonstrations to help put a point across. CIC agents agreed that although Rhee would have been considered a trouble maker by American standards, by Korean standards he was merely a normal politician.

In the Middle

In between the right wing and the left wing were a sizable number of moderates ranging from those with rightist inclinations to Socialists. The aged intellectual, Dr. Kim Kyu Sik, the leading middle-of-the roader, was seen by many in MG as the eventual leader of the hoped for coalition. Kim Kyu Sik had wide popularity but not enough real support to compare with that of Rhee.**

Dr. Kim, a graduate of Roanoke College in Virginia, headed the Korean Independence Federation which worked for an independent and unified government to be arranged by meetings of northern and southern political leaders.*** The Federation was founded in October 1947 from 18 middle-of-the-road parties and fifty-one cultural organizations.****

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* Every CIC agent interviewed was asked his opinion of Rhee. Three of the more representative opinions were quoted above.

** Interview with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

*** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 57-64, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #25, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 9 October 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Lib.

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Eventually Dr. Kim was able to swing Kim Koo to his opinion and the two went to the meetings in Pyongyang in April 1948. When these conferences failed and separate governments were set up for North Korea and South Korea, the Korean Independence Federation remained neutral and supported neither government. Finally on 6 October 1948, Dr. Kim announced that the Korean Independence Federation would officially support the South Korean government, but planned to work through legal means to supplant it.

Another essentially moderate party was the Laboring Peoples' Party, headed by its organizer, Lyuh Woon Heun. Formed in the spring of 1947, this party was composed of rightists, coalitionists, and Communists. The dissension, characteristic of such conglomerate organizations, was kept under control by the dynamic personality of the party leader. The assassination of Lyuh in the summer of 1947 left the party to wend a chaotic path through the rest of the occupation. The leftists elements began to gain control of policy with encouragement from the North Korea Labor Party and eventually party policy fell under control of the Soviets in Pyongyang. Later, the conservatives evicted the Communists, but the party was never able to provide a leader who achieved the stature of Rhee.*

CIC reported the rumor of an attempt on Lyuh Woon Heun's life several weeks before the killing took place, but so frequently were informants relaying news of other people's plots, that the report went virtually unheeded. There were several red faces when Lyuh was assassinated in mid-July 1947.** The assassin climbed on the bumper of Lyuh's slow-moving car and fired three shots which instantly killed Lyuh and with him the effectiveness of his party. Investigation disclosed that Lyuh, a man with scores of enemies, had never been given the slightist protection from the police although there had been several abortive attempts on his life previously.*** On 27 September 1947 Han Chi Keun, a man of right-wing sympathies, was tried and pleaded guilty to assassinating Lyuh.****

To supplement the account of political activity in Korea, two detailed examples of CIC investigative work in the political field will be presented. The

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* 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 57-64, (Secret) Staff and Faculty Library.

** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 Sept. 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #14, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 24 July 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

**** Ibid., Weekly Information Bulletin #24, 2 October 1947.

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first is a report of one of the more interesting of the periodic interviews with prominent Korean political figures. The second case is a prime illustration of a wild Korean youth group in action.

CIC Interviews Kim Seung Soo

The CIC interviews of every important political figure in Korea were part of an effort to keep posted on the ever-changing political situation. In early July 1947, S/A R.W.Hatch of the Seoul District Office interviewed Kim Seung Soo, chairman of the Korean Democratic Party and an important rightist. Kim warned that in North Korea the Communists had formed a strong administration with intentions of eventually controlling all of Korea. He stated that the Russians were busy preparing for war, and North Korean factories were producing weapons for the Russians. Meanwhile, in South Korea, he noted that the Americans were doing nothing to stave off the Communist threat to the whole peninsula. Kim regretted the lack of a strong rightist army and felt that the longer the United States waited to recognize officially the Communist threat in Korea, the harder it would be to combat this movement. He questioned whether the American hatred of war was an asset or a detriment to the world, since he felt that Russia and the United States had reached a situation where a war to decide whether the world would be democratic or communistic was inevitable.

Returning to the local situation, Kim stated that most of the people were opposed to the Joint Commission because they did not want to trust Russia with a hand in an election. Any coalition government, he said, would be unable to function because of basic disagreements among the officials. Kim expressed a feeling of indebtedness to the Americans for liberating Korea, but at the same time expressed the desire that neither the United States nor Russia would actively participate in the nation's government. However, Kim did not want American forces to leave the peninsula until a sufficient South Korean army had been established.

Kim felt that a national election at that time would easily give the presidency to Syngman Rhee.

This statement of opinion by a prominent political figure was fairly representative of the thought of the less extreme right-wingers in Korea.*

My Old Friend Chung

Frequently cited as the most difficult and prolonged case investigated by CIC was that of Kim Doo Whan and his powerful right-wing youth group, The

* USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin #12, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, 10 July 1947, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

Dia Han Min Chung (The Great Korea Democratic Young Men's Alliance). The importance of the case lay in the fact that it showed to the Koreans that the American Military Government sought justice even for its political opponents. In this instance, CIC took great pains to secure the punishment of men who had committed a crime while fighting an enemy that also was the American's rival, Communism.

Kim Doo Whan's story went back to the days of the Japanese occupation of Korea. Kim' father was sent out of the country for killing a Japanese, and Kim was subsequently left to grow up on the streets of Seoul. Kim's best friend was another young thug named Chung Chin Yung who joined him in giving the Japanese authorities a tough time until they were hired by the Japanese to organize and run the Police Assistance Association. From then on, Kim and Chung were legal terrorists and informants for the Japanese. When they saw their position dissolve with the end of the war, they became unemployed thugs, and consequently gathered up their youth groups and hired out as strong arms on short notice for political parties. The only trouble was that Chung took his Chosen Chun Wi Dai (Korean Advance Guard) to work for the South Korea Labor Party and Kim hired out to the party of the rightist, Chang Duk Soo. It was then that Kim began to speak of "my old friend, Chung." Unfortunately for Chung, Kim was the hand and foot fighting champion of all Korea. The first time out, Kim beat up Chung and two of Chung's cohorts right in the streets of Seoul. Another time, Chung drew a pistol on Kim who proved equal to the occasion by taking the pistol away and shooting Chung in the knee.*

In April 1947, while right wing Koreans were eagerly awaiting the arrival of Syngman Rhee, considered by many of them to be the future father of their country, the left-wingers were making their plans also. Chung Chin Yong and his thugs had been called upon to distribute pamphlets denouncing Rhee as a grafter and self-interested politician.**

On 20 April, Kim sent out some of his men to pick up the men distributing the anti-Rhee literature, since he had decided that this was as good a time as any to bring his old friend back into the fold. Kim's boys roamed the theater and market district of Seoul, picking up Chung's men singly or in pairs. Within three hours, they had rounded up thirteen leftists, including Chung, and the day's outdoor activity was brought to a close. Chung and his men were lined up in a kneeling position and bound. Kim and his boys began a ceremonial beating of these men in the hope that they might see the error of their ways. The beatings were administered with long, stout sticks of Japanese maple.

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* Interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case #4, 27 February 1948, Subject: Kim Doo Whan and the Dia Han Min Chung (CIC Political Case), (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

Chung boasted that his orders came from Huh Hun, chairman of the SKLP in the absence of Pak Heun Young, and that he obeyed all orders coming from Communist leaders. He further called Syngman Rhee a traitor. At this point, Kim lost his temper and kicked Chung in the chest. He asked his old friend to recant, but Chung refused. Kim administered another blow which apparently started an internal hemorhage, and soon Chung was dead.

CIC Spoils the Fun

During the beatings, one of the leftists had been knocked unconscious and put into the back room to recover. When he regained his senses, he escaped and made his way to a CIC informant who subsequently notified the Seoul District Offices of the disturbances.

Fifteen minutes later, a full scale raid was organized which caught Kim in the act of further carnage. In a small room just off the large central room of the rightist's headquarters, the body of Chung Chin Yong was found. While medical assistance was being secured for the injured followers of Chung, CIC took custody of Kim and his assistant, Shin Yong Kyun.*

The actual on-the-spot investigation of the case presented no serious obstacles to the agents. An autopsy of the murdered leader was made and the doctor's report taken as evidence. Signal Corps photographers took pictures of the victims, the rightists, and the rightist headquarters. The weapons were taken as evidence.** S/A Richard Killin, in charge of the 971st Special Squad, was responsible for the collection and custody of the evidence.***

Because they firmly believed in the righteousness of their actions Kim Doo Whan and his followers readily admitted their part in the murder. In turn, the surviving victims identified the individuals who had beaten them.**** Kim stated that he would gladly commit the same act again for his actions had assured Rhee a safe homecoming.***** Confessions of the beatings were

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* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer In Charge, 21 April 1947, Subject: Dia Han Min Chung, Terroristic Activities of, on 20 April 1947, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case #4, 27 February 1948, Subject: Kim Doo Whan and the Dia Han Min Chung, (CIC Political Case), (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

*** Interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird Md.

**** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case #4, 27 Feb. 1948, Subj: Kim Doo Whan and the Dia Han Min Chung, (CIC Political Case), (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Lib.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For the Officer in Charge, from Seoul DO, 21 April 1947, Subj: Kim Doo Whan, Interrogation of, (Confidential), S&F Lib.

obtained from Kim and the men under him. The evidence was more than sufficient to convict Kim and his men of first degree murder.*

On 26 June 1947 the members of the Dia Han Min Chung were brought to trial in the Seoul District Court. Apparently it had become obvious to the Koreans that the Americans meant business and would be more likely to hand out death sentences than medals. Witnesses claimed that Kim had had nothing to do with the beatings; the ill health of Chung Chin Yong was stressed; and on repeated occasions, the judge and the jury were reminded that the accused were pro-Rhee while the beaten men were leftists and trouble makers of the worst sort.**

Completely ignoring the statements of the victims and the previous confessions of the defendants, the judge and jury maintained that there was insufficient evidence of murder.*** Kim Doo Whan was fined the equivalent of two cartons of cigarettes on the black market.**** Kim Young Tai, one of the lesser Dia Han Min Chung members, openly claimed responsibility for the murder to protect his more important bosses and took a seven-year sentence for his sacrifice.***** The incident pointed up the fact that with the right political backing, in Korea one could get away with almost anything.

It is interesting to note that during the interrogation of Kim and his men, CIC had quite a problem with their interpreters, who were all of rightist sympathies. Interpreters had to be cajoled, promised protection, and severely reprimanded before they would refrain from twisting the truth in favor of Kim. One interpreter quit rather than be a part of what he felt was an unjust investigation. Some of the other Korean employees kept themselves out of sight during the whole series of interrogations. The feeling seemed to be that as long as Kim was a rightist, CIC should let him go without investigation.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case #4, 27 Feb. 1948, Subject: Kim Doo Whan and the Dia Han Min Chung, (CIC Political Case), (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer in Charge, from Seoul DO, Subject: Dia Han Min Chung, Terroristic Activities of, on 20 April 1947, 7 July 1947, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Specific Case #4, 27 Feb. 1947, Subject: Kim Doo Whan and the Dia Han Min Chung, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

**** Interview with M/Sgt. Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

***** USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum For The Officer in Charge, from Seoul DO, Subject: Dia Han Min Chung, Terroristic Activities of, on 20 April 1947, 7 July 1947, (Confidential), Staff and Faculty Library.

MG Orders Retrial

Shortly after the first trial, the Military Governor ordered a retrial, feeling that justice had been kicked around rather liberally by the Korean Court. The trial never was held because the Police, in a weaker moment, had somehow "misplaced" the physical evidence. General Hodge then ordered a retrial before a Military Commission, and CID was given the job of preparing what evidence they could and reinterrogating the principles. The two men put in charge of the interrogations were novices, and shortly before their work was to be completed, it developed that the interpreters were shading the testimony to protect Kim. The interrogations had to be conducted all over again.

The trial ran for the whole month of March 1948; and when the smoke had cleared away, Kim was given a death sentence which was later commuted to life imprisonment by General MacArthur. Early in April 1948, a year after his crime, Kim Doo Whan was sent to prison.

The National Elections were held in May, and by 15 August 1948, Korea was a sovereign nation under the Rhee government. Shortly afterward, Kim was freed.

Kim Doo Whan had never had a chance to acquire the benefit of an education and was illiterate to the extent that he was not exactly sure of the spelling of his own name. Upon his release from prison by the Rhee government, Kim was taken under the wing of a wealthy Korean woman who educated him in the Korean classics and Korean chivalry. After the Korean War, Kim Doo Whan became the Chief of the Investigation Section of the Korean Youth Corps and the personal body guard of Syngman Rhee.*

* Interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 18 September 1954, Fort Holabird, Maryland.

Section 7

CIC AND POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

On 12 March 1947, CIC officially took on the added mission of collecting positive intelligence concerning North Korea. One week later, a letter from the 971st Headquarters was forwarded to all District Offices outlining the reasons and necessity for the special CIC operations.

Command Relies on CIC For Positive Intelligence

This letter to the District Offices mentioned that CIC had been formerly forbidden to engage in positive intelligence collection. But it was noted, the Commanding General had come to rely on CIC not only to confirm the information furnished by other agencies but also to actively seek positive intelligence. As a result of joint conferences of intelligence agencies in January 1947, CIC was specifically assigned positive intelligence missions. The letter formally created the Information Section as the unit to handle the new mission.*

Prior to the official designation of the 971st as a positive intelligence collection agency, scraps of positive intelligence picked up in the course of normal duties had been reported to the G2, XXIV Corps. CIC had participated in the field of positive intelligence as early as November 1945, when information was received concerning the removal of equipment from North Korea by the Russians. Reports were processed by the Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section at this time.

1st Lt. Wallace K. Wittwer, a recent graduate of West Point, was placed in charge of the newly formed Information Section. S/A Donald P. Whitaker, a civilian formerly in the Army, who had considerable intelligence experience, acted unofficially as co-chief. Both men had been in Korea for over a year at the time the Information Section was organized. Wittwer had originally been with the 1036th CIC Detachment, while Whitaker, then a T/Sgt, had been with the 224th.**

Whitaker was extremely valuable because of his Chinese and Korean linguistic ability. He usually began an interrogation with an interpreter, pretending not to

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 2, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and Rosters of the 224th CIC Detachment dated 11 March 1946, (Kansas City Depot Bx 25103.)

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know Korean. At the right moment he would ask the subject questions in Korean and the shock often led to the "breaking" of a person with valuable information.*

Wittwer, as OIC, performed all the necessary administrative functions of the section and processed reports for forwarding to higher headquarters.

OIC Visits District Offices

Soon after the Section was set up, the OIC made a visit to several of the District Offices to explain the work and mission of the section, and to request that one agent specifically be assigned to positive intelligence. This agent had to be thoroughly briefed on the Information Section's EEI and the general situation in North Korea, since it was realized that it would be impossible for every agent to acquire the necessary background on the situation in North Korea.

It was soon discovered, however, that the CIC agents in the field, without access to Central files, could not acquire the full background that members of the Information Section at headquarters were able to develop. As a result, the interrogations held at headquarters were proving to be more fruitful.

Agents were encouraged to pay frequent visits to Headquarters to read the Periodic Summaries of Intelligence and other reports, and through these visits, a few agents became reasonably well versed in the North Korean situation. But all too frequently agents in the field would be transferred or discharged just as they were beginning to produce high quality, useful reports. This rapid turnover of personnel made necessary a procedure whereby agents in the field were used mainly to screen individuals and to send on to Headquarters those who had important information.

In September 1947, permission was obtained from the G2 to send the Periodic Summaries of Intelligence to those District Offices properly equipped to safeguard them. At the same time, another policy was initiated which brought the agents in the field to Seoul for four days of special instruction. In many cases, these classes encouraged a new interest in the collection of positive intelligence in the field.**

At the completion of the first six months of operations, a progress report issued by the Information Section indicated that Seoul, with three agents and the OIC, had

* Interview with Captain Theodore E. Griemann, 10 December 1954, Fort Holabird.

** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 1-15, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

completed fifty-three percent of the total reports rated average and seventy-two percent of the reports rated superior in addition to having performed the processing and administrative functions.

The report also particularly lauded the work of the Taejon District Office and its suboffice at Chongju, although these offices were inland and consequently did not have the abundant opportunities for intelligence gathering that were presented to offices near points of entry into South Korea. 1st Lt. Kenneth MacDougall, OIC in Taejon, and Agents John W. Anderson and Theodore E. Griemann were commended for their excellent work. Frequent trips had been made to Headquarters to look at the Periodic Summaries of Intelligence and other reports, and this procedure seemed to be the key to success at Taejon.* The Taejon Office had also set up a special positive intelligence interrogation room with numerous North Korean maps on the wall for ready use.**

The most frequent failures in reports during the period stemmed from a lack of background information on the part of the interrogator, a failure to use maps during the interrogation, a failure to properly identify troops and equipment by name and description, and a failure to obtain the Chinese characters for names reported.

The attempts to encourage and improve the collection of positive intelligence by the District Offices continued throughout the occupation. The 971st's wide network of field offices was a necessity to successful positive intelligence collection. Since no other intelligence agency had nearly the number of offices that CIC did, it was imperative that CIC utilize its network of offices to the greatest advantage.***

CIC Sends Korean Agents North

For some time the main body of positive intelligence information was obtained from refugees coming from North Korea into the south. The refugees had often seen a great deal in the north, but it was rare when one of them knew much about

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Information Section, Quarterly Progress Report, 26 August 1947, To: Commanding Officer, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library) and USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #29, 6 November 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #2, To: All DOs, CIC-K, 30 April 1947, (Secret), (CIC Central Files.)

*** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Information Section, Quarterly Progress Report, 26 August 1947, To: Commanding Officer, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

the military and political organizations in North Korea. Aware of the shortcomings of their information and sources, the Information Section gradually began to assign specific positive information missions to Korean agents. Usually an agent was briefed and dispatched to obtain information concerning one particular matter. By fitting individual reports together, CIC was able to get the overall military and political picture in North Korea.

After supervising the activities of these Korean operatives for several months, the Information Section noted that the efficiency of the paid agent tended to flag following his first few missions. These agents were usually men who had just recently entered South Korea and knew their way around in North Korea. When first dispatched, the agents willingly carried out their assigned mission. As they grew accustomed to living in South Korea, they became more and more reluctant to head north. Soon they began to hire others to enter North Korea for them and to talk with recent refugees from North Korea. This procedure enabled them to compile enough information to feel confident that they could sell it to the Americans. In some cases, these frauds were uncovered and the persons involved were forced to return the funds paid to them. Because the frauds occurred with frequency, agents seldom were employed for more than one or two missions into North Korea.

Another type of Korean agent was hired solely for the purpose of traveling along the border and contacting other persons who were making their way into South Korea. These recent arrivals were screened and the most important ones were sent to Headquarters for interrogation. The number of agents used to pick up recent arrivals was kept to a minimum by the reluctance of the National Police to honor the passes of these men near the area of the 38th Parallel.

Agents were also used to go into North Korea to contact and arrange for the escape of valuable persons known to be disaffected with the conditions in North Korea.

When it was learned that certain rightist political organizations had formed their own network of agents and their own intelligence section for the purposes of fighting Communism, the Information Section established liaison with them to obtain their collected information. These organizations were useful in finding individuals who had recently escaped from North Korea and in contacting persons who desired to escape. The most important of these rightist groups was the North West Young Men's Association, composed of men who had themselves escaped North Korea. Because of their first-hand experience with Communism, these men were extremely anti-Communist and would go to great lengths to work against the Reds.

Through interrogation of refugees, the use of paid agents of various sorts, and through liaison with rightist political organizations, the Information Section was able to keep posted on happenings north of the 38th Parallel.* At the conclusion of operations in 1948, the Section had turned out more than four thousand reports, about half of which had emanated from Headquarters in Seoul. The peak month was October 1947 when 297 reports were written.**

CIC Takes A Trip To Pyongyang

In one instance travel to the north was not limited to Koreans. In July 1947, the Information Section was able to send eight CIC agents with the American Delegation to Pyongyang for the Joint US-USSR Commission meeting to be held there. The agents went undercover as drivers for the American delegates. This dodge was expected to fool no one, but it proved sufficient to give the agents a chance to see with their own eyes the conditions that prevailed in the police state and made them better able to comprehend the reports of CIC's Korean agents and refugees from the north.

The agents discovered that the Communist domain was full of fear, hunger and hopelessness. Guards, police and army personnel flooded the streets, controlling every move of the civilians. Forced demonstrations greeted the delegates of the Joint Commission. A few brave souls dared to cheer the Americans and their flag, but they were hushed up or hauled off to jail in waiting trucks. It was apparent that the people were subjected to the terrors of a secret police and Communist brutality, and that they were virtually ignorant about the world around them. It was also evident that those who expressed a feeling of doubt about the Communists and their ideas were removed from the local scene in haste.

The CIC agents also noted considerable detail. Korean soldiers were equipped with Soviet weapons and the Korean army was using American-made trucks, probably given to Russia under lend-lease. Great amounts of equipment were piled up everywhere, but there was a desperate lack of food in the stores. The vast majority of the buildings were dilapidated and the back streets were filthy. Most North Koreans appeared tired and bitter.

The agents managed to take about a thousand general photographs of Pyongyang. A picture of the Headquarters of the North Korea Labor Party showed a large

* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 1-15, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

** Above reference and 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 5-15, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

picture of Stalin hanging over the main entrance. Another photograph showed at least twelve American-made two-and-one-half ton trucks with Soviet Army markings being loaded at the Pyongyang railroad station.

While taking these photographs, the agents were trailed at all times by a convoy of Soviet and Korean Intelligence men. While sometimes bothersome, most often the "tail" furnished the agents and onlooking Koreans with a source of amusement. The condition of the Soviet vehicles was poor and their drivers worse; so the Americans, without deliberate intention, usually lost their surveillants. On foot, it was often necessary for the Americans to retrace their steps and politely tap the detectives following them on the shoulder so that they would not become separated. At no time was a CIC agent left to his own devices by either the Korean plainclothesmen, Soviet officers and enlisted men, or teams composed of both Koreans and Russians. The bland unconcern of the Americans confused their surveillants and the presence of the Soviet agents did not materially interfere with the American observations.*

Section Covers Many Subjects

The complete coverage of the North Korean situation by the Information Section can be indicated by noting several fields in which positive intelligence operations were most successful.

The Section was able to keep track of Soviet forces in North Korea, including unit development, personnel, TOE, uniforms, insignia, and training plans. Descriptions and pictures of weapons were obtained and eventually examples of the weapons themselves. In general, CIC was aware of the Order of Battle of Soviet and North Korean forces at all times as well as changes in governmental organization and personalities. To cover the economic situation, CIC collected information concerning food and commodity distribution, industry, mining, and transportation.**

* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #12, To: All District Offices, CIC-K, 10 July 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library) and USAFIK, CIC, Special Report of the North Korea Trip, 27 July 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library), and Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 1-15, (Secret), and 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 5-15, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

The Section diligently sought information on the North Korean press and the people who exercised control over it. Investigations showed that complete Communist control of the press had begun almost the minute the Soviets had arrived. Even two newspapers which had no political connections were immediately closed with the statement that newspapers bearing no relation to the Communist Party would not be allowed.*

General Wedemeyer Receives CIC Report

One of the most comprehensive positive intelligence reports was written by Donald P. Whitaker for General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was on an important trip to the Far East to report on Communist activities and intentions. In the report, dated 28 August 1947, and consequently written after only half a year of operations by the Information Section, Whitaker concluded that: "the aim of the Soviet Forces in North Korea is to establish a Communist government for the whole of Korea, that they will not agree to any government for all Korea that will not result in the establishment of a Communist state, and that there will be no united, free and democratic (in the Western sense) government for the whole of Korea until such time as the present Communist Soviet Government in the USSR is destroyed, either by internal revolution, or through the action of outside, liberating forces." The report went on to summarize concisely events in North Korea since the Russians had taken over.

History of The Soviet Occupation

When the Russian troops had first entered Pyongyang on 27 August 1945, they found already established the National Reconstructing Preparatory Peoples' Committee, composed primarily of Christians, business men, and educators. The head of the committee was Cho Man Sik, a Presbyterian minister.

The Communists set up a committee to govern North Korea and included fifteen members of the Communist Party and fifteen followers of Cho Man Sik. During the latter months of 1945, Cho and his followers, encouraged by the Russians, organized a political party, the Chosen Democratic Party, in opposition to the Communists.

On 28 December 1945, the plan for a trusteeship for all Korea was announced. Immediately Cho Man Sik and his party expressed opposition while the Communists, instructed by the Russians, came out in favor of the plan. Eventually Cho Man Sik and most of his followers resigned from the government.

*USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, Subject: North Korean Newspapers and Their Control, 2 September 1947, (Confidential), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

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On 5 January 1946, Cho Man Sik was placed in protective custody by the Russians. His party was taken over by the Russian-appointed Choi Yong Keun and completely subverted by the Communists. All the major followers of Cho Man Sik were eliminated. The Chosen Democratic Party unwittingly had served the purpose of bringing together all the leading rightists so that the Russians could easily put them out of the picture. From this time on, there could be no word of opposition to the Russians.

And A Forecast

The CIC report included a brief estimate of the current situation in North Korea and went on to predict the eventual outcome resulting from the Soviet influence: "It is the intention of the North Korea Labor Party (the Communists) to set up a government for Korea composed entirely of Communists, or, if this is not feasible, one completely under Communist control. Further, the North Korea Labor Party and the Peoples' Committee are controlled by a small group of Korean returnees from the USSR and from Yenan, China, who work hand-in-glove with the Soviet Political Committee headed by Major General Romanyenko, Military Governor of North Korea. This small group, aided and abetted by the Russians, is determined to force upon the Korean people its own conception of government, regardless of the opinions of the majority...."

The report turned to the armed security force under the thumb of this small group. This force consisted of armed police, railroad guards, coast guards and the Peoples' Army, the latter Soviet trained and equipped and numbering 125,000 to 150,000 men. It was prepared to do the bidding of this inner circle of Communists.

The subject of North Korean Communist cooperation and interdependence with the Communists in other Far East nations was next considered and several instances outlined fully. The report ended by quoting a propaganda slogan which stated what was undoubtedly the real aim of the North Korean and other Asian Communists: "Let us build up a new Manchuria, a new China, and a new Korea in accordance with the principles of STALIN, the same principles by which our great fatherland, Soviet Russia, was built."*

The CIC report, viewed in the light of future events, had laid the cards on the table. The plans of the North Korean Communists and their Russian masters

* USAFIK, CIC, Memorandum for General Wedemeyer, Subject: North Korea, Manchuria, and the USSR, (Confidential), 28 August 1947, (Staff and Faculty Library.)

were known to American intelligence people long before the start of the Korean war. General Wedemeyer's report, made when he returned to the United States, reflected the information and predictions of this and similar reports from other areas in the Far East.

All CIC men in Korea felt that the Communists would forcefully enter Korea some time soon after the Americans left. It was an unavoidable conclusion to those in close contact with the situation.

Section 8

THE SECURITY SECTION

The Security Section of the 971st CIC Detachment was charged with an extensive and varied mission in the Standing Operating Procedure of 29 March 1947. The section's duties included investigations of violations of AR 380-5, initiation of security surveys, some of the investigations of subversion in the military, investigation of disaffection within the military, investigation of all personnel requiring clearance, and all activities involved in maintaining the security of CIC in Korea.*

The Security Section at headquarters had three men specifically assigned to it, the Officer in Charge, his assistant and an administrative agent.** William Ward, a civilian, 1st Lieutenant John M. Fergeson, 1st Lieutenant Wilbur T. Measley, and Captain Elbert H. Eller served, in turn, as OIC of the section.***

The heavy workload of the Security Section in all its fields of operation was attested to by the tallies in the Report for 1948. During the year the section handled 5,484 travel clearances, 1,790 local agency checks, 493 general agency checks and partial background investigations, 41 background investigations for cryptographic clearances, 34 disaffection investigations, 3 cases of subversive activity, 3 investigations of persons impersonating CIC agents, 7 investigations of persons desiring admittance into CIC, 22 violations of AR 380-5, 167 security inspections,and 8 investigations of a miscellaneous nature.****

Section Investigates Chronic Complainer

Disaffection has been called the embryonic stage of subversion and CIC in Korea had to investigate all alleged instances of wavering loyalty in its effort to prevent subversion. One striking case of disaffection which was handled by the Security Section involved an American Department of the Army civilian who had been a U.S. Army Lieutenant. This man was brought to CIC's attention after he had written a letter to the Chief Advisor of the Korean Police complaining bitterly about the Military Government's policy regarding leftists. Investigation revealed that the

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standing Operating Procedure for CIC, Korea, To: All Personnel, CIC, Korea, 29 March 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Lib.

** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

*** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Ft Holabird and Major Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington DC.

**** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, pp. 85-86, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library.

subject met regularly with leftist Koreans and that the drift of his conversation was generally along Communist lines. Most of his associates, both American and Korean, had already been brought to the attention of CIC. In August 1947, the subject wrote another bitter letter, this time to General Hodge, denouncing the "unwarranted" arrest of a Korean friend. Several months later, he continued his complaints by forwarding a petition from a leftist cultural group to General Helmick, then Acting Military Governor, that appealed for an investigation into the right wing's terroristic activities against this cultural society. The subject left Korea in December 1947 under the watch of a CIC informant. His conversations and associations continued to reveal his leftist sympathies. The case was forwarded to the United States with recommendations that the subject be further observed as he returned to the area under FBI jurisdiction.*

Stateside Background Checks Incomplete

Background investigations designed to keep such disaffected people from sensitive positions posed a major problem for CIC in Korea. Department of the Army civilians coming to Korea for sensitive positions were scheduled for security checks by CIC in the United States, but as soon as these individuals sailed for Korea their cases were discontinued in the states, often with only a superficial records check having been made. Case control was transferred to the 971st where only the subjects' activities and associates could be investigated. Consequently, on the basis of a discontinued investigation, temporary clearances which were, in effect, permanent had to be given.** Only after overt actions in Korea brought an individual to the attention of the 971st was there further investigation.

The 971st CIC Detachment felt that higher priorities were given to investigations for other commands than for their own. The Monthly Information Report dated 29 July 1947 contained a recommendation that stateside background investigations on Department of the Army civilians headed for Korea be expedited.***

On the Interoffice Memorandum that he attached to this report, Brigadier General Keyser, Commanding General of the CIC Center, wrote: "after considering the practicability of expediting ZI investigations of WD employees in USAFIK,

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 102, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library and Interview with Captain Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird and with Major Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington DC.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report, 29 July 1947, To: Chief, CIC, Holabird Signal Depot, p. 5, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

I prefer that no IOM to Security Group be written. G2 in USAFIK knows the situation there and if it is too bad, he should have General Hodge write to ID. Stepping up this type of investigation would only slow up other more important types."*

Actually disaffection among civilians in Korea was a major concern to Colonel John N. Robinson, G2, USAFIK. His alarm was expressed in his last minute decision to change the mission of a group of fifteen CIC undercover agents to investigation of Department of Army civilians in Korea from their original mission of investigating Army enlisted personnel, an operation discussed in Section ten of this Chapter.**

Even if proper investigation of civilians had been completed in the United States, there would still have been a problem. So few people volunteered for work as DACs in Korea that Military Government offices in Korea welcomed those they could get and were usually reluctant to refuse clearances even in doubtful cases.***

In spite of these unfortunate complications, some background checks from the United States proved to be extremely important. In 1947, CIC headquarters received the report of a routine background check on a man to be employed as a _____ This report contained considerable derogatory information. From the first day of the local investigation, the case became one of great controversy. The subject was extremely likeable and made a favorable impression on all men who had contact with him. The special report from the United States indicated that the subject was currently using an alias and that, under his real name, he had been a member of the Communist Party and had been involved in much Communist activity. Before CIC could check his fingerprints with the FBI, the subject departed from Korea and the investigation in Korea was forwarded to other offices.****

Security Surveys Neglected

Security Surveys were part of the mission of the Security Section. The section set a tentative goal of one survey per week for each office, but Weekly Information

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* Interoffice Memorandum, Counter Intelligence Corps Center, Subject: Monthly Report of Activities, 971st CIC Detachment, July 1947; 4 September 1947, Remark #5, To: Executive Officer, From: Commanding General dated 15 September 1947, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington DC.

*** Interview with Major Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington DC.

**** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 104, (Secret) Staff & Faculty Library and Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

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Bulletins indicate that this goal was not always attained. Surveys were frequently haphazard when they were conducted. The following remark in the Information Bulletin of 29 December 1947 was typical of the attempts to urge District Offices to increase the quality and quantity of Security Surveys. "The attention of all District Offices and Sub-offices is invited to the fact that in the past few months very few Security Surveys have been received by this Headquarters.... Security is a continuing thing and cannot be emphasized one week or one month and forgotten the next. Security surveys should be conducted continuously by each particular office, on the basis of one military installation per week, whether it be a Regimental Headquarters, a Company orderly room, a military barracks, a motor pool, a POL dump, a few warehouses or anything else. If it is military in nature, it should be surveyed for security. If a repetition of surveys becomes necessary, all the better. In such a case an opportunity is afforded to see that previous recommendations for improvement of security have been carried out.*

Agents were urged to be on the lookout for security hazards, even when assigned to other cases or off duty. Routine security surveys and inspections had such a low priority in Korea, that much that should have been done was neglected. But this neglect was not universal as the following quote from the Monthly Bulletin of 4 June 1948 indicated: "S/A Gillies of the Seoul District Office turned in two extremely commendable security surveys during this past month.... One survey that he worked on was of such unusual interest in pointing out defects in regard to fire hazards and lack of security-consciousness of personnel that this headquarters deemed it advisable to forward the original copy of the survey directly to the Commanding General, 7th Infantry.... Perhaps that one report will be as a 'lever' to cause to be instituted among all Seoul units of the Division a general drive for security and the reduction of careless fire hazards. If such occurs, then once again, CIC has been of value to the tactical command in a material way."**

In February 1948, the policy of one Security Survey a week per office was discontinued. Basic SOPs were sent to all offices, stating that surveys would not be initiated or conducted unless specifically requested by the Commanding Generals of the 6th Division, the 7th Division, or Korean Base Command for their particular units.***

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #36, 29 December 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Bulletin No. 3, 4 June 1948, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

*** USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin No. 41, 2 February 1948, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Lib.

Section Checks CIC Security Weaknesses

Although each agent was expected to be security conscious to the best of his ability, it was the job of the Security Section to ferret out leaks in the security of CIC and continually to remind the agents of areas where possible slips might occur. For instance, it was the Security Section's responsibility to halt the practice which developed in some sub-offices late in 1947 of including tactical units on distribution of investigation reports. All the offices responsible for such errors had to retrieve the misdirected reports and send a statement to this effect to the Security Section.*

It was also part of the Security Sections mission to prevent identification of CIC personnel in public. Once again, of course, the prime responsibility had to rest with the individual agent. One major source of disclosure was mention of agents names in Service publications when CIC personnel were transferred on orders.**

Often agents returning to the United States in uniform were compromised on shipboard. When the seriousness of this problem became apparent, Lieutenant Measley and WOJG Mark Huss received permission to travel home in civilian clothes to determine how effective such a procedure would be in cutting down compromise incidents. When Huss was compromised early in the trip, the two men agreed to ignore each other the rest of the way, and Measley was able to make the trip without being identified.

CIC ran background investigations on all agents who were locally procured. However, there was no rapid way to find out whether an individual under consideration had been rejected by or separated from CIC in another part of the world. Consequently, inefficient and dangerous personnel could worm their way into CIC in one area after rejection by another.

The Security Section suffered heavily from the extreme shortage of CIC personnel in Korea. The usual low priority on the section's work meant that many important duties were neglected in favor of more pressing matters from other sections.***

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* USAFIK, CIC, Weekly Information Bulletin No. 27, 23 October 1947, To: All District Offices, CIC-Korea, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Lib.

** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Report of Activities, 1 September 1948, To: CIC Center, Ft Holabird, (Secret), Staff & Faculty Library.

*** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954 at Fort Holabird, Md.

Section 9

THE SPECIAL SQUAD

The duties of the Special Squad were outlined in the SOP dated 29 March 1947 as follows: procurement, supervision and control of all Korean interpreters and translators used by CIC, the processing of all foreign language documents, supervision of "Special Projects" (reports involving extensive research in CIC files), and preparation and custody of evidence in cases requiring prosecution.*

The Special Squad was originally headed by S/A Richard C. Killin, a civilian, who had been among the first group of the 224th to arrive in Korea.** He had been separated from the service in April 1946 as a First Lieutenant, but had agreed to stay with CIC in a civilian capacity.*** When Killin returned to the United States, WOJG S. S. Browning, who, like Killin, had been a lawyer, took over the position.**** Two agents and a clerk typist were included on the Special Squad's roster.*****

Great Reliance Placed On Indigenous Koreans

The major problem for the Special Squad was the procurement and supervision of Korean interpreters and translators. Since only a few of the agents spoke any Korean at all, CIC had to rely heavily on indigenous Korean interpeters who were generally a mercenary lot, taking advantage of any situation favorable to them. Many were former employees of the Japanese, which left CIC open to charges of harboring Japanese collaborators. When it suited their purposes, the interpreters were able to twist their interpretations and keep CIC in the dark.******

Since reliable interpreters and translators were at such a premium, CIC was gratified to find some men who, time and again, demonstrated their loyalty. Shin

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Standard Operating Procedure for CIC, USAFIK, To: All CIC Personnel, Korea, 29 March 1947, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

** USAFIK, 224th CIC Detachment, Subject: Roster of the CIC in Korea, 11 March 1946, (Kansas City Depot Bx 25103)

*** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for April 1947, 30 April 1947, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, Pentagon, (Secret), (Staff & Fac Lib.)

**** Interview with M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley, 12 Oct 54, Fort Holabird.

***** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 135, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

****** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

Jung Kyoon, originally recommended and procured by 1st Lt. Harry H. Dow, was the most trusted of the Koreans. Shin had been Korean representative for the Singer Sewing Machine Company and was unusually "Westernized." Shin and Killin worked to standardize the English spelling of Korean names for CIC reports. Without an SOP, agents had been using all the diverse spellings for anglicizing Korean names in their reports with the result that the Seoul files were in a chaotic state. To indicate the scale of the problem, the Korean name "Lee," one of the most common, could also be anglicized in about forty ways including the following: Rhee, Rhii, Ri, Li, Ree, Yi, Yee, E, Ee, and I. Although it was too late for the 971st to adopt Shin's standard spelling system completely, it was put to use by CIC in the Korean War.* Another valuable interpreter was Suh Sung Kyong, known to all as "Old Mr. Suh." This trusted old man and his whole family were publicly executed by the Communists in Seoul during the war.**

Among the unscrupulous linguists was Song Kong Sam, an interpreter for the Inchon District Office late in the occupation. Song defected after the invasion and later became a Communist guerrilla leader. Undoubtedly he was able to supply the Reds with considerable information concerning the operations of the 971st during the occupation.***

In addition to controlling interpreters and translators, the Special Squad was in charge of all Korean CIC personnel. Only about one in ten Koreans reporting for work could be accepted. A detailed interview at the time of application was made to ascertain the applicant's ability and fitness. If the Korean seemed desirable, he was given a Personal History Statement form to fill out. Later he appeared before the Operations Officer who thoroughly questioned him on his political beliefs and affiliations. If the applicant passed these screenings he was sent to be photographed and his Personal History Statement was turned over to the Security Section for a background investigation. If the clearance was granted, the applicant was put on a sixty-day trial basis, during which time his work and actions were carefully checked.

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* USAFIK, CIC, Subject: SOP for the Spelling of Korean Names, To: CIC District and Sub-District Offices, 21 May 1947, (Confidential), /s/ Richard C. Killin, SAIC, Special Squad, (Staff and Faculty Library) and Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** Letter to Major John O. Garrison, Deputy Chief Of Staff, Hq AIC, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Md., from Hq, US Army Forces Antilles and MD of Puerto Rico, in response to questions concerning 971st activities, 22 November 1954, /s/ Joseph Genovese, Captain, (Confidential.)

Dismissal as well as employment of Korean personnel was within the province of the Special Squad.*

In accord with the mission of processing all foreign language documents, the task of translating the great bulk of documents taken by CIC during the nationwide raids on all SKLP Headquarters on 12 August 1947 fell to the Special Squad. These documents included books, propaganda leaflets, party directives and party membership lists. Screening these documents was a three-month task. A list of titles and a rough outline of the contents of each document was sent to the G2, USAFIK, who then compiled a list of the individual documents that he wanted translated in detail.

A Helpful Young Man Enters The Scene

When WOJG Browning was in charge of the Special Squad, an informant came to him with the news that he could pick up some SKLP documents if Browning was interested. The Korean was given enthusiastic approval and went on his way. A few hours later he backed a truck up to the CIC offices and deposited two safes, still locked and full of documents, and an untold number of boxes of documents. The Korean had rounded up a group of strong-arm specialists from the North West Young Men's Association and barged into the SKLP Headquarters to seize the documents. Of course, the SKLP had much to say about American police tactics, but the documents and the safes were never returned.**

Section In Charge of Confidential Funds

Although the SOP did not mention that the Special Squad was in charge of the procurement and distribution of confidential funds, the Section was assigned the added responsibility. During 1947, confidential funds granted the 971st CIC Detachment were in the neighborhood of $3,000 a month, an amount increased during 1948 to $5,000 a month. However, an unrealistic exchange rate (50 hwan/1 dollar) prevented this "hard cash" from being enough to cover CIC's necessary commitments. The Special Squad purchased cigarettes and "incentive" goods, some of which were converted into Korean currency when such extra-legal action was an operational necessity. The remaining supplies were utilized for the direct payment of informants. Additional "incentive" supplies, particularly clothing, were obtained from various civilian relief agencies and utilized for confidential

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* 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), p. 135, (Staff and Faculty Library).

** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

purposes. Contacts with medical channels resulted in the procurement of relatively large supplies of Sulfa drugs and antibiotics, unobtainable in the civilian economy.*

The "Special Projects" mentioned in the SOP were long range research reports on various features of CIC activity in Korea. Three of the more important of these reports were: "The Pro-Japanese Issue," "Sabotage Since 1945," and "Soviet-Communist Inspired Espionage."** Often, however, members of the Special Squad were too much engrossed in their daily assignments to devote sufficient time to these projects.*** Much of this work was absorbed by the Reports and Analysis Section.

The legal aspect of the Special Squad's mission was in experienced hands since both Killin and Browning were lawyers. The case that involved the most legal work was the case of Kim Doo Whan, covered in Section 6. Since CIC arrived at the scene of the crime when all the principals were still present, there was a large amount of evidence for this case. Procurement, preparation and custody of this evidence fell to Killin and the Special Squad in accord with its mission.****

Beginning in May 1948, the Special Squad was gradually dissolved. The varied duties were farmed out to other sections and a new unofficial section was created to handle the interpreters and translators with Donald O. Shirley the Agent-in-Charge.*****

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* Interview with Major Marion R. Panell, 18 October 1954, Fort Holabird, and CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with CWO John R. Dilworth, 16 September 1954, Fort Holabird.

*** 1947 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, p. 135, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

**** USAFIK, CIC, Monthly Information Report for April 1947, 30, April 1947, To: Director of Intelligence, WDGS, Pentagon, (Secret), (Staff and Faculty Library.)

***** Interview with Master Sergeant Donald O. Shirley, 12 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

Section 10

"OPERATION BLUE"

** Interview with Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

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(U) * Interview with Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

** Interview with William J. McTigue, 23 November 1954, Washington.

*** Interview with Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

**** Letter to Major James T. Reitz, ExO, CICC, Subject: Special Assignment in Korea, /s/ Floyd S. Dunning, S/A, CIC, (Unclassified), 7 August 1947, (CICC Files).

***** Interview with Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

****** Interview with George Henderson, 22 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

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* Interviews with George Henderson, 22 October 1954, and Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, both at Fort Holabird.

** Interview with Captain William I. Jennings, 28 October 1954, Fort Holabird.

Section 11

PHASING OUT

In July 1948, when it was known that CIC would soon withdraw from Korea, Syngman Rhee, Col. Thomas Watlington, G2, XXIV Corps, and Lt. Col. H. E. Erickson, American Advisor to the Korean National Police, after many conferences, decided that a South Korean organization modeled after CIC should be established. At the insistence of Rhee, the organization was to be actually composed of civilians.

CIC Aids Research Bureau

Colonel Huckins named Major Theodore Roberts and Captain Richard Fox from the 971st to procure, organize, and train the personnel to be assigned to this agency. The great majority of the men were drawn from the National Police and the Korean employees of CIC. A training school was established at the National Police Academy in Seoul and the first six-week course began in mid-July 1948.

The organization was named the Korean Research Bureau and the T/O set at 315 men. There were only sixty men in the first class which graduated in late August. Immediately thereafter, a class of 240 began training at the Kyonggi Middle School near the capitol building in Seoul. Some of the better students from the first class served as instructors to this second group.

The curriculum for the Research Bureau school included all aspects of counterintelligence: safeguarding information, report writing, security surveys, interrogations, counterespionage, surveillance, arrests and searches, undercover investigations, background investigations, informants, riot control, police laboratory methods, document examination, observation and description, and preservation of evidence.

When the second class graduated in early October, Research Bureau personnel were assigned to the CIC District Offices.

Because the National Assembly would not sanction the Research Bureau as an official government agency, it was necessary to establish an investigative agency within the Korean Constabulary called the Special Investigations Section. A group of selected officers of the Constabulary were ordered to Seoul for a month-long counterintelligence course. Upon returning to their units, these men were to set up detachments modeled after CIC.

When CIC left in December 1948, the two Korean counterintelligence organizations were left to fend for themselves. Shortly afterward the Korean Research

Bureau ceased to exist and all CIC functions were left to the Special Investigations Sections of the Constabulary.*

Skeleton Staff Left in Korea

Gradually, through the final months of 1948, CIC turned its functions over to the Korean Research Bureau. A majority of CIC's files were placed in the hands of this organization.**

On 31 December 1948, the largest remaining group of agents of the 971st left Korea. However, since a considerable segment of the XXIV Corps still remained in Korea, it was necessary to keep a skeleton staff of the 971st on the peninsula. Captain Harry W. Baker was left in charge of the following sixteen agents: Gene M. Eubank, Edward F. Marsh, George E. Brown, George Stroebel, Jr., Patrick C. Pisauro, Steve P. Kuhar, Donald S. Koonce, Vincent P. Smith, Elmer Smith, Joseph Genovese, Yukinobu Fukioka, Michael Nidositko, Charles F. Bruce, Chester E. Carpenter, Robert W. Kilpatrick, and Paul H. Roe.

Under Baker, Nidositko served as Operations Officer, Genovese as Chief of the Political Section, Carpenter as Chief of the North Korean Order of Battle Section (comparable to the former information section), and Bruce as Office in Charge of the Seoul District Office. Vincent Smith and Fukioka took care of administrative matters and Kilpatrick was Liaison Officer.

Basically the mission of this group was exactly the same as the mission of its predecessor. Due to the efforts of well-placed informants, the unit was able to keep higher headquarters posted on the political situation in Korea. Often CIC was able to predict the various alignments of the still numerous political parties and the various changes in the Rhee government. The collection of positive intelligence on North Korea was equally successful.

Among the significant cases investigated by this unit was a case of suspected espionage involving a stateless White Russian who had been recruited by the U. S. Army for deep sea diving. A CIC investigation linked him with the Communists, and he was denied a visa to enter the United States by the State Department on the strength of this investigation. This unit continued the earlier investigation of the Russian colony connected to the Seoul Orthodox Church. Another

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* GHQ, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, Letter, Subject: Korean CIC Organization and Function, To: Chief, CIC, Fort Holabird, Md., 7 July 1951, (Confidential), Staff & Faculty Library (Document is Appendix 4 to this chapter.) and , Interview with Major Elbert H. Eller, 20 October 1954, Washington, DC.

** Interview with Captain Wilbur T. Measley, 30 September 1954, Fort Holabird, Md.

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investigation by CIC brought to justice the Communists responsible for the murder of the wife of an American missionary in Korea.

There were many cases involving the smuggling of gasoline from South Korea to the Communists in China.

The majority of tactical troops left Korea in late May 1949. At this time the 971st was deactivated and the seventeen men who had performed CIC operations during the last months were placed on orders to leave Korea.*

* Letter to Major John O. Garrison, Deputy Chief of Staff, Hq, AIC, Fort Holabird, Md., from Hq, US Army Forces Antilles and Military District of Puerto Rico, in response to questions concerning 971st CIC Detachment activities, dated 22 November 1954, /s/ Joseph Genovese, Captain, (Confidential), Correspondence file.

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APPENDIX 1

PERSONNEL OF THE 971ST CIC DETACHMENT

1. Roster as of 11 March 1946.
2. Roster as of 23 December 1948.
3. Roster of other CIC Agents in Korea.
4. Roster of Personnel in important positions with the 971st CIC Detachment.

1. ROSTER AS OF 11 MARCH 1946

224th CIC Det

Day, Emmett E.	1st Lt.
Dow, Harry H.	1st Lt
Killin, Richard C.	2d Lt
Patchell, James K.	2d Lt
Campbell, Joseph W.	T/Sgt
Whitaker, Donald P.	T/Sgt
Avison, Gordon W., Jr.	S/Sgt
Eken, Truman C.	S/Sgt
James, John E.	S/Sgt
Roberts, Bernard V.	Sgt
Sakumoto, Seiya	Sgt
*Sakai, Jack	T/4
*Tsuchiyama, Tommy	T/4
*Tokushige, William T.	T/5
*Yoshida, John D.	T/5
Cho, Kee Nam	Cpl

1034th CIC Det

Holmes, Van C.	Capt
Midianko, Frank H., Jr.	1st Lt
Bjorklund, Bob L.	2d Lt
Hashizume, Shoichi	S/Sgt
Baba, Yoshio	Sgt
Fujioka, Yukinobu	Sgt
Kankani, Takeichi	Cpl
Nakagawa, Giro	Cpl
Adachi, Shizuo	Sgt

1035th CIC Det

Woods, Arthur A., Jr.	Capt
Harbin, Jay B.	1st Lt
Cassidy, Alfred B.	2d Lt
Heimann, Raymond A.	S/Sgt
Bungo, Jimmy J.	Sgt
Hara, Walter S.	Sgt
Kageyama, Bob E.	Sgt

* Attached Unassigned Personnel.

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2. ROSTER AS OF 23 DECEMBER 1948

Fox Richard A.	Capt
Hessevick, George I.	Capt
Steele, Joseph C.	Capt
Steiner, Ellis A.	Capt
Stevens, George B.	Capt
Genovese, Joseph (NMI)	1st Lt
Hancock, William A.	1st Lt
Harbidge, Kenneth R.	1st Lt
Kavanagh, William J.	1st Lt
Roth, Edward (NMI)	1st Lt
Shauklas, Victor F.	1st Lt
Sweet, Francis R.	1st Lt
Twombley, Joseph G.	1st Lt
Webb, Dennis (NMI)	1st Lt
Weinberger, Howard W.	1st Lt
White, Everett B.	1st Lt
Wilson, Jackson L.	1st Lt
Wright, Charles E., Jr.	1st Lt
Wyllie, Robert, Jr. (NMI)	1st Lt
Gochenour, John C.	1st Lt
Goff, William J.	1st Lt
Timpano, Angelo J.	1st Lt
Quigg, John (NMI)	CWO
Arnold, B.D.	WOJG
Koettner, Frank X., Jr.	WOJG
Koonce, Donald S.	WOJG
Minnihan, Ira S.	WOJG
Church, William K.	M/Sgt
Norrick, Gordon D.	M/Sgt
Reynolds, Robert S.	M/Sgt
Brady, Even E.	SFC
Buster, Dan W.	SFC
Cyr, Chester H.	SFC
Grice, William E.	SFC
Gruenewald, Harold (NMI)	SFC
Harpel, William F.	SFC
McCutcheon, James B.	SFC
Nelson, Richard O.	SFC
Parke, Alan L.	SFC
Reed, William R.	SFC
Sackett, Harold W., Jr.	SFC
Stevenson, Alvin E.	SFC
Swonder, Joseph A.	SFC

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1035th CIC Det (Cont'd)

Akiyame, Teruo	Cpl
Anderson, John K.	Cpl
Maduffer, Merle C.	Cpl

1036th CIC Det

Moses, Albert	2d Lt
Wittwer, Wallace K.	2d Lt
Arita, Katsuyoshi	Sgt
Fujie, Asa A.	Sgt
Kuramoto, Yoso	Sgt
Kunugi, Jimmie H.	Cpl
McTigue, William J.	Cpl
Ward, William G.	Cpl

1110th CIC Det

Sergeant, Maurice D.	Capt
Weatherholt, Charles S.	1st Lt
Jones, Harold E.	T/4
Interlandi, John G.	Pfc

1111th CIC Det

Buckley, Robert G.	1st Lt
Rathje, Theron L.	2d Lt
Wingfield, Hale	2d Lt
Tanaka, Francis F.	T/Sgt
Ishihara, James H.	S/Sgt
Leicher, William	S/Sgt
Abe, Davis S.	Sgt
Van Leeuwen, George H.	Sgt

7th CIC Det

Sinn, Donald F.	1st Lt
Tognetti, Paul	Sgt

Hqs, XXIV Corps, 224th CIC Detachment, Subject: CIC Monthly Administration Report, To: Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, Washington 25, D.C., 11 March 1946, /s/Maurice D. Sergeant, Captain, CAC, Adjutant (for the Commanding Officer), (Unclassified), KCD BX25103.

Taylor, Robert J.	SFC
Wojciechowski, Henry A.	SFC
Connolly, John T.	Sgt
Fedorowich, Walter	Sgt
Havelin, Alan D.	Sgt
Kish, William M.	Sgt
Moriarty, Richard P.	Sgt
Nelson, Bennett O.	Sgt
Pogledich, Frank Jr. (NMI)	Sgt
Remes, Waino	Sgt
Robinson, James F.	Sgt
Anders, Elbert N.	Cpl
Baum, Maurice (NMI)	Cpl
Brown, Gordon K.	Cpl
Gorelick, Harold	Cpl
Hammond, John F.	Cpl
Lightner, Frederick W.	Cpl
Smith, William B.	Cpl
Olivas, Sabino III	Pfc

Hqs, XXIV Corps, 971st CIC Detachment, Letter, Subject: CIC Personnel, To: Commanding Officer, 441st CIC, GHQ, 23 December 1948, /s/ G. B. Stevens, Captain, Infantry, Adjutant (for the Commanding Officer), (Kansas City Depot C3744).

3. OTHER CIC AGENTS IN KOREA

Officers

Adams, Arvel T.	WOJG
Ahn, Harry H. B.	WOJG
Allen, Wayne H.	1st Lt
Baker, Harry W.	Capt
Beistal, Arthur E.	Capt
Benjamin, Lawrence E.	WOJG
Bellin, Robert W.	1st Lt
Brake, Harold D.	WOJG
Bratcher, Guffy L.	WOJG
Browning, Samuel S.	WOJG
Carmen, Thomas R.	1st Lt
Carpenter, Chester E.	1st Lt
Crandell, Charles A.	WOJG
Dilworth, John R.	WOJG
Dumond, John L.	WOJG
Eberlein, Carl A.	1st Lt
Egan, Donald H.	Capt
Eller, Elbert H.	Capt
Ewbank, Gene M.	1st Lt
Ferguson, John M., Jr.	1st Lt
Gering, George W., Jr.	1st Lt
Gordon, William R.	Capt
Gottardi, Milton T.	WOJG
Griemann, Theodore E.	WOJG
Funk, Robert L.	Capt
Hazen, Alfred W.	WOJG
Howard, Taylor D.	Capt
Huckins, Joseph (NMI)	Lt Col
Huss, Mark C.	WOJG
Johnson, Lemuel S.	Capt
Johnson, Paul H., Jr.	WOJG
Kelly, John J., Jr.	1st Lt
Kilpatrick, Robert W.	WOJG
Law, James E.	1st Lt
Lee, Chong W.	WOJG
Legare, Eugene V.	Capt
Lim, Stuart	WOJG
MacDougall, Kenneth E.	1st Lt
McNitt, Andrew R.	2d Lt
Marfori, Edmundo J.	1st Lt
Marsh, Edward F.	WOJG

Officers (Cont'd)

Measley, Wilbur T.	1st Lt
Merritt, Henry C.	1st Lt
Meurlott, Byron M.	Lt. Col
Molina, Orlando A.	Capt
Moore, James M.	2d Lt
Myers, Melvin D.	2d Lt
Narel, Andrew	Capt
Nidositko, Michael (NMI)	Capt
Panell, Marion R.	Capt
Phillips, Warren B.	Capt
Piefke, John B.	WOJG
Pierce, Richard A.	Capt
Pisauro, Patrick C.	WOJG
Potvin, Vernon A.	WOJG
Presley, Lemuel I.	1st Lt
Randell, Robert U.	WOJG
Ream, Ellis A.	Capt
Reed, Jack B.	Maj
Ricci, John C.	WOJG
Roberts, Theodore J.	Maj
Robichaud, Albert (NMI)	1st Lt
Robinson, Jerome D.	2d Lt
Roderick, David N.	WOJG
Roe, Paul H.	2d Lt
Rogers, Herman M.	WOJG
Scott, Edward L.	Capt
Siegal, Erwin A.	1st Lt
Smith, Elmer L.	WOJG
Smith, Roderick K.	Capt
Stoops, John A.	WOJG
Stroebel, George, Jr. (NMI)	WOJG
Sugarek, Charles L.	Capt
Ulibarri, Prudencio D.	Capt
Walter, William F.	1st Lt
Ward, Palmer W.	1st Lt
Wattigny, Charles C.	1st Lt
Whalen, James J.	WOJG
Wheeler, Robert H.	1st Lt
Wiseman, T. J.	WOJG
Wurtz, Robert H.	Capt
Yurko, Albert (NMI)	WOJG

Enlisted Men

Ackley, Cortland G.	SFC
Atkins, Louis H.	Sgt
Baughman, Billy J.	Sgt
Beck, Charles R.	Sgt
Beckman, Morris H.	Sgt
Blue, John I.	Sgt
Braccio, Francis A.	Sgt
Brown, George E.	---
Butler, R. L.	---
Cannan, Richard L.	S/Sgt
Carmell, Samuel	M/Sgt
Choy, Robert C. W.	S/Sgt
Cook, Wilfred C.	T/Sgt
Cordova, Carlos (NMI)	Sgt
Cowan, John H.	SFC
Crossman, William E.	Sgt
Dudley, Herbert M.	Sgt
Dutko, Joseph J.	Sgt
Eggert, John W.	S/Sgt
Frechette, Telesphore	S/Sgt
Floyd, Samuel F.	Cpl
Gillies, John A.	M/Sgt
Green, Francis J.	1st Sgt
Greene, T. M.	---
Griffith, Billy J.	Sgt
Hammond, Richard I.	Sgt
Hatch, R. W.	---
Hawn, Harry K.	S/Sgt
Hooper, Ray E.	Sgt
Howser, Donald W.	Sgt
Hummel, Harold S.	SFC
Hutchins, John A.	---
Jackson, William S.	S/Sgt
Jeuick, William	---
Kang, Peter	---
Keeler, Richard P.	Sgt
Kiger, Willie M.	Sgt
Kim, Harold S. O.	S/Sgt
Kim, Hash C.	Sgt
Krowel, Richard W.	Cpl
Kuhar, Steve P.	M/Sgt
Lane, Harold A. V.	M/Sgt
Lavergne, Nelson G.	Sgt

Enlisted Men (Cont'd)

Lavold, Ernest (NMI)	Sgt
Lizotte, Joseph C.	Sgt
Lee Yong Soon	S/Sgt (later DAC)
Marsh, Frank H.	---
Marshall, William R.	Sgt
Massey, Eugene S.	Cpl
McKillop, Archibald C.	T/Sgt
McWhirter, George W.	S/Sgt
Miller, Charles C.	Sgt
Misener, Robert J.	Sgt
Nehren, Carl P.	T/Sgt
Oggs, James R., Jr.	T/Sgt
Oravec, Frank T.	Sgt
Pang, Daniel	---
Park, Chauncey C.	Cpl
Pearson, Edwin E.	M/Sgt
Pfister, Arthur E.	Sgt
Pineda, Umberto (NMI)	Sgt
Ross, James T.	T/Sgt
Shanks, Dave D.	T/Sgt
Shirley, Donald O.	T/Sgt
Shuffield, Wayne E.	Sgt
Slusher, Golden B.	Sgt
Smith, Kelly B., Jr.	Sgt
Smith, Vincent P.	---
Stein, Herbert J.	Sgt
Stine, James H.	Sgt
Sushansky, William (NMI)	Sgt
Swanson, Douglas N.	Sgt
Swinnerton, Arthur L.	---
Thomas, Lauren F.	T/Sgt
Tanaka, Thomas T.	T/Sgt
Turner, Roger E.	M/Sgt
Urroz, Hector C.	Sgt
Villyard, James G.	SFC
Wheeler, Ernest W.	Sgt

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Enlisted Men (Cont'd)

Wong, Bing Y.	T/4
Yang, Stephan S. S.	Sgt

With the exception of the rosters dated 11 March 1946 and 23 December 1948, there is no listing of CIC personnel in Korea during the occupation. The preceding list was compiled from reports and correspondance of the 971st CIC Detachment and the 224th CIC Detachment, records of credentials issued and recalled from the 441st CIC Detachment, and the remembrance of former agents of the 971st. Among the latter, CWO John R. Dilworth and M/Sgt Donald O. Shirley were particularly helpful.

4. PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS

Commanding Officer, 224th CIC Det
- Lt Col Byron M. Meurlott
- Capt William R. Gordon
- Capt Van C. Holmes

Commanding Officer, 971st CIC Det
- Maj Jack B. Reed
- Maj Theodore J. Roberts
- Lt Col Joseph Huckins
- Capt Harry W. Baker

Operations Officer
- 1st Lt Harry H. Dow
- 1st Lt James K. Patchell
- Capt Orlando A. Molina
- Capt George I. Hessevick

Executive Officer (position not filled until early 1948)
- Capt Marion R. Panell
- Maj Theodore J. Roberts

OIC Political Section
- 1st Lt James K. Patchell
- Capt Orlando A. Molina
- Capt Marion R. Panell

OIC Information Section
- 1st Lt Wallace K. Wittwer
- Mr. Donald P. Whitaker (unofficially shared duties with Lt Wittwer)

OIC ES&M Section
- 1st Lt Wallace K. Wittwer
- Mr. William J. McTigue

OIC Security Section
- Mr. William G. Ward
- 1st Lt John M. Ferguson, Jr.
- 1st Lt Wilbur T. Measley
- Capt Elbert H. Eller

4. PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS (Cont'd)

OIC Special Squad

Mr. Richard C. Killin
WOJG Samuel S. Browning

OIC Reports and Analysis Section

2d Lt Albert R. Moses
1st Lt Alfred B. Cassidy
Capt Ellis A. Ream
1st Lt Kenneth E. MacDougall
Capt George I. Hessevick

OIC Seoul District Office

Capt Jay B. Harbin
Capt Elbert H. Eller
1st Lt Carl A. Eberlein
1st Lt Kenneth E. MacDougall
Capt Ellis A. Steiner

[redacted]

APPENDIX 2

DISTRICT OFFICES OF THE 971ST CIC DETACHMENT

1. District Offices in September 1946.
2. District Offices in May 1947.
3. District Offices in December 1948.

[redacted]

1. District Offices in September 1946*	2. District Offices in May 1947**	3. District Offices in December 1948***
SEOUL	SEOUL	SEOUL (Uijongbu Sub-office)
SONGDO	SONGDO (Kaesong, Ongjin, Chunchon, Kangnung, Wonju)	INCHON
INCHON	INCHON	KANGNUNG (Samchok Sub-office)
KANGNUNG (Chunchon Sub-office)	TAEJON (Chongju Sub-office)	TAEJON
TAEJON (Chongju Sub-office)	PUSAN	PUSAN (Masan Sub-office)
PUSAN (Chinju Sub-office)	KWANGJU (Mokpo Sub-office)	KWANGJU (Mokpo Sub-office)
KWANGJU	CHONJU (Kunsan Sub-office)	CHONJU (Kunsan Sub-office)
CHONJU	TAEGU	TAEGU (Pohang Sub-office)
TAEGU	CHEJU DO	CHEJU DO
		KAESONG
		ONGJIN
		CHUNCHON
		CHONGJU

* 971st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Organizational Chart dated 7 September 1946, attached to letter from GHQ, USAF, Pacific, MI Section, General Staff, dated 28 August 1946, Subject: Organization, Disposition, and Strength of the 971st CIC Detachment within the XXIV Corps, To: ACofS, G2, XXIV Corps, APO 235, (Unclassified), Kansas City Depot files, C3743.

** USAFIK, CIC, Subject: Weekly Information Bulletin #5, 22 May 1947, To: All District Offices of the 971st CIC Detachment, (Secret), CIC Central Files.

*** 1948 Annual Progress Report, 971st CIC Detachment, from a map included in this document, (Secret), Staff and Faculty Library.

APPENDIX 3

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE OF THE 971ST CIC DETACHMENT

1. Standard Operating Procedure, dated 29 March 1947
2. Amendments to Standard Operating Procedure, dated 14 April 1947

[redacted]

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

29 March 1947

SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea.

TO : All Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel, Korea.

SECTION I

General

1. Purpose

To standardize administrational and operational procedures for the Counter Intelligence Corps in Korea. To clarify the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps and to provide for uniform reporting and compilation of records.

2. Mission

The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is governed by:

a. War Department letter AG 322, CIC (31 October 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 13 November 1944, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. AFPAC regulations #100-10 dated 1 August 1945.

c. AFPAC letter AG 322 (22 March 1946), CI.

d. USAFIK letter AG 322 (TFGBI) dated 30 April 1946.

The basic mission of Counter Intelligence Corps is to assist in the maintenance of military security. The mission has now been enlarged to require special investigative activity in both the Positive Intelligence and Counter Intelligence fields involving political groups and social organizations and the collection of information relating to adjacent areas to insure the successful completion of the over-all mission of the U. S. Forces in Korea to set up a democratic form of government as outlined in Headquarters XXIV Corps letter TFOIE dated 15 January 1947.

This document regraded CONFIDENTIAL by Order Secretary of the Army per letter dtd 8 Apr 55 on file in G2, AIC; document on file in Historical Project, AIC

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

3. Organization and Equipment

a. The Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Forces, Korea, is organized under T/O&E 30-500 and constitutes one A4, six B2, four B3 and four B4 teams with a total enlisted strength of 88, Warrant Officer strength of 46 and Officer strength of 44.

b. The formation of District Offices with such Sub-offices as necessary is authorized for complete coverage of the U. S. zone in Korea. The centralized administration and operational control will be exercised by Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters for Korea. The Headquarters located in Seoul is as follows:

(1) Office of the Commanding Officer
(2) Office of the Executive

(a) Adjutant
(b) Supply Section
(c) Billet and Office Section
(d) Motor Pool Section
(e) Mess Section
(f) Message Center

(3) Office of the Chief of Operations

(a) Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section
(b) Political Section
(c) Security Section
(d) Special Squad
(e) Information Section
(f) Reports and Analysis Section
(g) Liaison Section
(h) Operational File Section

The District Offices are as follows:

(1) Seoul District (covering Seoul and environs)
(2) Inchon District (covering all of Kyonggi Do south of the Han River)
(3) Songdo District (covering Kyonggi Do north of the Han river and such portions of the provinces of Hwang Hae Do and Kang Won Do south of the 38th Parallel)

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(4) Taejon District (covering all of the provinces of Chung Chong Nam Do and Chung Chong Puk Do)
(5) Chonju District (covering all of Cholla Puk Do)
(6) Taegu District (covering all of Kyong Sang Puk Do)
(7) Kwangju District (covering all of Cholla Nam Do)
(8) Pusan District (covering all of Kyong Sang Nam Do)

c. Normal supply is issued under T/O&E 30-500. Special investigative equipment is issued in accordance with War Department letter AG 400 (27 November 1943) OB-S-SPDDL-M dated 29 November 1943.

d. Authorization for the District Offices to draw all classes of supply at the nearest available source in their respective operational areas is contained in letter of Headquarters XXIV Corps, AG 400.12 (TFGDS) dated 24 July 1946, Subject: Authorization for District Offices of 971st CIC Detachment to Draw Supplies.

SECTION II

Personnel

1. General

a. All personnel matters will be referred to and handled by the Adjutant at Headquarters for CIC, Korea.

b. Direct correspondence between District Offices and Headquarters CIC-K is authorized. Sub-offices of Districts will clear through District Offices.

c. Correspondence on personnel matters will be forwarded in quadruplicate and will bear the rank and serial number of the individual, omitting the designation "Special Agent".

2. Promotion

a. Recommendations for promotion will be forwarded to Headquarters not later than the 15th day of each month.

b. A separate letter of recommendation will be submitted for each individual.

c. Promotions will be made only to the next higher grade after a minimum of one month's service in grade subject to existing Army regulations and directives.

d. All recommendations will be classified confidential and forwarded in a sealed envelope, attention of the Commanding Officer.

e. Promotions of Officer personnel under existing regulations, with the exception of promotion from Second Lieutenant to the next higher grade, cannot be made.

3. Leaves, Furloughs and Passes

a. Request for leaves or furloughs, compassionate leaves or furloughs and request for emergency leaves or furloughs will be made through this Headquarters.

b. Passes not exceeding three days may be granted by the Commanding Officer or the Officer-in-Charge of a District Office.

4. Finance

a. Enlisted Personnel

(1) Monthly payrolls will be prepared by the Personnel Section of Headquarters for all enlisted personnel of CIC in Korea.
(2) Such payrolls will be sent to each District Office or Sub-office by courier for signature of the personnel concerned.
(3) Payment will be effected by a finance agent of this Headquarters as conveniently as possible after the first day of the month and the payroll will be returned to Headquarters and clearance obtained.
(4) TM 14-505 dated September, 1945 forbids the finance agent apportioning the payroll and only direct payment to personnel concerned may be made.

b. Officers

(1) Payment of Officer personnel will be the responsibility of each individual officer.

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c. War Department Civilians

(1) Civilian personnel will have time sheets prepared for forwarding to the Civilian Personnel Section, Headquarters XXIV Corps and payment is the responsibility of each individual.

d. No Bank of Chosen notes will be acquired by CIC personnel except in accordance with Circular 2, Headquarters XXIV Corps dated 3 January 1947, with changes.

5. Credentials

a. Application for credentials will be made through Headquarters and be processed by the Security Section.

b. Credentials are obtained from the 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ, AFFE upon the request of the Adjutant, this Headquarters.

c. Loss of credentials or badge will be reported by the most expeditious means to this Headquarters and the Office of Record (441st CIC Det.) will be likewise immediately notified.

d. Generally only agent personnel are issued credentials and badge. Credentials and badge requested for clerks, mechanics and other non-agent CIC personnel will be requested only upon specific authority from the Commanding Officer.

e. The preparation, issue and accounting of badges and credentials is governed by War Department letter AG 200.2 (10 August 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 12 August 1944.

6. Strength Reports

a. Strength reports will be submitted by this Headquarters for all CIC personnel in Korea.

b. Any change in strength of a District Office or in the strength of Headquarters personnel will be reported immediately to the Adjutant for changes.

7. Casualty Reports

a. In the event of the death of any personnel a verbal report will be made immediately to the AG Section or the Duty Officer, Chief of Staff Section, XXIV Corps and will be followed by a written report within 24 hours. Further, letter Headquarters XXIV Corps, AG 600.913 (TFXAG) dated 26 November 1945 will be compiled with in reporting accidents, fire or destruction of property. This letter calls for telephonic report to the AG Section during day duty hours and to the Chief of Staff's office at night.

b. Casualty reports pertaining to persons subject to Military law will conform with Circular 13, GHQ, FEC, dated 31 January 1947.

c. Information Bulletin 67, Headquarters USAFIK, dated 6 May 1946 provides for reports of investigation in the case of deaths in accordance with AR 600-550 to be forwarded in triplicate to AFFE and such other copies as necessary by reasons of channels.

d. A written report of casualty will also be submitted to Headquarters CIC-K accompanied by detailed inventory of the individual's personal effects. In the preparation of the inventory, care will be exercised to be sufficiently descriptive of the items catalogued.

8. Claims Reports

a. Investigations of claims will be in accordance to letter, Headquarters, AG, XXIV Corps 150 (TFYJA) dated 25 November 1945. Special attention is invited to the fact that Claims Reports do not preclude the submission of the usual 24 hour Administrative Reports of accidents and similar matters.

b. Information Bulletin 67, Headquarters XXIV Corps, dated 6 May 1946, in connection with reports of investigations of deaths under AR 600-550 calls for three copies of the report to be forwarded to FEC. This bulletin also calls for the forwarding of two copies to FEC of reports of injuries investigated under AR 345-415.

c. For guidance in Claims Reports a check list will be used. Said check list is a part of letter Headquarters XXIV Corps, AG 333 (TFYJA) dated 10 May 1946.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

d. In connection with claims investigations under AR 25-20, where military personnel or any civilian is injured or where there is property damage, no commitments will be made by the Unit Claims Officer. Persons desiring information will merely be advised that a record of the incident has been made and contact will be made at a future date.

e. Headquarters XXIV Corps Circular 18, dated 29 August 1946, will be followed in all claims investigations.

9. Personnel Locator Card

a. All personnel of the CIC in Korea will have maintained a personnel locator file at Headquarters.

b. Upon redeployment or transfer the personnel locator card will be placed in a "dead" file for future reference.

10. Personnel Section Sheet

a. The status of all personnel will be checked monthly against records maintained by the Adjutant.

b. Information copies of said Personnel Section Sheet will be forwarded to and be maintained by Headquarters for all CIC personnel in Korea.

c. Action will be taken to correct discrepancies existing.

11. Replacements

a. All newly arrived personnel will report to the Adjutant at Headquarters for assignment.

b. A Personal History Statement will be executed by each individual and be maintained in a permanent operational file after processing by the Security Section. This Personal History Statement will serve as a basis for the personnel locator card.

c. Personnel arriving from the U. S. will complete change of address cards and postal service forms and forward same to the proper addressee.

d. Personnel procured in this theater will be given complete loyalty checks initiated by and processed through Security Section of Headquarters.

e. Any personnel rejected for duty will be sent to Headquarters accompanied by a complete written report showing reasons for such rejection.

12. Redeployment

a. All personnel eligible for redeployment will report to Headquarters on date specified unless notified of change of status which has had prior approval.

b. All Officer personnel requesting upgrade of category statements will be made through this Headquarters under existing regulations.

c. Enlisted personnel may upgrade volunteer statements only under existing regulations through this Headquarters.

13. Uniform

a. Civilian type uniform will not be worn unless specifically directed by this Headquarters and in accordance with War Department letter AG 420 (26 August 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 29 August 1944.

b. Civilian clothing will only be worn when necessitated by a particular mission and only upon prior authorization of the Commanding Officer.

c. War Department Civilians will normally wear civilian clothing. Where a particular mission necessitates the wearing of Army uniform prior authorization must be obtained from this Headquarters.

d. The wearing of special insignia including U. S. insignia is specifically forbidden by Book Message TFGB 312 Headquarters XXIV Corps dated 23 June 1946.

e. The insignia of rank and branch of service will not be worn unless directed by this Headquarters. Officers will wear, when visiting Army installations, their insignia of rank and branch of service where existing directives require the wearing of rank.

14. Billet, Office and Mess

a. All CIC personnel will be furnished billets and mess at recognized CIC installations. Exceptions are such officers who are assigned to Headquarters in Seoul who will billet and mess at XXIV Corps Headquarters installations and such officers with dependents who maintain separate rations and quarters.

b. No agent will be permitted to maintain separate billet or mess except for operational purposes under authority of Paragraph 12, War Department letter AG 322, CIC (31 October 1944) OB-S-B-M.

c. Quarters and rations away from a recognized CIC installation, if investigation requires, will be secured by the agent from the most convenient military unit in the area.

d. No female personnel will be entertained in any CIC installation except during prearranged, planned social gatherings or upon authorization by the Commanding Officer for operational purposes. Circular 27, 1947, Headquarters XXIV Corps, forbidding females in the rooms of billets occupied by male personnel will be rigidly adhered to.

e. All CIC installations will conform with fire regulations as set forth in Circular 26, Headquarters USAFIK dated 1 October 1946.

f. CIC markings will not be permitted on any equipment or buildings. Complete obscurity will be maintained in accordance to letter this Headquarters dated 25 June 1946, Subject: Operational Policy and Procedure.

15. Charge of Quarters

a. The official office hours of all CIC installations will be from 0830 to 1730 on week days and from 0830 to 1200 on Saturdays.

b. A Charge-of-Quarters and a Duty Officer will be provided at all CIC installations at all times.

c. A set of instructions for such duties to cover security of the installation, security of weapons and ammunition, the maintaining of a telephone log and the proper burning and disposal of waste paper.

SECTION III

Supply

1. General

a. The Commanding Officer's property accountability and responsibility will be handled by the Supply Section of this Headquarters.

b. All correspondence and directives relating to supply will be kept in files separate and distinct from operational and other administrative orders, directives and documents. Each District Office and their respective Sub-offices will initiate and maintain a set of property records which will reflect at all times the exact status of the property and a periodic check will be conducted of such records to assure their accuracy.

2. Initial Entry and Responsibility

a. The Commanding Officer is initially responsible and accountable for all investigative and organizational property of CIC in Korea. The issue of equipment as required by each District Office will be by memorandum receipt.

b. Records will be maintained at Headquarters to show such issue and balance of property and will be periodically inventoried by the Supply Section.

c. In the event personnel holding property on memorandum receipt is replaced or departs, a physical inventory will be made of all property as listed and his successor will assume the responsibility for such property by the execution of a new memorandum receipt.

3. Stock Record Book

a. A stock record book will list each item of investigative or organizational equipment and be maintained by the Supply Section of this Headquarters.

b. Each stock record sheet for items having serial numbers will contain a list of such numbers.

c. Expendable items will not be entered in the stock book. The original entry in the stock book may be made from an inventory. Every subsequent entry will be supported by a numbered credit or debit voucher and a new balance carried over to the appropriate column.

d. All credit and debit vouchers will be numbered and bound in a separate debit and/or credit voucher file and such vouchers will be initialed to show posting in the stock record book.

e. Items of investigative or organizational equipment required by individual agents and not entered on their Form 32's may be issued on a memorandum receipt. Such memorandum receipt will be prepared in duplicate and have entered thereon all of the detailed information signed by the agent and kept by the Officer-in-Charge of the District Offices or by the Supply Section of this Headquarters. Memorandum receipts will not be used as debit or credit vouchers to be posted against the balance in the stock record book.

f. Form 32's will be maintained by the Supply Section this Headquarters for all enlisted personnel based upon physical inventory properly initialed and signed. A physical showdown will be conducted for each newly arrived enlisted agent and checked against the items listed on Form 32 and articles missing will be accounted for by a statement of charges or a report of survey.

g. The serial number of all small arms will be recorded and a consolidated list will be submitted to the Provost Marshal, XXIV Corps in accordance with XXIV Corps letter AG 474 (TFYIG) dated 17 November 1945.

4. Reports of Survey

a. Reports of survey may be initiated at any District Office or this Headquarters on War Department Form 15 and will be prepared in accordance to AR 35-6640.

b. When originating at a District Office the report will be forwarded in five copies to this Headquarters.

c. All reports of survey must be witnessed by an officer authorized to administer oaths. If witnessed by a Summary Courts Officer the report must indicate the special "Order" or equivalent authorizing the title.

5. Billet Property

a. A system of property accounting will be maintained by all District Offices and the Billet, Supply and Mess Sections of this Headquarters will maintain similar accounting for CIC installations in Seoul.

b. A physical inventory will be taken and a signed and witnessed copy will be provided the local billeting officer where required.

c. The evacuation of a billet, mess or office will require a new physical inventory of all property and a clearance secured from the local billeting officer where required.

6. Ration and Mess Accountability

a. All CIC messes will be conducted in accordance with War Department Circulars No. 138 and 171, dated 2 April and 2 May 1944 respectively.

b. Rations will be drawn on an accurate head count basis utilizing QM Form No. 4.

c. Authorization for the drawing of supplies at the nearest available source is directed by Headquarters XXIV Corps under letter AG 400.12 (TFGDS) dated 24 July 1946.

d. A guest book will be maintained at each CIC mess for the signature of all persons not permanently attached to said mess.

e. All personnel employed in CIC messes will be inspected by an American medical officer and medical clearance obtained.

f. Spot checks will be made to show that rations received accurately reflect the number of rations authorized.

7. Physical Accountability

a. Each District Office and Headquarters will maintain rigid control of the fuel received and that withdrawn for the use of each vehicle in the unit.

9. Motor Vehicles

a. Headquarters will be responsible for the procuring and distributing of all motor vehicles within Korea.

b. Procurement

(1) Headquarters will procure and issue all Military vehicles to the District offices. No vehicles will be procured on a loan basis.

(2) Only vehicles authorized by existing T/O&E or added spec ial list of equipment will be operated by CIC personnel.

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(3) Accountability will be established and maintained for all vehicles issued by the CIC in Korea.

c. Maintenance

(1) Proper maintenance of motor vehicles will be in accordance with AR 850-15, 1 August 1945, TM 37-250 and TM 37-2810 and is the responsibility of the Officer-in-Charge of each District.

(2) The driver regularly assigned to each vehicle will be responsible for first echelon maintenance.

(3) The Officer-in-Charge of each District is responsible for second echelon maintenance.

(4) Local authorized ordinance and tactical unit maintenance facilities will be used whenever practicable.

(5) Higher echelon maintenance will be performed by establishments designated by the major commands.

d. Maintenance Records

(1) A separate record will be kept for each vehicle showing type and serial numbers and indicating mileage when received and condition and date and nature of repairs.

(2) Preventative maintenance records will be kept to show the dates of weekly, monthly and semi-annual inspections and major repairs and periods of "dead line".

(3) Where Korean mechanics are employed for vehicle maintenance and repair work, it shall be the responsibility of the Officer-in-Charge of the Districts to inspect the work accomplished and to maintain all records thereto.

(4) Headquarters XXIV Corps letter AG 319.1 ( ) dated 24 October 1945 requires an Automotive Disability Report to be made when a vehicle becomes unsafe to drive or is unfit for the service intended.

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e. Headquarters Motor Pool at Seoul

(1) All vehicle maintenance and records for CIC vehicles in Seoul will be performed by this section.

(2) All vehicles from District Offices, while in Seoul, will be given maintenance by this section.

f. Vehicle Documents

(1) Notwithstanding directives "honoring" CIC credentials, each vehicle will carry a daily trip ticket showing routine use, giving the organization as G-2, XXIV Corps and at no time revealing that the vehicle is used by the CIC.

(2) The standard accident report Form 26A and the statement of witness form will be carried in all vehicles at all times. These forms will be filled out completely in the event of accident and used in a report to the nearest Military Police Detachment.

(3) Permanent trip tickets will not be used.

(4) All personnel will possess authorized motor vehicle operator's permits.

(5) All Officers will have, in addition to the operator's permit, authorization from the Provost Marshal to operate motor vehicles in accordance with Information Bulletin No. 7, Headquarters, USAFIK dated 4 October 1945.

g. Vehicle Markings

(1) All vehicles will be marked on the front and rear bumpers using contrasting white or light colored paint only in the following manner:

(Left)	(Right)
"XXIV"	"HQ" and number as assigned below:

(2) The following blocks of numbers are assigned to each District Office (vehicles used by Headquarters are considered assigned to the Seoul District Office.)

Seoul	District	Office	Assigned Numbers	100-130
Pusan	"	"	" "	131-140
Taegu	"	"	" "	141-150
Chonju	"	"	" "	151-160
Taejon	"	"	" "	161-170
Inchon	"	"	" "	171-180
Kwangju	"	"	" "	181-190
Songdo	"	"	" "	191-200

(3) In the event more vehicles are assigned to a District than numbers allocated, the numbers will be repeated adding an "X" (Example: 101X).

(4) The Officer-in-Charge of each District Office will notify the Motor Section of this Headquarters of vehicles serial numbers and corresponding assigned numbers used. Any change will likewise be immediately brought to the attention of the Motor Section.

h. Privately Owned Vehicles

(1) CIC personnel may procure privately owned vehicles under the same authorization granted to the U. S. personnel in Korea.

(2) Privately owned vehicles will not be maintained at Government expense even though such vehicles may be on occasion used for official purposes by the owner. Mechanics employed by the U. S. may work on privately owned vehicles on their own time at the expense of the vehicle owner. The use of Government owned lubricants, fuel and parts is specifically prohibited.

i. Violations Involving Vehicles

(1) Traffic violations may be punished by a Summary Courts Martial in areas of the major echelons as a command responsibility irrespective of the organization of the person committing the violation. Officers will report all violations observed. Said provisions are in accordance to letter of Headquarters, XXIV Corps AG 101.8 (TYFSG) dated 30 October 1945.

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(2) Traffic accidents will be reported by telephone to the nearest Military Police unit or to the Provost Marshal of the major echelon where the accident occurred. This is required in addition to the administrative telephone and written reports involving accidents. Said provisions are required under Information Bulletin 86, Headquarters XXIV Corps dated 17 June 1946.

(3) Effective as of 23 September 1946, in traffic violations where human life has been endangered, the violator apprehended may have his vehicle empounded. The vehicle is released only to an officer of the organization of the violator and where the organization is located beyond 25 miles of the place of the incident, the Commanding Officer will be notified and the driver will be directed to return to his organization. Said provisions are in accordance to letter of Headquarters XXIV Corps AG 250.7 (TFYMP) dated 16 September 1946.

SECTION IV

Operations

1. General

a. The Commanding Officer is responsible to the A.C. of S., G-2, USAFIK, for the administration and operations of the CIC in Korea and for the employment of personnel to insure the maximum Counter Intelligence coverage for Korea.

b. The Executive Officer will act in the stead of the Commanding Officer and supervise and be responsible for all administrative matters, including the preparation of the Monthly Administrative Report required by the War Department under Memorandum No. 380-44 dated 5 October 1944.

c. The Chief of Operations will be responsible for:

(1) The maintenance of the training and proficiency of all agents in accordance with War Department Memorandum 350-44 dated 7 September 1944. Providing for the training of all agent personnel procured in this theater and directing a training school for such purposes.

(2) Planning and drawing up the Counter Intelligence Annex to Field orders.

(3) Procuring CIC personnel in this theater in accordance with War Department Circular 379 dated 19 September 1944.

(4) Planning in detail the necessary Counter Intelligence coverage based on information furnished by A.C. of S., G-2, USAFIK.

(5) The supervision of:

(a) Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Sections.
(b) Political Section
(c) Security Section
(d) Special Squad
(e) Information Section
(f) Liaison Section
(g) Reports and Analysis Section
(h) Operational Phases of all District Offices
(i) Operational Files Section

(6) For the dissemination to the proper agencies of all Intelligence and Counter Intelligence information.

(7) For the approval of and signature on all CI-R1 reports prepared by this Headquarters.

d. The Espionage, Sabotage and Miscellaneous Section will:

(1) Initiate investigations on all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, treason and sedition, control and coordinate such investigations, and process all reports pertaining thereto.

(2) Initiate investigations in all cases involving subversive activity on the part of the U.S. military and civilian personnel and coordinate and control and process reports pertaining thereto. The following directives will control cases involving subversive activity on the part of U. S military and civilian personnel:

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(a) War Department letter AGO 14.311 (31 January 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 5 February 1944, Subject: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel.

(b) War Department letter AG 104.311 (14 October 1944) OB-S-B-M Subject: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel.

(c) War Department letter AG 014.311 (28 December 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 30 December 1944, Subject: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel.

(d) War Department letter MID 918.3 dated 9 August 1946, Subject: Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Personnel.

(e) Interrogation of suspects in a manner to avoid compromise of sources of information in connection with the investigation of subversion or disaffection will be made in accordance to War Department letter AG 350.09 (9 June 1944), Subject: Interrogation of Suspects.

(3) Initiate, control and coordinate investigations in all other operational matters not specifically delegated to the other operational sections.

(4) Prepare summary or covering CI-R1 case reports on all investigations requiring this type of report.

e. The Political Section will:

(1) Initiate investigations on all known political, social and other organizations to determine their objectives and activities and control and coordinate such investigations and process reports thereto.

(2) Initiate investigations on all underground and secret organizations to insure that their activities are not inimical to Military Government and control and coordinate such investigations and process all reports pertaining thereto.

(3) Collect and compile all information of a political nature and about political personalities.

(4) Arrange for the contact and the gaining of the confidence of influential local persons whose cooperation will be helpful.

(5) Make political analysis and prepare reports of political trends.

(6) Initiate investigations on all Koreans or other foreign nationals of a political nature involving subversive activities and control and coordinate such investigation and process reports pertaining thereto. Proclamations of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers and Ordinances of USAMGIK will be used as a guide in connection with the investigation of persons involved in subversive activities other than U. S. military and civilian personnel.

(7) Perform all such other duties as the command authority shall determine that are within the CIC mission.

(8) Conform with operations policy and procedure letter No. 1 of this Headquarters dated 2 December 1945 and letter of this Headquarters dated 20 September 1946, Subject: Political Party Investigations.

(9) Prepare summary or covering CI-R1 case reports of all investigations requiring this type of report.

f. The Security Section will:

(1) Initiate investigations on all requests for loyalty checks on U. S. military and civilian personnel and such Korean and other non-American personnel, control and coordinate the investigation, process the reports and clear or reject such personnel as the case may be. Loyalty investigations of U. S. military and civilian personnel will be in accordance to the following:

(a) War Department letter AG 250.1 (29 January 1946) OB-S-B-M dated 5 February 1946, Subject: Loyalty Investigation of Military Personnel.

(b) War Department letter AG 250.1 loyalty (22 January 1944) OB-S-B-M dated 26 January 1944, Subject: Loyalty Investigation of Military Personnel.

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(c) Letter GHQ SCAP AG 230, 27 November 1945 CIS, Subject: Security Clearance and Employment Restrictions of Civilian Personnel.

(d) Incoming message from Washington (OB-3) to CINC AFPAC dated 19 September 1946.

(e) War Department letter AGO 230.82 dated 30 January 1946, Subject: Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel.

(f) Headquarters USAFIK letter TFGBI dated 20 September 1945, Subject: Safeguard of Military Information and Security Checks.

(g) AFPAC Circular No. 83 dated 18 September 1946, entitled Recruitment of Civilian Personnel from within the Occupation Area.

(2) Initiate investigations on all requests for cryptographic clearance of military or civilian personnel and process such reports for clearance or rejection as the case may be. The investigation of cryptographic cases will be governed by the following:

(a) War Department letter AG 311.5 (8 July 1946) dated 11 July 1946, Subject: Qualifications, Investigations and Clearance of Persons having access to Classified Cryptographic Aids or Devices.

(b) War Department letter AG 311.5 (12 March 1945) OB-I-B-M dated 21 March 1945, Subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties.

(c) CINCAFPAC radio dated 25 September 1946.

(3) Initiate investigations in all cases where the determination of U. S. citizenship is the issue and process all reports pertaining thereto. Circulars 34 and 56 GHQ AFPAC dated 2 and 28 August 1945 respectfully governing the naturalization of non-citizen members of the Armed Forces will be used as guides in connection with investigations involving U. S. citizenship. Letter Headquarters XXIV Corps AG 014.32 (TFGAP) dated 7 June 1946 is likewise applicable.

(4) Initiate investigations on all personnel procured for CIC in this theater, control and coordinate all such investigations, have l all the necessary photographs taken and process the reports pertaining thereto and prepare the correspondence relating to such personnel to be forwarded to the War Department. In the procurement and investigation of CIC personnel the following will be complied with:

(a) Section 1, Counter Intelligence Personnel of War Department Circular No. 379 dated 19 September 1944.

(b) War Department letter AG 250.1 (17 May 1945) OB-S-B-M dated 19 May 1945, Subject: Procedure Pertaining to Investigation of Prospective CIC Personnel.

(c) GHQ AFPAC letter AG 210.31 (22 January 1946) GA, Subject: Procurement of CIC Personnel.

(d) War Department letter AGAO-S-A-M 210.31 (24 September 1946) dated 30 September 1946, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps.

(e) War Department memorandum No. 600-750-4 dated 8 November 1946, Subject: Enlistment in the CIC.

(f) GHQ AFPAC letter AG 342 (13 May 1946) AG-PR, Subject: Direct Enlistment for CIC.

(g) War Department letter AGAO-S 322 CIC (21 January 1947) B-M dated 24 January 1947, Subject: CIC Personnel Transfer Procedure.

(5) Initiate investigation in all cases involving disaffection, control and coordinate such investigations and process the reports pertaining thereto. The directives enumerated at d (2) above are applicable in the investigation of cases involving subversive activity and will herein be used as guides in connection with the investigation of disaffection cases.

(6) Initiate investigations pertaining to violation of AR 380-5, control and coordinate such investigations and process the reports pertaining thereto.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

(7) Initiate security surveys of vital civil and military installations for the purpose of discovering security violations and for corrective action and recommendations and control and coordinate such surveys and process all reports pertaining thereto.

(8) Initiate investigations on all matters pertaining to the Counter Intelligence mission not specifically assigned other Sections and not falling within any of the preceding categories.

(9) Prepare summary or covering CI-R1 reports of investigations in all cases requiring this type of report.

g. The Special Squad will:

(1) Procure, supervise and control and be responsible for the pay of all Korean translators, interpreters and other operators of this Headquarters.

(2) Supervise, control and carry out all "Special Projects" assigned.

(3) Process all foreign language documents, arrange for the translation and compilation of such documents where it is of importance.

(4) Initiate investigations in all cases pertaining to the good conduct and reputation of the CIC and control and coordinate such investigations and process reports pertaining thereto.

(5) In all cases investigated by CIC requiring prosecution, to prepare the evidence and draw up specifications and charges or other legal documents or advise in the preparation of such matters.

(6) Prepare summary or covering CI-R1 case reports in all investigations requiring this type of report.

h. Information Section will:

(1) Organize, "vet" and brief informants and operators for the purpose of obtaining information of a counter-intelligence and positive intelligence nature covering both the American occupied area of Korea and adjacent areas outside of that controlled by the U. S. armed forces. Prepare and collate reports of this type of information.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

(2) Maintain a file marked "Secret" to provide a key to all informants' identities used by CIC in Korea.

(3) Process all reports from adjacent areas so that information of a given locality or type will be consolidated under one title readily accessable.

(4) Coordinate the activities of the section with the KIG Section of the Office of the A.C. of S., G-2, USAFIK with particular care that the activities of neither section will be compromised.

(5) Prepare studies and analysis of trends of both positive and counter intelligence information.

(6) Prepare for dissemination Essential Elements of Information (EEI) based on analysis and studies.

(7) Prepare summary and covering CI-R1 case reports on all matters requiring this type of report.

i. The Liaison Section will:

(1) Maintain liaison with all Military Government and Tactical Units likely to possess information of a Counter Intelligence nature and receive such information and report same in writing to this Headquarters.

(2) Maintain contact with all Provost Marshal and Military Police units in the Seoul area and receive information of a Counter Intelligence interest and report same in writing to this Headquarters.

(3) Maintain liaison with the District Offices for administrative matters and such emergency operational matterss that may arise.

(4) Obtain maximum compliance to the directives set forth in Headquarters USAFIK Circular No. 19 dated 6 September 1946 pertaining to Responsibility of Military Personnel in Collection and Dissemination of Information.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

j. The Reports and Analysis Section will:

(1) Prepare the Monthly Information Report required of this Headquarters by the War Department Memorandum No. 380-44 dated 5 October 1944.

(2) Prepare the semi-monthly situation report required by the 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ, FEC.

(3) Prepare daily periodic reports required by the A.C. of S., G-2, USAFIK.

(4) Analyze and study all reports received by and disseminated from this Headquarters for use in the preparation of the above reports.

k. District Offices will:

(1) Carry out all necessary local administrative duties not handled by Headquarters.

(2) Perform all the applicable operational duties as outlined for the various sections above within the area covered by the given District Office.

(3) Submit local Daily Periodic Reports to the Reports and Analysis Section this Headquarters for the compilation of the over-all Daily Periodic Report.

(4) Submit Semi-Monthly Situation Reports to the Reports and Analysis Section in accordance with the form prescribed.

(5) Initiate all investigations originating in the area covered by the given District Office and forward reports to Headquarters.

(6) Disseminate all information requiring immediate attention to the local agencies interested. USAFIK letter AG 322 (TFGBI) dated 30 April 1946 will be complied with.

l. The Operational Files Section will:

(1) Maintain files and indices of all matters of an operational nature.

(2) Properly label and store all exhibits and evidence.

(3) Maintain references and publications of interest to the CIC in Korea.

(4) Index all matters as indicated by the varous Sections or the Chief of Operations.

m. Special Agents with Korean linguistic ability will be dispersed through the various District Offices for maximum efficient use and will not be assigned as office staff personnel except for Special Squad activities.

n. Korean civilian personnel will not be used in any operational or administrative capacity except upon specific authorization by this Headquarters. Extreme caution will be exercised to insure that all Korean personnel used by CIC do not have access to any classified information.

o. Korean civilian personnel used as interpreters or "detectives" are strictly forbidden to act as free lance agents or to wear U. S. army insignia or uniform. Care will be exercised to insure that such personnel do not have access to written classified information.

p. Special Agents in the field may be granted permission by the Officer-in-Charge of a District Office to assume a false rank for operational expediency for a period of no longer than three days. Any longer period will require the approval of this Headquarters.

q. Local Police agencies will be checked daily for all matters of Counter Intelligence interest.

r. Personnel assigned to one District will not conduct investigations in the area of another District unless clearance has been granted by this Headquarters or by the Officer-in-Charge of the District in whose area the investigation is being conducted. Maximum latitude for lateral communications between Districts is authorized by this Headquarters to maintain operational efficiency. Information copy of any lateral communication made will be forwarded this Headquarters as early as practicable.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

2. Records and Files

a. Each District Office will maintain files and records of all activities and investigations made within the area.

b. Each District Office will maintain files of G-2 periodic and weekly summary reports for reference.

c. Each District Office will compile such local information as is necessary for efficient operation. Information copies will be forwarded this Headquarters.

d. Headquarters will maintain a duo decimal file system with the following control numbers:

(1) Sabotage
(2) Treason
(3) Sedition
(4) Subversive Activity
(5) Disaffection
(6) Security
(7) Atrocity
(8) Miscellaneous
(9) Informants
(10) Contacts
(11) Administration
(12) Censorship
(13) Loyalty
(14) Espionage
(15) Public Relations
(16) Other detention cases
(17) Interrogations
(18) Cryptographic
(19) Parole
(20) Citizenship
(21) Publications
(22) CIC Applicants

The second number will designate the case file under the control number; reports filed in a given case will be given a serial number and the entire number will be reflected in the index.

e. The File Section at Headquarters will maintain files of publications of Counter Intelligence agencies of other theaters, of intercepts of the Civil Censorship Intelligence Group - Korea and such other agencies of interest to CIC in Korea.

f. Headquarters File Section will index all personalities and other pertinent information of all reports and make such cross reference index as is required.

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3. Maps

a. All CIC District Offices and Headquarters will maintain the following maps:

(1) Korea 1:250,000 AMS/L551
(2) Korea 1: 50,000 AMS/L751

b. The gazetteer Korea 1/250,000 AMS/L551 will be used in conjunction thereto.

4. Personality Files

a. Alphabetized master file of personalities, whether suspect, informant or otherwise, encountered in the course of investigations will be maintained at Headquarters. Such personalities will be indexed and a check against this master file will be made by the CIC personnel in Korea in connection with investigations.

b. A similar file of personalities will be maintained by the District Offices for their given area.

5. References

a. Headquarters and all District Offices will include in their references complete files of G-2, USAFIK Periodic Reports and Weekly Summary reports.

b. Headquarters will maintain files of all publications of Counter Intelligence interest including texts, periodicals, intelligence summaries and bulletins, atlases, maps and dictionaries under the control number 21 used for publications.

6. Correspondence

a. All operational correspondence originating in the Field will be directed to this Headquarters throughcchannels regardless of final destination.

b. Operational correspondence will be forwarded this headquarters addressed to the Commanding Officer, attention of the Operations Officer or the Officer-in-Charge of a particular section.

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c. Correspondence will be on approved letterhead and will bear Headquarters, District Office or Sub-District Office designation.

d. Civilian postal channels will not be used.

e. Basic letter endorsements will conform with regulations pertaining to Military correspondence.

f. All correspondence will be appropriately classified and provisions will be made for the receipt of secret and top secret documents.

7. Suspense Date

a. This Headquarters and each District Office will utilize the suspense date letterhead in all matters where the prevention of oversight or unnecessary delay is of importance. Priorities will also be indicated in all such matters.

b. Where the suspense date is used a separate file for suspense date correspondence will be maintained to insure that replies are received and/or forwarded within the specified time period.

8. Directive Folders

a. All operational directives will be worded according to classification and be maintained in separate folders from other directives and be bound chronologically in a set.

b. Each folder will bear a sheet listing the date, issuing agency and the subject of each directive.

9. Dissemination of Information to the Field

a. The Chief of Operations of this Headquarters will disseminate all investigative leads and operational instructions to the District Offices.

b. The Chief of Operations will be responsible for the issuance, amendment, change, recession and dissemination of operational memoranda and the Officer-in-Charge of the District Offices will prepare and issue operational procedure memoranda as required locally on matters not covered by operational memoranda issued by Headquarters. Copy of local memoranda will be furnished this Headquarters.

c. All Field Officers will be required to contact Headquarters by telephone on all matters of importance. A report will be made on all doubtful matters.

d. Headquarters will provide a telephone directory together with the auxiliary means of contacting each CIC installation, listing the address and telephone number and disseminate same to all CIC Officers in Korea.

e. Headquarters will maintain a directory of all agents, listing by name their address in the Field, address of separate billet, if any, and telephone number and agent's number.

f. A bulletin board will be maintained at Headquarters and at each District or Sub-District office for the posting of unclassified information of a general nature.

10. Arrests

a. Authority for arrests by CIC under Paragraph 20b of War Department letter AG 322 CIC (31 October 1944) OB-S-B-M permits the arrest or detention of any person who violates military security or whose detention is otherwise deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence mission. In all arrests, care will be used so that this authority is not exceeded and that in every case the arrest is justified. Under the principles of "arrest" the ensuing search will be methodically and meticulously carried out.

b. No spectacular or over-dramatized arrest will be effected by any personnel under this command unless necessitated by a specific operational order.

c. All arrestees will be permitted to contact their families or kin within 24 hours after arrest except in such cases where such notice would endanger the security of the U. S. forces or compromise the investigation.

d. The Officer-in-Charge of the District Offices will be responsible for the collection of prisoners and their detention at appropriate places of internment.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

e. The Officer-in-Charge of the District Offices will be responsible for the checking of the arrest rosters daily for the expeditious handling of arrests effected.

11. Handling of Classified Material

a. All incoming or outgoing correspondence of a secret or a top secret classification will be logged in a separate standard log sheet columned to show classification, log number, receipt number, incoming or outgoing, number of copies, copy number, date of document and title of document. All matters that require action, appropriate entry will be made on the log sheet to insure that action is taken within a reasonable time.

b. Headquarters and District Offices will comply strictly with the provisions of AR 380-5 regarding classified material.

c. Security in telephone conversations will be adhered to except in extreme emergencies. Letter Headquarters XXIV Corps AG 312.1 dated 4 April 1946 directs the use of other means of communications in the event that classified information over telephone may become compromised.

12. Wanted and Watch Lists

a. Headquarters will maintain a "Wanted" and a "Watch" list for all persons wanted or under technical surveillance by CIC in Korea. Such lists will be disseminated periodically to all District Offices for information and guidance. All persons wanted or under technical surveillance in a given area will be reported to Headquarters periodically for inclusion in the master list.

b. Separate file folders will be prepared for the lists.

c. All persons wanted or watched will be carded and cross indexed in the master files of this Headquarters.

13. Investigations

a. Care will be taken that no unfavorable publicity will result from CIC investigations. All CIC personnel will protect from publicity all CIC information and activities.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea. 29 March 1947 (cont'd)

b. All CIC personnel are subject to the provisions of Circular 3, 18 October 1945, Headquarters XXIV Corps and are forbidden entry into all "off limits" areas. Where specific operations requires the entry to such areas, prior permission, except in emergencies, will be obtained from this Headquarters or the Officer-in-Charge of the District Offices. Letter Headquarters XXIV Corps, AG 250 (TFXAG) dated 28 May 1946 precludes AW 104 for persons apprehended in prostitution area unless first offenders and due to youth and inexperience. Persons over the grade of private are held and may not be punished under AW 104.

c. The transportation of Koreans for operational purposes is permitted under USAFIK letter AG 322 (TFGBI) dated 30 April 1946. Other transportation of Koreans is prohibited.

d. Investigations requiring the coverage of Korean mail and telecommunication will be made in accordance with Memorandum 35 of the 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ, dated 14 December 1945. All District Offices will forward requests for "watch listing" to this Headquarters which, in turn, will submit same to the Civil Censorship Officer for Korea.

e. All investigations of subversive activities or subversive potentialities will be developed through "informants" rather than open investigations to prevent needless alienation of persons investigated or the possibility of driving them underground.

f. In cases where facts indicate non-CIC jurisdiction the matter will be referred to the appropriate agency through liaison. In an emergency, in cases where another agency has primary jurisdiction, CIC District Offices will take such action as may be immediately necessary, turning the matter over to the appropriate agency by the most expeditious means, as early as practicable.

g. Policy regarding police matters will be governed by letter 1 November 1946, this Headquarters, subject: Police Methods CIC Policy regarding. CIC personnel will make no public utterances that may be construed as censure of police actions and in no way interfere with police activities.

h. Full use of scientific and technical facilities of the Crime Laboratory and the Fingerprinting Section of the Detective Bureau of the Department of National Police will be utilized in all cases where necessary. Letter this Headquarters dated 19 November 1946, subject: Facilities Available to CIC, enumerates the various types of scientific and technical aids available.

i. Ordinance No. 20, USAMGIK provides for the assisting and co-operating with the CIC when requested in the investigation and apprehension of criminals by the Detective Bureau of the Department of National Police. Full use of this assistance and co-operation will be utilized in connection with CIC investigations.

j. In all investigations personnel will govern themselves in accordance to Headquarters XXIV Corps letters AG 230.741 (TFYAG) dated 17 November 1945, AGO 14.13 (TFYAG) 23 February 1946 and TFGBI dated 6 February 1947. Actions of military personnel toward Koreans is controlled by this letter and no CIC personnel will behave in a manner reflecting discredit upon the Armed Forces of the U. S. No gifts, favors or entertainment will be accepted from Koreans, however, free social friendly relations or operational necessity is not discouraged.

k. In investigations where narcotics are confiscated same will be released to Military Government after having served the purposes of CIC, in accordance to Headquarters XXIV Corps letter AG 443 (TFYSG) dated 30 October 1945.

l. In the carrying out of the CIC mission in investigations, in undercover, or in the cultivation of informants, no Korean liquor will be consumed. Acceptance of liquor as a gift will be considered a violation. This prohibition is governed by Headquarters XXIV Corps message TFYSG 24 dated 28 October 1945 and Ordinance 23 of USAMGIK.

m. Investigations involving violations of directives pertaining to mail is covered by Headquarters XXIV Corps letter AG 311.1 (TFAPO) dated 14 December 1945; Information Bulletin 73 dated 16 May 1946; and AFPAC Circular No. 89 dated 25 September 1946. No person in or attached to the Military service and entitled to use APO facilities will act as intermediaries.

n. Investigations involving the search of baggage and effects may be made under Headquarters XXIV Corps letter AG 720.4 (TFYSG) dated 24 October 1945, subject: Foreign Quarantine Regulations.

o. Civilians in this theater are amenable to Headquarters XXIV Corps Circulars 73 and 92, dated 14 September and 26 November 1946 respectively. All civilians over the age of twelve are subject to regulation and control and must carry identification cards obtained from the Provost Marshal and may not carry firearms unless specifically authorized.

p. Koreans, other than Police or persons acting in a police capacity, are not permitted to carry firearms. Persons carrying firearms must have a permit duly authenticated in both English and Korean.

q. Secret Message, Headquarters XXIV Corps, TFGBI 239 dated 25 March 1946 will be complied with. The presence of Russian Military or Civilian personnel, other than White Russians outside of the Seoul area will be reported to Headquarters; such personnel will be surveilled without the fact becoming known.

14. CIC Periodic and Flash Reports

a. A consolidated Semi-Monthly Periodic Report will be submitted by all District Offices, except the Seoul District Office, to reach Headquarters for the compilation of the over-all Semi-Monthly Report no later than two days after the close of the period and in the form required by the Reports and Analysis Section.

b. The Semi-Monthly Report will be classified confidential and matters of a higher classification will be submitted as an annex. Two copies of the report are required by this Headquarters.

c. Daily Periodic Reports will be submitted in the form required by the Reports and Analysis Section immediately upon close of the period by the most expeditious means.

d. In all reports where Korean proper names appear, a space in parenthesis after such name shall be provided and the Chinese characters for such name shall be written in. This applies to both names of persons and place names.

e. All geographical localities will be further identified by coordinates as indicated in the official maps used by CIC in Korea and the English spelling of all place names shall be those appearing in the official gazetteer. Place names not appearing in the gazetteer will be further identified by the giving of its proximity to a larger town or city mentioned in the gazetteer.

f. Memorandum No. 38 with changes 1, 2 and 3 of the 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ FEC will be used as a guide. Special attention is invited to the short form of memorandum report permitted for cryptographic cases.

16. Progress Reports

a. A Progress Report will be submitted in all pending cases under investigation for every 30 day period that such case remains open. Two copies of such progress report will be forwarded to this Headquarters.

17. Letters of Transmittal

a. The standard buck slip in two copies may be used as a letter of transmittal in forwarding documents to Headquarters.

b. Where pertinent and for the purpose of giving information, making comments or recommendations pertaining to the material forwarded, the usual letter of transmittal in five paragraphs will accompany same in two copies.

c. Letters of transmittal from this Headquarters to higher Headquarters will be in sufficient copies to provide for extraction at each point in the channels.

18. Summary of Information

a. The standard Summary of Information will be prepared in as many copies as practicable and forwarded to this Headquarters.

b. Summaries of Information will not be misused and the informant will not be revealed in the content thereof. The informant's name and other data will be hand written on a copy specifically designated "CIC-K File Copy" together with the name of the agent compiling or receiving the information.

c. All Proper names appearing in Summaries of Information will include further elucidation as indicated for Memorandum Reports.

19. CIC Arrest Report

a. In all cases of arrest by CIC in Korea a report in two copies will be made to Headquarters containing all pertinent dates including place of confinement.

b. In all arrests not charged and held for trial within ten days, a subsequent report will be submitted to Headquarters explaining the reasons therefor.

c. USAMGIK appointment Number 36, dated 19 November 1945, provides for the petition and release of prisioners held over thirty days. In all arrests held over thirty days a report will be submitted to this Headquarters with sufficient facts to justify the detention and to oppose the petition for release.

d. Each District Office will keep an arrest log and all reports made to this Headquarters will indicate the number applicable to the given arrest appearing on the log of a District Office.

HARRY H. DOW
1st Lt., C.M.P.

[redacted]

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

14 April 1947

SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea, amendments to.

TO : All Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel, Korea.

Refer Section IV, 9, b, Amendments of Standard Operating Procedure.

The following additions are made to Section IV, 6, Correspondence:

In order to clearly understand that correct procedures concerning the use of "Assignment Sheets," the following Standard Operating Procedure is prepared for the use of all concerned. The use of such "Assignment Sheets" will be in full conformity to the outline as shown below.

Within the Seoul District Office a system of "Assignment Sheets" has been effected. All other detachments are given assignments or leads on appropriate sheets, similar to those used in the Seoul District Office. An "Assignment Sheet," a "Letter Form," and an "Action Letter" are attached to this report.

1. The following procedure will govern the use of "Assignment Sheets:"

   a. When used - To initiate investigations, to continue investigations, to initiate file checks, to give further leads of cases initiated.

   b. Why used - To give the agent investigating the case a full background upon the case, so that he can fully investigate, knowing what leads to follow, how to proceed, and what to obtain.

   c. Where used - Seoul District Office only.

   d. Who uses - The following list, subject to change, will govern the use of such sheets:

      OIC Operations, OIC Political Section, OIC Security Section, OIC Information Section, OIC ES&M Section.

      Note: Cases initiated through Killin, Whitaker, Ferguson, or other officers and agents will be filed through one of the above and be made a part of that section's records.

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e. How used - The following rules will govern the use of such a form:

(1) Two copies will be made of each sheet. The original will be forwarded to Commanding Officer, Seoul District Office. The duplicate copy will be maintained within the section in chronological order of case initiation.

(2) Each separate investigation will be placed upon a single "Assignment Sheet." In case several cases are closely associated it will be the responsibility of the Section Head to see that such investigations are coordinated.

(3) Each Section Head will put full details of investigations to be made, methods to be used, and special notes of importance. At the present time agents are not fully schooled in carrying varying cases from espionage to disaffection, so that it is the responsibility of the section heads to see that each agent knows the complete facts of the case, knows what to investigate, and how to proceed. Under the 'remarks:' column on the sheets adequate space is provided to fully cover the case at hand.

(4) In no case will copies destined for the files be attached to an "Assignment Sheet." This information will be copied on the "Assignment Sheet," with reference of the file copies which include such information.

(5) In no case will buckslips, or inter-office-routing-slips be attached. In most cases these must be returned and should be maintained within the respective section until investigations are completed.

(6) Full information will be typed upon each sheet showing the date, file number, the section to which assigned, the subject of investigation, the addressee, information of leads, and initials of the respective section heads. The blanks at the bottom of the sheets are for use of the Seoul District Office only.

(7) On the 1st and 15th of each month, each Section Head will check with the OIC of the Seoul District Office to determine the progress of investigations, the assignments, and the future dispositions.

(8) Priorities will follow the pattern shown below:

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea, amendments to. 14 April 1947 (cont'd)

A Priority — Cases involving immediate action, the reports being awaited by the CG, G-2, or other agencies. Cases involving life, death, if not initiated immediately (Reports of riots, strikes, etc.)

B Priority — Cases of importance which require detailed investigation, and which must be completed by a specific time.

C Priority — Cases involving important, but not immediate investigations. Loyalty checks and Cryptographic clearances, plus travel clearances of immediate import.

D Priority — Cases which must be accomplished at some future date, but involving investigations, which cannot be dropped. (S/I's of doubtful evaluation will fall into this category.)

E Priority — Cases involving checks which can be made if agents and time are not involved. (Investigations of political organizations, general security checks, investigations for other organizations as a means of battering liaison). Most cases falling under this classification will not be cases specifically requested by some higher authority or agency.

2. The following procedure will govern the use of "Letter Forms."

a. When used - See 1a above. Only when a report has been previously submitted by that detachment.

b. Why used - to give leads to detachments, not to agents of Seoul District Office, continue investigations, showing leads to be followed, correction, etc.

c. Where used - All detachments except Seoul District Office.

d. Who uses - See 1d above.

e. How used - The following rules will govern the use of such a form.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea, amendments to. 14 April 1947 (cont'd)

(1) Two copies will be made of each sheet. The original will be returned to the district office. The duplicate copy will be maintained within the section. Remember, these are to be used only when a field office has forwarded a report to this headquarters.

(2) Comments on a particular report will be forwarded on this form, the original being sent to the district office and the duplicate sent to the files, with the file copies of the report in concern.

(3) Full details of investigation desired and references to original report should be included.

(4) In no case will the original reports, destined for the files, be returned attached. All such information will be extracted and typed on this sheet under the "Remarks" column.

(5) These "Letter Forms" will be retained by the District Offices and not used as a lead sheet, but will become a part of the District Office case files. The information for use in further investigations will be copied from this sheet by agents of the district offices.

(6) On the 1st of each month, each Section Head will check, by letter, with the Commanding Officer of each district office concerned to determine the progress of investigations, the assignments, and future dispositions. These will be done as shown in "Action Letter," see paragraph 3 below.

3. The following procedure will govern the use of "Action Letters."

a. When used - See 1a above. Only when a report has not been previously submitted by the district office concerned.

b. Why used - To give initiations of cases to district offices, when no reports have been received by district offices concerning the case at hand. This should include the details for investigation in the detachment.

c. Where used - All detachments except Seoul District Office.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea, amendments to. 14 April 1947 (cont'd)

d. Who uses - See 1d above.

e. How used - The following rules will govern the use of the "Action Letter." Note: Since no such forms exist at the present time, these will be typed by Section Heads, following closely the form, as shown in attachment "C."

(1) Three copies will be made of each letter. The original and duplicate will be forwarded to the district office concerned. The triplicate copy will be made a part of the records of the section concerned. In the detachments, the original will be returned with first indorsement upon completion of the case or assignment. If leads prove negative, this will be returned with proper notation in the first indorsement. The second copy will be retained in the files of the detachment.

(2) Full details of leads and background will be forwarded to the detachments.

(3) Agents of the district offices will not carry this letter as an information letter, as it will be retained in the files of the district offices or forwarded to this headquarters with an indorsement (See 3 (a) (1) above.)

(4) On the 1st of each month, each Section Head will check, by letter, with the Commanding Officer of each district office concerned to determine the progress of investigations, the assignments and future dispositions of such cases. This will be done by another "Action Letter."

4. All "Assignment Sheets," "Letter Forms," "Action Letters," and other miscellaneous forms and correspondence will be routed through Operations.

5. All Section Heads and Commanding Officers of District Offices will be responsible to see that correspondence concerning cases and special forms concerning these cases are filed with these cases, when closed.

SUBJ: Standard Operating Procedure for Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army Forces, Korea, amendments to. 14 April 1947 (cont'd)

6. Such forms as these, which are in existence in CIC in Korea, are not always legitimate for forwarding to higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

JAMES K. PATCHELL
1st Lt., Inf.
CIC, Operations

ENCLOSURES:

Attachment "A" - "Assignment Sheet"
Attachment "B" - "Letter Form"
Attachment "C" - "Action Letter"

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CONFIDENTIAL

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ENCLOSURE "A"

ASSIGNMENT SHEET

_____ 194___

File No. _____

Section _____

Priority

A B C D E

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

SUBJECT: _____

TO : _____

REMARKS:

Lead Sheet No. _____ Case Completed _____ 194___

Assigned to _____ Report _____

ENCLOSURE "A"

4187

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE "B"

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File Number_____
Date_____

SUBJECT:

TO :

1. Your_____dated_____ was received and has been made a matter of record in this office.

2. Any future reference to this case should bear the same subject and file number as shown on this communication.

3. Remarks:

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Incl:

ENCLOSURE "B"

ENCLOSURE "C"

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File No._____
Date_____

SUBJECT:

TO :

1. The following information was received by this office from _____ and is evaluated _____.

2. Request that your office initiate an immediate investigation, forwarding results to this headquarters.

3. Any future reference to this case should bear the same subject and file number as shown on this communication.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Incl.

[redacted]

APPENDIX 4

THE KOREAN RESEARCH BUREAU

1. Early History of Korean CIC
2. Research Bureau Training Schedule
3. Appropriation From The Military Governor
4. Table of Organization
5. Authorization For Korean On-the-Job Training With CIC
6. Pay and Allowance Rates For Research Bureau Personnel
7. Roster of Class #1, 27 September-30 October 1948

[redacted]

[redacted]L

EARLY HISTORY OF KOREAN CIC

In July 1948, when it was known that American CIC would withdraw from Korea later that same year, Dr. Rhee Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea, Col Thomas Wattington, G2, XXIV Corps, and Lt Col H. F. Erickson, American advisor tc the Korean National Police, after many conferences, decided that a South Korean organization, modeled after the United States Army 971st CIC Detachment, should be established. The organization, at the insistence of Dr. Rhee, must be an all-civilian agency.

The commanding officer of the 971st CIC Detachment selected Maj Theodore Roberts and Capt Richard A. Fox from the detachment to procure, organize, train, and assign personnel for this civilian counterintelligence corps. The officers were informed that the Korean personnel would be trained and in the field by the end of September 1948.

In order to procure potential agents, a recruiting campaign was initiated in the ranks of the National Police and among Koreans employed by American CIC. Lt Col Erickson handled procurement from the National Police while the American advisors, in direct liaison with the several CIC district field offices in the provinces of South Korea, scoured the indigenous ranks of the 971st CIC Detachment.

The training school was established at the National Police Academy in Seoul, and a six week's course organized (Incl 1). The two American advisors, utilizing interpreters and personnel from various government positions, instructed the first class of 60 students which convened in mid-July 1948.

While the first class was in session, much remained to be accomplished to ready the organization to assume American CIC duties. Conferences among Dr. Rhee, the National Police advisor, and the American CIC advisors produced the following results:

a. Organization would be known as the Korean Research Bureau.

b. Appropriation, by executive order, of W 203,000,000 for the fiscal year 1948-49 (Incl 2).

c. Table of organization approved (Incl 3).

d. Letters from Headquarters, 971st CIC Detachment, informed commanding officers of the CIC district offices that Korean Research Bureau personnel would assume the duties of American CIC (Incl 4).

Incl 1

4191

[redacted]

[redacted]

Dr. Rhee also made several unsuccessful attempts before the National Assembly to have the Korean Research Bureau recognized as a legal government entity.

Before the first class graduated in late August 1948, the American advisors decided to continue recruiting in order to bring the bureau up to its 315 men T/O strength.

Immediately following the graduation of the first class, a second group of 240 students commenced training. Because the National Police Academy's facilities were inadequate, larger quarters must be found. Kyonggi Middle School, on the side of North Mountain in the rear of the capitol building, was the chosen site. Instructors were key personnel from the first class plus some of the original teachers.

During the closing weeks of the second class, a Korean Research Bureau headquarters building was procured in Seoul, and plans were made for the reception of Korean personnel at the CIC district offices.

In the meantime, Dr. Rhee continued his efforts to have the National Assembly recognize the Research Bureau. However, because the majority of the assemblymen felt that the bureau was an organization whose purpose was to ferret out Dr. Rhee's political adversaries, his attempts were in vain.

During the second class, the following were accomplished:

a. With Kyonggi Middle School as a base of operations, headquarters was established, and the various departments commenced to function.

b. Office supplies and investigative equipment were purchased.

c. Fiscal and accounting procedures were adopted.

d. Pay Scale was adopted and effected (Incl 5).

When the second class graduated in early October 1948, Research Bureau personnel were assigned to the CIC district field offices. The National Police advisor and the American CIC advisors selected Min Jung Sik to be the first director of the bureau.

Because it was obvious that the National Assembly would not sanction the Korean Research Bureau, G2, XXIV Corps, decided that a military CIC

[redacted]

should be established within the Korean constabulary forces. In September 1948, a group of Korean Army and Navy officers and cadets (Incl 6) were ordered to Seoul for a one month's CIC course. The American CIC advisors organized the "Special Investigations Section" school and set up a classroom in a former Japanese shrine in the "Gold Coast" section of Seoul. The students were told that upon conclusion of the course they would return to their units and organize CIC detachments; the details of organization were their responsibility. It is believed that the G2 advisor to the Korean Military Advisory Group exerted some influence in the formulation of CIC within the Korean constabulary.

When the personnel of the 971st CIC Detachment departed Korea in December 1948, the American CIC advisors were relieved of their duties. Subsequent reports revealed that the Korean Research Bureau ceased to exist, and the Special Investigations Section within the armed forces performed CIC functions.

[redacted]

6 WEEK MASTER TRAINING SCHEDULE - RESEARCH BUREAU

	SUBJECT	TOTAL HRS	WEEK OF TRAINING 1	2	3	4	5	6
1	INTRODUCTION & MISSION	3	3					
2	ORGANIZATION	2	2					
3	SAFEGUARDING INFORMATION	3	3					
4	REPORT WRITING	15		5	5	5		
5	SECURITY SURVEY	7	3	4				
6	CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	2					2	
7	INTERROGATIONS	24	4	4	4	4	6	2
8	SABOTAGE & ESPIONAGE	10	2	5	3			
9	COUNTER ESPIONAGE	5	3	2				
10	UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS	5		2	3			
11	BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS	9		4	5			
12	INFORMANTS	5	5					
13	SURVEILLANCE	13				8	5	
14	ARRESTS & SEARCHES	5			2	3		
15	RIOT CONTROL	2		2				
16	TRAINING FILMS	4			2	2		
17	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	2	2					
18	FINGERPRINTING	5	3	2				
19	POLICE LABORATORY INSPECTION	3			3			
20	BLOOD & BODY FLUIDS	1	1					
21	DOCUMENT EXAMINATION	2			2			
22	SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE EQUIP.	5				5		
23	CODES & CIPHERS	5					5	
24	PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE	3					3	
25	COMMUNICATIONS	2				2		
26	METHODS OF ENTRY	3					3	
27	OBSERVATION & DESCRIPTION	17		3	4	4	6	
28	PISTOL	15						15
29	1ST ECHELON MAINT. & DRIVING	16						16
30	LAW OF SEARCH & ARREST	3					3	
31	PHYSICAL TRAINING	24	4	4	4	4	4	4
32	EXAMINATIONS	12	2	2	2	2	2	2
33	EXAM REVIEW	5		1	1	1	1	1
34	APTITUDE TEST	3	3					
	TOTAL	240	40	40	40	40	40	40

APPROVED: /s/ Min Jung Sik

Incl #1

4194

[redacted]

SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Seoul, Korea

26 July 1948

SUBJECT: Department of Police Supplemental Appropriation FY 1948/1949

TO: Advisor and Director, Department of Police

1. A supplemental appropriation in the amount of 203,400,000 is hereby approved for the Research Bureau, Department of Police, to be allocated on a monthly basis effective 1 July 1948.

2. It is hereby directed that funds in the total amount of 14,175,000 be transferred from object class 01, salaries, divisions 01 and 03, of the current approved budget for the Department of Police, to object class 01, salaries, Research Bureau, Department of Police. This amount to be allocated on a monthly basis effective 1 July 1948.

3. The detailed supplemental appropriation by object class and limitation within division, together with the transfer of funds, is to be allocated monthly as follows:

06	Research Bureau		
	112 Food and Clothing		3,000,000
	09		
	115 Intelligence		
	02 Wages		8,000,000
	124 Office Expense		
	01 Salaries	1,575,000	
	03 Travel	5,000,000	
	06 Rent & Utilities	1,000,000	
	08 Other contractual Services	1,000,000	
	09 Supplies	1,600,000	
	10 Equipment	2,000,000	12,175,000
	175 Contingency Funds		1,000,000
	TOTAL MONTHLY ALLOCATION		24,175,000

Incl #2

4. It is further directed that all unobligated funds remaining at the end of each month will automatically be withdrawn, and will not be available for obligation during the succeeding month.

5. No funds will be obligated that are not absolutely necessary, and all vouchers for expenditures will be approved by the Principal Advisor, Department of Police.

W. F. DEAN
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

4196

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
RESEARCH BUREAU
Seoul, Korea

2 Sep 1948

Class I Offices

Location	Officer in Charge
1. Seoul	OHM SAH SUN
2. Pusan	KIM CHUNG TAE
3. Taegu	KWON OH YONG

Class II Offices

1. Inchon	MIN YUNG SIK
2. Kaesong	CHA SANG ICK
3. Chunchon	PAK SO YUNG
4. Chongju	HAN PILL WOO
5. Taejon	LEE JAI WHA
6. Chonju	RA CHONG DAI
7. Kwangju	KIM HONG KI
8. Cheju	SA MYUNG
9. Kunsan	KIM BYUNG KI
10. Mokpo	MOON TAL SUB
11. Pohang	KOUN HANG JAB
12. Masau	KIM IL

Class III Offices

1. Ongjan	HONG IN YUNG
2. Kangnung	KIM HUN HI
3. Hoengsong	HONG KAP PYO
4. Samchock	WHONG JI SAM

Han:
MIN JUNG SIK
Director

Incl #3

4197

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS T/O

Section	Officers	Sgts
Chief	1 Class I	2 Clerks
Deputy Chief	1 Class II	1 Driver
Executive Officer	1 Class III	1 Clerk
a. Adjutant	1 Class V	2 Clerks
b. Personnel O	1 Class V	1 Clerk
c. Finance O	1 Class V	1 Clerk
d. Supply O	1 Class V	2 Clerks
e. Transportation O	1 Class V	1 Clerk
		4 Mechanics
f. Communications O	1 Class V	2 Clerks
		6 Couriers
		3 Radio Oprs.
Operations	1 Class III	1 Clerk
	1 Class V	
Espionage-Sabotage	1 Class IV	2 Clerks
	1 Class V	
Foreign	1 Class IV	2 Clerks
	1 Class V	
Security	1 Class IV	2 Clerks
	1 Class V	
Political	1 Class IV	2 Clerks
	1 Class V	
Reports & Analysis	1 Class IV	2 Clerks
	1 Class V	3 File Clerks
TOTAL	21 Officers	40 Sergeants

4198

[redacted]

[redacted]

ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN

District	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
Headquarters	21	40	61
Seoul	51	9	60
Pusan	15	5	20
Taegu	15	5	20
13 Class II	104 (8 ea)	26 (2 ea)	130
8 Class III	24 (3 ea)	-	24
Total	230	85	315

4199

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL DISTRICT T/O

Section	Officers	Sergeants
Officer in Charge	1 Class III	1 Clerk
Deputy OIC	1 Class IV	
Executive O	1 Class V	
Investigations:		
Investigations O	1 Class V	5 Clerks
15 Chief Agents	15 Class V	
15 Special Agents	15 Class VI	
15 Agents	15 Class VI	
Files:		
2 Agents	2 Class VI	3 Clerks
TOTAL	51 Officers	9 Sergeants

PUSAN - TAEGU DISTRICT T/O

Section	Officers	Sergeants
Officer in Charge	1 Class III	
Executive O	1 Class V	
Investigations O	1 Class V	3 Clerks
4 Chief Agents	4 Class V	
4 Special Agents	4 Class VI	
4 Agents	4 Class VI	
Files		2 Clerks
Total: Pusan	15 Officers	5 Sergeants
Total: Taegu	15 Officers	5 Sergeants
Total:	30	10

4200

SECOND CLASS OFFICES T/O

District	Officers	Sergeants	Total
Inchon	1 Class IV 2 Class V 5 Class VI	2 Clerks	10
Kaesong			
Chongju			
Chonju			
Kunsan			
Mokpo			
Kwangju			
Masan			
Pohang			
Taejon			
Kangnung			
Chunchon			
Cheju			
Total	13 Class IV 26 Class V 65 Class VI	26 Sergeants	130
Total	104	26 Sergeants	130

THIRD CLASS OFFICES T/O

District	Officers	Total
Ongjin	1 Class V 2 Class VI	
Yonan		
Hoengsong		
Suwon		
Andong		
Tongyong		
Hongsong		
Samchok		
Total	8 Class V 16 Class VI	24

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
971st CIC DETACHMENT
APO 235, c/o PM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Korean On-the-Job Training

TO: Officers in Charge

1. In accordance with present plans to train Korean personnel to assume the duties and responsibilities of this organization, at a date to be announced later, the procedures as herein set forth are established.

2. It is anticipated that Korean personnel, who have received a basic course in Counter Intelligence methods and operations, will eventually maintain and operate the headquarters and district offices which are presently operated by this organization. In order to further qualify the Korean personnel to assume their responsibilities an on-the-job training period will commence on or about 15 September 1948.

3. The designated Korean officer in charge is respon sible for the administration, supply, messing, billeting and discipline of the Koreans attached with him, and is himself responsible only to his own higher headquarters. In the event of any disagreements which cannot be satisfactorily settled between you and the Korean OIC, the matter will be referred to this headquarters for determination.

4. You are authorized to make available to these attached personnel, files and information pertaining to Korean incident and complaint type cases. In addition to being given on-the-job training the attached personnel will be used in furthering the mission of your office by working together with you in the production of intelligence and counter intelligence.

5. It is imperative that wholehearted cooperation be accorded these men during the ensuing transition period. Their mission requires knowledge and understanding and their success depends in large measure upon your guidance during the embryonic stages.

JOSEPH HUCKINS
Lt Col QMC
Commanding

4202

Incl #4

[redacted]

4203

MONTHLY RATES OF PAY & ALLOWANCES OF RESEARCH BUREAU PERSONNEL

GRADE	MONTHLY BASE PAY (124-01)	MONTHLY SUPPLEMENT (115-02)	TOTAL MONTHLY SALARY	SERVICE								
				OVER 1 YEAR			OVER 3 YEARS			OVER 5 YEARS		
				124-01	115-02	TOTAL	124-01	115-02	TOTAL	124-01	115-02	TOTAL
DIRECTOR I	13,200	10,800	24,000	14,400	10,800	25,200	15,600	10,800	26,400	16,800	10,800	27,600
DEPUTY II DIRECTOR	10,780	9,220	20,000	11,780	9,220	21,000	12,780	9,220	22,000	13,780	9,220	23,000
DISTRICT CHIEF III	9,540	9,460	19,000	10,490	9,460	19,950	11,440	9,460	20,900	12,390	9,460	21,850
SECTION CHIEF IV	7,350	10,650	18,000	8,250	10,650	18,900	9,150	10,650	19,800	10,050	10,650	20,700
SPECIAL AGENT V	5,800	10,200	16,000	6,600	10,200	16,800	7,400	10,200	17,600	17,750	10,650	18,400
SPECIAL AGENT VI	4,840	10,160	15,000	5,590	10,160	15,750	ADVANCE TO SPECIAL AGENT GRADE V					
CLERK VII	3,570	8,430	12,000	4,170	8,430	12,600	4,770	8,430	13,200	5,370	8,430	13,800

Incl #5

KOREAN SIS SCHOOL
CLASS # 1
27 Sep - 30 Oct 1948

ARMY OFFICERS

NAME			RANK	SERIAL NUMBER
Shin Chi Ho	(	)	Cadet	148
Moon Sang Hun	(	)	Cadet	336
Kim Jai Sun	(	)	1st Lt.	10585
Wang Sei Il	(	)	2nd Lt.	11095
Lee Han Chin	(	)	2nd Lt.	10898
Kang Ung Sup	(	)	2nd Lt.	11346
Yuk Keun Soo	(	)	1st Lt.	10584
Um Ja Myung	(	)	2nd Lt.	10953
Kim Soon Ki	(	)	2nd Lt.	11101
Cheung Jai Bong	(	)	Cadet	209
Song Dai Hoo	(	)	1st Lt.	10651
Kim An Il	(	)	Capt.	10218
Lee Joo Hyo	(	)	Cadet	218
Huh Jun	(	)	1st Lt.	10561
Chang Chui	(	)	Cadet	137
Kang Sung Chul	(	)	2nd Lt.	11244
Lee Oo Cheung	(	)	1st Lt.	11210
Kim Pan Kyoo	(	)	2nd Lt.	11290
Kim Choong Yan	(	)	2nd Lt.	10660
Yoo Moon Il	(	)	2nd Lt.	11422
Oh Bo Kyoon	(	)	2nd Lt.	10824
Lee Hi Yeung	(	)	2nd Lt.	1113
Kim Kwan Chin	(	)	2nd Lt.	11370
Lee Sei Ho	(	)	Capt.	10253
Oh Sung Kyoo	(	)	1st Lt.	10543
Song Yun Am	(	)	Cadet	21
Cheung Lam Teik	(	)	1st Lt.	10541
Huh Hyung Soon	(	)	1st Lt.	10443
Paik Oon Sang	(	)	1st Lt.	10422
Bin Chul Hyun	(	)	Capt.	10247
Yang Lim Suk	(	)	2nd Lt.	10925
Kim Chang Young	(	)	Capt.	10579
Pak Pyong Nai	(	)	2nd Lt.	11167

Incl #6

4204

NAVY OFFICERS

NAME	RANK	SERIAL NUMBER
Sung Myung Soo ( )	(1st) Lt.	80133
Kwon Suk Ki ( )	Ensign	80279
Oh Sang Kyoo ( )	Ensign	80376
Kim Chong Sik ( )	Ensign	80283
Huh Seung Young ( )	Lt. j.g.	80232
Yoon Yeung Jun ( )	Lt.	80231
Chang Nam Sup ( )	Lt.	80120
Sung Keun Hwan ( )	Ensign	80257

BOX NUMBER: ///

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME IV

THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS: 1918-1941

CDR, USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2+3
DECLASSIFY ON

May 1960

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

0517

* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction.":

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS: 1918-1941

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Part I: CIP Demobilization Problems

[redacted]

Section 1

OCCUPATION ERA OVERSEAS

Communist Problem Recognized

Two days after the 1918 Armistice, Col. Ralph H. Van Deman, War Department Military Intelligence observer attached to G2, American Expeditionary Force, at Chaumont, France, cabled his chief in Washington:

> In view of the evident attempt of the Bolsheviks and affiliated elements to bring about widespread trouble, consider it most important that passport control is strictly maintained. Suggest you keep in close touch with the Department of Justice and urge on them the importance of watching this matter in the United States and keeping you informed. Vital that we here be kept informed of any developments of this kind in the United States and names of Americans now in Europe identified with revolutionary movements and of departures of such persons for Europe. Whole matter should be kept as quiet as possible.[1]

Colonel Van Deman's concern arose from the fact that almost simultaneously with the cease fire of 11 November, reports of Communist disturbances in many parts of Europe began arriving at G2, Army Expeditionary Forces. In Switzerland Communist railway workers refused to transport troops. In Brussels, the Red Flag was raised as soldiers and workers took over the government. Northern Italy was reported "ready to blow up;" Austria-Hungary, "practically gone to pieces;" Holland and Sweden were "honeycombed." Communist conditions in France, Poland, Germany and Russia were well known.[2]

Colonel Van Deman followed his cable with a letter to Brig. Gen. Marborough Churchill, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, in which he said:

> "There is no use telling you what this movement means or what its object is--a world-wide social and political revolution. In other words, the fullfilment of the dream of the Internationalist. If they are able to carry out their plans, we all know what will happen.

---

1 Maj Gen R. H. Van Deman, Memoirs, 10 Apr 1951, Vol 3, Appendix F, (FUOU), (Central CIC Files). NOTE: Hereafter this reference will be referred to as "Van Deman."

2 Van Deman, Vol 2, p 67; and Vol 3, Appendix G.

NOTE: All sources in Section 1 are unclassified unless otherwise noted.

[redacted]

"From our standpoint (Intelligence) the first thing to be done is to ascertain how far this propaganda has permeated our troops and next to take any measures possible to eradicate what exists and counteract future efforts of the Bolshevik-Internationalist group. This we have started to do by means of our troop Counter Intelligence organization... To maintain discipline in our forces over here during that demobilization period is going to be a most difficult task. It would be under the most favorable conditions, but with this revolutionary business on, there is no telling what may happen...it looks as if we might be entering on a period of even greater danger to the civilization of the world than the one through which we have just passed...the closest watch must be kept on all the well known agents of these people both here and in the U.S....

"It seems to me that the intelligence services of all of us should take this work over, in close liaison with the civil services of the various governments. It is perhaps hardly a 'war activity' but if an attempt to spread anarchy and revolution over the world is to be made, it seems to me we must use every means at our disposal to fight it. Don't think I am an alarmist. But I cannot help thinking that things look most dangerous for the future..."[3]

Colonel Van Deman's warnings of demobilization problems were subsequently justified. The mutiny of American troops with the Army Expeditionary Forces, Northern Russia, has been described in the previous chapter. In France, just after the Armistice, a serious morale problem between temporary and Regular Army officers arose. Col's. William (Wild Bill) Donovan and Theodore Roosevelt discussed with Colonel Van Deman the possibility of forming an American Veterans organization as a diversion, but the trouble died down before the Bolsheviks could exploit it. The veterans association plan was shelved and subsequently these plans matured when the American Legion was formed in the United States.[4] Colonel Van Deman's stress on the importance of keeping track of American Communists abroad was justified by difficulties with Occupation troops which will be discussed later.

As Colonel Van Deman had anticipated, total demobilization took more than a year. Within five months, half of the Army's four million men had been discharged, but it took six months more to return another million and a half to civilian life.[5] Even then the Army was still cutting back to the 325,000 men it had been authorized

3 Van Deman, Vol 3, App G.
4 Van Deman, Vol 3, pp 10, 12, 14.
5 Army Almanac, 1950, p 655.

on 11 July 1919.[6] In Europe, however, a speed-up was attained, and within a month after the Armistice, first units were back in the United States. Of the two million troops that had been in Europe during World War I, there remained nine months later only a 6,800-man Occupation Force in Germany.[7] However, demobilization of the Corps of Intelligence Police in Europe was delayed six months because of security requirements for the Peace Conference and service with the initial occupation force in the period between the Armistice and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919. Only those men in training and on probation were returned to their units, and the Corps in Europe had a strength of 405 in January 1919.

G2: SOS After the Armistice

Following the Armistice of November 11, 1918, the general duties of G2, SOS, continued to be performed. Carding of suspects continued at an accelerated pace. New problems included: the investigation of possible enemy activities designed to create dissension among the Allies; inquiry into the possible peacetime aims of certain radical, Socialist and Bolshevik elements; obtaining information on political, social and labor conditions; studying the effect of demobilization in France and England; and observing activities of various groups and committees in Paris representing small nations seeking recognition at the Peace Conference.[8]

Colonel Ward reported that after the Armistice, work of many Intelligence Service branches was increased and intensified. Efforts could not be relaxed "to prevent the entry into areas occupied by American troops of propagandists sent through enemy influences." Another task was to provide intelligence service for officers of the Army Expeditionary Forces in control of the Negative Intelligence of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. To carry out orders received, it was necessary to open new bureaus, and G2 activities were extended to Army Expeditionary Force bases at Antwerp and Rotterdam. In addition, passport activities of the Intelligence Service were greatly increased, and assistance of the Intelligence Police was officially requested by the United States Secret Service in connection with the arrival of President Wilson for the Peace Conference at Paris.[9]

A portion of the Corps' work with regard to the President's arrival centered at the Port of Brest, where it was rumored that French radicals, financed by

6 Kull, Nell and I.S., A Short Chronology of American History, Rutgers Press, 1952, p 231.

7 Army Almanac, 1950, p 442.

8 History G2, SOS, p 6, "History & Critical Analysis of Functions of G-2, S.O.S." prepared by AC/S, G2, SOS, dtd 15 May 1919, (Uncl) Photostat copy, Central Record Facility. Hereafter cited as: History, G2, SOS.

9 History G2, SOS, pp 35, 360, 154.

Bolshevik funds, were planning an uprising the day President Wilson arrived. It was further rumored that the President would be Number 1 target for a bomb. All available Intelligence Police were sent to Brest to work with French agents. Posing as American salesmen and journalists with Red sympathies, they became acquainted with the Communist leaders, and before the arrival of the President, convinced the leaders that President Wilson did not know their problems, but since American labor was well treated, the President might turn out to be their best friend. As a result, when the President arrived, he was greeted by a petition instead of a bomb.[10]

At the LeHavre CIP office, morale surveys ended with the Armistice and consequent stoppage of troop arrivals, and the CIP trainee school was discontinued about this time.

In December, the office took over some of the more complex CID cases since the local Provost Marshal had no investigators available. Among the cases handled was one involving the hijacking of about $50,000 worth of American supplies a month at a point between the docks and the railheads. During this three-month investigation, according to one officer, agents learned of an "...untouchable international dope ring which was at the bottom of stealing American supplies and much incidental espionage..." Early in 1918, the 40-man force was split in half to provide a unit for the Paris Peace Conference.[11]

G2, SOS, continued its operations until 15 May 1919, and was then demobilized, although the Peace Treaty had not been signed, and Colonel Van Deman had urged that the Paris and Brest officers be continued in operations. The most unfortunate aspect of this demobilization was that all files were shipped to the United States, and there was no means of supplying information which French and British Intelligence Services felt necessary to assist the Peace delegation. Colonel Van Deman had urged that these files be left with the American Military Attache in Paris, but General Nolan had objected because he felt they would not be kept strictly confidential.[12]

Paris Peace Conference

Corps of Intelligence Police agents served as interpreters, translators and security guards for the President and the American Commission, and maintained

10 Johnson, T.M., Our Secret War, Bobbs-Merrill, 1929, p 270; and Van Deman, Vol 3, p 5. NOTE: Johnson, T.M. hereafter cited as "Johnson."

11 Watkins, John B., Lt Col, MI, ORC, "Some Intelligence Missions," pp 4 and 54, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac). Hereafter cited as Watkins.

12 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 15 and p 17; and History, MID Vol 3, p 3, (Secret).

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security at the Hotel Murat while President Wilson was there.[13] Prior to the President's arrival, the residence and its surroundings were carefully examined, and inhabitants of near-by buildings were investigated. The building was examined from garret to cellar to check for concealed explosives. Telephone and telegraph wires were inspected as a safeguard against wire tapping, and the neighboring streets were guarded by plain-clothes men.

Colonel Ward stated that when the premises were turned over to the jurisdiction of the United States Secret Service on arrival of the President, the Chief forwarded a written commendation on the preparations made.

Secret Service secured Intelligence Police, who could speak French, to work with French Inspectors at the entrance to the Peace Conference chambers at the Palais d'Orsay. The task of these agents was to prevent unauthorized persons from entering. Confidential information was requested and furnished a number of United States plenipotentiaries, including representatives at the War Council at Versailles. Surveillance of various ministries along with overt and covert coverage of various committees and reunions was maintained, and surveillance of Bolshevik activities was facilitated by dividing Paris into CIP districts.[14]

Colonel Van Deman had been notified on 22 November 1918 that he would be in charge of "counterespionage" at the Peace Conference. By 1 December, he had established his office at #4 Place de la Concorde in the building which had been rented for the American section of the Peace Conference, and established his quarters with other American delegates at the Hotel Crillon. Two Corps of Intelligence Police agents, Sgts. W. W. McKinnon and L. F. Hensel, and a messenger were assigned Colonel Van Deman from G2, SOS.[15]

Herbert Hoover was in charge of providing food and relief for certain devastated sections in Europe, and Colonel Van Deman proposed that intelligence agents familiar with the country be sent with relief workers. Mr. Hoover, Colonel Van Deman said, "violently" objected. However, "Certain intelligence agents were sent on some of these missions and they reported conditions upon their return."[16] The opposition of Hoover to covert intelligence activities was to handicap the service again in 1929.[17]

On 4 December, Capt. Ogden Mills reported as Colonel Van Deman's assistant, and together they worked on various security procedures for passes, mail distribution and telephone security. At the Hotel Crillon, the telephone

13 History G2, SOS, p 36.
14 History G2, SOS, p 154.
15 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 3.
16 Van Deman, Vol 3, pp 4 and 10.
17 History, MID, Vol 3, p [illegible], (Secret).

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cable was enclosed in lead; American girls chosen as operators were carefully screened, and a part of the exchange arranged to allow intelligence personnel to check on calls for security violations.[18]

Because of its unsavory reputation, Maxim's Restaurant was placed off limits for all American Armed Forces personnel in Paris. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel Van Deman discovered that a trap door led from one of the Commission offices at #4 Place de la Concorde to the second floor above the restaurant. Van Deman had the door padlocked and gave the key to one of his sergeants who was vouched for as entirely reliable. Two weeks later the door was discovered open. This time it was repadlocked "but," said Colonel Van Deman, "the sergeant no longer kept the keys."[19]

In addition to other duties at the conference, Van Deman was detailed as a member of the "Dresel" Committee on Current Diplomatic and Political Correspondence of the American Section. With E. L. Dresel of the State Department as chairman, members included the two Dulles brothers, Adolph Berle, Maj. Roal Tyler and Maj. Delancey Kountze. The principal function of this committee was to receive and examine the credentials of various couriers as they reported from different sectors of Europe before they had made reports to the Commissioners. The committee met every morning.[20]

During this period Colonel Van Deman had innumerable conferences with prominent American, British and French intelligence officials regarding various problems. Among these was a conference with Leland Harrison, head of the Secret Service of the United States State Department, and Mr. Joseph Grew, on the collection of positive intelligence. On other occasions he conferred with Dr. Edward Benes of Czechoslovakia, Lawrence of Arabia, and Sir Basil Thompson of Scotland Yard. Van Deman also received an intelligence report from Col. Sherman Miles who had completed a Balkan tour. When Nelly Bly, well-known newspaper woman, arrived in Paris after spending the war in Austria, it was felt she knew a considerable amount about the Bolshevik organization and activities there; efforts to get her to talk about them failed.[21]

Van Deman's Report

In his official report, Colonel Van Deman said that the work of the "Negative Intelligence Department" for the American section of the Peace Conference was to prevent interference with the operation of the Commission by outside agencies

18 Van Deman, Vol 3, pp 4 and 10.
19 Ibid, p 7.
20 Ibid, p 5.
21 Ibid, p 13.

through three specific steps: (1) safeguarding records, (2) protecting personnel, and (3) counterespionage measures.[22]

Colonel Van Deman said:

> To accomplish these objects it was, of course, imperative that the personnel employed by the Commission should be trustworthy, that persons known to hold disloyal sentiments and those of anarchist or terrorist tendencies should be denied admission to the buildings, that constant and close supervision should be kept on all persons entering the buildings whose sentiments and affiliations were not known, and that all orderlies, messengers, telephone operators, hotel employees, clerks, typists, laborers, etc., had to be carefully investigated before being employed. It also meant that we must know what persons were permitted to the buildings, where they went in those buildings and when they left...that no evil-intentioned persons were allowed to loaf about the entrances of buildings. To accomplish this a system of passes had to be established... Press passes were issued only upon a written request from the "Press Bureau" with a statement that the Executive Committee of Correspondents had considered the individuals named and were convinced a pass should be issued...watch was kept on all offices and living quarters to see that important and confidential papers were not left lying about when rooms were unoccupied... Intelligence Police sergeants were stationed as guards in the Records and the Map Room at all hours...contents of the waste paper baskets were burned daily under the direct supervision of an Intelligence Police sergeant.

Much of Colonel Van Deman's security supervision required great tact and diplomacy. CIP sergeants were detailed to circulate throughout the conference building on a 24-hour basis to check on any one acting in a suspicious manner. While everyone except the general officers of the Army and high officials of the Allied Governments were required to have a pass, discretion had to be used in requests to examine these credentials. Colonel Van Deman stated, "As the Central powers maintained espionage personnel in France and particularly in Paris, it was necessary to make sure that uninformed members of the Commission personnel were warned when they were approached by individuals who were definitely 'suspect.' This was done by myself personally and in the most quiet and confidential way possible."[23]

In addition to regular "counter" intelligence work, Colonel Van Deman, at the request of the Secretary General, took up the subject of "Bolshevism" and its allied activities. All cables, reports and interview notes were routed to his

22 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 30.
23 Ibid, p 31.

Negative Intelligence Department, and military attaches were directed by the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff to send Colonel Van Deman direct all information obtained by them in this connection. Beginning 12 December 1918, a daily resume on "Bolshevism" and kindred activities was issued, and each month conditions in every country in the world in which Bolshevist activities were disclosed were summarized.[24]

Coverage of Bolshevist activities was one of the principal counterintelligence functions of the Peace Conference. Early in 1919 there were false rumors that the Allies were going to send an expedition to Russia to supplement the Siberian Forces and force out the Communists. British intelligence officials urged that American intelligence cooperate with them in a plan to keep track of Soviet supporters in all parts of the world. From Berlin came reports that the Germans were in a "blue funk" about Bolshevism, and many firsthand accounts of Communist activities were received. Among them was the report of the widow of Mr. Proctor of Proctor and Gamble who had "escaped" after serving with the Russian Red Cross, and the report of William Treadwell who had been imprisoned by the Bolsheviks.[25]

Some of the 100 newspaper correspondents accredited to the Peace Conference had records that were "not too good." One such person was Robert Minor, the prominent American Communist, whose case will be reported later. Colonel Van Deman arranged for discreet surveillance, and for this assignment, received the help of an exceptional volunteer, ...

In February, volunteered to go to Germany in connection with the Minor case, and while in Berlin sent in firsthand accounts of the Bolshevik uprising in June.[26]

The Bullitt Case

The Bullitt Case was the most outstanding intelligence incident of the Peace Conference. In February 1919, William C. Bullitt, Chief of the Confidential Records Section of the American Commission, made a trip without authorization of the Peace Commissioners to Russia with Lincoln Steffins, the writer. On his return in March, Bullitt submitted "an extremely rosy" report to the Commissioners regarding Bolshevik accomplishments in Russia. Since Colonel Van Deman was collecting all available facts on the subject, he was directed by the Secretary of the American delegation to prepare a rebuttal to the obvious inaccuracies in Bullitt's report, such as the statement that only a small number of people were

24 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 32.
25 Ibid, pp 9, 12, 15, 16, and 17.
26 Ibid, pp 7, 8, and 24.

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killed in the Russian Revolution. Colonel Van Deman, in his reply to Bullitt's report dated 1 April 1919, commented, "...documents in this office indicate that compared to the Russian Revolution, the French was a tame affair..."[27]

Ignoring Colonel Van Deman's documented evidence, Bullitt appeared before the Dresel Committee 10 days later and "told members there would be a revolution in Europe and that nothing they could do would stop it." On 21 May, Bullitt resigned, following disapproval by the Commissioners of his unauthorized trip and his "propaganda" report. In June, Bullitt was in London where it was reported he was consorting with radical elements.

In his report to the Chief, MID, Colonel Van Deman wrote, "... I am afraid that he is going to develop into a dangerous man. Personally, I like Bullitt, but he is an extreme radical and has become more so by his stay in Europe. He is also a disappointed and disgruntled man, and such a chap is always likely to be dangerous if he is smart, and Bullitt is that."[28]

On 25 June, Colonel Van Deman was informed by a State Department representative that a cable, stolen from Bullitt's safe in Paris, had turned up in Chicago. This safe had contained all confidential records of the American Section of the Peace Conference and its communications with Washington. The results of this investigation are not known.[29]

Bullitt continued his high opinion of the Soviets for 14 years. When John Reed, one of the original American Communists, died disillusioned in Russia in 1923, Bullitt married his widow and continued to champion the Bolsheviks to such an extent that when the Soviet government was recognized by President Roosevelt in 1933, Bullitt was appointed as first U.S. Ambassador and served in Moscow for three years.[30]

The rosy pictures developed during his few weeks in 1919 dissolved in reality as his Moscow tenure rolled by, and Bullitt returned from Russia completely disillusioned. In 1946, he wrote a book called The Great Globe Itself, in which, among other indictments of the Soviets, he paralleled their violations of international agreements with crimes of the Nazis. Without direct reference to his previous infatuation, Bullitt wrote, "...All Americans wanted to believe that the Soviet Union was what we wished it to be. Our hopeful wishes predisposed us to accept any laudatory lie and to discount every refractory fact."[31] Bullitt was subsequently a highly active opponent of communism.

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27 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 13 and App B.

28 Ibid, pp 15, 18 and 20.

29 Ibid, pp 23, 24.

30 Ibid, pp 13, 14; and Weyl, Nathaniel, The Battle Against Disloyalty, Thomas Y. Crowell, N.Y., (1951), p 125. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Weyl."

31 Bullitt, W.C., The Great Globe Itself, N.Y., 1946, Scribners Sons, p 22.

But to Van Deman in 1919, Bullitt was a living example of the warning given two days after the Armistice that "we might be entering on a period of even greater danger to the civilization of the world than the one through which we have just passed..."[32]

While Bolshevism was the principal counterintelligence problem of the conference, Van Deman had several other reports of more than routine interest. From London, Capt. Bronson Cutting, the assistant military attache, reported that a letter Van Deman had sent him marked "personal and confidential" had been opened by a secretary who was a former code clerk of the London Embassy. The girl claimed she opened the letter by error but previously, in the summer of 1918, the girl had been under suspicion in connection with the suspected espionage case at the London military attache office, reported in the chapter on the CIP in World War I. Colonel Van Deman wrote, "Bronson Cutting endeavored to investigate this matter, but no definite results were ever obtained."[33]

In July 1919, Colonel Van Deman received a report that forecast a war then more than a decade away. From a Britisher connected with the biggest firm of metal merchants in Europe, who had been an officer in the British Intelligence Service during World War I, Van Deman learned that Japan had sold a large quantity of copper in England in the spring and was now buying it back at an advanced price. The informant added that Japan was buying all the land in Australia she could get, and getting in a considerable stock of mercury and antimony.[34]

During the same spring, Colonel Van Deman was asked to give one of the Presidential advisors his ideas on how military intelligence should be handled by the League of Nations, but in June Van Deman wrote to General Churchill at Washington that he had talked with several people on the subject:

> ...so far as I can gather, no one seems impressed with the necessity for having such a service as part of the League of Nations. How under the sun they expect to function without it, I can't imagine and am sure they will have to come to it in the end. Just now they seem to have exceedingly vague ideas of what the organization of the League is going to be and also seem to have a feeling that they are not going to let military people have anything to do with it.[35]

To handle work at the conference, Van Deman's original force was increased to three officers (Lieutenants Colwell, Brevoot and Hornblow) and 35 sergeants.

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32 Van Deman, Vol 3, App G.
33 Ibid, p 9.
34 Ibid, p 26.
35 Ibid, pp 29, 30.

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This staff was gradually increased to a peak of seven officers and 60 Intelligence Police with Major Cooper as unit commander. At the termination of the conference, the force consisted of six officers, two army field clerks, and 35 Intelligence Police sergeants. When G2, SOS, was terminated on 15 May 1919, the men remaining with Van Deman were placed under the command of G2, GHQ, American Expeditionary Forces, Chaumont.[36] One of the personal problems facing these CIP agents in Paris was that food costs had doubled while their allowance remained at 11 francs a day, with 7.50 francs a day allowed for room; this put the men on very short rations.[37]

With the Occupation Forces

Shortly after the Armistice, Maj. Gen. George H. Harris went to Berlin as chief of the American Section of the Inter-Allied Prisoner of War Commission. Some of the officers attached to this section and living with General Harris at the Hotel Adlon had duties in addition to getting prisoners cared for and shipped out of Germany. G2, GHQ, American Expeditionary Forces, remained at Chaumont with General Nolan in charge, but an advanced GHQ was established at Trier on the border of the German Rhineland. Here Major Henrotin, who had handled the Tours district of G2, SOS, during World War I, headed the Counter Intelligence Service. Soon Henrotin placed an Intelligence Police sergeant under cover in a Bolshevik organization in Berlin where the sergeant posed as an American deserter.[38]

The American Third Army was designated the Army of Occupation. It consisted originally of nine divisions, totaling about 200,000 men, and included a CIP contingent. On 7 November, it started for the Rhine and four days later reached Luxemburg. By 23 November, it had reached the German border and halted for a week while the British and French forces flanking it assembled. On 9 December, leading elements reached the Rhine at Coblenz; four days later III Corps crossed the river and established its bridgehead with impressive Fortress Erhenbreitstein as its headquarters. By a coincidence of fate, one division crossed the Rhine at Remagen where 27 years later another division of III Corps was to cross in the next World War. Meanwhile, two divisions of the Second Army occupied Luxemburg.[39]

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36 Van Deman, Vol 3, App B.

37 Elliott, Gilbert, History of a Portion of the CIP in France, CIP Basic Data File, CIC Historical Project Files, p 1, written for MID by this former agent in Aug 1919, File #103090-211. (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac) NOTE: Hereafter cited "Elliott."

38 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 15; and Johnson, p 225.

39 Army Almanac, 1950, p 441.

CIP agents in Luxemburg made a timely discovery of French plans to annex the little Grand Duchy. General Pershing was ready when French troops marched in; he ordered American troops to remain and protect the little kingdom. Two CIP agents, posing as newspaper correspondents, penetrated the parliament of Luxemburg and met members of all parties and heard various debates; they were even presented to the Grand Duchess. Several stay-behind agents of the Germans were discovered in Luxemburg and turned over to the French.[40]

At Third Army headquarters at Coblenz, Col R. H. Williams was chief of Intelligence and under him was established the first "Political Section" of G2, with Col. Newbold Morris, noted journalist, in charge. After World War II, political reporting was to become an important part of CIC work with the Occupation of Germany. Some 20 CIP agents were on duty at Coblenz.[41]

German intelligence sent a number of agents to Coblenz. Intelligence Police spotted many on arrival and steered suspects to a residence at the Riesenfuerstenhof, a hotel thoroughly covered by American counterintelligence. When one of these spies posing as a prosperous butter and egg merchant, was spotted, a German-American CIP agent bluffed his way into his confidence and worked with him until he was about to leave for Berlin. At that time the spy and his papers were picked up.[42]

Historian Johnson states that two German foreign office officials disguised as working men were picked up by American Intelligence agents at Coblenz when their forged papers were detected. An American CIP agent penetrated a huge black market ring which was rigging bidding on the purchase of American Army surplus stocks of goods; a resultant raid bagged 200 prisoners. Since several prominent Germans were involved and the peace negotiations were in a delicate state, higher authority ordered the prisoners released, but not until they had been paraded through Coblenz so that everyone could get a good look at them.[43]

The Minor Case

Among the most important work of the Occupation counterintelligence group was neutralization of Bolshevik efforts to cause dissatisfaction and mutiny among the Allied troops. Outstanding in this connection was the Robert Minor case. In January 1919, American Army Intelligence agents discovered that circulars were being distributed to both the American and British forces on the Rhine. These circulars were open invitations for mutiny, and informants reported they were

40 Johnson, pp 281-282; and Elliott, p 7.
41 Johnson, pp 255 and 287.
42 Ibid, pp 283-284.

being prepared by a Bolshevik group centered at nearby Dusseldorf, in the Ruhr, where even the Chief of Police was said to be working with them.[44]

The writer of the circulars was Robert Minor, native American, Texas-born, of Virginia blood and son of a Democratic politician and Federal judge. Benjamin Gitlow, former Communist and associate, has described Minor as, "...the most important figure in American Communism, for he has done more than any other American Communist, living or dead, to transform the American Communist movement into a real Bolshevik movement..." Minor first went to Russia in 1918 as a correspondent for the New York World, the Philadelphia Public Ledger and Max Estman's Liberator. He spent nine months there and had the confidence of Lenin who spent many hours talking with him.[45]

From Russia, Minor went to Paris in February 1919, where he became an accredited correspondent and cartoonist of the Paris Peace Conference. He obtained passports and special government passes entitling him to travel all over Europe and he disappeared from Paris. In Berlin he obtained more special passes from General Harris. In Berlin, Minor told German Communists that the time was "ripe to spread the doctrines of Lenin and Trotsky among the American soldiers," and a Corps of Intelligence Police agent, who had infiltrated this group of Communists, learned that Minor was in charge of the manufacture of propaganda for the Communist "Spartacus" group which planned an armed uprising. Shortly afterward, Minor turned up at Dusseldorf writing seditious pamphlets.[46]

At Coblenz an Intelligence Police sergeant was sent across the border, posing as a deserter. He verified the fact that Minor was preparing the circulars. He was ordered to entice Minor, under some pretext, to go into American-controlled territory at the bridgehead where he might be picked up, but this he was unable to do.[47]

When Colonel Van Deman learned of this problem, who was in his office reporting on surveillance of news correspondents, immediately volunteered to go to Germany and entice Minor to the border.

Arrangements for arrest were made quickly and Minor was apprehended.[48]

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44 Johnson, p 290; and Van Deman, Vol 3, p8.

45 Johnson, p 290-294; and Gitlow, Benjamin, The Whole of Their Lives, New York, 1948, Charles Scribner and Sons, pp 70 and 82.

46 Ibid.

47 Van deman, Vol 3, p 8.

48 Ibid, p 9.

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Colonel Van Deman had planned to have Minor court martialed, but the rotation of his capable assistant, Capt. Ogden Mills, prior to Minor's apprehension saved the Communist. Van Deman had been waiting four months for this pickup, but by a coincidence of fate, the arrest occurred during the only four days Colonel Van Deman was absent in the four-month period, and just 10 days after Captain Mills had left. Since Colonel Van Deman knew nothing of the background or discretion of the young captain who had been assigned to him as Mills' replacement, he had not informed the captain of the pickup plan because he was to be gone for such a short time.[49]

The young captain, not knowing what to do when the intelligence officer at Coblenz told him he had Minor, called the American Embassy at Paris which immediately demanded that Minor be turned over to its custody. By the time Colonel Van Deman returned, Lincoln Steffins knew of Minor's arrest and demanded of Van Deman the names of "liberal minded" Army officers to defend Minor.[50]

The Embassy had informed other Americans. Colonel House, who had given Minor a long private interview just before he left Paris, urged Minor's release, but General Liggett at Coblenz refused. Judge Minor wired his son from San Antonio not to spare any expense in arranging for his defense, and the case suddenly assumed such international and domestic importance that jurisdiction was taken away from the Occupation Forces and turned over to American Expeditionary Force General Headquarters. Pressure resulted in Minor being treated in prison more like a "VIP" than a traitor. American newspaper circles, Gitlow states, were astounded by the extent to which men of high official standing in the government were trying to quash the case. The trial was postponed and, finally, without warning, General Pershing ordered Minor released. Colonel Williams, G2 of the Occupation Forces, took the evidence against Minor to Washington, and there was talk of a Senatorial investigation. Gitlow and Johnson both report that research has failed to reveal any satisfactory answer as to why nothing came of this investigation. Minor continued on to become an editor of the Daily Worker and one of the top officials of the American Communist Party, helping to carry out its treasonable activities for another 30 years. This last opportunity illustrated the result of lack of continuity in counterintelligence assignments.[51]

On 24 January 1923, the American flag was lowered on Fortress Erhenhreitstein, and the last American troops left for home. Intelligence and counterintelligence in that area reverted to the military attaches, who were also being curtailed

49 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 9.
50 Ibid, p 9; and Johnson, pp 290-294.
51 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 9; and Johnson, pp 290-294.

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by economy reductions.[52] Some 300 CIP agents had participated in the World War I Occupation where more than 2,000 would participate in the occupation of Europe some 26 years later.

52 Army Almanac, p 442.

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Section 2

IN THE U.S.A. AND POSSESSIONS

Demobilization in the United States

Demobilization in the United States was rapid. Within three months after the Armistice, the Corps of Intelligence Police had been reduced to 128 men, nearly half its wartime strength.[53] Nine months after the Armistice, the entire CIP world-wide was reduced to 42 men. By September 1919, it was down to 28 men; by November, to 21 and in January 1920, to 18. On 20 August 1920, the Corps reached a low of six men, all of whom were eligible for discharge.[54] Meanwhile, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department was being curtailed. From November 1918 to July 1919, it was reduced from 1,259 persons to 274.[55]

Radical activities in the United States were increasing, however. By January 1919, the Soviets had at least one active espionage agent in the United States.[56] From a total of less than half a million persons before World War I, left-wing supporters had increased to an estimated three million at the time the Communists struck out for power in August 1919.[57] When the National Guard was called out in September 1919 to suppress riots during the Boston Police strike and the aid of Federal troops was offered Massachusetts, the Corps of Intelligence Police was losing more of its 28 remaining agents.[58] The CIP was virtually out of existence by 1920 when Federal troops were sent to West Virginia to restore order during the coal strikes.[59]

For the remaining CIP agents during 1919 and early 1920, there was little time for coverage of radical activities. Graft and fraud investigations required practically all available manpower. Before this CIP mission was terminated in

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53 CIP Correspondence #114, dtd 1919, MID, 10389-A-1, Series 1 to 1100, Records of WDGS, MID, National Archives. NOTE: Hereafter cited as: CIP Corres #_____ dated _____.

54 CIP Corres #114, dtd 1919; #112, dtd 1920; 111 & 110, dtd 1921; and Hist, MID, Vol 3, pp 204-205, (Secret).

55 Hist, MID, Vol 3, p 14, (Secret).

56 The Shameful Years, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 30 Dec 51, p 5. NOTE: Hereafter cited as House Rpt #1229. (Uncl)

57 Gitlow, Benjamin, The Whole of Their Lives, Scribners (1948), New York, p 5, (Uncl). Hereafter cited as Gitlow.

58 Ibid, p 56.

59 Hist, MID, Vol 3, pp 16-54; and CIP Corres #89, dtd 1920.

(Note: All sources CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise noted.)

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June 1920, the Corps had handled more than 1,100 cases and still had a number of incomplete investigations to turn over to the Army Inspector General and the Department of Justice.[60]

In addition, CIP agents were frequently required to work on Army phases of investigations controlled by the Department of Justice, which had uncovered such cases as a 25 million dollar airplane fraud.[61]

By 1920, Corps of Intelligence Police agents were aware that subversion of the Armed Forces was a primary mission of Communists in the United States. Army Intelligence files contained ample evidence to prove these Communist intentions. Instructions from the Comintern to the Communist Party in the United States stated, "...one of the most important aims at present is the organization of Communist 'nuclei' among soldiers and sailors..." This was to result in "the fanatical persecution of officers." Another intelligence report stated "...General Summerall is fully alive to the great danger of the Bolshevik element planting men in the various organizations to undermine and destroy their present very high morale. He was sure that there was a great deal of Bolshevik activity among wounded soldiers in the general hospitals."[62]

Although nearly half the field agents of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice were working on radical cases, the Army's counterintelligence force, now down to 18 men, was kept out of this field. At the conference of Army Department and Division Commanders in January 1920, the Director of Military Intelligence made it plain that the War Department had no desire to become involved, to any degree, in the field of investigations relating to the political beliefs or other private opinions held by military personnel.[63]

Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, who was finishing out his term as wartime director of MID, was in full accord with the views of the Secretary of War on the matter of investigating individuals in the military service. Writing for a military publication in early 1920, he characterized the idea as "repugnant" but added, "...if a state of war makes such investigation necessary, we want it done by agencies under our own control, and not by unsympathetic civilian bureaus."[64]

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60 Lowenthal, Max, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York, (1950), William Sloane Associates, Inc., p 298. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Lowenthal." (Uncl)

61 Hist, MID, Vol 3, p 53; and CIP Corres #89, dtd 27 Jun 1920.

62 CIP Corres #78, #81, dtd 20 Aug 1920.

63 Lowenthal, p 85; and Hist, MID, Vol 3, p 54.

64 Hist, MID, Vol 2, VIII-2.

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Solution by "Detail"

In January 1920, it was evident, also, that by normal attrition, the Corps of Intelligence Police would cease to exist even before the wartime authority which had made it possible terminated in June. Obviously, the time had come either to disband or to reorganize on a peacetime basis.

Yet public aversion to investigations of Americans continued to grow. Secretary of War Baker incorporated this feeling into an Army directive three years later with the explanation, "It is very obvious that the American people are very sensitive with regard to any military interference in their affairs. Harmless and even readily justifiable inquiries arouse suspicion, and opponents of the Army are very apt to quote such acts as forms of Russian or Prussian military supervision..."[65]

A solution was found in a proposal to make the work a "detail." This would preserve the Corps in a sense, and yet because "details" were essentially temporary affairs, the plan would avoid the controversy that a proposal for a permanent peacetime organization seemed certain to arouse. A staff study for an admittedly temporary plan was prepared by Col. A. B. Coxe, Chief of the Negative Branch, and presented by General Churchill to the Chief of Staff on 3 February 1920.[66]

The Military Intelligence Division Staff Study said:

> "The organization of the Army is now being made to conform to the National Defense Act, in force before the war. No provisions are made in this act for Intelligence Police; therefore, in a short time there will be no existing authority for any such Police Corps. Small bodies of men are absolutely necessary in New York City, Washington and in the Western and Southern Departments for purposes of investigations and guard duties of a strictly confidential nature."

Authority was requested "to have not to exceed 24 sergeants of the duly authorized organizations of the Army and whose services may not be indispensable to same, detailed on special duty for Intelligence Service..." Six men each were to serve under the Commanding Generals of the Eastern, Southern and

65 Hist, MID, Vol 3, p 60, (Secret). Also, see App 1, page xx, for letter from Director of Military Intelligence, War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, to Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, dated Mar 1920; Subject: "Counterespionage Manuals."

66 CIP Corres #107, dated 3 Feb 1920.

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Western Departments, and six others under command of the Director of Intelligence. The study stated that ten of the remaining CIP agents on duty were in the Eastern Department, four in the District of Columbia and two each in the Southern and Western Departments.[67]

This first peacetime proposal had three serious weaknesses. First, no survey had been made to determine actual needs. Second, it made no provision for CIP agents in the Army departments overseas in United States territories where actually a large part of counterintelligence work was to be done between the two World Wars. Third, and most serious, it proposed to man the Corps with men who were dispensable to their own organizations--a system proven in World War I to provide far from the best type of man. This plan ignored that lesson and entailed all the difficulties that had arisen when efforts were made to transfer good men to CIP from other units.[68]

First Postwar Plan

On 6 February 1920, the Secretary of War approved the detailing of 24 sergeants from line organizations, with distribution as Military Intelligence Division had requested. As approved, however, the directive provided for the complete elimination of the Corps of Intelligence Police. It authorized the Adjutant General, at the request of the Director of Military Intelligence, to direct any department commander to assign any CIP sergeants then on duty to a line organization and from there to detail the sergeant back on special duty as a member of the Intelligence Police.[69]

Apparently the Chief of Staff recognized that unit commanders might be reluctant to have sergeants assigned or attached to their organizations detailed for special duty with the Intelligence Police. The order as published directed that department commanders, after consultation with the Director of Military Intelligence, would issue the orders necessary to insure the detail.[70]

When this directive reached G-2 sections in the various Army departments, CIP agents were encouraged by the evidence that the Army planned to continue CIP work in peacetime, even if only by "detail." Agents eligible for discharge saw an incentive to re-enlist, provided they were assured that the line organization for which they enlisted would be required to release them for an Intelligence Police detail.

67 CIP Corres #107, dated 3 Feb 1920.
68 CIC Hist, CIP in WW I, Sec IV (8).
69 CIP Corres #102, dated 6 Feb 1920.
70 Ibid, #101, dated 13 Feb 1920.

This important proviso was stressed in a letter written by Maj. R. B. Woodruff, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Southern Department, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in February 1920. He pointed out that the directive explained what could be done with the remaining CIP members, but did not specify what must be done. Further, he wanted to know if the two agents of long experience in his command did re-enlist in a line organization, could he get them detailed back over the protest of their new organization commander?[71]

In reply Colonel Coxe stated: "The Corps of Intelligence Police, as such, must cease to exist on or before June 30, 1920. At the same time it is realized that the duties performed by members of this corps will continue to be necessary. Therefore, it is essential that arrangements be made in advance... Any sergeants, not to exceed six in number, whom you desire to have on Intelligence Police duty, must, by June 30th, therefore, be regularly assigned to some organization authorized by the National Defense Act and detailed on special duty by the department commander."

Colonel Coxe said it was "the understanding of this office" that the Adjutant General would make the assignment and detail over the protest of the organization commander, if necessary. However, he said, such procedure was not in accord with the customs of the service or the intent of the General Order which placed troops under the department commander. It was believed that ordinarily the department commander had the authority necessary to settle such matters within his department. Colonel Coxe added, "...the Director (Military Intelligence Division) would not make such requests except where the interests of the service manifestly demanded such action..."[72]

Under these conditions, department G2's and CIP agents were not reassured. Although many agents took their discharges, others hung on, as they were hoping that something would come out of the Army Reorganization Bill before Congress prior to the 30 June deadline.

Their hopes were rewarded on 16 June. The Operations Department of the General Staff informed the Military Intelligence Division that the Army Reorganization Bill did not affect the status of the Corps of Intelligence Police; that the Overman Act (the President's emergency wartime powers) had not been repealed; and that the Corps could continue to function for the period of the emergency. Military Intelligence Division was advised, however, that all temporary organizations should be eliminated as soon as possible, and it was recommended that the Military Intelligence Division get special authorization for the necessary personnel to carry on the work needed for a permanent establishment.[73]

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71 CIP Corres #101, dated 13 Feb 1920.
72 Ibid #98, dtd 24 Feb 1920.
73 Ibid #96, dtd 16 Jun 1920.

In June 1920 the Army Reorganization Bill was passed, and the authorized strength for the Army represented a reduction of 27,000 men. At the same time the "DEML" or "Detached Enlisted Men's List" was created to cover all organizations of enlisted men not covered by the new bill. Military Intelligence Division was advised by the Adjutant General that if a permanent CIP was wanted, the time had come to request authority for it.[74]

There was another urgent reason for action at this time. The Corps was down to six men, all of whom were eligible for discharge. The plan to create a Corps by "detail" had not worked out. Agents had been reluctant to transfer or to re-enlist in line organizations without positive assurance that they would be detailed back to CIP. Military Intelligence Division had provided no help in procurement. In fact, in January 1920, when the detailed plan was being worked out, Military Intelligence Division had written to area G2's: "...It is not the intention of the Military Intelligence Division to furnish men to the Corps areas or departments for assignment to the Corps of Intelligence Police..." The letter had stated that since CIP agents should have "the full confidence" of local G2's, the G2's should select men only after personal investigation. While Military Intelligence Division said it had no facilities for obtaining CIP agents, it reminded G2's that Military Intelligence Division approval was required for any man selected.[75]

First Request for Permanent CIP

A staff study entitled "Corps of Intelligence Police as Part of the Permanent Military Establishment" was prepared in August 1920 and submitted to the War Plans Division by Col. A. B. Coxe, Acting Director of Military Intelligence Division. One reason for taking this action in the absence of General Churchill may have been the vast number of attempted military subversion cases in Military Intelligence Division files from which a number of illustrative reports were taken for inclusion in the study. In its recommendation for 50 intelligence police, the study incorporated the request for three grades -- one master sergeant for Military Intelligence Division Headquarters, nine staff sergeants to provide one each at the nine Corps headquarters, and 40 sergeants to be distributed as needs required.[76] Once again the number requested was not based on any survey of area requirements.

At this time the Army was in the process of reorganization with the six territorial departments being converted to nine corps areas.[77]

74 CIP Corres #82, dated 10 Aug 1920.
75 CIP Corres #108, dtd 7 Jan 1920.
76 CIP Corres #78 and #81, dtd 20 Aug 1920.
77 Hist of Military Intell Div, Vol 3, p 51, (Secret).

There is no record of any action on this proposal, but five days after it was submitted, Brig. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, Pershing's G2 of the American Expeditionary Forces, replaced General Churchill as Director of the Military Intelligence Division. General Nolan proceeded to reorganize the Military Intelligence Division, but it was not until 1 October 1920, after the War Plans Division had suggested it, that another CIP staff study was submitted.[78] One item which may have contributed to a lack of desire to act on the August proposal was a "sensational" article entitled "The Political Spy System in the United States" which appeared in the New York Call on 16 August 1920.[79]

On 8 October 1920, General Nolan submitted a staff study in which he stated that, "the Corps of Intelligence Police which consisted of several hundred men has been demobilized since the Armistice." He omitted from the study examples of subversive activity, but repeated essentially the justification given in the previous staff study: "Small bodies of highly trained men are absolutely necessary for the purpose of combatting the activities of Mexican agents on the Southern border and the persistent efforts of various radical groups operating for the express purpose of destroying the morale of the personnel of the Military Establishment by spreading propaganda, advocating and encouraging mutiny, unions of soldiers and sailors, and disobedience of authority among enlisted men of the Army, generally, as shown by the files of the Military Intelligence Division."[80]

In the accompanying memorandum, General Nolan cited his authority as:

> Under the provisions of Sections 4b, 4c and Section 25 of the Act of Congress approved June 3, 1916 (as amended by the Act of Congress approved June 4, 1920) the following allotment of grades for enlisted men for duty as Intelligence Police is authorized: Sergeants...45. The above mentioned sergeants will be charged against the item "Detachments for Headquarters at Nine Corps Area and Headquarters of the General of the Army" -- 240, which appears in Section II, General Orders Number 54, War Department, 1920, covering the allotment of the Detached Enlisted Men's List.

The quota was to be obtained by enlistment or transfer, subject in each case to the approval of the Director of Intelligence who was also to instruct the Adjutant General on where the men were to be assigned.[81]

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78 CIP Corres #68, dated 1 Oct 1920.
79 Hist of Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, pp 3-55, (Secret).
80 CIP Corres #71, dated 8 Oct 1920.
81 Ibid #69, dtd 8 Oct 1920.

[redacted]

Permanent CIP Approved

This proposal was approved, and on 23 October 1920, by General Order Number 64, a permanent peacetime force of Intelligence Police was authorized.[82] No available evidence exists as to why this second staff study omitted the word "Corps" as well as any proposal for grades above those of "Fourth Sergeant." The necessity for a "Corps" status and for opportunities for promotion were two obvious lessons of World War I. Possibly, these requests were deliberately omitted to avoid the fate of the August study, since the quoted statutory authority for these police was now the same as the authority for the DEML itself.[83]

Although there was no legal authority, the term "Corps of Intelligence Police" remained in general use during the entire peacetime period and was even used in official correspondence. However, on 16 March 1921, by War Department Circular 72, enlisted men were prohibited from wearing the special CIP insignia.[84] Lack of promotional opportunities immediately handicapped the rebuilding of the "Corps," and by 1924, morale was so low that some higher grades had to be provided. Restrictions on promotions continued to be a problem throughout the peacetime era.[85]

While approval for a permanent Corps was pending, Maj. Gen. Henry Jervey, Operations Division, requested G2 to furnish him with information as to how many CIP agents were in Washington, what the minimum number required would be, and what their duties were.[86] This resulted in the ordering of a general survey of needs. On 22 October, letters and cables to all Corps Areas and departments were sent asking how many agents were on duty and how many were desired.[87]

When this survey was completed in mid-November, it revealed that there were still two CIP agents not transferred to line organizations, and 11 men were "detailed" to CIP. In addition, the First Corps Area at Boston reported having one civilian agent. Requests for agents by the Corps Areas and department totaled 105 men. This added to the mystery of what the basis had been for requesting only 45 men.[88]

On 9 December 1920, General Nolan forwarded a memorandum to the Adjutant General stating that the Secretary of War had directed that a letter be sent all Corps Area and department commanders allocating quotas. Either by accident

82 CIP Corres #58, dated 23 Oct 1920.
83 Hist Mil Intell Div, p 206.
84 Ibid, p 208.
85 Ibid, p 209.
86 CIP Corres #73, dated 18 Oct 1920.
87 Ibid #63, dtd 22 Oct 1920.
88 Ibid #104, dated 15 Nov 1920.

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[redacted]

or intention, this letter carried the subject "Corps of Intelligence Police" and in its text stated "...the following are the quotas of the Corps of Intelligence Police allotted..." This was published on 14 December 1920, by the Adjutant General, unchanged except that the Military Intelligence Division file number was changed to 322.999 -- "Corps of Intelligence Police (Miscellaneous Division) CHA/ANT 158," and officially contributed to the confusion on the status of the "Corps."[89]

Allocations to the nine corps areas, the three departments, and the Military Intelligence Division were as follows: two each to the I Corps Area at Boston, Mass.; the II Corps at Baltimore, Md.; the VII Corps at Fort Crook, Neb.; and to the Panama Department. Three spaces were allocated to the Hawaiian Department and four spaces each to the II Corps Area at New York and the VI Corps at Fort Sheridan, Ill. Five spaces each were allocated to the IX Corps Area at San Francisco, the Philippine Department, and to Military Intelligence Division Headquarters in the District of Columbia. Finally, seven spaces were allotted to the VIII Corps, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which covered the Mexican border.

In allocating the quotas, G2's were told, "In addition to the other qualifications, men selected for appointments must possess the ability to speak, read and write one or more foreign language, and the possession of this qualification must be shown in forwarding applications for appointment.[90]

About this time, the appointment of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence in each Corps Area and Department had just been ordered by the War Department, and consequently questions arose almost as soon as the directive reached various Corps Areas and Departments. Replying to a request for two agents from the II Corps Area, Maj. J. Lawton Collins, Executive Officer of Military Intelligence Division, stated, "The intention is that these men will be personally selected by the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Military Intelligence." The paragraph of a January 1920 Military Intelligence Division letter was repeated: "Military Intelligence Division has no facilities for obtaining men for Corps of Intelligence Police."[91]

Problems of the 1921 Era

In January 1921, Corps Areas and Departments were busy filling their quotas and submitting names of men selected for approval by Military Intelligence Division. IX Corps Area was reminded that the "detail" plan of February 1920 had been a temporary measure "...providing the necessary men for this duty until such time as a definite policy had been adopted regarding the Intelligence Police and provisions made for the necessary personnel." It was pointed out that this had been

89 CIP Corres #103 and #101 (101 is dated 14 Dec 1920).
90 Ibid, #101, dtd 14 Dec 1920.
91 Ibid, #95, dtd 17 Dec 1920.

[redacted]

ıccomplished in December and it was "...desired to relieve the men detailed as Intelligence Police...as soon as their services can be spared, after you have obtained men to fill your quota of Intelligence Police..."[92]

In March 1921, the G2 in the Panama Department cabled, "In view of the Panama-Costa Rica situation, recommend that the two Corps of Intelligence Police (agents) authorized in this department be selected by the Intelligence Division and ordered to this department as soon as possible. Spanish must be spoken by these men."[93] Available correspondence files of this period do not show what action was taken on the request, but when the next survey of men actually on duty was taken as of 28 August 1923, the Panama Department still had no agents.[94]

Local procurement in the territorial departments involved new problems. In April 1921, General Nolan disapproved two selections by the Philippine Department and stated, "It was his policy that no Filipinos would be detailed as a member of the Corps of Intelligence Police."[95] Maj. John C. H. Lee, G2 of the Philippine Department, had available the advice of the most experienced intelligence officer in the Army, Col. R. H. Van Deman, who, following the Paris Peace Conference, had been assigned to troop duty as commanding officer of the 21st Infantry at Manila. In June, Major Lee asked for reconsideration of the men he had selected because it was "...feared that conditions here are not understood. The garrison ow is largely composed of native troops, a Filipino mobile division in addition to the coast defense garrison. For use among such native troops, white Intelligence Police personnel will be of very little value. Native agents are expensive and much less reliable than old scout soldiers of established character still serving under the discipline of the Army..."[96]

By midsummer 1921, shortly before he was replaced by Lt. Col. Stuart Heintzelman as G2, General Nolan reached the conclusion that it would be better if the appointments of Intelligence Police were made "without reference to the Director of Military Intelligence Division." He prepared a staff study requesting that this requirement of General Order #64, 1920, be rescinded. This request was approved by the Chief of Staff on 19 August 1921, and published as General Order #44 on 29 August 1921. However, it was not until November that the Philippine Department learned it could recruit the agents it desired.[97]

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92 CIP Corres #86, dated 15 Jan 1921.
93 Ibid, #56, dtd 3 Mar 1921.
94 Ibid, #28, dtd 30 Oct 1923.
95 Ibid, #57; dtd 28 Apr 1921.
96 Ibid, #55, dtd 29 Jul 1921.
97 Ibid, #51, dtd 16 Aug 1921; and #50, dtd 16 Aug 1951.

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Part II: CIP Organization for Peace

Section 1

PEACETIME CIP POLICY

First Instructions Issued

In January 1921, an agreement between Maj. W. W. Hicks, Military Intelligence 4, and J. Edgar Hoover, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was reached providing that the Department of Justice would furnish 11 copies of its General Intelligence Bulletins for G2's in Corps Areas and Departments. Local Army G2's were authorized to see local Department of Justice field reports provided they came to Department of Justice divisional offices to see them and did not remove them from the offices. In turn, Military Intelligence Division agreed to furnish copies of its G2 Weekly Situation Survey for Department of Justice's nine divisional superintendents.[98] This same month, Department of Justice evidence resulted in the deportation of Ludgwig Martens, labeled by the House Un-American Activities Committee in a 1952 report, as the first known Soviet espionage agent in the United States.[99]

On 4 March 1921, Secretary of War Baker completed his term, and John W. Weeks succeeded him. At this time, the AC of S, G-2 for Sixth Corps Area at Fort Sheridan, asked Military Intelligence Division at Washington for information on the "Method of Employment of Corps of Intelligence Police." Manus McCloskey wrote, "No instructions can be found in this office. If approved by the Director, Military Intelligence Division, it is intended to provide Corps of Intelligence Police with civilian clothing and have them obtain employment and live in industrial centers, submitting reports from time to time as to their activities."[100]

McCloskey was informed:

> "No instructions have been issued by this Division in reference to the employment of Intelligence Police. Since different conditions existed in the various Corps Areas and Departments, it was thought desirable to leave this matter for the time being to the decision of the Corps Area commanders. Thus the scope of the CIP was extended to enable their use to assist the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of Corps Areas and Departments in intelligence work."[101]

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98 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 571, (Secret).
99 House Rpt #1229 (398), p 5.
100 CIP Corres #61, dated 3 Mar 1921.
101 Ibid, #61; and #82A, dated 2 Aug 1930.

NOTE: All references in this section "CONFIDENTIAL" unless otherwise indicated.

[redacted]

McClosky was sent by G2, War Department, a rough draft of instructions for Military Intelligence which was "subject to further changes before being issued." He was told to return the copy after consulting its pertinent paragraphs.[102] Subsequently, hastily revised copies of these "Provisional Instructions for the Operations of the Military Intelligence Service in the Corps Areas and Departments," which were originally issued in 1918 to assist field intelligence officers forming divisional intelligence services, were sent to the Corps Areas and Departments.[103]

For CIP, the pertinent part of these instructions was contained in Part III: "Information Relative to Hostile or Potentially Hostile Elements." Information was to be collected relative to:

a. "RADICAL ACTIVITIES. Propaganda or activities, the object or tendency of which is the ultimate overthrow of the Government of the United States or of all governments or the ultimate overthrow of the existing economic system through force or violence... Information as to the particular groups which constitute the political and industrial classes enumerated above will be furnished from time to time in special letters of instruction...

b. "LABOR UNREST. Strikes, unemployment, discontent and any other conditions tending to render labor susceptible to subversion by radicals or lead to interference with governmental functions...

c. "ANTI-AMERICAN RACIAL GROUPS. Ethnic activities, the aim or tendency of which is the formation of groups hostile to the United States Government or the promotion of internationalism as against Americanization or the propaganda of class hatred...

d. "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. Any organization whose avowed purpose is the destruction of the morale of the army by means of propaganda advocating mutiny among troops. The formation of soviets of of soldiers and sailors and encouragement of disobedience of authority among enlisted men of the army generally...

e. "FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES. The military activities of the agencies of other nations within our continental limits or within the limits of our colonial possessions...

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102 CIP Corres #61, dated 3 Mar 1921.

103 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 52, (Secret).

[redacted]

f. "MISCELLANEOUS. Any activity or condition of whatever nature, which is designed or likely to produce a situation of general disorder or lawlessness with the consequent possibility of the intervention of the federal forces..."

The instructions under "Collection" stated:

"For the detection of radical influences within Military Establishment, organization officers should be relied upon. As a means of combating radicalism, unit commanders should explain to their non-commissioned officers that radical organizations are openly advocating a violent overthrow of the Government of the United States. Copies of 'Red Radicalism," a pamphlet issued by the Department of Justice, have been forwarded...for the purpose of assisting officers in understanding and explaining the situation...

"...Revised Tables of Organization provide that in each unit of the army, down to and including a battalion, an officer will be assigned to intelligence duty. It is moreover, considered essential that a suitable officer, in addition to his other duties when necessary, be detailed as Intelligence Officer at each post, camp or station and with every field detachment larger than a company where provision is not made for such detail in existing Tables of Organization..."[104]

The Deleted Paragraphs

In the revision of these instructions three paragraphs were deleted. These had required that (1) "Great care should be exercised in the detailing and instruction of Intelligence Officers; (2) Commanding officers should be kept fully informed on all Intelligence matters; (3) If an Intelligence officer failed in the performance of his Intelligence work because of other duties, steps should be taken to remedy the situation."

Corps Area G2's were placed in charge of intelligence training, including the National Guard and Organized Reserve, and charged with the preparation of suitable courses of instruction in Military Intelligence in accordance with instructions to be issued from time to time by the War Department. There is no record of any such instructions being issued during the time the pamphlet was in force, and a G2 was presumably to train himself and all officers detailed under his jurisdiction.[105]

104 Hist of the CIC, 1907-1913, War Dept Doc #62-82, 1921, Wash, D.C., CIC School File #016141, 9 Oct 51, (Staff & Faculty Library) (Uncl).

105 Ibid.

One of the problems confronting these Corps Area G2's resulted from the National Defense Act of 1920, which authorized a Military Intelligence Reserve, to be officially activated on 4 August 1921. This organization was largely the effort of General Nolan, who insisted that a separate "branch" was necessary to insure suitable Military Intelligence specialists in case of war. In its initial stage, the MI-Reserve consisted of 286 officers out of a total of 66,905 reserve officers.[106]

In May 1919, Colonel Van Deman had urged General Churchill to adopt a system for registering and keeping track of the officers and enlisted men who had worked with G2 in the American Expeditionary Force and in the United States. Unfortunately, General Van Deman later wrote, this was not done and, "as a consequence we lost touch with men who would have been of great assistance to Military Intelligence both during and in preparation for the Second World War."[107]

Instead, while other branches were granting commissions to their demobilized personnel, the Director of Military Intelligence had to make hasty arrangements with the Quartermaster Corps to issue commissions to a selected group of Reserve officers. Records of these men were supposed to be marked "for Intelligence duty" and they were to be transferred to the MI-Reserve upon its activation. Instead, the entries were either improperly made or ignored and these officers found themselves subject to Quartermaster mobilization assignments and active duty in the Quartermaster Corps instead of Military Intelligence. Bidwell, the G2 Historian, reports that when they complained, "no ready solution" could be found and many of them lost interest in their Reserve status. Finally, on 2 April 1921, the Director of Military Intelligence was given official authority "to act in the capacity of a branch chief" but since there was no Intelligence Corps as such to put men in, assignments still had to be made by detail.[108]

Officers continued to be "detailed" for CIP and CIC type work for the next quarter century, although it was only after July 1942 that CIC was authorized officer spaces. It was not until the eve of the Korean conflict that "CIC Specialization" was authorized as an appendix to the basic branch when officers were detailed to the Corps.

Comparing provisional instructions issued in 1921 with the general operating responsibilities and restrictions of Counter Intelligence Corps following World War II, there is to be seen a surprising similarity, despite a time lapse of 25 years. G2's were ordered to exercise due care that "they did not in any wise

106 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, pp 84, 85, (Secret).
107 Van Deman, Vol 3, p 17.
108 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 86, (Secret).

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ncroach upon the jurisdiction or sphere of action of other investigative agencies of government."[109] They were told that:

> "In the majority of Corps Areas the principal and most practical source of information on radical activities will be the offices of the Department of Justice... Generally speaking all complaints of criminal activity in whatsoever form should be turned over to the Department of Justice or its accredited agents for such investigation and action as the known facts may warrant in the judgment of the Department..."

Limitations of Authority

Limitations of authority and jurisdiction were stressed again and again:

> "It is of the greatest important that the Military Intelligence personnel should not be employed as a general investigative body, interesting itself in the private relations of people or duplicating or interfering with the interests and activities of other agencies of the government. Intelligence officers were forbidden under any condition to assume any of the duties or initiate any investigations which normally pertain to the office of a Provost Marshal... The investigating function of Military Intelligence personnel is limited to inquiry into allegations of misconduct involving disloyalty and sedition...it does not include questions of a personal or disciplinary character which are in the province of the Inspector General's Department Personnel...it should always be borne in mind that it is not the proper function of the Military Intelligence Division activity to investigate the commission of crimes, civil or military.
>
> "Intelligence officers have no authority to put civilians under arrest or to make searches and seizures of private property without the assistance of civil authorities acting pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by a Court of competent jurisdiction... In obtaining information...care must be taken not to excite antagonism or apprehension nor generally to acquaint persons with the interest of the Military Intelligence Division in the subjects at issue. It is proper to collect literature and to converse with well-informed persons but not to interrogate in a summary of inquisitorial manner, nor to institute searches or seizures..."[110]

Intelligence personnel were told that their function could be described as one of "observation" and that with proper working arrangements and close personal contact with local Department of Justice officials:

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109 Hist of the CIC, 1907-1913, War Dept Doc #62-82, 1921, Wash, D.C., CIC School File #016141, 9 Oct 51, (Staff & Faculty Lib), (Uncl).

110 Ibid.

"...it should be possible to obtain the greater part of the valuable and important information relating to subjects under military consideration... The political beliefs of officers and men, unless they be of a nature advocating the overthrow of the Government of the United States...their moral conduct, their discipline or attitude may be affected by disloyalty to the Government, sedition or radical propaganda, are not matters to be taken cognizance of by Military Intelligence."

When such information was disclosed, it was to be referred to the department involved or forwarded to Military Intelligence Division, Washington, and "...no further investigation or inquiry with regard thereto will be undertaken by Intelligence officers beyond what is necessary to the full development of all matters within the legitimate scope of Military Intelligence."

However, intelligence officers were required to collect large quantities of detailed information. They were to maintain a "Situation Monograph" with specific information on more than half a hundred topics concerning all radical parties, anarchists, revolutionary socialists, antiradical groups and other radical groups of "politico-military significance." From this data, "estimates of the situation" were to be prepared following another detailed form.

A "Weekly Situation Survey" was to be prepared and sent to Military Intelligence Division in Washington. This survey was a four-section intelligence report: I--Radical Activities; II--Labor Unrest; III--Moderate and Conservative Tendencies (Counter-Radical); and VI--Conditions Within the Military Establishment. Among the 10 subheadings under Section I was one requiring information on special radical meetings -- place, time, speakers, subjects, attendance, information on organizations to show changes in membership strength; policy, affiliations and "immediate plans."[111] Another section listed in detail specific information desired in reporting strikes, such as:

"...The Military Intelligence has a legitimate interest in any organized movement for the overthrow of the Government by force and arms because of the military aspect of such a movement. It is interested for the same reason in the activities of individual agitators or radical leaders who commit, incite, procure or aid or abet acts of violence in the furtherance of such movements..."

CIP Press Coverage

Intelligence officers were told to obtain and carefully scrutinize the press, "both conservative and radical," as well as radical periodicals and literature. In addition, other suggested sources of information were: state, county and

111 Ibid.

municipal officials; civic bodies such as chambers of commerce or trade associations; former members of the American Protective League; and reports of radical meetings and demonstrations.' To meet the requirements it was obviously necessary for agents to attend such meetings or demonstrations. Special or spot reports were required.

Corps Area commanders were authorized direct communication with officers in charge of recruiting districts to enlist the aid of these officers for intelligence coverage, provided it did not interfere with their recruiting duties. The officer-in-charge of a General Recruiting District was authorized general intelligence supervision over any of his subordinates so engaged, and was further charged with insuring that any investigations were "conducted in a confidential manner..." However, Corps Area commanders were warned, "This source of information should not be used except in special cases and then only with great caution..."

Of the 21 pages in the Instructions, 15 were devoted to these counterintelligence requirements. One and one-half pages were devoted to mapping requirements, which included terrain studies. This later became a major intelligence mission in the Eighth Corps Area which covered the Mexican border.[112] Preparation of War Plans occupied a page and a half of the instructions. Finally, two one-sentence paragraphs outlined the responsibilities for combat intelligence training and responsibility for code security.[113]

The preparation of War Plans involved civilian area investigations. The plan was intended to include detailed descriptions of public buildings and their troop capacity; local railroad data showing capacity for loading, unloading and storage; critical buildings such as telegraph offices, banks, water works, garages and filling stations, police stations, factories, street railway facilities, and camp sites. A traffic plan for entrance and egress of the city was required.[114]

In August 1921, Col. Mathew C. Smith, Chief of the Negative Branch of Military Intelligence Division, learned that an Intelligence Police private in the Fourth Corps Area at Fort McPherson, Georgia, had gone undercover and joined the International Workers of the World (IWW). Colonel Smith called this to the attention of the Executive Officer, MID, and stated, "In my opinion it would be very dangerous to allow members of the Intelligence Police to join the I.W.W. or any other organization... I think it would be well to write all G2's in reference to this matter..." Colonel Smith proposed that G2's be told "...it is not desired that members of the Intelligence Police be permitted or allowed to join radical or other organizations for the purpose of obtaining information."[115]

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112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 CIP Corres #53, dated 12 Aug 1921.

It was at this time that the Department of Justice started curtailment of its more obvious antiradical activities in response to public pressure. Seventy sedition bills had failed in Congress as the Communists made effective use of their "civil rights" propaganda.[116] This may have been the reason for Colonel Smith's proposal. At all events, G2 gave a quick answer. Colonel Smith's note was returned with the penciled notation, "The Director believes all such matters should be left to the discretion of the Corps Area G2."[117]

The Pershing Reorganization

Actually, Military Intelligence along with the rest of the Army, was still in process of reorganizing under the peacetime provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920. On 1 July 1921, Gen. John J. Pershing replaced Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March as Chief of Staff and began implementing this reorganization along the lines of his successful American Expeditionary Force staff. On 1 September, he established five main General Staff divisions consisting of a G1, 2, 3, 4, and a War Plans Division (WPD).[118]

Under the law, a general officer of the line was authorized for only four divisions of the War Department General Staff; a colonel had to be placed in charge of one of the divisions. In anticipation of this change, Col. Stuart Heintzelman had replaced Brigadier General Nolan as G2 on 23 August 1921.[119]

Colonel Bidwell, G2 Historian, has written,

> "When the Military Intelligence Division was selected for this dubious distinction, it soon became in a very important sense merely a junior partner within the framework of the General Staff system. This not only proved to be a matter of continuous embarrassment to the officials of that agency during their subsequent dealings with members of the other staff elements but also was often seriously restrictive in the proper fulfillment of their basic military intelligence responsibilities. Additionally, the example set by the War Department in this original instance was promptly copied into the Tables of Organization for the Army at large and thus turned out to be an even greater calamity in respect to the overall military intelligence effort.[120]

116 Weyl, p 126.
117 CIP Corres #54, dated 12 Aug 1921.
118 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 22, (Secret).
119 Ibid, p 25.
120 Ibid.

General Van Deman has observed that many of the higher officers of the Army, during the period between World War I and World War II, knew nothing about the intelligence service. They did not know how impossible it was to carry on a war without the necessary information concerning the enemy organization, nor did they see the need for an efficient service for the discovery and elimination of spies and saboteurs within our own country and armed forces.[121]

This attitude was observed by the British historian, Chester Wilmot, who, in his "The Struggle For Europe," commented on the American lack of attention to the enemy point of view.

> "...Such an approach is foreign to the American Army which tends to concentrate on the development of its own strength and unlike the British Army does not normally seek victory by playing upon its opponents' weaknesses..."[122]

In the 1920 Defense Act there was no specific mention of Military Intelligence in connection with the over-all duties assigned to the War Department General Staff. In the first reorganization of Military Intelligence Division in August 1920, General Churchill made no mention of negative intelligence in the listed responsibilities of the Army's G2. In November 1920, when General Nolan reorganized after taking over as G2, a Negative Branch was reestablished. However, when Colonel Heintzelman took over in 1921, the Negative Branch disappeared again.[123]

These were not the only losses. General Churchill's 1920 Military Intelligence Division reorganization had eliminated Military Intelligence Division training supervision except for attaches, observers and foreign language students; Military Intelligence Division was not authorized direct communication with lower echelon Military Intelligence Division units; its "economic situation" coverage also was eliminated.[124]

The 1921-23 curtailment was even more drastic. Seven attache posts were eliminated. The entire duty of coding, decoding, distributing and filing War Department cables and telegrams was transferred from Military Intelligence Division to the Adjutant General.

The Military Intelligence Division's 1921-22 budget had been reduced by $75,000, and personnel was cut to 44 officers and 107 civilians. In 1922-23

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121 Van Deman, Vol 1, p 34.

122 Wilmot, Chester, The Struggle For Europe, Harper Bros, N.Y., (1952), p 454.

123 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, pp 10 and 28, (Secret).

124 Ibid, p 13.

there was another reduction in Military Intelligence Division's appropriation by $60,000, and 20 officers and 41 civilians were dropped. Only mapping continued as a major activity.[125]

While intelligence personnel were being curtailed, an almost dormant Military Intelligence Division responsibility was growing rapidly. Public information had always been a responsibility of the division, but during World War I, the early establishment of the Creel Committee on Public Information had made it possible for this work to be supervised by a small group of G2 personnel as part of the Negative Branch.[126]

Bidwell reported bitterly:

> "The 'war to end war' had been brought to a successful conclusion and the world was now safe for democracy. Isolationist and pacifist sentiments were gaining an ascendency throughout the nation, while idealists were clamoring loudly for international disarmament. There was a persistent demand for governmental economy, and whenever the national budget had to be balanced the military establishment suffered disproportionately."[127]

Communists Encourage Economy

Encouraging this situation was the Communist underground which had its beginnings in 1921, and the full ramifications of its effort were not disclosed even a quarter of a century later. Through this underground, said former Communist Benjamin Gitlow, the Soviet government built up an American Fifth Column by taking advantage of the freedoms prevailing in the United States.[128]

To combat the effects of this Communist activity, the Army Press Relations group grew rapidly. By February 1922 it became a section of Military Intelligence Division, and by August 1926 it was a branch.[129] This growth was of particular significance to the Intelligence Police who in addition to scanning various publications for radical intelligence soon found themselves assigned to collect publicity clippings, and perform other clerical work in relation to the public information service.[130]

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125 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 26, (Secret).
126 Ibid, p 177.
127 Ibid, p 177.
128 Gitlow, p 65, (Uncl).
129 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 179, (Secret).
130 Ibid, pp 213, 214, (Secret)

Colonel Bidwell's research revealed that incidents of an extremely embarrassing nature arose in the field during this period where many G2's were still engaged in undercover activities based primarily upon guidance they had derived from the "Provisional" instructions. Since these activities were causing a considerable amount of adverse comment to be directed against the United States Army, in June 1922, the instructions were rescinded and all copies of the pamphlet ordered returned to Washington. At the same time Corps Area Commanders were instructed: "...In general, except for the supervision of all activities concerning Military Topographical Surveys and Maps, the collection of information pertaining to our own territory is a function of staff sections or branches other than G2."[131]

Bidwell states that as a result of this "notably vague" letter, questionable practices continued, particularly since all Army tactical units were required to maintain "Emergency Plan White" for the possible use of troops in local disturbances. Moreover, intelligence officers at posts, camps and stations and MI-Reserve officers continued to conduct semi-private investigations relative to radical groups in the United States.[132]

The Oregon Incident

In the fall of 1922, 1st Lt. W. D. Long, Post Intelligence Officer at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, sent a letter to all County Sheriffs of the State of Oregon without the knowledge or sanction of his commanding officer. Long told these officials that the primary purpose of Military Intelligence Division was the surveillance of all organizations hostile or potentially hostile to the government. In addition to the commonly recognized radical groups, Long included the "...World War Veterans, Socialists, Non-Partisan League, Big Four Brotherhoods and the American Federation of Labor..."[133]

The Nation, The Labor Herald and other publications gave this letter national publicity. Editorial comment spread through the country. President Harding and Secretary of War Weeks were deluged with letters of protest, many of them signed by influential political leaders. Lieutenant Long was immediately relieved of his military intelligence duties and authority for appointment of Military Intelligence officers outside existing Tables of Organization was rescinded.[134]

In December 1922, the Secretary of War issued a letter of instructions which effectively put investigation of domestic subversive organizations or persons off limits. The opening paragraph of the letter stated:

131 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 59, (Secret).
132 Ibid, p 61.
133 Ibid, p 62.
134 Ibid, p 63.

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"The Secretary of War is much concerned at reports from time to time of the activities of intelligence officers in the United States... During the war it became necessary to investigate individuals, groups and corporations... All investigations ceased shortly after the Armistice but the general idea was kept alive by the seeking of information preparatory to the drafting of the various local War Plans White. The result is that in the minds of the civilians and those of many officers as well, the word intelligence is associated with the investigations and inquiries mentioned above."[135]

The Corps of Intelligence Police was specifically restricted:

"...Appreciating the responsibility of a Corps Area Commander for his readiness to meet all demands that may be made upon him in case of domestic disturbance, the Secretary of War does not desire unduly to restrict him as to his methods or means of obtaining such information as he believes to be necessary for adequate preparation. The importance of the matter, however, requires that it be not left to subordinates but that the judgment of the Corps Area Commander be exercised. Therefore, the Secretary of War directs that the making of inquiries for the above purpose be limited to Corps Area Commanders, their staffs and to officers who are especially selected for their judgment and discretion; and that in these inquiries should as a rule be through the proper civil authorities and by scrutiny of the public press; that this last restriction particularly applies to the employment of sergeants of the Corps of Intelligence Police; and furthermore that without the specific approval of the War Department in each individual case, officers of the Reserve Corps on inactive status will not be used in work of this character."[136]

Several efforts to modify these restrictions met with rebuffs. As a warning to MI-Reserve officers, a circular letter was issued in March 1923, and sent to each individual officer. The letter stated that appointment to the MI-Reserve did not authorize an individual to engage in any military investigations except when duly authorized by the War Department.

135 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 60, (Secret).
136 CIP Corres #69-70, dated 16 Aug 1930.

Section 2

POST-WAR CURTAILMENTS

Propose Cut to 30 Men

Although 45 Intelligence Police had been authorized in December 1920, only 27 were actually on duty by 7 February 1922 when the Army G3 asked Colonel Heintzelman, G2, War Department, why so many CIP personnel were needed. Since only the Hawaiian Department had requested an additional agent over current strength, and practically all the Corps Areas had unfilled spaces, obviously the full quota was not being utilized, Colonel Heintzelman replied that CIP authorized strength could be reduced by 15 spaces and only 30 need be retained.[137]

In justification for retaining the 30 spaces, the G2 said, "their services are actually needed on the Mexican border and in connection with Japanese questions, and in the overseas possessions; that is, in the Eighth and Ninth Corps Areas and at Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. To meet the possible employment of Federal troops and to act as watchmen for certain of the secret records of the Military Intelligence Division, a few men are required here in Washington. It is understood that Second Corps Area has one (agent) in Puerto Rico." Colonel Heintzelman felt that the reduction could be accomplished by relieving all Corps quotas excluding, however, the 8th and 9th Corps Areas.[138]

A reduction was indicated since the Army, already down to 150,000 men, was being reduced another 25,000. Reduction became a certainty in June 1922, when first restrictions on the activities of CIP agents in domestic Corps Areas became effective.

During the next six months, before the cut was ordered, some effort was made to determine needs. In February, the G2, Hawaii, said he needed his assigned three agents. In May, the G2 of the 6th Corps Area at Chicago said he needed his four men and added:

> "Chicago is the field headquarters of the I.W.W., the Communist Party and other lesser radical organizations. There are also many labor organizations with radical leanings. In addition, there are the many 'pink' and 'parlor Bolshevist' societies such as the 'Bug Club,' the 'Dill Pickle Club' and others whose meetings must be attended... It is believed that the work accomplished, compared with the cost, justifies the retention of four sergeants of police..."[139]

137 CIP Corres #42, dated 7 Feb 1922.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid, #38, dtd 12 May 1922.

The G2, New York, said that he could eliminate one agent but that the three remaining were an absolute minimum. One man was on duty at the G2 office and two were out in the field. The agent who could be spared was actually working in Puerto Rico.[140]

In June 1922, MI-4 (Foreign Influence Section of the Negative Branch) proposed to reduce by two agents each, spaces allotted to Corps Areas at Washington, New York and Chicago and to reduce the San Francisco allotment by three agents. Panama was to have two more agents, Hawaii three more and the Philippines four more under the plan. The memorandum stated that the redistribution was the "result of the instructions which have been sent out by The Adjutant General relative to G2 activities in Corps Areas...and to place them where their services are most needed."[141]

In his proposal, Maj. W. H. Cowles, Chief of MI-4, admitted that only the 6th and 2d Corps had been consulted on the proposal.[142] Before acting on the plan, Colonel Heintzelman suggested that the Departments be asked whether they wanted the additional agents.[143]

Panama Department, which had sought 10 agents in October 1920,[144] said its two authorized spaces were enough. Hawaiian Department said it would like three more men[145] and Eighth Corps, on the Mexican border, said it needed at least one more agent. The Philippine Department felt it could utilize an additional three agents, primarily to make available the services lost when three agents were assigned to China -- one with the Expedition and two in the China Far Eastern Republic. The Philippine reply was not received, however, until after CIP had been ordered reduced to 30 men.[146]

In August Colonel Heintzelman ordered his Chief of MI-4 to send letters to the Corps Areas similar to those distributed in July which had requested Departments to inform Military Intelligence Division of the number of CIP agents they recommended as necessary and the reasons therefore, Unfortunately, neither Colonel Heintzelman nor his executive, Lt. Col. M. E. Locke, processed this letter for distribution. It went out merely as a survey requesting data on the number of men on duty, the number of vacancies and the date of expiration of enlistments.[147]

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140 CIP Corres #36, dated 23 May 1922.
141 Ibid, #126, dated 28 June 1922.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid, #26, dtd 28 Jun 1922.
144 Ibid, #56, dtd 25 Oct 1920.
145 Ibid, #23, dtd 23 Jul 1922.
146 Ibid, #95, dtd 21 Aug 1922.
147 Ibid, #12, dtd 7 Aug 1922.

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On 14 August 1922, when the survey was tabulated, it revealed that 37 of the 45 men authorized were on duty. The Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Corps and the Panama Department had one vacancy each. The Eighth Corps, which wanted another space authorized, had four vacancies. However, the Fourth Corps Area had reported that it did not plan to fill its vacancy in the near future, and made that space available to the Eighth Corps Area.[148]

Reduction is Ordered

By the time Capt. J. V. McConville, then Acting Chief of MI-4, had compiled the survey, G.O. 33, War Department, dated 28 July 1922, reduced the CIP to a strength of 30 men. This meant that all plans for filling the eight vacancies had to be cancelled, and, in addition, seven agents on duty had to be dropped. Coincident with this reduction, plans were made to increase the Eight Corps Area allotment from seven to eight agents and the Hawaiian Department from three to four. Panama would not lose its vacancy, but would continue to be allotted two spaces. The Philippine Department would retain its allotment of five men.

In effect, only one of the existing vacancies would actually be cancelled and 14 of the 25 agents remaining in Corps Areas would have to be dropped or transferred to the Departments or Branches. Since the Hawaiian Department had Japanese problems and Eighth Corps Areas had Mexican problems, specialized types of agents were required. Consequently, transfers of purely 21 agents were not possible.

The reduction to 30 spaces was effective as of 1 January 1923, and it was argued that the reduction could be achieved through expiration of enlistments without having to declare experienced CIP sergeants as surplus and transferring them to other organizations. Unfortunately, however, few of the agents qualified for this "happy" solution. In a few cases early discharges were arranged but in most instances transfer to a line outfit was the only solution. With all personnel frozen in the grade of sergeant fourth class (line sergeant) the future was not too bright for those remaining. Colonel Bidwell, in his history of G2, states, "...the general morale and efficiency of the entire group reached an exceedingly low ebb..."[149]

On 11 September 1922, all Corps Areas and Departments were officially informed of the distribution for Intelligence Police which provided one agent each in Corps Areas One through Seven and None, and gave the Eighth Corps Area and Department increases as proposed.[150]

148 CIP Corres #107, dtd 14 Aug 1922.
149 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 209.
150 CIP Corres #89, dtd 11 Sep 1922.

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G2, Second Corps Area, New York, reported to Military Intelligence Division that he had two excellent agents available for transfer. One of them spoke, read and wrote Polish, Russian and German and had four years experience.[151] Military Intelligence Division wrote back that there were "no vacancies to which these men can be transferred."[152]

G2, Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, protested the loss of one of his two CIP agents. He said the agent had been his chief clerk and file and record clerk for 18 months and that it was "essential that some one person, at least, have familiarity with the files and records which comes only with permanent handling of the same." The other sergeant, prior to the cutback had processed all newspapers, periodicals, etc., subscribed to by this office, and after clipping them compiled a weekly summary. He also did most of the G2 office typing. G2 McCloskey added that both sergeants had attended radical and socialist meetings usually on Saturday or Sunday afternoon or evening, and reports of these meetings had been incorporated in the Sixth Corps Area's information summary.[153]

Contrasted with the fact that more than 200 CIC agents operated out of this headquarters 20 years later, the request seems pitifully small. By 1922 standards, however, two men were unnecessary and the G2 of Sixth Corps Area was ordered to curtail his CIP force to one agent because "...the duties that have been assigned to the Departments and the Eighth Corps Area are particularly incumbent on this Division." McCloskey was reminded that attendance of CIP agents at radical and socialistic meetings was not in conformity with the restrictions imposed in June, and that his workload could be eased by using the services of the clerks allotted to the various corps headquarters and confining the CIP agent to normal duties of his position.

G2, Military Intelligence Division, in comments to his Chief, MI-4, stated, "that sole dependance should be put upon them for the filing and record system I do not think is correct." Nowhere in the correspondence is there any recognition of the fact that intelligence files are not comparable to ordinary correspondence files and must be handled differently.[154]

Although the Hawaiian Department was pleading for an additional CIP agent and was authorized the man under the September redistribution effective October 1922, G2, Military Intelligence Division, informed the Hawaiian Department that it could not have its man until the CIP had been reduced to 29 men by normal discharges, retirements, and transfers. Need did not matter.[155]

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151 CIP Corres #88, dtd 15 Sep 1922.
152 Ibid, #87, dtd 21 Sep 1922.
153 Ibid, #82, 9th Ind, dtd 9 Oct 1922.
154 Ibid, #78, dtd 14 Oct 1922.
155 Ibid, #77, dtd 20 Oct 1922.

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The Philippine Department was informed that it would not get the three additional agents it had requested because on 1 April 1923 the American forces in China would become a separate command and the three CIP agents working in China would be returned to the Philippines.[156] Eighth Corps was told that it would not be authorized its additional agent until 1 January 1923.[157]

Years of Neglect Start

By the time Col. William K. Nayler succeeded Colonel Heintzelman as Director of Military Intelligence Division on 27 November 1922, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, had been reduced to virtual inactivity. In March 1922, for economy reasons, Military Intelligence Division was delegated responsibility for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information in the three vital overseas territories transferred to the respective Department commanders. This included the preparation of the Military Monographs from which all security plans were derived. For a period of three years, until 27 November 1925, intelligence files compiled at overseas bases remained there and were not forwarded to MHitary Intelligence, Washington.[158] As a result, except for the Eighth Corps Area on the Mexican border, the principal counterintelligence activities of the Army for the next 17 years were carried on in Hawaii, Panama and the Philippines.

From 1922 until 1939, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, had seven different directors and, at one time, for a period of three months, had only an acting director. Only twice in this period was Military Intelligence Division headed by a general officer. In 1933, Col. Alfred T. Smith was promoted to brigadier general and served his final two year term with Military Intelligence Division in that rank. For the nine months following, Brig. Gen. Harry E. Knight was director. During the other 15 years, Military Intelligence Division was commanded by colonels. Administration of CIP consisted primarily in answering inquiries from the field and was handled by the G2 executive officer.

Instructions issued by the War Department in December 1922, which ordered post and station intelligence officers to confine their work solely to training personnel for combat intelligence duties, continued in force. Even this "training" was neglected.

In February 1920, a Troop Sub-Section of Military Intelligence Division was organized and assigned the mission of preparing tables of organization and operational instructions. It was so inadequately staffed, however, that three years later its chief reported officially that "...nothing in the way of supervision

156 CIP Corres, dtd 1 Nov 1922.
157 Ibid, #70, dtd 14 Nov 1922.
158 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 39, (Secret).

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of combat training in the Army has been accomplished..." The only accomplishment of the four-year period was issuance in 1924 of the first edition of TR 210-5, "Combat Intelligence Regulations." Training in the field was still lagging.[159]

Soviet Military Espionage

Although the 1923 removal by the United States of trade barriers against the Soviets provided legitimate cover for espionage against the United States, activities had started, in fact, four years before. In 1919, Arthur Alexandrovich Adams, then listed as a technical advisor for the USSR, began espionage activities against the United States which continued for the next 26 years and were interrupted only by intermittant trips to his native Russia. The next year a Yugoslav named Steve Nelson entered the United States on an illegal passport and began Soviet espionage operations which continued for more than 30 years.

The Intelligence Department of the Red Army, originally known as the Fourth Department, was established in 1921 and operated separately from the Soviet political intelligence organization. Both intelligence organizations operated under-cover firms and, in 1924 formed the Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York City through a merger of Products Exchange and Acros-American, Inc. Amtorg provided for the first time legitimate cover to both Soviet political and military intelligence bureaus.[160]

The mission and organization of the political intelligence agency known as the OGPU from 1922 to 1934 when it became the NKVD was described by its Chief in his annual report to the Soviet Government in 1924:

> "The OGPU not only works energetically by paralyzing the espionage of foreign citizens in the U.S.S.R. but it has also succeeded in creating a network of information intelligence agencies in all other large centers of Europe and North America. Responsible workers of the OGPU are detailed to all the diplomatic and trade missions of the U.S.S.R. abroad. The total strength of the Foreign Department of the OGPU is 1,300... The OGPU has reportedly rendered service to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the staff of the Red Army in supplying secret information both of a political and military nature."[161]

By 1924 the United States had but few means for keeping tab on Communist espionage activities. The Navy closed its CIC equivalent, the Domestic Bureau, in 1921. The Secretary of War's directive of 1922 barred subversive investigations by the Corps of Intelligence Police, and in 1924, when Harlen F. Stone

159 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 195, (Secret).
160 House Rpt #1229, (Uncl).
161 Ibid, p 5.

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became Attorney General, he announced, "The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States."[162]

Espionage laws were highly inadequate as the House Un-American Activities Committee reported more than a quarter of a century later. Moreover enforcement of what laws there were was often blocked by administrative decisions. After 26 years of espionage against the United States, Adams easily escaped from New York City while the government was trying to work out a plan for his arrest.[163]

Even if appropriate laws had been enacted, the 30 CIP men and 440 FBI agents available who had to cover all the United States and several possessions would have found themselves outnumbered by their enemies. The FBI had more than 100 Federal criminal laws to enforce during the lawless Prohibition Era apprehending major hoodlums such as Dillinger, Karpis, Barker, Floyd and Touhy.[164]

Fortunately for the United States, officials of these intelligence agencies did not let the lack of congressional authority for enforcement prevent them from continuing some surveillance, although it was extremely discreet and highly curtailed. Navy Intelligence personnel supplied decoy information to a Soviet agent.[165] More than a quarter of a century later, when anti-subversive laws were enacted, trials of various Communists revealed that the FBI had been observing them for years through undercover informants.

Army counterintelligence maintained what it could of anti-subversive coverage in the late 1920's by placing Capt. John J. Maurer, MI-Reserve, who was on duty as a master sergeant of Intelligence Police, in direct charge of all Military Intelligende Division matters pertaining to Communist activities and subversion of Army personnel. Maurer continued this type of work until retired for physical disability in 1943. His duties were considered so ultra-secret that many members of his own Military Intelligence Division had no clear idea as to who he was or what he was supposed to be doing.[166] But it was one man against the many!

Mobilization Plan Problems

In April 1925, Col. James H. Reeves, G2, came to the conclusion that Military Intelligence Division was not receiving sufficient domestic information

162 Lowenthal, p 298, (Uncl).
163 House Rpt #1229, p 38, (Uncl).
164 Lowenthal, p 300; and The Story of the FBI, by the Editors of Look, E. P. Dalton & Co, N.Y. (1947), pp 100, 125 and 198, (Uncl).
165 Lowenthal, p 85, (Uncl).
166 Hist Mil Intel Div, Vol 3, p 68, (Secret).

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under the current system to fulfill duly assigned responsibilities in support of the War Department General Mobilization Plan. He requested that restrictions be slightly modified so that Corps Areas would be again required to forward periodic reports to the War Department "relative to groups and organizations which might be involved in internal disorders or aiding the enemy." When this request was submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval it was Maj. Gen. Dennis Nolan, then Deputy Chief of Staff, who had the unfortunate responsibility of disapproving it.[167]

In January 1926, the Corps of Intelligence Police was given its first approved Mobilization Plan. The plan placed CIP "under a subsection" of the Secret Service Section of G2, War Department, with G2, 5b, 3a charged with administration and G2, 5b, 3b charged with policies and training. Initially, strength was to be 250 men assigned as follows:

G2, War Department	20
Corps Areas	160
District of Washington	10
Overseas Departments	30
Puerto Rico and Alaska	10
GHQ (later)	20
Total	250

As mobilization might progress, each Army and Corps headquarters would be assigned 10 CIP agents. Of the initial strength, not more than 20 percent were to be sergeants and 40 percent corporals.

The functions of the CIP, the plan stated,

> "...are purely of special investigative nature and do not include the duties of guarding, preserving order, apprehension or similar 'police' duties. Intelligence Police are practically militarized detectives whose duties are to detect and forestall the secret activities of enemy agents other than his armed forces. Their investigational duties with respect to our own personnel are confined to Acts of Treason and Disloyalty.
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> "In time of peace in the United States, except the 8th (Mexican Border) Corps Area, their duties are practically restricted to work in connection with confidential and secret intelligence papers."

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167 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 68, (Secret).

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Peacetime Mission Debated

The peacetime mission of the Corps of Intelligence Police had not been clearly defined and was the subject of conflicting opinion among higher commanders. The justification for CIP existence in 1920 had been to fight subversion, but two years later this mission was so circumscribed that by 1930 Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, father of CIP, who now commanded the Fifth Corps Area wrote, "...The restrictions on subversive coverage placed on CIP in December 1922 make it unnecessary to assign members of the CIP to Corps Areas."[168]

On 3 April 1926, when CIP was arbitrarily cut from 30 to 28 men,[169] one space was taken from the Eighth Corps Area and the other from the Philippine Department. At that time the Philippine G2 explained the mission of his CIP's as he protested the cut.[170]

Maj. Gen. Fred W. Sladen, commanding the Philippines, wrote:

> "...numerous demands for assistance have been made and are still being made upon the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G2 by the various post commanders and chiefs of bureaus in their attempts to rid themselves of dishonest and thieving elements. Such a class of work, although not contemplated among the duties of intelligence agents, must necessarily be done by them since no Federal Department of Justice agents are available in the Philippine Islands. Constabulary and police agents have proven unreliable - the former by disinclination and the latter by inability and unsuitability for work in military commands..."

General Sladen went on to describe how a ring stealing airplane cloth was broken at Camp Nichols. Three soldiers got prison terms and nine civilians were indicted. In other cases cited, thefts totaling thousands of dollars were stopped and two soldiers sentenced to prison while 11 civilians were apprehended.

In connection with the 1929 personnel survey, the actual mission performed was discussed in papers originating in several Corps Areas. Sixth Corps Area wrote:

> "...The present Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, being Corps Area Athletic and Recreation Officer in addition to his other duties, the Staff Sergeant's duties also include a small amount of clerical work in connection with these activities. The Intelligence Section has been burdened

168 CIP Corres #69-70, dated 16 Aug 1930.
169 Ibid, #29, dtd Apr 1926; GO #7, 1926.
170 Ibid.

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[redacted]

with considerable research and special War Plan work in fields only remotely pertaining to intelligence matters... The present Intelligence personnel of these headquarters is utterly inadequate for the performance of more than routine intelligence duties despite the reduction of paper work to a minimum. Whenever special duties arise of an Intelligence or other nature all but the most urgent routine must be neglected until the completion of the former.

"Attention is invited to the fact that the term 'Corps of Intelligence Police' is a misnomer which, when applied to present enlisted personnel of the Military Intelligence Division, tends to create misunderstanding upon the part of those not familiar with the situation. Although originally designed for secret service duties it is believed that the present trend toward maintenance of a corps of enlisted specialists, qualified in other intelligence duties as well as secret service, dictates a change of name to 'Intelligence Corps'."[171]

A similar suggestion was made by Col. W. K. Naylor, in connection with the 1930 personnel survey. Naylor, then G2 at New York, wrote:

"While it may be true that the presence at any headquarters in time of peace of members of a corps whose proper functions limit their local duty assignments tends to create an administrative problem; yet it is nevertheless true that many such are required as for example Ordnance, Chemical Warfare, Air Corps, etc., etc.

"The proper performance of Intelligence duty requires specialists in Military Intelligence work, irrespective of the name by which they are known. Efficiency requires adaptability of the personnel to the work and long training with a full sense of responsibility. Consequently, the personnel placed on such work should have ample rank and emoluments to cause the maintenance of a high standard of self respect. Further efficiency requires that such personnel be continued on the work without constant change.

"It is recommended that personnel with adequate rank and emoluments continue to be made available for the work performed by Corps of Intelligence Police even though the name of the group be changed to Military Intelligence Specialists or some similar title."[172]

Although an Intelligence Corps was not achieved, a quarter of a century later the Counter Intelligence Corps Center had become the Army Intelligence Center.

171 CIP Corres #14-15, dated 19 Feb 1929.
172 Ibid, #78-79, dtd 13 Aug 1930.

In suggesting the 1929 personnel survey, Lt. Col. W. K. Wilson, Chief of the War Plans and Training Branch, War Department, wrote Colonel Ford, War Department, G2:

"...The Corps of Intelligence Police in France were used for investigations in connection with counterespionage. In the United States they were also used for counterespionage work and later in connection with fraud and graft cases. It is believed that much of their work in the United States was made necessary by the failure of the Department of Justice to expand sufficiently to handle the situation.

"The Corps of Intelligence Police can be used in a legitimate way to discover cases of disloyalty among military personnel and to counteract efforts of radical organizations to promote disloyalty in the Army itself. The work of the Corps of Intelligence Police in Panama, Hawaii, the Philippine Islands and Eighth Corps Area has been very useful and has been in accordance with the purpose for which the Corps of Intelligence Police was created.

"In the remaining eight Corps Areas, the work of the Corps of Intelligence Police has depended largely upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, at Corps Area headquarters. There is but one staff sergeant assigned to each Corps Area. In the Fourth and Seventh Corps Areas the Staff Sergeant has been loaned to the Adjutant General. In all other Corps Areas it is believed that the Staff Sergeant has performed duties useful to the G2, although only a small percentage of his time has been devoted to the principal mission of the Corps of Intelligence Police.

"With the exception of the Fourth and Seventh Corps Areas, it is believed that the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, has operated more efficiently on account of the presence of the Corps of Intelligence Police. Should the Corps of Intelligence Police be withdrawn, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, would be forced to get the necessary clerical help from the Corps Area Commander. In some Corps Areas, this would probably result in the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, receiving very little clerical help."

Colonel Wilson discussed various other solutions for the future of the Corps. One was another reduction in personnel which he opposed: "...any further reduction would limit their (CIP) usefulness to G2 at the outbreak of war."

Finally, he gave consideration to the possibility of abolishing the Corps. No necessity for the Corps was seen in peacetime but Colonel Wilson believed it inadvisable to abolish it, "in view of the difficulty which was experienced in getting

authorization for the Corps of Intelligence Police in 1917 and in view of the necessity for having a nucleus of this Corps available at the outbreak of war."[173]

That CIP had an important place in peacetime was shown in a letter from Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, commanding the Eighth Corps Area. In May 1929, he wrote the War Department that an increase in his CIP allotment was "deemed absolutely necessary. The operations of the Military Intelligence Section of the staff of this Corps Area during recent disturbances in Mexico, have served as a test of the qualifications and sufficiency of the personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police allotted to this Corps..."[174]

Opposition to Peacetime CIP

Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood, commanding Seventh Corps, wrote:

> "As Chief of Staff of the Services of Supply in France, the whole organization of counterespionage in the back areas came under my immediate jurisdiction and I fully realize the importance of this service in time of war, and in a country like France. But in my opinion in time of peace in America, radicalism, communism, and efforts to overturn the existing form of government are political questions with which the Army should in no wise concern itself, either directly or indirectly, any more than it should concern itself in questions of religion or party politics. I do not believe that the Army has the right, the knowledge or the facilities for determining what individuals or organizations in America stand for good government and what stand for bad government. The President of the United States is the Commander In Chief for the Army. Under him it must not only support the national government but the local government. And if enough laborites, radicals, anarchists or what not get together to elect him and other public officials in accordance with the laws and the constitution of the United States, it is the duty of the Army to support them. The Army cannot condemn individual citizens or groups of citizens because of their political views so long as they come within the provisions of the laws which the army itself is required to enforce... The contrary confirms the sentiment 'Standing armies are a menace to free peoples! Some branch of the government must undoubtedly look after these matters but not the Army."[175]

173 CIP Corres #10-12, dated 11 Feb 1929.
174 Ibid, #109, dtd 2 May 1930.
175 Ibid, #65-66, dtd 18 Aug 1930.

Maj. Gen. G. LeR. Irwin, commanding the Panama Canal Department, urged that CIP be modified to allow increased grades to insure retaining the type of man necessary for the work.[176]

After 1922, CIP agents in the 8th Corps worked on secret mapping assignments. Brig. Gen. Halstead Dorey, commanding, wrote:

> "In this Corps Area, the members of the Corps of Intelligence Police perform very important missions. The G2 missions performed by these soldiers could not be accomplished other than by veteran informants of the highest character... It is impracticable and would be inimical to the public service to replace members of the Corps of Intelligence Police in Corps Area by competent clerks."[177]

The survey letter to all Corps Areas and Departments was sent out on 6 August 1930 and the last reply from the far away Philippines was received on 22 October. Of the 12 Areas and Departments, nine said the assigned allotment of CIP agents was required and adequate. The Sixth and Eighth Corps each said an additional agent was required.

Only five G2's felt that CIP agents could be replaced by clerks. Of these, four felt that the replacement should be a military clerk and only one felt a civilian clerk would be better. Ten of the 12 reported their CIP agent handling clerk-typist work for the G2 and half of the 12 reported the CIP agent was handling public relations work assigned to the G2's. In the Third Corps Area, the CIP agent was working for the War Plans Officer and assisting G1 and G4 as well as the G2. In the Eighth Corps Area and in the Departments CIP agents were doing CIP work for the most part, but in the Philippines, since there was no Department of Justice unit, CIP agents were also investigating fraud cases.[178]

Results of the survey gave Colonel Ford no assistance in efforts to get more men. First Corps Area said all it needed was a man for publicity duties. Second Corps said its agent was needed to handle publicity and correspondence and records of extension school work for 200 Military Intelligence Reserve officers. Third, Sixth and Fourth and Ninth Corps admitted CIP agents were not performing many CIP duties, but argued that the agents should be kept in case of sudden domestic disturbances or mobilization.

From the time of the one-third reduction in July 1922, CIP correspondence files are filled with scores of letters from Corps Areas and Departments fighting for one additional man or protesting bitterly when ordered not to fill a vacancy so

176 CIP Corres #50-51, dated 26 Aug 1930.
177 Ibid, #62-64, dated 14 Aug 1930.
178 Ibid, #59b, dated 22 Oct 1930.

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as to provide a needed space elsewhere. Commanders have seldom pleaded for line reinforcements with more vigor. While these were eloquent tributes to the value of CIP in peacetime, their eloquence produced no additional funds to provide manpower.

Eighth Corps protested in 1927 when it lost an allotted space to provide a CIP agent for the Military Attache in Peking, China. The Eighth Corps G2 described what was left of his capable CIP force of three years before: One had TB and was hospitalized. One was to retire in a month and another in six months. A fourth was "nothing extra." Only two were capable and one of those could not be recommended for foreign service.[179] In February 1928, the China Military Attache tried to get another CIP agent but was turned down.

In the survey conducted in February 1929, the First and Seventh Corps Areas and the Panama Department had reported their respective CIP allotments could be reduced one space. However, when G2 attempted to transfer these allocations, First and Seventh Corps protested and an increase for the Eighth Corps was taken from Panama.[180] After two years the Panama G2 reported he was "swamped" with work and needed another man. The harassed War Department G2 reviewed his 28 man roster and concluded that the only solution was to take away the CIP agent working with the Military Attache in China and replace him with a clerk.[181]

The Chief of the Operations Branch, Military Intelligence Division, saw no hope for obtaining an additional man. In a memorandum to the G2 executive officer, Col. W. H. Wilson stated, "The strength of the CIP is determined by the President and belongs under the Detached Enlisted Mens List. Increases and decreases are usually arranged between G2 and G3, and G3 has been and is opposed to any CIP as such, and continually seeks to get G2 to say it can spare all of them."[182]

For seven years, from April 1926 until October 1933, G2 held off attempts to further reduce the Corps. But on 9 October 1933, the bomb dropped.

Penciled at the bottom of an Interoffice Memo to the G2 was, "The Deputy Chief of Staff desires your views and solution to proposal for reduction in strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police to not more than 15."[183]

Anticipating a final fight for survival, the G2 queried all Corps Area and Department G2's as to whether their CIP could be replaced by military or civilian personnel. If this was not possible, he asked how many additional CIP's they

179 CIP Corres #86, dated May 1927.
180 Ibid, #102, dated 17 May 1929.
181 Ibid, #38-39, dated 25 Feb 1931.
182 Ibid, #39, dated 25 Feb 1931.
183 Ibid, #63a, dated 9 Oct 1933.

could justify by specific reasons. On 14 November 1933, the results of this survey were submitted to the Chief of Staff in a staff study which revealed that no Corps Area or Department felt CIP agents could be eliminated and actually, seven more were urgently needed.[184]

In support of this need, the G2, Brig. Gen. Alfred T. Smith, reported,

> "The increase in radical activity in all Corps Areas and Departments and the prospects of still greater unrest this winter has thrown added work on all G2 sections and has greatly increased the importance of their having trained and thoroughly reliable personnel. Civilian personnel cannot be used satisfactorily for outside contact work; a reduction in personnel can not be efficiently made unless there is a reduction in work to be accomplished."

General Smith added,

> "The work is highly specialized and quite technical. The organization of radical groups is so complex and involved that a considerable period of time is necessary before a man can be trained to a point where he is of value in dealing with them.
>
> "The work now being carried on by the Corps of Intelligence Police cannot be discontinued without detriment to the service. To continue the work by other means that the present Corps of Intelligence Police will necessitate the use of the very highest type of enlisted man and in some cases, where enlisted personnel would not be qualified for clerical duties, of both enlisted and civilian personnel. This would result in no saving to the government, would take from other organizations much needed personnel, and would reduce the efficiency of G2 divisions until the new personnel could be trained. Should enlisted men be detailed for duty the last condition would recur periodically with the changes in detail."

Since the Deputy Chief of Staff had asked for a solution to the proposal to reduce to 15 men, General Smith proposed that if the cut had to be made, all CIP agents in Corps Areas, except the Eighth should be eliminated. The Eighth Corps contingent would be reduced from seven to three agents and department strength and three agents with G2, War Department, would remain static. General Smith also made an attempt to get rid of the allocation of a CIP agent to the China Military Attache, which change had been recommended since 1931.[185]

184 CIP Corres #56-59, dated 14 Nov 1933.
185 Ibid.

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Reduction to 15 Agents

G3 was waiting for the study and in a memorandum dated 5 December 1933, Brig. Gen. John H. Hughes said,

> "The Operations and Training Division does not concur in the action recommended (by G2) on the proposed reduction in the strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police for the following reasons:
>
> "These men are used on purely clerical duties -- or they should be in all Corps Areas except the Eighth and our foreign Departments.
>
> "Attendance at radical meetings of a public nature enumerated among their duties is, in the opinion of this division, a function of the Department of Justice.
>
> "In general, members of the Corps of Intelligence Police have rank greater than the needs of their positions and their cost to the government in pay and allowances, including money allowed them for civilian clothes, which it is presumed is still allowed, is more than the amount for which efficient civilian clerks could be had.
>
> "In the opinion of this Division, the Corps of Intelligence Police should be reduced as proposed in the memorandum of the Deputy Chief of Staff."[186]

It was only four days after this comment that Maj. Gen. H. A. Drum, Deputy Chief of Staff, endorsed the G2 staff study: "The Corps of Intelligence Police will be reduced to fifteen (15) by June 1, 1934. The reduction will be accomplished by transfer in grade to combat units, grades of combat units being increased accordingly. G2, G3 to handle details."

On 21 December 1933, G3 concurred in the details of G2's proposal to reduce the Corps to 15 men prior to 1 June 1934, by transferring in grade to combat units one technical sergeant, seven staff sergeants and five sergeants. This proposal prohibited reductions or promotions by Corps Areas in order to retain desired personnel. Except in the Eighth Corps Area on the Mexican border, CIP in the United States was going out of business.[187]

At this same time, the Russian espionage system in the U.S. was growing. On 17 November 1933, the United States and the U.S.S.R. resumed full diplomatic

186 CIP Corres #55, dated 5 Dec 1933.
187 Ibid, #26-24, dated 16-21 Dec 1933.

relations on conditions which included a pledge to "refrain from propaganda against the policies or social order of the United States." Ex-Communist Gitlow has stated:

> "American Communism owes its rise to prominence to the election of Roosevelt as President in 1932; to the Committee on Industrial Organization in 1935 and to the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933."[188]

Soviet Espionage in High Gear

While the Communist Party drew renewed vigor from the recognition of Russia by the U.S. in 1933, Soviet espionage in the United States had been operating with increasing intensity for 10 years, most in large part undetected.

Other nations were more alert. Two women espionage agents who had operated safely in the United States were in prison soon after they were sent to Finland. An American couple engaged in Soviet espionage in the United States went undetected for three years but were arrested within three months when they were transferred to France.

Even when detected, the inadequate espionage laws of the U.S. hampered convictions. A Soviet agent active in this era operated for 12 years before he was convicted; even then the only charge established was passport fraud. Another agent, who had operated in the United States for three years was arrested in 1933 and found to have on his person $28,700 in cash, along with espionage credentials. On the only charge that could be brought against him, passport fraud, he was convicted, fined $1,000 and given probation.

In 1926 a defected Soviet diplomat at Paris stated that the Comintern had two agents in the United States charged with directing the activities of the American Communist Party. This defector said that the chief of Soviet espionage had told him there were two illegal organizations operating in the United States, centering in New York and maintaining contact with the U.S.S.R. through Amtorg.[189]

In 1927, a British Intelligence raid of a Soviet "front" firm produced names of certain undercover addresses in the United States.

By 1928, Soviet Army Intelligence was operating on a big scale, under the personal direction of a Soviet Intelligence officer specifically assigned to head activities in the U.S.A. Seaman couriers delivered funds through the office of a

188 Gitlow, p 254.
189 House Rpt #1229.

New York dentist. A woman agent collected technical and similar books which another agent forwarded to mail drops in the scandinavian countries. Yet another agent operated a photographic studio for a cover. The House Report states,

> "Their work must have been quite voluminous because the Soviet Military Intelligence organization purchased a large photostating machine which was installed in a back room of the photo shop. One agent told another said that he had spent an entire night photographing secret plans for the British warship Royal Oak intercepted en route from Canada to Washington, D.C."

In 1928, Arthur Adams, who had begun espionage work in 1919, was back in the United States, ostensibly representing a Russian automobile concern but in reality in contact with a New York woman who was one of his major agents. In 1932, he returned again as a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission buying airplanes.

The year 1932 also saw the entry of a young Hungarian, probably named Alexander Goldberger, into the United States. During the next 20 years, before he left voluntarily to escape deportation, he attained notority under the alias of "J. Peters." His organization is believed to have been the original Soviet espionage net within the United States government.

In 1929, a Soviet Military Intelligence agent was sent to the United States, where other agents assisted him in establishing an American background preparatory to an assignment in France. There he was to establish a business as a cover for activities of Soviet Military Intelligence.

In 1931, an employee of a firm producing fire control and other confidential mechanisms for the Navy reported to American Naval Intelligence that he had been offered $1,200 to $2,000 a year to furnish information to a man he suspected of being a foreign agent. Under intelligence guidance, the worker furnished decoy information and the contact man was identified as a Soviet agent.[190]

This same Soviet agent recruited an assistant about this time and trained him as an expert photographer. During 1931-32 the latter photographed numerous United States military reports that had been secured by members of the Soviet espionage ring. Ex-Communist Gitlow reports that the agents had little trouble getting the best photographic equipment since in 1927 an aerial photographer of the United States Army joined the Communist Party and selected and bought all the latest equipment for his new masters.

190 House Rpt #1229, p 11.

The year 1931 was an important one for American Intelligence, although there was no way of knowing this until 17 years later. Whittaker Chambers, a senior editor of Time magazine, testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1948 that he had become a Communist espionage courier in 1931, and had continued this activity for eight years.

There were many other Soviet espionage activities during this era. One was the theft of certain Army emergency plans from the Panama Canal Zone which will be related in the account of the Panama Canal Department in another section. But the interest of the United States Corps of Intelligence Police in these matters was summed up in the annual reports for 1927, 1928 and 1929 of G2, War Department: "The collection of information by G2 regarding the radical situation in the United States is confined to that which appears in the public press.... G2 takes no active part in combatting the activities of pacifists or radicals."[191]

Radical Restrictions Continue

The restriction on CIP radical coverage continued for a decade after 1922, and after temporary relaxation of the restriction in 1932, was resumed and continued until the eve of World War II. The temporary break was occasioned by the arrival of the "Bonus" Army of unemployed at Washington, D.C., in June and July 1932.

G2 had anticipated the need for more authorized coverage of subversion the year before, as the growing depression increased the ranks of the radicals. In February 1931, a detailed study was submitted to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, in which it was strongly recommended that restrictions on surveillance of subversive radical activities by Corps Area commanders and unit intelligence officers be lifted. Although G1, G3, G4 and the War Plans Division all concurred, General MacArthur disapproved with the statement "it is not believed advisable at this time to initiate this procedure."[192]

In August, the G2 tried again and obtained temporary permission, for Corps Area commanders to forward to the War Department a monthly report covering subversive activities within their respective commands.

As the bonus groups began the march on Washington in May 1932, Col. Alfred T. Smith, G2, was authorized to provide more coverage and secretly instructed Corps Areas G2s to investigate and report regularly on bonus demonstrations by veterans.[193] Since at that time all Corps Areas except the Eighth

191 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 67.
192 Ibid, p 70.
193 Ibid, p 72, (Secret).

had only one CIP agent, coverage was either extremely limited or provided by amateurs. A daily report was furnished the Chief of Staff on the bonus marchers situation in Washington proper.

Soon G2 found itself functioning in the role of an operational intelligence center with Master Sergeant Maurer in charge. G2 processed the reports of enlisted men assigned to G2 who proved capable of "furnishing information which was obtainable in no other way, because of their ability to associate with the veterans on terms of equality."[194] These observations were supplemented by interviews with cooperative bonus marchers, Metropolitan police, Washington press reports, and some special reconnaissances by U.S. Army troop elements in Washington.

However, when the Second Corps Area queried the Department of Justice on bonus marchers activity, it was reported, "the Department of Justice has no jurisdiction over communistic or radical activities and could not engage in any inquiry concerning same."[195]

It was soon evident that an impressive number of Communist agitators were operating in the ranks of the marchers. Even after the marchers were peacefully evicted by the Army on 28 July 1932, new threats of similar marches developed and radical elements were discovered to be making a serious attempt to organize subversive units in the Civilian Conservation Corps then in process of formation. In addition to the anti-military discontent stirred up by Communists in the CCC, a similar subversive program was being conducted in the National Guard.[196]

The New York G2 wrote in 1933, just as he was losing his one CIP agent, that he needed two agents because:

> "Practically all radical agencies within the United States have headquarters in New York City, and public meetings of Communist and pacifist organizations are increasing in number and attendance.
>
> "The importance of observing meetings in the metropolitan area is emphasized by the increasing number and force of the anti-Army programs. Careful observation of the activities of those interested in subverting the national defense agencies, by extending influences outside the Army is important in order that measures to counteract the entry of dangerous influences into the Army may be instituted. It is very desirable to be able to identify and observe the more vicious activities of subversive agencies before they become too strongly intrenched in our military organizations.

194 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 73. (Secret)
195 Ibid, p 74.
196 Ibid, p 75.

"...New York is peculiarly different from all other cities in the vicinity of Corps Area headquarters in that it is the center of not only practically all radical activities but also the base of intriging revolutionary elements of various Latin-American countries.

"...There is a large amount of work of this character and its difficulty is increasing at the present time by virtue of the continual changes in personnel assigned to this office... The undesirability of using temporary personnel in the handling of secret and confidential information is emphasized. The danger of leakage is thereby greatly increased. It is believed that it would be preferable to discontinue observation of subversive activities rather than to operate with any uncertainty as to the reliability or discretion of personnel."[197]

From Chicago, the G2 requested an additional agent just as, he too, was losing his only CIP man. He wrote,

"Chicago is an important industrial center. In the Corps Area is also Detroit which is also an important area; both areas are seriously affected by Communist influences. In view of the present situation in this country a careful watch should be kept on radical activities."[198]

G2 Historian Bidwell has written of this period,

"The United States Army obviously stood in great need of an effective counterintelligence organization...but it was not long before the previous adverse influences tending to restrict activities of this special nature again became controlling. In March 1934, therefore; 'in order to relieve Corps Areas G2s of the burden of preparing monthly subversive reports' this requirement was officially discontinued. The importance of this information was recognized by responsible counterintelligence officials and an informal practice gradually grew up where in the Corps Area G2s still managed to forward to Military Intelligence Division a series of monthly 'Notes on the Subversive Situation'."[199]

Military Intelligence Division personality files also had some current information.

197 CIP Corres #106-107, dated 31 Oct 1933.
198 Ibid, #72, dated 20 Oct 1933.
199 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 76, (Secret).

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[redacted]

Part III: Economy Results on the CIP

[redacted]

Section 1

ACTIVITIES IN THE DEPARTMENTS

The Panama and Hawaiian Areas

In 1920, Lenin told Communist leaders that one of their "practical" tasks was to "incite" the United States and Japan against each other.[200] In the next decade and a half, events such as the United States enactment of the Japanese Exclusion Act, and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai provide ample opportunity for Soviet incitement. By 1933, when the Soviets were recognized by the United States, the Japanese had walked out of the League of Nations and were preparing for war.

Most Japanese counterintelligence problems centered in the three Departments: Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines; but the California coast of the Ninth Corps Area was another potentially dangerous area. Japanese espionage efforts were first disclosed by the Army Military Intelligence service within a decade of its inception in 1885. In 1902, the famed Japanese Captain Tanaka was discreetly expelled from Manila because of suspected espionage activities. A few days later the Military Information Division's undercover agents discovered and expelled another Japanese officer in Manila who had posed as the agent of a boat building firm.[201]

The danger of sabotage to the Panama Canal had always existed. The Panama-Costa Rica situation in 1921 caused some concern,[202] and in 1926, the Panama G2 warned the War Department that it was "most probable that any emergency confronting the Panama Canal Department will come suddenly and will have to be met by the forces already in the Canal Zone."[203]

In 1933, Cpl. Robert Osman of the Panama Department was arrested when he attempted to transmit to Soviet agents a copy of the highly secret "White Plan" which set forth U.S. Army operations in event of riot or revolution. Osman's conviction was set aside by a review court, but he was discharged from the Army.

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200 Soviet World Outlook, prepared by the Div of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intell Research, Dept of State, for the Coordinator of Psychological Intell, U.S. Info Agency, 30 Apr 54, p 367. NOTE: Hereafter cited as Soviet World Outlook. (Uncl).

201 Van Deman, Vol I, pp 11-13.

202 CIP Corres #59, dated 3 Mar 1921.

203 Ibid, #4, dated 23 Aug 1926.

NOTE: All references "CONFIDENTIAL" unless otherwise indicated.

After he was immune from further prosecution, Osman revealed that a Soviet courier had visited him in 1932 and 1933 and had paid him $400. Osman said he was given the name of a physician in New York City to use as a confidential mail drop.[204]

Early in 1934, both President Roosevelt and Secretary of War George H. Dern received a considerable number of anonymous and signed letters claiming the Panama Canal to be in serious danger of sabotage. This resulted in a high level conference of War, Navy and State Department officials and the commanding general of the Panama Department was directed that "no effort be spared to maintain the safety of the Canal from any type of sabotage."[205]

This was the opportunity for which G2 of the Canal Zone was waiting. Panama had asked for 10 CIP agents in its 1920 initial peacetime request and that, in addition, civilian agents be provided for Japanese investigations unless competent enlisted agents from elsewhere could be provided.[206] However, only two agents were authorized and even these were not provided in spite of a special request from the Department in 1921 for two CIPs who spoke Spanish.[207] Panama had to fill its own vacancies and this resulted in many difficulties.

Finally, in 1927, a highly capable Military Intelligence Reserve lieutenant, versed in four languages, was obtained and became a staff sergeant CIP. Six years later he was still a staff sergeant although his G2 reported he was a man of "most unusual experience and ability; quiet, discreet and intelligent," and performing "several men's work."

In addition, he was an able draftsman, cartographer, translator (proved by work done for the commanding general), an area specialist (shown in preparation of an area handbook), and editor of the bi-weekly intelligence summary.

In the same letter, the Panama G2 pointed out that although Sergeant Reinhart had on several occasions declined a civilian position at twice the pay, while he had remained unpromoted, privates on the Detached Enlisted Men's List had advanced to master sergeant.[208] In reply, Military Intelligence Division said that under

204 House Rpt #1229, pp 12-13.
205 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, p 76.
206 CIP Corres #56, dated 25 Oct 1920.
207 Ibid, #59, dated 3 Mar 1921.
208 Ibid, #16, dated 3 Feb 1933.

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the Single Promotion List, there were no immediate prospects of promotion but in the three years past, the sergeant had been advanced from fourth to third on the promotion list![209]

Consequently, the G2 welcomed a directive in March 1934 to "spare no effort." When counterintelligence funds and a counterintelligence specialist to coordinate activities and advise the Panama Canal Governor were requested, both the FBI and the Secret Service declined the request of G2 to recommend such a specialist. Maj. Harry A. Taylor, who had headed the CIP Washington Field Office in World War I, and after demobilization had retired as a New York City Police captain, was recalled to active duty in August 1935, for the task. As a result, an Interdepartmental Intelligence Liaison Board was created and counter-intelligence activities with the Panama Canal area were "markedly" improved.[210]

Maj. Gen. H. B. Fiske, commanding, urged in 1935 that a secret morning report be authorized to protect the identity of one agent who lived as a civilian in Panama City. Wrote General Fiske,

> "Due to the proximity of the cities of Panama and Colon to the Canal Zone, personnel residing in the Canal Zone are in almost constant daily contact with large numbers of persons residing in those cities. As a result, citizens of the Republic of Panama, as well as interested aliens residing therein find it a comparatively easy matter, by discreet inquiry among third parties, to learn the identity of any person about whom they may be curious."[211]

The use of a supplemental morning report for CIP agents at Panama was authorized.[212]

From this period on until the end of World War II, sabotage intelligence was the number one priority of CIP agents in the area and espionage a close second. No CIP agent had any doubt why the German liner "Bremen" was scheduled for a cruise in the late "30's" that took her through the Panama Canal.

The Hawaiian G2 had asked for a minimum of 30 agents when the peacetime CIP was authorized in 1920. He was given three agents immediately and finally another in 1922.[213]

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209 CIP Corres #15, dated 15 Feb 1933.
210 Hist Mil Intell Div, Vol 3, pp 78, 79, (Secret).
211 CIP Corres #7-8, dated 26 Apr 1935.
212 Ibid, #114, dated 23 May 1935.
213 Ibid, #57, dated 25 Oct 1920; and #38, dated 11 Sep 22.

In Hawaii, the counterintelligence problem was acute since in excess of 42 percent of the population was Japanese. A large number of Chinese-Filipinos and Koreans further complicated the problem and the loyalties of many Hawaiian-born Japanese were questionable. In a 1922 report, the G2 said that Japanese were constantly arriving and changing their residence. Ship panelling, directed at screening potentially subversive Japanese organizations and collecting Japanese statistical data along with surveillance of certain Japanese individuals imposed a tremendous counterintelligence mission. Additional work included investigation of potential officers for the Hawaiian National Guard and coverage of radical labor organizations such as the United Workers.[214]

The Hawaii G2 reported in 1933, "If the supervision of the Japanese press and the translations into English of Japanese articles could be done by someone not a member of the Corps of Intelligence Police, it would release one member for more effective work in the Japanese community."[215] For its work Hawaii had four agents. One was hospitalized with TB.

The Far East and Philippines

Soviet interest in the Far East was revealed in many ways. When World War II started, British investigation of the Far Eastern Fur Trading Company in London, which had been operated by two Austrians, was found to be a Soviet espionage cover firm, as was the "Anonymous Society for the Importation or Dried Beans," in Paris, France. Both were associated with the firm of Wostwag in Berlin, Germany, the principal cover firm for Soviet espionage in Europe, which had as a director an American dentist, who later fled the U.S.[216]

In 1933, when negotiations were pending for the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by the United States, espionage activities by the Soviets were temporarily curtailed to prevent unfavorable incidents. One of the most active Soviet agents in America was sent to China at this time to establish a business cover for Soviet Military Intelligence activities in that country and in Japan. Another American Soviet was sent to Shanghai in 1933.

Three years before, Dr. Richard Sorge, the German Communist, who had become an ace agent of Soviet Military Intelligence, had started his own China net in Shanghai. Working closely with Sorge was Agnes Smedley, American Soviet spy, who remained in Asia after 1932 when Sorge went back to Moscow to make plans for establishing his net in Japan.

214 CIP Corres #19, dated 27 Jul 1922.
215 Ibid, #86-90, dated 12 Oct 1933.
216 House Rpt #1229, (Uncl).

As far as the United States was concerned, the Military Attache in China in 1937 still retained his one CIP agent he had been ordered to replace in 1931 but his hope of obtaining an additional one had died after repeated turndowns.

Meanwhile, the American-Soviet agent sent in 1933 was given $10,000 to establish a business. At Tientsin, in the British concession, he made arrangements to represent the American Radio Corporation in China and established the Amasia Sales Co. For four years he was occupied solely with the running of the business in order to make satisfactory cover for Soviet Military Intelligence activities. In 1937 the American was relieved by an Austrian and returned to Moscow to report.

He was then ordered to establish a similar cover in the Philippine Islands. During a trip to New York, where he made arrangements to represent a motion picture equipment corporation in the Philippines, he was met by a Soviet agent and given $8,000. The difficulties of setting up a business in Manila were greater than expected, and the agent ran out of funds. He returned to Moscow in 1939 where he was initially ordered back to China, but when he said it would take $100,000 to set up or acquire a representative business concern at that time, he was sent back to the United States. Here his luck failed: he was arrested for passport fraud and after serving a one year sentence defected to the West.[217]

In the Philippines, Japanese agents continued operations and encouraged Filipino subversion when problems developed in connection with negotiations to obtain independence from America. The situation was further complicated in 1922 by a reduction in the ratio of American to Filipino personnel in the Philippine Department. The reduction plan contemplated making the Corregidor garrison mainly Filipino.[218]

The Philippine Department had three agents on duty when it asked for 15 agents as a peacetime requirement in 1920, and further requested discretionary authority to increase the number in case of a war or rumors thereof.[219] It was authorized five spaces. In 1923, two spaces were filled from the United States.[220] Military Intelligence Division was unable to locate Japanese-speaking agents as requested; one was selected because Maj. P. N. Bagly, Chief of MI-4, G2, War Department, had seen him around headquarters at the War Department. While Bagly admitted he was taking a chance, he said the man "seemed intelligent and to have common sense as well."[221]

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217 House Rpt #1229, pp 9 and 10, (Uncl).
218 CIP Corres #95, dated 21 Aug 1922.
219 Ibid; #58, dated 25 Oct 1920.
220 Ibid, #58, dated 24 Jun 1923.
221 Ibid, #55, dated 18 Jul 1923.

At the time, the Philippine G2 wrote Military Intelligence Division that its prompt assistance in procuring men had "...materially strengthened the position of this office..."[222] But the result of this ad hoc procurement policy was reported by the new Philippine G2 a year later. He wrote,

> "Two men in particular, a Filipino and an American are flat failures ...the American is a burden. I can use him no where -- he has no clerical ability. One other Filipino Intelligence policeman works in the office as a clerk... However, he too is a flat failure as a secret operative. There is only one man in the office who was of any value. This man is a civilian. The sergeants of Intelligence Police were of no value to me during the critical period of the mutiny (of Philippine Scouts at Fort McKinley). If some means can be found to let me have approximately the cost of these men to the government in money, available for hire of operatives and the buying of secret information in Manila, I can greatly increase the value of this office..."[223]

Six months later, the Adjutant General of the Philippine Department, still seeking action, wrote the Adjutant General at Washington:

> "A Secret Service man to be of any real value in the Philippine Islands must have a background furnished by intimate knowledge of the natives close contact with the social and political conditions. In addition he must like the work and have the ability and courage to carry it out. These facts are emphasized by the inefficiency of the force now employed on this duty in the G2 office. Of the five sergeants on this duty only one gives any promise of being a useful man in the capacity for which he is paid by the United States. This man has just arrived and is apparently fitted for the work by race, intelligence and disposition. He is a Puerto Rican, speaks Spanish, looks like a Spanish mestizo and likes his work. Under the present system upon the expiration of his foreign service tour at the end of two years he will be a valuable man in his work if he continues his interest. Of the remaining sergeants of Intelligence Police one is a Pole, well fitted for ferreting Red activities among white men. He is out of place here. He might fit well in places like San Francisco, Chicago and New York. Another sergeant is an American unfitted by temperament for the work, inefficient and useless, even dangerous to this office. Two Filipinos make up the remainder of this group. One has no stomach for the risk attendant upon the duty and is used as a clerk inside the office, while the other is stupid and useless in any capacity and is likewise a danger to the office. If I were paying these

222 CIP Corres #34, dated 21 Aug 1923, (Conf).
223 Ibid, #1, dated 4 Sep 1924.

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in a commercial firm I would discharge all except the Puerto Rican and would hold him on probation. At present, as a body, they are contributing nothing to the efficiency of the G2 office..."

The power to replace these men with civilians was repeated and an allotment of funds requested. In lieu of this proposal, the Philippine Department requested that five Detached Enlisted Men's List spaces be assigned to it by the War Department and that the Philippine Department be authorized to fill these spaces by local procurement of CIP agents.[224]

G2, Washington, did not concur with the request to substitute hired civilians for Corps of Intelligence Police agents, on the ground that no money was available for that purpose. However, Colonel Reeves concurred with the proposal for local procurement which actually had been authorized since 1921, even though the Philippines had never been given a quota.[225]

In January 1925, the Philippines solves part of the problem by sending "the Pole" back to the States on furlough. Before his return, arrangements were made to have him transferred to the Eighth Corps Area where his abilities were more suited than in foreign service.[226]

The American agent who had been selected by casual observation at Military Intelligence Division, was returned to the States when his tour of service expired and discharge for the convenience of the government, with the notation that there was no vacancy in the Corps of Intelligence Police to which he could be assigned.[227]

Thus, after two years, the ad hoc Military Intelligence Division procurement policy had not produced the Japanese agents desired and instead had demonstrated that a capable "stateside" agent was not necessarily qualified for foreign service. It also made clear that a man "who seemed intelligent" might not be fitted for any kind of CIP work.[228]

Subversion incidents continued to increase. From the Philippines in 1934, the report of the G2 summed up the problem,

"Japanese are supplanting Chinese as the retail merchants of the Philippine Islands. Six months ago this office came to the realization that the Japanese economic expansion in the Philippine Islands necessitated a realignment of the duties of the personnel of the Military Intelligence

224 CIP Corres #70, dated 30 Jan 1925.
225 Ibid, #65, dated 21 Mar 1925.
226 Ibid, #62, dated 21 May 1925; and #45, dated 3 Dec 1925.
227 Ibid, #53, dated 9 Sep 1925.
228 Ibid, #86, dated May 1927.

Division with a view to greater concentration of effort in the Japanese field. This realignment of duties was accomplished at the expense of some other activities which should be followed by this office. . .

. Therefore, it will take considerable time and effort for our agents to build up their own group of contacts among the Japanese. To be of any value at all, these contacts must be absolutely reliable. . . time will be necessary to perfect this change."[229]

On the Mexican Border

Between World Wars I and II, the Eighth Corps Area, with headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, handled the largest volume of counterintelligence field operations.

There were only three CIP agents on duty in the area when the peacetime corps was authorized in 1920. At that time, 12 agents were requested but only eight were authorized.[230] From then on, various G2s constantly battled for more men while their force dwindled to seven in 1926,[231] to six in 1927,[232] and finally to three in 1934.[233] Actually, since one agent had tuberculosis and was hospitalized for a number of years and other agents had various handicaps, the actual force was reduced to limited effectiveness.

In 1924, at the time the United States Immigration Service established the Mexican border patrol, G2, Eighth Corps Area, was assigned several secret mapping missions which he, in turn, delegated to his Corps of Intelligence Police. His force included the men described below who at that time comprised more than 25 percent of the Army CIP force.

. had been a CIP agent since 1921 and had served as a clerk, draftsman and topographer. In 1924 he was assigned a section of the Border Liaison and Mapping area. He was rated a man of excellent judgment and discretion and produced a high quality of work until he contracted tuberculosis.[234]

229 CIP Corres #95, dated 25 Jan 1934, (Secret).
230 Ibid, #58, dated 25 Oct 1920.
231 Ibid, #29, dated 2 Aug 1920.
232 Ibid, #85, dated 7 Feb 1927.
233 Ibid, #56-59, dated 14 Nov 1933.
234 Ibid, #158, dated 2 Oct 1924; and #16, dated 4 Jun 1924.

had been with CIP since 1920 and was on duty at Laredo, Texas, until when it became necessary to transfer him because of civilian opposition which when it began to pay made him too well known.[235]

He was rated an extremely valuable man.[236]

had 16 years of Army service when he was assigned to CIP in 1920 and began work in Border Liaison. In 1924, he was working on the local Mexican situation and revolutionary developments.[237]

was detailed to CIP in 1921. He held a commission as a first lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Reserve. He served with the U. S. Army for nine years before being detailed to CIP. He spoke, read and wrote eight languages including Japanese and was rated as of excellent judgment, common sense, and discretion.

had been in the Army since the Spanish-American War and had 18 years service when detailed to CIP duty. who spoke very good Spanish, used as a cover a civilian position he held for two years before reenlisting after World War I.

held two special letters of recommendation and a reserve commission as a major of Cavalry.[238]

who held a reserve commission as 1st lieutenant, Military Intelligence, had been in the Cavalry and Quartermaster Corps for eight years before World War I. In September 1917, he was assigned to counter-espionage work in the El Paso area where his investigations secured a number of convictions in Federal Court. From the Armistice until June 1920, he was engaged in graft and fraud investigations and recovered property valued at more than $500,000. His investigative specialties included radical and semi-radical activities, arms smuggling and certain types of agitators. For three years, starting in 1920, he was used extensively all over the Corps Area in procuring informants among agitator groups. spoke and read Spanish, Polish, Russian and German and understood Slav dialects.[239]

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235 CIP Corres #156, dated 2 Oct 1924.
236 Ibid, #31, dated 27 Apr 1926.
237 Ibid, #160, dated 2 Oct 1924; and #30, dated 23 Jul 1931.
238 Ibid, #16, dated 4 Jun 1924; and #164, dated 2 Oct 1924.
239 Ibid, #16, dated 4 Jun 1924 and #163, dated 2 Oct 1924; and #86, dated May 1927.

who had been in the CIP for only a year, was labeled a good man but in need of experience when he was made available for transfer to the Philippines in 1925 in exchange for . _ previously mentioned.

Camouflage Employment

Following this analysis of his CIP agents, Lt. Col. J. A. Moss, G2 of the Eighth Corps Area wrote Military Intelligence Division in 1924:

> "...sergeants of CIP of this Corps have been able to add little or nothing to their pay as a result of camouflage employment in civil pursuits -- men in this area are known to be financially embarrassed most of the time. It is found that sergeants, CIP, generally get married and from the results produced, the work of married men has generally been more reliable than work of a single man. No married men have had to be moved on account of conduct or low association...yet...the grade of sergeant is too low to permit the transport of dependents at government expense. It will be in the best interests of the service for the U.S. to take care of its intelligence personnel and enable them to perform their duties efficiently. The only feasible plan to help them seems to be an advancement in grade with the attendant increased pay. The principle of rewarding merit is generally recognized in business. To have one grade for CIP with no system of reward for efficient service is believed to be fundamentally wrong... As a matter of morale it is very disheartening for these men to come in contact with men of other branches, often with less service and ability, holding much higher grades and enjoying the privileges thereof while the CIP men however hard they work have no advancement to look forward to as a reward or for the purpose of retirement..."

Colonel Moss recommended that grades up to and including master sergeant be authorized.[240]

Four months before, Lt. Col. Edward R. Stone, the retiring Eighth Corps G2, had made a similar plea. He wrote,

> "these men are the first reserve for officers of the Military Intelligence Officers' Reserve Corps and would constitute a reservoir of highly trained men whose service would be invaluable in an emergency. It requires a man of superior ability and attainments to qualify for appointment -- the work these men do is of necessity, a thing lacking all

240 CIP Corres #156, dated 2 Oct 1924.

publicity and personal glory -- is in many cases not only dangerous but requires a considerable personal and financial sacrifice -- they are men who could go to any line organization and hold down a first class rating without any delay whatever. Most of the men we now have remain in their present grade and on their present work through love of the work, rather than because it is the best that they can do or have done..."[241]

The Eighth Corps intelligence workload appears to have remained at an even level; that is, consistently heavy. During the post-World War I era, secret border mapping requirements took up much of the time. In 1933, G2 reported that the full time of one CIP agent was required to maintain close liaison with "the Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Immigration Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Border Patrol and the U.S. Secret Service..." Four CIP agents provided coverage along the border and handled informants. Another headed the Latin-American section of the G2 office and managed Spanish translations and statistical reports. The seventh agent was essentially an administrative and confidential assistant to the G2, although he handled informants, as well.[242]

By 1935, Eighth Corps G2 had ceased to plead for additional men or protest losses. In April, he merely reported without comment:

"Under the new tables of organization no allowance is made for warrant officers in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. As surplus warrant officers in the Eighth Corps Area are being transferred to other Corps Areas, it is only a matter of time when this office will be deprived of the services of warrant officers now engaged in the performance of essential duties."[243]

In 1936, Eighth Corps made one final plea -- not for more men but to retain one. G2 wrote the War Department,

"I am in favor of a foreign service roster provided an exception could be made in the case of This man had made himself an expert in regard to Mexican affairs. It would take years of experience for any one else to get a background equal to that possessed by him. In an emergency his services as a confidential agent in Mexico would be invaluable. In other words this man is a specialist and he should be kept where his knowledge can be used to best advantage."[244]

To this plea available records show no reply.

241 CIP Corres #16, dated 4 Jun 1924.
242 Ibid, #69, dated 25 Oct 1933.
243 Ibid, #33, dated 20 Apr 1935.
244 Ibid, #78, dated 27 Jul 1936.

Section 2

ENEMY GAINS AND CIP LOSSES

More Men Again Requested

From June 1934 until July 1940, the Corps of Intelligence Police made no progress either in gaining men or ratings. One exception was for the addition of a Filipino agent in 1935 at the request of the Philippine Department. It was justified by three reasons. First, the necessity of an additional man there was "...based upon the expectation that with the establishment of the Commonwealth Government certain of the present sources of information will disappear, necessitating increased activity on the part of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department Commander's staff..." Second, there was no Filipino member of the Corps of Intelligence Police who could be transferred to the Philippines; and finally, no CIP agent could be spared for transfer "without curtailing some essential function."[245] A sergeant, fourth grade, was authorized on 10 October 1935.[246]

Protests continued to be received from many of the Corps Areas and Departments at the drastic curtailment of 1934 which slashed the Detached Enlisted Men's List to provide personnel for the motorization of service companies of infantry.[247] No cuts were restored. Meanwhile, G2 was reduced to 22 officers, 48 civilians and a budget of only $26,650.[248]

For the next six years, G2 kept trying to get more men. In March 1935, Brig. Gen. H. E. Knight, who had just become G2, made his first attempt. He sought 32 as the minimum number, and pointed out that the proposed allotment of 46,250 additional enlisted men to the regular army would enable CIP to add 17 men without materially affecting the strength of any organization. Former members of CIP would be transferred back from combat outfits and additional men obtained by transfer of suitable men from Regular Army ranks.[249]

In justification, General Knight described the subversive situation of the past nine months:

> "Since June 1934, there has been a marked increase in the subversive activities directed against the military establishment. This has been especially noticeable in the Ninth Corps Area and in the Hawaiian Department.

245 CIP Corres #97, dated 25 Sep 1935, (Secret).
246 Ibid, #94, dated 10 Oct 1935.
247 Ibid, #4, dated 28 Jun 1934.
248 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 29, (Secret)
249 CIP Corres #101-103, dated 22 Mar 1935, (Secret).

There has also been an increase in what is purported to be espionage activities in and adjacent to the Panama Canal Department. These conditions have necessitated material increases in the intelligence funds allotted to the Ninth Corps Area and the Panama Canal Department. The general situation is sufficiently serious to have caused Congress to initiate corrective legislation.

"Corps Area G2's on whom the burden falls to secure information on subversive activities within the military establishment in their respective areas, have been materially handicapped by the lack of proper enlisted personnel for confidential work. They are now dependent upon men detailed to them for limited periods. This is unsatisfactory and not productive of the results the seriousness of the situation demands and which can only be assured by the use of personnel specially trained and permanently employed on such duties. Even prior to 1934, the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department complained that there were an insufficient number of Intelligence Police assigned to his Department. The increased activities in the Department have accentuated that condition."[250]

G4 concurred with G2 but G1 joined G3 in nonconcurrence. Brig. Gen. John H. Hughes, G3, wrote,

"Even before the impending increase in the strength of the Army is obtained there is a shortage of grades and specialist ratings needed for new purposes resulting from the initiation of mechanization and motorization... The impending increase of strength is to be entirely in the seventh grade. This will result in an increased demand upon the noncommissioned officer strength..."[251]

On 8 May, General Knight, in an appeal to the Chief of Staff, attempted to override the opposition by proving that his recommended increase would actually take only six noncommissioned officer spaces. Since four Corps Areas had retained their CIP agent by "detail" back from the troops and three other Corps Areas and the Panama Department had "detailed" 11 men from troops to CIP work, the Corps actually had 30 men on duty. Moreover, said General Knight, he was asking for three less than the Corps Areas and Departments were seeking.

Although General Knight ended his plea with the statement, "It is considered that the purpose for which these men are requested is second to none in importance," one week later the request was returned stamped "Disapproved" - and signed "Douglas MacArthur, General, Chief of Staff."[252]

250 CIP Corres #101-3, dated 22 Mar 1935, (Secret).
251 Ibid, #15, dated 30 Mar 1935; and #14, dated 4 Apr 1935.
252 Ibid, #10-11, dated 8 May 1935; and #103, dated 22 Mar 1935.

In January and 12 months later in December 1936, G2 answered requests from the field for an additional agent with the statement that there was "...absolutely no chance of getting an increase in the number of Intelligence Police this year."[253]

In 1937, Congress tacked onto the Army Appropriation Bill for 1938, the proviso that except in the Philippine Scouts, there could be no enlistments or reenlistments of persons not citizens of the United States. In the Philippines, this hit three Filipinos who were members of the CIP. The G2 Philippines wrote,

> "Failure to permit these Filipinos to reenlist would be interpreted as a breach of faith and would have an adverse affect on the public. It is particularly desired to protect the interest of these Filipinos who have served so faithfully and so well."[254]

Although the G2 had stated that it would be "less economical and less efficient," the only solution found was to rehire the men as civilians as their enlistments expired and G2 radioed such authority early in August. A salary of $140 a month was authorized.[255]

In November 1927, when the Military Attache at Peiping, China, asked what regulations were for CIP agents, the War Department wrote back that none was published. The War Department authorized procurement of a man in the area for CIP, however, and inclosed was a check for $223.51 to provide an initial clothing allowance of $140 and a maintenance allowance of $83.51.[256] The man selected and trained as a CIP agent by the Military Attache was perhaps the subject of more correspondence in the next ten years than any other member of the Corps. In 1931, the Attache was ordered by G2 to replace the agent by a clerk at $1,500 a year as such duty was not consistent with CIP regulations.[257] In spite of this, four years later this agent was still carried as surplus and was not returned to the United States until 1940.[258]

Civilian Clothing Problems

In 1939, G2 was on the defensive this time with regard to CIP's clothing allowance. Col. Stanley H. Ford, then G2, said, "I do not want to do away with

253 CIP Corres #88, dated 16 Jan 1938; and #67, dated 10 Dec 38.
254 Ibid, #65-67, dated 30 Jul 1937, (Secret).
255 Ibid, #49a, dated 30 Aug 1937.
256 Ibid, #3, dated 4 Nov 1927.
257 Ibid, #33, dated 11 Apr 1931.
258 Ibid, #32, dated 5 Aug 1935.

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the CIP nor their clothing allowance but I do not propose to be put in a weak defensive position."[259]

From December 1920, when the wearing of civilian clothing by CIP agents in peacetime was authorized and allowances provided, this expense had been eyed by economy-minded Army officials of other branches as needless. After 1922, when undercover activities were virtually prohibited in the United States, surveys revealed the majority of the agents were doing clerical work in G2 offices. Since in this era, all military personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes for their daily work but received no such clothing allowance, normal jealousies arose.[260]

The original authorization provided a $130 initial allowance to be used as follows: overcoat, $35; raincoat, $15; two suits, $35 each; 2 hats, $5.00 each. There was an annual allowance of $10 for shoes and a semi-annual allowance of $13.50 for three shirts at $2.50 each; one necktie, $1.50; six pairs of socks, $3.00; and six collars, $1.50. For repairs, cleaning, pressing and laundry, a monthly allowance of $7.00 was authorized. During his first year, a CIP agent could receive up to $251, and $121 per annum thereafter.

In 1924, for reasons not explained, the initial allowance was increased to $140 and a semi-annual allowance of $58.83 established. This resulted in an increased initial allowance of $10 but reduced the annual maintenance by $3.17.[261] At the same time, G2 recommended agents to put in uniform where possible, to save funds.[262]

In 1927, a detailed explanation was required to justify the $4,284 clothing appropriation for Fiscal Year 1928. At this time the semi-annual allowance was $55.50. In February 1929, the Chief of the War Plans and Training Branch suggested "in order to relieve the embarrassment in connection with the appropriation for civilian clothes, civilian clothing should be authorized only in those cases where official duties required the wearing of civilian clothes. A certificate from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, stating that the duties required the wearing of civilian clothing could be used in connection with the vouchers."[263]

This suggestion was followed by a survey of Corps Areas and Department during February 1929. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Corps said civilian clothing was not required, but the other four Corps Areas and the three

259 CIP Corres #26a, dated 11 Feb 1929.

260 CIP Clothing Fund, fiscal year 1934, p 3, Topical Ref Sec, CCIC Files of the Cen Rec Fac, (Army Intell Center, Fort Holabird, Md.). NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Cen Rec Fac." (Conf)

261 CIP Clothing Fund, fiscal year 1934, (Cen Rec Fac).

262 CIP Corres #77, dated 15 Aug 1930.

263 Ibid, #10-12, dated 11 Feb 1929.

Departments reported them necessary. Third Corps Area reported that it had discontinued the allowances on 9 December 1924 and First and Fifth Corps Areas reported they had returned the allowance since 1929.[264]

Only two Corps Areas argued for the retention of civilian clothing for CIP agents. The Sixth Corps Area at Chicago wrote,

> "...In view of the fact that the Corps of Intelligence Police is intended primarily for and would be of especial value in any emergency requiring their employment upon secret service duties, it is recommended that their value not be destroyed by any steps looking toward abolition of the allowance for civilian clothing..."

Eighth Corps, on the Mexican border, reported,

> "...The duties required of all members of the Corps of Intelligence Police in this Corps Area require the wearing of civilian clothing."[265]

All three Departments were emphatic in their statements that civilian clothes were required. Maj. Gen. Malin Craig at Panama wrote that they were required for "Making investigations in Panama of radical and anti-American activities; attending demonstrations with a view to getting advance information of disorders that might necessitate military intervention."[266]

> Hawaii wrote: "Some of the members of the Corps of Intelligence Police have been engaged in this work for a number of years and have been wearing civilian clothing habitually. Their connection with the Army is generally not known either to Army personnel or to civilians. It is particularly desirable that this connection be not disclosed..."[267]

> The Philippine Department wrote: "Without civilian clothing these men would not be able to operate. To be exposed as members of the Army would render them valueless, be embarrassing to this office, and be a positive danger to the individuals."[268]

Civilian clothing caused other problems necessitating special reports. In September 1930, The Adjutant General asked G2 if the recent inclusion of the Corps of Intelligence Police in Tables of Organization would not make CIP status

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264 CIP Corres #82, dated 11 Aug 1930; and #76-77, dated 15 Aug 30; and #69-70, dated 16 Aug 1930.

265 Ibid, #128-9, dated 19 Feb 1929, (Secret).

266 Ibid, #22, dated 2 Mar 1929.

267 Ibid, #24, dated 1 Mar 1929.

268 Ibid, #116-117, dated 25 Mar 1929.

reports unnecessary. G2 explained that the report of actual service was necessary for basing funds for purchase of civilian clothing, but if the Adjutant General could furnish it the form, reports could be abolished.[269]

Promotion Problems

For the CIP the only consolation in the 1934 personnel reduction was that it provided some much deserved promotions. Promotions had been a problem for more than a dozen years, since the Corps was established on a peacetime basis with no provision for any rank but sergeant.

By 1924, the promotion problem had become acute. Col. James H. Reeves, who became G2, War Department, in July, discovered that the inability of commands to promote CIP agents had resulted in vacancies among even the few CIP spaces authorized. He submitted a staff study recommending the authorization of grades and spaces for one master sergeant, three technical sergeants and 16 staff sergeants for the Corps. Fortunately, Brig. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, CIP's staunch supporter, was now Deputy Chief of Staff, and over the opposition of G3 and G4 approved the higher grades except for the master sergeancy which G3 had protested as "the duty required and performed is not commensurate with this grade."[270] G4 based its opposition on the increased cost of the higher grades which it said would cause an increased drain of $5,260.56 a year. This was the equivalent cost of 20 recruits and "would, therefore, result in an actual reduction of 20 in the total strength of the Army."[271]

G2's justification which overcame G4 opposition included excerpts from the plea of Eighth Service Command, previously related, and from two other Corps Areas. G2 of the First Corps Area was quoted:

> "There have recently been promotions in every branch of the Detached Enlisted Men's List on duty here except the Corps of Intelligence Police; some with comparatively short service have been promoted to the grade of staff sergeant. As the educational and moral qualifications for Corps of Intelligence Police are above average for enlisted men, length and character of service should be considered in connection with promotion..."[272]

An unidentified G2 in another Corps Area was quoted:

269 CIP Corres #49, dated 25 Sep 1930.
270 Ibid, #140, dated 15 Nov 1924.
271 Ibid, #122, dated 22 Nov 1924.
272 Ibid, #154, dated 17 Oct 1924.

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"It will be in the best interests of the service for the United States to take care of its intelligence personnel and enable them to perform their duties efficiently. The only feasible plan to help them seems to be an advancement in grade with attendant increased pay... As a matter of morale it is very disheartening for these men to come in contact with men of other branches often with less service and less ability holding much higher grades and enjoying the privileges thereof while the Corps of Intelligence Police men, however hard they may work, have no advancement to look forward to..."[273]

Promotions posed problems throughout this economy era. Apportionment of enlisted grades was fixed by the National Defense Act, and promotions for the Corps meant reductions elsewhere.[274] At the time of the 1929 survey, the Sixth Corps Area Commander commented on having only one CIP agent allotted to a Corps Area "and promotion accordingly being impossible." He wrote,

"This condition results in the initial assignment of Intelligence Police in grades higher than necessary or advisable and must ultimately result in loss to the Intelligence Service of the best of its trained men through their inability to secure promotion. If the Corps is to be continued and maintained at its highest efficiency, it is recommended that no specific allotment of grades be made to Corps Areas and that promotion be regulated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department... In view of the small numbers involved this should be proven entirely practicable and should result in a satisfactory technical development of the Corps as a nucleus for rapid expansion to a wartime status."[275]

In connection with the same survey, General Craig wrote,

"The nature of the duties devolving upon this noncommissioned officer are such that frequent changes in personnel are especially undesirable and there should, consequently, be offered the maximum available inducement to insure some degree of permanency."[276]

G3 Suggests More Promotions

By 1930, G2 was too discouraged from fighting for manpower to try for promotions and the suggestion to increase CIP ratings came amazingly enough from G3. This situation was the result of a personal appeal by Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, commander of the Panama Canal Department, who wrote The Adjutant General in May 1929,

273 CIP Corres #7, dated 25 Nov 1924.
274 Ibid, #150, dated 5 Nov 1924.
275 Ibid, #14-15, dated 19 Feb 1929, (Secret).
276 Ibid, #22, dated 2 Mar 1929.

"The operations of the Military Intelligence Section of the Staff of this Corps Area, during recent disturbances in Mexico, have served as a test of the field qualifications and sufficiency of the personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police allotted to this Corps Area and revealed the need of revision of allotment... Advance in grade is deemed just, as compensation for services being rendered by the present incumbents and the absolute necessity to insure future replacement by men of corresponding qualifications. The master sergeancy is well merited by the present technical sergeant, chief of secret agents, a man of excellent character, long and efficient service and remarkable ability in Military Intelligence work... The increase in total number from six to seven is deemed absolutely necessary..."[277]

On 12 May 1930, Brig. Gen. Edward L. King, G3, War Department General Staff, forwarded a memorandum to Col. Stanley H. Ford, G2, in which he quoted part of a previous request from General Lassiter for increased grades. General King wrote,

"...It is probable that when the Intelligence Police were formed, these grades were appropriate for the age and experience of the personnel then assigned to the Intelligence Police. It is also probable that as time goes on, increasing demands will be made for the promotion of certain of these men who have by long service and ability earned promotion... It is suggested, in view of the above, that you consider the question of the grades now allotted to the Intelligence Police with a view to revising the allotment of these grades so as to permit of a limited promotion, from time to time, of this personnel. It is desirable that the revised allotment should not exceed the pay cost of the existing allotment although if deemed absolutely essential by you a very limited increase in such pay costs may be found to be possible."[278]

Colonel Ford, who was retiring as G2, ignored the suggestion to obtain increased ratings by elimination of personnel to keep the total cost the same. Instead he recommended:

"That the allotment of grades to the Intelligence Police be one master sergeant, four technical sergeants, fifteen staff sergeants and eight sergeants... The allotment now made is three technical sergeants, fifteen staff sergeants and ten sergeants. A majority of the men now assigned have more than twelve years' service. They are all excellent men, carefully selected and trained for the specialist work that they are required to perform. The responsibilities and duties assigned them

277 CIP Corres #113, dated 2 May 1929.
278 Ibid, #88-89, dated 12 May 1929.

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require a comprehensive knowledge of local conditions and make it essential that the men who have acquired this knowledge be retained in the service to perform these duties.

"Unless these men can have a reasonable assurance of promotion it will not be possible to retain them in the service. Many of them have now served from eight to ten years in their present grades and can see little or no prospect for advancement. Some excellent men have been lost because of this fact and several corps area commanders as well as the Panama Canal Department Commander have stated this condition in requesting promotion of the men assigned to them. The present unsatisfactory condition can be relieved only by an increase in the allotment in the higher grades..."[279]

Colonel Ford pointed out that since grades were already allotted to G2s and promotions were made locally, an increase in grades under this system would only afford temporary relief. "Promotion in the Corps of Intelligence Police can be made with fairness to all only by adopting a single promotion list." Promotions would then be made by The Adjutant General on recommendation of the G2, War Department General Staff.

Colonel Ford opposed a plan to have definite grades assigned each Corps Area and Department and recommended that tables of organization should only specify the numbers assigned. Otherwise, agents would frequently have to be transferred upon promotion and, said Colonel Ford, "...Due to the fact that a knowledge of local conditions is a prerequisite to the proper performance of their duties, the transfer of these men from one Corps Area or Department to another is not advisable."[280] Colonel Ford recommended that local commanders be authorized to fill any vacancies within their numerical quotas in the grade of sergeant with all future promotions determined by the single promotion list. These recommendations were approved on 11 July 1930 by Gen. Charles P. Summerall who was then Chief of Staff and a man well aware of Communist problems.[281]

The Single Promotion List was not published and distributed to Corps Areas and Departments and consequently the correspondence files for the next six years reflect efforts by field G2s to get their men promoted, even if only for purposes of retirement. Maj. Thomas T. Handy, who later became a full general, but G2 in Panama at this time, discovered that while the CIP had obtained a master sergeant rating, under the single list, it went to an agent in Eighth Corps Area.

279 CIP Corres #86, dated 27 May 1930.
280 Ibid, #86-7, dated 27 May 1930.
281 Ibid, #36, dated 11 Jul 1930.

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The CIP agent at Panama was ninth on the list. Three years later, he had moved up to eighth place and remained a sergeant at the time of his death in 1934.[282]

The Eighth Corps Area soon found that the Single List had not helped morale as much as anticipated. In 1931, the Corps G2 attempted to promote one of its sergeants so that he could retire after 29 years service as a master sergeant. The man was S/Sgt Pablo Lloveras, who had been 10 years with the CIP. The G2 wanted Lloveras to be retired so that a man could be put in the field.

wrote the G2, "is physically able and fully competent to perform field duties,

The G2 pointed out that Lloveras was married and could not afford retirement on a staff sergeant rating. However, the G2 said, his master sergeant agent would be willing to step down to permit Lloveras to retire, provided he had definite assurance he would be reappointed master sergeant when Lloveras retired.

The Executive Officer of G2, War Department, replied that he agreed. "Such action would be a just reward for his excellent service. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find any way in which this can be effected by the War Department..."[284] Under the Single Promotion List, if the Eighth Corps Area master sergeant stepped down the rating would have to go to another Corps Area.

Four months later, Eighth Corps Area was "surprised" when a CIP agent with two years experience less than one of its other agents was suddenly promoted. On inquiry, G2, War Department, wrote back that the Single List was prepared with primary consideration to "...total length of enlisted service; date of appointment to present grade; length of service in the Corps of Intelligence Police. Where these factors conflicted, an effort was made to insure justice and fairness to all concerned. ...All new appointments are made in grade of sergeant and the appointee is placed at the bottom of the promotion list regardless of his former grade or length of service."[285]

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282 CIP Corres #18, dated 22 Jul 1930; and #15, dated 15 Feb 1933; and #3, dated 29 Sep 1929.

283 Ibid, #27, dated 5 Oct 1931.

284 Ibid, #26, dated 10 Oct 1931.

285 Ibid, #22, dated 26 Feb 1932.

In 1935, Lt. Col. George S. Patton, Jr., G2 at Hawaii, attempted officially and unofficially to get a master sergeancy for one of his CIP agents. In a personal note to Lt. Col. C. K. Nulsen, Executive Officer of G2, War Department General Staff, Patton wrote,

> "Dear Charley: I am sending a letter to G2 War Department on the subject of getting Tec. Sgt. Luth promoted to Master Sgt. prior to his retirement a year from now. Luth is an exceptionally good man and has much more than pulled his weight since he has been in this office. It would be hard luck if owing to the fact that he is an M.I. man he could not get this step. The A.G. here says it is up to the War Department. If it is do your damdest. If you can't work it get the dope and write me what crooked work we can do here to put the deal over. Please give this matter your personal attention!!!!!."[286]

Agent Qualification Problems

When the Corps was established on a peacetime basis in December 1920, proficiency in a foreign language was a requirement. However, provision was made for waivers, and over the years the Corps acquired a number of agents in the United States who lacked linguistic ability. This created an administrative problem when the overseas roster was established. In March 1925, the problem was further complicated by an order from the War Department that all CIP agents in the Philippines who did not volunteer for longer service than their normal tour were to be reduced to the grade of private before returning to the USA.[287]

It was in this era that the disgusted commander of the Philippines Department in requisitioning two CIP replacements wrote in the Qualifications Column "No special qualifications."[288]

In 1933, a survey of qualifications was made and six areas reported on 13 CIP agents. Nine had some degree of proficiency in one or more foreign languages and four had no language qualifications.[289]

One of the basic qualification problems turned on the question of whether the peacetime mission of CIP agents was to act as confidential clerks for G2 or fill the role of secret service investigators. This problem was well outlined in 1935 when Col. J. C. Pegram became G2 of the Third Corps Area at Baltimore, Maryland. Colonel Pegram wrote G2, War Department,

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286 CIP Corres #125, dated 24 Sep 1935.
287 Ibid, #74, dated 26 Mar 1925.
288 Ibid, #80, dated 5 Feb 1925.
289 Ibid, "Summary of," dated Sep 1933.

"First, for what are the Corps of Intelligence Police to be used. As clerks I don't want them, have not a damn bit of use for them. As operatives we are practically not allowed to use them. If you could get authority for one secretary-stenographer for each Corps Area G2, we would be six times better off and save considerable money besides. On the other hand, I could use two members of the Corps of Intelligence Police for investigating work and as plants in various outfits. Of course, if used this way these men would have to be changed around from time to time. This would also give us a nucleus on which to build in war and what is more to the point, will give us actual experience in handling operatives, which is something on which I believe we are rather shy at the present time. To sum up briefly, my experience with members of the Corps of Intelligence Police as clerks has been rather sad. I believe I can use two as operatives for strictly service activities."[290]

In October 1935, another G2 asked about the same question. From the Fourth Corps Area, Lt. Col. I. T. Wyche wrote, "So far from available regulations and literature on file at this headquarters, I have been unable to determine satisfactorily the contemplated employment of the Corps of Intelligence Police." Colonel Wyche asked for information on (a) the mission; (b) plan of procurement; (c) plan of training; and (d) assignment procedures.[291] Available records reveal no answer to this inquiry; probably because there was no answer.

Nowhere in the records is there any mention of age or educational requirements although a G2 report on an "excellent" CIP agent in the Third Corps Area stated the agent had an eighth grade education, and no linguistic qualification.[292]

Soviet Espionage Nets Grow

While attention was turning to threats of Japanese and German espionage, Communists continued their systematic infiltration and penetration of countless critical positions in industry and government -- many of which would not pay off for another five years or more.

An operational error in 1933 disclosed one Soviet espionage network. While other United States investigative agencies were nearly dormant as far as subversion cases were concerned, the United States Secret Service was still an effective force. The Soviets soon found this out when they brought counterfeit United States currency into part of their apparatus.

290 CIP Corres #20, dated 12 Apr 1935.
291 Ibid, #108, dated 28 Oct 1935.
292 Ibid, #10, dated 13 Oct 1933.

When a Russian in New York City attempted to pass a bogus $100 Federal Reserve note, he was taken in custody. Investigation of the case which led to Chicago, revealed the Russian to be a Soviet espionage agent with $100,000 in counterfeit bills. The Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, who later defected to the West, said these counterfeits were printed on direct instructions from Moscow. Another defector said the counterfeits were printed to raise money to finance the establishment of a Soviet espionage cover firm, to operate in New York against Rumania.[293]

In 1934 the OGPU became the NKVD, but the change was only in internal organization and not in the espionage mission, which, if anything, was intensified. This was the year, Whitaker Chambers later testified, that he started a three year assignment of working with the Communist apparatus operating in the United States Government.

In 1936, Arthur Adams was back in the United States this time with his wife. Ostensibly, he was visiting his sister-in-law in New York City. But as shown by subsequent investigation, he was actually on another espionage mission. This same year a naturalized Russian, subsequently known to have passed information to the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, became a staff chemist in the radiation laboratories of the University of California at Berkeley, California. For three years during World War II, this same man was assigned to the Manhatten Engineering District's bomb project, and participated in some of its most important developments.

Gaik Ovakimian was a Soviet spymaster who operated one of the largest agents nets in the United States for nine years or more starting in 1932 and possibly before. Some 14 of his agents have been identified.

Ovakimian's net was unusual in that several of his agents operated in other countries simultaneously with activities in the United States. Among his agents was Fred Rose, Canadian Parliament member, later convicted in the atomic spy trials. Another agent had missions extending into Mexico as well as the U.S., while yet another operated a New York tourist agency as a cover. Two recruits operated a wholesale fradulent passport mill in Canada.

Most of these agents concentrated on economic and industrial espionage, but during 1937-38 an attorney with the Department of Justice was subverted in a manner not disclosed, and furnished information from FBI reports available to him. Another agent was subverted to the Soviet cause by a threat to kill his sister who was living in Russia.

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293 House Rpt #1229, p 13. (Uncl)

In 1936, a Soviet employee of Amtorg in New York was transferred to California to take charge of the Los Angeles office of Intourists, which supervised foreigners traveling in the Soviet Union. There he made contact with a native Russian then a naturalized American citizen who was on leave of absence from the Berkeley California Police Department to the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Soviet eventually persuaded this man to furnish him information from Naval Intelligence files.

The first attempt at persuasion consisted of an implied threat, made through a letter from the Soviet vice-consul at Los Angeles telling the Russian-American that his relatives in the Soviet Union were all right. When this failed, either by accident or arrangement, the proposed agent had financial difficulties, and was persuaded to accept financial help. From then on, until the handling agent carelessly left a classified Naval document in a suit he sent to the cleaners, information was delivered regularly. In 1939, the naturalized citizen went to prison for four years, but his Russian spymaster received only a $10,000 fine and deportation.

In 1937, a Pole who had become a naturalized Canadian decided to join the Republican Army in Spain. On arrival at the International Brigade, he was relieved of his passport as were several others, on the pretext that the men should not risk losing them while in combat. When the time came to return to Canada the soldier was told that the truck containing the passports had been destroyed in action.

Actually, the passport had been turned over to Soviet Intelligence and given an agent who arrived in the United States in 1938. The agent enrolled as a student in the University of Southern California where he won a Phi Beta Kappa key for his excellent marks, and between studies attempted to line up persons for Soviet espionage. Normally, this fraudulent passport deal was nearly foolproof, for the Soviets had contacts in the Canadian passport offices who changed files on the switched passports to reflect the description of the person substituted. Normally, too, the Soviets ascertained that the true owners of passports were dead before they attempted to use them. In 1929, for example, the Soviets outfitted an agent with a passport obtained from a dead man by a deal with a Brooklyn undertaker. However, in the 1937 case, there was a slip up. Investigation revealed the real passport owner had returned to Canada and had peacefully resumed his farming.

In Spain in 1937, Soviet agent, Steve Nelson, who had operated in the United States since 1920, met and befriended a woman in Spain who had come to meet her husband and found he had been killed in the International Brigade. The woman returned to Berkeley, California, and married one of the leading physicists working on the atomic bomb.

In New York, Soviet agents in New York began making arrangements for penetration in Paris, France, of the Trotsky security organization in Mexico City. The efforts matured in assassination of Trotsky three years later.

These are only a few of the activities which were subsequently disclosed. There were innumerable others.

In 1934 the Communists obtained domination of the Institute of Pacific Relations and started a web that culminated in the Amerasia Case. A raid in the course of that case disclosed Soviet possession of more than one thousand classified documents of the United States government, including Military Intelligence reports.

Thus, the post-war years drew to a close. To counteract the vast amounts of military intelligence the Soviets were collecting, there was an equally vast task for an effective army counterintelligence organization. Instead, 16 CIP agents provided what little coverage they could on the Mexican border and in the overseas Departments, leaving the Zone of the Interior, as the United States was then called, as a free area for foreign espionage.

There was only one consolation for these dismal years of American security. The Office of Naval Intelligence reactivated its CIC equivalent, the Domestic Branch, in 1935, and in 1936 the number of FBI agents was nearly doubled and 614 men were available to cover the country. But the FBI still lacked the authority to halt Communists as it had halted major crime with 11,153 convictions in a period of three years.[294]

As Federal Judge Kaufman remarked after the atomic spy trials "every trial and investigation dealing with specific members of the underground has led to the conclusion that those members were linked to an infinite number of others still undetected."[295]

CIP in the Prewar Era 1938-39

Although World War II did not start in Europe until September 1939, and the United States was not involved until 27 months later, the prewar era of counterintelligence activity in the United States Army may be dated from 17 April 1938. It was at this time that increasing evidence of Japanese Intelligence agents

294 The Story of the FBI, by the Editors of Look, E.P. Dalton & Co, N.Y., (1947), pp 127 and 198. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "The Story of the FBI."

295 Burnham, James, The Web of Subversion, John Day Co, N.Y., (1954), p 213. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Burnham." (Uncl)

operating both in the United States and overseas led to the establishment of a Counterintelligence Branch of the War Department Military Intelligence Division.[296]

Assigned as sections to the branch were censorship, counterespionage, domestic intelligence, safeguarding military information and "espionage functions" of the agency. For personnel, a colonel, a lieutenant colonel and a major were authorized.[297]

At this same time, G2, War Department, submitted a request to increase the Corps of Intelligence Police from 16 to 20 men. In his staff study, dated 23 April 1938, Colonel McCabe said,

> "Intelligence activities have shown a marked increase in the recent past, especially in the Orient and in the Second and Ninth Corps Areas. This division believes that an increase in intelligence personnel is necessary. Members of the Corps of Intelligence Police are utilized as confidential clerks or agents and perform services not readily obtainable in any other way at a like cost. Their maintenance and training in Corps Areas will facilitate the handling of intelligence matters and provide a nucleus for expansion on mobilization. Previous studies have indicated that a total of 32 would provide one for each Corps Area and a more adequate number in War Department overseas departments and the Second, Eighth and Ninth Corps Areas."

However, Colonel McCabe, concluded, while 32 could be efficiently employed, only four were being requested as the minimum essential requirements.[298]

G1, War Department General Staff, concurred, and said the necessary grades could be allotted from the War Department Reserve. G3 did not concur and Brig. Gen. R. M. Beck, Jr., wrote,

> "This division is still of the opinion as expressed in G3/32662 dated December 5, 1933, viz: In general, members of the Corps of Intelligence Police have rank greater than their needs of their positions and the cost to the government in pay and allowances including money for civilian clothes is more than the amount for which efficient clerks could be had. It is not desirable to have soldiers performing comparable work and receiving disproportionate pay. The extra allowance for clothing for members of the Corps of Intelligence Police is based on the assumption that they are put to extra expense by reason of the nature of their duties. When used on clerical duties side by side with other soldiers this disparity in expense does not exist."

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296 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 81, (Secret).
297 CIP Corres #26, dated 23 Apr 1938.
298 Ibid.

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G3 concurred in a proposal of the G2, Philippine Department, that the Philippines be allotted funds to hire two Filipinos to replace a CIP agent who was not reenlisting.[299] G3 said that since the Philippines already received $2,900 in intelligence funds an increase of only $1,100 would provide the required $4,000. A penciled marginal note on the G3 file copy of this letter states, "Part of the $89,450 to G2 could be used for civilian clerks. G2 has the money, but doesn't want to spend."[300]

The end result of this opposition was no increase for the Corps and an allotment of an additional $700 in intelligence funds to the Philippines.[301]

Colonel McCabe's staff study did not detail the plea of the G2, Ninth Corps, who had written:

> "The work of this office in intelligence matters has more than doubled over that involved six months ago. Data on subversive elements including Japanese and Nazi activities here is being received in increasing amounts from legitimate sources authorized in War Department letter dated September 28, 1937. Espionage cases are increasing. As an example, five new cases possibly involving espionage were called to the attention of this office in one eighteen hour period recently..."

Ninth Corps Area urged that in as much as its clerical force would be filled by CIP members on M-Day, it be allocated two CIP spaces.[302]

Not only were increases in personnel rejected but intelligence funds were also sharply limited. In spite of the increased workload, intelligence fund allocations which had remained at $87,000 since 1936, were increased by only $2,450.00, and remained at this figure through 1939.[303] In 1938, Brig. Gen. George V. Strong, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division Intelligence Branch wrote that the satisfactory functioning of his branch had been "seriously handicapped due to a shortage of funds and a lack of adequate clerical and stenographic personnel."[304]

Until World War II, no provision was made for technical training of the chief of the new Counterintelligence Branch of G2 nor for the officers directing the highly specialized sections under his supervision. Even then, there was no

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299 CIP Corres #44, dtd 17 Jan 38; and #24, dtd 5 May 34, (Secret).
300 Ibid, #22, dtd 5 May 38.
301 Ibid.
302 Ibid, #57, dtd 25 Mar 38.
303 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 29, (Secret).
304 Ibid, p 48.

aining specially provided for the counterintelligence officer, and his qualifications consisted primarily of being available at a time when it was necessary to detail an officer to the position.

In May 1938, Lt. Col. J. H. Lindt, Chief of G2 Operations Branch, who had been in charge of CIP for the previous seven years, made another plea for additional agents. In a Memo to the G2 he said,

> "In view of the troubled conditions in Mexico and the activities of the Japanese on the West Coast, the constant study of related intelligence activities by personnel not subject to change in duties is a prime essential if domestic intelligence is to be given the attention it deserves. In New York, the increasing number of reports of activities of German individuals and groups is such as to result in a great amount of work."[305]

By August, interest in the CIP had reached such a low ebb that no volunteers could be obtained to replace a Hawaiian agent returning on rotation, and a mandatory foreign service roster had to be established. At the same time, a request from Hawaii that the replacement be sent in civilian clothes was disapproved; this resulted, however, in a study of the overseas undercover problem and the decision in November that replacement agents would be sent on civilian status by first class passage.[306]

Efforts to increase manpower were still unavailing. In November 1938, the Army Interdepartmental Pay Committee reported that no additional CIP personnel were required but in justifying the 16 CIP authorized, it stated,

> "Unsettled world conditions have brought about a marked increase in espionage and subversive activities. The value of the Corps of Intelligence Police is therefore greater than ever in peacetime. Members of the Corps of Intelligence Police are used on confidential missions and perform services not readily obtainable in any other way at like cost."[307]

In December 1938, a survey was completed by G2, War Department, of duties performed by the 16 CIP agents. Ten were essentially confidential clerks, handling files, messenger service, mimeographing, reception and library work. One was reported as unfit for any type of CIP work, and of the remaining five agents performing investigations, only four were qualified linguists.[308]

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305 CIP Corres #17, dated 17 May 1938.
306 Ibid, #12, dtd 2 Aug 1938; and #82, dtd 17 Sep 1938; and #11, dtd 9 Nov 1938.
307 Ibid, #75, dated 29 Nov 1938.
308 Ibid, "Summary of," dated Dec 1938.

Soviet Espionage in High Gear

In 1938, Arthur Adams was returned to the United States on yet another Soviet espionage mission. This time he entered the country via Canada with a fraudulent birth certificate. For primary cover purposes, he and another Soviet agent established a business known as Technological Laboratories. Two other businesses were also used for cover; one, Electronics Corporation headed by an Adams associate, obtained six million dollars worth of contracts for exclusive production of highly secret items for use in radar installations. As a super-abundance of cover caution, Adams gave a business man with an office in Hollywood, California, enough money to mail to Adams' residence at a New York hotel each week, a check of $75. Adams represented himself to acquaintance in New York as a machine designer employed by the concern in California.

This same year, Elizabeth T. Bentley, who had been an official in various Communist activities in New York, became acquainted with a key Soviet agent. She became an executive of U.S. Service and Shipping, Inc., which was organized as an espionage cover. Soon she was courier and liaison official between her employer and two highly placed Soviet handling agents who operated espionage nets within the United States Government. In addition, she contacted nearly a dozen other highly placed government employees who furnished information on an individual basis.

These informants, Miss Bentley later testified, included Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt; a Department of Justice official; a State Department official; a Department of Commerce official; several Treasury officials, including Harry Dexter White, a top advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury. Other informants included five agents in Office of Strategic Services, including the legal advisor to its chief; and a dozen others, employed by the Board of Economic Warfare, Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization, War Production Board, Bureau of Employment Security, the Chief of Analysis and Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Material and Services, Air Force, and the Commission handling the Roster of Scientific and Specialized personnel.

During this same period, several of the Soviet agents later involved in the atom bomb cases penetrated military installations. One was at the Navy Bureau of Ordnance in Washington, D.C.; one was with Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and another in Army Ordnance Research at Aberdeen, Maryland.

While Army counterintelligence had its troubles, it was not alone. The FBI, had only 851 agents to cover the 48 states and investigate complaints involving more than five score Federal Statutes, practically all of criminal nature. Prior

to 1938, the bureau averaged only about 35 espionage cases a year, but in 1938 the number jumped to 250 and every week the number increased. Yet this same year, budget limitations resulted in the Bureau having to place half its investigative force on compulsory leave during May and June. Consequently, investigation of civilian angles of military cases was equally handicapped.[309]

In early 1939, the seven Federal departments -- War, Navy, Justice, State, Treasury, Post Office, and Commerce had a substantial increase in the various national security investigations handled. By the end of 1939, Justice had handled 1,651 cases or an increase of 1,400 over the year before; the FBI reestablished a General Intelligence Division which it had closed down in 1924.[310]

With seven different Federal departments handling national security type investigations, duplication of effort, compromise of cases and jurisdictional disagreements often arose. To resolve certain conflicts, on 26 June 1939, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a confidential memorandum to the cabinet members concerned which stated:

> "It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.
>
> "No investigation should be conducted by any investigative agency of the government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except by the three agencies mentioned above.
>
> "I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information or material which may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counterespionage or sabotage."
>
> (Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.[311]

An Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee was formed by the three designated agencies. Since the memorandum did not differentiate between

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309 The Story of the FBI, pp 17 and 22, (Uncl).

310 Lowenthal, p 300, (Uncl).

311 Tab I, Appendix of Tabs for Hist of CIC in Army Service Forces, Conf Memo dtd Jun 26, 1939, Cen Rec Fac.

overseas and domestic investigative responsibilities, the State Department which was concerned with overseas intelligence problems was asked to provide a representative without vote. Adolph A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State was then designated.[312]

A working agreement was reached on 6 September 1939, just three days after ex-Communist courier Whitaker Chambers had spent an evening with Mr. Berle and outlined to him details of a Soviet espionage net which had infiltrated highest circles of the American government. Berle reported this conversation to President Roosevelt, but available intelligence records reveal no evidence of any further action and the information lay dormant. A decade later Berle's report was confirmed by wholesale convictions and resignations of Communist workers in high government positions.[313]

During this same eventful week, Hitler started World War II with the invasion of Poland; President Roosevelt proclaimed a limited emergency; and the Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring, blocked a proposal of G2 which would have abolished the Army's Military Intelligence Reserve, providing instead for intelligence and counterintelligence obtaining its reserve officers as well as its regular officers by detail from the Arms and Services.[314]

The Corps of Intelligence Police fought on in vain for additional personnel. In April, the only means of filling an "urgent" need for a CIP agent in Panama was to obtain permission from the Chief of Staff to transfer a space from the Philippine Department; this was done over the protests of the later G2.[315]

To provide an urgently needed CIP agent in Puerto Rico, an allotment was taken from the Eighth Corps Area in November.[316]

But the strength and status of CIP was well concealed in one regard. In answer to a request for information, the Adjutant General wrote, "The Corps of Intelligence Police has no insignia of a regimental character. Moreover, as this organization operates in a more or less confidential capacity it is desired that no publicity be given it."[317]

An overseas G2 summed up the major problems of the era in a letter to Military Intelligence Division: "...in the past we have relied too much on

312 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol. 3, pp 238-239, (Secret).
313 Chambers, Whitaker, Witness, Random House, N.Y., (1952), p 463. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Chambers." (Uncl).
314 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, pp 91-95, (Secret).
315 CIP Corres #26, dated 1 Apr 1939.
316 Ibid, #140, dated 24 Nov 1938.
317 Ibid, #141, dated 21 Nov 1939.

gratuitous information and we should now organize to go after it rather than receive it... Others pay for information and we cannot hope to compete adequately with untrained, unpaid people...little permanent and continuing value to the Department is possible with the ever changing personnel..."[318]

The Corps of Intelligence Police was not the only poverty portion of the national defense. In mid-1939, the United States Army totaled less than 200,000 men. Its three and a half divisions were at half strength, and scattered in 130 Army posts across the country. Training was virtually impossible on a five percent budget and without adequate motor transportation. The mighty United States possessed the peacetime Army of a third-rate military power.[319]

318 Basic Hist #1, Hist of the CIC - 1907-1943, p 117, (Cen Rec Fac), (Army Intell Cen, Fort Holabird, Md).

319 The Army Almanac, 1950, p 292.

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Part IV

CIP IN THE PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA

The CIP Revived

The year 1940 opened with the granting to the President of wartime powers. On all sides with one exception, prewar activities were accelerating. The exception was the CIP which during the first part of the year continued in an impoverished state.

On 30 April 1940, Colonel McCabe was succeeded as G2 by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, whose intelligence experience dated back to World War I. While General Miles could see no hope for increased CIP strength he did have funds available since the Military Intelligence Division budget, which had remained in the eighty thousands for the four previous years, was increased to $150,000.[320] Consequently, in May he was able to advise the Philippine Department that while there was no hope for obtaining two more CIP agents, the Department could detail two men on special duty, and funds would be supplied for the initial issue of clothing.[321] G2, Second Corps Area, was told the same thing and advised that funds were available for the employment of reserve officers.[322]

In June 1940, CIP received its most substantial assist when G2s were informed that as of the start of the Fiscal Year July 1, funds would be available for the employment of civilian clerical personnel. CIP agents could be freed of years of confidential clerical work for G2s, and assigned their anticipated mission.[323]

Meanwhile, World War II was approaching its full intensity. In April, the Germans took Norway and Denmark. In May, they took the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Belgium. Churchill, as prime minister of Britian, was warning of the "blood, sweat and tears" ahead, as the world soon realized from the disaster of Dunkerque. By June, France had surrendered and Russia had taken Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Bessarabia.

On 5 June 1940, one year after the President's memorandum, the Chiefs of Military Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau

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320 Hist of MID Vol 3, p 29, (Secret).

321 CIP Corres #138, dated 14 May 1940. MID, 10389-A-1 (Series 1-1100) Records of WDGS, MID, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as "CIP Corres."

322 CIP Corres #137, dated 16 May 1940.

323 Ibid, #136, dated 22 Jun 1940.

NOTE: All references in this section "CONFIDENTIAL" unless otherwise noted.

f Investigation signed a memorandum of "agreement of the definition of jurisdiction to be exercised by the agencies concerned..." commonly known as the "Delimitations Agreement." This agreement limited Military Intelligence ivision to the "investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control." In the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands, Military Intelligence Division was given jurisdiction over all civilians as well as military.[324]

Just before this agreement was signed, Mr. Berle, the State Department representative, telephoned President Roosevelt regarding the possibility of a unit for foreign intelligence work aside from the Army and the Navy. In an on-the-spot reply President Roosevelt stated that he desired the FBI to handle such work in the Western hemisphere "on request of the State Department and that the Army and Navy would cover the rest of the world as the necessity arose." The parties to the agreement felt, however, that the problem of foreign intelligence had not been adequately settled and further study was in progress when the United States entered the war.[325]

Corps Areas were feeling the increased work loads and appealing for more men by mid summer of 1940. Maj. A. R. Bolling, G2 of the First Service Command, wrote that he had one warrant officer, one clerk and two Military ntelligence Reserve officers detailed on six months active duty but he needed wo CIP agents as soon as possible.[326]

On 3 July 1940, General Miles submitted a staff study requesting an increase of 26 men to raise authorized CIP strength to 42. Justification was based on the fact existing personnel was inadequate for "the current limited emergency." General Miles cited the responsibilities of Military Intelligence Division under the Delimitations Agreement and the fact that there were no investigative personnel in eight of the Army's nine Corps Areas, although each had requested an average of two CIP agents each.[327]

In connection with the increase, General Miles recommended an increase in the higher grades to provide five master sergeancies instead of one and eight technical sergeancies instead of three. General Miles wrote, "...only enlisted men of the highest integrity can be entrusted to perform the duties required which involve access to classified documents and investigations demanding utmost discretion. Moreover the higher rate of pay commensurate with the grade is

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324 Tab A Appendix to Hist of CIC, (Cen Rec Fac).
325 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 242, (Secret).
326 CIP Corres #122, dated 15 Jul 1940.
327 Ibid, #131-34, dated 3 Jul 1940.

essential, as members of the Corps of Intelligence Police are, almost without exception, required to maintain themselves in large cities where living costs are greater."[328]

While the request was pending, G2 notified the Corps Areas and Departments that anticipated increases in strength would make CIP promotions possible. G2 asked the commanders to recommend those justified for promotion.

In the Eighth Corps Area, the G2's evaluation nearly cost him the services of the senior agent in the Corps -- Tech. Sgt. George Atwell, who had 16 years of CIP service. Because of his age and educational status, the G2 pointed out that Atwell was not qualified for extended duties but was doing a good job where he was. Return mail brought an "Immediate Action" letter from The Adjutant General to transfer Atwell to another organization. Whereupon, the surprised G2 countered with not only a recommendation that Atwell be retained but that he be promoted. When the study was approved, Atwell was promoted to master sergeant.[329]

By the time a personnel increase was approved on 17 July 1940, Corps Areas had been alerted to have qualified men tentatively selected for transfer. "...These enlisted men should be carefully investigated from every angle prior to actual transfer to the Corps of Intelligence Police..."[330]

The following month Maj. G. R. Carpenter, G2, Sixth Corps Area, who was later to become G2 of Army Ground Forces, wrote Military Intelligence Division asking what qualifications were required of CIP applicants.[331] In reply Military Intelligence Division reported, "...There is no record in this office of any instructions having been furnished you in regard to special qualifications required for personnel of the C.I.P. The qualifications demanded will vary depending on the nature of the work required. In any case only men of the highest integrity with a high school education or better should be selected."[332]

In December 1940, qualifications were more specifically defined and field G2s were informed that the qualifications for CIP agents were 22 to 33 years of age, high school education as a minimum, and basic military training. Desirable, but not required, was previous experience as an investigator in some government or law enforcement agency.[333]

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328 CIP Corres #132, dated 3 Jul 1940.
329 Ibid, #120, dtd 19 Jul 40; and #116, dtd 24 Jul 40; and #115, dtd 9 Aug 40; and #100, dtd 10 Aug 40.
330 Ibid, #121, dtd 19 Jul 1940.
331 Ibid, #109, dtd 1 Aug 1940.
332 Ibid, #108, dtd 3 Aug 1940.
333 Ibid, #10, dtd 26 Dec 1940.

[redacted]

Higher standards could be set by October 1940, since 17 million men had registered for selective service and manpower was becoming plentiful. In turn, the horde of inductees created new areas of counterintelligence responsibility. On 19 November, the G2 submitted a staff study in which he listed 51 Army installations where a military population of 5,000 or more was anticipated, and 26 important arsenals and depots. All of these areas would require counter-intelligence agents. The figures were conservative. In the case of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 8,300 military personnel were anticipated yet more than 25,000 were stationed there at the height of World War II.[334]

General Miles estimated that the current authorized strength of 42 agents would be required to man overseas departments alone. To adequately man the Zone of the Interior, he estimated a need for three agents at each of the Corps Areas and their major installations, for a total of 246 men and a grand total of 288 men. Since many of the training camps would not be completed and manned for another seven months, the additional CIP agents were requested on a quarterly basis for approval on 15 January, 15 March and 15 June 1941, in quantities of 46, 100 and 100 respectively.[335]

Instead, on 26 December 1940, G2 was informed by the Adjutant General that both January and March quotas had been approved "effective at once," and the Corps was authorized 188 men.[336] After years of begging for one man, the CIP had reached a point where it was receiving more than it had asked for! The impoverished days were over.

Command Problems

Directly after taking over as G2, in April 1940, General Miles began to strengthen the Military Intelligence Division. Before the year ended, eight officers and three enlisted men were added to make a staff total of 80, which was still pitifully small compared to the cyclonic expansions ahead.[337]

Among the first new personnel arriving in May was Lt. Col. James C. Lester, who as G2 of the First Corps Area, had fought for additional CIP agents. Lester was named Chief of the Counterintelligence Branch and another new arrival, Maj. John T. Bissell, was appointed executive officer. After 23 years without designated control, a CIP section was established with Maj. W. S. Holbrook as chief.[338]

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334 CIP Corres #24, dated 19 Nov 1940.

335 Ibid.

336 Ibid, #14, dated 26 Dec 1940.

337 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 29, (Secret).

338 Holbrook, W.A., Memoirs of Brig. Gen. W.A. Holbrook 1954, (Cen Rec Fac). NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Holbrook." (Unel)

[redacted]

When Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of War in July 1939, one of his first acts was to summon Attorney John J. McCloy of New York to the War Department as personal advisor on counterintelligence work. McCloy was considered to have a wide knowledge of subversive methods as the result of years of legal work in connection with claims from the famed "Black Tom Explosion" caused by German saboteurs just prior to America's participation in World War I.

General Eisenhower summed up the situation in this period: "Within the War Department a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of intelligence. The fault was partly within and partly without the Army. The American public has always viewed with repugnance everything that smacks of the spy; during the years between the two World Wars no funds were provided with which to establish the basic requirement of an intelligence system -- a far flung organization of fact finders."[339]

In July 1940, Military Intelligence Division established branch offices in New York, San Francisco and New Orleans; coordination problems appeared at the outset. The offices were supposed to obtain foreign intelligence through civilian sources returning from abroad, but the New York office encountered problems when Military Intelligence Division failed to establish a proper relationship between that office and the G2 of the Corps Area. In November 1940, the New York office was prohibited from handling any counterintelligence activities.[340]

In August 1940, G2 opened its Washington field office with Lt. Robert Curtiss as investigator and Lt. Garland Smith as his assistant. This office was solely for counterintelligence work and was manned by CIP agents. One of the first cases handled resulted in the discharge of a woman Communist agent in the War Department.[341]

In October 1940, the number of CIP agents had grown to the point where new credentials were needed; the silver and black Military Intelligence Division badge of World War I was supplemented by new Military Intelligence Division credentials of blue and white.

However, CIP agents could not be obtained fast enough to keep up with the growing number of cases and in October, the hiring of civilian agents was authorized. CIP case figures are not available but a hint of the tremendous increase in suspected espionage cases is revealed by FBI figures for the period. In 1938, the FBI had 35 such cases. During one day in May 1940, it received 2,871 complaints.[342]

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339 Eisenhower, Dwight D., Crusade in Europe, Doubleday & Co, Garden City, N.Y., (1948), p 32. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Eisenhower." (Uncl)

340 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 251; (Secret).

341 Holbrook, p 2.

342 The Story of the FBI, p 22, (Uncl).

One of the primary problems of the Counterintelligence Branch was an organizational plan for the Corps of Intelligence Police. On 2 December 1940, a memorandum was forwarded to General Miles over the signature of Colonel Bissell, who had replaced Colonel Lester as Chief, Counterintelligence Branch in September. The plan proposed:

"1. The Corps of Intelligence Police be organized under the direction of the A.C. of S., G2, War Department; personnel suballotted to Corps Areas.

"2. A Chief of CIP be appointed with a main office in Washington to be charged with training, preparation of manuals of instruction, recommendations for assignment, promotion and movement of CIP's, establishment of a school in which he is to act as commandant.

"3. Chiefs of CIP in each Corps Area to be appointed to operate under the direction of the G2, Corps Area: to receive reports of CIP's, review and transmit same to G2, issue instructions to CIP's to regulate and submit to G2's an account of expenses incurred in connection with CIP's and operatives. The Office of the Chief of CIP's normally to be removed from the Office of the A.C. of S., G2, Corps Area.

"4. School courses to cover essentials for investigators in order to provide uniform method throughout the service, with school established in Washington to start six weeks courses about February 1941 and 18 officers and 46 enlisted men.

"5. Funds for expenses incurred by CIP's to be paid from funds allotted to A.C. of S., G2, Corps Area except travel expenses from one Corps to another or to and from school. Funds for the establishment of schools to be determined."[343]

General Miles said that the basic principles seemed sound and that the details should be worked out more fully, particularly as to funds, school space, and selection of instructors and students. He questioned the necessity of a six-week course as compared to the FBI's one month course and suggested it be determined whether the FBI would share in the instruction.[344]

Available records do not show that the study was ever resubmitted, but within the next year all proposals were put in effect. On 27 January 1941,

343 Basic Hist of CIC - 1917-1943, 2 Dec 40, (Gen Rec Fac).
344 Ibid.

Maj. Garland Williams, reserve officer and Treasury agent, was appointed Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police and commandant of the CIP Training School.[345]

Capt. H. G. Sheen and Lt. Hugh D. Wise, Jr., were selected in December 1940 and January 1941, respectively, to attend the regular FBI agent course, preparatory to the establishment of a CIP school in February. In the organization of the CIP school, the Commandant leaned heavily on other government investigative agencies to assemble a faculty. Both FBI and Treasury agents in the reserve were called to active duty and assigned as instructors. Pending their arrival, Sheen and Wise became instructors of the first CIP course "in addition to their other duties."[346]

The Status Problem

Unfortunately, the informal achievement of CIP aims failed to provide the CIP with official status as a Corps. Major Williams was verbally appointed Chief of CIP by Major Holbrook and available records show no formal order creating the position or giving it official sanction. Moreover, a valid question later arose as to whether a Chief, CIP, ever was authorized and whether the title was not actually Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police subsection, Counter Subversive Section, Counterintelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, Office of the AC of S, G2, War Department General Staff.[347]

Major Williams was well aware of the lack of authority for his position and in his final report of 9 July 1941, before transfer to the Infantry, he did not sign as Chief, CIP, but merely as "Major, General Staff." In his report, Major Williams recommended that the Secretary of War create "in the War Department, the Office of Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, to work under the supervision of the Secretary of War." Williams recommended that the Corps be composed of officers and civilians as well as enlisted men and that the Chief, CIP should have the power to prescribe its regulations.[348]

Between the wars there had not been enough CIP agents to raise the problem of internal control, but with the Corps getting closer and closer to its World War I strength, the same problems of centralization or decentralization arose. At the outset of the pre-World War II period, G2, War Department, kept control of CIP agents: suballotting spaces to Corps Areas, controlling promotions on a single list, controlling transfers, and maintaining a foreign service list.

345. CIP Hq Journal, dated 27 Jan 1941.
346 Holbrook, 1, (Uncl).
347 War Dept and Government Agencies, 1941, Sec 4, (A8), (Cen Rec Fac).
348 CIC Office Journal #9, dated 27 Jan 1941; and CIP Corres #19, dtd 1922.

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In the November 1940 request for 246 more agents, General Miles asked, "that the Corps of Intelligence Police be set up as a group, to be assigned at the direction of this Division to Corps Areas and Departments."[349] The approval of 146 of the spaces requested on 26 December 1940, ignored this request,[350] although a letter sent the same day to G2s of Corps Areas and Departments from the Acting G2 of the War Department, stated that the anticipated increase in CIP would "be suballotted to Corps Areas and Departments to be used as investigators and undercover operatives."[351]

However, this suballotment of spaces failed to provide CIP headquarters with authority to secure from Corps Area G2s trained agents or experienced officers for transfer to other Corps Areas or Departments. In March 1941, requests from both Hawaii and Panama for trained CIP agents had to be denied because no Corps Area would release a single agent.[352]

CIP Gets a Chief

The year 1941 was a year of belated preparedness for the Corps of Intelligence Police. The Corps was assigned a chief and a training school, allocated ample funds and authorized to double its strength. The CIP Office Journal was opened on 27 January 1941, with Item #1 "Maj. Garland H. Williams, Infantry, reported for duty as Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, and as Commandant, C.I.P. Training School."[353]

For the small headquarters staff, this rapid expansion imposed a heavy work load. The Office Journal states, "This was a period of tremendous activity, and the personnel assigned to the C.I.P. worked from the usual morning hours to almost midnight every night. An equal amount of work was done on weekends. The tremendous amount of work necessary to begin the school could not have been accomplished without the unusual cooperation given by all persons involved and this hard work could not have been performed if all the individuals concerned had not been imbued with a keen personal interest in the success of this new endeavor. During this same period a considerable amount of time was spent in connection with the organization work of the C.I.P...."[354]

Fortunately, in this period the CIP mission did not materially increase although General Holbrook later wrote,

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349 CIP Corres #24, dated Nov 1940.
350 Ibid, #14, dated 26 Dec 1940.
351 Ibid, #10, dated 26 Dec 1940.
352 CIP Office Journal, page 5, dated 27 Jan 1941.
353 Ibid, Item 1.
354 Ibid, Item 7.

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"I realized that the ultimate objective in counterintelligence was combat counterintelligence, since eventually the FBI would be mainly charged with countersubversive investigations in the ZI. With this end in view our section worked out details regarding TO&Es for various combat units relative to counterintelligence..."[355]

While this planning was carried on at G2 level, the CIP staff faced the immediate problem of preparation for the possibility that plant security surveys, which had been a CIP responsibility in World War I, might again become a CIP mission. There were indications that the FBI which had handled such surveys after 1939 might ask to be relieved of its responsibility for making surveys of civilian establishments operating solely in the interests of the War Department, and that the CIP might have this work in addition to military camps, depots, arsenals and other establishments controlled by the War Department. There was a feeling at G2 level that it was improper and unnecessary for this work to be done by civilian agencies.[356]

More than offsetting any additional plant security work, however, was the reduction in workload occasioned by elimination of G2 responsibility for handling Army public relations. This task was assigned G2 in 1918, and by 1921, under General Pershing it became such an important function that it required much of the time of CIP agents in the field. In February 1941, the Bureau of Public Relations was organized and placed directly under the Chief of Staff, freeing the intelligence organization of a burden that was becoming increasingly heavy.[357]

Coverage requirements, however, continued to increase faster than personnel could be provided. The G2, Fourth Corps Area at Atlanta, reported CIP requirements at nine training camps with military populations ranging from 20,000 to 76,000 and at 25 airfields. An "urgent" need for a CIP agent was obvious at the Charleston Ordnance Depot, which handled the bulk of artillery ammunition in the area and had only four officers and one enlisted man supervising more than 1,000 employees, the majority recently hired. In the adjacent community there was only one civilian policeman for supervision.[358]

Authority for manpower became much easier to get than the manpower. In January, Corps Areas and Departments were notified of new CIP allotments in the Detached Enlisted Men's List. MID withheld 46 spaces for a reserve and assigned 142. Corps Areas, which had been depleted six months before, now had a minimum

355 Holbrook, p 2, (Uncl).
356 CIP Office Journal, Item #22, 27 Jan 1941.
357 Army Almanac 1950, p 710, (Uncl).
358 CIP Corres #134, dated 7 Feb 1941.

f eight agents and Third Corps had 13 agents allotted. Overseas departments aried; an allotment of five more agents went to the Puerto Rican Department, while 16 were provided for the Philippines.[359]

On 20 February, four months ahead of schedule, an additional 100 spaces were allotted to CIP. The Corps then had 14 master sergeancies available; nearly as many men in this one grade as it had total authorized strength the year before.. In announcing the new quotas, which strengthened Corps Areas, but not Departments, MID reserved 104 spaces for future assignment.[360]

By May 1941, there was a backlog of 2,600 cases in the Corps Areas and it was evident that more manpower would be needed. A staff study asking for 225 additional spaces, cited the backlog and called attention to the fact that during World War I ... "It was necessary to have approximately 500 agents of the Corps of Intelligence Police with the A.E.F. alone." General Miles asked that all the spaces allotted be in the first three grades because "...The enlisted men of the Corps of Intelligence Police live outside military reservations and must maintain a scale of living commensurate with the specialized character of their assignment..." The request was approved one week later.[361]

Distribution of the 513 spaces was made on 23 June. Despite a survey two weeks before, distribution did not follow the requests of field units. Instead, ome Corps Areas and Departments were surprised for the first time in their istory to receive more men than they had requested, while other units were nonplussed when they received less than the number requested since this was the ay it had always been. Actually, mobilization was reaching a point where G2 knew from future plans far better than the units what the future workload would be. In this distribution was an allotment of two spaces to Panama to provide agents to Trinidad and St. Lucia; an allotment of nine spaces to Puerto Rico to provide agents at Antigua, Bahamas and Jamaica; and an allotment of six spaces to Ninth Corps Area to provide six agents for Alaska.[362]

Variations in workload produced temporary surpluses and shortages of CIP agents stationed in the lower echelons. In November 1941, this problem was resolved by an AG letter to the field which stated,

> "Information has been received by the War Department to the effect that in many instances some Corps Areas are temporarily in need of more members of the Corps of Intelligence Police than are locally assigned while, at the same time, other Corps Areas could function efficiently with fewer C.I.P. agents.

359 CIP Corres #87b, dated 2 Jan 1941.
360 Ibid, #83, dated 20 Feb 1941; and #4, dated 14 Mar 1941.
361 Ibid, #98, dated 20 May 1941; and #97, dated 27 May 1941.
362 Ibid, #53, dated 10 Jun 1941.

"In view of the fact that only the War Department is capable of determining the varying C.I.P. personnel needs of the several Corps Areas and Departments and, in order to provide an expeditious administrative method effecting the rapid movement of C.I.P. agents from places where their services can best be spared to points in other areas where unforeseen and dangerous developments have occurred, such temporary changes in station will hereafter be announced by written or telegraphic instructions issued by the Military Intelligence Division War Department."[363]

During the year, G2, War Department, also was growing rapidly. By Pearl Harbor, 172 officers and 599 civilians had been added to the division which by then totaled 848 persons. Its strength increased 10 times in 12 months. Its 1940 budget was more than doubled and totaled $360,000. It was a going concern when the war hit, but its cyclonic growth did not provide time for intelligent planning or the assimilation of personnel into smoothly operating teams.[364]

Organization and Manpower

In early 1941, the Military Intelligence Division, War Department was organized into five branches; among them was the Counterintelligence Branch. This branch was further developed into four sections, one of which was Domestic Intelligence, originally called Counter-Subversive. Domestic Intelligence had two sections directly concerning the Corps of Intelligence Police. The Investigating Subsection assigned cases to CIP detachments through various commands and received cases from the various areas. This subsection also acted as case control, and saw that leads were forwarded. In addition, it was operational and directly controlled the activities of all agents assigned to the Washington Field Office.

The other subsection was labeled Corps of Intelligence Police. It was purely administrative and directed the activities of the Office of the Chief of CIP. This office was "to keep abreast of the investigative needs of the Military Establishment" and, based on anticipated needs, to recommend allotments of personnel, grades and ratings pertaining to CIP in Corps Areas and Departments. In addition, it was to prepare courses of instruction for CIP Schools and formulate regulations and training for CIP.

By February 1941, the Investigating Subsection had grown from one officer and one clerk in 1940 to more than a hundred persons and a monthly case load of about 1,500. The CIP Subsection had 11 persons. An August survey of the Office,

363 CIP Corres #80, dated 12 Nov 1941.
364 Hist Mil Intell Div Vol 3, p 29, (Secret).

Chief, CIP, of authorized and actual CIP procurement showed after many months of effort a deficit of 34 percent in actual procurement.[365]

Corps Areas			Departments & Other		
Unit	Authorized	Had	Unit	Authorized	Had
First	22	15	Alaska	6	2
Second	40	40	Hawaii	19	13
Third	52	36	Philippines	32	19
Fourth	41	34	Panama	16	15
Fifth	24	22	Islands[366]	9	0
Sixth	29	17	Trinidad	8	1
Seventh	22	20	Iceland	12	0
Eighth	35	31	MID	25	28
Ninth	44	29	Reserve	50	
			TOTALS	513	338

This was in spite of repeated urging to bring the Corps up to strength at once.[367]

Problems involved both quality and quantity. When the January 1941, distribution of allotments reached the field, new problems arose, particularly in the Departments. Any unit not making efforts to fill its quotas lost them as Fourth Corps Area learned in August when its allotment, which by then was 59 agents, was cut back to 41 agents.[368]

The Philippine G2 said he could fill his 13 CIP vacancies locally except for two men. For those agents he needed "two former expatriates, American born Japanese with ROTC training, one of Italian and one of German backgrounds, education and training similar..."[369]

Efforts to meet this requirement drew blanks from the various Corps Areas and in late January, several post commanders where selectees were assembling were queried.[370] Finally Third Service Command submitted the names of two men but added "Both these men are being considered for CIP duty with this headquarters but neither was regarded as a first-rate prospect."[371] The fact was

365 CIP File 319.1, Aug-Dec 41, 25 Aug 1941, AG Intermediate Records Depot, Ft Holabird, Md., (Conf).
366 Islands: Antigua, Bahamas, and Jamaica.
367 CIP Corres #24, dated 17 April 1941; and #54, dated 7 July 1941; and CIP Office Journal.
368 CIP Office Journal, Item #99, dated 8 Nov 1941.
369 CIP Corres #110, dated 9 Jan 1941.
370 Immediate Action Letter, from G2, to CG, Ft McClellan, Ala., dated 29 Jan 41.
371 CIP Corres #20, dated 30 Jan 1941.

that all areas were having such a hard time finding suitable men to fill their own vacancies that they had scant time or interest in the procurement problems of other areas.

In February 1941, the Philippine G2 was authorized direct communication with the Hawaiian G2 in the hope that his requirement could be met.[372]

The Panama G2 asked if high school graduation requirement could be waived for men "who have qualifications not gotten in high schools, which include good common sense and the ability to arrive at sound decisions."[373] Authority to waive both educational requirements and age limits was granted by MID for several Corps Areas and Departments.[374] By February, however, MID was becoming worried about the many waivers and General Miles informed Eighth Corps to tighten up requirements. If an area was unable to fill its allotment with suitable type, men could be procured from other areas.[375]

The reason that age men were being requested for CIP duty was explained in a letter from the G2, Fifth Corps Area, who rebutted MID's suggestion that personnel be found among the selectees:

> "...they are required to complete basic training for three months before becoming available...must serve four months at $21.00 despite being granted the grade of sergeant when appointed to CIP... Selectees are drawn into the Army to serve one year. Their military service would therefore terminate about the same time that their training and experience had ripened sufficiently to give them any value to the CIP... this office feels that the possibilities for suitable personnel among selectees are not encouraging..."[376]

Further problems in obtaining CIP agents were outlined by the G2, Ninth Corps Area who wrote MID, "One major difficulty encountered in finding suitable candidates for the CIP is that men who possess the desired qualifications and who have completed their basic training are the men who are now noncommissioned officers in key positions and with more favorable opportunity for future promotion than the CIP can offer..."[377]

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372 CIP Corres #178, dated 3 Feb 1941.
373 Ibid, #105-6, dated 11 Jan 1941.
374 Ibid, #54, dated 23 Jan 41; and #12, dated 28 Jan 41.
375 Ibid, #212, dated 3 Feb 1941.
376 Ibid, #51, dated 31 Jan 1941.
377 Ibid, #185, dated 4 Feb 1941.

Field G2s were filling quotas but were still short of personnel meeting the qualifications for specialized problems. In requesting an additional quthorization, the G2, Third Corps Area wrote MID that out of well over a hundred interviews by his officers, he had a few CIP prospects but still needed a man who could speak High German fluently.[378]

To ease his procurement problem, Lt. Col. M. S. Eddy, (later Lt. Gen.) G2 of the Third Service Command, contacted a number of leading casualty insurance companies to determine whether or not any of their salaried adjusters or investigators were going to be inducted. Soon Colonel Eddy not only had leads for his own area, but because of his contacts with nation-wide organizations was able to provide leads on prospective personnel to other areas.[379]

Shortage of Qualified Manpower

By mid-April 1941, the shortage of qualified prospects was being felt even by Colonel Eddy. The Third Corps Area reported that the shortage would become acute if more men were not assigned before the opening of the next CIP class in May.[380] MID replied that more spaces were anticipated and field G2s should institute necessary inquiries and investigations to locate suitable personnel.

MIDs said men of higher education than the high school graduate minimum were desired and that there should be included among Corps of Intelligence Police personnel some individuals whose education had been along mechanical, architectural or electrical engineering lines or individuals with college education who had been engaged in responsible positions in factories or industrial enterprises. Such men were desired in anticipation of plant survey requirements, although the field was not told this.[381]

MID stated that in as much as there were many individuals serving in the Army who had such high standards, it was entirely feasible to obtain them. Such people could be located by contacting civilian agencies and having them report where these men were now assigned. For such leads, MID recommended contacting:

> "Federal, State and Municipal police and investigative agencies; Bar Associations; Federal and District Attorney offices; Private Investigative Agencies; College Alumni Associations; Engineering Societies;

378 CIP Corres #65, dated 24 Feb 1941.
379 Ibid, #128, dated 10 Feb 1941.
380 Ibid, #37, dated 15 Apr 1941.
381 CIP Office Journal, Item #25, dated 17 Apr 1941.

Universities and Colleges; Industrial Enterprises; National Associations related to the work of the type performed by the Corps of Intelligence Police."[382]

Three policy decisions from the Office of the Chief, CIP, added to 1941 procurement problems. In March, it was decided that Negro CIPs would have to be employed if many dangerous areas were to be properly covered, particularly since the FBI could not hire them because of civil service regulations. In Pittsburgh, for example, CIP was enabled to furnish the FBI with reports it had long wanted.[383]

A second decision, made in April, slowed down procurement but provided essential security. The Chief ruled that a Personal History Statement (PHS) would be furnished for all personnel assigned to the Corps or considered for assignment.[384]

Finally, in May when the request to double the strength of the Corps was submitted to the Army Chief of Staff, MID approved the CIP headquarters recommendation to dispense with civilian investigators. It was believed that the Army had enough drafted manpower that trained investigative personnel could be found in its ranks or that young men of legal training or linguistic ability with potential ability as investigators could be easily developed as such.[385] Corps Areas were given three months to eliminate civilian investigators.[386]

In August to help ease the personnel situation, permission was obtained from the Adjutant General to enlist men for CIP from National Guard units.[387]

Of great importance during this period was the procurement of linguists. When screening of Replacement Training Centers failed to provide sufficient men, the CIP headquarters turned to the tactical units. The commanding generals of all four armies were ordered to forward lists of names and essential data on men who spoke Icelandic, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Russian, Portuguese, Japanese and Chinese. The degree of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing these languages was to be shown.[388]

The results of Replacement Training Center screening are shown by the Eighth Corps Area. The Infantry Replacement Center at Camp Wolters, Texas,

382 CIP Corres #101-2, dated 17 Apr 1941.
383 Holbrook, p 2, (Uncl).
384 CIP Office Journal, Item #23, dated 3 Apr 1941.
385 Ibid, #44, dated 20 May 1941.
386 Ibid, #46.
387 Ibid, #101, dated 12 Jul 1941.
388 CIP Corres #34, dated 18 Jul 1941.

eported 10 soldiers who spoke German; four that spoke Norwegian and one that spoke Japanese. The Eighth Corps G2 at Fort Sam Houston was ordered to obtain Personal History Statements and investigate the suitability of likely appearing prospects. MID labeled this an "urgent" request as personnel with such language requirements were particularly desired and, if suitable, would be assigned to the Washington, D.C., Field Office.

The Eighth Corps' report of interviews revealed that only one of the 15 men had a high school education. One had a brother in the German Army; another was a "mental case and some action was being considered by the local authorities;" one was under surveillance because of pro-German contacts; another was a native of Poland and suspected of having relatives there; one could speak only poor English; one could speak German but could not read or write it; another had relatives in Germany and Austria. The roster read like a description of the first 50 CIP agents of 1917.

Out of the entire group there was only one whom the G2 felt he could recommend and this man did not fully meet the educational requirements. The G2 added that the men had been interviewed by an officer who was an experienced investigator and the G2 had complete confidence in his ability, judgment and rating on the above listed men.[389]

Efforts in other Corps Areas to find fluent German linguists encountered similar difficulties, as did efforts to find qualified Negro agents. In July 1941, Sixth Corps reported that after four months of searching only one suitable Negro agent was located.

In October 1941, when Negro Civil Service employees were authorized for the War Department the problem became critical.[390] As the year progressed it became evident that the requirements for linguists would only be met by training personnel, and in November 1941 the Army Language School was organized as part of the Fourth Army Intelligence School at San Francisco. Meanwhile, two other specialized problems had been recognized. In March 1941, cryptographic needs had resulted in the establishment of the Army Security School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and in May the Troop Information and Education Branch had been activated to handle counterpropaganda.[391]

Promotional difficulties added to the recruiting problem since latrine gossip spread the word that while the Corps numerically had more grades because of its increased strength, it still suffered on the percentage scale in comparison to the opportunities for promotion existing in other sections of the various headquarters

389 CIP Corres #82, #84, dated 28 July 1941.
390 CIP Officer Journal, Item #154, dated 3 Oct 1941.
391 Army Almanac, (Uncl).

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to which CIP agents were assigned. In the First Corps Area at Boston, Lt. Col. A. R. Bolling, the G2 (G2 of the Army following World War II) wrote the War Department:

> "As I am unaware of the method of promotion within the CIP, other than by recommendation, this communication is forwarded with a view to placing my recommendations on file... I base my recommendations on personal observation of the soldiers concerned and feel that if they were in a line organization at this time they would have attained, without any difficulty whatever, at least the grades I have recommended."[392]

Two weeks later he again wrote:

> "A concrete promotion system would tend to create an incentive and improve morale."[393]

In the Third Corps Area at Baltimore, Lt. Col. M. S. Eddy, G2, wrote:

> "Duty sergeants of the Corps of Intelligence Police are now working on permanent assignments in the cities of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and Baltimore, as well as other small communities in the Corps Areas. In the three cities named the cost of living is high, and going higher and a duty sergeant is likely to find it difficult to live and do his work properly on the $118 a month base pay and commutation of quarters given him... several of the men...are qualified investigators of considerable experience, who in civilian life were making an appreciably larger amount of money, and whose background is such as to justify a higher rating than sergeant..."[394]

MID acknowledged the problem of increased living expenses and maintenance and said efforts were being made to get a percentage of higher grades.[395]

An effort of the G2, Third Corps Area, to obtain a specialist rating for his CIP agents resulted in a letter from the Adjutant General dated 20 March 1941, stating curtly that there was no specialist allotment for the CIP.[396]

In July 1941, the CIP made its first effort to secure recognition of the military specialty "Investigator," when it submitted to the Adjutant General a definition of the term for use by classification officers.[397]

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392 CIP Corres #76, dated 1 Apr 1941.
393 Regulations CIC, 1941-1942, File #8, (Cen Rec Fac).
394 CIP Corres #74, dated 1 Apr 1941.
395 CIP Corres #82, dated 11 Jan 1941.
396 Ibid, #33, dated 20 Mar 1941.
397 CIP Office Journal, Item #72, dated 25 Jul 1941.

Centralization vs Decentralization

Procurement and promotion of CIP agents was completely decentralized to Corps Areas and Departments by an AG letter of 11 January 1941, which allotted both numbers and grades. The letter abolished the CIP single promotion list which had been in effect 11 years, since 11 July 1930, and the requirement of prior approval of MID for CIP selections. For statistical purposes, subordinate commands were to furnish special reports of each change of status. No special qualifications for personnel were required except that men "properly qualified" should be selected or promoted.

By March 1941, decentralization of selection and assignment of CIP agents had not worked out and Corps Areas and Departments were ordered by the Tentative Regulations for the CIP to "...submit recommendations to the War Department for the selection, transfer and promotion of qualified enlisted men in order to bring the CIP to present authorized strength." A previous warning was repeated: Under no circumstances will the prescribed allotment be exceeded.[398]

Less than two weeks later, this requirement was revoked for all overseas Departments.[399]

Less than two months later field protests resulted in a complete reversal of policy when on 28 May, selection, transfer and promotion of CIP personnel were decentralized to the various Corps Areas, but permission still had to be obtained of MID to waive qualification requirements.[400]

This second change was made over protests from the Office of the Chief, CIP, who pointed out that this made it impossible to organize an investigative agency on a national scale and would result in the creation of 14 distinct, localized investigative agencies with resulting inefficiency and lack of effectiveness.[401] Years afterward, it was evident that this was exactly what subversive personnel, who had infiltrated the administration, desired.

The reversal was precipitated by the issuance of TM 30-225 on 20 March 1941 and it was hoped that the manual would standardize CIP operations in the Corps Areas. To avoid the delays inherent in staffing the regulations through to an approved manual, they were issued as "Tentative" and remained so for the duration of World War II. It was distributed to the field with the notation that

398 CIP Corres #124, dated 21 Mar 1941.
399 Ibid, #54-58, dated 2 Apr 1941.
400 Ibid, #72, dated 28 May 1941.
401 CIP Office Journal, Item #50, dated 28 May 1941, p 8, (Cen Rec Fac).

comments and suggested changes were to be submitted by 15 September 1941.[402] Some Corps Areas did not wait long to protest.

Centralized control in the Office of the Chief was regained for another two years following Pearl Harbor, when Captain Sheen pointed out to Colonel Holbrook that during his tour of five Corps Areas the month before, he observed that under the decentralization policy the quality of personnel was not up to the CIP standard. Colonel Holbrook approved a return to centralized control and the transfer of substandard officers. Further, he directed that a letter be sent to all Corps Areas requesting a report on all members of the CIP who had not been properly investigated.[403]

On 16 December 1941, a confidential letter was sent the commanding generals of all Corps Areas by the Secretary of War directing that effective 22 December 1941, "assignments to the Corps of Intelligence Police and transfers thereto within the Corps Areas will be made only with the approval of The Adjutant General. Such approval will be given only upon the basis of a report of investigation with respect to the individual, furnished The Adjutant General at the time when the request for approval of assignment or transfer is made."[404]

This proviso lasted for two years, but not without protests. On 24 December, Brig. Gen. F. E. Uhl, head of Seventh Corps Area, wrote to The Adjutant General that this order was "...centralization to a degree that seriously interferes with the proper performance of the responsibilities assigned to the Corps Area commander..."[405] To this the Adjutant General replied on 6 January 1942:

> "The instructions contained in the basic communication were issued after decentralized procedure had been tried and found unsatisfactory. In a majority of cases soldiers were transferred into the Counter Intelligence Corps (formerly Corps of Intelligence Police) without having been investigated and, in few instances where an investigation was made all leads were not developed, the soldier's own statements being accepted without attempt at confirmation. ...The decentralized system served to introduce into the Counter Intelligence Corps a large percentage of agents whose character, education, adaptability and experience in no way qualified them for the duties which they would be required to perform..."[406]

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402 MID 10389 A - 1-942, 20 Mar 1941, Records WDGS, (MID National Archives, Wash, D.C.).

403 CIP Office Journal, Item #340, dated 10 Dec 1941.

404 MID 200.3, dated 16 Dec 1941, (Cen Rec Fac).

405 MID 200.3, dated 24 Dec 1941, (Ft Holabird AG Intermediate Depot).

406 AG 322.999 (17 Dec 41) EA 2nd Ind, 6 Jan 42, (Cen Rec Fac).

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To centralize or decentralize? Some years later Col. Hugh D. Wise, Jr., CIP Executive Officer in this era, termed this question "The eternal conflict!"

Comments on other provisions of the Tentative Regulations for the CIP were solicited by G2 throughout the year. Second, Fifth and Seventh Corps Areas had no comments. Puerto Rico had none. Most had a few minor points. But in Ninth Corps, Lt. Col. John H. Wilson, G2, had plenty to say.

One of the first objections was to the age limitations of 24-34 years, since there were many qualified investigators both below and above this bracket. Both Hawaii and Ninth Corps argued for a reduction to 21 years but MID replied that 24 years was the minimum age necessary to obtain maturity. Ninth Corps argued the point again, five months later, stating in its September 1941 letter,

> "...The most suitable members of the CIP that have been obtained in this Corps Area have come from among the selectees. Now that the upper age limit for selectees is 28 years, the field of choice is considerably narrowed, especially since the best men that have been obtained are in their early thirties. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find the especially desired qualification of previous investigative experience among men under twenty-eight and it is becoming increasingly necessary to select men on a basis of education and character only. In order to widen the field of selection, the lower age limit should be reduced to twenty-one. In fact, it would be desirable to have authority to enlist men directly from civil life for the CIP. This would open a field not now open due to the low age limit of the draft..."[407]

First, Eighth and Ninth Corps objected to the requirement of putting men through basic training which prevented direct enlistments to the Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Bolling in First Corps at Boston, argued, "...While in training with other recruits, he becomes known as a member of the military service to soldiers who later will be assigned to units throughout the Corps Area. A member of the CIP does not require basic military training to further his future in the service..."[408]

Colonel Bolling recommended the establishment of a basic and advance CIC school so that all training, military and investigative, would be standardized and identity would not be compromised by having to attach agents to units within the Corps Areas.

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407 Regulations CIC, 1941-1942, File #8, 8 Sep 41, (Cen Rec Fac).
408 Ibid.

In reply, MID wrote,

"...MID agrees with you that it is not essential that an investigator in the Corps of Intelligence Police specifically complete basic military training. In several instances this Division has extended waivers to individuals who have had some type of military training in the past... Primarily, we are concerned with securing operatives who can carry on investigative work... This type of ability is not necessarily connected with military experience or proficiency..."

MID felt the necessary training in small arms could be obtained through liaison with other law enforcement agencies and obtaining the use of their ranges and there was no need for a MID Basic Military School.[409]

In May 1941, at a conference between the Chief, CIP, and G2, the policy was established that to secure personnel promptly in the early organizational stages of CIP, basic training would not be considered essential for CIP personnel. Emphasis was to be placed on securing men with investigative experience.[410]

Two months later when Fifth Corps had lined up two investigators and asked for a waiver on basic training, General Miles disapproved the request and wrote, "It is deemed advisable for CIP investigators to complete basic military training in order that they may carry on their work with military personnel in the most efficacious manner."[411] This statement was reinforced by a letter from the Adjutant General on 2 August 1941, which included, "It is the policy of the War Department to send all men...for thirteen weeks' basic training."[412]

Case loads were piling up and Corps Areas G2s did not want to lose the services of a trained investigator for three months while he took basic military training. In reality, requirement was not rigidly enforced until the first untrained men were drafted from the Corps Areas for overseas combat work as preparations for the invasion of North Africa got under way a year later.

Administrative Problems of TM 30-225

There were protests from the field on the number of reports required by TM 30-225: spot, periodic progress on cases, monthly summary, quarter efficiency, morning reports and rosters both open and secret, reports of change and particularly the agent's daily activities which some agents claimed took them more time to fill out each day than it did to write up their reports. Ninth Corps

409 Regulations CIC, 1941-1942, File #8, (Cen Rec Fac).
410 CIP Office Journal, Item #30, dated 22 Apr 1941.
411 CIP Corres #204, dated 18 Jul 1941.
412 Ibid, #8, dated 2 Aug 1941.

Area felt that MID would be buried in a mass of paper if it forwarded copies of all its letters; reports on minor cases in progress or pending; agent status. In reply, MID said that the daily report of activities protected the agents, and instances had been encountered by investigators in which unfounded accusations were made and frequently disproved by records of daily activities. Progress reports were necessary to prevent cases from being put aside for long periods to await some outside action.[413]

TM 30-225 specified a procedure for maintaining counterintelligence files so that there would be a nation-wide uniformity of numbering, indexing, and assembly of dossiers. This was generally welcomed in the field.

However, Eighth Corps felt that all field files should be kept at a minimum and Sixth Corps felt that the entire section on file procedures should be deleted from the regulations.

There were comments on most other provisions of the regulations. Travel was one. The G2 at Hawaii repeated the request of his predecessor of three years before and asked that regulations be included to provide for passage by commercial vessel or on military transports, first class, for CIP agents to conceal their identity. Again, there is no record of any action. Such travel was finally authorized in July 1941.[414]

Publicity was another CIP problem in this period. Since activities were increasing so rapidly, it was virtually impossible to keep knowledge of all cases away from the newspapers. The regulations called for:

> "every proper effort to avoid publicity" and instructed that if a "representative of one of these publicity agencies is persistent he should be referred to the proper Assistant Chief of Staff G2 using the name only of the officer concerned. A verbal report should be immediately made to the officer whose name has been given."[415]

> The C.I.P. Subsection later reported that G2s had "been advised that there is no method of completely preventing publicity on cases involving local interest and the best solution generally arises from proper relationship between the Corps and the various newspapers. An out-and-out attitude of complete secrecy normally results in complete exposure of all information rather than properly supervised publicity."[416]

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413 Regulations CIC, 1941-1942, File #8, (Cen Rec Fac).
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.

The regulations made a welcome distinction between CIP investigators and civilian investigators, who were authorized only when they possessed "unusual or unique qualifications" which could not be "readily developed within the Corps itself or when necessary to the success of a particular investigation," and, only then for that particular job. They were to be designated "Special Employees."

The sections which required that personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police wear civilian clothes unless otherwise specifically instructed drew protests. The regulations stated it is:

> "...Highly desirable that the identity of the personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police be kept secret from the general public and military personnel in general...it is desirable that office space for detachments of the Corps of Intelligence Police not be located on military reservations or in buildings with other military units. Office space should be secured on private premises whenever possible. The office should be disguised by use of a name such as a nonexistent sales agency, canvassing firm, or similar business which would have men working in and out of the office."

In Ninth Corps Area, the G2 wrote MID:

> "In this Corps Area, the present eight members of the CIP are assigned to different Corps Area Service Command units, except two who are assigned to the unit at Fort MacArthur. Each man is carried on the records as a member of the 'Detached Enlisted Mens List' for his unit. He does not show as a member of the Corps of Intelligence Police; this information is in the confidential records of the unit.[417]

> "Some of these men drew commutation of rations and quarters, while others live with their units. None are prohibited from coming to the Intelligence Office and in all cases personnel records and pay rolls are prepared at their assigned stations."

Ninth Corps G2 admitted these procedures were different from that prescribed in the Corps of Intelligence Police Regulations but argued the procedure being followed was better for field conditions in Ninth Corps Area than that prescribed in TM 30-225.

The letter continued: "...While many investigations will have ramifications that lead to distant points, the majority of them will require extensive investigations in the vicinity of Army establishments. The

417 CIP Corres #160-163, dated 22 April 1941.

bulk of the troops in this Corps Area are concentrated in five general sections of the Corps Area; namely, the vicinities of Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Ord, California; San Luis Obispo, California; San Diego, California and Riverside, California. None of these are in the vicinity of the Corps Area Headquarters, and because of the great distances involved it would be entirely impracticable to handle investigations through CIPs located at a central point. In addition, there are many important air fields at places other than the localities mentioned above to which CIPs should be assigned, since the importance of aircraft and their susceptibility to sabotage may be expected to give rise to an unusually large number of investigations.

"Practically all investigations will involve both Army reservations and the adjacent community. The CIP in uniform can move around on the Army post without attracting attention, and will have entree to installations to which he would not be admitted in civilian clothes without identification. It has always been the custom to have some enlisted clerical help in the Intelligence offices of the Corps Area and of the military posts. Hence, it will attract no undue attention to have the CIP work out of the intelligence office. On the contrary, it will facilitate greatly both investigations on the military reservation and the supervision of such investigations."

Ninth Corps G2 said, "Some of the more important new camps were not near towns of any appreciable size and a CIP living in an adjacent village would attract attention; whereas he would be unnoticed if in uniform on the military post."

"...Except in exceptional cases," the letter continued, "this office questions the advisability of obtaining offices for CIPs on private premises and attempting to disguise such offices by the use of a name, such as a nonexistent sales agency... Eventually, people of adjoining offices or residences will begin to suspect the office of illegal activities. The successful use of subterfuge over a long period of time is extremely doubtful, and a disclosure of such use, unnecessarily, would be damaging to the prestige of the Army.

"Morning reports and pay rolls should be made out by the Corps Area G2 only for the CIPs who are not assigned to posts. CIPs will be subject to sickness and other changes in status that require entries on Sick reports or Morning reports and these matters can be more conveniently handled at the stations where the man is physically located. If the pay rolls for all men are made out at Corps Area headquarters, payment will be delayed several days in reaching some CIPs. This is not fair to the enlisted man with his small pay."[418]

418 CIP Corres #160-163, dated 22 Apr 1941.

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Ninth Corps Area G2 said that he proposed to continue his own procedures unless ordered otherwise. In other Corps Areas, the problems outlined by Ninth Corps occurred. In Chicago, in Sixth Corps, where the CIP agents established a down town undercover office, the agents had a shock at Christmas time when in the window of an adjacent office appeared a sign "Merry Christmas Army!" In Third Corps Area, delays in getting pay checks to CIP agents from the headquarters at Baltimore to a post as near as Aberdeen Proving Ground, 30 miles away, were frequent occurrances.

No Reply to Ninth Corps

A reply was prepared by the Counter Intelligence Corps subsection but Colonel Lester vetoed it saying, "No reply is considered necessary to this letter from IX Corps. They do not want to follow Tentative Manual exactly and the Corps Area Commander concurs."[419]

However, the unsent letter represented the viewpoint of those preparing the manual on the much debated question of concealment of CIP identity. The letter said,

> "The assignment of Corps of Intelligence Police personnel to the Corps Area Service Command in a Detached Enlisted Mens' List status with no reference to the type of duty on which engaged generally excites the interest and curiosity of other military personnel, and it quickly becomes common knowledge as to the mysterious character of the assignment of work performed by the soldier, the result being that he is strongly believed to be engaged in Military Intelligence activities. Such records will not maintain the desired secrecy regarding the identity of Corps of Intelligence Police personnel."[420]
>
> "...all enlisted personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police should draw commutation of rations and quarters and no personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police should be regularly quartered or rationed with military units. As a practical matter it is not thought that there would never be an occasion when a Corps of Intelligence Police investigator visited the Military Intelligence Office on a post, but such visits should be unusual and should not result in his being identified by other headquarters personnel as a member of the Corps of Intelligence Police. The individual should call at the Intelligence Office in connection with official matters in the same manner that civilians or other persons wearing civilian clothing call at the office and confer with Intelligence Intelligence Officers. Such visits should be necessary only in

419 CIP Corres #16, dated 18 Jun 1941.
420 Ibid, #67, dated 3 Apr 1941.

exceptional circumstances and the officer in charge of the Corps of Intelligence Police for the Corps Area should confer with the investigators at points other than a military headquarters."[421]

The Chief, CIP, said, "...when personnel records of an enlisted man assigned to the Corps of Intelligence Police were maintained outside Military Intelligence Offices, it should be assumed that his identity would become generally known. However, if the regulations were carried into effect, the only record of a Corps of Intelligence Police operative in a Corps Area or Department would be located in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in a Corps Area or Department headquarters. The only other record for such an individual would be maintained at the Office of The Adjutant General in the War Department. In the Corps Areas and Departments, The Adjutant General would have a record of the Corps of Intelligence Police only by total numbers and grades. The unsent letter continued:

"...decentralizing the control of investigative work is considered to be very sound. It is believed feasible to have one officer in Corps Area headquarters to handle the administrative work of the Corps of Intelligence Police personnel throughout the Corps Area and his office should be the sole Corps of Intelligence Police administrative headquarters. In each post, camp or station or area where Corps of Intelligence Police investigators are stationed, a specially qualified Intelligence Officer should be designated as officer in charge of the Corps of Intelligence Police and should actually supervise and direct investigative work under the general supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 in Corps Area headquarters. The investigators should be stationed either temporarily or permanently in the area where their work is being performed. They should be kept extremely mobile in order that you may concentrate a larger number at any point where work shows an increase or strong protective measures are considered feasible...

"...it is contemplated that there will be many occasions when a Corps of Intelligence Police operative will wear a uniform in order to move around a military post easily and associate with military personnel. However, this will not necessitate his being permanently assigned to a unit on the post. A temporary assignment arranged for in a normal manner might be desired for the accomplishment of a specific purpose. It is especially desired by this Division that Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators not be utilized as clerks in Intelligence Offices. This Division cannot agree with you that it will attract no undue attention to have a Corps of Intelligence Police operative work out of the Intelligence

421 CIP Corres #160-2, dated 22 Apr 1941.

Office. It might appear that a person working in a Military Intelligence Office is attracting no undue attention and this is probably true of the large mass of soldiers who have nothing to conceal. On the other hand, it is believed we should assume that an enemy agent or saboteur or an individual engaged in subversive activities, would make a special point of identifying the persons who operate from a Military Intelligence Office.

"...it is believed that it is entirely feasible for an individual of the type now being selected for the Corps of Intelligence Police to live in a civilian community near an Army post and not come under the suspicion of the inhabitants. There are many assumed poses that such an officer could adopt.

"...it is entirely possible for an office to be operated in the manner provided for in the Regulations. It is suggested and it is entirely proper, and generally desirable, to move such offices periodically. In those situations where only one Corps of Intelligence Police investigator is stationed in an area, his 'office' will actually be his home or in his private quarters. Records kept in such places should be held to an absolute minimum or provision should be made for security commensurate with the security ordinarily maintained in a business office."[422]

In its September comments, Ninth Corps Area again criticized the provisions for case control at lower echelons. Said its G2,

"The division of responsibility for investigations on the basis of the boundaries of Post, Camp or Station is impracticable. Based on the experience of hundreds of cases, no case is known to this corps area that did not cross such a boundary at some time or other in the course of the investigation...the Corps Area G2 should have full control of all investigations and not merely have coordinating or supervising functions. This means that all post intelligence officers, in addition to their other duties, should be agents of the Corps Area Commander for military intelligence. The supervisory and coordinating functions now assigned to the Corps Area Commander are insufficient..."[423]

However, the principal MID problem was one of control at its level where demands for agents at overseas bases were growing. In July 1941, MID notified the Corps Areas, "It will be necessary in the future for trained personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police to be transferred to the various base commands now being established, and at this time it is desired to transfer a small number of Spanish-speaking investigators."[424]

422 CIP Corres #160-2, dated 22 Apr 1941.
423 Regulations CIC, 1941-1942, File #8, (Cen Rec Fac).
424 CIP Corres #6, dated 31 Jul 1941.

In anticipation of growing procurement problems, MID had its Tentative Regulation requiring that an officer in charge be designated for each CIP unit in the field backed up by an Adjutant General's letter, "By Order of the Secretary of War" which stated,

> "1. In order to provide adequate assistance for Corps Area and Department Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2, and with a view toward securing the utmost efficiency from the operation of local detachments of the Corps of Intelligence Police, it is desired that immediate action be taken to select a qualified commissioned officer for assignment to duty as Chief of the Corps Area or Department C.I.P. detachments.
>
> "2. The officer so selected and designated should be a thoroughly capable and experienced investigator possessing practical knowledge of current investigational methods, preferably a graduate of the Officers' Training School, C.I.P. or of the special course conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He should possess leadership and administrative ability qualifications...
>
> "3. The Chief of the C.I.P. detachment will function under the Corps Area or Department A.C. of S., G2, and will exercise active supervision over the work of all members of the detachment.
>
> "4. In consideration of the current requirements of the service necessitating the more or less frequent turnover of commissioned staff personnel, it is desired that the Chiefs of local C.I.P. detachments be selected with a view to their retention on such duty without permanent change in station, during the period of the emergency. Such personnel will not be transferred elsewhere or assigned other duties without approval of the War Department. No increase in allotments of personnel for this purpose is authorized."[425]

The letter required Corps Areas and Departments to reply showing their action on the letter. The G2, Second Corps Area at New York, complied with this order and secured an over-age in grade major for the position, only to have him selected nine months later as commander of the first CIC combat unit. (See North African invasion.)

Time for preparedness was running out fast in 1941. In April, Yugoslavia surrendered and Greece was all but conquered. In May nearly 1,500 persons were killed in one day's air raid on London. On 27 May, President Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited emergency. In June, Hitler attacked Russia and the

425 CIP Corres #12, dated 12 Nov 1941.

Communists in the United States overnight changed from sabotage of the Capitalist war to down with the Fascists. All German consulates were ordered closed and their staffs withdrawn. In July the United States occupied bases in Iceland while the Nazis moved deep into the heart of European Russia. In September, President Roosevelt ordered the Navy to "Shoot first," any Axis raiders in U.S. zones, and pledged every effort to defeat Germany.

Selection of CIP Chief

In January 1941, Maj. Willard A. Holbrook, Jr., then Chief of the Domestic Intelligence Section, Counterintelligence Branch, MID, came in contact with Garland H. Williams, an Infantry Reserve major, who was a former customs agent, then assigned as a district supervisor at New York for the Bureau of Narcotics.[426]

Major Holbrook was impressed with Major Williams' investigative record; his good appearance; his educational background; and his energy. A commandant was needed to handle the innumerable details in connection with the opening of the first CIP Investigators' Training School at Washington, D.C., the next month. Holbrook has stated he offered and Williams accepted on 21 January his extended active duty orders were issued the 24th and he reported the 27th. But there is no mention of his position as Chief of CIP in his letter order which merely reads "...for duty with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2..."[427]

Major Williams served as "Chief" until 5 August 1941, when he was assigned to the Infantry School Service Command. In January 1942, he was assigned to OSS. Meanwhile, Capt. Donald B. MacDonald was assigned to replace Major Williams but with the title "Chief of the CIP Subsection of MID," and not "Chief, CIP." When Maj. H. G. Sheen succeeded Captain MacDonald on 7 October 1941, he was referred to by Holbrook as having "succeeded Mr. Williams."

Sheen had an Army background. His father was an Army colonel who served in the first Occupation of Germany in 1918.

In January 1941 he was called back to active duty as a captain with MID, at the same time Williams was reporting.[428]

This was an era of organizational plans and nearly every one had one. Major Williams' comments on a plan by a were summed up in a final paragraph, "The whole plan is not considered sound and is an instance where

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427 Ibid.

428 201 Sheen, Henry Gordon, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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One proposal of the period was to have CIP agents trained by the FBI including "on-the-job" training with FBI agents. Another would have set up a technical laboratory rivaling that of the FBI. Major Williams merely said that since the FBI laboratory was available to all law enforcement agencies, the CIP could avail itself of the same facilities that a country police force could.

Major Williams was particularly emphatic regarding a proposal to create a "Flying Squad." Said he,

> "This 'Flying Squad' idea is a period in the development of every executive in every investigative service. It sounds good and we have all tried it at least once. Without exception it always fails. Investigation must be decentralized and the local agents, if properly selected originally can always do a better job than strange agents who do not know local conditions or have local contacts. On inter-district or inter-area cases you can send selected men into other districts but they must operate under the local supervisory officials. These 'Special Squads' under a higher headquarters seldom produce effective results and always destroy the morale of the service. I strongly oppose this plan."[429]

In July 1941, Major Williams reviewed his six month tenure of office and the state of the CIP under its decentralized control. His report stated both the problems and recommended solutions. Major Williams said he felt that the investigative jurisdiction of the CIP would "be materially increased in the future."[430]

Williams said these increases would result from Army overseas operations; creation of theaters of operation within U.S. territories; the failure of civilian investigative agencies to carry out their mission; and the necessity for the Army to exercise a more efficacious control over additional categories of civilians whose activities may endanger the military effort. The Chief, CIP, continued:

> "The prevention of espionage, sabotage and subversive activity which in any way affect the possibility of the success of military operations is a direct and entirely proper responsibility of the War Department and such responsibility should not be shifted to civilian agencies who may possess only an elementary conception of military needs. This is a difficult mission and its successful accomplishments will necessitate the creation of a powerful investigative force..."

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429 201 Williams, Garland Hubbard, X896, 9554, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).
430 CIP Corres #19-22, dated 9 July 1941.

In this final report to the AC of S, G2, Major Williams said:

"In approaching the solution of the problem presented by this assumption of nation-wide investigative responsibility, the War Department has elected to proceed on the basis of developing 14 different investigative groups, each of which has been placed under the supervision of an existing office. Such existing offices were not designed for carrying on such difficult and extensive investigative work and were, in general, operated by officers either entirely inexperienced or very slightly experienced in the conduct of, or the supervision of, modern investigative work. Each of these 14 officers have different ideas of their investigative mission and the result is that inevitably there will be 14 different policies, 14 different practices, 14 different methods of work and, in general, 14 separate and distinct units with very little cohesion and no basis for unity of action. No central control agency has been created for handling this problem (which is national in scope) on a nation-wide scale. The result will be that the local problems will be variously handled in accordance with the varying ability of the local personnel, but the important cases, all of which will extend over a large part of the nation, will not be fully exploited. This condition generally results in developing cases against local figures of minor importance, but provides an almost automatic means of escape from apprehension by the major operators or the directing and financing heads who work behind the scenes. A situation similar to this is the well-known impossibility of having local police departments successfully handle the investigation of crimes on which the participants are able to cross city boundary lines and this condition has given rise to the creation of state police forces and national investigative agencies in this country and in other countries as well. Another possible similar situation would have been for the President, instead of giving the civilian investigative job to the experienced and centrally-led Federal Bureau of Investigation, to have given the responsibility for investigating espionage, sabotage and subversive activities to the States' Attorney Generals in the 48 states and the several possessions, and such Attorney Generals to work under the authority of their respective governors. The ineffectiveness and absolute error of such a procedure is easily apparent, and no thinking person would have taken such action."

Referring to World War I, the Chief of CIC said,

"In the United States the Corps of Intelligence Police was composed of many well-meaning but inexperienced officers, enlisted men and civilians and their unorganized efforts accomplished practically nothing. It is said that the organization in the United States may have caught one spy. From a study of the records and from interviews with persons

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involved, it would appear that the same type of investigative organization that is now being created was the type of organization that was utilized during the World War.

"There must be now created within the military service an investigative group that is organized along the same lines that successful Federal investigative agencies are organized. There must be a carefully selected field force and these men must be carefully "backed up" by a strong central directing head, who possesses full power and is given full responsibility. The individual investigators must either be experienced in investigative work or meet rigid requirements as to special qualifications. Supervisory personnel must have had extensive investigative experience of a suitable type. All personnel must be selected by the Chief of the Service and he alone must be responsible for the complete administration of the Corps. The Chief of the Corps must be an individual of wide experience in the supervision of investigative forces. He should bring with him the ability to secure the willing cooperation of the maximum number of Federal, State and Municipal police and investigative forces. It must be expected that the Corps will be conducted in accordance with proven civilian practices and not in accordance with strict principles of military organization and control. It is only through this type of investigative organization that the Army will be able to show tangible results in its counter-espionage and related work."[431]

Major Williams recommended that the Corps of Intelligence Police consist of a headquarters and a field force with one chief and such other commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted men and civilian employees as might be necessary for the execution of the functions imposed on the Corps. This chief would have the power to prescribe such regulations as he deemed necessary, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War.

Although Major Holbrook referred to him as "Chief," Williams was not fooled and he signed his report as "Major, General Staff." Moreover, he included in his recommendations:

"That the Secretary of War be requested to direct that: 1. There is hereby created in the War Department the Office of the Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police, who, under the supervision of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with the duty of detecting and investigating all matter pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, countersabotage, subversive and countersubversive activities, and related

431 CIP Corres #19-22, dated 9 Jul 1941. NOTE: See Hist of the Counter Intelligence Corps World War I, Sec I, p 15, for Gen Van Deman's views.

matters, among all military personnel and among all persons whose activities affect the military effort..."[432]

There is no record of any action on these recommendations except that three weeks later Major Williams was transferred to the Infantry School at Fort Benning.

To the staff study Major Williams had attached a proposed organization chart for CIP showing both functions and personnel requirements. This provided for a Chief, an executive, an administrative assistant and an operations assistant. The chief would be a lieutenant colonel and the assistants, majors. Under them would be nine groups: Liaison, Special Investigations, Review, Legal, Training, Personnel, Supply, Fiscal and Files.[433]

The plan called for increasing the headquarters to 65 persons and the field force, authorized at 513, to 1,523 persons. A large percentage of the headquarters personnel could be obtained from personnel assigned to similar duties in the various offices of MID. Several hundred of the 1,000 men recommended for the field would be obtained from personnel on duty with area G2s as assistants, clerks, etc.[434] The plan called for a major to command area CIP detachments with a captain as assistant. There would be 60 subordinate offices under lieutenants, and 52 lieutenants assigned as special investigators. The plan also called for 240 stenographers and clerks.

Espionage School Planned

Espionage was considered in this final report. Major Williams pointed out as a possible future contingency, the necessity for "The organization, training and direction of specially selected units and individuals for espionage, sabotage and subversive activity in foreign countries including hostile nations." Here Major Williams was recommending the same step he had suggested in February and which had faded into War Department oblivion, much to the disappointment of Colonel Lester, Chief, G2 Counterintelligence Branch, who had also sponsored it. A plan for an Espionage School was submitted less than two weeks after Major Williams became chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police and before the opening of the CIP School. It was intended to operate the schools concurrently and have them supplement each other as the Chief of SOS in World War I had recommended.[435]

Williams prepared a staff study on the necessity for establishing a "Training School for Military Intelligence Agents." Had the plan been adopted, the Army

432 CIP Corres #22, dated 9 July 1941.
433 Ibid, #24, dated 18 July 1941.
434 Ibid, #25, dated 18 July 1941.
435 CIP Office Journal, Item #10, dated 2 July 1941.

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would have had its own positive field intelligence agency and would not have had the problems that resulted when the Communist-infiltrated OSS was forced upon it; further, the Corps would not have been delayed another decade before beginning to assume a task which was rightfully its own.

The study cited for justification essentially the same reasons that had been stated by Col. Cabot Ward, following World War I. Ward had argued the importance of a foreign detachment of "secret service" to work beyond our own lines in neutral and enemy countries. He had pointed out that Military Attaches were limited by protocol and the fact that they were naturally suspected and under constant surveillance. Moreover, without other agents there was no means of confirming such reports.[436]

Major Williams also repeated the belief of Colonel Ward that a "...Foreign Espionage Service may be considered basically as an element of counterintelligence extended to the source of hostile espionage." Further, Major Williams argued that military authorities should have control of the source material of plans for which the Army was responsible. He felt that civilian agencies could not be expected to secure, properly evaluate or even report fully and specifically what the military might require.

In making the request, which was signed by General Miles as G2, the study said:

> "The present international situation and the possibility of an adverse change make it imperative that this nation (crossed out in pencil and the words 'the Army' substituted) develop an efficient espionage service that can function independently of any other nation. The plans should be predicated on the assumption that there is a possibility that the Americas may stand alone in a world of hostile and predatory nations and movements. These same plans should contemplate the possibility that the United States may be entirely isolated and dependent solely on its own resources for protective information."[437]

Major Williams recommended establishing additional "controls" with official agencies in the international field, and the use of a similar type private agency. He also recommended the creation and operation of a completely secret espionage service, and the establishment of a 90 day secret training school for foreign espionage agents.[438]

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436 G2 File, GHW, Subj: Espionage School Memorandum for Chief of Staff, dated 7 Feb 1941, (Cen Rec Fac).

437 Ibid.

438 A proposed course of instruction is included in Appendix 1.

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For some reason, presumably orally communicated since there is no official "paper" on the subject in the files, General Miles held up action and the paper bears the notation "Never submitted to the Chief of Staff." In July, OSS was created and the opportunity had passed. Intelligence jurisdiction conflicts in the New York Area continued until 19 March 1941, when President Roosevelt, without consulting either MID or FBI, appointed Commdr. Vincent Astor, USNR, Area Controller to establish intelligence jurisdictions and priorities. Astor was not called to active duty and consequently served as a civilian director.[439]

In May 1941 a meeting was held by G2, War Department to discuss the desirability of establishing a Joint Intelligence committee. In addition to State, Navy and Treasury, representatives of the Administrator of Export Control, the Director General of the Office of Production Management, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, the National Defense Research Council, and the Office of Emergency Management attended. But before this group reached an organizational basis, President Roosevelt directed on 11 July 1941, that the Office of Coordinator of Information for the United States Government be created. One year later this became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under Brig. Gen. William ("Wild Bill") Donovan.[440]

This Coordinator was to analyze, correlate and disseminate to the President or his designees, information collected from existing agencies and, when requested by the President, to produce security information not otherwise available. The office was specifically instructed not to interfere with or impair the duties of the regular military and naval advisors of the President. Within two years it was clashing with CIC.

In spite of restrictions, G2 Historian Bruce Bidwell states,

> "The Coordinator...lost no time in attempting to assume centralized control over all American overseas intelligence activities. In this endeavor, he was vociferously championed by a politically influential group of supporters who not only favored the establishment of a single Central Intelligence agency for the United States but also displayed decided ignorance of the subject by naively asserting that now there would only be one intelligence agency instead of eight."[441]

Unfortunately, this hastily formed organization recruited among its thousands of personnel, a number of Communist agents; one penetrated the office of Col. William J. Donovan, the Director.[442]

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439 Hist of MID, Vol 3, p 251, (Secret).
440 Ibid, p 252, (Secret).
441 Ibid, p 253-254.
442 Burnham, p 119, (Uncl).

Meanwhile MID and ONI were fighting for recognition with the Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee and by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack nearly had a Joint Intelligence Committee organized.

Responsibility for defense plant surveys had been assumed by the FBI on 3 October 1939 when the FBI informed the Army G2 that it would handle plant inspections and surveillance. However, in December 1941, a Plant and Utilities Section was added to the Counterintelligence Branch. G2 expressed continuing dissatisfaction with FBI progress in this field which was handled by G2 in World War I with the assistance of Justice Department informants. One report made after the FBI had held control for more than a year revealed only 646 inspections out of 1,345 requested by the Army had been made.[443]

Another source of jurisdictional conflict between the Army counterintelligence and the FBI concerned the gathering of data for the "Counter Fifth Column Plan" which required all Army Area Commanders to anticipate civil disorder in their areas and be prepared to handle it. Logically, the plan required advance information regarding potentially or actually subversive persons and organizations in an area. Since such persons and organizations were almost entirely civilian, it was agreed at a conference in August 1941, that the Army would do the advance planning but would rely upon information furnished by FBI sources.[444]

Administrative Problems

Administrative problems increased so rapidly that on 8 May 1941, an office staff organization was deemed necessary at headquarters. Major Williams appointed Lt. Hugh D. Wise, Jr., as personnel officer and Lt. E. Russell Kennedy as supply officer. Personnel records were organized and Kennedy began making arrangements to purchase approximately $25,000 worth of investigative equipment. This required contacting many manufacturing concerns, examining sample equipment, making tests and handling the details of securing bids and making purchases.[445] In August, Kennedy was succeeded by Lt. Theodore J. Walker.[446]

Shortly after Kennedy's appointment, all Corps Areas and Departments were advised that the Office of the Chief, CIP, would procure, through centralized purchasing, the necessary technical and investigative equipment for CIP. Field G2s were instructed to provide an inventory of equipment on hand and the unexpended balances of equipment funds.[447]

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443 Hist, MID, Vol 3, p 244, (Secret).
444 Ibid.
445 CIP Office Journal, Item #35, dated 8 May 1941, (Secret).
446 Ibid, Item #127, dated 21 Aug 1941.
447 Ibid, Item 45, dated 20 May 1941.

Funds were in ample supply, and the War Department Finance Officer was consulted frequently and cooperated generously. The last day of 1941, CIP received purchase authority for an additional $46,000 worth of equipment. Just prior to that time CIP was asked to submit a list of its needs in connection with increased personnel.[448]

In July the first shipment of investigative equipment was made to Corps Areas and Departments. It consisted of Minox cameras, Cine Kodaks, Smith portable typewriters, fingerprinting cameras, latent fingerprint kits and films.[449] Before the month was out, it was necessary to purchase approximately $3,000 worth of revolvers, holsters, blackjacks and portable typewriters for Iceland and British Guiana.[450]

In November, 300,000 rounds of .38 caliber revolver ammunition were obtained and 10 days after Pearl Harbor another 120,000 were obtained from Ordnance.[451] Procurement of 11 revolvers caused complications on one occasion when CIP attempted to get a priority certificate for a back-dated purchase.[452] Many hours were put in at equipment demonstrations. Personnel were called from other duties to go to local hotels where visiting suppliers set up demonstrations.[453]

Clothing funds presented problems. In January 1941, CIP had no trouble in securing an additional $40,845.00 to care for its increased strength. The increase provided for 246 initial allowances at $140 each or a total of $34,440.00 and 226 semi-annual allowances based on actual procurement of manpower anticipated for the next six months. This totaled $6,405.00.[454]

The purchase of clothing often involved compromise of identity, particularly at overseas bases, since funds were handled by the Quartermaster and there was no means of keeping transactions confidential. In September, conferences were held with the Finance Department and arrangements were made for the purchase of civilian clothing out of G2 confidential funds with a voucher notation to charge the amount later to Quartermaster funds, in bulk, without identification of personnel.[455]

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448 CIP Officer Journal, Item #290, dated 18 Nov 1941; and Item #393, dated 31 Dec 1941.

449 Ibid, Item #71, dated 22 Jul 1941.

450 Ibid, Item #78, dated 30 Jul 1941; and Item #91, dated 6 Aug 1941.

451 Ibid, Item #288, dated 18 Nov 1941; and Item #367, dated 17 Dec 1941..

452 Ibid, Item # 291, dated 18 Nov 1941.

453 Ibid, Item #301, dated 25 Nov 1941.

454 CIP Corres #2, dated 23 Jan 1941.

455 CIP Officer Journal, Item #201, dated 23 Sep 1941; and Item #206, dated 26 Sep 1941.

Identity was protected and the government was saved the necessity of buying large numbers of official automobiles in May 1941, when the Finance Department approved the payment of 5¢ a mile to investigative personnel when operating privately owned vehicles. "The mileage rate was made sufficiently large to encourage investigators to purchase and operate privately owned cars in performing official duties."[456]

Badges and credentials created an early problem. In July 1941, as the result of many conferences it was decided that with 167 MI badges lost and unaccounted for, the badge had been compromised and its use might be dangerous. New badges of a "shield" type were decided upon and new credentials designed. Separate types for active personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police and officers assigned to or engaged upon Military Intelligence Investigations were ordered. CIP credentials did not carry any military identification while MI credentials showed rank and organization. Corps Areas and Departments were ordered to recall and forward to MID all outstanding badges. When these were received in August, new badges were issued.[457]

Issuance of these new badges and credentials was proceeding under centralized control when in October 1941, Colonel Holbrook instructed that all the remaining badges and credentials be shipped out by blocks to all Corps Areas and Departments for issuance by the G2s thereof. Moreover, the matter was so imperative that the supply officer was not to leave the building until the shipment was accomplished. Said the Office Journal, "Personal ideas pass. Orders of Colonel Holbrook will be followed." Commented Captain MacDonald (in the Journal) "This is an entire reversal of former policy in this matter; and again presents the possibility of recurrance of the unsatisfactory situation during the World War, i.e., issuance of badges to friends and associates regardless of the type of work they undertake..."[458]

Masses of forms were required, particularly to make the Tentative Regulations effective. Instructions detailing preparation of Confidential Rosters and forms for "Statement of Travel by Motor Vehicle" were mailed.[459] This method of maintaining records to safeguard CIP identities was the result of many conferences with G1 and the Adjutant General.[460] In May, all field units were furnished copies of the "Daily Report of Activities" designed to provide a

456 CIP Office Journal, Item #49, dated 28 May 1941.
457 CIP Office Journal, Item #67, dated 14 Jul 1941; and Letter, G2 File #10347-7, dated 14 Jul 1941, (Cen Rec Fac); and CIP Office Journal, Item #94, dated 8 Aug 1941; and Item #95, dated 9 Aug 1941.
458 CIP Office Journal, Item #210, dated 1 Oct 1941.
459 Ibid, Item #49, dated 28 May 1941.
460 Ibid, Item #19, dated 31 Mar 1941.

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permanent record of the activities and work performed by individual CIP investigators.[461] In June, Corps were calling for more of these forms. Ninth Corps wanted 5,000 copies and got them. Fourth Corps wanted 10,000 and got 5,000.[462] Efficiency Reports, intended to be used semi-annually, were shipped out in June,[463] but the CIP regulation requiring quarterly submission was not changed until November.[464] In September, revision of the report writing manual set out procedure for making up the "fourteen point" outline of the Counterintelligence Report (CIR) 1 form.[465]

Personnel in the Office of the Chief, CIP, put in a great deal of time during 1941 in securing funds, equipment and instructors for the CIP School. The School was opened on 24 February 1941, and permanent location of the institution provided an immediate and continuing problem. The site was moved about Washington and the adjacent area was surveyed for likely locations. In November, the School was settled in what was hoped would be a permanent location in Chicago, Illinois.

Aside from the problems and requirements of the physical plant, the securing of quotas for the 30-day course provided recurrently arising issues. This facet of the problem is covered in a separate section.[466]

In April 1941, the first case of a disciplinary breach by a CIP agent was reported. An agent of the Fourth Corps Area at Atlanta, Georgia, stationed at Tampa, Florida, attended an electrical contractors and dealers state convention, accompanied by a young woman of questionable appearance. According to witnesses the agent was drunk and attended the sessions for the purpose of "mooching liquor" utilizing the whisper technique that he was an "FBI" or "Intelligence" man. Evidence indicated that no military information was divulged. Upon identification and investigation, the G2, Fourth Corps Area asked MID for authority to reduce the agent to the grade of private and discharge him from the Corps.[467]

On 9 May, permission was granted but only over the protest of the Office of the Chief, CIP, which recommended that disciplinary action for CIP personnel "be based on a policy of corrective action instead of punitive action, such action to consist, in general, of reprimands on the first occasion, punishment that 'hurts' on the second instance and separation from the CIP on the third instance."

461 CIP Office Journal, Item #36, dated 9 May 1941.
462 CIP Corres #167 - #168, dated 18, 19 Jun 1941.
463 CIP Office Journal, Item #61, dated 26 Jun 1941.
464 MID 200.3, dated 12 Nov 1941, (Ft Holabird AG Intermediate Depot).
465 CIP Office Journal, Item #187, dated 18 Sep 1941.
466 Hist of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Chap V, "CIC ZI in World War II, Sec entitled, Intro to CIC Training During World War II, (Uncl).
467 CIP Corres #16, dated 16 Apr 1941; and #5, dated 17 Apr 1941.

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"This recommendation," said the CIP Office Journal, "is based on the experiences with investigators and frequently results in developing better men instead of losing all men who commit indiscretions. However, the policy was adopted of allowing Corps Area and Department G2s to 'bust' their men and transfer them from C.I.P. without the necessity of submitting the facts to this office or explaining their action."[468]

Both headquarters and the Corps Area agreed with action transferring out of the Corps a CIP agent who made a false statement as to his marital status on a CIP application.[469]

There was a continual stream of administrative problems throughout the year.

Should a man who failed to secure a certificate of satisfactory completion of the Corps of Intelligence Police Training School be transferred from the Corps? The Chief, CIP, replied that he did not consider this sufficient reason, but such failure would make it necessary for the individual concerned to show an unusual proficiency in the performance of his work in order to merit retention or future promotion. For the CIP agent who married without prior approval of his superior officer, the Chief recommended transfer from the Corps.[470]

In October 1941, all CIP agents were ordered to spend not less than three hours a week on physical fitness as MID anticipated the day when many of them would be required for combat duty.[471]

In June 1941, MID changed its filing plan and the decimal system was adopted. MID file 10389-A-1 for CIP became "MID 322.999 CIP."[472]

Overseas Problems

American overseas Departments and bases created many problems for CIP. Operations were complicated by training difficulties and the calling back to active duty of agents who held reserve commissions. In Hawaii, where the CIP faced "the most critical period of its history," four of its eight CIP agents were reserve officers and only one could be retained in CIP work as commanding officer of the detachments. The Hawaiian G2 proposed that four graduates of the CIP School be sent to the Islands and, in exchange, four CIP agents there on duty would be returned to the mainland for reassignment. With the four men earmarked to

468 CIP Office Journal, Item #37, dated 9 May 1941.
469 Ibid, Item #133, dated 22 Aug 1941.
470 CIP Corres #18, dated 23 Jun 1941.
471 MID 329.999 CIP, Subj: Physical Fitness, dtd 27 Oct 41, (Cen Rec Fac).
472 CIP Corres #1, dated 18 Jun 1941.

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replace the officers, G2 proposed they be sent two at a time so that experienced agents would not be too far depleted. The Hawaiian G2, commenting on the possibilities of local schooling, said that suitable facilities did not exist in the Islands to conduct with any degree of secrecy a course comparable to the CIP course being conducted at the Army War College. He recommended that Hawaiian agents be trained in the United States.[473]

In March 1941, the G2, Philippines reported on his organization and training. Of authorized 16 CIP agents, 11 were on duty at Manila and two enroute from Hawaii. Arrangements were being made for the enlistment of a Philippine Scout soldier for one vacancy; and the other two spaces were scheduled to be filled shortly.

In addition, the G2 had 39 agents throughout the Philippines and planned to acquire 10 more civilian agents for work in the Provinces.

The commanding officer of the detachment was Capt. N. W. Raymond, M.I. (a Regular Army warrant officer). Captain Raymond had had many years of G2 experience including a detail in Hawaii in connection with the CIP. All new CIP men had a background of legal training or investigative experience or both. They were picked from twice as many candidates and were "exceptionally high type of men, and have already demonstrated an unusual aptitude for the work."

The G2 said that even before a copy of the Washington school schedule was received, a school had been organized. The program included the essential subjects incorporated in the Washington school program. "Of course, in view of the small size of the organization and the volume of work to be done, it is not possible to conduct a full-time training school, but it is believed that the instruction being given several hours a week in the evening, plus the actual experience gained in their daily work, is accomplishing the satisfactory training of our detachment...we are well underway with a force which will be able to handle the situation here."[474]

One year later, a CIP agent was able to accompany General MacArthur when he left the Philippines, and the rest were facing the critical weeks before the surrender of Bataan.

The S2 at the Trinidad Base Command wrote in September that there was strong feeling between American Negros and local Negros. A Negro agent was necessary to cover this situation.

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473 CIP Corres #109, dated 20 Mar 1941.
474 Ibid, #79-80, dated 28 Mar 1941.

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Another problem was coverage of French circles as there were many old French families in the area and in the neighboring British West Indies (Martinique and Guadeloupe). The S2, Maj. George Avery Chester, said that an agent was needed "who possesses special qualifications as to meeting and impressing the ladies. In other words, he should be good-looking and have 'it'." Another agent was needed with French background and language ability. Major Chester suggested by name officers who might fill these positions--two of them on duty with the CIP Washington Field Office. To his request MID replied with a curt statement of unavailability.

In November, Chester asked for two undercover agents for assignment at Fort Read, Trinidad.[475] The S2 reported that deliberate injury to expensive machinery was suspected and it was desired that one agent be placed in the power shovel and heavy machinery section as a grease monkey while the second agent be assigned to the motor repair shop.

In September the S2 at Newfoundland requested two agents. He reported that an extensive building program was in progress using citizens of the United States, Canada and Newfoundland and that headquarters inspectors had commented upon the lack of surveillance over possible fifth-column activities in that area.[476] Because of the loss of 90 agents to the Provost Marshal General in December, which will be discussed later, it was necessary to take men from the Washington Field Office to fill the quota.[477]

One problem in filling requests of overseas departments and bases until war was declared was that in spite of Public Law #96, instructions to the Adjutant General were that no selectee or reserve officer could be ordered out of the continental limits of the United States or its possessions without the consent of the soldier concerned.[478]

In the Office of the Chief, CIP, there were special operational missions that required much time in 1941 and eventually resulted in the establishment of an operations section for headquarters. In connection with supplying highly qualified agents for the most sensitive and delicate jobs, the Office of the Chief often had to arrange with various civilian organizations for individual background "cover" for Special Agents with plausible occupation and background stories; the necessary "cover" credentials; a plausible draft status; and authentic civilian passports.[479]

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475 CIP Corres #15, dated 19 Sep 1941; and #15, 1st Ind, dated 1 Oct 1941; and #9, Radio Gram, dated 22 Nov 1941.

476 CIP Corres #18, dated 9 Sep 1941.

477 (56) MID 322.999 CIC, dated 10 Dec 1941, (Cen Rec Fac).

478 CIP Office Journal, Item #89, dated 5 Aug 1941.

479 Special Text on CIC, Subcourse 30-2, p 30, (Cen Rec Fac).

One such rush assignment occurred on 10 July 1941, when German consular officers were deported to Lisbon on the U.S. Army Transport West Point. Three agents were needed; one to be a waiter, one a deck steward and one a room steward. Major Williams recommended arrangements to get the men into their respective positions prior to arrival of passengers.

Although CIP was short of skilled agents, the situation was steadily improving, and Major Williams was able to supply three agents whose education and experience made them acceptable. A card index of agent abilities which had been set up by Lieutenant Wise, the Personnel Officer, paid off; two suitable men were found in the CIP School at Washington and one in the Second Corps Area at New York.

The latter man was CIP S/Sgt. Alfred Krebs, who spoke German, French, Spanish and Italian fluently and had traveled extensively in Europe. He was, in civilian life, assistant to the famed Oscar of the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, and had years of experience as a waiter, dining room manager and hotel manager.

In the CIP School were Sgts. Lucian L. Picard and Charles F. Berlitz. Picard spoke German, French, Spanish, Italian and Swiss and had traveled throughout Europe. He had been an assistant U.S. Treasury representative in various European capitals and had extensive investigative experience. Berlitz, was of the Berlitz language school family, spoke German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and several other languages. He had traveled in Europe, South America and Asia.[480] Available records do not show the results of this assignment but numberous calls for other specially qualified agents quickly followed, and would indicate that G2, War Department, was pleased with results. For further details on many of these requirements, the section of this history entitled "CIC With the Base Commands" should be read.

Although the Office of the Chief, CIP, was organized as an administrative unit, operational intelligence information gravitated to it. In December 1941, Captain Sheen, then chief of CIP, forwarded information to the G2 Investigations subsection on a Nazi working for the Production Management Board. Another report concerned a "Baroness" at Annapolis, who had been the mistress of a high ranking Marine officer and was now cultivating the acquaintance of many Naval officers. The officer's visits to her apartment alternated with visits from the German Military Attache. Her brother was reported to be a courier for a Nazi espionage net working out of a cover firm in New York City.[481] So complete was the control by the G2 Investigative subsection that it was not until August that the Office of the Chief, CIP (OCCIP) was provided with copies of corresponsence regarding prospective members of the Corps.[482]

480 CIP Corres #51-52, dated 10 July 1941.
481 201 Sheen, Henry Gordon, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).
482 CIP Office Journal, Item #123, dated 20 Aug 1941.

The Provost Marshal "Raid"

Handling of cases, particularly background investigations of prospective CIP applicants, by the Investigative Subsection of the Domestic Intelligence Section, G2, under Maj. Nicholas Beckett, led to a conflict with OCCIP. Captain MacDonald, then Chief, complained to Colonel Bissell that the Washington Field Office of CIP had become " 'a three-headed monster', with the Third Corps Area handling it for purposes of promotion and reduction; with Major Beckett attempting to control it for investigations in the District and OCCIP attempting to build it into a specially qualified mobile force to be used wherever needed in and outside the United States as deemed necessary by the CIP headquarters."[483]

This situation may have been part of the reason for Colonel Holbrook's statement to Captain MacDonald, "They have been taking authority away from the CIP headquarters for a long time. I want you to attempt to gradually expand the authority of this headquarters. Do it in a diplomatic way."[484]

"Build up the Washington Detachment. If it gets too large, loan or attach some of these men as needed to other Corps Areas or Departments with the clear understanding that they may be ordered elsewhere at any time as deemed necessary by the C.I.P. headquarters." At this same time Colonel Holbrook curtailed the jurisdiction of the Investigative Subsection by ordering that when OCCIP requested an investigation of a CIP prospect, it would not be required to submit a Personal History Statement with the request.[485]

Another jurisdictional problem involved MID and the Third Corps Area. The District of Columbia was within the area of responsibility of the Third Corps Area and Third Corps had first operated a CIP office in the District. In May 1941, MID decided that it was impractical to attempt to conceal the identity of CIP agents in the Washington office as long as they were attached administratively to the Washington Headquarters Company. A decision was reached that all CIP personnel stationed in Washington would be transferred to Headquarters, Third Corps Area, for administrative purposes only. It was planned that Third Corps Area would decentralize administrative control to the officer placed in charge of the CIP detachment in Washington and the office would operate independently of all Corps Area matters and engage in investigative work solely for MID.[486]

However, later in the month Third Corps Area asked specifically what this transfer meant and General Miles replied that the personnel were "part of the DEML, CIP detachment, Third Corps Area and their administrative control is the

483 CIP Office Journal, Item #160, dated 4 Sep 1941.
484 Ibid, Item #146a, dated 28 Aug 1941.
485 Ibid, Item #155, 156, dated 3 Sep 1941.
486 Ibid, Item #38, dated 10 May 1941.

responsibility of Headquarters, Third Corps Area..." General Miles said investigative work would be carried on under the sole direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department.[487] Moreover, OCCIP was told that Colonel Eddy's OK was required to move CIP personnel of the field office.[488]

Since this reply said nothing about decentralization of administrative responsibility to MID, the result was that Third Corps Area assumed that responsibility. The situation was further confused in August by plans to merge the two Washington CIP offices in the interest of economy and have the MID detachment "execute instructions and missions normally performed by Third Corps Area."[489]

Colonel Bissell, chief of the Counterintelligence Branch, G2, agreed that the local detachment should be under control of the OCCIP so that agents could be sent to any place at any time. He said he was "going to take this matter up with the front office (General Miles)..." The following day, it was decided that requests for investigation of prospective members of CIP, Washington Detachment, would be written by OCCIP for the signature of Colonel Bissell, and a carbon of the letter furnished Major Beckett, Chief of the Investigative Subsection. Maj. David G. Erskine, Chief of the Domestic Intelligence Section, would actually sign the letters.[490]

In October, General Miles ordered the Chief, CIP to visit all Corps Areas and consult with them on the CIP expansion program.[491] Meanwhile, opposition to CIP expansion was growing. In August, by Presidential Executive order, the Office of Provost Marshal General and the Military Police Corps were recreated. Shortly thereafter, agitation was started to transfer CIC functions in the United States to the jurisdiction of the Provost Marshal. This pressure did not let up until such a transfer was accomplished in February 1944.

This agitation had encouragement even within G2, as some officers believed that the CIP should be divorced from G2, and that G2, as a policy unit, should not operate any organization. This idea was furthered by Military Police officials charged with organization of the PMG School; they claimed there was a possibility that Military Police and the CIP would be combined.[492] When this was reported to Colonel Holbrook, Executive Officer of the Counterintelligence Branch, G2, he informed OCCIP that there was "no assurance whatever" that CIP will be merged with the Military Police under the Provost Marshal General; he planned and personally hoped that MID would be able to organize its own intelligence

487 CIP Office Journal, Item #58, dated 31 May 1941.
488 Ibid, Item #156, dated 3 Sep 1941.
489 Ibid, Item #144, dated 28 Aug 1941.
490 Ibid, Items #160, 162-3, dated 4 Sep 41 and 5 Sep 41.
491 Ibid, Item #240, dated 25 Oct 1941.
492 Ibid, Item #165, dated 6 Sep 1941.

operating outfit.[493] The Military Police did not stop trying. In October 1941, they proposed that the CIP School be operated at the Arlington Cantonment, Arlington, Virginia, at the same location as the proposed Military Police School. This was vetoed by G2 on the ground it would entail $250,000 in construction expense.[494]

Meanwhile, the Provost Marshal had another proposition which had been advanced in September when the Chief of Staff of the Army had desired to reduce the number of personnel spaces directly chargeable against the War Department General Staff. At that time it was reasoned if seven specific MID functions were transferred to the Provost Marshal General, there could be a reduction in MID personnel. Although G2 recommended strongly that this not be done, the Chief of Staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, approved the plan as of 29 October 1941.[495]

Functions taken from CIP included investigation of applicants for employment in the Military Establishment; of employees scheduled for sensitive duties; of Civilian Conservation Corps cases; of scientists for the National Defense Committee; and of sources for data for the Counter Fifth Column Plan. It also took away from MID, operation of the Visa and Passport Section and issuance of credentials to visitors to plants and arsenals engaged in classified work. Both of the latter named activities often had important connections with CIP cases.

Since under the Delimitations Agreement, MID was the only War Department agency officially authorized to contact the FBI in connection with Army security matters, this transfer confused and complicated liaison problems. Of this jurisdictional transfer G2 Historian Bidwell has written,

> "Heretofore there always had been a sharp line of demarkation existing between the various counterintelligence activities of MID and the duties concurrently assigned to the Provost Marshal General which included only those pertaining to criminal investigation and police responsibility for the United States Army. Although under the new circumstances MID still continued to assume prompt control over all investigative cases showing any evidence of subversion or disloyalty, the fine distinction which had been traditionally drawn between the operational functions of the two agencies no longer could remain in force.[496]

In November, when CIP Chief Sheen made his inspection of five Corps Areas, he discovered that representatives of other departments of the Government, notably members of the FBI, indicated that much confusion had been created by

493 CIP Office Journal, Item #178, dated 12 Sep 1941.
494 Ibid, Item #239, dated 24 Oct 1941.
495 Hist, MID Vol 3, pp 255, 257, (Secret).
496 Ibid, p 257.

the existence of numerous and apparently unrelated investigative organizations within the Army. Critics named the Air Corps Plant Protection setup, the Ordnance Department Plant Protection Establishment; the Quartermaster General's Office, the Military Intelligence Division and now the newly created Provost Marshal General's Office. These gentlemen definitely stated that they preferred to deal with the Military Intelligence Division and were completely befogged by ignorance of prescribed fields of jurisdiction of the various agencies mentioned above.

On 13 November 1941, OCCIP learned that not only had it lost a number of its important functions but it was to lose more than 20 percent of its total CIP to the Provost Marshal General to carry on the CIP functions which the Provost Marshal General was assuming.[497]

Not only were 90 agents being taken, but with them were being transferred 90 appropriate grades. OCCIP was not consulted when these quotas were determined.

No matter where the men were drawn, operations would suffer but after consideration of all angles, OCCIP recommended to G2 that no agents be taken from Department, bases, the Alaska Defense Command or the Washington Field Office which had an authorized strength of 55 men. OCCIP proposed that the CIP agents of this latter office be considered "a pool available for temporary assignment where particular need is emphasized."[498]

In connection with this request, OCCIP provided an example of the difference between authorized and effective manpower. The Washington office was authorized 55 agents but actually had 23 men to do the work. It had 15 vacancies, nine of which were due to legislation which released all selectees who were 28 years of age or more when inducted. Eight men were on special duty either with MID or as linguists. Six were trainees awaiting schooling; one was alerted for overseas assignment, another for Officer Candidate School and one was in the hospital.[499]

On 1 December 1941, with war only a week away, Captain Sheen contemplated the reduction in force and forwarded to G2 his conclusions on other problems of the Corps which came to light during his two week inspection tour of the Fourth through Eighth Corps Area.

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497 CIP-Office Journal, Item #277, dated 13 Nov 1941.
498 CIP Corres #11, dated 15 Nov 1941.
499 Ibid.

The Chief's Recommendations

Corps Area G2s, Captain Sheen said, were administering CIP Confidential Funds in a restrictive and circumscribed manner. "Agents engaged in the investigation of an active case should not be restricted in the accomplishment of their mission by being required to engage in extensive fiscal accounting. I am definitely of the opinion that the matter of disbursing M.I.D. funds to C.I.P. agents is entirely too arbitrary and that this procedure is partly responsible for such low morale and improperly conducted investigations as may exist at the present time..." He recommended that a policy letter be issued emphasizing common sense in the handling of these funds.

Captain Sheen felt that there was a tendency on the part of many commissioned officers having supervision over members of the CIP to administer such agents in exactly the same manner as peace-time enlisted men in garrison. "They overlook the fact that a large majority of the agents of the C.I.P. are college graduates, of good birth and breeding, and exceptionally fine background, and that in most instances these men have had considerable investigative experience in long established Federal agencies and other professional bodies, and, in having been investigated and accepted, should be considered reliable and trustworthy, and not looked upon with suspicion or contempt..."[500]

Captain Sheen voiced the same criticism that Colonel Ward had voiced in World War I, i.e., that officers having supervision of CIP agents did not inform the agents of the final results of the work performed by these men. "One of the ways," said Captain Sheen, "in which we can maintain high morale among the members of the C.I.P. is to keep them informed as to the results of their investigations. When the suspect is eventually dismissed from the service or otherwise disposed of, the agent responsible for the initial action should be so informed and commended..." However, experience later in the war revealed that this morale problem was created at higher levels. Immediate supervisors were well aware of the importance of relaying this information and usually could convince their immediate superiors in the next echelons. But somewhere above that the system failed.[501]

Captain Sheen said that in every Corps Area he visited, he learned that the majority of post, camp and stations intelligence officers were being assigned additional duties having no bearing upon intelligence functions. This was especially true at many exempt stations. "In the Sixth Corps Area," said

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500 CIP Corres #11, dated 15 Nov 1941.

501 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, M.I., USAR, who supervised CIC agents during World War II at the Army's Ordnance Research Center, Aberdeen, Md, where he was chief investigating officer.

Captain Sheen, "one intelligence officer has been assigned some six additional duties, including those of post exchange officer, welfare and recreation officer, etc..."

Captain Sheen reported general agreement on the importance of bringing CIP out from under cover and on changing the name to de-emphasize the word "police." Captain Sheen said the "shroud of anonymity with which we have endeavored to cloak the C.I.P. is actually the greatest obstacle we have in the accomplishment of our mission."

Captain Sheen found that the need for additional Civil Service stenographer and typist personnel was general and the OCCIP policy of recommending one typist for each three CIP agents was inadequate. "It is believed the lack of sufficient clerical personnel is one of the reasons for the backlog of cases existing in most Corps Areas and also interferes with the investigating functions of agents inasmuch as these men are now required to type up their own reports after the day's work is done." He recommended action to see that all quotas for stenographer typists were filled.

Finally, Captain Sheen recommended that CIP district offices be established in Houston, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri; Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Detroit and Lansing, Michigan; Rock Island, Rockford and Springfield, Illinois; Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin; Cleveland, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In addition, there were offices to be considered for the four Corps Areas not included in the inspection. A chart was prepared and submitted to General Miles.[502]

On 24 November, General Miles agreed to the establishment of 22 district offices and Major Erskine was directed to draw up the necessary staff study to complete the project.[503] At this time OCCIP received information to prepare a flexible plan for organization of a sizeable CIC detachment for duty at headquarters of any theater of operations the United States might be forced to create.[504]

Meanwhile, Army structure was evolving. In February 1941, the Alaskan Defense Command and the Caribbean Defense Command were activated. In March the Iceland Command was created; in May the Southern Defense Command and in June the Eastern Command.

By November 1941, the Army was one million, four hundred thousand stronger than it had been two years before. It had 36 partly equipped divisions out of more than 90 that would be needed. Some large scale training maneuvers had been held,

502 CIP Office Journal, Item #279, dated 22 Nov 1941.
503 Ibid, Item #300, dated 24 Nov 1941.
504 Ibid, Item #311, dated 28 Nov 1941.

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but equipment was still critically short. The Army had only 2,000 of the 96,000 tanks the war would require and small arms ammunition stores totaled less than the amount used in two months by the Infantry alone after the invasion of France. Only 600 of the 61,500 105mm howitzers and 60 of the 7,800 155mm guns used during the war were received by the Army in 1941. Only seven divisions could be equipped for immediate dispatch to battle zones and had all the divisions been ready, only a fraction of the shipping required was available.[505] Compared with future requirements, the Corps of Intelligence Police was in the same state.

Previous sections of this chapter have shown the effectiveness of what G2 Historian Bidwell terms "...the adverse influences tending to restrict activities" whenever efforts were made to attain an active and efficient counterintelligence organization.[506] Author James Burnham in "The Web of Subversion" has described the era starting in 1933 as the great growth period of Communist subversion in Government. Whittaker Chambers described much of it to Adolph Berle of the State Department in 1939.[507]

In 1941, Congressman Martin Dies, summed up four years of investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee with a report to the President. Dies subsequently wrote, "Now in 1941, I submitted to the Executive a list of about 2,000 Communists on the federal payroll including Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Harold Glasser and others and asked that they be discharged."

Dies said that in spite of his efforts, the Communists remained in office for more than a decade after that time. He said that President Roosevelt had stated, in effect, that he did not want communism investigated and that the President did not see communism was any threat to the United States, but did feel that it was essential that the United States and the Soviet Union work together to win the war.[508]

Historian Chester Wilmot says that Roosevelt also believed that since Russia would dominate Europe on defeat of the Axis, it was essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with her.[509]

When the CIP investigated War Department Communists in 1940, Mrs. Roosevelt revealed an interest according to Brig. Gen. W. A. Holbrook, Retired, who at that time was Major Holbrook, Officer-in-Charge of the Corps of Intelligence Police for the Army G2. General Holbrook wrote, "This became a test

505 Army Almanac 1950, pp 298, 304, (Uncl).
506 Hist of MID Vol 3, p 75, (Secret).
507 Burnham, pp 32, 97, (Uncl).
508 U. S. News and World Report, dated 20 August 1954, p 57.
509 Wilmot, Chester, "The Struggle for Europe," Harper Bros, New York, (1952), P 447. NOTE: Hereafter cited as "Wilmot." (Uncl)

case, inasmuch as Mrs. Roosevelt showed personal interest in it. However, the employee was not reinstated...our activities with Communists had to be carried on very carefully because of the sympathetic attitude of the White House."[510]

This was the atmosphere in which CIC started its war time growth, with the "adverse influences" as Bidwell had termed them, urging that CIC's functions be transferred to other agencies and that its true role was in combat counterintelligence. By the summer of 1942, General Holbrook wrote, "...there had been several instances which had incurred the displeasure of certain powerful politicians with a result that in July information was given orally to the Counterintelligence Section it would be reduced radically in the scope of its functions and a great many of their civilian employees and officers would be transferred to other sections..." It was then, General Holbrook says, that he was relieved from the General Staff and transferred to combat troops.[511]

Meanwhile, Communists were boasting that they had some 50,000 comrades in the Armed Forces, but keeping discreetly quiet about the location of important agents who by this time had infiltrated practically all the nation's sensitive areas. Dies has stated that the Communists had infiltrated the Armed Forces even before Selective Service and that his committee found considerable evidence of this.[512]

It was at this time that plans were being made for the assignment of CIC agents with the first waves of invasion troops in North Africa and the start of a program that would take thousands of them away from the United States into combat duty in all areas of the world.

December 1941

On 1 December 1941, Item #314 of the Office Journal of the OCCIP reads, "All officers turned out in uniform for inspection." Item #324 on 4 December reads "Colonel Holbrook called a conference of all sections relative to a Christmas party for the Branch -- 3 to 5 p.m. December 23." The next significant item is dated "7 December 1941." This item, #329, reads:

> "In view of radio reports concerning the attack on Honolulu by Japanese aircraft, Captain Sheen and Lieutenant Wise reported to the office 5:30 p.m. Captain Sheet reported to Colonel Holbrook who stated no action to be taken until Monday, December 8. Captain Sheen called the field office, received no answer. Eventually aroused Sergeant Wills at his home and instructed Sergeant Wills to detail two agents to duty at night in the field office."

510 Holbrook, pp 2, 3, (Uncl).
511 Ibid, p 3, (Uncl).
512 Dies, Martin, from U.S. News and World Report, dated 20 Aug 54, p 64, (Uncl).

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The next day staff studies were forwarded requesting that the strength of the Corps be doubled to a total of 1,026 men; that all former CIPs now in the Enlisted Reserve be ordered back to duty and that orders for the transfer of 90 agents to the Provost Marshal General be revoked.[513] The doubling of strength and recall of Enlisted Reserve members was approved the next day. But the Provost Marshal General was not to be denied and in spite of the cost to the Corps, 90 agents were transferred as of 15 December.[514]

The increased strength was allocated as follows:[515]

Corps Areas		Other Areas	
1st	38	Hawaii	35
2nd	89	Philippines	56
3rd	78	Panama	53
4th	67	Puerto Rico	32
5th	39	Alaska	15
6th	49	Bermuda	3
7th	39	Caribbean	23
8th	56	Greenland	4
8th	71	Iceland	24
MID	106	Newfoundland	3
		Trinidad	20

Allocations do not immediately produce manpower, and although the Corps was authorized 1,026 by 22 December 1941, it had a total of 405 men of which 383 were available for duty.[516] By 31 December 1941, the total actually on duty had increased to 399.[517] Demands were growing steadily and the year ended with a request from the Air Force that a special allotment be made to provide at least one CIP agent for each air base; world-wide, this would require practically all of the existing CIP force then.

The tempo was fast increasing. On 11 December, an additional $3,000 a month was received for increased rentals for the Chicago school to handle additional quotas.[518] On 23 December, instead of the Christmas party, there was a meeting of section chiefs to discuss coordination of counterintelligence activities with the newly established Defense Command headquarters within

513 CIP Office Journal, Item #330, dated 8 Dec 1941.
514 CIP Corres #7, dated 8 Dec 1941.
515 (9) MID 322.999 CIC, dated 8 Dec 1941, (Cen Rec Fac).
516 MID 319.1, dated Aug - Dec 41, (Ft Holabird AG Intermediate Depot).
517 Basic Hist of CIC, 1917-1943, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).
518 CIP Office Journal, Item #348, dated 11 Dec 1941.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST ARMORED DIVISION
Fort Polk, Louisiana

17 July 1956

Chief Army Intelligence Center
Fort Holabird, Maryland
ATTN: Historical Officer

The inclosed letter, dated March 1920, concerning counter-espionage was found included with some other old records. I am sending it to you since it might be a suitable addition to your intelligence library.

Sincerely,

/s/Landon G. Cox
LANDON G. COX
Colonel, Armor
ACOFS, G3

1 Incl: a/s

0673

Military Intelligence Division
In replying refer to
10589-119-MIN

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington

March 1920.

From: Director of Military Intelligence,

To: Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence.
Southern Dept., Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Subject: Counter-Espionage Manuals.

1. The counterespionage service will be discontinued as it is believed that there is no longer any necessity for such an organization in the Military service. The C. E. service was organized primarily for locating and eliminating enemy agents in our ranks. The war being over, the activities of the German Secret Service are no longer a source of danger to the Army. The only menace we will have to combat is the radical propaganda that the Reds may try to disseminate in the Army, and the activities of Red agitators who may enlist. It is believed that this can be successfully met by requiring each organization commander to keep his own ranks free from radical influence. This should be done through the vigilance of noncommissioned officers rather than by operation of a C. E. system.

2. The fact that radical organizations, such as the Union of Russian Workers, the I. W. W., the Communist Party of America and the Communist Labor Party, are openly advocating the overthrow of this Government by force should be carefully explained to the noncommissioned officers in each organization.

3. It is therefore requested that you return immediately to this office such of the following confidential pamphlets as may be in your possession:

Provisional C. E. Instructions, edition of February, 1918.

Principles of C. E. Organizations and Control within the Military Establishment edition of May, 1918.

Provisional Intelligence Instructions for Civilian Personnel under Military Control.

Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of C. E. Service within Military Units, edition of August, 1918.

4. Upon receipt of these confidential pamphlets, proper credit will be made on our record.

/s/ W. A. McCain
W. A. McCAIN,
Colonel, Cavalry
Chief, Negative Branch

No incls.
Bc

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14 August 1956

Colonel Landon G. Cox
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Headquarters 1st Armored Division
Fort Polk, Louisiana

Dear Colonel Cox:

The March 1920 letter from the Director of Intelligence which you found among old records and sent to us has turned out to be a very important document. Researchers who were working from 1953 through 1955 on a History of the Counter Intelligence Corps and its predecessor, the Corps of Intelligence Police, had heard of its existence but were unable to locate a copy. Although they finished their basic manuscript last November, this letter will be incorporated, since it furnishes a significant link in the deemphasis of our intelligence organization during the years between the two World Wars.

Your thoughtfulness in rescuing this document and sending it to us is deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

FRANK M. HOSTERMAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

Memo for Record: Original letter filed in AIS Museum by PIO 13 Sep 56

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ARMY Ft Holabird

continental limits of the United States, and a conference with the acting G2 followed the next day.[519]

Washington became very security conscious. Radar equipment arrived at Bolling Field and CIP was called upon to furnish two uniformed agents as security guards.[520] The Provost Marshal apprehended a suspicious individual at the main entrance of the Munitions Building on 12 December and requested CIP assistance for the interrogation. A CIP agent investigated and cleared the suspect.[521]

CIP agents were assembled on 12 December and briefed on plans for a security survey of the Munitions Building. Three days later the initial reconnaissance and preliminary survey had been completed; this included obtaining floor plans. Conferences were held with the Provost Marshal concerning security problems of the area. During the night of December 17-18, Captain Sheen, 11 officers and 34 special agents conducted an exhaustive search of the Munitions Building and secured a room full of classified material which had not been properly safeguarded. Included was the official War Department seal and a proposed promotion list for high ranking officers that was obtained from the Adjutant General's office. Although the search had been approved by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and the G2, Maj. Gen. E. S. Adams, The Adjutant General, was not particularly pleased at the seizure of the promotion list. The next day he called upon Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, who was Acting G2 in the absence of General Miles for a trip to South America. General Adams complained about the methods used by the searchers, but when Captain Sheen, who was present at the meeting, explained what actually had been done, it was evident that General Adams had been mislead by his officers who were trying to cover up for themselves and their personnel.[522]

Another security assignment was safeguarding a meeting of the Supreme War Council. Rooms to be used in the Federal Reserve building were surveyed and six special agents under Capt. F. C. Brennecks, commanding the Washington Field Office, were scheduled for interior coverage during the conference.[523]

In connection with a general security survey of the District of Columbia, a CIP special agent discovered that there were two danger points in the District water supply system; guards were immediately ordered to these points. Conferences were held with representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence relative to internal security problems in the District.[524]

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519 CIP Office Journal, Item #380, dated 23 Dec 1941.
520 Ibid, Item #350, dated 11 Dec 1941.
521 Ibid, Item #352, dated 12 Dec 1941.
522 Ibid, Item #369, dated 18 Dec 1941; and Item #370, dated 19 Dec 1941.
523 Ibid, Item #382, dated 23 Dec 1941.
524 Ibid, Item #391, dated 29 Dec 1941.

On 11 December, Colonel Holbrook approved the recommendation to change the name of the Corps and on 13 December, AG letter order, AG 320.2 (12 Dec 41) MR-M-B, was issued stating, "Effective January 1, 1942, the Corps of Intelligence Police is redesignated and will thereafter be known as the Counter Intelligence Corps... All enlisted personnel who are members of the Corps of Intelligence Police as of midnight December 31, 1941 will be transferred in their present grade to the Counter Intelligence Corps."[525]

On 9 December 1941, General Miles submitted to the Chief of Staff the proposal to bring the Corps out from undercover. He wrote:

"The anonymity surrounding the Corps of Intelligence Police serves as a barrier to the full and efficient accomplishment of certain missions of that body and should be abandoned...

"In the current endeavor to function secretly it has been found that agents of the Corps of Intelligence Police encounter much difficulty in obtaining rapid and whole-hearted cooperation from persons who know nothing of the existence of the organization our agents purport to represent... Secrecy also serves to prevent persons possessing information of military value from reporting such data to the appropriate intelligence authorities...

"Long established professional investigative units such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and similar bodies have found that any attempt to cloak their organizations in secrecy has the sole effect of placing such organizations into a vacuum... It is believed that knowledge of the existence of a trained body of carefully selected agents operating within the military service will have a salutory affect upon the Army and the general public... Under present circumstances, requirement for classification of all communications of a general nature, not pertaining to suspects or cases, constantly retards and impedes the normal functions of the Corps of Intelligence Police.

General Miles recommended that "the existence, history, activities and jurisdiction of the Corps of Intelligence Police be made known publicly... That in its future operations the Corps of Intelligence Police will function with part of its personnel operating as such openly and the remainder operating under cover."[526]

A proposed directive was prepared which included personnel identification stating, "Identity of commissioned and enlisted Corps of Intelligence Police

525 CIP Office Journal, Item #346, dated 11 Dec 1941.

526 MID 322.999 CIP, "Immediate Action Staff Study," dtd 9 Dec 41, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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personnel will remain undisclosed except in those cases where, in order to further the interests of the service, it is deemed appropriate to permit certain individuals to be known in the community as agents of military intelligence." The directive would also state, "This change in policy in no way affects the classification of case reports, rosters, suspect lists, movements, strength and other matters of an official or professional nature."

On 24 December, Brig. Gen. William Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, directed Captain Sheen to report to him concerning the proposed abandonment of the anonymity now surrounding the CIP. Captain Sheen explained the need and General Bryden approved this action unofficially, but suggested that a press release be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau of Public Relations and a copy of the press release be sent out with the letters announcing change in policy.[527] This action was still pending at the close of the year and the announcement was not made until mid-January.

With war an actuality, the question of CIP leadership became critical, and on 26 December, General Lee, Acting G2, forwarded to the Chief of Staff a staff study by Captain Sheen in which he recommended that prior to assignment of commissioned officers to duty with the CIP, the names of the officers would be furnished to G2, War Department, for clearance. To eliminate misfits already in such positions, Captain Sheen further recommended that all field units furnish MID with a roster of all officers in such positions. This recommendation was speedily approved.[528]

In his discussion of the problem, Captain Sheen reported:

> "Effective operation of the Corps of Intelligence Police cannot take place without suitably experienced officers... Fourteen month's actual experience has proved that the majority of the officers who have been assigned by local commanders are unsuited and untrained. This has injured the morale of our Corps of specially trained Intelligence Police, and the counterintelligence mission is less effective than it must be... The counteraction of the skillful professional enemy agents will not occur under inexperienced amateurs. ...This division has a list of competent and experienced commissioned personnel who are exceptionally qualified by previous training to supervise the activities of the Corps of Intelligence Police wherever the services of that body may be required, and believes they should be used for this purpose. This is particularly true at this moment when the effectiveness of counterintelligence should be at its peak."

527 CIP Office Journal, Item #384, dated 24 Dec 1941.

528 MID 322.999 CIP, Memo to C/S, Subj: "Commissioned Personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police," dtd 26 Dec 1941, (Cen Rec Fac).

The full impact of the war was felt almost immediately at the Office of the Chief CIP, with greatly increased activity due to movement and procurement of personnel, interviews with prospective members of the CIP; supply problems, fiscal matters and general matters. A direct two-way line had to be installed between the Executive Officer of the MID Counterintelligence Branch and the Office of the Chief, CIP (OCCIP). Captain Wise, the personnel officer, was literally swamped as applicants for CIP duty came in personally or forwarded mail. The Office Journal notes, "This office is being flooded with visitors volunteering their services, most of whom have an idea that intelligence work consists of nothing but glamor and excitement."[529]

In a letter urging field G2s to make provisions for physical exercise facilities for CIP agents, the "glamor and excitement" is described by the Chief, CIP as being "subject to call twenty-four hours per day, they have to work long hours without adequate rest, they are subjected to the harshness of certain weather conditions, and quite often they find it necessary to go long hours without food. In addition these agents often find it necessary to resort to physical bodily force in self-defense..."[530]

So ended the 23 years between World Wars and the longest span of peace in the history of the United States. The CIP was now better organized than ever before and at the start of World War II it had nearly half as many agents actually on duty as it had in World War I. But the growth which should have been spread over two decades was compressed into two years with an inevitable loss of efficiency. Nevertheless, team work with associated agencies under the Delimitations Agreement had resulted in the virtual neutralization of German and Japanese espionage and sabotage agents in the United States. But national security cases were piling up; CIP's backlog totaled in the thousands and the FBI was reported to have nearly 50,000 such cases unassigned.[531]

In these two decades, Soviet espionage had reaped a harvest of military information and had so successfully penetrated the United States Government at high levels that it took another decade to dislodge it. Even then it was doubtful whether it had all been uncovered. In the 30 years, when Army counter-intelligence should have been at its best, it is evident that there was little military information from atomic bomb data to morale in the ranks, that failed to reach Soviet spy masters.

In retrospect, it seems easy to assess the blame but perhaps Nathaniel Weyl in his book, "The Battle Against Disloyalty," came close to the truth:

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529 CIP Office Journal, Item #373, dated 20 Dec 1941.

530 MID 322.999 CIP, Memo for Chief, CI Branch, Subj: "Physical Fitness," (Cen Rec Fac).

531 Lowenthal, p 422, (Uncl).

"Throughout most of American history, the temper of the people has been to distrust law enforcement agencies; to confine the power of the state to a bare minimum and to prefer revolution to anything smacking of despotism. It was only when the United States plunged into the maelstrom of European conflicts and found itself facing conspirative organizations which were in essence mere forward lines of a foreign enemy that the need for a complex federal organization to investigate, explore and secure punishment of the disloyal became evident."[532]

532 Weyl, p 8, (Uncl).

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BOX NUMBER: ///

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME V

CIC HEADQUARTERS, ZONE OF INTERIOR WORLD WAR II

[redacted]

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON

April 1960

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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[redacted]

* *

MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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ZONE OF INTERIOR WORLD WAR II

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Section 1

THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

At the beginning of 1942, the Counter Intelligence Corps still was in its infancy, despite a history spanning more than 20 years as the Corps of Intelligence Police. The name was new; the Corps of Intelligence Police was rechristened the Counter Intelligence Corps only on 1 January 1942. Most of the Corps' personnel were novices at counterintelligence, and, more important, a host of new and unforeseen problems were thrust upon the Corps by the outbreak of global war. The urgency of the times demanded that they be solved quickly.

Within the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, rested the tremendous responsibility for recruiting, training, and equipping new CIC agents and for determining policies governing their employment in untested situations.[1] To key CIC officers, the scope of the problems seemed to require centralized control of counterintelligence activities. The question of centralization or decentralization was an old one, never quite answered. But in the first two years of the war, concentration of control within a central organization was authorized.

By 1 January 1943, it had been recommended that CIC operations be divorced from the existing staff organization and established under a special staff officer as an operational division similar to the Signal Corps.[2] Although this recommendation never was accepted, strong arguments were advanced for greater centralization.

On 22 May 1943, the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch insisted in a memorandum to Col L. R. Forney that his office must have certain powers if it was to accomplish its mission. "If the job assigned to the Corps is to be performed," he wrote, "it will be necessary to:

a. Improve the quality of the Corps.
b. Limit activities of members of the Corps to approved CIC functions.
c. Redistribute personnel to meet work load conditions."

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1 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), p. 148.

2 Memorandum for Colonel Crist, dtd 1 Jan 43, subj: "Memorandum from the Detachment Counter Intelligence Corps dtd September 26, 1943, subject: "The Counter Intelligence Corps," /s/Hugh D. Wise, Maj, Chief Counter Intelligence Corps, (Unclassified) (in Origin and Organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-25 October 1943, Central Records Facility).

He particularly stressed the third point. "The redistribution of CIC personnel to conform with work loads must continue to be a continuing activity with the control of the Corps centralized under the CIC branch..."[3]

Letters from the field also emphasized the desirability of centralized control of CIC personnel. In a personal letter to Maj Gen George V. Strong, the War Department G2,[4] Brig Gen James C. Crockett, G2, European Theater of Operations, commented: "Experience here and in North Africa indicates that these investigators should be under central control and sent out either for specific missions or to handle territorial areas...All special investigators should be Chicago trained, under the central control of the Theater G2...."[5]

In the summer of 1943, when General Strong was transferred and Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner became acting G2, War Department, his CIC briefing from the CIC Chief again called attention to the need for centralization:

> The counterintelligence mission can be accomplished more efficiently by a centralized Corps carried on War Department overhead, than by personnel assigned to utilizing units on a permanent Table of Organization basis.
>
> (1)...Complete centralization of control has long been established as essential in intelligence work; e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Scotland Yard, Royal Mounted Police.
>
> (2)...Centralized control permits the utmost economy in the use of manpower...
>
> (3)...Both by Presidential Directive and War Department Regulations, the counterintelligence responsibility rests on G2, War Department. The direct control of the instrument, through which this responsibility is discharged, greatly facilitates the operation.
>
> (4)...Centralized control of the War Department overhead organization permits maximum secrecy of operation.

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3 Memorandum from Col H. R. Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, 22 May 1943, subject: "Suggested Changes and Adjustments Within the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

4 General Strong had replaced Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee as G2 on 5 May 1942.

5 Ltr from Brig Gen James C. Crockett to Maj Gen George V. Strong, 6 Jul 43, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

(5)...Centralized control permits the utilization of the individual at the point where his specific qualifications or talents can be of maximum value.[6]

Organization of the Chief's Office

The concept of centralization was reflected in the mission and organization of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

Duties of the Chief were essentially administrative. They included the selection, investigation, assignment, movement, supply, and training of all members of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Mobilization, with its concomitant increases in the size of the Corps, multiplied the duties--and problems--many times. On 1 June 1942, Maj H. G. Sheen estimated that his work as Chief had increased by 250 percent since the beginning of the war.

At that time, the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch was organized into five sections: Personnel, Supply, Fiscal, Operations, and Plans and Training.

The Personnel Section, directed by 1st Lt James F. Foothorap, was given responsibility for the stepped-up CIC recruiting program. Three other officers and six civilian employees assisted Lieutenant Foothorap in the selection, investigation, assignment, and classification of all CIC personnel. Maintenance of files, preparation of strength reports, and review of efficiency reports were among the duties of this section.

Selection, testing, procurement, and shipment of investigative equipment to detachments in the field were among the major responsibilities of the Supply Section, under Maj Thomas G. O'Neal. This section, composed of three officers and three civilian employees, also handled all Military Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Corps badges and credentials.

Capt Neville K. Adkinson, as Chief of the Fiscal Section, was assigned the complicated task of setting up budget requirements of the Counter Intelligence Corps. He worked closely with commands utilizing CIC detachments and made frequent trips to the Corps areas to audit fiscal and property accounts.

The primary responsibility of the Operations Section was the coordination of CIC activities with all operations of the Army outside the United States. Capt Lowell J. Bradford, the CIC operations officer, conferred with intelligence personnel of outgoing task forces and arranged for CIC detachments to accompany

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6 Memorandum from Col H. R. Kibler to Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, 31 Aug 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

the forces. He also assisted agents in the preparation of cover for special undercover missions overseas.

Work of the Plans and Training Section was directed by Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., who also doubled as CIC Executive Officer. Planning and control of all CIC training activities were among his responsibilities.[7]

Seven months later, after Major Wise had replaced Colonel Sheen as Chief, CIC, an Army Air Forces Liaison Section had been established to coordinate counterintelligence activities between CIC and the Air Forces.[8] For some time, Major Bradford served as liaison officer in addition to his duties as operations officer. In June 1943, he was appointed liaison officer on a full-time basis, and Capt Samuel E. Ewing became Chief of the Operations Office.

An Administrative Section was established in May 1943, with Lt Montgomery Curtis as Chief. A month later the Plans and Training Section was redesignated the Training Section, and Maj George L. Staudt was appointed section chief.[9]

On 1 February 1943, the expanded duties of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, were itemized in a memorandum from Col John T. Bissell, Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group. They included the formulation of general policies pertaining to CIC; liaison with directors of intelligence of the service commands; liaison with the War Department's Operations Division, Services of Supply, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the various services; selection and procurement of investigative equipment; selection of detachments for special missions; auditing of CIC funds; maintenance of training schools and selection of special agents for attendance at officer candidate schools, and all matters pertaining to CIC personnel.[10]

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7 History of Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), pp. 152-153; and Memorandum from Maj H. G. Sheen to Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, 1 June 1943, subject: "Report on Study of Organization and Civilian Personnel Needs," quoted in History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 to March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

8 Memorandum from Major Wise to Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, 29 Dec 42, Subj: "Duties and Functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Military Intelligence Service," quoted in History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 to March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

9 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), pp. 153-154. Work of these sections will be discussed more fully in other sections of this chapter.

10 Memorandum from Col John T. Bissell to Chief, CIC, 1 Feb 43, subject: "Duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Several important personnel changes occurred on 10 May 1943. Colonel H. R. Kibler became Chief, CIC, and Lieutenant Colonel Wise was designated Assistant Chief. Major Adkinson was appointed Executive Officer.[11]

CIC Goes House-Hunting

The Counter Intelligence Corps Branch was forced to move its offices frequently during 1942 and early 1943 as the ever-increasing staff required larger quarters.

Originally located in a single room in the Munitions Building in Washington, D.C., the CIC Headquarters expanded and moved into a second room in the same building on 12 February 1942.[12] In March, with office space in the Munitions Building at a premium, CIC Headquarters were opened in the Security Exchange Commission Building in Washington. A month later, CIC moved again--this time to offices at 1430 K Street in the nation's capital.[13]

A problem more serious than cramped quarters prompted the next move of CIC Headquarters. On 3 December 1942, a War Department memorandum specified that not more than a third of the officers assigned to any section in Washington could be below 35 years of age. A quick check of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch revealed that six of its nine officers were below that age. Either the young officers had to be replaced, or CIC Headquarters had to be moved outside Washington.

In a memorandum for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, Major Wise explored the possible solutions to CIC's problem. Since the CIC Chief felt that replacement of the officers in his section would result in impared efficiency, he requested that CIC be excepted from the provisions of the War Department memorandum. As an alternative, he proposed moving CIC Headquarters to Baltimore.[14]

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11 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

12 CIC Office Journal, Entry 528, 12 Feb 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

13 CIC Office Journal, 27 Jan 41 - 1 Mar 42, entry dtd 24 Mar 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, p. 151, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

14 Memorandum, Maj Hugh D. Wise to Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, 17 Dec 42, subject: "Memorandum dated December 3, 1942, Subject, Allotment of Officers of Different Classifications," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Even before Major Wise officially suggested the move to Baltimore, he had inspected a large, private residence at 2327 N. Charles Street in Baltimore and had learned that it could be rented for a price substantially lower than the rent on CIC's Washington offices. The building, formerly a girl's dormitory at Goucher College, would be ready for occupancy by 1 January 1943.[15]

The move to Baltimore was approved. On 16 January 1943, Colonel Bissell notified the Military Intelligence Service that CIC had been directed to close its Washington offices and reopen at the Baltimore location on 28 January. Both military and civilian personnel in the Office of the Chief, CIC, were transferred to Baltimore.[16]

Actually, the move was completed without top-level G2 knowledge or approval. On Monday after the Baltimore office had been opened, Major Wise notified G2 of the change and requested confirming orders.[17]

CIC's Mission: A Perplexing Problem

A far more perplexing problem than the housing situation was the misunderstanding of the CIC mission by commanders and G2's in the field. Some misunderstandings were inevitable, since the Corps still was virtually unknown when the United States entered the war. But continued flagrant misuse of CIC agents and detachments became a serious problem in some areas.

As early as 25 March 1942, The Adjutant General sent to all commanding generals a letter describing the organization, personnel, training, and operation policies of CIC in order to "insure the most efficient and beneficial results through the use of trained personnel." In this letter he pointed out that:

> The primary mission of these agents is undercover operation for the detection and investigation of espionage, sabotage, disaffection, disloyalty, and general subversion. It is the policy of the War Department that these agents be fully utilized to perform the mission indicated above. They should not be used as clerks, typists, or to perform other duties which

15 Memorandum for the File, prepared by Maj Hugh D. Wise, 17 Dec 42, subject: "Possible Removal of Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters to Baltimore, Maryland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

16 Memorandum from Col J. T. Bissell to Chief, Military Intelligence Service; 16 Jan 43, subject: "Movement of the Counter Intelligence Corps to Baltimore, Maryland," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

17 Interview with Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

can be equally well accomplished by other personnel having fewer specialist qualifications.[18]

On 15 February 1943, a tentative field manual describing the military intelligence mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps with tactical organizations and in theaters of operation was submitted to units in the field for comment. It strongly emphasized the role which CIC was to play:

> It is the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps to provide effective counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversive security for the unit to which assigned, and to investigate all cases of positive or suspected disaffection, disloyalty, and general subversion within or affecting the military service. The CIC will not serve to replace or assume the responsibility for tactical security, combat counterintelligence or countersubversive installations prescribed for all field force units but will be considered as a supplemental counterintelligence agency available to the commander for the enforcement of counterintelligence discipline, and for other activities in combating the operation of enemy agents.[19]

The manual stressed that CIC personnel were to be encouraged to "exercise... initiative to the fullest extent" and to be permitted to operate "with minimum restrictions" upon movements or channels of communication. Agents were to be prepared at all times "to resort to any means, methods, or stratagems necessary to accomplish the mission assigned."[20]

The tentative manual was the basis for Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," which was published on 22 September 1943 as the first CIC manual for use in the field.[21]

Despite the manual's emphatic words concerning the employment of CIC agents and detachments, reports of improper use of CIC by commanders and intelligence officers continued to flood CIC Headquarters in Baltimore. The situation was so acute by 29 March 1943 that Maj Gen George V. Strong, the War Department G2, prepared a letter for distribution to all commands in which he

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18 Ltr, AG 322.999 CIC (3-21-42) EA-B, The Adjutant General to commanding generals, 25 Mar 42, subject: "Duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

19 War Department Basic Field Manual, "Military Intelligence, Counter Intelligence Corps," (Tentative), 15 Feb 43, p. 1, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

20 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

21 War Department Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 22 Sep 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

outlined anew the War Department policy governing CIC operations.[22] A separate memorandum for the record noted that the letter was necessitated "by the lack of understanding prevalent among intelligence officers of air and ground force units and directors in intelligence or service commands regarding the functions of CIC personnel..."[23]

Some specific instances of misunderstanding of CIC duties were reported to Major Wise on 10 April 1943 by the G2, Sixth Service Command. The G2 listed these glaring violations of policy gleaned from letters and interviews with agents assigned to duty with divisions and tactical units:

> Divisional intelligence officers have no knowledge of the capabilities, training or type of duties which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel should perform, and assign such personnel to either routine duties or to combat intelligence....
>
> Enlisted men already on duty with the division regard the Counter Intelligence Corps agents with distrust and suspicion, and the officers of the division do not give any weight of authority to the Counter Intelligence Corps duties, if and when the men are allowed to do Counter Intelligence Corps work....
>
> A staff sergeant-special agent...stated that there were no Counter Intelligence Corps duties for him to perform; that all of the men in his detachment were assigned for infantry duty and were engaged in performing fatigue duties....The divisional intelligence officer did not know the use of the Counter Intelligence Corps...
>
> A second lieutenant...writes: 'I am familiar with the CIC Detachment Manual (Tentative) which is apparently our bible, but to try to put some of that doctrine into practice here would be the worst possible mistake. Both the Divisional G2 and the camp intelligence officer would see red.'[24]

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22 Memorandum from General Strong to The Adjutant General, 29 Mar 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel Assigned to Units of the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces Within the United States," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

23 Memorandum for the Record, undated and unsigned, attached to Memorandum from General Strong to The Adjutant General, 29 Mar 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel Assigned to Units of the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces Within the United States," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

24 Memorandum from Colonel Furbeshaw, G2, Sixth Service Command, to Major Wise, 10 Apr 43, subject: "CIC With Tactical Units," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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In an effort to combat this situation, Major Wise and Major Bradford held a series of conferences with Col Giles Carpenter, G2 of the Army Ground Forces. As a result of these conversations, Major Wise prepared a suggested directive which he hoped Colonel Carpenter would forward to all ground force units. Basically, the directive reiterated the counterintelligence mission and specified that CIC personnel would not be used for duties not related to counterintelligence.[25]

Colonel Carpenter refused to issue the suggested directive. He approved the tentative CIC manual, but objected to Major Wise's insistence that CIC agents not be required to perform routine housekeeping and fatigue duties. He considered CIC personnel members of the G2 section and declared that they would be used interchangeably for CIC and other G2 work when the situation demanded.[26]

Another conference between Colonel Carpenter and Major Bradford followed, and Colonel Carpenter requested a list of specific cases where CIC personnel had been improperly employed. Major Bradford gave him a list of incidents in which CIC detachments with 14 Infantry divisions and two corps had been required to perform tasks either specifically prohibited or not within the CIC mission.

"This conference was productive of a fine spirit of cooperation," Major Bradford reported. "An educational program and other corrective suggestions were to be taken up with Colonel Forney by Colonel Carpenter."[27] Records do not indicate the nature of the "corrective suggestions;" however, on 25 May 1943, a letter from Colonel Carpenter to all Army Ground Forces G2s stated:

> "It is the desire of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Counter-intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, that the CIC personnel serving with units of Army Ground Forces be trained and function as detachments under the command of the senior CIC officer assigned to that unit."[28]

On 4 June 1943, General Strong prepared a letter for distribution to all commands in which he stressed once again that the shortage of CIC personnel,

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25 Memorandum from Major Wise to Colonel Carpenter, 22 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

26 Memorandum from Colonel Carpenter to Col L. R. Forney, 24 Apr 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

27 Memorandum from Maj Lowell J. Bradford to G2, Army Ground Forces, 26 Apr 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments on Duty With Army Ground Force Units," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

28 Ltr from Colonel Carpenter to G2s of all Army Ground Forces Units, 25 May 43, subject: "Information Concerning CIC Detachments," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

combined with the specialized nature of their training, made it absolutely essential that agents be used only for counterintelligence duties.[29]

In fairness, it must be stated that the CIC concept of its own mission in combat was developed only through a period of evolution as detachments entered battle and proved their worth. As late as May 1943, Colonel Kibler, CIC's new Chief, was uncertain of CIC's role in combat. Agents in the field, top-level G2s, and field commanders all had their own opinions of what the work of the Corps was supposed to be.[30]

An example of some of these individual opinions concerning the CIC mission was expressed by Brig Gen James C. Crockett, G2, European Theater of Operations, in a personal letter to General Strong. General Crockett felt that the field security and investigative missions of the Counter Intelligence Corps should be distinct and that two types of agents should be employed. For field security work, well-trained soldiers with a minimum of investigative training were desirable, in General Crockett's opinion. On the other hand, he was convinced that special investigators needed little or no field training but required extensive schooling in their specialty. "CIC should be charged with both special investigation and field security but there should be a certain amount of cleavage between personnel for each function," he wrote.[31]

Another G2, Colonel Homer P. Ford of IV Armored Corps, was emphatic in his assertions that field security was perhaps the major CIC combat function.[32]

CIC Inspection Trips

To clarify the CIC mission, Colonel Kibler sent officers assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch on extensive inspection trips to all overseas areas where agents were serving, except the Pacific. Out of interviews with CIC agents and officers, commanders, and tactical G2s, a clearer concept of CIC's work gradually emerged.[33]

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29 Memorandum from General Strong to The Adjutant General, 4 June 43, subj: "Use of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

30 Interview with Colonel J. R. Kibler, 19 September 1952, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

31 Ltr from Brig Gen James C. Crockett to Maj Gen George V. Strong, 6 July 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

32 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Assistant Executive Officer, Counter Intelligence Group, 21 August 1943, subject: "Items of Interest," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

33 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler, 19 September 1952, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Actually, the trips abroad were continuations of similar tours to the Corps areas in the United States begun in 1941. They were not limited to discussions of the CIC mission, but touched on every phase of Counter Intelligence Corps organization and activity.

One of the earliest inspection trips on record was made during March 1942 by Captain Wise, while he was still the CIC Executive Officer. Between 15 March and 7 April, he visited First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Corps areas. In every area, he found a backlog of cases resulting from a shortage of CIC agents and clerks. Officer personnel were on duty in the Corps areas in sufficient numbers, but many were required to perform non-CIC duties in addition to their counterintelligence responsibilities. In some instances, agents were forbidden to investigate commissioned officers or to conduct investigations within military installations. Some G2s were using clerks who had not been investigated to handle confidential and secret documents. Captain Wise's report recommended correction of these deficiencies.[34]

At Colonel Kibler's direction, a series of overseas inspection tours was completed in the summer of 1943. Major Bradford visited CIC detachments in the Western Defense Command, Alaskan Defense Command, Northwest Service Command, and Air Transport Command CIC detachments in Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Belem, and Brazil. CIC detachments in the Caribbean Defense Command were inspected by Major Adkinson. Colonel Wise visited units at Accra, Gold Coast; Cairo, Egypt; Bengasi, Libya; Algiers, Algeria; Oran, Algeria; Casablanca, French Morocco; London, England, and Presque Isle, Maine.[35]

The value which Colonel Kibler placed on these inspection trips is indicated by a report he prepared on 8 February 1944, as he prepared to vacate the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. He listed the trips and the resulting "firsthand knowledge of counterintelligence activities within each theater" among the more important accomplishments during his tour of duty as Chief, CIC.[36]

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34 Memorandum from Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 16 Apr 42, subject: Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility). See also the Chapter of CIC in the Service Commands during World War II.

35 Memorandum from Col H. R. Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, 22 Jun 43, subject: "Inspection Trips by Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility). Reports of these trips are discussed fully in chapters dealing with CIC operations in the various base and defense commands and theaters of operation.

36 Memorandum from Col H. R. Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 8 February 1944, subject: "Activities of Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 10 May 1943--8 February 1944," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Technical Manual 30-215

Conclusions and recommendations of the inspecting officers were embodied, in part, in the Counter Intelligence Corps Technical Manual 30-215 when it was finally published on 22 September 1943.[37]

Actually, by the time the long-awaited manual was distributed, most G2s and detachment commanders had devised their own methods of operation. The manual came too late to be of much value in Europe, and it was rescinded before the intense Philippine fighting was well under way in the Pacific. It was replaced by a letter from the Adjutant General outlining CIC organization and mission for all commands.[38]

Publicity: Bane or Boon?

While the Chief of CIC was resorting to manuals, letters, and inspection trips to explain CIC's role to other units of the Army, key planners within the Office of the Chief were debating how much--if anything--the public ought to know about the Corps.

In late 1941, when authority was granted to change the name of the Corps of Intelligence Police to the Counter Intelligence Corps, plans were made to bring the Corps and its activities "out in the open." It was thought that the public would be told something of the Corps and its work.[39] To implement this policy, CIC issued through the Bureau of Public Relations on 9 January 1942 the first press release concerning the existence and activities of CIC.[40]

However, in June 1942, Col J. T. Bissell, Assistant Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Service, censured the G2 of the Third Corps Area in Baltimore for what he called "inappropriate Counter Intelligence Corps publicity." Newspapers in Philadelphia and Norfolk published stories which stated that the Army

37 War Department Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 22 September 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL). A copy of this manual is attached as Appendix 1.

38 AG Ltr, AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) OB-S-B-M, to all commands, 13 Nov 44, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL), included as Appendix H to volume of appendixes to History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

39 WD General Staff, MID G2, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subj: "Operation of the Corps of Intelligence Police," file MID 322-999 CIP (12-9-41), (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

40 CIC Office Journal 21 Jan 41-1 May 42, Entry 425, 9 Jan 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

was accepting enlistments for the Counter Intelligence Corps. Colonel Bissell demanded an explanation for the newspaper articles.[41]

Another indication that CIC was not too eager to publicize its work was the comment by the Inspector General on 6 November 1943 that in many instances "telephones were not listed, the locations of offices secret, and the identity of resident agents concealed. This is in direct contrast to the FBI, the existence and purposes of which are widely publicized, their offices known, telephones listed, and public support and cooperation encouraged."[42]

As CIC detachments with combat units fought their way through North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, war correspondents for American newspapers filed glowing accounts of CIC success in thwarting the plots of enemy agents. For the most part, the stories glamorized the spy-catching angle of CIC's work. A typical story in the Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes, referred to CIC as "one of the Army's hush-hush departments."[43]

The publicity question was forced upon CIC in the fall of 1943 when a Look Magazine correspondent who had worked with the 45th CIC Detachment in Sicily requested approval for a picture story on CIC combat operations. Major Bradford felt that publication of the story might do more harm than good, since security questions were involved.[44] However, Colonel Kibler authorized publication of the article "in view of the fact that other investigative organizations outside of G2 have claimed credit for the counterintelligence work accomplished by the Counter Intelligence Corps." One of the organizations of which Colonel Kibler spoke was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had been organized on 13 June 1942, primarily for collection of positive intelligence. By the time of Colonel Kibler's comment, CIC agents in combat areas had run into considerable trouble with OSS agents.[45] The CIC Chief felt that properly censored publicity for the Corps would

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41 Ltr, Col J. R. Bissell to G2, Third Corps Area, 10 Jun 42, subject: "Inappropriate Counter Intelligence Corps Publicity," (Unclassified), (Central Records Facility).

42 Memorandum, from Maj Gen Virgil Peterson to Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (Unclassified). A copy of this report is attached as Appendix 2.

43 "Fascist Ring Breakup Puts CIC in Spotlight," Stars and Stripes, 23 Dec 43.

44 Memorandum from Maj Bradford to Chief, CIC, 8 Oct 43, subject: "Publication of Story and Photographs in Look Magazine concerning CIC Detachment, 45th Infantry Division, Operations in Sicily," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

45 Reference chapters on North Africa, Sicily, Critique: North Africa-Sicily, Italy, and Preparation for OVERLORD.

boost morale of agents in the field and would also help to educate Army officers on the work on the Counter Intelligence Corps.[46]

On 9 October 1943, Major Bradford recommended the appointment of a CIC Public Relations Officer responsible for periodic release of CIC information through Army publications and bulletins and to the general public through the media of the press, radio, and periodicals.[47] Although records do not show whether the request was approved, ten days later Major Bradford prepared a standing operating procedure governing the release of CIC publicity. Among the more important provisions of the SOP were specifications that names of CIC personnel and full-face photographs of agents would not be published. The policy also required approval of the Chief, CIC, for each article released.[48]

Following a 5 November tour of CIC offices and the staging area in Baltimore,[49] representatives of the Army's Bureau of Public Relations in Washington outlined an extensive publicity program designed to educate both the Army and the public on CIC's wartime role. Press conferences, radio broadcasts, newsreels, motion picture short subjects, fiction based on actual CIC cases, news releases, and a CIC history were among the publicity devices suggested.[50]

Colonel Kibler forwarded the report for General Strong's consideration,[51] but available records do not indicate whether it was ever approved.

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46 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to G2, War Department, 11 Oct 43, subject: "Authorization to Release Story and Photographs Concerning Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 45th Infantry Division, During the Sicilian Campaign," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

47 Memorandum from Major Bradford to Chief, CIC, 9 Oct 43, subject: "Appointment of Public Relations Officer," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

48 Memorandum from Major Bradford to Chief, CIC, 19 Oct 43, subject: "S.O.P. Concerning Release of Publicity," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

49 Schedule for Tour of Public Relations Officers, 5 Nov 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

50 Memorandum from Col J. Noel Macy, Acting Chief, News Division, to Chief, CIC, 19 Nov 43, subject: "Dissemination of Information to Army and Public on Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

51 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to AC of S, G2, 24 Nov 43, subject: "Dissemination of Information Concerning the Counter Intelligence Corps," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

More and more stories of CIC's work in combat appeared in the nation's newspapers during 1944 and early 1945.[52] In January 1945, The American Magazine featured an article on CIC operations entitled "G-Men in Khaki." The Adjutant General distributed copies of the article to all commands.[53]

Anonymity of Personnel

Underlying the early hesitancy to publicize CIC activities was the belief that identities of agents should be concealed if their operations were to be effective. This concept was carried into the war years to some extent, despite the avowed intention to dispel some of the secrecy surrounding the Corps and its personnel. Agents were required to sign an oath to conceal their association with CIC at all times, except in the conduct of official business.[54]

In combat zones, where CIC units worked closely with tactical troops, agents often wore brightly lettered brassards identifying them as CIC agents on entering a town for the first time. Yet in the rear areas, where enemy saboteurs and spies were more likely to be active, efforts were made to conceal the identities of the CIC agents.[55]

Actually, the major problem of anonymity in combat zones was that of concealing the rank of CIC agents, whose status as noncommissioned officers sometimes was a hindrance. Especially was this true in North Africa and in Europe. One team of enlisted agents working on an important case in North Africa was eating at an officers' mess when someone discovered they were enlisted men and ordered them out of the mess. The resulting disturbance compromised the entire CIC operation, and the team had to begin its work anew. At Baltimore, the Office of the Chief determined that the only practical solution to the problem of concealment of rank was for agents in combat to wear U.S. brass with the civilian uniform.[56]

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52 See Appendix I in Appendixes to History of the Counter Intelligence Corps for examples of these stories.

53 Ltr, AG 461 (14 Dec 44) SPINT-MP-M, Brig Gen Robert H. Dunlop, Acting The Adjutant General, to all commands, 16 Dec 44, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). A copy of the magazine article is attached as Appendix 3.

54 Ltr from Major Sheen to G2s of Corps Areas, Departments, Base and Defense Commands, 21 Feb 42, subject: "Oath for Special Agents," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

55 "G-Men in Khaki," The American Magazine, January 1945.

56 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler, 19 Sep 52, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

In the United States, where most CIC agents wore civilian clothing and were called "Mister," anonymity also created problems, particularly when agents were required to operate on Army posts. At the Presidio of San Francisco, for example, the post commander ripped one agent's post exchange card to shreds because it listed his rank only as "Mr." The post commander directed the post exchange officer not to acknowledge such cards.[57]

As a result of this incident, the G2 of the Western Defense Command recommended that the Chief, CIC, obtain specific authorization for agents to possess post exchange cards, installation passes, and similar documents which would not reveal the rank of the agent or his connection with CIC.[58]

The question of whether the rank of CIC agents should be known came up frequently, and correspondence of the Office of the Chief indicates a conviction that concealment of rank was an operational necessity. General Strong, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated 3 June 1943, declared that CIC agents known to be enlisted personnel were at "an extreme disadvantage" in investigative activities involving cooperation between CIC, FBI, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.[59] The Chief of Staff of the Western Defense Command reported similar conclusions in a memorandum to the War Department Chief of Staff on 9 August 1943.[60] In a letter clarifying the War Department policy governing use of civilian clothing by CIC agents, the Adjutant General notified all commands that civilian clothing often was necessary to protect the identity of the agent.[61]

Badges and Credentials

The official identification for the CIC agent or special agent was his credentials.

57 Memorandum to Col John Weckerling, signed "H.C.C.," 27 Feb 43, subject: "Special Agent STANLEY A. HIRTLE," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

58 Ltr from Col John Weckerling, G2, Western Defense Command, to Chief, CIC, 16 Mar 43, subject: "Status of Special Agents and Agents, CIC," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

59 Memorandum from Maj Gen George V. Strong to the Chief of Staff, 3 June 1943, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of the CIC, MIS," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

60 Ltr from Col C. C. McCornack, Acting Chief of Staff, Western Defense Command, to Chief of Staff, War Department, 9 August 1943, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel Requirements," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

61 AG Ltr to all commands, 29 Aug 44, subject: "Civilian Clothing for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Soon after the creation of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and the centralization of CIC control, the Military Intelligence Service withdrew from the Corps areas the authority to issue CIC credentials and badges. Effective 1 April 1942, the Military Intelligence Service assumed the responsibility of issuing all credentials and badges. Forms were sent to Corps areas to be signed by the agents, then were returned to Washington for authentication. Special agent credentials were authorized for commissioned officers and for certain noncommissioned officers. Agent credentials were provided for enlisted men designated as agents.[62]

Apparently the plan did not prove satisfactory, for the responsibility for issuing CIC credentials and badges was again decentralized to service commands and base commands on 15 November 1942. Under the new arrangement, G2, War Department, provided supplies for issuance of credentials to the various commands in quantities not exceeding the total CIC allotment for the command. Special questionnaires and receipts were retained at War Department level for all credentials and badges issued. Whenever an agent was transferred from one command to another, he carried his credentials with him. They were destroyed as soon as the agent had been issued credentials at his new assignment. G2, War Department, was notified within 48 hours of any changes affecting the possession of credentials and badges.[63] Similar provisions were adopted for tactical detachments, with the division, corps, or Army G2 authorized to issue credentials.[64]

Despite the distribution of instructions on issuance of badges and credentials to all commands, the Chief, CIC, reported a "widespread lack of uniformity" concerning their handling in the summer of 1943. As a result, Colonel Kibler requested all offices responsible for issuing the credentials to submit a Monthly Change Report of Credentials and Badges to the Office of the Chief, Counter

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62 Ltr from Lt Col John T. Bissell, Asst Executive Officer, MIS, to G2s, all Corps areas, departments, and base and defense commands, 19 March 1942, subject: "Credentials and Badges," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

63 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to all departments, defense commands, service commands, and base commands, 15 Nov 1942, subject: "Issuance of Counter Intelligence Corps Credentials and Badges," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

64 Ltr from Capt James F. Foothorap, CIC Personnel Officer, to G2, Army Ground Forces, 19 Jun 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Credentials and Badges," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Intelligence Corps.[65] A special subsection in the Office of the Chief was created to handle all problems related to badges and credentials.[66]

65 Ltr from Col H. R. Kibler to all Army Ground Forces commands, 30 Jun 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Credentials and Badges," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

66 Memorandum from 2d Lt Edward S. White to CIC Personnel Officer, 25 July 1943, subject: "Discontinuance of Questionnaires and Receipts as a Part of Credential and Badges Records," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Section 2

PERSONNEL

Few problems faced by the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, surpassed those which centered on personnel procurement, administration, and employment in an expanding Corps.

Early 1942 brought rapid increases in CIC strength. On 27 April 1942, when the authorized strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps was only 1,026 noncommissioned officers, General Strong requested immediate approval for a CIC quota of 543 officers and 4,431 enlisted men. The G2 made a strong plea for the assignment of officers to CIC "in order that only the most proficient and experienced counterintelligence commissioned personnel may have supervision over the specialized activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps and to provide...that the security mission of the Corps may not be impaired through transfer of such personnel to other duties." General Strong proposed the transfer into CIC of 337 officers currently performing counterintelligence duties connected with CIC activities. The remaining 206 officers were to be obtained from former CIC agents who were graduates of officer candidate schools.

Both G1 and G3 concurred in General Strong's recommendations, and on 13 May 1942, the Deputy Chief of Staff approved the suggested CIC allotments.[67] On 6 July, The Adjutant General notified G2 that the authorized commissioned strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps was set at 12 colonels, 28 lieutenant colonels, 55 majors, 136 captains, 156 first lieutenants, and 156 second lieutenants. Enlisted strength was established at 80 master sergeants, 300 technical sergeants, 750 staff sergeants, 1,049 sergeants, 1,900 corporals, and 352 privates first class.[68]

The next request for an increase in CIC strength came on 23 February 1943, when a staff study recommended that CIC be allotted 1,392 officers and 8,360 enlisted men, for a total strength of 9,752. To justify the request, General Strong cited the ever-increasing work of the Corps in areas throughout the world:

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67 Memorandum from Maj Gen George V. Strong to the Chief of Staff, 27 April 1947, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

68 Memorandum from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to AC of S, G2, War Department, 6 July 1942, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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"In order to meet the need which exists and the ever-increasing demands, particularly from tactical units overseas and Services or Supply organizations overseas, it is essential that the authorized strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps be substantially increased at this time. The presence of American forces in hostile and semi-hostile countries has given rise to counterespionage, countersabotage, and general counter-subversive problems of extraordinary volume and importance. The continued operation of American forces in such areas and the eventual invasion of other hostile and semi-hostile countries will increase these problems which are complicated by differences in language, race, and custom, and create additional demands for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel qualified to combat enemy agents under such circumstances."[69]

The request, like others that were to follow, was doomed to a stormy future marked by nonconcurrences and administrative delays.

In May, while the request was still pending, Major Bradford, the CIC liaison officer, learned informally that it would not be approved. Colonel Kibler began immediately to plan ways to redistribute CIC personnel and to limit activities of members of the Corps to approved CIC functions.[70]

Meanwhile, another request for an increase in CIC strength was being prepared. On 31 May, General Strong asked the Chief of Staff to approve a CIC strength of 3,187 officers and 3,787 enlisted men. He also sought approval for 2,000 vacancies for CIC in the Army's officer candidate schools.

General Strong insisted that CIC duties required a high ratio of officers to enlisted men and maintained that almost all personnel within the Corps were officer material. He said the increases in grades and ratings were necessary to boost morale and to check the increasing loss of expensively investigated and trained personnel.[71]

This request also was ill-fated. G1 reluctantly concurred in the need for additional personnel, but bitterly opposed the plan suggested by General Strong.

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69 Memorandum from General Strong to the Chief of Staff, 2 Feb 43, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

70 Memorandum from Col H. R. Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, 22 May 1943, subj: "Suggested Changes and Adjustments Within the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

71 Memorandum from General Strong to the Chief of Staff, 31 May 1943, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Brig Gen M. G. White, the G1, labeled the proposed ratio of officers to enlisted men "excessive" and urged decentralization of CIC control. He stated:

> "CIC activities are an essential element of command responsibility and must be operated with established channels. Personnel of the CIC directly under the Military Intelligence Division should confine their activities to the preparation of plans and policies, the supervision of counterintelligence functions, the procurement and supply of special equipment, and the conduct of Counterintelligence Training. The MID allotment of personnel for CIC should be reduced to the number required to discharge (these) functions... The balance now in the field should be transferred to the overhead allotments of the commands and activities concerned."

G1 also opposed granting CIC 2,000 vacancies for officer candidate schools, since that number was approximately 10 percent of the total vacancies. He recommended that additional officers be obtained from those already commissioned.[72]

Faced with the prospect of further opposition to the proposed increases in CIC strength, Colonel Kibler began preparation of a new staff study by asking directors of intelligence of all commands to forward through command channels letters stating their future CIC requirements.[73]

Replies signed by commanding generals of the various commands indicated a need for 1,513 CIC officers and 4,909 enlisted men. Almost uniformly, requests from the service commands pleaded desperately for a greater ratio of officers to enlisted men.[74] From the Director of Intelligence, Second Service Command, came a typical reply. He wrote:

> "We are operating in an area and dealing with persons in all walks of life where a larger proportion of officers would be distinctly advantageous, and operate with greater efficiency....It is recommended that a proportion of one officer agent to every three enlisted agents be secured...in order

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72 Memorandum from Brig Gen M. G. White, G1, to Chief of Staff, 24 Jun 43, subject: "Reorganization and Expansion of CIC, MIS," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

73 Ltr from Colonel Kibler to all commands, 27 Jul 43, subject: "CIC Personnel Requirements," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

74 Memorandum from General Strong to the Chief of Staff, 23 Sep 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

to place us on a comparable footing with the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which operate on similar missions in the same area."[75]

Armed with these figures, G2 submitted another staff study on 23 September 1943 requesting a minimum increase to 1,331 officers and 5,432 enlisted men. Of these, 2,317 were slated for duty overseas, 1,182 with the Air Force, and 3,264 for duties within the Zone of Interior.[76]

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations concurred in the proposed increase in CIC strength,[77] but once again G1 and G3 balked. The Personnel Division (G1) agreed to a total of only 1,150 officers and 4,750 enlisted men and insisted that these would have to be made available within the troop basis.[78] Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, G3, repeated G1's comments and added that any increase in officer strength should come from the existing officer surplus rather than from CIC enlisted ranks.[79]

Another indication of G1's opposition to strength increases for CIC was a letter from Colonel Wise to Colonel Kibler on 23 September. Colonel Wise said General White, the G1, had been in the Middle East asking unit commanders: "How about CIC men, you don't need them do you?" All over the area the G1 was told that CIC agents were needed. Each echelon felt that CIC personnel should be assigned there and attached to lower units.[80]

Despite nonconcurrences by two staff sections, General Strong submitted the original staff study to the Chief of Staff and asked that he overrule the objections of G1 and G3.[81]

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75 Ltr from Col S. V. Constant to Chief of Staff, War Department, Attention G2, 29 Jul 43, subject: "CIC Personnel Requirements," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

76 Memorandum from General Strong to the Chief of Staff, 23 Sep 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

77 Memorandum from Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, AC of S for Operations, to AC of S, G2, 29 Sep 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

78 Disposition Form from G1 to G2, War Department General Staff, 6 Oct 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

79 Disposition Form from G3 to G2, War Department General Staff, 12 Oct 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

80 Ltr from Col Wise to Col Kibler, 23 Sep 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (included in File 201, Wise, Hugh D., Central Records Facility Dossier X 1481264).

81 Brief of Staff Study on Increase in Authorized Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps from G2 to Chief of Staff, 19 Oct 43, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

On 3 December 1943, G3 notified G2 that Counter Intelligence Corps units were not included in the 1944 troop basis being submitted for approval by the Chief of Staff. Tentative estimates of CIC needs were to be included in the overall allotment figures in overseas and continental United States overhead. G3 also asked G2 to prepare tables of organization and equipment for CIC units with division, corps, army, Zone of Interior, Army Air Force, and Army Service Forces. According to the G3 memorandum, a cellular type table would be favorably considered.[82]

When CIC tables of organization were prepared by G2, they were not of the cellular type recommended by G3. Instead, G2 wrote:

> "It is recognized that these Tables of Organization are not the cellular type in its strictest sense but are considered to be modified cellular Tables of Organization and Equipment. The cellular type of organization is adaptable to organizations such as Signal Corps where the personnel have been specifically trained for one major duty. The specialized training furnished personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps involves concentrated training in investigative technique and other prerequisites of counterintelligence work....To break down CIC detachments in cells for specialized functions would necessitate increasing the number of personnel required by each unit, since each unit would require a combination of specialists teams....If the cellular principal in its strict sense were applied to CIC detachments, the numbers and grades necessary would exceed the number that the commands...have requested."

Emphasizing that the recommended tables were based on requests from theater commands, G2 urged that modification of the cellular principle be permitted for CIC.[83]

Once again, G3 refused to accept G2 recommendations on the strength of the various types of CIC detachments. Col Lloyd S. Partridge, acting G3, returned the suggested tables of organization and reiterated the G3 demand for strict adherance to the cellular type of organization. Colonel Partridge drew up samples

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82 Memorandum from Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, G3 to G2, 3 Dec 43, subject: "Increase in Authorized Strength for the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

83 Memorandum from General Strong to G3, 18 Dec 43, subject: "Tables of Organization and Equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

of flexible cells and asked that specification serial numbers be furnished for all officers and enlisted men.[84]

Finally, on 18 January 1944, G2 submitted a cellular table of organization for CIC units which was approved by G3. The table did not contain the specification numbers requested by G3, but G2 said the numbers would be added later, as soon as The Adjutant General could establish new classifications for CIC officers, special agents, agents, and clerks. Although the table was designed primarily for CIC units in overseas theaters, it was also adaptable for detachments in training with tactical units within the United States. Once more G2 asked approval for a bulk allotment of CIC personnel for the Air Force.[85]

The negotiations finally resulted in Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, published on 24 January 1944.[86] This table actually represented a compromise between G2, G1, and G3 and terminated, for the time being, the inter-staff feud over CIC personnel requirements. During the months of haggling over CIC strength, Colonel Kibler gradually realized that part of G1 and G3 opposition to CIC increases was based on the request for senior officers, since this would eliminate these grades for other units. As a compromise measure, Colonel Kibler decided to eliminate the twelve full colonels authorized on 6 July 1942. The top grade suggested in the CIC table of organization which was finally approved was lieutenant colonel. Surrender of the twelve colonel vacancies expedited the approval of other staff sections for the new CIC table of organization.[87]

On 25 January 1944, G3 announced approval of the G2 plan and said a CIC pool would be included in the 1944 troop basis.[88]

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84 Memorandum from Col Lloyd S. Partridge to G2, 31 Dec 43, subject: "Tables of Organization and Equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

85 Memorandum from General Strong to G3, 18 Jan 44, subject: "Tables of Organization and Equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

86 A copy is attached as Appendix 4.

87 Memorandum from Lt Col James F. Foothorap (MI-Res) to Chief, Historical Section, Counter Intelligence Corps, 23 Sep 55, subject: "History of the Office of Chief CIC from change of name in January 1942 to disbanding of Baltimore headquarters in January 1944," p. 24, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

88 Memorandum from Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, G3, to AC of S, G2, 25 Jan 44, subject: "Table of Organization and Equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

Actual vs Authorized Strength

Throughout the period when CIC was struggling to obtain authorization for more officers and agents, the actual strength of the Corps remained slightly under the total allotment. However, a vigorous recruitment program directed by the personnel section in the Office of the Chief quickly narrowed the gap of vacancies.

On 6 May 1942, overseas bases had only 165 of their authorized 250 CIC agents. On 30 June 1942, when the total authorized strength was 1,026, rosters showed only 833 CIC agents. After the authorization on 6 July 1942 for 543 officers and 4,431 enlisted men, CIC strength began to climb rapidly. By the end of the year, there were 157 officers and 3,219 enlisted men.[89] On 30 September 1943, CIC agents and officers numbered 4,901--only 73 short of the total allotment. Of these, 1,720 were serving overseas.[90]

An estimate of the distribution of CIC personnel as of 31 December 1944, prepared by Colonel Kibler for the Operations and Plans Division for inclusion in the 1944 troop basis, listed 2,642 CIC personnel in theaters of operation and 1,396 in the Zone of Interior.[91]

Qualifications for CIC Personnel

Despite the tremendous increase in the size of the Corps, CIC did not lower its standards for agents or officers.

Slight changes were made, however. On 13 April 1942, the age span for CIC agents was increased to include persons between the ages of 22 and 45.[92] On 24 July 1942, Major Sheen notified G2s of the Corps areas that the minimum age for CIC clerks was 20 years.[93]

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89 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility) p. 169.

90 Memorandum from Capt Thomas A. Gagan to Personnel Officer, Military Intelligence Division, 30 Sep 43, subject: "Distribution of CIC Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

91 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Executive Officer, Counterintelligence Group, 1 Feb 44, subject: "Estimated Distribution of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel as of 31 December 1944," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

92 Ltr from Col Hayes A. Kroner to G2s of all Corps areas, 13 Apr 42, subject: "Basic Qualifications for Original Assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

93 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, all Corps areas, 24 Jul 42, subject: "Requests for Approval of Assignments to the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Another requirement imposed shortly after the beginning of the war was that all CIC applicants must first complete at least eight weeks of basic military training. On 23 January 1942, Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee, Acting G2, notified The Adjutant General that "favorable consideration will not be given to requests for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps made with respect to individuals who have, as of the time of the request, completed less than eight weeks' basic military training."[94]

Apparently, however, service commands ignored the basic training qualification in some instances. As late as November 1943, CIC agents were assigned to tactical detachments or to officer candidate schools without first completing basic training, and the Military Intelligence Service found it necessary to remind directors of intelligence in the service commands that CIC agents must first qualify as soldiers.[95]

Indicative of the high standards demanded of agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps was an information leaflet prepared by Major Sheen for CIC applicants early in 1942. Many of the men who flocked to the CIC office in Washington after Pearl Harbor sought to evade fighting, or were intrigued by the possibility of a glamorous undercover assignment. Major Sheen went to considerable length to dispel such notions and to stress the high qualifications expected of every CIC agent:

> "The Counter Intelligence Corps does not solicit applicants...Nine out of every ten applicants are rejected, and the Corps has more potential material than can be absorbed...To be a special agent the applicant must possess certain linguistic, investigative, legal, technical, or other ability qualifications peculiar to the mission of the Corps...The officers and men of the Corps...are aggressive, daring, determined, shrewd, resourceful, and self-reliant. Their loyalty to their country and to the Army is unquestionable. The most important word in the vocabulary of the Corps is "DUTY." Their discipline is largely self-imposed and severe."

The brochure listed these additional qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel: active duty in the United States Army, completion of eight weeks basic military training, subjection to an exhaustive background investigation, and actual experience as an attorney, investigator, accountant, or a similar profession.[96]

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94 Memorandum from Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee, Acting G2, to The Adjutant General, 23 Jan 42, subject: "Requests for Approval of Assignments to the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

95 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to Directors of Intelligence, Service Commands, 9 Nov 42, subject: "Basic Military Training," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

96 "Counter Intelligence Corps Information for Applicants," signed by Maj H. G. Sheen, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Excellent physical condition was another prerequisite for the potential CIC agent, although this requirement was waived on rare occasions when an applicant was outstandingly qualified for CIC assignments otherwise, and the physical impairment was of a relatively minor nature.[97]

All these, plus certain educational requirements, were embodied in Technical Manual 30-215, when it was published on 22 September 1943. For officers, a college education, experience in military intelligence activities, experience in investigative work, or linguistic qualification was essential. Similar standards were established for enlisted men, although only a high school education was required.[98]

Personnel Procurement

Urgent procurement problems faced the CIC Personnel Section as new vacancies were authorized for both officers and enlisted men.

On 25 February 1942, directors of intelligence in the Corps Areas were directed to fill all CIC vacancies in their Areas and were advised that agents soon would be needed for duty outside the United States.[99] On 14 May, the Military Intelligence Service notified the Corps Areas that authorization for 1,900 vacancies for CIC corporal agents was expected shortly. Selection of these agents within the Corps areas was directed, without prior approval of the War Department.[100] Less than a month later, the anticipated expansion of CIC was authorized, and the Chief, CIC, prodded directors of intelligence in the Corps areas to expedite procurement of the new agents and clerks. Meanwhile, the Personnel Section in the Office of the Chief was pushing recruitment of special agents.[101]

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97 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to G2s, all service commands, 28 Oct 42, subject: "Limited Service Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

98 Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 22 Sep 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) A copy is attached as Appendix 1.

99 Memorandum from Brig Gen Raymond E. Lee to TAG, 25 Feb 42, subject: "Strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

100 Ltr from Lt Col Holbrook, Jr., Asst Executive Officer, MIS, to G2s of Corps areas, departments, and base and defense commands, 14 May 1942, subject: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

101 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, all Corps areas, 3 Jun 42, subject: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Similar attention was given to the selection of CIC officers. When the vacancies allotted to CIC at officer candidate schools did not immediately supply an adequate pool of commissioned personnel, all branches of the War Department's Counter Intelligence Group were directed to report the names of officers of troop age who could be released for CIC duty.[102] Service Commands were advised of the officer grades available to CIC, and instructions were issued to effect the transfer of counterintelligence officers within the commands to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.[103]

Tabbing of Potential CIC Personnel

As early as 25 July 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police had prepared a definition of an investigator so that classification sections at Army reception centers could refer men with investigative experience to the Corps.[104] This was the beginning of a tabbing system which ultimately became one of CIC's most important procurement devices.

In March 1942, arrangements were made with the Adjutant General of each Corps Area to tab the name of every soldier being considered for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps. Once a tab was affixed to a prospective agent's records, he could not be transferred from his present assignment without word from the Corps Area G2 that he was no longer desired by CIC.[105]

As an additional procurement aid, reception centers in October 1942 began furnishing directors of intelligence excerpts from qualification cards of all enlisted men with investigative or stenographic experience.[106]

Although the tabbing system was a valuable procurement tool, it had its drawbacks. Perhaps the most serious disadvantage was the delay in training of men

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102 Memorandum from Col W. A. Holbrook, Jr., to Chiefs of all Branches and Sections, Counter Intelligence Group, 20 Jun 42, subject: "Foreign Duty for Commissioned Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

103 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to G2s, Service Commands, 3 Dec 42, subject: "Commissioned Personnel, Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

104 Definition of "Investigator," 25 July 41, included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

105 Ltr from The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Corps areas, and Western Defense Command, 3 Mar 42, subject: "Tabbing CIC Soldiers Under Investigation," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

106 Ltr from Maj Hugh D. Wise to G2s, Service Commands, 30 Oct 42, subject: "Change in System of Tabbing Prospective Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

who had been tabbed for CIC consideration. Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces all complained that the tabbing kept them from putting valuable men in either jobs or training.

The complaints resulted in a modification of the system in the summer of 1943. Instead of the tab which isolated a potential CIC man, a letter was attached to his service records which indicated that he was being investigated by CIC. Whenever he was transferred to another station, the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch was notified. If the man at any time was dropped from CIC consideration, the letter was removed from his service records.[107]

Obtaining Linguists a Problem

The greatest single CIC procurement problem during the war years was the difficulty in obtaining linguists who were qualified for CIC duty. As reports poured in to the Office of the Chief from tactical units throughout the world, all stressed the need for agents who could conduct interrogations in the native languages of the countries in which they were serving.

On 29 November 1942, the CIC personnel officer directed his section to concentrate on selection of agents fluent in any foreign language. Urgently needed were men who could speak Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, Egyptian, Dutch, Russian, French, German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.[108]

From the first, personnel in the Office of the Chief were aware that linguists would eventually be required in large numbers. On every visit to the service commands, officers from the Baltimore headquarters emphasized that procurement of qualified linguists was to take precedence over selection of other CIC personnel.

It was relatively easy to locate linguists from information furnished by the Adjutant General from questionnaires completed at reception centers, but the percentage of individuals who were acceptable for CIC was quite small. The cards furnished by the Adjutant General showed the language spoken and the degree of fluency claimed, as well as the individual's score on the Army Classification Test. Linguists whose score was only slightly under the 110 minimum prescribed for CIC were investigated, but few proved to be qualified. In many

107 Ltr from Col H. R. Kibler to G2s, Service Commands, 3 Jul 43, subject: "Change in System of Tabbing Prospective Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

108 Memorandum from 1st Lt James F. Foothorap to Personnel Section, 29 Nov 42, subject: "Obtaining CIC Personnel with Specialized Qualifications," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

instances, persons who were excellent linguists were dropped from consideration because of a G2 ruling that men with close foreign backgrounds could not be assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps.[109]

Racial requirements also complicated the CIC procurement problems. Negro agents were needed for assignment with Negro troops in the United States, Africa, and Australia. One task force in the South Pacific Area requested Polynesian agents for a special operation.[110]

CIC Seeks Technicians

Throughout 1943, CIC gave special attention to the procurement of agents with technical or mechanical training for duty with Air Force CIC detachments.

At first, the Air Force was reluctant to transfer to CIC men who had completed training at its technical schools. CIC was forced to resort to the few men they could muster who had worked with aircraft in civilian life. Finally, after a series of conferences between Major Wise and Air Force officials in February 1943, the Air Force agreed to furnish trained personnel to CIC.[111]

Arrangements were made through the Assistant Chief of Staff, A2, of the Technical Training Command, for CIC officers to visit Air Force Technical schools to screen records of potential CIC agents. After the men thus selected graduated, they were transferred from the Air Force to the Counter Intelligence Corps for duty with Air Force CIC detachments.

At the outset of the new procurement program, CIC requested 175 graduates of the aircraft mechanic schools, 75 from radio operators and mechanic schools, and 50 from other specialized schools of the Technical Training Command.[112]

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109 Memorandum from Lt Col James F. Foothorap (MI-Res) to Chief, Historical Section, Counter Intelligence Corps, 23 Sep 55, subject: "History of the Office of the Chief CIC from Change of Name in January 1942 to Disbanding of Baltimore Headquarters in January 1944," pp. 24-25, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

110 Memorandum from 1st Lt James F. Foothorap to Personnel Section, 29 Nov 42, subject: "Obtaining CIC Personnel with Specialized Qualifications," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

111 Ltr from Maj Hugh D. Wise to G2s, Service Commands, 17 Feb 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel with Technical Training in the Army Air Forces," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

112 Ltr from Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, Chief, MIS, to Assitant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, 24 Apr 43, subject: "Procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

By the end of June 1943, CIC counted among its agents 256 men supplied by the Air Force or trained in aeronautical work in civilian life. Requests for 171 other Air Force personnel were pending, and Colonel Kibler was confident that agents for Air Force duty would be available in adequate numbers.[113]

Investigation of CIC Personnel

An integral part of personnel procurement was the background investigation conducted on every potential CIC agent, clerk, or officer.

On 1 January 1942, when it became evident that a large number of officers would be required for the new Counter Intelligence Corps, The Adjutant General notified commanders of all Corps Areas and departments that commissioned officers must first be cleared by G2, War Department, before assignment to CIC duties.[114] Top priority was placed on loyalty investigations of prospective CIC agents. Only sabotage and espionage cases took precedence over the background checks for potential agents.[115]

As increases in CIC strength were authorized, Corps Area G2s were cautioned not to slight the background investigations in the haste to bring the Corps up to wartime strength. Col Ralph C. Smith, the G2 executive officer, warned that in accomplishing the rapid increase in CIC strength, "the primary consideration must be that of selecting properly qualified personnel and assigning only those who have been thoroughly investigated and found to be absolutely reliable and loyal."[116]

To expedite the investigations and to simplify transfers to the Corps, G2, War Department, assumed control of all background investigations of CIC

113 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 30 Jun 43, subject: "Procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel from Army Air Forces," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

114 Ltr from Maj Gen E. S. Adams, The Adjutant General, to commanders, Corps Areas, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 1 Jan 42, subject: "Commissioned Personnel of the Corps of Intelligence Police," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

115 Ltr from Lt Col John T. Bissell to G2s, Corps Areas, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 6 Jan 42, subject: "Expediting Investigations," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

116 Ltr from Col Ralph C. Smith to G2s, Corps Areas, 27 Jan 42, subject: "Investigation of Candidates for Assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

candidates in late January 1942. Corps Areas were instructed to complete any investigations already in progress, but requests for any new investigations were to be channeled through G2, War Department.[117]

The change in policy may have been the result of laxity on the part of some Corps Areas in making only superficial investigations. On 3 February 1942, the CIC personnel officer advised the Chief that security considerations had been ignored in the investigations of some CIC agents. He cited the presence in the Corps of a "large number" of special agents of questionable loyalty as "a source of real potential danger."

Agents in the field were warned that thoroughness in the background investigations was absolutely essential. They were told:

> "Investigations of prospective agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps should be made from two points of view. In the first place, it should be determined that the subject possesses a suitable personality and experience or background which makes him at least good potential material from which it may be expected that a well qualified special agent may be developed. In the second place, the candidate should have been thoroughly investigated and found to be absolutely loyal, honest, courageous, and reliable."[118]

However, a seemingly contradictory directive went out to Service Commands on 14 May 1942, when a G2 letter advised that complete investigations were not necessary prior to the assignment of agents and clerks to the Corps. Although the letter urged every effort to secure only personnel of proven loyalty, it stated that "it is not expected that a complete and thorough investigation will be made with respect to them prior to such assignment." The criteria of the investigations of potential special agents were not relaxed.[119]

On 21 October 1942, the control of investigations of CIC candidates was again decentralized to the Service Commands. The G2 of each Service Command was authorized to instigate investigations in his own area and to request investigations in other Service Command areas. Copies of reports on investigations were

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117 Memorandum from Brig Gen Sherman Miles to The Adjutant General, 28 Jan 42, subject: "Investigation of Prospective Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

118 Memorandum from Maj Hugh D. Wise, Jr., to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 3 Feb 42, subject: "Investigations of Prospective Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

119 Ltr from Lt Col W. A. Holbrook, Jr., to G2s, Corps Areas, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 14 May 42, subject: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

forwarded to the War Department, which still retained the authority to appoint special agents.[120]

Soon the Military Intelligence Service again protested the manner in which the investigations were being conducted in the Service Commands. Investigations were being continued long after sufficient evidence to warrant action was obtained, apparently for the purpose of making records formally complete. In some areas, the investigations spanned periods of up to eight months. The result was a tremendous backlog of cases in every Service Command, while detachments in the field begged for more agents. Service Command G2s eventually were instructed to terminate investigations immediately when a CIC candidate became unavailable for any reason. Other suggestions were that records checks and similar leads should be developed by mail and that more discrimination should be exercised in initiating an investigation.[121]

Assignments and Allotments

An extensive bookkeeping system was developed within the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to check CIC vacancies by comparing assignments to the various commands with their portion of the total CIC allotment.

When staff studies produced increased strengths, the overall allotment was divided among the various Service Commands. Each Service Command had its permanent allotment and an apportionment of the War Department reserve pool set up for the procurement of personnel for service with tactical units overseas. As each new detachment was activated, the War Department reserve pool vacancies were taken from one or more Service Commands, usually the ones from which personnel were being transferred. An allotment for the newly activated detachment was set up from vacancies subtracted from the Service Commands. This required considerable bookkeeping, since the allotments were not only by numbers but also by officer and enlisted grades. Eventually the record became quite complex, and each week the allotment vacancies for all units had to be proved out.[122]

120 Ltr from The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Service Commands, 21 Oct 42, subject: "Investigation of Prospective Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

121 Ltr from Col John T. Bissell to Directors of Intelligence, Service Commands, 12 Feb 43, subject: "Unnecessary Investigations," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Ltr from Col John T. Bissell to Directors of Intelligence, Service Commands, 25 Mar 43, subject: "Investigation of Prospective Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

122 Memorandum from Lt Col James F. Foothorap, (MI-Res) to Chief, Historical Section, Counter Intelligence Corps, 23 Sep 55, subject: "History of the Office of Chief CIC from Change of Name in January 1942 to Disbanding of Baltimore Headquarters in January 1944," pp 25-26, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

For example, in September 1942 a special Task Force "A" was being assembled at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation in Virginia. An allotment of 45 CIC special agents, agents, and clerks was established for the task force. CIC allotments for the First, Second, and Fifth Service Commands and the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army were reduced by the number of CIC personnel transferred from those commands to the new tactical detachments.[123]

In October 1942, when the Counter Intelligence Corps was authorized 4,431 enlisted men, 2,216 were allotted to the Service Commands, leaving 2,215 for overseas service and the War Department reserve pool.[124]

The Service Command permanent allotments and their portion of the War Department reserve for tactical units in October 1942 were as follows:

	Permanent	Overhead
First Service Command	228	60
Second Service Command	311	67
Third Service Command	298	61
Fourth Service Command	282	58
Fifth Service Command	230	70
Sixth Service Command	245	127
Seventh Service Command	208	53
Eighth Service Command	266	60
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army	292	61

Service Commands were authorized to fill not only their permanent quotas, but also their share of the reserve pool to be used for subsequent assignment overseas.[125]

On 24 April 1943, Service Command control over CIC personnel was withdrawn, and agents were assigned to the War Department, then detailed out to the

123 Memorandum from Col J. T. Bissell to The Adjutant General, 11 Sep 42, subject: "Allotment of Counter Intelligence Corps Enlisted Personnel to the Field Army, Task Force 'A'," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

124 Memorandum from Col J. T. Bissell to Director of Military Personnel, Services of Supply, 6 Oct 42, subject: "Allotment of Counter Intelligence Corps Enlisted Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

125 This information was extracted from a series of letters from The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals of the First through Eighth Service Commands and the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, all dated 23 Oct 42 with the subject: "Allotments, Counter Intelligence Corps Enlisted Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Service Commands as needed.[126] Until 26 June 1943, theaters of operation were authorized to select and release agents and clerks under their allotments. On that date this selection privilege was withdrawn and was vested in the War Department.[127] The new arrangement was destined to be short-lived, however. The Chief of the Military Intelligence Service decided to transfer CIC agents to the using agencies, and a plan to implement the decision was submitted on 17 September 1943.[128]

New tables of organization for the various theaters of operation were prepared by 29 November 1943, and assignment of CIC personnel to the theaters was once again authorized. The quota for the European Theater of Operations was set at 38 officers and 428 enlisted men; United States Army Forces in Middle East, 13 officers and 81 enlisted men; Southwest Pacific Area, 29 officers and 299 enlisted men; South Pacific Area, 10 officers and 108 enlisted men; Allied Force Headquarters, 52 officers and 459 enlisted men. Theater commanders were directed to issue orders relieving the CIC personnel from the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and assigning them to the theaters in which they were serving. Provision was made for automatic increases in the theater CIC allotments as new tactical detachments arrived from the United States.[129]

In the United States, however, functions and activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps were passing from the Office of the Chief, CIC, to the Army Service Forces. War Department Circular 324, dated 14 December 1943, ordered the combination of CIC and Provost Marshal general functions in the Zone of Interior in a single staff agency under each Service Command. With few exceptions, CIC agents remaining in the United States were transferred out of the Corps and assigned to the Service Commands.[130]

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126 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), p 158.

127 Ibid., p 155 and 158.

128 Memorandum for Col L. R. Forney, subject: "Transfer of CIC Personnel from the Zone of the Interior to Theaters of Operation, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Special Detachment," dtd 16 Sep 43, s/Kibler and Memorandum for General Kroner, dtd 17 Sep 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

129 Extracted from a series of memoranda from Maj Gen George V. Strong to The Adjutant General, all dated 29 Nov 43 with the subject: "Table of Organization for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

130 War Department Circular 324, 14 Dec 43. See Section 5, Part I, of this chapter for a complete discussion of the transfer of CIC to the Army Service Forces.

After the publication of Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 in January 1944, its provisions were used as a guide for the activation and assignment of CIC detachments in overseas commands.

In February 1944, Maj Gen Clayton Bissell, War Department G2, recommended to G3 the procedures for activating detachments in accordance with the new table. For Army Ground Forces units, the provisions of the table were to be followed explicitly. Air Force detachments were to be activated on the basis of the cellular type table, but the total strength of the Air Force detachments was not to exceed the total CIC personnel then serving with the Air Force in the United States. Commanding generals of theaters, overseas departments, and base and defense commands were to be given the authority to activate detachments based on teams indicated in a special table.[131]

Under Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, detachments were activated by the theaters and attached to divisions, corps, and field armies by combining one or more headquarters teams with one or more operations teams. Although the size of the detachments varied, a divisional detachment ordinarily was composed of four officers and 13 enlisted men; a corps detachment, of five officers and 14 enlisted men. A common size of an army detachment was six officers and 15 enlisted men, although these detachments contained as few as six and as many as 72 men.[132]

Personnel Classification

In the early days of the Counter Intelligence Corps, when few men were assigned to CIC, an officer in the Personnel Section reviewed personal history statements to locate men with linguistic, occupational, or other specialized qualifications for a particular assignment or mission. As the Corps grew, however, extensive personnel records had to be maintained to permit selection of properly qualified men with a minimum loss of time.

From a review of personal history statements, the classification system spread to looseleaf file records and then to card records on the various characteristics and backgrounds of CIC agents. In mid-1943, when large numbers of men were being transferred from the Zone of the Interior to overseas units, the personnel records were inadequate to keep pace with the vast personnel movements. As a result, one CIC enlisted agent, who had been a college professor in civilian life, was brought in to the office of the Chief to revise the personnel

131 Memorandum from Maj Gen Clayton Bissell to the AC of S, G3, 10 Feb 44, subject: "Tables of Organization and Equipment for CIC Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

132 "Organization of Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments," inclosure 1 to Ltr, AG 322 (8 Jul 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M, 13 Jul 44, (SECRET) (Staff and Faculty Library). A copy of this chart is attached as Appendix 5.

[redacted]

classification system. He organized the files on a visible index basis, using different colored cards for different subjects. Although the system was in use only a short time, it proved especially helpful in the selection of personnel for special projects, such as assignment with the Manhattan District Engineers Project.[133]

A classification system of a different type was the designation within the Service Commands of certain "key men" among CIC agents who were considered unavailable for transfer to overseas units.

In May 1942, the Corps Area G2s were directed to forward to the Office of the Chief, CIC, a list by name of special agents considered essential to counter-intelligence operations within the areas, along with descriptions of their jobs and the reasons why they were considered key personnel.[134]

Three months later, after some Corps Areas had designated large numbers of agents as key personnel, The Adjutant General ruled that not more than ten percent of the CIC strength of any Service Command could be classified as essential. Service Commands were reminded that they were responsible for providing CIC personnel for combat as well as for operations within the Zone of the Interior.[135]

Despite the continual emphasis on the responsibility of the Service Commands to provide qualified CIC personnel for tactical units, some persisted in releasing for combat duties only those agents who were of little or no value locally.

This practice resulted in a complaint from The Adjutant General that Service Commands were sending overseas "personnel not possessing suitable qualifications for such assignments." "The present practice of meeting requests for personnel

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133 Memorandum from Lt Col James F. Foothorap, (MI-Res), to Chief, Historical Section, Counter Intelligence Corps, 23 Sep 55, subj: "History of the Office of Chief CIC from Change of Name in January 1942 to Disbanding of Baltimore Headquarters in January 1944," pp 26-27, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

134 Ltr from Lt Col W. A. Holbrook, Jr., to G2s, Corps Areas, Departments, Base and Defense Commands, 14 May 42, subject: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

135 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio to Commanding Generals, all Service Commands, 26 Aug 42, subject: "Transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

for assignment to tactical organizations and overseas with personnel most easily spared will be discontinued," a directive dated 20 March 1943 stated.[136]

Promotions

One personnel problem which at times seemed to defy solution was that of promotions. Rank accorded CIC agents was startingly low--a fact so widely known that a civilian magazine writer listed lack of rank as one of the Corps' greatest handicaps. Men of the caliber required for the Counter Intelligence Corps quickly gained promotion and commissions in other branches of service, but those who preferred CIC and stayed in the Corps sometimes went as much as two years without promotion![137]

Within CIC, the main distinction within the enlisted ranks was between agent and Special Agent. The coveted title of "Special Agent," available only to sergeants and persons of higher rank, was a symbol that the CIC man had proved himself worthy of the most exacting duties and responsibilities. Service Commands were empowered to designate corporals and sergeants as agents of CIC, but the War Department jealously guarded its authority to create Special Agents.[138] For a time, the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command were authorized to promote agents to Special Agent and to appoint Special Agents directly. The War Department revoked that authority on 15 June 1943.[139]

Provisions were made for a number of CIC agents to be commissioned after completion of Officer Candidate Schools. Thirty agents were commissioned after their graduation from a special eight-week advanced course at the CIC Training School in Chicago in the spring of 1942.[140] However, War Department policy forbade operation of a separate Officer Candidate School for CIC personnel, and vacancies in existing schools were allotted to the Counter Intelligence Corps for

136 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio to Commanding Generals, Service Commands, 20 Mar 43, subject: "Assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel to Tactical Units and Overseas," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

137 "G-Men in Khaki," The American Magazine, January 1945.

138 Ltr from The Adjutant General to Service Commands, 21 Oct 43, subject: "Investigation of Prospective Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL), included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

139 Memorandum from Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner to The Adjutant General, 15 Jun 45, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

140 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, Corps Areas, 27 Mar 42, subject: "Advance Course, Counter Intelligence Corps Training School," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

its agents. Special Agents with 60 days prior service in CIC were permitted to apply for admission to Officer Candidate Schools.[141] Apparently this system was satisfactory, for on 2 September 1943, Colonel Kibler notified the Counter Intelligence Group that there was no need for a CIC Officer Candidate School as long as agents could be returned to CIC after receiving commissions at Officer Candidate Schools of the arms and services.[142]

CIC repeatedly attempted to secure authorization for more of its agents to attend Officer Candidate Schools. In one plea for increases in officer strength, General Strong wrote:

> "The personnel of this Corps is of officer caliber; the standards for assignment to the Corps are higher than those established for admission to Officer Candidate Schools....The character of work being done by these men is work which should be done by commissioned officers. Its counterpart is done in the Navy by commissioned officers and in civilian life by the carefully trained and well paid special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."[143]

Although it was against War Department policy to offer direct commissions for Counter Intelligence Corps work, corporal and sergeant agents often were offered commissions in other branches of the service. In many instances, they refused commissions, preferring instead to remain with CIC in an enlisted capacity.[144]

Special Agents, on the other hand, were forbidden to accept direct commissions under any circumstances, except in the case of battlefield commissions. General Strong stated the reasons for this seemingly harsh policy in a letter to the Commanding General of the Third Service Command on 23 November 1942:

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141 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, Corps Areas, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 14 May 1942, subject: "Officer Candidate Courses for Special Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

142 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, 2 Sep 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Group, Officer Candidate School," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

143 Memorandum from Gen George V. Strong to Chief of Staff, 31 May 43, subj: "Reorganization and Expansion of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

144 Memorandum from Maj Hugh D. Wise to Colonel Bissell, 12 Dec 42, subj: "Activities of the American Intelligence Command With Respect to Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and "G-Men in Khaki," The American Magazine, January 1945.

"While the release of agents from the Counter Intelligence Corps is entirely a Service Command matter, Special Agents will not be released for the purpose of accepting a direct commission. The reasons for this are several. In the first place, a very large portion of the Special Agents are of officer caliber. They have been extremely carefully selected and they possess exceptional backgrounds of experience and education. Were the various Arms and Services of the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard permitted to give direct commissions to these men, the results of such "raids" would be disastrous to the Counter Intelligence Corps....In the second place, the effect upon the morale of the Corps as a whole resulting from the selection of individuals from such a relatively small organization for commission directly would be very harmful. In the third place, Officer Candidate Schools are available to the personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps and...we do not think that the Corps should be officered by lieutenants who have not been given the very valuable training available in candidate school..."[145]

For those agents and clerks who did not attend Officer Candidate Schools, promotions came slowly. Although Service Commands were authorized to promote CIC enlisted men within the approved allotments, the opportunity for advancement dwindled as the Corps was brought up to strength. On 22 May 1943, the Chief, CIC, urged increases in grades and ratings for CIC personnel and stated "unless morale can be maintained it is doubtful that the Corps...can satisfactorily accomplish its mission..."[146]

The situation did not improve immediately. A survey completed on 24 August 1943 indicated that CIC had lost 565 men in the past seven months, many of them to seek greater opportunities for advancement elsewhere.[147] Still the promotion situation tightened. On 1 October 1943 all CIC promotions were frozen, both in the United States and in overseas areas.[148] Nine days later, the authority to

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145 Personal Ltr from General Strong to Maj Gen Milton A. Reckord, Commanding General, Third Service Command, 23 Nov 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

146 Memorandum for Colonel L. R. Forney, subject: "Suggested Changes and Adjustments Within the Counter Intelligence Corps," dtd 22 May 1943, s/H.R. Kibler, Colonel, Chief, CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

147 Memorandum from Maj James F. Foothorap to Chief, CIC, 24 Aug 43, subject: "Contingency Reserve of CIC Grades," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

148 Ltr from The Adjutant General to All Commands, 1 Oct 43, subject: "Promotion of Counter Intelligence Corps Enlisted Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

promote CIC enlisted personnel was withdrawn from the Service Commands.[149]

Officer promotions required the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, through the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Corps, since CIC commissioned personnel were assigned to the War Department. Officers were eligible for promotion, providing vacancies were available, after six months in rank.[150] One drawback to the officer promotional program was the long delay that frequently followed recommendation for promotion by the Office of the Chief, CIC, and the final approval by the Military Intelligence Service. In some instances, promotions were delayed as much as two months after approval by the Office of the Chief, CIC.[151]

CIC Efficiency Reports

Efficiency reports of both officers and enlisted agents were considered in promotions. G2s who supervised CIC agents were required to submit semi-annual efficiency reports on all Special Agents to G2, War Department. Special reports were required on the transfer of Special Agents to other commands, or on transfer out of CIC.[152]

149 Ltr, AF 220.2 (28 Sep 43) PE-AB, 11 Oct 43, subject: "Promotion of CIC Enlisted Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

150 Ltr from Colonel Forney to G2s, All Commands, 29 Apr 43, subject: "Promotion of Counter Intelligence Corps Commissioned Personnel," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

151 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Colonel Forney, 17 Sep 43, subject: "CIC Officer Promotional Policy," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

152 Ltr, Col J. T. Bissell to G2s of Service Commands, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 12 Nov 42, subject: "Efficiency Reports, Counter Intelligence Corps Enlisted Personnel," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Section 3

OPERATIONS

The Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, was purely an administrative office not directly concerned with actual investigations such as those conducted by detachments in the field. Still, the Chief, CIC, was vitally concerned with operations of a different sort, the movement of CIC detachments from the Zone of the Interior to overseas theaters and to tactical units in training in the United States. It was for this purpose that the Operations Section of the Office of the Chief was created in March 1942.[153]

As its primary mission, the Operations Section was charged with selection of men for overseas assignment, forming of detachments of the men selected, in proper grades, and moving the detachments to their proper destinations. Obviously, fulfillment of the mission required the closest liaison with the theaters, the War Department General Staff, and with other sections within the Office of the Chief, CIC.[154]

In the first days of the war, the CIC Operations Section was seriously hampered by failure of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff to notify CIC of pending troop movements. The result of this lack of coordination was stated bluntly in a letter from Col J. T. Bissell, Assistant Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Service, to the Operations Division on 1 May 1942:

> "...at the present time no specific plan for Counter Intelligence personnel is made in the initial stages of preparation prior to sending such forces overseas. In the past forces have gone overseas without any Counter Intelligence personnel in some instances and in others without sufficiently prepared personnel. This has resulted from a failure to take into account the need for such personnel until the shipment has reached its destination."[155]

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153 This followed reorganization of the General Staff when the Military Intelligence Service was created to take G2 out of the operating business. (It didn't work)

154 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, pp. 223-224, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

155 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to Col Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 1 May 1942, subject: "Notification to the Counterintelligence Group of Actual or Contemplated Shipments Overseas of Task Forces, Expeditionary Forces, or Reinforcements for Troops Already Overseas," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

A conference between Capt Lowell J. Bradford, CIC Operations Officer, and Col Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief of the theater group within the Operations Division, resulted in an official CIC request for more information concerning contemplated troop movements. The Joint Staff Planners, Operations Division, were specifically asked to notify CIC of projected shipments of troops overseas "while the plans are still in the formulative stages" and to include the character, destination, and mission of the force.

CIC declared that early notification was essential if properly qualified, trained, and equipped CIC agents were to accompany the tactical units.

To coordinate movements of tactical units and CIC detachments even more closely, CIC suggested that commanders of task forces and their staffs should confer with representatives of the Chief, CIC, when they came to Washington for pre-movement briefings.156

The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff agreed to only a portion of the CIC request. Although the Office of the Chief, CIC, was placed on the distribution lists for troop movement orders, CIC actually was notified only of shipment of troops from training camps to staging areas. Ultimate destination of the troops still was withheld.

Another series of conferences between Captain Bradford and officers in Operations Division followed in July, but results were inconclusive. CIC still was denied access to top-level plans for employment of the tactical units.

Finally, on 6 July, another G2 letter stating CIC's dilemma was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. The letter stressed that CIC agents, to be effective, should be picked specifically for service in certain areas: "To operate efficiently in a foreign theater, a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment must be thoroughly staffed with personnel having special language and background qualifications in that particular geographic area."

Once more permission was sought for Captain Bradford and Capt Samuel E. Ewing, the CIC Assistant Operations Officer, to secure from the Logistics

156 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to Col Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 1 May 1942, subject: "Notification to the Counterintelligence Group of Actual or Contemplated Shipments Overseas of Task Forces, Expeditionary Forces, or Reinforcements for Troops Already Overseas," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

section of the Operations Division ultimate destinations of all troop movements.[157]

Four days later, a terse indorsement to the G2 letter indicated that CIC had won the argument:

> "Effective this date, the Operations Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Intelligence Service, is authorized to obtain from the Chief, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, such information concerning destination of troop movements as is necessary."[158]

Once other staff sections had conceded CIC's authority to participate in early planning for combat operations, the CIC Operations Section began work in earnest to study procedures for organizing the tactical CIC detachments.

Actually, proposals for organization and operation of tactical detachments had already been drafted in the Office of the Chief. On 20 May 1942, a recommended organization for a theater detachment was completed. The suggestions called for division of detachment personnel into five sections: executive and administrative, counterespionage, countersabotage, specialist, and general assignments sections. A further recommendation called for undercover assignment of highly qualified special agents at strategic points within the theater.

Several recommendations for internal procedures were also urged:

> "(1) That all incoming cases be carefully read by specially selected reviewers in the Executive and Administrative Section and that these cases be classified and assigned to individual special agents on the basis of the case itself and the special agent's particular ability.
>
> (2) The detachment commander should be authorized to initiate investigations on his own responsibility.

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157 Ltr from Col T. E. Roderick, G2 Executive Officer, to AC of S, Operations Division, 6 Jul 42, subject: "Notification to the Counterintelligence Group of Actual or Contemplated Shipments Overseas of Task Forces, Expeditionary Forces, or Reinforcements for Troops Already Overseas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

158 1st Ind by Col C. K. Gailey, Jr., OPD Executive Officer, 10 July 42, to Ltr from Colonel Roderick to Operations Division, 6 July 42, subject: "Notification to the Counterintelligence Group of Actual or Contemplated Shipments Overseas of Task Forces, Expeditionary Forces, or Reinforcements for Troops Already Overseas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

(3) The special agents should be armed...

(4) A close check system should be adopted in order that the theater office may make rapid contact with all special agents wherever they may be...

(5) ...all...special agents should be familiar with the use of technical equipment;...

(6) A carbon copy of memoranda, notes, and other written records of special agents' actions and activities should be turned over to the reviewers daily in order that any mistakes made by the special agents may be corrected at once rather than several weeks later when the case is completed."[159]

But the real work of the Operations Section, so far as overseas troop movements were concerned, began in the summer of 1943 after Colonel Kibler had been ordered to transfer CIC to the theaters of operation.[160] A series of conferences between CIC officers and representatives of the G2, Army Ground Forces, helped to clarify the role of the tactical detachments.

At the first conference in the series, on 19 May 1943, it was determined that CIC detachments would serve Army Ground Forces units in five ways:

a. Advising and assisting in the installation of the CS System.

b. Making the investigations required by the information developed through the CS system.

c. Making investigations necessary in the elimination of subversive personnel.

d. Conducting investigations and other security activities relating to sabotage, espionage, etc.

e. Making general investigations required of the G2 section.

Army Ground Forces were cool to the CIC proposal to establish a separate CIC Staging Area. Colonel Giles R. Carpenter, G2 of Army Ground Forces,

159 Memorandum from Major Sheen to Colonel Guenther, 20 May 42, subject: "Proposed Organization and Operation of the Theater Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

160 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler, 19 September 1952, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

believed the detachments could get enough soldiering with their divisions to equip them for combat duty. In any event, Colonel Carpenter opposed sending the entire detachment to a separate Staging Area immediately prior to the division's embarkation. He conceded, however, that it might be desirable to send small groups of agents to a CIC Staging Area well in advance of overseas shipment.[161]

At another conference on 12 June, Colonel Carpenter stated his conviction that CIC detachments should be attached to divisions as soon as the divisions were activated rather than just before embarkation.[162]

By September, when movement of CIC detachments overseas was in full swing, Colonel Carpenter apparently had revised some of his opinions concerning CIC training for combat. In a conference with 1st Lt Donovan J. Ault of the CIC Operations Section, Colonel Carpenter declared that the CIC Staging Area was of "definite benefit" to tactical detachments. Furthermore, Colonel Carpenter advised the G2 of the II Armored Corps that the Corps' specialized training program for its CIC detachment was not necessary in view of the training at the CIC Staging Area.

Apparently the efforts of the Operations Section to coordinate activities of CIC with the tactical commands was paying dividends, for Colonel Carpenter stated that the tactical CIC detachments "are generally becoming more effective and more standardized in their administration and operations." Realizing CIC's personnel problems, Colonel Carpenter expressed willingness for tactical detachments to operate slightly understrength until the War Department granted CIC requests for additional personnel.[163]

Work of the Operations Section increased proportionately with the number of CIC agents marked for overseas assignment. With the rapid expansion of the Corps, it became necessary to reorganize the Operations Section according to theaters of operation. A separate sub-section was established for each theater, and officers in the sub-sections were detailed to handle all matters pertaining to their theaters.

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161 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Colonel Forney, 21 May 1943, subject: "Report on a Conference of 19 May 1943, with Colonel Carpenter, AC of S, G2, Army Ground Forces," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

162 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Colonel Forney, 16 June 43, subject: "Meeting with Col Giles R. Carpenter, G2, Army Ground Forces, on 12 June 1943," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

163 Memorandum from 1st Lt Donovan J. Ault to Chief, Operations Section, 10 Sep 43, subject: "Conference at Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Army Ground Forces, War College, Washington, D.C.," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

As new agents arrived at the CIC Staging Area, they were interviewed by officers from the Operations Section to determine their suitability for proposed assignments. Once marked for a particular theater, each agent received an orientation on his area of service from the assistant operations officer in charge of that theater.[164]

On 22 September 1943, The Adjutant General notified service commands of an impending mass movement of CIC agents and officers to overseas areas. The service commands were directed to release a total of 165 officers and 1,894 enlisted men for shipment overseas before 31 January 1944.[165]

Implementation of the mass movement required considerable planning in the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, most of it by the Operations and Personnel Sections. In a report to Colonel Forney, Colonel Kibler said the transfers could be completed on schedule only through a number of modifications in the existing operating procedure. Additional facilities and personnel at both the CIC Advanced Training School in Chicago and at the CIC Staging Area in Baltimore were held essential to the success of the operation. Colonel Kibler anticipated resistance from the service commands and urged that the G2, War Department, plan to counter this opposition.[166]

It was contemplated that the mass movement of CIC personnel to theaters of operation between September 1943 and February 1944 would solve personnel problems in the theaters. On 17 January 1944--just seven days before the publication of Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500--a letter from CIC Headquarters advised the Chief, CIC, NATOUSA, that by the following month "the major job of procurement, selection, equipment, distribution and shipment of an enormous organization will have been completed."[167] That, in effect, was a statement that CIC personnel had been procured in adequate numbers to fulfill the requirements established by Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, which by then had already been drafted. It was a statement proved false by subsequent developments, for at the time of the invasion of France only those detachments assigned to the European Theater of Operations that actually participated in the landings were up

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164 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1907-1943, pp. 223-224, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

165 Ltr from The Adjutant General to Commanding Generals, Service Commands, 22 September 1943, subject: "Transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

166 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, 16 Sep 43, subject: "Transfer of CIC Personnel from the Zone of the Interior to Theaters of Operation, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and the Special Detachment," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

167 Ltr from WDGS, MID to Maj Edward L. Ray, Jr., 17 Jan 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

to strength.[168] Either the Office of the Chief was ignorant of the status of the field detachments--which is unlikely--or top CIC officers had deliberately endorsed a Table of Organization and Equipment they knew could not be filled.

The Office of the Chief ducked another operational problem in late 1943 when Maj Edward L. Ray, Jr., CIC Chief at Allied Force Headquarters, urged that immediate attention be given to plans for CIC's occupational duties at the end of the war.[169] On 17 January 1944, Major Ray was notified that "your problems with respect to post hostilities activities are receiving some consideration and thought now, but final respect to the establishment of broad policy, etc., will be delayed for at least another 45 days."[170] In less than a month the Office of the Chief, CIC, was closed without determination of occupational policies.

Undercover Missions

One specialized function of the Operations Section at CIC Headquarters was the selection of men for undercover missions in all parts of the world and the preparation of adequate cover for agents chosen for the secret missions. Details of the specific undercover missions are related in other chapters of this history,[171] but the undercover duties of the Office of the Chief will be discussed briefly here.

Close coordination with the Personnel Section was necessary for the selection of agents for undercover work. Once personnel records revealed men potentially qualified for an undercover mission, the agents in question were ordered to the Office of the Chief on temporary duty. Only after interviews with all candidates did the Operations Section choose agents to go undercover.

After agents had been selected for undercover assignment, the Operations Section faced a host of problems in planning transportation and cover employment, securing passports, and obtaining proper Selective Service identification papers.

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168 Rosters of ETO detachments indicated only about ten detachments which were going ashore in the initial waves were near the authorized strength. In the fall of 1944, after it was obvious that no replacements were coming from the United States, the other detachments were authorized to recruit agents locally to reach authorized strength. See also Chapter 3, "Critique: North Africa and Sicily."

169 Memorandum from Major Ray to Colonel Kibler, 17 Dec 43, subject: "Functio of CIC in Post-Hostility Period," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility)

170 Ltr from Colonel Wise to Major Ray, 17 Jan 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

171 See particularly the chapter on CIC in Base and Defense Commands. Most undercover operations directed by the Operations Section occurred in these areas.

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CIC also managed to eliminate considerable administrative red tape in the processing of applications for passports in connection with undercover missions. At first, agents sent passport applications directly to the State Department. Soon it was discovered that processing time could be cut by channeling the papers through the War Department.[173]

Selective Service credentials also were essential for agents posing as civilians. Since agents had surrendered their draft cards on entering the Army, the Military Intelligence Service requested Selective Service officials to issue special registration cards and permits to leave the country to CIC agents who needed such documentation to back up their cover stories.[174]

Since undercover agents--and those who operated in the open--often were required to make unexpected expenditures during the course of investigations, the Military Intelligence Service stipulated that all agents must carry at least $20 at all times. The money was issued from confidential funds, and inspections were made periodically to account for it.[175]

Despite these preparations, blunders in connection with undercover assignments came frequently as officers at headquarters learned through trial and error the steps necessary to prevent compromise of secret missions. One agent was sent to Newfoundland to pose as a civilian employee of a construction company, yet he was forced to travel on orders and transportation requests which identified him as a sergeant. Others were often required to sign military payrolls. Lack of coordination between the Office of the Chief and commands in which undercover agents worked also caused misunderstandings. For example, the Operations

172 Memorandum for the File, prepared by Maj Lowell J. Bradford, 23 April 1943, subject: "Special Undercover Mission," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

173 Ltr from Major Sheen to G2s, Corps Areas and Western Defense Command, 17 Mar 42, subject: "Procurement of Passports," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

174 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to Maj Gen Lewis B. Hershey, Director, Selective Service System, 27 Jan 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

175 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to G2s of Corps Areas, Departments, Base and Defense Commands, 6 Jun 42, subject: "Emergency Money," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Section arranged cover employment for several agents destined for work in Iceland only to learn later that the G2 there wanted the men to work in uniform.

On another occasion, cover for one agent assigned to Iceland was so airtight that no one in Iceland--not even the G2--knew he was connected with CIC. Not until the War Department decided to bring the agent home months later did the Iceland G2 know he was supposed to be receiving reports from the undercover agent.[176]

Despite frequent fiascos in connection with undercover assignments, the processing of agents for undercover roles probably could be most effectively handled through the CIC Operations Section rather than by local detachments. This concept was clearly explained in correspondence between CIC headquarters and the Western Defense Command on 14 October 1943. The G2, Western Defense Command, wanted approval to place an agent undercover. The Operations Section advised:

> "In view of the danger of revealing the identity of the agent under the original plan, it is believed that a period of processing in the Office of the Chief, CIC, on a background story and the agent's possession of a "section-eight" discharge and draft card exempting him from service could be advisable and effective. If your office desires him to use any particular background story, it is requested that this division be so advised immediately."[177]

Improper requests for undercover agents sometimes were received--and vetoed--by CIC Headquarters. In December 1942 the American Intelligence Command asked for CIC vacancies so that agents might work on special missions under the supervision of the American Intelligence Command in South America. CIC rejected the proposal as inconsistent with War Department policy, and the CIC Chief suggested that the American Intelligence Command "be requested to cease proselyting Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel."[178]

The Manhattan District Project

Another task of the Operations Section in late 1943 and early 1944 was the selection of qualified officers and men for a special CIC detachment to perform

176. Details and documentation of these incidents are recorded in the Chapter on CIC in the Base and Defense Commands.

177 Ltr from Capt Samuel E. Ewing to G2, Western Defense Command, 14 Oct 43, subject: "DSM Project," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

178 Memorandum from Major Wise to Colonel Bissell, 12 Dec 42, subject: "Activities of the American Intelligence Command with Respect to Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

security duties in connection with the Manhattan District Engineers Project. This project is discussed in detail in a separate chapter of this history.

The Washington Field Office

One of the most peculiar operational responsibilities of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, was centered in a special CIC detachment in the nation's capital.

This strange organization, known officially as Detachment, Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, was commonly called the Washington Field Office. Its command structure and its duties were unique among the wartime CIC detachments.

Although the Washington Field Office originally was under the administrative control of the Washington Provisional Brigade and later the Third Corps Area, its investigative work was conducted under the sole direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department. The G2 exercised this control directly in some cases; in others, subordinate echelons from the Military Intelligence Service down to and including the Office of the Chief, CIC, guided activities of the special detachment.[179]

Under such a complex system, some confusion was inevitable. One of the early misunderstandings involved the question of personnel allotments for the Washington Field Office. The question was clarified by a G2 letter which stated that the allotment for the Washington office was separate and distinct from the Third Corps Area, despite the attachment to the Third Corps Area for administration.[180]

The mission of the special detachment was equally confusing. Originally intended to be the G2's agency for high-level investigations, the detachment by early 1942 was operating primarily as a pool of agents for overseas duty or for special undercover missions. Gradually it became a sort of "errand boy" for G2, and its rosters included Military Intelligence Division couriers, draftsmen, and legal researchers in addition to regular Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.[181]

179 Memorandum from Brig Gen Sherman Miles to The Adjutant General, 31 May 1941, subject: "Relief of Corps of Intelligence Police Personnel from Attachment to Headquarters Company, Washington Provisional Brigade," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, 27 Oct 55.

180 G2 Disposition Form dtd 1 Jul 41, subj: "Allotment of Grades to Corps of Intelligence Police," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

181 Ltr from Maj F. C. Brennecke to Chief MIS, 2 Jun 42, subj: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

A memorandum prepared by the detachment commander on 16 April 1943 discussed his concept of the Washington Field Office's mission and lists some of the organization's many bosses:

> "(Its mission is to)...Complete all phases of investigations and miscellaneous confidential missions pertaining to counterintelligence activities as assigned or requested by the Military Intelligence Service; the Counter-intelligence Group; the Investigative Branch, C.I.G.; the CIC Branch, C.I.G.; and the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands... For operational purposes within the Military Intelligence Service, the Washington Branch Office has always been considered a part of, or closely affiliated with, the Investigative Branch, Counterintelligence Group..."

Little is known of the detachment's internal organization, except for brief glimpses of the detachment's structure gleaned from a letter written by the commander, Lt Col F. C. Brennecke. The Washington Field Office was divided into two sections. An Administrative Section was responsible for personnel, services, plans and training, case assignments, and report review. Personnel in the Investigative Section were grouped according to their duties: counter-espionage, countersabotage, personnel investigations, safeguarding military information, and specialists.[182]

Extensive use of the Washington Field Office as a replacement pool for CIC personnel complicated its investigative work throughout 1942, since the turnover of agents was tremendous. The detachment commander protested this situation on 2 June 1942 in a letter to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service:

> "This organization has actually functioned as a replacement training center as well as an investigative agency, and in the interest of efficiency it is requested that, so far as possible, the present force be left intact... It is pointed out that approximately seventy (70) men have been transferred from the organization since January 1, 1942. Since the maximum strength has been one hundred sixteen (116), this means that over half the force is constantly in the 'recruit' or 'trainee' class. If the ratio of experienced and inexperienced agents is too disproportionate, the quality and quantity of work performed must suffer."[183]

Two weeks later, Captain Bradford of the CIC Operations Section called attention to the Washington Field Office's plight in a report to Major Sheen.

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182 Memorandum from Colonel Brennecke to Col David G. Erskine, 16 Apr 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

183 Ltr from Maj F. C. Brennecke to Chief, MIS, 2 Jun 42, subject: "Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

He noted that the detachment "cannot possibly supply" all the demands made on it for personnel, and cited figures to show that the special detachment had been the source of all agents recently assigned to foreign duty.[184]

By September, with the situation no less acute, Major Brennecke suggested a remedy. He recommended that 70 percent of the agents in each command be retained in their original assignment for at least six months in order to provide a pool of experienced agents and to stabilize the investigative situation.

Major Brennecke said 150 agents had been transferred out of his detachment since the first of the year, with the result that as many as eight different agents sometimes worked on a single case before it could be closed. "As we now operate," he wrote, "an agent has just begun to learn the area, make his contacts, and get into his cases when he is ordered to a new station." Agents were reassigned almost as soon as they began to develop qualities which would make them valuable as investigators. Personnel turnover in the Washington Field Office was almost 200 percent in less than nine months.[185]

Apparently the fluid situation had been stabilized by mid-1943, for on 16 April 1943 the detachment commander wrote of his unit: "...except for miscellaneous assignments, the only function is investigative."[186]

A change in the Washington Field Office's complicated command structure also had been effected by mid-1943. Divorced from the Third Service Command, the detachment was placed under the administrative care of the Military District of Washington. One of the earliest available records indicating the change is an estimate of strength requirements for the Washington Field Office, prepared by the G2, Military District of Washington. On 3 August 1943, the G2 listed the detachment's requirements at one lieutenant colonel, one major, five captains, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, and 120 enlisted men.[187]

Only three months later the Washington Field Office was condemned to a quick death, when, on 5 November, CIC was ordered to terminate its operations

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184 Memorandum from Captain Bradford to Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 15 Jun 42, subject: "Status of Operations Section, Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

185 Memorandum from Major Brennecke to Col W. E. Crist, 26 Sep 42, subject: "The Counter Intelligence Corps," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

186 Memorandum from Major Brennecke to Col David G. Erskine, 16 Apr 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

187 1st Indorsement dtd 3 Aug 43 to Ltr from Colonel Kibler to G2, Military District of Washington, 31 July 43, subject: "CIC Personnel Requirements," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

in the nation's capital.[188] Although available records do not cite the reasons for the edict, a series of events which took place concurrently caused some top-ranking intelligence officers to speculate that one of the detachment's investigations was about to embarrass a person high in government circles.[189]

Operations of the Washington Field Office

Few records are available on specific cases handled by CIC agents in Washington, although some investigative activities can be traced back to 1940, when the Washington Field Office was first opened.

Most of the work of the special detachment before the declaration of war was routine, consisting largely of background investigations of applicants for the old Corps of Intelligence Police. Occasional discreet investigations of Nazi, Fascist, and Communist sympathizers were conducted. After war was declared, General Holbrook has written, "Our activities with regard to the Communists had to be carried on very carefully because of the sympathetic attitude of the White House."[190]

A few days after Pearl Harbor, agents seized hundreds of classified documents in an unannounced, midnight security raid of War Department Headquarters in the Munitions Building. Documents of every classification had been left unlocked in desk drawers and filing cabinets. Agents carted the papers away to their office, which was deluged the next day by irate War Department brass who were infuriated by the CIC tactics. Particularly bitter was Maj Gen E. S. Adams, The Adjutant General, in whose offices the agents had found an unprotected classified list of high-ranking officers slated for promotion. General Adams stormed into the G2 office to complain, but his attitude softened when he discovered that his subordinates had misinformed him about the nature of the search.

Despite the furor created by the security raid, it accomplished its purpose. Stricter measures to protect classified documents resulted.[191]

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188 AG Memo, file 320.2PO-M-A, dtd 5 Nov 43, subject: "Allotment to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 WDGS, for CIC Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

189 This topic is discussed in detail in Section 5, "Office of the Chief Abolished."

190 Memoirs of Brig Gen W. A. Holbrook, p. 3, undated, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

191 Ibid., and interview with Hugh D. Wise, Jr., 23 Aug 54, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Blair House Detail

The Washington Field Office provided coverage at Blair House, the official residence provided French General Giraud during his visit to the United States in July 1943.

Four agents were on duty around the clock inside the residence, and a CIC automobile detail patrolled the streets outside. Officers in charge of the detail made frequent inspection tours of the area.[192]

192 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney to Gen George V. Strong, 21 Aug 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Section 4

SUPPLY

Procurement of specialized investigative equipment for the Counter Intelligence Corps assumed new importance as CIC ranks swelled during the rapid expansion of 1942.

At the time of the creation of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, the supply function was listed as one of the major responsibilities of the Chief. Equipment ranging from weapons and ammunition to miniature cameras and recording devices were required not only for use in the field, but also for training new CIC agents.

To the Supply Section in the Office of the Chief was delegated the responsibility for the selection, procurement, storage, and issuance of all CIC equipment and supplies. From a simple list of five categories of investigative equipment in 1942, the operational needs of CIC detachments in the field increased so rapidly that by the end of 1943 a list of CIC equipment numbered more than a hundred items.

Originally, the Supply Section classified its equipment in these groups: observation, identification, examination and preservation of evidence, sound detection and recording devices, and weapons and defensive equipment. Binoculars was the only item listed as observation equipment. For identification purposes, detachments were issued cameras and fingerprinting sets. Ultra-violet ray lamps, cameras, moulage, latent fingerprinting sets, and iodine fumers were considered necessary for examination and preservation of evidence, while Speak-O-Phone and Recordgraph were the only items of sound equipment listed. Weapons and defensive equipment included .38 caliber revolvers, holsters, and ammunition; blackjacks, and handcuffs.

In early 1942, manufacturers and distributors of investigative equipment were asked what types of equipment they normally furnished to investigative agencies. Samples were examined. When approved by the Chief, special equipment was purchased directly from commercial agencies through confidential military intelligence funds. Distribution, not governed by special lists of equipment, was based largely upon requests from individual officers selected to command CIC detachments.

Change in Procurement Policies

On 1 August 1942, the Army clamped down on the purchasing powers of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. CIC was advised that it must use the Army's normal supply channels for procurement of equipment. Before authority could be

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granted for CIC to requisition equipment, the Chief was required to submit to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, an estimate of supplies needed during the coming year.

Although the new method of procurement curtailed the discretion previously exercised by the Chief, he still was authorized to use G2 confidential funds to obtain essential equipment not available through the Army Service Forces.[199]

On 22 November 1942, the Requirements Division, Services of Supply, approved the CIC Chief's first catalog of estimated requirements of equipment. The catalog, covering a period from 1 November 1942 to 31 December 1943, listed heavy demands for photographic and sound equipment, lockpicking sets, weapons, and various expendable items.[200]

CIC Supply Depot Established

With large shipments of CIC equipment arriving at Baltimore headquarters at increasingly frequent intervals, CIC's meager storage facilities were quickly exhausted. In March 1943, it became apparent that creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot was the only practical solution to the problem.

On 20 March, General Strong requested authority for the Counter Intelligence Corps to establish a Supply Depot "for the purpose of receiving, storing, and issuing of Counter Intelligence Corps investigative equipment and supplies."[201] The request was quickly approved, and on 31 March the CIC Depot was established and assigned a service number of the Office of the Chief of Finance, Army Service Forces. The action made it possible for CIC to procure high-priority items, such as cameras, and to expedite the shipment of vital supplies to tactical units overseas.[202]

By November, the storage space rented by the CIC Supply Depot in the Pace-Pratt Building in Baltimore was filled to capacity, and there was no room for ten

199 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, pp. 170-171, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

200 Counter Intelligence Corps Catalogue of Equipment and Supplies Required for the period 1 November 1942 to 31 December 1943, included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

201 Memorandum from Maj Gen George V. Strong to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 20 March 1943, subject: Establishment of Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

202 History of Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, p. 171, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

tons of photographic equipment en route to CIC from the Philadelphia Signal Depot. Colonel Kibler submitted an urgent request for authority to negotiate for rental of additional space in the Paca-Pratt Building. The request was approved on 17 November, and the CIC Depot increased its storage capacity by 960 square feet.[203]

Since there was no table of equipment for CIC detachments, the requests for equipment varied according to the whims of the individual commanders.

In an effort to standardize the issue of special equipment, a letter went out from the Office of the Chief on 10 June 1943 requesting all detachments to submit recommendations concerning CIC equipment. Commanders also were asked to survey their supply rooms and determine whether any equipment already on hand was not applicable to present or anticipated needs. Few changes were suggested by the 39 commanders who replied to the questionnaires.[204]

When results of the survey were compiled, the first Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps was prepared for distribution to detachments in the field on 17 July 1943. The list itemized not only investigative equipment but also standard military equipment obtainable through the Army's technical services.

Tactical detachments were instructed to requisition equipment and supplies, other than investigative equipment, through the commanding generals of the tactical units to which they were attached. Nontactical detachments could obtain the supplies upon requisition by the commanding generals of the service commands, defense commands and base commands to which they were attached. All CIC investigative equipment was issued through the property officer, Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot, on requisition.[205]

Such a lack of policy inevitably resulted in misuse of the authority to requisition special investigative equipment.

In September 1943, while on a visit to the European Theater of Operations, General Strong discovered vast surpluses of technical equipment for which the tactical detachments had no use. He immediately cabled Colonel Forney:

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203 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 13 November 1943, subject: "Additional Bulk Storage Space for the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

204 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, p. 172, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

205 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to all commands, 17 July 1943, Subject: "Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL). A copy is attached as Appendix 6.

> Matters of equipment particularly of technical character needs looking into. Immediate steps should be taken to return officers to the United States from both active and nonactive theaters for consultation in regard to equipment in order that equipment situation may be straightened out. It is now highly academic basis on which types and quantities of equipment have been determined is making CIC an ineffective laughing stock. Get busy on this.[206]

Colonel Forney retorted that "the list (of equipment) represents the considered opinions of the using services and is not at all academic or theoretical." "In particular," he explained further, "the views of responsible CIC officers of ETOUSA were incorporated." He noted that officers already had been recalled from the theaters to give their advice on CIC's need for equipment.[207]

Colonel Kibler agreed with Colonel Forney. In a memorandum for the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, Colonel Kibler wrote:

> It is believed that the action taken by the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Section and Depot has been based on the best information available to the Property Officer, CIC Supply Depot, from personnel in the field as well as from technical experts. It is further believed that on the basis of available reports, CIC investigative equipment and supplies are in general suitable to the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps and are desired by CIC detachments for the prosecution of their missions.[208]

To substantiate CIC's claims that its equipment was purchased and distributed according to needs of detachments in the field, a detailed history of the CIC Supply Section was prepared.[209] In addition, Colonel Forney forwarded a special memorandum to General Strong, which purported to be "at least a partial answer" to the CIC equipment situation in Europe. Colonel Forney told of receipt of a request from ETOUSA for "a long list of considerable quantities of quite technical investigative equipment, much of it of dubious value in a theater such as ETOUSA... Thus far we have not had any report of unnecessary equipment from ETOUSA

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206 Cable from General Strong to General Kroner for Colonel Forney, 6 September 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

207 Memorandum from Colonel Forney to Deputy for Administration, MID, 7 September 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

208 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 11 September 1943, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Equipment and Supplies," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

209 Memorandum from Capt Edwin Bennett to Chief, CIC, 10 September 1943, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Equipment and Supplies," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

except the general statement made to General Strong that the equipment furnished was ridiculous. Probably some of it was ridiculous, but they got just what was asked for."

At the bottom of the memorandum the following note was scribbled: "Suggest you advise Forney that 'all is forgiven' if he keeps up the good record of CIC since three months ago." It was signed only "TNC."[210]

A revision of the Special List of Equipment and Supplies on 29 November 1943 did not include supplies obtainable through the technical services, but listed only CIC investigative equipment. Instructions which accompanied the list stipulated that the Chief, CIC, would determine the initial issue of equipment for each detachment. Additional items would be available on requisition to the Property Officer, CIC Supply Depot, "providing a sufficient investigative need for such issue is shown." Detachment commanders were directed to requisition expendable supplies quarterly, through G2 channels of communication.[211] On 10 February 1944, with the closing of the Office of the Chief, commanders were instructed to requisition investigative equipment from the Military Intelligence Service through command channels.[212]

Property Responsibility and Accountability

At first, accountability and responsibility for CIC equipment varied according to local policies in the Corps areas, but on 1 August 1942 accountability for all CIC equipment was vested in the Supply Officer at the Washington headquarters. Each Corps area designated a responsible officer to care for property locally. In preparation for the change to the new system, property officers of all detachments inventoried equipment on hand and forwarded debit memorandum receipts for CIC equipment to the Supply Officer in Washington, who then assumed the responsibility for maintenance of records and inventory of CIC equipment.

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210 Memorandum for General Strong from Colonel Forney, 14 September 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

211 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to all commands, 29 November 1943, subject: "Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) attached as Appendix 7.

212 Ltr from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, to all commands, 10 February 1944, subject: "Supply of CIC Investigative Equipment and Supplies to Overseas Commands," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

CIC detachments were authorized to purchase some items of equipment locally, through G2 funds, but such purchases were to be reported to the CIC Supply Officer for purposes of accountability.[213]

The system was abandoned shortly, when the mounting flow of investigative equipment to detachments in the field made central accountability difficult, if not virtually impossible. Accountability reverted to the major commands to which CIC units were attached on 1 December 1942, and a responsible and an accountable officer for CIC property were appointed within each command.[214]

CIC supply policies, once clarified and defined, were included as a special section in Technical Manual 30-215, published 22 September 1943. The manual set forth in detail the responsibilities of the Chief, CIC, and the individual detachments with regard to supply problems.[215]

The Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, also was charged with procurement of certain types of noninvestigative equipment and supplies. Among them were .38 caliber ammunition, automobiles, gasoline, automobile tires and civilian clothing.

Ammunition for Training

CIC agents in Zone of the Interior and Base and Defense Command detachments received periodic weapons training with the .38 caliber revolver. One of the major supply problems was the procurement of ammunition for training purposes. To solve the problem, the Office of the Chief, CIC, maintained liaison with the Chief of Ordnance.

Initially, detachments were authorized 300 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition per individual per annum, although each detachment was required to keep 100 rounds per man in reserve for an emergency. Students at the Chicago school were issued 50 rounds each for weapons instruction while attending classes.

213 Ltr from Col T. E. Roderick, G2 Executive Officer, to G2s, Corps areas, Commanding Officer of War Department CIC Detachment, and Commandant of CIC Training School, 29 July 1942, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Equipment and Supplies," included in CIC Field Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

214 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to G2s, Service Commands, 17 November 1942, subject: "Property Accountability for CIC Investigative Equipment and Supplies," included in CIC Field Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

215 Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 22 September 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL). See copy attached as Appendix 1.

Requisitions for ammunition were forwarded through the G2 to the ordnance officer of the major command.[216]

Pressing demands for ammunition on the battlefields of the world early in 1943 brought drastic reductions in the amount of ammunition allotted to CIC for training purposes. On 26 January 1943, the Military Intelligence Service warned that the quantity of .38 caliber ammunition being allocated to the Army was "considerably less" than requirements. Strict economy of existing supplies was urged, and "dry shooting" practice was encouraged. Top priority on the ammunition available went to agents who previously had failed to qualify with firearms.[217]

Fortunately the shortage was only temporary. In mid-April, detachments received word that .38 caliber ammunition was again available at the rate of 300 rounds per man per annum "or as necessity may require."[218]

Automobiles and Jeeps

Both in the United States and in combat zones, transportation was a problem for CIC agents.

Agents in the United States and in certain base commands where civilian clothing was worn often drove their private automobiles. For those who had no cars of their own, the Army provided civilian-type sedans whenever possible. In the summer of 1942, the Military Intelligence Service persuaded the Services of Supply to purchase 108 second-hand sedans for CIC use in the Corps Areas and in Washington. Intended for "exclusive use" of G2s and CIC personnel, the automobiles carried no visible Army identification numbers, and state license plates were purchased from confidential funds. As a further aid in concealing CIC's connection with the automobiles, a variety of makes and colors were purchased.[219]

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216 Ltr from Col Ralph C. Smith, G2 Executive Officer, to G2s, Corps Areas, Departments, and Base and Defense Commands, 3 February 1942, subj: "Requisitions for .38 Caliber Revolver Ammunition - CIC," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

217 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to G2s of Service Commands and Commandant of CIC Advanced Training School, 26 January 1943, subj: "Necessary Economy in the Use of .38 Caliber Special, Revolver Ammunition," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

218 Ltr from Col L. R. Forney to G2s, all Theaters, Departments, and Base Commands, 12 April 1943, subject: "Ammunition, .38 Caliber Special Revolver, for CIC," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

219 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, Corps Areas, Western Defense Command, and Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment, MIS, WD, 6 June 1942, subject: "Automobiles for the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

In some Base Commands, transportation problems were not so easily solved These problems are discussed more fully in other chapters of this history, but the following examples typify the problems which confronted the Office of the Chief, CIC. Eighteen civilian-type vehicles sent to Panama for CIC use were promptly identified as CIC vehicles, despite efforts at concealment. All identical new models, the cars bore consecutively numbered license plates. In Bermuda, agents were forced to use a pick-up truck borrowed from the post engineer for most of the duration of the war. Requests for trucks for use by CIC in Iceland were repeatedly denied.[220]

CIC detachments attached to tactical units sometimes found the tactical units unwilling to issue transportation for CIC agents.[221] In the summer of 1943, the Chief, CIC, initiated action which resulted in provisions for a jeep for every two agents in a tactical detachment, along with a cargo trailer for every second jeep.[222] When Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500 was published on 24 January 1944, it clarified the right of the tactical detachments to transportation of their own.[223]

Agents Get Extra Gas and Tires

For those agents in the United States who drove their personal automobiles on CIC business, gasoline rationing was a hardship until the Office of the Chief, CIC, secured extra rations for agents in the field.

On a request initiated by the Office of the Chief, CIC, the Office of Price Administration issued blocks of gasoline rationing "C" books and "C" stickers to service command G2s for distribution to CIC agents. New books were issued quarterly. To protect the identity of the agents, records of the specially issued ration books were maintained centrally in Washington rather than in local Office of Price Administration offices.[224]

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220 See chapter on CIC in Base and Defense Commands for further details.

221 Memorandum from Maj Lowell J. Bradford to G2, Army Ground Forces, 26 April 43, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments on Duty With Army Ground Force Units," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

222 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

223 Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, 24 January 1944, attached as Appendix 4.

224 Ltr from Col J. T. Bissell to Directors of Intelligence, Service Commands, and G2, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, 13 November 1942, subject: "Nation-wide Gasoline Rationing," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Gasoline for the government-owned sedans was obtained through Quartermaster facilities, although agents were reimbursed when they purchased gasoline for the government vehicles.[225]

The Office of Price Administration also approved requests for new tires and tubes for personal automobiles used by CIC agents in their work.[226]

Civilian Clothing Allowance

A final aspect of supply of particular interest to agents in the Zone of the Interior was the civilian clothing allowance from confidential funds.

Until 11 June 1942, agents whose duties required that they wear civilian clothing received an initial allowance of $140 and a $117 annual maintenance allowance. At that time, however, the initial allowance was reduced to $100 and the maintenance allowance was set at $7 per month.[227]

The clothing allowance was increased again on 20 May 1943, when the Adjutant General notified all commands that a $125 initial allowance had been authorized to protect the "health and identity" of CIC enlisted agents. G2s were empowered to increase the initial allowance when unusual circumstances dictated such action. A monthly maintenance allowance of $12 was established.[228]

CIC's Budget Requirements

CIC's wartime budget assumed tremendous proportions when compared with the meager expenditures for counterintelligence during the years between the wars. On 9 January 1943, the CIC Fiscal Officer estimated budget requirements for the 1944 fiscal year at a whopping $10,476,910, excluding the cost of equipment procured through the Services of Supply and salaries of military personnel.

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225 Ltr from Maj H. G. Sheen to G2s, Corps Areas, Western Defense Command, and Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment, MIS, WD, 6 June 1942, subject: "Automobiles for the Counter Intelligence Corps," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

226 Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," 22 September 1943, attached as Appendix 1.

227 WD Ltr, file AG 322.999 CIC (6-6-42) MS-B-M, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Clothing Allowances," dtd 11 June 1942, To All Commands, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Interview with Arthur K. Peters (Maj MI-Res), 23 September 1955.

228 Ltr from Brig Gen H. B. Lewis, Acting The Adjutant General, to all Commands, 20 May 1943, subject: "CIC Clothing Allowance," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Largest single item in the proposed budget was $2,740,400 earmarked for salaries of 1,768 civilian clerks. Quarters allowances for agents totaled $1,909,800, and was the next largest expenditure. A total of $1,273,200 was set aside for subsistance not covered by commutation allowances.

Travel costs also were a big share of the suggested budget. It was estimated that mileage not covered by travel orders would cost $1,432,350, while mileage partially covered by orders would require $254,640. For general transportation - trolly and taxi fares and the like - the budget estimate was $954,900. Some travel expenses such as gasoline and oil for government-owned automobiles were absorbed by the $318,300 designated for miscellaneous investigative expenses.

Another major item was the civilian clothing allowances. Initial clothing allowances were expected to total $380,000 during the year, and clothing maintenance costs added another $106,000 to the budget.

Only two other items were listed - $636,600 for entertainment of informants and $25,000 for incidental supplies and equipment to be purchased through the Office of the Chief, CIC, for use at headquarters and by detachments in the field.[229]

229 Memorandum from Maj Wise and Maj Adkinson to Colonel Crist, 9 January 1943, subject: "Estimate of Funds, Fiscal Year 1944," included in CIC Office Manual, 1941-1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Section 5

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ABOLISHED

Trouble for CIC was brewing in the summer of 1943, even as the Corps stepped up the flow of agents into combat areas.

Acting on orders from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Army's Inspector General launched on 16 July 1943 an extensive investigation of intelligence activities in the Service Commands. His report, published three and a half months later, was damning to the Counter Intelligence Corps. It foretold the end of CIC activities in the service commands and resulted in the closing of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, on 15 February 1944.[230]

What prompted the investigation is not revealed in official records, although a chain of events which began as early as April 1943 indicates that top-level embarrassment over certain CIC investigations may have touched off the probe.

The first indication that something amiss had attracted the attention of officials high in the Roosevelt Administration came in April, when the Deputy Chief of Staff requested a list of all agents operating in Washington by name.[231] At a period when the Allies were rushing preparations for the invasion of France, this request from a general officer high in the War Department must be construed as more than passing interest in CIC affairs. There was little time in those hectic days for consideration of trivia at top echelons.

On 5 May 1943, the Assistant Secretary of War asked Colonel Forney for an explanation of CIC policies regarding attendance of special agents at officer candidate schools. Despite Colonel Forney's detailed reply, an informal note from James F. Perry to Major Wise on 27 May advised:

> "Hugh...Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to Secretary Stimson, has become interested in CIC because of letters from some of his friends asking why certain enlisted men with outstanding qualifications for the Army have not been commissioned. Bundy had one of his young officer assistants look into the CIC situation and it is reported his young man felt a thorough investigation warranted."[232]

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230 Memorandum from Maj Gen Virgil Peterson, Inspector General, to Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands." (Unclassified). A copy of this report is attached as Appendix 2.

231 Memorandum from Lt Col F. C. Brennecke to Col David G. Erskine, 16 Apr 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

232 Ltr from James F. Perry to Maj Hugh D. Wise, Jr., 27 May 43, filed in 201, Wise, Hugh D., (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Whether the "thorough investigation" mentioned in the note to Major Wise had any connection with events leading to the Inspector General's probe is problematical. It is conceivable, however, that once the door was opened for an investigation of CIC promotion policies, persons fearful of exposure by CIC could easily have agitated for a closer scrutiny of Counter Intelligence Corps activities.

That such persons did exist and did attempt to influence CIC policy has since been confirmed by both Colonel Kibler and Brig Gen W. A. Holbrook, who as an officer in the G2 section was keenly aware of events pertaining to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

In his unpublished memoirs, General Holbrook states that several incidents during the summer of 1942 "incurred the displeasure of certain powerful politicians" with the result that "in July information was given orally to C.I. section that it would be reduced radically in the scope of its functions."[233]

In an interview ten years after the publication of the Inspector General's report, Colonel Kibler charged bluntly that the probe was the direct result of top-level intervention in CIC affairs. The former CIC Chief asserted that Gen George C. Marshall, then Chief of Staff, ordered the investigation after repeated insistence from Gen Joseph T. McNarney, his deputy, to stifle one CIC report "personally embarrassing" to persons high in the Government.[234]

Colonel Kibler refused to elaborate on the nature of the "embarrassing" report. Communism was involved, he said, but the main consideration was a personal matter unrelated to communism.[235]

Originally Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, the Inspector General, was directed to investigate and make appropriate recommendations on the organization, scope of activities, and operating procedures of the directors of intelligence and their offices in the Service Commands. Oral instructions issued after the probe was underway extended its scope to include a study of Provost Marshal General investigative functions within the Service Commands. Reason for the additional investigation purportedly was to determine whether Provost Marshal General and intelligence personnel were performing overlapping duties.

When the Inspector General's report appeared on 6 November 1943, it was far afield from the assigned mission. Most aspects of intelligence and Provost

233 Memoirs of Brig Gen W. A. Holbrook, undated, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

234 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler, MI, USAR, at Fort Holabird, 27 Oct 53, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

235 Ibid.

Marshal General activities were slighted, but the report criticized the Counter Intelligence Corps at every opportunity.[236]

But the forces opposed to CIC didn't wait for the Inspector General's report to wreak their vengeance. On 5 November--the day before the report was submitted--CIC was ordered to withdraw its agents from the District of Columbia in a move that strengthens the theory that the investigators were about to uncover embarrassing information about certain high officials.[237]

The report first scored CIC training. Charging that little or no military training of value was given CIC agents, the Inspector General also criticized the lack of instruction in foreign languages. Time allotted for CIC training was described as inadequate.

CIC investigations and reports in the Service Commands were disparaged, as these excerpts from General Peterson's report indicate:

"In many Service Commands the telephones were not listed, the locations of offices secret, and the identity of resident agents concealed...Investigations of military personnel were carried on without the knowledge of such personnel and by agents...who concealed their identities and purposes.

"...investigations...with the exception of the so-called 14-point CIR-1 reports, were superficial and unproductive of positive results...

"...geographical expansion of the investigation without evaluation of the importance and pertinency of the undeveloped leads caused unnecessary delay...

"In other Service Commands there appeared to be little supervision by commissioned officers over the conduct of the investigations by the agents and special agents....An examination of the reports indicates that there was no attempt to delete adverse or derogatory information based on hearsay, rumor, and gossip."[238]

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236 Memorandum from Maj Gen Virgil Peterson, Inspector General, to Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (Unclassified) See Appendix 2.

237 AG Memo, file 320.2 PO-M-A, 5 Nov 43, subject: "Allotment to the Assistant Chief of Staff G2, WDGS, for CIC Personnel," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

238 Memorandum from Maj Gen Virgil Peterson, Inspector General, to Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (Unclassified). A copy of this report is attached as Appendix 2.

The Inspector General was particularly disturbed by instances in which CIC enlisted agents conducted investigations of commissioned officers. According to General Peterson, reports of such investigations often contained an evaluation of the officer's efficiency by an enlisted man, in violation of Army regulations. To attach adverse information to an officer's service records without giving him an opportunity to deny charges against him was a breach of the 97th Article of War and the fundamental principles of American justice, the report stated. It went so far as to recommend that all such CIC case reports be recalled, reviewed, and destroyed, except when evidence to substantiate adverse information was absolutely conclusive.

General Peterson also criticized the centralization of CIC control at War Department level:

> "The Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands were placed in an anomolous position. They were members of the staff of the commanding general...and owed him complete loyalty and allegiance and acted in their field of activity as his representative. However, they received directives for the use of the CIC detachment directly from G2 WDGS....This situation has been a contributing cause to the deficiencies found during this study....The Army has been built on certain fundamental premises; namely, command responsibility for activities from the lowest level upwards, strict adherence to command channels, and immediate corrective action of deficiencies at the lowest command level. The study of the operation of intelligence activities in the field clearly indicates that the failure to adhere to these fundamental principles has been a contributing cause to the deficiencies..."

Then came the words that ultimately led to the removal of the Counter Intelligence Corps from the Service Commands:

> "The arbitrary division of investigative activities between the CIC and the PMG resulted in a duplication of personnel, overhead, and effort. The administration of the Army's responsibilities in the Zone of Interior can be accomplished by placing the responsibility on the commanding generals of the service commands for the security of their geographical areas. A consolidation of the investigative functions of the CIC and the PMG within the Zone of Interior should be made and a group of investigators should be organized and trained as a section of each service command unit for the purpose of making such investigations as may be required by competent authority."

CIC's place was with tactical units in theaters of operation, General Peterson declared. He recommended that CIC agents be recruited and trained exclusively

for combat activities "except for such activities within the Zone of Interior as shall be specifically directed by appropriate authority."

That there was duplication of effort between CIC and the sergeant investigators of the Provost Marshal General cannot be denied. Over a period of time, the Office of the Chief, CIC, had gradually yielded to repeated requests to transfer counter-intelligence personnel and functions to the Provost Marshal General. First plant security responsibilities, then loyalty investigations of civilian employees of firms holding classified contracts were shifted to the Provost Marshal General. Even highly trained CIC agents were loaned to the Service Commands and carried as Provost Marshal General personnel.[239] The Office of the Chief watched silently as the empire-building tactics of the Provost Marshal General steadily gnawed at the foundations of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

Reaction to the Report

The speed with which top-echelon approval was stamped on the Inspector General's report left little doubt that someone--possibly Communists who still held key positions in government--was determined to halt CIC investigative activities in the United States.

The Counter Intelligence Corps was given opportunity neither for rebuttal of the charges nor for correction of deficiencies.

On 15 November, General Strong hastily sent to the Chief of Staff a memorandum outlining CIC's combat successes in Sicily. After emphasizing CIC's value in combat operations, General Strong lashed out at the proposed decentralization of CIC activities:

> "The Military Intelligence Division is constantly receiving requests direct from theaters for individuals or detachments of CIC personnel... To fill these requests fully and with the necessary speed, it has been necessary for the Military Intelligence Division to be able to take the required personnel from where it could be found. Recent directives which will require a complete decentralization of control of the Counter Intelligence Corps, particularly a decentralization of the personnel on duty in Service Commands which has been the pool from which theater

239 Memorandum from Maj Gen Virgil Peterson, Inspector General, to Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (Unclassified) A copy of this report is attached as Appendix 2. See also chapter on CIP in the Pre-World War II Era.

requisitions are filled, will make it difficult if not impossible to fill requisitions from theaters for personnel of special qualifications."[240]

His protest went unheeded. On 25 November the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff announced the approval of the Inspector General's report in its entirety.[241]

CIC's reaction to this stunning blow was best summed up in a terse memorandum signed by the CIC Chief. On 4 December he wrote sarcastically:

"The following item is submitted as being of possible interest to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department: CIC--period. (signed) H. R. Kibler."[242]

Approval of the report brought immediate and drastic steps to curtail CIC's investigative jurisdiction within the United States. CIC personnel in the Service Commands who were assigned to the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, were ordered assigned to the Service Commands by 31 December. A physical merger and integration of the Intelligence Division and the Internal Security Division in each Service Command was directed--a move to combine CIC agents and the sergeant investigators of the Provost Marshal General into a single investigative agency. Other measures directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff were the elimination of CIC Headquarters at Baltimore and the closing of the CIC Staging Area.

Army Service Forces were ordered to provide basic training for counterintelligence personnel, and G2 and Army Service Forces were to coordinate plans for procurement and shipment of CIC agents to overseas theaters. Although overall supervision of counterintelligence activities remained with G2, the Deputy Chief of Staff insisted that command channels would be used and command responsibility emphasized in all future CIC activities.[243]

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240 Memorandum from General Strong to the Chief of Staff, 15 Nov 43, subj: "Counter Intelligence Corps," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

241 Memorandum from Col O. L. Nelson, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and the AC of S, G2, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

242 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to the Assistant Executive Officer, Counterintelligence Group, 4 Dec 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

243 Memorandum 1943 from Col O. L. Nelson, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and the AC of S, G2, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

War Department Circular 324

The formal order which spelled out the fate of the Counter Intelligence Corps was published on 14 December 1943 as War Department Circular 324. The circular reiterated the pronouncements of the Deputy Chief of Staff regarding combination of CIC and Provost Marshal General functions and announced the transfer of counterintelligence responsibility within the Zone of the Interior to the Army Service Forces, effective 1 January 1944.[244]

On 20 December, the Army Service Forces directed each Service Command to establish immediately a new staff agency known as the Security and Intelligence Division. This division, which merged intelligence and Provost Marshal General functions, was to be subdivided into four branches: Military Police and Prisoner of War Branch, Internal Security Branch, Personnel Security Branch, and Intelligence Branch.

The Provost Marshal General in each Service Command was charged with the supervision of all investigative functions in the Zone of Interior when the merger was completed.[245] This paved the way for the creation of the Security Intelligence Corps, which succeeded CIC in the United States.

Policies governing the new consolidated investigative agency were announced to the Service Commands on 10 January 1944. Like CIC, the Security Intelligence Corps was to be composed of both "agents" and "Special Agents," with the latter coming from the top three enlisted grades and commissioned officers.

Jurisdiction of the new agency was limited to loyalty investigations of military and civilian personnel within the military establishment and of certain civilians in vital war industries; investigation of the same groups and incidents within the military establishment where subversion, espionage, sabotage, or disaffection might be suspected; personnel security inspections in important war plants and facilities, and investigations of disturbances of any kind which would require the use of troops.

"Under no circumstances will the Security Intelligence Corps be used for any other purposes," the directive stated.

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244 War Department Circular 324, "Transfer of Counterintelligence Functions Within the Zone of the Interior," 14 Dec 43.

245 Army Service Forces Ltr, 20 Dec 43, (CONFIDENTIAL), (MID File 200.3, Oct-Dec 43, Office of the Chief, CIC, AG Intermediate Records Depot, Fort Holabird).

Agents of the Security Intelligence Corps were authorized to wear civilian clothing, except when investigative duties required the use of military uniforms.[246]

Countersubversive System Abandoned

Another aftermath of the Inspector General's report was the abandonment of the Countersubversive System which had been one of the Army's prime sources of information on disloyal soldiers since the early days of the war. Although the Countersubversive System was not a part of CIC's assigned mission, it did produce many leads which subsequently were checked out by CIC agents. The Adjutant General, on 2 December, ordered destruction by burning of all countersubversive manuals, statistical reports, and personnel records.[247] On 13 December, an Army Service Forces letter required all commands to submit rosters of personnel under investigation as a result of the Countersubversive System.[248] A week later, Service Commands were told that "every effort should be made" to reduce the number of investigative personnel conducting loyalty investigations.[249] Combined, these directives paved the way for concealment of the activities of many persons suspected of subversive activity within the Army.

CIC Prepares to Close Shop

The War Department directives left little time to prepare for the transfer of CIC functions and the closing of the Office of the Chief. On 14 December, Colonel Kibler was ready with his recommendations for the phase-out period.

A request to continue operations at the CIC Staging Area until 5 February 1944 was granted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Colonel Kibler estimated the extension would allow completion of the transfer of 116 officers and 1,229 enlisted men to tactical units overseas. An agreement between the Office of the Chief, CIC, and the Army Service Forces called for the transfer of approximately 58 officers and 943 enlisted men to the Service Commands on 1 January 1944. Colonel Kibler

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246 Army Service Forces Ltr, SPX 333.5 (1 Jan 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, to Commanding Generals, all Service Commands and Military District of Washington, 10 Jan 44, subject: "Consolidation of Investigations," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

247 AG Ltr 300.7 TM 30-205 (2 Dec 43) OB-S-B-M, subject: "Countersubversive System," (CONFIDENTIAL), contained in MID File 200.3, Oct-Dec 43, Office of the Chief, CIC, (AG Intermediate Records Depot).

248 ASF Ltr, 13 Dec 43, subject: "Abolition of CS System and Destruction of TM 30-205 Published," (CONFIDENTIAL) (AG Intermediate Records Depot, Fort Holabird).

249 ASF Ltr, 20 Dec 43, MID File 200.3, Oct-Dec 43, Office of the Chief, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (AG Intermediate Records Depot, Fort Holabird).

planned to close the Advanced Training School in Chicago on 31 January 1944 and to vacate the Office of the Chief, CIC, by 15 February.[250]

Since War Department Circular 324 authorized limited use of CIC within the United States when "specifically directed by appropriate authority," General Strong asked for three exceptions to the new CIC employment policies. He wanted special detachments assigned as follows:

> "a. To the Army Air Forces for duty with Air Forces and Air Force Commands in the Zone of the Interior...for the investigation of specific incidents within the Army Air Forces, particularly airplane crashes, and for special security duties in connection with flight safety.
>
> "b. To the Army Ground Forces for duty with and training with elements of the Army Ground Forces prior to the shipment of such elements to theaters of operation....
>
> "c. To the Manhattan Engineering District for security duties in connection with the activities of that district, as requested by the Commanding General of the district."

All three requests were approved. Later, another CIC detachment was authorized in the Zone of the Interior for port security duty with the Office of the Chief of Transportation.[251]

Meanwhile, Colonel Kibler prepared recommendations for G2 regarding the discharge of G2's continuing counterintelligence responsibilities. The CIC Chief proposed that the existing CIC Branch be abolished and its duties absorbed by one officer within the Counterintelligence Group.

Colonel Kibler pointed out G2 still was charged with staff responsibilities pertaining to procurement, training, supply, assignment, and distribution of CIC

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250 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 14 Dec 43, subject: "Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and AC of S, G2, subject: 'Intelligence Activities in the Service Commands,' 25 Nov 43," included in History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 to March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

251 Memorandum from General Strong to the Deputy Chief of Staff, 2 Dec 43, subject: "CIC in Zone of the Interior," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility). Separate chapters of this history deal with CIC units with the Air Force, Manhattan Project, and the Transportation Corps.

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personnel. After 1 January 1944, however, the G2 role was one of planning and coordinating, and control rested with the major commands to which CIC detachments were assigned.[252]

Although Colonel Kibler's suggestions regarding the Counterintelligence Group were not immediately adopted, they were the basis for a reorganization which was completed in May 1944.[253]

After 1 January 1944, there remained few important decisions for the Chief, CIC to make concerning the Counter Intelligence Corps world-wide, but Colonel Kibler was swamped with administrative details as he prepared to vacate his office.

Agents for Ike

One of the last personnel requests received at the Baltimore headquarters was a radiogram from General Eisenhower on 19 January 1944 asking for 71 officers and 402 enlisted men for the European Theater of Operations. The requisition was not easily filled, since 963 enlisted CIC personnel already had been transferred to the Army Service Forces on 1 January.

Colonel Kibler decided to attempt to draw the needed personnel from three sources: nonalerted Army Ground Force units, excess CIC personnel assigned to the Air Force, and reclaiming of 169 CIC vacancies which had been transferred to the Army Service Forces.

Both the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Force agreed to the plan, but records do not indicate whether the Army Service Forces consented to return men to CIC for overseas duty.[254]

How to process men destined for Europe posed another problem, since the Staging Area was scheduled for deactivation on 5 February 1944, and facilities at Camp Ritchie were inadequate to handle the large group.

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252 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 14 Dec 43, subject: "Discharge of G2 Continuing Responsibilities Relating to Counter Intelligence Corps," included in History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 to March 1945, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

253 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 to March 1945, pp. 84-85, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

254 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 26 Jan 44, subject: "Request for CIC Personnel from General Eisenhower," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

A paperwork maneuver was the answer. The CIC Staging Area at Holabird Signal Depot was formally deactivated on 5 February to comply with directives from the Deputy Chief of Staff. On the following day, the "CIC Overseas Pool" was established at Holabird to serve as an assembly point for CIC personnel being transferred to Europe pursuant to General Eisenhower's request. For practical purposes, it continued to operate until May 1944 when the European requisition was filled.[255]

On 26 January 1944, with most of the work at headquarters completed, Colonel Kibler reported CIC's authorized strength at 483 officers and 3,498 enlisted men. The Corps was 51 officers and 319 enlisted men short of its allotment. A total of 180 officers and 1,190 enlisted men still were in the United States with Army Ground Forces and the Air Force.[256]

Office of the Chief Closes

Phase-out activities at the Office of the Chief proceeded according to schedule. On 10 February 1944--exactly nine months after he came to Baltimore--Colonel Kibler stepped down as Chief, CIC, and returned to the Sixth Service Command, where he had previously served.[257] In his final report to the Counterintelligence Group, the outgoing Chief summed up the accomplishments of the Baltimore headquarters during his brief tenure there. Among the highlights he mentioned were the establishment of a CIC Staging Area; inspection trips to all areas where CIC was serving, with the exception of the Pacific; improvement of technical and language training facilities; publication of Technical Manual 30-215, and organization of tactical detachments by cellular-type tables of organization. He concluded:

> "At present, all theaters of operation have been provided with CIC personnel to meet approved requests. This personnel is properly trained, equipped, and prepared to perform its mission. While present War Department policy does not permit the centralized control of the Corps by G2, War Department, it is War Department policy that G2 continue to establish the broad overall policies and to maintain

255 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Assistant Executive Officer, Counterintelligence Group, 5 Feb 44, subject: "Items of Interest Pertaining to the CIC," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

256 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 26 Jan 44, subject: "Request for CIC Personnel from General Eisenhower," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

257 Memorandum from Lt Col Robert H. Harris to Chief, Personnel Branch, MID, 5 Feb 44, subject: "H. R. Kibler," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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general supervision of CIC activities. The proper discharge of this responsibility will assure the Counter Intelligence Corps continuing to be an effective Army instrument."[258]

Colonel Wise became Acting Chief, CIC, on 10 February and remained in that capacity for five days to close the Baltimore office on 15 February 1944. When the CIC headquarters was officially dissolved, about half the officers who had been assigned to the Office of the Chief were included in the personnel being processed for shipment to Europe. Six officers and seven civilian employees moved to the Pentagon in Washington for duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch of the Counterintelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.[259]

258 Memorandum from Colonel Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 8 Feb 44, subject: "Activities of Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 10 May 1943 - 8 February 1944," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

259 Memorandum from Lt Col Hugh D. Wise to Assistant Executive Officer, CIG, 12 Feb 44, subject: "Items of Interest Pertaining to the CIC," and Memorandum from Maj G. L. Staudt to Assistant Executive Officer, CIG, 19 Feb 44, subject: "Items of Interest Pertaining to the CIC," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Section 6

CIC OPERATIONS UNDER ARMY SERVICE FORCES

On 22 May 1944, a reorganization within the MIS placed the office formerly known as the CIC Branch under the Security Branch of MIS, with the title CIC Section. At this time the Counterintelligence Group was abolished.[260]

The CIC Section operated under the Security Branch, MIS, until a War Department letter, dated 25 July 1944, transferred the Section's functions to the Army Service Forces, effective 1 August 1944. The letter listed the "principal functions" of the section as the supervision of procurement and assignment of agents; arrangement of undercover status of agents as requested by using agencies; supervision of training; procurement of investigative supplies not available to field units through normal channels; and supervision of CIC administration and operation. The letter directed that: "Staff action on changes in allotment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will continue to be performed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff."[261]

The CIC Section, with Maj George L. Staudt as Chief, operated under the Domestic and Counterintelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division of Army Service Forces until 1 December 1944.

A letter from the Office of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, dated 30 November 1944, designated the CIC Section as a separate branch of the Intelligence Division effective 1 December 1944. The CIC Branch assumed the exact duties of the CIC Section.[262]

To accomplish the duties outlined in the letter of 25 July 1944, the CIC Section, and later the CIC Branch, was divided into three units: Procurement, Training and Supply, and Assignment.[263]

The major task of the Procurement unit involved the formulation and recommendation of policies relating to recruitment and selection of CIC personnel. Up to

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260 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 1917 - March 1945, pp. 84-85, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

261 War Department, Washington 25, D.C., subject: "Transfer of Functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, Security Branch, MIS, to Army Service Forces, To: Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 25 July 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

262 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, from 1 Aug to 1 Sep 1945, p. 14, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

263 Ibid., p. 16.

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September 1944, there was no formal procurement authority for CIC. War Department Circular 216, dated 1 June 1944,[264] had been published as a procurement authority, but was never used.[265]

Prior to September 1944, procurement was generally accomplished through informal arrangements with the service commands. Then, on 19 September 1944, the War Department published, as Part One of Circular 379,[266] an order for a CIC procurement program. Under this order, quotas of men were procured from Army Air, Ground, and Service Forces and sent for training to the Camp Ritchie MITC course. Assignment to CIC was contingent upon successful completion of the Ritchie course and the granting of a security clearance as a result of a background investigation.[267]

The principal difference between Circular 379 and the older Circular 216 was that the former established officer and enlisted strength of the three major commands as of September 1944 as the basis for CIC procurement quotas. Under Circular 216, the basis for enlisted quotas was the strength of the respective commands at 30 November 1943. There was no basis for quotas of officer procurement.[268]

Circular 379 also authorized the Army Ground and Air Forces, theaters of operation, overseas departments and base and defense commands to procure within their departments and transfer men into CIC subject to War Department approval. This, in effect, was official authorization for overseas detachments who found themselves understaffed to seek agents for replacement on their own initiative.[269]

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264 War Department, Washington 25, D.C., Circular Nr 216, Counterintelligence Personnel Procurement, 1 June 1944, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

265 History of the CIC Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, from 1 Aug 44 until 1 Sep 45, p. 20, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

266 War Department, Washington 25, D. C., Circular 379, Part One, "Counter-intelligence Personnel," 19 Sep 44, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

267 History of the CIC Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, 1 Aug 44 to 1 Sep 45, p. 21, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

268 Memo for Colonel Gray, subject: "Special Activities Reports, 23 Sep 44, /s/G. L. Staudt, Major, Chief, CIC Section, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

269 War Department, Washington 25, D.C., Circular 379, Part One, "Counter-intelligence Personnel," 19 Sep 44, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). Local procurement of CIC personnel in the European Theater of Operations, as authorized under paragraph 4, WD Circular 379, is discussed in the ETO series, Chapter 7, Part I, Section 1.

Circular 379 Lists Agents Qualifications

Under Circular 379, qualifications for officers and enlisted men for CIC assignments were outlined. All personnel were to be between 25 to 38 years of age at the time of their entry into CIC, "physically fit for full field duty overseas," and a U.S. citizen. Fluency in one or more foreign languages was desired and a background investigation must have established "character, loyalty, integrity, and discretion."

Officers were to be college graduates or "experienced in CIC either as an officer or enlisted man." Enlisted men who had not graduated from college were required to have "linguistic ability or special qualifications for investigative work" in addition to a General Classification score of at least 110. Officers were desired to have had previous military service in the field.[270]

Circular 379 was broad enough to allow CIC to recruit the number of agents needed to meet the immediate demands of the field. However, the program was such that many commissioned officers with no experience in even related investigative fields were procured and placed in responsible positions with CIC detachments. Many of the enlisted men obtained through the program did not come up to the standards formerly required by the organization.

Need for More Agents, Better Training Prompts Staff Study

Beginning in August 1944, 1,281 men successfully completed the Camp Ritchie course and were assigned to CIC duties.[271] However, the basic emphasis in this course was combat intelligence--with little emphasis on counterintelligence. Furthermore, as the war in Europe drew to a close, the counterintelligence mission there changed from combat to occupational. Concurrently, the need for additional agents for duty with the Pacific Theater increased. It was determined that a new type of training program was necessary to enable the Commanding General, Army Service Forces "to discharge his counterintelligence responsibilities."[272] Maj Edwin Bennett was given the mission of preparing a staff study on the problem.[273]

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270 War Department, Washington 25, D.C., Circular Nr 379, Part One, "Counterintelligence Personnel," 19 Sep 44, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

271 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, from 1 Aug to 1 Sep 45, p. 22, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

272 Ibid., p. 38.

273 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler (Res MI), 14 Oct 53, Building 2, Fort Holabird, Md, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Major Bennett divided CIC activities in World War II into four phases. The third phase had begun in February 1944 with the transfer of all CIC personnel from G2, War Department General Staff, to the using agency, and, most particularly, the utilization of the MITC course at Ritchie for CIC training. It was felt that the Ritchie course did not adequately cover all phases of the specialized CIC activity. Lack of linguistic courses and training in the application of investigative techniques in urban areas were considered to be glaring deficiencies of the Ritchie school - at least from a counterintelligence standpoint.

As a result of the increased need for men in the European and the Pacific Theaters, it was envisioned that the fourth phase would most certainly resemble the period from May 1943 to February 1944 (phase two) when the Office of the Chief was in operation and 3000 agents were trained, equipped, processed, and shipped to using agencies.

It was deemed necessary that War Department Memorandum 350-44 which directed that CIC agents be trained at MITC be rescinded and that authority "be granted to conduct such additional training needed to prepare CIC personnel to perform their duties."

The study then cited the necessity for reestablishment of the Office of the Chief:

> To insure uniformity in administration, training, and supply of the Counter Intelligence Corps during the redeployment and post redeployment period, in the training of new personnel as required by the Pacific area, and in training of replacements, reestablishment of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, under the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, is necessary.

Five specific recommendations were made as a result of Major Bennett's findings in his staff study. They were as follows:

1. That the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, be authorized to establish on or about 1 June 1945 the Office of the Chief, CIC, and the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Army Service Forces, of Counter Intelligence Corps officer and enlisted personnel as a Class IV activity outside the Military District of Washington under supervision of the Director of Intelligence, with authority to transfer from Military Intelligence Training Center into the Class IV activity the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot.

2. That the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, be authorized:

a. To supervise and/or conduct Counter Intelligence Corps training, redeployment training and training of replacements for rotated personnel in accordance with War Department policy...
b. To maintain and operate the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot in accordance with War Department policy.
c. To assign Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and theaters of operating, including compliance with provisions of POM and POR prior to overseas movement, and to perform such other activities in connection with the Counter Intelligence Corps responsibility of the Commanding General, ASF, as are assigned to him by the War Department.

3. That War Department Memorandum 350-44, 7 September 1944, be rescinded and that there be published in lieu thereof a new memorandum.

4. That vacancies, to include the following grades and ratings, be authorized for the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Army Service Forces, and for no other purposes:

1-Colonel
5-Lt Colonels
8-Majors
12-Captains
13-1st Lieutenants
3-Master Sergeants
1-1st Sergeant
3-Technical Sergeants
8-Staff Sergeants
8-Sergeants
8-Corporals

This Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment will be reduced in proportion of the procurement, training and shipment work-load caused by redeployment and by replacement requirements.

5. That authority be granted for a Counter Intelligence Corps Training Group, to be assigned to the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to include 788 vacancies to be filled by personnel procured for the Counter Intelligence Corps and undergoing training prior to assignment; that authority be granted to attach to the Counter Intelligence Corps Training Group Counter Intelligence Corps personnel redeployed or rotated from theaters of operations and undergoing specialized Counter Intelligence Corps training or redeployment training prior to assignment.[274]

274 Army Service Forces, Office of the Commanding General, Washington 25, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, USA, Subject: "Administration, Training and Redeployment Training of the Counter Intelligence Corps, 18 May 1945, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The G sections of the War Department General Staff concurred in the recommendations. In a memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, dated 23 June 1945 and signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, the proposals were approved by the War Department.[275]

The CIC Detachment, Army Service Forces, was established effective 15 July 1945 to operate under the supervision of the Director of Intelligence, ASF, and under the command of the Chief, CIC. The detachment was assigned to the CIC Center located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The personnel allotment as recommended in the staff study of 18 May 1945 was instituted for the ASF Detachment.[276]

Summary: The Chief and the Center Reinstituted

It had become increasingly apparent that great numbers of new agents were needed for the war in the Pacific; that CIC faced a major deployment problem and a change of mission in Europe as the war came to a close and that attendance at the MITC school was insufficient preparation for CIC work. To handle these problems, the Office of the Chief and the CIC Center had been reinstituted after lying dormant for more than a year and a half.

275 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, from 1 Aug to 1 Sep 45, p 40, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

276 Memorandum for The Adjutant General, subject: "Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Army Service Forces," 14 July 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Headquarters Army Service Forces, ASF Circular Nr 268, Part Two, Par 1, 13 July 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Operational History of Theaters, "CIC Center, 1945-48," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility). NOTE: There appears to be a lack of documentation to indicate exactly how the "Center" came into existence; the Office of the Chief, CIC, unofficially became tagged "The Center" upon its establishment in Baltimore in 1944. Gradually the term became adopted in official references and correspondence relating to the establishment of the Chief, CIC. In August 1954 the CIC "Center" was officially redesignated the Army Intelligence Center.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

TECHNICAL MANUAL

30-215

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

22 September 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

TECHNICAL MANUAL

TM 30-215

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

22 September 1943

Dissemination of restricted matter.--The information contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the United States and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized military public relations agencies. (See also par 18b, AR 380-5, 28 Sep 1942)

NOTE: Published for Historical purposes only. Not to be utilized otherwise.

Section I

GENERAL

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1. Purpose.--a. In addition to the counterintelligence responsibilities recognized in 30-25 and the usual field security counterintelligence mission, there exist other counterintelligence responsibilities which fall upon commanders of geographical areas and which must be assumed by theater commanders and the commanders of units therein, but for which no personnel provision is made in Tables of Organization. These responsibilities are those connected with the prevention or neutralization of the activities of enemy agents within the territory occupied. Included in these responsibilities are the need for the prevention of the entrance of enemy saboteurs into the territory and the prevention of their reaching installations vital to the military effort. This counterintelligence mission requires personnel particularly trained and specially qualified. The fulfillment of this phase of the counterintelligence mission demands organization upon a territorial basis, with provision for personnel to remain in the territory, operating without being moved with tactical organizations. The necessity that a number of men in this work be placed undercover for long periods of time and that many operate over extended periods without in any way disclosing their connection with the Army, emphasizes the need for a Corps free from the limitations and the control of smaller tactical units.

b. The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to furnish appropriate commanders with carefully selected personnel specially trained and equipped to assist commanders in the performance of the duties incident to this type of counterintelligence coverage and the mission of field security. It will not serve to replace or assume responsibility for tactical security or counter-subversive installations prescribed for all field force units.

c. In order to accomplish this mission, the Counter Intelligence Corps will utilize commissioned and enlisted personnel which has been carefully selected and thoroughly trained. This personnel will be fully investigated as to its loyalty, discretion, and basic qualifications prior to its transfer to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

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d. This manual furnishes the basic principles of the operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps and it will govern the organization, administration, operation, and employment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Where applicable, its provisions apply equally to Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the Zone of the Interior and in theaters of operation.

2. Freedom of action.--a. It is essential to the effective accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission that the personnel of the Corps be encouraged to exercise its initiative to the fullest extent and that it be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions upon its movements or channels of communication. Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badges will be honored at all times. The personnel of the Corps are frequently entrusted with extremely hazardous and important secret missions requiring expeditious action and, when engaged upon such missions, they are often delayed by the observance of standard customs and prohibitions. Speed is an essential of counterintelligence, and lateral communication between Counter Intelligence Corps echelons is authorized.

b. In order for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to perform their missions effectively, expeditiously, and in a secret manner, it is essential that the commanding officer of each detachment have full authority, in appropriate circumstances, to direct the movement of his men within the area of his jurisdiction upon his verbal authorization and without either previous or subsequent written orders. It is further advisable that the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached to a theater of operations be designated an Assistant Adjutant General for purposes of preparing and issuing classified orders to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

3. General supervision.--The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, will prescribe policies governing the administration, operation, and employment of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Military Intelligence Service, War Department, acting through the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, will render general supervision over all Counter Intelligence Corps activities, but the immediate supervision of operational activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be exercised by the commands in which detachments are serving.

4. Function of command.--The employment of the Counter Intelligence Corps is a basic function of command and is an operational activity. The commander of any organization with which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are serving, is responsible for the proper and effective organization, administration, and employment of such personnel. In the discharge of this responsibility, these commanders will be governed by the policies established pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3.

5. Jurisdiction.--The jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps is limited by the counterintelligence jurisdiction of the command with which it is serving. The extent of this jurisdiction in the Zone of the Interior will be limited by the Delimitation Agreement of February 22, 1942, entered into by Military Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In departments, and defense, service, and base commands overseas, jurisdiction is limited by the counterintelligence responsibility of the command. In theaters of operation, jurisdiction is limited by the policies of the commanding general of the theater, and by existing international agreements.

6. Power of arrest.--a. The personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps on duty in the United States has only that power of arrest which all citizens of the United States possess; that is, the power to arrest any person in the act of committing a felony.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in theaters of operation will have full power and authority to make arrests in cases within its jurisdiction where it is apparent that the arrest being made is essential to the performance of the counterintelligence mission and that its accomplishment is not in violation of any policy of the commanding general of the theater of operations with respect to such enforcement activities.

7. Publicity.--a. The fact of the existence of the Counter Intelligence Corps will not be considered as classified information. However, every effort will be made to keep identities, locations of personnel, and methods of operation confidential. In the event that contact is unavoidably made with individuals connected with the press, radio, or other news agencies, every effort will be made to prevent publicity.

b. Since Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will, from time to time, be used in undercover capacities, identification cards furnished such personnel will bear no military title. This applies particularly to post exchange and gasoline cards. It is deemed advisable that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel be addressed by all concerned as "Mister" during conversations which might divulge the identity of such personnel and its connection with the Counter Intelligence Corps, in a manner which might be detrimental to the military intelligence mission. Normally, such personnel will be addressed as "Mister" when in civilian clothing and by military title when in uniform.

c. Emphasis will be placed upon the protection of the identity of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel both in the interest of the mission and to protect the lives of the personnel. The identity of members of the Corps will be disclosed to the minimum number of civilian or military personnel. All members of the Corps are constantly subject to being placed on undercover or other missions where a

knowledge by others of their identity would seriously jeopardize the success of the mission and endanger their lives.

Section II

ORGANIZATION

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8. General.--a. The Counter Intelligence Corps is composed of such commissioned and enlisted personnel as may be authorized by the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Personnel in Service Commands, departments, and in oversea Defense, Service, and Base Commands, and with Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces organizations, are attached and are carried chargeable to War Department overhead; it is not chargeable to allotments of personnel authorized for such commands. These commands will carry Counter Intelligence Corps personnel as over and above their existing tables of organization. Personnel in theaters of operations will be assigned to such theaters and will not be carried as War Department overhead. These theaters will exercise all normal command and administrative functions with the following exceptions:

(1) Neither officers nor enlisted men will be transferred into the Counter Intelligence Corps, nor relieved therefrom, without the prior approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, except in instances of gross inefficiency of for disciplinary reasons.

(2) Enlisted personnel will not be promoted from the classification of agent to the classification of Special Agent without prior approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

(3) Enlisted personnel who are commissioned either through Officer Candidate School, or directly, will not be returned to the Counter Intelligence Corps except with the prior approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

b. The supervision over the Corps rendered by the Military Intelligence Service will be exercised through the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, which office will be organized and operated under the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.

9. Disposition.--Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be utilized directly under the supervision and control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, when necessary. Normally, however, detachments will be attached or assigned to headquarters of commands which are charged with counterintelligence responsibilities. It is the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, to furnish personnel as provided for in theaters of operation, departments, and oversea Defense, Service, and Base Commands, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces, and Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior.

a. Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior.--The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, will furnish to each of the Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior, authorization for detachments of appropriate strength. These detachments will be of sufficient strength to provide the personnel necessary in accomplishing Counter Intelligence Corps missions, and to serve as reservoirs of personnel to be relieved from attachment thereto, and assigned or attached to other commands as needed.

b. Departments and oversea Defense, Service and Base Commands. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will be attached to departments and oversea Defense, Service, and Base Commands in accordance with tables of organization, based upon the needs of such commands, and in consideration of the extent of the counterintelligence responsibility of the command. Bases and other departments or commands which are component parts of defense or other larger commands will not normally be furnished detachments, but necessary personnel will be placed with them on detached service by the higher command to which a detachment has been attached.

c. Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces units in the Zone of the Interior. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will normally be attached to units of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces in the Zone of the Interior for operational and training purposes in accordance with tables of organization established for such units. Such personnel will not normally be attached to Army Ground Forces echelons lower than divisions nor to Army Air Forces echelons lower than Air Forces or the Air Force commands.

d. Theaters of Operations. (1) All Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in a theater of operations will be assigned to the headquarters of that theater. The headquarters of the theater will have assigned to it the detachment provided for by its initial table of organization. Thereafter, as Army Ground Forces or Army Air Forces units arrive in the theater of operations with Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, those detachments will, after the arrival of the units, be relieved from such attachment by the commanding general of the theater, and assigned to theater headquarters, the theater table of organization being

thereby automatically increased. The commanding general of the theater of operations may, thereafter, in his discretion, place Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on detached service with such tactical units from one theater of operations to another, the commanding general of the theater from which the units are leaving, will attach Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of appropriate strength to such units prior to their departure, the tables of organization being, accordingly, altered. These detachments will move to the new destination of the units and there be assigned to the headquarters of the new theater of operations, again with appropriate changes in tables of organization.

(2) Theater commanders, in placing Counter Intelligence Corps detachments on detached service with tactical units within the theater of operations, or attaching such personnel to units departing therefrom, will constantly maintain, to the fullest extent practicable in view of available personnel, adequate Counter Intelligence Corps personnel assigned to the theater headquarters for counterintelligence missions vital to the theater of operations and the geographical area covered by it.

10. Replacement of personnel. Replacement of lost personnel and necessary increases in detachment strength will be furnished to the various commands by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, within authorized tables of organization, upon request made to him and according to the availability of personnel.

11. Command. Each Counter Intelligence Corps detachment will be under the command of the senior Counter Intelligence Corps officer thereof, and the commanding officer of the detachment will be responsible for all matters relating to the detachment to the commanding officer of the command with which it is serving, through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or S-2, of that command.

12. Internal organization of detachment.--a. The commanding officer of a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment will establish such internal organization within the detachment and make such distribution of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, through the area involved, as may be directed by the commanding officer of the command with which it is serving. In making such disposition of personnel and establishing such internal organization, the commander of the area will consider fully the mission of the detachment and will carefully weigh the recommendations of the detachment commander.

b. Since the strength of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments furnished to various commands will vary, the internal organization of such detachments will not be uniform. However, in every instance where circumstances permit, the Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters should be established,

physically removed from the other sections of the command headquarters. When the size of the detachment will permit, it may be organized internally into five sections as follows:

(1) Administrative section. Personnel required for maintaining records and performing clerical duties.

(2) Counterespionage section. Personnel whose experience, training, and natural aptitude fit them for counterespionage activity.

(3) Countersabotage section. Personnel familiar with plant, communication, port, and transportation security, mechanical and electrical engineering, and other allied subjects qualifying them to perform security surveys and make recommendations based thereon.

(4) Technical section. Personnel with technical training and experience qualifying them to perform duties connected with photography, sound recording, telephone supervision, detection of secret links, and other technical investigative activities.

(5) General assignment section. Personnel not possessing specialized training or experience qualifying them for assignment to one of the above enumerated sections.

Section III

PERSONNEL

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13. General. The Counter Intelligence Corps is composed of officers and enlisted men whose natural and cultivated abilities, talents, characteristics, and professional qualifications are such as to fit them for certain specialized activities peculiar to counterintelligence operations. They are selected, investigated, equipped, and intensively trained under the direct supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department. The personnel of the Corps is divided into four classifications:

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a. Officers. The commissioned personnel of the Corps is composed of qualified officers of the arms and services assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department.

b. Special agents. Special agents are enlisted men possessing investigative, linguistic, legal, technical or other qualifications to a marked degree, who have been selected because they have been proved loyal, intelligent, self-reliant, and resourceful.

c. Agents. Agents are enlisted men who possess characteristics, training and experience which make them potential Special agents.

d. Clerks. Clerks are enlisted men whose training as typists, file clerks, and stenographers qualifies them for such duties.

14. Procurement of commissioned personnel.--a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, is charged with the responsibility of taking action to accomplish the procurement of properly qualified officer personnel for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps and the relief from assignment to the Corps of officers found not qualified for continued assignment to it. Commissioned officers will not be assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps nor relieved therefrom except with his approval. In selecting officers for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps; and in determining upon the relief of officers from such assignment, consideration will be given to the recommendations in the case made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, S-2, or director of intelligence of the command in which the officer is desired for service, or in which, in the case of relief from the Corps, he is serving at the time the action is contemplated.

b. So far as practicable, commissioned personnel will be obtained from among former enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps who have been commissioned after graduation from accredited Officer Candidate Schools. However, any commissioned officer may make application through normal military channels for assignment to the Corps. It is not the policy of the Counter Intelligence Corps to request original commissions for civilians, nor for enlisted men in the Corps.

c. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps will, from time to time, make arrangements whereby a limited number of Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel may attend Officer Candidate Schools, and, upon graduation therefrom, be assigned to the Corps as commissioned officers. The names of the enlisted personnel recommended by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or S-2, and the directors of intelligence concerned, for assignment to Officer Candidate Schools, under such arrangements, will be furnished to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, upon request, for final approval.

d. No obstacle will be placed in the way of any Counter Intelligence Corps personnel desiring to attend Officer Candidate Schools, pursuant to provisions of AR 625-5. If recommended by the command from which Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel is assigned to an Officer Candidate School, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, will, if practicable, take the action necessary to have such personnel reassigned to duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps, in commissioned capacity, upon graduation from Officer Candidate School.

15. Qualifications of commissioned personnel. The specialized mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps makes it necessary that its commissioned personnel be exceptionally well-qualified, and highly desirable that they possess previous experience warranting their assignment to the Corps. Except in special instances, commissioned personnel who do not possess one or more of the following qualifications will not be assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps:

a. College education, preferably followed by study of law;

b. Experience in investigative work;

c. Experience in Military Intelligence Service, or Counter Intelligence Corps activities, or both;

d. Linguistic qualifications in one or more languages pertinent to the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

16. Procurement of enlisted personnel.--a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, is charged with the responsibility of taking action to accomplish the procurement of relief from assignment to the Corps of enlisted men, found not qualified for continued assignment thereto. The responsibility for the procurement of enlisted personnel may be delegated to the directors of intelligence of the Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior. Such enlisted personnel will be procured in accordance with policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department. The relief of enlisted personnel in the classification of clerk or agent may similarly be delegated to the directors of intelligence of the Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior.

b. Enlisted personnel of the Army may make application for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, through appropriate channels.

c. Request, where appropriate, for the assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps of soldiers who are found suitable, may be initiated to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, by any Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence who desires the assignment to be effected.

d. Soldiers, who in civil life had investigative experience, are given a classification of "301 Investigator," and upon entrance into the Army, their identities will be furnished by classification officers to appropriate authority for consideration for the Counter Intelligence Corps, the names of all enlisted personnel in the Army who have special language qualifications.

e. Close liaison will be maintained with civilian investigative organizations by the offices concerned with procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, in order to determine when personnel of such organizations is inducted into the Army. It will be the responsibility of offices charged with Counter Intelligence Corps procurement to provide for the identification at induction centers of individuals apparently suitable for assignment to the Corps, and to insure that consideration is given to all such personnel with a view to such assignment.

f. Subject to the procurement policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, the transfer of enlisted men to the Counter Intelligence Corps, as agents or clerks, will be accomplished through The Adjutant General of the Service Command desiring such transfer, provided the individual desired is within the jurisdiction of that command. In the event the individual is not within the jurisdiction of the command concerned, request for his transfer will be made to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, who will initiate the action necessary to accomplish transfer.

17. Qualifications of enlisted personnel.--a. To be eligible for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps, enlisted men must possess the following minimum qualifications:

(1) Age - 22 to 44 years, inclusive, for Special agents, and 20 to 44 years, inclusive for clerks.

(2) Education - graduation from high school, or equivalent thereof.

(3) Military training - completion of a minimum of eight weeks actual basic military training at a Replacement Training Center.

(4) At least one of the following:

(a) Linguistic fluency in one or more foreign languages.

(b) Technical experience of value to the Counter Intelligence Corps, such as ability in the fields of photography, electrical engineering, laboratory technician, etc.

(c) Experience in investigative work, or in allied fields.

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(d) Aptitude for general Counter Intelligence Corps activities and undercover assignments.

(e) Actual ability as a stenographer-typist (for clerks only).

b. Waiver of one or more of the above basic qualifications may be granted by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in his discretion, and upon receipt of a request that such a waiver be granted, accompanied by an explanation of the consideration believed to justify granting it.

c. Since the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is extremely broad in scope, it is necessary that personnel of the Corps be diversified as to qualifications, training, and experience. Imagination must be used by procuring authorities to secure personnel with civilian and military experience in multitudinous fields of endeavor in order that undercover and other secret missions, both foreign and domestic, may be properly carried out. Personnel with language, travel, legal, and investigative experiences are particularly useful for assignment to the Corps, but these factors in and of themselves are not necessarily controlling. Primary consideration should be given to an individual's work, and also to his mental capacity for adapting himself to varying situations and conditions with which he will be faced.

d. Since the duties assigned to personnel of the Corps are arduous and exacting, it is essential that, with a few exceptions, personnel selected for assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps be qualified for general military service.

18. Background investigations.--a. It is essential that all personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps be thoroughly and completely investigated. The responsibility for accomplishing such investigation rests with the office of origin of the case involving investigation of his suitability.

b. No individual, either commissioned officer or enlisted man, will be assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps until sufficient investigation has been made to establish strong indications of his suitability for such assignment, and personnel assigned prior to the completion of full investigation will, so far as practicable, be denied access to secret and confidential information. No member of the Corps will be approved by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for promotion to the classification of Special Agent until a thorough and complete investigation has been accomplished with respect to him.

22. Records and reports.--a. All records which tend to establish the identities, locations, or activities of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, will be given a classification sufficiently high to insure adequate safeguarding of the information contained in such records.

b. Officers' Qualification Cards (W.D. A.G.O. Form Nr 66-1) for Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned personnel attached to various commands and assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, are retained by the Personnel Office, Military Intelligence Service. Entries on these cards will be made in that office when the officers submit the proper material. It is the individual responsibility of every officer to submit this material and to insure that it is submitted by proper authority. Qualification cards of officers assigned to other commands will be sent to those commands upon such assignment and will be handled in conformity with existing regulations.

c. Efficiency reports will be rendered on Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned personnel in accordance with the provisions of AR 600-185. Such reports with respect to officers assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and attached to a command will be sent to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for final disposition.

d. Efficiency reports, Counter Intelligence Form Nr 3, with respect to Special Agents attached to various commands, will be prepared by detachment commanders and submitted by 1st Indorsement to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or S-2, or director of intelligence of the command to which the detachment is attached, to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, semi-annually, on June 30 and December 31. Such reports with respect to enlisted personnel assigned to a command will be prepared and handled in accordance with existing regulations. In addition, efficiency reports will be rendered upon the transfer of Special Agents, from one command to another, or upon transfer from the Counter Intelligence Corps. An efficiency report will not ordinarily be rendered covering a period of 1 month or less, but may be rendered if, in the opinion of the reporting officer, the service appears to have been unusual through merit or lack thereof. These reports will be forwarded by the reporting office within 10 days after the period covered by the report. Only one copy of an efficiency report will be made on each individual, and this copy will be forwarded through the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps to The Adjutant General, War Department. The efficiency of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel should not be judged upon the basis of the volume of cases completed, but rather upon the character of the work done and the exercise of judgment and ingenuity in its accomplishment. Whenever an efficiency report contains entries that may be considered in any sence unfavorable, the reasons for the entries will be clearly stated. Unfavorable official communications will normally be attached to efficiency reports; however, reporting offices are not required to attach thereto administrative admonitions or reprimands which, as corrective measures, have served their purpose in creating or maintaining efficiency.

e. In addition to the records maintained by the headquarters with which Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are serving, all Counter Intelligence Corps

detachments serving with Army Ground Forces or Army Air Forces units or in theaters of operation, will maintain a confidential morning report. This record will be maintained at all times, and will report a chronological personnel history of the detachment. W.D., A.G.O. Form Nr 1 (Morning Report) will be used for this purpose and will be marked confidential.

f. In addition to such reports as operational circumstances may require, each detachment will furnish to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence of the command with which it is serving, a monthly Counter Intelligence Corps Situation Report. A copy of this report will be sent at the time it is prepared directly to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. Negative reports, when appropriate, will be submitted. The report will be brief and will contain appropriate remarks covering subjects indicated below:

(1) Current strength showing officers and enlisted men separately and by grade. This will include a roster noting changes which have occurred during the month reported on.

(2) Statistical summation of cases, pending and closed, indicating the character thereof.

(3) Special difficulties being encountered in operation or administration.

(4) Specific needs including personnel, funds, equipment, or supplies. This should indicate also unnecessary equipment and supplies on hand.

Reports made by detachments on detached service will be rendered to the theater G-2 through the G-2 or A-2 of the tactical unit with which the detachments is on detached service.

g. Special Counter Intelligence Corps Situation Reports will be rendered whenever circumstances warrant.

23. Assignment, promotion, and transfer of commissioned personnel.--
a. Changes of station within the Counter Intelligence Corps of officers assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be made at the direction of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in accordance with the needs of the service. The assignment of officers to theaters of operations and the transfer of such personnel from such assignment will be made at the direction of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, with the concurrence of the theater concerned.

b. Promotion is based on War Department Policy and covered by current War Department regulations and directives. Recommendations for the promotion of Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, through the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for necessary action. Recommendations for promotion will, in addition to the data required by War Department instructions and regulations, contain the following:

(1) Component of officers. (AUS, Res., etc.)

(2) Military history and date of birth.

(3) Date of assignment to Military Intelligence Service or Counter Intelligence Corps.

(4) Date of last promotion (or date of original appointment).

c. Recommendations for demotion will be accompanied by full particulars and will be in form to be forwarded to proper authority for final action without further correspondence.

d. Promotion and demotion of officers serving under commanders who have been granted authority to promote and/or demote on their own initiative will be made in conformity with existing War Department instructions, regulations, and policies without reference to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

e. Copies of all special orders affecting the duty status of commissioned personnel assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be submitted to the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, War Department.

24. Assignment, promotion, reduction and transfer of enlisted personnel.

a. Assignment of enlisted personnel to the Counter Intelligence Corps will be accomplished in accordance with policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

b. Changes of station of enlisted personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be made at the direction of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in accordance with the needs of the service. Individuals, groups of individuals, or whole detachments may be relieved from attachment to one command and attached to another. When

a command is directed to relieve personnel, not specified by name, from attachment to it, and send such personnel for attachment or assignment to another command, every effort will be made to send well-trained and properly qualified personnel. No agent or clerk will be transferred from attachment to one command for attachment or assignment to another, until a full background investigation has been completed with respect to him, unless the individual in question is specifically required to be transferred. The assignment of enlisted personnel to theaters of operations and the transfer of such personnel from such assignment will be made at the direction of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, with the concurrence of the theaters concerned.

c. Promotions of enlisted personnel, within the limits of established tables of organization, will be made by the commander of the command to which the detachment is assigned, acting upon recommendations made by the detachment commander, subject to the limitation set forth in d. below. Promotions of enlisted personnel attached to a command may be made by the commander of the command within the limits of promotion furnished for the attached detachment, subject to the limitation set forth in d. below.

d. No enlisted man, including Counter Intelligence Corps agents and clerks, will be appointed Special Agent without the prior approval of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

e. Reductions in grade of enlisted personnel will be made by the commander of the command to which such personnel is attached or assigned, except that an enlisted man will not be reduced from Special Agent to agent or clerk without prior approval of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

f. Agents and clerks attached to Service Commands in the Zone of the Interior, may be relieved from assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps by the commander of the command to which such personnel is attached. Special agents will not be relieved from assignment to the Corps without prior approval of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, except in emergency situations making such action imperative. In such event, full information with respect to the action taken and the reasons therefor, will be furnished without delay to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

g. Copies of all special orders affecting the duty status of Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, will be submitted to the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, War Department.

25. Finance.--a. The missions to which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is assigned are often exceptional in character, requiring unusual and

unforseeable activities and expenditures. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or the S-2, or the director of intelligence of any command to which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is assigned or attached, is authorized to furnish to Counter Intelligence Corps detachments Military Intelligence funds necessary to such detachments for the accomplishment of their mission. These funds will be supplied from Military Intelligence funds available to the G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or director of intelligence concerned. Necessary supervision over the expenditure of the Military Intelligence funds will be maintained to prevent excessive expenditure as compared with results obtained.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the Zone of the Interior and overseas, operating in civilian clothing, who are not furnished Government rations and quarters will be provided per diem payments in the amount provided for by applicable finance regulations or will be placed on commutation of rations and quarters.

c. In consideration of the fact that Special agents and agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps, in performing their investigative duties, frequently find themselves in a position where there is an urgent and immediate need for cash, every Special Agent and agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be required to have in his possession at all times, except following an emergency expenditure, not less than twenty dollars ($20.00) or, in the case of personnel serving overseas, a similar amount of the appropriate currency.

d. Subject to the provisions of e. below, all travel performed by commissioned and enlisted Counter Intelligence Corps personnel for official business of the Army, which is necessary in Military Service, will be accomplished in accordance with official travel orders, and reimbursement therefor will be made in accordance with existing Army Regulations.

e. Reimbursement from Military Intelligence funds allotted to the commands concerned for the following expenses, when such expenses are incurred in the performance of investigative duties in connection with official business of the Military Intelligence Service, will not normally be questioned by the Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

(1) Travel.--(a) Reimbursement to commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps for expenses incident to the performance of official business of the Military Intelligence Service will be made from "Travel of the Army" funds on mileage vouchers (Standard Form Nr 1071) or on per diem vouchers (Standard Form Nr 1012); or from Military Intelligence funds disbursed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence concerned. In some instances, partial reimbursement may be made both from "Travel of the Army" funds and Military Intelligence funds.

(See (d) below.) It is believed that few instances will arise where "Travel of the Army" funds cannot be used to cover at least part of the cost of travel of officers and enlisted men, and every effort should be made toward the conservation of Military Intelligence funds and the utilization of "Travel of the Army" funds.

(b) Official travel orders. Reimbursement to officers and enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps for the difference between the total mileage or per diem allowance and the total of actual normal expenses incurred while traveling under official orders will normally not be questioned by the Chief, Military Intelligence Service. All travel incident to inspection trips, attendance at conferences, permanent changes of station, and other official business not directly connected with actual investigative duties will be performed on official travel orders in accordance with the existing Army Regulations. In this connection, attention is invited to the fact that confirmatory orders may be secured when circumstances preclude the issuance of orders in advance.

(c) Reimbursement for mileage, not to exceed five cents (5¢) per mile, for local travel, by privately owned automobiles, when the officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, or Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel concerned are not traveling under official travel orders will normally not be questioned.

(d) Additional reimbursement of Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel for mileage, at a rate not to exceed two cents (2¢) per mile, when traveling under official orders providing mileage at three cents (3¢) per mile in accordance with paragraph 10, AR 35-4540, will normally not be questioned. In this connection, attention is invited to the fact that it often may be advisable to utilize repeated travel orders. Special agents and agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps should be encouraged to use their privately owned automobiles wherever it is believed that the use of such transportation will increase the efficiency with which cases are handled. Their attention should be invited, however, to the fact that the Government will not be held liable for any damage which might result from accidents involving such privately owned vehicles. Special agents and agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps who use their privately owned motor vehicles should be encouraged to take out insurance policies covering property damage and personal liability.

(e) Government automobiles (civilian type) furnished for Counter Intelligence Corps.

1 Normally, the division engineer, having jurisdiction, will provide for the rental of garage space in the vicinity of branch offices. Such arrangement should be effected through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence concerned.

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2 Gasoline, oil, and greasing. Normally, when practicable, credit cards should be issued for the servicing of Government automobiles (civilian type) with gasoline, oil, lubricating, and car washing. These cards will be issued by the quartermaster of the command in which the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment is located. They should bear fictitious names, as accounting for purchases will be made according to the serial numbers of the cards. A statement for each card of all purchases made, together with the sales slip, should be sent to the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment concerned, at the end of the month, for transmission to the quartermaster for the checking of the bill rendered by the vendor.

3 Maintenance repairs, and tires and tubes. Replacement of tires and tubes, on an exchange basis, can normally be obtained from the motor transport district. When a maintenance repair is necessary, a request should be made for a job order on the quartermaster maintenance unit which is to make the repair. In making the request, the requisition number, serial number, motor number, and make of the vehicle should be stated. For breakdowns on the road, the car should be towed to the nearest maintenance shop, or be taken to a civilian garage, and the officer in charge of the detachment concerned should be notified. This officer should call the motor transport district officer for instructions. In emergencies, when Government sources are not available, garage rent, minor repairs, and the necessary expenditures for the operation of these cars may be made and reimbursement therefor may be claimed on a confidential subvoucher. Amounts of gasoline and oil so purchased will be held to the minimum necessary to reach the nearest point of Government supply in the course of a mission.

4 Maintenance records. A log will be maintained for each automobile, showing the daily mileage for each operator, the total mileage and the case numbers, or purposes for which the vehicles were used. In addition, it may be advisable to maintain Motor Vehicle Service Record books on each Government-owned Counter Intelligence Corps motor vehicle.

(2) Public transportation. Reimbursement for trolley fares, bus fares, taxi fares, rental of automobiles, and ferry travel will normally not be questioned. The use of taxis and the rental of automobiles should be kept to a minimum, consistent with maximum efficiency in accomplishing missions. This method of transportation is expensive and should be used only in exceptional cases.

(3) Charges for parking and for rental of storage space.

(4) Tolls incurred. Tolls incurred in the use of privately-owned motor vehicles, and those furnished by the Government for Counter Intelligence Corps use, where passes are not furnished, normally will not be questioned.

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(5) Communications. Telephone calls and telegrams on official matters are proper charges against Military Intelligence funds, when official Government telephone and telegraph service is not available. Telephone calls and telegrams concerning personal matters not of an official nature, are not proper claims for reimbursements. Reimbursements for the cost of installation service, where necessary in the interest of the Government, and the rental charges for such telephones, normally will not be questioned.

(6) Purchase of information and salaries of informants. The cost of the entertainment of informants who furnish, or who are known to be qualified to furnish, information of definite value to the Military Intelligence Service constitutes a proper claim for reimbursement. Such expenditures must be left to the judgment of individual Special agents and agents, but the occasion for such expenditures must be reasonable and appropriate, and of definite value to the investigation in progress. Lavishness will be avoided in order not to arouse suspicion. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel may claim reimbursement for drinks and meals taken by themselves under circumstances necessitating their doing so in conjunction with informers or contacts. Habitual use of this method of investigation will be avoided.

(7) Gratuities or tips. Gratuities or tips in reasonable amounts constitute proper claims for reimbursements.

(8) Certain items of equipment and supplies. Reimbursement for certain items of equipment and supplies needed immediately to assist in the securing of information of definite value; that is, tape, wire, film, rope, etc., normally will not be questioned. This will include, in the case of detachments overseas, the local purchase of necessary equipment which has not been furnished to the detachment by higher Counter Intelligence Corps echelons or which, having been furnished, has become lost, destroyed, or unserviceable, and must be replaced without delay.

(9) All other normal expenses. All other normal expenses incurred in investigation of appropriate cases not mentioned specifically herein, are properly reimbursable from Military Intelligence funds. This will be interpreted to include extraordinary living expenses incurred by the necessity of the character of the duties assigned.

(10) Subsistence.

(a) Reimbursement for actual expenses. In cases where enlisted special agents and agents are absent from their official stations in connection with actual investigative duties pertaining to official business of the Military Intelligence Service, and find it impossible to obtain their meals at

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their boarding houses, the reimbursement of such personnel from Military Intelligence funds for the actual expenses incurred in procuring the necessary meals will normally not be questioned by the Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

(b) Deduction for commutation of rations. When Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is not subjected to the costs outlined in (a) above, the total of the commutation of rations allowance granted such personnel while on the DEML, in accordance with AR 35-4520, should be deducted from the total of the expense accounts on which reimbursement is claimed.

(11) Quarters. The total of the allowance for commutation of quarters for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on the DEML should be deducted from any claim for reimbursement for cost of quarters incident to the investigative duties of such personnel, unless such personnel maintains quarters of a permanent nature when, at the same time, it is required to spend certain periods of time away from such quarters on official business for the Military Intelligence Service.

(12) Shipments of property. Except in emergencies, the quartermaster designated to supply the concerned station should be called upon to provide for shipments of material necessary for the conduct of Military Intelligence Service activities.

26. Civilian clothing.

a. Allowances for civilian clothes.

(1) When enlisted personnel are transferred to the Counter Intelligence Corps, it will be provided with the seasonable clothing necessary to protect its health and identity. Normally, the cost of this initial procurement of civilian clothing will not exceed one hundred and twenty-five dollars ($125.00); however, this amount may be exceeded provided it is determined that the additional clothing required is actually necessary. The responsibility for making this determination rests with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or director of intelligence of the command to which such personnel are assigned or attached. So far as practicable without jeopardizing necessary security, issue clothing (underclothes, handkerchiefs, towels, and similar items) should be used by enlisted men of the Corps. Military Intelligence funds should be used for the purchase of such items only when the use of issue clothing is impracticable from the point of view of the mission to be performed.

(2) Provided enlisted personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps has certain civilian clothing which it desires to use, only such additional items of clothing as actually may be required should be procured; therefore the entire initial allowance need not be expended at once.

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(3) This initial civilian clothing allowance is not authorized for soldiers who reenlist and are retained on duty with the Counter Intelligence Corps. No additional clothing allowance will be allowed members of the Counter Intelligence Corps upon recalling such individuals to active duty from an inactive status.

(4) In addition to the initial allowance prescribed in (2) above, Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel are authorized a clothing maintenance and replacement allowance of one hundred and forty-four dollars ($144.00) per annum. This maintenance allowance is available to this personnel at the rate of twelve dollars ($12.00) per month, and cannot be drawn in advance.

(5) Special clothing needed to accomplish specific Counter Intelligence Corps missions may be procured and furnished to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel without regard to the allowance prescribed in (2) and (4) above.

(6) When essential, appropriate clothing will be obtained for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel regardless of expenditures for clothing which may have been made by or for the individual in question upon previous occasions.

(7) Since Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted clerks normally are not required to perform investigative duties, civilian clothing normally will not be furnished them. Enlisted clerks assigned to undercover offices may be furnished civilian clothing as prescribed in the preceding subparagraphs.

(8) The allowances for civilian clothing prescribed in the preceding subparagraphs will be defrayed from Military Intelligence funds. These allowances are furnished solely for the purpose of supplying clothing needed by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the performance of their assigned duties and do not accrue to the man, nor should they automatically be authorized nor allowed when not actually required.

(9) Articles of civilian clothing purchased for members of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be classed as expendable and will be dropped from accountability in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1c, AR 35-6620.

(10) Adequate clothing records will be maintained for all members of the Counter Intelligence Corps showing separately obligations and unobligated balances under the initial and maintenance allowance for civilian clothing.

b. Mixture of civilian clothing and uniform. Under no circumstances should a mixture of civilian clothing and uniform clothing be worn simultaneously by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel when to do so might disclose the connection of such personnel with the Army or arouse comment.

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c. Statement of civilian clothing allowances. Upon the transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel, statements of civilian clothing, initial and maintenance allowance will be forwarded, together with the service records and allied papers of the individuals concerned, on the date of transfer, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence of the command to which such personnel is transferred. As an alternative, these data may be entered in the appropriate section of the soldier's individual service records, if desired. Upon the release of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel from the Corps, and upon discharge of such personnel from the Army, statements of civilian clothing and initial and maintenance allowances will be inserted as part of the individual's service record.

27. Preparation of vouchers and expense accounts.

a. Mileage and per diem (travel on official orders). Mileage vouchers (Standard Form Nr 1071) and per diem vouchers (Standard Form Nr 1012) will be prepared in accordance with AR 35-5020 and 35-5320.

b. Expense accounts (Subvoucher to Confidential Voucher Form Nr 6).

(1) Individual monthly expense accounts. These will be prepared in complete detail. Expense will be listed opposite the actual dates on which incurred, and under the actual case numbers to which they pertain. Reference to an OCS Form Nr 21 (CIC Nr 1) is not sufficient. General entries such as "Entertainment - $10.00" will not be considered as being sufficiently detailed. In such cases it is necessary to show the type and purpose of such entertainment and the name of the individual entertained, unless it is deemed inadvisable to divulge his name. In connection with payments to informants, reference should be made to the cases concerned or to the purpose of securing such information. Prior to being paid by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, each individual expense account should be thoroughly reviewed by the officer in charge of the detachment concerned, who should indicate the correctness of the expense account by initiating a statement on the face of the vouchers, such as: "Approved, reimbursement recommended." Totals for each page will be carried forward to the next. These vouchers are to be classified as "confidential," or, if deemed advisable, "secret."

(2) Expenditures for civilian clothing for Counter Intelligence Corps (Subvoucher to Confidential Voucher Form Nr 6). A separate voucher for each agent to cover expenditures for civilian clothing will be submitted after purchases have been made. The voucher will show each item and the cost thereof, and will be supported by receipted bills of sale or sales slip. The officer in charge will certify on the voucher that the items purchases were necessary.

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c. Receipts. Receipts, when available, will be obtained when it is possible to do so without jeopardizing the identities of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel and its mission.

d. Use of OCS Form Nr 22. In all cases of reimbursement from Military Intelligence funds for travel performed in privately owned automobiles in connection with actual investigations, OCS Form Nr 22, properly executed in every detail, should be attached to the subvoucher covering such reimbursement. The column headed "Time of Departure and Arrival," on OCS Form Nr 22, should be disregarded and "Case Number" should be substituted therefor. Proper case numbers, to which the travel was incident, should always be listed or, when case numbers have not been assigned, the words, "Special Investigative Mission" should be shown, together with name of authorizing officer. The total amount on OCS Form Nr 22 should be entered as a separate item on the regular monthly expense account of the individual concerned. When more than one page is required, the certificate at the bottom of all but the last will be cut off, thereby requiring only one signature for each individual. These vouchers are to be classified as confidential or, if deemed necessary, secret. Responsibility for determining the necessity for use of privately owned motor vehicles by Counter Intelligence Corps enlisted personnel is placed with the officer in charge.

28. Salaries, gifts, gratuities and favors.

a. Funds received by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel as payment for services rendered employers, while such personnel are employed in "undercover capacities," normally will be turned over to the commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to which such personnel are assigned. The commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments receiving such funds will obtain United States Postal Money Order, made payable to the Treasurer of the United States, in the amounts indicated, and will forward such money orders to the Finance Officer, Military Intelligence Service, for final disposition. Expenses incurred by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the performance of their "undercover missions" will be paid from Military Intelligence funds in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 25.

b. No member of the Counter Intelligence Corps shall receive any gift, favor or gratuity from, or make such payments to any individual firm, group, organization, or society, without specific authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, or director of intelligence of the command to which he is attached or assigned.

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Section IV

SUPPLY

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29. General.--a. The type of work performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps requires the use of certain types of supplies and equipment not normally provided in standard tables of equipment. The procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps investigative equipment and supplies will be accomplished by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, who will furnish initial issues of Counter Intelligence Corps supplies and equipment to detachments attached or assigned to the various commands. Replacement of such supplies and additional needed supplies will be furnished to these detachments by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, upon request made to him through military intelligence channels. Detachments on detached service will requisition upon the detachment from which they are on detached service for replacements and for additional supplies and equipment.

b. Equipment and supplies, other than Counter Intelligence Corps investigative equipment and supplies, will be obtained upon requisition made by the commanding general of the command to which the detachment is assigned or attached upon the appropriate chief of technical services. Such equipment and supplies will be furnished in accordance with W.D., A.G.O. letter File Nr AG 400 (16 Jul 43) OB-S-B-M, Subject, Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps," 17 July 1943, and the special list of equipment inclosed therewith.

30. Procurement of investigative equipment and supplies.--a. All procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps investigative equipment and supplies will be accomplished by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, who is charged with the responsibility of selecting, procuring, storing, and issuing all such equipment and supplies. He will obtain the necessary equipment and supplies from the Army Service Forces which procure them in accordance with approved requirements included in the Army Supply Program. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, is charged with the responsibility of preparing the annual estimate of Counter

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Intelligence Corps, investigative equipment and supplies requirements, which estimate will be submitted to the Director of the Requirements Division, Army Service Forces, for inclusion in the Army Supply Program, for the respective periods.

b. Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, and directors of intelligence will procure Counter Intelligence Corps investigative equipment and supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments under their jurisdiction from the Property Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot, 2327 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Maryland, on requisitions (W.D., Q.M.C. Form Nr 400), except where emergencies require that local procurement be made, as indicated in d below.

c. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, may make local purchases of investigative equipment and supplies when an emergency exists, and when Army Service Forces is unable to provide the desired materials within the time available. Such purchases may be made with Military Intelligence funds, but the approval of the Finance Officer, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, War Department, must first be obtained, when such purchases amount to five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more.

d. Local procurement is authorized to be made from Military Intelligence Service funds by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or A-2, or S-2, and Directors of Intelligence Divisions, where the investigative equipment and supplies are essential to the accomplishment of emergency missions and cannot be promptly obtained through the normal channels of supply.

31. Property responsibility and accountability.--a. Responsibility and accountability for Counter Intelligence Corps property will be maintained in accordance with Army Regulations. Attention is particularly invited to War Department Circular MO-D-M, Subject: "Policy Governing Property Accountability in Theaters of Operation," 21 February 1942.

b. Accountable officers for Counter Intelligence Corps property will be appointed for the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps; for the Counter Intelligence Corps Advanced Training School; and for all Counter Intelligence Corps detachments. These officers will perform the duties as prescribed for accountable officers in AR 35-6520, 35-6640, and 35-6680.

32. Ammunition.--a. The .38 caliber special revolver and the .45 caliber automatic pistol are the standard weapons of the Counter Intelligence Corps. Other weapons, carbines, caliber .30 M1, and Grenades, hand throwing (dummy), are authorized for training purposes only. The following per individuals allowances

of training ammunition per annum for personnel of Counter Intelligence Corps have been authorized by the Secretary of War, pending publication of an appropriate change to AR 775-10:

Cartridge cal.	.30 Ball (Rifle)	50 rounds
Cartridge cal.	.30 Carbine	40 rounds
Cartridge cal.	.45 Pistol Revolver	25 rounds
Cartridge cal.	.45 SMG	25 rounds
Cartridge cal.	.38 Revolver	*200 rounds

*Includes 100 rounds for qualification, 100 rounds for combat, close combat and special training. An additional 100 rounds "Ball" ammunition per individual will be maintained for emergency (initial issue only of this quantity will be made).

An allowance of 50 rounds of caliber .38 special revolver ammunition is authorized for use in training commissioned officers and enlisted personnel while assigned as students at the Counter Intelligence Corps Advanced Training School.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments attached or assigned outside the continental limits of the United States, including Alaska, will direct requests for all types of ammunition listed in a above, to the ordnance officer of their respective commands.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments attached to the service commands in the Zone of the Interior, will requisition ammunition from the Property Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps, Supply Depot, 2327 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Maryland. The basis for issue will be computed on the actual strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps organization concerned, as of the date of the requisition. Ammunition allowances are not cumulative.

33. Maintenance of investigative equipment. All items of technical equipment will be adequately maintained, the cost of such maintenance being properly payable from Military Intelligence funds. Equipment which becomes damaged or unserviceable should be disposed of in accordance with existing Army regulations.

34. Gasoline rationing "C" books.--a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, will arrange for the procurement of an adequate supply of gasoline rationing "C" books for issue to personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps operating personally owned or Government-owned automobiles, on official business within the continental limits of the United States.

b. The gasoline rationing "C" books will be issued by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to the directors of intelligence of their respective commands. Requests, in blocks, for gasoline rationing "C" books should be submitted to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, when needed.

35. Procurement of tires and tubes for privately owned automobiles. It is the responsibility of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to effect arrangements with the Office of Price Administration to provide new tires and tubes for personally owned automobiles of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who use their cars principally for official business of the Military Intelligence Service. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel requiring tires and tubes for personally owned automobiles will submit to the director of intelligence of the command of the area in which such personnel is serving (whether attached to that command or to an Army Ground Forces or Army Air Forces unit stationed therein) application for needed tires and tubes. The director of intelligence will thereupon forward Office of Price Administration Form Nr R-1, properly accomplished to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, together with a request that an authenticated certificate for purchase of tires or tubes be issued by the Office of Price Administration. The director of intelligence will accompany this request with a certification that a "C" gasoline rationing book issued by the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, has been reissued to the automobile for which the tires or tubes are desired. Upon receipt of this request, the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, will take necessary action to secure from the Office of Price Administration and forward to the requesting director of intelligence an authenticated certificate for the purchase of tires or tubes.

Section V

OPERATIONS

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36. General. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department is responsible for the formulation of policies governing the operation of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. The actual operational activities of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are a function of command and the commanding officer of such a detachment is responsible to the commanding general of the command with which the detachment is serving for the operation of the detachment. He is the operational Counter Intelligence Corps advisor to the G-2, A-2, S-2, or director of intelligence of the command concerned. Within the policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, the control and direction of the operations of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments lies with the commanding officer of the command to which the detachment is attached or assigned and regardless of wether it is assigned or attached. The recommendation of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commander should be considered in determining upon missions which may involve Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. In formulating plans for offensive intelligence action, it is advisable that the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commander be consulted concerning probable enemy counterintelligence measures.

37. Channels of communication. Counter Intelligence Corps channels of communication are the same as those prescribed for other intelligence organizations. Direct communication between Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of adjacent units is authorized whenever circumstances justify it. Direct communication between commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, is authorized on all administrative matters.

38. Credentials and badges.--a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, is responsible for the design and procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badges. Commands with which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are serving will requisition necessary credentials and badges together with necessary supplies and instructions required for the issuance of such credentials and badges from the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to be issued to the personnel entitled to them. The credentials will be authenticated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or S-2, or the director of intelligence of the command to which the detachments for which credentials or badges are being issued is attached or assigned. Proper records with respect to the possession of the credentials and badges will be maintained by his office. The Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, will be advised of the issuance of any badges or credentials by the command issuing it, and Monthly Reports of Change with respect to badges and credentials will be furnished to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, by every command to which such badges and credentials have been furnished.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badges should never be taken to the front lines or elsewhere where there is a serious danger of their loss or capture. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be constantly reminded that the careless loss of Counter Intelligence Corps credentials or badges is a serious offense. They will, however, also be instructed that the failure to report such a loss is a more serious offense than the loss itself. Periodic inspections at intervals of not more than three months will be made of Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and badges.

39. Duties and functions of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments.--
a. The duties and functions of the Counter Intelligence Corps fall, generally, into two categories: the general investigative, rear echelon mission, including safeguarding military information, security against the activities of enemy agents and rear echelon counterintelligence functions in general: and the field security mission, including counterintelligence measures performed in forward echelons.

(1) General investigative and rear echelon mission. This part of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission includes the investigation of cases and other appropriate duties within the scope of the counterintelligence jurisdiction of the command to which the personnel concerned is assigned or attached. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Corps will be limited in the Zone of the Interior by the Delimitation Agreement of 22 February 1942. Overseas it will be limited by existing agreements entered into by the commanding general of the command or area concerned. Included in this category will be the following general duties:

(a) Provisions of TM 30-205. Assisting in the establishment and functioning of the provisions of TM 30-205 (Confidential) 27 March 1942, and furnishing investigative coverage with respect to material obtained through the operation of the provisions of that manual, the primary duty of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be investigative work which arises from the provisions of the manual. However, this personnel will render assistance and advice in connection with the establishment and functioning of the provisions of that manual. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be used to form an integral part of the organization described in TM 30-205.

(b) Safeguarding military information. The Counter Intelligence Corps will assist in the enforcement of the provisions of AR 380-5, "Safeguarding of Military Information" and will investigate to determine the responsibility for violations of those regulations. It is a part of the mission of the Corps to conduct surveys to determine measures taken to insure compliance with AR 380-5 and other directives concerning the safeguarding of military information, and to make recommendations through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or the S-2, to the commanding officer of the unit surveyed with respect to appropriate measures

to be taken to obtain proper security and insure compliance with the security measures taken. Members of the Corps, will periodically, deliver lectures on safeguarding military information to troop units.

(c) Frontier control. The Counter Intelligence Corps will cooperate with the Corps of Military Police and other military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of the command to which such personnel is attached or assigned. This section will include recommending the establishment and assisting in the maintenance of controls systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into the territory occupied by the command.

(d) General security against activities of enemy agents. This will include the following:

1 Investigation of actual or apparent instances of or plans for espionage, sabotage, antiallied propaganda, harmful rumors, fifth column activities, disaffection, or other subversive activities within or affecting the Armed Forces.

2 The performance of security surveys to determine the security of communication, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, headquarters, and other military activities and installations from adverse actions of enemy agents, and the recommendation of security measures to be taken based upon surveys conducted. However, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be used to accomplish the actual protection of such installations or the implementation of the recommendations made. The function of the Corps in this connection is advisory. This does not preclude the use of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to make periodic checks with respect to the effectiveness of security measures taken.

3 Recommendations with respect to necessary control of the movements of civilian personnel within the area under the jurisdiction of the command with which the detachment is serving, including suggestions with respect to the establishment of pass systems, restricted areas, refugee control and related matters.

4 The maintenance of constant liaison with Signal Intelligence Service and the performance of investigations resulting from intercepts indicating the existence of enemy activity.

(e) General investigative duties. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be used to perform other necessary investigative missions, falling within the counterintelligence field. Every effort will be made, however, to

prevent the diversion of a large percentage of the performance of the more important counterintelligence missions falling within the jurisdiction of the Corps both in the Zone of the Interior and overseas.

(2) Field security mission. The field security mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps will be performed with forward echelons during tactical operations and will be designed to neutralize the efforts of enemy agents relating to the tactical operation. It will include the securing of information of counter-intelligence value with respect to the identity and activities of enemy agents. The performance of these duties may be outlined as follows:

(a) Search of enemy headquarters, billets, and personnel, and seizure of significant documents.

(b) Arrest of known enemy agents and dangerous sympathizers.

(c) Establishment of an informer net based upon immediate contact with known friends.

(d) Seizure of telephone exchanges and/or radio stations, arrangements for their protection until they are taken over by proper personnel.

(e) Stopping of all civilian communications by mail, radio, telephone, telegraph, and the seizure of all mail and civilian post boxes and of the records of all radio and telegraph stations.

(f) Establishment of contacts with local officials.

(g) In the event of withdrawal, the search of evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, billets, and other installations and areas for documents or material which would be of value to the enemy and the safeguarding or destruction, as required by circumstances, of material found.

(h) The control of refugees to prevent enemy infiltration.

b. While division has been made above between the general investigative mission and the field security mission, both come within the general mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and duties coming within the scope of either will be performed by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, when appropriate whether such personnel be in the Zone of the Interior, in a theater of operations, in an overseas defense, service or base command, or with a tactical unit of the Army Ground Forces or Army Service Forces either in the Zone of the Interior or overseas.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel attached to tactical units may be used for routine housekeeping duties when such use will not interfere with the proper performance of its primary functions as outlined in this manual.

40. Coordination.--a. Successful operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps frequently depend upon the rapid and concerted action of several Counter Intelligence Corps detachments or elements thereof. Such teamwork can only be properly developed by close and constant liaison between the commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and individual contacts, where feasible, between the enlisted personnel of such detachments.

b. To accomplish this coordination, the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in each theater of operations will maintain close contact with the officers in charge of the detachments throughout his theater and will require those officers to maintain close liaison among themselves at all times. Similarly, in the Zone of the Interior, the commanding officers of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments attached to tactical units of higher echelons will maintain close contact with the commanding officers of detachments attached to lower echelons, in order that the activities of all may be coordinated.

41. Liaison with other agencies. The commanding officers of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and the personnel of such detachments, both in the Zone of the Interior and in theaters of operations, will foster close liaison and mutual cooperation between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Corps of Military Police in the same area. In theaters of operations, every effort will be made by all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to establish and maintain cooperation with local law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence and Military Police Organizations of Allied Armies. Emphasis will be placed upon this element of the operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in theaters of operations.

42. Civil situation overseas.--a. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments entering new areas with tactical units or as the initial detachments assigned to a new theater headquarters will take appropriate steps to become oriented at the earliest practicable moment. The personnel will seek to familiarize itself with local political and economic conditions, racial and religious elements and problems, the particular outstanding customs and characteristics of the civilian population, and the attitude of the population toward the war.

b. Having begun the orientation outlined in a above, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment will prepare itself, within the policies established by the commanding general of the theater of operations, to make discreet contact with friendly elements in the area and to identify hostile and neutral individuals, and groups, taking appropriate action with respect to them. These friendly elements will form the nucleus of informant nets to be established.

43. Special missions. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are frequently required to perform special missions involving complicated activities and highly specialized capabilities. The number of individuals selected for a mission of this character will depend upon the mission and circumstances but, normally, not less than two individuals will be assigned. Whenever practicable, a commissioned officer will be placed in charge of such a mission. It is important that individuals selected for special missions be familiar with each other's methods of operation and have full confidence in each other's ability.

(A. G. 300.7 (9 Aug 43).)

By order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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OK to Release
By IG

Appendix 2

Inspector General's Report

6 November 1943

(Attached to Copy 1 Only)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of the Inspector General
Washington

333.9-Intelligence Activities 6 November 1943

MEMORANDUM for the Deputy Chief of Staff

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Service Commands

AUTHORITY FOR INVESTIGATION

1. This study was conducted 16 July - 28 October 1943 by this office pursuant to a directive from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (16 July 1943) to The Inspector General to investigate and make appropriate recommendations on the existing organization, scope of activities, and operating procedures of the directors of intelligence of Service Commands and their offices, including military personnel allocated by the Service Command for such duty, Counter Intelligence Corps police attached to the Service Commands by G-2, civilian employees allotted by the Service Commands, and civilian employees made available by allocation of funds by G-2; the relationships between Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (Counter Intelligence Branch) and the offices of the directors of intelligence of the Service Commands. Additional oral instructions were given (11 August; 7 September 1943) to extend the investigation to include the investigative functions of the Provost Marshal General at Service Commands and the possible duplication and overlapping of these investigative functions with those made by the intelligence personnel allotted to the Service Commands; the C/S System; and the correlations of intelligence activities between the directors of intelligence of the Service Commands, those of the Army Air Force units and installations and Army Ground Forces, and the Military Intelligence Division, G-2 WDGS.

2. The installations visited are listed in Tab "A". They include all Service Commands, Defense Commands, Armies and several Air Force headquarters and installations.

ORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

3. It was reported that prior to 1940 the Corps of Intelligence Police consisted of a small group (less than 40) of enlisted personnel, operating as secret police (in civilian clothes) under the G-2 WDGS chiefly in the Philippines and Panama. During 1940 it became evident that the existing personnel of MIS G-2

WDGS for the investigation of "espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage" within the military establishment as contemplated in the Memorandum of the President (26 June 1939) was inadequate. A subdivision of the MID G-2 WDGS was constituted for this purpose and authorized at T/O of approximately 1,000 enlisted men to be carried as War Department overhead and to be controlled and directed by G-2 WDGS. The plan of operation called for the procurement and training of this Corps by the then Corps Areas. The qualifications required that the personnel should have had investigative or legal education and experience. A certain number were attached to each Corps Area headquarters for investigations directed either by the G-2 WDGS or the G-2 of the Corps Area; the balance of this personnel was maintained under the control of the G-2 WDGS in Washington, D.C. Although the reorganization of the Army creating the AAF, AGF and ASF was authorized 9 March 1942 no change in status was made of the CIC personnel attached to the Service Commands. On 27 April 1942 a study was submitted by G-2 WDGS to the Chief of Staff recommending that 543 officers be commissioned or transferred into the CIC and that the enlisted personnel be increased to a total of 4,431. The stated basis of the recommendation was the need of additional personnel both for service within the United States and for eventual service in theaters of operation. This request was approved 13 May 1942. The strength of the Corps on 30 September 1943 was reported to be 480 officers and 4,121 enlisted men (Tab "B"), of which 234 officers and 1,486 enlisted men are reported with tactical units and either in staging areas or on overseas duty. It is contemplated that on or before 31 January 1944 a total of 399 officers and 3,380 enlisted men will be ordered to duty with tactical units or to duty overseas. This will leave for duty within the United States, on the basis of the present strength of the Corps, 81 officers and 741 enlisted men, the Corps being 63 officers and 310 enlisted men understrength.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GROUP (G-2 WDGS)

4. At the time of this investigation the control and direction of the Counter Intelligence Corps was exercised by the Chief of the Counterintelligence Group, an integral part of the Military Intelligence Division, WDGS. This group was composed of the following branches:

Investigation and Review Branch
Evaluation Branch
Counter Intelligence Corps Branch
(Headquarters located in Baltimore, Maryland)
Visa and Passport Control Branch
Security Branch
Censorship Branch
Special Assignments Branch

The activities of the first three branches are the only ones covered by the directive for this investigation. The personnel of the Investigation and Review Branch consisted of 29 officers (not CIC) and approximately 150 civilians. The personnel of the Evaluation Branch consisted of 14 officers (not CIC) and approximately 30 civilians. The personnel of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch at Baltimore, Maryland (which included certain personnel at the "Counter Intelligence Corps Advanced Training School" at Chicago, Illinois) consisted of 64 officers (CIC), 59 enlisted men (CIC) and 31 civilians (these civilians are carried as War Department overhead by the Third Service Command).

The total number of personnel engaged in intelligence activities in Service Commands was reported as 348 officers, 2,598 enlisted men, and 770 civilians. Of this number, 174 officers, 2,547 enlisted men and 726 civilians were carried as War Department overhead. The remainder were charged to the bulk allotment of each Service Command. A breakdown of this personnel by Service Commands is shown in Tab "C."

PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING

5. The procurement and preliminary training of the CIC personnel was generally handled by the Service Commands. The selection of personnel was based mainly on previous civilian experience in investigative fields or on legal education. The training in the Service Command schools (Tab "D") has consisted to a large extent of methods of surveillance, detection and "undercover" operations in plain clothes in use by governmental agencies charged with law enforcement and apprehension of criminals. Emphasis was placed on report writing. Little or no military training of value in or with combat units was given these men. Uniforms were seldom, if ever, worn. Although linguistic ability was one of the several major requirements, instruction in foreign languages was completely subordinated to the investigative training. This method of procurement and training continued into the summer of 1943. The curricula of the "25th Enlisted Men's Class" 9 August to 4 September 1943 (Tab "E") and of the "Nineteenth Officers' Class" 16 August to 11 September 1943 (Tab "F") indicates that this type of training was carried out in the "Counter Intelligence Corps Advanced Training School" at Chicago, Illinois. The curriculum of 3 October 1943 (Tab "G") indicates the first definite change in the training policy, concentrating on subjects related to activities in the theaters of operation. This training is now further supplemented by the teaching of various foreign languages by the Berlitz Language Schools, authority for which has recently been obtained. Short periods of advance training in military intelligence activities in theaters of operation are carried on at Camp Ritchie, Fort Belvoir, Holabird and the staging area (CIC), Baltimore, Maryland. The curricula in use at these various schools (Tab "H") indicate an attempt to cover subjects concerning combat activities prescribed for

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CIC personnel. However, the time allotted by G-2 WDGS for instruction is too short (for example, two weeks for the regular eight-week intelligence course at Ritchie) to permit adequate coverage of these subjects.

SPECIALIZED PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

6. It was evident from this investigation that the qualifications, training, and physical characteristics of personnel required to perform the prescribed functions of CIC in the Zone of Interior, in the theaters and with the Air Forces differ to a marked degree. It would be practically impossible to recruit the Corps from men possessing all qualifications. For example, in addition to basic investigative training, the Air Forces require personnel with technical mechanical knowledge of engines and planes; and the combat forces in theaters require combat training, knowledge of military intelligence operations and languages. Within the last few months these requirements have been recognized in procuring and training of the personnel.

DEFINITIONS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

7. The most generally known and accepted definition of counterintelligence is that given in FM 100-5 (22 May 1941) (paragraph 279, page 57), "The object of counterintelligence is to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy intelligence system." The counterintelligence measures available to a command are detailed in the same paragraph and the application of these measures is set forth in FM 30-25 (15 February 1940). Directives issued subsequent to the manuals assign certain responsibilities such as censorship, activities of newspaper correspondents to other agencies of the War Department, but the primary object of counterintelligence as understood by the Army in general remains the same.

TM 30-220, Corps Area Intelligence (8 January 1942) defines counter-intelligence as (paragraph 18, page 11) "Functions: The counterintelligence functions in the Corps area intelligence office include the safeguarding of military information, the collection of information concerning the domestic situation, enemy espionage activities and subversive tendencies, the apprehension of enemy agents and sympathizers operating within the military establishment. These functions will be carried out in accordance with provisions of AR 380-5, FM 30-25 and instructions issued by the War Department."

TM 30-215, Counter Intelligence Corps (22 September 1943) defines the responsibility of the Counter Intelligence Corps as those connected with the prevention or neutralization of activities of enemy agents within the territory occupied. This manual is written primarily for operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in theaters but it states in paragraph 1d "Where applicable, its provisions apply equally to Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the Zone of Interior and in theaters of operation."

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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MID WDGS UNDER THE PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM (26 JUNE 1939) AND DELIMITATION AGREEMENT

8. The Presidential Memorandum of 26 June 1939 reads as follows:

"It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the FBI of the Department of Justice, the MID of the War Department, and the ONI of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities."

"No investigation should be conducted by any investigative agencies of the government into matters involving, actually or potentially, any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except by the three agencies mentioned above."

On 9 February 1942 an agreement of coordination of the FBI, MID, and ONI was entered into on the basis of "the President's Memorandum of 26 June 1939, as augmented by his directive of 6 September 1939, and the Delimitation Agreement of 5 June 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder." Paragraph 3 of this agreement reads "MID will be responsible for: '1) Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories (espionage, counter-espionage, subversion, and sabotage) in the military establishment including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control." Paragraphs 9-12 inclusive, under the heading of "Periods of predominant military interest, not involving martial law" authorizes a military commander of an "area" which has come into prominence as a potential theater of operation to take such steps in his discretion as he may believe necessary "to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared."

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES OF DIRECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE OF SERVICE COMMANDS

9. In addition to the procurement and training of CIC personnel as described in paragraph 5, supra, the directors of intelligence of service commands were generally performing the functions described in TM 30-220, Corps Area Intelligence (8 January 1942), supra, and were charged with the supervision of the activities of CIC personnel and the countersubversive system in military units within the service command area. They made current and weekly summary reports of incidents and of the general intelligence situation within the service command area to G-2 WDGS.

ACTIVITIES OF THE CIC PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO SERVICE COMMANDS

10. The prescribed duties of the CIC personnel attached to Service Commands (under the supervision of the directors of intelligence of Service Commands) concerned investigation of alleged subversive incidents and the loyalty of military personnel and civilian personnel paid from War Department funds. An elaborate manual for investigation and report writing was prepared by G-2 WDGS (CIRM-1, revised July 1942 and now in process of revision). The Service Command areas were subdivided into zones and districts in which CIC personnel were stationed. The zones and districts did not conform in boundaries either with the operating districts established by the FBI or the Directors of Internal Security. Contact was maintained with the local law enforcement agencies, the ONI and the FBI. In many Service Commands the telephones were not listed, the locations of offices secret, and the identity of resident agents concealed. This is in direct contrast to the FBI, the existence and purposes of which are widely publicized, their offices known, telephones listed and public support and cooperation encouraged.

Investigations of military personnel were carried on without the knowledge of such personnel and by agents in plain clothes who concealed their identities and purposes. The military personnel seldom learned either of the investigation or of any of the derogatory information contained in the reports of these investigations.

INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS OF CIC

11. The activities of CIC personnel included not only investigation of incidents of alleged subversion and of the loyalty of military personnel and civilians paid from War Department funds but also alleged violations of AR 380-5 (Safeguarding Military Information), AR 600-90 (Illegal wearing and sale of decorations and insignia) and impersonation of military personnel. These investigations, because of their volume and the limited number of investigative personnel, were, with the exception of the so-called 14-point CIR-1 reports, superficial, and unproductive of positive results except in rare instances. No information of a statistical nature was available to determine the percentage of investigations which developed positive (not potential) evidence of subversion. During a week's period, 3,952 cases were received in all Service Commands, 3,020 cases closed and 12,836 held pending. A detailed tabulation is attached hereto as Tab "I." For example, commanding officers were authorized to request an investigation of the loyalty, integrity and discretion of personnel having habitual access to confidential and secret information. The volume of these requests permitted merely a superficial investigation which rarely developed any positive information other than that contained in the personal questionnaires, service records and qualification cards. It is fair to assume that this authority to request an investigation has been widely abused, the result used as an "alibi sheet" and the purpose defeated by the superficiality of the investigations.

The loyalty investigations of candidates for Officer Candidate Schools in the past were of the same superficial nature and the volume developed such a backlog that the majority of investigations were not completed until the candidate had completed more than half his term at school. Many of these were expanded to the 14-point investigation and CIR-1 reports.

In contrast to the loyalty investigations described supra the so-called 14-point investigations and CIR-1 reports were detailed and exhaustive. Although the number of these investigations was small, in comparison to the other type, it was estimated by the majority of the directors of intelligence that this type of investigation required from 60 to 65 percent of the time of the CIC investigators. These investigations concerned two general classifications of personnel; first, applicants for transfer to the CIC and second, military and civilian personnel (paid from War Department funds) suspected or alleged to be subversive. In the first classification the investigation required a complete background history of the applicant to determine his loyalty, integrity and discretion as well as his qualification for transfer to the CIC. In such cases the applicant tacitly consented to a complete investigation of his life. In the second classification (suspected or alleged subversion) the person involved was subjected to the same detailed and exhaustive investigation of his life, but without his consent or knowledge. The manual for investigation and report writing (including specimen reports and memoranda) covering both of these classifications required an investigation in and a recording of information under 14 different headings. These reports were forwarded to the Investigation and Review Branch of the Counterintelligence Group WDGS which rigidly enforced the requirement that complete information be reported under each of these 14 headings. This was required even though information was obtained in the early stages of the investigation in the case of applicants for transfer to the CIC from which it could be definitely determined that the person investigated was not qualified for transfer to the CIC; and in the case of alleged subversion the investigation into the life history of this personnel was continued at great length even though the falsity of the allegation of subversion had already been established. These investigations were made by agents (corporals and sergeants) under the supervision of special agents (master sergeants, technical sergeants, and staff sergeants). The reports were usually written by the special agents who were authorized and required to make "an evaluation of the subject's (person investigated) efficiency" under the sub-topic "personal characteristics;" to record all adverse information (this included, in actual practice, adverse information based solely on hearsay, rumor and gossip); to express his opinions of the person investigated; and under the heading "Recommendations" to recommend what action should be taken with respect to the subject (person investigated) and what disposition should be made of the case. In the course of this type of investigation it was found frequently that the person investigated had lived during some period in his life in places outside the service command area in which the investigation originated. The agent was required to list undeveloped leads (sources of information) outside the service command area. The manual places the

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responsibility on the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (now Director of Intelligence) of the Corps Area (Service Command) (the Office of Origin) for the investigation of all undeveloped leads in other Corps Areas (Service Commands). This geographical expansion of the investigation without evaluation of the importance and pertinency of the undeveloped leads caused unnecessary delay in the closing of the investigation. The manual provided that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Director of Intelligence) of the various Corps Areas (Service Commands) establish their own internal system for approval of these reports. In some Service Commands a system of supervision of these investigations, of the evaluation of undeveloped leads and of the pertinency and accuracy of information contained in the reports and memoranda had been established. In other Service Commands there appeared to be little supervision by commissioned officers over the conduct of the investigations by the agents and Special Agents, in the requests to other Service Commands for investigations of undeveloped leads and in the inclusion of adverse information based on hearsay, rumor and gossip. The distribution of these reports (complete to include copies of all memoranda) was as follows: 3 copies of each report originating within a Service Command to the MID, War Department, Washington, D.C. (one of which was given to the FBI); 2 copies to the office of origin; 1 copy for the files of the director of intelligence of the Service Command in which a supplemental investigation had been made; 1 copy for each intelligence office in a post, camp, or military establishment at which a lead was developed; 2 copies for the office requesting the investigation. The Investigation and Review Branch of the CIG MID G-2 WDGS (29 officers and approximately 150 civilians) processed these reports and, in such cases as the reports did not include complete information under each of the 14 headings, returned the report for a further investigation without regard to the importance or pertinency of the item. An examination of the reports indicated that there was no attempt to delete adverse or derogatory information based on hearsay, rumor, and gossip.

The CI Group MID G-2 WDGS were authorized to take action in two classes of cases; investigations of candidates for Officer Candidate Schools and transfer of subversives. It was reported that the CIC had prevented the commissioning of only some 50 out of the total number attending Officer Candidate Schools and had recommended the transfer of a comparatively small number of subversives. The functions of this Investigation and Review Branch CIG MID G-2 WDGS, as reported, were to coordinate and guide the investigative activities and the disposition of subversive personnel to prevent unnecessary investigations; to act as an office of origin for investigations requested by overseas components; to correlate and coordinate sabotage investigations among the various Service Commands; to transfer dangerous subversives to special organizations; to direct the transfer to the Pacific or Alaskan Theater of Operations personnel who have expressed a reasonably understandable reluctance to fight either Germany or Italy but are otherwise loyal to the United States; to initiate all adverse counter-intelligence action concerning officers; to recommend the removal of individuals from Officer Candidate Schools.

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The examination of a great number of CIR-1 reports of investigations of commissioned officers alleged to be or suspected of subversion showed a common pattern of a complete life investigation in spite of the fact that the alleged subversive act or statement was proved to be untrue in the early stages of the investigation; that these reports had attached to them in the form of typewritten memoranda alleged interviews containing unverified information derogatory to the character of the officer based on hearsay, rumor and gossip; that these reports quoted such information as factual; that these reports contained "an evaluation of the efficiency of the subject" (officer) made by an enlisted man in violation of the regulations prescribing the method and persons authorized to make efficiency reports on officers; that recommendations were made by agents (enlisted men) adverse to the standing of the officer in the military establishment; that these reports were presumably reviewed by officers of the various service commands and of the Investigation and Review Branch CIG MID G-2 WDGS and allowed to become a part of the permanent record of the officer, distributed as stated supra; that copies of these reports were sent to his commanding officer and forwarded to his new station or unit upon transfer; that the officer was not informed of the imputations and allegations against his character, integrity, discretion and conduct and was given no opportunity to deny and disprove the statements recorded. This practice is directly contrary to the inherent right of a commissioned officer of the U.S. Army to be advised of imputations and allegations as to his character, integrity, discretion, conduct and efficiency affecting his standing in the Army. It is a violation of the spirit of the 97th Article of War, the War Department policy as expressed in paragraph 7, AR 20-30, and the fundamental principles of American Justice. This subject has been discussed in its application to commissioned officers as many of such cases have been reinvestigated by this office. All military personnel are entitled to the same rights.

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE PMG SERGEANT INVESTIGATORS

12. Subsequent to the organization of the Office of the Provost Marshal General certain activities previously handled by G-2 WDGS were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. These activities included the responsibility for security of facilities operating classified War Department contracts, investigations of civilians holding key positions in such plants, certain classes of aliens called for induction, civilians applying for employment in War Department agencies and applicants for commissions from civilian life. A small number of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel and other enlisted personnel (with legal experience) was transferred to the PMGO for the performance of these investigative activities. Allotments were made to the different service commands and the investigative operations were carried on under the direction of the directors of Internal Security. These investigators (sergeants), now totaling approximately 900, operate in civilian clothes and are carried as PMGO personnel, and not part of the bulk allotment of the service commands. The details of this personnel as

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attached to the different service commands are tabulated in Tab "C". There are no officers nor civilians included in this group other than those charged to service command bulk allotments.

Authority was given to managers of factories holding classified War Department contracts and various War Department agencies employing civilians to request an investigation of the loyalty of certain classes of employees either before or as a result of a change in their status as employees. This authority was apparently interpreted by the managers of these plants and by the various War Department agencies as a requirement rather than as a safeguard in special cases involving access to confidential or secret material. As a result of this interpretation the volume of cases increased to a point far beyond the capacity of the personnel of the PMGO. In order to cope with this work load, loyalty investigations were divided into two classes: routine and special. The routine investigations consisted of a verification of certain of the statements made by the person on his Personal Security Questionnaire. This type of investigation was turned over to selected commercial investigative companies at the contract price of $3.00 per investigation. Special investigations, all of which were performed by the sergeant investigators of the PMGO, consisted of a thorough and complete check of the person's history and background. These special investigations were made only when derogatory information was developed in a routine investigation or when special circumstances required a full and complete investigation. It was noted that in the month of July the routine investigations completed by the commercial companies aggregated 100,000; special investigations, 25,000. An examination of the information developed as a result of these routine investigations showed that only a small percentage disclosed information requiring a special investigation. For example, in one service command during the month of August one potential subversive case was developed from 7,900 routine investigations by commercial companies. It is to be noted in this connection that the field of activity of the sergeant investigators of the PMGO does not extend into investigations of subversive activities. In such cases, when the investigation developed a suspicion of subversion, it was required that the investigation be turned over to the Director of Intelligence. Under the Delimitation Agreement supra the CIC investigates cases of potential subversion of military personnel and civilian personnel paid from War Department funds and turns over to the FBI the cases involving civilians not within this classification. From an examination of activities of both the PMG sergeant investigators and CIC personnel it was indicated that there was duplication of effort in this particular field.

A recent memorandum (4 August 1943) Nr W380-15-43, subject: "Screening of internal security questionnaire" is directed to a reduction of requests for loyalty investigations. At the time of this study the results from this memorandum were not reflected in any figures available. The assignment of the investigative group to the service command as a part of the bulk allotment and direct command

responsibility and authority to the commanding general (who has knowledge of local conditions) can result in an elimination of unnecessary investigative activities and duplication of effort.

THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE SYSTEM

13. Under date of 27 March 1942, TM 30-205 (Countersubversive Instructions) was approved as a manual of instructions for the establishment and operation of the CS system within the military service. Its function is stated in Section I, paragraph 4, as follows: "Function of CS Service.--a. The CS Service is informative and preventive, not punitive. It collects information upon which competent authorities may act." The information includes espionage, sabotage, propaganda against and disaffection toward the Government of the United States.

This system represents an elaborate and fine network of secret agents within the military establishment composed of both military and civilian personnel. In military organizations the average is one for every 30 men in a group or unit. The personnel are chosen from all types and necessarily include these with little education or training. It can be fairly described as an undercover organization the purpose of which is to report any statements or activities which, in the opinion of the operative, indicate possible disaffection or disloyalty toward the Government of the United States. The extent to which this system has been integrated into the Army is shown in the report for the month of July 1943 of the director of intelligence of a service command. In this command there were over 53,000 operatives. These operatives submitted over 150,000 reports for that month. These reports had to be read, evaluated, and processed. The activities for this month were in proportion to the number of military personnel within that service command for the previous months of 1943. It was reported that out of approximately 1,000,000 reports a total of 600 suspicious persons had been named in the reports for the first seven months of 1943. No record, however, was available to determine how many times the same person had been reported and included within this total number of 600. There were no statistics either compiled or available in this service command or any other service command to indicate definitely that positive results had been obtained by this activity. Many reports were read, none of them found to contain any information of value, and many were found to contain information relative to actions of individuals which might require disciplinary action unconnected with disloyalty or disaffection.

TM 30-205 emphasizes the fact that the CS System is valueless unless its existence is kept secret. It states that "It is imperative that commanding officers see to it that the operation of the Countersubversive System does not disrupt the morale of their troops or employees." It was found, however, that the existence of the CS System has become a matter of public knowledge, a subject of criticism by newspaper columnists. It has been adversely "written up" in at

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least one newspaper with a wide circulation among the colored people. All public comments have been adverse and severely critical of this system. It was the opinion of officers interviewed that the knowledge of the existence of the system had placed potentially subversive personnel on notice and that it had created a feeling on the part of some of the military personnel that they were relieved of responsibility to report un-American activities as this responsibility had been assigned to definite personnel.

It was the opinion of many officers interviewed that the responsibility for security in a unit should be that of command and that the personnel should be regularly indoctrinated with their individual responsibility, from the viewpoint of their own safety and the safety of their organization, that they should report any evidence of un-American activity coming to their attention either within the military establishment or elsewhere.

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OF G-2, WDGS

14. This report has concerned itself with intelligence activities which can be appropriately delegated to subordinate commands. It is recognized, however, that matters of a highly secret nature arise which must be handled directly by the highest command authority. These activities require liaison, coordination, and correlation with the Chiefs of the ONI, FBI, OSS, State Department, and other Governmental agencies. In order that the highest degree of secrecy may be maintained, it is necessary that the responsibility for and the direction of these activities be centralized within the smallest possible group. The proper agency for this responsibility and activity is G-2, WDGS. There should be made available when required personnel of the trained investigative group attached to the various service commands. This responsibility and authority to conduct activities should be limited to matters which are the subject of special directives from competent authority and should not invade the field of intelligence which are the responsibility of subordinate commands.

DISCUSSION

15. The Presidential Memorandum of 1939 and the Delimitation Agreement between the FBI, MID and ONI places the direct responsibility on MID of G-2 WDGS to control, handle, and conduct investigations into matters involving, actually or potentially, espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage. G-2 WDGS organized the Counter Intelligence Corps as the operating agency. This was accomplished during the period that the Army was organized and commanded under the Corps Area System. The growth in personnel of the CIC was gradual due to the requirements as to qualifications of the personnel. Small detachments of CIC personnel were attached to the various Corps Area and Defense Command Headquarters. It was planned that these groups would operate as units under the

command of a CIC officer under the direction of the then G-2s of the Corps Areas and Defense Commands within their prescribed fields of activities. In the development of this activity direct intelligence channels between G-2 WDGS and the G-2s of the Corps Areas and Defense Commands were gradually utilized. An intimate control was exercised by G-2 WDGS over all these G-2s during this development period so that it became the accepted practice that the G-2s and subsequently the directors of intelligence of the Service Commands were responsible and accountable directly to G-2 of the WDGS in these operations. The directors of intelligence of the Service Commands were placed in an anomolous position. They were members of the staff of the commanding general of the Service Command and owed him complete loyalty and allegiance and acted in their field of activity as his representative. However, they received directives for the use of the CIC detachment directly from G-2 WDGS. This resulted in misunderstanding as to the responsibility for intelligence activities within the Service Command. This situation has been a contributing cause to the deficiencies found during this study; namely, lack of low level supervision, a misconception and misinterpretation of manuals and directives, a waste and misapplication of manpower and effort, delays in the completion of investigations, and a multiplication of paper work. The Army has been built on certain fundamental premises; namely, command responsibility for activities from the lowest level upwards, strict adherence to command channels, and immediate corrective action of deficiencies at the lowest command level. The study of the operation of intelligence activities in the field clearly indicates that the failure to adhere to these fundamental principles has been a contributing cause to the deficiencies described supra. The arbitrary division of investigative activities between the CIC and the PMG resulted in a duplication of personnel, overhead and effort. The administration of the Army's responsibilities in the Zone of Interior can be accomplished by placing the responsibility on the commanding generals of the Service Commands for the security of their geographical areas. A consolidation of the investigative functions of the CIC and the PMG within the Zone of Interior should be made and a group of investigators should be organized and trained as a section of each Service Command unit for the puspose of making such investigations as may be required by competent authority.

16. The activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps and the requirements as to the qualifications of the personnel for operations in the Zone of Interior and the theaters differ to a marked degree as described in paragraph 6 supra. It is a logical conclusion that the Counter Intelligence Corps as such should be procured, trained and organized for service in theaters and with tactical units. Consideration should be given to the advisability of procuring personnel for service with the AAF and the AGF from those recommended by each of these commands.

17. It is evident from this study of the activities of the PMG and CIC that there were many unnecessary and unproductive investigations made and that many of the investigations made were carried into fields involving matters not pertinent

to the issue. It is impracticable to make a loyalty check of all military personnel, civilian personnel paid from War Department funds and civilian personnel employed in facilities holding classified government contracts. The existing directives relating to loyalty investigations have permitted such a volume of requests to be made that the great majority of investigations have been superficial. New directives should be published emphasizing the fact that the selection of personnel for confidential positions is a command responsibility and that the request for a loyalty investigation does not evade that responsibility.

18. The manuals for investigations and report writing should be rewritten to restrict the investigation to the issue involved, to require the closing of the investigation upon the determination of the truth or falsity of the allegations, to limit the report to pertinent facts and to verify information susceptible of proof. Competent officers should be selected to review these reports, draw the conclusions and make the recommendations. Only one copy of the report and memoranda of information should be made. This should be kept at headquarters of the Service Command in which the investigation originated. Pertinent information required by other commands and agencies should be forwarded in summary form. Requests for supplemental investigations should be limited to vital and pertinent information. The reports of investigations should include a definite determination of the issue involved. The present CIR-1 report with information required under each of the 14 headings is cumbersome and unnecessary. The investigation and report should be limited to the issue involved.

19. Paragraph 11 of this report deals with CIR-1 investigations and reports concerning commissioned officers. These investigations are in violation of the spirit of the 97th Article of War and the War Department policy as expressed in paragraph 7, AR 20-30. All investigations of commissioned officers should be made in accordance with the established War Department policy. A problem exists, however, as a result of these investigations and the reports involving commissioned officers, copies of which have been widely distributed. Grave injustice has been committed against these officers and this injustice will exist so long as these reports are permitted to remain as a permanent part of the records of such officers. All copies of these reports should be recalled by the War Department, reviewed, the pertinent factual information extracted, and the original and the copies of these reports and attached memoranda destroyed.

20. Countersubversive System. The value of the Countersubversive System has been weakened by the publicity given to it. The security of a command is the responsibility of the commanding officer. The Countersubversive System is not designed to discover trained enemy agents but to maintain a channel of information for reports of disloyalty, disaffection and sabotage. It is believed that effective results generally can be obtained by a regular indoctrination of the personnel in their individual responsibilities to report any evidence of un-American activity

either within the military establishment or elsewhere. Authority should be given commanding officers, however, to provide a special channel of all information for reports of disloyalty, disaffection, and sabotage, when deemed necessary. TM 30-205 (Confidential) (Countersubversive Instructions) should be rescinded and a directive issued in accordance with the suggestions supra.

21. The directors of intelligence of Service Commands are required to make current reports of incidents and weekly summary reports of the general intelligence situation within the Service Command. An examination of these reports indicated that, in general, the information was based on news items. The outline for reports required information under the following headings: economical, political, psychological, espionage and subversive activities, and geographical and meteorological data. Many of these reports were long and covered over 50 pages of single spaced typing. A total of 14 officers and over 30 civilians were actively engaged in a summarizing of these reports for a monthly report to the Chief of Staff. The information contained in the monthly report could not be classed as current intelligence information. No justification could be found for a continuance of the weekly summary reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS

22. It is recommended:

a. (1) That the investigative functions of the Provost Marshal General and the Counter Intelligence Corps be consolidated within the Zone of Interior and that a group of investigators be organized as a section of each Service Command unit for the purpose of making such investigations as may be required by competent authority.

(2) That all procurement, assignment, training and operations of this investigative group be decentralized to appropriate commands.

(3) That administrative or disciplinary action based on these investigations be delegated to the appropriate subordinate commander.

(4) That the manual of report writing be revised to provide that the completed report contain only verified information pertinent to the issue, appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

(5) That effective supervision be established on all levels.

b. That all reports and attached memoranda of investigations made by the Counter Intelligence Corps be reviewed, pertinent verified information extracted and the originals and copies recalled by the War Department and destroyed.

c. That the Counter Intelligence Corps be specially procured and trained for utilization in theaters of operation; that they be so utilized except for such activities within the Zone of Interior as shall be specifically directed by appropriate authority; that the functions and activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps within the Zone of Interior except as stated supra be performed by the investigative agency referred to in paragraph 22a(1).

d. That TM 30-205 (Confidential) (Countersubversive Instructions) be rescinded, and a directive issued giving authority to a commanding officer, in his discretion, to organize and operate an adequate channel of information for reports of disloyalty, disaffection, and sabotage.

Approved
By order of the Secretary of War
Joseph T. McNarney
Deputy Chief of Staff

By O. L. Nelson
GSC Asst to the Deputy Chief of Staff

/s/ Virgil L. Peterson
VIRGIL L. PETERSON
Major General
Inspector General

Incls.
Tabs A thru H

[redacted]

Appendix 3

Magazine Article: "G-Men in Khaki"

(Attached to Copy 1 Only)

CONFIDENTIAL

G-MEN IN KHAKI

An article published in "The American" magazine, January, 1945 issue.

Not long ago a general court martial tried an American soldier accused of violating the 81st and 96th Articles of War, by aiding the enemy and fraternizing with prisoners.

Four hours later, speaking in the grim language of war, it pronounced its terrible sentence: "...to be discharged dishonorably from the Army of the United States, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be hanged by the neck until dead."

The evidence against him was unanswerable; it had been gathered by the expert Counter Intelligence Corps, the U.S. Army's amazing and little-known G-men in khaki.

Ironically, a compass had led him to a traitor's noose.

The condemned man (let us call him "Smith") was a patient in an army hospital, convalescing from a minor illness. Next to the hospital, in an area set off by barbed wire, were many German prisoners of war. It was easy for walking patients like Smith to talk to them over the barrier. This he did frequently, and made friends with some.

He was incredibly stupid or incredibly careless: he confided in another American patient. He began praising Germany, belittling America, and once said that if the chance ever came, he would desert to the Germans, though he was not of German ancestry. One day he revealed he was planning to help ten prisoners escape; he had already found them American clothing, food, medicine.

"They're ready to go as soon as I can get them a compass," he said.

The second American shrewdly pretended to be sympathetic, but secretly reported to army authorities, who assigned the Counter Intelligence Corps to the case. To develop sound legal evidence, CIC laid a clever trap:

An agent began working in the hospital as a wardboy. One day (making sure Smith was listening) he mentioned casually that he had a nice war souvenir: a German compass. Smith's eyes lighted up and he bit eagerly at the bait. He said he'd always wanted a compass like that and wondered if he could buy it. After proper reluctance and bargaining, the "wardboy" sold it to him. Of course, it was secretly marked so that later it could be positively identified.

The end came quickly. That very night Smith sauntered to the prisoners' area, began talking to some Germans who drifted up to meet him. When he thought no one was looking, he passed over the compass. A moment later he and the prisoners with him were under arrest. The fatal compass was found on one of the Germans, who quickly confessed the whole plot. Smith was doomed...

Few people, even in the Army itself, knew much about the Counter Intelligence Corps, for obviously it must operate behind a smoke screen of secrecy. CIC has two major functions: First, to catch enemy spies, saboteurs, and subversive agents. Second, to prevent out military plans and secrets leaking out to the enemy. Operating under G2 (Intelligence), CIC is the operational field force that does most of our counterintelligence.

The Corps is a puzzling mixture of G-men and plain G.I. Although its agents scoff at any cloak-and-dagger mystery about themselves, they have, in fact, done detective work that rivals any Oppenheim novel. They have caught literally hundreds of enemy agents. By recovering lost Allied secret papers and by discovering equally secret enemy ones, they have unquestionably saved thousands of American lives.

But they are also soldiers, and often trigger-pulling ones. They have ridden the very first waves of every African or European invasion, by landing craft, glider, and parachute. They have done front-line intelligence work that has won them many medals and more compliments.

Not the least of the CIC romance lies in its own agents, who remain as nearly anonymous as possible, never appear in print, and sometimes fool even their friends about their real jobs. Once, in Algiers, I knew a lieutenant fairly well for six months without realizing he was a CIC agent. Even in official reports they are sometimes referred to merely as "Agent XXX." They may wear any kind of insignia, from cavalry to air corps. Within CIC itself, rank means little; the real difference is between "special agent" and "agent," the first ranking higher.

CIC is an outgrowth of the last war's CIP (Corps of Intelligence Police), organized in 1917. It saw active service overseas, but after the Armistice CIP was--like the rest of the Army--drastically whittled down, until in 1940 it had less than 20 men in it. At the beginning of this war, CIP was abolished, and a new, streamlined unit was formed in its place. This was CIC, which now numbers thousands of agents.

The Army was combed to find men of exactly the right background. Hundreds of thousands of names were examined; only a few thousand were chosen (the exact number is still secret). Perhaps no other army unit has men of such consistently high caliber. Mostly they were ex-diplomats, newspapermen, accountants,

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lawyers, private detectives, FBI agents, foreign representatives for American firms, and some college professors. The Army favored men who had traveled extensively abroad and could speak at least one foreign language well. Their loyalty and integrity were, of course, triple-checked.

Such drastic selection produced men of astonishing talent, experience, and education. Almost all hold college degrees, and at one time, in the London office alone, there were 8 PH.D.'s. The composite experiences of one 15-man group were typically startling: Among them, they had raced cars in Italy, played hockey for Harvard, newspapered in Paris, investigated credit ratings in New Jersey, taught English in France, fought legal cases for the Government, studied science in Germany, learned naval aviation, taken scientific photographs in Alaska, investigated the Bund, taught political science, prospected for gold.

No less remarkable was their Army training, partly done in a certain Chicago hotel taken over especially for that purpose. Their teachers were America's best --formerly secret service agents, FBI aces, narcotics investigators, military intelligence experts. They learned all known detective arts, and also such things as jujitsu, enemy spy methods, the laws of arrest and trial. They learned the almost magical powers of "interrogation"--how to trap a suspect by cunning questions. They became cract pistol shots. They also got rigorous, toughening field training.

Often, wearing civilian clothes, they had to endure the sneers of people who wondered--and sometimes out loud: "Why aren't they in uniform?"

Sent overseas, they learned some more, depending on where they were. In Britain and on the Mediterranean they sometimes spent three hours a day on languages alone. They had to learn the intricacies of government, politics, coinage, weights and measures, laws, police systems, etc., of many countries-- especially Germany, Italy, France.

This almost frightening thoroughness has turned out agents superbly efficient and versatile. They have to be both. Today a CIC agent may find himself posing as anything from a deserter to a diplomat, from a clerk to a colonel. One day he may lounge in a smart London bar; the following week he may be assaulting an enemy invasion beach, utterly G.I. He may be interviewing a beggar or a general, a duchess or a prostitute; he may be wearing a dinner jacket or torn trousers.

The new CIC's first real combat test was the North African landings; it passed with flying colors and a fat fistful of decorations. Long before the invasion, every agent knew exactly what building to dash for and exactly what he would probably find there.

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At Casablanca one agent (who won a Silver Star for it) was so intent on racing from the beach to the Axis armistice commission building that he outstripped our own advance! For 36 hours he remained alone in the building, under heavy American shellfire, guarding valuable documents with drawn pistol.

Such swift work gave the enemy no time to destroy highly secret papers, and two especially fat plums fell into CIC's hands. These enabled the Allies to round up hordes of pro-Axis Frenchmen and Arabs with a speed that left them gasping.

Another agent won a Silver Star by sneaking 40 miles behind enemy lines to capture a German agent who controlled Arab chieftains; he was the nephew of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.

Within 10 months, CIC ran up an astonishing record: It captured no less than 100 enemy agents in North Africa. All were turned over to the French, tried in French courts, and many were shot.

One of CIC's biggest headaches--especially in France--was the problem of civilian refugees. Homeless and hungry, they wandered in disorganized hordes in and about battle areas, usually heading for their ruined villages and Allied food. They had already suffered so terribly that it seemed heartless to bother them further.

Yet grim experience had shown they must all be carefully examined. As CIC agents explained to them so many weary thousands of times, "We know 99 out of 100 of you are all right. But we also know one of you might be a German agent. So, to catch that one, we must check all of you." This is a long, tiring task, involving endless questions, and it has created some resentment among French people, who continually demand, "Why do you treat us as if we were les boches?"

Sicily proved how necessary this sifting is. There, in one batch of 900 refugees, CIC discovered 16 spies, all Italians who had been specially trained by the Germans. They had good stories, but one of them aroused suspicion by a wrong answer to a minor question. Then the full barrage of relentless cross-examination was turned on him and he broke down. He squealed on the others and revealed the hiding place of three radio transmitters and some $30,000 in Allied currency. In all, CIC rounded up over 100 German spies in Sicily.

In Normandy, agents found two young Frenchmen from quite a different part of France, and with about $400 on them. These two things, not of course damning in themselves, were enough to call for stricter questioning. The answers became more rattled and vague. Finally one confessed they were both German agents. Hidden on their clothing were sketches of American gun positions, and the roster of an American engineering unit. The French sentenced both to life imprisonment.

One day a CIC agent, looking through binoculars from a French hilltop, actually watched six German soldiers change into civilian clothes. After that, the check on refugees became even tighter.

Aside from spies and German soldiers, CIC also watched for what one officer aptly called "political booby-traps." The Germans, old hands at promoting Fifth Columns and having occupied France for four years, unquestionably left behind some secretly pro-Axis Frenchmen to cause us trouble. This they can do by encouraging friction, spreading false rumors, and working against us politically. (Once in Italy, CIC arrested 17 men who were plotting to set up a new Fascist regime in a town far from our front. The leader was sentenced to death.)

By quizzing civilians and prowling about the front, CIC agents often stumbled across precious nuggets of information valuable to military commanders on the spot. They are trained to recognize such nuggets and pass them on swiftly to the proper officers. Occasionally they have thus changed the course of battles.

It may now be told that the swift fall of Cherbourg was helped by two CIC agents who jumped into Normandy with paratroops. The Ninth Infantry Division, which captured the city, had its job made infinitely easier because it possessed two priceless documents, found by the CIC agents in an abandoned German command post. The first was a detailed plan of all the Cherbourg fortifications; the second was a "mine overlay," showing exactly where every German mine was placed.

These "overlays," of which the public has heard little, were especially valuable finds, and CIC was always on the lookout for them. Whenever the Germans (or we, for that matter) lay mines, the locations are marked on a transparent sheet of paper or plastic. By itself, this sheet means nothing, but when placed over the proper map, it reveals everything. Obviously, a commander who has an enemy overlay can plan his attack so as to save hundreds of lives.

I talked to three CIC agents, a sergeant and two corporals, who went to France with an airborne division. In peacetime, the sergeant had painted covers for detective magazines. But he had also been a national champion rifle and pistol shot, had lived in France and Poland eight years, and spoke the languages of both countries well. He was supposed to go with paratroopers, but broke his leg in two places during a practice jump and barely left the hospital in time for D-Day in a glider. It crashed, killing two other occupants, but the sergeant escaped injury and went right to work.

"Once," he told me, "we were questioning French civilians and came across one old boy who'd just walked through no-man's land. He said he'd seen a column of Germans moving up to the front, almost a division strong. We told G2

(Intelligence) about it right away. They checked up, found the peasant was right, called for the air force, and bombed hell out of the column. G2 sent a major over to thank us for that little item."

One of the corporals, formerly a Richmond newspaperman, recalled how they'd found some French civilians who, only a few hours before, had watched Germans putting in new gun sites and minefields. "We passed that along to G2, and our artillery neutralized them in an hour." he said.

The other corporal, who had been a private detective in Peoria, described how they'd searched an abandoned German officers' clubhouse, finding documents that showed strengths of various outfits...

Another of CIC's major jobs is "security"--guarding our military secrets. Before one invasion (not Normandy), the Corps quietly made its own tests to see just how secure the security was. Two agents, posing as American civilians, began visiting pubs, listening to U.S. soldiers talk, trying to get information.

They visited various Army headquarters, asking to speak to a mythical "Colonel Henderson," explaining they were from his home town. This thin excuse, plus their authentic American accents, got them by everywhere. Everybody was most helpful--and shockingly careless. One major left them alone in his office while he went off to see if he could locate "Colonel Henderson" for them. While he was gone, one agent quickly photographed secret papers and maps lying on his desk, using a tiny camera concealed in his hand. A real spy could have done the same.

This kind of thing went on for days. After deluding colonels and majors galore, the two agents were finally caught by a staff sergeant who got suspicious of their conversation in a pub. Arrested, it took them several hours to prove their identity. The sergeant won a warm official commendation. As for the rest, sizzling letters came down through channels, and security was drastically tightened up.

The greatest secret, of course, was the when and where of D-Day in Normandy. As the tension mounted, Britain became increasingly spy-conscious, and CIC had to handle hundreds of reports of "suspicious activities," most of which proved false alarms.

Late one night, an American officer blundered by mistake into the hotel room next to his own. He was startled to find quantities of German literature in the closet and quickly reported that a "spy" was obviously there. Actually, it was a perfectly respectable Swiss diplomat, quite entitled to read German.

Only a few days before D-Day, CIC received a frantic call from a secret marshaling area. Someone had found a mysterious capsule containing tiny rolls of paper which bore strange, unreadable inscriptions.

"It's obviously a code," a worried colonel explained. The capsule turned out to be a mazuza, a religious object which devout Jews wear about their necks, as Catholics wear a crucifix. The "code" was merely portions of the Five Books of Moses, written in Hebrew. An embarrassed Jewish soldier reclaimed it.

One agent told me, "We must have got hundreds of tips about 'flashing lights' and 'hidden radio transmitters.' We checked them all, but not a one amounted to anything. Once the 'transmitter' was a little kid blowing on a mouth organ."

There were other reports, too. A high-ranking officer was dating a lovely Viennese girl of questionable politics. A night-club hostess was asking too many questions about air force targets. A certain "pub" was reported to be the starting point for an "underground railway" to Eire, for spies and AWOL soldiers. An unknown civilian had taken a photograph of a secret headquarters. A prostitute seemed to know where every airdrome in Britain was. A German refugee kept pigeons in his back yard and listened to Nazi broadcasts. Perhaps the birds were carrier pigeons.

In such cases, which involved people other than American military personnel, CIC worked with British authorities, who of course have jurisdiction over all civilians in the British Isles. The vast majority of cases were like this, and the hush-hush Anglo-American cooperation thus developed was surprisingly harmonious. Information was pooled, and often a Briton and an American would work together as a team. The Americans have the utmost respect for such British agencies as Scotland Yard and Field Security, the British counterpart of CIC.

"There aren't many things in the world that live up to their reputation," one CIC officer told me, "but British Intelligence is one of them. You can believe whatever the novelists tell you about it." The British have equally kind things to say about CIC, being frankly amazed that an organization only three years old can do such excellent work.

In the comparatively few cases which concern purely American military personnel, CIC is of course supreme. One disgruntled corporal, embittered because he thought he hadn't been promoted fast enough, decided to revenge himself by selling information to the enemy. Being in a certain secret department, he had something to sell, too.

"We got on his trail immediately," an agent on the case told me, " and instead of arresting him right away, we followed him for weeks, hoping he'd

lead us somewhere. But he couldn't find anybody to buy his information! Finally we saw neither he nor we were getting anywhere, and we picked him up."

There were a number of serious breaches of security by informed people who talked too much. More than one officer was reprimanded, demoted, and sent home for carelessly revealing information worth millions of dollars to the Germans. CIC managed to neutralize all such leaks.

There were other breath-taking slip-ups, although CIC retrieved all of them. One officer left a brief case of the most secret plans in a hotel cloakroom. Once a bundle of maps, showing the invasion beaches, fell off the rear of a speeding truck. (In North Africa, a CIC agent hunting down lost documents found an Arab street vendor innocently using them to wrap pecans.) A civilian electrician, fixing some wiring, accidentally happened to see a full map of the invasion scheme.

Yet the great secret was kept. Although all the world knew the blow was coming, although thousands in Britain knew exactly when and where, the Nazis were kept in the dark.

It is now definitely established that they were not certain until an excited German lieutenant, commanding some guns on a rocky islet just off the Norman coast, actually saw the invasion fleet looming up out of the morning mists of June 6. For this triumph, CIC can claim a good share of the credit.

Besides these major tasks, CIC has many side lines. It does a fairly thriving business rounding up phonies of one kind or another. Like the fake American sailor in London, blazing with ribbons, who was spotted because he creased his trousers in the front, instead of on the side.

Occasionally the Corps dabbles in censorship, usually only when regular censors find something suspicious. They've discovered messages in such crude invisible inks as lemon juice, aspirin, and a mixture of brandy and milk. They've found innocent-looking newspaper clippings with certain letters underlined by invisible ink or pinpricks.

CIC even takes a hand in civil affairs in front-line towns just captured. Combat troops are too busy fighting; civil affairs officers haven't yet arrived. Once CIC men were, by accident, the first American troops into a city of 40,000--Agrigento in Sicily. For five hours no other Allied soldiers were there, and the population was bent on loot and riot. The five agents managed to keep order, working with town officials and broadcasting assurances that everything was going to be all right...

Despite its striking success, CIC is by no means perfect. Like any other three-year-old, it has growing pains. Its own agents are the first to admit that it has not yet come up to the level of the much more experienced British counter-intelligence. For one thing, it still hasn't enough linguists. An agent may be perfect in all other respects, but almost entirely useless if he can't speak the language of the country he works in.

CIC has startlingly low rank, which is often a handicap. One outfit I know is commanded by a major; in almost any other branch of the service he would be a full colonel. Some agents have remained without promotion for as much as two years, which is not good for morale.

In the field, they are still occasionally cold-shouldered by some commander who doesn't know CIC's full function and capacities. Recently, in France, one group was deprived of all eight of its jeeps (thus slowing down its work to almost nil) by a high-ranking officer who thought CIC agents were merely a bunch of gumshoes. The CIC agent in charge couldn't argue much; he was only a sergeant.

But nothing is perfect in the Army, and CIC agents know it. Almost without exception, they would laugh at the idea of transferring to any other branch of service. For now they are having adventures that a few years ago would have seemed the wildest dreams of some novelist. They are on the inside of great happenings.

Many of them want to stay in CIC after the war. "Always assuming, though," as one of them told me, "that never again will the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army consist of only 20 men."

Appendix 4

T/O & E 30-500, 24 January 1944

Reproduced for historical purposes only; not to be extracted or used in any way as an authority.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No. 30-500

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 24 January 1944.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

SECTION I

ORGANIZATION

Designation: †_____Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
			Headquarters and administrative				Operations			
1	Unit	Specification serial No.	Headquarters and administrative team, type No. 1	Headquarters and administrative team, type No. 2	Headquarters and administrative team, type No. 3	Headquarters and administrative team, type No. 4	Operations team, type No. 1	Operations team, type No. 2	Operations team, type No. 3	Operations team, type No. 4
	Type		A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4
2	Lieutenant colonel	9325	-----	-----	1	1	-----	-----	-----	-----
3	Major	9325	-----	1	-----	•1	-----	-----	-----	-----
4	Captain	9325	1	-----	-----	▷1	-----	-----	1	2
5	First lieutenant	9325	-----	-----	1	•1	-----	1	1	2
6	Second lieutenant	9325	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	1	1	-----
7	Total commissioned	-----	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4
8	Master sergeant, including	-----	-----	-----	1	1	-----	-----	-----	1
9	Chief (special agent)	728	-----	-----	(1)	(1)	-----	-----	-----	-----
10	Section chief (special agent)	728	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	(1)
11	Technical sergeant, including	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1	2	3	4
12	Special agent	728	-----	-----	-----	-----	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
13	Staff sergeant, including	-----	-----	-----	1	2	1	3	4	4
14	Special agent	728	-----	-----	(1)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(4)	(4)
15	Sergeant, including	-----	-----	1	2	3	2	3	4	2
16	Agent	728	-----	-----	-----	-----	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)
17	Clerk	054	-----	(1)	(2)	(3)	-----	-----	-----	-----
18	Corporal, including	-----	1	2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	Clerk	054	(1)	(2)	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
19	Total enlisted	-----	1	3	4	6	4	8	11	11
20	Aggregate	-----	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15
21	O Carbine, cal. .30, M1	-----	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7
22	O Gun, submachine, cal. .45, Thompson	-----	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7
23	O Pistol, automatic, Colt, cal. .45, M1911 or M1911A1, w/holster	-----	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15
24	O Rifle, cal. .30, M1	-----	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7
25	O Trailer, ¼-ton, cargo	-----	1	1	2	3	1	3	4	4
26	O Truck, ¼-ton, 4 x 4	-----	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7

COLUMN II—REMARKS

† Insert number of detachment. • Executive officer. ▷ Liaison officer. ◦ May be designated as adjutant.

Counter Intelligence Corps detachments composed of a combination of 1 or more headquarters and administrative teams and 1 or more operations teams will provide Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to discharge the counterintelligence responsibility as prescribed by TM 30-215. Tables of Organization and Equipment will be composed of at least 1 headquarters and administrative team and 1 operations team, but the two kinds of teams are so designed that any combination will provide a well-balanced Counter Intelligence Corps detachment.

While a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment may, when authorized by the War Department, be made up of any combination of teams, standard detachments, as follows, will ordinarily meet the counter-intelligence responsibility indicated above:

1. A detachment composed of headquarters and administrative team, type No. 1 plus an operations team, type No. 1 for tactical units, ground or air, from 1,000 to 15,000 troops; for any army installation of a fixed nature exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over 1,000 to 5,000 civilians; or a small geographical territory requiring a small number of counterintelligence personnel.

2. A detachment composed of headquarters and administrative team, type No. 2 plus an operations team, type No. 2 for tactical units, ground or air, from 15,000 to 40,000 troops; an army installation of a fixed nature exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over 5,000 to 25,000 civilians; or a geographical territory more complex than indicated for type No. 1.

3. A detachment composed of headquarters and administrative team, type No. 3 plus an operations team, type No. 3 for a large tactical installation such as an Army headquarters, or Army Air Forces headquarters; or for complex fixed installations such as base commands, ports of embarkation or debarkation, frontier areas, etc.

4. A detachment composed of headquarters and administrative team, type No. 4 plus an operations team, type No. 4 will provide a staff for a headquarters exercising counterintelligence jurisdiction over a large geographical area such as a theater of operations; over a number of separate military units or installations; over a large civilian population; or where there is an important liaison responsibility with other headquarters or important civilian agencies.

Detachments organized under this table are not self-sufficient and will be attached to another unit for administration, mess and supply except technical supply.

For specification serial numbers shown in column 2, see AR 615-26; for officers, see TM 12-406.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

SECTION II

EQUIPMENT

GENERAL

1. This table is in accordance with AR 310-60, and it will be the authority for requisition in accordance with AR 35-6540, and for the issue of all items of equipment listed herein unless otherwise indicated, subject, however, to the provisions of AR 705-5, paragraph 5, section c, sub-section 2, which provides issues of equipment will be based on actual needs rather than authorized allowances. This table rescinds all Tables of Basic Allowances, Special List of Equipment, and Tables of Equipment heretofore published except the following: T/E 21, Clothing and Individual Equipment; Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps, file AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, 29 November 1943, as amended, so far as they pertain to the allowances of equipment for the organization and individuals covered by this table.

2. Items of clothing and individual equipment, components of sets and kits, spare parts, accessories, special equipment, including investigative equipment tools, and allowances for expendable items, are contained in the following publications:

Chemical Warfare Service.

Standard Nomenclature and Price List.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1, OC of CWS.

Corps of Engineers.

Supply Catalog, Parts 1, 2, and 3.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Series A.

Medical Department.

Medical Department Supply Catalog.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 26, SGO, WD.

Ordnance Department.

Standard Nomenclature Lists SNL, index to which is the Ordnance Publications for Supply Index (OPSI).

T/A for Cleaning, Preserving and Lubricating Materials, Recoil Fluids, Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue.

T/A 23, Targets and Target Equipment.

Quartermaster Corps.

Table of Clothing and Individual Equipment, T/E 21.

Allowances of Expendable Supplies, Circular No. 1-18, OQMG.

Components, Spare Parts, Accessories and Contents of Chests, Kits and Sets and Other Items of Quartermaster Property, Circular No. 4, OQMG.

AR 30-3010, Items and Price List of Regular Supplies Controlled by Budget Credits and Price List of other Miscellaneous Supplies.

Signal Corps.

Signal Corps Catalog (T/B Items).

Circular No. 10-1, OCSigO, Allowances of Spare Parts, Accessories, and Expendable Supplies.

Special Investigative Equipment and Supplies.

Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps, file AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDDL-M, 29 November 1943, as amended.

AR 310-200, Military Publications, Allowance and Distribution.

AR 775-10, Qualification in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

CHEMICAL

1	2								3
Item	Allowances								Basis of distribution and remarks
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Apparatus, decontaminating, 1½ quart, M2	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle.
Mask, gas, service	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Per indiv.
Respirator, dust, M-2, or equal	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	When required.

ENGINEER

Alidade, Boxwood, triangular, 8½".	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	When required.
Compass, lensatic, luminous dial, with case.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Do.
Glass, reading, 4½", with case.	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	Do.
Net, camouflage, twine, garnished with fabric, 22' x 22'.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when required.
Ruler, folding, 6', 12 folds	1	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	When required.

MEDICAL

Kit, first aid, motor vehicle	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle.

ORDNANCE

Weapons and miscellaneous

Bayonet, M 1910	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per rifle issued.
Binoculars, M3, with case, 6 x 30 or equal.	1	1	2	4	5	10	14	15	When required.
Carbine, Cal. .30, M-1	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per 2 indiv when required.
Gun, Sub-machine, Cal. .45 Thompson.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Pistol, Automatic, Colt, Cal. .45, Model 1911 or 1911A1, w/holster.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	1 per indiv when required.
Rifle, Cal. .30, M-1	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	In lieu of carbine as atzd.
Scabbard, bayonet, M3, Q & M 1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per bayonet issued.
Watch:									
Pocket, 15 jewel, or more	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	Per off.
Wrist, 7 jewel	1	3	4	6	4	8	11	11	Per EM.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

Vehicles

1	2								3
Item	Allowances								Basis of distribution and remarks
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Automobile, civilian type	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	As atzd by CG.
Trailer, ¼ Ton, Cargo	1	1	2	3	1	3	4	4	When required. As atzd by theater comdr or appropriate CG.
Truck, ¼ Ton, 4 x 4	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.

Motor transport equipment

Axe, handled, chopping, single bit, standard grade, 4 lbs.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when required.
Defroster and Deicer, electric, windshield.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Rope, tow, 1" diameter, 20' long.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.
Shovel, general purpose, D handled, strap back, round point, No. 2.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Do.

QUARTERMASTER

Axe, intrenching, M-1910 w/hdl.	---	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	As atzd.
Bucket, Canvas, folding, 10 qt. or equal.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when required.
Cabinet, file, steel, w/lock, if available, otherwise wood:									
4 drawers, 2 drawers high, 2 drawers wide, or equal.	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	When required.
4 drawers high, 1 drawer wide, lettersize or equal.	---	---	---	1	---	1	1	1	Do.
Can, water, 5 gallon	---	---	---	1	1	2	2	2	Do.
Carrier:									
Axe, intrenching, M-1910.	---	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1 per axe intrenching.
Cutter, wire, M-1938	---	---	---	---	1	1	1	1	Per cutter, wire.
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910.	1	1	2	4	2	4	5	6	1 per pick-mattock, intrenching.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per shovel, intrenching.
Case:									
Bag, carrying, ammunition.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per SMG.
Canvas, dispatch	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	1 per off.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

1	2								3
Item	Allowances								Basis of distribution and remarks
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Chair, folding, wood, or equal.	1	2	3	5	3	5	7	8	When required.
Cutter, wire, M-1938	---	---	---	---	1	1	1	1	Do.
Desk, field, empty, fiber, company.	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	Do.
Drum, inflammable liquid, gasoline, steel, w/carrying handle or equal.	2	4	6	10	4	10	14	14	2 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when required.
File, paper, clip, wood back, 9 x 12½".	1	2	3	5	3	5	7	8	When required.
Goggles:									
M-1942, complete or equal.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Do.
M-1943, with clear lens.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per mtr vehicle driver.
Lantern:									
Electric, portable hand.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	When required.
Gasoline, two mantle, commercial with pump.	1	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.
Locker, trunk, or equal	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	Do.
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910 w/handle.	1	1	2	4	2	4	5	6	As atzd.
Pocket:									
Double Web, magazine, E. M.	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	Per pistol, cal. .45.
Web, magazine, for Carbine Cal. .30 M-1.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	Per carbine, cal. .30 M-1.
Safe, field, key lock or equal.	1	1	1	2	---	---	---	---	As indicated.
Scabbard, gun, submachine.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per SMG.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910.	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	As atzd.
Stove, tent, M1941, c/w grate.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	Per tent issued.
Table, Camp, folding, or equal.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	When required.
Tent, command post, black out, c/w pins and poles.	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	3	Do.
Tube, flexible nozzle	1	2	3	5	2	5	7	7	1 per fuel consuming mtr vehicle when required.
Typewriter:									
Portable, w/carrying case.	1	1	2	3	2	3	5	5	
Standard, 11" carriage Underwood or equal, w/box.	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	
Whistle, thunderer	1	1	2	4	1	2	3	4	Per off when required.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT

SIGNAL

1	2								3
Item	Allowances								Basis of distribution and remarks
	A1	A2	A3	A4	B1	B2	B3	B4	
Flashlight, TL-122-A	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	As indicated.
Knife, TL-29	2	4	6	10	5	10	14	15	When required.
Pliers, TL-13	---	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.
Pouch, CS 34 or CS 35	---	1	2	3	1	3	4	5	Do.

[A. G. 320.3 (18 Jan 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

AGO 59

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1944

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[redacted]

Appendix 5

Projected Organization of CIC Detachments
Under T/O & E 30-500

(Attached to Copy 1 Only)

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENTS

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
1st				4	13	ETO	1st Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
2d				4	13	ETO	2d Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
3d				2	5	NATO	3d Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
4th				4	13	ETO	4th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
5th				4	13	ETO	5th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
6th	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	6th Inf Div		

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
7th				2	5	CPA	7th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
8th				4	13	ETO	8th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
9th				4	13	ETO	9th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
11th	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	11th Airborne Div		
24th	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	24th Inf Div		
25th	1	B1	7	1	4	SPA	25th Inf Div		
27th				2	5	CPA	27th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
28th				4	13	ETO	28th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
29th				4	13	ETO	29th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
30th				4	13	ETO	30th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
31st	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	31st Inf Div		
32d	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	32d Inf Div		
33d	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	33d Inf Div		
34th				2	5	NATO	34th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
35th				4	13	ETO	35th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
36th				2	5	NATO	36th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Comp: Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority for Contr Equip	Remarks
37th	1	B1	7	1	4	SWPA	37th Inf Div		
38th				2	5	CPA	38th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
40th	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	40th Inf Div		
41st	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	41st Inf Div		
43d	1	B3	9	3	11	SWPA	43d Inf Div		
45th				2	5	NATO	45th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
77th				2	5	CPA	77th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
79th				4	13	ETO	76th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
80th				4	13	ETO	80th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0838

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Comp: Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
81st				2	5	CPA	81st Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
82d				4	13	ETO	82d Airborne Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
83d				4	13	ETO	83d Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
85th				2	5	NATO	85th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
88th				2	5	NATO	88th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
90th				4	13	ETO	90th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0839

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
91st				2	5	NATO	91st Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
**93d	1	B1	7	1	4	SWPA	*93d Inf Div		*Negro EM personnel **Negro Offs & EM's
98th				2	5	CPA	98th Inf Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
101st				4	13	ETO	101st Airborne Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
182d	1	B1	7	1	4	SWPA	Americal Div		
201st				3	11	SWPA	I Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
202d				3	11	NATO	II Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
204th				3	11	NATO	IV Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0840

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Comp: Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
205th				5	14	ETO	V Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
206th				3	11	NATO	VI Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
207th				5	14	ETO	VII Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
208th				5	14	ETO	VIII Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
210th				3	11	SWPA	X Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
211th				3	11	SWPA	XI Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
212th				5	14	ETO	XII Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				

0841

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
213th				5	14	ETO	XIII Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
214th				3	11	SWPA	XIV Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
215th				5	14	ETO	XV Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
219th				5	14	ETO	XIX Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
220th				5	14	ETO	XX Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
224th				3	11	CPA	XXIV Corps		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
301st				6	15	ETO	First Army		
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				

0842

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets..	Comp: Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
303d				6	15	ETO	Third Army		
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
305th				10	31	NATO	Fifth Army	)	(Pers from Prov
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)			)	Dets:)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)			)	6792
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)			)	6793
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)			)	6794)
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)			)	
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)			)	
306th	1	A3	5	2	4	SWPA	Sixth Army		
307th				17	50	NATO	Seventh Army	)	
	3	A2	4	(3)	(9)			)	(Pers from Prov
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)			)	Dets:)
	3	B2	8	(6)	(24)			)	6795 6797
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)			)	6796 6798)
309th				5	15	ETO	Ninth Army		
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
310th				5	15	ETO	Tenth Army		Station, Ft Sam
	1	A3		(2)	(4)				Houston, Texas
	1	B3		(3)	(11)				

C0843

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp: Team Nr	Comp: Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
400th				17	55	USAFIME		A-2-d-1	
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	3	B3	9	(9)	(33)				
401st				25	70	CPA		A-1-b-3	(Hqs, CPA & Oahu)
	4	A1	3	(4)	(4)				
	3	A2	4	(3)	(9)				
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	4	B1	7	(4)	(16)				
	3	B2	8	(6)	(24)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
402d				5	15	CPA		A-1-b-3	(Hawaii Dist)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
403d				3	11	CPA		A-1-b-3	(Maui Dist)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
404th				3	11	CPA		A-1-b-3	(Kauai Dist)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0844

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets	Comp Team Nr	Comp Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
405th				11	25	CBI		A-1-b-4	(CIC Hqs)
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	2	B1	7	(2)	(8)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
406th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #1)
407th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #2)
408th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #3)
409th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #4)
410th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #5)
411th	1	B1	7	1	4	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Field Office #6)
412th				10	34	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Tactical Section #1)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	2	B1	7	(2)	(8)				
	2	B3	9	(6)	(22)				
413th				6	19	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Tactical Section #2)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
414th				2	5	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Tactical Sec #3)
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
415th				2	5	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Tactical Sec #4)
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
416th				2	5	CBI		A-1-b-4	(Tactical Sec #5)
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
417th				7	14	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Theater Hqs)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
418th				30	103	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Army Gp & AGF Res)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	8	B3	9	(24)	(88)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
419th				8	30	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Port)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				

159

0846

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets:	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Cont. Equip	Remarks
420th				8	30	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Port)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
421st				8	30	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Port)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
422d				8	30	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Port)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
423d				9	23	ETO		A-1-b-1	(Hq Brit Liaison Base Sect Hq)
	1	A2	3	(1)	(1)				
	2	B4	10	(8)	(22)				
424th				29	103	ETO		A-1-b-2	(Interior)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	7	B2	8	(14)	(56)				
	2	B3	9	(6)	(22)				
	2	B4	10	(8)	(22)				

0847

1	2		3	4		5	6	7	8
	a	b		a	b				
Designated: CIC Dets	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
425th				15	45	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Hq, Med Allied AF,
	3	A3	5	(6)	(12)				Pers from Prov CIC
	3	B3	9	(9)	(33)				Det):
									6770, 6771, 6772)
426th				17	51	NATO		A-1-b-2	(City Adm Sec, Rome.
	2	A1	3	(2)	(2)				Pers from Prov Dets):
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				6767
	2	A3	5	(4)	(8)				6768
	2	B1	7	(2)	(8)				6788
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				6789
	2	B3	9	(6)	(22)				6791)
427th				5	18	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Northern Base Sec.
	2	A2	4	(2)	(6)				Pers from Prov Dets):
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				6766
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				6769)
428th				15	48	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Allied Force Hqs.
	2	A2	4	(2)	(6)				Pers from Prov Dets):
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				6769
	5	B1	7	(5)	(20)				6761
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				6763)
429th				5	16	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Hq, Med Base Sec.
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				Pers from Prov Dets):
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				6782
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				6783)
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0848

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
430th				13	42	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Hq, Peninsular Base Sec. Pers from Prov Dets:
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				6784
	2	A2	4	(2)	(6)				6785
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				6786
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				6787)
	2	B2	8	(4)	(16)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
431st				3	11	NATO		A-1-b-2	(Hq, Allied Garrison, Sardinia. Pers from 6790 Prov Det)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
432d				3	11	USAFSA		A-2-d-2	
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
433d				8	17	SPA		A-1-b-3	(Theater Hq)
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
434th	1	B3	9	3	11	SPA		A-1-b-3	(I Island Cmmd)
435th	1	B1	7	1	4	SPA		A-1-b-3	(II Island Cmmd)
436th	1	B1	7	1	4	SPA		A-1-b-3	(III Island Cmmd)
437th	1	B2	8	2	8	SPA		A-1-b-3	(IV Island Cmmd)

0849

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
438th	1	B2	8	2	8	SPA		A-1-b-3	(V Island Cmmd)
439th	1	B1	7	1	4	SPA		A-1-b-3	(USAF & Service Cmmd)
440th	1	B1	7	1	4	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Island Cmmd, Formerly in SPA)
441st				8	17	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Theater Det)
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
442d				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Australia Area 1)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
443d				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Australia Area 2)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
444th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Australia Area 3)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
445th				5	15	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 1)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				

0850

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Comp Team Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	Auth Str EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
446th				5	15	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 2)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
447th				5	15	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 3)
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				
448th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 1, Area 4)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
449th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 1, Area 5)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
450th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 1, Area 6)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
451st				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 1, Area 7)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
452d				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 2, Area 8)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0851

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
453d				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 2, Area 9)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
454th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 2, Area 10)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
455th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 2, Area 11)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
456th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 3, Area 12)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
457th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 3, Area 13)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
458th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 3, Area 14)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
459th				3	11	SWPA		A-1-b-3	(Region 3, Area 15)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				

0852

1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O &E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
460th				2	5	BBC		A-2-d-9	(Activated, EDC. Assigned, BBC.)
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
461st	1	A4	6	2	6	IBC		A-2-d-4	(Hqs) Minus Capt & 1st Lt (Activated by ETO. Assigned, IBC.)
462d				1	11	IBC		A-2-d-4	(Port Control) Capt in lieu of Maj (Activated, ETO. Assigned, IBC.)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B2	8	-	(8)				
463d				2	30	IBC		A-2-d-4	(Reykjavik Def Area) B2 Team minus off B3 Teams minus Lts (Activated, ETO. Assigned, IBC.)
	1	B2	8	-	(8)				
	2	B3	9	(2)	(22)				
464th				1	23	IBC		A-2-d-4	(Akureyri - Seydisfjordur Def Area.) B1 & B2 Teams are minus offs. (Activated, ETO. Assigned, IBC.)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B1	7	-	(4)				
	2	B2	8	-	(16)				
465th				1	5	IBC		A-2-d-4	(Kajlavik Def Area) B1 Team minus off. (Activated, ETO. Assigned, IBC.)
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	-	(4)				

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1	2		3	4		5	6	7	8
	a	b		a	b				
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
466th	1	B1	7	-	2	EDC - NBC		A-2-d-8	Less: 1 2d Lt, 2 Sgts. (Activated, EDC. Assigned, NBC.)
467th				8	17	Alaskan Dept		A-1-b-6	
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
468th				8	17	PGC		A-1-b-5	
	1	A4	6	(4)	(6)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
469th				12	11	CDC		A-2-d-3	(Hq, CDC.)
	1	A4	6	(4)	-				Less enlisted men.
	1	B4	10	-	(11)				Less officers.
	2	B4	10	(8)	-				Less enlisted men.
470th				1	25	CDC		A-2-d-3	(Hqs, Panama Canal Dept.)
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	2	B4	10	-	(22)				Less officers.
471st				1	22	CDC		A-2-d-3	(Hqs, Antilles Dept.)
	1	A2	4	(1)	-				Less enlisted men.
	2	B4	10	-	(22)				Less officers.
472d				1	22	CDC		A-2-d-3	(Antilles Air Cmmd)
	1	A2	4	(1)	-				Less enlisted men.
	2	B4	10	-	(22)				Less officers.

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
501st				2	5	NATO	1st Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
502d				4	13	ETO	2d Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
503d				4	13	ETO	3d Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
504th				4	13	ETO	4th Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
505th				4	13	ETO	5th Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
506th				4	13	ETO	6th Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(				

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Co Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
507th				4	13	ETO	7th Armd Div		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	B1	7	(1)	(4)				
	1	B2	8	(2)	(8)				
							Attached to Headquarters Squadron		
606th				1	22	CDC	6th Air Force		Less enlisted men. Less officers.
	1	A2	4	(1)	-				
	2	B4	10	-	(22)				
607th				14	46	CPA	7th Air Force		
	1	A1	3	(1)	(1)				
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	A3	5	(2)	(4)				
	4	B1	7	(4)	(16)				
	2	B3	9	(6)	(22)				
608th				8	26	ETO	8th Air Force		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	3	B1	7	(3)	(12)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				

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1	2 a	2 b	3	4 a	4 b	5	6	7	8
Designated: CIC Dets.	Comp Team Nr	Type	Col in Org T/O & E 30-500	Auth Str Off	EM	Activated and Assigned	Hq Squad Attachment	Priority For Contr Equip	Remarks
609th				8	26	ETO	9th Air Force		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	3	B1	7	(3)	(12)				
	1	B4	10	(4)	(11)				
613th				4	14	SWPA	13th Air Force		
	1	A2	4	(1)	(3)				
	1	B3	9	(3)	(11)				

ABBREVIATIONS

ETO - European Theater of Operations
NATO - North African Theater of Operations
SWPA - Southwest Pacific Area
CPA - Central Pacific Area
SPA - South Pacific Area
USAFIME - United States Army Forces in the Middle East
CBI - China-Burma-India
USAFSA - United States Army Forces in the South Atlantic
BBC - Bermuda Base Command
IBC - Iceland Base Command
NBC - Newfoundland Base Command
PGC - Persian Gulf Command
CDC - Caribbean Defense Command
EDC - Eastern Defense Command

Inclosure 1, to letter, AG 322 (8 Jul 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M, 12 July 1944.

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Appendix 6

SLOE, 17 July 1943

(Attached to Copy 1 Only)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

AG 400 (16 Jul 43) OB-S-B-M CJM/hg-2B-939-Pentagon

17 July 1943

SUBJECT: Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps.

TO: Commanding General's,
Army Ground Forces;
Army Air Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area;
Commanding General's,
Theaters of Operations;
Defense Commands;
Hawaiian Department;
Service Commands;
Ports of Embarkation;
Separate Base Commands;
Commanding Officer's,
Ports of Embarkation;
Separate Base Commands;
Chiefs of Technical Services.

1. The equipment and supplies included in the inclosed Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps will be issued to Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments upon requisition. Requisition and issuance will be made in accordance with the basis of issue as stated in this Special List of Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps.

2. Equipment and supplies, other than Investigative Equipment and Supplies, for Counter Intelligence Corps Tactical Detachments will be furnished by the Chiefs of Technical Services upon requisitions by the Commanding Generals of the tactical units to which they are attached. Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments activated within the continental limits of the United States to be attached to tactical units already outside the continental limits of the United States will be issued equipment and supplies at the Port of Embarkation. A Counter Intelligence Corps Tactical

0859

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Detachment will be construed to be the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel authorized to be attached to a Division, Corps, Army, Theater Headquarters, Air Force, Air Transport Command Wing or any other tactical unit.

3. Equipment and supplies, other than Investigative Equipment and Supplies, for Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments attached to Service Commands, Defense Commands and Base Commands will be furnished by the Chiefs of Technical Services, upon requisition by the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands, Defense Commands and Base Commands to which they are attached.

4. Counter Intelligence Corps Investigative Equipment and Supplies for all Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments will be furnished by the Property Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot upon requisition.

5. Allowances of Quartermaster clothing and individual equipment are stated in Table of Equipment No. 21, War Department, 10 March 1943.

6. Components of sets and kits, spare parts and accessories and supplies will be issued in accordance with the following publications:

Chemical Warfare Service Nomenclature and Price List,
Corps of Engineer Supply Catalog, Parts 1 and 2,
Circular No. 8 SGO, Allowances of Expendable Supplies,
Ordnance Standard Nomenclature Lists,
Circular No. 1-18 OQMG, Allowances of Expandable Supplies and Bulletin No. 4 OQMG, Components, Spare Parts, Accessories and Contents of Chests, Kits, Sets and other items of Quartermaster Property,
Circular No. 10-1, OCSigO, Allowance of Spare Parts, Accessories and Expendable Supplies,
T/A Cleaning, Preserving and Lubricating Material, Recoil Fluids, Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue,
AR 775-10 Training Allowances of Ammunition.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ulio
J. A. ULIO
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

0860

1 Incl.
Cy Sp List of Equip.

COPIES FURNISHED:
Divisions of the War Department General Staff (2);
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF (5);
Director of Materiel, ASF (5);
Director, Requirements Division, ASF (5);
Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps (125);
Director, Planning Division, ASF (5);
Director, Mobilization Division, ASF (5).

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SPECIAL LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
FOR THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

SECTION I CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	ALLOWANCE.	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Apparatus, decontaminating, 1-1/2 quart, M-2	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle in tactical detachment.
Mask, gas, service	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment.
Respirator, dust, M-2 or equal	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment.

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SECTION II ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Alidade, Boxwood, triangular, 8-1/2".	2 each	Per tactical detachment.
Compass, Lensatic, Luminous dial, with case.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per ten (10) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Glass, reading, 4-1/2", with case.	1 each	Per tactical detachment.
Net, Camouflage, twine, garnished with fabric, 22' x 22'.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle. (To be issued in desert, summer, or winter color as authorized by T. of Opns. Commander.
Ruler, folding, 6', 12 folds.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per ten (10) individuals in non-tactical detachments.

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SECTION III MEDICAL CORPS EQUIPMENT

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Kit, first aid, motor vehicle, 24 units.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.

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SECTION IV. ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

Weapons and Miscellaneous

ITEMS	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Rifle, Ball.		Tactical detachments and all other detachments outside continental United States as authorized.
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Carbine.		Tactical detachments and all other detachments outside continental United States as authorized.
Ammunition, Cal. .45 Thompson Sub-machine Gun and pistol.		Tactical detachments and all other detachments outside continental United States as authorized.
Ammunition, Cal. .38 Special Revolver, Ball.		Tactical detachments and all other detachments outside continental United States as authorized.
Binocular, M3, w/case, 6 x 30 or equal.	1 pair	Per O in tactical detachment, per fifty (50) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Carbine, Cal. .30, M-1	1 each	Per three (3) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Gun, Sub-machine, Cal. 45 Thompson.	1 each	Per seven (7) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Pistol, Automatic, Colt, Cal. .45 Model 1911 or 1911 A1, w/holster.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment.
Watch, Pocket, 15 jewel, or more	1 each	Per O in tactical detachment.
Wrist, 7 jewel.	1 each	Per EM in tactical detachment.

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Vehicles

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Truck, 1/4 Ton, 4 x 4		Tactical detachments only: one (1) per Division; one (1) per Corps; two (2) per Army; one (1) per Air Force; one (1) per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in all other tactical detachments.
3/4 Ton, 4 x 4, Weapon Carrier, or equal.		Tactical detachments only; one (1) per Division; one (1) per Corps; four (4) per Army, two (2) per Air Force; one (1) per twelve (12) individuals in all other tactical detachments, or fraction thereof.
1-1/2 Ton, 6 x 6, Cargo, or equal.		Tactical detachments only: one (1) per Corps; two (2) per Army; one (1) per Air Force; one (1) per twenty (20) individuals in all other tactical detachments.

Motor Transport Equipment

Defroster and Deicer, electric, windshield.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle when authorized.
Gauge, tire, pressure, 10 to 160 pounds, general service type.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.
Rope, tow, 1" diameter, 20' long.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.
Tool set, c/w tools, pioneer equipment Motor Vehicle Set #1.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.
Tube, flexible nozzle.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.

0866

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SECTION V QUARTERMASTER EQUIPMENT

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Axe, intrenching, M-1910, w/hdl.	1 each	Per ten (10) EM or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Bucket, Canvas, folding, 10 quart or equal.	1 each	Per fuel consuming motor vehicle.
Cabinet, file, steel, w/lock, if available, otherwise wood, 4 drawers, 2 drawers high, 2 drawers wide, or equal.	1 each	Per tactical detachment.
Cabinet, file, steel, w/lock, if available, otherwise wood, 4 drawers high, 1 drawer wide, lettersize or equal.	1 each	Per forty (40) individuals in tactical detachments.
Can, water, 5 gallon.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Carrier:		
Axe, intrenching, M-1910.	1 each	Per axe, intrenching, M-1910.
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910.	1 each	Per pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910	1 each	Per shovel, intrenching, M-1910.
Cutter, wire, M-1938.	1 each	Per cutter, wire, M-1938.
Case:		
Canvas, dispatch.	1 each	Per three (3) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Web, for 30 rounds magazine Sub-machine gun.	1 each	Per Sub-machine gun.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Chair, folding, wood, or equal.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment.
Cutter, wire, M-1938.	1 each	Per tactical detachment.
Desk, field, empty, fiber, company.	1 each	Per six (6) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Drum, inflamable liquid, gasoline, steel, w/ carrying handle or equal.	2 each 2 each 4 each	Per 1/4 ton truck. Per 3/4 ton truck. Per 1-1/2 ton truck.
File, paper, clip, wood back, 9 x 12-1/2"	1 each	Per two (2) individuals in tactical detachments.
Goggles, M-1942, complete, or equal.	1 pair	Per individual in tactical detachment.
Lantern:		
Electric, portable, hand.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Gasoline, two mantle, commercial with pump.	1 each	Per three (3) individuals in tactical detachment.
Locker, trunk, or equal.	1 each	Per eight (8) individuals in tactical detachments or fraction thereof.
Machine, paper fastening, L or P type, wire staple, pre-formed, 1/4" x 1/2", or equal.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Pad, stamp, dry, 3-1/4 x 6-1/4".	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Perforator, paper, non-adjustable, 2 hole, 2-3/4" center to center, or equal.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Pick-mattock, intrenching, M-1910 w/handle.		Tactical detachments only: two (2) per Division; two (2) per Air Transport Command; three (3) per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in other tactical detachments.
Pocket:		
Double Web, magazine, E.M.	1 each	Per Pistol, Cal. .45.
Web, magazine, for Carbine, Cal. .30 M-1.	1 each	Per Carbine, Cal. .30 M-1.
Ruler, polished Maple, brass edge, 12", or equal.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Safe, field, key lock, or equal.	1 each	Per tactical detachment.
Shears, office, 9" overall, or equal.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Shovel, intrenching, M-1910.		Tactical detachments only: two (2) per Division; two (2) per Air Transport Command Wing; three (3) per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in all other tactical detachments.
Stamps, rubber:		
Secret	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Confidential	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Restricted	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Table, camp, folding, or equal.	1 each	Per six (6) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Tent, command post, black out, c/w pins and poles.	1 each	Per six (6) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Typewriter:		
Portable, w/carrying case.	1 each	Per three (3) individuals in tactical detachments; one (1) per twenty-five (25) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Standard, 11", carriage, Underwood or equal, w/box.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments.
Whistle, thunderer.	1 each	Per O and NCO in tactical detachment.

SECTION VI SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Flashlight, TL-122-A.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per ten (10) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Knife, TL-29.	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment.
Pliers, TL-13.	1 each	Per three (3) individuals in tactical detachments.
Pouch, CS 34 or CS 35.	1 each	Per three (3) individuals in tactical detachments.

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SECTION VII CIC INVESTIGATIVE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

(To be supplied by Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot as deemed applicable to investigative mission by the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps)

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Adapter, lens, 16mm, Cine Kodak for use with Anastigmat Telescopic Lens.	1 each	Per Camera, 16mm, Cine Kodak.
Adapter Ring, Bantam Kodak.	1 each	Per Camera, Bantam.
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Rifle, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Carbine, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .45, Ball, Sub-machine gun and pistol.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .38 Special, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Automobile, civilian type, sedan.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Battery, "A", f/Speak-O-Phone, 1-1/2V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery, "B", f/Speak-O-Phone, 45V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery, "C", f/Speak-O-Phone, 4-1/2V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery, Eveready 789, f/ Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint Camera.	2 each	Per Folmer-Graflex Camera.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Blackjacks	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per six (6) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Brush, Wire, f/Cal. .38 Revolver.	1 each	Per ramrod, Cal. .38.
Camera, Bantam Kodak, f/4.5.	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per twenty (20) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Camera, Bolsey, 16mm.	1 each	As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Camera, Cine Kodak, 16mm, Magazine type, f/1.9 lens, w/combination case.		Tactical detachments: 1 each per Corps, 2 each per Army, 1 per 25 individuals in all other detachments. In non-tactical detachments as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Camera, Folmer-Graflex, Fingerprint.	1 each	Per fifty (50) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per fifty (50) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Camera, Speedgraphic, PH-104, c/w case, tripod, and Synchronizer, filter, lens shade, etc.	1 each	Per twenty-five (25) individuals in tactical detachment. In non-tactical detachments as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Case, Carrying, f/Bantam Kodak.	1 each	Per Bantam Kodak issued.
Case, Carrying, f/Kodascope Projector.	1 each	Per Kodascope Projector.
Film, Bantam, Plus X, Tropical Pack.	24 rolls	Per Camera, Bantam.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Film, Bolsey, 16mm, Panatomic X, Tropical Pack.	2 mag.	Per Camera, Bolsey.
Film, Minox, 50 Weston, Tropical Pack, 2 cass. per pkg.	12 cass.	Per Camera, Minox.
Film, Speedgraphic, pack 4 x 5, Plus X, Tropical Pack.	24 packs	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Film, Speedgraphic, pack 4 x 5, Super XX, Tropical Pack.	24 packs	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Film, 16mm, Super X in Magazines, Tropical Pack, f/Cine Camera.	20 mag.	Per 16mm Camera, Cine.
Film, 16mm, Super XX in magazines, Tropical Pack, f/Cine Camera.	20 mag.	Per 16mm Camera, Cine.
Film, 35mm, Plus X, Tropical Pack.	24 rolls	Per photographic set, Lab. PH 261.
Film, 35mm, Super XX, Tropical Pack.	24 rolls	Per photographic set, Lab. PH 261.
Film, 2-1/4 x 3-1/4, Contrast, Tropical Pack, f/Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint camera.	6 packs	Per Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint Camera.
Film, Recording, Recordgraph, 50' Straight Loop.	50 rolls	Per Recordgraph.
Film, Recording, Recordgraph, 50' Reversible Loop.	50 rolls	Per Recordgraph.

0874

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Fingerprint-Taking Set, c/w Ink, slab, Card holder, tube of ink, roller.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per twenty-five individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Handcuffs.	1 pair	Per three (3) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Holster, hip, leather, for Colt, Cal. .38 Special Revolver, 2" bbl.	1 each	Per Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38 Special, 2" bbl.
Holster, hip, leather, for Colt, Cal. .38 Special Revolver, 4" bbl.	1 each	Per Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38 Special, 4" bbl.
Holster, shoulder, leather, for Colt, Cal. .38 Special Revolver, 4" bbl.	1 each	Per three (3) Revolvers, Cal. .38 Special, 4" bbl.
Iodine Fumer, (Component Parts): Calcium Chloride Flakes, 1 lb.	1 can	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.
Funnels, Glass, 40mm, short stem.	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.
Glass Wool, 1 oz. box.	1 box	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof.
Iodine Crystals, 1 oz. btl.	1 btl.	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof.
Stopper, rubber, 1 hole, size 3.	1 each	Per eight (8) individuals or fraction thereof.
Tube, glass, drying, CaCl, 200mm.	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Tubing, rubber, 3/16".	1 foot	Per eight (8) individuals or fraction thereof.
Kit, fingerprint, Latent, c/w four types fingerprint powder, magnifying glass, rubber lifter, camel's hair brush.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Lamp, Photoflash, (bulb), GE-22.	25 each	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Lamp, Photoflash, (bulb), GE-5, blue.	25 each	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Lamp, Photoflash, (bulb), GE-5, clear.	25 each	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Lamp, Projector, 750 Watt.	1 each	Per Projector, Kodascope, 16mm.
Lamp, Ultra-Violet, portable c/w Transformer, stand, reflector, BH-4 bulb, extension cord and carrying case.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per fifty (50) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Lamp, Ultra-Violet, GE, BH-4, bulb only.	1 each	Per Lamp, ultra-violet.
Lens, Portra, f/Bantam Camera.	1 each	Per Bantam Camera.
Lens, Telescopic, Anastigmat f/2.7 63mm or equal for 16mm Cine Camera.	1 each	Per Cine Camera, 16mm.
Lock-pick Sets, c/w case, 8 tools, 1 tension wrench.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Magnifier, glass, tripod, 25mm lens, f/studying fingerprints.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Microphone, Carbon, w/rubber shields and terminal wires.	1 each	Extra per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC or Battery type.
Microphone, Contact, w/ screw jacks terminal.	1 each	Extra per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC or Battery type.
Moulage, Positive, 5 lb. pkg.	1 pkg.	Per twenty-five (25) individuals or fraction thereof.
Moulage, Negative, 5 lb. jar.	1 jar	Per twenty-five (25) individuals or fraction thereof.
Needle, cutting, f/Speak-O-Phone Recorder	10 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.
Needle, playback, f/Speak-O-Phone Recorder, (100 per pkg.)	2 pkg.	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.
Needle, Cutting, f/Record-graph.	1 pair	As required.
Needle, Playback, f/Record-graph.	1 pair	As required.
Photographic Set, processing, PH-406.	1 each	Per tactical detachment. Per Defense Commands, Base Commands and Service Commands as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Photographic Set, PH-261, c/w camera, field laboratory for 35mm processing.	1 each	Per twenty-five (25) individuals in tactical detachments.

0877

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, black.	1 oz.	Per six (6) individuals, except for individuals of detachments assigned to Air Forces, Divisions, Army Corps and Air Transport Command Wing.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, brown.	1 oz.	Per six (6) individuals, except for individuals of detachments assigned to Air Forces, Divisions, Army Corps and Air Transport Command Wing.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, gray.	1 oz.	Per six (6) individuals, except for individuals of detachments assigned to Air Forces, Divisions, Army Corps and Air Transport Command Wing.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, white.	1 oz.	Per six (6) individuals, except for individuals of detachments assigned to Air Forces, Divisions, Army Corps and Air Transport Command Wing.
Projector, Kodascope, 16mm, (16-10) not sound equipped.	1 each	Per Cine Camera, 16mm.
Protractor, Semi-circular, Vinylite, 6".	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per ten (10) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Ramrod, Cal. .38.	1 each	Per Revolver, Cal. .38, Colt, 2" or 4" bbl.
Recorder, Speak-O-Phone, portable AC c/w lead-in jacks.	1 each	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC.
Recording Discs, Speak-O-Phone, Cardboard base.	50 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.
Recording Discs, Speak-O-Phone, Steel base.	25 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.

0878

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Recordgraph, portable, AC, "Commando" model, built in speaker, direct taps, conference microphone and accessories.	1 each	Per fifty (50) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38, Special, 2" bbl.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals.
Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38, Special, 4" bbl.	1 each	Per individual, except individuals furnished Revolvers, Colt, Cal. .38, 2" bbl.
Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, portable, AC-DC, c/w tubes, 2 carbon microphones, 1 contact microphone, 1 direct tap, 1 induction coil, 2-50' lengths twisted pair wire.	1 each	Per twenty (20) individuals in Defense Commands, Base Commands, and Service Commands; to tactical Detachments as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, portable, battery operated c/w tubes, batteries, 2 pair earphones, 1 contact microphone, 1 induction coil, 1 direct tap.	1 each	Per twenty (20) individuals or fraction thereof in Corps and Army detachments; all other as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Tape, Scotch, transparent, fingerprint lifting.	1 roll	Per tactical detachment, per thirty (30) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Telephone Hand test set, (both letters and numbers) with mouthpiece and receiver.	1 each	Per twenty (20) individuals or fraction thereof in Corps and Army detachments; all others as authorized by Chief, CIC.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, N5G.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, G6G.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.

0879

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 123J7/GT.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 14-F-7.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 35L6/GT/G.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 1LB4G.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 35Z5(GTG)	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 123J7/GT	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 35/25/GT/G.	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Recordgraph set of 1 each of the following: 6F5; 6SF5; 6L7; 6N6G; 5W4; 6H6; 7F7; 20-50.	1 set	Per Recordgraph.
Wire, copper, #30, white cotton insulation, 1/2 lb. spool.	1 spool	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone.
Wire, copper, #30, black cotton insulation, 1/2 lb. spool.	1 spool	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone.
Wire, Telephone, twisted pair, #14.	500 feet	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone.

Basis of Issue for Expendable Supplies in Section VII is per year.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 7

SLOE, 29 November 1943

(Attached to Copy 1 Only)

CONFIDENTIAL

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D.C.

AG 400 (27 Nov 43)OB-S-SPDDL-M KIS/sr-2B-939 Pentagon.

29 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps.

TO: The Commanding Generals,
Army Air Forces;
Army Ground Forces;
Army Service Forces;
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area;
The Commanding Generals,
Theaters of Operations;
Defense Commands;
Alaskan Department;
Service Commands;
Ports of Embarkation;
Separate Base Commands;
The Commanding Officers,
Ports of Embarkation;
Separate Base Commands;
Chiefs of Technical Services.

1. Inclosed for your information and guidance is copy of Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps which supersedes and rescinds letter, AG 400 (16 Jul 43)OB-S-B-M, 17 July 1943, subject: Special List of Equipment and Supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps.

2. The investigative equipment and supplies included in the inclosed Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps will be issued to Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments from the Counter Intelligence Corps Supply Depot, 2327 North Charles Street, Baltimore 18, Maryland. An initial issue of investigative equipment and supplies included in the inclosed list will be made to each CIC Detachment without requisition. Amounts and types of investigative equipment and supplies issued initially will be determined by the Chief, CIC, on the basis as set forth in this list.

3. Additional items of non-expendable investigative equipment over and above initial issue will be supplied by the Property Officer, CIC Supply Depot, on requisition from CIC Detachment Commanders, providing a sufficient investigative

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need for such issue is shown. Expendable supplies will be requisitioned by CIC Detachment Commanders on a quarterly basis. Requisitions will be submitted to the Property Officer, CIC Supply Depot, in triplicate, on W.D., Q.M.C. Form No. 400, if available, and should be forwarded through G-2 Channels.

4. Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Commanders in non-tactical units issued investigative equipment and supplies under the provisions of this list are hereby directed to assume property accountability for same under existing Army Regulations. Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Commanders in tactical units where property accountability does not apply are directed to assume property responsibility for same under the provisions of War Department Circular 170, 24 July 1943.

5. Components of sets and kits, spare parts and accessories and supplies will be issued in accordance with the following publications:

Circular No. 10-1, OCSigO, Allowance of Spare Parts, Accessories and Expendable Supplies,
T/A Cleaning, Preserving and Lubricating Material, Recoil Fluids, Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue,
AR 775-10 Training Allowances of Ammunition.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ulio,
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Cy. Sp List of
Investigative
Equipment.

COPIES FURNISHED:
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Att: G-4, Maj. Elliot and Major Hanson, Rm. 33, Army War College (5)
Divisions of the War Department General Staff (2 each)
Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps (300)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Boston Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Charleston Port of Embarkation (2)

COPIES FURNISHED: (Continued)

Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, New Orleans Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Los Angeles Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Seattle Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Baltimore Cargo Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, Philadelphia Cargo Port of Embarkation (2)
Officer in Charge Overseas Supply Division, San Francisco Port of Embarkation (2)
Chief, New York Field Branch, Stock Control Division, A.S.F., (Att: Col. Malcolm Byrne) (2)
Chief, San Francisco Field Branch, Stock Control Division, ASF, (Att: Col. T. G. Jenkins) (2)
Chief, Hampton Roads Field Branch, Stock Control Division, ASF, (Att: Lt. Col. F. W. Walker) (2)
Chief, Seattle Field Branch, Stock Control Division, ASF, (Att: Lt. Col. Walter M. Porosky) (2)
Chief, New Orleans Field Branch, Stock Control Division, ASF, (Att: Lt. Col. G. McCormick) (2)
Chief, Atlanta Field Branch, Stock Control Division, ASF, (Att: Col. McFarland Cockrill) (2)
Chief, Tank-Automotive Center, Supply Branch, Union Guardian Building, Detroit, Michigan (3)
Chief of Transportation (Att: Major Heidorn, Rm. 3C653) (1)
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF, Liaison Branch (6)
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF (5)
Director of Materiel, ASF (5)
Director, Requirements Division, ASF (5)
Director, Planning Division, ASF (5)
Director, Mobilization Division, ASF (5)
Director, Mobilization Division, ASF, Troop Units Branch (1)
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF, Ord. (Lt. Col. Wood) (1)
Director, Stock Control Division, ASF, Ord. (Major Barnes) (1)

SPECIAL LIST OF INVESTIGATIVE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
for the Counter Intelligence Corps

ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Adapter, lens, 16mm, Cine Kodak for use with Anastigmat Telescopic Lens	1 each	As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Adapter Ring, Bantam, Kodak	1 each	Per Camera, Bantam.
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Rifle, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .30 Carbine, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .45, Ball, Sub-machine gun and pistol.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Ammunition, Cal. .38 Special, Ball.		Non-tactical detachments within continental limits of United States in accordance with AR 775-10.
Automobile, civilian type, sedan.		As authorized by Chief, CIC, in non-tactical detachments.
Battery "A", f/Speak-O-Phone, 1-1/2V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery "B", f/Speak-O-Phone, 45V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery "C", f/Speak-O-Phone, 4-1/2V.	2 each	Per Speak-O-Phone, Battery operated.
Battery, Eveready 789, f/Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint Camera.	2 each	Per Folmer-Graflex Camera.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Blackjacks	1 each.	Per individual in tactical detachment, per six (6) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Camera, Bantam Kodak, f/4.5	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per twenty (20) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Camera, Victory, 16mm.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Camera, Cine Kodak, 16mm, Magazine type, f/1.9 lens, w/combination case.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Camera, Folmer-Graflex, Fingerprint.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Camera, Speedgraphic, PH-104, c/w case, tripod, Synchronizer, filter, lens shade, etc.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Case, Carrying, f/Bantam Kodak.	1 each	Per Bantam Kodak issued.
Case, carrying, f/Kodascope Projector.	1 each	Per Kodascope Projector.
Film, Bantam, Plux X, Tropical Pack	48 rolls	Per Camera, Bantam
Film, 16mm, Panatomic X, Tropical Pack, f/Victory Camera.	2 mag.	Per Camera, Victory.
Film, Minox, 50 Weston, Tropical Pack, 2 cass. per pkg.	12 cass.	Per Camera, Minox.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Film, Speedgraphic, pack 4 x 5, Plux X, Tropical Pack.	48 packs	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Film, Speedgraphic, Cut, Infra Red.	6 boxes	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Film, 16mm, Super X in Magazines, Tropical Pack, f/Cine Camera.	20 mag.	Per 16mm Camera, Cine.
Film, 16mm, Super XX in Magazines, Tropical Pack, f/Cine Camera.	20 mag.	Per 16mm Camera, Cine.
Film, 2 1/4 x 3 1/4, Contrast, Tropical Pack, f/Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint camera.	6 packs	Per Folmer-Graflex Fingerprint Camera.
Film, Recording, Recordgraph, 50' Straight Loop.	50 rolls	Per Recordgraph.
Film, Recording, Recordgraph, 50' Reversible Loop.	50 rolls	Per Recordgraph.
Fingerprint-Taking Set, c/w Ink, slab, Card holder, tube of ink, roller.	1 each	Per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per twenty-five individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Handcuffs.	1 pair	Per three (3) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Holster, hip, leather, for Colt, Cal. .38 Special Revolver, 2" bbl.	1 each	Per Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38, Special, 2" bbl.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Holster, shoulder, leather, for Colt, Cal. .38 Special Revolver 4" bbl.	1 each	Per three (3) Revolvers, Cal. .38 Special, 4" bbl.
Iodine Fumer, (Component Parts): Calcium Chloride Flakes, 1 lb.	1 can	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.
Funnels, Glass, 40mm, short stem.	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.
Glass Wool, 1 oz. box.	1 box	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof.
Iodine Crystals, 1 oz. btl.	1 btl.	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof.
Stopper, rubber, 1 hole, size 3.	1 each	Per eight (8) individuals or fraction thereof.
Tube, glass, drying, CaCl, 200mm.	1 each	Per four (4) individuals or fraction thereof.
Tubing, rubber, 3/16".	1 foot	Per eight (8) individuals or fraction thereof.
Kit, fingerprint, Latent, c/w four types fingerprint powder, magnifying glass, rubber lifter, camel's hair brush.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Lamp, Photoflash, (bulb), GE-22.	25 each	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Lamp, Photoflash, (bulb), GE-5R, Infra Red.	12 each	Per Camera, Speedgraphic.
Lamp, Projector, 750 Watt.	1 each	Per Projector, Kodascope, 16mm.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Lamp, Ultra-Violet, portable c/w Transformer, stand, reflector, BH-4 bulb, extension cord and carrying case.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Lamp, Ultra-Violet, GE, BH-4, bulb only.	1 each	Per Lamp, ultra-violet.
Lens, Portra, f/Bantam Camera.	1 each	Per Camera, Bantam.
Lens, Telescopic, Anastigmat f/2.7 63mm or equal for 16mm Cine camera.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Lock-pick Set, c/w case, 8 tools, 1 tension wrench.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Magnifier, glass, tripod, 25mm lens, f/studying fingerprints.	1 each	Per five (5) individuals or fraction thereof in tactical detachments, per ten (10) individuals or fraction thereof in non-tactical detachments.
Microphone, Carbon, w/ rubber shields and terminal wires.	1 each	Extra per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC or Battery Type.
Microphone, Contact, w/ screw jacks terminal.	1 each	Extra per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC or Battery type.
Moulage, Positive, 5 lb. pkg.	1 pkg.	As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Moulage, Negative, 5 lb. jar.	1 jar	As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Needle, cutting, f/Speak-O-Phone Recorder.	10 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Needle, playback, f/Speak-O-Phone Recorder, (100 per pkg)	2 pkg.	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.
Needle, cutting, f/Record-graph.	1 pair	As required.
Needle, Playback, f/Record-graph.	1 pair	As required.
Photographic Set, Processing, PH-406.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, black.	1 oz.	As required.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, brown.	1 oz.	As required.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, grey.	1 oz.	As required.
Powder, Latent, fingerprint, white.	1 oz.	As required.
Projector, Kodascope, 16mm, (16-10) not sound equipped.	1 each	Per Cine Camera, 16mm.
Protractor, Semi-circular, Vinylite, 6".	1 each	Per individual in tactical detachment, per ten (10) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Recorder, Speak-O-Phone, portable AC c/w lead-in jacks.	1 each	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, AC-DC.
Recording Discs, Speak-O-Phone, Cardboard base.	50 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.
Recording Discs, Speak-O-Phone, Steel base.	50 each	Per Recorder, Speak-O-Phone.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Recordgraph, portable, AC, "Commando" model, built in speaker, direct taps, conference microphone and accessories.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38, Special, 2" bbl.	1 each	Per individual except those issued 4" bbl. revolver.
Revolver, Colt, Cal. .38, Special, 4" bbl.	1 each	Per individual except those issued 2" bbl. revolver.
Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, portable, AC-DC, c/w tubes, 2 carbon microphones, 1 contact microphone, 1 direct tap, 1 induction coil, 2-50' lengths twisted pair wire.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone, portable, battery operated, c/w tubes, batteries, 2 pair earphones, 2 carbon microphones, 1 contact microphone, 1 induction coil, 1 direct tap.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Tape, Scotch, transparent, fingerprint lifting.	1 roll	Per tactical detachment, per thirty (30) individuals in non-tactical detachments.
Telephone Hand test set, (both letters and numbers) with mouthpiece and receiver.		As authorized by Chief, CIC.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, N5G	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, G6G	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.

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ITEM	ALLOWANCE	BASIS OF ISSUE AND REMARKS
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 123J7/GT	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 14-F-7	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 35L6/GT/G	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, 1LB4G	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 35Z5(GTG)	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 123J7/GT	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Speak-O-Phone, Recorder, 35/25/GT/G	1 each	Per Speak-O-Phone Recorder.
Tube, Vacuum, Recordgraph set of 1 each of the following: 6F5; 6SF5; 6L7; 6N6G; 5W4; 6H6; 7F7; 20-50.	1 set	Per Recordgraph.
Wire, copper, #30, white cotton insulation, 1/2 lb. spool.	1 spool	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone.
Wire, Telephone, twisted pair #14.	500 feet	Per Sound Detector, Speak-O-Phone.

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Appendix 8

CIC Officers at Headquarters Baltimore
in the Service & Defense Commands

CIC Officers at Headquarters Baltimore,
In the Service & Defense Commands

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Kibler, H.R.	Col.	1/22/43	Res.	4/11/96	O of C	Chief, CIC	
*Karp, W.A.	Lt. Col.	11/8/41	Res.	5/18/95	2 S C		
Parsons, W.B.	Lt. Col.	10/13/42	Res.	1/3/04	CIC Sch	Commandant	
Pierce, Ralph W.	Lt. Col.	12/17/42	Res.	7/28/94	8 S C		
Rew, E. A.	Lt. Col.	2/25/43	Res.	4/5/05	CDC	Chief, CIC Det	
Wise, H.D. Jr.	Lt. Col.	5/15/43	Res.	1/27/12	O of C	Asst. Chief CIC	
Adkinson, N.K.	Lt. Col.	7/17/43	Res.	3/14/10	O of C	Control Officer CIC Staging Area	
Brown, S.D.	Lt. Col.	8/13/43	Res.	7/11/95	1 S C		
Starr, G.J.	Major	8/12/29	Res.	5/8/90	EDC		
Michelman, O.C.	Major	10/16/41	Res.	8/7/00	7 S C		
Conrad, H.C.	Major	6/24/42	Res.	4/20/05	WDC		
Walker, T.J.	Major	7/2/42	Res.	9/22/04	CIC Sch	Executive Officer	
Luna, Hayes O.	Major	7/17/42	Res.	2/16/07	8 S C		
Schrantz, G.N.	Major	8/11/42	Res.	8/17/03	7 S C		

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Sullivan, W.A.	Major	8/13/42	Res.		2 S C		
Gillette, K.M.	Major	8/30/42	Res.	5/14/10	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Curtiss, R.B.	Major	10/29/42	Res.	1/25/06	3 S C	C.O. CIC Det	
Bradford, I.J.	Major	11/4/42	Res.	1/17/14	O of C	Liaison Officer	
Newburger, S.	Major	12/16/42	Res.	2/25/05	8 S C		
Witt, W. H.	Major	12/22/42	Res.	7/20/09	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Staudt, G.L.	Major	1/16/43	Res.	5/28/12	O of C	Training Officer	
Sobel, H.	Major	1/23/43	Res.	12/28/89	5 S C		
Candler, A.W.	Major	2/16/43	Res.	8/30/14	4 S C		
Hearn, N.J.	Major	4/3/43	Res.	5/19/13	WDC		
Holsinger, H.W.	Major	4/3/43	Res.	2/20/00	CIC Sch	Faculty	
*King, B.J.	Major	4/3/43	Res.	10/30/91	2 S C		
*Lake, D.W.	Major	4/3/43	Res.	4/2/93	2 S C		
*Salz, L.C.	Major	4/3/43	Res.	10/26/94	2 S C		
Hurst, P.A.	Major	6/7/43	Res.	2/11/05	5 S C		

*Second Service Command requested that these officers be relieved from CIC and assigned to 2nd S.C.

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Foothorap, J.F.	Major	7/30/43	Res.	9/28/10	O of C	Personnel Officer	
Turner, C.	Major	8/9/43	Res.	12/19/06	7 S C	Exec Off I.D.	
Fuller, J.R.	Major		Res.		4 S C		
Jackson, V.O.	Major		Res.	5/26/01	CDC		
Krings, L.W.	Captain	3/20/40	Res.	9/5/04	8 S C	Asst Ch Fiscal Br	
Jones, H.L.	Captain	2/1/42	Res.	5/24/03	O of C	Staging Area	
Turner, E.D. Jr.	Captain	2/1/42	Res.	11/15/15	Ant.	C.O.-CIC Det	
Boule, L.L.	Captain	3/7/42	Res.	9/4/93	5 S C		
Murray, W.B.	Captain	6/13/42			CIC Sch	Faculty	
Larios, E.E.	Captain	6/24/42		11/26/98	WDC	Asst Off Seattle Br	
Straiton, K.E.	Captain	7/8/42	Res.	12/29/06	6 S C	Operations-I.D.	
Hill, L.C.	Captain	9/5/42	Res.	2/21/13	6 S C		
Petty, F.D.	Captain	11/4/42	N.G.		CIC Sch	Faculty	
*Henderson, S.L.	Captain	12/3/42	Res.	7/23/01	2 S C	C.O., CIC Off #5	
Cole, F.K.	Captain	12/5/42	Res.	12/4/13	O of C	Staging Area	

*Second Service Command requested that Captain Henderson be relieved from CIC and assigned to 2nd S.C.

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Lamet, L.L.	Captain	1/2/43	Res.	11/22/05	O of C	Staging Area	
Petru, F.L.	Captain	1/2/43	Res.	8/12/07	6 S C		
Stout, R.M.	Captain	1/23/43			CIC Sch	Faculty	
Thompson, G.C.	Captain	1/23/43	Res.		CIC Sch	Faculty	
Hart, Paul M.	Captain	2/2/43	Res.	2/6/01	8 S C		
Orth, C.E. Jr.	Captain	2/6/43	Res.	9/9/13	3 S C	Personnel Off	
Hartman, W.C.	Captain	2/16/43	Res.	3/17/15	4 S C		
Coleman, C.N.	Captain	3/3/43	N.G.	10/5/12	CDC	Ch CIC, PCD	
Bennett, Edwin	Captain	4/1/43	Res.	8/14/12	O of C	Supply Off	
Ewing, S.E. Jr.	Captain	4/3/43	AUS-C	7/27/06	O of C	Operations Off	
Gagan, T.A.	Captain	4/3/43	AUS-C	4/30/14	O of C	Actg Pers Off	
Wood, H.G.	Captain	4/3/43	Res.	7/27/10	3 S C		
Huyler, C.D.	Captain	4/18/43	AUS-C	10/9/11	5 S C	5 S C	
Smith, F.J.	Captain	4/18/43	AUS-C	5/16/07	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Velez, P.M.	Captain	5/13/43	Res.	4/28/18	CDC	Asst Sup Det	
Gelwicks, H.G.	Captain	5/20/43	Res.	2/12/10	O of C	En Route Sch	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Geiss, E.P.	Captain	6/5/43	Res.	6/7/17	8 S C		
Belshaw, M.E.	Captain	6/7/43	Res.	6/4/05	5 S C		
McInerney, M.F.	Captain	6/23/43	AUS-C	8/25/07	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Booth, J.W.	Captain	6/24/43	AUS-C	10/12/13	1 S C		
Heegaard-Jensen	Captain	7/20/43	AUS-C	2/2/15	O of C	En Route-NATO	
Bennett, R.O.	Captain	7/23/43	Res.	7/11/15	6 S C		
Britt, A.E.	Captain	7/23/43	AUS-C	3/2/15	7 S C	C.O. CIC Det	
Case, J.P.	Captain	7/23/43	AUS-C	3/15/08	4 S C		
Hardin, F.	Captain	7/23/43	Res.	12/26/17	3 S C		
Harless, R.W.	Captain	7/23/43	AUS-C	4/16/15	8 S C	Asst Ch OIB	
Kolb, L.J.	Captain	7/23/43	AUS-C	9/9/14	4 S C	Personnel Off	
Noyes, G.M.	Captain	7/23/43	Res.	8/14/11	7 S C		
Stacy, J.T.	Captain	7/23/43	AUS	6/14/09	5 S C	Ch Dist Off	
Sims, R.	Captain	7/30/43	AUS-C	8/5/18	O of C	C.O. Staging Area	
Allan, G.H.	Captain		Res.	4/9/01	8 S C		

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Allen, C.W.	Captain		Res.	10/4/02	CIC Sch	Faculty	
DeLoach, J.B.	Captain		Res.	1/31/11	4 S C		
Gordon, J.F.	Captain		Res.	5/9/05	WDC		
Hutchinson, H.K.	Captain			12/26/12	WDC		
Sweeney, T.P.	Captain			2/8/94	8 S C		
Banta, G. Jr.	1st Lt.	2/1/42	Res.	11/07/02	CDC	Ch-Training Sch	
Seras, V.	1st Lt.	2/1/42	Res.	9/17/15	CDC	Exec Off Ant Dept	
Peters, A.K.	1st Lt.	5/25/42	Res.	10/17/19	2 S C	Sup Spec Invest	
Reed, F.J. Jr.	1st Lt.	5/25/42	AUS	6/8/11	O of C	Asst Operat Off	
Carey, T.J.	1st Lt.	5/26/42	AUS	8/11/08	CDC	Actg C.O. Det PCD	
Beatty, W.H.	1st Lt.	7/2/42	AUS-C	2/4/19	O of C	Stage	
Baynard, J.P.	1st Lt.	8/13/42	Res.	6/30/09	O of C	Special Assgn	
Lantz, C.T.	1st Lt.	10/1/42	Res.	10/8/17	8 S C	En Route - Stage	
Marynowski, S.W.	1st Lt.	10/12/42	Res.	3/11/11	6 S C	Asst Det C.O.	
Brown, D. R.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	AUS-C	6/7/11	O of C	Staging Area	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Hale, K.B.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	Res.	5/18/20	O of C	Staging Area	
Skinker, D.C.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	AUS-C	9/5/15	O of C	Asst Oper Off	
Ault, D.J.	1st Lt.	11/18/42	AUS-C	3/14/09	O of C	Asst Oper Off	
Cheyne, L.J.	1st Lt.	12/1/42 (approx)	AUS	2/8/00	1 S C		
Hutchinson, J.K.	1st Lt.	12/5/42	AUS-C	9/20/15	5 S C	En Route Stage	
Berlitz, C.F.	1st Lt.	12/7/42	AUS	11/22/13	CDC		
Schutze, W.A.	1st Lt.	12/12/42		2/15/07	8 S C		
Jones, T.O.	1st Lt.	12/17/42	AUS-C	9/6/16	6 S C	Ch Invest Sub-sec	
Doyle, R.H.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	8/5/10	2 S C	Ex Off Field Off #1	
Grieve, W.G.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	7/16/13	2 S C	Ch, Disaffection Off #1	
Keenan, A.J.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	4/15/13	2 S C		
Matthews, D.M.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	1/12/11	2 S C	Sup Pers Sec Off #1	
Curran, J.M.	1st Lt.	1/19/43	AUS	11/11/08	7 S C		
Lobb, A.	1st Lt.	1/28/43	Res.	6/22/09	O of C	Staging Area	
Shoals, G.R.	1st Lt.	1/?/43	Res.	9/8/03	2 S C		

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0500

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Frutchey, R.W.	1st Lt.	2/6/43	Res.	2/13/99	3 S C		
Dickey, D.B.	1st Lt.	2/9/43	AUS-C	12/2/10	8 S C	Asst Chief CIB	
Wallace, W.H. Jr.	1st Lt.	2/9/43	AUS-C	12/23/17	8 S C	Asst Chief CIB	
Sutton, H.A.	1st Lt.	2/17/43	AUS-C	5/17/19	7 S C	En Route Stage	
Foster, R. McK.	1st Lt.	2/19/43	Res.	1/13/22	CDC		
Smith, Edwin B.	1st Lt.	3/10/43	AUS	3/11/19	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Gray, Arthur P.	1st Lt.	4/3/43	AUS-C	10/2/14	3 S C		
Howell, J.F.	1st Lt.	4/3/43	AUS-C	3/26/14	3 S C		
Hinds, Colin C.	1st Lt.	4/25/43	AUS	7/10/20	CDC		
Klubertanz, A.J.	1st Lt.	5/13/43	AUS	9/12/94	1 S C		
Lord, Donald S.	1st Lt.	5/13/43	AUS-C	9/22/14	O of C Sch	Faculty	
Pennewell, N.A.	1st Lt.	5/13/43	AUS-C	12/25/07	O of C Sch	Faculty	
Dreshler, H.F.	1st Lt.	5/14/43	AUS-C	7/22/14	O of C	Asst Supply Off	
Young, George D.	1st Lt.	6/7/43	AUS-C	8/26/15	5 S C		
Viney, William E.	1st Lt.	6/14/43	AUS-C	7/14/16	O of C	Special	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Bates, Vernon B.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	11/28/07	6 S C	Asst Off Field Unit	
Cox, Carroll T.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	12/19/12	O of C	Asst Supply Off	
Donovan, John M.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	2/18/14	O of C	Staging Area	
Gallagher, G.R.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	4/10/15	O of C	Asst Oper Off	
Gaughran, Paul F.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	5/20/15	1 S C	Asst Eval Off	
Harris, John D.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS	3/16/11	8 S C	Asst Dist Intel Off	
Horton, D.W.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS	5/12/06	WDC		
Hurley, J.P.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	7/25/11	6 S C	Personnel Sec	
Muir, Tom L.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	2/5/18	8 S C	Asst Ch Intel Br	
Murphy, M.P.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	7/7/12	O of C	Staging Area	
Kirkbride, M.C.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	9/18/09	O of C	Asst Oper Off	
Sexton, W.J.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	9/26/13	O of C	Asst Personnel Off	
Simmons, L.J.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	3/24/10	O of C	Asst Personnel Off	
Snyder, R.A.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	3/4/12	O of C	Asst Liaison Off	
Steptoe, T.W.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	3/23/14	O of C	Asst Personnel Off	

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0502

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Turechek, C.S.	1st Lt.	6/28/43	AUS-C	9/25/14	O of C	Asst Adm Off	
Shapiro, P.F.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	2/23/15	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Tynes, S.B.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	4/11/10	4 S C	C.O., School	
Uanna, W.L.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	5/13/09	CIC Sch	Faculty	
Hancock, H.H.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	7/16/12	7 S C		
Hill, R.A.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	6/18/00	O of C	Staff-Stage	
Nichols, R.H.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	11/4/11	O of C	Staging Area	
Salevouris, E.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	2/19/14	7 S C		
Ward, P.F.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	9/13/15	5 S C		
Bacon, W.E.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	4/30/15	WDC	Juneau Of ADC	
Ciesielski, S.A.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	5/30/10	3 S C	Richmond Off	
Cobean, R.L.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	4/22/14	WDC	San Franc Off	
Curtis, M.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	11/11/05	O of C	Admin Off	
Klein, E.A.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	8/2/18	3 S C	Harrisburg Off	
Murray, J.S.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	6/16/16	WDC	Special Assg	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Musick, J.W.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	1/13/14	3 S C		
Jacobi, W.F.	2nd Lt.	9/1/42	AUS-C	7/9/09	O of C	Staff-Stage	
Clark, C.L.	2nd Lt.	11/11/42	AUS-C	9/14/12	8 S C		
Brown, A.F.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	AUS-C	2/4/15	3 S C		
Rhodes, F.B. Jr.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	AUS-C	12/17/13	3 S C		
Steinway, C.F.G.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	AUS-C	4/7/14	O of C	Temp Duty	
Hemingway, J.H.	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	AUS-C	7/11/14	2 S C		
McKenna, John P.	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	AUS-C	2/4/08	O of C	Staging Area	
O'Connell, J.J. Jr.	2nd Lt.	12/7/42	AUS-C	1/16/16	4 S C		
Rowland, J.L.	2nd Lt.	12/10/42	AUS-C	11/26/11	WDC		
Rowan, C.P.	2nd Lt.	12/17/42	AUS-C	7/19/13	4 S C		
Kerr, J.K.	2nd Lt.	12/18/42	Res.	5/10/01	3 S C		
Nix, E.J. Jr.	2nd Lt.	12/18/42	AUS-C	6/9/16	4 S C		
Menendez, R.R.	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	AUS-C	8/24/17	2 S C		
Preston, N.R..	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	AUS-C	3/9/16	CDC		

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0504

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Stollenwerck, E.C.	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	AUS-C	1/21/15	O of C (SA)	78th Inf (Temp)	
Wathen, F.J.	2nd Lt.	12/21/42	AUS-C	3/10/13	8 S C		
Lee, W.L.	2nd Lt.	12/24/42	AUS-C	1/11/19	8 S C		
Fortunato, N.A.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	1/3/14	2 S C	En Route Stage	
Grier, H.D.M.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	1/23/14	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Armwood, J.H.	2nd Lt.	12/29/42	AUS-C	9/19/12	7 S C		
Kendall, T.H.	2nd Lt.	12/29/42	AUS-C	5/17/18	2 S C		
McClenahan, H.I.	2nd Lt.	12/30/42	AUS-C	3/11/16	WDC		
Gray, A.M.	2nd Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	11/2/17	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Bell, E.P., Jr.	2nd Lt.	1/5/43	AUS-C	8/18/06	2 S C		
Salstrom, E.O.	2nd Lt.	1/6/43	AUS-C	12/8/04	O of C	Asst Personnel Off	
Kerns, L.A.	2nd Lt.	1/7/43	AUS-C	7/26/16	4 S C	En Route Stage	
Iwanowski, J.S.	2nd Lt.	1/21/43	AUS-C	11/7/09	O of C	Special Assign	
Schluter, C.	2nd Lt.	1/27/43	AUS-C	7/20/11	O of C	Asst Personnel Off	
Mellinger, S.	2nd Lt.	1/29/43	AUS-C	7/27/14	WDC(ADC)		

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0905

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Corey, G.H.	2nd Lt.	1/30/43	AUS-C	2/16/16	WDC(ADC)		
Jacobs, W.M.	2nd Lt.	2/17/43	AUS-C	8/8/16	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
White, E.S.	2nd Lt.	2/18/43	AUS-C	7/19/13	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Shapiro, H.	2nd Lt.	2/25/43	AUS-C	4/7/09	3 S C		
Ashdown, M.H.	2nd Lt.	2/27/43	AUS-C	8/2/16	CDC		
Frizzell, R.B.	2nd Lt.	2/27/43	AUS-C	4/6/18	8 S C		
Ermis, L.L.	2nd Lt.	3/6/43	AUS-C	4/6/17	6 S C		
Giacobbe, W.	2nd Lt.	3/8/43	AUS-C	8/24/07	1 S C		
Francis, W.H.	2nd Lt.	3/10/43	AUS-C	11/11/15	8 S C		
Rabenold, E.M.	2nd Lt.	3/15/43	AUS-C	7/21/16	CDC		
Morrissey, J.J.	2nd Lt.	3/16/43	AUS-C	6/26/14	6 S C		
Koutz, J.G.	2nd Lt.	3/19/43	AUS-C	9/1/16	CDC(PCD)		
Lee, Seaward S.	2nd Lt.	3/27/43	AUS-C	11/12/13	O of C	Asst Adm Off	
Robertson, B.L.	2nd Lt.	4/1/43	AUS-C	8/20/16	8 S C		
McCarthy, F.H.	2nd Lt.	4/6/43	AUS-C	7/9/09	1 S C		

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0906

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Cahoon, R.C.	2nd Lt.	4/8/43	AUS-C	9/24/13	O of C	Asst Tng Off	
Abrams, G.C.	2nd Lt.	4/9/43	AUS-C	8/18/13	4 S C		
McCarty, K.T.	2nd Lt.	4/9/43	AUS-C	2/10/12	O of C	Staff Stage	
Ryan, T.A.	2nd Lt.	4/9/43	AUS-C	5/10/11	4 S C	En Route Stage	
Rasin, G.B. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/11/43	AUS-C	5/28/17	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Gahan, P.J. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	10/24/07	2 S C	Student CIC Schl	
Smith, W.C.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	7/30/16	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Roberson, I. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/15/43	AUS-C	8/5/18	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Green, C.B.	2nd Lt.	4/16/43	AUS-C	5/26/05	O of C	Asst Oper Off	
Russell, R.D.	2nd Lt.	4/16/43	AUS-C	5/26/16	7 SIC		
Aimone, W.F.	2nd Lt.	4/17/43	AUS-C	11/6/18	4 S C	En Route Stage	
Hill, R.V.	2nd Lt.	4/17/43	AUS-C	10/2/08	WDC	WDC	
Dowd, T.H.	2nd Lt.	4/19/43	AUS-C	5/26/09	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Gross, P.	2nd Lt.	4/19/43	AUS-C	8/9/10	6 S C		
Barnaby, W.F. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	9/15/17	4 S C		

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Grice, L.E. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	4/15/15	4 S C		
Hardin, K.E.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	7/15/15	6 S C		
Harris, J.A.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	8/22/17	6 S C		
Hayden, J.M.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	12/4/14	4 S C		
Hoge, W.J.J.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	1/14/16	4 S C		
Weidner, C.R.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	4/20/16	4 S C		
Yarnevich, E.N.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	2/18/16	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Beebe, R.W.	2nd Lt.	4/28/43	AUS-C	11/18/15	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Parker, O. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/28/43	AUS-C	10/24/17	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Cummins, P.M. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/?/43	AUS-C	11/5/18	2 S C	En Route Area	
Sparks, W.M.	2nd Lt.	5/3/43	AUS-C	5/13/10	6 S C		
Farrell, M.P.	2nd Lt.	5/11/43	AUS-C	10/21/12	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Evans, T.	2nd Lt.	5/12/43	AUS-C	1/24/11	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Medina, M.	2nd Lt.	5/12/43	AUS-C	5/20/18	8 S C		
Hill, J.W.	2nd Lt.	5/25/43	AUS-C	11/12/13	6 S C		

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Fernandez, F.I.	2nd Lt.	5/26/43	AUS-C	11/6/16	WDC		
Rood, W.A.	2nd Lt.	5/26/43	AUS-C	9/6/17	O of C	Asst Supply Off	
Simpson, R.P.	2nd Lt.	5/27/43	AUS-C	10/24/14	5 S C		
Smyk, S.	2nd Lt.	5/28/43	AUS-C	4/15/19	2 S C		
Flinn, T.E.	2nd Lt.	5/29/43	AUS-C	11/15/13	O of C	Staff Stage	
Strange, R.F.	2nd Lt.	5/29/43	AUS-C	3/6/14	8 S C		
Boren, R.D.	2nd Lt.	6/2/43	AUS-C	5/30/14	8 S C		
Miller, E.R.	2nd Lt.	6/2/43	AUS-C	8/21/16	8 S C		
Smith, C.J.	2nd Lt.	6/2/43	AUS-C	7/8/17	3 S C		
Spencer, G.B.	2nd Lt.	6/2/43	AUS-C	3/30/13	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	
Appell, C.S.	2nd Lt.	6/3/43	AUS-C	5/19/18	8 S C		
Calhoun, R.L.	2nd Lt.	6/3/43	AUS-C	1/17/07	4 S C		
Sayers, S.R.	2nd Lt.	6/3/43	AUS-C	6/21/14	8 S C	En Route Stage	
Carey, G.W.	2nd Lt.	6/5/43	AUS-C	8/1/17	WDC (ADC)		
Pursell, H.R.	2nd Lt.	6/5/43	AUS-C	5/24/17	O of C (SA)	Staging Area	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Rodriguez, Alfonso	2nd Lt.	6/6/43	AUS-C	11/18/17	WDC		
Wolfe, George	2nd Lt.	6/7/43	AUS-C	6/28/05	1 S C		
Sebelios, K.G.	2nd Lt.	6/9/43	AUS-C	9/10/16	CDC		
Thorn, J.H.	2nd Lt.	6/9/43	AUS-C	5/31/14	5 S C		
Riback, H.W.	2nd Lt.	6/10/43	AUS-C	1/1/14	O of C	Staging Area	
Durkin, J.T.	2nd Lt.	6/17/43	AUS-C	8/23/13	6 S C		
Sanderson, E.G.	2nd Lt.	7/21/43	AUS-C	1/31/13	6 S C		
Amberg, W.A.	2nd Lt.	6/25/43	AUS-C	3/16/16	O of C	Asst Adm Off	
George, S.T.	2nd Lt.	6/26/43	AUS-C	2/29/16	5 S C	Temp Duty	
Halford, E.L.	2nd Lt.	6/26/43	AUS-C	4/8/17	2 S C	Temp Duty	
Riley, S.P.	2nd Lt.	6/27/43	AUS-C	8/1/15	1 S C		
Seibert, J.E.	2nd Lt.	6/30/43	AUS-C	5/30/11	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Simons, F.W.	2nd Lt.	6/30/43	AUS-C	6/2/17	7 S C		
Dowling, C.R.	2nd Lt.	7/2/43	AUS-C	1/9/08	1 S C		
Iversen, L.E.	2nd Lt.	7/2/43	AUS-C	1/10/14	6 S C		

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0910

...e	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	...e of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency ...ng
Cooper, P.S.	2nd Lt.	7/3/43	AUS-C	5/24/16	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Tunal, J.R.	2nd Lt.	7/3/43	AUS-C	7/21/19	8 S C	En Route Stage	
Locke, H.F.	2nd Lt.	7/7/43	AUS-C	1/10/10	6 S C		
Peralts, A.L.	2nd Lt.	7/7/43	AUS-C	11/8/14	CDC	En Route CDC	
Miller, G.J.	2nd Lt.	7/12/43	AUS-C	2/9/16	3 S C		
Becker, T.T.	2nd Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	7/4/14	4 S C		
Bott, A.K. Jr.	2nd Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	3/1/16	WDC		
Stapleton, J.T.	2nd Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	9/11/10	1 S C		
Rufty, A.C.	2nd Lt.	7/22/43	AUS-C	6/27/14	7 S C		
Cranford, P.D.	2nd Lt.	7/29/43	AUS-C	1/3/15	4 S C		
Gagen, J.E.	2nd Lt.	7/29/43	AUS-C	8/16/19	1 S C		
Lowther, J.A.	2nd Lt.	7/29/43	AUS-C	3/22/16	1 S C		
Emmert, L.J.	2nd Lt.	7/30/43	AUS-C	9/17/18	1 S C		
Heyrman, J.H.	2nd Lt.	7/30/43	AUS-C	5/2/12	6 S C		
Puryear, R.E.	2nd Lt.	7/30/43	AUS-C	11/15/13	7 S C		

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Skala, J.W.	2nd Lt.	8/10/43	AUS-C	3/26/00	5 S C		
Taylor, W.E.	2nd Lt.	8/13/43	AUS-C	2/10/15	6 S C		
Loney, T.R.	2nd Lt.	8/14/43	AUS-C	11/7/18	O of C	Asst Pers Off	
Capps, T.D.	2nd Lt.	8/26/43	AUS-C	8/1/05	3 S C		
Bell, R.A.	2nd Lt.	8/27/43	AUS-C	10/6/18	1 S C		
Gladney, V.C.	2nd Lt.	8/27/43	AUS-C	8/11/10	O of C	Asst Supply Off	
Stilwell, J.E.	2nd Lt.	8/27/43	AUS-C	7/3/15	4 S C		
Hill, M.F.	2nd Lt.	8/28/43	AUS-C	9/15/15	1 S C		
Rendleman, J.C.	2nd Lt.	8/30/43	AUS-C	11/11/13	1 S C		
Attwood, W.H.	2nd Lt.	9/2/43	AUS-C	7/14/19	1 S C		
Sheldon, G.C.	2nd Lt.	9/2/43	AUS-C	12/23/17	1 S C		
Anderson, E.E.	2nd Lt.	9/8/43	AUS-C	7/29/19	O of C	Temporary	
Stalker, I.F.	2nd Lt.	9/11/43	AUS-C	7/24/16	4 S C		

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CIC Officers Attached to Tactical Units
Within the Continental Limits of the United States

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Kopansky, M.R.	Capt.	2/1/42	Res.	5/23/12	13th Cor	C.O. Unit	
McDuff, A.L.	Capt.	8/13/42	Res.	10/18/15	4th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Dorsett, J.K.	Capt.	9/19/42	Res.	11/15/16	7th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Kardwell, H.P.	Capt.	7/23/43	Res.	12/3/05	3rd Cor	C.O. Unit	
Fossieck, T.H.	Capt.			2/18/14	15th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Mitchell, E.R.	Capt.		Res.	6/22/12	9th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Prescott, J.P.	Capt.			11/2/05	3rd Army	C.O. Unit	
Rungee, J.P.	Capt.		Res.	5/12/04	12th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Smith, T.D.	1st Lt.	9/10/42	Res.	8/20/05	11th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Lueck, W.O.	1st Lt.	11/14/42	AUS-C	10/17/11	9 Ar Div	C.O. Unit	
Carpenter, F.W.	1st Lt.	1/22/43	AUS	7/29/07	26 Inf D	C.O. Unit	
Buckley, H.W.	1st Lt.	1/23/43	AUS-C	4/11/12	I Troop C	C.O. Unit	
Ruge, N.M.	1st Lt.	3/10/43	AUS-C	12/28/13	3rd AF	C.O. Unit	
Trout, C.W.	1st Lt.	5/4/43	AUS-C	8/18/11	31 Inf D	C.O. Unit	
Frederick, H.F.	1st Lt.	5/19/43	AUS-C	1/8/14	1 Cav D	C.O. Unit	

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OS13

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Foster, J.S.	1st Lt.	5/22/43	AUS-C	5/5/14	99th Div	C.O. Unit	
Bowen, A.R.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	4/11/17	8th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Handville, M.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	4/16/10	100th Div	C.O. Unit	
McMillen, T.R.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	6/8/16	80th Div	C.O. Unit	
Ray, R.R.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	6/20/14	4th Cor	Asst C.O. Unit	
Stillwell, H.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	2/21/15	2nd AF	C.O. Unit	
Appleton, O.D.	1st Lt.	7/14/43	AUS-C	1/10/05	4th Mo Div	C.O. Unit	
Jenkins, A.D.	1st Lt.	7/14/43	AUS-C	10/7/15	86th Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Wheeler, R.E.	1st Lt.	7/14/43	AUS-C	7/10/10	96th Div	C.O. Unit	
Gluckin, L.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	6/16/19	30th Div	C.O. Unit	
Bogatin, Irvin	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	8/4/15	79th Div	C.O. Unit	
Callan, A.S.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	1/23/18	66th Div	C.O. Unit	
Dunn, W.B.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	2/11/19	102 Div	C.O. Unit	
Gordon, W.R.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	3/7/14	77th Div	C.O. Unit	
Hallett, James B.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	8/30/15	III Army	C.O. Unit	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Hanna, G.R.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	1/19/18	10th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Webster, J.R.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	9/15/16	6th Div	C.O. Unit	
Blair, W.P.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	AUS-C	10/28/14	44th Div	C.O. Unit	
Hines, G.W.	1st Lt.	8/4/43	Res.	6/17/15	92nd Div	C.O. Unit	
Ayr, A.H.	1st Lt.	8/13/43	AUS-C	1/13/19	78th Div	Temp Duty 12 Corps	
Somerville, J.F.	1st Lt.	8/18/43	AUS-C	8/27/14	4 Ar Div	C.O. Unit	
Baker, E.S.	1st Lt.		AUS-C	6/9/10	3rd Ar Cor	C.O. Unit	
Baldwin, G.A.	2nd Lt.	8/3/42	AUS	4/24/11	38th Div	C.O. Unit	
Carnahan, W.T.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	AUS-C	12/2/19	17th AB Div	C.O. Unit	
McLaughlin, T.D.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	AUS-C	6/17/06	2nd Div	C.O. Unit	
Riley, A.H. Jr.	2nd Lt.	12/7/42	AUS-C	8/8/14	ATC, Wash DC	Assgd Hq	
Brewster, R.D.	2nd Lt.	12/10/42	AUS-C	8/3/16	81st Div	C.O. Unit	
*Morton, M.M.	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	AUS-C	12/5/05	85th Div	C.O. Unit	
*Penree, J.C.	2nd Lt.	12/21/42	AUS-C	7/2/10	2 Ar Cor	C.O. Unit	
Donahoe, B.M.	2nd Lt.	12/22/42	AUS-C	4/6/18	33rd Div	C.O. Unit	
Victor, O.A.	2nd Lt.	12/23/42	AUS-C	4/17/19	83rd Div	C.O. Unit	

*Promoted to 1st Lt. - promotion orders not received.

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GS15

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
*Dumm, P.J.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	7/15/13	103 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Julian, B.P.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	10/7/17	104 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
McQuade, J.S.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	7/9/06	8 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Fritz, W.G.	2nd Lt.	12/30/42	AUS-C	10/3/17	98 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Clay, W.R.	2nd Lt.	1/14/43	AUS-C	11/21/12	75 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Gonzales, R.M.	2nd Lt.	1/23/43	AUS-C	5/9/18	11 Arm Div	C.O. Unit	
Biscoe, H.C.	2nd Lt.	2/11/43	AUS-C	9/20/12	2 AF	Asst C.O. Unit	
Wheeler, W.B.	2nd Lt.	2/12/43	AUS-C	5/15/16	87 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Osborne, W.D.	2nd Lt.	3/6/43	AUS-C	3/10/18	90 Mot Div	C.O. Unit	
Miller, A.B.	2nd Lt.	3/17/43	AUS-C	4/15/10	28 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
James, G.E.	2nd Lt.	3/31/43	AUS-C	3/1/18	Hq ATC	Assgd Hq Det	
Mehling, J.J.	2nd Lt.	4/6/43	AUS-C	1/3/16	10 Arm Div	C.O. Unit	
McKennan, B.	2nd Lt.	4/6/43	AUS-C	8/30/15	101 AB Div	C.O. Unit	
Boyce, B.F. Jr.	2nd Lt.	4/7/43	AUS-C	5/25/15	106 Inf Div	C.O. Unit	
Colgan, C.W.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	12/15/11	89 Light Div	C.O. Unit	

* Promoted to 1st Lt. - promotion orders not received.

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0516

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Eveland, W.C.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	7/1/17	9th Cor	C.O. Unit	
Huebner, A.G.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	9/28/09	8th Ar D	C.O. Unit	
Hughes, K.T.	2nd Lt.	4/14/43	AUS-C	10/29/12	5th Ar D	C.O. Unit	
Weimer, R.M.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	5/2/16	76th Div	C.O. Unit	
Black, T.M.	2nd Lt.	4/27/43	AUS-C	10/3/19	3d Ar D	C.O. Unit	
Cook, D.F.	2nd Lt.	5/12/43	AUS-C	10/19/14	93d Div	C.O. Unit	
Hardage, J.M.	2nd Lt.	5/20/43	AUS-C	8/29/18	2d Cav D	C.O. Unit	
Dennis, W.M.	2nd Lt.	6/3/43	AUS-C	6/14/18	91st Div	C.O. Unit	
Ryan, E.M.	2nd Lt.	7/7/43	AUS-C	2/20/07	6th Ar D	C.O. Unit	
Roberts, L.D.	2nd Lt.		AUS-C	12/29/14	7th Ar D	C.O. Unit	

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0917

CIC Officers at Military District of Washington, Manhattan Engineering District, Base Commands, Air Transport Command Outside Continental United States, and Theaters of Operations

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Query, L.J.	Lt. Col.	7/6/42	Res.	9/25/02	USAFIME	Chief-CIC Det	
Stevens, R.D.	Lt. Col.	8/6/42	Res.	11/14/02	ETOUSA	Chief-CIC Det	
Brennecke, F.C.	Lt. Col.	12/23/42	Res.	3/20/03	MDW	Chief-CIC Det	
Stinson, F.E.	Major	11/9/42	Res.	8/24/14	NATOUSA	Assgd 12th A.F.	
Miliman, L.	Major	12/23/42	Res.	9/13/11	MDW	Exec Off Det	
Hjalmarson, D.	Major	1/21/43	Res.		IBC	Exec Off Det	
Ray, E.L. Jr	Major	2/19/43	Res.	1/21/11	NATO	C.O. Det	
McCafferty, J.T.	Major	3/8/43	Res.	10/29/15	USAFIME	Sup Western Area	
Irwin, J.N.	Major	5/11/43			SWPA	Exec Off G-2	
Falkner, M.C.	Major	8/9/43			NATOUSA	Hq Det	
Snowden, F.C.	Major	8/9/43	Res.	5/28/05	NATO	Port Sect C-7 Army	
Spingarn, S.J.	Major	8/9/43	AUS	9/1/08	NATO	CIC School	
Boone, Dana H.	Major		Res.	7/12/97	USAFIME	Sup Eastern Area	
Turner, A.	Major			5/19/05	SPA	Chief-CIC Det	
Vreeland, A.L.	Major		Res.	7/2/01	SWPA	Chief-CIC Det	

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0918

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Wilson, H.E. Jr	Capt.	3/20/42	Res.	9/26/11	ETO	C.O.-CIC-SOS	
Goodrick, C.H.	Capt.	5/29/42	Res.	7/6/04	USAFFE	C.O.-Hq Det	
Earle, Richard G.	Capt.	8/28/42	Res.	5/24/07	SWPA	C.O.-6th Army Det	
Larkin, C.E.	Capt.	9/30/42	Res.	9/18/09	ETO	Hq Det	
Stefansson, R.	Capt.	9/30/42	NG		IBC	Chief-Akureyri Sec	
*Papurt, M.J.	Capt.	10/23/42	Res.	6/12/07	NATO	Assgd ABS	
Goza, C.L.	Capt.	12/16/42		6/24/17	ETO	Exec Off Hq Det	
Reese, R.M.	Capt.	12/22/42	Res.	4/1/08	MDW	Personnel Officer	
Read, C.E.	Capt.	1/8/43	Res.	11/13/03	NATO	Assgd MBS	
Lindjord, H.	Capt.	1/21/43	Res.	7/10/15	IBC	Chief-Reykjuvik Sec	
Kaufman, W.J.	Capt.	1/23/43	Res.	3/5/15	NATO	C.O.-NAAF Det	
Tucker, R.W.	Capt.	2/7/43	Res.	8/27/11	NATO	Assgd 5th Army Det	
Browning, E.S.	Capt.	3/29/43	Res.	9/7/17	IBC	Chief-CIC Det	
Koenigsdorf, W.J.	Capt.	4/3/43	AUS-C	9/2/14	SWPA	C.O.-1st Corps Det	
Barry, E.P.	Capt.	4/18/43	AUS-C	5/23/14	USAFIME	Chief-Iraq-Ivan Det	

* Promoted to Major - promotion orders not received.

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0319

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Saberhagen, H.A.	Capt.	5/8/43	AUS	11/19/07	IBC	Chief, Budareyrc Sec	
Graham, D.M.	Capt.	5/21/43	Res.	8/21/14	ETO	S.O.S. Det	
Granholm, Alex V.	Capt.	6/23/43	AUS	7/10/10	ATC	C.O. Carib Wing	
Cameron, J.B.	Capt.	7/20/43	AUS-C	5/16/12	NATO	C.O. Port Sect B	
Costello, H.G.	Capt.	7/20/43		8/11/15	NATO	C.O. Port Sect A	
Crystal, J.C.	Capt.	7/20/43		9/18/20	NATO	Asst Chief ABS Sect	
Hammond, J.O.	Capt.	7/20/43		5/4/19	NATO	Exec Off-CIC Sch	
Lucas, J.H.	Capt.	7/20/43	AUS	10/27/10	NATO	Special Assign	
Picard, L.L.	Capt.	7/20/43	AUS-C	12/12/05	NATO	Rabat Sect	
Rubsam, John L.	Capt.	7/20/43	AUS-C	8/4/11	NATO	C.O. Field Section	
Goff, M.C.	Capt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	3/23/16	SPA	Exec Off CIC Det	
Nielsen, L.J.	Capt.	7/26/43	AUS-C	3/30/17	SWPA	Hq S.O.S.	
Albertson, C.H.	Capt.		Res.	4/19/01	USAFFE	C.O. 5 Air Force Det	
Colliston, P.N.	Capt.		Res.	4/28/09	NATO		
Crowell, G.K.	Capt.			1/6/08	NATO	Staff Field Sch	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Owsley, C.H.	Capt.		AUS	9/14/10	ETO	C.O. 8th A.F. Det	
Pettus, E. Jr.	Capt.		Res.	2/12/11	ETO	C.O. 5 Corps Det	
Powers, R.W.	Capt			12/27/06	NATO	Assgd E.B.S.	
*Thill, V.J.	Capt.			7/7/12	NATO	Assgd Hq CIC Det	
Templeton, W.B.	1st Lt.	1/2/42	Res.	9/28/06	ETOUSA	C.O. 29 Div Det	
Mahlum, E.K.	1st Lt.	7/3/42	Res.	11/13/09	IBC	Security Officer	
Johnson, A.	1st Lt.	7/16/42	AUS	2/3/10	IBC	Chief, Keflavik Sect	
Neuman, A.F.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	AUS-C	6/27/14	MDW	Investigations Sect	
Stanley, C.H.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	AUS-C	7/4/14	MDW	Training Off	
Barnes, S.U.	1st Lt.	11/20/42	AUS	2/17/14	USAFIME	9th A.F. Det	
Wilson, G.L.	1st Lt.	12/4/42	Res.	8/11/11	CIB	Hq Det	
Allen, L.B.	1st Lt.	12/16/42	Res.		ETOUSA	Exec Off-29 Div Det	
Mock, W.T.	1st Lt.	12/29/42	AUS-C	1/14/42	ETOUSA	Hq ETO	
Greene, W.E.	1st Lt.	1/4/43	AUS-C	9/7/98	NATOUSA	En Route	
Van Kirk, A.H.	1st Lt.	1/23/43	AUS-C	4/17/16	NATO	Port Sect A-7 Army	

* Promoted to Major - promotion orders not received.

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0921

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Saxe, E.L.	1st Lt.	3/22/43	AUS-C	1/17/16	ETO	Chief-Invest Sect	
Kirwin, P.J.	1st Lt.	4/15/43	AUS-C	3/1/15	AME, ATC	C.O. Unit Det	
Kearns, F.M.	1st Lt.	5/19/43	AUS	11/27/17	ETOUSA	Assgd Hq	
Labatt, B.P.	1st Lt.	5/21/43(Approx)	AUS-C	10/18/16	SWPA	Exec Off Det	
Major, T.H.	1st Lt.	6/3/43	AUS-C	11/29/11	SWPA	6th Army Det	
Davis, G.B.	1st Lt.	6/12/43	AUS-C	11/1/14	MDW	Special-CIC	
Edwards, R.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	3/1/08	MDW	Asst Tng Off	
Kinsey, B.T.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	9/13/17	BBC	C.O. Unit	
Menke, B.W.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	2/11/19	MSD	Special	
Walcott, J.C.	1st Lt.	6/24/43	AUS-C	2/24/12	NATO	CIC School	
Daly, W.J.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	5/15/17	NATO	Asst C.O. NAAF	
Judson, C.H.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	3/1/19	NATO	Assgd 5 Army	
Knowles, B.G.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	5/22/16	NATO	Det Adjutant	
La Branche, R.R.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS	4/30/11	NATO	Det 2 Ar Div	
Ray, J.E.	1st Lt.	7/16/43	AUS-C	2/11/13	NATO	Det 1st Inf Div	

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0922

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Crow, G.D.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	12/18/09	SPA	C.O. Unit	
Curry, G.E.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	5/2/12	CA	C.O. Unit	
Tonini, M.A.	1st Lt.	7/23/43	AUS-C	10/11/13	NATO	Hq Det	
Brod, M.E.	1st Lt.		AUS-C	10/4/09	NATO	Port B-7 Army	
Ginocchio, L.A.	1st Lt.		AUS-C	9/2/11	ATC	South Atl Wing	
Kohn, L.	1st Lt.		Res.	3/8/07	SWPA	Hq 6th Army	
Cornell, W.B. Jr.	2nd Lt.	6/13/42	AUS-C	1/2/14	NATO		
Travis, A.	2nd Lt.	8/14/42	AUS-C	8/25/17	AFIME	Det 9 A.F.	
Riddle, Daniel M.	2nd Lt.	9/30/42	AUS-C	9/12/10	ETO	Det V Cor	
*Eichelberger, J.M.	2nd Lt.	10/1/42	AUS	12/17/16	NATO	Det A.F. Hq	
Gardner, J.R.	2nd Lt.	10/1/42	AUS	5/28/15	NATO	Det EBS	
Depourtales, A.W.G.	2d Lt	10/1/42	AUS	3/22/17	NATO	CIC School	
Amerman, Harry L.	2nd Lt	10/1/42	AUS	7/11/13	NATO	Det 5 Army	
Kummer, A.J.	2nd Lt.	11/12/42	AUS-C	8/8/14	NATO	Det 7 Army	
*Johnson, Lyall E.	2nd Lt.	11/30/42	AUS-C	11/11/13	MED	Special	

* Promoted to 1st Lt. - promotion orders not received.

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Blair, D.H. Jr	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	AUS-C	3/23/19	Hq ETOUSA	Hq Det	
*Guenther, R.W.	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	AUS-C	1/16/15	NATO	CO-45th Div	
Tehaan, F.A.	2nd Lt.	12/9/42	AUS-C	8/12/13	MDW		
Applegate, T.W.	2nd Lt.	12/10/42	AUS-C	11/14/14	SWPA	Hq VI Army	
Corsatea, Ovid	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	AUS-C	10/16/08	AME	Asgd Hq	
McColl, J.W.	2nd Lt.	12/21/42	AUS-C	11/18/14	SWPA	Asgd Hq	
King, J.A.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	AUS-C	6/10/18	Man Eng Dis	Special	
Southerland, J.E.	2nd Lt.	12/29/42	AUS-C	2/23/15	Man Eng Dis	Special	
Webb, M.L.	2nd Lt.	12/29/42	AUS-C	5/29/16	Man Eng Dis	Special	
McGillicuddy, D.F.	2nd Lt.	12/31/42	AUS-C	3/24/16	SWPA	Asgd Det 6 Army	
Bledsoe, J.A.	2nd Lt.	1/14/43	AUS-C	8/22/15	SWPA	Hq SOS	
Nokes, T.J.	2nd Lt.	1/23/43	AUS	5/20/30	USAFIME	Liaison Off	
Tworzydlo, F.R.	2nd Lt.	1/27/43	AUS	4/13/15	USAFIME	Levant Group	
Flannery, F.R.	2nd Lt.	1/30/43	AUS-C	12/7/14	USAFISPA	Unit C O	
Ksieniewicz, C.A.	2nd Lt.	2/3/43	AUS-C	6/10/13	ETO	Hq Det	

* Promoted to 1st Lt. - promotion orders not received.

Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Lyon, P.E.	2nd Lt.	2/10/43	AUS-C	9/18/16	NATO	Hqs Det	
Bruder, C.W.	2nd Lt.	2/12/43	AUS	3/5/13	ETO	Hqs Det	
Tobin, E.A.	2nd Lt.	2/18/43	AUS	4/2/10	ASFIME	Barat Dist	
Barrett, J.E.	2nd Lt.	2/19/43	AUS	11/18/12	ASFIME	Delta Group	
Hayden, E.M.	2nd Lt.	2/19/43	AUS	8/21/10	ASFIME	Palestine Group	
Smith, H.W. Jr	2nd Lt.	3/8/43	AUS-C	1/7/18	NATO	Hqs Det	
Teeple, D.S.	2nd Lt.	3/27/43	AUS	5/15/14	SPA	Temp CIC Sch	
Forkey, L.O.	2nd Lt.	3/31/43	AUS-C	3/12/06	NATO	Hqs Det	
Mattos, A.R.	2nd Lt.	3/31/43	AUS-C	11/23/17	ATC	S Atl Wing	
Roach, P.O.	2nd Lt.	4/6/43	AUS-C	8/23/16	SWPA	Hqs 32 Div	
Cook, V.I. Jr	2nd Lt.	4/8/43	AUS-C	8/13/17	SWPA	Hqs 41 Div	
White, C.V.	2nd Lt.	4/16/43	AUS-C	4/17/16	MED	Special	
Mooney, H.T.	2nd Lt.	4/17/43	AUS-C	9/8/11	MDW		
DelGenio, N.	2nd Lt.	4/19/43	AUS-C	8/25/06	MED	Special	
Wallace, W.C.	2nd Lt.	4/20/43	AUS	1/2/11	SPA	Unit C.O.	

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Name	Rank	Date of Rank	Component	Date of Birth	Unit	Job Designation	Efficiency Rating
Cuddeback, H.L.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	10/22/16	SWPA	Assgd Hq	
Gilmore, G.E.	2nd Lt.	4/21/43	AUS-C	11/1/14	USAFFE	Assgd Hq	
Ballentine, D.K.	2nd Lt.	5/28/43	AUS-C	4/28/13	ATC In Ch Wing	Assgd Hq	
Hull, J.N.	2nd Lt.	5/28/43	AUS-C	5/16/14	Man Eng D	Special	
Conick, C.B.	2nd Lt.		AUS	12/19/16	NATOUSA	9th Inf Div	

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Balance of Promotion Vacancies Allocated
And to be Filled Upon Recommendations From Unit Commanders

First Service Command	One First Lieutenant to Captain
Fourth Service Command	One Captain to Major
Western Defense Command	One First Lieutenant to Captain
Office of Chief, CIC	Five First Lieutenants to Captains
	One Captain to Major
Caribbean Defense Command	Five Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
Army Ground and Air Force Tactical Units	Thirteen Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
	Seven First Lieutenants to Captains
	Six Captains to Majors
Departments	None (No officers presently assigned)
European Theater Operations	Two First Lieutenants to Captains
	One Captain to Major
North African Theater	Three Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
	Three First Lieutenants to Captains
Southwest Pacific Area	Seven Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
	Two First Lieutenants to Captains
	One Captain to Major
South Pacific Area	Two Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
African Middle East	Six Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
	One First Lieutenant to Captain

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIC PROMOTIONS AWAITING APPROVAL BY MIS

CIC Officers at Headquarters Baltimore,
in the Service and Defense Commands

Name	Grade & Rank	Date of Rank	Unit	Promotion To	Date Sent to MIS
Krings, L.W.	Capt.	3/10/40	8 S C	Major	9/10/43
Turner, E.D.	Capt.	4/13/42	CDC	Major	9/11/43
Larios, E.E.	Capt.	6/24/42	WDC	Major	8/6/43
Petty, Fern D.	Capt.	11/4/42	O of C (CIC Sch)	Major	9/27/43
Henderson, S.L.	Capt.	12/3/42	2 S C	Major	8/30/43
Emmet, L.L.	Capt.	1/2/43	6 S C	Major	8/24/43
Petru, F.L.	Capt.	1/2/43	6 S C	Major	8/30/43
Serae, V.	1st Lt.	4/20/42	CDC	Capt.	9/11/43
Benta, C., Jr.	1st Lt.	4/20/42	CDC	Capt.	9/11/43
Peters, A.K.	1st Lt.	5/25/42	2 S C	Capt.	8/30/43
Carey, T.J.	1st Lt.	5/31/42	CDC	Capt.	9/11/43
Marynowski, S.W.	1st Lt.	10/12/42	6 S C	Capt.	9/11/43
Ault, D.J.	1st Lt.	11/18/42	O of C	Capt.	9/9/43

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Name	Grade & Rank	Date of Rank	Unit	Promotion To	Date Sent to MIS
Jones, T.O.	1st Lt.	12/17/42	6 S C	Capt.	9/11/43
Doyle, R.H.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	2 S C	Capt.	8/30/43
Grieve, W.G.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	2 S C	Capt.	8/30/43
Matthews, D.M.	1st Lt.	12/31/42	2 S C	Capt.	8/30/43
Curran, J. McE.	1st Lt.	1/19/43	7 S C	Capt.	9/22/43
Dickey, David B.	1st Lt.	2/9/43	8 S C	Capt.	9/10/43
Wallace, W.H.	1st Lt.	2/9/43	8 S C	Capt.	9/10/43
Clark, C.L.	2nd Lt.	11/12/42	8 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Bandaway, J.H.	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	2 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
McKenna, J.P.	2nd Lt.	12/5/42	2 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
O'Connel, J.J.	2nd Lt.	12/7/42	4 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Rowan, C.P.	2nd Lt.	12/17/42	4 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Nix, E.J.	2nd Lt.	12/18/42	4 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43

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CONFIDENTIAL

Name	Grade & Rank	Date of Rank	Unit	Promotion To	Date Sent to MIS
Menendez, H.R.	2nd Lt.	12/19/42	2 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Lee, W.L.	2nd Lt.	12/24/42	8 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Lyon, F.E.	2nd Lt.	2/12/43	1 S C	1st Lt.	8/30/43

CIC Officers Attached to Tactical Units
Within the Continental Limits of the United States

Buckley, H.W.	1st Lt.	1/23/43	Troop C Com	Capt.	9/11/43
McLaughlin, T.D.	2nd Lt.	11/25/42	2nd Inf Div	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Jullian, B.P.	2nd Lt.	12/26/42	104th Inf Div	1st Lt.	9/17/43
Clay, W.R.	2nd Lt.	1/14/43	75th Inf Div	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Gonzales, R.M.	2nd Lt.	1/23/43	11th Ar Div	1st Lt.	9/11/43
Biscoe, H.C.	2nd Lt.	2/11/43	2nd A.F.	1st Lt.	8/30/43
Miller, A.B.	2nd Lt.	3/19/43	28th Inf Div	1st Lt.	9/22/43

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CIC Officers at Military District of Washington, Manhattan Engineering District, Base Commands, Air Transport Commands Outside Continental United States, and Theaters of Operations

Name	Grade & Rank	Date of Rank	Unit	Promotion To	Date Sent to MIS
Pettus, E., Jr.	Capt.	2/1/42	ETO	Major	9/17/43
Wilson, M.E., Jr.	Capt.	3/20/42	ETO	Major	9/17/43
Templeton, W.B.	1st Lt.	1/2/42	ETO	Capt.	9/17/43
Neuman, A.F.	1st Lt.	11/6/42	MDW	Capt.	9/9/43
Allen, L.B.	1st Lt.	12/16/42	ETO	Capt.	9/17/43
Riddle, D.M., Jr.	2nd Lt.	9/16/42	ETO	1st Lt.	9/17/43
Bruder, C.W.	2nd Lt.	2/12/43	ETO	1st Lt.	9/17/43

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Recommendations Received And Being Processed by Office of Chief, CIC

Office of Chief, CIC	Two Majors to Lieutenant Colonels
	One First Lieutenant to Captain
Caribbean Defense Command	One Captain to Major
	One First Lieutenant to Captain
Ground and Air Force Tactical Units	Two Captains to Majors
	One First Lieutenant to Captain
	Two Second Lieutenants to First Lieutenants
Military District of Washington	One Captain to Major
	Two First Lieutenants to Captains

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



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME VI

[redacted]

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS TRAINING DURING WORLD WAR II

November 1959 0933

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

[redacted]

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather
RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Chapter 1

THE CIP INVESTIGATORS TRAINING SCHOOL

The Selective Service Act, passed on 16 September 1940 by a United States Congress to which the fall of France had crystallized the realization that an "arsenal of democracy" was a necessity to a free world,[1] brought the strength of the U.S. Army to approximately 1,640,000 men within slightly more than a year.[2] Yet the end of 1940 found the CIP, upon whose shoulders would fall the responsibility for providing internal security for this expanded force, with only 42 trained investigators.

The first problem was to secure qualified personnel; the second was to train the personnel after they had been secured. In light of these requirements, an order from the Secretary of War, dated 18 January 1941, initiated the Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators Training School in Washington, D.C.[3] A little over a month later, on 24 February, the first students of this school crowded into the single room in the Army War College, now Fort Leslie J. McNair, where their classes were to be held.[4] Army counterintelligence training for World War II had begun.

The CIP Investigators Training School

The original plan that preceded the Adjutant General's order to establish the CIP Investigators Training School recommended that the "courses cover essentials for investigators to provide uniform method throughout the service." A Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police was to be charged with the supervision of training and the preparation of manuals of instruction for the students.[5]

The minimum qualifications for attendance at the CIP Investigators School opened the doors to many new and old members of the Army. According to the proposed plan, a potential student was required to meet the following requirements:

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1 The Army Almanac, p. 292.

2 Ibid, p. 298.

3 History of CIC in Army Service Forces, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

4 Office Journal, Headquarters CIC from 27 Jan 1941 to 1 May 1942, entry dated "2-24-41." (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

5 Memorandum for General Miles from Lt Col J. T. Bissell, Subj: Plan for Corps of Intelligence Police, dtd 2 Dec 1940, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Record Center).

Age: 22 to 33
Minimum education: Graduate of High School (College Education preferable with training in law or accounting).
Completion of basic military training.
Desirable qualification: Previous experience as an investigator in some governmental or law enforcement agency.[6]

The allotment of CIP personnel was jumped from 42 to 188 men in December 1940. Maj Garland Williams was selected as Chief, CIP and Commandant of the CIP School. He reported for duty 27 January 1941.[7]

The men chosen to instruct at the school were detailed from the Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C. They were to be assisted by the FBI, when available, and officers who were graduates of the FBI school. By the time the CIP School was opened, five full time instructors had been procured.

Students who attended the first classes of the school found that the entire course was geared to training agents for duties they would encounter in the Zone of the Interior. No basic texts were provided. Instead, instructors in the school were requested to reduce all their lectures to written form so that they could be mimeographed. The reproduced lectures would enable students to compile their own reference material. These could be used during training as texts and after training as continual guides in the absence of immediate advice from trained supervisors. The instructors complied with the request, and soon the volume compounded from the various lectures became a standard ready reference at CIP offices throughout the United States.

The curriculum of the school was entirely oriented around procedures involved in the conduct of an investigation and the aids that could be utilized by an investigator. Students were taught the principles of observation and description, espionage and counterespionage, bombs and "infernal machines," undercover work, and numerous other topics that the well-trained investigator should know. A total of 61 separate courses and practical problems were listed in the course of study prepared for the first class.[8] From this material the students could be expected to gain an introduction to their future work. The basic FBI courses, on which the CIP School's four week curriculum had been patterned, extended for 14 weeks.

Since the CIP School planners had chosen the FBI as a model, subjects were included in the curriculum that dealt almost exclusively with criminal matters. For example, ten hours were allotted to "Practical Work With Headquarters

6 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
7 Office Journal, Headquarters CIC from 27 Jan 1941 to 1 May 1942, entry dated "1-27-41" (Central Records Facility).
8 Course of study attached as Appendix 1.

Detective Squads of the Metropolitan Police Forces." Potential CIPs were scheduled to spend these hours working with detectives on the robbery, check forgery and fraud, homicide, theft of jewelry and clothing, narcotics, auto theft, and fugitive and wanted persons squads. Another ten hours were set aside for work with agents of the U.S. Secret Service, Alcohol Tax Unit, Customs Agency Service, Narcotics Bureau and Intelligence Unit of the Treasury Department.[9]

The performance of the men assigned to the CIP Investigators Training School varied considerably. In the first class 39 men were given certificates of "satisfactory completion of instruction," while nine men failed the course. In the second class, 43 students received certificates, while seven failed. In the third class, all 50 students graduated satisfactorily.

CIP headquarters officers were faced with the problem of evaluating the degree to which a student's record at the school reflected his ability as a CIP agent. The conclusion was reached that "the record made by an individual in the CIP School is not necessarily indicative of his value to the CIP. An individual who makes the highest possible grade does not necessarily deserve the highest possible grade in the CIP, and conversely the individual who fails to make a satisfactory grade in the school does not necessarily have to be separated from the CIP."[10]

But the course of study was generally approved by the agents attending the CIP School. One student wrote back to his commanding officer, "There is a very high-class group of boys from other sections of the country. We have several excellent instructors and a couple that lull me to sleep. But, in all, the course is very interesting, and the men are studying hard to see that they make the proper showing."[11]

The Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators Training School continued to function in Washington, D.C., until six classes, numbering 298 students, both officers and enlisted men, had graduated.[12] In addition to the basic investigators course, special training for 48 commissioned officers from all Corps areas and the Puerto Rican Department was given from 7 April to 3 May 1941.[13] The subjects that were studied in this supplementary course were primarily concerned with industrial security and consisted of the following:

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9 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

10 CIC Office Journal, Headquarters CIC from 27 Jan 41 to 1 May 1942, entries dtd 3-22-41; 5-31-41; 6-19-41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

11 Ltr from 201 File, Thomas A. Ryan to 1st Lt Asa W. Candler, undated.

12 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

13 Office Journal, Hqs CIC from 27 Jan 1941 to 1 May 1942, Entry dtd 5-3-41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

1. Plant Organization
2. Problems of Plant Management
3. Protection of Industrial Facilities (General)
4. Personnel Management
   a. Selection of Personnel
   b. Investigation of Applicant and Employees
   c. Countersubversive Control
   d. Morale
5. Protection of Physical Installations
   a. Fire Protection
   b. Communications - ADT Controls
   c. Restricted Areas
   d. Exterior Protection
6. Care of Documents
7. Identification Systems
8. Guard Force Organization and Functioning
9. Report and Recommendations
10. Follow-up Investigations[14]

While the Corps of Intelligence Police Training School provided standard instruction for all potential CIPs, there still existed complications that G2 planners had to solve. At this time CIP was still a confidential organization whose existence was not generally known throughout the Army. Lt Col A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, First Corps Area, noted that while a potential CIP was in basic training with other recruits, he became known as a member of the military service to soldiers who would later be assigned to units throughout the Corps Areas. To avoid this possible compromise of CIP identities, Colonel Bolling suggested that the CIP training school conduct two courses, basic and advanced. The basic course would include fundamental military training, and instruction in small arms and qualification firing with the .45 caliber pistol. Successful completion of this basic course would be the condition for admission to the advanced training that would acquaint the CIP with his specific future responsibilities.

Colonel Bolling concluded that this method of centralized schooling would insure uniformity in instruction in stages. Nor would it necessitate the attachment of members of the CIP to units within the CASC (Continental Army Service Commands) for basic instruction and firing of the pistol, thereby aiding to a great extent in not disclosing the identity of members of the Corps. These schools would

14 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

further establish a basis for promotion, supplementing quarterly efficiency reports and recommendations from the AC of S, G2 of the Corps Area."[15]

Although this plan was never adopted, the concept of two stages, preliminary and advanced, in the education of a counterintelligence agent was put into practice one year and a half after Colonel Bolling's report.

A major problem that faced the CIP planners was finding a suitable site for locating the training school. The classroom provided at the Army War College was entirely inadequate. The billets provided at the Arlington Cantonment were "definitely unsatisfactory." CIP officers combed Washington military reservations in search of school rooms, and Fort Foote, Fort Hunt, Fort Washington, Fort Belvoir, Camp Sims, and Bolling Field were tried. The forays all ended with the same remark: "No space available." [16] One suggestion was to rent a private hall in Washington, requisition bunks, blankets and other supplies and hire a janitor who would take care of the hall while CIP students attended classes.

The Provost Marshal came up with the suggestion that the CIP School be merged with the Provost Marshal General's Military Police School then being organized. This was the first recorded of many attempts by the Provost Marshal to usurp the functions of the CIP and later the CIC.[17] This suggestion was ignored. A little more than a month later, however, the Provost Marshal made another attempt, this time requesting that the CIP School be moved to the Arlington Cantonment, the same location selected for the proposed Military Police School.[18] It was not until 26 November, after the school had physically moved to Chicago, that the Army G3 made the final decision in CIC's favor.[19]

For several weeks classes were held at 2145 C Street, NW. Then they were switched to the Post Theater at the Arlington Cantonment with some courses given at the Munitions Building.[20] It became increasingly clear that an expanding defense effort was placing a premium on every bit of space within Washington and its immediate environs.

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15 Report to Military Intelligence Division, G2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C., Subject Suggested Changes to TM 30-225 (Tentative) from Lt Col A. R. Bolling, AC of S, G2, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

16 Office Journal, Headquarters, CIP-CIC from 27 Jan 41 to 1 May 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

17 Ibid, Entry dtd 6 Sep 41.

18 Ibid, Entry dtd 24 Oct 41.

19 Ibid, Entry dtd 26 Nov 41.

20 Ibid; Entries dtd Sep-Oct 41.

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On 7 October 1941, Col Hayes A. Kroner, Acting AC of S, G2, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, reported the results of a survey which revealed that suitable accommodations for the CIP School had been found in Chicago, Illinois. An athletic club and two hotels in the "Loop" area were large enough for the necessary class rooms, offices, and housing the students.[21]

Arrangements in Chicago were hastily completed by Capt Sylvester P. Smith and Corps Area Quartermasters for the lease of the Tower Town Club. On 3 November, Headquarters CIP in Washington received a telephone call from Captain Smith advising that he was prepared to open the school on 10 November. On that day orders were issued transferring instructors and students to Chicago. The struggle for permanent quarters for the CIP Training School was temporarily over.[22]

21 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Col Hayes A. Kroner, Subj: Transfer of Corps of Intelligence Police School, dtd 7 October 1941, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

22 Office Journal, Hqs CIC from 27 Jan 1941 to 1 May 1942, Entry dtd 11-3-41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 2

THE CHICAGO TRAINING SCHOOL

The Tower Town Club at 820 North Michigan Avenue was a far cry from the original locations of the CIP Investigators Training School. In addition to the ample classrooms arranged within the club building, the police laboratory of the City of Chicago was made available to the CIP School. CIP instructors were also permitted to give demonstrations at the criminal laboratory of Northwestern University, and study sabotage problems at the huge Underwriters Laboratory.

The students were billeted in comfortable hotel rooms that were well suited for quiet study. In contrast to the crowding in the barracks at the Arlington Cantonment, two men were accommodated in each room. The students were fed in the school mess that was also located in the hotel; meals were described as "wholesome, appetizing, well prepared, and well served...typical of the bill of fare found in any good hotel." Students had daily access to the hotel swimming pool and an exercise room that was used for recreation and jui jitsu instruction.[23]

Capt H. G. Sheen, who had become Chief of CIP in October 1941, was completely satisfied with the facilities following a visit from 13-15 November. By 7 December 1941, the day that the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, plans had already been laid for a second set of school classes. The enlisted men were to begin on 5 January and the officers on 19 January.

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war altered the CIP plans drastically. The Military Intelligence Division was suddenly faced with the problem of supplying hundreds of counterintelligence agents to the Army forces in addition to increasing the strength of operatives to accomplish missions within the Zone of Interior. By 9 December 1941, the first step in mobilization had been completed. The Chief of Staff had authorized an increase in the strength of CIP to 1,026 agents.[24]

Two days later, increased funds for the expansion of the CIP School in Chicago were informally approved by representatives of the AC of S, G3, and the AC of S, G4, War Department.[25] Captain Smith maintained direct contact with CIP Headquarters awaiting the announcement of revised figures for the January classes in the school. When the order of the Secretary of War redesignating the Corps of

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23 Memorandum for General Miles from Lt Col J. T. Bissell, Subject: CIP Training School, dtd 21 Nov 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Kansas City Records Center).

24 Office Journal, Headquarters, CIC, from 27 Jan 41 to 1 May 42, entries dtd Nov-Dec 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

25 Ibid, entry dtd 11 Dec 41.

Intelligence Police as the Counter Intelligence Corps, effective 1 January 1942, was released, the title of the school was appropriately changed to the Counter Intelligence Corps Investigators Training School.

The first enlisted men's course at the school had 51 members. Courses starting in January had an enrollment of 100 agents. No major changes in the curriculum were instituted despite the sudden broadening of the scope of counter-intelligence activities. Maj Charles A. Ellis, CIC Chief at the Office of the AC of S, G2, Second Corps Area, recommended after a visit to the school that practical assignments in taking fingerprints, "shadow work," and physical descriptions, be increased.[26] There was no mention of preparing the potential CIC agents for overseas duty while at the Chicago school. Instead emphasis was placed on turning out the best possible investigators for duty within the Zone of Interior.

The basic course was not substantially altered during the early months of 1942. The curriculum for both enlisted men and officers covered 26 days. In order to instruct a maximum number of personnel, each officer's class was scheduled to commence exactly two weeks after the start of the enlisted men's class then in attendance. The succeeding enlisted class began a week prior to the termination of the officers' class. This arrangement of staggering classes eased the teaching load of the heavily taxed instructors somewhat without greatly reducing the number of agents turned out by the school.[27]

During July, Maj Theodore J. Walker relieved Major Smith as Commandant of the CIC School.[28] Two months later, the school was subjected to a careful scrutiny by several high ranking officers of the Office of the AC of S, G2, War Department General Staff. Maj Gen George V. Strong in the course of a routine visit to the school had noticed a number of weaknesses in the organization and facilities of the school that he considered necessitated a staff study. Among the suggestions that General Strong wished to be considered were: (1) increase in the faculty; (2) relief of the crowded living conditions of the students; (3) re-examination of curriculum; (4) use of visual training aids and "skits;" and (5) use of outstanding civilian personnel in the selected fields as lecturers.[29]

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26 Ltr to AC of S, G2, ATTN: Captain Sheen, from Col F. J. Pearson, containing Rpt of Maj Charles A. Ellis on CIC Training, Subject: CIC Training School, dtd 19 Jan 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

27 Memo for Captain Smith from Captain Sheen, Subject: School Schedule, dtd 25 Jan 42, (Unclassified) (Kansas City Records Center).

28 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

29 Memo for the Chief, CIC, Subject: CIC Investigator's Training School, Chicago, Ill., dtd 3 Sep 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The staff study was accomplished under the direction of Col P. H. Timothy who visited the school from September 15-18. A single word could best summarize Colonel Timothy's opinion of the entire school: inadequate. Among the shortcomings discussed were the following:

"a. Housing - Present facilities for classrooms, office space, and sleeping accommodations are inadequate. Lighting is poor throughout. Rooms are overcrowded. Neither classrooms nor bedrooms are satisfactory for study purposes.

"b. Staff and Faculty - Inadequate. There are at present nine officers on duty at the school. The Commandant, a Major, instructs and has little time to supervise school activities. The Executive Officer and Adjutant, a Captain, also instructs. The Supply Officer, a Lieutenant, instructs in addition to his supply duties. Four Captains and two Lieutenants instruct without additional administrative duties.

"c. Assignment of Officer Graduates - Student officers are procured through allotments to the various Service Commands. They are ordered to the school on temporary duty and upon graduation revert to control of the service commands. The bulk of the graduates, consequently, are not assigned Counter Intelligence Corps duties, for which trained at the school, but are assigned post intelligence, public relations, or duties not connected with intelligence activities...

"d. Directive - No approved directive was available covering school objectives, the procurement and assignment of students. Furthermore, certain subjects now taught at the school such as pistol marksmanship, could be taught in the field under the supervision of the Directors of Intelligence and the time saved devoted to other important school subjects...

"e. Methods of teaching - The classes are too large due to lack of sufficient classrooms and instructors. The methods of teaching are believed sound and effective. However, much improvement can be made through the use of more and better visual aids. Copies of Army and FBI training films and slides should be provided for the school...In lieu of the exclusive use of blackboards, charts mounted on cloth and rolled on sticks should be prepared for use whenever practicable. A projector is needed for slides. Some of the existing equipment needs replacement."[30]

In the course of his survey, Colonel Timothy had come across many weaknesses in the school. He did not have to search for these failings; they had been apparent for many months to the school administrators and officials at CIC Headquarters. There was no single doorstep to which the school troubles could be

30 Memo for the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service from Col P. H. Timothy, Subject: Inspection of CIC Training School, Chicago, Ill., dtd 19 Sep 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

traced. In the overall mobilization of the country, the affairs of the Counter Intelligence Corps Training School were only a small part of the large war problem.

The most significant disclosure of the staff study of the school was the fact that conditions which had been more than satisfactory for the training of the CIP agents prior to Pearl Harbor were no longer adequate. Formerly comfortable quarters were now cramped, classroom space had dwindled from ample to scarce, and the ratio of instructors to students had taken a sharp decline.

The change in the physical facilities of the school was not solely due to the increased student body. The Navy had been assigned space in the Tower Town Club and the rooms of the hotel building bulged with Armed Forces personnel.[31] Students now got off the elevators at decks instead of floors.

The recognition at high levels of the plight of the CIC Training School proved to be a cue to action. Within a few weeks after the staff study was published, a memorandum from General Strong to the Adjutant General requested that the Commanding General, Services of Supply, locate new quarters "within an approximate two-mile radius of the center of Chicago, Illinois" for the school. The urgency of the move was increased when the Navy developed aspirations of expanding the space allotted to them in the Tower Town Club. The letter was sent forward marked "immediate action."[32] A new location for the school was found at 66 East 11th Street on Chicago's South Side, and the shift was made during November 1942.[33]

Even while these changes in the facilities of the school were being contemplated and accomplished, plans were crystallized for streamlining the training of potential CIC agents. Prior to Colonel Timothy's visit to the Chicago school, a plan was devised that would make the Chicago CIC School an Advanced Training School. The initial instruction of agents would be delegated to preliminary CIC schools within all Departments and all Service Commands except the Ninth, which was to be included with Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. A memorandum dated 3 November 1942, to the Adjutant General suggested that courses be conducted for periods of not less than three and not more than four weeks.[34] The The AC of S, G2, would assume responsibility for assigning quotas of commissioned and noncommissioned officers for attendance at the CIC Advanced Training School

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31 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

32 Memo for the Adjutant General from Maj Gen George V. Strong, Subject: CIC Investigator's Training School, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

33 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

34 Memo for the Adjutant General from Maj Gen George V. Strong, Subject: CIC Training Schools, dtd 3 Nov 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

to be filled by the various commands. Students selected for the Chicago school would be placed on temporary duty by their respective Commands and would report and remain in civilian clothing throughout the training period.

This two-level training program was designed to ease the load of the Chicago school without reducing the number of CIC agents. All members of CIC would receive similar fundamental training. Specialized training could be offered to selected agents without hindering the efficiency of detachments in the field. Officers and enlisted men already graduated from the Advanced CIC School would serve as training cadre.[35]

The program met with quick approval. On 11 November, a letter was dispatched to the Departments and Commands calling for the establishment of the preliminary training schools. Enclosed with the letter was a list of the basic courses that would be taught in the Service Command schools, and also the revised curriculum of the Advanced Course.

CIC Training School instructors took the initiative in suggesting changes in the program, and the new curriculum for the Chicago School[36] included several courses previously not taught. These included the Delimitation of Jurisdiction Agreement; a short lecture on Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments in Theaters of Operation; a brief history of the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I; and countersubversive systems. Hours were added to such courses as counterespionage and countersabotage. The Counter Intelligence Corps School was beginning to prepare agents for CIC's biggest task in World War II, service with the tactical commands in areas of operations. The school still turned out investigators, but many were destined to be "gumshoes" in combat boots.

The change in administration and instruction at the Chicago school late in November 1942 was accomplished by a revised Table of Organization that called for a total of 18 commissioned officers. The Headquarters Detachment also had to be staffed by non-CIC personnel to perform maintenance services and operate the mess. The TOE was adjusted to allow for a total of 26 enlisted men to take care of these functions.[37]

The Chicago school continued to operate at 66 East 11th Street without significant changes in curriculum until July 1943. By this date, high level planners realized that the CIC School was the victim of a considerable time lag. CIC agents had been overseas with combat units for many months and yet the principal training

35 Interview with Arthur K. Peters, Major, MI Reserve.

36 Curriculum attached as Appendix 2.

37 Memo for the Chief of Staff, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, Subject: CIC Advance Training School, dtd 11 Nov 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

school for these agents was still concentrating on preparing investigators for domestic service. Something had to be done to bring the school up to date.

The something turned out to have two phases: a change in instructors and a completely overhauled curriculum. CIC Headquarters turned to foreign areas of operation to locate new members of the faculty. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Parsons, commander of the detachment in North Africa was transferred from NATOUSA to Chicago on 16 July to be commandant of the school. Major Walker became executive officer. Men with combat experience, such as Paul Heegard-Jensen, were placed on the faculty as instructors. Up to this time, the instructors had been of uniformly high caliber. But they all had similar professional backgrounds: members of State and Federal Police organizations, district attorneys, treasury officials, special agents who had recently completed OCS.[38]

The revamping of the curriculum was along logical lines. The new instructors were freshly returned from combat zones. Their experiences and the lessons they had learned would provide the core of practical data around which lectures on frontier and travel control, troop security and other combat CIC concerns would be constructed. No single sweeping change was made in the curriculum. The goal was apparent and the CIC School Staff worked steadily toward it.

By January 1944, a course of study had been evolved that seemed to answer the training needs of agents destined either for work in the Zone of Interior or with tactical detachments overseas.[39] The final curriculum accented schooling in the work of CIC detachments in the various theaters of operation, allied and enemy political intelligence and police systems, and additional hours of security. Investigative training was not made subordinate: 101 hours were devoted to surveillance, interrogation, report writing and allied subjects. Moulages, microphone planting and several technical subjects were deleted to free hours for the new courses.

A major change in the administration of the Chicago school during this time of revision was the requiring of all school personnel to report in and attend school in military uniform. There was no worry about compromising agents, most of whom would soon be wearing the bright red "CIC" brassard on their arms in combat areas. With the donning of the uniform came a new stress on "soldiering." Command inspections and unarmed combat military drill were included in the program for students who understood that they would be soldiers first and agents second.

The Counter Intelligence Corps School that evolved from these modifications was far different from the original Washington CIP School. No longer were agents

38 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
39 Curriculum attached as Appendix 3.

"detailed" to receive instruction, often in subjects in which they had long practiced in the field. The men attending the Chicago school at the end of 1943 were for the most part engaged in serious study that would teach them how to perform their counterintelligence duties effectively wherever in the world they were sent.[40]

The report of the Inspector General who took CIC operations in the Zone of Interior out from under G2 doomed the revised Chicago CIC School to an early demise. Early in November 1943, the Commanding General of the Sixth Service Command announced that General Strong, the AC of S, G2, had agreed to release control of the CIC Advanced Training School to the Sixth Service Command. This announcement was followed by a proposal to move the school from Chicago and merge it with the Provost Marshal General School at Fort Custer, Michigan.[41] This was the same idea CIC had vetoed in 1941. The argument was the same: that both the Provost Marshal and the counterintelligence investigators were charged with similar responsibilities and that the personnel of both organizations were mainly individuals who had been lawyers and investigators in civilian life. The difference in purpose and procedure between intelligence and criminal investigations was overlooked or bypassed.

In a memorandum to Colonel L. R. Forney, dated 6 November 1943, Colonel Kibler put up what amounted to a last ditch fight for the Chicago school. His arguments in defense of the school were numerous and urgent. Some were based on current Army Regulations, some on the past performance of the school, and some on common sense. Included were the following points:

> "Direct control of the school by the Office of the Chief, CIC, permits immediate changes and modifications in training to meet changing conditions in the various theaters...
>
> "The Counter Intelligence Corps is presently engaged in a special operation involving the transfer of the bulk of the Corps from duty in the Zone of Interior to duty in theaters of operation and with tactical units... To successfully accomplish this movement, and to provide the theaters with highly trained men, it was necessary to utilize the entire facilities of the school for the instruction of three classes of 270 men each in a revised program based squarely on the immediate, current theater needs. The ability to make such a quick and sudden shift in the activities of the school was only possible because the school was under the control of the office of the Chief, CIC...
>
> "For many months the school has been built into the consciousness of the members of the Corps. It has become the center of the morale and esprit de corps of the entire Corps...

40 Curriculum attached as Appendix 4.

41 Memo for Col L. R. Forney, from Colonel Kibler, Subject: CIC Advanced Training School, dtd 6 Nov 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

"The present physical establishment of the CIC Advanced Training School has been the result of many months of experimentation and testing, and only within the last months have there been secured what are considered complete and adequate facilities."[42]

The earnestness of Colonel Kibler's opposition to the closing of the school was no match for the determination of high level commanders to follow the Inspector General's suggestions. On 5 February 1944, the twenty-fourth enlisted class graduated from the Counter Intelligence Corps' Advanced Training School in Chicago. From the school's inception in November 1941 to this date, approximately 3,000 enlisted men and 1,000 officers had attended the Chicago course.[43]

Jurisdiction of the buildings and training was transferred to the Provost Marshal General's office, and the name of the school was changed to the Security Intelligence School. The change came so rapidly that orders cut on CIC personnel were not rescinded and the first class at the Security Intelligence School consisted largely of CIC agents.[44]

42 Memo for Col L. R. Forney from Colonel Kibler, Subject: CIC Advanced Training School, dtd 6 Nov 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

43 Training History of CIC During World War II, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

44 Various orders of CIC personnel to attend "Advance Security Intelligence Course Nr 1." Folder "Orders and Correspondence." (Central Records Facility)

Chapter 3

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

The qualifications required of an individual for selection as a CIC agent were at least equal to the qualifications of an applicant to Officer Candidate School. Many War Department officials admitted that the CIC requirements were even stiffer than the standards set for OCS students. It was evident to many individuals that a program for commissioning selected CIC agents was highly desirable, but the Military Intelligence Division had no OCS of its own. Enlisted intelligence men who wanted to receive a commission had to attend an OCS conducted by a combat arm of the service.

On 5 December 1941, two days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, radiograms had been sent out from CIP Headquarters in Washington to all Corps areas and departments, urging that all qualified and deserving CIP agents be sent to certain Officer Candidate Schools under quotas allotted to the Corps areas and departments. Less than two months after the United States entered the war, a staff study authorizing the appointment of CIC personnel to the grade of Second Lieutenant, MI Reserve was prepared. A representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, revealed that this plan was generally acceptable but suggested that it would be more suitable to conduct the CIC School in Chicago as an Officer Candidate School for the Military Intelligence Division.[45]

On 3 February 1942, Capt Sylvester P. Smith, the Commandant of the CIC School in Chicago, received a memorandum from Capt H. G. Sheen, the Chief, CIC, that recounted elements of a telephone conversation the two men had held a few days previously. Captain Sheen noted that an Officer Candidate School for CIC personnel "considered qualified for commission" was needed. He suggested that this school be conducted as an advanced version of the CIC School with the addition of courses suitable for the education of future officers. The factors that Captain Sheen termed essential for eligibility were completion of basic military training, service as a CIC agent for a period of not less than six months, successful completion of the CIC basic course, and "demonstration by actual performance of duty his fitness for commission."

Selection was to be initially the responsibility of an individual's immediate commanding officer. But the choice would have to be approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, of the headquarters to which the individual was assigned and confirmed by the AC of S, G2, War Department. The Chief, CIC, would be authorized to select three students at large for every course.

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45 Office Journal, Headquarters CIC from 27 Jan 41 to 1 May 42, entries dtd 5 Dec 41 and 23 Jan 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Captain Sheen included in the memorandum an outline of courses that he deemed essential for the instruction. Listed were the following:

1. Military history of the United States.
2. Organization of the Army.
3. Military customs, courtesy and service.
4. Company administration.
   a. supply
   b. mess management
5. Military law and courts martial.
6. Map and aerial photo reading.
7. Military hygiene and first aid.
8. Defense against chemical warfare.
9. Scouting and patrolling.
10. Rifle and pistol marksmanship.
11. Bayonet combat.
12. Military correspondence.
13. Camouflage and field fortification.
14. Military Intelligence (to include organization of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, combat intelligence, including interrogation of prisoners of war, censorship, public relations and all allied matters).
15. Refresher course of basic CIC School.[46]

Captain Sheen's memorandum reflected the considerable thought that had been given to the idea of an Officer Candidate School for the Military Intelligence Division. But there were still numerous administrative matters to be accomplished before the plan on paper became a reality. In Chicago, Capt James B. Long, a member of the staff of the CIC School, conferred with representatives of the National Park Service trying to obtain the facilities of a former Civilian Conservation Corps camp located some 17 miles from the city. By 6 February 1942, however, conferences with the Commanding General of the Sixth Corps Area revealed that space, shelter, all facilities, equipment and personnel could be provided at Fort Sheridan, and CIC officials regarded this arrangement favorably.[47]

Two months and one staff study later, the first (and only) Military Intelligence Officer Candidate School in the history of the United States Army was opened at the Illinois Women's Athletic Club in Chicago. Major Long was designated as Commandant. Captains Kent Carris and E. C. Townsend and Lieutenants

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46 Memorandum for Captain Smith from Capt H. G. Sheen, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps Training Program, dtd 3 Feb 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

47 Office Journal, Headquarters CIC, from 27 January 1941 to 1 May 1942, entries dtd 3 Feb and 6 Feb 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

R. W. Tucker and A. K. Peters were assigned as instructors. The first class of 30 candidates reported on 20 April and undertook an eight-week course that was primarily geared to train the agents in subjects provided in any OCS; a background in investigative work was a prerequisite for all the candidates.[48]

The course totaled 628 hours with 306 devoted to General Military Subjects. The candidates spent hours in Infantry drill, learning elements of scouting and patrolling, camouflage, fox hole construction, bayonet combat, and weapon firing. These courses were designed to acquaint the prospective officers with the combat responsibilities that they would have to shoulder. Specific duties required as intelligence personnel were also covered in the course, including instruction in maps and mapping, reconnaissance, and other combat intelligence problems. An additional 78 hours were spent in review of investigative procedures and other subjects that pertained to Domestic Intelligence. This varied program was designed to prepare the candidates for assignments either in the Zone of the Interior or overseas theaters to meet the need for trained intelligence officers that existed throughout the Army.[49]

All 30 agents that attended the Officer Candidate School successfully completed the course, a fact which testified not only to the careful instruction they received but also to the outstanding qualifications of the men themselves.[50] On 13 June, at a ceremony in the main ballroom of the Knickerbocker Hotel in Chicago, the graduates received their commissions as 2d Lieutenants in Military Intelligence. Major General George V. Strong, the AC of S, G2, WD, was present at the exercises and delivered the commencement address.[51]

Even while this OCS class had assembled to receive their commissions, plans had taken form to disband the school. In fact, four days before the men were to graduate, word came through that the Craig Board in Washington, which supervised the procurement and training of Army officers, had disapproved commissioning the Military Intelligence agents. After a good deal of discussion, a statement was released that the AC of S, G1, and the Craig Board did not consider the course at Chicago as a candidate school within the accepted definition.

The conclusion had been reached that the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Division did not have sufficient personnel or sufficient demand for officer personnel to justify the continuance of an officer candidate school for Military Intelligence. It is interesting to note, despite this conclusion,

48 Interview with Arthur K. Peters, Major, MI Reserve, 22 Sep 55.
49 Curriculum attached as Appendix 5.
50 Interview with Arthur K. Peters, Major, MI Reserve, on 22 Sep 55.
51 Folder, CIC Advanced Training from March 41 to Dec 42, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

that CIC was shortly to have its authorized officer strength increased to 543 officers and that many officers were later commissioned from CIC ranks.[52]

The 30 men were granted their commissions. The Military Intelligence Division Officer Candidate School, however, was discontinued after this class had graduated.[53]

The irony of this was that the 30 commissions had been given to the Chief, CIC, to award direct. Since Captain Sheen came from an old Army family and had been to West Point, he did not feel that men should be given commissions without some officer training. The school was organized to provide it. A complaint of an agent with a foreign background who was not selected for the course, is said to have called the school to the attention of the Craig Board.[54]

52 Interview with Arthur K. Peters, Major, MI Reserve, on 22 Sep 55.
53 Folder, CIC Advanced Training from March 41 to December 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
54 Interview with Arthur K. Peters, Major, MI Reserve, on 22 Sep 55.

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Chapter 4

A SERVICE COMMAND PRELIMINARY TRAINING SCHOOL

Although there were some variants in the operation of the different Service Command Preliminary Training Schools, the CIC school maintained by the Third Service Command, was more or less typical in its procurement of personnel, its teaching methods and its administration.

On 11 August 1942, Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Third Service Command, moved into one of the former dormitories of Goucher College in Baltimore, Maryland. Six days later, the initial session of the CIC Training School for this Service Command was under way. The administration of the school was under the direction of the Detachment Commander. A lieutenant was designated as Training Officer, and a special agent performed the dual function of Sergeant Major for the Detachment and the School. All classes were conducted within the Detachment Headquarters Building.

A photographic darkroom and investigative research laboratory were established in the Headquarters building and completely equipped for photographic development, printing and enlarging, photostatic reproductions, and ultra-violet examinations.

The faculty that the Third Service Command gathered for the training school consisted of members of the detachment and outside speakers who simply accepted the teaching assignment as an added responsibility. This system eliminated the procurement of a large permanent faculty, and provided for experts and specialists instructing in the fields with which they were particularly conversant.

By 11 November, when the Adjutant General's letter requiring the Service Commands to institute CIC training schools was published, the Third Service Command School had already completed two separate sessions and had graduated 66 men for duty in the field.

The theory behind the Third Service Command School curriculum was that CIC training fell into two primary classifications: military and investigative. The military aspects were to be obtained at Basic Training Centers in order that an agent could function properly when assigned a military mission. The investigative aspects were the responsibility of the Counter Intelligence Corps. The Service Command felt that it should provide the basic investigative training and the apprentice training in a field office. Further specialized and advanced training was considered the province of CIC Headquarters and the War Department.

The training program was designed for classes of four weeks duration, and of sufficiently wide scope to:

"1. Teach agent to handle himself properly under all circumstances before anyone, in a manner that will reflect credit to the Corps.

"2. Keep agent out of trouble generally.

"3. Teach agent to recognize urgent important facts or 'hot' leads and what to do with them.

"4. Cause agent to know his limitations and not to hesitate to get competent help when the situation requires it.

"5. Orient agent so that he will know what is expected of him, in what subjects he is weak, and from what sources he can secure help in overcoming these weaknesses.

"6. Show agent how to get started off on the right foot, practicing good investigative procedure."

With these six points as a guide, the Third Service Command evolved a full scale training program. When the prospective agents arrived at the CIC detachment, they were greeted and given living quarters in the building. After filling out administrative forms, they were dispatched to purchase civilian clothing. Lectures on security regulations, safeguarding military information, supplies, and report writing as well as typing and driving lessons were included in the "pre-training duties." The trainees were strictly enjoined to avoid revealing their connection with CIC unless required by the nature of their duties. They also were warned to avoid congregating in groups with fellow agents when outside the building and never to "talk shop" in public places. To underscore these requirements, each prospective agent took an oath which bound him to the maintenance of secrecy about his assignment.

The formal curriculum taught at the Third Service Command entailed almost two hundred hours of training for the role of investigator. Included in the course of study were forty-six hours of subjects grouped as "investigative" (e.g., observation and description, surveillance and undercover, personnel investigation), seventy hours of "technical and practical" studies (e.g., fingerprints, microphone installation, moulage, plaster casts), fourteen hours on "laws," five hours on "government agencies," eleven hours on "pistol marksmanship," and six hours on "espionage and counterespionage."[55]

55 Curriculum for Third Service Command School attached as Appendix 6.

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Upon completion of this course, the trainees were sufficiently well educated in investigative procedures to begin work as apprentice agents in Service Command field offices. Under the guidance of a special agent, each newly trained agent was given practical experience for four weeks. After showing himself to advantage during this apprenticeship period, the agent was advanced to the title of special agent and became eligible for further training at the CIC Advanced Training School in Chicago.[56]

56 All material in this section is drawn from: Report of Counter Intelligence Corps Investigator's Training School, Third Service Command, Baltimore, Maryland, complying with War Department letter AG 320.999 CIC (11-3-42) OB-D-B-M, subject: Counter Intelligence Corps Training Schools, dtd 11 November 1943. (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 5

CIC STAGING AREA

Education for investigative work was one phase of CIC training; education for combat activity was another. By mid-1943, most of the agents of CIC had completed eight weeks of basic training. Few had more than a nodding acquaintance with the weapons and techniques of the fighting men. The Chicago Advanced Training School, with its desks and blackboards, was hardly an adequate place for combat indoctrination, and the CIC planners saw the necessity for a staging area once the CIC role with tactical units became evident.

Many Difficulties Encountered at Ports of Embarkation

Another reason for a CIC Staging Area was the need for equipping CIC agents with special items, such as civilian clothing, to avoid compromise of the men at the ports of embarkation. Some difficulties encountered in processing CIC groups for overseas shipment were mentioned in a letter to the Chief, CIC, from a harrassed captain at the New York Port of Embarkation, shortly after the invasion of North Africa had been undertaken. Among the problems that were listed was the inadequate and contradictory Table of Equipment for CIC agents:

> The orders glibly recite, in what is probably approved form, that the men should be equipped in accordance with Table So-and-So for overseas service. In the first place the table cited, as amended up to date, makes no mention of impregnated clothing, which throws the entire allotment of clothing out of balance. At the present time, the authorities issuing the clothing take the position that the men are entitled to only one outfit of clothing, which suits everyone, and only one other complete outfit, which suits no one. Presumably, the men can hole up for the time necessary for periodic cleaning of their one suit of clothing...One day we are told that summer clothing is necessary - or permissable, and the next day, that it is not...[57]

Snafus similar to these frequently plagued CIC detachments during the critical days in which the units were staging for overseas duty.

One of the earliest recognitions of the need for a CIC Staging Area was recorded in a memorandum from Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, to Chief, CIC. Dated 6 May 1943, the memorandum

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57 Ltr from Capt Earl Pettus, Fort Hamilton, N.Y. Overseas Staging Area to Chief, CIC, dtd 17 November 1942, Subject: Embarkation of CIC Detachments for Overseas Stations, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

read, in part, "I am aware of the fact that no authority exists at the present time for a CIC casual detachment where personnel may be refreshed in up-to-the-minute information and directives just prior to being sent to the battle theater..."[58] By 15 May, Colonel Kibler was attempting to correct this lack.

Another factor which gave impetus to the creation of the staging area was a letter from the Adjutant General in March 1943, assigning quotas to Service Commands for an eight-week training program at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, designed to ready CIC personnel for overseas tactical duty.[59] But as Colonel Kibler stated, this training was primarily designed for "the instruction of the intelligence personnel of combat units, and for the instruction of language men being trained in the intelligence of enemy prisons." Colonel Kibler strongly recommended that the assignment of CIC agents to Camp Ritchie be discontinued and a CIC Staging Area established in lieu of this program.[60]

CIC Staging Area Activated

On 26 June 1943, a memorandum from Colonel Kibler to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group stated that space had been obtained at the Army Air Base, Logan Field, Baltimore, Maryland for a CIC Staging Area.[61] In addition, facilities had been offered for specialized training at Fort George G. Meade, Fort Holabird, and Fort Hunt.

The Staging Area was activated on 3 July 1943 by verbal directive of the Chief, Military Intelligence Service. Two days later the initial class entered training with 34 CIC agents (including officers) present. For men used to desk jobs, the schedule was arduous. There was no time to waste in preparing the men physically and mentally for combat duty.

The first week involved training at Logan Field in School of the Soldier: marksmanship with .45 automatic pistol, .38 revolver, sub-machine gun, and the M1 rifle; map reading; tent pitching; and other military subjects. At the close of this week, the trainees were transferred to Fort Hunt in Washington. Here the classified portion of the staging area program was undertaken with

58 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

59 Ltr, dtd 19 March 1943, to all Service Commands, from Maj Gen J.A. Ulio, TAG, Subject: Attendance of CIC Personnel at the MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md., (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

60 Memorandum for Colonel Forney from Colonel Kibler, Subject: Review of CIC Training Situation and Preliminary Training Suggestions, dtd 15 May 1943, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

61 Memorandum for the Chief, CIC from Colonel Kibler, Subject: Activation of CIC Staging Area, dtd 25 June 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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instruction given by members of the Prisoner of War Branch. Courses in escape and evasion, resistance to interrogation, Geneva Convention, and camp conditions were included in this highly specialized training.

After a week at Fort Hunt, the trainees were on the move again, back to Baltimore and the Holabird Motor Base. During the third week, the men at the staging area learned about the mechanics and operation of Army vehicles. In addition to practical driving tests, there were courses in motor "trouble shooting" and field expedients and blackout driving. The men were returned to Logan Field for the final phase of their staging area training at the end of the week.

The fourth week was dedicated to an accelerated program of physical training which included an overnight hike, review of marksmanship, drilling and preparation for departure.[62] By 31 July, the first group to enter the staging area had been transferred to theaters and tactical units. Some went to NATOUSA for special duty in Sicily, some to the China-Burma-India theater, and some to tactical units within the Zone of the Interior.[63]

Main Facilities of Staging Area Moved to Holabird

The CIC Staging Area had hardly been established at Logan Field for a month when the Air Corps requested the return of its loaned facilities to accommodate a new fighter command. CIC headquarters turned to the nearby Holabird Ordnance Depot where the motor training had taken place and asked if additional space could be made available.[64] Arrangements were made and on 8 August, Staging Area training became centered at Holabird. The new location proved superior in many respects. More men could be trained simultaneously, and the facilities were leased for a period of twelve months.

The physical facilities at Holabird were also more satisfactory. Barracks equipped with showers and latrines were available for approximately 30 officers and 150 enlisted men. Mess facilities for these personnel were available, and the administration section was provided with one building which served as an office, supply room, and day room. Space for two class rooms in the southwest

62 Training Schedule, Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area, Baltimore, Md., dtd 2 July 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

63 Memorandum for Col L. R. Forney from Colonel Kibler, Subject: Progress of CIC Staging Area, dtd 31 July 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

64 Ltr to Military Training Division, The Office of the Chief of Ordnance from Colonel Kibler, Subject: Staging Area for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel, dtd 31 July 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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section of the post near Colgate Creek were also furnished.[65] No one realized then that three years later Holabird would become the postwar home of CIC.

The curriculum at the Staging Area remained substantially unchanged despite the new location. However, one significant feature was added. After four days at Fort Hunt, the trainees were shipped to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie. Here, for two days the men were taught the fine points of knife-fighting, street fighting, house fighting, and unarmed offense.[66]

As reports filtered in from theaters of operation on the effectiveness of the Staging Area, revisions and additions were made to the program. By 30 August, the course was lengthened to six weeks under this new program. An entire week was spent at Camp Ritchie under the guidance of counterintelligence instructors who gave extended lectures and problems in map reading, scouting and patrolling, enemy identification, and port and field security. In addition the techniques of close fighting were included as before.

The course at Fort Hunt was maintained under the new curriculum, but it was compressed into three days. The time thus saved was spent at Fort Belvoir where the trainees were instructed in camouflage and camouflage discipline, mines and booby traps, methods of search and disposal of explosives. Approximately 700 officers and enlisted men received this three-day training.[67]

The second additional week was gained by the inclusion of special courses and trips in the vicinity of Baltimore. Time was spent inspecting the Port of Baltimore with lectures enroute on Port and Harbor security, Cargo Search and Placement, and Ship Search. For most of the men attending the Staging Area, these were subjects which had been completely neglected in previous training. CIC's mission in many theaters soon brought into play many of the principles that approximately 725 trainees learned in their tour of the Baltimore harbor.

Industrial Security Added to Program

Industrial security was another phase of the revised program. An afternoon was spent by the trainees at the Glenn L. Martin plant where critical war industry

65 Memorandum for Colonel Kibler from Capt Edwin Bennett, Property Officer, CIC Branch, MIS, Subject: Establishment of CIC Staging Area at Camp Holabird, dtd 2 August 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

66 Training Schedule, CIC Staging Area, dtd 2 August 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

67 Training History of CIC in World War II, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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was in progress. A tour of the plant under the instruction of the security officials permitted a view of actual protection procedures. Approximately 940 CIC officers and enlisted men took this tour.[68]

Although these new features of the Staging Area seemed more closely allied to the specialized work of CIC, the goal of the Staging Area remained primarily the preparation needed to meet the physical rigors of combat. A letter received from a CIC agent stationed in New Guinea stressed the importance of physical conditioning for the agents:

> The first battle that every man in this section fights is the one to keep himself physically fit...A soldier must be in perfect shape when he comes here, and he must know how to keep himself in shape. That is his first duty.
>
> The US Army is mainly a civilian Army, but do not let them act like civilians when they get into an operations zone. Give them hell now, and they will thank you for it later.[69]

The Staging Area was never a literal "hell" for the trainees, but hundreds of CIC agents were transformed from civilians to soldiers during their brief stay.

Modifications in the Staging Area program continued until the Area was deactivated on 5 February 1945. Some changes were desirable and others were simply necessary. With the transfer of Camp Holabird from Ordnance to Signal Corps control, the automotive course had to be taught at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, about 30 miles from Baltimore, after 8 November. Approximately 400 officers and enlisted men took the Aberdeen training. The course of instruction remained essentially the same despite the change in locale.[70]

Staging Area Deactivated

With the curtailment of CIC activities in the Zone of the Interior, the Staging Area was officially discontinued. However, in reality it continued as a "Casual" center until 10 May 1944 in order to train the last scheduled personnel for the

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68 Training Schedule #3, CIC Staging Area, Baltimore, Md., dtd 31 August 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility); and Training History of CIC in World War II, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

69 Letter written by CIC agent (unidentified) to his former Commanding Officer copy incl in memo to Col L. R. Forney from Col H. R. Kibler, dtd 16 July 1943, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

70 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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European Theater. These were for the most part personnel from the Office of the Chief, CIC, which was discontinued on 5 February.[71]

On 29 January 1944, authority was granted for establishment of a CIC Overseas Pool at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Physical training and refresher courses were given agents here just prior to shipment.[72]

In reviewing the activities of the Staging Area, Colonel Kibler remarked that the program had been designed to accomplish two specific purposes:

a. To bring about an orderly transfer of CIC from Service Commands to theaters and tactical units.

b. To permit a more careful selection and organization of detachments for tactical organizations and to provide an opportunity for specialized training.[73]

These objectives had been achieved during the six months of the CIC Staging Area operation; 218 officers and 2,201 enlisted men were processed, trained and moved through the Staging Area. The training gap left by the CIC Advanced Training School in Chicago, even with its revised program, had been filled temporarily.

Staging Area Administration

The organization of the Staging Area constituted a major problem from the time when the Area was only a plan on paper. First to be considered was a dual procurement matter; how to get trainees from the Service Commands and where to get instructors. The first was solved by notifying the Service Commands in June of the number of men to be withdrawn monthly through November 1943 for Staging Area training.[74] These requests were made with the understanding that most of the men who completed the Staging Area would not revert to control of the Service Commands that sent them. Instead, they would be ticketed for overseas duty.

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71 Interview with Lt Col James F. Foothorap, MI, Res, on 15 September 1955, (Central Records Facility).

72 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

73 Memorandum for Chief, Counterintelligence Group from Colonel Kibler, dtd 7 February 1944, Subject: CIC Staging Area, Baltimore, Md., (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

74 Memorandum for Chief, Counterintelligence Group from Colonel Kibler, Subject: CIC Staging Area, Baltimore, Md., dtd 7 February 1944, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility); and Memorandum for Chief, Counterintelligence Group, Subject: Activation of CIC Staging Area, dtd 25 June 1943, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

The officers selected for training were drawn in part from the members of CIC Headquarters. Lt Col Neville K. Adkinson was initial Commanding Officer of the Staging Area. He was relieved to assume duties as Executive Officer of CIC and was succeeded by Capt Ralph Sims in August.[75] Capt LeRoy C. Hill commanded from December 1943 through May 1944. Officers who participated in the Staging Area program were often detailed to serve as student instructors, to gain familiarity with command and respect from the enlisted men who frequently were to serve under them in combat. Since many of these officers had never attended Officer Candidate School in a combat arm, a one-week, pre-training, indoctrination course was provided to teach them the principles they in turn would be teaching at the Staging Area.[76]

Strict adherence to the standards of military discipline and courtesy was demanded of all the trainees, most of whom were accustomed to rather informal relations between officers and enlisted men. The following general schedule was put into effect to be observed by all personnel assigned to the Staging Area:

First Call	0545
Assembly	0555
Reveille	0600
Calisthenics	0600
Breakfast	0645
Sick Call	0730
Drill Call	0755
Recall	1150
Dinner	1200
Drill Call	1255
Recall	1730
Supper	1800
Tattoo	2100
Call to Quarters	2245
Taps	2300 [77]

Although the duty hours were long, the training rugged, and the requirements on the individual trainee rigid, reports from official Staging Area observers

75 Memorandum for Chief, MIS, from Colonel Kibler, Subject: CIC Staging Area, dtd 3 July 1943, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

76 Memorandum for Chief, CIC, from Lt Thomas H. Dowd and notes thereon by Major Staudt, Subject: Observations at the CIC Staging Area, dtd 24 August 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

77 CIC Staging Area, Holabird Ordnance Depot, Administrative Orders Nr 5, dtd 17 August 1943, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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uniformly praised the spirit and the morale maintained by the men in training. The performance of the CIC agents at the Staging Area gave promise of their future performances in the theaters of operation to which they were assigned.[78]

78 "Official Observers' Reports," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Chapter 6

CIC TRAINING AT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER

The Inspector General's report of November 1943 that spelled the end of CIC's domestic role also threatened to deactivate all CIC training programs in the Zone of the Interior. However, an important factor had been neglected by the efficiency-minded officials of the War Department; CIC still had an overseas mission to perform.

On 4 January 1944, Colonel Kibler met with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, to devise a means of training CIC agents for duty in overseas combat areas. The plan that appeared most feasible was to send CIC personnel to the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.[79] Agents would be enrolled in the General Intelligence Course, which included some counterintelligence training. They also would receive special instruction in subjects formerly taught at the CIC Advanced Training School in Chicago. Instructors for the CIC subjects would be selected from the personnel who had taught at the Advanced Training School.[80]

Program Works Out on Paper Only

This plan was duly placed on paper, but the proposed training program soon became enshrouded in a fog of uncertainties and vaguenesses. When the fog had lifted, it was clear that no formal CIC training was to take place at Camp Ritchie. Usually, only officer personnel, newly assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps, were sent to MITC for the General Intelligence Course. Only occasionally did small groups of enlisted men enrol in this course.[81] CIC

CIC training remained in this indefinite status for more than six months despite the issuance of War Department Memorandum 350-44 on 12 June 1944 which outlined a three stage training program for CIC personnel consisting of:

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79 Memorandum from Lt Col Hugh D. Wise, Jr., to Assistant Executive Officer, CIG, Subject: Items of Interest Pertaining to the CIC, dtd 8 January 1944, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

80 A memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff from Maj Gen George V. Strong, dtd 2 December 1943, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility), indicates that although all CIC training was to end not later than 5 February 1944, the "Staging Course" at Camp Ritchie was to continue. General Strong apparently first conceived the idea of expanding facilities at Ritchie to encompass all necessary CIC training when the other facilities were shut down.

81 MITC Training File, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

(1) A 17-week basic tactical and technical training program to be provided by the Army Service Forces at the Provost Marshal General's Replacement Training Center, Fort Custer, Michigan.
(2) A four-to-six-week investigative training at the Security Intelligence School (the successor to the CIC Advanced Training School) in Chicago.
(3) A eight-week general Intelligence Course at the MITC.

An attempt was made to start the first phase of the CIC training at Fort Custer, Michigan, but the effort was abandoned when no personnel were procured. A staff study of the plight of CIC training, completed on 7 August 1944, concluded that War Department Memorandum 350-44 was unsatisfactory, since it required too long a period of training before personnel were prepared for assignment to overseas theaters of operation.[82]

On 11 August 1944, Maj G. L. Staudt, Chief of the CIC Section, met with members of the MITC staff to attempt a consolidation of the informal training arrangements that had been made for CIC personnel. At the conference, it was noted that MITC was currently teaching the majority of the 58 subjects deemed essential for a CIC agent. In order to train CIC personnel on a full-scale basis, no additional instructors were needed. The MITC officers suggested, however, that experienced CIC members be returned from theaters of operation for temporary duty at MITC to advise and assist in the instruction. The meeting was ended with the understanding that the MITC would be ready to start CIC classes composed of sections of 30 students by 22 September.[83]

One immediate result of this meeting was that the number of CIC agents assigned to Camp Ritchie for General Intelligence training beginning 22 August was promptly stepped up from 10 to 30.[84] The period in which CIC agents had been slipped into the MITC program under rather nebulous agreements was at an end.

A revision of War Department Memorandum 350-44, dated 7 September 1944, established CIC training on a solid basis once again.[85] On 21 September, the first CIC class under this new authorization embarked on the eight-week course

82 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
83 Memorandum for Colonel Roamer from Maj G. L. Staudt, Subject: CIC Training at MITC, dtd 12 August 1944, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
84 TWX to Commandant, MITC, signed "for Bissell by Lewis," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).
85 Memorandum for Colonel Gray from Major Staudt, Subject: Special Activities Report, dtd 23 September 1944, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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designed to prepare the 121 officers and enlisted men for overseas assignments. The CIC Section in Washington undertook the preparation of a CIC guide book to assist the instructors, and monthly CIC information reports and other field reports were forwarded to Camp Ritchie to be used as illustrative material in the CIC course.

Many of these documents were of current intelligence value, and security precautions were not overlooked by the inclusion of this classified material in the course of study. The note appended to the documents stated that "Reproduction of any of the items submitted for use in training purposes will be authorized provided the classification is maintained. Since CIC trainees will handle confidential and secret material to a major extent when assigned to CIC detachments, it is believed they should be permitted access to such material while in training. Any breach of security discipline with regard to classified material will be considered lack of discretion sufficient to disqualify the individual for assignment to CIC and all students should be so advised."[86]

Counterintelligence Simply One Phase of MITC School

Despite these preparations by the CIC Section in Washington, the MITC program for CIC personnel did not deviate to any large degree from the General Intelligence Course that had been the standard instruction at Camp Ritchie. Counterintelligence was simply one phase of the training, consisting of a total of 24 hours. CIC trainees received an additional "specialist course of instruction" of 82 hours that was tailored for their future needs.[87] But the requirements of the revised War Department Memorandum 350-44 were still not met. The Memorandum called for a general breakdown of CIC training as follows:

1.	Investigative subjects	83 hours
2.	Security subjects	41 hours
3.	General subjects	31 hours
4.	Field subjects (including a 7-day field problem employing all subjects)	297 hours
5.	Allied subjects	28 hours

The course that actually was given was but a dull reflection of the Counterintelligence Section's outlined program. As late as 7 January 1945, the Commandant of the MITC contended that "The CIC students are not a separate class, but are part of each regular class undergoing a course of instruction at the MITC...

86 Ltr from Major Staudt to Major Winkler, MITC, Subject: Material for Instruction in CIC Course, dtd 14 October 1944, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

87 MITC curriculum, August-October 1944, attached as Appendix 7.

Special scheduling of special students or special sections is confusing to the extent that the regular instruction suffers immeasurable harm."[88] CIC training had been officially authorized, it had become part of an Army school, and it had been given to several hundred officers and enlisted men. But despite the efforts of officers at the CIC Section, the training fell far short of the goal anticipated by WD Memorandum 350-44.

The outlook was not entirely bleak. The Chief of the Counterintelligence Section at Camp Ritchie took a particular interest in the CIC trainees, and, after they had completed the regular eight-week MITC course, he accompanied some of them on a "post-graduate instructional visit to Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Virginia.[89] The purpose of the three-day trip was to demonstrate the special problems of intelligence involved in port security. Another innovation in CIC training at MITC was the division of the students into "Counter-intelligence-ETO" and "Counterintelligence-Pacific" groups. Although the period of training was too short for real specialization, CIC graduates earmarked for theaters of operation were given a mild taste of the problems they would face.

Throughout the first six months of the MITC program, CIC officials persisted in their efforts to have courses of specific value to the CIC trainees added to the training program at Camp Ritchie. Only slight modifications were made in the standard intelligence course of the MITC, but by March 1945 the curriculum mirrored some important changes.[90] A careful course-by-course analysis of the extent to which the training program prepared agents for duties in the theaters of operation was completed in this month. It revealed significant shortcomings and omissions. Such matters as "Checking jails and all persons confined therein, impounding mails, establishing CIC office in the center of town, were only briefly touched on." The obvious inadequacies of the CIC training program caused Colonel Kibler (at this time, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Division) to write a memorandum in March 1945 that strongly indicated the need for some serious revamping of the Camp Ritchie CIC program. The memorandum stated in part:

> Within the limitations imposed by the Commandant, MITC, the Intelligence Division, ASF, has sought to specify the specific subjects within the regular training schedule of greatest benefit to CIC personnel

88 1st Indorsement of a letter to Commanding General, ASF, Attention: Director of Intelligence, dealing with the establishment of a language course for CIC personnel at Camp Ritchie, from Col Mercer C. Walter, Commandant, MITC, dtd 7 January 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

89 Memorandum for Colonel Kibler from Major Staudt, Subject: Special Activities Report, dtd 2 December 1944, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

90 MITC curriculum, 11 March 1945, attached as Appendix 8.

and to bring about changes and additions to the regular course that would incorporate a maximum of Counter Intelligence Corps materials.

Under the former Commandant at MITC it was virtually impossible to secure changes in the schedule. CIC classes received the eight-week MITC course with practically no Counter Intelligence Corps modification.

With the advent of the new Commandant of MITC that situation was materially changed. The new Commandant has offered full cooperation and there have been...changes and additions in the course. The new Commandant is also seeking to replace certain faculty members with Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. The new Commandant does, however, concur with the former Commandant in the position that faculty and facilities will not permit a separate eight-week Counter Intelligence Corps course at MITC.

Colonel Kibler also enclosed an hour-by-hour comparison of the prescribed CIC training program (WD Memorandum 550-44) with the current course. The following breakdown was noted:

SUBJECTS	hrs in WD Memo	hrs in present schedule
Investigative	83	58
Security	41	31
General	31	66
Field	297	314
Allied	28	15
	480	484

Subjects such as "terrain intelligence" and "foreign maps" were still receiving an inordinate amount of the CIC trainees' time while courses such as "investigation of sabotage" and "CIC in tactical operations" were not being taught at all. A final shortcoming was noted in Colonel Kibler's summary:

> The facilities at Ritchie do not and cannot be made adequate for the instruction of certain specialized subjects of vital importance to the Counter Intelligence Corps; for example, in the investigative field, the course at Ritchie does not permit adequate instruction in surveillance, undercover investigations, technical laboratory equipment, methods of searching in municipalities, and actual problems concerning these subjects...[91]

91 Memorandum for Colonel Jones, G2, WDGS, from Colonel Kibler, Subject: Counter Intelligence Corps Training at MITC Camp Ritchie, Md., dtd 24 March 1945, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The lingering effects of the Inspector General's report of a year and a half earlier still permeated CIC training at MITC and the investigative aspects of security were often overlooked. Nevertheless, CIC's role as a field intelligence agency was clearly recognized. Although the end of the war in Europe was approaching, CIC officials soon began to concentrate on establishing a program for redeployment of CIC personnel for the Pacific Theater.

Redeployment Training at MITC

On 18 December 1944, the Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces, had disseminated a memorandum entitled, "ASF Military Training Policy After the Defeat of Germany." The initial paragraph contained a message that was, in effect, the preamble of a new CIC training program:

> All training activities during this period (post German conquest) will be conducted to prepare individuals, crews, teams, and organizations specifically for operations against JAPAN...Redeployment training will be the term used to designate the training conducted in the UNITED STATES for individuals and organizations returned from other theaters for eventual redeployment in the Pacific Theater.[92]

By 5 April 1945, CIC and MITC officials had prepared a suitable course outline for the redeployment training of CIC agents. The training was scheduled to cover two weeks and entail a total of 88 hours broken into major subject divisions as follows:

Terrain Intelligence	9 hours
Signal Intelligence	3 hours
Staff Intelligence	2 hours
Counterintelligence	47 hours
Enemy Armies	15 hours
Military Interpreters	7 hours
Combat Section	5 hours

Courses in investigation, interrogation, travel control, use of informants and other CIC duties especially oriented for the Pacific Theater were included, along with instruction dealing with "Japanese Racial Characteristics," "Japanese Espionage Agents and Techniques," and "Japanese Police Systems."[93]

92 ASF Military Training Policy After the Defeat of Germany (Reference Memo, Dir/MTD "Changes in ASF Basic Plan for Period 1," SPTRG 370.01 (Pl), 18 December 1944), (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

93 Report from MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md., dtd 5 April 1945, "Reorientation Training for CIC Personnel," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The Redeployment Training Program was given to personnel from ETO who had not gathered sufficient points for discharge and who were sent to Camp Ritchie prior to shipment to the Pacific Theater. A major problem confronted the instructors at MITC throughout the CIC Redeployment instruction. The men who were assigned to Camp Ritchie for training were, for the most part, experienced in CIC combat operations. The members of the second class submitted comments on the program that were largely unfavorable. While individual courses and instructors were praised, serious basic faults were found with the program:

> The great emphasis that most instructors give to the fact that the war in the Pacific is entirely different from war in ETO is a bunch of Malarky. This is especially true in the case of CIC.
>
> Many references as to the difference of CIC operating procedure in the Pacific from that in ETO have been made, but no evidence of such has been shown.
>
> The lecturers who happened to be veterans of the Pacific tended to give the impression that landing a couple of regiments on some Pacific atoll was a greater triumph than the whole victory in the ETO...

Particularly strong "gripes" were lodged about the practice of using instructors who had never been overseas to teach combat veterans, and the utilization of nine hours a day for training. Many of the unfavorable comments could be traced to a single cause. The men in the redeployment class had finished "their war" and were being transferred to another theater of operations before the exhilaration of victory had worn off.

With the unconditional surrender of Japan on 14 August, the need for preparing CIC agents for Pacific combat duty ended. The Redeployment Training program continued at Camp Ritchie with modifications suitable for preparing men for occupation duties.[94]

World War II was over, only the initial chills of the Cold War had set in, and CIC training, like many other military matters, entered into a new period.

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94 Rpt to Commandant, MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md., from CIC Redeployment Training Class #2, Company "B", First Training Battalion, Camp Ritchie, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 7

SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR CIC AGENTS

In addition to the investigative training, some CIC personnel received specialized training that was designed to better prepare them for their assignments during World War II.

Berlitz Language Schools

To meet demands for more CIC agents with linguistic ability, an intensive 13-week language training program was established from 6 September 1943 to 4 December 1943. Arrangements for the instruction were made with the Berlitz Language Schools located in Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York; and San Francisco, California.

One hundred fifty members of the Counter Intelligence Corps were selected for the Berlitz language training. They were temporarily attached to the Service Command in which their schooling was given. When not attending classes, the agents were assigned regular investigative duties.

By the time the courses were completed, 60 agents had received instruction in French, 40 in German, 20 each in Italian and Spanish, and 10 in Dutch. Each class was limited to five students so that the full benefit of the language instruction could be received.[95]

Language Training at University of Pennsylvania

To meet the heavy demand for German-speaking agents as the U.S. forces drove into the Rhineland, a radiogram on 23 December 1944 from the ETO CIC Chief to the Chief, CIC, in the War Department, recommended that agents shipped to ETO be trained in at least the rudiments of the German language. The recommendation was turned over to the CIC Training Section which presented a proposal to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie for the addition of two weeks to the CIC training course for instruction in German. Officials at MITC demurred on two grounds: first, Camp Ritchie lacked qualified personnel to teach German; second, an extension of the regular MITC course from eight to ten weeks was undesirable because it would cause classes to overlap.

The Director of Intelligence turned to other sources. On 3 February 1945, he secured approval from the Director, Military Training, ASF, to institute a

95 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

course in training in the German language at the University of Pennsylvania.[96] Under the direction of Otto Springer, Professor of Germanic languages, the instruction was planned for a period of four weeks per class.

The initial class to enter this training began 22 February 1945 and continued until 21 March. Three other classes received training before the course was discontinued in June 1945, with a total of 263 men completing the studies.

In establishing the course, Professor Springer and his associates took heed of several difficulties. The men who were selected for the German training came to Philadelphia with varying degrees of proficiency in the language. For the purpose of more efficient and individual instruction, each class was subdivided from the outset into two main groups - beginners (men with little or no linguistic preparation) and advanced (men with some or considerable linguistic preparation). Each of these main subdivisions was further split into small sections of eight to twelve men each. The men in each class who were extremely fluent or "native speakers" were utilized as Army assistants and helped the teaching staff. In the four classes that completed training, there was almost even division between "beginners" and "advanced." The faculty had a sizeable task in attempting to produce fairly skilled German linguists.

There were three phases to the language instruction at the University of Pennsylvania: conventional drill, language lectures and applicatory exercise. In addition, the agents were given a CIC lecture once a day and an hour of physical training was included in the daily schedule.

The work done in the conventional drill hours was deemed the core of the program. A technique known as the "direct method" was utilized. The instructor repeatedly read aloud phrases of graded difficulty in the language, the students responding in chorus and then individually, trying to imitate the sounds that the instructor produced. Training aids included a compilation of German conversational phrases.

The most important aspect of these conversational drill hours was special training in "Interrogational CIC Practice." A series of about ten interrogational plots were worked out in mimeographed form, and utilized after the students had gained a minimum proficiency in the language. As a further aid to interrogation, the instructors prepared a list of interrogational CIC phrases, a standard interrogation form questionnaire, and an outline of the simplest possible routine interrogation.

96 History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The hours devoted to language lecture were spent in systematic instruction of German pronounciation, grammatical forms, word order, social and regional differences of speech, and other fundamentals of the language. The applicatory exercise gave the students a more informal opportunity to learn to use the language in everyday situations and also to understand the habits and customs of the country where they would soon be sent.

At the end of each week of training, the students were given a proficiency test, and the final examination was weighted heavily to test the students' grasp of interrogational procedure. At the end of the course, each man was given an Army proficiency rating based on his performance at the University of Pennsylvania.[97]

Air Mechanical Schools

Since CIC agents assigned duties with the Army Air Forces needed some technical understanding of airplane construction, a special air mechanical training program was organized from 4 July 1943 until 5 February 1944. Three hundred sixty-five agents received this training.

Offered at Middletown Air Depot, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Chanute Field, Illinois; and Hill Field, Ogden, Utah, the course was designed to give CIC personnel a technical background and familiarize them with repair and overhaul of Army aircraft, engines, and accessories. Emphasis was placed on "trouble shooting" and inspection as well as on learning the operating principles of all airplane parts.

Training of the CIC agents at these schools was considered a part of the regular Air Corps Mechanical course. The graduates qualified as skilled mechanics, capable of performing undercover missions as ground crew men, competent to investigate mechanical failures of aircraft for possible sabotage.

Upon completion of this special training program, the agents were assigned duty with the Air Corps. In March 1944, when a directive placed all these agents directly under Army Air Forces command, future training for the investigators became Air Corps responsibility.[98]

97 General Report on CIC Language Training (German) by Otto Springer, PhD, Professor of Germanic Languages, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penna., 1945, (Central Records Facility).

98 Training History of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

[redacted]

Appendix 1

Curriculum, Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators Training School, held in Washington, D.C., from 24 February 1941 through October 1941.

[redacted]

CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE

Investigators Training School

Washington, D.C.

February 24 to March 22, 1941

Subjects of Instruction and Time Allotted Each

Subject	Hour Periods
1. Enrollment and Welcome Ceremonies Entrance formalities; general instructions by school commandant; purpose of course, and general outline of course; speech of welcome by Colonel Lester.	2
INVESTIGATION COURSE	
2. General Principles of Investigative Procedure Hard work, intelligence, resourcefulness, personal initiative, patience in following out leads, common sense; force versus tact; general knowledge of identity of possible suspects; cooperation with all other officers and offices; duplication of work of other officers or services is prevented if you maintain contacts with them and merit their genuine assistance; studying files on previous investigations; the value of information to military authorities as contrasted with evidence in civil life; contemporaneous memoranda; use of experts; professional concept of your work; unethical tactics; duress, third degree, entrapment; idealism in your work, ethics and standards; realization of possible importance in national security of any job to which you may be assigned; ethics and standards of conduct; practical psychology; modus operandi files; diaries; legality of your work; personal courage; willingness to sacrifice your career or your life.	4
3. Observation and Description Variation in accuracy of observation by different persons; study of detail is essential; observation and perception closely related; fallibility of the senses; time, speed, color, light, and distance; understanding of the cause of the facts observed; see things from an investigator's viewpoint; know suspects; memory gets dimmer by the hour;	2 Lecture 8 Practical

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constantly train yourself in observing situations and recording facts; use your intelligence in arriving at conclusions from known facts; general appearance files; portrait parle; conduct visual memory test.

4. Modus Operandi: Arsonists

Known methods of arsonists; material used; igniting devices; traces of materials used; indicators of origin of fire; photographs of previous investigations; exhibit of instruments of arson; ashes; use of experts. 1

Modus Operandi: Burglars

Common methods of entry; protective devices; instruments used by burglars and source of such; time; inside jobs; marks of professionals. 1

5. Alien Registration Laws and Alien Investigations

Immigration and naturalization laws; alien registration act; enforcement of laws by immigration service, relation to National Defense; organization of field force, how to contact them for information, what information is available. Mutual cooperation. 2

6. Bombs, Infernal Machines

Exhibit of known types; particles; entire procedure when located; protective procedure; origin of materials; use of experts. 2

7. Sabotage and Saboteurs

Industrial, political, and military; methods; previous cases; protection against. 2

8. Espionage and Counterespionage

Types; origin; objectives; countermeasures. 5

9. Labor Organizations Affecting National Defense

Identities; methods; objectives; membership; localities; public relations. 2

10. Plant Protection

Need for; surveys; recommendations; plant protective officer; plant police; patrols; passes; badges; gates; view; lights; freedom of movement of employees; fire-fighting equipment; vital points; exterior protection. 2

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11. Applicant and Charge Investigations — 2

Suspects; applicants; employees; thoroughness in checking credit companies; civil service records; neighbors; associates; drinking; promiscuousness; number of past jobs and why left--word of subject not sufficient; waste-basket and garbage surveillance; tailing; detailed knowledge of short period of activities for use in frightening subject on questioning; hotel detectives; precinct detectives; neighborhood policemen; children who know subject; record everything.

12. Methods of Surveillance — 3 Lecture, 8 Practical

In automobiles, on foot, on train, in airplanes, on streets and country roads; big cities and small towns; dress; language; pretext for presence; study neighborhood first when possible; observation posts in commercial buildings or neighboring homes, meeting subject's eyes; hotels; saloons; hours of duty; telephone reports to superior; written reports in detail each day; attention to small matters; signals of suspect; adjacent telephone booth; surveillance of subject's associates; A. B. C. Method; radio cars.

13. Undercover Work — 3 Lecture, 8 Practical

Aptitude; psychology; self confidence; forget you are an officer; establish unbreakable background story; dress; appearance; various attitudes to adopt; objects to be achieved; deafness; blindness; expenses; drinking; telephoning reports; care in reporting; "throwing a tail;" women; famous cases.

14. Informers — 2

Honest citizens; suspects; nuts; professionals; questioning; toughness versus politeness; appreciation of information; payment; control; relationship with officer; women; cautions; corroborating information; their undoubted value; how to secure from other officers and by yourself.

15. Interrogation of Persons — 2

Extreme value to investigator; careful study of psychology quickly recognize types; consider procedure; private place; only one questioner; written notes; stenographer; set the stage; create dignified and authoritative impression; get on your ground; lie detectors; truth serum.

16. Moulage

Plaster cast; footprints; tire treads; practice in making casts. 2

17. Fingerprinting

Taking; keeping cards; patterns; disposition; practice in taking. 2

18. Latent Fingerprints

Great value; where found; how found; mechanical methods; chemical methods; photographing; lifting; preserving; practice. 3

19. Systems of Identification

Old thieves; men; rogues gallery; Schwartzkapf system; Bertillion; geometrical identification; modus operandi; factors in modus operandi are type of property or person attacked; how attacked; the means used; the time of work; the object of the work; trade marks; be familiar with modus operandi of your principal suspects. 1

20. Codes and Ciphers

General familiarity with simple codes and ciphers; how to encode and decode; types of codes in espionage; secrecy; powers of cryptoanalysist; get as many words as possible for submission; frequency. 1

21. Handwriting Comparison

Elementary document examination; exemplars; tentative comparison; identification; continuous custody; submission to experts; value as evidence; typewriting identification; FBI files; samples from all machines available to suspect; more than one sample from each machine; length of sample; invisible inks; types; use of; concealment; value; paper; chemicals to bring out; test suspected documents. 2

22. Documentary Corroboration

Value of corroborative evidence; where to look for records; how to get documents informally; subpoenas; bank records; telephone and telegraph companies; business concerns; public utilities; passport records; citizenship records; credit companies; laundry marks; copying names and addresses found on persons and premises; contact with other government agencies to ascertain if they have record of persons you are working on. 2

23. Photography

Elementary photography and use of cameras; types of cameras best suited for law enforcement; minox cameras; movie cameras; fixed and concealed cameras; posing as street photographer. 1

24. Methods of Searching

Persons; premises; wooded areas; open areas; vehicles. 4

25. Preserving Evidence

Physical evidence; documents. 1

26. Dictaphones, Induction Coils, etc.

Installation of microphones; wiring; location of observation posts and how to secure them; entering and leaving observation posts; records of conversation; mechanical recording; discreetness; primary use as information and not in evidence; secrecy; most valuable source of information available. 2

27. Scientific Aids to an Investigator

Microscophy, ultra-violet rays; infra red rays; chemistry; physics; metallurgy; spectrosophy; firearms identification; glass; traces; ashes; teeth; hair; dust; dirt; fingernails; ear wax; bloodstains; other stains. 6

LAW COURSE

28. Civics

Development of constitutional and common law; powers and limitations of officers; organization of government and theory of operation; advantages of democracy. 2

29. Law of Arrest

Military Personnel and Civilian Personnel. 2

30. Law of Search and Seizure

Affidavits; warrants; returns; entry; motions to quash; legality; certificate of probable cause; searches without warrant. 2

31. Evidence

Rules of evidence. 2

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32. Confessions and Statements
Types; weight; taking; recording. 1

33. Conspiracy
Definition; common design; overt acts; venue. 2

34. Laws
Espionage act; Hatch act; neutrality act; selective service act; civil service law and regulations; firearms laws; explosive laws; restricted areas; treason; impersonation laws; reference to all laws affecting national defense.

35. Articles of War and Military Law 2

36. Functions of United States Attorney's Office 1

37. Federal Court Procedure
Commissioner; grand jury; arraignment; information; pleadings; trial; sentencing; commitment. 1

38. Visit to Local Courts 3

39. State Court Procedure
Outline of typical organization; distinction between state and federal court practices and procedures. How to initiate action by state courts. 1

40. Court Martial Procedure 1

41. Testifying in Court
Conduct on the witness stand; manner of testifying; hearsay; value of conferences with District Attorney in matters to be ultimately submitted to him. 2

GENERAL COURSE

42. Report Writing
Forms; method of composition; promptness; summary of case; accuracy; neatness; elimination of superfluous matter; conciseness versus completeness; no slang; placing yourself in the position of reviewing authority. 4

43. Military Correspondence
Formal letters; informal memoranda; indorsements; copies; subjects; filing. 1

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44. Public Relations and Personal Conduct

Dress; appearance; demeanor; tact; diplomacy; no hard-boiled attitude; understanding; representative of the government; publicity. 1

45. Organization of the Army

Particular reference to identification of present-day units and their insignia; location of post stations and units throughout the country and abroad. 1

46. Communism

History; current organization; agencies in this country; known members and leaders; method of work, aims, methods of combatting; constant study; attitude of public; discreetness; keep informed of activity of all suspected organizations and persons. 2

47. Nazism

History; current organization; agencies in this country; known members and leaders; method of work, aims; methods of combatting; constant study; attitude of public; discreetness; keep informed of activity of all suspected organizations and persons. 2

48. Fascism, Japanism, Falange

History; current organization; agencies in this country; known members and leaders; method of work; aims; methods of combatting; constant study; attitude of public; discreetness; keep informed of activity of all suspected organizations and persons. 2

49. War Department Policies

General outline of War Department policies which would concern a Military Intelligence investigator who is constantly in contact with the public and engaged in conduct which might involve foreign nationals; also engaged in conduct affecting national defense and private individuals concerned therewith. This to include all matters except military intelligence; war department organization and corps area organization. 2

50. Military Intelligence Organization, Policies, and Functions

Complete and detailed information relative to the Military Intelligence organization; its policies and practices; its 3

[redacted]

powers and limitations; its objectives and the manner in which the program is executed. This to include all phases from War Department to all lower echelons.

51. Inspector General's Department--Organization and Functions
A general outline of organization and functioning sufficient to acquaint CIP personnel with its sphere of activity. What can be expected from Inspector General's office and what it expects from Military Intelligence. Methods of possible cooperation and ways to avoid conflict. 1

52. Judge Advocate General's Department--Organization and Functions
General outline of the organization and functioning of the Judge Advocate General's offices, their responsibilities, and their sphere of activity; type of reports that are most valuable; type of assistance that can be rendered by the Corps of Intelligence Police; possibilities of cooperation and insurance against conflict. 1

53. Organization and Functions of the Military Police
Organization of the Military Police of tactical commands and of Zone of Interior agencies; duties and responsibilities of Provost Marshals in posts and stations and in territorial assignments; possibility of cooperation between Corps of Intelligence Police and Military Police; close understanding of the criminal investigative agencies of the Military Police and development of methods insuring joint action on common causes; exchange of information. 2

54. Organization and Functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
General outline of the organization and functioning of the bureau; detailed outline of the bureau's organization in connection with national defense problems particularly espionage and counterespionage, sabotage and countermeasures; plant protection and subversive elements; methods of which FBI and CIP can mutually work toward common objectives on individual cases and general programs; joint action on cases; reference of matters to each other; contact with local field offices; contact between individual agents of the two services; exchange of information. Visit to FBI offices and laboratories. 2 3

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55. Organization and Functions of the Naval Intelligence

General understanding of the organization, operations, and aims of Naval Intelligence; information as to location of field offices and persons available for contact by the CIP officers; methods of exchanging information; methods of cooperation. 1

56. Organization and Practices of State and Municipal Police

General outline of organization of state and municipal police sufficient for our officers to know the cooperation that can be secured and the assistance available from police agencies; types of detective squads and their value as sources of information and assistance on specific types of violator suspects. 1

57. Practical Work with Headquarter Detective Squads of the Metropolitan Police Forces

CIP's will spend one full day and evening with working detective on the following named squads: robbery squad, check forgery and fraud squad; homicide squad, theft of clothing and jewelry squad, narcotics squad, auto theft squad, fugitive and wanted persons squad. 10

58. Organization and Functions of the Post Office Inspectors

General outline of the organization and laws enforced; information on covering mail and securing tracings; method of securing information from post office personnel; money order records; special delivery records; foreign money orders. 1

59. Organization and Functions of the Treasury Investigative Agencies

Customs; intelligence; A. T. U.: Narcotics; Secret Service; Coast Guard; organization and function of each of these investigative service; laws enforced; information at their command; ways of securing information from these agencies; location of field offices; types of information available from these various agencies; method of insuring cooperation and exchange of information; assistance that can be secured from treasury agencies. 2

60. Practical Work With Federal Investigative Agencies

The students will spend one full day and evening with experienced investigators of local offices of following service: 10

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U.S. Secret Service
U.S. Alcohol Tax Unit
U.S. Customs Agency Service
U.S. Narcotic Bureau
U.S. Intelligence Unit

61. Ju Jitsu — 8

62. Examinations
Two hours of examinations each Saturday on the previous week's works; examinations to consist of a multiplicity of questions that can be answered by true or false, or yes or no. — 8

63. Graduation Exercises
Presentation of certificates of completion of course; speech by the Acting Chief of Staff, G2; checking out; departure. — 2

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Appendix 2

Curriculum, CIC Training Schools, 1942

CURRICULUM
For
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS TRAINING SCHOOLS

Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	Theory	Practical Work	Theory		Practical Work		Experts as Lecturers	Visual Aids
			Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.		
Anti-American Ideologies	6	-	8	8	-	-	Experts	
Arrests, Law of	2	-	-	-	-	-		
Articles of War and Military Courts Martial	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Bombs and Infernal Machines	-	-	3	3	-	-	Experts	Types of Bombs
Calisthenics and Jiu-Jitsu		20	-	-	20	20		
C.I.C. Administration: Regulations and Policies	3	-	2	1	-	-		
Finance, Supply and Travel	3	-	2	1	-	-		
Files and Records	2	-	2	1	-	-		
Organization and Administration of Detachment	1	-	3	1	-	-		
C.I.C. Detachments in Theaters of Operation		-	2	2	-	-	Experienced Lecturer	

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Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	Visual
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Aids
Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I	-	-	2	2	-	-	Experienced Lecturer	
Countersubversive Systems		-	3	1	1	1		
Conspiracy	2	-	-	-	-	-		
Codes and Ciphers	-	-	2	2	1	-	Expert	Crypto-graphic Devices
Contacts and Sources of Information	2	-	3	3	-	-		
Cooperating Law Enforcement Agencies: Military Police	1	-	-	-	-	-		
F. B. I.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
O. N. I.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Treasury	1	8	—	-	-	-	-	
Post Office Inspectors	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Counterespionage	2	-	5	5	-	-	Experts	
Countersabotage		-	5	5	-	-	Experts	

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Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as Lecturers	Visual Aids
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.		
Civil Service Law and Hatch Act	1	-	-	-	-	8		
Delimitation of Jurisdiction Agreement	1	-	1	1	-	-		
Evidence: Law of,	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Examination of,	-	-	3	3	1	1	Experts	Films
Examination of Scenes of Crime	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Firearms Act and Explosives Law	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Fingerprinting	2	3	2	2	3	3		Actual Equipment Slides
Immigration and Naturalization	2	-	2	-	-	-		
Informers and Informants	2	-	2	2	-	-		
Interrogation	3	6	2	2	2	2		Films
Investigation Equipment	2	-	2	2	2	2		Actual Equipment
Methods of Investigation	4	-	3	3	1	1		

OSO

Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Visual Aids
Methods of Searching	2	2	2	2	4	4		Demonstration
Military Correspondence	1	1	-	-	-	-		
Military Courtesy	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Microphone Installations	1	-	2	2	4	4		Actual Equipment
Moulage Casts	1	-	2	2	3	1-1/2		Visual Tests
Personal Descriptions	2	1	2	2	4	4		
Personnel Investigations	4	-	3	3	1	1		
Photography, Investigative	2	-	2	2	4	4	Experts	Actual Equipment
Pistol Marksmanship, 38 Cal	6	8	-	-	-	-		
Plaster Casts	1	-	1	1	3	1-1/2		
Police & Underwriters	-	-	-	-	3	3	Experts	Lab Equip.
Police Line-up	-	-	-	-	2	2		
Questioned Documents and Handwriting	-	-	2	2	1	1	Experts	Slides & Films

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Subjects' (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as Lecturers	Visual Aids
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.		
Safeguarding Military Information	2	-	2	2	-	-		Film
Searches and Seizures, Law of	1	-	2	2	-	-		
Security of Installations	2	-	4	4	-	-		
Selection of C.I.C. Personnel	2	-	2	1	-	-		
Surveillance, Methods of	2	-	2	2	-	6		Film
Sedition Laws	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Telephone Installations	1	-	1	1	3	2		Actual Equip.
Treason and Impersonations	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Undercover Investigations	2	3	2	2	-	-		
Visit to Nearby Plant, Re: Plant Security	-	-	-	-	4	4		Visual Inspec.
Warrants	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Report Writing	6	-	8	4	-	-		
Total Hours	90	52	104	90	67	69		

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Appendix 3

Curriculum, CIC Training Schools, 1943

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CURRICULUM
For
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS TRAINING SCHOOLS
1943

Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Visual Aids
Anti-American Ideologies	6	-	8	8	-	-	Experts	
Arrests, Law of	2	-	-	-	-	-		
Articles of War and Military Courts Martial	1	-	1	2	-	-		T/Films
Bombs, Booby Traps and Demolitions	-	-	5	5	-	-	Experts	Types of Bombs T/Films Slides
British Counter Intelligence	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Calisthenics and Close Order Drill, and Unarmed Combat	-	20	-	-	20	20		
Camouflage	-	-	3	3	-	-		Film
C.I.C. Administration: Regulations and Policies	3	-	2	1	-	-		
C.I.C. Detachments in Theaters of Operations	-	-	4	4	-	-	Experienced Lecturer	

Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	Visual
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Aids
Civil Service Law and Hatch Act	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Codes and Ciphers	-	-	2	2	1	2	Expert	Cryptographic Devices
Conspiracy	2	-	-	-	-	-		
Contacts and Sources of Information in Theaters of Operation	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Contacts and Sources of Information in Zone of Interior	2	-	3	-	-	-		
Cooperating Law Enforcement Agencies in Zone of Interior M. P.	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Countersubversive Systems	-	-	3	3	-	-		
Current Situation in all Theaters	-	-	4	4	-	-		
Delimitation of Jurisdiction Agreement	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Espionage and Counterespionage	2	-	5	5	-	-	Experts	
Evidence:								
Law of,	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Examination of,	-	-	3	3	1	1	Experts	Films

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Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Visual Aids
Examination of Scenes of Crime	2	-	-	-	-	-		
F.B.I.	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Files and Records	2	-	-	-	-	-		
Finance, Supply and Travel	3	-	1	1	-	-		
Fingerprinting	2	3	2	2	3	3		Actual Equipment, Slides
Firearms Act and Explosives Law	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Immigration and Naturalization	2	-	1	-	-	-		
Informers and Informants	2	-	2	-	-	-		
Interrogation	3	6	2	2	2	2		Films
Investigative Equipment	2	-	-	-	-	-		Actual Equipment
Map and Aerial Photography Reading, and Use of Compasses	8	5	3	3	-	-		Films
Marksmanship, .38 Cal. Revolver, 45 Cal. Pistol; Carbine	10	16	2	-	4	-		

Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Visual Aids
Methods of Investigation	4	-	3	3	1	1		
Methods of Searching	2	2	2	2	4	4		Demonstration, Films
Microphone Installations	1	-	2	2	4	4		
Military Correspondence	2	2	-	-	-	-		
Military Courtesy	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Military Police in Theaters of Operation	-	-	1	1	-	-		
Motor Vehicle Driving, Army (Motorcycles, Jeeps, 1- to 2-ton Trucks, Reconnaissance Cars)	5	8	-	-	-	-		
Moulage Casts	1	2	1	-	-	-		Visual Tests
O. N. I.	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Organization and Administration of Detachment	2	-	1	-	-	-		
Personal Descriptions	2	1	2	2	4	4		
Personnel Investigations	4	-	2	-	1	-		

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Subjects (Figures Indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as	
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Lecturers	Visual Aids
Photography, Investigative	2	-	2	2	4	4	Experts	Actual Equipment
Plaster Casts	1	2	1	-	-	-		Actual Equip.
Police and Underwriters Laboratory	-	-	-	-	3	3	Experts	Laboratory Equip.
Port and Frontier Control	-	-	2	2	-	-		
Post Office Inspectors	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Practical Investigative Problem	-	-	-	-	7	7		
Questioned Documents and Handwriting	-	-	2	2	1	1	Experts	Slides Films
Recognition of Enemy and Allied Uniforms, Insignia, and Identifications	-	-	4	4	-	-		Visual Aids
Report Writing	6	-	8	1	-	-		
Sabotage and Countersabotage	2	-	5	5	-	-	Experts	

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Subjects (Figures indicate hours of Inst.)	C.I.C. Preliminary Training Schools		C.I.C. Advanced Training School					
			Theory		Practical Work		Experts as Lecturers	Visual Aids
	Theory	Practical Work	Ofcrs.	E.M.	Ofcrs.	E.M.		
Safeguarding Military Information	2	-	5	5	-	-		Films
Searches and Seizures, Law of	1	-	2	2	-	-		
Security of Installations	2	-	5	5	-	-		
Sedition Laws	2	-	1	-	-	-		
Selection of C.I.C. Personnel	2	-	1	-	-	-		
Signal Communications	-	-	3	3	-	-		
Surveillance, Methods of	2	-	3	3	-	6		Films
Telephone Installations	1	-	1	1	3	2		Actual Equip.
Treason and Impersonations	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Treasury	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Undercover Investigations	2	3	2	2	3	-		
Warrants	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Total Hours	113	70	123	101	66	64		

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Appendix 4

Curriculum, CIC Advanced Training School, Chicago

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS ADVANCED TRAINING SCHOOL
Chicago, Illinois
Final Curriculum

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER
CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

11 March 1945

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS COURSE OF INSTRUCTION

PAC SECTION

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (136 hours total)

Loose Talk — 1 hr

Orientation to Counterintelligence (first hour of course): definition of terms; purpose of counterintelligence; general nature of course; conduct of classes and presentation of material; tests and grades. Loose talk hazard; security regulations.

Security Against Indirect Attack — 1 hr

Enemy use of espionage and sabotage in this war; methods of entry; operating techniques; preventive and countermeasures.

Classified Information — 2 hrs

Practical interpretation and presentation of revised AR 380-5 (effective 15 Mar 44). Reasons for classification; limitations on dissemination of classified information; registration of documents and materiel; marking; handling, transmitting, and storing of classified material; field precautions; methods of destruction; records and reports.

Principles of Censorship — 1 hr

Reasons for military censorship; responsibility and organization for censorship in theaters of operations; base censorship detachment; unit censors; censorship stamps; censorship of mail in unit and base; action taken by censors in case of violations; preparation and disposition of comment sheet; necessity for education of all troops.

Safeguarding Military Information in the Field — 1 hr

Practical application of loose talk, classified information and censorship in the field. Chief sources of information open to

enemy; markings and information on personal or organizational equipment and personal possessions. Necessity for making all personnel security conscious.

Tactical Measures — 1 hr

Nature and purpose; positive aspects of counterintelligence. Tricks, feints, ruses, and other strategems adopted to deceive the enemy; current examples of enemy measures reported in Intelligence Bulletins and other sources.

Camouflage Demonstration — 3 hrs

A practical field exercise to illustrate individual camouflage methods. Different means and types of camouflage are explained and demonstration troops demonstrate how they actually appear and blend with various types of background.

Combat Propaganda — 1 hr

Use of propaganda as an offensive weapon; enemy techniques; countermeasures; examples of American, Allied, and enemy propaganda. Illustrated by specially prepared set of slides.

Counterintelligence Plan — 2 hrs

Necessity for prior planning; origin and dissemination of plan; explanation and application of approved form; use of available agencies. Practical problem involving drawing up a plan to cover given situation.

Security Survey — 4 hrs

Three-hour practical exercise preceded by orientation lecture. Nature and purpose of survey; physical safeguards; map and ground reconnaissance; selection of critical points; report on findings; recommendations based on survey. Problem situation in theater of operations. Fifteen minute critique illustrated by slide map at conclusion of exercise.

Principles of Investigation — 1 hr

Fundamental investigative procedure; preservation of evidence; use of scientific aids and qualified experts in the field; records and reports.

Use of Informants 2 hrs

This lecture sets forth the function of informants in CIC work, the information we can and do obtain from informants and how to organize an informant net, as well as how to enlist individual informants. The general rules to follow in handling informants are also stressed.

Investigative Techniques 2 hrs

The purpose of this lecture is to point out the investigative techniques peculiar to CIC investigatory work. The CIC investigative systems are explained and specific cases of CIC investigation are discussed.

Introduction to Raids and Searches 1 hr

Illustrated lecture showing procedure for raiding an occupied building and searching for documents, materiel, and personnel. Planning and reconnaissance; organization of raiding party; arms; posting of cordon; raid and search proper; disposition of documents and personnel; necessary reports.

Operation of Mines and Booby Traps 2 hrs

First hour deals with component parts of mines and booby traps, the actions which will explode them, and the functioning of US anti-personnel devices. During the second hour foreign mines and booby traps are discussed with instruction in their detection and neutralization.

The Japanese Espionage Agent 1 hr

This course presents the basis for the doctrine of "Total Espionage" and the exploitation of every national or subject native as an agent whenever possible. The standard Japanese espionage agencies are reviewed as well as the selection, training, and employment of agents. Means of entry, typical assignments methods used are also discussed.

Sabotage Devices 1 hr

This course presents the incendiary and explosive devices available to the saboteur. Their mechanical operation, employment, and neutralization are explained. Through a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of these devices, the student is able to neutralize the efforts of the saboteur.

Crash Investigations (Sabotage of Aircraft) 1 hr

The purpose of this lecture is to teach the students how to detect and to prevent sabotage of aircraft. The lecture includes a discussion of the general techniques to be employed in preventing sabotage, and to investigating accidents resulting from sabotage. This latter phase of the instruction includes information on how to preserve the evidence, the persons to be interviewed, documents to be examined and a list of the kinds of physical evidence that may be encountered which would be indicative of sabotage. AAF and I.O. forms and reports in connection with this subject are also discussed.

Security Talks (Practical) 5 hrs

First hour is a discussion of topics and methods of presenting security talks. The last four hours are used to give each student experience in effective speaking by giving a five-minute talk. Talks are critiqued by class and instructor.

Security Education Program (Practical) 2 hrs

The course teaches the student to plan a balanced security education program and to coordinate this plan with combat training. The course stresses the need for education and the importance of eliminating conflicts and omission in security education. It also points out the advisability of making certain specially qualified individuals responsible for the instruction in the various phases of the program. The second hour is devoted to a practical exercise requiring the students to draw up a program for security education.

Construction and Use of Booby Traps 4 hrs

Following a short discussion on hasty and deliberate mine fields, students, formed into groups of four, are required to: (1) sweep a bivouac area for mines and traps with mine detector SCR 625 F and to mark and neutralize all booby traps and mines detected. (2) Proceed as a patrol through booby trapped wire. (3) Search a house and neutralize all booby traps located. Throughout the exercise umpires assess casualties when mines or traps are detonated and give spot critiques at the conclusion of each phase.

Explosives and Demolitions 2 hrs

Security personnel are instructed in the detection and isolation of demolitions prepared by the enemy. The characteristics of hasty

and deliberate demolition methods are discussed with emphasis on German and Japanese explosives. Charts showing the stress points of steel, wood and concrete structures are employed as training aids. Detection and isolation of improvised bombs are discussed.

Security Survey Problems — 1 hr

A practical lecture showing the student specific problems of a security survey under various circumstances, and actual types of security checks that CIC might be called upon to make either in a survey or as an isolated check; the essential parts of a security check (preparation; the check itself; on-the-spot education of violators; the report of findings) and the relationship between CIC and the organization security officer.

Principles of Interrogation — 8 hrs

This lecture is designed to equip the student with information necessary to conduct a complete CIC interrogation and to give him practical experience in conducting them for this purpose he is instructed in the basic principles of interrogation, the characteristics of the enemy espionage agents, the part that interrogation plays in CIC work, CI questionnaires, case studies, how to obtain the whole truth from an interrogee and how to conduct a complete interrogation.

Principles of Interrogation (Application) — 4 hrs

Demonstrations and practical interrogations by the students; are also conducted for the purpose of giving actual, practical experience in the type of interrogations conducted by CIC agents.

Interrogation Through Interpreters (Problem) — 6 hrs

Military investigation through the use of informants and interpreters. The problem is set up in the theater of operations, the military and political situation being as near as possible to that which actually exists in the territory selected as the locus of the problem. Problem is designed to bring out proper interviewing techniques and to point out the difficulties when working through an interpreter. At the conclusion of the investigation each student is required to write a report covering his investigative activity.

Investigation (Problem) — 8 hrs

A comprehensive hypothetical problem set up to give each student practical experience in various investigative techniques.

Court Procedure (Practical) 1 hr

Mock trial of a subversive. The proceedings are based on the factual evidence obtained during the eight-hour investigative problem.

Military Offenses 2 hrs

This lecture explains and defines the various military offenses with which CIC agents will concern themselves. Specifically detailed explanations of sedition, treason, espionage, sabotage, disaffection, subversive activities, war crimes, and war treason offenses are explained to the students. The various courts before which these offenses are prosecuted are also explained--these courts covered in this lecture are, courts-martial, military commissions, provost courts, and Allied Military Courts; the role of CIC in these courts is also explained.

Law and Preservation of Evidence 2 hrs

This lecture instructs students in how to preserve various types of evidence found in various cases which they investigate. The rules of evidence of the various military tribunals where military offenses are tried, are also explained to them.

Fingerprinting (Practical) 4 hrs

The first hour is a discussion of fingerprinting and standard CIC equipment. This includes some information on classification to show the detail needed in the print. In the last part of the hour, the students have practical experiences in taking fingerprints. The second hour is a discussion of the powder method and iodine fumer method of bringing out latent prints, the use of the Folmer fingerprint camera, and lifting prints with sticky rubber and scotch tape. The first part of the "lifting" the prints.

Lock Picking and Ultra-Violet Lamp 1 hr

This course is designed to acquaint the student with these valuable aids to the investigator. The fundamentals of locking mechanisms are discussed and the employment of lock picks and ultra-violet light explained.

Codes, Ciphers, and Secret Writing — 1 hr

Discussion of the characteristics of codes and ciphers and their employment. Demonstration of methods of detecting secret inks by the use of ultra-violet lamps, iodine and other chemicals.

Investigative Photography (Practical) — 4 hrs

Instruction in the functioning and operating of the 35mm and Speed Graphic cameras as used by the investigator. Two hours are devoted to classroom instruction, with demonstration of various investigator techniques. The other two hours are devoted to practical work. Each student is required to take pictures which are developed before the final hour of instruction which will include a critique of the work done by the students.

Observation and Description (Practical) — 2 hrs

Instruction covers the need for and some methods of perfecting an ability to describe accurately an individual or an event. Students are taught to observe and describe systematically so that their reports will be clear, concise, and accurate. Two practical problems are used to illustrate the difficulties involved.

Surveillance Techniques — 1 hr

A lecture on the purpose of conducting a surveillance of a person or a subversive headquarters. The various standard techniques and escape methods are discussed.

Raids and Searches (Problem) — 2 hrs

This is a practical field problem in which the students actually conduct a raid on a building containing subversives. The exercise is designed to drive home the essential matters to be borne in mind in conducting raids and searches in the field.

Security in Occupied Territory — 2 hrs

A discussion of the importance of adequate security for military operations; problems of security in occupied territory of Pacific Theaters; the role of CIC in general security work, and its relationship to Civil Affairs and Military Government; specific measures that must be taken to control an area and maintain security.

Riot and Refugee Control — 4 hrs

One hour is devoted to the threat to security which riots create and the means at the disposal of CIC personnel to prevent or control them. The second hour considers the physical control of refugees and the measures employed to channelize them into control centers. The remaining two hours are devoted to the detection of enemy agents from the refugee streams based on experience and reports from the theater. Stress is laid on the devise of the espionage agent to avoid normal refugee channels.

Port Security — 1 hr

A discussion of security problems in a port and of general security measures taken by CI and other security personnel.

Travel Control — 1 hr

A discussion of specific problems of all types of travel control in the Pacific theaters; reasons for travel control, types of travel control work that pertains to this area, and the CIC mission pertaining thereto.

Capabilities and Limitations of CIC Detachments — 2 hrs

Lectures bringing out the specific mission of CIC in Pacific theaters; relationship of CIC to other agencies in the field; types of assignments for CIC detachments and duties therein; and thorough study of the actual limitations of CIC and means of overcoming these limitations.

Administrative Procedures of CIC Detachments — 3 hrs

The first hour is devoted to overall administration, T/O and E, detachment operational status, and individual operational status. The second hour will consider Confidential Funds, civilian clothes, and credentials of CIC personnel. The final hour will cover matters of supply, CIC monthly reports and routine administrative operation considering morning reports, sick book, service records, finance, etc.

CIC Special Equipment (Display) — 1 hr

Classes will visit a display at the QM warehouse prepared by CIC overseas Staging Supply Officer showing all specialized equipment issued to the CIC.

CIC Cooperation with Civil Affairs — 3 hrs

Includes an analysis of liaison between CIC and the Philippine Commonwealth Administrative Units (PCAU). Mission of PCAU and a comparison with the Australian New Guinea Administrative Units is attempted (ANGAU). Cooperation with the Netherlands East Endies Armed Forces is also stressed (NICA).

CIC Liaison with Other Security Agencies — 1 hr

This lecture includes a discussion of the necessity for constant cooperation between CIC and the Field Security Personnel (British) and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Detailed consideration is given FSP development, training, organization and operational functions and a comparison made with CIC. The organization of Naval Intelligence agencies and the duties, functions and capabilities of each are discussed. Special emphasis is placed upon the type of information that can be obtained from Naval Intelligence.

CIC Cooperation With OB and Military Interpreter Teams — 1 hr

One hour devoted to the operation and duties of MI and OB teams, and their importance to CIC personnel. The information that these agencies will supply is emphasized in a counterintelligence light.

Report Writing (Practical) — 4 hrs

This lecture gives the student practical experience in writing the various types of reports required in the different theaters of operation. Problems laid in both the European and Pacific Theaters are presented and the student is required to write the kind of report appropriate to the problem and required in the respective theater.

CIC Organization in Theater and War Department — 1 hr

CIC Organization in the War Department is herein discussed. Brief consideration is then given to CIC Organization in ETO but stressed here is the organization in SWPA, POA, and IB. Letter of 13 Nov 44 is discussed as basis of CIC operations.

Experiences of Returned CIC Officers — 3 hrs

Officers returned from SWPA and POA discuss their experiences in CIC work. Difference of CIC operations in various echelons are discussed. Time is allowed for students to ask questions of these officers.

Japanese Espionage Techniques 1 hr

This lecture analyzes the organization and operation of the agencies performing intelligence and counterintelligence functions for the Japanese Army, with special mention of the methods used in establishing contact with the native populations in the Southwest Pacific and Asia. Characteristics of the Japanese people which peculiarly affect this type of work, such as the Japanese concept of "total espionage" and the close cohesion of the State are summarized. Individual organizations are outlined, including the intelligence branch of the field armies, the Japanese Intelligence Service, Foreign Ministry Intelligence, miscellaneous intelligence such as commercial and consular agents, the Japanese Gendarmerie, the state police, railway police, and the system used in occupied countries and territories.

Japanese Racial Characteristics 1 hr

A discussion of the main physical differences between the Chinese and Japanese. The means of easily identifying members of each race and some of the racial characteristics of each are discussed.

Orientation for Tropical Areas 2 hrs

The course deals with tropical foods, diseases, and topography likely to be encountered by our forces in the Pacific. Second hour includes a display of jungle and mountain equipment and rations being used by American troops in the far Pacific.

CIC Annex 8 hrs

Lecture, two graded problems and a critique hour to instruct students in the main CIC function in the "advancing" phase of an operation - namely - "Target hitting." Discussion of types of targets CIC will raid and search; reasons for such action; determination of priorities; and problems of target hitting.

Philippine Guerillas 1 hr

A cursory study of the activities of the guerillas of the Philippines after the fall of Bataan to the invasion of Leyte in 1944. The extent of utilization by CIC throughout the Philippine campaign is also stressed along with a running history of the potentialities of native groups in the Far East. It is expected that this course will be eventually expanded to include a discussion of the estimated 90 million fighting civilians in the interior of China.

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(11) Diploma
(12) Documents

Appendix 5

Curriculum, Military Intelligence Officer Candidate School

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
1942

TRAINING PROGRAM

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this course of instruction, will be to qualify selected enlisted men of the Army of the United States as second lieutenants of the Military Intelligence Division.

2. SUMMARY.

Subject	Approximate Hours
Opening Exercises, Outline of the course	2
General Military Subjects	306
Military Intelligence Subjects	270
1. General	5
2. Combat Intelligence	187
3. Domestic Intelligence	78
Reserve Hours	50
Total	628

Key

Conf. ------ Conference
Dem. ------ Demonstration
PE -------- Practical Exercise
TE -----Terrain Exercise
TF -----Training Film

3. PROGRAM IN DETAIL.

A. GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS .....

(1) Organization of the Army	3
(2) Military Discipline, Courtesy and Customs of the Service	4
(3) Infantry Drill	84
(4) Military Sanitation and First Aid	5
(5) Military Law and Courts Martial	8

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(6) Defense Against Chemical Warfare 8
(7) Command and Staff Functions 8
(8) Map and Aerial Photograph Reading..... 35
(9) Signal Communication for all Arms and Services..... 7
(10) Message Centers 3
(11) Scouting and Patroling..... 24
(12) Combat Orders..... 8
(13) Administration 5
(14) Military Correspondence 5
(15) Mess Management 3
(16) Hasty Field Fortifications and Camouflage 10
(17) Conduct of Elementary Military Training..... 3
(18) Rifle Marksmanship 30
(19) Pistol Marksmanship..... 30
(20) Bayonet Combat 20

(1) Organization of the Army 3
Conf.....3

Purpose and Scope: To ground the student in general information about the composition of the Army of the United States and its territorial organizations in time of war and peace; general features of division, corps, and field army organization; a general picture of the military system of command and staff.

(2) Military Discipline, Courtesies and Customs of the Service... 4
Conf. and Dem....2. TF....1. PE....1.

Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with the essentials of military discipline; the disciplinary aspects of military courtesy; the social aspects of military courtesy; and the fundamentals and background of customs of the service.

(3) Infantry Drill.....84
Conf. and Dem.....4. Practical Work.....80

Purpose and Scope: To instruct the student in close and extended order drill. To promote in him the habit of instant obedience to command. To train the student in giving commands and in handling bodies of men. To provide an organized means of mental relaxation from the arduous instruction program.

(4) Military Sanitation and First Aid.....5
Conf. and Dem.....3. PE.....2.

Purpose and Scope: Instruction in first aid procedures and elementary sanitation with special reference to the protection and maintenance of physical efficiency of personnel.

1018

(5) Military Law and Courts Martial.....8
Conf. and Dem.....3. PE.....5

Purpose and Scope: To present to the student the elementary principles of the jurisdiction and procedure of courts martial and rules of evidence as applied by them. A moot court martial to be organized as a part of the practical exercise.

(6) Defense Against Chemical Warfare.....8
Conf. and Dem.....4. PE.....4.

Purpose and Scope: To give the student an elementary knowledge of chemical agents that may be encountered; use of field sets for identifying such agents; practice in the fitting, adjustment and care of the gas mask; a trip through a gas chamber; tactical defense against chemical attack.

(7) Command and Staff Functions.....8
Conf. and Dem.....4. PE.....4.

Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with the principles underlying command and staff organization; functions of the general and special staff; general staff procedure; duties of the several divisions of the general staff.

(8) Map and Aerial Photograph Reading.....35
Conf. and Dem.....5. PE.....15. FE.....15.

Purpose and Scope: To ground the student in orientation; direction; distances; vertical and horizontal; slope; visibility; conventional signs; and coordinates of maps. To teach elementary interpretation; orientation; scales; distances; appearance of natural and artificial features in aerial photographs.

(9) Signal Communication for all Arms and Services.....7
Conf. and Dem.....2. PE.....2. FE.....3.

Purpose and Scope: To give the student instruction in military messages; means and methods of transmission; signal orders; signal supply; abilities and limitations of various means of signal communication.

(10) Message Centers.....3
Conf. and Dem.....1. PE.....2.

Purpose and Scope: Instruction and practical work concerning message center procedure and operation.

(11) Scouting and Patrolling.....24
Conf. and Dem.....4. PE.....20

Purpose and Scope: Fundamental instruction in the conduct of individual scouts and reconnoitering patrols. Methods of taking cover and transversing various types of terrain by daylight and at night.

(12) Combat Orders.....8
Conf. and Dem.....4 PE.....6
Purpose and Scope: To instruct and train the student in the formulation and issuance of oral and written, complete and fragmentary field orders in assumed tactical situations.

(13) Administration.....5
Conf. and Dem.....2 PE.....3
Purpose and Scope: To outline for the student the basic company records and reports; individual personnel records and reports; rations and funds; payrolls and allotments of pay; supply and equipment; transportation; preparation and maintenance of administrative forms and files relating thereto; and efficiency reports necessary in a basic administrative unit.

(14) Military Correspondence.....5
Conf.....3 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To thoroughly familiarize the student with correct forms for military correspondence; use of franked envelopes; correspondence within the intelligence network.

(15) Mess Management.....3
Conf. and Dem.....1 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To teach the student the composition and use of the rations; preparation of monthly mess accounts.

(16) Hasty Field Fortifications and Camouflage.....10
Conf. and Dem.....4 PE.....6
Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with general camouflage practice; road screens; camouflage discipline; entrenchments and emplacements; obstacles; the application of the technique of hasty field fortifications to tactical situations.

(17) Conduct of Elementary Military Training.....3
Conf. and Dem.....1 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To emphasize for the student the methods and mechanism of instruction; organization and preparation of material and presentation of prepared material to a group.

(18) Rifle Marksmanship.....30
Preliminary Instruction.....15 Range Practice.....15
Purpose and Scope: To instruct the student in the efficient use of the rifle as a combat weapon.

(19) Pistol Marksmanship.....30
Preliminary Instruction.....15 Range Practice.....15
Purpose and Scope: Practical use of the pistol and revolver as defensive weapons.

(20) Bayonet Combat.....20
Conf. and Dem.....5 PE.....15
Purpose and Scope: To instruct and train the student in the proper use of the bayonet as a combat weapon.

B. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS

(1) GENERAL

a. Military Intelligence Organization and Functions...5 hrs
Conf.....3 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To outline for the student the organization of the G-2 of all staffs from the War Department to the battalion in the field forces and through the corps areas to camp headquarters; G-2 functions and duties in each echelon.

(2) COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

a.	Combat Intelligence	10
b.	Intelligence Documents	5
c.	Interpretation of Aerial Photographs	7
d.	Maps and Mapping	6
e.	Map Reproduction in the Field	4
f.	Reconnaissance	10
g.	Tactics and Technique of the Separate Arms	100
h.	Combat Duties of Intelligence Personnel	5
i.	Combat Intelligence Problems	40

a. Combat Intelligence.....10
Conf.....5 Dem.....2 PE.....3
Purpose and Scope: To familiarize the student with means and methods employed in the collection of information in the field; evaluation of this information; means and methods employed in the dissemination of combat intelligence.

b. Intelligence Documents.....5
Conf. and Dem.....3 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: Basic instruction and practical work in graphic representation of enemy information; preparation and use of battle order and

situation maps; intelligence records and preparation of intelligence plans, reports and annexes.

c. Interpretation of Aerial Photographs.....7
Conf. and Dem.....3 PE.....4
Purpose and Scope: To train the student to gain military information from aerial photographs and in the reconnaissance.

d. Maps and Mapping.....6
Conf. and Dem.....3 PE.....3
Purpose and Scope: To furnish the student information on military maps, their production types, importance, supply, and use; functions of the Corps of Engineers; the Air Corps, and the Military Intelligence Division as related to maps, mapping, and map reproduction.

e. Map Reproduction in the Field.....4
Conf. and Dem.....2 PE.....1 TE.....1
Purpose and Scope: To train the student in techniques of reproducing map overlays and sketches in the field.

f. Reconnaissance.....10
Conf.....3 TE.....5 TF.....2
Purpose and Scope: To familiarize the student with the basic principles of reconnaissance, its tactics and technique; the formation of small task forces to gain enemy information.

g. Tactics and Techniques of the Separate Arms.....100
Conf.....60 TF.....40
Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with basic tactics and techniques of infantry, field artillery and cavalry essential to an understanding of the powers, limitations and role of each in combined operations.

h. Combat Duties of Intelligence Personnel.....5
Conf. and Dem.....2 PE.....2 TF.....1
Purpose and Scope: To familiarize the student with the organization and functioning of the intelligence units of the battalion, regiment, and brigade and preparation of unit intelligence documents.

i. Combat Intelligence Problems.....40
Conf.....5 PE.....15 TE.....20
Purpose and Scope: To give the student practical training in combat intelligence.

(3) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

a.	Review of Investigative Procedure	30
b.	Camp Intelligence Office	10
c.	District Intelligence Office	5
d.	Corps Area Intelligence Activities	5
e.	Public Relations	16
f.	Military Cryptography	5
g.	Domestic Disturbances	2
h.	Reserve for Classified Subjects	5

a. Review of Investigative Procedure.....30
Conf. and Dem.....30
Purpose and Scope: Refresher course on Counterintelligence with particular reference to investigative procedures.

b. Camp Intelligence Office.....10
Conf. and Dem.....10
Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with the organization of a camp intelligence office; sources of information; relations with Federal, State and Municipal authorities; and the duties and responsibilities of a camp intelligence officer.

c. District Intelligence Office.....5
Conf.....5
Purpose and Scope: Organization and functioning of a District Intelligence Office including review of necessary forms, reports and office routine as well as control and direction of CIC agents.

d. Corps Area Intelligence Activities.....5
Conf.....5
Purpose and Scope: To inform the student concerning military intelligence activities in the Zone of Interior; relations with other governmental agencies and with state authorities and the duties and responsibilities of a Corps Area G-2.

e. Public Relations.....16
Conf.....16
Purpose and Scope: To orient the student in the correlation of military intelligence and public relations activities.

f. Military Cryptography.....5
Conf.....3 PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To acquaint the student with codes and ciphers as adjuncts to military signaling; instruction in simple types of ciphers; enciphering

and deciphering dispatches; simple code books; encoding and decoding; precautions in handling codes and cipher paraphernalia.

g. Domestic Disturbances.....2
Conf. and PE.....2
Purpose and Scope: To outline for the student the duties and responsibilities of intelligence officers during domestic disturbances.

h. Reserve for Classified Subjects.....5
Conf.....5
Purpose and Scope: To present to selected students near the end of the course certain classified matters relating to domestic intelligence.

Examinations		2 hrs
Training Films (6 hours total)		
TF 11-321	Combat Counterintelligence	1 hr
TF 5-1212	Detection and Neutralization of Enemy Mines	
TF 5-645	Camouflage - Individual Concealment	1 hr
TF 5-646	Camouflage - Bivouac Area	
TF 5-648	Camouflage - Use of Artificial Materials	
TF 5-649	Camouflage - Principles	
TF 15-992	Administration of Military Justice and Courts Martial	1 hr
TF 5-954	Enemy Booby Traps	1 hr
TF 5-2039	Passage of Mine Fields for all Arms	
TF 1-3383	Resisting Enemy Interrogation	1 hr
TF 19-1290	Riot Control	1 hr
TF 5-572	Demolition of Concrete Arch Bridge	

Appendix 6

Curriculum, Third Service Command Preliminary Training School

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CURRICULUM OF THIRD SERVICE COMMAND PRELIMINARY TRAINING SCHOOL

ORIENTATION: 4 hours
- 1 General
- 1 Administrative
- 1 Intelligence
- 1 Plant and Geographic

ADMINISTRATIVE: 6 hours
- 2 Policy and Regulations
- 1 Administrative
- 3 Records and Files, Daily Reports and Supplies

INVESTIGATIVE: 46 hours
- 6 Report Writing
- 5 Investigative Procedure
- 2 Observation and Description
- 2 Interrogation
- 4 Surveillance and Undercover
- 2 Arson and Fire
- 1 Search and Arrest
- 1 Treason and Impersonation
- 1 Burglary: Modus Operandi
- 1 Handwriting and Questioned Doc.
- 2 Personnel Investigation
- 2 Codes and Ciphers
- 1 Preservation of Evidence
- 2 Bombs and Infernal Machines
- 1 Mechanical Sabotage
- 1 Firearms Identification
- 1 Immigration and Nationalization
- 1 Civil Service and Hatch Act
- 1 Documentary Source of Evidence
- 1 Selective Service Procedure
- 8 Open for Special Demonstration and Outside Speakers

TECHNICAL & PRACTICAL: 70 hours
- 10 Investigative Photography
- 2 Methods of Searching
- 4 Observation and Description
- 3 Plaster Casts
- 3 Locks
- 3 Microphone Installation
- 8 Surveillance
- 3 Fingerprints
- 3 Searching Practice
- 3 Latent Fingerprints
- 3 Moulage
- 6 Practical Problem
- 3 Federal Agencies
- 3 Mail
- 3 Telephone Installation
- 2 Interrogation
- 1 Observation and Description
- 1 Police Lineup
- 2 Special Demonstration
- 1 Practice Interview
- 4 Examinations

ESPIONAGE & COUNTERESPIONAGE: 6 hours
- 1 Espionage
- 1 Fifth Column
- 1 Germans and Japanese
- 1 Fascists and Falangists
- 1 Counterespionage
- 1 Pressure Groups

MILITARY COURSES & OUTSIDE SPEAKERS: 15 hours
- 2 Organization of Army
- 1 Military Courtesy and Customs
- 2 Military Correspondence
- 1 Safeguarding Military Information
- 1 Military Police
- 2 Military Law and Courts Martial
- 2 Chemical Warfare
- 4 Inspection of Quarters

LAWS: 14 hours
- 2 Law of Evidence
- 1 Firearms Act and Explosives Law
- 2 Law of Arrest
- 1 Law of Search and Seizure
- 1 Warrants, Forms and Uses
- 3 Moot Court
- 2 Conspiracy, Sedition and Espionage Laws
- 1 Court Procedure
- 1 U.S. Courts

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GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: 5 hours
1 Office of Naval Intelligence
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 Post Office Inspectors
1 Treasury Agencies
1 State Police

MARKSMANSHIP: 11 hours
11 Pistol

PHYSICAL TRAINING: 17-1/2 hours
12-1/2 Judo
5 Callisthenics

TRAINING FILMS: 2 hours
1 Arrest and Search - TF 11-296
1 Safeguarding Military Information
TF 11-324 TF 11-325

TOTAL HOURS 197-1/2

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Appendix 7

MITC Curriculum, August 1944-October 1944

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[redacted]

Curricula for Class 22

22 August 1944 - 21 October 1944

GENERAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
(Outline of Course)

IV.	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (24 hours total)	Hours
	Security Against Indirect Attack	1
	Combat Propaganda	1
	Counterintelligence Plan	2
	Loose Talk	1
	Classified Information	2
	Censorship	1
	Safeguarding Military Information in the Field	1
	Signal Security	1
	Tactical Measures	1
	Booby Traps	2
	Security Survey	4
	Principles of Investigation	1
	Use of Informants	1
	Investigative Techniques	1
	Raids and Searches	1
	Camouflage	3

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In addition to the above regular subjects the following special class was given.

Security Education Program

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[redacted]

GENERAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
(Scope of Course)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (24 Hours Total)

Security Against Indirect Attack — 1 hr

Enemy use of espionage and sabotage in this war; methods of entry; operating techniques; preventive and countermeasures.

Combat Propaganda — 1 hr

Use of propaganda as an offensive weapon; enemy techniques; countermeasures; examples of American, Allied, and enemy propaganda. Illustrated by specially prepared set of slides.

Counterintelligence Plan — 2 hrs

Necessity for prior planning; origin and dissemination of plan; explanation and application of approved form; use of available agencies. Practical problem involving drawing up plan to cover given situation.

Loose Talk — 1 hr

Orientation to Counterintelligence (first hour of course): definition of terms; purpose of counterintelligence, general nature of course, conduct of classes and presentation of material; tests and grades. Loose talk hazard; security regulations; security education. Illustrated by posters and other training aids.

Classified Information — 2 hrs

Practical interpretation and presentation of revised AR 380-5 (effective 15 Mar 44). Reasons for classification; limitations on dissemination of classified information; registration of documents and materiel; marking; handling, transmitting, and storing of classified material; field precautions; methods of destruction; records and reports.

Censorship — 1 hr

Reasons for military censorship; responsibility and organization for censorship in theaters of operations; base censorship detachment; unit censors; censorship stamps; censorship of mail in unit and base; action taken by censors in case of violations; preparation and disposition of comment sheet; necessity for education of all troops.

Safeguarding Military Information in the Field — 1 hr

Practical application of loose talk, classified information and censorship in the field. Chief sources of information open to enemy; markings and information on personal or organizational equipment and personal possessions. Necessity for making all personnel security conscious.

Signal Security — 1 hr

Objectives of signal security; interest of intelligence personnel. Chief means of signal communication; methods of compromise and security measures in each case.

Tactical Measures — 1 hr

Nature and purpose, positive aspects of counterintelligence. Tricks, feints, ruses, and other strategems adopted to deceive the enemy; current examples of enemy measures reported in Intelligence Bulletins and other sources.

Booby Traps — 2 hrs

Interest to intelligence personnel. Construction and use; standard and improvised types; illustrated demonstration of enemy and American mines and booby-trap firing devices. Suggestions for training.

Security Survey — 4 hrs

Three-hour practical exercise preceded by orientation lecture. Nature and purpose of survey; physical safeguards; map and ground reconnaissance; selection of critical points; report on findings; recommendations based on survey. Problem situation in theater of operations. Fifteen minute critique illustrated by slide map at conclusion of exercise.

Principles of Investigation — 1 hr

Fundamental investigative procedure; preservation of evidence; use of scientific aids and qualified experts in the field; records and reports.

Use of Informants — 1 hr

Importance of informants overseas; types; motives; potentialities under proper approach and procedure.

Investigative Techniques 1 hr

Definition of terms; purpose and techniques of undercover agents; surveillance; observation and description; countering shake-off attempts.

Raids and Searches 1 hr

Illustrated lecture showing procedure for raiding an occupied building and searching for documents, materiel and personnel. Planning and reconnaissance; organization of raiding party; arms; posting of cordon; raid and search proper; disposition of documents and personnel; necessary reports.

Camouflage 3 hrs

Discussion on principles of camouflage and the security to be achieved by their effective application. Five colored camouflage training films are shown prior to the outdoor demonstration. The first phase of these demonstrates poorly camouflaged installations which the students critique by pointing out the errors and listing corrective measures. The second phase shows effective camouflage and proper camouflage discipline.

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Current series of CIC classes are given two hours Security Education lectures instead of Principles of Investigation and Investigation Techniques, because most of them are graduates of the Chicago or Service Command Investigative Schools.

Security Education Program 2 hrs

The course teaches the student to plan a balanced security education program and to coordinate this plan with combat training. The course stresses the need for education and the importance of eliminating conflicts and ommissions in security education. It also points out the advisability of making certain specially qualified individuals responsible for instruction in the various phases of the program. The second hour is devoted to a practical exercise requiring the students to draw up a program for security education.

SPECIALIST COURSE OF INSTRUCTION FOR CLASS 22
(Outline of Course)

IV.	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (82 Hours Total)	Hours
	Raids and Searches	3
	Security Talks	5
	Practical Censorship	1
	Booby Traps and Mines	4
	Explosives and Demolitions	1
	Security in Occupied Territory	1
	Riot and Refugee Control	1
	Control of Correspondents and Observers	1
	German, French and Italian Police	1
	Field Security Personnel	1
	Functions of AMG	1
	CIC Annex to CI Plan	3
	Investigation Through Interpreters	6
	Radio Direction Finding	2
	Radio Operations Advanced	2
	Radio Intercept	1
	Foreign Equipment	2
	Wire Surveillance and Security	1
	Tactical Terrain Study	4
	Selection of a Bivouac	2

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Camouflage	2
German Documents	1
Foreign Maps (5 hours total)	
German Tactical Maps	1
Hachures	1
US - British Maps of France	1
Foreign Map Review	1
Final Examination	1
Political Situation of France	1
Disarming	2
Street Fighting	3
Weapons Firing	16
Silent Movement Course	4
Patrol Procedure and Night Patrolling	4
Order of Battle	1

SPECIALIST COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
(Scope of Course)

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (82 Hours Total)

Raids and Searches — 3 hrs

Three-hour practical exercise based on raids and searches as taught in basic course. Acting as member of raiding party, each student participates in planning reconnaissance, and conduct of a raid and search of an enemy-occupied building. Critique on spot at conclusion of exercise.

Security Talks — 5 hrs

Practical instruction in effective speaking to troops. At least one 3-minute security talk by each man before his class. Student gains experience in speaking before a group.

Practical Censorship — 1 hr

Examination of copies of letters condemned by censor. Notations of offending parts, with reasons, followed by class discussion.

Booby Traps and Mines — 4 hrs

Practical field exercise. Students required to detect and neutralize several types of mines and booby traps, and also pass through booby-trapped barbed wire entanglements, special areas and buildings being reserved and trapped for problem purposes.

Explosives and Demolitions — 1 hr

A basic training film is a prerequisite to this one-hour lecture. A consolidated picture of German and Japanese demolition tactics is presented with particular stress upon the explosive aspects. The construction and employment of changes are discussed and during the course of the lecture various changes are demonstrated and conventional locations explained. Comparisons are made as to the characteristics of Allied and Axis explosives and as to differences in employment.

Security in Occupied Territory — 1 hr

Review and summation of general security subjects, basic course, special problems encountered in territory evacuated by enemy; US Army policies in occupied territory; available agencies; civilian controls and administrative techniques.

Riot and Refugee Control 1 hr

Advanced lecture for CIC personnel showing methods of control of riots and refugees, the manner of detecting subversives among refugees and CIC preventative measures in occupation of a town. The lecture is illustrated with examples from the Italian Campaign, the African Campaign and the fall of France.

Control of Correspondents and Observers 1 hr

A study of the status and activities of correspondents and observers, the usual problems arising of interest to intelligence personnel, and the special controls and limitations needed for security. The course includes a brief introduction to duties of Public Relations Officer for better understanding for coordination with security.

German, French and Italian Police 1 hr

Organization and functions of chief continental police systems; characteristics in common; value to occupying forces; probable reliability.

Field Security Personnel 1 hr

British field security units, their organization, training and functions.

Functions of AMG 1 hr

The purpose, occasion, types and degree of control by allied Military Government is indicated. The general organization is set forth and considered in action as illustrated by our experiences in North Africa and Italy. Special emphasis is placed on the type of information the civil affairs officer might be able to contribute, how the work of CIC aids AMG in carrying out their mission, and the necessity for close cooperation between AMG and CIC.

CIC Annex to CI Plan 3 hrs

Illustration and demonstration of use of CIC Annex to Counterintelligence Plan by division CIC detachment in the attack; CIC missions; intelligence targets with priorities; control points; records and reports.

Investigation Through Interpreters 6 hrs

Military investigation by use of informants and interpreters; practical experience in interrogation through interpreters. Problem characterized

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by overseas setting, logical situation; qualified language personnel employed throughout. At conclusion of investigation students are required to write a report covering their investigative activity.

Radio Direction Finding 2 hrs

The beginning of the period will be devoted to a brief review of intercept equipment SCR 504. The remainder of the period will be utilized for practical work by the students in locating an outlaw station on the post. This outlaw station will be sending canned poop of a subversive nature and will be located at the CI House. The students start from the parade grounds and are given the approximate frequency on which to search for this station. Students will each be given the opportunity to operate the SCR 504.

Radio Operations Advanced 2 hrs

This period will be spent as follows: The first portion of the period will be a review of SCR 206 A operation. The students are divided into teams for each SCR 206 A, which will be spotted at various points along the road in the rear of C-1, Commandant's Office, and School Supply. On the road that passes in front of the hospital, there will be a jeep mounted with an SCR 284 radio. This jeep will move to various points along the road. At each point it will stop long enough to give the students an opportunity to pick up the canned poop being sent and to get a fix on that location. The information will be plotted on a map of Camp Ritchie. At the end of this exercise, the students will be given the location of the jeep at its various stops. They can then see where they made their errors.

Radio Intercept 1 hr

In this period the students will receive the complete method of operating the SCR 504 and the SCR 206 and their employment in the field. The last ten minutes of the time, they will be given a brief outline of what SIS does in the Army.

Foreign Equipment 2 hrs

Foreign equipment will be divided into two periods of one hour each. The first period will deal with methods employed by the enemy in booby-trapping wire and radio equipment. With an explanation of the various ingenious devices that could be used. Second period, the students will be shown exactly how and where booby traps could be employed in foreign signal equipment.

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Wire Surveillance and Security 1 hr

This period will be divided as follows: First will be a brief lecture on wire security and a review of tapping methods. The remainder of the period will be a practical demonstration on wire tapping and how to find these taps.

Tactical Terrain Study 4 hrs

The course is designed to give the student practice in interpreting relief. The student must select four routes which will offer cover and concealment to an infantry unit. In order to select such a route he must, through the use of stereo-vision, pick out stream beds, gullies, etc., and wash-outs. All these particular features will offer cover. The "Floating Line Method" will be used to check enemy fields of fire and observation.

Selection of a Bivouac 2 hrs

Students move an R.C.T. into bivouac, using photographs in conjunction with a photomap. Must select routes of entrance and exit and areas to be occupied by each unit of the R.C.T.

Camouflage 2 hrs

This course is designed to give the student experience in detecting camouflage from a small gun position to a large supply installation. Camouflage measures are explained to the students with practical illustrations on aerial photos. The photos have examples of poor and good camouflage which bring out to the students the principles which have been violated.

German Documents 1 hr

Recognition, exploitation, and disposal of captured documents. This includes a lecture with training aids, and an examination of actual and facsimile documents. The documents used are the types encountered by CI personnel. Also covered in this lecture are the disposal of documents, German terminology, German abbreviation, and classification of documents.

Foreign Maps (5 hours total) 1 hr

German Tactical Maps

Practical problems on a German tactical map, 1:25,000.

Hachures 1 hr

Characteristics of hachures with practical problems on hachured maps.

US - British Maps of France 1 hr

Practical problems on new map series of France, 1:100,000 and 1:25,000.

Foreign Map Review 1 hr

Review of British, French, German, and Italian maps and coordinate systems.

Final Examination 1 hr

Examination on British, French, German and Italian maps bases on 15 hours.

Political Situation of France 1 hr

The lecture consists of a brief description of the Vichy Government and its character; the resistance movement, its origin, composition, and activities; the Free French Movement and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Disarming 2 hrs

Methods and practice in disarming a man when he confronts you with a pistol or rifle.

Street Fighting 3 hrs

A short movie on Street Fighting, firing weapons in a street fighting village problem.

Weapons Firing 16 hrs

Combat firing without the use of sights of the .45 automatic, .38 special, M-3 Sub-Machine Gun. Firing foreign sub-machine guns and rifles. Throwing live grenades. Each man shoots his way through "The Chamber of Horrors."

Silent Movement Course 4 hrs

This course consists of various types of terrain and natural and artificial obstacles which must be crossed quietly. This course is arranged according to the type terrain and obstacles a patrol might encounter in the active theaters.

Sniping. A demonstration showing the capabilities of a sniper, impressing on the students the need to utilize cover and concealment.

Individual Scouting and Patrolling--Standing and Moving Guard. During the daylight phase, each student, equipped with a compass and map is given a mission as a reconnaissance scout. Along the way snipers are distributed to furnish opposition of scouts not utilizing proper cover and concealment. At night, each student with the same equipment is given another mission. Again snipers and patrols are scattered along the routes. During this night phase, the students are canalized so they must pass through a field where standing and moving guards are located. The student must pass by both guards without being detected.

Patrol Procedure and Night Patrolling 4 hrs

The students, in patrols, go through the correct procedure in preparing themselves for a night mission. At night they operate as patrols against an occupied enemy position.

Night patrolling. The students, as patrols, operate against occupied enemy positions to gain information.

Order of Battle 1 hr

Functions of OB Team (1 hr). The functions of Order of Battle teams in the field, the scope of their work, and their cooperation with other intelligence agencies.

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Appendix 8

MITC Curriculum, 11 March 1945

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER
CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

11 March 1945

GENERAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
(Outline of Course)

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (All Sections Except CIC)
(28 Hours Total)

Loose Talk	1 hr
Security Against Indirect Attack	1 hr
Classified Information	2 hrs
Principles of Censorship	1 hr
Safeguarding Military Information in Field	1 hr
Tactical Measures	1 hr
Camouflage Demonstration	3 hrs
Combat Propaganda	1 hr
Counterintelligence Plan	2 hrs
Security Survey	4 hrs
Principles of Investigation	1 hr
Use of Informants	1 hr
Investigative Techniques	1 hr
Introduction to Raids and Searches	1 hr
Introduction to Booby Traps	1 hr
Operation of Mines and Booby Traps	1 hr
The Enemy Espionage Agent	1 hr
Training Films	4 hrs

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[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER
CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

11 March 1945

GENERAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
(Scope of Course)

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (All Sections Except CIC)
(28 hours total)

Loose Talk — 1 hr

Orientation to Counterintelligence (first hour of course): definition of terms; purpose of counterintelligence; general nature of course; conduct of classes and presentation of material; tests and grades. Loose talk hazard; security regulations.

Security Against Indirect Attack — 1 hr

Enemy use of espionage and sabotage in this war; methods of entry; operating techniques; preventive and countermeasures.

Classified Information — 2 hrs

Practical interpretation and presentation of revised AR 380-5 (effective 15 Mar 44). Reasons for classification; limitations on dissemination of classified information; registration of documents and materiel; marking; handling, transmitting, and storing of classified material; field precautions; methods of destruction; records and reports.

Principles of Censorship — 1 hr

Reasons for military censorship; responsibility and organization for censorship in theaters of operations; base censorship detachment; unit censors; censorship stamps; censorship of mail in unit and base; action taken by censors in case of violations; preparation and disposition of comment sheet; necessity for education of all troops.

Safeguarding Military Information in the Field — 1 hr

Practical application of loose talk, classified information and censorship in the field. Chief sources of information open to enemy; markings

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and information on personal or organizational equipment and personal possessions. Necessity for making all personnel security conscious.

Tactical Measures 1 hr

Nature and purpose; positive aspects of counterintelligence. Tricks, feints, ruses, and other strategems adopted to deceive the enemy; current examples of enemy measures reported in intelligence bulletins and other sources.

Camouflage Demonstration 3 hrs

A practical field exercise to illustrate individual camouflage methods. Different means and types of camouflage are explained and demonstration troops demonstrate how they actually appear and blend with various types of background.

Combat Propaganda 1 hr

Use of propaganda as an offensive weapon; enemy techniques; countermeasures; examples of American, Allied, and enemy propaganda. Illustrated by specially prepared set of slides.

Counterintelligence Plan

Necessity for prior planning; origin and dissemination of plan; explanation and application of approved form; use of available agencies. Practical problem involving drawing up plan to cover given situation.

Security Survey

Three-hour practical exercise preceded by orientation lecture. Nature and purpose of survey; physical safeguards; map and ground reconnaissance; selection of critical points; report on findings; recommendations based on survey. Problem situation in theater of operations. Fifteen minute critique illustrated by slide map at conclusion of exercise.

Principles of Investigation 1 hr

Fundamental investigative procedure; preservation evidence; use of scientific aids and qualified exports in the field; records and reports.

Use of Informants 1 hr

Importance of informants overseas; types; motives; potentialities under proper approach and procedure.

Investigative Techniques 1 hr

Definition of terms; purpose and techniques of undercover agents; surveillance; observation and description; countering shake-off attempts.

Introduction to Raids and Searches 1 hr

Illustrated lecture showing procedure for raiding an occupied building and searching for documents, materiel, and personnel. Planning and reconnaissance; organization of raiding party; arms; posting of cordon; raid and search proper; disposition of documents and personnel; necessary reports.

Introduction to Booby Traps 1 hr

Interest to intelligence personnel. Construction and use; standard and improvised types.

Operation of Mines and Booby Traps 1 hr

Illustrated demonstration of enemy and American mines and booby-trap firing devices. Suggestions for training.

The Enemy Espionage Agent 1 hr

A study of the individual agent - how he was selected, propositioned and trained. Typical espionage assignments and means ordinarily used to carry them out are discussed. Special stress is placed on the means used to enter Allied territory and the means used to transmit their information.

Training Films (4 hours total)

TF 11-321 Combat Counterintelligence 1 hr
TF 5-1212 Detection and Neutralization of Enemy Mines

TF 5-645 Camouflage - Individual Concealment 1 hr
TF 5-646 Camouflage - Bivouac Area

TF 5-648	Camouflage - Use of Artificial Materials	
TF 5-649	Camouflage - Principles	
TF 15-992	Administration of Military Justice and Courts Martial	1 hr
TF 5-954	Enemy Booby Traps	1 hr
TF 5-2039	Passage of Mine Fields for all Arms	

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER
CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

11 March 1945

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS COURSE OF INSTRUCTION

ETO SECTIONS

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (130 hours total)

Loose Talk	1 hr
Security Against Indirect Attack	1 hr
Classified Information	2 hrs
Principles of Censorship	1 hr
Safeguarding Military Information in the Field	1 hr
Tactical Measures	1 hr
Camouflage Demonstration	3 hrs
Combat Propaganda	1 hr
Counterintelligence Plan	2 hrs
Security Survey	4 hrs
Principles of Investigation	1 hr
Use of Informants	2 hrs
Investigative Techniques	2 hrs
Introduction to Raids and Searches	1 hr
Operation of Mines and Booby Traps	2 hrs
The German Espionage Agent	1 hr
Sabotage Devices	1 hr

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Crash Investigations (Sabotage of Aircraft)	1 hr
Security Talks (Practical)	5 hrs
Security Education Program (Practical)	2 hrs
Construction and Use of Booby Traps	4 hrs
Explosives and Demolitions (Demonstration)	2 hrs
Security Survey Problem	1 hr
Principles of Interrogation (Application)	8 hrs
Interrogation Through Interpreters (Problem)	6 hrs
Investigation (Problem)	8 hrs
Court Procedure (Practical)	1 hr
Military Offenses	2 hrs
Law and Preservation of Evidence	2 hrs
Fingerprinting	2 hrs
Lock Picking and Ultra-Violet Lamp	1 hr
Codes, Ciphers and Secret Writing	1 hr
Investigative Photography (Practical)	4 hrs
Observation and Description (Practical)	2 hrs
Surveillance Techniques	1 hr
Raids and Searches (Problem)	2 hrs
Security in Occupied Territory	2 hrs
Riot and Refugee Control	4 hrs
Port Security	1 hr
Travel Control	1 hr

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Capabilities and Limitations of CIC Detachments	2 hrs
Administrative Procedures of CIC Detachments	3 hrs
CIC Special Equipment (Display)	1 hr
CIC Cooperation with Civil Affairs	3 hrs
CIC Liaison with Other Security Agencies	1 hr
CIC Cooperation with OB and Military Interpreter Teams	1 hr
Report Writing (Practical)	4 hrs
CIC Organization in Theaters and War Department	1 hr
Experiences of Returned CIC Officers	3 hrs
CIC Annex	8 hrs
Examinations	3 hrs
Training Films	6 hrs

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Examinations		3 hrs
Training Films	(6 hours total)	
TF 11-321	Combat Intelligence	1 hr
TF 5-1212	Detection and Neutralization of Enemy Mines	
TF 5-645	Camouflage - Individual Concealment	1 hr
TF 5-646	Camouflage - Bivouac Area	
TF 5-648	Camouflage - Use of Artificial Materials	
TF 5-649	Camouflage - Principles	
TF 15-992	Administration of Military Justice and Courts Martial	1 hr
TF 5-954	Enemy Booby Traps	1 hr
TF 5-2039	Passage of Mine Fields for all Arms	
TF 1-3383	Resisting Enemy Interrogation	1 hr
TF 19-1290	Riot Control	1 hr
TF 5-572	Demolition of Concrete Arch Bridge	

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING CENTER
CAMP RITCHIE, MARYLAND

11 March 1945

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS COURSE OF INSTRUCTION

PAC SECTION

IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (136 hours total)

Loose Talk	1 hr
Security Against Indirect Attack	1 hr
Classified Information	2 hrs
Principles of Censorship	1 hr
Safeguarding Military Information in the Field	1 hr
Tactical Measures	1 hr
Camouflage Demonstration	3 hrs
Combat Propaganda	1 hr
Counterintelligence Plan	2 hrs
Security Survey	4 hrs
Principles of Investigation	1 hr
Use of Informants	2 hrs
Investigative Techniques	2 hrs
Introduction to Raids and Searches	1 hr
Operation of Mines and Booby Traps	2 hrs
The Japanese Espionage Agent	1 hr
Sabotage Devices	1 hr

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Crash Investigations (Sabotage of Aircraft)	1 hr
Security Talks (Practical)	5 hrs
Security Education Program (Practical)	2 hrs
Construction and Use of Booby Traps	4 hrs
Explosives and Demolitions	2 hrs
Security Survey Problems	1 hr
Principles of Interrogation	8 hrs
Principles of Interrogation (Application)	4 hrs
Interrogation Through Interpreters (Problem)	6 hrs
Investigation (Problem)	8 hrs
Court Procedure (Practical)	1 hr
Military Offenses	2 hrs
Law and Preservation of Evidence	2 hrs
Fingerprinting (Practical)	4 hrs
Lock Picking and Ultra-Violet Lamp	1 hr
Codes, Ciphers, and Secret Writing	1 hr
Investigative Photography (Practical)	4 hrs
Observation and Description (Practical)	2 hrs
Surveillance Techniques	1 hr
Raids and Searches (Problem)	2 hrs
Security in Occupied Territory	2 hrs
Riot and Refugee Control	4 hrs
Port Security	1 hr

Travel Control	1 hr
Capabilities and Limitations of CIC Detachments	2 hrs
Administrative Procedures of CIC Detachments	3 hrs
CIC Special Equipment (Display)	1 hr
CIC Cooperation with Civil Affairs	3 hrs
CIC Liaison with Other Security Agencies	1 hr
CIC Cooperation With OB and Military Interpreter Teams	1 hr
Report Writing (Practical)	4 hrs
CIC Organization in Theater and War Department	1 hr
Experiences of Returned CIC Officers	3 hrs
Japanese Espionage Techniques	1 hr
Japanese Racial Characteristics	1 hr
Orientation for Tropical Areas	2 hrs
CIC Annex	8 hrs
Philippine Guerillas	1 hr
Examinations	2 hrs
Training Films (6 hours total)	2 hrs
TF 11-321 Combat Counterintelligence TF 5-1212 Detection and Neutralization of Enemy Mines	1 hr
TF 5-645 Camouflage - Individual Concealment TF 5-646 Camouflage - Bivouac Area TF 5-648 Camouflage - Use of Artificial Materials TF 5-649 Camouflage - Camouflage Principles	1 hr
TF 15-992 Administration of Military Justice and Courts Martial	1 hr

TF 5-954	Enemy Booby Traps	1 hr
TF 5-2039	Passage of Mine Fields for all Arms	
TF 1-3383	Resisting Enemy Interrogation	1 hr
TF 19-1290	Riot Control	1 hr
TF 5-572	Demolition of Concrete Arch Bridge	

BOX NUMBER: ///

DOCUMENT COLLECTION: US Army Intelligence Center Library (Ft Huachuca, AZ)



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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME VII

CIC IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR, WORLD WAR II

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2+3
DECLASSIFY ON

November 1959

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CIC IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR, WORLD WAR II

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NOTE

Overall strength allocations and many policy level decisions concerning Service Commands are covered in the Volume on "CIC Headquarters, Zone of the Interior, World War II" since their application was world wide even though the Service Commands were the units primarily concerned.

While Service Commands employed the greatest number of CIC agents during World War II, their work was for the greater part concerned with "routine" cases since the other types of cases in the ZI were, almost inevitably, within the jurisdiction of the FBI. To avoid meaningless repetition, these routine cases are portrayed as general problems of all commands and operations within the Service Commands confined to more localized angles.

Available records covering this section were in short supply and time did not permit interviewing sources for this Volume to the extent desired. It is hoped that readers will forward data on all significant events not covered and with which they are familiar or suggest sources who can be contacted at some future time when this initial manuscript is revised.

THE EDITORS

Chapter 1

GENERAL PROBLEMS IN SERVICE COMMANDS

World War II activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Zone of the Interior were conducted for the most part in the nine Service Commands of Army Service Forces. These wartime activities may be divided roughly into three phases. The first phase was from May 1940 until May 1943, a period of three years when the primary emphasis was on the procurement of personnel for work in the United States. The second was the hectic one year from May 1943 until May 1944 when the Service Commands worked frantically to clean up their backlogs of cases before their personnel were drastically reduced by overseas shipments. Finally, the third phase was the two years from May 1944 to May 1946, when the CIC personnel in the Service Commands had been depleted 80 percent, their most important sources of information eliminated, and their activities restricted by merger into a Security and Intelligence Corps (SIC) under the operational control of the Provost Marshal General.

The period 1940-41 is covered in the section of this history entitled "The CIP in the Pre-World War II Era," and the period from mid-1945 until May 1946 is covered in the section of this history entitled "CIC in the United States in the Post War Era." As in all arbitrary divisions of history, various phases overlap one another and some summation of these other sections is necessary in this section to portray the complete problem.

Several name changes are confusing to historical writers and readers of this later era, as they confused CIC personnel originally. Fortunately, however, the nine Army Corps Areas of the pre-war era remained essentially the same in size, jurisdiction, mission, and command structure throughout the entire war. The Ninth Corps Area was pushed out of San Francisco to a headquarters at Fort Douglas, Utah, and all its CIC personnel were taken over by the Western Defense Command which then suballotted to Ninth Corps. Southern Defense Command, which controlled an eight-mile-wide strip of the Mexican border from Western Texas extending to New Orleans, likewise pushed Eighth Corps out of Houston to Dallas, Texas. However, Eighth Corps kept its CIC allotment and suballotted to Southern Defense Command until September 1943.

The Corps Areas had officially been titled Corps Area Service Commands. In March 1942 when the Services of Supply, (the following year redesignated Army Service Forces) were activated and took command of the areas, The Corps Areas were redesignated Service Commands. For this chapter they will be called Service Commands.

In May 1940, Brig Gen Sherman Miles, the new War Department G2, informed the Service Commands that for the first time in six years funds were available for

securing additional CIP manpower. Men could now be "detailed" from the Service Commands. Two months later when CIP got its first manpower increase in six years, eight of the nine Service Commands were again allotted two CIP spaces. Eighth Corps on the Mexican border, which had managed to keep two CIP spaces during the lean years, received an additional space. During the three years following 1940, the Corps grew steadily with its authorized strength always ahead of its actual strength.

Lack of CIC manpower was a continual wartime problem of the Service Commands. At the start of World War II, some Commands had nearly 400 CIC agents. One week after Pearl Harbor CIC lost 90 of them to the Provost Marshal General. From this low, they built to a high point of 2,900 in September 1943.[1]

There were three serious problems in connection with Service Command CIC manpower. First, CIC manpower needs for the United States were drastically underestimated in April 1942, and only 1,200 spaces requested. It was not until February 1943 that a total of 3,500 ZI spaces were requested, but by that time CIC was trapped by the Army's general manpower shortage.

Another problem in the Service Commands was that the Air Force, which eventually discovered it could meet its requirements with less than 1,000 CIC agents, originally asked for 2,600 men.

The third serious problem was that the Service Commands were used as a "pool" for holding CIC personnel destined for later assignment to Army Ground Forces and theaters. Remarkably, G2 estimated this requirement in April 1942 as totaling 3,300. In January 1944, when the last space requirement was met, the total was 3,250.

Had the Air Force request for 2,600 agents listed in the April 1942 CIC personnel requisition been reduced 40 percent and the 1,600 spaces saved included in the ZI request, the proposed allocations of the 7,400 requested would have very closely met the actual CIC manpower needs of the war. Instead, CIC spaces were cut to approximately 5,000 when an increase was approved. This loss of 2,400 spaces led to serious complications 17 months later, when men were required overseas.

What was not obvious in 1942 was that unless CIC obtained another increase in authorized personnel it would take all but some 350 ZI CIC agents to meet all future overseas requirements. No increase was obtained, however, until the Service Commands had been depleted.

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1 For CIC manpower details see section of this Chapter on CIC Headquarters.

When the recall sounded and these tactical "loans" were taken, there was some bitterness in the Service Commands for having been used as a "pool" and training school while attempting to perform an intensive operational mission. Col H. R. Kibler, Chief, CIC, reported to Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, G2, that "...A Service Command offers a safe pool in which to hold men during the thorough investigation to determine their suitability for retention in the Corps and provides time in which the individual can be observed in order to determine the position in which he can best serve. Finally, the Service Command pool provides an active and useful place to hold a man with a specialized talent until that talent is required in a specific area."[2]

Maj F. C. Brennecke, commanding the Washington Field Office of CIC, summed up the opposition to the policy in a letter to the Chief, CIC in June 1942 commenting on the use of his detachment as "a replacement training center."[3]

This use of the Service Commands for investigative recruit training had grave dangers and created the opportunity for charges such as were made by the Army Inspector General in November 1943 that some types of investigations were "superficial and unproductive" and included adverse information based on "hearsay, gossip and rumor." While CIC could prove that such instances were the exception and not the rule, every CIC operations officer of the era was well aware of the danger that existed when shortages of personnel forced him to send out a "green" agent on other than a routine case.[4]

This same report commented upon another problem of the Service Command G2's who, it said, were "placed in an anomalous position." As members of the staff of the Service Command they "owed the service commander complete loyalty and allegiance and acted in their field of activity as his representative." However, they received directives for the use of the CIC detachment directly from G2, WDGS. This resulted in a misunderstanding as to the responsibility for intelligence activities within the Service Command, since commanders were reluctant to see their men transferred into the Counter Intelligence Corps. For the most part of World War II, the directives transferred them from the local command to direct War Department jurisdiction.

At one point, the Chief of CIC was calling for Service Command CIC agents by name in order to assure good agents. G2s protested loudly at having their best agents taken away. At the Conference of Directors of Intelligence held

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2 MID 909 (8-31-43) Memo from Chief, CIC to G2, Subj: "CIC," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

3 See Operations Section, CIC Hqs, in Part I, this Chapter.

4 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

6 October 1942, one complained: "We were hard hit. Eighteen were called by name." Colonel Crist, from G2, War Department General Staff, admitted in reply: "Yes, it isn't good policy to pull out men by name."[5]

Later this practice was replaced by the system of calling for men by rank and special qualifications such as age, specific language ability or other criteria. This still permitted the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps to pinpoint men effectively.

At the same Conference the Director of Intelligence, Third Service Command warned: "You can have a raid on your Corps so that you won't have a special agent left if you aren't careful."[6] These "raids" were often inspired by requests made upon the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps by Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commanders overseas. Particular agents in the Service Command whom the commanders knew were requested.

The resentment of such raids was only natural, since Directors of Intelligence were responsible to their commanding generals of the Service Commands as well as to G2, War Department General Staff for a successful counterintelligence job. However, it sometimes seemed they had lost sight of the training mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in Service Commands. Also forgotten was the Military Intelligence Service directive of 14 May 1942 which asked them to name the key Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the Service Commands, not exceeding 10 percent of total strength, the balance of 90 percent to be considered available to G2. On the other hand, the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, soon discovered that the Service Command Directors of Intelligence were releasing their less satisfactory agents first to fill requests for personnel.

The most aggravating personnel problems in Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps detachments revolved around the procurement of suitable officers for Counter Intelligence Corps. Initially, the supply was adequate, but it dwindled so rapidly at Service Command levels that in October 1942 the Director of Intelligence for the Second Service Command stated: "I have 35 vacancies in my command for intelligence officers; I have lost six to the War Department and other agencies. There are no replacements. Installations requiring officers have jumped from 61 to 108 in three months and the demand is increasing," and with respect to officer allotments added:

"They don't exist as far as Second Service Command is concerned. Everyone is picked to the bone. We are operating on less than 70 percent authorized strength. ....That brings up my strong point. We need your help to get 35 more officers of any kind, even officers from civilian life. If I could get a procurement authority

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6 See Personnel Section, CIC Headquarters, Part I, this Chapter.

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for 35 intelligence officers I'd be able to go on functioning. It's now very difficult. We can't pull out any men for intelligence duties. It is impossible to get them. I imagine the same condition exists elsewhere. When you give us this procurement authority, it ought to be definitely earmarked for intelligence, because it is like a bone to a hungry pack of wolves when you throw 10 officers into a Corps Area; everybody grabs them. Intelligence never gets a look at them."[7]

Another basic personnel problem which continued to harass the Service Command Director of Intelligence was promotion.

Authority to promote enlisted men in grade was decentralized to Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands in June 1941. The allotted grades, though, were inadequate and promotions were repeatedly frozen for long periods. In the Second Service Command Security Intelligence Corps Detachment, for example, promotion recommendations as late as April 1944 were turned down on several outstanding enlisted men who had been corporals over one and one-half years. It was not unusual for such men to remain corporals for two or three years, no matter how well qualified they were for advancement.

During 1942 and 1943 a large number of enlisted men were sent to Officer Candidate School from the Service Commands. When it was found by the directors of intelligence that many such newly commissioned officers returned to the Service Commands only to be moved out immediately, the enthusiasm for sending enlisted men to Officer Candidate School cooled off. In 1943 only about nine enlisted men went to Officer Candidate School from the Second Service Command.[8] An inspection report from the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, remarked that attendance at Officer Candidate School was not being directly encouraged.[9]

A letter from the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, to all Special Agents and Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps was disseminated in July 1943, advised that all qualified and interested enlisted men should apply for Officer Candidate School because the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel ceiling had been reached. When the agents learned any enlisted men had the right to apply for Officer Candidate School, a number of applications were sent forward through channels by the agents on their own initiative. The reaction of detachment commanders and Service Command directors of intelligence can be illustrated by the

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7 Col S. V. Constant, proceedings of Conference of Director of Intelligence, 6 Oct 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

8 Peters, A. K., Maj, (MI) (USAR), CIC Officer Second Service Command during WW II, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 9 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

9 Memo from Capt James E. Foothorap to Chief, CIC, 15 Mar 43, subj: "Report of Visit to Second Service Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

fact that one detachment commanding officer called a group of such applicants into his office, lectured them as being ungrateful trouble-makers, and tore up the applications in front of them.[10] As a last resort the directors of intelligence were sometimes forced to obtain Officer Candidate School quotas for Counter Intelligence Corps agents from Service Command allotments, but this was extremely difficult to arrange.[11]

On the whole, procurement of suitable personnel for the Counter Intelligence Corps in Service Commands was not so much a problem as clearing them through quickly enough. The usual personnel problems in Army units were at a minimum, since the Counter Intelligence Corps agents lived independently in civilian quarters (often at home), and since the caliber of man selected for Counter Intelligence Corps was extremely high. With few exceptions the enlisted men of the Counter Intelligence Corps at that time were of officer qualifications.

Within limits prescribed by the War Department, the Corps Area Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, recruited potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Initially, emphasis was placed on securing men with extensive language, legal and investigative experience in civilian life. During 1941 nearly all officers doing counterintelligence work in the Second Corps Area were hand-picked reserve officers who volunteered for duty in G2.

Many of the enlisted men were volunteers who came directly from substantial positions in civilian life such as federal, state, and city investigative agencies, university faculties, and prominent law firms. All had college educations except those who had special abilities which made them essential for Corps of Intelligence Police purposes. A check of Second Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in 1942 showed men of the following backgrounds: lawyers, certified public accountants, district attorneys, judges, agents from the Treasury Department, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Department, Alcohol Tax Unit, college professors, men with Ph. D.'s and M. A.'s, language teachers, state police officers, New York City detectives, telephone company technicians, Merchant Marine, business men, and even one silversmith.[12]

The Second Corps Area, unlike some of the others, happened to include a wide range of civilian talents which could be tapped successfully for Counter Intelligence Corps candidates. The problem of interviewing these applicants at

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10 Peters, A. K., Maj, (MI) (USAR), CIC Officer Second Service Cmd during WWII, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

11 Memo from Capt James E. Foothorap to Chief, CIC, 15 Mar 43, subj: "Report of Visit to Second Service Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

12 See Personnel Section of CIC Headquarters, Part I this Chapter.

induction centers and at Corps Area CIC Headquarters, screening out ineligible and tabbing desirable men, and processing exhaustive Personal History Statements consumed the full-time efforts of several officers and enlisted men from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in the Second Corps Area. Machinery was set up to investigate selected candidates as quickly as possible so they could be transferred into the local Corps of Intelligence Police detachment. But, due to investigative leads in other Corps Areas (who were also critically short of personnel and long on incoming cases) and because of the scarcity of Corps of Intelligence Police agents then available within the Second Corps Area, these cases often required months to complete. In the meantime the candidate frequently had moved on to another assignment in the Army and was no longer available.[13]

As more men were recruited later in 1942 and 1943, Service Commands were able to handle the steadily increasing case load. It had grown from 8,510 new cases opened in November 1942 to 11,627 cases in April 1943. In early 1943 as CIC approached its authorized strength, CIC headquarters found itself obliged to assign capable agents to Service Commands to avoid losing them. It appeared that Service Commands would be amply supplied with manpower without having an adequate quota.[14]

Service Commands had repeatedly warned losses were inevitable and in May 1943, the enemy had been driven from Africa. Other activities could be started. The bugle blew for CIC and recall sounded. Col L. R. Forney, officer-in-charge of CIC affairs for MID, WDGS, wrote all Service Command G2s that the War Department had requisitions for 1,900 agents overseas which would have to be filled. Moreover, he said, since there was no hope of getting any increase in strength, men would have to be provided without replacements. In February 1943, G2 had asked for a CIC strength of 9,752 men and when this was disapproved tried again in May for 6,974. This too had been rejected.

Colonel Forney said that G2 had been asked to relieve CIC detachments of the responsibility for loyalty checks, personnel investigations and investigations concerning safeguarding of military information (SMI). G2, he said, favored this as "an emergency measure." CIC personnel were to be employed directly on investigations of disaffection, subversion, espionage and sabotage. No longer would they be employed on any non-CIC duties.[15]

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13 Peters, A. K., Maj, (MI) (USAR), CIC Officer Second Service Cmd during WWII, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

14 Memo C/S from G2, WDGS, dtd 16 May 43, subj: "Reorganization and Expansion of the CIC," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

15 Correspondence Chief, CIC, May-Jun 43, Ltr from Colonel Forney to D/Is, Service Commands, dtd 29 May 43, (SECRET) (Intermediate Records Depot, Ft Holabird, Md.).

However, in May 1943, CIC had only 4,300 of its 5,000 authorization, leaving 700 vacancies. Consequently, although 700 persons were sent overseas in the next four months, Service Commands recruited an additional 300 men and their net loss was only 400 persons. They felt they had supplied half of their obligation of the 1,400 man overseas pool allocated them.

The Blow in September 1943

In September 1943 the recall bugle really blasted. G2, WDGS, had made another attempt to get a CIC increase, on the basis that field security had become an added CIC mission. This time he asked for 6,763 spaces. This increase was rejected. On 16 September, Colonel Forney gave the warning, in a letter to all Service Commands, "...This is a difficult letter to write because what I have to say will be very unpleasant news for you. It relates to the number of members of the CIC you may expect to be available to you in the near future... For the past nine months this office has been making strenuous efforts to obtain authority for an increase in the strength of the Counter Intelligence Corps. For various reasons our efforts have not met with success up to this time. There are urgent demands for CIC personnel for use in the theaters of operations and for other phases of the present offensive stage of the war. Filling these demands cannot be postponed any longer. The result is that we must take immediate steps to obtain needed personnel by denuding the Service Commands... I estimate you cannot count on more than five officers and 60 enlisted men..."[16]

On 22 August, the AG informed the Service Commands that 2,059 men of their CIC officers and men would be transferred overseas before 31 January 1944, leaving them only 787 CIC officers and men--an average of 87 each.[17]

Not only were spaces drastically cut, but quality manpower was in short supply. In May 1943, Service Commands had estimated that without lowering the standards of the Corps, not more than 2,000 men suitable for CIC assignment could be obtained within the next six months.[18] This total also had to furnish replacements for CIC personnel losses which were primarily by transfer to Officer Candidate School, or for cause. In eight months, nearly 600 men had been lost, so the indications were that the 2,000 prospects would make a net gain of not more than 1,600.

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16 MID 909 (16 Sep 43) to DIs, Service Commands from Col L. R. Forney, Assistant Executive Off, MIS, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

17 AG 210-31 (20 Sep 43) P-A-B, subj: "Transfer of CIC Personnel," to CGs of Service Commands, dtd 22 Sep 43, from AG, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

18 MID 902 (5-15-43) Memo C/S for G2, WDGS, dtd 10 May 43, subj: "Reorganization and Expansion of the CIC," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

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However, the Air Force, which had only 129 CIC agents in July 1943, was tapping this same manpower source in a drive for 1,000 agents. It had opened CIC Air Mechanics Training schools at four airbases and in the next four months 365 agents were trained at these schools. Another 450 agents were recruited directly so that Air Force CIC had tapped about half the estimated available manpower. Air Force was supposed to provide the personnel from its own ranks, but in actual practice this was not the case.[19]

After September 1943, disintegration of the CIC ZI was rapid. From the 2,700 CIC agents in the Service Commands on 30 September, the figure had dropped to 2,150 by 25 November 1943. Service commanders protested. In the Third Service Command, where 311 CIC agents were being cut to 86, Maj Gen M. A. Reckord "urged that a minimum of 236 CIC agents be retained. General Reckord said that his command was prepared to take the maximum calculated risk" but "...to weaken our counterintelligence coverage beyond that limit would be hazardous and a greater threat to the safety of our people abroad than if we sent them no CIC at all..."[20]

General Reckord also asked that the countersubversion informant network which had been ordered abolished be retained. While this information service was not operated by CIC but by other sections of the Intelligence Service, it was a prime source of leads to potentially subversive personnel. Without it the number of espionage, sabotage, disaffection, subversion or other type of complaint cases would materially decrease.[21] In one Service Command, it was resulting in 90 new cases a month.[22]

The 2,000 communist agents that Congressman Dies reported in 1941 as entrenched in key spots in the government were still there. Communist Browder was boasting there were 13,000 comrades in the Army.[23] On the Board of Economic Warfare, Communist Lauchin Currie, administrative assistant to the President of the United States, was busy adding other Communists to this important board. In 1942, Currie attempted to get his Communist spymaster, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, detailed to the Board. However, a G2 report, signed by General Strong, said Silvermaster was not only an active Communist but probably a secret agent of the OGPU. Silvermaster was sent back to his old job in the Farm Security Administration.

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19 For details, see Section of the History on CIC With the Air Force.

20 Ltr, Maj Gen M. A. Reckord, to CG, ASF, dtd 25 Sep, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

21 Ibid.

22 See Section, "Office of the Chief CIC During WWII," in Chapter on CIC Headquarters.

23 Burnham, James, The Web of Subversion, John Day Co., N.Y. (1954), pp. 37 and 62.

G2 counterintelligence was becoming a hindrance to the Communists.[24] But G2 was soon informed that its counterintelligence activities were going to be drastically reduced because it had incurred the displeasure of certain powerful politicians.[25]

Further evidence was not long in coming. In July, the Army Inspector General had been ordered to investigate G2 activities, including CIC, in the Service Commands. His report was submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Joseph McNarney. (This, incidentally, was the same McNarney, who as Major McNarney of the Air Force had been pushed about by G2 during the Air Force controversy of the 30s.) Details of this IG report and its implications are covered in the section of this chapter on CIC Headquarters During World War II.

On 1 January 1944 the 963 remaining CIC agents in the ZI were merged into a Security and Intelligence Corps (SIC) to join with the 900 provost marshal investigators on duty.[26]

The Chief CIC had been urged to start pushing out activities in December. For activities in process, 4 February 1944 was set as "Der Tag" when the Office of the Chief, CIC, would close and all ZI CIC functions would cease. However, 718 agents would remain with the Air Force, 516 with the ground forces, and 162 with the Manhattan Engineering (Atomic) District. This would leave 1,396 agents on specialized missions.[27]

As far as the Service Commands were concerned, the worst appeared to have happened. But another blow came later. In January 1944, 169 more Service Command agents were taken to fill a European Theater request.

The final Service Command phase, from May 1944 until May 1946 when ZI CIC detachments were again authorized divides into the first year to the German surrender in May 1945 and the first post-war year. The latter is covered in another section and was marked by the end of the need for SIC personnel. The SIC gradually decreased to 512 persons in the spring of 1946, when War Department Circular 108 transferred all SIC personnel back to CIC.

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24 Burnham, James, The Web of Subversion, John Day Co., N.Y. (1954) pp. 37, 62.

25 Holbrook, p. 3.

26 Brief of R. C. Jacobs, Executive Office, G2, dtd 19 Oct 43 to C/S with Staff Study dtd 23 Sep 43 attached. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

27 Memo to Ex CIG for Chief CIC dtd 1 Feb 44, subj: "Estimated Distribution CIC Personnel," 31 Dec 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

In the interval, there was little for former CIC personnel to do in the ZI. Loyalty checks and personnel investigations had been taken from them, leaving only complaint-type cases. The Countersubversive System, principal source of this type of case, was abolished. There were as many posts, camps, stations and other Army units in the United States as there were agents. To cover them without informants was to spread CIC personnel to a point of complete inefficiency. During this final year of the war, CIC could but aid PMG investigators and hope that the FBI was able to provide an effective type of the security for the nation, since the Domestic Branch of Office of Naval Intelligence had had its countersubversive sources clipped at the same time as CIC. Most of the CIC agents remaining in the ZI had never had a chance to go to any of the CIC advanced or specialized schools before they were closed.

At the time of the frenzied shipment in the fall of 1943, the Second Corps Area lost 327 CIC personnel in 60 days. By December 1943 the Counter Intelligence Corps field office in New York was down to a first lieutenant in command. Sections previously headed by captains and lieutenants were being administered by corporal agents.

The phrase "calculated risk" became popular at this time.[28] At the operational level friction was so pronounced among the agents that the Security Intelligence Corps Field Office in New York was reorganized along geographic lines so as to force the former Counter Intelligence Corps and Internal Security men to work together as much as possible. Thus the feeling that each group had a special type of investigation was eliminated. In reality the functions previously performed by Counter Intelligence Corps and by Internal Security Division men in the Service Commands continued to be carried on as they were prior to the merger, by the same men and in the same way, except that all the agents were now called Security Intelligence Corps. This situation continued for the rest of the war.

Maj A. K. Peters, who commanded a Second Service Command field office in World War II has written: "In retrospect it is questionable whether the severe blow to morale of both Counter Intelligence Corps and Internal Security Division agents, and the virtual paralysis of investigative activity in the Service Commands which ensued from October 1943 through March 1944, were offset by the economy of combined operation as suggested by the Inspector General's report of November 1943. Certainly this six-month period prior to the Allied invasion of Europe was highly critical. If enemy sabotage or espionage was ever to move into high gear or to throw a sunday punch in a desperate effort to delay or frustrate the invasion, this, it seemed, was their last chance. And the Service Commands were left with the barest handful of trained men to meet such an emergency. Happily the calculated

28 Peters, A. K., Maj (MI)(USAR), CIC Officer Second Service Cmd during WWII, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

risk policy was successful, but mainly through good fortune rather than the validity of the calculations, for the transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps overnight from Service Commands to tactical units was a crash program without proper advance planning and the subsequent attempt to plug the breach with Internal Security Division investigators in the Service Commands was a policy of expediency which resulted unquestionably in seriously lowering our level of security in the Zone of the Interior from October 1943 until the war's end."[29]

Among personnel at Service Command level this consolidation became the object of considerable bitterness and resentment. The agents no longer enjoyed their status as members of the Counter Intelligence Corps and felt they had been kicked downstairs by a mandatory merger with the sergeant investigators of the Provost Marshal General. Of this Major Peters has written, "There were three main reasons for this resentment by the former counterintelligence agents: first, they continued to do Counter Intelligence Corps investigative work plus a share of the Criminal Investigations Division work, and therefore felt they should retain their Counter Intelligence Corps standing. Second, the basic qualifications and training of the Criminal Investigations Division men was not considered up to the Counter Intelligence Corps standards nor had they been cleared by the same type of investigations as Counter Intelligence Corps qualifying them for access to highly classified information. Third, the Criminal Investigations Division was mainly composed of Jewish agents. Counter Intelligence Corps on the other hand was mainly Protestant and Irish Catholic, and although it should not have been so, the fact remains that this condition created a cleavage between the two groups which was never completely bridged. For their part, the former Criminal Investigations Division agents, many of whom had earned the grade of sergeant in tactical units before entering Criminal Investigations Division and who therefore usually outranked the 'Corps of Indignant Corporals,' considered the Counter Intelligence Corps men as 'prima donnas' and 'Ivy League boys.' This entire condition was a problem in human relations which had a serious effect on the morale of both groups and to a very definite extent adversely affected the successful accomplishment of the Security Intelligence Corps mission. The circumstances dictating this consolidation are discussed elsewhere in the History, but it should be pointed out here that the merger was superficial only. The new Security Intelligence Corps agents shared office space at 50 Broadway, New York, but the same individuals who were Counter Intelligence Corps agents before continued to work on Counter Intelligence Corps type investigations, and the same individual Criminal Investigations Division men continued to work on their type of cases. Although the missions and jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps and

29 Peters, A. K., Maj (MI) (USAR), CIC Officer Second Service Cmd during WWII, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Criminal Investigations Division had been combined under the Security Intelligence Corps, they continued to be carried out separately by the same men as before with the chief difference being the organization name."[30]

CIC ZI Mission and Operations

The Counter Intelligence Corps mission in the United States during World War II was based on the Delimitations Agreement with the FBI and ONI completed in 1940. Because of its huge case load, though, the FBI frequently overlooked CIC activities off military reservations where the boundary line of jurisdictions touched. Unless CIC worked the case it would only add to the FBI burden. This did not, of course, apply to a case of any magnitude or special importance.

Essentially the CIC mission was similar to its World War I ZI mission, which was primarily counterespionage and countersabotage. Although the FBI had taken over all plant security early in 1940, it agreed to a proposal made in February 1943 that in the case of so called "shadow plants" MID could assume jurisdiction, if it so notified FBI. These shadow plants were set up by the government for the exclusive manufacture of war materiel but were operated by private firms. In September 1943, to further this work, a Plant Security course was set up, and 940 CIC officers and men completed it.[31]

Specifically, the CIC mission in the Service Commands included the investigation of suspected espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, disaffection and violations of regulations for safeguarding military information. Since impostors could have subversive as well as criminal intent, such suspects were included in CIC investigative jurisdiction. It also included loyalty checks and investigations, security surveys and the collection of radical group intelligence. At ports and borders as members of air, road or ship panels operated jointly with FBI and ONI, it had a positive intelligence mission.

Prevention of espionage and sabotage was the first consideration. If CIC could eliminate the opportunities, there would be none to detect. More practically, the probabilities of detecting an enemy agent increased proportionately with the effectiveness of security measures. Preventive work was unspectacular but, in effect, the most important of all.

Obviously the first essential was that every position of trust be filled by a person of pre-determined loyalty. This required an investigation based upon a

30 Peters, A. K., Maj (MI) (USA), CIC Officer Second Service Cmd during WW II, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

31 Agreement dtd 13 Feb 43 signed by G. V. Strong, H. V. Train and J. E. Hoover, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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calculated risk theory that the more sensitive the position the more extensive the investigation must be. These varied from merely a records check to a complete background investigation requiring months to complete. Since the loyalty of the persons investigated was based on the loyalty of the investigator, CIC applicants were subject to the most complete background investigations, and since all other investigations depended upon the availability of CIC manpower, their investigations had top priority.

Once trustworthy persons were obtained, the next requirement was to provide physical security for the building or area in which they worked. Fences, locks and similar barriers were designed to provide a means of entrance and exit for only the trusted persons through a system of guards and passes. CIC had the responsibility of surveying the status of all military installations and recommending improvements to prevent the entrance of espionage or sabotage agents. It was because of such dangers that CIC arranged to provide the same service for the "shadow" War Department plants.

When a CIC investigation had resulted in a person being placed in a position of trust it was necessary periodically to check the person's current activities to insure that no change in his or her loyalty had developed since the previous investigation. This required the utmost in discretion, particularly in the case of high level scientists working for the Army. In general, this surveillance was left to informants. CIC only took an active part when some doubt had arisen.[32]

Much more important was supervision and assistance in security education. This included both teaching persons how to safeguard military documents and material and educating them not to talk about their own work. What they saw or heard of others' military activities also was restricted to authorized personnel who had a need to know. This was often a thankless, weary task but probably one of the most effective means of preventing espionage and sabotage. Throughout the war CIC agents conducted scores of "loose talk" campaigns both on posts and in adjacent communities.

Collection of radical group intelligence was an important part of prevention as it enabled the military authorities to anticipate disturbances that could have all the effect of sabotage. CIC agents collected this information frequently as incidental parts of other investigations. It came through extensive liaison with other investigative agencies and through informants, generally voluntary and frequently unknowingly. This intelligence, summarized, passed through various echelons to provide top level Army commanders with an overall picture of potentially subversive groups.

32 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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Detection depended upon well organized and trained CIC sources. Many of the activities that aroused suspicion occurred off the military reservations when soldiers and civilians were off duty. For leads from such incidents, local CIC depended to a large extent on its liaison with the FBI, as the public had been well educated in reporting incidents to them. Moreover, since it was not until the war had started that CIC came out from complete undercover, agents soon discovered that in spite of their War Department Military Intelligence credentials, the greater part of the citizenry they called upon thought that they were FBI agents.

Local state and municipal law enforcement agencies also were good sources of information as to the activities of War Department personnel off duty. Until it was abolished in late 1943, the Countersubversive Informant Network, based on one source for each 30 military personnel and operated through unit intelligence officers, was a fertile source of tips. At the time it was abolished this network totaled about 250,000 secret informants.[33]

There were literally thousands of cases of suspected espionage and sabotage opened during World War II. All had to be investigated to the point where the truth of the charge could be determined. If indeterminate, a conclusion was usually reached to label the suspect "potentially subversive."

Espionage and sabotage, being enemy directed, involved more than one person. Usually there were a number in the chain extending from the agent in the United States back through cutouts and couriers to the enemy country. This inevitably involved civilians with military suspects and the case became connected with the FBI. The military aspect became minor, and major investigative effort was in the civilian community to locate the higher-ups who presumably were controlling more than one agent.

Available documents reveal no statistical record of the achievements of the Service Commands in this category. In a speech in late 1943, Col H. R. Kibler, Chief of CIC, summed up two years work of the Corps by saying there were only a few such cases. He did not identify them. However, any CIC case in this category is probably included in FBI statistics for the period. In July 1944, an FBI spokesman told how some enemy spy rings had been penetrated and furnished worthless information which had been prepared "...with the fine assistance of the Army and Navy intelligence organizations." Foreign agents, he told an Army Intelligence Conference, haven't had much success. Even including violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the total number convicted of espionage activities since January 1940 had been only 117.

In the same period the FBI had checked out 16,295 complaints regarding sabotage and established that some form of sabotage occurred in 1,736 cases.

33 IG Report section in CIC Headquarters and Army Almanac.

Convictions were obtained in 531 cases. Included were the eight saboteurs sent over from Germany by submarine, which was a fairly good indication that Germany had no such apparatus functioning in the United States. Most cases of sabotage were not enemy inspired but malicious jokes that backfired or the result of grudges against other individuals or organizations.

Along the Atlantic seaboard, from Long Island to Florida, occasional landings of enemy sabotage agents were attempted by rubber boat from offshore submarines. In no known cases were these successful. The agents either were apprehended in a short time by the Coast Guard or surrendered themselves to the FBI when their funds were exhausted.

On the Pacific Coast the sporadic landings of high altitude balloons with incendiary devices attached indicated a sabotage effort by the Japanese to start forest fires. These attempts soon fell off when they proved unsuccessful. Probably the greatest single potential sabotage threat in the Zone of the Interior during the period of May 1941 to September 1945 was the confusion and discord sowed by the Communist element among the labor and minority groups of the population. The deliberate stirring up of animosities in these groups, as evidenced by the race riots of 1943 throughout the country, posed a continuous threat to the uninterrupted production of vital war materiel.[34]

has written: "The accusation of general overzealousness on the part of domestic counterintelligence more often than not emanated from sources who found counterintelligence investigations irksome or dangerous to their own activities. Such persons or groups were the ones who were caught flat-footed when Russia broke up the Russo-German pact in 1941. They were the type who also clamored loudest for a second front in 1942-43. And they were the ones who brought pressures directly on the White House in 1941-42 which culminated in the White House orders to discontinue certain investigations indicating Soviet Intelligence agents had stolen vital plans and drawings from commercial aviation construction companies at work on military production."[35]

In the vast majority of cases, including enemy sympathizers of all types, the verified, factual information necessary to positively establish a subject as either an enemy agent or sympathizer could not be obtained. Until January 1944 such persons were termed "potentially subversive." These were handled as the reverse of the calculated risk of the loyalty program. Disposition of the individual depended upon the degree of subversion suspected. In some cases this meant removal merely from sensitive positions; in others, being placed in a special unit

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34 (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

35 Ibid.

organized in the Service Command and set up isolated from classified projects where a limited type of surveillance could be maintained. A War Department Special Organization was set up in the Black Hills of South Dakota to handle those considered most potentially subversive.

The entire problem of potential subversives concerned the Communists. There was little problem in neutralizing the activities of any one suspected of pro-German, pro-Japanese or any of their satellites or sympathizers. With the Communists it was a different matter. On the books they were our Allies, but as Col L. R. Forney, in charge of CIC at G2 WDGS, told the 1944 Army Intelligence Conference: "There has been no change in Communist policy within the United States...at no time has it lost sight of its long-range goal of world Communism... Their objectives in the Army will be to make it difficult for troops to be used in the domestic field in cases where the Party resorts to violence to gain some immediate specific objective and to make it difficult to wage a war that the Communists do not like." Later at the conference, in discussing requests to bar radical publications from Army posts, Colonel Forney summed up the Army's counterintelligence problem: "G2 is extremely cagey because they know that everything of a radical nature is settled at the highest War Department level."

In this connection, Colonel Forney said, "In cases of removal of officer candidates from training, although the cases have not been numerous, they have been the most difficult cases we have had to handle in counterintelligence. When I was first confronted with the subject I thought we must have excluded 50,000 people. After a diligent search extending over a period of a year we found we had excluded less than 50 but the row created was as great as though the number had been 50,000. Here is one fundamental thing: if a man progresses any great distance in the Officer Candidate School, the high echelons of the War Department won't stand for his removal."

So touchy was the subject that Colonel Forney advised that if the investigation turned up any adverse information other than subversion, that information should be gotten to a faculty or examining board. In that way the candidate could be removed without bringing out the subversive angle.[36]

Colonel Forney said concerning the new policy which had been adopted on 15 February 1944, the day the Office of the Chief of CIC was abolished: "Most precautions based on reasonable suspicion of subversion before actual proof was obtained are now abolished." Moreover, the term "potentially subversive" was abolished and dispositive action was relegated to the time when factual information positively establishing disaffection was at hand.[37]

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36 War Department Intelligence Conference, New York, 19-21 Jul 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

37 Ibid.

CIC agents who were investigating Communists during World War II read this directive of 15 February 1944 as they took over their new duties as Security and Intelligence Corps personnel. They realized from experience that such proof would require extensive and timely investigation, much of it in civilian areas. Also for all practical purposes unless there were indications of overt acts it was a waste of time to investigate military personnel merely suspected of Communism. Even in 1942, it had not been easy to get action. An Army major of Military Intelligence discovered to have an undercover connection with a subversive organization merely lost his commission.[38] CIC had never been an action agency, but it had been allowed to make recommendations. The Directive of February 1944 prohibited CIC agents from even making any recommendations in their reports.

Disaffection, a more acceptable term, escaped any ban. It was a catchall when subversion was not apparent. Whereas subversion implied a positive feeling against the United States, a disaffected person was not for the United States in the manner a good citizen would be expected to be in time of war. Cases classified "Disaffection" totaled next in size to loyalty cases and early in the war represented as much as 40 percent of all cases in a Service Command. Frequently, the attitude of a Communist led to his being labeled "Disaffected." Disaffection truly applied to members of other radical organizations, who, while not dedicated to the overthrow of the United States government, were so completely interested in furthering their own organizations that they would slow down production or in other ways hurt the war effort to accomplish their goals. Since such group actions could affect serious sabotage, their activities were closely watched by CIC.

Another large number of disaffection cases involved individuals with grudges against other individuals or organizations. Many of these individuals were actually cases for a psychiatrist. During the war CIC agents sometimes found liaison with this unit of the Army very profitable. Many mentally unbalanced people acted so suspiciously that their associates reported them to CIC agents who quickly learned that a doctor was needed.

These were not the only false alarms that kept CIC agents busy night and day all over the nation. Every month there were scores of reports of suspicious objects or flashing lights or severed communication lines that had to be checked out. Suspicious objects would turn out to be almost anything that the vivid imagination of a spy-catcher maniac could conceive. Flashing lights more often than not turned out to be from the headlights of cars on some lonely lover's lane.[39]

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38 Memo from Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., to Chief CIC, 3 Feb 42, Subj: "Investigations of Prospective Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps," (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

39 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

As copper prices climbed, communications lines were sliced by persons who wanted to obtain a few dollars from the local junk dealer. A "secret" radio turned out to be a model railroad enthusiast dispatching trains over an old fashioned telegraph set. As a CIC agent sped through the night to an inlet on the Chesapeake Bay to check out a report that a German submarine had surfaced there, the weary officer in charge located the spot on a chart and discovered there was all of eight feet of water in the cove when tides were exceptionally high![40]

All incidents, no matter how trivial, had to be checked out. There was no room for calculated risks in incident coverage. There was no basis for calculation or assumption. Only through a trivial incident resulting from a moment of carelessness by an otherwise cautious enemy agent, could the most dangerous subversives be caught. There was a presumption of sabotage in all accidents until proved otherwise. An impostor might be motivated by his work as an enemy agent or for personal gain.

At the working level such incidents brought CIC agents into jurisdictional collision with Criminal Investigators of the Provost Marshal General until both were merged in the SIC. Prior to that, appeals for a policy ruling had been unavailing and the question was generally settled by which agent first started the case. At posts where there were capable agents in both units, there was little problem. When one unit was weak, however, the other usually had a justified complaint that the cases transferred had been bungled before transfer. At the Army's Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen, Maryland, the question was settled by a ruling of the commanding general that the CIC agents had primary jurisdiction in the investigation of all incidents until any intelligence interest was fully exploited. This ruling also cleared the scene of accidents of amateur investigators from Claims, Engineers, Quartermaster, Personnel, and other sections who all claimed an interest in the event.[41]

However, CIC agents had not always confined their activities to "the book." Major Peters has described the situation in the Second Corps Area:

> "In the late summer of 1941 all CIP agents were working on several different types of investigation from the above categories, and cases were assigned in a haphazard fashion, with the most delicate assignments going to those enlisted agents or officers judged best qualified for the particular case. Control over investigations was relatively loose and divided among half a dozen officers. Agents frequently became involved in investigations which went beyond CIC jurisdiction, or else spun out an investigation far

40 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

41 Ibid.

beyond the merits of the case. Also certain undercover agents who had not been thoroughly investigated themselves originally were found to be undesirable when careful background checks were made on them in early 1942 as the investigational activity became better organized."[42]

Until the merger of CIC and CID in 1944, fully half the time of CIC agents in the United States during World War II was devoted to personnel investigations for CIC. To acquire its 5,000 agents, it was necessary to make complete background investigations of more than 25,000 prospects. Equally extensive backgrounds had to be done for officer candidates, cryptographers, and many other intelligence personnel, including some working for the Office of Strategic Services.

Extensive background investigations had to be made of personnel working in Signal Corps activities such as radar. Ordnance had such items as the then highly secret proximity fuse and half a dozen other projects that required completely cleared workers. Chemical Warfare had some ultra-secret phases of bacteriological work. Air Force wanted to be sure its bombardiers would aim on target. Before the special CIC detachment was created for the Engineer's atomic bomb project, selected agents in certain Service Commands were used for investigation of scientists. The calculated risk policy of the Manhattan Project has been well publicized. This same policy was used in many other research and development projects of the various Army technical services, and part of the CIC work was keeping a discreet surveillance on such persons. All these projects had clerks, custodians and couriers who also required clearances.[43]

Interviewing citizens in connection with these personnel investigations resulted in some problems. A mid-West university professor couldn't understand the reasons for the detailed questions, such as "What games does he play?" The professor, writing to the War Department, said he told the investigator that as a boy the applicant "enjoyed playing with electric trains." However, the real reason for writing the War Department was that the investigator had not shown any credentials and the professor had forgotten to ask for them.[44]

Whether a CIP agent should identify himself by showing his credentials when seeking information was the subject of debate. Some argued that the immediate display of the credentials put the interview on an official basis and consequently resulted in more and more accurate information. Other agents claimed that

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42 Peters, A. K., Maj, (MI) (USA), CIC Officer Second Service Command during World War II, manuscript written in the Historical Project, dtd 19 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

43 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during WW II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

44 CIP Correspondence, 30 Apr 41, (CONFIDENTIAL)(National Archives).

showing credentials scared interviewees into giving less information for fear of getting someone into trouble. These agents claimed that by identifying themselves, they attracted more attention. The interviewee was subsequently more likely to tell his friends about talking with a federal agent and thus endanger security. The tentative CIP Regulations published in the spring of 1941, as interpreted by the Fourth Corps Area, did not answer the question specifically but stated "...cards will be exhibited at any time during the course of an investigation where it is necessary to do so to obtain the information desired..." Badges were to be shown only to illiterates.[45]

There were many occasions during the war in the Service Commands when CIC, ONI, and FBI worked together on cases. This was particularly true on mass screenings. The most common of these was at the ports and borders of the nation where travelers entered and departed. At the major seaports, CIC enlisted agents were regular members of a panel with ONI officer investigators and FBI agents to examine passengers and crews of neutral nation vessels.

While the counterintelligence angle of this screening was an effort to determine whether any of the persons screened were enemy agents or couriers, the major portion of the work was strictly positive intelligence. It included not only neutrals, but prisoners of war being shipped to this country for internment and our own rotated Army personnel. CIC agents had long lists of EEI's (Essential Elements of Information) from all the Army technical services. Even Medical Intelligence was desired.

Among the doorbell-pushing ranks of CIC, investigations of officers caused the most trouble. Extreme discretion had to be used when the case involved an officer of rank, particularly field grade and above. While investigations involving general officers were normally handled by officer agents, enlisted men handled practically all the others.

The order published in late 1941 that required all agents in civilian clothes to be called "Mister" helped to conceal identity. Officers in charge of agents explained, where necessary, that the rank of these agents was only simulated for pay purposes and that they were really "agents" or "Special agents." But this pretense was dispelled every pay day whey they were ordered into uniform to be paid. It was essential to conceal the rank of an agent to enable him to get information from his fellow Americans, not to deceive enemy agents who were just as much afraid of a CIC enlisted agent as of a CIC officer agent.[46]

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45 Page 12, CIP Regulations, Basic History "Government Agencies," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

46 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Spot and Other Reports

Counterintelligence branches of Service Commands were charged with the collection of domestic intelligence. At the operational level CIC agents were the only personnel available for collecting it. Thus, in spite of all the numerous reminders issued by higher headquarters that CIC agents were not to be used on non-CIC activities, they were still assigned to collect all types of information of interest to military authorities, including positive information and even general news.

This general information angle of intelligence was inherent in the work in spite of all efforts to escape it. At every echelon commanders expected Military Intelligence sections to keep them completely informed on any and all matters of general interest. Spot reports, consisting of a quick preliminary summary, forwarded by telephone or telegraph, were mandatory. Woe to the CIC agent out in the field who failed to report an incident that made morning headlines, unless there was not even a remote connection with the Army. "When in doubt, forward the dope" was a common guideline. Army superiors of agents at all levels would turn to them on almost any question and say, "You're Intelligence, what's the story?"[47] This involved gathering all information that affected the war effort and the Army. Col L. R. Forney categorized the information required as the following three types:

> 1. Information concerning matters having a detrimental effect on the morale, training and loyalty of members of the Army and on the security of military information and equipment. Of course in mentioning morale and training, I am not thinking of ordinary obstacles, but of subversive influences.
>
> 2. Information concerning the effects certain aspects of the domestic situation are having or may have on the war effort.
>
> 3. Information concerning specific conditions that may require the use of troops in the domestic area.[48]

One of the more legitimate information services was the preparation of monthly Subversive Situation Reports, familiarly known as "Sitreps." These

47 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

48 Address delivered by Col L. R. Forney, G2, War Department General Staff, 20 Jul 44, "Domestic Positive Intelligence and Counterintelligence," (See: Transcript of Proceedings, War Department Intelligence Conference, New York, 19-21 Jul 44), (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

summaries were compiled in the field and collected at post, camp and station level, which in turn forwarded them to the Service Commands. The nine Service Command reports were consolidated at G2 War Department level by the Military Intelligence Service.

The Communist attempt in 1942-43 to dictate Army policy by demanding a "Second Front" was extensively reported by the various Service Commands. However, there were many more specific Communist problems of concern to the Army.

A great amount of the energy of the Communist Party was spent in attempts to infiltrate the Armed Forces and recruit servicemen to their cause. In late April 1943, for example, Second Service Command reported the continued distribution of the Communist publication, In Fact, to Army posts. Also servicemen were encouraged to attend Red-sponsored social functions at various rendezvous in New York City.[50] Reports of this nature were frequent.

Less often there were indications that the Communists sought to disrupt the military by criticism of the Army command system. In August 1943, First Service Command noted the distribution of a booklet entitled The Class Struggle in the Army. This publication spoke violently against the Army noncommissioned officer, stating that he was "part of the Army bureaucracy" and that only "the rottenest, most brutal, and backward soldiers become good noncoms."[51]

Particularly interested in attracting servicemen to the "cause" was the Young Communist League. The League's concern with servicemen was noted in the report from the Sixth Service Command in August 1943 that the group planned to

49 Interview with Lt Col Franklin E. Jordan, who was Chief of Investigations at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during World War II, dtd 28 Oct 55, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

50 General Subversive Situation Summary, 26 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

51 Ibid., 25 Aug 43.

form a club known as the SOS Club (Sweethearts of Servicemen) in Detroit. This club was supposed to sponsor social gatherings for servicemen.[52]

The Young Communist League, which also pitched its appeal to working youths and college students, began in late 1943 to formulate plans for going undercover. The league dissolved and then reappeared with a more respectable name, The American Youth for Democracy.[53] Like its predecessor, this group aimed at creating a heavy membership of service personnel and returning veterans. Reports in December indicated an all out effort to attract men in uniform in Massachusetts. Plans were in the works to open a canteen and obtain "respectable" sponsors to back the enterprise. The Massachusetts group, like the Communists in other areas, was seeking to influence the soldier vote and to get servicemen to sign various petitions.[54]

A paragraph from the 9 March 1944 subversive summary offers a concise conclusion on Communist efforts to "get through to" men in uniform:

> The Communist Party has intensified its efforts to win sympathizers in the Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine, in which infiltration the American Youth for Democracy is rapidly becoming a spearhead. In promoting their cause in the Army and Navy, the Communists are systematically operating under the guise of patriotism and all-out aid to serviceman, working through such organizations as the American Youth for Democracy and its servicemen's canteens, and the International Workers Order, which recently purchased 5,000 copies of the "Spotlight" to be sent to their members in the Armed Forces.[55]

It goes without saying that many persons already Communist Party members were taken into the Armed Forces. The following report from Eighth Service Command indicated the desire of the Party to keep hidden the identity of Communists in the service:

> Indications of the Communist Party's desire to keep undercover servicemen's participation in Party activities is evident in recent statements of leading functionaries that members of the Armed Forces who are Communists will be forbidden to pay dues to the Party or attend Party meetings, and that their wives will be requested to refrain from attending meetings or actively engaging in Communist Party affairs;

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52 General Subversive Situation Summary, 25 Aug 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

53 Ibid., 27 Oct 43.

54 Ibid., 30 Dec 44.

55 Ibid., 9 Mar 44.

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however, they will be permitted to retain membership and their dues will be collected surreptitiously.[56]

Apparently in the realization that their basic subversive intent was becoming painfully obvious to the country's investigative agencies, the Communists added another arrow to their bow. Although most of the damage was done sub rosa, the Reds also publicly worked to discredit these agencies. Concurrent with their statement of the Communist attempts to hide the identity of Party members in the service, the Eighth Service Command reported:

> Communists in this area appear to be entrenching themselves and fighting anti-communistic accusations of fact-finding agencies with the charge that these agencies, in bringing to light alleged nefarious acts and practices of the Communists, fellow-travelers and liberals, are using Gestapo and undemocratic methods.[57]

The Communists found fertile ground for agitation in the Negro population. It was natural that there would be some unrest among Negroes as a result of the Army's segregation policy, but the Reds worked constantly to fan the flames. As Western Defense Command reported in May 1943:

> Racial discrimination by the Army represents the outstanding theme of Negro publications currently being distributed among Negro units of this command. The opinion has been voiced that the greater part of this radical propaganda is Communist-inspired.[58]

One particular instance of Communist agitation over the service's segregation of Negroes was the American Youth for Democracy's movement to secure signatures for anti-segregation petitions to Secretaries Knox and Stimson. This drive, reported in early 1944, was supposed to build up enough steam so that by April a delegation could proceed to Washington with the signed petitions.[59]

Activities of the more violent movements for Negro betterment were also reported in the MIS summaries. Of particular significance was the March on Washington Movement, headed by A. Philip Randolph. The organization attempted vigorously to combat "Jim Crow" measures and preached the necessity for Negro unity in order to gain their freedom.[60]

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56 General Subversive Situation Summary, 3 May 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
57 Ibid., 3 May 43.
58 Ibid., 10 May 43.
59 Ibid., 30 Mar 44.
60 Ibid., 8 Jul 43.

The March on Washington Movement, agitating along the same lines as the Communists, was accused by the Reds of "black nationalism" and of putting their own race's problems and goals ahead of the "betterment of mankind."[61]

Areas of racial tension, particularly around military posts and defense plants, were also covered in the subversive summaries. The Detroit race riots of June 1943 were a particular source of concern, and all commands reported the reactions in their areas to this major disturbance.

For instance, Fifth Service Command reported after the riots that:

> ...the racial situation throughout this command has developed what has been termed a "powder keg" aspect. Numerous minor incidents have been reported from various points, primarily in the manufacturing states of Ohio and Indiana. Serious outbreaks are believed imminent, particularly in Evansville and Gary, Indiana, and Mansfield, Columbus, Cincinnati and Youngstown, Ohio. Growing tension is reported at Indianapolis where pawnshops have reported increased sales of guns and knives, etc., and where trouble between transient defense workers and Negroes is expected.[62]

The expected problems in the area of the Fifth Service Command did not materialize, and the racial tension diminished by the end of July. It was reported that both Negroes and whites had for the moment become weary of hearing the same gossip recounted time and time again. The inflammatory rumors had greatly decreased.[63]

The racial situation in the South, particularly around Army camps, was also extremely touchy. For instance, Fourth Service Command wrote:

> The Negro situation in this command is reported to be rapidly approaching a critical stage, spurred on by inflammatory write-ups in the Negro press concerning racial conditions, particularly the current tense situation at Camp Stewart, Georgia, the scene of a recent riot. Reports indicate that increasing numbers of Negroes in this command have been observed carrying guns and revolvers in place of the knives previously carried.[64]

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61 General Subversive Situation Summary, 20 Jan 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
62 Ibid., 30 Jun 43.
63 Ibid., 4 Aug 43.
64 Ibid., 23 Jun 43.

After the Detroit riots, the MIS subversive summaries contained almost weekly reports from all commands on the possible points of racial tension. This sentence from the 30 March 1944 issue, written in reference to the nation-wide situation, is typical: "Service Commands report the racial situation as remaining tense, but foresee no imminent danger."[65]

Pro-Nazi Activity of Minor Proportions by 1943

Subversive activity among pro-Germans and pro-Nazis in the United States was of rather insignificant proportions by 1943. There were occasional reports that innocent-sounding organizations were cloaks for the continuation of the German-American Bund.[66] Other German organizations were reportedly refraining from open displays of sympathy to Nazilism so they could remain intact for "possible future help to Germany."[67]

Many German-Americans apparently nourished the hope that Germany would not be dealt with too harshly by the Allies. One report from the Sixth Service Command indicated the Germans of Chicago hoped to see the growth of serious differences between Russia and the other Allies which would result in easier peace terms. There were wild rumors that Germany and Russia had already come to a secret peace treaty.[68]

Indications of subversive intent among America's Italian population were also almost nonexistent in the period from March 1943 to March 1944.

One of the few significant reports came from the First Service Command in November 1943. It stated that most pro-Fascist activity had been driven underground or been displaced by "more timely objectives," namely attempts to secure "peace with justice," a peace without punitive or repressive measures against Italy.[69]

Incidents of subversion within the Japanese population were also infrequent. The Japanese population of the United States had been concentrated in relocation centers after Pearl Harbor. Those known to be disloyal were placed in the Relocation Center at Tule Lake, California. The major subversion incident involving Japanese was the upheaval at this camp in early November 1943. The Caucasian supervisors of the camp were held virtual prisoners by the Japanese

65 General Subversive Situation Summary, 30 Mar 44, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
66 Ibid., 23 Mar 43
67 Ibid., 14 Oct 43
68 Ibid., 14 Oct 43
69 Ibid., 18 Nov 43

for several hours. For two weeks previous, the internees had been on strike against the management. They refused to harvest food on the grounds that they actually were "prisoners of war."[70]

On 4 November, the Army took over the Tule Lake camp and things quieted down rapidly. Some contraband, including 500 radio receivers and 500 knives, was seized; several attempted demonstrations were suppressed; and a number of the troublemakers were taken into custody.[71] On 14 January 1944, the Tule Lake Relocation Center was returned to full civilian control.[72]

Domestic Fascists Also Covered

The United States had its own breed of domestic Fascists to contend with during the war years. Perhaps the leading organization of this nature was the America First Party, whose national organizer, Gerald L. K. Smith, was described in one report as "pro-fascist, a Ku Klux Klan member, a promoter of anti-Semitism and an associate of Father Coughlin."[73] As the war progressed, Smith and his cohorts increased a program to win servicemen to their point of view. The America First argument was that the government should give more financial assistance to servicemen rather than spend money in foreign countries.

Smith constantly reiterated that, in the event the Republicans nominated another "stooge" like Wilkie, he and his followers would be forced to call a nation-wide convention and nominate a man for the presidency along the line of "a Nye, Wheeler or Lindbergh."[74]

Pacifist organizations like the "Peace Now Movement" and religious sects who aggressively preached pacifism, like the Jehovah's Witnesses, also were covered in the subversive summaries.[75]

Basically it can be said that the MIS summaries on subversion dealt with individuals and groups of a vehement and vocal nature whose speech and actions were primarily motivated by other than a desire to see America victorious in the war. Having goals other than American victory, these persons and groups tended to preach and aggressively strive for that particular outcome of the war which most favored their primary personal desire.

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70 General Subversive Situation Summary, 11 Nov 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).
71 Ibid., 25 Nov 43.
72 Ibid., 20 Jan 44.
73 Ibid., 22 Sep 43.
74 Ibid., 3 Feb 44.
75 Ibid., 23 Mar 44.

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Chapter 2

CIC OPERATIONS IN THE SERVICE COMMANDS

Inspections and liaison trips through the various Corps Areas by Capt H. G. Sheen, CIP executive officer, and Capt Hugh D. Wise, his successor, in 1941 and 1942 give a good insight into CIC operations and problems during the period.

First Corps Area

The First Corps Area, later called First Service Command, had headquarters in Boston and included the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with an overall population of approximately 9,300,000. During the peak war years the area was commanded by Maj Gen Sherman Miles. Col A. R. Bolling held the post of Director of Intelligence, and Lt Col S. D. Brown commanded the CIC detachment. The detachment began the war with 15 agents but had a total strength of 271 men by September 1943. Drains on the unit for CIC personnel to man tactical detachments caused reduction to 101 agents by January 1944.[76]

In the pre-war era, work loads increased rapidly. Colonel Bolling, the G2, reported in June 1941 that with three agents at school, he had an effective force of only 12 CIP agents and three civilian investigators. With these he had to cover New England and such vital centers as the Watertown Arsenal and the Springfield Armory. Already he had 90 loyalty investigations pending for cases outside the Corps Area.[77]

Captain Wise found that while there was sufficient officer personnel in the First Corps Area office at Boston, the shortage of agents was so acute that even if all authorized and tentative quotas were filled, there would still be an insufficient number. At the time of the visit, the lack of civilian clerical help was holding up the typing and final disposition of 131 cases.

Liaison with Boston law enforcement agencies was termed excellent. A personality index file was maintained by CIC, with over 60,000 names carded. The Corps Area G2 did not seem particularly interested in discussing the use and employment of CIC and referred Captain Wise to the head of his counterintelligence section. The officer in charge of that section seemed cordial and cooperative, but was inexperienced and seem unaware of the ramifications of his position. The

76 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md.).

77 Ltr AC of S, G2 First Corps Area to G2 WDGS dtd Jun 22, 1941, Corps of Intelligence Police Correspondence 1941, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

officers in charge of both field offices in the area had little or no intelligence experience and expressed strong desires for troop duty. Captain Wise felt that there was a lack of harmony in the internal organization. A backlog of 422 cases was being whittled down during the course of the inspection.

All agents with the detachments had completed at least basic infantry training, and all had good educational and background qualifications. However, it was felt by the officers in charge that the men left something to be desired as investigators. The officers suggested that CIC might do well to procure men with investigative experience, regardless of educational level.

All personnel in the First Corps Area detachment felt that the time in the CIC school at Chicago was well spent. There was no formal post-school training, but new agents were indoctrinated by being assigned for a short period to assist experienced men. A library of technical books and pamphlets was maintained by the detachment.

Agents were using private automobiles and collecting the authorized five cents a mile, but a problem was arising at the time of the inspection trip. Priorities for tires for the personal cars had not come through, even though they had often been requested. Subsistence, quarters, and clothing allowances were adequate, but special expenditures presented something of a problem. While the G2 stated that none of the agents were hard pressed financially, reports from agents contended that it was necessary to rely to some extent on private means without the expectation of reimbursement.[78]

Visits to First Corps Area Headquarters in Boston were made in January 1942 by Capt Neville K. Adkinson and in March 1943 by Capt James E. Foothorap. Both men prepared reports of their visits for the Chief, CIC.

No Room to Work

Captain Adkinson found that a severe shortage of physical facilities was hampering the unit. The situation was no better at the time of Captain Foothorap's visit. Although additional space had been procured in the interim period, an increase in agent personnel had kept quarters as cramped as ever. The agent shortage noted during the first visit was eased by 1943, however. The investigative backlog that provided a source of serious concern in 1942 was eliminated by 1943, but clerical shortages left a typing backlog of between 1,500 and 2,000 cases.

78 Memo dtd 1 Dec 41, Subj: "Report of Visit to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Area," from Capt H. G. Sheen, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and Memo dtd 16 Apr 42, Subj: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," from Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The need for official personnel with knowledge of intelligence operations, called imperative in 1942, was even more acute by 1943. Individual workloads were large. Coordinated performance of assigned duties had become impossible.

Although no language training or physical fitness program was conducted by the detachment in 1942, courses in Spanish, German and Italian were being taught by Berlitz instructors to all agents, and physical training schedules had been set up by the time of Captain Foothorap's visit.

Both inspection trips led to the conclusion that the First Corps Area Detachment left something to be desired when compared with other detachments. Captain Adkinson felt that personnel were below normal CIC standards. Morale was comparatively low. Officers charged with employment of the detachment seemed unaware of the magnitude of their duties.

Captain Foothorap concurred in these findings and added that the procurement program was the basic flaw in the detachment operation. He also felt that the wholesale distribution of CIC duties to many officers in the G2 Section was an evil that should be remedied by giving all routine counterintelligence duties to a junior officer. Enlargement of the basic CIC staff was recommended as a means of administrative improvement.[79]

Eastern Defense Command

The Eastern Defense Command, originally the Eastern Theater of Operations, was activated in December 1941 immediately after Pearl Harbor, when an enemy attack on the Atlantic Coast was considered a possibility. Its area of responsibility within the seaboard states included areas of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps Areas and the Army bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.[80]

The four Service Commands served the Eastern Defense Command for counterintelligence investigations so the larger command was assigned only one CIC officer and no agents, except for separate detachments in the Newfoundland and Bermuda Base Commands.[81]

Second Corps Area

The Second Corps Area, later called the Second Service Command, maintained headquarters at Governor's Island, New York. It was responsible for a geographic

79 Memos dtd 14 Jan 42 and 16 Mar 43, for Chief, CIC from Captains Adkinson and Foothorap, respectively, Subj: "Report on Visit to First Service Command, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

80 The Army Almanac, p. 599.

81 File FDC 1, 12 Nov 43, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

area that included the states of Delaware, New Jersey, and New York. At the outbreak of war it had 47 agents, reaching a peak of 460 in July 1943 and, at the time agents were transferred to SIC in 1944, numbering 126.[82] The area was commanded by Maj Gen Thomas A. Terry. Col Samuel V. Constant held the post of Director of Intelligence.

In the center of this vital coastal area lay New York City, the largest port of entry for immigrants, the largest city, and the biggest shipping port in the United States. Within the Second Corps Area, with a total population of 20,000,000, lived more foreigners and enemy aliens than in any other two areas combined.[83] Also a vast number of induction centers, Army posts, camps and stations, and key industrial plants were located here. New York was a nerve center of the nation's communication and transportation network. For these reasons, the Second Corps Area was recognized as the one in which the counterintelligence burden would be the heaviest in time of war. Throughout World War II there were always more Counter Intelligence Corps personnel at work in the detachment of this area than in any other Corps Area or Service Command detachment.[84]

In the summer of 1941, a contingent of about 15 CIC agents operated in civilian clothes and in an undercover capacity out of a two-room office in the financial district of New York. The office door carried the name "Economics Research Corporation." Since there were only six desks and chairs available for the entire detachment, it was difficult to organize an orderly office administration. Personnel newly assigned to the detachment were taken by the officer in charge to a large file cabinet and shown a deep drawer into which hundreds of cards had been dumped. These were the suspect files, and Corps of Intelligence Police agents rummaged through them at random to pick out cases which looked most exciting. The assignment and investigation of cases was at best a haphazard affair, although an attempt was made to give some priority to possible espionage or sabotage leads. A few picked agents worked directly out of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Headquarters, Second Corps Area at Governor's Island, New York. There they were assigned as leg-men to several officers who reviewed incoming requests for investigation, screened the most urgent cases, and assigned them to the agents at hand for immediate investigation.

Several of these officers had attended the first Corps of Intelligence Police Investigator's School at Washington, D.C. This training, together with civilian

82 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of 30 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md.).

83 From Speech by Director of Intelligence Second Service Command, at Director of Intelligence Conference, 6 Oct 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

84 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

backgrounds with investigative organizations gave them a head start on most of the Corps of Intelligence Police agents. At that time young college graduates eager for the adventure of spy-hunting were the usual agents.

Most of these agents were not draftees, but volunteers who were often granted waivers for a physical disability which might have kept them out of this work. Maj Charles A. Ellis, formerly a member of the United States Secret Service and an able investigator himself, supervised the officers and agents at Governor's Island for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Headquarters Second Corps Area. In 1942, Major Ellis was selected to head the CIC force in the invasion of North Africa.

The atmosphere surrounding Corps of Intelligence Police activities before Pearl Harbor was charged with urgency, glamor, and informality from the agents' point of view. The civilian clothes, the impressive credentials describing the agents as a representative of the Office of the Secretary of War, the tacit permission to carry private firearms and blackjacks, the immediate-action, red-bordered, highly classified letters requesting investigation which flooded in with every mail, all created a strong sense of mission in officers and enlisted agents alike. Everyone was on call at all hours of the day and night. Surveillances, raids, and other special assignments frequently kept men in the field into the early hours of the morning. Many of the agents used their private automobiles for investigations without compensation, since there were, until late 1941, no civilian-type vehicles available for the Corps of Intelligence Police. Although some confidential funds were available, disbursements for entertaining informants, carrying out case investigations, and purchasing clothing and equipment, were frequently made by the agents out of their own pockets with no reimbursement.

From the increased CIC authorizations in April 1941, the Second Corps Area was allotted 21 men. Even with this increasing number of agents the investigators assigned to the Second Corps Area were daily dropping further and further behind the rapidly mounting case load.[85]

Agents were facing a backlog of over 1,600 cases when Captain Wise arrived for his inspection in April 1942. The report of his visit gives all officer and administrative personnel the highest commendation for their devotion to duty and enthusiasm for the CIC in the face of a tremendous work load. Liaison between the headquarters office at Fort Jay and New York City police and the FBI was termed excellent.

The personnel picture was similar to that in other areas. Officer personnel was available as needed, but the shortage of clerical personnel and agents was

85 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 4-6, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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acute. To remedy the shortage of agents, a unique system of procuring and processing applicants was implemented. Men not in the service who were interviewed at Fort Jay and appeared to be good CIC material were advised to enlist immediately. Arrangements were then made to have the men begin basic military training with the Military Police Battalion at Fort Jay. The men so taken were tabbed by the Adjutant General and were not available for assignment elsewhere. After eight weeks of basic training the men were transferred to the G2 office for clerical work until their security clearances were completed. Arrangements were made to carry such men over and above the authorized strength of the Corps Area, and when the clearance was completed the men were assigned to CIC.[86]

Despite the chronic problem of inadequate procurement authority and the delays in recruitment and investigation, the Second Corps Area had been authorized strength at that time of 49 men.[87]

The allotted strength was revised upward in September 1942, when the detachment's quota was set at 149 special agents, 263 agents, and 32 clerks.[88]

Like the other Service Commands, the Second Service Command reached its peak wartime strength in the summer of 1943, when as many as 460 agents were on duty at one time.[89] By December 1943, overseas shipments had taken a heavy toll of personnel from the Second Service Command. Only two officers and 170 enlisted men remained.[90]

In January 1944, after the merger of the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal General's Investigators, the strength of the Second Service Command Security Intelligence Corps was approximately 220 officers and enlisted men. SIC strength was stabilized at slightly under this level until V-J Day.[91]

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86 Memo dtd 16 Apr 42, prepared by Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr.; Subj: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

87 Capt N. K. Adkinson's report of visit to Second Corps Area, 15 Jan 42, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

88 Ltr from the Adjutant General to Commanding General Second Service Command, 13 Sep 42, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

89 Arthur K. Peters Historical Manuscript on Second Command, 1941-45, p. 16, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

90 Ltr from Adjutant General, Army Service Forces, to Commanding Generals, Service Commands, 20 Dec 43, subj: "Consolidation of Internal Security and Intelligence Division and Activities," (CONFIDENTIAL) (AG Intermediate Records Depot, Ft Holabird, Md.).

91 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, p. 17, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

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Organization and Administration

In October 1942, the detachment required additional office space. It moved from 90 Church Street to a modern office building at 50 Broadway, where several entire floors of office space were allocated to CIC. The detachment remained there until 1946, when it returned to the Church Street location.

Four additional field offices were opened early in 1942 in an effort to provide adequate counterintelligence coverage of the Second Corps Area. CIC offices were established at Troy, Rochester, and Buffalo, New York, and at Trenton, New Jersey. The Trenton office later moved to Philadelphia as a joint operation with the Third Service Command.

All the field offices of the Second Corps Area came under the command of Maj W. A. Sullivan, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commander. The autonomy of the detachment was not complete, however, since it could initiate no investigations. All incoming cases were assigned to it by the Chief, Investigations Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Headquarters Second Corps Area. Furthermore all case reports were reviewed by the Review Branch office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, before they were disseminated to other interested echelons. One officer who served in the area had this to say of the system:

> "This machinery which was designed to keep the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment strictly as an investigative body without policy-making power, was a compromise of expediency. It worked reasonably well, although there were frequent clashes between the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and the Investigative and Review Branches at Governor's Island, who sometimes overstepped their administrative functions and tried to direct actual investigations from Governor's Island. This friction, which persisted throughout the war, invariably generated more heat than light."[92]

The administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was controlled by the Field Office at 50 Broadway. An Administrative Section under the commanding officer was composed of a warrant officer and several clerks who maintained all personnel and pay records for the detachments. Two enlisted men with a part-time supply officer took care of all supply matters except the detachment automobiles, which were under the care of two mechanics. Credentials and badges, however, were issued and accounted for only by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, at Governor's Island. An indication of the attitude of CIC agents toward administrative matters is this statement from a former CIC officer in the area:

92 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 24-25, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

"The administration of the detachment was carried on with a minimum of red tape consistent with security and directives from higher authority. The primary target of the administrative 'team' was always to keep as many agents as possible actively at work in the field....

"In this connection the detachment was fortunate in being able to procure and keep several Civil Service administrative clerks who not only performed their functions most diligently but also provided the necessary continuity to administration of records when the military administrative personnel was rotated. The administrative and housekeeping details operating a large investigative organization like the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in New York were always looked on as unnecessary evils."[93]

The field office at 50 Broadway was constantly manned, from the time it first opened. Internal guard duty was rotated among the agents, who also were assigned guard duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, at Governor's Island every night. Due to the classified nature of the correspondence and reports written in the field offices, the waste paper had to be collected from all three floors of the CIC offices and burned each night by Counter Intelligence Corps agents. Even the scrub women had to be followed on their rounds by a Counter Intelligence Corps agent. Much of the report typing, all the countless messenger details between the field offices and Governor's Island, and even the central files at Governor's Island were maintained by Counter Intelligence Corps agents.

One officer who inspected the detachment estimated that in view of the amount of agents' time consumed in housekeeping, administration, and training details, the effective investigative force of the detachment was diminished by about 40 percent at any given time.[94]

The most critical problem in administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment was the procurement of enough civilian personnel to type and assemble the great number of investigative reports being turned out daily by the agents. One of the cumbersome arrangements which slowed down CIC operations of the Second Service Command was the locating of the Central CIC Files on Governor's Island across the harbor from the field office in Manhattan. Agents spent many valuable hours each week travelling back and forth on the ferry between these two points. In the course of four years, this loss of man hours added up to a very substantial figure.

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93 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, p. 26, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

94 Memo from Capt James F. Foothorap to Chief, CIC, 15 Mar 43, subj: "Report of Visit to Second Service Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The disciplinary administrative problems common to tactical units were non-existent in the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment. There were no AWOL's or desertions, no reports of veneral disease, and no courts martial among the personnel of the detachment. The conclusion of the inspecting officer from the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps on 15 March 1943 was that the operation and administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in the Second Service Command was "well organized and relatively efficient.[95] In the fall of 1945 the 1251 SCSU (as the Security Intelligence Corps Detachment for Second Service Command was designated) was awarded the Service Command Meritorious Service Unit Plaque by the commanding general for excellence of administration and performance of duties assigned.[96]

CIC Training

When Captain Wise visited the Second Corps Area in the spring of 1942, he commented favorably on the detachment's training program. At that time, most agents were sent to the Chicago school after brief preliminary training locally.[97]

As the war wore on, however, the early enthusiasm for sending agents to Chicago for advanced training waned. Usually agents were sent from the school to assignments outside the Second Service Command. One writer has described the situation in this manner:

> "Early in the war it was common to expose the best Counter Intelligence Corps agents to the advantage of training in the Counter Intelligence Corps Investigators Training School, but when it became apparent that these men were earmarked at school and shortly afterward withdrawn from the Service Command, the tendency was to keep the key agents at work on the most important investigations in the Service Command and to send the less capable men to school. The idea behind this practice was that they needed the extra training most anyway, and they would not leave as wide a breach in the Service Command investigative ranks if they were detailed elsewhere after completing school."[98]

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95 Memo from Capt James F. Foothorap to Chief, CIC, 15 Mar 43, Subj: "Report of Visit to Second Service Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

96 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

97 Memo dtd 16 Apr 42, signed by Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., subject: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

98 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, p. 34, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

In December 1942 the Counter Intelligence Corps Preliminary School was established at the Second Service Command's main CIC field office at 50 Broadway. All new agents were assigned to this school before beginning any investigative duty. The school included four weeks of instruction and practical work administered by qualified officers, agents, and representatives of local civil enforcement agencies. The curriculum followed that of the Chicago school. Twelve classes were completed from the inception of the school to June 1944. A total of 625 agents were graduated.

In addition to the preliminary school, arrangements were made for agents to practice pistol marksmanship at the United States Treasury range at 90 Church Street, New York. The prescribed Army Qualification Test was given each agent, and many men qualified as sharpshooters and experts. In their investigative work, the agents were not authorized to carry firearms without special permission from the officer in charge. There were probably not more than a dozen occasions from 1941 to 1945 when a Counter Intelligence Corps agent in the Second Service Command drew a gun in line of duty. Nevertheless, for guard duty in the field offices and for later emergencies overseas, as well as for the morale purposes, the extensive training in the use of the .38 caliber revolver was valuable.[99]

To compensate for the general lack of basic military training for CIC agents there were periodic attempts to toughen up the agents. Groups went through infiltration courses at Camp Upton, others took basic training refresher courses at Fort Ontario. Still others attended the Second Service Command Tactical Training School at Hackettstown, New Jersey. Agents were often not physically equipped or prepared for some of the field experience given them at these courses. They could see little connection between their ability to crawl under barbed-wire entanglements under machine gun fire and their primary occupational specialty of ringing doorbells in New York City. But in late 1943, when many of these same agents began moving to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie and then overseas, the field training, brief as it was, stood them in good stead.

In addition to the Advanced Counter Intelligence Corps Investigators Training School at Chicago, to which the Second Service Command sent an average of 20 men per month during 1942-1943, and the tactical training courses mentioned above, the Second Service Command CIC Detachment was directed to detail men for other training. The Berlitz Language Schools, the Pennsylvania State School of Aeronautics at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and a great number of officer candidate schools (including Infantry, Armored, Military Police, Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Medical Administration) received quotas. But in the opinion of one historian of CIC activities in the Second Service Command:

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99 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, p. 35, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

"The most valuable training which eminently qualified agents for their work was that which they received during the 20 years prior to entering the Army. The men coming into the Counter Intelligence Corps brought with them not only sound family upbringing which instilled in them the fundamentals of integrity, loyalty, good character, and discretion which were rigorously demanded of all agents, but also professional skills in the fields of law, languages, investigation, business and education which the Army could readily build on but which it could never hope to provide."[100]

Supply and Finance

The first supply difficulties encountered in the Second Service Command were lack of automobiles for use in investigations and awkward arrangements for providing agents with civilian clothes. As late as January 1942, the Second Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment had only one vehicle. The country had been at war over a month and there were thousands of cases waiting to be investigated.[101] Even this one car had been requisitioned many months before it arrived. The ordnance officer had been asked to provide a civilian-type sedan, not painted olive drab, in an effort to make the car as inconspicuous as possible for surveillance work. The car turned up painted coal black from top to bottom except for the glass. There was not a speck of chrome or trim. That car was as "inconspicuous as an Italian funeral carriage." It was promptly dubbed "The Black Maria."

In October 1942 the car shortage was still acute in view of the sky-rocketing case load and the great influx of personnel. However, by early 1943 the civilian car pool of the Second Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps contained about 40 automobiles which were kept in a private garage. Two enlisted mechanics were permanently assigned for maintenance purposes. This arrangement proved adequate for the remainder of the war. Minor administrative problems were encountered due to gas rationing, but these were neither serious nor permanent.

Although a monetary allowance was available to each Counter Intelligence Corps agent for the purchasing and maintenance of civilian clothing necessary to "conceal his identity," the allowances were barely enough to keep the men from looking threadbare unless the funds were substantially supplemented by the agents themselves.[102]

100 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 36-37, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

101 Memo signed by Capt N. K. Adkinson, 15 Jan 42, subj: "Report of Visit to Second Corps Area," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

102 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Much investigative equipment was available to CIC in the Second Service Command--moulage, lock-pick sets, ultraviolet lamps, photography and sound equipment, to mention but a few items. Although they sometimes were used, their primary value was as a morale factor in training. A laboratory was established as a part of the New York Field Office, but it was not used extensively until 1944 after the formation of the Security Intelligence Corps. At that time, the technical equipment was widely used in conjunction with criminal investigations.[103]

CIC Investigations

In the late fall of 1941, the New York Field Office, in accordance with the pattern of case categories established by War Department directives, set up the following investigative subdivision: Disaffection Squad, Personnel Squad, CIC Squad, Agency Check Squad, and Special Squad. The Disaffection Squad checked out all complaints of disaffection. The Personnel Squad conducted routine investigations of certain military and civilian personnel who had access to classified information or working in war plants handling classified Army projects. The CIC Squad conducted exhaustive background investigations on candidates for the Counter Intelligence Corps. File checks of local enforcement agencies were the duty of the Agency Check Squad. The Special Squad was responsible for investigating cases of espionage, sabotage, sedition, treason, and other cases not of a routine nature. Minor changes in titles and duties of these squads were made from time to time, but fundamentally the detachment was organized on this basis until the formation of the Security Intelligence Corps. At that time the added responsibility of criminal investigations was given to the Special Squad.

In January 1942, an inspector from the Office of the Chief, CIC, reported that agents in the Second Corps Area were working mostly on CIC personnel background and loyalty checks. A total of 1,773 cases were reported pending in the Second Corps Area. Of these less than half had been sent to the field offices for investigation. More than 900 incoming cases were still backlogged in the Investigations Section of the Office of the AC of S, G2 at Governor's Island, where they were registered in and read prior to assignment to the CIC detachment.[104]

In addition to the critical clerical shortage, the diversion of cadres of trained agents from the Second Service Command to help set up detachments elsewhere contributed to the bottleneck of cases. Twelve men from the Second Corps Area CIC Detachment started the newly created Investigations Branch of the Corps Area Provost Marshal's Office in December 1941. They were not returned to CIC duty until August 1942. Agents from the New York office also played similar roles in

103 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, p. 41, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

104 Memo by Capt N. K. Adkinson, 15 Jan 42, subj: "Report on Visit to Second Corps Area," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

the subsequent formation of CIC detachments for the Manhattan Project and the New York Port of Embarkation.

Besides routine investigations of disaffection, loyalty, and personnel cases, the Second Service Command CIC agents were continually called upon to perform a wide range of additional investigative duties.

One of the most demanding of these was the "ship detail," during which panels of CIC, FBI and Office of Naval Intelligence personnel were formed. They interviewed passengers, refugees and repatriated internees from enemy zones who entered the United States by such ships as the Drottningham and Gripsholm. These panels attempted to gather positive foreign intelligence from the persons interviewed, and also served as a security screen. The number of these details increased so rapidly from early 1942 to 1945 that a group of CIC (and later SIC) agents was permanently assigned to the Foreign Positive Intelligence Office in New York to assist in this operation.

More than 1,000 displaced persons were interrogated and fingerprinted by Counter Intelligence Corps agents at Fort Ontario, New York. The State Department had brought most of them here from Yugoslavia.

Negro CIC agents in Harlem throughout the war conducted undercover investigations of subversive or borderline groups. The value of the Negro agents reached its peak during the summer of 1943 when a series of race riots spread across the country in New York City, Detroit, and Beaumont, Texas. CIC reports formed a regular part of Weekly Intelligence Summaries sent to Military Intelligence Service by the Director of Intelligence of the Second Service Command.

Visiting dignitaries of Allied military organizations were frequently given Counter Intelligence Corps escorts while in the Second Service Command. When General Giraud of the Free French Forces visited New York City, elaborate security measures were planned by personnel to prevent his assassination on American soil. These included such details as the microscopic search of the General's suite and the ballrooms at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel to detect concealed microphones or bombs, the installation of a woman undercover agent in the ladies' powder room to eavesdrop on persons present at receptions, and the posting of soldiers armed with submachine guns at every overpass and crossroad between Governor's Island, New York and the United States Military Academy when the General visited West Point.

In the days immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, the Counter Intelligence Corps in New York conducted almost daily raids, in conjunction with the FBI and New York City police, on the homes and business places of suspected Nazi sympathizers. These persons included members of the German-American Bund, the NSDAP, and the Kyffhaeuser League. Property seized was mostly of a propaganda

nature such as booklets, swastika armbands, and uniforms. There were also some shortwave radios, weapons, and membership lists and records. By the middle of 1942 the menace from organized pro-German or pro-Nazi groups had been neutralized in the New York-New Jersey area, and CIC discontinued the raids.

The raids, together with many other specific investigations conducted jointly by Counter Intelligence Corps and Office of Naval Intelligence or the FBI helped build a close-knit system of cooperation between the organizations. This paid regular dividends in manhours saved and results accomplished. Liaison at the operational level reflected the harmony of inter-agency relationships between the Director of Intelligence of the Service Command, the District Agents of the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Several Counter Intelligence Corps agents in New York were sons of top-ranking New York City police and State Police officials. These personal contacts prompted a degree of cooperation unobtainable under ordinary circumstances. Interdepartmental conferences held weekly in the Second Service Command between the local heads of the FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence and G2, were inaugurated by the Director of Intelligence, Second Service Command, and contributed greatly to better relations. These conferences were not attended by the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment, but by the Director of Intelligence himself, partly as a matter of protocol and also to keep the military intelligence representation in strong hands.

The only complaint reported against the FBI by Counter Intelligence Corps agents was that instead of freely turning over their entire reports to a CIC investigator on request (as G2 did with them) the FBI agents revealed only the answers to specific CIC questions. As one CIC officer stated the situation:

> "This carryover from cautious dealing with less discreet enforcements than Counter Intelligence Corps was greatly resented by the Counter Intelligence Corps agents. There was also a tendency on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents to regard themselves as professionals in the field and the Counter Intelligence Corps men as dilletantes. When this feeling, which was only human nature, showed itself at the operating level it caused some bitterness between the agents involved. Except for a few minor instances of poor judgment by an FBI agent, as for example when one Federal Bureau of Investigation man accidentally stumbled into the Counter Intelligence Corps field office and was detained and interrogated by the Counter Intelligence Corps floor guards, there were no important problems between the FBI and CIC."[105]

105 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Another of the miscellaneous types of investigation frequently assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps were those involving impersonation. Many neurotics, civilians and military, felt the urge during the war to add new lustre to their personalities by donning unauthorized uniforms and insignia. The bars and night clubs regularly attracted these impersonators. There they often spun mysterious and impressive yarns about their connections with G2, or they gave out imaginative accounts of military activities which, if true, would have been security violations. Since there was always the chance these people might be clumsy enemy agents, the job of apprehending them was usually assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps.

Usually the impersonators turned out to be nothing more serious than an old man who had absconded with a $4,000 payroll and had come to New York to spend it while passing himself off as an intelligence general. The cleverest impersonator removed from circulation by CIC in the Second Service Command was one Colar Theodore Ludberg, who was a young civilian of confidence-inspiring appearance. He not only passed as a lieutenant colonel but also commandeered a PT boat from the Navy and went up the Hudson in style to deliver a lecture at West Point.

The CIC Technical Laboratory, staffed by agents from the Special Squad of the Second Service Command Detachment, was frequently called on by the field agents to assist in microphone installation, clandestine recording of interviews and interrogations, wire tapping, fingerprinting, preparations of exhibits for reports, and similar work of highly specialized nature. The techniques of wire tapping in New York buildings required professional skill. Some training in this work had been received at Counter Intelligence Corps schools. But there were literally no agents in the Service Command who had acquired sufficient skill through practice to be able to install a complete tap with recording facilities without the expert assistance of Counter Intelligence Corps men who had civilian experience in this activity.

One potential espionage investigation conducted by the Special Squad involved a 24-hour-a day surveillance and telephone tap with recordings. The case ran for weeks. Before it was closed, four cartons of dictaphone records had been used up. By and large however, telephone taps and microphone installations, used in extreme cases, did not yield much evidence usable in court or courts martial.

The information developed through these means did speed up investigations by turning up leads quickly and establishing relationships between subjects in a case.[106]

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106 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 50-52, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

Although the German sabotage apparatus in the United States was considered neutralized by 9 December 1941,[107] there were instances of malicious mischief or neglect which amounted to sabotage, though not enemy inspired. Crude incendiary bombs made of candles and match boxes were discovered among warehouse material at the Brooklyn Army Base. Big coastal artillery guns in the harbor defenses of New York City were immobilized by rocks and gravel in the lubricating wells. Such incidents pointed up a necessity for sound inspection systems as a means of detecting and guarding against sabotage.

Another example of the preventive value of even the routine CIC investigations was finding a dangerous civilian timekeeper at the Craven Point ammunition loading piers. This man had been deeply involved in one of the greatest espionage scandals on record in the early thirties. He had joined the U.S. Army at that time at the insistence of the Young Communist League, and at the behest of Soviet Army Intelligence had stolen the White Plans for defense of the Panama Canal. For this he had been tried and convicted. Needless to say the man was removed from the ammunition zone, and no damage was done. Had he remained undetected in that assignment, another Black Tom explosion might have occurred.

Another investigative function of CIC was to check all reported violations of AR 380-5. In addition to making routine security lectures and spot checks of offices, technicians from the Special Squad were often directed to make careful inspections of the telephone and communications security of major Service Command installations, including the commanding general's circuits. Critical installations were also checked for concealed microphones or other surreptitious penetrations of War Department intelligence conferences and secret offices in the Service Command area.

One of the major cases of the Second Service Command SIC Detachment, although beginning as an espionage case, ended in investigation of a grave infraction of AR 380-5. A civilian employee of the Air Force had stolen in a New York hotel a suitcase containing plans he was to deliver to a secret Foreign Positive Intelligence office in New York City. The plans were so important that only the SIC officer in charge of the investigation was informed of their contents. Within 36 hours, after round-the-clock investigative activity, the missing plans were recovered by Second Service Command agents in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.

It was established that the contents had not been compromised. It was later divulged that these plans--which were originals having no copies--were too important to be classified at all. They were blue prints, indicating in detail the

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107 Memo from Col H. R. Kibler to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, 8 Feb 44, subj: "Activities of the Office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, 10 May 43-8 February 44," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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target cities, bomb loads, and dates of buildup for the first long-range bombing of Japan by Air Force B-29's. Failure to follow the procedures outlined in AR 380-5 nearly cancelled the many years of work behind the plans and might have seriously delayed the prosecution of the war against Japan.

The preponderance of disaffection cases investigated by CIC and SIC in the Service Commands involved Communist activity rather than German or Japanese. It is not too much to say that the information acquired by CIC from May 1941 to September 1945 regarding communism and its adherents played a major part in keeping communism under control in the United States ever since.[108]

Loyalty investigations suffered in late 1943 because of a dearth of agents. After 1 January 1944, the Provost Marshal General men who had been incorporated into SIC conducted these investigations. In order to reduce the great backlog which had built up, the criteria for these cases were revised downward and the investigations were conducted largely by telephone. A bank of about 30 telephone cubicles was installed in the SIC office at 50 Broadway for this purpose, and the investigations were rapidly completed. On 1 November 1943, 60 days prior to the consolidation, the Second Service Command CIC Detachment had on hand about 5,000 cases and only 40 agents available for full time investigative duty.

SIC at Work

In January 1944 the newly formed Security Intelligence Corps in the Second Service Command was given the title of the 1251st Service Command Service Unit for administrative purposes. The various field installations within the Service Command formerly belonging to the Provost Marshal General's Office or under the Counter Intelligence Corps were closed, with the exception of the office in Rochester, New York. The Rochester office was discontinued in January 1945 and all work was thereafter carried on from New York City.

In early 1945, a further change was made. Agents devoted to a particular type of case, as under the old Counter Intelligence Corps, were reassigned geographically. A New York State section, a New York City section, and a New Jersey and Delaware section were created. The Special and Criminal Sections remained unchanged. During this latter period, a total of 63,000 cases of all categories were completed.

The SIC agents in the Second Service Command were assigned a new duty after the African invasion. The first German prisoners of war from Rommel's Afrika Korps arrived in Jersey City by the shipload. SIC agents traveled as guards and interpreters on the trains which took the prisoners to internment camps in inland areas.

108 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 53-56, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

The SIC was also responsible for criminal investigations in the Service Commands. Due to the technical nature of this work, with violations ranging from desertion and malingering to homosexual activity and suicide, these cases were made the exclusive responsibility of the Special Squad agents and its laboratory. Personnel from other sections assisted on surveillances and other group requirements. Much valuable work was accomplished in this field by September 1945, including investigating of the Trial Judge Advocate of the General Court at First Army for bribery; the breaking up of a ring at Mitchell Field, L. I., which was accepting large sums from parents in return for arranging the transfers of sons in the service to choice stateside assignments, and solving numerous cases of grand larceny involving the theft of tremendous quantities of vehicle parts, signal equipment and arms and ammunition.

Perhaps the most involved criminal investigation in the Second Service Command concerned a trio of United States Army deserters. They left the Bastogne area and made their way back to this country via Paris, London and Glasgow on orders which they composed and mimeographed themselves. These men were apprehended by SIC agents. Interrogation disclosed they had drawn large sums of money from Army finance officers here and abroad, all on false orders of their own writing, during their months at large. Not only that, but they had personnally entered the Pentagon, obtained discharge blanks, and discharged themselves from the service! The three men were returned to their unit at the front for trial as deserters from a combat area. The SIC agent responsible for their apprehension accompanied them by plane to testify at their court martial.

The men were convicted, but before sentence could be carried out, two escaped in France. The SIC agent was immediately charged with their apprehension. He captured the first in Paris, and the second fugitive, heavily armed, was taken in a pub in London shortly thereafter. The SIC agent returned to the United States. Not long afterwards, it was learned that the ringleader of the trio had escaped a third time, killing a military policeman in the process. As deserters and larcenists these men had violated enough Articles of War to establish a shocking criminal record. Of greater importance to SIC, however, was the significance of their entire escapade. From an intelligence point of view, their incredible movement from the front lines to the Pentagon with the government financing the entire way, was a blunt travesty on military security.

The criminal investigations required quick action and quick investigation. They also required advanced interrogative ability and technical skill at microphone and recording installations. Notarized statements were usually necessary, and exhibits were carefully marked and maintained. All investigative action pointed toward ultimate trial by court martial or civil courts, instead of disposition by G2 directives as in the case of disaffected personnel. This meant that the agents

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doing the criminal work had to rapidly acquire the practical knowledge they did not already possess when the responsibility for criminal cases was unexpectedly thrust upon them.[109]

Third Corps Area

The Third Service Command started World War II with 34 CIC agents to provide counterintelligence coverage of the tri-state area of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, which had total population of over 16,000,000. On 30 September 1943, agent strength reached a peak of 323, but by the time personnel were transferred to SIC in 1944, only 123 agents remained. Maj Gen Milton A. Reckord commanded the Area, Col Frederick S. Doll served as Director of Intelligence and Maj R. B. Curtiss commanded the CIC detachment.[110]

Italian Espionage in the U.S., 1941

An estimate of the Italian espionage system in the United States as of June 1941 was made by the G2, Third Service Command. Reliable informants reported that Italian consulates in all areas had selected a few loyal and trustworthy individuals as the nucleus of a widespread net. Most of the men selected were naturalized citizens, and in almost every case held membership in the Federation of Italian World War Veterans. The proficiency of these agents was tested after group schooling. The candidates had to procure some bit of information, extremely difficult to obtain, but not necessarily connected with espionage. By this evaluation system, the control man was able to select those men best qualified for espionage missions that did arise. A strong liaison and interchange of men between Italian and German intelligence in this country was also reported.

It was reported that most of the suspected agents had infiltrated vital industrial and manufacturing plants. Plans to broaden their activities with the cooperation of anti-British Irish-Americans contacted through acquaintances in the Catholic Church were learned.

The same informant reported that the best agents and informers were being concentrated in the central and western states, where it was felt that defense production would most likely expand. These agents were advised to send all correspondence by air mail, to evade any censorship and to travel by private auto rather than by public conveyances which could be traced. The agents were

109 Arthur K. Peters, Historical Manuscript on Second Service Command, 1941-45, pp. 57-62, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

110 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

paid through trusted intermediaries, but cover employment to allay any suspicion was purportedly advised by Italian officials running the net.[111]

Situation in the Orient, 4 Dec 1941

Intelligence officers in the Third Service Command were instructed on 4 December 1941, by a letter from the G2, to survey all files for recent information on the Orient. The officers were cautioned that the "greatest discretion is required in any inquiries made at the present time in this connection."

A summary of the current situation, compiled by the War Department, was forwarded for information. It gave little light on the intentions of the Japanese Empire, other than vigorous propagandizing efforts were being made by that government to justify its "New Order in Asia." It was pointed out that the Japanese had developed a sizeable information-gathering machinery in the United States.[112]

CIP and the Captive Mine Strike

Third and Fifth Service Commands used CIP for positive intelligence coverage of the United Mine Workers' strike that occurred along the east coast during late 1941.

The strike was anticipated about a month before it occurred. Agents were briefed far in advance as to the physical location of the mines, number of employees, production capacity, and expected trouble spots. In the prestrike period, two agents were sent out in the guise of reporters to determine sentiment among the workers and their families. Every effort was made to obtain a clear and complete picture of the situation before the men were called upon to act in the field.

When the strike broke, a temporary headquarters was set up at Pittsburgh, and additional agents within the Third Corps Area were immediately sent there. When the strike spread into Fifth Corps Area, it was felt that centralized control would provide improved coverage. Two agents within Fifth Corps Area were put at the disposal of the Pittsburgh office to allow central integration of information.

All agents working in the field were supplied with press stickers for their cars and press identification cards. These credentials provided ready access to

111 File, Italian Espionage System in US, dtd 14 Jul 41, signed by Maj W. W. Christian, G2 Exec, Third Service Command, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

112 File, Third Service Command, "Background on Present International Situation in the Orient," dtd 4 Dec 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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most groups, since everyone was interested in a favorable press and would give the reasons behind his actions. The men traveled in pairs for their own protection and were instructed to avoid arguments and fighting at all costs. Spot reports were phoned in to the Pittsburgh office for evaluation and integration as quickly as they could be obtained. Instructions to the men regarding movement to critical areas could readily be relayed during the frequent "report" calls into headquarters, permitting optimum use of the few agents available.[113]

It was felt that the favorable showing made by CIC in what amounted to a pure positive intelligence mission spoke well of the ingenuity, adaptability, and general high quality of the type of men in the Corps.[114]

The "Gear Box" Cases

Agents in the Third Service Command were detailed in October 1941 to investigate the possibility of sabotage in the case of damaged trucks delivered to the Ordnance Training Center, Aberdeen, Maryland. Since a civilian manufacturer had produced the trucks under Army contract, the FBI was called in on the case at the same time. The two organizations coordinated all efforts by close liaison.

The transmission grease found in the trucks had a high water content which had caused corrosion and pitting of the gears. This called for extensive replacement and repair to over 20 trucks. Investigation at the factory in Michigan by agents of the Fifth Service Command and FBI men from the Detroit office disclosed that the water had probably been introduced during outside storage of the vehicles at a time when heavy rains occurred. The possibility of malicious damage was not eliminated, however, and investigation continued for almost a month. The case was conducted by interviews and laboratory examination. The technical facilities of the FBI were invaluable in leading to the closing of the case.[115]

Communist Activity in the Armed Forces, 1941

The G2, Third Corps Area, in late 1941 conducted a survey of Communist activity at various Army camps. Proof was demonstrated at some length that Communists were exploiting the recreational and educational agencies of the Army for propaganda purposes.

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113 Report dtd 1 Dec 41, subj: "CIP Activities During 'Captive' Mine Strike," from Agent James E. Ray, Third Service Command, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

114 Ltr, dtd 1 Dec 41, to G2, WD, from Col Philip Thurber, G2, Third Service Command, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

115 Rpt, dtd 21 Oct 41, from Col Philip Thurber, Suspected Sabotage of Trucks, Third Service Command, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The Daily Worker and other Communist organs were publishing letters from "comrades" in the service, and photographs of soldiers fraternizing with members of Communist-controlled organizations and unions.

The G2 pointed out that the activity of the Communists in the armed services was in support of the Leninist doctrine that "dissemination of Communist ideas necessitates carrying on a steadfast, systematic propaganda in the armies." He pointed out that the experience of the Communists and naivete of the Army made the operation relatively simple.

The G2 closed his report with the suggestion that careful control of publicity and Army publications would cut down on the amount of infiltration possible. He deemed it improper for the Soviets to utilize the morale and recreational programs of the Army to popularize the Party and build allegiance to Russia.[116]

Ship Panelling

CIC in the Third Service Command participated in the panelling of persons arriving in Philadelphia from foreign countries on neutral ships during the war. Many were refugees, but others were American-born persons who had spent the greater part of their lives abroad. These never claimed American citizenship until the outbreak of war made it necessary to establish some nationality. Most did not speak English, and many were very old.

To meet the need for interrogation of all of these individuals, a panelling team was formed in Philadelphia. It included representatives of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and CIC.

The FBI was interested in subversive organizations and smuggling activity, while the ONI stressed the collection of naval installation and armament information. To this end, ONI generally interviewed all crew members of the ships. The Immigration and Naturalization Service sought to establish citizenship, while CIC interrogated for information on military installations where the persons had lived.

In one case uncovered by the panel, it was learned that a crew member had a piece of platinum about the size of a match box. Search of the ship failed to reveal the metal, but surveillance of the man when he left the ship led to its discovery.[117]

116 Summary of Information, dtd 13 Jan 43, Subj: "CP Activities in the USA," from Col F. S. Doll, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

117 Interview with Capt Leslie R. Harrison, Army Intelligence Center, 16 March 1954.

One difficulty encountered by CIC during these paneling operations was that the Army was represented by an enlisted man, in contrast to a commissioned Naval officer and a highly paid FBI agent. In spite of the fact that the CIC agents were of exceptionally high caliber, the agents were at a distinct disadvantage in this situation. The difficulty was expressly cited by Maj Gen George V. Strong, G2, War Department, in a memo he wrote for the Chief of Staff urging the allotment of more commissioned personnel to CIC.[118]

Undercover Error

A shipment of seven agents to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, did not add to CIC's professional prestige. The agents had been requested for an undercover assignment, and it was intended that they be put in language classes as countersubversive operatives. The request had asked for men proficient in various languages, so that the study load would not effect their operational effectiveness.

The men arrived at Ritchie unaware of the assignment awaiting them and apparently ignorant of undercover operating techniques. In addition, three of the men did not possess the necessary language qualification, and one had a record of Communist affiliation and sympathies.[119]

Problems In Third Service Command

who later testified of the work he had done for the Communists at that center. When routine background checks were made at the start of the war, became a suspect because of his previous Communist connections. However, there were no tangible activities that could even cause suspicion of subversive activity. His work was, of course, superior.

As far as possible he was isolated from other workers and kept from classified materials. In three years of observation, nothing derogatory was observed. CIC agents who had watched him felt better when, after the war, he testified that he had done his Communist espionage at in the late thirties. Apparently he became suspicious when he was shifted at the start of the war to the less sensitive position and he followed the Communist policy of ceasing all activities for a long period.

118 Memo, dtd 16 May 43, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, Subj: "Reorganization and Expansion of CIC, MIS," (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

119 Memo for the Chief, CIC, dtd 30 Jun 43, from Lt Donovan J. Ault, Subj: "Undercover Assignment at Camp Ritchie, Md," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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In 1944, he applied for leave of absence and told friends he was going to New Mexico for his health. To the CIC agents at this had no particular significance until the location of the atomic test grounds in New Mexico was later made public. Then it was evident that his Communist spymasters had transferred him to an area where his mathematical brain could be of service to them.

As manpower problems grew more and more critical, personnel officers hiring War Department civilian labor to work on military reservations grew less and less critical of quality. Finally it was a common expression that anybody that was warm was hired. CIC agents of the Third Service Command picked up one civilian worker on a machine gun test range who had confided to a fellow worker that he was going to steal guns and ship them to Peru. The subject, waving a six inch knife, was apprehended. He turned out to have been just released from an insane asylum where he had been sent by a friendly judge instead of being jailed for stealing antique guns from a state historical museum. This was literally a "warm body."[120]

On another occasion, a CIC officer suddenly discovered that because the huge officers' mess at a Third Service Command post was civilian operated, the employees were not given the regular processing. Consequently they had had no check whatsoever. He immediately sent the mess steward a batch of personal history statements for the 90 cooks, bakers, waiters and other employees to fill out.

Four quit rather than fill out the statements. Reviewing the statements of others, the CIC agents found several who admitted serving prison sentences for robbery and larceny. Four of the men who were working in the center of dozens of wooden barracks admitted they had served terms for arson. The mess steward was not happy when the CIC agents informed him that his bookkeeper had done time for forgery. Subsequent records checks revealed police records on a number of others who had neglected to mention them on the personal history statements.

These "bottom of the barrel" employees created a tremendous burden for CIC agents. In one case a wholesale stealing of gun tool kits had all the attributes of enemy sabotage since these were special kits necessary for the assembly of the pack howitzer. Although this turned out to be just plain theft, the thievery in this one section was so widespread that CIC agents wound up with 40 signed confessions before they were convinced that some subversive had not suggested and abetted the stealing.[121]

(CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

121 Ibid.

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Fourth Corps Area

The Fourth Service Command covered the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi, a combined population in excess of 21,000,000. Maj Gen William Bryden commanded the Fourth Service Command, and Col Stacey Knopf held down the post of Director of Intelligence. Maj Asa W. Candler, later A2 of Army Air Forces, was commanding officer of the CIC contingent.

The Fourth started the Second World War with 30 agents and reached a strength peak of 298 agents in September 1943. Ninety-one agents remained when CIC merged into SIC in January 1944.[122]

When Captain Sheen visited the Fourth Corps Area late in 1941, he found the 41-man detachment spread thinly over 21 substations and field offices. The G2 requested nine more agents at that time. Captain Sheen closed his report with the remark: "An air of complete self-sufficiency exists in this area."

Captain Wise found much the same situation about five months later when he made an inspection visit to Atlanta headquarters of the area.

The G2 was thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which the CIC activities were being carried out in his area and was interested in specifics regarding CIC only insofar as they affected Fourth Corps Area.

Officer personnel was sufficient to meet present needs, but no replacement or emergency personnel was available. Agents were desperately needed. Clerical help shortages were cited as the main bottleneck in closing many investigations.

The case backlog of the detachment varied from 1,000 to 1,300, mostly personnel cases. Four agents were undercover, working on other matters at troop installations and at vital manufacturing centers.

Every effort was made to cultivate liaison contacts with other agencies in the Corps Area. Cooperation with the Provost Marshal General was remarkably good. This was due in no small part to the fact that when the transfer of agents to the Provost Marshal was ordered on 15 December 1941, that office found itself unprepared to take over assigned duties. The transfer was made on paper only, and G2 continued to perform functions for which the Provost Marshal was responsible. The most cordial relations existed between the two offices, and the Provost Marshal channeled many fine agent prospects to CIC. A gradual transfer of the duties which were chargeable to the Provost Marshal was being made at the time of the inspection.

122 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Record Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

The detachment had set up a local orientation and training program for new agents which consisted largely of on-the-job assistance to experienced men. There was a general feeling expressed at administrative levels in the detachment that the training provided at the Chicago school was too theoretical and not sufficiently practical.

Captain Wise ran into a transportation problem. The general complaint that tires on private automobiles were wearing out, and priorities for replacement were not available was repeated. All pay, allowances, and special expenditure funds were considered sufficient by personnel contacted. The detachment had a full stock of technical equipment, but found much of it of little value for Zone of Interior duty. Agents were not allowed to carry firearms without express written permission from the G2; permission was granted only for a specific case. Special pains were taken in and out of the office to protect the identity and rank of all agents.

In commenting on the detachment in his report, Captain Wise felt that it was isolating itself from world affairs and the progress of the war because of the disproportionate concern and attention given local affairs. To remedy this, he suggested that summary sheets on vital and important developments world-wide be furnished G2s for dissemination and information.[123]

Fifth Service Command

The Fifth Service Command spread over the states of Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, and Kentucky. The population of 17,000,000 in this area was covered counterintelligence-wise by fifteen agents at the outbreak of World War II. CIC peak strength in September 1943 was 267 agents, but the number dropped to 93 by January 1944.

Brig Gen John M. Eager was commanding general, while Lt Col Robert Copeland acted as Director of Intelligence. Maj H. Sobel headed the CIC detachment.[124]

When Captain Sheen visited Fifth Corps CIP, headquarters were located in an office building in Columbus, Ohio. By the time of Captain Wise's inspection trip, however, the CIC office had relocated at Fort Hayes, some three miles outside Columbus.

123 Memo dtd 1 Dec 41, Subj: "Report of Visit to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Corps Areas," from Capt H. G. Sheen, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and Memo dtd 16 Apr 42, Subj: Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas, from Capt Hugh D. Wise, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

124 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of 30 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Record Holding Depot).

The personnel situation fell into the general pattern. Sufficient officers were available, but the 39 agents assigned were inadequate. Twenty-five more were on requisition. Clerical help was badly needed. All agents had completed basic CIC training, but certain operational deficiencies had changed the emphasis of the procurement program from educational background to previous investigative experience.

Agents were not placed in the field until after they had completed the school at Chicago and had a minimum of four weeks training with a veteran agent. No post-school or orientation training was conducted by the detachment.

The unavailability of tire priorities was creating a transportation problem being felt across the country, and 18 government vehicles were on requisition. No complaints on pay, allowances or reimbursement for special expenditures were registered, but a careful and rapid system of reimbursing for special expenditures was implemented by the unit. Investigative equipment was plentiful, and every evidence of frequent utilization was shown. A training course with firearms had been set up by the detachment, although agents did not carry arms as a rule.

No attempt was made to protect agents' identity within the office structure, and outside the office the men were called Special agents rather than "mister." Agents were not used for investigation of commissioned officers, for policy demanded that such cases be handled by officer personnel.

The drain of men being taken for overseas assignment created a problem of sorts, since the best men were selected for such duty. An attitude was promulgated within the unit that such assignment was an honor, and travel to ports of embarkation was made with civilian accommodations.

The report was closed with a note of the serious shortage of typewriters and the availability of a Negro agent for reassignment to more vitally needed positions.[125]

Military Information Program

The role of the CIC detachment assigned to Fifth Service Command in carrying out the program of safeguarding military information had three phases: personal contact with installation intelligence offices and other intelligence agencies; contact with the public; and investigation of specific cases.

125 Memo dtd 1 Dec 41, Subj: Report of Visit to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas, from Capt H. G. Sheen, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility); and Memo dtd 16 Apr 42, Subj: Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas, from Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

The contact with other installations and intelligence agencies which was an everyday part of the average agent's job gave an excellent opportunity for implementing military information security programs. Agents were called upon to supply advice as to proper security maintenance of files, to counsel commanding officers on the discharging of their counterintelligence responsibility, and to interpret and apply security regulations. This personal contact was expeditious and invaluable at smaller installations where officers and men in many cases had little or no intelligence experience.

SIC agents reached the public on the subject of safeguarding military information through publicity contacts and procurement and orientation of speakers. Publicity for SIC security campaigns took the form of newspaper advertisements, radio spot announcements, posters, stuffers in utility bills, and even specially printed bottle caps. In a number of instances, agents helped set up department store window displays with security themes.

Although the agents themselves did little public speaking because of operational necessity for anonymity, civilian lecturers were supplied information for security speeches, and films were made available for showing to club and social groups.

The third phase of SIC's role in the security program was corrective, in that it involved investigation of actual or suspected security violations. Coming within the scope of these investigations were instances of philatelists collecting cancellations from military post offices, troop attempts to evade censorship regulations, careless talk by troop personnel in public places, photographing of classified installations and equipment, and improper mailing of classified documents and orders.

In one case, confidential texts were sent out without proper cover or accounting measures. Agents assigned to investigate were able to locate all documents by standard accounting procedure. Findings of negligence and disregard for regulations led to disciplinary action by the proper agency.

In a more bizarre case, information was given the FBI through an informant that an espionage ring involving officers and enlisted men was flourishing on a post within the Fifth Service Command. FBI turned the case over to CIC, and preliminary investigation enlarged the story to include a German espionage agent who purportedly was a contact and courier for the ring and was known as the Prussian Baroness.

Investigation revealed that the entire incident had been given by a drunk sergeant who wanted to impress a local girl with his importance. Although he had committed certain security violations, the story of an espionage ring was a

figment of his imagination and had no foundation in fact. The CIC investigation of the case culminated in the separation of the sergeant from the service.[126]

Sixth Service Command

The states of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin constituted the Sixth Service Command, and had a combined population of approximately 18,500,000. Maj Gen Henry S. Aurand commanded the area, and Lt Col W. L. Furbershaw was the Director of Intelligence.

The detachment had 22 agents at the outset of hostilities in 1941. It reached a peak strength of 325 agents by September 1943. One hundred six men remained for transfer to SIC in January 1944.[127]

Technical Manual 30-225 (tentative), which was sent to the various Corps Areas in April 1941,[128] required that each office mail to the next higher echelon a report of accomplishments for each month. This was one of the reports which the G2 Ninth Corps Area said "would entail a considerable burden of work that is not considered of sufficient value to justify the effort..."[129]

Apparently most Corps Areas felt the same way, because on the Sixth Corps Area reports are available in the records of the National Archives, and there is no mention or record of any others. Maj G. R. Carpenter, Sixth Corps Area G2 and later the G2 of Army Ground Forces, submitted reports for April, May, June and July 1941. Since there is no record of any others, compliance with this paragraph of the tentative regulations seems to have ended at that time.[130]

Collectively, these reports provide a statistical picture of a Corps Area in action during the critical summer months of the last pre-war year. Sixth Corps Area embraced a large population of first and second generation Germans and its subversion problems were comparable to those of the Second and Ninth Corps Areas.

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126 Address by Maj J. J. Schnell, WD Intelligence Conference, 21 Jul 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

127 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of 30 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Record Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

128 CIC Office Journal, Entry 21, dtd 12 Apr 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

129 Regulations CIC, File 8, 1940-41, 8 Sep 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

130 CIP Correspondence 96-98 for 1 Apr 41-30 Apr 41; CIP Correspondence 146-147 1 May 41-31 May 41; CIP Correspondence 70-71, 1 Jun 41-30 Jun 41; CIP Correspondence 25-26, 1 Jul 41- 31 Jul 41, (CONFIDENTIAL) (File MID 10389-A-1 Records WDGS, MID, National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

In April and May 1941, Sixth Corps CIP Detachment consisted of nine men of its authorized 18 men. Two were staff sergeants and seven were sergeants. The effective force, however, was only five men, because four agents were attending the CIP school at Washington.[131]

In June 1941, the Sixth Corps CIP force was increased from nine to 14 men, but before the month ended its allotment had been increased to 29. Since two agents were at the CIP school in Washington, the effective force was 12, consisting of a master sergeant, two technical sergeants, five staff sergeants, and four sergeants. In July an additional agent was added, leaving 14 vacancies and an effective force of 12, since by that time three more agents were at CIP school in Washington.

In April, with only five agents available, the G2 reported that the men were being held in a headquarters pool for temporary assignment as needed. In May, four agents were on detached service in various parts of the area, and in June five were so assigned.[132]

One of the May assignments was that of Sgt Joseph J. Dodge, who was sent to assist the intelligence officer at Sault Ste. Marie. From then on, assignment of agents to this area became an important part of the counterintelligence mission, since 80 percent of all the nation's iron ore passed through these locks, and damage to the canal could have had a crippling effect. Col H. R. Kibler, CIC's final wartime chief, later praised CIC's security work at Sault Ste. Marie.[133]

By June, work had increased to the point where three agents had to be detailed to the G2 office to process reports there. T/Sgt John E. Shea, who had replaced Dodge at Sault Ste. Marie in June, remained there in July. Scott Field, Illinois, had become a regular station for one CIP agent. Fort Custer, Michigan, and Camp Grant, Illinois, provided enough work to keep agents there on temporary duty much of the time. Trips to Detroit and Midland, Michigan; to Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin; and to Joliet, Belleville and Ottawa, Illinois, took much time and scattered the small force over long distances.

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131 CIP Correspondence 38-39, 14 Apr 41, File MID 10389-A-1 Records, WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

132 CIP Correspondence 96-98, 1-30 Apr 41; CIP Correspondence 146-147, 1-31 May 41; CIP Correspondence 70-71, 1-30 Jun 41; CIP Correspondence 25-26, 1-31 Jul 41, File MID 10389-A-1 Records WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

133 Interview with Col H. R. Kibler (MI-Res) at Ft Holabird, 29 Sep 52, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Administration was handled by a military intelligence officer on duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, in the post office building in Chicago. This officer also directed training and the assignment of cases.

On 10 April 1941, a separate CIP office was established in a downtown office building in Chicago. This office consisted of one large room and two smaller rooms. Office equipment included a fireproof vault with steel door, two desks, three tables, chairs, three rented typewriters, a card index unit, supply of stationery, wardrobe, lavatory and an unlisted telephone.

On the door of the office was lettered the name of a plausible-sounding but nonexistent business concern. Contact between the G2 office was maintained by telephone, and the location and identity of the office was reported by confidential letter to the Special Agent in charge of the Chicago office of the FBI, to the Chicago Chief of Police, and to the Cook County State's Attorney.

Office hours originally were 0800 to 2200 Monday through Friday and until 1700 on Saturdays, but within a month were changed to conform to the military post hours of 0830 to 1600. For the first month, an agent was detailed as a charge of quarters to tend office during the day, but the following month a full time stenographer was hired and all agents were freed for outside work.[134]

With the hiring of the stenographer, the practice of submitting roughly typed or handwritten reports to the G2 office was terminated. The stenographer typed the reports from agents' notes.

Most of the work consisted of searches and background investigations of prospects for CIP assignment to fill the existing vacancies in the authorized strength. In compliance with War Department orders in April, special efforts were made to recruit members of federal, state, and municipal police, bar associations, federal and district attorneys, private investigative agencies, college alumni associations, engineering societies, universities and colleges, and industrial enterprises. There were also a number of personnel investigations for clerical help and persons being assigned to sensitive positions. For the four-month period from April to July, personnel investigations averaged 50 percent of the work.

There were no cases of suspected treason, sabotage, or security violations reported during the period. Three cases of suspected espionage were listed, but no details were given. Since they were all closed in less than three months, they presumably were either not substantiated or were turned over to the FBI. There

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134 CIP Correspondence, Sixth Corps Monthly Statements, Apr-Jul 41, File MID 10389-A-1-Records, WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

were two impersonation cases during April, one in June, and another in July. Thirty "routine" cases during the period are not further identified. These cases totaled only 10 percent of the work load.

Labor unrest at the Dow Chemical Company at Midland, Michigan, was an example of a routine case which required continuous coverage by a CIP agent for an entire week. During National "Alert" Week, 29 May-1 June, when the Corps Area G2 maintained 24-hour coverage, CIP agents were working 12-hour shifts. However, no unusual incidents were reported.[135]

Forty percent of the cases handled during the period were labeled "suspected disaffection," but without case records there is no means of evaluating either their importance or the work load they represented. However, in previous years the Sixth Corps Area G2 had reported on the Nazi problems existing in the heavily Germanic populations in his area. When many of these German men were drafted into the Army, disaffection cases became common in all Corps Areas. Sixth Corps Area normally had a higher percentage.

These Sixth Corps reports also provided a picture of the accomplishments of CIP agents:

Month	Agents Working	Cases Completed	Interviews Completed	Cases Closed By One Agent	Most Interviews By One Agent
Apr 41	9	47	646	11	118
May 41	5	57	523	19	151
Jun 41	10	88	1020	20	187
Jul 41	12	63	855*	14	148
Total	--	255	3044	--	--
Average	9	64	761	--	--

* Work of only 7 agents

Some of these interviews must have been done by telephone, since the monthly average represents one interview every half hour, ten hours a day, six days a week.[136]

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135 CIP Correspondence 145-146, 1-31 May 41, File MID 10389-A-1-Records, WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, DC).

136 CIP Correspondence 96-98, 1-30 Apr 41; CIP Correspondence 146-147, 1-31 May 41; CIP Correspondence 70-71, 1-30 Jun 41; CIP Correspondence 25-26, 1-31 Jul 41, File MID 10389-A-1-Records WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, DC).

Four months after the period covered by these summaries, Sixth Corps Area was inspected by the Chief, CIP, who reported that there was "...every evidence of efficient organization and operation... The Sixth Corps Area commander and his staff have exhibited a thorough understanding of the problems confronting counterintelligence operations and have demonstrated resourcefulness in the preparation of plans for the accomplishment of successful countersubversive action..."

Plans were discussed for establishing district offices at Detroit and Lansing, Michigan; Milwaukee and Madison, Wisconsin; and Rock Island, Rockford, and Springfield, Illinois.

The CIP Chief observed that the Chicago office was "...separated from the headquarters by some ten blocks. The office is well located and is provided with adequate furnishings and equipment."

The CIP detachment had reached its full strength of 29 agents, but the problem was that the Sixth Corps Area G1 would not authorize designation of specially selected enlisted men, then in basic training, for future CIP assignment, although by the time these men completed their basic training, normal attrition would have reduced the strength of the CIP detachment to such an extent that vacancies would exist. The local G2 suggested that the problem would be solved by authorizing a quota of 50 agents for the Corps Area, which would make vancancies immediately available and permit the "earmarking" of selected trainees.[137]

In March 1942, Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Executive Officer of the Office of the Chief, CIC, made an inspection of the CIC operations in the Sixth Corps Area. There he met Maj H. R. Kibler, who later was to succeed Wise as Chief of CIC, and who was then Executive Officer of the Intelligence Section of the G2 office. Major Kibler handled the financial and travel problems of the local CIC detachment. Wise said Kibler was familiar with the organization and "to a certain extent the agents." He added that Kibler was interested in the Corps and its problems and discussed them at length.[138]

In the matter of personnel, the Sixth Corps Area had temporarily solved its officer problem. Its Acting G2 and its Chief, CIC, were both former Treasury Investigators, and the chief of its Investigations Division was a former attorney and graduate of the first CIP Officer's Investigative Course. Subordinate positions had been filled and reserve lieutenants over-age in grade had been designated as

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137 CIP Correspondence 2-1, dtd 1 Dec 41, File MID 10389-A-1-Records, WDGS, MID, (CONFIDENTIAL) (National Archives, Washington, DC).

138 Memo from Captain Wise to Chief, CIC, 16 Apr 42, Subj: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

understudies. A current problem was a lack of promotions. Officers of the G2 division were all assigned to "BI" - Branch Immaterial - and since that branch was filled, there were no promotions available. Even vacancies in the G2 division could not be filled.

The number of agents was definitely inadequate. Instead of 29 men, the Corps Area needed a hundred agents in the opinion of the Chief of Investigations, although it was only asking for 78 if the pending CIC increase was approved. No plant security work was being done, although it was anticipated, but personnel investigations for CIC applicants, for bombardiers, for officer candidates and for Signal Corps personnel "buried" agents. Few other cases were handled in the field offices. There were some serious cases, but the countersubversion informant system was revealing little. The number of names in the personality file index of the area was growing steadily and had already reached 25,000. While clerical help was considered adequate, a backlog of 725 cases existed from an earlier period when personnel was critically short.

In conformity with the new CIC policy, the Chicago office was abandoning its undercover status, and liaison was good with all federal agencies except the FBI. Agents worked so closely with the Provost Marshal that no objection was voiced at a proposal to transfer six agents to the Provost Marshal.

Agents seldom used the special investigative equipment furnished the detachment, although the CIC unit requested a Speed Graphic camera to replace the Minox it was using for plant security work. The Minox created developing and enlarging problems. Firearms were stored under lock, and G2 policy forbade agents to carry weapons. This probably was just as well, since the agents had had no firearms practice. No regular physical training was provided, but it was hoped to have instructions in judo and in street fighting at a later date. All agents had completed basic training.

Although Army policy since May 1941 had permitted payment of five cents per mile to agents using their private automobiles, Major Kibler said he had been instructed not to pay more than three cents per mile. As a result, his agents were losing money. Automobiles were scarce, and those available needed new tires.

Personnel procurement had been systemized. Initial screening of the many CIC applicants was conducted at the Army Public Relations Bureau, where the obviously unsuited were weeded out. Others filled out a questionnaire which enabled the detachment commander to determine which candidates he should interview. When interviewed by the detachment commander, the prospective agents completed the official personal history statements.

If an applicant was tentatively qualified for CIC, he was told to notify the G2 at the time of his induction. When the man was inducted, his service records were tabbed for CIC duty. He was then sent to Fort Sheridan for basic training. If already in the service, the man was frozen at his station until a background investigation could be completed. By agreement with the G2, these candidates were assigned to the G2 file room while awaiting final approval for assignment.

The Sixth Corps Area had already had a taste of things to come. Already several of its agents had been tapped for overseas assignment. The Corps Area had provided credentials so the men could travel to ports of embarkation as civilians. The G2 had only one request: that more information be provided in connection with overseas assignments so that departees could be more effectively briefed.[139]

Procurement Difficulty in Sixth Service Command

Procurement difficulties developed when the system of tabbing potential agents was eliminated in late 1942. Under a new arrangement, men could only be procured from lists of those deemed qualified by officers in the reception centers. Or, if CIC furnished a list of the men it desired, it could ask the officer in charge of a recruiting or induction station to notify CIC when the man was inducted.

Under the former enlistment program, CIC could plan its procurement and maintain an age and training balance. This was not possible under the induction and assignment system. Furthermore, the induction program also blocked the enlistment for CIC by individuals who had highly specialized qualifications.[140]

Detroit Race Riot

The Sixth Service Command was faced with a race riot of some proportions in June 1943. For three days, the situation in the area was critical, and mobs armed with clubs and weapons roamed the city searching for other groups. After 24 hours of rioting, federal troops moved in, and a state of martial law was declared. CIC worked with troops to stop the fights that occurred in widely scattered areas of the city, and agents attempted to determine whether a central control or plan for the rioting existed.

It was concluded that the incident was of spontaneous origin, the result of several economic and political factors that belied the presence of any promotional

139 Memo from Captain Wise to Chief, CIC, 16 Apr 42, Subj: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

140 Memo for General Strong, dtd 19 Dec 42, from Col H. R. Kibler, Subj: "Sixth Service Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

agency. The rioting died down within three days, and CIC closed the case with the comment that there was no evidence of "coordinated planning of action by enemy subversive agencies."[141]

Disposition of this report is worthy of mention. Concern in Washington over the race situation was so great that the reporting officer was called to Washington for a briefing session with Secretary of War Stimson. The officer was flown to Washington on 23 June and prepared a more extensive report which was discussed at a cabinet meeting on 25 June 1943.[142]

Seventh Service Command

The Seventh Service Command included a large number of states but had a relatively small population. The nine states in the command, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado, had a combined population of only 15,600,000. Twelve agents were charged with coverage of the area in 1941, but strength soared to 185 men in 1943. The command was headed by Maj Gen Frederick E. Uhl, and Lt Col Harold White was Director of Intelligence. Maj O. C. Michelman commanded the CIC detachment.[143]

Captain Sheen found the situation at Seventh Corps Area during his November trip to be generally satisfactory, but in "some instances it is being impaired by interference and misinterpretation of existing policies."

The Corps Area Chief of Staff had formerly served as a G2 and still harbored a deep interest in G2 activities. He exerted considerable influence over management of the section, and his policy was at variance with that prescribed by the War Department.

The G2 felt that an experienced civilian investigator was sorely needed in the area and that eight additional CIP men could be utilized. Clerical help was a must, and improved physical facilities were needed. Captain Sheen closed his report with the comment that the G2 was "not much impressed with training by the CIP school and gave the impression of being reluctant to rely upon CIP personnel in the accomplishment of cases of a serious nature."

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141 Memo dtd 25 Jun 43, Factors Behind the Detroit Race Riots, by Lt L. A. Lowenstien, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

142 Ltr, dtd 25 Jun 43, to Col L. R. Forney, Chief, Security Group, from Col H. R. Kibler, Chief, CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

143 CIC Record List, compiled as of 30 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Record Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

Considerable changes had occurred by the time Captain Wise made his liaison trip in April. Although the G2 still was reluctant to depend on CIC agents, new officers assigned to operating field offices in the area seemed to make up for the G2's lack of enthusiasm. A sharp improvement in CIC status was predicted.

The personnel shortage reported by Captain Sheen was corrected by the time Captain Wise arrived, at least with regards to officer personnel. Enlisted and civilian clerical help was still needed. The detachment had a case backlog of about 800 investigations. Though many agents were lawyers in civilian life, procurement by the detachment had stressed characteristics of dependability and varied experiences, rather than educational background.

Although many promotion spaces were available within the detachment, the grades were held back and awarded only as merit was proved. The system seemed to work well, and complete filling of higher grades was anticipated in a few months following the inspection.

The agent training pattern was slightly varied in the Seventh Corps Area. Men were held at the detachment in Omaha, Nebraska, for orientation and on-the-job training immediately after procurement for a period of five to six weeks. Under careful supervision, the men were put on cases of their own as quickly as possible after completion of the preliminary period. Agents were sent to the Chicago school for classroom work. No provision was made for post-school training.

The officer in charge of the investigations section was charged with all case report review work and in most instances rewrote all agent reports into a finished form. Original copies were kept on file for the protection of the agents concerned. Finished reports were not considered a job of the agent, but were felt to be the responsibility of the investigations officer.

The lack of adequate agent transportation was termed by Captain Wise as the dominating problem of the detachment. Agents were reluctant to use their own cars because of the lack of tire priorities. Government vehicles, when available, were painted in such a manner that identity of the user was immediately compromised. No monetary problems were discussed in the report.

All technical equipment was kept in custody of the G2 and was usable only with his permission. The G2 explained that this policy safeguarded equipment until a need for it arose. He felt that present case work did not require equipment and that no time was available for experimentation and familiarization by the agents. Firearms were distributed for use as needed, but no ammunition was available to permit practice and qualification.

The scope of agent jurisdiction allowed investigation of commissioned as well as enlisted personnel, and care was taken to conceal identities and rank.

Field offices, however, were run completely in the open, with the name on office doors and listed telephone numbers. CIC personnel were never used to conduct investigations on military installations. This duty was delegated to intelligence officers who employed trusted enlisted men. It was felt that this method was most satisfactory, since it did not cause new faces to appear during the course of an investigation and eliminated transfer and travel problems.

Captain Wise cited a few of the difficulties raised by the control exercised over G2 and CIC by the Chief of Staff. Although an agent from the detachment was sent to Washington for special training in the review of reports and assigned that task when he returned to the detachment, the man was returned to the field for investigative work when the Chief of Staff expressed the opinion that only officers should handle such work. The Chief of Staff also termed special investigative equipment sent the detachment "a lot of junk" and ordered it put under lock when it arrived at the headquarters. He did not keep the unit informed as to what had arrived and was available for use on the theory that "the less they know about it the less they would bother about trying to use it."[144]

Barring of Agents

When agents of the Seventh Corps Area detachment were barred from the premises after an explosion at the St. Louis Ordnance Plant, St. Louis, Missouri, sharp repurcussions followed. The agents had properly identified themselves and sought to investigate the explosion for the possibility of sabotage, but the commanding officer repeatedly denied them access to plant facilities.

Maj Gen George V. Strong, G2 War Department, in commenting on this situation remarked that the officer did not have the proper conception of the responsibilities, duties, and functions of the Military Intelligence Division. He pointed out that the case was one demanding CIC attention, and did so in terms that proved useful to agents with similar problems in all Corps Areas.

He stated that all "field personnel should be instructed to furnish to agents of the Military Intelligence Division any assistance which they may need in the performance of their duties."[145]

144 Memo, dtd 1 Dec 41, Subj: "Report of Visit to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas," from Capt H. G. Sheen, (CONFIDENTIAL), (Central Records Facility); and Memo, dtd 16 Apr 42, Subj: "Report of Liaison Trip to Certain Corps Areas," from Capt Hugh D. Wise, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

145 Ltr, dtd 16 Oct 42, for CG, Services of Supply, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: "Refusal to Admit CIC Agents to St. Louis Ordnance Plant," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Eighth Service Command and Southern Defense Command

Eighth Service Command covered the southwestern states of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arkansas, and Louisiana, with a combined population of about 15,000,000. Twenty-two agents were stationed in the area when World War II broke, and strength of the CIC in the command steadily increased to a peak of 236 men in 1943. Only 87 men remained in January 1944, when CIC was filling units for tactical groups moving overseas.

Maj Gen Richard Donovan commanded the Eighth Service Command and had Col Worrel A. Roffe as his Director of Intelligence. Lt Col Ralph W. Pierce commanded the CIC detachment in 1943.[146]

The Southern Defense Command, activated in March 1941, pushed the Eighth Corps Area to Dallas for the war, and took over the counterintelligence mission along the Mexican border. As far as the CIP agents were concerned, this assignment soon became essentially a border control mission. They interviewed returnees for Mexico and occasionally briefed a traveler en route as to what particular information was wanted. One of the principal targets along the border was the "Sinerquesta," or Mexican Communist Front organization, whose activities were closely watched. This control assignment extended from West Texas to New Orleans. Much of the information obtained concerned the attitude of Mexico toward the Good Neighbor Policy.[147] Southern Defense Command was not allotted any CIC agents until the summer of 1943, when it received 28, of which 12 were Negro. Prior to that time Eighth Service Command provided CIC coverage.

An inspection trip through Eighth Corps Area, with headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, by Captain Sheen, revealed perhaps the most extensive and ambitious deployment of agents in the Zone of Interior. Ten field offices, aside from the headquarters offices, were maintained, and though the agents were spread thinly, widespread coverage was obtained. It was felt, however, that additional agents were needed at Denver, Colorado and Houston, Texas, to provide assistance at what were felt to be the most sensitive areas in the Corps.[148]

One civilian investigator was requested by the G2 as essential to CIP operations, and a qualified man had been located to fill the position when authorization

146 CIC Record Lists, compiled as of 30 Oct 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Adjutant General Intermediate Record Holding Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

147 Interview with Daniel Canfield, former CIC agent in Southern Defense Command, 8 Aug 55 at National Counter Intelligence Corps Association Convention in New York City, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

148 Memo for Personnel Officer, File 200.3, Oct 43, dtd 30 Sep 43, subj: "Disposition of CIC Personnel," (CONFIDENTIAL) (AG Intermediate Records Depot, Ft Holabird, Md).

for his employment was received. Government-owned transportation was urgently needed in the area, because of the large area of responsibility and the reluctance of agents to use their own vehicles in view of gasoline and tire shortages.[149]

Racial Coverage

Coverage of the racial difficulties that developed during this period provided a problem to all Service Commands. The method adopted by the Eighth Service Command for coverage was typical and effective.

Seven district offices were established within the command, corresponding with FBI districts. Intelligence offices were established in sensitive areas. All post, camp, and installation intelligence officers fed information from over 200 locations into this net. Cooperation and liaison with the FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence, state, county, and municipal police provided additional density.

The efficiency of coverage and the prompt and accurate reports that could quickly be obtained in this way allowed preventive rather than suppressive action. When racial incidents of any proportion occurred, agents were dispatched to the point of origin and information could be immediately disseminated to the interested staff agency for necessary action.[150]

Western Defense Command and Ninth Corps

In the Western Defense Command, which took over the Presidio of San Francisco in March 1941 and pushed the Ninth Corps Headquarters to Salt Lake City, Utah, Japanese workers and sympathizers constituted the principle problem, and the bulk of subversion investigations fell on the FBI. When war came, Army counterintelligence worked closely with the FBI in the initial roundup of potentially dangerous suspects and their internment. This Command also had the responsibility of supplying CIC personnel to the Alaskan Theater of Operations until November 1943.

Jurisdiction was always a problem in Army areas that embraced large land masses. In 1941, the Ninth Corps G2 described his operational procedure starting at post level, where the local intelligence officer assumed the responsibility for the investigations. This procedure was similar to that used in Third Corps Area. CIP assistance was furnished by the Corps G2 as needed. The post intelligence officer conducted all phases of the investigation and arranged directly with unit

149 Memo, dtd 1 Dec 41, subj: "Report of Visit to Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas," from Capt H. G. Sheen, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

150 Address delivered by Lt Col Cylburn O. Matfeldt, WD Intelligence Conference, 21 Jul 44, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility).

intelligence officers for the necessary cooperation when cases could best be handled at unit level. The Corps Area G2 assisted the post intelligence officer by conducting phases of the investigation at a distance from the post. Many of the installations, however, were so small that the post intelligence officer often had neither the time, the means, nor the experience to handle the investigation. In such cases the Corps Area G2 often assumed full responsibility for the investigation. The G2 also directed the investigation when two or more installations were concerned. In general, the matter of responsibility was settled at local level under the guidance of the Corps Area G2, who by having knowledge of all the cases in the area was best able to decide.[151]

The Seditious Lieutenant

Mimeographed pamphlets attacking the President, his Cabinet and the war effort in general turned up in the officers club at a large western Army camp in 1942, almost simultaneously with the discovery of similar material in USO clubs, libraries, and public vehicles in the area. A few days later, the proprietor of a stationery store about 1,000 miles from the came became suspicious of a young man who had requested the printing of these pamphlets and turned a copy of the literature over to local police. The man who had ordered the pamphlets had not given his name at any time during the transaction, but the dealer could furnish a complete description.

At the same time, a lieutenant assigned to an organization at the camp aroused suspicion when he began to put in a good deal of time in writing at his desk and was very careful to prevent others from seeing what he was writing. Eventually, he discarded a sheet of carbon paper which was turned over to Military Intelligence because of his strange actions. The carbon revealed that the lieutenant had been writing seditious material and had used the name of the organization which had purported to produce the pamphlets. Shortly after this, a letter was turned over to military authorities by a person in the middle west, which had been sent by the lieutenant in question and which contained additional seditious statements.

At this point, CIC entered the case and began a discreet surveillance on a 24-hour basis. During the course of the surveillance, the lieutenant was invited to speak at a local university on the subject of Criminology. During his talk, he bitterly attacked the Army. The lieutenant also placed an order and received new pamphlets from the same printer, all of which were seized by CIC agents. When it was determined that no other persons were involved in the case, the man was arrested and subjected to interrogation. A search of his quarters revealed

151 File #8, CIP Regulations 1941 & 1942, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

additional materials. When confronted with the evidence, the man confessed. He was convicted of sedition and other misconduct by a general courts martial and sentenced to a term in a federal prison.[152]

Golden Gate Bund

A voluntary informant told Western Defense Command officials early in 1942 that he had heard a War Department employee giving details of American losses at Pearl Harbor to unauthorized personnel. Since the individual concerned had access to confidential information, CIC was called upon to investigate the incident.

An agent was put undercover in the section where the civilian was employed and developed a friendly relationship with the suspect. Eventually, another man was placed undercover to assist in the case. It developed that the suspect was German-born and harbored strong pro-Axis sentiments. He claimed that he had relatives in German police positions and that he was anxious to form an organization in this country which would allow Germans with similar feelings to be of genuine aid to the Fatherland.

He eventually showed the undercover agents the plans for formation of the Golden Gate Bund. The suspect drafted rules and regulations for the organization and even had membership cards printed. The man was transferred to nonsensitive duties while the investigation continued. When it was determined that he and his associates were not engaged in espionage activities but were merely disloyal, he was discharged from his War Department position. He was later brought before the Individual Exclusion Board to show cause why he should not be removed from vital Pacific Coast areas, and it was determined that his past actions bordered upon treason. He was ordered to be excluded from Military Areas 1 and 2 of the Western Defense Command.[153]

An acute shortage of agents during early 1942 in the Western Defense Command was set out by that headquarters in a letter to the Military Intelligence Service. The G2 asked that the Command's CIC allotment be raised from 71 to 250 agents in order that effective coverage of the area could be effected. Of the requested allocation, it was planned to suballocate six agents to Headquarters, Ninth Service Command at Fort Douglas, Utah. Without the increase, the

152 File, undated, Title, "Events Leading to the Apprehension and Conviction of Lt X for Sedition by Agents of the CIC, DA, Western Defense Command," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

153 File, undated, Summary of Investigation conducted by AC of S, G2, WDC and Fourth Army of Case, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff and Faculty Library).

staffing of field offices and branches with adequate forces was impossible. Formation of a sorely needed pool of men for overseas duties could only be possible if the number of men was increased.[154]

Undercover Investigation of Sabotage in Northwest

An agent of the Western Defense Command CIC detachment was sent to Canadian stations of the Air Transport Command in mid-1942 to investigate possible sabotage to Army aircraft leased to civilian operating companies. A fire had occurred aboard one ship, and a few weeks later an oil filter screen was found to be clogged with sand.

The agent was put undercover with civilian maintenance employees and moved to various stations where incidents occurred after servicing by civilian crews. He found that while the crews were young, inexperienced, and inclined to be negligent in maintaining fuel stores and spare parts, there was no positive evidence of intentional sabotage to aircraft.

The agent uncovered and explored a morale problem which developed from preferential treatment given civilian employees over Army personnel, and recommended certain changes to correct the situation. As a result of his suggestions, separated messes were abandoned, and comparable barrack accommodations were furnished civilian and military personnel.

The total length of the agent's stay in the area is not disclosed, but for at least three months he remained undercover at the airfields.[155]

Bomber Crash

The detachment with Western Defense Command investigated the crash of a large bombing plane during an experimental flight in early 1943. The plane was a total loss, over a million and half dollars of property damage was involved, and 32 lives were lost. Many agencies were involved in the investigation under G2 coordination: FBI, Army Air Forces personnel, local police, and aviation experts.

Over 200 witnesses to the crash were interviewed, and from their reports it was possible to plot a chronology of events and determine the probable cause

154 Ltr, dtd, 3 Apr 42, from Col John Weckerling, G2, WDC, to MIS, subj: "Allotment of CIC," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

155 Rpts, dtd 17 Sep and 13 Nov 42, from Agent A. W. Staffen, to G2, Western Defense Command and 4th Army, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

of the disaster. While it was not possible to prove the absence of sabotage, mechanical failure was determined as the probable cause of the accident.[156]

Western Defense Command agents also handled the investigation of a fire at dog kennels on a Western Ordnance Depot. A report of the military guard responsible for patrolling the area was at variance with other eyewitness accounts and led to thorough background investigation of the man. When a large amount of derogatory information and certain psychological difficulties came to light, interrogation and reinterrogation brought a confession from the man that he had started the fire in order to bring glory to himself by rescuing the dogs. He underestimated the fury of the blaze he ignited, however. The dogs and the building were lost.

The investigation and reports by the detachment led to conviction of the guard for arson on a government reservation. He was given a prison sentence of three years.[157]

More malicious mischief was uncovered at Mills Field, California, where a civilian mechanic in a fit of anger at his superiors punched holes in a wing flap assembly at 14 points. After extensive questioning, the suspect admitted guilt and was prosecuted and sentenced.[158]

Cover Error Under Cover

Early in 1943, the G2 for the 92d Infantry Division, which was training in Southwestern United States, asked for four Negro agents from Western Defense Command to conduct an undercover investigation within his division.

Only two agents could be supplied, and the method of forwarding these agents very nearly compromised their identity. The division G2 had asked that the agents arrive in privates' uniforms with service records, but that portion of his request was apparently not forwarded to Western Defense Command. The agents were utilized for the investigation, but the attendant difficulties resulted in the setting forth of a definite policy by the Office of the Chief regarding forwarding of men to

156 File, Investigation by AC of S, G2, Western Defense Command of Bomber Crash, dtd Feb 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

157 File, dtd Feb 43, Western Defense Command, subj: "Investigation of Incendiary Fire at Western Ordnance Depot," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

158 File, Damage to Left-Hand Wing Flap Assembly, compiled by Western Defense Command, dtd Nov 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

tactical units for undercover investigations. Among the recommendations were provisions that the men carry their service records and report in a normal fashion to allay suspicion.[159]

American Intelligence Command

The American Intelligence Command asked in 1942 that vacancies be furnished it from the CIC allotment to allow selection and assignment of CIC personnel to duty under that command. The command, which was a G2 counterpart to the Office of Strategic Services, participated in a positive intelligence effort by interrogating returnees from South and Central America and maintaining card files on travelers and their reports. The ambition of the command is illustrated by its request of 8 September 1942 of the Director of Intelligence, that all 175 agents in the Caribbean be assigned to it.[160]

In spite of objections by Major Wise, Chief of CIC at the time of the request, some agents were furnished for duty with American Intelligence Command. As a part of his objection, Major Wise cited instances where the American Intelligence Command had attempted to "raid" CIC ranks by offering direct commissions to highly specialized personnel.[161] Although records on the unit are scanty, it does appear that the drain of that command on CIC personnel continued, for in a letter in mid-1943, Col H. R. Kibler, then Chief, CIC, asked that nine agents with American Intelligence Command be relieved of that assignment and returned to Fourth Corps Area, in view of the current drastic shortage of agents, and the non-CIC mission of the American Intelligence Command.[162]

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159 Memo for Col L. R. Forney, from Col H. R. Kibler, dtd 19 Jun 43, subj: "Report on Request of Investigation Made by General Kroner, 92d Division Incident," (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

160 File 200.3, Corres OCCIC, Sep-Dec 1942, AG Intermediate Record Depot, Ft Holabird, Md.

161 Ltr, dtd 12 Dec 42, from Maj Hugh D. Wise, Chief CIC to Colonel Bissell, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

162 Memo, dtd 24 Jul 43, from Chief, CIC Group, from Col H. R. Kibler, Chief, CIC Branch, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Chapter 3

CIC WITH ARMY GROUND FORCES

A major problem for the top level CIC planners and administrators involved the establishment of CIC detachments for tactical units in training in the Zone of the Interior for eventual shipment of overseas combat areas. These detachments, many of which were later to reflect great credit on CIC, were initially only a source of headaches.

The basic reason for attachment of CIC units to divisions was stated by Gen George V. Strong, AC of S, G2, WDGS, in 1943 in a letter to the commanding generals of the various components under Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces:

> "Members of the Counter Intelligence Corps have been assigned to Army Air Force and Army Ground Force units within the United States primarily to afford them the necessary specialized training required before their departure for theaters of operations with their organizations. It is especially necessary that they learn the organization, characteristics and special needs of the units to which they are assigned and to prepare themselves to meet those special needs. In addition, they will assist in the operation of the countersubversion system, supplement without replacing the established investigative network of the Service Commands and the Western Defense Command, and provide immediately available investigative service for organizations to which they are assigned."[163]

Right from the beginning, there was controversy among high level intelligence officers over when CIC detachments should be provided the training divisions and corps. It was the thought of Col H. R. Kibler, the Chief of CIC, that detachments should be attached to divisions after the divisions had been fully formed and only a few months prior to the division's departure for the theater of operations. However, this policy was assailed from two sides--one favoring a longer period of attachment and the other no attachment in the Zone of the Interior at all.

Col Giles R. Carpenter, G2, Army Ground Forces, took exception to Colonel Kibler's plan, feeling that CIC personnel, at least a portion of what would be a full detachment, should be attached at the earliest stages of the division's activation. In a conference with Colonel Kibler on 12 June 1943, Colonel Carpenter outlined

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163 Memo for The Adjutant General, Subj: "CIC Personnel Assigned to Units of the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces within the United States, 29 Mar 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (draft of a letter to be sent to all the commanding generals of the various components of the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces), (Central Records Facility).

the basic reasons for his stand. The Army Ground Forces G2 believed that during the initial stages of a division's activation, a large and important counter-intelligence problem existed. He felt it was then the investigations of potential subversives in the division's ranks might best be initiated and conducted. Secondly, during the activation period, the staff of the division would have more time to consider the proper use of CIC. Colonel Carpenter concluded: "It is very hard for a growing concern to absorb a new activity. It would be easier during the activation period for a new activity to be added. The CIC will fit into the picture better during the activation period."[164]

Eighth Service Command Officer Takes Opposite Stand

On the other hand, there was high level questioning of the advisability of having CIC personnel on duty with tactical units, both ground and air forces, in the Zone of the Interior. Col W. W. Roffe, Director of Intelligence in the Eighth Service Command, wrote to Col Lester R. Forney, Chief of the Counterintelligence Group of the War Department General Staff, that: "there is not sufficient work in such units to utilize the full time and effort of the personnel." Colonel Roffe elaborated, "Now that economy of CIC personnel is the order of the day and based on actual conditions in this Service Command, the further assignment or retention of the CIC detachments in tactical units cannot be justified."

Colonel Roffe felt that agents with divisions were being used for work outside the CIC jurisdiction, mainly because something had to be done to keep the agents busy "regardless of the legitimacy of such work;" and because division G2s in most instances had "no conception of the proper use of such detachments." The Colonel also felt that the agents' morale was "going to the devil" and their initiative deteriorating from lack of constructive work. A number of instances where agents were reported willing to take a cut in grade to be relieved of division assignments were noted.

Finally, the problem of CIC "cover" was cited: "...the identity of CIC personnel on duty with units is completely exposed to all other military personnel, and in many instances to others outside military circles. They are openly referred to as CICs, G-Men, Gestapo, Sherlock Holmes' and various other descriptive terms that clearly indicate their connection with CIC."

Colonel Roffe's main point, however, remained that CIC agents with divisions were not being utilized "to the fullest advantage" and could not be in such a situation.[165]

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164 Memo for Col L. R. Forney, Subj: "Meeting with Col Giles R. Carpenter, G2, Army Ground Forces on 12 Jun 43," 16 Jun 43, /s/H. R. Kibler, Col, Chief, CIC Branch, MIS, (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

165 Hqs, Eighth Service Command, ASF, Office of the Director of Intelligence Division, To: Col Lester R. Forney, Director of Intelligence, WDGS, 4 Jun 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

In spite of the opposition of Colonel Carpenter and Colonel Roffe, the policy of attaching CIC agents to divisions several months prior to the overseas shipment of the division continued in effect throughout the war.

Difficulties Encountered by Detachment Commanders Numerous

If this top level controversy reflected a basic problem, it was academic compared to some of the tangled situation encountered by detachments newly assigned to training divisions. Most of the standard problems were encountered by one of the first of these CIC units, the 2d Armored Division Detachment, when it began operations at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 24 September 1942. 2d Lt Paul A. Heegaard-Jensen, the CIC commander, reported the following difficulties: the fact that most of the agents were fresh from "door bell pushing" assignments in the ZI and were "quite unaccustomed to the rigors of field service;" the unavailability of .45 caliber pistols which were not an item of issue with an armored division; and the fact that one of his agents was on a "limited service assignment" and was classified as a noncombatant.

The lack of physical training was apparently the most glaring deficiency. The men of the 2d Armored Division CIC Detachment were all living in pup tents bivouaced 32 miles from the nearest town of any size, Fayetteville, North Carolina. Such a set-up was a far cry from field office operations in metropolitan areas. In regard to getting his men in shape to face a combat situation, Lieutenant Heegaard-Jensen wrote: "Physical conditioning, hand to hand combat training, use of the grenade, pistol marksmanship, nomenclature, care and use of the sub-machine gun training will be conducted by this officer as soon as the more important problem of adequately equipping these men is off our hands."

Lt Heegaard-Jensen also noted his own lack of rank as a stumbling block. He stated, "I have been received courteously by all officers of headquarters. Because of the predominance of rank in this section, however, the general impression appears to be that the CIC job cannot be so important as evidenced by the lack of rank accompanying this detachment."[166]

While the difficulties encountered by the 2d Armored Division CIC Detachment frequently reoccurred in subsequent months, new and additional problems for detachment commanders arose.

Frequently detachments would encounter periods of inactivity. It was then up to the commanding officer to arrange constructive training. Physical conditioning

166 Hqs, 2d Armored Division, Fort Bragg, NC, Subj: "CIC Administration," To: Director, CIC, Washington, D.C., 26 Sep 42, (SECRET) (Central Records Facility) (See Volume I, Series I of this history for an account of the difficulties of another early CIC unit, the 3d Division CIC, in the ZI training phase).

and combat training filled some time gaps and many detachments cooked up their own maneuvers. One of the more ingenious training ideas was evolved by 1st Lt Albert R. Bowen, Commanding Officer of the VIII Corps CIC in Brownwood, Texas. Lieutenant Bowen required each member of his detachment to submit written papers of 300 words or more in which they gave their opinions on such subjects as obtaining informants, setting up an informant system, activity of CIC in the combat zone and activity of CIC in tactical units. These papers were then read anonymously and a round table discussion held on the topics.[167]

Conflicts With Division G2s Most Serious

Of all the problems facing CIC units newly-assigned to tactical outfits, the difficulties arising out of conflicts between the division G2s and CIC detachment commanders were perhaps the most serious.

One typical instance of conflict arose in the 75th Infantry Division in training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The CIC detachment commander, 1st Lt David Blair, reported that his G2 was very "conservative concerning the initiation of any investigation, and has stated that he doesn't care for CIC." The G2 apparently felt that his CIC detachment was of little use as long as the division was in the United States. However, Lieutenant Blair was of the opinion that he and his detachment could convince the G2 of CIC's importance. Although the G2 had not initially favored barracks and unit checks by CIC, he had been convinced of their necessity and it was believed that further indoctrination and orientation could bring this "conservative" officer to recognize the value of CIC.[168]

In April 1943, a listing of detachment commanders' complaints of difficulty with the G2 and other officers of their divisions was compiled by Colonel Kibler's staff. It was recognized that there existed two possible reasons for these difficulties--basic personality clashes involving the CIC commander and the G2 and "a lack of sufficient information concerning the operation and mission of CIC."

The unfortunate happenings discovered by Colonel Kibler's staff were frequently trivial in themselves, but usually indicated the great gulf of misunderstanding that existed. Some of the reported incidents follow:

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167 Memo for the file, subj: "Interview with 1st Lt Albert R. Bowen, Comg CIC Det, Hq, VIII Corps, Brownwood, Texas, 4 Jun 43, /s/Donovan J. Ault, 1st Lt, Operations Section, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

168 Memo for the file, subj: "Interview with Lt David Blair, Commanding, CIC Det, 75th Infantry Division, Ft Leonard Wood, Mo., 10 Jun 43, /s/Donovan Ault, 1st Lt, Operations Section, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

CIC investigative personnel were doing clerical work for the G2. (31st Infantry Division)

There was no phone in the CIC office. To make calls, agents had to take five minutes to walk to the G2 office. The situation made action in an emergency impossible. (31st Infantry Division)

The subversive situation was ignored as unimportant. It was felt that there was no need to "clean house" before going overseas. (31st Infantry Division)

The G2 had ordered half the week spent on basic infantry training and the other half in combat intelligence courses with the rest of the G2 section. The subversive situation in the division was not thought important. (44th Infantry Division)

The G2 felt that the detachment was with the division because of a War Department recommendation and not because the division wanted it or needed it. (84th Infantry Division)

The G2 was suspicious of the detachment. (85th Infantry Division)

The G2 had little use for investigations and felt that as far as tactical units were concerned, they needed every soldier they could get. Subversive elements in a tactical unit, he felt, could do little harm. (85th Infantry Division)

The G2 and his assistant failed to understand CIC or its functions. They stated their intentions of making field soldiers out of the agents. (98th Infantry Division)

The G2 informed the CIC detachment that during maneuvers, CIC would perform combat intelligence. (93d Infantry Division)

CIC officer was informed that he no longer commanded the detachment. As just another 2d lieutenant in the G2 section he took direct orders from the rest of the officers in the section. (93d Infantry Division)

CIC personnel were subject to company duty such as kitchen police, guard duty or CQ. (99th Infantry Division)

The G2 had disdain for enlisted men and would not allow them to contact him. He had no use for the recommendations of the Special agents. (102d CIC Detachment)

The entire CIC detachment was assigned and confined to clerical work and the administration of the division's countersubversive system. (104th Infantry Division)

The commanding general did not want the detachment, desiring no indications of subversion be brought to light within his division. He felt that such indications would reflect adversely on his outfit. Consequently, the G2 authorized no investigations. (103d Infantry Division)

CIC personnel were specifically instructed to in no way deal with the post intelligence officer, not even to establish liaison. (X Corps)[169]

Troubles Point Up Need for Manual on CIC With Tactical Units

Although some of these instances of resistance to CIC by G2s arose out of the animus to the organization and its doctrines, most of the unfortunate occurances resulted from a wide-spread misunderstanding for the use, purpose and mission of CIC with divisional forces. Many of these incidents might have been avoided had sufficient directives from the Office of the Chief, CIC been made available to G2s and other intelligence officers--and, for that matter, to the CIC detachment commanders themselves. However, it was 15 September 1943 before the manual dealing with CIC operations with tactical organizations (TM 30-215) was approved by the G1, WDGS, and 22 September 1943 before publication began. This manual on a tentative and unapproved basis was available in a limited supply throughout 1943, but apparently did not relieve much of the confusion.[170]

Even those CIC commanders equipped with the tentative manual frequently ran into resistance from division G2s. One second lieutenant commanding a detachment reported: "I am familiar with the CIC Detachment Manual (Tentative) which is apparently our Bible, but to try to put some of the doctrine into practice here would be the worst possible mistake. Both the Divisional G2 and the camp intelligence officer would see red."[171]

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169 Memo for the AC of S, G2, Army Ground Forces, Army War College, Washington, D.C., subj: CIC Detachments on Duty With Army Ground Force Units, 26 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

170 Basic Field Manual, Military Intelligence Mission of the CIC with Tactical Organization and in Theaters of Operations (Tentative copies of this manual are dated 15 Feb) (Unclassified) (Central Records Facility).

171 Memo, CIC with Tactical Units (delivered personally to Major Wise by Colonel Furbershaw, AC of S, G2, Sixth Service Command on 20 Apr 43) dtd 10 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

Reports from another division indicated that the tentative manual lacked force and was ignored by G2 officers.[172]

Another detachment commander noted that the G2 supervising the detachment's operations "thinks the combat angle is the only thing and the positive and counter stuff are only foolish." Consequently this G2 was training his detachment in combat intelligence--to the exclusion of the tentative doctrines of the manual.[173]

In lieu of the manual, many intelligence officers wrote letters to the Chief, CIC, seeking detailed information on the proper use of CIC.

In a typical request for information, the Second Army, AC of S, G2, wrote to the Director of Intelligence, Fifth Service Command for "your interpretation of directives and policy letters" regarding the use and training of CIC with tactical units. It was noted: "Some confusion exists in the minds of detachment commanders and the G2s of the units to which they have been attached regarding their training and functions."[174] Fifth Service Command referred the matter to the Chief, CIC, but in the meantime passed along some suggestions on an informal basis:

> "CIC personnel already have had training and personal practical experience in the making of investigations of subversion and sabotage. It will be found that they are competent to make investigations on such matters originating within, or concerning, their tactical units. However, it may be found that the men of the detachment have had little more than basic training for combat and are not overly familiar with small arms weapons or combat intelligence. When attached to a tactical unit, it therefore may be advisable to give CIC personnel (including officers) thorough training in the infantry weapons available, training in the operation of combat and supply vehicles available (excepting tanks) and training, under the supervision of the G2, in combat intelligence....It is the opinion of this office that CIC personnel given field training under the G2 will be better prepared to do their jobs overseas; further, it is likely that a G2 will find such

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172 Memo for the AC of S, G2, AGF, Army War College, Washington, D.C., subj: CIC Detachments on Duty With AGF Units, 26 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

173 Memo, CIC with Tactical Units (delivered personally to Major Wise by Colonel Furbershaw, AC of S, G2, Sixth Service Command on 20 Apr 43) dtd 10 Apr 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

174 Hqs, Second Army, Office of the AC of S, G2, subj: CIC Detachments, to Director of Intelligence, Fifth Service Command, 16 Jun 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

personnel extremely valuable to him if he familiarizes the men with the details of his office and work. In as much as subversion cases within a tactical unit are likely to be developed through the Countersubversion System, CIC detachments with the divisions should be familiar with the operation and use of the CS System in the division, and should be used in conjunction with, and to supplement that system...Within the continental limits of the United States, the mission of a CIC detachment with a tactical unit is the local investigation of subversion or sabotage within or particularly concerning the unit to which it is assigned. CIC officers or men should not be given assignments or duties which in any way will interfere with the accomplishment of this mission, for they have been highly trained for this specific purpose, were picked men of high qualifications prior to assignment to CIC, and many have passed up opportunities for promotion or attendance at OCS to remain in the Counter Intelligence Corps. The G2 of a tactical unit should utilize his CIC detachment to the utmost in the investigation of, and making reports on, subversion cases within the command. The G2 will find that the officer-in-charge of the CIC detachment and the agents are thoroughly capable of complete handling of such investigations, including physical and technical surveillances when necessary."[175]

Colonel Kibler Notes CIC Objective is Twofold

These suggestions were broadened in a letter from Colonel Kibler which noted the twofold objective of CIC units attached to tactical commands. The detachments were to be utilized by the division to perform counterintelligence investigations and to train for counterintelligence operations with the tactical unit.

In regard to the first objective, Colonel Kibler wrote:

"The CIC detachment has a definite mission in the field of counterintelligence even while the tactical unit is in its training phase. Investigations upon information received through the CS System; the proper supervision of the installation and operation of the CS System; investigation and removal of potentially subversive personnel; general security in the field of countersabotage, counterespionage, and countersubversion of enemy agents; and general investigations are all CIC functions. In fact, the CIC detachment is taking action to counter actual or potential activity of the enemy agents at the time the unit itself is in training for combat.

175 Office of the Director of Intelligence, Seventh Service Command, ASF, To: AC of S, G2, Hqs, Second Army, 23 Jan 43, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

CONFIDENTIAL

All activities are necessarily coordinated under the supervision and policy of the unit Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and all reports are made to him."

Colonel Kibler then turned to the types of training that CIC agents should be engaged in while attached to a division preparing for combat:

"Although CIC personnel had abilities, qualifications, and experience fitting them for investigative duties before their assignment to CIC, considerable time and training has been expended in order that they might become specialists in counterintelligence duties. Since a maximum of effectiveness in their duties cannot be reached by training alone but is dependent to a great extent on actual experience in the duties for which they have been trained, it is believed that the best time for CIC personnel to gain the necessary experience is during their assignment to tactical units in this country. However, tactical training given them should not be so extensive as to divert them from the performance of their specialized functions, resulting not only in the hindrance of their practical counterintelligence training but also in a failure to accomplish their mission. It is recognized that to have CIC personnel thoroughly familiar with tactical or combat intelligence as well as counterintelligence might be the ideal situation, but this would only be possible if unlimited time were available. In view of the necessity for gaining proficiency in a limited period of time it is deemed more advisable for them to attain proficiency in their specialized field. CIC personnel, however, are to be trained in order that they might be physically and mentally equipped for specialized duties with a tactical unit. Physically they should be conditioned in order that when called upon, they will be able to undergo the rigorous activity required of tactical troops. Mentally they should be conditioned by study and knowledge of combat intelligence activities which are allied to phases of counterintelligence, and by obtaining complete familiarity with all components of the tactical unit so that they can operate therein intelligently and effectively. To enroll the CIC personnel in the complete intelligence and tactical training courses would preclude their devoting sufficient time to counterintelligence activities and obtaining effective results. It is believed that the CIC officer, in view of his knowledge of the functions of CIC, should be given the opportunity to select courses allied to counterintelligence and make recommendations and arrangements for the training of the CIC personnel in these subjects."

Colonel Kibler concluded with a suggestion that CIC detachments be given the essential operational latitude to accomplish the mission.

"The investigative field is in itself a difficult one, requiring not only specialized activities, knowledge and procedures, but also unusual abilities and character on the part of personnel so engaged. Considerable freedom of operations and a great deal of support are vital necessities if the desired result is to be accomplished."[176]

176 Military Intelligence Service, WD, Washington 25, D.C., To: Director of Intelligence, Fifth Service Command, Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio, 10 Jul 43, /s/H. R. Kibler, Col, Chief, CIC Branch, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Central Records Facility).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME VIII

RE[redacted]ADED Unclassified
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THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS WITH SPECIAL PROJECTS

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Part I: CIC With the Army Air Forces

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 1

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The story of the Counter Intelligence Corps with the Army Air Corps[1] had its official inception in April 1942 but the relationship between these organizations had a long and somewhat complicated background.

Until World War II the specialized counterintelligence requirements of the Air Corps were not generally recognized as being significant; the United States still was indulging in its pre-Pearl Harbor attitude of determined naivete in regard to matters of international espionage, sabotage and, to a lesser degree, the country's need to collect military information for its own use. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the security aspects were rudimentary at best; the collection aspects had fared rather better; they were seriously considered first in 1926 and some steps taken to put machinery into motion.

At this time air attaches were assigned to London, Paris, and Rome with instructions to overtly collect all the information they could on matters of importance to the Air Corps. At the same time Congress ordered all divisions of the Army General Staff, including that of Intelligence (AC of S, G2) to establish an Air Section under the control of an Air Officer. The first Air Officer to be assigned to G2 under this program was Maj Joseph T. McNarney.

From the start the G2 office expressed opposition to the new section and as time went on and air elements moved toward eventual independence, Army G2s on various levels opposed all efforts to establish a separate intelligence arm for Air on the basis that it would involve duplication and unnecessary expense. At the same time, however, Army commanders were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of air observation and, concurrently, the importance of controlling it. Essentially these and other aspects of disagreement were the inevitable by-products of the larger evolutionary process in which the specialized branch, the Air Corps, with its own particular requirements, were contrasted with those of the broader parent organization, the Army. The adolescent dependent was progressing toward adulthood; in thinking and actions it was looking toward the day when it would quit the parental fold and strike off on its own. The period of transition produced its harvest of conflicting opinions and resultant strivings on both sides. Some of these were selfish and shortsighted, most were honest, as may characterize human activities generally but particularly when concerned with the organization and operation of such an inexact activity as "Intelligence" within the rigid framework of service establishments.

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1 Until 1943 the official name was the Army Air Corps; in 1943 it became Army Air Forces. The separation from the Army occurred in 1947 and the name then became United States Air Force.

Initial Authorities

Overall jurisdiction for counterintelligence activities within the Army originally was conferred by Presidential directive upon the Army's Military Intelligence Section (AC of S, G2), later called Military Intelligence Service. Zones of responsibility among the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were outlined in a "Delimitation Agreement."[2] The latter precluded dependent branches of the Army, such as the Air Corps, from engaging in most types of intelligence activities without the specific permission of the Army's chief of intelligence.

Sufficient delegation of authority was made by the Army to enable the Air Corps to implement a basic establishment. Counterintelligence matters for Air first were vested in a Counter Intelligence Section, Office of the Chief of Air Corps. The unit later became known as the Domestic Intelligence Section. On 1 July 1941 it was designated the Counter Intelligence Section, Intelligence Division. The staff consisted of three officers and nine civilians. They were primarily concerned with the establishment of security in Air Corps installations and plants manufacturing Air Corps materials; additionally they were to serve as a channel between Military Intelligence Service and Air Corps field activities.

* Specific counterintelligence "support" at first was provided the Air Corps facilities through the G2s of the various Corps Areas (later termed Service Commands). This "support" was more theoretical than actual, since from 1934 to 1940 the Corps of Intelligence Police for the whole Army establishment boasted no more than 16 agents assigned for duty.[3] When upon rare occasions agents could be spared by Corps Areas for Air Corps investigations, the agents were not attached to the Air Corps installations concerned but at all times worked out of and remained responsible to Corps Areas furnishing them. This lead to an undesirable development as Air Intelligence Offices on the lower levels postponed or decided against calling for assistance except in the most important instances, ignoring many incidents which perhaps warranted investigations. *

* Thus it was that the outbreak of World War II found the Air Corps without an investigative organization. The situation became aggravated to an intolerable degree almost immediately by the appearance of an Air Force directive making Air Corps commanders responsible for counterintelligence within their own commands.[4]

2 Memo dtd 26 Jun 39 from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sec of War, from Appendix to Hist of CIC, (CONFIDENTIAL) (Staff & Faculty Library). Also see in same vol Memo dtd 5 Jun 40 from Brig Gen Sherman Miles, (CONFIDENTIAL).

3 Hist, MID, Vol 3, pp 96-108, (SECRET) (Office of Chief of Mil Hist).

4 Ltr, dtd 14 Jun 42, subj: CI Activities, from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, to The CGs, AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OIS Files, Wash DC).

The onset of war produced its automatic tremendous stepup in demand for counterintelligence services of all kinds. Requests for assistance swamped the G2s of Service Commands despite the fact that by this time, CIP had become Counter Intelligence Corps and there had been a sharp increase in the number of personnel assigned the new Corps. More than 300 agents now were available to the various Service Commands. Application for assistance still had to go to the Service Commands, and when agents were assigned, they still operated out of and reported to the G2 of the Service Command furnishing them.

Obviously this state of affairs could not satisfy Air Directors of Intelligence, especially in the face of the new policy making them responsible for their own counterintelligence. Urgent representations were made to the Army intelligence chief.

A study was undertaken by the Army. In consequence a recommendation was drawn up designed to insure a reasonable support by assigning CIC agents directly to the Air Corps.

Dated 27 April 1942,[5] these documents proposed to supply from CIC's authorized strength certain commissioned and enlisted personnel for duty with the Air Corps and at stations of the Ferrying Division of the Air Transport Command. Twelve Air Forces and 94 ferrying stations were provided for, through a total authorized allotment of 154 officers and 392 enlisted men. Each Air Force was to have a detachment of five officers and 17 men, while the ferrying stations were authorized one officer and two enlisted men.

Unfortunately, in the beginning this document also proved to be more academic than practical, although it did become a usable foundation for planning. By January 1943, only four officers and 11 enlisted men had been assigned to the Air Corps; of this number, fewer than half were stationed as designated by the staff study. It was seen by further study that even should there be a fulfillment of quotas, it would be necessary for the Air Force to look to the Service Commands for continued support because of swiftly expanding wartime responsibilities.[6]

Reasons for the delay in assigning allotted personnel are not clear but there is evidence that the requirements of the Air Corps were being met as quickly as CIC agents became available.[7] It is significant, though, that even as of January 1943 it was felt that even if existing quotas were fully met, the shortage of personnel for Air investigations still would be acute.[8]

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5 Memo, dtd 27 Apr 42, for the C/S, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: "Reorganization and Expansion of CIC, MIS," (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash, DC).

6 Memo dtd 14 Jan 43, to Chief CID, AAF, subj: "Allotments of CIC Personnel to AAF," p 4, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid, p 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

The allocation of CIC personnel to the Air Corps was based on the theory that approximately one-fourth of the total strength of the military establishment would be in the Air Corps; since approximately a quarter of the counterintelligence investigative burden would be generated by that branch, it should logically be entitled to a proportionate amount of the total CIC strength. This proposition appeared sound on paper, but Air Corps officials wanted the allotment to be larger.

These officials based their argument on the points that there was a greater possibility of sabotage to vulnerable Air Corps equipment; that the geographically diversified operations of Air Corps commands required supervision of a large number of installations; that most Air Corps activities were of an especially confidential nature.[9]

Agitation for an Integrated Counter Intelligence System

Obviously, as of January 1943, the Air Corps was not satisfied with its counterintelligence program. Since the immediate future held no promise of improvement, the Air Corps conceived the idea of solving its problem through the creation of an independent and integrated counterintelligence system which would include the assignment of CIC agents to all Air Corps units.

The Air Corps was optimistic that it could fulfill its counterintelligence mission if given the necessary personnel and for proof offered an instance where something approaching the desired program had been implemented: a small CIC detachment had been given the Southeast Air Forces Training Center through an informal agreement with the G2, Fourth Service Command; under Air Force direction, this detachment had effected complete counterintelligence coverages through its own efforts and the coordinated assistance of the unit remaining with the Fourth Service Command.[10]

They Knew What They Wanted

Reasons behind the demand for an integrated intelligence system were clearly set out in a memorandum dated 25 February 1943.[11] It said: that experience had demonstrated that technically trained CIC investigators were needed for Air Corps sabotage investigations. Only with special knowledge of aircraft technology could an agent properly determine the method and means

9 Memo dtd 14 Jan 43, to Chief CID, AAF, subj: "Allotments of CIC Personnel to AAF," p 7, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

10 Ibid, p 4.

11 Memo, dtd 25 Feb 43, for Chief CID, AAF, from Maj F. I. McGarraghy, subj: "Proposed Allotments of CIC to AAF," (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

utilized to sabotage planes and servicing equipment. Only with these abilities could he efficiently function under cover to detect saboteurs, espionage agents, and subversive elements at aircraft installations and depots. It was estimated that the counterintelligence program of the Air Corps could be many times more effective if CIC personnel were so attached and deployed; at the same time, there would be no duplication with the type of work carried on by CIC attached to Service Commands. It was now clear, the memorandum said, that the Service Commands were unable to supply such personnel; even if present in the Service Command unit, delay incurred by the agent in arriving and undertaking an Air Corps investigation militated against success. The memorandum also indicated that it was the belief that the personnel problem would not ease under the system of Service Command control, for those Commands did not have a close enough lateral liaison and did not have a true perspective of the need of the Air Corps.

There were other Air Corps complaints. It was the opinion that the Service Commands could have earmarked men with special training and aptitudes for Air Corps investigations, or at least have consistently appointed the same men for Air Corps work when a new request for personnel was received; familiarity with Air Corps procedure would have elements of uniformity and continuity, as well as thoroughness.

On the other hand, the Service Commands felt that they should not hold men qualified for Air Corps work in reserve if their services were needed for other Army jobs and with this the Air Corps could only concur. There was evidence, however, that Army CIC personnel with Air Force technical training occasionally had been transferred to duty with the Army's tactical ground units and in other instances had not been assigned to Air Corps investigations even when available for such work.

Although the Air Corps made it clear that it preferred to be given men who had already completed technical training, it added that under a permanent assignment set-up, it would be possible to train CIC personnel in the intricacies of specialized investigation. Then too, experience in such manners alone would progressively increase the efficiency of the personnel.

Another facet of the problem was brought out. Although overseas operations were hardly initiated at the time the memorandum was written, the Air Corps was looking ahead to the massive transfer of tactical units to war theaters outside the continental United States. The need for qualified men would become acute and the present program was not gauged to meet such need, either quantitatively or qualitatively. While it was granted that tactical Air Force units were being furnished with CIC detachments, these were described as being so pitifully inadequate that a counterintelligence effort on their part was impossible. From the quality standpoint, it was seen that the men assigned to these units usually were those who

could most easily be spared, probably because of a lack of experience in the investigative field--especially in the specialized field of Air Corps investigations.

Along with the plan for assignment of CIC personnel to the Air Corps, it was emphasized that in any scheme for an integrated counterintelligence system the Air Corps must be allowed to supervise and control its own investigations. It was felt that only through experience could Air Corps intelligence officers gain knowledge of supervisory and control methods which they would be called upon to perform when placed on an active tactical status overseas. Under Service Command control of CIC, Air officers were gaining no supervisory experience and in many cases even lacked knowledge of counterintelligence activities being carried on within the confines of their own installations;[12] Service Commands, in providing counterintelligence coverage, often by-passed A2s and didn't even furnish those offices with reports of local investigations.[13]

Pressure for a complete revision became intense.

Nevertheless, it was not the original intention of the Air Corps to set up a wholly separate counterintelligence network and to divorce itself from the association with the Service Commands. Initially this not only was impossible under existing regulations but quite unfeasible. The Air Corps hoped to work with the Service Commands and believed it essential to retain the right to rely upon them for aid when an investigation required additional personnel or when it went beyond the scope of jurisdiction of one particular Air Force; it was Air's ultimate aim to increase the effectiveness of the Military Intelligence Service counterintelligence system with the Air Corps through the use of CIC assigned to Air under an Air Corps operations control structure, but it wanted to look to Military Intelligence Service for coordination and administrative control.[14]

Manning the Plan

Planning went so far in Air Corps staff offices as to include the draft of a plan for procurement of CIC personnel to man the proposed integrated system.

As the first step, it was suggested by Air that all CIC personnel with experience in the Army Air Corps be transferred thereto under existing quotas set up by the April 1942 staff study.[15] By now it was known that this alone would

12 Memo, dtd 28 Mar 43, for C/S, subj: "Responsibilities, Controls and Channels for CI of AAF," (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

13 Ibid, tab B

14 Ibid, tab D

15 Memo, dtd 27 Apr 42, for the C/S, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: "Reorg and Expansion of CIC, MIS," (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

be insufficient and in any case, most such qualified personnel were at that time stationed within the continental United States. To this nucleus, it was suggested, therefore, that there be added, still within the limits of the quotas, men who regardless of branch prior to CIC training, had worked on Air Corps investigations while attached to a Corps Area Service Command or to a Defense Command. The selection of desired men and the actual transfer of personnel could be negotiated through Headquarters, CIC.

It was proposed that the remainder of men for the integrated program be obtained by selective processing of Army Air Forces specialists from CIC investigative training. The Air Corps itself expressed some apprehension about this element of the plan, however, for in the past it had happened that Air Corps personnel assigned to CIC for training had not found their way back to Air Corps branches. Relying on Headquarters, CIC, for coordination and supervision still appeared to be the most satisfactory solution. The plan was deemed workable for procuring both officers and enlisted personnel.[16]

Attempts at Resolution of the Air Corps-Service Command Conflict

The proposal did not go unheeded by Army Intelligence but no positive action was immediately forthcoming. Reports of disagreement within the Air Corps commands themselves as to the merit of the proposed plans were seized upon to effect delays, for it can be said that Military Intelligence Service did not easily accept the idea.[17] Finally, however, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, suggested to the Chief of the Air Staff that a conference be held involving representatives of Air Forces Commands and the Military Intelligence Service to consider adjustments. It was proposed that subsequent to this high level policy conference, a meeting of lower echelon officers be held to air differences. The Air Corps concurred and added that it further would arrange a meeting of Air Corps command A2s prior to the lower level meeting for the purpose of consolidating issues to achieve unanimity.[18]

To prepare for these meetings, draft memoranda were circulated among all Air Corps commands for comment. It was requested that each command give its reasons for considering an integrated force essential, list instances where Service

16 Memo, dtd 14 Jan 43, for Chief, CID, AAF, from Maj F. I. McGarraghy, subj: Proposed Allotment of CIC Personnel to AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (SOI Files, Wash DC), pp 11-16.

17 Memo, dtd 9 Apr 43, for Chief of Air Staff, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: Responsibilities, Control and Channels for CI Activities of the AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC), pp 3-4.

18 Memo, dtd 28 Mar 43, for the C/S, subj: Responsibilities, Controls, and Channels for CI Activities in the AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

Command's control was compromising operations of its counterintelligence program; and if necessary, suggest modification of the proposed integration plan. When these comments were collected, a comprehensive memorandum was drafted for use as a basic agenda and foundation for discussion at the ensuing conferences. Matters touched upon by the memo summarized Air Corps points already alluded to but added a reference to the need for assignment of investigative funds directly to Air for use by Air CIC agents.[19]

The March Memo

It was stated there was existing authority, though not clear cut, for an integrated intelligence system within certain Air Corps commands; this "authority" was disputed by many Service Commands through a contrary interpretation of regulations. It was thought by them that the proposed program might be undertaken without directives being necessary if this ambiguity were resolved, not necessarily in favor of the Air Corps, but rather with full recognition of the immediate needs of the Air Corps.

To establish firmly its point in this memo that Service Command control of personnel and investigations was crippling the necessary and required training program for its own intelligence officers, the Air Corps cited as typical the situation of the Third Air Force. This group had headquarters at Tampa, Florida, in the geographic area of the Fourth Service Command. Within the Third Air Force installation, the Service Command exercised complete counterintelligence control over Air Intelligence officers, investigations, CIC personnel, intelligence funds and the preparation of reports of investigation. This was said to leave the A2 and his staff helpless to deal with matters of vital concern to the Air organization.[20]

The memo also brought to light the complicated fact that most Air Force commands extended over a geographic area larger than any one Service Command. This meant that as many as four Service Command groups might be involved; this could not afford a coordinated situation, with consequent failure of the counterintelligence effort. It was pointed out, too, that this multiple control system caused endless confusion relating to the utilization of and accounting for confidential funds.

Because of the cross-country nature of Air Corps operations, investigative expense could be incurred in any number of Service Commands in a given case.

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19 Memo, dtd 28 March 1943, for the C/S, subj: Responsibilities, Controls, and Channels for CI Activities in the AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC), p 1.

20 Ibid, tab B

Reimbursement practices among these commands varied but it was most often necessary to seek repayment from the Service Command in which the major expense was incurred.

The tenor of the memorandum indicated unanimity among Air Force commands in the desire for a change in the existing intelligence system and that minor alterations of the Service Command system would be inadequate.

Meanwhile, the counterintelligence effort remained static.[21]

The April Memo

During this otherwise unproductive interval memos were exchanged between the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and the Chief of the Air Staff, relative to the provisions of the original memorandum, that of 25 February 1943.[22] This correspondence served to draw the issues more clearly and eliminate elements of confusion and misunderstanding; the memos will be dealt with as a single unit.

General Strong apparently still retained the impression that the Air Forces wanted to set up a countersubversive and counterintelligence system independent of the powers of coordination of the Service Commands. He pointed out impracticalities in such a plan but Air answered by making clear its idea to work under the direct supervision of Military Intelligence Service to all Service Commands.

General Strong also stated his position that an independent CIC for the Air Corps was not feasible under the existing interrelated command structure. He visualized an endless duplication of effort under such a system and felt that it would hinder rather than improve the overall counterintelligence situation. The Air Corps replied with the argument that it only wished to control CIC for the purposes of Air Force investigations. Since these investigations were being neglected under the present system, there would be no duplication of effort, rather there would ensue a new and improved contribution to the counterintelligence picture. In addition to this, the Air Corps urged the argument of the original memorandum that its investigations needed highly specialized training not found in average CIC personnel.

As a further objection to CIC assignment with the Air Corps, General Strong voiced the opinion that a separate controlled investigative branch would breach the

21 Ltr, dtd 3 Apr 43, to Comdg Gens, AAF, from Maj Gen J. A. Ulio, subj: CIC Personnel Assigned to Units of AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

22 Memo, dtd 9 Apr 43, for the Chief of the Air Staff, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: Responsibilities, Controls, and Channels for CI Activities of the AAF, (Unclassified) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

terms of the existing Delimitations Agreement. The Air Corps felt that this would not be the case, for CIC within that organization would operate under direct supervision of Military Intelligence Service and in such a situation would be subject to all Military Intelligence Service directives and agreements.

The memoranda contained other than bickering and argumentation, however, for several important points under contention were ironed out by the correspondence.

As an example, the need for a separate allotment of confidential funds was obviated by General Strong's statement that under existing regulation, the Service Commands should honor intelligence fund vouchers regardless of where the expense was incurred. Payment should be made, he said, at the Service Command headquarters for the geographic area in which the Air Force Command headquarters was located.

Another matter, which had troubled Air Force Commands since the outbreak of the war, was settled by the memos. As previously stated, these commanders were aware of their responsibility for counterintelligence matters but felt that a proper performance was not possible while investigative power was vested in the Service Commands.

General Strong pointed out that since ultimate responsibility for counterintelligence investigations was expressly vested in Military Intelligence Service, it was necessary to delegate this duty for purposes of administration. This delegation, for the sake of convenience, was to the Service Commands. However, since the only positive duty of Military Intelligence Service was the provision and coordination of such matters, it followed that this duty, and no more, was all that was delegated to the Service Commands.

The issue, then, turned upon the meaning of "supervision and coordination." General Strong agreed to correct the erroneous interpretation of "supervision," which was taken by some Service Commands to give authority to direct counterintelligence matters within their geographic area, regardless of the installations involved. General Strong believed that since it was granted under existing authority, dissemination of such information would make clear the right of Air Force commanders to institute control investigations at least with their own installations. This pronouncement nevertheless assumed that agents to perform such investigations still would be obtained through the Service Commands.

In the same vein, General Strong agreed to issue a clarifying directive to the effect that any responsible commander had the right to be furnished with the reports of investigations conducted within the confines of his jurisdiction; several Service Command heads had refused to supply such reports to Air Force commanders.

It appears clear that the G2's attitude was that the present system, although it had flaws, could be made adequate if properly administered, and that the proposal for a separate integrated system was not justified. The only solution he offered under the circumstances lay in the more effective deployment of available facilities and utilization of CIC personnel.

The Conferences

Under these circumstances the high-level policy meeting was held in mid-April 1943. Transcripts of the parley are not available, but results are set out in an Air Corps letter that was intended to provide a foundation for discussion at the conference for Air Forces intelligence personnel set for 4 May 1943, at Gravelly Point, Virginia, and the meeting of G2 and A2 officers set for the next day in Baltimore.[23]

A letter indicated that at the policy meeting, the G2 had informally admitted the validity of some Air Forces objections and was ready and willing to see appropriate changes made. These concessions were said to be, in general, along the lines indicated in his memorandum to the Chief of the Air Staff.[24]

General Strong and his staff had agreed to equalize intelligence operations among the Service Commands to the end that the Air Corps would not be faced with the complexities of varying policies and procedures. The Air Corps also received a promise that the Service Commands would be notified through channels that counterintelligence was a command responsibility and that Service Command authorities were only to supervise and coordinate that function.

As to personnel and funds, Military Intelligence Service apparently would prove to be less conciliatory. The G2 had reiterated his plan to fill existing quotas for allocation of CIC to the Air Forces but refused to grant CIC personnel to fill separate investigative units for Air Forces work. The policy on funds was somewhat more satisfactory as it appeared likely that G2 would agree to make uniform the reimbursement policy among the Service Commands, obviating the need for separate allocations of funds to the Air Forces.

Under these conditions, the lower level conferences at Gravelly Point and Baltimore were inaugurated; it was hoped that here the outstanding differences could be resolved.

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23 Ltr, dtd 24 Apr 43, to CG, 3d AF, from Col Edgar P. Sorenson, AC of AS, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

24 Memo, dtd 9 Apr 43, from Maj Gen George V. Strong, subj: Responsibilities, Controls, and Channels for CIC Activities with AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

Gravelly Point, 4 May 1943

Lt Col Roy H. Boberg, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Army Air Forces, acted as chairman of the meeting. He warned that softening of the Air Corps demands set out in the memorandum dated 28 March would likely be necessary.

Colonel Boberg gave the opinion that Col L. R. Forney, Assistant Executive Officer, Military Intelligence Service, who would head the Army delegation at the forthcoming Baltimore conference, was extremely sympathetic and had indicated that accord could be reached on many points.

Boberg said that Forney was of the opinion that existing directives provided a framework for agreement and reiterated that uniformity of procedures within the Service Commands would be brought about. MIS appeared to be ready to set up intelligence channels paralleling command channels, and felt that while no change could be wrought in the Delimitations Agreement, it would be rigidly enforced. Other changes being contemplated by Military Intelligence Service were outlined, such as a plan whereby control of counterintelligence functions would be transferred from the Service Commands to certain district offices to be established by Military Intelligence Service. These district offices would either be responsible for a geographic area similar to Service Command areas, or be increased in number. At any rate, intelligence channels would be through the district offices rather than the Service Commands if the change were made. The Air offices favored this program in the hope that it would contribute to uniformity.[25]

The meeting also was told that Military Intelligence Service planned to spot CIC agents trained in Army Air Force investigations throughout the Service Commands and eventually to pass 1,500 CIC agents to the Air Corps for disposition by operating A2s. The jurisdiction of these agents would be sharply limited but a group could be retained as a unit at headquarters or assigned to various stations.

The gains to Air Corps appeared to be significant but by the end of the conference it was apparent that there existed solid agreement among the Air Forces officers to insist upon the direct assignment of CIC to the Air Forces for local employment. It was the consensus that in addition to this, there should be continued access to CIC assigned to Service Commands or the proposed district offices of Military Intelligence Service. It was also deemed necessary to enlarge the scope of jurisdiction enjoyed by Air Forces CIC agents. It was conceded, however, that this enlargement should be closely coordinated with the responsible Service Command.[26]

25 Adm Hist of the CID, Office of AC of AS, Intel, prepared by Capt Charles V. B. Cushman, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC), p 15.

26 Ibid, p 24

Baltimore Conference

At the joint conference 5 May 1943 at Baltimore, Colonel Forney assumed the chairmanship. His prefacing remarks indicated the extent of concessions to be made to the Air Corps, inasmuch as widespread importance of counterintelligence under present conditions had made obvious the need to relax strict control by Military Intelligence Service and Service Commands over the Air system. The scope of this relaxation proved to be significant and something more than had been expected by Air Force delegates.

For present purposes it was agreed that Air Force intelligence officers might call directly upon the nearest CIC unit in emergency cases, and for routine matters, request such personnel through the Director of Intelligence of the Service Command. To that end, Directors of Intelligence were ordered to inform the A2s of the location of CIC units for the contemplated emergency calls.

Military Intelligence Service agreed to assign CIC agents to overseas allotments of the Army Air Forces as well as to resident installations and to spot agents qualified for Air Corps investigations among the Service Commands. It was made clear that while this personnel should handle all Air Corps matters, it could also be used within the Service Command network when necessary. In all cases, where Air Force CIC agents were operating off the immediate installation, the local Service Command was to be furnished complete information.

A momentary conflict threatened to disrupt the harmony. It concerned the basic matters of control and supervision of CIC investigations. The Service Command Directors of Intelligence felt that no matter where CIC was assigned, those powers should remain with the Service Command, while the A2s contended that when a CIC agent was assigned to a Post Intelligence Officer at his request, that officer should retain supervision and control. The vital question was resolved in favor of the A2s with the stipulation that the Directors of Intelligence retain the power of recall and reassignment. Nevertheless, the original CIC report was to be routed to the Service Command of Intelligence with copies sent through Air Force intelligence channels.

The jurisdictional area of CIC assigned to the Army Air Forces was not clearly defined. While it was suggested that the area should be limited, what constituted a limited "local area" was left to the discretion of the Air Corps intelligence officers.

Although some problems remained, the gains made by the Air Corps at these conferences were very important. During the summer of 1943, the Counter

Intelligence Division worked in close coordination with the Military Intelligence Service in turning the conference agreements into workable directives.[27]

Era of Good Feeling

Following the conferences, an extensive period of planning began. Now that it was clear that CIC was going to be assigned to Air Force units, a survey was conducted among all installations to determine personnel on duty and needed for duty; estimates were forwarded through the Counter Intelligence Division Army Air Forces to the Military Intelligence Service.

A preliminary survey dated 14 May 1943, estimated that a total of 1,026 men would be needed by the Army Air Forces organizations by November 1943.[28] The total of CIC agents assigned or scheduled for assignment to the Army Air Forces on 22 July 1943 was something over 200, broken down to roughly 34 officers and 195 enlisted men. A revised estimate in July 1943, set the number of CIC agents needed at 344 officers and 963 enlisted men.[29] Under either estimate, however, the number of men assigned or scheduled for assignment by July 1943, was far short of stated requirements. Correspondence during the month of August reveals effort on the part of the CIC and Military Intelligence Service to train and supply the allotted personnel.

It was about this time that the Military Intelligence Service itself began serious consideration of the plan to completely separate control of counterintelligence functions from the Service Commands. Within the Air Corps there emerged, curiously enough, a degree of reluctance to accept the idea in which such a strenuous effort had been invested.[30] It was the broad consensus, however, that the die had been cast in favor of an independent setup and plans along that line were reviewed. Tentative conclusions in such a vein were made at a conference of low-level Army Air Force Counter Intelligence Division personnel and representatives of the Third Service Command.[31] The high levels were active, too, and

27 Adm Hist of the CID, Office of AC of AS, Intel, prepared by Capt Charles V. B. Cushman, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC), p 28.

28 Memo, dtd 14 May 43, for Chief of CID, from Maj F. I. McGarraghy, subj: Estimate of CIC Personnel Required for AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

29 Memo, dtd 22 Jul 43, for Maj F. I. McGarraghy, from Capt Samuel Ewing, subj: CIC Assigned to AAF, (SECRET) (OSI Files, Wash DC). Also see Memo, dtd 26 Jul 43, for Chief, CID, from Capt F. B. O'Mahoney, subj: CIC Personnel for AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

30 Memo, dtd 28 Sep 43, for Chief, CID, from Capt Bronson Griscom, subj: Assignment of CIC to AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC), p 3.

31 Memo, dtd 6 Oct 43, subj: Tentative Conclusions Reached in a Discussion of Transfer of CI Personnel from the Commands to the AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC)

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crystalization of Air Corps thinking appeared in a memorandum distributed in late November 1943 over the signature of the Chief of the Air Staff.[32]

The terms of the memorandum placed all CIC attached to Air Force units under the general supervision of the Chief, CIC, Army Air Forces. Immediate supervision was to be the responsibility of local A2s. The Chief placed personnel on duty with subordinate commands as needed and available, and maintained a reserve pool at Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to meet unusual conditions in the field and to temporarily replace personnel undergoing training.

The investigative jurisdiction of these agents was clearly defined in an effort to prevent overlap with the work of Service Command detachments. The jurisdiction outlined included: Army Air Force personnel stationed on the air-bases of a given command; all other personnel for whom the operating A2 was responsible; investigation of incidents on the bases of the command; development of leads as requested by intelligence officers and A2s. Under no circumstances would Army Air Force CIC exceed the limits of Military Intelligence Service jurisdiction. Investigations conducted off of Air Force bases were to be carefully coordinated with the Service Command involved and requests from A2s were to be channel through CIC detachment commanders.

Even prior to this proposed and apparently imminent transfer of control to the Army Air Force, training schools were established by Air to acquaint CIC agents with the special problems of Army Air Force investigations. In instances where a special school was not deemed necessary, agents were put through technical schools on an accelerated basis to acquire a background in specialized fields.[33] It was planned to continue this program for CIC attached to the Army Air Forces.

An Air Service course was conducted at the Pennsylvania State School of Aeronautics, Middletown Air Service Command, Middletown, Pennsylvania, and at Chanute Field, Illinois. These courses featured a problem wherein agents were confronted with a wrecked plane bearing several traces of sabotage. An Aircraft Mechanics course was conducted at Hill Field, Ogden, Utah, where agents without prior mechanical training were detailed for instruction.[34]

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32 Operating Procedure for CIC personnel on duty with the AAF, dtd 29 Nov 43, to Commanding Generals, AAF, from Maj Gen Barney M. Giles, (Restricted) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

33 Memo, dtd 9 Oct 43, for Lt Colonel Boberg, from Capt Bronson Griscom, subj: CIC Personnel Allotted to AAF, (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC) p 2.

34 Ltr, dtd 11 Nov 43, subj: AAF Eastern Flying Training Command, from Capt Samuel E. Ewing, Jr., (CONFIDENTIAL) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

"Operation Big Switch"

In mid-December 1943, a War Department Circular placed responsibility for investigation of personnel and incidents involving Army Air Force personnel and materiel on the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.[35] This was accomplished by a provision that all counterintelligence matters be confined to Air command channels. Pursuant to this regulation the Military Intelligence Service delegated its investigative jurisdiction under the Delimitations Agreement in a like fashion.[36] To execute this function, control of certain CIC elements was given to the Army Air Force in a letter dated 29 December 1943, and revised in a letter dated 24 May 1944.[37]

In addition to the elements granted by attachment to the Army Air Force by the two last mentioned letters, a War Department directive in March of 1944[38] assigned directly to the Army Air Force all CIC agents on duty with those commands as of that date. Such personnel were to be organized under TO&E 30-500, dated 24 January 1944. The establishment of policies and the broad supervision of CIC activities was retained by G2, War Department General Staff.[39]

The Adjutant General's letter of 24 May made it clear that the Air Force was to maintain self-sufficient counterintelligence networks. The letter made CIC agents assigned to the Army Air Force specifically responsible for investigating the following cases:

1. Sabotage, espionage, subversion and disaffection cases pertaining to Army Air Force personnel, materiel, and installations.

2. Checks on loyalty of Army Air Force military personnel.

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35 War Dept Circ Nr 324, dtd 14 Dec 43, Title: Transfer of Counterintelligence Functions Within the ZI, (Restricted) Appendix to Hist of CIC, (S&F Lib) Tab D.

36 Ltr, dtd 13 Mar 44, subj: Delimitation of Responsibility for Investigations, of Espionage, Sabotage, and Subversion in the US, (Restricted) (from file 1867 S&F Lib).

37 Ltr, dtd 14 Mar 44, to CGs, AAF, subj: CI Investigative Activities, (Restricted) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

38 Ibid

39 It appears that this direct assignment can be traced to the recommendation of the Inspector General, in a report dtd 6 Nov 43 directed to the Deputy Chief of Staff, that the Counter Intelligence Corps be decentralized and the duties of the Chief, CIC be given through Military Intelligence Service to the appropriate subordinate commander. Appendix to the Hist of CIC, tab C, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

3. Security surveys and investigations pertaining to Army Air Force materiel and installations.

4. Violations of the security of military information within the Army Air Force.

5. Investigation of undeveloped leads in the above cases extending outside of the Army Air Force channels, but only with coordination through the Service Command involved, and strict observation of the Military Intelligence Service jurisdiction under terms of the Delimitations Agreement.

The letter further instructed Army Air Force commands to furnish the local Service Commands appropriate reports of investigation and to establish liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Naval Intelligence.

Pursuant to this authority, all CIC personnel were transferred to Headquarters Squadron, Army Air Forces, Bolling Field, Washington, D.C. It was at this point that the planning stage ended and the execution of an integrated Air Forces intelligence service began. Agents were to be divided into such detachments or teams as were deemed practical for efficient field operation.

In this organizational period, the Air Corps seemed to recognize the difficulties which had harassed and hampered and continued to hinder CIC operations with both tactical and nontactical units[40] whose commanders were uninformed as to the real nature of the CIC mission and the proper use of CIC personnel. Misuse was as old as the Corps (nor would it be terminated with World War II).

It was provided that no CIC personnel, either officer or enlisted man, would be assigned or detailed to fatigue or administrative duties except as required in the operation of the detachments. Conversely it also made clear that regardless of seniority status, officers within the counterintelligence structure would exercise jurisdiction only over their respective detachments of teams and would have no command authority over non-CIC sections of squadrons.

Authority for activation of CIC under the Army Air Force was granted 21 June 1944. This provided for 12 detachments.[41] Total strengths were for 231 officers and 592 enlisted men. Official activation was effective 24 June 1944 under TO&E 30-500 and the 12 detachments were placed on duty with the major

40 Ltr, dtd 27 May 44, to CGs, AAF, subj: Transfer of CIC Personnel, from Brig Gen Thomas D. White, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

41 Ltr, dtd 21 Jun 44, to CGs, AAF, from P. S. Kissinger, Adjutant General, subj: Constitution and Activities of Certain Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments, (Restricted) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

commands of the Army Air Force.[42] Those commands further attached sub-detachments to the principal base within their areas or to other important installations. By July 1944, more than 235 installations of the Army Air Force had CIC personnel on duty, providing counterintelligence coverage.

Within the next month the Air Forces set up a procurement program within the Corps structure to meet existing and future needs.[43] By this time, the training schools operated by the Chief of CIC had been closed and all necessary training for Air CIC apparently would be done by Air Forces. Procurement standards were commensurate with those demanded by the War Department for CIC personnel within the whole Army structure.

During the same month the Commanding General, Army Air Force was granted authority to issue badges and credentials to Army Air Force CIC. These he obtained by requisition to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.[44] Here too, standards were identical with those set up for other Army branches.

Once in operation, it was the policy of Army Air Force CIC to investigate all counterintelligence matters pertaining to Army Air Force personnel and materiel, and to cover appropriate undeveloped leads pertaining to those investigations. Even so, Army Air Force CIC was not divorced from the Service Commands, for in many instances it was more convenient and expedient to utilize Service Command facilities. Service Command assistance was appreciated, and cooperation was termed excellent.[45]

Administration of Complaint Investigations

Once a verified complaint concerning personnel within the jurisdiction of the Army Air Force CIC was ascertained, it was forwarded to the Operating Intelligence Echelon. This system, previously mentioned, was, in short, a system whereby one office within a command area was given responsibility for control of investigations and establishment of liaison. If the initiating office had been

42 Item #55 Air Forces Conference, 21 Jul 44, subj: Problems and Policies Relating to Investigation of Personnel and Incidents Involving Possible Subversive Activity AAF, p 2, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

43 Ltr, dtd 3 Aug 44, to CGs, AAF, from Lt Gen Barney M. Giles, Chief of Air Staff, subj: Procurement of CIC Enlisted Personnel for AAF, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

44 Ltr, dtd 18 Aug 44, to CGs, AAF, Commands and Tactical Centers, from Col Roy H. Boberg, subj: Issuance of Badges and Credentials to CIC Personnel, (Uncl) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

45 Item #55, Air Forces Conf, 21 Jul 44, subj: Problems and Policies Relating to Investigations, p 2, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

delegated authority to develop leads, the report to Operating Intelligence Echelon merely served as notice that an investigation was being undertaken. If such authority had not been delegated, the Operating Intelligence Echelon dispatched appropriate "lead sheets" and acted as the control point of the investigation. In all instances, necessary liaison with the Service Command, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the FBI for the development of leads was handled through the Operating Intelligence Echelon. When the investigation was concluded, a summary was prepared by the Operation Intelligence Echelon, with copies going to the appropriate action agency, to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and to the local Service Command for permanent record. Records checks were accomplished through the Operating Intelligence Echelon liaison channels and it is noteworthy that through these same channels, undeveloped leads pertaining to Army Service Forces or Ground Forces personnel were disseminated for action by Army Air Forces CIC.[46]

Incident Investigations

The principal responsibility of CIC with the Air Forces was dealing with the investigation of incidents involving aircraft or aircraft materiel in which there was an indication or possibility of sabotage. This possibility was present in every incident, since it was considered that all incidents were the result either of design or of negligence; if the former, investigation was to determine the guilty party; if as a result of negligence, investigation was to determine whether that negligence was intentional or unintentional, and the identity of the person ultimately responsible.

It most often happened that investigation would result in a finding that no sabotage was involved, with consequent elimination of counterintelligence jurisdiction. However, since this jurisdiction was present until the establishment of such a finding, the investigations were continued as a regular part of CIC activity.

Reports of such investigation, though they did not reveal sabotage, were valuable for preventing future accidents and consequent losses. Ultimately these CIC investigations contributed to publication of revised technical manuals, modification of aircraft design, correction of deficient production methods, and the institution of important safety programs. It was reported that CIC deserved a large part of the credit for reducing aircraft accidents more than 30 percent in one six-month period.[47]

46 Item #55, Air Forces Conf, 21 Jul 44, subj: Problems and Policies Relating to Investigations, p 4, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

47 Ibid, pp 4-6

The Finished Product

By December of 1944, the CIC structure of the Army Air Forces had assumed, for the most part, the organizational pattern and consistency that was to continue until the separation of the Army Air Forces from the Army in 1947. That structure is detailed here, not only because of its long period of evolution, but because it may serve as a framework for other Army branches which attain such stature that a separate counterintelligence service appears warranted.

As stated, for purposes of administration, all CIC personnel were assigned to "K" Squadron, 2d Army Air Force Base Unit, Headquarters Squadron, Bolling Field, Washington, D.C. The total authorized strength was 231 officers and 592 enlisted men. The squadron was divided into 12 detachments assigned as follows:

601st CIC Det (AAF)	1st Air Force
602d CIC Det (AAF)	2d Air Force
603d CIC Det (AAF)	3d Air Force
604th CIC Det (AAF)	4th Air Force
700th CIC Det (AAF)	Headquarters, AAF
701st CIC Det (AAF)	Troop Carrier Command
702d CIC Det (AAF)	AAF Proving Ground Command
703d CIC Det (AAF)	20th Air Force
704th CIC Det (AAF)	AAF Personnel Distribution Command
705th CIC Det (AAF)	Air Technical Service Command
706th CIC Det (AAF)	Air Transport Command
707th CIC Det (AAF)	AAF Training Command

A list of Air Force installations and bases where CIC personnel were stationed within this framework may be found in Appendix 1.

It should be understood that this initial setup was modified as expedience demanded; changes will be covered in this text as they occurred. It is natural

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that expansion of Air Force activities into foreign theaters would call for an enlargement of counterintelligence operations; such needs were met through additions to this framework.

When the War Department rescinded TM 30-215, an Air Forces letter[48] replaced the old system, with certain modifications. This new manual was tailored to Air Forces purposes.[49] It is summarized here.

The broad mission of Army Air Force CIC was to provide assistance to Air Force commanders in discharging their counterintelligence responsibilities.

The jurisdiction of CIC was limited to the area of jurisdiction of the command with which it was serving, that area in turn being determined by War Department directives.

Duties in the Zone of the Interior included: investigation of military and civilian personnel within Army Air Force jurisdiction suspected of disaffection, subversive activity, espionage, sabotage, treason and sedition, incidents or activities in which security violations were apparent or suspected, the conduct of surveys to determine the security of installations and to prevent the leakage of information. CIC was expected to maintain security with regard to Army Air Force materiel and troop movements and to orient troops on the importance of military security. Of primary importance was the duty of investigating incidents involving aircraft or aircraft materiel to determine the presence or absence of sabotage.

CIC was expressly prohibited from performing the following duties: combat intelligence missions; prisoner of war interrogation; black market investigations; criminal investigations; investigations of cases involving moral turpitude; kitchen police; fatigue or general guard duty.

Since the communication was designed to replace TM 30-215, it was necessarily comprehensive and in the final analysis worked well as a substitute for the old manual.

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48 Ltr, dtd 13 Nov 44, AG 322, CIC (31 Oct 44) OB-S-B-M, (Uncl) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

49 Ltr, dtd 13 Nov 44, to CGs, AAF, subj: Organization, Administration and Operations of CIC, AAF, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

Chapter 2

OPERATIONS

In the pursuance of historical research, the availability of operational reports for CIC detachments with the Air Corps leaves much to be desired. Many files went to the Air Force in the separation of that service from the Army in 1947; records which have been located by this project are limited, at best. The cases which follow are considered to be a cross section of Air Corps CIC work; for with the exception of cases inherent or unique to a location, a screening of available material reveals few differences in the nature of missions accomplished, whether the installation was in California or Casablanca.

It is true that some unusual operational problems arose; they are treated in the text as they became important and affected a given case. It will be noted, too, that the number of cases in any category varied with the detachments, but in most instances, Air Corps CIC found itself principally occupied with aircraft accident investigations.

Brazilian Project

When the United States entered the war, Brazil, like most South American countries, remained neutral, at least in early 1942. In spite of this status, there was little question as to the sympathies of the Brazilian Republic. As evidence of western hemisphere affinity, President Getulio Vargas allowed the United States to establish airbases within Brazil and employed the Brazilian Navy in patrol operations along the South American coastline.

Personnel of the Air Transport Command were present in Brazil in some strength by May 1942, manning major ferrying stations at Belem and Natal. At this time, Brazil's neutrality, though conceded to be partial to the Allied cause, began to raise some difficulties. Axis citizens, agents, and consuls had the right of unrestricted travel within the country; many had resided there for long periods and had become firmly entrenched members of the business and social community. The presence of these persons generated the constant possibility of espionage and sabotage. Increasingly it was felt by U.S. authorities that some positive steps should be taken to establish all the military security measures possible under the circumstances.

In mid-May 1942, Special Agents Jose M. Bensuade and Anthony R. Mattos were temporarily released from the Counter Intelligence Corps by orders of the Chief, CIC, and assigned to the United States Ferrying Command for a period of six months. Linguistic abilities and some knowledge of the country made possible an undercover assignment at Belem, Brazil; original instructions contemplated a three-week stay there with American troops for purposes of familiarization.

[redacted]

An undercover assignment in civilian clothes was to follow at other locations; this phase was not carried out, however, and the agents remained at Belem for the entire six-month period.

Adverse conditions militated against accomplishment of a creditable intelligence job. The installation commander was informed of the mission contemplated for the agents and was directed to protect their cover as members of the military police unit of the base. It was thought that this would enable them to wander about the town on patrols and to otherwise permit movement without arousing suspicion. Because of the linguistic abilities of the men, however, their services soon were in demand by many officers on post, and these demands, along with military police duties, continued for the total period of the agents' assignments. Every effort was made by the agents to obtain more time for imperative counterintelligence work, but they were unsuccessful.

The report of the agents makes clear the fact that their true purpose in the area was not appreciated. In addition to military police duties which lasted from 1800 to 2400 hours every day, the agents were ordered to give daily instructions in the Portugese language to American soldiers at the installation; translate and dispatch official correspondence for the commanding officer; act as interpreter for the commanding officer, adjutant, and medical officer; dicker with merchants with regard to credit and payment of bills; act as shoppers for the supply and mess departments; perform special shopping tasks for officers on the base.

The duties as shoppers for officers on the base apparently were not authorized and worked a special hardship on the agents; if more important assignments interferred with these odious "duties," adminishments followed. Even so, the men accomplished something of their mission.

The agents were ordered to submit summary reports of intelligence activity after they had been in the area for about one month. To facilitate such reporting they hired a hotel room off base which was furnished for use as an operational office. From here they circulated about the area in off duty hours and endeavored to become acquainted with the residents of the area, and to pick up whatever information was available.

Their first report set a pattern for those to follow for the next six months. In that report, they described the principal social centers and hotels in the area and gave a short run-down on persons who appeared particularly prominent. Security-wise they noted much loose talk by American and indigenous personnel in the area regarding Air Corps operations. Their collection reports described in some detail the disposition and strength of Brazilian military units in the area. While functioning as interpreters on trips with the Air Transport Command they had been able to examine at first hand Brazilian military installations and the

[redacted]

The set-up of local public utilities and transportation systems was covered. They also compiled a list of suspect personalities.

Several citizens appeared to associate frequently with American troops and apparently were quite uninhibited about inquiries concerning air facilities in the area. Although no definite conclusion as to the loyalty of these persons was offered, the agents added that careful investigation was desirable in most instances.

Subsequent reports included investigations of such individuals, as detailed and as complete as the limited time and facilities of the agents would allow.

To insure security at the American installations, the agents in coordination with the commanding officer drafted lengthy information tracts for transient officers and enlisted men. These information handouts gave certain rules to be followed by personnel when on pass from the base and cautioned against the dangers of loose talk.

The general nature of the agents' assignments required the gathering of considerable positive intelligence. The most significant accomplishment in this field took place after an anti-Axis rally, just prior to the time Brazil actually entered the war. The rally degenerated into a riot in which many Axis-owned businesses and buildings were destroyed and eight Japanese killed.

The riot ended in the late afternoon.[50]

The agents interpreted in their reports as best they could, the Brazilian political picture and gathered necessary information through the contacts they had developed in the area. The Vargas regime exercised strong control and

[50] "Assignment Brazil" File #220.3, dtd 5 Nov 42, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

once Brazil was involved in the war, attempted to institute a system for handling enemy aliens in the country. All anti-Vargas elements combined themselves in the Integralista movement. Although this group was ostensibly loyal to the United Nations, it was felt that its members constituted a threat to Brazilian security, especially should cooperation with the Axis lead to the ousting of Vargas. The reports disclosed many instances of interference with the war effort by the Integralistas.

Eventually, the cover of the agents became a farce. Their informant contacts in the city as well as the Brazilian police and American military personnel guessed or became suspicious of their mission in the area. In October 1942, the agents were relieved of the Brazilian assignment and reported back to Washington.[51]

608th CIC Det (AAF)

In August 1942, a detachment designated the 608th was organized for duty with the Eighth Air Force. The unit was composed of five officers and 17 enlisted men and was placed under the supervision of the A2, 8th Air Force with operational and administrative control vested in the detachment commander. Operational records of the unit are scanty, but reflect activities similar to those of other detachments during this same period of time.

According to a January 1945 report, CIC agents discovered that large quantities of serviceable Army equipment were being discarded at a salvage dump, Great Staughton, Hunts, England; when this was reported, corrective action was promised. A spot check about two months later, revealed that the condition had not been corrected. At that time agents recovered several secret, confidential, and restricted documents from the area, along with considerable serviceable clothing. A report recommending disciplinary action was submitted. Meanwhile a police guard was instituted at the dump as a temporary measure and articles were recovered from many civilians who had innocently appropriated them.[52]

A possible security leak was turned over to the CIC by the Earl of Cranbrook, Cambridge, England. The Earl picked up a hitchhiker, who volunteered information on a new secret weapon and the date when Allied forces were to undertake operations on the Continent. A lengthy investigation ensued. The hitchhiker, an Air Force private, was reprimanded after it was determined that disciplinary action would be futile, since the man was of such low mentality that he could not have disclosed intelligible information that would have been of value to the enemy.[53]

51 "Assignment Brazil," File #220.3, dtd 5 Nov 42, (Conf) (S&F Library).
52 Monthly Info Rpt, 608th CIC Det (AAF), dtd 7 Jan 45, from Maj Charles Owsley, (Secret) (S&F Lib).
53 Ibid

609th CIC Detachment

The 609th first came into being as the CIC Detachment, Headquarters Ninth Air Force. Fourteen agents reported in January 1944. At that time the Ninth Air Force was stationed in England and teams of agents were distributed to provide counterintelligence coverage for all units. Just prior to the Normandy landings, the detachment was reorganized as the 39th CIC Detachment and provision was made for agents to proceed with Ninth Air Force units to advance bases on the Continent. In August 1944 the formal designation as 609th CIC Detachment came through. The unit by that time was operating largely on the Continent with the Ninth Air Force. By September, the entire unit was on duty on the Continent and the agents were providing coverage in Paris and at Chantilly, Beauvais, Laon, Reims, St. Quentin, Nancy, Cambrai and St. Dizier in France, and at Charleroi, St. Trond, Liege and Vierviers in Belgium, at Mastrich, Holland, and Luxembourg City, Luxembourg. The work of the unit was apparently outstanding, for 75 percent of the men received individual commendations from and through Ninth Air Force, while five enlisted men were given direct commissions in recognition of their work with the detachment. First Continental headquarters of the unit was located at Chantilly, France, but later was moved to Wiesbaden, Germany, as operations progressed. The commanding officer of the detachment was Maj Leon L. Lamet.[54]

Because of the proximity of detachment teams to tactical units, the 609th had many cases involving collaborationists. Certain psychological difficulties which faced the detachment in dealing with these instances were cogently set out in a detachment report:[55]

"A reliable informant made the statement that when German occupational troops arrived after the fall of France, many French people accepted them socially. The Germans condoned and fostered a 'black market' in food and clothing and the German soldier, supplied with little food and much money, made good business for farmers and merchants. Associations were condoned between French girls and German soldiers and often children were born as a result of these associations. If the offspring were male, guarantees of assistance were given the mother by German authorities. The few Frenchmen who resisted the overtures of the Germans found comfort in the belief that one day the Americans and British would surely come. At last the Americans arrived and those who consorted with the enemy would now meet retribution. But instead, the Americans began to associate with the offenders. The contractors who had fared so well under German occupation were now employed by the Americans. It is true the

54 Unit Hist, 609th CIC Det, undated, unsigned, (Uncl) from folder, AF-Europe, (S&F Lib).

55 CI Report for period 26 Sep to 10 Oct 44, 609th CIC Det, Hq, Ninth AF, dtd 28 Nov 44, /s/ Maj Leon Lamet, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

contractors who had been allowed by the Germans to survive were the only ones with proper equipment to do the work. Also, it is true that those who had collaborated with the enemy were in much better condition to entertain the Americans. All of which is disconcerting to those people who managed to keep their hands clean. It is believed that the Americans should exercise a much higher degree of care in accepting contractual and social obligations."

A typical case in point involved Nourhan Fringhian, who was brought to the attention of CIC through a developed informant. Fringhian, an Iranian subject of American origin had operated four factories producing consumer goods. He continued operation of the factories after occupation and employed 9,000 men in meeting the needs of the German Army. Because of overcharges and a breach of exchange regulations, Fringhian was arrested by the Germans and heavily fined and imprisoned. He was released after a short period, however, when he gave assurance of devotion to the German cause, and renounced his Iranian nationality. He was arrested when Allied forces moved into Paris, but after two weeks was released on the recommendation of high French officials. CIC felt that Fringhian's wealth and position had brought him undue consideration and recommended study of the case by the Bureau Securite Militaire, Paris.[56]

Several collaborators were able to obtain employment with American units and thereby delay identification and denunciation. This made persons who were aware of their true colors reluctant to come forward with derogatory statements. One such case was that of Lucien Noo, a Belgian national who had collaborated with the Gestapo during the occupation. Noo was employed by a military police company and when appearing outside the billet, where he acted as a fireman, would wear an American uniform. Only through liaison contact with Luxembourg police did the 609th learn of Noo's record.[57]

In other instances, the detachment was faced with the common problem of whom to believe. At St. Simon, France, it was found that almost without exception, the merchants had dealt commercially with the Germans; cross-denunciations by various shopkeepers put agents in a dilemma that could be solved only through investigation of all parties involved.[58]

The task of detecting collaborators was simplified in many sectors, especially with regard to female offenders. Soon after Allied forces entered the area, French patriots at St. Remy-les-Chevreuse had either cut or shaved the hair from all

56 CI Report for period 26 Sep to 10 Oct 44, 609th CIC Det, Hq, Ninth AF, dtd 28 Nov 44, /s/ Maj Leon Lamet, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

57 CI Report for period 11 Nov to 26 Nov 44, dtd 3 Dec 44, 609th CIC Det, /s/ Maj Leon Lamet, (Conf) (S&F Lib), p 1.

58 Ibid, p 3

women who had consorted with Germans during the occupation. It may or may not be significant that districts wherein these women resided were declared off limits to Allied personnel.[59]

Copious amounts of propaganda material were left behind in some sectors by the Germans, when it was found that many of our troops were collecting it as souvenirs. CIC [illegible] found [illegible] that [illegible] was anti-British and anti-[illegible] literature, along with picture cards warning civilians what indignities they and their daughters might expect from American troops. Wherever possible, the material was collected and burned, but the extent of circulation and effect of the leaflets and cards could not be determined.[60]

Responsibility for the detection of persons aiding German soldiers who remained in the area also fell upon the 609th. The task would have been simplified if a list of collaborationists had been available. In at least one town, Mons et Chause, French Forces of the Interior officials were unable to designate even one person as completely reliable and innocent of collaborationist activities. Even the Allied-appointed Mayor was highly suspect.

In that town CIC found an elderly Polish couple who freely admitted to having aided the escape of German soldiers of Polish decent. The excuse offered was sympathy for the plight of the soldiers who claimed they had only served under pressure and threats against their families. In such a situation, the course chosen by CIC was continual surveillance of as many suspects as possible, with a careful patrol supervised by CIC to enforce restriction of movement and curfew.[61]

Relationships which German soldiers had fostered during the occupation period also made detection of deserters and stay-behinds difficult. In the case of Richard Barber, a noncommissioned officer in the German Wehrmacht, informants lead to his arrest in the apartment of his mistress where he had been concealed in civilian clothes for almost a month. Interrogation revealed Barber to be a German deserter and he further revealed that men in Forces of the Interior and influential citizens were aiding such deserters. He gave the names and locations of six other German soldiers, who were apprehended. He named French participants in a black market ring in which he was a member, gave details on an escape route used by German personnel into Spain, and named a number of couriers and letter carriers who had worked for the Germans.[62]

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59 CI Report for period 26 Sep to 10 Oct 44, 609th CIC Det, Hq, Ninth AF, dtd 28 Nov 44, /s/ Maj Leon Lamet, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

60 Ibid, p 3

61 Ibid, p 3

62 Monthly Info Rpt, 609th CIC Det, dtd 4 Apr 45, /s/ Leon Lamet, Maj, AC, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

Well-intended but costly misunderstandings caused extensive damage to communications lines in France. A line between an airfield and an Air Group headquarters was severed on four consecutive nights, each time in at least 12 places. Surveillance and investigations disclosed that French Forces of the Interior personnel had cut the line, thinking it was a German operational line and that they were aiding the Allied cause. A few days later, approximately 1,800 yards of wire were removed from an important line between a tactical airstrip and the headquarters of an air unit at [illegible]. The offender turned out to be a [illegible] captain who had been told by local Frenchmen that the wire was not in use; he had appropriated it for use by his own unit.[63]

Although these investigations were predicated on an assumption of sabotage, a case handled by the detachment in April 1945 had more of the conventional aspects of a standardized sabotage case. Forty power units had been received by the Signal Company stationed at an Air Corps installation and examination of the units revealed damage to cables which rendered them useless. The cable had been severed in some instances by a sharp instrument; in other cases they appeared to have been cut and torn by pliers: one cable had a six-inch piece cut from it. Agents from the 609th photographed all the damaged wires and interrogated personnel who had uncrated the mechanisms. Since the damage appeared to have been accomplished before the units were sent from the United States, the case was referred to the Zone of the Interior.[64]

In November 1944, the 609th was instructed to investigate the possibility of sabotage when the Marne River overflowed and flooded a tactical airstrip. The order was flattering but fruitless. The river had first flooded a bivouac area and Air Group headquarters at the airstrip; in an effort to clear one area, a dam had been cut which made the situation worse and put the entire area under four feet of water. In a report three weeks after the incident, the closing comment reveals that the area was still under water. Group abandoned the air strip.[65]

702d CIC Detachment (AAF)

[redacted] came to the attention of CIC at a base of the Air Proving Ground, in September 1946. As a officer, [redacted] had made arrangements for a speaker from the [redacted] to appear at the base.

63 CI Rpt for period 26 Sep to 10 Oct 44, 609th CIC Det, dtd 28 Nov 44, /s/ Leon Lamet, (Conf) (S&F Lib) and CI Rpt for period 11 Nov to 26 Nov 44, dtd 3 Dec 44, /s/ Leon Lamet, Maj AC, p 3, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

64 Monthly Info Rpt, 609th CIC Det, Ninth Air Force, /s/ Lt Col Joseph Mahar, dtd 4 Apr 45, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

65 CI Rpt, 26 Sep to 10 Oct 44, 609th CIC Det, 9th Air Force, dtd 28 Nov 44.

The case was noteworthy, not only because of the personality involved, but as well, for the investigative techniques which it utilized.

was interviewed. She stated that members of her squadron had expressed an interest in Soviet foreign policy. She had been advised by letter would be pleased to deliver the lecture she desired. At the same time, the forwarded numerous propaganda leaflets which admitted she had acknowledged by letter and had promised to distribute among members of her squadron. The interview was not particularly productive, but did open several leads.

It was determined that the Steps were taken by mid-October to tactfully refuse the offer of the speaker. In the interim an extensive file and agency check was undertaken and considerable information collected.

It was found that had been active prior to entering the WAC in a and was referred to as the It was found that the union was Communist-dominated and that its leading officers were confirmed members of the party. Of more interest was the close friendship of with these officials and her continued correspondence with them. Although no record of Party activities was discovered, additional contacts with card carrying Communists were brought to light in examining references furnished by at various times and listed in her 201 file. had been a collector for Russian War Relief during 1942.

A reinterview with on 18 October was unproductive except for the information that she intended seeking a position with the State Department after separation from the service.

Interviews with associates of revealed defense by her of the policy and activities of the Communist Party. At least one associate considered her to be a Communist.

Mail intercepts were imposed for a two-month period and a good deal of pertinent information was collected. In one letter from a confessed Communist, was accused of deviating from the Party line and embracing a Fascist philosophy by continuing her stay in the WAC. In mentioning the letter when writing another friend, mentioned that she had not changed her views, but felt "the same, fundamentally, about labor and such." She gave economic gain as her only reason for staying in the service.

During a furlough at her home in New York City, was under constant surveillance and an undercover agent managed to date her on several occasions. No positive information was gathered and results of the undercover portion and surveillance were inconclusive.

Results of the investigation were not a basis for discharge of but she was removed to nonsensitive duties on her return from furlough. A continued mail intercept was placed on along with periodic surveillance until she was discharged from the service in June 1948.[66]

602d CIC Detachment

The 602d was attached to the 2d Air Force and covered installations in the south-central and southwestern section of the United States. Headquarters for the detachment was maintained at Colorado Springs, Colorado. A rather unique orientation program for new agents involved a quick trip through the circuit of field offices within the command.

Since the 2d Air Force was largely operational, the major portion of case load consisted of aircraft accident investigations. An agent with the detachment from 1943 to 1945 reported many instances in which pilot error was found to be the cause of crashes.[67] In one instance, a C-47 crashed on take-off because of inattention by the pilot to the routine safety practices involved in a pre-flight cockpit check. In another case, a crash, which caused the death of three men, was due to disregard by the pilot of instruction to use instruments for a take-off. The pilot reportedly believed the light to be sufficient to use visual procedures and chose his own course. In yet another crash, a $650,000 B-29 was sent to the scrap heap when the pilot attempted to take off without the proper pre-flight running-up of engines.

In 1944, an agent was sent by Headquarters to Topeka Army Air Base, Kansas, to investigate a case of suspected subversive activity. An American-born soldier of German parentage, assigned to a service unit on that base, was suspected of distributing Nazi literature. A barracks check and surveillance revealed the man also to be involved in a bootleg liquor ring in the "dry" state and disclosed attempts by him to organize a branch of the German Bund.[68]

While evidence of these charges was being collected, it also developed that the soldier had intentionally injured himself to avoid being shipped overseas. It

66 Summary Rpt, Title:

67 Interview with J. Francis Ford, Munsey Bldg, Balto, Md, 17 Aug 1955.
68 Ibid

appeared that he had friends in the Personnel Office who informed him when his shipment was imminent. He would then hire a hotel room and repeatedly flex his knee, which had been injured before he came into the service. When in consequence it had swelled sufficiently, he would report to the infirmary and be taken off the shipping list. The ruse had been used successfully in at least two instances.

The man's footlocker was eventually inspected and disclosed considerable Nazi literature. After his arrest by military police and interrogation by CIC, he confessed to all charges. The case then took a wry turn.

All evidence, along with the sworn confession, was turned over to the Base Legal Officer. The CIC investigator, J. Francis Ford, remained for the Court Martial and subsequently reported that "an unbelievable chain of errors on the part of the prosecuting officer allowed his complete acquittal."[69]

In an equally bizarre case, Ford was sent to Pyote Army Air Base upon receipt of reports to 2d Air Force that an Air Corps owned dairy was turning out bad milk.[70] Ford found, first of all, that the dairy was not government owned but was the business of an Air Force officer who served as Provost Marshal at the Pyote installation. In addition to his dairy, the officer also owned the only pasteurizing equipment in the area and was using Air Corps enlisted men to run this business during and after duty hours! The agent also found the officer to be involved in local politics and it was further established by affidavits that he was attempting to control the vote of civilian employees on the base by threatening their jobs. Ford submitted his findings to the commanding officer of the base who commented that he would handle the matter administratively.

Ford later heard that the dairy had been closed by Texas authorities, but that the officer remained on duty despite recommendations from Headquarters, 2d Air Force. To Ford's knowledge, he remained as Provost Marshal until an investigation by the Inspector General's Office resulted in an order for his removal.

702d CIC Detachment (AAF)

Original plans attached the 702d CIC Detachment to the Air Proving Command but the detachment was not required by that branch after July 1945. The designation then was transferred to the Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater, for organization of a unit to take over personnel and equipment of the 609th CIC Detachment. The 609th had been serving with the Ninth Air Force but was to be deactivated. The 702d became functional again in August 1945 and the

69 Interview with J. Francis Ford, Munsey Bldg, Balto, Md, 17 Aug 55.
70 Ibid.

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following year was confirmed without a change in command as the 702d CIC Detachment.

As the occupation of Europe began, the 702d became attached to Headquarters, US Air Forces in Europe. With this, the highly technical activities which had characterized operations while the unit was attached to the Proving Ground Command were replaced by the more routine duties which all detachments faced on occupational status. The detachment worked in close coordination with Military Government and the Military Police, but continued to meet special Air needs when the occasion arose.

During June 1947, agents of the 702d apprehended Heinrich Susser, at Schondorf, Germany, identifying him as a former member of the German Criminal Secret Police. He had been stationed at Kilinskiege No. 152 (Concentration Camp) in Lodz, Poland. The investigating agent contacted inmates at the Jewish Displaced Persons Camp at Lansberg, Germany, in an attempt at positive identification. Eleven people identified Susser and named him as responsible for beating and torturing inmates of the camp. Susser was surrendered to the War Crimes Group at Dachau, Germany, for further disposition.[71]

Close liaison with displaced persons camps and other intelligence agencies also led to the arrest of Sylvester Weiss. Weiss was picked up by Military Police, and turned over to the 702d when his connection with the Schutz Staffeln came to light. Interrogation revealed that Weiss had been a block leader at Concentration Camp Diehenfurth in charge of more than 200 inmates. He admitted to brutal mistreatment and torture of his charges and was handed over to the 970th CIC Detachment for interrogation and disposition.[72]

The informant system maintained by the detachment led to the discovery of three persons who claimed to be CIC agents attached to the 702d. All were German civilians but had authentic-appearing forged papers which had been successfully used in lieu of identification cards to obtain the benefits of U.S. facilities and services. The impersonators were referred to the Office of Military Government at Schwabach, Germany, for prosecution.[73]

The informant net was also responsible for the recovery of more than $50,000 worth of technical equipment stolen by a German civilian. Leo Altmann had removed short-wave sending and receiving sets, radio and radar devices and

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71 Monthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 31 Mar 47, from Lt Col C. D. Wright, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

72 Minthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 30 Jun 47, from Lt Col C. D. Wright, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

73 Monthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 9 Nov 46, from Capt Kenneth B. Baker, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

other technical instruments from the Flugforschungsinstitut (Flight Research Institute), Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, to Herrsching and Friesing, Germany, where he intended to continue unauthorized research. The research value of the equipment far exceeded its monetary worth, for the Flugforschungsinstitut was formerly a part of the Dornier Works, which at that time were being occupied by units of the Air Force and Technical Intelligence Division. Altmann was surrendered to Military Government, Starnberg, Germany for prosecution and disposition.[74]

A suspected sabotage case which aroused considerable interest was handled by the 702d in January 1947. The detachment received word that the only remaining communication line between the Kissingen Air Base and the Kissengen base radio station at Schonberg Castle had been cut. An agent was dispatched to examine the line and found that 10 poles had been sawed down and removed. Lourance Geisler, a German farmer, was observed to be cutting and rolling the wire which had been a part of the communication line. He was taken to the field office for interrogation. Geisler denied any plans to commit sabotage and explained that he had assumed the line to be part of the old German system and that he needed the wire to fence his vineyard. His story apparently was proved true, for Geisler was freed after a fine and reprimand from Military Government.[75]

A case more closely allied with the imagined pattern of Air Force CIC investigations was handled by the 702d in May 1947. While a P-51 type aircraft had been receiving a final check prior to shipment, a bullet hole was detected in the fuselage. Examination revealed a .30 caliber slug imbedded in the wall of a self-sealing gas tank, and an investigation of the possible sabotage incident was opened.

From the position in which the plane had been parked, the location of the guard post, and the angle from which the projectile had entered the fuselage, agents felt that the bullet had been fired by one of the hired Polish civilian guards at Industriehafen Aircraft Storage Field. Five men who had served on the guard post involved at the time the incident occurred were questioned, but all denied firing the shot. Suspicion was strong enough, however, to decide the investigating agent to fire all of the weapons of the suspect guards and forward the projectiles to Erding Air Depot Analytical Laboratory for comparison with the slug recovered from the gas tank. The laboratory report established that the projectile found in the tank matched that fired from the carbine used by Guard Wlanyslaw

74 Monthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 3 Jul 46, from Lt Wilsie A. Currie, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

75 Monthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 28 Feb 47, from Lt Col C. D. Wright, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

Szopinski. Szopinski refused to admit guilt and the intent to commit sabotage could not be established. He was discharged from his position at the airfield and steps were taken to return him to Poland.[76]

[redacted]

The 700th CIC Detachment stationed with Air Force Headquarters, Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., investigated in great detail possible sabotage to an engine on the special plane normally used by President F. D. Roosevelt. The incident is cited largely because it demonstrates the thoroughness that characterized CIC aircraft incident investigations.

The plane was used to fly the President to Russia in 1945 and prior to the return trip had been test-flown at Saki, Crimean Peninsula, Russia. Malfunction of the number two engine was noted during the test flight. The engine was removed from the plane prior to the return to the United States and shipped back to this country. It was subjected to thorough disassembly inspection at the factory and found to have a faulty connecting rod. Laboratory tests of the rod eventually disclosed metal fatigue as the causative factor; no sabotage having been involved. The investigation was closed only after the parts inspector and all assembly workmen had been given background checks and cleared.[77]

During October 1946, a routine inspection disclosed that 14 life rafts in an aircraft at McDill Field, Washington, D.C., had been slashed and the morphine syrettes pilfered from accessory kits in the rafts. Routine inspection reports revealed that the damage had been accomplished within one month prior to discovery. A shakedown inspection of a barracks and attempts to lift fingerprints from the rafts proved futile, as did the use of entrapment powder to ensnare future culprits. A two-week surveillance of parked aircraft also failed to develop any leads.

Assuming another task, CIC agents tried to associate crew members having ready access to the rafts with persons known by medical authorities to suffer from migraine headaches or other periodic acute pain. They also questioned all crew chiefs on the base as to the character and general behavior of crew members. These efforts, too, proved abortive.

As a stopgap measure, all morphine syrettes were removed from the rafts and a roving patrol was conducted on parked aircraft. It could not be determined

76. Monthly Info Rpt, 702d CIC Det, dtd 31 May 47, pp 2-3, from Lt Col C. D. Wright, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

77 Monthly Info Rpt, 700th CIC Det (AAF), dtd 2 Apr 45, pp 2-3, from Lt Col Asa W. Candler, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

whether the same instrument had been used in all cases, for there were no microscopic marks which would permit identification of the tool used.

About one month later, the informant [illegible] gave the first break in the case. Certain flight line personnel were reported to have had the drug in their possession about the time of the thefts. A check with the Flight Surgeon disclosed that the suspected men had the physical characteristics distinctive to drug users. After interrogation, two enlisted men were charged, tried, and found guilty.[78]

With regard to incident cases, the attitude taken by the 705th was typical of that assumed by all Air Force detachments. Jurisdiction was acquired in such cases by the presumption that sabotage was involved where an occurence was unexplained. In these cases, CIC completed investigations even though sabotage was disproved before the case was closed. The purpose of this was to assure remedial efforts and make certain that corrective administration action was taken. At any rate, it was felt that such investigations increased the overall efficiency of the Air Forces and the deviation from the actual mission of CIC was countenanced on the basis that the efforts were aiding the prosecution of the war.[79]

In a few isolated instances, commanding officers preferred to work on the theory that an incident did not involve sabotage until there were proved indications of positive activity. Such an attitude operated to reduce the jurisdiction of CIC but in most cases a change in attitude eventually was effected.[80]

The technical nature of some CIC investigations with Air Force units is demonstrated by a case at Tinker Field, Oklahoma, handled by Air Technical Service Command CIC personnel.

A C-60a type transport crashed after take off with a full load of passengers. Five men were killed, and nine were critically injured. The left engine had failed as the craft became airborne and investigation was initiated to determine the presence of sabotage.

Examination of the engine under CIC supervision, in cooperation with base personnel, disclosed that the failure was caused by shearing of the drive shaft of the engine-driven fuel pump. A steel washer was found to have locked the pump and caused the shaft to break. In addition it was discovered that foreign matter

78 Rpt, dtd 12 May 47, subj: Monthly Info Rpt, 700th CIC Det (AAF), from Capt Edward L. Forrest, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

79 Monthly Rpt, 705th CIC Det, ATSC, from Maj Marshall E. Belshaw, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

80 Monthly Rpt, 705th CIC Det, ATSC, pp 13-14, from Capt Marshall E. Belshaw, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

[redacted]

had found its way into the pump through negligence of the aircraft crew chief. Extensive bench tests made with an identical pump under flight conditions established the washer as the prime cause of the crash. Information to correct contributory negligence was disseminated through the Maintenance Division, ATSC, and the investigation was closed.[81]

All intelligence reports on aircraft accident cases were channeled into Wright Field and there processed for type of plane involved, common causative factors, and investigative techniques used. The findings were indexed and a card system established which made a ready reference file for investigators. The system was eventually duplicated in all Air Force commands, with the Wright Field office acting as a distributor of the information.[82]

Familiarity and repeated reference to this cross-indexing system was credited with the discovery of an important CIC case involving B-17 aircraft.[83] Agent Johnston Russell at the Headquarters office, noted that several B-17 crashes were due to defects and collapse in the rear landing wheel. At the same time, as a result of bench tests rear landing wheel assemblies for B-17s were being returned to the Wright Field parts depot with "Unsatisfactory" reports attached. Russell had one of the assemblies torn down for analysis. Metal stress tests showed that an important piece of the gear were not being properly hardened and would cause operational failure when put to heavy use. An order was disseminated by the command after this finding that the wheel be lowered cautiously by manual control until the part could be replaced with one meeting required specifications.

Russell found that the part, manufactured by the Maytag Company, did not meet specifications, but that gross factory negligence rather than intent was the source of the trouble. The saving in lives and material which was effected by Russell's thorough investigation cannot be computed.

In September 1944 CIC agents at the Middletown station of the ATSC, were faced with several damaged and cut fuel and gas lines which appeared to be the result of deliberate sabotage.

A civilian worker, employed as a supervisor on a shakedown crew, came under suspicion when he reported finding a number of such lines after planes had been inspected and approved. He seemed to make all of his discoveries when working alone, and in one instance his pocket knife was found near a cut fuel line.

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81 Monthly Info Rpt, dtd 11 Jun 45, from Lt Col Hayes O. Luna, 705th CIC Det, (AAF), (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

82 Interview with William K. Riehl, 5420 Carville Ave, Arbutus, Md, 17 Aug 55.

83 Interview with Marvin Smith, Law Building, Denton, Md, 18 Aug 55.

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To offset [illegible] evidence, CIC agents had senior inspectors report an hour before the suspect came on the job, and make a thorough inspection of the plane on which the suspect was scheduled to work. After ascertaining that the [illegible] in good condition the plane was watched to prevent [illegible] but the suspect gained access to it. On several occasions after these prior inspections, the suspect would report damaged lines. Sworn statements were taken from witnesses to develop the case.

When the suspect was finally questioned, he seemed pained at the accusation and denied all guilt. But after protracted interrogation during which he was confronted with the evidence against him, he confessed to the deliberate damage and was turned over to the Federal District Attorney for prosecution.

The reason he gave for his action was that he was having trouble with the inspection department on the base, and hoped to gain better cooperation by showing up defects they had "missed." No connection with the enemy was disclosed.[84]

In a similar vein was a case at the San Bernadina Branch of Air Technical Service Command, at San Bernadino, California. A workman there was suspected of deliberate destruction of aneroid diaphragms worth $592.00. A CIC investigation was requested. All inquiries and evidence pointed to the workman and when interrogated he admitted damaging the material because he was disgusted with his work and believed that by causing the damage, he would be transferred to another section. He was--to Federal authorities for prosecution and disposition.[85]

Agents with the 705th were faced with racial problems of some magnitude during 1944. an incident at the Air Technical Service Command base at Stockton, California, involved a disaffection movement among colored troops to disregard all authority. It was suspected that this attitude was the result of the use of marihuana purchased with money supplied by German prisoners and numerous Japanese in the area. Several courts martial had resulted in prosecutions but these seemed to have no effect.

Colored agents were placed undercover for about three weeks. They confirmed that there was considerable unrest among Negro troops and extensive use of marihuana but reported no evidence of subversive activity or connections with German or Japanese elements.

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84 Monthly Rpt, 705th CIC Det (AAF), dtd 12 Sep 44, from Maj Marshall E. Belshaw, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

85 Monthly Info Rpt, dtd 10 Apr 45, from Maj Louis W. Krings, 705th CIC Det, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

It should be noted here that at least one agent cast doubt on the practice of placing these colored agents on undercover assignments with Negro troops. He contended that while the men were probably efficient and as conscientious as possible, there was a general feeling in the detachment headquarters that their reports were not in all cases objective and without bias. The agent offered no proof or evidence to support this statement, but was firmly convinced of its validity.[86]

Colored troops at the Herbert Smart Airport, Macon, Georgia, held a sit-down strike in their mess hall and placed demands before the commanding officer. NCOs "turned in their stripes." Subversive activity was suspected to be behind the movement. CIC investigation in the open and undercover indicated that unrest was due to inefficiency on the part of several commissioned and noncommissioned officers assigned to the colored units. Key personnel were transferred and dissension subsided.

During May 1944, Negro troops stationed at Brookley Field, Mobile, Alabama, rioted after obtaining carbines, machine guns and considerable ammunition. More than 1,000 rounds were fired during the melee. One Negro soldier was critically wounded. CIC agents were placed with the unit in an undercover capacity. The case was complicated with erroneous newspaper reports which stated a white soldier had been shot in the course of the disturbance, thus arousing further resentment among the colored troops.[87]

Five CIC agents at Brookley Field worked directly with a Board of Inquiry established as a result of the incident and produced sufficient evidence to convict nine men of mutiny, and to bring about dishonorable discharges and long sentences at hard labor.[88]

Agents with the Air Technical Service Command at Ogden, Utah, received an important lead for investigation from the officer censoring mail of soldiers in the post stockade. The mail of two Negro prisoners addressed to friends and relatives expressed the idea that they were being discriminated against on a color basis. The soldiers wrote with vivid imaginations, a mixture of half-truths and wild stories. Investigation was begun after photostats had been made of the letters and the originals returned to their writers.

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86 Interview with Marvin Smith, Law Bldg, Denton, Md, 18 Aug 55.

87 Memo, dtd 19 Jun 44, for Office of the Asst Chief of the Air Staff, Intelligence, from Maj Asa V. Candler, subj: Admin of CIC Program, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

88 Memo, dtd 28 Jul 44, for Office of Asst Chief of the Air Staff, Intelligence, from Maj Asa V. Candler, subj: Admin of CIC Program, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

One agent was placed under cover as a prisoner in the stockade and others were assigned to the guard personnel and other prisoners. The soldiers had told in their letters that "torture houses" were being constructed to kill Negro soldiers when actually small solitary confinement houses were being built within the stockade for normal punishment purposes. They said that whites wanted to make slaves of the colored people in the Army; that white soldiers never got guard house sentences while Negroes were always given six months; that the Army was more interested in killing the Negro than the Nazi.

The undercover agent gathered several incriminating statements. One suspect stated that if he were at liberty to kill his enemies "there would not be a white man on the base within one week." Both affirmed that if sent overseas they would kill everyone not black. The other suspect told his fellow prisoners that he hoped America would lose the war and that the Germans would soon invade the country. He alleged that he would sabotage the installation when released from the stockade.

During this period the agent in the stockade was also counseled by the suspects to play dumb when ordered to drill by the Officer of the Day.

Not to be outdone by the statements of his comrade, the other suspect argued that Americans were only fighting the Japanese because they were nonwhites and would be friends to the Negro. He, too, hoped the Allies would lose the war.

Interviews with other prisoners disclosed that the suspects had urged them to write inflammatory letters, and in at least one instance had written such a letter for one of the prisoners. Guard personnel testified that they had heard one of the suspects say that he was "strictly Nazi" and would join up with Tojo if sent overseas. At the close of the investigation, the two soldiers faced courts martial for disaffection and sedition.[89]

An important case of Communist infiltration came to the 705th CIC Detachment in January 1945. The editor of the "Orientation Digest," a publication of the Army Air Forces Special Services Section was suspected of being an active Communist. CIC investigations was requested. The Digest was distributed to unit commanders and Information and Education officers and received wider dissemination than any other publication within the Army Air Force.

Analysis of issues over a long period disclosed rigid editorial policy adherence to the Communist Party line; books listed as recommended reading by the Digest were authored by well-known Communists.

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89 Monthly Rpt, dtd 12 Sep 44, 705th CIC Det (AAF), from Maj Marshall E. Belshaw, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

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A record check and investigation of Leon Askin, the suspect editor, disclosed that he had three times been interned in German concentration camps before arriving in this country. After arriving in the United States he had become employed by Communist-controlled organizations in Washington, D.C. Askin associated socially with professed and proved Communists. He married an American girl, Mildred M. Smith, who characterized herself as "a great admirer of Communism." Askin was granted citizenship in 1943. He was inducted into the Army in 1942 and served at various stations before becoming editor of the Digest in 1944. Askin alleged that just prior to the war he had been offered jobs by the Federal Communications Commission, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by the Special Services Office in Washington, D.C., none of which he had been able to accept because he was not a citizen at that time.

A ten-day surveillance of Askin during a furlough revealed associations with Irwin Piscator, an internationally known and self-admitted Communist and organizer for the party, and with Herbert Berghof, a co-worker of Piscator. During the course of the surveillance, Askin became enraged by an anti-Communist comment of Senator Burton Wheeler published in a newspaper and was seen to throw it down and jump on it and exclaim, "What am I doing in this army?"

Undercover agents were placed on duty in Askin's office but they failed to discover much more than the fact that Askin believed himself very brilliant and well informed. Askin either reprinted verbatim or paraphrased much of the material he used, but no Communist material was found in his desk. Mail cover likewise disclosed nothing of a derogatory nature.

As a result of the investigation, Askin was removed from his position by special orders and divorced from any possibility of an opportunity to engage in specialized Army assignments.[90]

706th CIC Detachment (AAF)

The 706th was attached to the Air Transport Command. From headquarters at Washington, D.C., agents were distributed to ATC divisions and wings in all parts of the world. The detachment had probably the most widespread operations of any CIC unit and handled an enormous volume of cases.

At the Headquarters office in Washington, D.C., an agent was assigned to determine the possibility of sabotage in the crash of three C-46 transport planes, within a relatively short period of time.[91] The crashes all occurred after an engine seemingly would explode or disintegrate during flight. Since the plane

90 Monthly Info Rpt, 705th CIC Det (AAF), dtd 10 Mar 44, from Maj Lewis W. Krings, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC), pp 1-4.

91 Interview with Marvin Smith, Law Bldg, Denton, Md, 18 Aug 55.

would not remain airborne on one engine, this failure always led to a crash. Examination of the craft which had crashed as well as study of models in current [illegible] the engine holdown studs which passed through a fire extinguisher bracket were not properly designed and were allowing the engine to vibrate loose from the wing assembly. This ruptured gas and oil lines close to hot exhaust stacks, precipitating the explosion. All C-46 aircraft were grounded until the defect was corrected.

A bona fide espionage case was developed by agents of the 706th at a Ferrying station in Sacramento, California. Interrogations of an enlisted man during a routine background check disclosed that a private in a barracks on the base had made several statements boasting the prowess of the average German soldier. Investigation of the private revealed that he had been born and educated in Germany. To clear the matter up, the man was called in for interrogation where, with little pressure, he stated he had left Germany and entered the Army as part of an agreement with the German Government to commit espionage. He argued with some force, however, that he had given the promise merely as a ruse to escape the country and had not, in fact, done anything inimical to the best interests of the United States Government. Legal officers could not advise prosecution since there had been no overt acts, and the man was merely put on a subversive list and eliminated for consideration for overseas assignment.[92]

Agents assigned to the South Atlantic Wing, ATC, were supplied with a memorandum prepared to orient them on undercover fundamentals which were to be used in the area. Each agent was instructed to prepare a background story which was to be borne out by his passport and identification cards, and it was the implication of the memo that all agents in the South American area would work in such a capacity.[93]

Although the memorandum may have been authentic at the time it was written, most operations in the area were not carried on in such a fashion. Perhaps as operations in the South Atlantic area increased, the program became unworkable but the real reason does not appear and there were many instances of agents working in uniform, in the open.

A case handled by the detachment in Brazil during 1944 and 1945 gave agents an introduction to Latin American politics and what appeared to be a serious sabotage ring.[94]

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92 Interview with Marvin Smith, Law Bldg, Denton, Md, 18 Aug 55.

93 Memo, dtd 1 May 43, Re: Required Preparations for Agents Assigned to CIC Det South Atlantic Wing, ATC, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

94 Rpt, from CIC Det, South Atlantic Wing, ATC, Re: Pedro Pontes, dtd 14 Dec 44, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

95 Memo, dtd 13 Jan 45, CIC Det, AAF in the South Atlantic, from Agents Cloyes and Wilson, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

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A sabotage investigation was ordered when a C-47 transport caught fire during refueling at Bahia, Brazil, and was destroyed. Agents with the South Atlantic Division of the ATC, CIC Detachment found an enlisted Navy man who claimed that a Brazilian workman had started the fire with a cigarette lighter.

Facts revealed, however, that the workman had merely been attempting to fill his cigarette lighter and was heard to remark that he could not understand how the fire started. The workman left the field after the fire was extinguished and was never found. The agents concluded that sabotage was not intended, for the workman had endangered his own life by starting the fire as he did. This workman also had worked as a watchman for a long period on large gasoline storage tanks where he could have committed sabotage without fear of discovery.[96]

96 Monthly Info Rpt, dtd 10 Aug 45, 706th CIC Det, from Capt Paul S. Cooper, AC, p 4, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

Agents of this detachment at Belem, Brazil, also fell under the jurisdiction of the South Atlantic Wing. Here, too, aircraft accident cases constituted the bulk of the investigative load, and no evidence of positive sabotage was found by CIC in the area.

The Caribbean Division of the Air Transport Command spread its CIC agents as thinly as possible to maintain maximum coverage in its area. With six agents assigned to the unit in 1944, six installations were serviced, and although no cases of special interest are disclosed, the volume of personnel and incident cases handled was high.

British-controlled Ascension Island, a 34 square mile comparatively isolated piece of land in the South Atlantic, was the scene of considerable CIC activity. The island, which is approximately mid-way between South America and Africa, became an important Air Transport Command base and with the many operational flights coming through, there were numerous accident and incident investigations. No investigations, however, other than those pertaining to aircraft, have been found in available records. These files do not bear out instances where sabotage was established. Typical investigations during the months of June, July, and August 1945 disclosed pilot error and negligence on the part of flight and ground crew personnel as causative factors rather than sabotage attempts.[97] Again, the reason for including aircraft investigations as a standard portion of the CIC mission with the Air Corps is made clear by the lengthy reports written: in almost every instance, the investigations resulted in some safety regulation being drafted or a source of potential harm being eliminated.

North Africa

Agents of the 706th CIC Detachment attached to the North African Division, ATC, received reports that mail bags arriving from Abadan, Iran, where a sub-office was in function, had cuts and tears in them. When the damage continued despite continued surveillance, a method was devised of trapping the offender.

The mail bags were inspected and loaded on a transport plane and then offloaded and inspected. One bag had a long razor cut in it. The native personnel who had loaded the plane were then subjected to body searches. One man was found with two mailed packages on his person and several razor blades. He was turned over to British authorities for prosecution.[98]

97 Summary Rpts, Hqs, South Atlantic Div, ATC, dtd 18 Aug 45, 27 Aug 45, 10 Jul 45, from Capt Orly Davis, Div I and S Off, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

98 Monthly Situation Rpt, 1-31 July 44, dtd 5 Aug 44, from North African Div, ATC, Capt Pat J. Kirwin, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

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A rear security violation was detected by military police at Cazes Air Base, Casablanca, French Morocco, and turned over to CIC. An Arab employee was discovered on leaving the base to be carrying several classified military documents. The discovery resulted in the issuance of directives for the disposal of classified papers; the Arab was dismissed when he explained that he was illiterate and had taken the papers from a trash can to wrap up some "hashish," a native drug.[99]

Liaison difficulties with French authorities in North Africa developed over a case in April 1944. A French civilian was arrested by French intelligence agents, who had requested CIC assistance, and was charged with suspected espionage. Investigation prior to his arrest revealed that he had been trying to obtain information on American air installations and aircraft movements from military and indigenous personnel.

The French released the suspect after what CIC felt was a "thoroughly unsatisfactory interrogation," giving as a reason for the release that the suspect had informed another French intelligence agency of the matter and had been told to carry on in an effort to soon trap espionage ring leaders. CIC investigation revealed that some of the French officials involved had been friendly with the suspect for some time. The detachment kept the case pending with a request to the AC of S, G2, NATOUSA, for a full report on the French investigation and reasons for the release of the suspect.[100]

One agent with the North African Wing, Air Transport Command, particularly distinguished himself. Charles W. Dewing came to the CIC with a background as a news editor, broadcaster and free lance writer. He was attached to the North African Wing, ATC, where soon after arrival, plaudits began to pour in.

While attached to Detachment "E" in Adan, Turkey, Dewing's reports were commended by the Chief of Staff, ATC, as presenting a clear and concise picture of the relationships between State Department and military personnel with Turkish authorities. In a letter of commendation, it was stated:

"The manner in which Special Agent Dewing carried out his mission in the preparation of this report is most commendable and reflects great credit upon the Counter Intelligence Corps of the entire Command."[101]

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99 Monthly Situation Rpt, 1-31 July 44, dtd 5 Aug 44, from North African Div, ATC, Capt Pat J. Kirwin, (Secret) (S&F Lib) p 7.

100 Monthly Situation Rpt, 1-30 June 44, dtd 5 Jul 44, from North African Wing, ATC, /s/ Capt Pat J. Kirwin, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

101 Ltr, dtd 16 Aug 44, from Col Harold R. Harris to CG, North African Div, ATC, in Dossier, Charles W. Dewing, (CRF) (Secret).

Comments in a letter of commendation from the commanding officer of the North African Detachment include:

"SUBJECT agent performed his own duties in a superior manner and was always willing to be of assistance to others whenever called upon to do so, and it was only through Mr Dewing's help and cooperation that the undersigned officer was enabled to establish certain valuable contacts in this area."[102]

The letter also commended Dewing for the special manner in which he managed his duties as agent in charge of a CIC district with the command.

When ATC planes were moved to bases in Greece, Dewing went along in spite of an agreement with the Russians that no American intelligence personnel would enter the Balkans. A reliable source has said that Dewing gained data which enabled him to notify his commanding officer of the exact date of the outbreak of the civil war in Greece, along with the information that American equipment and personnel would not be bothered by either faction in the conflict if clearly designated and identifiable. This same source advised that no action was taken on the information.[103]

There is also evidence that Dewing was instrumental in arranging the meeting of Greek leaders with Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1944 when an effort was made to end the internal conflict.[104]

Dewing was eventually awarded the Legion of Merit. The citation accompanying the award further pictures the man.

> "Technical Sergeant Charles Wilson Dewing, Counter Intelligence Corps, as a special agent in Turkey, Greece, and North Africa, from April 1944 to January 1945, displayed unusual powers of discernment, tact, and sound judgment in the exceptional manner in which he handled the difficult problems of his assignment. By the skillful and intelligent way in which he conducted his operations, his reports were the basis of information for briefing all American personnel traveling through Turkey. When the Commanding General, North African Division, Air Transport Command, was directed to activate a detachment at Athens, Greece, he was sent to Athens to act as advisor to the Commanding Officer on all liaison with the British, Greek, and American diplomatic and other intelligence personnel. On 10 December 1944, a vehicle in which he was riding was totally demolished by mortar fire. His injuries resulted in the permanent loss of the sight in one eye;

102 Ltr, dtd 13 Jan 45, to CO, 706th CIC Det, ATC, Washington, D.C., from Capt Roy Wood, in Dossier of Charles W. Dewing, (CRF) (Secret).
103 Interview with Marvin Smith, Law Bldg, Denton, Md, 18 Aug 55.
104 Ibid

however, he continued to perform his duties until 6 January 1945. Sergeant Dewing, by his zeal and untiring devotion to duty rendered services of outstanding value to the Air Transport Service and to the war effort."

Central Africa

Investigations conducted by the Central African Division of Air Transport Command followed the pattern of other units in the command. Since there was no evidence of enemy activity or sabotage in the area; however, the CIC often investigated cases not strictly within its mission.[105]

Smuggling by United States military personnel of cigarette lighters and fountain pens into the area, where they could be sold for several times their nominal value, was detected by CIC and in one instance resulted in the courts martial convictions of two Army Air Force officers at Khartoum, Africa.[106]

The agents of the 796th also investigated alleged incidents where Air Corps officers were acting as "middlemen" in the sale of Gold Coast mahogany to American markets. Such transactions were against the policy of the command, and by obtaining a pronouncement that the contracts involved were voidable, CIC eliminated the situation.[107]

One monthly summary also discloses that five separate surveillances were being run on persons suspected of black market activity.[108] Illegal exchange transaction in French francs also were handled by CIC as a regular part of the mission in the area.[109]

Pacific Division

706th personnel with the Pacific Division of Air Transport Command participated in a "parachute case" which encompassed many Air Corps commands. The shroud and tie lines on all parachutes aboard a C-47 transport were found to have been cut, apparently by a sharp instrument, surmised to be a razor blade. Investigation in the Pacific area disclosed improper handling of equipment by crew members of the aircraft but did not solve the matter of the cut lines. Final outcome of the case does not appear, but leads were sent to the Ferrying Division,

105 Monthly Rpt Nr 8, CEAD CIC Det, for period 1 Sep to 30 Sep 44, /s/ Lt Garland Smith, p 8, (Secret) (S&F Lib).
106 Ibid, p 6
107 Monthly Rpt Nr 5, CAFW CIC Det, dtd 4 Jul 44, /s/ Lt Louis A. Ginocchio, (Secret) (S&F Lib).
108 Ibid, pp 3-8
109 Ibid, p 5, p 9.

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Air Forces Training Command and to Air Technical Service Command before the data [illegible] sufficiently exploited.[110] The covering of such extensive geographic areas in the course of Air Corps investigations was not rare, for air crews were often spread out by transfers, and the number of stations where a plane might touch during a few days of operation was extensive.

European Division

Agents of the 706th attached to the European Division, Air Transport Command, were stationed throughout England, Scotland and Ireland by February 1944.

An agent from the unit was faced with a near international incident at Camp Comnock, Ayr, Scotland. The camp was used prior to the Normandy landing as a billet for Free French troops and there had been considerable friction between these troops and American soldiers stationed nearby, for reasons not made clear in the report. When French troops were transferred to the continent it was determined to use the camp as a German prisoner of war enclosure. Prior to such use, a complete cleaning and renovation was ordered by the new commanding officer. When engineers commenced such work, numerous booby traps were discovered in toilets and cupboards, constituting a serious hazard to the workmen.

CIC investigation disclosed that the French had learned before their departure that the camp was to be used for German prisoners of war and had left the explosives for that reason. No harm to friendly troops was intended and since it was impossible to trace the culprits, the case was closed.[111]

110 Monthly CIC Situation Rpt, from Pacific Div, ATC, 706th CIC Det, dtd 6 Sep 44, /s/ Lt Joe R. Tunal, p 2, (Conf) (S&F Lib).

111 Monthly Counterintelligence Rpt, for Jul 44, from European Div, ATC, /s/ Capt George E. James, dtd 1 Aug 44, (Secret) (S&F Lib).

Appendix 1

CIC With the Air Force

Appendix 1

STATION LISTS OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS PERSONNEL AS OF 1945

1. 601st CIC Detachment, (AAF), attached to 1st Air Force.

Bradley Field, Connecticut

Dover Army Air Field, Dover, Delaware

Chatham Army Air Field, Georgia

Godman Field, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Camp Spring Army Air Field, Camp Spring, Maryland

Westover Field, Massachusetts

Selfridge Field, Michigan

Osceda Army Air Field, Osceda, Michigan

Fort Dix Army Air Base, Fort Dix, New Jersey

Millville Army Air Field, Millville, New Jersey

Mitchel Field, New York

Suffolk County Army Air Field, Westhampton Beach, New York

Blumenthal Field, Wilmington, North Carolina

Seymour Johnson Field, Goldsboro, North Carolina

Hillsgrove Army Air Field, Providence, Rhode Island

Charleston Army Air Field, Charleston, South Carolina

Waterboro Army Air Field, Waterboro, South Carolina

Richmond Army Air Base, Richmond, Virginia

Norfolk Army Air Field, Norfolk, Virginia

2. 602d CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to 2d Air Force.

Davis-Monthan Field, Tucson, Arizona

Colorado Springs, Colorado

Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho

Army Air Field, Mountain Home, Idaho

Army Air Base, Sioux City, Iowa

Army Air Field, Great Bend, Kansas

Army Air Field, Pratt, Kansas

Walker Army Air Field, Victoria, Kansas

Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Army Air Field, Alexandria, Louisiana

Lincoln Army Air Field, Lincoln, Nebraska

Fairmont, Nebraska

Grand Island, Nebraska

Kearney, Nebraska

McCook, Nebraska

Harvard, Nebraska

Army Air Field, Clovis, New Mexico

Army Air Field, Fort Sumner, New Mexico

Army Air Base, Alamogordo, New Mexico

Army Air Field, Ardmore, Oklahoma

Army Air Base, Rapid City, South Dakota

Army Air Base, Dysersburg, Tennessee

Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas

Majors Field, Greenville, Texas

Army Air Base, Casper, Wyoming.

3. 603d CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to 3d Air Force.

Avon Park Army Air Field, Avon Park, Florida

Bartow, Florida

Lakeland Army Air Field, Lakeland, Florida

Dale Mabry Field, Tallahassee, Florida

Pinellas Army Air Field, St. Petersburg, Florida

Drew Field, Tampa, Florida

McDill Field, Tampa, Florida

Mariana Army Air Field, Mariana, Florida

Sarasota Army Air Field, Sarasota, Florida

Page Field, Fort Myers, Florida

Perry Army Air Field, Perry, Florida

Punta Gorda Army Air Field, Punta Gorda, Florida

Venice Army Air Field, Venice, Florida

Orlando, Florida

Hunter Field, Savannah, Georgia

Harris Neck Army Air Field, Harris Neck, Georgia

Thomasville Army Air Field, Thomasville, Georgia

Coffeysville Army Air Base, Coffeyville, Kansas

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Barksdale Field, Louisiana

DeRidder Army Air Base, DeRidder, Louisiana

Esler Field, Alexandria, Louisiana

Lake Charles Army Air Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana

Kellogg Field, Battle Creek, Michigan

Key Field, Meridian, Mississippi

Gulfport Army Air Field, Gulfport, Mississippi

Morris Field, Charlotte, North Carolina

Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Muskogee Army Air Field, Muskogee, Oklahoma

Columbia Army Air Base, Columbia, South Carolina

Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, South Carolina

Myrtle Beach Army Air Field, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina

Florence Army Air Base, Florence, South Carolina

4. 604th CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the 4th Air Force.

San Francisco, California

Army Air Base, Hamilton Field, California

Army Air Base, March Field, California

Municipal Airport, Daggett, California

Muroc Army Air Field, Muroc, California

Camp Pinedale, Fresno, California

Army Air Base, Hammer Field, California

Army Air Field, Ontario, California

Army Air Base, Salinas, California

Lemoore Army Air Field, Lemoore, California

Santa Maria Army Air Field, Santa Maria, California

Army Air Field, Santa Rose, California

Metropolitan Airport, Van Nuys, California

Army Air Field, Chico, California

Tonopah Army Air Field, Tonopah, Nevada

Army Air Base, Portland, Oregon

McChord Field, Washington

Army Air Base, Ephrata, Washington

Army Air Base, Geiger Field, Washington

Army Air Field, Walla Walla, Washington

5. 700th CIC Detachment (AAF) (remained at Headquarters, AAF, Washington, D.C.

6. 701st CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the 1st Troop Carrier Command.

Lawson Field, Fort Benning, Georgia

George Field, Lawrenceville, Illinois

Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana

Baer Field, Fort Wayne, Indiana

Sedalia Army Air Field, Sedalia, Missouri

Malden Army Air Field, Malden, Missouri

Laurinburg-Maxton Army Air Base, Maxton, North Carolina

Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

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Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas

7. 702d CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command.

Elgin Field, Illinois

8. 704th CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the Air Forces Personnel Distribution Command.

Miami Beach, Florida

Atlantic City, New Jersey

Greensboro, North Carolina

Kearns, Utah

9. 705th CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the Air Technical Services Command.

Brookley Field, Mobile, Alabama

McClellan Army Air Field, Sacremento, California

San Bernadino Army Air Field, San Bernadino, California

Los Angeles, California

Oakland, California

Miami Air Technical Service Command, Miami, Florida

Atlanta, Georgia

Robins Field, Warner Robins, Georgia

Daniel Field, Augusta, Georgia

Atlanta Army Air Base, Atlanta, Georgia

Chicago, Illinois

Wichita, Kansas

Bedford Army Air Base, Bedford, Massachusetts

Detroit, Michigan

Newark, New Jersey

Buffalo, New York

New York City, New York

Rome Army Air Field, Rome, New York

Syracuse, New York

Fairfield, Ohio

Tinker Army Air Field, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Olmstead Field, Middletown, Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Kelly Field, San Antonio, Texas

Hill Field, Ogden, Utah

Spokane Army Air Field, Washington

10. 706th CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the Air Transport Command.

Ferrying Division

Long Beach Army Air Field, Long Beach, California.

New Castle Army Air Base, Wilmington, Delaware

Homestead Army Air Base, Homestead, Florida

Great Falls, Montana

Cincinnati, Ohio

Memphis Municipal Airport, Memphis, Tennessee

Love Field, Dallas, Texas

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North Atlantic Division

Dow Field, Bangor, Maine

Presque Isle Army Air Field, Presque Isle, Maine

Manchester, New Hampshire

Grenier Field, Manchester, New Hampshire

LaGuardia Field, New York

Caribbean Division

Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Florida

36th Street Airport, Miami, Florida

11. 707th CIC Detachment (AAF) attached to the Army Air Forces Training Command.

Eastern Flying Training Command

Courtland Army Air Field, Courtland, Alabama

Craig Field, Selma, Alabama

Auburn, Alabama

Gunter Field, Montgomery, Alabama

Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama

Napier Field, Dotnan, Alabama

Tuskeegee Army Air Base, Tuskeegee, Alabama

Blytheville Army Air Field, Blytheville, Arkansas

Buckingham Army Air Field, Fort Myers, Florida

Hendricks Field, Sebring, Florida

Tyndall Field, Panama City, Florida

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Freeman Army Air Field, Seymour, Indiana

Columbus Army Air Field, Columbus, Mississippi

Greenville Army Air Field, Greenville, Mississippi

Lockbourne Army Air Base, Columbus, Ohio

Shaw Field, Sumter, South Carolina

Smyrna Army Air Field, Smyrna, Tennessee

United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

Harlingen Army Air Field, Harlingen, Texas

Laredo Army Air Field, Laredo, Texas

Eastern Technical Training Command

Boca Raton Army Air Force Base, Florida

Cochran Field, Macon, Georgia

Spence Field, Moultrie, Georgia

Turner Field, Albany, Georgia

Moody Field, Valdosta, Georgia

Chanute Field, Illinois

Scott Field, Illinois

Air Force Headquarters, St. Louis, Missouri

3533d Army Air Force Base, Brooklyn, New York

Sioux Falls, South Dakota

Langley Field, Virginia

Truax Field, Madison, Wisconsin

Central Flying Training Command

Dodge City Army Air Field, Dodge City, Kansas

Liberal Army Air Field, Liberal, Kansas

Selman Field, Monroe, Louisiana

Enid Army Air Field, Enid, Oklahoma

Altus Army Air Field, Altus, Oklahoma

Randolph Field, San Antonio, Texas

Bryan Army Air Field, Bryan, Texas

Ellington Field, Houston, Texas

Childress Army Air Field, Childress, Texas

Midland Army Air Field, Midland, Texas

Foster Field, Victoria, Texas

Laughlin Army Air Field, Del Rio, Texas

Goodfellow Field, San Angelo, Texas

Lubbock South Plains Army Air Field, Lubbock, Texas

Waco Army Air Field, Waco, Texas

Pampa Army Air Field, Pampa, Texas

Perrin Field, Sherman, Texas

Fort Worth Army Air Field, Fort Worth, Texas

Moore Field, Mission, Texas

Western Flying Training Command

Douglas Army Air Field, Douglas, Arizona

Luke Field, Phoenix, Arizona

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[illegible] Air Field, Marana, Arizona

Williams Field, Chandler, Arizona

Yuma Army Air Field, Yuma, Arizona

Santa Ana, California

Merced Army Air Force Base, Merced, California

Minter Army Air Field, Bakersfield, California

Stockton Field, Stockton, California

Las Vegas Army Air Field, Las Vegas, Nevada

Kirtland Field, Albequerque, New Mexico

Hobbs Army Air Field, Hobbs, New Mexico

Roswell Army Air Field, Roswell, New Mexico

Marfa Army Air Field, Marfa, Texas

Western Technical Training Command

Lowry Field, Colorado

Denver, Colorado

Buckley Field, Denver, Colorado

La Junta Army Air Field, La Junta, Colorado

Keesler Field, Biloxi, Mississippi

Amarillo Army Air Field, Amarillo, Texas

Sheppard Field, Wichita Falls, Texas

Part II

CIC WITH THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT

Chapter 1: Organization History

Chapter 2: Physical Security

Chapter 3: Safeguarding Military Information

Chapter 4: Investigation: CIC's Major Job

Appendix 1: Letter from Provost Marshal General to commanding general of each Service Command, requesting the designation of officers to act in liaison capacity with the Manhattan District.

Appendix 2: Letter authorizing the organization of a Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment for Manhattan Engineer District.

Appendix 3: Letter sent to each Service Command announcing formation of special CIC detachment to handle all intelligence matters pertaining to the Manhattan District.

Appendix 4: Roster of Manhattan District CIC Detachment.

Appendix 5: Organizational Chart of the Intelligence and Security Division.

Appendix 6: Intelligence Bulletin #3, a sample of the kind of material sent to all installations engaged on Manhattan District work to aid in the program of "Safeguarding Military Information."

CIC WITH THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT

Chapter 1

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

In August 1942 the United States government embarked upon a program that was to alter the whole course of the war, and to an unfathomable degree, affect the destiny of mankind itself. This was the Atomic Energy Program. Understandably, then, the need for the tightest kind of security was an absolute requirement. This was the more appreciated when it was known by Washington that the Germans likely were working on the same kind of broad program; the first nation to achieve a workable weapon in the field obviously would possess a tremendous military advantage.

The research work of the Program was masked initially under the name of "Development of Substitute Materials Project" while the overall effort was encompassed under the term "Manhattan District, United States Engineers."[112]

From the beginning, the situation demanded that the Project be protected from both sabotage and espionage. By the middle of 1943, when United States and other Allied scientists were convinced that they were making progress and that a successful end seemed in sight, the protection of this fact became equally important with the protection of actual data concerning atomic energy. Had the Germans learned of the progress being made by our scientists, their doubts that a successful solution of the technical and industrial problems was possible would have been eliminated and they would have extended greater efforts to keep the United States from that solution.

Apparently lulled by the belief that they were well ahead of the United States in the research and development race, German efforts continued to be limited and divided.

In the official "Manhattan District History," written in December 1945, preservation and nourishment of this deception was called "the greatest triumph" of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Project. The history of the Counter Intelligence Corps with the Manhattan Project is synonomous with the history of its Intelligence and Security Division, which was manned, from the beginning, almost entirely by experienced CIC officers and agents. A number of other persons,

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112 Most of the information in this chapter, "CIC With the Manhattan District," has been taken from the "Manhattan District History, Book I, General, Volume 14, 'Intelligence and Security,' " (Classification SECRET) on file in the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., which will hereafter be referred to as Basic Document.

added to the Intelligence and Security Division because of certain technical abilities, worked side by side with CIC agents from the beginning and were taken into the Counter Intelligence Corps and assigned to the Manhattan District CIC Detachment in January 1943.

Organizational Changes Made

The Intelligence and Security Division was actually the outgrowth of many operational and administrative changes made to keep pace with the growth of the District and its increasing security needs. A resume of these changes is pertinent here to show CIC's part in the protection of what has been called "the War's best kept secret."

In June 1942, just prior to the actual inception of the Manhattan Engineer District, the Protective Security Section was established in accordance with OCE Circular #1070, dated 15 January 1942. 1st Lt W. A. Fogg was designated District Protective Security Officer. During the one year that this section functioned, there was established a personnel security program, a plant protection program, and limited programs for security education and for safeguarding military information. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, was responsible for Counter Intelligence activities, and Maj John Lansdale, Jr., acted as Liaison Officer between the Manhattan District and the War Department Military Intelligence Division.

The first important change came in February 1943, as by this time the work of the District had progressed sufficiently to make it apparent that a carefully planned counterintelligence program was necessary. Capt Horace K. Calvert and Capt Robert J. McLeod were sent to the Manhattan District to organize an intelligence section with Captain Calvert designated as District Intelligence Officer. Approximately two weeks later, two additional officers were assigned on detached service from the Counter Intelligence Corps to serve as assistants in the Intelligence Section.

The Commanding Generals of the Service Commands were notified that this section had been created, and were requested to designate an officer in the intelligence division of each Service Command to act as liaison officer with the Manhattan District Intelligence Section.[113] These liaison officers were informed that the Manhattan District was engaged in a project of great secrecy and importance; that knowledge of the Project and of the nature and extent of the program were to be confined to as few persons as possible, and that it would be necessary to utilize Service Command investigative facilities since certain elements of the project

113 Ltr, dtd 12 May 43, from Provost Marshal General to Commanding General, Each Service Command, subj: "Loyalty Investigations of Personnel of the Manhattan District, United States Engineers," attached as App 1.

were located in each of the Service Commands. These Service Command liaison officers were authorized to correspond directly with the Manhattan District Intelligence Section.

During the next three months, other Counter Intelligence Corps officers were obtained and stationed at the Clinton Engineer Works, at Chicago, at St. Louis, at Site "Y", and at Berkeley, and others were assigned to branch offices in various areas to serve as intelligence officers for Manhattan District activities. As the work progressed, some of the original offices were eliminated and others were opened, until by the end of World War II, the United States had been divided into 11 geographical subdivisions with a branch office in each.

In May 1943 the responsibility for personnel security was transferred from the Protective Security Section to the Intelligence Section and was immediately decentralized to the branch offices, each of which assumed responsibility for the investigation and clearance of all persons engaged on classified Manhattan District work within their geographical boundaries, which closely paralleled the Service Command boundaries.

The next major organizational change came in July 1943, when the Intelligence and the Protective Security Sections were consolidated and renamed the Intelligence and Security Division, with Captain Calvert in charge. In August 1943, the Intelligence and Security Division moved, along with Manhattan District headquarters, from New York to the Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. From then on until after the end of World War II, every aspect of the security of the Project was handled by this Division. New sections were created and organizational changes were made to meet changing demands brought about by the expansion of the Project.

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Organized

Although many Counter Intelligence Corps officers and agents had been working with the Manhattan Project almost from its inception, it was not until December 1943 that a CIC detachment actually was organized to be employed exclusively on District work. The need for this detachment had been seen for some time. In a complex espionage case which had occurred in April 1943, the difficulties encountered in having the Service Commands perform auxiliary investigations pointed up the need for a CIC organization capable of assuming all investigative responsibility for the District. On 18 December 1943, Maj Gen George B. Strong, Army G2, signed a memorandum for the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces authorizing the creation of a special Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of 25 officers and 137 enlisted agents.[114]

114 Ltr from Strong to CG, ASF, dtd 18 Dec 43, subj: "Organization of Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment for Manhattan Engineer District," (Conf), attached as App 2.

Captain Calvert and Captain McLeod went to the Staging Area at Camp Holabird, Maryland, and, through review of personnel files and by personal interview, selected 137 CIC agents. Among them were lawyers, technicians, former policemen, linguists, editors; all were specialists in some specific field. Many of these agents were scheduled for overseas assignments but, because of the high priority of the Manhattan Project, were withdrawn from shipping lists. The CIC officers already with the Intelligence and Security Division were also assigned to this new CIC detachment.

By letter dated 27 December 1943, General Strong notified the commanding generals of the Service Commands that they were relieved of counterintelligence responsibility for the Project, although their assistance might be required from time to time in cases of emergency and in maintaining routine liaison with other investigative agencies. With these changes, the District Intelligence Office, which formerly had functioned mainly as a staff unit, became an operational unit and was in a position to expedite investigations and to function more efficiently.[115]

By this time, the Security and Intelligence Division had assumed responsibility for plant and personnel security throughout the far flung installations that made up the Manhattan Project, including the installations at Oak Ridge, the Hanford Engineer Works, Site "Y", the University of California, Chicago University, Columbia University, and numerous other lesser installations. Even the preliminary investigations of federal crimes not of an intelligence nature, committed at Project sites, were made by Security and Intelligence personnel.

On 7 January 1944 Lt Col John Lansdale, Jr., was transferred from the War Department Military Intelligence Service to the CIC detachment as a special assistant to General Groves with full responsibility for all intelligence and security matters affecting the Project. This included the operation of a positive intelligence program and direct supervision over the counterintelligence and security programs of the Manhattan District.

For the next several months the Intelligence and Security Division expanded rapidly. In February 1944, Lt Col W. B. Parsons, former head of the CIC Advanced School in Chicago, was appointed Chief of the Division, replacing Major Calvert who had been sent to Europe on a mission connected with the Manhattan District. Additional plant inspectors were obtained from the Provost Marshal General, assigned to the Special Engineer Detachment, Manhattan District, and detailed to the Intelligence and Security Division for duty. Specially trained enlisted men were also selected from the Special Engineer Detachment and assigned to the Division to operate in undercover capacities and as consultants on technical investigations. This rapid expansion and the procurement of

115 Sample of letter from Strong to CG, each Service Command, dtd 27 Dec 43, subj: "Personnel on DSM Project," attached as App 3.

additional non-CIC enlisted personnel necessitated the creation in May 1944 of the 12th District CIC Unit, also commanded by Colonel Parsons. To simplify administration and since their work was so closely integrated, permission was obtained in January 1945 to transfer all the non-CIC military personnel to the Counter Intelligence Corps and assign them to the CIC Detachment, Manhattan District, thereby bringing the Detachments' strength to 148 officers and 161 enlisted men.[116] This personnel level remained fairly static throughout 1945. Thus, in name as well as in fact, the protection of the Manhattan Project became completely a CIC responsibility.

Numerous administrative and organizational changes were made until, by mid-1945, the Intelligence and Security Division was operating in six branches. Three of these, the Security Branch, the Administrative Branch, and the Clinton Engineer Works Branch operated under the supervision of Major McLeod, Deputy Chief; the other three, the Evaluation and Review Branch, the Branch for Safeguarding Military Information, and the Branch Offices Branch, were supervised by Capt Bernard W. Menke, Executive Officer.[117]

Administration Centralized at District Headquarters

For security reasons and to facilitate operational control, administration of the Detachment was centralized at the Manhattan District Headquarters at Oak Ridge. Agents were placed on detached service at the branch office headquarters or, in the case of Resident agents, at locations within the geographic boundaries of the branch offices. At times, the location of these agents was so highly classified that code symbols were used in referring to them and only the Finance Officer computing the pay of the agent was permitted to know his exact location. All records were maintained at Detachment headquarters, each branch office submitting a daily morning report by TWX. A single payroll was processed through the Finance Office in Knoxville, Tennessee; all orders were classified Confidential and per diem reimbursement for travel was paid by the Manhattan District Disbursing Officer. All travel vouchers were prepared by the Administration Section from itineraries forwarded by the various branch offices.

Special investigative equipment obtained from the CIC Depot at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, was issued by the Administration Branch to the various branch offices on memorandum receipts. Various types of cameras, sound detecting and recording equipment, guns ranging from two-inch detective specials to .30 caliber machine guns, fingerprint equipment, handcuffs, blackjacks, lock-pick sets, X-ray lamps, and shortwave radios were among the various types of equipment used. Central property records were maintained at the District headquarters at

116 Roster of Detachment attached as App 4.

117 Organizational chart of Intelligence and Security Division attached as App 5.

A uniform accounting system was established at all Branch offices, and periodic audits of all accounts were made by a special auditor for General Groves. The Administration Section also operated the mail and records and classified file sections of the Security and Intelligence Division which, for security reasons, had to be operated independently of the classified file and mail and records section of the Manhattan District.

Eventually the Administrative Section assumed responsibility for all civilian personnel at District Headquarters and processed routine personnel and company clearances.

Evaluation and Review Branch

In June 1944 an Evaluation and Review Branch was set up under Capt Curtis O. Clark to coordinate all subversive investigations and to prepare special reports daily and weekly for higher echelons.

Investigative Responsibility Subdivided

The Clinton Engineer Works Branch was responsible for supervision of all intelligence and security activities at the Clinton Engineer Works and the K-25, Y-12 and X-10 Area offices, and for investigation of all suspected subversive activities and security violations, while the Branch Offices Branch supervised and coordinated similar work in the eleven Branch office areas.

The Clinton Engineer Works Branch was subdivided into seven sections headed as follows: Guards, Maj Lloyd R. Block; Review Board, Capt Robert Tait; Intelligence, Capt George W. Remsen; Security, Capt James W. Haley; Tennessee Eastman Electromagnetic (Y-12) Plant Office, Capt Emmons B. Brown; Carbide and Carbon Diffusion (K-25) Plant Office, Maj Royden E. Johannessen; and Monsanto Chemicals (X-10) Plant Office, Lt Elmer A. McCaskill.

Eleven Branch Offices in Operation

By the end of the war, 11 Branch offices were operating throughout the country, their work being supervised and coordinated by the Branch Offices Branch at headquarters. The location and chiefs of these offices were: Boston, Massachusetts, Lt James E. Nolan; New York, New York, Capt B. S. Peeples; Baltimore, Maryland, Lt Harry R. Walsh; Cleveland, Ohio, Lt John R. Baskin;

Chicago, Illinois, Maj Grover C. Thompson; Grand Junction, Colorado, Capt Pearl P. Mountjoy; Santa Fe, New Mexico, Maj Thomas O. Jones; Berkeley, California, Capt John A. King, Jr.; Richland, Washington, Capt Lyalle E. Johnson; Washington, D.C., Capt Fred B. Rhodes, Jr.; and Pasadena, California, Capt Robert W. Kirkman. The organizational breakdown of each Branch office was similar to that of the District office and went through the same structural changes. The Branch Intelligence officers operated under the direct command of the District Intelligence Officer and also acted as members of the staffs of the various Area Engineers having responsibility for the installation located within the geographical boundaries of the Branch office.

End of War Brings Change

On 7 September 1945 the functions and operations of the Intelligence and Security Division were separated. The Area Engineer assumed responsibility for all activities in connection with production security, shipment security, personnel clearance, security education and minor security violations for all installations under their immediate supervision. Trained personnel were transferred to the Area Engineers' staffs to carry on this work. The Security Division of District headquarters, with Colonel Parsons as District Security Officer, served the District Engineer in a staff capacity. The Intelligence Unit, under the supervision of Maj Claude C. Pearce, was made responsible for conducting investigations of subversive allegations against Project personnel, sabotage, and safeguarding of military information type violations of a serious nature. It also was made responsible for all security and intelligence functions at site "Y" and its affiliates and at Washington, D.C., Branch Intelligence officers were made directly responsible to Major Pearce.

From the inception of the security program in 1942, it was recognized that the goal was two-fold: prevention of unintentional disclosure of information which might find its way to the enemy; and prevention of espionage and sabotage through infiltration of enemy agents. Measures taken to accomplish this two-fold goal generally fell into three broad classifications: physical security, education, and investigation. These general classifications will be treated separately in succeeding sections of this chapter.

Chapter 2

PHYSICAL SECURITY

The Security Branch, as it finally evolved, consisted of two subsections, Plant Protection and Shipments, both operating under Captain Haley, who coordinated and supervised all aspects of the security program in the many facilities engaged in the Manhattan Project. But much planning, organizing and reorganizing were accomplished before this final set-up was achieved. From the beginning it was recognized that the danger of espionage and sabotage would require that all possible measures be taken to prevent unauthorized entry and that employed personnel had to be controlled closely. It also was recognized that fires, explosions and other major accidents would cause delays equal in effect to deliberate sabotage. Any program of plant protection had to be all-inclusive to protect against these dangers.

Program Delayed by Personnel Lack

However, the lack of personnel experienced in plant protection delayed for a long time the development of an adequate program. Since comprehensive surveys covering all phases of plant security could not be made, the physical security provided at the various installations was largely dependent on "security mindedness" of area engineers, plant managers, research directors and security agents. The early security inspectors were concerned primarily with having the management designate a security agent who would be responsible for the security of District work at the facility and for reviewing and discussing the policies and procedures outlined in the protective security manuals. At a number of installations good security programs were developed, but some facilities were slow in providing the high degree of protection necessary for the nation's greatest secret and its most vital war production effort.

In the early days, because of the lack of personnel trained in security work, inspections were confined to those facilities engaged in highly classified work. The majority of the work at this time was concerned with research, design and development, but at some locations production of materials and equipment had been started. Although at this stage, the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands had full responsibility for the security of such facilities, it nevertheless was necessary in many cases, because of the highly classified nature of the work being performed, that the District assume this responsibility and to exclude Service Command representatives from these areas. Authorization for the assumption of this responsibility was not obtained from higher authority until 23 February 1943.

Program Launched in August 1943

It was not until August 1943, when sufficient plant protection personnel had been obtained, that a regular plant protection program was launched covering each of hundreds of vital plants and installations. A standard survey method was adopted to provide for prompt security surveys of all installations engaged on important work of interest to the District, including many suppliers of unclassified equipment, the prompt procurement of which was vital to the construction program.

The security standards established jointly by the Army and the Navy and published in "Plant Protection for Manufacturers," WD Pamphlet #32-1, dated 1 May 1943, were adopted as the basic plant protection policy. On the basis of these surveys, the particular contractors were informed as to essential measures necessary and were apprized of their security responsibilities. In many cases where contractors had neither the experience nor the personnel to take the required steps, it became necessary to assist them.

Full advantage was taken of the reports made by Service Command representatives and competent fire protection engineers of various insurance organizations. At the beginning, security inspections did not include fire prevention but on 20 September 1943 this responsibility was also assumed. From then on inspectors were alert to all conditions which might lead to sabotage, espionage, fire, explosions, major accidents, inadequate power and water supplies, labor trouble, and the improper handling of classified documents, any of which might cause interruptions to production or the compromise of classified information.

Plants Categorized from Security Viewpoint

In order to determine the degree of security which should be maintained at each facility, it was necessary to evaluate and constantly reevaluate the relative importance of each of the facilities engaged on the Project. Close liaison was maintained with area engineers and their technical staffs, so that the security program might remain consistent with the production and development program which was frequently subject to major changes.

By 15 April 1944 all facilities which were doing work of a classified nature or work important from the "continuity of production" standpoint had been surveyed. In June 1944, three general categories of facilities were established. Facilities in which interruption or delay of construction would definitely and seriously delay the Project were identified as "A" facilities; those in which interruption or delay would cause a minor delay were identified as "B"; and others supplying critical materials or performing classified work not of "A" or "B" importance were identified as "C" facilities. For example, the Tennessee Eastman Corporation and Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation plants at Oak Ridge and the Hanford Engineer Works at Hanford were classified "A".

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Facilities such as the Linde Air Products Company, Tonawanda, New York, and the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, St. Louis, Missouri, which were supplying uranium in various forms, were first placed in the "A" category but as duplicate suppliers became available and a stockpile was built up, these plants were given a "B" rating. Machine shops, such as the Distel Tool and Machine Company, and the Mercury Engineering Company, Detroit, Michigan, supplying parts to the Chrysler Corporation, an "A" facility, were placed in the "C" classification because substitute shops would be quickly available in the event production was interrupted.

Each facility which was surveyed was given an overall rating of "poor," "fair," "good," or "excellent" as applicable, with specific recommendations for any necessary improvement. Area Engineers were instructed that the security of "A" facilities should rate not lower than good and "B" facilities not lower than fair. Schedules for resurveys were based on the relative importance of the facility and its security rating. For example, an "A" facility which rated less than "good" was scheduled for monthly resurvey. In the early months of 1945, the list of facilities being surveyed averaged 450 installations. In the 12-month period from 1 July 1944 to 1 July 1945, approximately 1,036 surveys were made.

Upon receipt of a survey report, the Area Engineer instituted such action as he deemed necessary to provide protection in accordance with the findings of the report. For example, at the recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Division, a completely new security organization was set up at the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Company for better coordination of the security activities of the very important gas diffusion plant (K 25) area at Oak Ridge. Also, on the recommendation of the plant protection representative, the Decatur Area Engineer authorized the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation to install automatic sprinkler systems to improve greatly the fire protection in several vital warehouses and process areas containing combustible materials, at a cost of approximately $13,000. Again, upon the suggestion of the District representatives, a vital experimental chemical process at Yale University was, within a week, completely relocated and protected to eliminate an explosion hazard considered so serious that operations were otherwise to be suspended by the research director.

"Security" was by no means an exact science, since the seriousness of the hazards often could not be definitely determined. All protection was considered relative; therefore security measures depended upon balancing potential hazards against calculated risks. Full consideration had to be given to the cost of providing security. The maintenance of adequate guard forces was one of the major security expenses. In January 1945 there were more than 5,000 civilian guards protecting various important installations concerned in some way with the Manhattan District Project at an approximate cost of one million dollars a month. In addition, at the principal sites there were about 800 U.S. Army Military Police. Following V-E Day and V-J Day appropriate adjustments were made, based upon a

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careful evaluation of the need for such expensive guarding. For instance, a guard force of 855 at the Tennessee Eastman Corporation Plant in January 1945 was reduced by December 1945 to 444.

Agents Assist in Prior Planning

Although the security survey program was the keystone of the plant protection program, it was early recognized that a far more effective program could be developed if the representatives of the Security and Intelligence Division could take an active part in setting up the program in a particular facility before the weaknesses had an opportunity to develop. At the principal sites it was soon discovered that contractors had neither the experience nor the personnel to set up adequate security organizations. It became necessary for CIC agents to assist in the actual procurement and training of security personnel, the establishment of security procedures and the procurement of equipment and supplies for security activities. In many instances agents were able to review plans for fencing, lighting, patrol roads, towers, gates, and identification systems before they had been constructed or put into effect. Also plans for buildings and water supply systems were closely scrutinized to check the adequacy of fire protection features.

During the construction of the K 25 and K 27 Plants of the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation at Oak Ridge, representatives of the District Intelligence and Security Division worked constantly with the construction officer and contractor to incorporate into the construction practicable measures to prevent sabotage, espionage, fires and explosions. When one chemical company was making plans for a new plant to process uranium, CIC agents were called in to advise on maximum fire protection measures and adequate safeguards for the ether extraction operation, and when the Monsanto Chemical Company at Dayton, Ohio, took over a new site, a plant security inspector met with company officials to discuss methods to be employed in fencing, lights, guarding, identification systems and fire protection. Security personnel worked very closely with the Eastman Corporation during the planning of its new final process building, and all possible measures were incorporated into the design to assure that only authorized personnel would be given entry to areas concerned with the vital final product.

Although the principles of protection remained the same, standards and requirements varied in their application throughout the various facilities engaged on the Manhattan Project. In general, security surveys and resulting recommendations provided for protection designed to prevent unauthorized entry and to control personnel.

Fencing, Screening, Effective Barriers

Fencing and screening were considered the most effective barriers; entrances were kept at a minimum and were locked and guarded at all times; lighting was

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provided to aid observation and, in certain cases, burglar alarm systems were installed. A well trained guard force was considered the principal enforcement agency to prevent unauthorized entry and to facilitate the detection of unauthorized entry, an identification system involving the use of identification cards and badges was established. Restricted areas were established, especially where regular plant employees, still uncleared, were working in the vicinity.

Visitors Carefully Controlled

In December 1942 when the District Personnel Security program was established, it was apparent that the same degree of control would have to be applied to visitors as was exercised over the selection and assignment of personnel to be regularly employed on highly classified work. It was necessary to insure that only individuals of known loyalty, who could definitely contribute to the advancement of the work at the installation visited, would be given access to areas where Manhattan District classified work was being performed. Each visitor was required to obtain written authorization from the District Engineer or his representative prior to his visit. Since most of the visits were between units of the Project, most persons who had occasion to visit a particular facility had already been cleared. Visitors who were not regularly engaged on the Project were investigated before being issued written authorization by the District Engineer. Visits were limited to those who were engaged on a particular phase of the Project.

The original system was revised in order to simplify mechanics and to assure uniformity. A standard printed pass was adopted which could be completed in less time than formerly and at the same time assure that certain personnel safeguards had been complied with. However, numerous problems were encountered which could not be solved completely. Since each contractor considered his visit urgent, there often was not time to arrange clearance and written authorization for a visit to an installation sometimes thousands of miles from the office of the District Area Engineer, and teletype and telephone clearances and authorizations became more and more frequent. Although there was no means of eliminating the necessity of resorting to certain short cuts, it was believed that experience proved that the basic policy upon which the system was founded was complied with throughout this period.

Physical Protection Considered Successful

In general the whole plant protection program was considered to have been successful. This was revealed in a study showing that during the history of the project up to 31 December 1945 there was no known compromise of classified information or damage to buildings, equipment, or materials which could be ascribed to the lack of physical protection against espionage or sabotage. Much credit was attributed to the many guards and Military Police who carefully checked credentials and badges of all personnel passing through the gates. Attempts to

crash the gates and run through road blocks were relatively few and only occasionally was it necessary to use firearms to stop a fleeing car or person ignoring a guard's challenge. One such incident resulted in a fatality. On another occasion, at the University of Chicago's West End Laboratories, a stranger was successful in evading the notice of a guard upon entering the classified area, but was apprehended in a few minutes.

Fire Prevention Program Effective

It was felt that stress placed on preventing fires and explosions had been worth while inasmuch as there were no serious construction or production interruptions attributable to these causes. Considering the fire hazards of some of the supply and research and warehouse facilities, serious fires might have resulted in costly delays in completing the mission. Fires originating from the spontaneous ignition of uranium in the form of turnings and grindings presented a serious problem at the Hanford Engineer Works, the University of Chicago and at a number of other plants processing uranium metal. Safeguards devised through studies made by plant protection personnel kept these fires at a minimum in both storage and transit and prevented this hazard from leading to any costly fires in vital production buildings and equipment.

Shipment Protection System Inaugurated

As a result of a survey made in November 1943, a Shipment Section was set up as a subsection under the Security Branch. During the early months of the Manhattan District Project, classified materials had been shipped among the various installations engaged on work for the Project in accordance with the general War Department policies prescribed for the safeguarding of all military information. In addition, from July 1942 to July 1943, the District Protective Security Section assisted and advised the responsible Area Engineers in providing necessary security measures to safeguard these materials.

It was not until the latter part of 1943 that the manifold problems related to shipment of many highly classified or hazardous materials made special consideration necessary. With the greatly increased volume of shipments, it became evident that close control would have to be exercised over these shipments and, in many cases, material involved would require special handling. Materials were being shipped in broadly fluctuating quantities between widely scattered installations, and security aspects were constantly changing. As a result of the November 1943 survey, a shipment security program was initiated to provide uniformity in the handling and shipment of classified materials. Guard pools, a courier system and other security measures were established, methods of transportation were prescribed, and special precautionary procedures to be followed in the case of shipment of certain vital products, materials and equipment were decided upon.

In February 1944 a guard pool consisting of 20 guards was established at Chicago, Illinois, under supervision of the Chicago Branch Office, and in May, a force of six men was set up in Wilmington, Delaware, under the supervision of the Wilmington Area Engineer. Later, the size of these guard pools was increased to 38 men and eight men respectively. All guards were sworn in as Auxiliary Military Police by the Service Commands and were armed. They were assigned primarily to guard rail shipments and truck convoy movements. All shipments of uranium billets being sent from eastern plants to Hanford were consolidated at Chicago and transported from that point as a single shipment, with guards from the Chicago pool providing the necessary protection. On the return trip from Hanford, these guards were utilized to protect shipments of classified scrap metal and turnings from Hanford, Washington, to plants in the mid-west and east for reprocessing. Guards were also drawn from the Chicago pool to protect truck movements of classified materials between various facilities and between facilities and the sites. In general, a policy was followed of using guard couriers on all shipments of secret material by either rail or motor whenever the high dollar value of the material or the urgency of delivery was of prime importance.

Under the courier system originally set up, all top secret documents and materials were to be carried by officer personnel when available and otherwise by CIC agents. In January 1945, it was decided that officer personnel only should be used for this purpose. Accordingly, approximately 25 officers were procured to form an officer courier pool and were assigned to Oak Ridge, New York, Chicago, Santa Fe, and Richland. In addition, guard couriers as well as officers were used to transport small but vitally important quantities of highly classified material by rail. They frequently traveled in civilian clothes and carried the material in ordinary luggage in order to avoid attracting attention. They were instructed to keep the material in their immediate physical possession in a locked compartment on the train at all times and to transport the material to and from the train by armed guard escorts. In March 1945, courier shipments of radioactive materials had become so numerous that it became necessary to give special consideration to the possible health hazards to the courier personnel. Since they were traveling in closed compartments in trains with the material in their immediate physical possession, it was felt that some method should be used to determine the degree of exposure experienced. Film badges were issued to couriers to carry on their persons during each trip. At the conclusion of each trip these badges were forwarded to the medical section for checking. Through December 1945, no serious exposures of personnel had been experienced.

When the use of guards or couriers on classified shipments was not possible or feasible, other substitute security measures consistent with the particular situation were taken. Special arrangements were made to equip railway cars with special seals and to make individual checks of cars at stops along the route.

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Measures taken on truck shipments included the use of special containers for materials, seals on the trucks, investigation of drivers, and special instructions in handling the shipment.

Eight Shipment Methods Used

It had been determined by the November 1943 survey that the selection of proper methods for shipping District materials would involve many considerations in addition to the classification of the materials themselves. Some of the more important factors were delivery time, size and weight, shipping costs, government and commercial restrictions, value and characteristics of the material, proper utilization of manpower and continuity of production. With these various considerations in mind, eight different methods of shipment, providing various degrees of security, were set up. These were: (1) railway express, carload, hand-to-hand signature, armed guard service; (2) railway express, less-than-carload, hand-to-hand signature, armed guard service; (3) rail freight, carload, sealed cars; (4) rail freight, carload, Manhattan District guards; (5) motor freight, commercial carrier, truck load, sealed truck; (6) motor freight, commercial carrier, truck load or less-than-truck-load, Manhattan District guards on trucks or in convoy car; (7) motor freight, government trucks, truck load or less-than-truck-load, Manhattan District guards on truck or in convoy car; (8) courier, special agents and Manhattan District guards, rail or air travel, closed space when required.

As a result of a study made in January 1944, it was decided that services of the Railway Express Money Department could be utilized to advantage by the District for intermittent shipments of classified material. Accordingly, instructions were issued regarding the use of this method.

Shipments of highly classified basic materials such as uranium metal, ores and oxides, special chemicals and other metals were carried by rail freight. In many cases these were consigned between individuals in order to conceal the identity of commercial firms engaged in processing classified material. Rail freight also was used to haul large size highly classified equipment between manufacturing plants and from manufacturing plants to the site. Where practicable, shipment was made in sealed railway cars. In some cases, however, because of the size and construction of units, it was necessary to place them on railway flatcars and use tarpaulin coverings. Large quantities of secret material were transported from Linde Air Products Company, Tonawanda, New York, to Houdaille-Hershey, Decatur, Illinois, by sealed commercial motor vans. After the material was processed into secret containers, the containers were then carried to the Chrysler Corporation, Detroit, Michigan, by government trucks with armed Auxiliary Military Police drivers. After the containers were installed in larger units these large and bulky units were shipped by railway flatcar and were protected from view by tarpaulin.

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In February 1945, a truck convoy system was established to transport end products from Hanford and the Clinton Laboratories to sites "T" and "Y". These convoys were in charge of officers with enlisted men and CIC agents acting as special guards. They were set up to move continuously to destinations with a complete change in personnel at the half-way point. Other motor truck shipments, such as regular shipments of uranium hexaflouride from a chemical company in Cleveland, Ohio, to the K 25 plant at Oak Ridge, were made in government trucks with armed Auxiliary Military Police drivers dressed in plain clothes.

During July 1945, when activities at site "Y" were in the most critical stage, air transport was used on three occasions to expedite the delivery of U-235 from the Y 12 plant at Oak Ridge. Arrangements were made with Army Air Forces to have a transport plane ready at Knoxville Airport at an appointed hour on each occasion. The material was transferred from the Y 12 plant to the airport by special military escort and accompanied on the plane trip by two officer couriers from the Shipment Security Section. A military escort was again provided from the Santa Fe Airport to site "Y". Numerous other classified shipments by ATC planes were made when urgency of shipment was paramount.

All of the important shipments of highly classified materials were handled exclusively by Manhattan District personnel. Top Secret materials were transported on hundreds of occasions either by officers traveling as passengers in trains, planes or automobiles or by truck convoys operated by military personnel under the command of officers. In every case, deliveries were completed without delay or unusual incident. Several minor vehicular accidents occurred; however, these were on practice runs or return trips and in no way jeopardized the safe delivery of material. Occurrences of lost, misrouted or damaged shipments of materials being carried by common carrier were few, but in every case full investigation showed that the incident was the result of normal operational hazards and not of subversive origin. On two occasions trucks carrying uranium oxide were involved in serious accidents. CIC agents, immediately dispatched to the scene, protected the shipments until new transportation was obtained. In one instance, a container of uranium grindings being shipped by railway express ignited spontaneously while standing on the station platform at Fort Wayne, Indiana. Flames shot 30 feet into the air and caused considerable local alarm and consternation among Railway Express officials. No damage resulted other than the loss of the material. District security officers contacted Railway Express officials and satisfied them that the District would take necessary steps to prevent a reoccurrence.

Considering the volume of classified shipments, the program was considered unusually successful. For example, it was estimated that during the 13 months prior to 31 December 1945, 18 officer couriers traveled approximately 832,000 miles. During this time they never lost or mislayed a bag, package or document

entrusted to them, nor did they even miss a train connection. During the same period government trucks, sometimes in convoys, traveled 300,000 miles carrying classified material without mishap.

Chapter 3

SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION

During the early stages of the Manhattan Project the safeguarding of military information was handled mainly by instructing Project personnel in the meaning of classified information and the proper methods of handling, transmitting and caring for this material. The Protective Security manual, prepared in February 1943, emphasized the need for safeguarding classified information and set forth the rules for handling classified documents. Distribution of this manual and an explanation of its provisions constituted the Safeguarding of Military Information (SMI) program.

Special Section Created

Indications that foreign agents were making concerted efforts to obtain information concerning the Project made obvious the need for an intensive program to impress all personnel connected with the Project with the necessity for protecting this information. With this purpose in mind, a new section known as the Safeguarding Military Information Branch, was created in September 1943, under the direction of Lt Nicholas Del Genio, a CIC agent who had special training and experience in this subject. Lieutenant Del Genio set up a program divided into three distinct phases: security of information, security education, and censorship of publications. In November 1943, Intelligence Bulletin #5, "Safeguarding Military Information Regulations," was prepared, embodying in understandable form all information concerning the care and handling of classified information with definitions and illustrations of Restricted, Confidential, and Secret categories. In this bulletin certain additions and modifications to the rules of AR 380-5 were made in order to make it practicable and usable by large numbers of civilians and contractor personnel. In March 1944, this bulletin was revised to include the newly created Top Secret category. Studies were made of equipment, materials, products, processes, operations and administrative matters of the District in order to provide a basis for determining the proper classification of each of these items and the correspondence concerning them.

"Need To Know" Policy Followed

A policy of strict compartmentalization under which persons and facilities were furnished only such information as was necessary was initiated and later intensified. Laboratories, universities, plants and contractors were not permitted to obtain information concerning the overall structure of work of the District and were furnished only the data which their operations required. When practicable, assembly of equipment was performed in places other than those in which the manufacturing took place, and the processing of raw materials was broken down in such a way that it was done in various stages at scattered

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locations. The existence and relationships to one another of the various Project sites and the relation of the contractors, laboratories, and universities to one another and to the Project were concealed insofar as possible to prevent persons from acquiring knowledge of the scope or nature of the Project.

Code names were designed for the principal Project sites as well as for the basic materials and equipment and even for some of the personnel employed on the Project. Since the background and training of many of the Project's scientists were of such character and so well known that their connection with the District would indicate the nature of its work, elaborate care was taken to refer to them by code names and to avoid any publicity concerning them.

Since the immensity of the Manhattan District required the assistance and cooperation of key government agencies, the Intelligence and Security Division reviewed a large amount of official correspondence carried on with these agencies in order to insure the omission of as much information as possible concerning the scope and operation of the Project. For example, requests to Selective Service offices for deferment of key personnel were screened to insure omission of descriptive terms about the applicant's duties which would indicate the nature of the activity. In like manner, requests to War Manpower Commission offices in regard to needed personnel omitted terms and phrases which would reveal the nature of the work carried on by the District. Similarly, correspondence with other agencies such as the War Labor Board in connection with union and contractor negotiations was reviewed to minimize the disclosure of classified information.

Education Program Carried On

A well integrated and continuous security education program was carried on with the goal in mind that all District personnel, military and civilian, would become instinctively so security conscious that: classified documents, information and material would be properly handled and safeguarded; loose talk would be minimized; that no information of value would be disclosed by word or action to the enemy or to those not properly authorized to receive it. Under the direction of the Safeguarding Military Information Branch, the various Branch intelligence officers supervised the work of the security agents who had been appointed by individual contractors and provided them with educational material and ideas.[118]

Dangers of "Loose Talk" Stressed

As in any educational program of this nature, it was necessary first to overcome the natural inclination to discuss with friends items of great interest.

118 Intell Bulletin #3, dtd 15 Sep 43, is attached as App 6 in illustration of the type of materials sent to the various facilities.

Because of the extreme secrecy maintained concerning the work of the Project, the majority of the workers did not know what was being done on it, and because of the rules of compartmentalization, they did not know of the existence of other Project sites about the country, what other plants at their own sites were doing, or what work the other departments in their own plants were performing. It was necessary to impress upon them the fact that, although they had no knowledge of the actual purpo e of the Project, they nevertheless did have important information through their knowledge of types of equipment used, materials handled, size of buildings and the number of people on the job; and that the enemy could, by piecing together these isolated bits of information, obtain valuable knowledge of the Project. Appealing to individual patriotism and loyalty to the fighting men, employees were told that the less publicity given the Project the more difficult it would be for the enemy to acquire information about it and the greater would be the element of surprise. Not only did this program of security education suceed in preventing undue publicity about the District and minimize rumors and speculation which could have resulted in damaging effect, but it also strengthened the plant protection program as well by helping the personnel to understand the reasons for identification regulations and other requirements and by prompting them to report unusual incidents and suspicious circumstances or persons.

Security Education Continuous

By the fall of 1944 the overall program had been so developed that employees received security instruction from the day of employment through the day of termination. New employees were given security talks outlining their security responsibility on the new job and were furnished leaflets which explained the security requirements for the Project. New employees signed secrecy declarations stating they would not divulge classified information to unauthorized persons. Security agents conducted periodic meetings at which security lectures were given or training films were shown. Security posters, handbills, circulars and notices were continually displayed and distributed to employees. Payroll inserts and telephone stickers were employed as constant reminders of security responsibility. At the principal Project sites, flash movies trailers, containing security messages similar to the type used on posters and handbills, were frequently shown in theaters. Frequent editorials were published in Project newspapers stressing the importance of security information. Editorials and security talks prepared by the Safeguarding Military Information Section often made use of news events to emphasize the importance of security. The invasion of the continent of Europe through Normandy was used as an illustration of the success which could be obtained largely because of the secrecy with which the action had been guarded. The landings of German agents on the Atlantic coast were used as illustrations of the need for safeguarding Project information in conversations and correspondence.

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Corrective Action Taken in 1,200 Violations

Corrective action was taken in more than 1,200 violations of procedures for handling classified material between September 1943 and the end of December 1945. A common violation was the failure of various officers to lock safes containing classified material. At District Headquarters and at most other facilities where classified material was used, guards made tours shortly after closing time to check all safes. When a safe was found unlocked, an effort was made to contact the person responsible and instruct him to return to the office and check the contents to be certain they had not been disturbed. Other violations included the failure to put classified waste in proper burn baskets, failure to enclose secret and confidential mail in double envelopes, failure to send secret material by registered mail, and similar violations of Army rules for the handling and the disposition of classified material. For his first violation a Project employee was usually reprimanded, informed of the possible application of the espionage act and warned not to repeat the violation. Particularly flagrant violations or repetition of previous violations usually resulted in the employee's termination or his removal from all work involving access to classified material. If the person was other than a Project employee, an appeal was made to him to refrain from any further such violations, and an effort was made to stop the spread of the information already disclosed by making similar appeals to all persons to whom he had made the disclosure. It was estimated that about two-thirds of the cases of unauthorized disclosure involved Project employees.

Secrecy Declarations Required

All personnel, military and civilian, were required to execute declarations of secrecy and were given interviews upon separation to remind them of their responsibility for the protection of classified Project information. All scientific articles written by Project technical personnel, referring to this particular work or not, were screened prior to release. Personnel were instructed not to make personal notes or records from classified documents or equipment. All consultants on the Project were required to execute personal history statements and were given instructions in security matters prior to performing work for the District.

These security principles were applied to contractor facilities away from the Project sites, as well as those located on principal sites, by the Branch Security and Intelligence officer. Constant checks were made of the contractors' knowledge of and compliance with security information and regulations. Reports of security surveys were reviewed by the Section for Safeguarding Military Information to insure that standards commensurate with the classification of the contracts were being met. Labor recruiting teams were instructed not to divulge any classified information in their personnel recruitment programs, and contractors were warned not to use their firm names in return addresses on envelopes used in correspondence with the Manhattan District. Contractors were given instructions

to omit from registration statements for the Securities and Exchange Commission any information that might be considered classified by the Manhattan District. Upon the termination of a contract, surveys were made to see that all classified documents and materials had been returned to the District or that adequate safeguarding measures had been taken.

Newspaper Cooperation Obtained

Considerable public relations work was done in cities and towns located near principal Project sites in persuading newspapers to omit stories and news items which would disclose the scope or nature of the work, attract undue attention to it or unduly emphasize its secrecy. To avoid harmful rumors and speculation, it was considered important to secure the good will of nearby communities. This was done by pointing out in speeches made to civic groups that Manhattan officials were aware of the additional wartime burdens on the communities, including labor shortages, crowded living conditions and increased traffic problems, and that they were trying in every way to minimize these hardships.

Victory "Let-Down" Anticipated

In anticipation of the possible relaxation of security with the fall of Germany, elaborate plans were made to offset this possibility. Posters, handbills and editorials were prepared and distributed in advance to all Branch Offices which in turn distributed them to the company security agents. Upon the announcement of V-E Day, these materials were immediately displayed to remind all personnel that rigid security requirements were still in effect. Similar posters were prepared for immediate display after the dropping of the first Atomic Bomb and the public release of information concerning it. After this release of information, greater emphasis was placed on the close alliance of security officials with management, on the job superintendents, foremen, supervisors and technical leaders. Frequent meetings were held with such groups for discussion of security problems and the adoption of a realistic program regarding the information still to be protected. Employees were continually reminded through various educational media of the types of information concerning the Project which should not be discussed. The principal criteria for information that had been released was Dr H. D. Smyth's report "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes under the Auspices of the United States Government," commonly known as "The Smyth Report."

Publications Scanned for Atomic Information

From July 1942 to February 1943 a few leading daily newspapers and a few periodicals were scanned by the censorship section for items of interest to the District or concerning its key personnel. In the spring of 1943, with the establishment of the District Intelligence Section, the coverage of newspapers and

periodicals was increased and a Wac was assigned to scan newspapers and periodicals published prior to that date. In September 1943 this censorship review work was placed under the then newly organized Safeguarding Military Information Branch where a Wac in that office continued the review of publications. A second Wac was added for this work in December 1943 and a third Wac in June 1944, and the Branch Intelligence Officers began reviewing leading newspapers published in their areas. In the spring of 1944, a survey was made of the completeness of the coverage of newspapers and periodicals, and additional assignments were made to each of the branch offices to insure complete coverage of the leading periodicals in their area. Three-hundred-seventy newspapers and 70 magazines were constantly reviewed until after public release of the Atomic Bomb had been made.

Reviewers of these publications were alert not only for violations or near violations of the censorship code but also for publicity pertaining to scientific developments related to the work of the District, for information concerning similar scientific work being done in foreign countries and for publicity about secret weapons developed by Allied and enemy countries which might be related to District work. Publicity regarding key personnel and principal Project sites was carefully reviewed to analyze the nature and amount of information being circulated and to determine whether such information included classified matter. Items concerning strikes and labor situations in key industrial areas where plants doing District work were located were also analyzed. Censors also were alert to any violations or near violations of the censorship code, in accordance with a confidential letter issued by Byron Price, Director of Censorship, on 28 June 1943, in which all editors and broadcasters were requested to avoid any mention of atomic energy or of any of the various elements with which the Project was experimenting. Technical trade journals and magazines were reviewed to learn the schedule of meetings of scientific groups so that such meetings could be attended by District personnel to ascertain whether scientific matters related to District work were discussed. Scientific books treating topics related to the work of the District were reviewed to detect any statements that the Army or the Government was interested in a particular work. These publications were also reviewed to follow the progress of current research at other facilities and by persons not connected with the District.

Few possibilities of compromise through published information were overlooked. When one CIC agent noticed that the pages concerning uranium in new manuals and reference books in the library were showing signs of use, agents were set to producing signs of wear in other sections of hundreds of library volumes.[119]

119 New Yorker Magazine, 27 Oct 45, Vol XXI, #37, "A Reporter at Large: The Top Top Secret." (This source is used as a reference since the official Manhattan District History mentioned the New Yorker account as accurate; furthermore, most of the facts contained in the New Yorker article are also in the official Manhattan District History.)

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All items containing possible censorship violations were forwarded by branch offices to the Safeguarding Military Information Branch where further analysis was made. If they were deemed violations, they were forwarded to the Office of Censorship which had the responsibility of contacting the appropriate editor or broadcaster, explaining to him the violation and requesting his cooperation in the future.

Strangely, some of these violations included letters to the editors of well known newspapers criticizing the Army for not getting busy with atomic weapons. "Hints point to the earlier realization of the Atomic Bomb," one optimistic reader wrote to the Toledo Blade in December 1944. "A special substance said to have amazing potentialities could, if it is automatically exploded the right way, insure victory." The University of Chicago's Maroon, shortly after V-E Day, praised the school for having a monopoly of Nobel prize winners and said, "Compton and His colleagues are working on problems fraught with tremendous possibilities to mankind: problems of releasing atomic energy." A Cleveland reporter, after spending a vacation near Los Alamos, New Mexico, wrote a story entitled "The Forbidden City." He said, "The Mr Big of the city is a college professor, Dr J. Robert Oppenheimer, called a second Einstein. A widespread belief is that he is developing ordnance and explosives. Supporters of this guess argue that it accounts for the number of mechanics working on the production of a single device, and there are others who will tell you tremendous explosions have been heard." The repercussion from these articles, however, was almost nil.

On 1 December 1943, a new code continuing the confidential directive of 28 June 1943, was issued to editors and broadcasters by the Office of Censorship.

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Chapter 4

INVESTIGATION: CIC'S MAJOR JOB

The elaborate physical security and educational measures previously discussed were designed to minimize the possibility of unintentional disclosure of information which might find its way to the enemy. But these measures could not give protection against the possibility of enemy infiltration or the compromise of information by persons whose lack of character and integrity would make them impervious to education in security measures or even make them suspect of approachability by enemy agents. It was early recognized that access to classified information must be restricted to those persons and business firms whose loyalty, integrity and discretion had been clearly established.

Basic Personnel Clearance Procedures Set

Personnel clearance procedures underwent several modifications as the District expanded and the conditions changed. In the beginning, all employees were divided into two classes, and later three, according to the type of information to which they would have access. Basic clearance requirements for individuals included positive identification, personnel security questionnaires or personal history statements, fingerprint checks and proof of citizenship or alien registration. These basic procedures were applied to all Manhattan District personnel and to employees of all contractors who were doing work for the Project. Basic procedures for company clearances included a check of the War Department G2 files, a Dunn and Bradstreet credit report and an agency check of key personnel. Additional investigations of companies and individuals were governed by the extent and type of information to which access must be given and by any doubts raised during the basic investigation. From the beginning of the Project until August 1945, approximately 400,000 employees and approximately 600 companies had been subjected to basic investigations.

Preliminary file checks eliminated many persons from employ. For example, one applicant, the author of a book on the structure of the atom, who had been employed on independent research in atomic energy for two years, was denied employment when a preliminary check showed that he was in contact with known subversive organizations.

FBI fingerprint file checks kept several thousand individuals from work with the Manhattan District, and in addition aided in the apprehension of many individuals wanted by other government agencies. Arrest records turned up by these checks ranged from speeding and disorderly conduct charges to murder, arson, rape, narcotics addiction, mayhem and other major crimes. One individual's record indicated that he had been arrested 116 times for bootlegging. Several escaped convicts, parole violators and deserters were apprehended.

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One man, however, who was about to be served by a process server for an increase in alimony, was spirited away by CIC agents to work on the Project, after investigation had indicated that he was otherwise all right.[120]

As an aid in eliminating unnecessary investigation, a master list of unemployables was distributed periodically to all contractors; and personnel were prohibited from transferring from one District installation to another except when such transfer was directed in the interest of the Project.

CIC agents were sent out with recruitment teams so that they might be able to eliminate obvious security risks during the initial interview. Alfred P. Ashton, one of the agents who worked for a while on this duty, recalled later that, during the first week, the team to which he was attached recruited 20 persons during the first week and put them on the train for Los Alamos. However, all but two or three were refused employment because they were not so highly skilled as they had seemed to be. Ashton made the suggestion that someone who knew the required qualifications be added to the team. This suggestion was adopted and largely eliminated this problem. Recruitment was also speeded up by making the first contacts with qualified electricians by mail, also at Ashton's suggestion.[121]

CIC Agents Employ Various Procedures

It was in the field of more complete investigations, those predicated upon a doubt raised during a preliminary investigation, or when a person was shown to have access to extremely sensitive information, that CIC agents were called upon to employ every known type of investigative technique to counter the accepted fact that the enemy would learn of the Project and would attempt to exploit that information. CIC had to assume the responsibility for the investigation of all persons suspected of disloyalty or disaffection; all incidents having possible espionage, sabotage or subversive significance; all unauthorized disclosure of classified Project information; and a considerable number of miscellaneous cases the import of which might endanger the Project's security. In attaining this objective, six types of counterintelligence investigations were performed: personnel, espionage, sabotage, general subversive, violations of the safeguarding of military information, and miscellaneous.

By the end of 1945, the Counter Intelligence Corps had handled more than 1,000 general subversive investigations; more than 1,500 cases of loose talk or leakage of information to unauthorized persons; approximately 100 cases in which espionage seemed to be probable; and approximately 200 cases where sabotage could have been present. According to the official Manhattan District History,

120 Interview with Alfred P. Ashton, Baltimore, Md, at NCICA Convention, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 6 Aug 55.

121 Ibid

these statistics measure only to a partial extent the quantity of work performed, since a number of additional tasks fell to CIC because of the unique position held by the Manhattan District.

Priority Requirements Make Investigations Difficult

Generally the extent of the personnel investigations was in direct proportion to the opportunity which the position afforded for obtaining classified information. Certain classified risks had to be taken in the case of the employee who was considered irreplaceable and whose removal would have retarded the progress of the work; such an employee was retained even though his loyalty might be questionable. This policy of giving first priority to getting the job done placed added responsibility on the investigators who of necessity had to follow the activities of such persons closely. Other calculated risks included certain key personnel whose recent migration to the United States make a complete background investigation impossible. These conditions, together with the recognition that human nature is apt to prove unpredictable when subjected to unusual pressure, necessitated more or less continuous watch over important Project employees.

The first known espionage case occurred in April 1943 when a non-District employee, whose loyalty to the United States was questionable, solicited and received classified information from a then unidentified Project employee. There also were indications that plans had been made to attempt to attain additional Project information at periodic intervals for transfer to a foreign government. Upon learning of this scheme, immediate steps were taken to identify this Project employee and to thwart the plan to establish an espionage channel. Specially selected agents were rushed to the area where the information had been obtained and after a few weeks of intensive surveillance, were able to identify the employee who had passed the information. They continued extensive surveillance and investigation of this employee, his associates, and many other Project employees whose loyalty appeared doubtful after preliminary investigation.

Agents Assume Various Covers

Provided with suitable background cover stories, agents, placed in strategic positions within the Project, were of great assistance as listening posts among suspected employees and in locating persons who warranted more than the usual investigation. An undercover office even was established in this area, operating ostensibly as the office of a magazine subscription company and later as an insurance adjustment agency.

Agents with the Manhattan District earned more than $60,000 in pay from their undercover civilian jobs, all of which was turned over to the United States Treasury.[122]

Other such surveillance squads were organized in the District to supplement personnel investigations as these activities were intensified. These specially trained agents maintained close surveillance of District personnel believed to be most likely to transmit classified Project information to unauthorized persons. Reports from all parts of the District were carefully reviewed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to determine: the members of any espionage network, including both District and non-District employees; the modus operandi for infiltrating Project installations; evidence of activities inspired by any foreign government; and any connection between similar activities at District installations even though widely separated geographically. Other espionage attempts were detected, but it was felt at that time that prompt action and intensified investigative activity in each case prevented the passing of any substantial amount of Project information.

Agents Become Proficient in Techniques

The CIC special agents assigned to espionage cases became proficient in all phases of investigative techniques. Many of them displayed skill and ingenuity unsurpassed by the most experienced investigators. Pictures of certain individuals and activities were obtained by the use of a telephoto lens or a special camera that could be concealed in the hand. On occasions, agents borrowed the equipment of street photographers or enlisted the assistance of night club photographers to obtain certain pictures.

Agents impersonated men of all occupations in order to obtain information. One agent worked as a hotel clerk for more than two years, while another worked as a bellhop and became bell captain in a few months. Agents posed as electricians, painters, exterminators, contractors and gamblers. One suspect may have wondered why the electrician took almost two hours to repair a light fixture and another might have thought it a coincidence that two men wearing hearing aids were sitting at tables near the one selected by him and his party. Actually the two men had special amplifiers carried in briefcases.

The surveillance of a certain individual immediately after his arrival in this country was made comparatively easy by an agent who learned of the traveler's plans in detail by sitting in at the ship panel with the customs officer.

Many difficult 24-hour surveillances were maintained. One suspect was shadowed by an agent who traveled as a fellow passenger on a cross-country

122 New Yorker Magazine, 27 Oct 45, Vol XXI, #37, "A Reporter at Large: The Top Top Secret."

plane trip. A crack train was held up for 30 minutes in one instance to allow time for agents to fly to a station to take up surveillance of a passenger.

Years later, Don Harley, former CIC agent with the District, told of a close surveillance which lasted for more than a year before the suspect realized that he was being followed, but by that time sufficient evidence had been obtained to indicate that he was in contact with a known Soviet espionage agent. The wind-up came with a week-long surveillance from Chicago to New York and down to Knoxville. Harley was given a 45-minute notice that the suspect, employed in the laboratory at Chicago, was taking a train for New York. The subject was closely associated with Clarence Hiskey, a scientist who was under suspicion, and Hiskey had been overheard telling him to "see Adams." Arthur Alexandrovich Adams,[123] long recognized as one of the top Soviet espionage agents in the United States, was then in New York, and it seemed probable that a meeting would take place there.

The tip came from an agent who was working under cover in the laboratory in an administrative capacity. Without luggage, even tooth brush, the agent boarded the train. He explained that the agents always carried extra money and a supply of transportation requests for such emergencies. Harley had been told that "the New York boys" would meet him at Grand Central Station and take over so that he could return to Chicago, but the agents who met him there insisted that they had been assigned only to "help" him and so Harley stayed on the job.

It was a hectic week, since the subject was a man "who got around." During one 30-hour stretch without sleep, Harley and one of the New York agents followed the subject on a bus trip to up-state New York. Much of the trip was during a heavy wind storm, nearing hurricane proportions. To add to their difficulties, they had car trouble, and had to follow the bus for many miles without lights.

But the surveillance was successful. The subject made the expected contact with Adams, and one of the agents even caught a bit of their conversation in which Adams was telling "how good things were in Russia."

On the final day, when the subject came out of the fraternity house in which he was staying, he walked up to the agents' car--it was during a heavy rainstorm--and said, "I have found out you have been following me. Will you drive me to the Railway station--I can't get a cab." The agents refused.

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123 For information re Adams and Hiskey, see The Shameful Years, Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States, dtd 30 Dec 1951, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, printed by U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash, 1952.

Immediately after this the subject, as well as were removed from the deferred list and ordered into the United States Army, to be sent to some remote spot where their contacts could be of no harm to the country. Both had passed beyond the "calculated risk" stage.[124]

Sabotage a Particular Problem

The greatest degree of alertness toward the possibility of sabotage had to be maintained at all times, since attempts at sabotage could be suspected if the enemy became aware of the great progress being made by our country in the development of the Atom Bomb. Progress of the Manhattan District Project could not be delayed; it had to continue without interruption and particularly without destruction or damage caused by sabotage. From the very beginning, policy demanded a complete investigation of every mechanical failure or breakdown of equipment which could not immediately be attributed to normal operating causes. The complex, novel and intricate design of some equipment demanded that sabotage be suspected whenever such equipment failed to operate. Investigation usually allayed the fears of sabotage by establishing the cause of such failures to be the inexperience of loyal conscientious employees; nevertheless, these investigations were not wasted because they contributed considerably toward the adoption of remedial measures which aided the progress of construction and operation.

CIC agents at one plant apprehended the "saboteurs" who were cutting multi-colored wires from important electrical installations, but when apprehended they were found to be cutting out these wires to weave them together to form a colorful belt or watchfob. At one stage in operations it became a justifiable reason for termination if an employee possessed a ring fashioned out of monel piping. In too many instances this type of material was being ripped out, often from very essential equipment, by some thoughtless individual to make a ring for himself, his boss or his sweetheart. Wilful sabotage had to be assumed upon the initial information of such incidents.

At times a combination of circumstances caused calm and experienced CIC agents to consider a certain incident a wilful attempt at sabotage only to learn that the situation was actually quite different. One workman was caught while trying to pass a gate with a length of pipe, pieces of wire, dry cell batteries and an alarm clock carefully wrapped and concealed. Only an explosive was lacking to fabricate a time bomb. Investigation determined that the offender had taken the clock to the plant to repair it since proper tools were available to him there, and had stolen the other articles for his personal use in his home.

A certain number of incidents of damage or destruction to Project property could not be explained, but since these incidents were few in number and did not

124 Interview with Don Harley, New York City, at Ft Holabird, Md, Aug 55.

cause serious damage or delay, it was considered a reasonable conclusion that they were not the result of sabotage. To quote from the official Manhattan District History: "The activity of the Counter Intelligence Corps in performing its function to prevent sabotage has been admirably, efficiently and successfully performed."

Subversive Investigations of Varied Origin

General subversive investigations were based upon derogatory information obtained from personnel clearance investigations and from the overall surveillance program of the Counter Intelligence Corps which sometimes revealed undesirable facts which had not been disclosed during the individual's routine personnel clearance investigation. These investigations were necessarily delicate in nature and required exhaustive treatment in every detail. The object of the Counter Intelligence Corps was to get the facts in every case, including the circumstances surrounding the original complaint. Frequently the informant had unintentionally magnified the seriousness of a comment by removing it from the atmosphere in which it was made; other informants made charges about persons with malicious intent; others were alarmists and became apprehensive over insignificant matters. Only after thorough investigation did the true character of complaints become self-evident and permit intelligent evaluation of the facts.

Organization affiliations also had to be taken into careful consideration. There were certain of these which, although not subversive in themselves, were indicative of possible political ideologies inimical to the interests of the United States. Whenever it was discovered that an employee belonged to one or more such organizations, his investigation was intensified. The fact that an employee might omit the names of these organizations from his personnel security questionnaire was suggestive that he was aware that such affiliation would work against his clearance. Membership in these organizations often required that intensive investigations continue until sufficient information had been obtained to permit a decision as to the advisability of retaining such persons on classified work. A policy of discharging all employees about whom there was any doubt of loyalty was not followed because of two factors: the right of the individual to work; and the need of the Manhattan District for the individual's services. When an employee could be transferred to a less sensitive job and fulfill a need, he was usually retained even though some doubt may have existed as to his adherence to democratic principles.

"Loose Talk" Cases Prove Varied

Between September 1943 and the end of 1945, more than 1,500 "loose talk" and leakage of information cases were investigated, and corrective action was taken in more than 1,200 violations of procedures in handling classified information.

Several of the loose talk cases were unusually interesting. Several of these were committed by members of the clergy who were completely unaware that they were revealing classified information. A pamphlet entitled "Startling Power," published by the Good News Publishing Company, Chicago, Illinois, in 1943 and distributed by the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago, was amusingly the cause of several intensive investigations. This pamphlet, using scientific statements to illustrate a deeply spiritual fact, stated that: "Uranium 235, extracted from natural uranium ore, promised to make all of our power sources mere child stories by comparison. Professor John R. Dunning, Columbia University leader in atomic energy research, has stated that the natural substances from which Uranium 235 is extracted are found abundantly in the earth and throughout many sections of the world." The pamphlet continued to make the point, "We must not overlook the far more vital and assured fact that God has given to Christians the gift of the Holy Spirit with energies far more dynamic than those of exploding atoms or mysterious elements."

In the winter of 1945 a patent engineer who came into possession of this pamphlet concluded that U-235 merited investigation by his company and made this suggestion to his superior who in turn contacted Dr Compton at Chicago University. When this fact became known to CIC, an investigation was launched to find out how U-235 had become known to the company and the engineer with the discovery that the case had innocently arisen from the reading of this religious pamphlet.

Some months later, a Lutheran minister in the South gave a sermon based on a "New Source of Energy called Uranium 235," and, a short time later, a Presbyterian minister in Tennessee preached a similar sermon, both making the conclusion that regardless of this devastating energy the power of God was infinitely greater. Investigation revealed that both of these ministers had read "Startling Power."

In the spring of 1945 a confidential informant reported to the Intelligence and Security Division that approximately 10 employees, believing that a body rash they had developed had resulted from exposure to radio-active elements and, unsatisfied with the care given by Oak Ridge Hospital physicians, had gone to their own doctors. Investigation revealed that the story was somewhat exaggerated. Several employees had developed a rash, possibly from excessive thermal conditions or from handling large quantities of carbon tetrachloride for cleansing purposes. When the physicians at the hospital could not say positively what had caused the rash, one or two of the patients, already troubled by a fear about the unknown elements with which they were working, had gone to private physicians "back home" to seek additional advice. To prevent patients from consulting "off-area" physicians in the future and disclosing classified information by describing their working conditions and the materials used, CIC agents requested the doctors at the hospital to assure all

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patients that the Oak Ridge medical authorities were best equipped and trained to treat any cases arising out of the peculiar conditions of the area. All operating companies also were asked to stress this fact to their personnel.

One Leak Traced to

One security leak was traced to a field hospital in Belgium. This came to the attention of CIC when a man working at Oak Ridge reported that he had received a letter from a in which the officer mentioned that his roommate had a younger brother also at Oak Ridge who had stated that they were making Atomic Bombs there. The officer and the roommate, also a medical officer, were very much surprised when a CIC agent called upon them at the field hospital to inquire concerning the statement in the letter. The roommate of the letter writer stated that the subject of Atomic Bombs first came to his attention in an article which appeared in Time Magazine in 1941 and that when the subject was again brought up in the presence of several other officers, he told the gathering that his brother was an engineer working on Atomic Bombs at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This man disclosed that when he visited with his brother shortly before leaving the United States, the brother said that he was working on the Atomic Bomb at Oak Ridge and that the work was very secret and conducted on a huge scale. The officer claimed that he had not mentioned the subject to anyone until shortly after the arrival of his unit in at which time the conversation mentioned had taken place. Back at Oak Ridge the brother was interviewed and admitted he had made the statement, although at the time he had acquired very little actual knowledge about the Project. He was seriously cautioned against future disclosures of this nature.

Some "Guessed" and Talked

At a dinner party in March 1945, a Naval lieutenant brought up the subject of the Atomic Bomb and expressed curiosity as to when we would use it. He stated that only about 10 pounds of U-235 were needed to end the war and that several thousands persons were working on it in Tennessee where most of TVA's electrical power was used. When questioned, the lieutenant explained that he recalled a lecture given the Chemistry Department at Harvard in 1942 regarding the possibilities of atomic power, and had since discussed the subject with friends and had read many articles in technical magazines on the subject. He added that anyone traveling for the government realized there was a great secret project in Tennessee and he had merely assumed that it was engaged in the development of atomic power. He was cautioned against such further disclosures.

In June 1945 received a long distance call from a man identifying himself as a who requested an unspecified quantity of U-235 for the purpose of creating a sensation in lectures he frequently gave. Upon investigation, proved to be an imaginative

who explained that about four years previously he had read several articles on the potentialities of U-235. He said he had met when the latter had visited employer, an old friend. Assuming that America was interested in U-235 from a military standpoint and knowing reputation in the field of cosmic rays and nuclear physics, had telephoned to learn from him where he could obtain a sample of this substance. After CIC agents explained the security aspects of the situation, promised to make no further inquiries.

A civilian employee, who, in her position as confidential secretary had necessarily acquired considerable information about the work of the Project, wrote a letter to an uncle stating that she knew what was being done at Oak Ridge; that was known as the ," and that it was expected that the war would be over quickly when the product produced at Oak Ridge was finally used. Unfortunately for her, but fortunately for security, the letter came into the hands of CIC agents after she dropped it in a bus on the Clinton Engineer Works area prior to mailing. Her employment was promptly terminated by the company.

In February 1945, a Project worker at the at the reported to the Director of Security that in a tavern across the street from the he had heard that the was soon to close and that many of the people would be transferred to New Mexico to a place that was quite confined and lacking in many of the urban comforts. Surveillance of the tavern for several days by CIC agents disclosed that employees of the tavern knew that the and the Army were working together at the that shipments entered the under armed guard; and that the owner of the tavern had probably made statements that some place in New Mexico was connected with the One employee was overheard to state in the tavern that the was engaged in experiments and research and that experiments were conducted on animals. The tavern owner was readily recruited in an attempt to stop this loose talk. He displayed security posters prominently and promised to inform agents of any further loose talk overheard in the tavern.

Engineer Careless With Papers

In the fall of 1944 an employee of a firm which was doing engineering work for the Project arrived at Pennsylvania Station carrying a highly secret file of engineering details. With several minutes to spare before departure time of his train, he made a last minute call to his wife from a telephone booth. As he started for the train he discovered that he did not have the secret papers with him. Since it was now time for the train to depart, he chose to report the loss by a quick telephone call to his office with the request that someone come down and look for the papers while he continued on the train. The security agent for the company

rushed to the station and finally located the papers at the information booth. A telegram was dispatched to the Union Station in Washington requesting that the employee be contacted when the train arrived there and told to telephone his office. When he made the call, he was ordered back to New York where he was soundly reprimanded for his failure to drop his travel plans and search for the papers himself. His employment by the company was terminated.

Fraud Cases, Bodyguard Duty Among CIC Jobs

There were in addition certain other investigations which could not be included in the above categories. Most of these were cases of suspected fraud against the government. In each such case CIC conducted an investigation before submitting the case to Federal authorities for prosecution. Among these cases was the apprehension of an individual who had stolen $5,000 from a bank and the investigation of bus drivers and operators which resulted in the indictment of 57 persons. Among the many and varied assignments for CIC agents was that of bodyguards for key scientists. J. R. Oppenheimer, E. O. Lawrence, A. H. Compton and Enrico Fermi were accompanied by agents almost constantly, and other scientists were protected at intervals depending upon the work they were doing. It was necessary for these agents to be good conversationalists and be able to adapt themselves to any situation in which their wards might become involved. They were selected to be pleasing companions as well as bodyguards.

One bodyguard assignment that carried a particular thrill was given to Don Harley and Morgan Frank Game. Just before the Atom Bomb test at Almogordo, they accompanied General Groves on a tour of all the major sites where he collected the final story of the development. As they entered the train compartment after their last stop, General Groves produced two manila envelopes. "It's all in these two envelopes," he said. "From now on they are your responsibility. Deliver them to me in Washington." Solemnly the two agents filled out receipts for the envelopes, but General Groves laughed as he received them; they all knew how little would be the value of the receipts if the papers were lost.

Before the Test

Among their final duties before the Atom Bomb test, for which all those in-the-know had been waiting, agents made an extensive survey of the area surrounding Almogordo. A CIC team fanned out over the area, gathering statistics on the population, extent and location of hospital facilities, fire fighting equipment, various means of transportation, including number of cars and trucks, and the available plane landing spots.[125]

125 Interview with Don Harley, New York, at Ft Holabird, Aug 55.

On the night before the test, about 30 agents were stationed in strategic spots in the surrounding area for the dual purpose of picking up any rumors as to the cause of the blast and to protect the government from fraudulent claims for damages, which might be made after the real cause became known. One agent who was sent on this detail told afterward that, when given the assignment, he was told to take a two-weeks supply of clothes, about $75 in cash, and a flash-light. He never did learn the reason for the flash-light. No damage was reported, but rumors as to the cause of the blast ranged from earth quakes to falling meteors.[126]

Praise from General Groves

After the Atomic Bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Maj Gen L. R. Groves wrote to Col H. R. Kibler, CIC Chief, a letter of appreciation for CIC's work with the Manhattan Project. His letter read in part:

> "From the date that this Special Detachment was organized to the present time, personnel of the Manhattan District Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment have performed the function of maintaining to the highest degree the secrecy of the work involved and of withholding from enemy agents all knowledge of our progress in this field. The manner in which they carried out this task will survive to the lasting credit of that organization.
>
> "The release of publicity concerning the work of this vast undertaking has evoked from the people of the world an expression of amazement that a job of such magnitude and vital interest could have been kept from the public ear. This outstanding success could not have been possible without the work performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps."[127]

126 Interview with Don Harley, New York, at Ft Holabird, Aug 55, and interview with Alfred P. Ashton.

127 Memo for the CG, Army Service Forces, ATTN: Col H. R. Kibler, dtd 14 Aug 45, s/ L. R. Groves, USA. (S&F Lib, Army Intell Center, Ft Holabird, Md)

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Appendix 1

Letter from Provost Marshal to Commanding General of each Service Command, requesting the designation of officers to act in liaison capacity with the Manhattan District.

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12 May 1943

SUBJECT: Loyalty Investigations of Personnel of the Manhattan District, United States Engineers

TO: Commanding General
Each Service Command

1. The Manhattan District of the United States Engineers is in charge of a very important secret war project. Certain installations in connection with this Project are within your Service Command. It is essential that the civilian personnel employed at these installations be given loyalty investigations for employment without delay.

2. In order to maintain strict secrecy in connection with loyalty investigations of civilian personnel at these projects it is desired that you designate a suitable officer to act as liaison with the Manhattan District, United States Engineers. It is desired that this office be furnished a copy of your correspondence with Manhattan District.

3. All necessary details as to installations, contractors, facilities, and the location of each will be furnished to you direct by the District Engineer of the Manhattan District in the near future.

/s/ Alan W. Gullion
/t/ ALAN W. GULLION
Major General
The Provost Marshal General

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Appendix 2

Letter authorizing the organization of
a Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
for Manhattan Engineer District.

18 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ASF

SUBJECT: Organization of Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment for Manhattan Engineer District

1. The Chief of Staff has authorized the establishment of a special detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps commissioned and enlisted men to provide security for the work carried on by the Manhattan Engineer District.

2. The Secretary of War directs:

a. That necessary action be taken to organize a detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps Commissioned and Enlisted personnel under the Chief of Engineers or an officer especially designed by him to be used solely to provide security for the work carried on by the Manhattan Engineer District.

b. That the following grades and ratings be authorized for this detachment and for no other purpose:

One Colonel		
One Lieutenant Colonel		
Five Majors		
Ten Captains		
Eight First Lieutenants		
Total	25	
Twelve Master Sergeants		
Twenty-two Technical Sergeants		
Twenty-six Staff Sergeants		
Seventy-seven Sergeants		
Total	137	
Total		162

c. That this detachment procure all supplies from a confidential list of equipment for Counter Intelligence Corps and that no standard table of equipment be established.

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d. That necessary Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to provide for this detachment be furnished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff.

/s/ George V. Strong
/t/ GEORGE V. STRONG
Major General
AC of S, G2

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Appendix 3

Letter sent to each Service Command announcing formation of Special CIC Detachment to handle all intelligence matters pertaining to the Manhattan District.

27 December 1943

SUBJECT: Personnel on DSM Project

TO: The Commanding General
Fourth Service Command
Atlanta, Georgia

1. Reference is made to letter to you dated 25 May 1943, subject as above, which is rescinded.

2. Heretofore substantially all counterintelligence activities within your command with respect to the DSM Project have been carried on under the direction of Col Stacy Knopf of your command.

3. A special detachment is now being organized to carry on counterintelligence activities with respect to the entire DSM Project; however, your assistance may be required from time to time in cases of emergency and in maintaining routine liaison with other investigative agencies. Col Stacy Knopf of your command is familiar with this proposed organization and its representatives within your command.

4. The Secretary of War directs:

a. That effective 1 January 1944, you are relieved of counterintelligence responsibility with respect to the DSM Project.

b. That the separate files containing the DSM Project maintained by Col Stacy Knopf, by direction of this division, be transferred effective 1 January 1944 to the custody of the District Intelligence Officer, Manhattan Engineer District, within your command. Extracts of counterintelligence information from these files of general interest to your command may be retained for your general counterintelligence files to the extent that such extracts do not disclose the character, activities or objects of the DSM Project.

c. Confidential funds for the Military Intelligence Division continue to be disbursed by you to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District for DSM counterintelligence activities in accordance with present directions until further instructions are issued through this division.

d. That all equipment heretofore devoted by your office exclusively to counterintelligence activities in connection with the DSM Project be transferred to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District with your command.

e. That you cooperate with and render assistance to the District Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan Engineer District within your command to the fullest extent, and that such assistance and cooperation be given first priority in all cases.

f. That future instructions of the Secretary of War concerning this matter may be issued by Brig Gen L. R. Groves, C. E.; that all such instructions and communications issued through General Groves be communicated directly to the officer designated in paragraph 3, and that all liaison between the area intelligence officer of the Manhattan Engineer District and your office be through the same officer. The connection of General Groves with the Manhattan Engineer District will not be disclosed to anyone other than the officer designated in paragraph 3.

/s/ George V. Strong
/t/ GEORGE V. STRONG
Major General
AC of S, G2

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Appendix 4

Roster of Manhattan District CIC Detachment.

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MANHATTAN DISTRICT COMPOSITE ROSTER OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

25 January 1946

Colonel

Parsons, William R
Lansdale, John Jr.
Consodine, William A.

Major

Block, Lloyd R.
Calvert, Horace K.
DeSilva, Peer
Gillette, Kirby M.
Johanneson, Royden E.
McLeod, Robert J.
Jones, Thomas O.
Thompson, Grover C.
Uanna, William L.

Captain

Barns, Guy E.
Brown, Emmons B.
Clark, Curtis L.
Cooper, Murray M.
Davis, George B. Jr.
Davies, John L.
Del Genio, Nicholas
Haley, James W.
Hayes, Arthur J.
Horan, John A.
Johnson, Lyalle E.
King, John A. Jr.
Kirkman, Robert W.
Leonard, George B.
McCleanahan, Henry I.
Menke, Bernard
Mountjoy, Pearl B.
Murray, James S.
Remsen, George W.
Rhodes, Fred B. Jr.
Sergeant, William T.
Simons, Foyle W.
Simpson, William J.
Southerland, James E.
Standsberry, Max E.
Stirling, Thomas A.
Tait, Robert
Teeple, David S.
Volpe, Joseph Jr.
Webb, Martin
Whitaker, Albert E. Jr.
White, Charles V.
Winstead, Charles B.

1st Lieutenants

Adam, Francis O. Jr.
Allen, George S.
Ambrose, Wayne A.
Anderson, Andrew J. Jr.
Anderson, Wilber S.
Anderson, William A. Jr.
Aylor, John H.
Azezedo, Daniel
Barge, Richman I.
Barnett, Oval C.
Baskin, John R.
Beerman, Fred L.
Belcher, Phillip F.
Bennett, Alfred
Bolten, Frederick H.
Brady, Max
Brock, Lawrence V.
Burnham, Bryson P.
Bush, Hobert H.
Cabaza, Jose E.
Callagahan, Francis P.
Carr, Joseph F.
Cator, William D.
Clancy, James F.
Clarke, Charles F. Jr.
Collins, Burton W.
Connors, Harold T.
Cooley, Larry E.
Crowley, John T.
Dailey, Daniel H.
D'Alfonso, Daniel V.
Dazzo, Nicholus C.
DeFrance, Frank J.
Daily, Robert H.
Delvin, William J.
Dunn, Jack H.

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Durkin, Edward
Eckberg, Carlton R.
Edwards, Robert W.
Eisenhart, William S.
Foll, Phillip S. P.
Forkner, Thomas F.
Foltz, William D.
Fry, Bernard M.
Gahan, Patrick J.
Geary, Richard L.
Gregg, Wayne D.
Guilfoyle, Thomas D.
Hart, Herbert F.
Hitchcock, Glenn E.
McAdam, Richard G.
McCaskill, Elmer F. Jr.
McMullen, William E.
Madigan, Arthur R.
Maguire, John J.
Mahoney, John H.
Marsh, Harold
Metzger, Donald A.
Miskulin, Mike
Murphy, Elmer F. Jr.
Neverick, Alfred A.
Nolan, James E.
O'Brien, Charles H.
O'Connell, John J.
O'Gara, John L.
Olson, Edwin G.
Pickett, Winston H.
Redenius, Josephine L.
Rendelman, John C.
Richardson, Ron E.
Rielly, William T.
Robinson, George O.
Rodgers, Max E.
Rosenman, Bernard M.
Rydzewski, Rudolph L.
Schacher, George P.
Schumann, Bernin K.
Seminara, Louis A.
Simpson, Omer R.
Smith, Arthur E.
Smith, Lawrence D.
Sulerud, John C.
Taylor, Robert A.
Thompson, Francis S.
Titus, John L.
Traver, Robert S.
Vaughan, Spruill J. III
Vettell, Charles T.
Vinciguerra, John V.
Waldner, Paul F.
Walsh, Harry R.
Weingarten, John L.
Wendt, Charles F.
Warner, William L.
White, Harold R.
Wulff, Alvert V. R. Jr.
Zindle, Harold J.

2d Lieutenants

Blauvelt, Robert W.
Kelly, Robert H.
Rhodes, Haris C.
Rolander, Carl A.

Master Sergeants

Addison, Artie A. Jr.
Averill, Roswell P.
Boch, Alfred L.
Burns, Lee G.
Burrall, Charles L. Jr.
Cooley, Richard P.
Cullins, Phillip G.
Cunningham, John J.
Davis, Henry G. Jr.
Deitz, Walter L.
Detweiler, Charles B.
Driscoll, Florence J.
Foley, Richard J.
Frye, Herbert H.
Furney, Lester C.
Gleaves, Raymond L.
Goldston, Joseph C.
Herrington, James G. Jr.
Hoyt, James L.
Joyce, Herbert M.
Kasefang, William E.
Kilgore, James A.
Lamb, Louis J.
Larcom, Charles C.
Marinucci, James R.
Miller, John O.
Nally, Charles M.
Nolan, Richard H.
Oliff, Hershall
Rathman, George J.
Russell, Edwin O.
Stout, Patriet
Thomas, Robert F.
Wagner, Emil C.
Wagener, William S.
Walker, Andrew A.
Walsh, Edward D.
Wheaton, George W.
Zimmer, Willard H.

Technical Sergeants

Bernacchi, Julian S.
Burke, William A.
Callahan, Francis W.
Campbell, Charles H
Christie, Charles B.
Crowley, William A.
Daerr, Robert L.
Ebinger, Robert F.
Edlund, Gustav V.
Flournoy, Copley W.
Finneran, Michael J.
Foor, Richard A.
Gleason, Edwin J.
Graves, Harold P.
Henderson, John B.
Harris, William J.
Hawkins, Howard G. Jr.
Hensley, Charles D.
Hoyt, James L.
Hand, Francis M.
Harvey, Sam B.
Jensen, Harold H.
Kemendo, Joseph P.
Lamb, Louis J.
Linde, Arthur W.
Longbotham, Miller P.
Lowenhaupt, Henry S.
Ludwig, Donald P.
Lynch, John J.
Mayer, George A.
Melton, Horace J.
McGuire, Peter J.
McElwreath, William J.
Miller, Arnold R.
Morgan, William H.
Murphy, Peter C.
Nadeau, Raymond L.
Nolan, Walter H.
O'Malley, Joseph M.
Phillips, Jack H.
Ream, Harold D.
Safferstein, Nathan C.
Schriver, Oliver M.
Shanley, John F.
Smith, Richard M.
Staruski, Anthony
Stevens, Alan
Wilson, Paul W.

Staff Sergeants

Arrington, Kenneth H.
Asciutto, Alfred S.
Bailey, Howard M.
Baudino, John M.
Brater, Donald C.
Bloom, Phillip
Chilcote, Lynn W.
Christopher, Lloyd R.
Cole, Clinton S.
Curran, John E.
Dauphin, Edward L.
Dillard, Jack W.
Dzimianski, John W.
Eggers, Harvey H.
Finnell, John E.
Fitzroy, Roland V. Jr.
Fotte, Hilis C.
Forgatch, Joseph
Gagen, Norbert R.
Game, Morgan F.
Gaughan, John J.
Gillette, Lee E.
Grow, Kenneth A.
Harley, Donald J.
Hennessey, Mathew J.
Johnson, Carl A. B.
Johnston, Joe B.
Kadlec, Walter H.
Karez, Frank R.
Kelley, William T.
Kelly, James A.
Kockritz, Herman
Kulesh, William E.
Milligan, John
Moffat, Henry C.
Mountford, Horatio C.
Myers, James X.
Myers, William T.
Nichels, Gene A.
Noel, Robert O.
Oates, Peter F.
Oland, Harold J.
Platou, William R.
Porter, Lee
Ryan, Alvin F.
Ryan, Earl F.
Sanford, Logan H.
Sciafe, Oliver P.
Schivers, Rufus W.
Shuping, Clarence L.
Tatur, Henry J.
Thompson, Frank D.
Valentine, William I.
Whitehead, Vinson O.

Sergeants

Anderson, John H.
Anderson, John Harold
Campbell, Albert M.
Eby, G. Hershey
Endel, Charles E.
Ennis, Frederic T.
Hammond, William P.
Hoeffel, Donald E.
Hollan, John D.
Hoover, Harold E.
Keltie, James A.
Kuchar, Keith
Landon, Edward F.
Loescher, Richard R.
Nelson, Robert A.
O'Brien, James A.
O'Neil, Cornelius B.
Polling, John P.
Rielly, Arthur E.
Rudisill, Edward L.
Ryan, James C.
Sentiff, Harry J.
Sperry, Lawrence
Spohn, William W.
Stein, Raymond B.
Scurdevant, Clinton T.
Summer, Isidor H.
Troy, Francis J.
Walsh, Thomas F.
Wingren, Richard H.
Zimwalt, Dean E.
Cowan, John H.

T/5

Larmon, Leigh R.

Corporal

Egan, John M.

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Appendix 5

Organizational Chart of the
Intelligence and Security Division


INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY DIVISION
Lt Col W. B. Parsons Chief
Maj R. J. McLeod Deputy
Capt B. W. Menke Exec Off
WAC (1) Civilian (2)
BRANCH OFFICES
Capt B. W. Menke Chief
Supervises and coordinates all intelligence and security activities of Branch Offices.
SECURITY BRANCH
Capt J. W. Haley Chief
Organizes, coordinates and supervises security programs for the protection of
portation of classifi materials and documents.
Civilian (1)
ADMINISTRATION BRANCH
Capt J.E. Southerland Chief
Supervises administration of military and civilian personnel. Supervises the District Personnel Security Program. Procures and issues property and equipment. Responsible for expenditures of all Branch Offices. Maintains all intelligence and security records.
Civilian (1)
CLINTON ENGINEER WORKS BRANCH
Maj R. McLeod Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities at Clinton Engineer Works. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the 4th Service Command Louisiana and Arkansas.
SMI BRANCH
Lt N. Del Genio Chief
Formulates SMI policies and procedures. Supervises security education. Reviews and evaluates censorship and publicity. Reviews District documents destined for other government agencies.
Civilian (1)
EVALUATION & REVIEW BRANCH
Capt C.L. Clark Chief
Reviews, evaluates and coordinates all investigative activities of the Intelligence and Security Division.
1st Lt (1)
2d Lt (1)
Wac's (1)
Civilians (2)
PRODUCTION SECURITY SECTION
2d Lt (1)
Civilian (2)
Supervises plant survey program, identification and visitor control systems. Coordinates all activities related to physical protection against sabotage and espionage.
SHIPMENT SECTION
1st Lts (2)
2d Lts (6)
Civilian (1)
Supervises and coordinates shipments of classified materials and documents throughout the District. Transports Top Secret material between sites. Furnishes courier service to operations and construction officers.
PERSONNEL SECURITY SECTION
1st Lt (1)
Civilians (17)
Investigates character and loyalty of all military and civilian personnel of Manhattan District
Also investigates contractor employees at CEW. Supervises and coordinates personnel security activities of Branch Offices
MILITARY PERSONNEL SECTION
2d Lt (1)
WAC's (2)
Civilians (4)
Administers all military personnel and supervises use of all CIC equipment.
SERVICE & RECORD SECTION
WAC's (4)
Civilians (11)
Administers civilian personnel. Supervises files. Processes mail.
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
Capt (1)
2d Lts (2)
EM (27) WAC's (7)
Civilians (4)
Investigates subversive activities and security violations.
SECURITY SECTION
Capt (1)
2d Lts (1)
EM (42)
Civilians (235)
Supervises all activities relative to prevention of sabotage and espionage. Operates Oak Ridge Fire Department.
GUARD SECTION
Maj (1) Capts (3)
1st Lts (6) 2d Lts (2)
EM (186) Civilians (639)
Operates security control for CEW and Police Dept. Oak Ridge.
REVIEW BOARD
Capt (1) 2d Lts (2)
1st Lt (1) Civilians (7)
Supervises law enforcement activities.
SECURITY EDUCATION SECTION
1st Lt (1)
Civilian (1)
Divises, initiates, and circulates information and media for security education. Evaluates SMI violations. Indoctrinates military personnel.
CENSORSHIP SECTION
1st Lt (1)
WAC's (3)
Coordinates coverage of leading newspapers and commentators publicity on District. Checks violations and maintains records indicating publicity trends.
RECORDS SECTION
Civilian (1)
Maintains accounting records on Top Secret documents. Also records on destruction of classified material.
RICHLAND BRANCH OFFICE
Capt L. Johnson Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities at the Hanford Engineer Works. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the states of Wash, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana
Capt (1) 1st Lt (2)
2d Lts (7) EM (10)
WAC's (7) Civilians (10)
SANTA FE BRANCH OFFICE
Capt T. Jones Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities at the Site Y Project. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the States of New Mex., Texas, Okla., and Ariz.
Capt (2) 1st Lt (17)
2d Lt (7) EM (18)
Civilian (9) WAC's (18)
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
Capt D. Teeple Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities of the N.Y. M.S.A., Col., Wil., Pon., M.H. Areas.
Also supervises intelligence investigations in the States of N.Y., N.J. and Del.
Capt (1) 1st Lt (3)
2d Lt (8) EM (24)
WAC's (10) Civilian (11)
CHICAGO BRANCH OFFICE
Maj G.C. Thompson Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities of the Chicago, Mil., Detroit, Decatur, St. Louis, and Iowa Areas. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the states of Minn., Iowa, Wis., Ill., Ind.
1st Lt (2) 2d Lt (12)
EM (21) WAC's (3)
Civilians (54)
K-25 AREA OFFICE
Capt R. Johannesson Chief
Supervises all security and intelligence activities relating to the construction and operation of the K-23, K-27, and S-50 Production Facilities.
2d Lt (2)
EM (3)
WAC's (2)
Civilian (1)
T-12 AREA OFFICE
Capt E.B. Brown Chief
Supervises all security and intelligence activities relating to the construction and operation of the Y-12 Production Facility.
1st Lt (1)
EM (3)
WAC's (2)
Civilian (1)
X-10 AREA OFFICE
Lt E. A. McCaskill Chief
Operates security and intelligence program at the I-10 Restricted Area.
Civilian (1)
BOSTON BRANCH OFFICE
Lt J. E. Nolan Chief
Supervises intelligence and security activities of the Boston Area. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the States of Me., N.H., Mass., Conn., R.I.
BALTIMORE BRANCH OFFICE
Lt H. R. Walsh Chief
Supervises intelligence investigations in the States of Pa., Md., Va.
EM (5)
WAC (1)
Civilian (1)
CLEVELAND BRANCH OFFICE
Lt J. R. Baskin Chief
Supervises intelligence investigations in the States of Ky., Ohio., W. Va., and part of Ind. Also supervises security activities for the Cleveland Area Eng.
EM (2)
WAC's (2)
Civilians (2)
GRAND JUNCTION BRANCH OFFICE
Capt P. B. Mountjoy Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities of the Colo. Area Eng. Also supervises all intelligence investigations in the States of N.D., S.D., Nebr., Wyo., Kan., Colo., Utah.
EM (2)
WAC (0)
Civilians (1)
WASHINGTON BRANCH OFFICE
Capt F. B. Rhodes Chief
Serves as liaison officer between intelligence and security division and all federal agencies. Supervises intelligence investigations in the District of Columbia.
2d Lt (1)
EM (9)
WAC's (3)
Civilians (2)
BERKELEY BRANCH OFFICE
Capt J. A. King Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities of the Cal. Area Engineer. Also supervises intelligence investigations in the States of Nevada and Northern California.
2d Lt (2) EM (10)
WAC (1) Civilians (5)
PASADENA BRANCH OFFICE
Lt R. E. Kirkman Chief
Supervises all intelligence and security activities of the Los Angeles Area Engineer and special assignments for the Santa Fe Branch Office. Also supervises all intelligence investigations in Southern Calif.
2d Lt (2) EM (3)
Civilians (2)

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Appendix 6

Intelligence Bulletin #3, a sample of the kind of material sent to all installations engaged in Manhattan District work to aid in the program of "Safeguarding Military Information."

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE
MANHATTAN DISTRICT
Oak Ridge, Tennessee MI-6

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #3 15 September 1943

SUBJECT: Security Educational Program

TO: All Area Engineers
MED
ATTN: Intelligence Officers

I. General:

A. Mission of the Program:

1. The manifold types of violations and derelictions in safeguarding classified military information evidence the need for a security educational program. The mission of such a program is to so educate all personnel concerned that they may become instinctively alert minded and security wise to the end that not only will all classified documents and other papers be handled and safeguarded in accordance with provisions of AR 380-5 and supplementary matter pertaining thereto, but also that loose talk will be eliminated and words and action will disclose no information of value to the enemy or to those not properly authorized to receive it. Accordingly the following program is submitted for adoption and adaptation as circumstances permit.

II. Details:

A. Security Agent.

1. Upon this person depends the supervision and execution of the bulk of the educational program presented.

2. Consequently the selection of such agent wherever possible should be made with care, not only should he have time at his disposal but also he should be tactful, a promoter possessing ability to sell himself and his work to all concerned. Further he should have personal address, some flare for public speaking, be possessed of imagination and some ability to dramatize.

B. Method:

1. This security educational agent should schedule activities so that he can assemble as large a group as possible of pertinent personnel - i.e., supervisors or others in charge of sections where classified work and documents are handled - for the first of periodic talks on the subject of "Security." These are the personnel who will execute the security agent's program in the lower echelons. The security agent might open his talk by explaining the average American's proneness for satisfying his curiosity for acquiring information, his tendency to disseminate it in his unguarded conversation or his incautious written communication or to give it without questioning the recipient's right to have it.

2. The security educational agent should explain that the object of enemy intelligence is to collect information which will reveal or from which can be deduced our proposed military activity. Then he should explain how espionage works--that is that it consists mainly of acquiring bits of information from this, that and other sources which may be apparently unrelated. From these varied scattered sources it is all compiled by specialists to formulate a complete picture, thus giving the enemy sufficient notice of our activities which may result in the failure of our mission and the destruction of our force. He should stress that, although information may be conveyed to one who is not authorized but yet apparently reliable, the informant has lost control of his information, he has set it in motion, and he can not be sure that the recipient will not in some way disclose it to another whose carelessness will cause it to fall into the hands of the enemy.

3. Further he should explain that if the individual can keep from disclosing his information, that makes one less available source contributing to the picture the enemy seeks to reproduce, and that the completion of their picture reflecting a military activity or defense work may be so delayed that it is of no use to them when it is completed because our mission will have been achieved. Indeed, it may be that the one bit of information that a person unwittingly passed on may prove to be the very piece that makes the jigsaw picture intelligible to the enemy. In short then, military or project information will be shared with no unauthorized person.

4. The question arises as to what categories of military or project information should not be discussed. The answer is simple. All military or project information should not be discussed with or written to persons not authorized to receive it.

5. To be effective however, the word all should be particularized. Particulars will vary at various installations. Accordingly, they may be drawn from the work being performed there; however, some of the following may be

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pertinent illustrations of what should be left out of conversations outside of technical areas or in the presence of unauthorized persons or should be omitted from personal letters.

(a) Any illusion to the mission of the Project.

(b) Any reference to the general problems being worked on.

(c) Any technical data covering (a) or (b).

(d) Reference to any materials being processed, procured or present anywhere on the reservation.

(e) The types of equipment within the restricted areas or the manner of operation.

(f) The affiliation of the Project with any other war project.

(g) Reference to the professions or former connections of persons working in any technical or restricted area.

(h) Discussion of the functions of co-workers in other restricted areas of the Project.

(i) The name of the contractor under whom this project is being operated.

(j) The size or scope of the Project.

(k) The mention of any sensitive points, e.g., the centers for communication, the power and water supply and other utilities including the fire protection system or the extent thereof.

(l) Circulation of newspaper articles that may discuss technical work or any of the above listed items performed on the Project.

(m) Circulation of any rumors covering the above listed subjects.

(n) Any photographs showing restricted areas or any items listed supra.

6. The purpose of elaborating on the topics here and above mentioned will be to illustrate how loose talk concerning any of these topics may result in loss or damage by hostile agents or may insight further search and inquiry by persons hostile to our interest. Further, the above listed topics will

serve to alert personnel towards any questions directed to them by strangers, for if an enemy agent cannot acquire information by listening to loose talk he must interrogate and the persistent interrogator will be reported and can be dealt with.

III. Suggestions for presenting the talk:

1. In pre enting his talk to supervisory or to operational personnel the security educational agent should bear several points in mind. He may have to overcome the prejudices or apathy probably existing among his audience that security is extremely dull. He will have to avoid technical jargon, e.g., "Security of information," "of materials," "of the Project;" for it may mean nothing to his listeners. He must show that security is not merely negative; it is a positive weapon to blind the enemy, to keep him guessing, possibly to dilute his strength by spreading his forces to cover all contingencies. He must avoid a succession of don'ts or the repetition of the necessity to "keep your mouth shut," or else he will soon put his audience to sleep. He should open on a light note, should sandwich heavy bits between more attractive material such as spicy stories, personal reminiscenses or examples of violations of security already noted in the particular installation involved.

2. He should emphasize that security is not a matter for specialists, rather it directly concerns every individual; he should stress that everyone is personally responsible for security and that a word on his part may well provide the enemy with what he wants to know. Emphasize to administrative or other persons in supervisory capacities the importance of exemplifying security consciousness, for the attitude of the workers will be conditioned by that of their superiors. It is well to remember that personal example is eloquent.

3. Further having presented his message on the "need-to-know," "loose talk," or the necessity for safeguarding military or project information, the security agent, to stimulate active interest on the part of all concerned may ask his audience for any suggestions on how such a program may be best effectuated.

4. Some sort of suggestion box or contest may be devised to receive suggestions which may be the subject of informative cartoons or posters which may be the basis of a better security observance program.

5. The importance in giving a clear informative talk covering the above subject matter cannot be over emphasized. Personnel see many memoranda covering many subjects. In many cases they develop a habit of merely glancing through the contents. The number of varied memoranda militates against their complete absorption in the absence of incessant supervision. Giving a talk therefore is a different approach and will serve to impress the content and the ends to

be achieved. Further, at the conclusion of the talk, where suggestions are asked for better effectuating the program, there should be an immediate participation therein. Suggestions for security made by personnel are more apt to be observed than any rules that may be imposed.

These devices keep the subject of security before the minds of personnel and will enliven interest.

IV. Other Media:

A. General.

1. Having explained the importance of security to the work being done on the installation, the security educational agent may employ other media further to vivify and to fix in the minds of his audience the need for security concerning the work being done.

B. Particular.

1. As soon as practicable after his talk, arrangements should be made for the audience to attend a showing of War Department training films on safeguarding military information and related subjects. A list of available training films and brief description of their contents is reflected in the appendix (Exhibit A). If in a project, films may be shown in a private theater as an extra to the current shows.

2. Thereafter there should be an appropriate follow up based on AR 380-5 circulated to all personnel handling or having access to classified papers. A composite diagram pertaining to handling of classified materials has been prepared and is submitted in the appendix hereto (Exhibit B). Copies of this diagram should be circulated to all personnel concerned and care should be taken to see that all have read it and understand it. An occasional checkup by the security agent is advisable to note compliance therewith.

3. Also helpful in this regard is a manual for personnel handling or having access to secret, confidential or restricted documents published by the Office of the Adjutant General, War Department, 1 June 1943, a copy of which is also appended hereto (Exhibit C). Some revisions have been made to suit Manhattan Engineer District subject matter.

4. Further, War Department Training Circular #99 (1942) contains an informative talk on the motives that impel loose talk and reasons for the necessity of eliminating it. Designed primarily as a basis for security talks to soldiers, this circular, nevertheless, has matter applicable to civilians.

5. Valuable for its explanations of how seemingly unrelated bits of information may be collected and fitted together by the enemy to reflect an intelligent picture of our war activities is a readable pamphlet entitled: A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE MOTHERS, WIVES, FATHERS, BROTHERS, SISTERS, AND FRIENDS OF SERVICE MEN FROM GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL KING.

6. In order to remind pertinent personnel to check that safes, files and other repositors have been locked at closing time, a fan shaped card about six inches long may be inserted in the handles of safe cabinets, lock files and so forth when they have been opened, and removed after being locked for the night (Exhibit D).

7. Further small card notices (3 by 4 inches) bearing the inscription "IS YOUR SAFE LOCKED?" may be circulated and judiciou ly posted (Exhibit E).

8. Posters designed for individual as well as for mass appeal should be generously distributed throughout the buildings and other places where workers congregate throughout the area. These should include notice of the federal sabotage act, the espionage act and subject on the theme of no loose talk. Appended hereto is a title list of other posters, available from the AGO and procurable through Service Command headquarters (Exhibit F). Attempts are being made to secure pertinent posters from other sources such as the Office of War Information and Army Service Forces. These will be distributed upon receipt. They should be rotated frequently to keep them from becoming stale.

9. A large billboard or a large bulletin-board readily visible and located at entries or exits to the post may be erected reflecting in substance the following caution:

"What you see here,
What you do here,
What you hear here,
When you leave here,
Let it stay here."

10. Cautionary notices on the theme of "No Loose Talk," or "Zip Your Lip," or "Don't Discuss Your Work" may be printed on handbills or posted where other public notices are ordinarily circulated.

11. Use of music with cautionary slogans as a theme may be used such as:

a. Jingles in juke boxes or

b. Tunes broadcast in a public address system.

12. Telephone booths. Attractive posters therein reminding persons to omit reference, in conversation, to military matters or other topics concerning the Project.

13. Telegraph. Install a voluntary form of censorship; that is, "Leave out references to military matters or to the Project."

14. Match folders, stationary and so on, and other matter having general circulation. These may be utilized to carry some catchy line or cautionary notice.

15. Any other means which may be peculiar to an installation or which may serve to educate personnel to become security conscious may be utilized.

V. Areas Surrounding Installations

A. Having thoroughly covered the project installation, the security educational program may be carried into nearby communities, towns and cities. The approach in these outside contacts surrounding a project or other important installation should be made through the service command in order to disassociate the project as a sponsor of specific requests and thus check curiosity on the part of those whose services are enlisted.

1. The cooperation of such organizations may be solicited.

a. Chamber of Commerce: Responsible persons therein may be interviewed and their cooperation secured to circulate and post posters, cartoons and other educational notices in business houses, public gathering places and public conveyances, etc.

b. Newspapers in neighboring communities may be furnished lead stories, cartoons and so forth, all on the theme of "Zip Your Lip." "Don't discuss military or defense matters; the enemy wants to know what you know."

c. Local radio stations may broadcast appropriate spot announcements and so forth: "Here is a message from - (commanding general of the Service Command). We are at war. Keep military or other information out of your conversation;" or "We are at war; don't discuss defense industries or other military matters with anyone." They may also put on local dramatizations on the effects of leakages of information. The Office of War Information has done considerable work in this respect. Appropriate items may be suggested to this office for transmission to that agency.

d. The services of regional offices of the American Legion, the DAR, the USO and so forth may possibly be enlisted in disseminating a security educational program appropriate to their areas.

B. Summary: An enterprising security educational agent will capitalize on his knowledge of his constituency to develop other pertinent suggestions. The ... ls ... ...y the need for being security wise and to build a habit of alertness by constant repetition using a variety of appeal. Ingenuity is valuable. As alertness increases, the work of the enemy agent is made progressively difficult; he must interrogate persistently; he must try to observe; consequently, all those who are apparently unauthorized to seek information will be reported.

VI. Precautions:

A. Concurrent with the instructive talk and the publicity follow up various precautionary measures may be instituted. These may be summed up as follows:

1. Check the efficiency of the plan frequently and maintain recurrent inspections to insure compliance.

2. Maintain a list of contacts who will report criticisms of the educational talks or other phases of the program so that appropriate remedial action can be guided accordingly.

3. Undertake a survey especially in the section of the installations handling or having access to classified papers or the status of security or connection therewith. Appended hereto is a sample list of questions which may be used to test the adequacy of security in such places (Exhibit G).

4. If outside sources seek to purchase products produced under contract with the Manhattan Engineer District or destined for this District, see that all inquiries from such outside sources, without revealing the present activities of the company, will be forwarded to the District Engineer, Attention, the District Intelligence Officer.

5. Devote special attention to the security educational program as it affects young personnel. There are a number of young college and graduate students engaged in classified work which involves traveling and visiting experimental laboratories. Upon employment they will be exposed to the various phases of the security program. Prior to departure from a home station, care should be taken to see that they have reviewed pertinent sections of literature on the subject: AR 380-5; War Department Training Circular #99, 1942; "A Personal Message

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from General Marshall and Admiral King," etc, and have been again alerted to inquiries from unauthorized personnel and cautioned against discussing any matter pertaining to their work in public places or conveyances.

6. Maintain an inventory of security violations and the action taken with respect thereto. Similarly for any violations of censorships. A list of rumors concerning the Project or the work of contractors for the Project is valuable. All these serve as a guide in laying plans for future security educational measures.

FOR THE DISTRICT ENGINEER:

/s/ H. K. Calvert
/t/ H. K. CALVERT
Captain, Corps of Engineers
District Intelligence Officer

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Part III: CIC With the Alsos Mission

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Part III

CIC WITH THE ALSOS MISSION

Ranking among the most important missions that CIC participated in during World War II was the ALSOS Mission. Created principally to determine how far [illegible] scientists and technicians had advanced in the application of atomic energy to warfare, the ALSOS Mission was accorded the utmost security precautions.

The military Chief and Deputy Chief of the Mission were both men of considerable counterintelligence experience. Before ALSOS was completed, a total of 22 CIC agents had been attached to the Mission. In December 1945 Lt Col George R. Eckman prepared a final report on the ALSOS Mission; it is from this document that the following history of CIC in the Mission has been extracted.[128]

Planning the Mission

The potential contribution of modern science to the waging of a new type of warfare confronted the War Department with a specialized intelligence problem in 1943. In recognition of this problem, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Maj Gen George V. Strong, presented the Chief of Staff, Gen George C. Marshall, with a plan for the first American scientific intelligence mission on 25 September 1943. A memorandum setting forth a proposal for the organization of the mission was concurred in by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and by Maj Gen Leslie R. Groves, Chief of the Manhattan Engineer District, which was developing the Atomic Bomb.

The plan was approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, and the Mission became a unified scientific intelligence endeavor representing the armed forces and the national emergency civilian agency responsible for coordinating science and research in the war effort.

The importance of the objectives of the Scientific Intelligence Mission and the nature of its operations dictated that the most thorough security measures be employed. In conforming with this policy, a code name, "ALSOS Mission," was selected to facilitate communications and other normal identification of the organization.

The first step in the change of ALSOS from a plan to an active organization was the selection of a Chief of the Mission. Due to the highly classified nature of the mission, counterintelligence factors as well as the collection and evaluation

128 "Final Report on the ALSOS Mission," prepared by Lt Col George R. Eckman, (Conf), is on file in the G2 Documents Lib, Pentagon, Wash DC.

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of positive intelligence, had to be taken into consideration in appointments to the ALSOS staff.

On 26 November 1943, Lt Col Boris T. Pash, MI, was appointed Chief of the Mission. For the two previous years Colonel Pash had headed the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Western Defense Command and the Fourth Army. In addition to the Chief of the Mission, the Army provided a small operating staff, including four CIC agents. Military and civilian scientists from the War and Navy Departments and the Office of Scientific Research and Development were assigned as the technical specialists for ALSOS.

Initial plans for ALSOS called for a small organization to conduct exploratory probing in the first areas retaken by Allied forces in Europe.

First Mission to Italy

ALSOS operations began in Italy 17 December 1943, when the first operating headquarters was established in Naples. Some Mission personnel arrived in the Theater after travelling by air from Algiers. Four CIC agents, Ralph T. Gerame, Carl F. Fiebig, Perry O. Bailey, and Gerald L. Beatson, were attached to the Mission in Naples, and necessary equipment was obtained on loan from the Peninsular Base Section.

The first active intelligence work of the Mission consisted of locating and interrogating Italian scientists who were in Sicily and liberated areas of Southern Italy. During the approximately six weeks of interrogations, it became evident that any possible information in Italy on German scientific developments in the higher priority fields would be centered in Rome.

Two plans were considered: the first, to join the "S" Force being organized for the fall of the Italian capital; the second, to devise means of abducting key scientists from Rome and Northern Italy for questioning. Due to the stalling of the Allied advance during the winter of 1944, however, and the dubious outcome of the abduction plan, it was decided to return the Mission to the War Department in the latter part of February 1944.

The sending of the first small ALSOS group to Southern Italy represented a new undertaking in our military history, and its brief experience was largely experimental. This pioneering effort served to demonstrate the great need in this new warfare of laboratories for an intelligence collecting agency organized with highly specialized personnel, both operating and technical.

Plans for the Mission in the European Theater

Preliminary plans for ALSOS operations in Continental Europe in conjunction with the forthcoming invasion by the Allied Expeditionary Force were completed in the Military Intelligence Services Office of the War Department during April and the first part of May 1944.

ALSOS was attached to the Office of the AC of S, G2, European Theater of Operations, for administration. The Mission was without organized tables of allowance or personnel and equipment and Colonel Pash found it difficult to secure even a bare minimum of manpower and supplies; contributory was the highly classified nature of the Mission which prevented the dissemination of its importance to any but a few high ranking officials in the Theater.

While operational plans were being completed in London, Lt Col George R. Eckman, MI, arrived to join the mission on 13 August 1944 as London Liaison Officer. Previously associated with Colonel Pash in counterintelligence work in the United States, Colonel Eckman became Deputy Chief of the ALSOS Mission upon the establishment of an European Headquarters in Paris.

Further Exploitation in Italy

Even while plans for ALSOS in the North European operations were being drafted, Colonel Pash made a hurried trip to the Mediterranean Theater during the period 4-10 June 1944. Landing by plane at Naples, Colonel Pash travelled to Rome in a jeep accompanied by CIC Agent Bailey. They arrived in the Italian capital shortly after the city fell to the Americans and proceeded to investigate ALSOS targets of first priority. Three leading Italian scientists listed as top personnel targets were apprehended and interrogated.

While in Rome they made arrangements for the reopening of a Mediterranean ALSOS office. An officer member of the Mission flew from Washington to take charge of this branch, assisted by Special Agent Cerame and other CIC agents. The Mediterranean Section continued investigations and interrogations of scientific personnel in Italy.

ALSOS Operations in Liberated France

The initial tactical successes of the Normandy beach landings failed to expose targets of primary interest to ALSOS. However, with the collapse of the German defenses in Normandy and Brittany early in August, the first Mission team landed on the French coast.

Rennes, France, was reached late on the afternoon of 9 August by Colonel Pash and CIC Agent Beatson. The following morning, the first institutional target,

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the University of Rennes, was entered and searched. Colonel Pash located two members of the faculty and secured documents indicating the nature of scientific activities in other universities of France as well as German physics and chemistry publications dated as late as March 1944.

While on this excursion, the Mission Chief made arrangements with the 12th Army Group G2 for an ALSOS team to enter Paris.

The ALSOS team selected for the purpose of joining the Task Force for entry into Paris was headed by the Mission Chief and included CIC Agents Beatson and Nathaniel W. Leonard. The party crossed the English Channel by dispatch boat on 22 August and reached the 12th Army Group "T" Force Headquarters near Rambouidlet the following day. It became apparent on 24 August that the American Forces were delayed by enemy resistance and that the first entry into Paris would probably be made from the southwest by elements of the French 2d Armored Division. The ALSOS party received authorization to cut across country and join the French unit. Colonel Pash and his group reached the Port d'Orleans gateway to Paris and entered the city at 0855 hours, 25 August, the first American unit to move into the liberated French capital.

Early entry into Paris had been of prime importance to the Mission, since it was expected that the first top priority personnel target would be reached in this city. Frederic Joliot-Curie, eminent French physicist and Nobel Prize winner, was sought by the ALSOS party to furnish the first tangible clues as to German progress in the application of atomic energy to warfare. Information was obtained that Doctor Joliot-Curie might be found at his laboratory. Four times during the day, Colonel Pash and his party attempted to reach Joliot-Curie only to be turned back by German tank and sniper fire. Finally, at 1640 hours, the laboratory was reached and Doctor Joliot-Curie located. The scientist was unarmed and joyous in his greeting of the American liberators. He readily agreed to cooperate in furnishing what preliminary information he had available. Later he was sent to London for conferences with American and British scientists.

Following receipt of ALSOS progress reports, citing the successful entry into Paris and the information obtained from Dr. Joliot-Curie and other early contacts, letters of commendation were received by the Mission from Maj Gen Clayton Bissell, AC of S, G2, War Department, and Brig Gen R. A. Osmun, Chief of the Military Intelligence Service.

Belgian Targets Reduced

Allied progress to the north of Paris indicated the possibility of an early entry by British forces into Brussels, the Belgian capital, and Antwerp. An ALSOS advance unit, headed by Colonel Pash and including three CIC agents, left Paris

headquarters on 6 September. The G2 of Communications Zone, ETOUSA, accompanied the party in order to acquaint the British Intelligence chief of 21st Army Group with the activities and authority of the ALSOS Mission. Due to the rapidly changing combat situation, 21st Army Group Headquarters was not located, and the advance party of ALSOS proceeded to Brussels, entering the city late in the afternoon. As far as can be ascertained, the ALSOS team established another first at Brussels, being the first American unit to reach the city after liberation.

Information had been furnished the Mission that a supply of critical materials, used in the atomic bomb process, might be found in the vicinity of Antwerp. The Commander of the British "R" Force at Brussels was contacted and the necessity of reaching Antwerp explained to him. As the road between the Belgian capital and Antwerp was still under sporadic enemy fire, the British Commander furnished the ALSOS unit with a platoon of armored cars to serve as an escort. The Belgian port was reached without incident, although scattered shellfire was being directed by the Germans at portions of the city. Belgian officials with knowledge of the existence of the valuable material were contacted and arrangements were made to visit the storage area on the Albert Canal, west of Antwerp, at a later date. Then, the ALSOS "spearhead" group returned to Paris.

A highly classified message was radioed from Paris to the War Department for the Manhattan Engineer District, advising of the existence of the highly valuable material near Antwerp. On 19 September 1944 Colonel Pash travelled from Paris to Belgium by jeep, accompanied by CIC Agents Beatson and Fiebig. Arriving at the British Brigade Headquarters near the warehouse in which the material was reputedly stored, the investigators learned that the exact location was within 200 yards of the German lines. During the period 19 to 25 September, this area was searched four times during lulls in enemy fire. Colonel Pash and his two CIC agents were subjected to sniper fire three times and on one occasion narrowly averted being hit by German mortar fire. The material was finally located on 25 September and a platoon of British Royal Engineers was placed at the disposal of the Mission for guard duty and subsequent removal of the material for shipment to Great Britain and the United States.

Between trips in search of the material, Colonel Pash and Agent Beatson made a hurried entry in Eindhoven, Holland, on 21 September. A primary target, the important Phillips Works, was reconnoitered and arrangements were made for the reception and billeting of investigative teams of the CIOS (Combined Intelligence Operations Service).

Southern France Operations

In order to further consolidate Mission activities for exploitation of targets in the liberated countries and study of target data in Germany, a decision was

made to close the Mediterranean Theater office at Rome. Personnel of this office, including Agent Cerame, was ordered to proceed to Paris by way of Marseilles. This group arrived in Marseilles on 2 October and continued operations in Southern France until 18 October, exploiting targets along the Mediterranean Coast.

When the vital material had been located in Belgium, information was obtained that approximately two carloads had been shipped to the south of France at the time of the German invasion. But the reports on this shipment had been only fragmentary. The Mission Chief felt, however, that the indicated area would have to be combed by ALSOS personnel, although no allied troops yet had entered that area in Southern France. Nevertheless the small party of ALSOS personnel, which included Special Agent Fiebig, left Paris on 26 September for the operational "invasion" of the territory.

Temporary headquarters was established in a chateau near Perigueux and the group split up into small parties for an intensive ground search. Much critical material was discovered at Toulouse and eventually secured and transported to Marseilles. The unit had the distinction of being the first small showing of American troops in this part of Southern France.

New Leads Discovered in Paris

The major part of the month of November was spent in organizing target information for operations in Germany, in consolidating of all ALSOS activities in Paris and in conducting several small expeditions in the liberated areas.

The scientific leader of the Mission and ALSOS CIC agents uncovered several interesting new leads in Paris during this period. Offices of the important German firm of Siemens and Halshe and an undercover German scientific agency were located and searched. They were found just as the Germans had left them, since no other Allied intelligence agencies had entered the buildings prior to the ALSOS team. The investigation provided valuable leads for target exploitation of German institutions and laboratories. At the same time a secret German teletype system directory was uncovered that proved of extreme value to Allied intelligence.

As a result of data collected by Mission personnel in Paris, Colonel Pash, accompanied by CIC Agents Fiebig and Leonard, left on 8 November for a visit to Eupen, Belgium, near the German border. Here, the team located and seized the former German head of the Paris office of a leading German war materiel agency. Also apprehended was this official's secretary. They were given preliminary interrogations in Eupen and then evacuated to Paris for further questioning.

Operations in Strasbourg

Intelligence gathered by ALSOS in Paris and other liberated areas included German documents that listed the names of key scientists in Strasbourg and indicated that the Alsace capital might become the first highly important enemy-held ALSOS target likely to fall to Allied armies.

Planning for the Strasbourg entry was pushed during November. The Chief of ALSOS acquainted the G2 of Sixth Army Group with the special mission requirements, and the G2 directed his "T" Force commander for Strasbourg to give first priority to ALSOS targets.

Colonel Pash and his operatives left Paris on 24 November and arrived at a rendezvous point in Saarburg that day, moving on to Strasbourg the morning of 25 November. Intermittent German shelling of Strasbourg for the next two days kept Mission members dodging as they went about their work.

As a result of preliminary planning for target exploitation, key target areas were secured and placed under guard during the first two days in Strasbourg, despite the sporadic shellfire and the attendant confusion. Initial searches failed to locate wanted German scientists but, by the evening of 29 November, seven University of Strasbourg physicists and chemists were taken into custody.

Several key German scientists had received ample warning of the impending fall of Strasbourg and had fled the city. But they had left behind in their homes and laboratories, documents which later proved of high value in determining the scientific progress of the German war effort.

Results obtained from the Strasbourg operation were among the major ALSOS accomplishments during the entire history of the Mission. Due to the desire for the utmost secrecy in reference to ALSOS interest in nuclear physics and practical applications of atomic energy, interrogations of the personnel targets had to be conducted deftly and indirectly. Security considerations hindered the quest for some information. But the documentary evidence gave the Mission members the first concrete story of German progress in the atomic research field.

Commendations were received by the ALSOS Mission for the Strasbourg discoveries. From Major General Groves came the message: "We have recently completed an analysis of the voluminous records and other material collected by the ALSOS Mission in Strasbourg. This is the most complete, dependable, and factual information we have obtained bearing upon the nature and extent of the German war effort in our field. Fortunately it tends to confirm our conclusion that the Germans are now behind us."

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Commendations were followed by promotions, and, in recognition of the superior work of two CIC agents, Carl Fiebig and Ralph Cerame, both men were given direct commissions as second lieutenants.

Cologne-Bonn Operation

In the second week of February 1945 ALSOS Mission directors learned of an impending Allied drive toward the Rhine in the Cologne-Bonn area. ALSOS planned to conduct operations in this new territory in conjunction with a 12th Army Group "T" Force. A Mission officer and several CIC agents went forward from Liege, Belgium, to the German city of Aachen to set up an ALSOS advance base for this operation. This team established the usual excellent ALSOS mess and prepared for the comfortable billeting of Mission personnel.

German resistance on the west bank of the Rhine collapsed suddenly on 6 March 1945. Colonel Pash and another Mission officer drove into Cologne on the morning of 7 March to find the "T" Force newly entered and preparing to establish a headquarters on the outskirts of the city. The Mission investigators were brought into Cologne on 8 and 9 March. They exploited targets at the University of Cologne and visited homes of personnel objectives.

On the afternoon of 8 March, while ALSOS teams were cleaning up target data in Cologne, word was received that the university town of Bonn was available for intelligence exploitation. Two teams were held in readiness for investigations in Bonn, but the city did not actually become available for entry until 10 March. A number of significant documents were secured at Bonn, and several personnel targets were interrogated. Exploitation of these targets continued until 12 March when part of the investigative team started back to Paris with a load of German documents. Major activities were completed the next day, and operating personnel returned to the ALSOS advance base at Aachen.

Information secured in the Bonn-Cologne area, though fragmentary, served to confirm the large amount of positive intelligence gathered earlier in Strasbourg on the highly important fields of practical application of atomic energy and bacteriological warfare. A few small details were added to the picture, and additional locations of important scientists and laboratories east of the Rhine were obtained and verified. A limited amount of data was also obtained on German research and development in metallurgy, aeronautics, and chemistry.

With the Germans driven across the lower Rhine, it became evident that the entire west wall would collapse and the upper Rhine would be cleared in the last week of March as well. ALSOS target preparations were pushed forward at Paris Mission headquarters for the next important Rhineland city: Ludwigshaven. Plans for the reduction of important scientific intelligence targets in this city were coordinated with the "T" Force of Sixth Army Group.

On 22 March, Colonel Pash led the ALSOS "spearhead" group into Ludwigshaven while the city was still being shelled by the enemy, who were holding their bridgehead on the west side of th Rhine to protect their retreat. The ALSOS party proceeded at once to the huge I. G. Farben Industries plant and secured guards for this important target from the armored unit driving through the city toward the Rhine. This major war plant was held by the ALSOS team and attached guards until the "T" Force moved in the next day.

Heidelberg Base Established

The crossing of the Rhine was delayed for the ALSOS advance elements until 29 March. All bridges had been destroyed by the retreating Germans, and Colonel Pash and his operating team finally crossed the river at Worms on a hastily constructed pontoon bridge. The "spearhead" outfit then turned south and entered Mannheim shortly before noon on the same day. A short survey of the secondary targets which ALSOS had listed in Mannheim revealed almost total destruction by shellfire and aerial bombing.

Contact was again established with the "T" Force of Sixth Army Group at Mannheim, and the ALSOS team learned that one possible avenue of approach to Heidelberg might be cleared. Colonel Pash decided to risk the dash to Heidelberg since the famous old German university town held many high priority targets.

Heidelberg was reached on the afternoon of 29 March, and the ALSOS advance party proceeded immediately to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. Because of the extreme importance of this target, two scientific consultants of the Mission accompanied the party. Ordinarily, the standard Mission practice had been to delay bringing up scientific personnel until targets were secured and deemed safe from fire. The ALSOS advance group spent the night at the Institute, and expert consultants started examining laboratory equipment and documents the following day. On 30 March, a new advance ALSOS base was established at Heidelberg.

New Base at Gottingen

German defenses along the lower Rhine were collapsing as ALSOS teams crossed the upper Rhine behind the advance elements to enter Mannheim and Heidelberg. From the Northern Advance Base near Aachen, a Mission officer and a CIC agent moved east, crossing the Rhine and entering the city of Frankfurt-am-Main on 1 Apr . 1945. However, heavy enemy fire forced a temporary withdrawal. Since Frankfurt had been severely damaged and many of the target personalities had fled, ALSOS obtained little information in this city.

On 9 April 1945, another party from the ALSOS Aachen base, which included CIC Agents Leonard and Mason A. Hicks, crossed the Rhine in an attempt to reach the important university center of Gottingen. The ALSOS party arrived at

the city at 1200 hours on 12 April. The chief of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Doctor Telchow, who had fled from Berlin, was located and interrogated. It was learned that the important records of his institution were available in Gottingen, having been evacuated from Berlin and ALSOS set up a new Northern Advance Base section in the outskirts of the town.

Osenberg Capture

The development of ALSOS target intelligence had indicated that one of the top objectives in Germany would be the personnel and records of the planning office of the Reichsforschungsrat, the Nazi counterpart of the American Office of Scientific Research and Development. The latest information, gathered from interrogation of German scientists and examination of documents, revealed that the organization's records and personnel had been evacuated to the village of Lindau, near the town of Nordheim. Questioning of Dr. Telchow at Gottingen on the afternoon of 11 April, confirmed this intelligence.

Information from the combat headquarters controlling troops in the area resulted in a decision to delay an attempt to reach Lindau until the morning of 12 April. CIC agents accompanied two Mission officers in a jeep, and the party arrived in Lindau at 1000 hours on 21 April. A German civilian conducted the group directly to the temporary Reichsforschungsrat offices. Agent Hicks was posted as a guard at the main entrance, and the Mission officers went to the office of Professor Werner Osenberg, Chief of the Planning Board of the Reichsforschungsrat. A preliminary interrogation of Osenberg and a brief examination of the secret files of the organization revealed that the ALSOS team had made one of the most important intelligence captures of the war.

In addition to the apprehension of Osenberg, the ALSOS team secured the major portion of his scientific and secretarial staff and all the key records disclosing the locations, personnel, budgets, and progress of the scientific and war research activities of the Germans. Due to the large number of personnel and bulk of documents taken with Osenberg, and the apparent cooperative attitude of the German scientific leader, the ALSOS team leader decided to hold his group in Lindau so that the wealth of material could be put in order for Mission exploitation.

Since Doctor Osenberg reported that two of his staff members had disappeared the previous night and would probably return with SS representatives to destroy secret documents, it was considered necessary to remove a small number of key files to Gottingen. One Mission officer and the two CIC agents remained at the Lindau offices as a provisional security guard while arrangements were made for a regular guard detail.

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During the next few days, expert scientific consultants of the Mission exploited the material of the Osenberg organization at the ALSOS base in Gottingen. While these scientists were at work, small expedition which included CIC Lieutenants James R. Aldorf and Delmore E. Reeves and Agent Hicks departed from Gottingen with the Brunswick area target list. They made an important contact near Brunswick when they located the former research center of the Luftwaffe. This institution proved of extreme interest to American aeronautics experts.

Stadtilm Operation

During the examination of documents which had been found at the University of Bonn, a few papers of dubious value were sent back to ALSOS Paris headquarters. A careful study of these papers revealed one potentially important clue to the evacuation address of a vital German war research activity. In some German correspondence it was stated that a leading scientist named Diebner was now living in the small town of Stadtilm. Previous documents recovered by ALSOS indicated that Diebner was probably connected with Nazi war research in the field of atomic energy. Interrogations of Diebner's colleagues in physics at the University of Heidelberg confirmed this information.

The extreme significance of the town of Stadtilm was perceived at Paris, and a scientific member of the Mission, who was also a licensed pilot, volunteered to fly his plane to Heidelberg to alert Colonel Pash and his operating personnel of this important target.

The scientist landed in Heidelberg on the afternoon of 10 April. On the following morning, Colonel Pash left for Stadtilm accompanied by scientists and three CIC agents. They reached Stadtilm less than an hour after the German troops had evacuated the town to discover that Diebner and another important personality target had fled, but additional research workers were rounded up and many important documents were seized. The installation turned out to be the atomic energy experimental laboratories and office headquarters of the German Army Ordnance. The Gestapo had managed to evacuate a large supply of highly valuable materiel from the laboratories, but this stockpile was later uncovered in the Bavarian mountains. The investigation at Stadtilm had uncovered one of the most important ALSOS targets in the field of nuclear physics and atomic energy.

Operations in Southwest Germany

Principal interest in ALSOS operations shifted back to the Southern Advance Base at Heidelberg during the latter part of April as plans were made for a major tactical advance into Southwest Germany. Reliable, confirmed information already obtained in ALSOS operations clearly indicated that remaining key German

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scientists engaged in war research work, particularly in atomic energy, would be found in this area, unless they had escaped eastward into Bavaria or southeast into the German and Austrian Alps.

The southwest Germany operation was the most elaborately planned, heavily staffed and carefully executed phase of the ALSOS Mission. Target data had been compiled and studied for a month before the movement took place. Aerial photographs, town plans, terrain features, and documentary evidence were reviewed in great detail.

On 21 April, Colonel Pash moved his ALSOS "Lightning A" advance unit into camp near Freudenstadt. This unit included 14 U.S. Army officers, seven British officers, five expert ALSOS consultants, eight CIC Special Agents, and 15 ALSOS enlisted men. On 22 April, this special task force advanced into Wurttemberg. During the next few days, as the combat forces captured five important towns, personnel, documentary, and institutional intelligence targets were seized by the ALSOS "Lightning A" unit. Scattered enemy resistance was encountered all along the route, but at only one point was the Mission delayed for any length of time by German fire.

While the combat phase of this penetration into southwest Germany ended on 25 April, ALSOS operations in the area continued until 29 April. Previous Mission findings had indicated that four important German laboratories had been evacuated to the Hohenzollern area towns of Haigerloch, Hechingen, Bisingen, and Tailfingen. These laboratories were found to possess key secret documents, equipment, and materiel of special interest, and they were staffed by the outstanding German scientists in the field of atomic energy research. One important ALSOS personality target had left for Munich two weeks previously but six scientists were held for evacuation to Paris where they were to be turned over to representatives of the Manhattan Project. ALSOS investigators also discovered the hiding places of critical material and secret documents which allegedly had been burned.

For the success of this ALSOS operation, Colonel Pash was recommended for the Legion of Merit by the Commanding General of Sixth Army Group. This award was later approved by the War Department.

Bavarian Operations

The completion of ALSOS operations in Southwest Germany found the Mission in possession of all but three important scientific personality targets. Information indicated that these scientists might be found either in Munich or in the Urfeld area of the Bavarian Alps. For the purpose of this "mopping up" operation, two teams were formed on 30 April in Heidelberg.

Colonel Pash took charge of a unit which included CIC men Fiebig and Beatson. On 2 May, this unit entered the town of Urfeld ahead of the American tactical forces with the aid of a patrol of combat troops only to discover a sizeable Wehrmacht unit nearby. German officers who came into the town with the intention of accepting surrender from the small band of Americans were bluffed by Colonel Pash into believing that large reserves were waiting in a nearby mountain pass. The Nazi officers left Urfeld, and Colonel Pash, realizing that to stay in the town might jeopardize the execution of the Mission and its security, withdrew his personnel. The following day, Urfeld was liberated by the American combat forces, and the ALSOS unit returned to take important personnel targets.

Meanwhile, another team which included two CIC agents and was headed by a Mission officer, entered the Bavarian city of Munich on 1 May, and located the home of their first target, Doctor Gerlach, a leading German physicist and war research director. There was no sign of the scientist at his residence, although the ALSOS investigators discovered a Luftwaffe major during a search of the house. The major was turned over to the 45th Division prisoner of war enclosure and the team proceeded to the University of Munich where they found Dr. Gerlach in the basement offices of the physics laboratory.

The Munich operation was a rapid and successful one. Personnel and documentary targets of primary interest to the Mission were secured without exception and returned to the base at Heidelberg.

Northern Base Activities

While the important operations in Bavaria and Wurttemberg were being conducted under the direction of Colonel Pash from the Heidelberg base, a number of investigative teams were dispatched from the Northern Advance Base at Gottingen during the latter part of April and early May 1945.

ALSOS investigative teams conducted several searches in the Harz Mountain area north of Nordhausen during the period 27 April to 10 May. Information had been obtained that valuable materials and documents might be cached in extensive natural caves in this region. A number of these caves and mines in the vicinity of the villages of Niedersachswerfen and Rubeland were searched and while various political documents of the Nazi party, stores of arms and explosives, and other supplies were discovered, no scientific documents were found.

Other targets visited by members of the Northern Base during this closing period of the war in Europe included personnel and institutional objectives at Hamburg, Jena, Braunschweig, Clausthal, Halle, Erfurt, and Essen. In the early days of May, ALSOS investigators uncovered additional caches of uranium compounds and "heavy" water which had been hidden away by the Nazis in the Harz and the Bavarian Mountains.

Berlin Investigation

During the early planning stages of ALSOS in 1943 and early 1944, many potential Berlin targets had been evaluated and listed for ultimate examination. However, as ALSOS intelligence was collected in operations in the liberated countries and Western Germany, it became evident that Berlin would become an area of only secondary interest. Most high priority targets had already been discovered by the ALSOS teams.

As the Air Force continued to rain down high explosives on the city, many of the war research laboratories and bureaus of institutes and factories were evacuated or obliterated. Following the German surrender and the Soviet Occupation of Berlin, it was expected that what ALSOS targets remained had been thoroughly "worked over" by Russian intelligence agencies.

There were certain missing items, however, that ALSOS officials thought might be discovered among the rubble of Berlin, and Colonel Pash headed a party of 14 Mission members that entered Berlin on 28 July. Three weeks were spent in following investigative leads, including documents and personnel of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. The effort was well spent, for a number of additional facts were added to the ALSOS dossiers.

The Berlin Operation was the last major expedition of the Mission. Colonel Pash returned to Paris headquarters in the second week of August 1945.

Mission Leaves the Theater

Mission field activities were completed during the latter part of September, and commendations and awards were received at ALSOS Paris Headquarters for outstanding service. Colonel Pash was presented the Legion of Merit while Colonel Eckman and Lieutenant Fiebig were awarded the Bronz Star Medal.

The ALSOS Liaison Office which had been established at Headquarters, USFET, was inactivated with the closing of operations, and all personnel, documents, and equipment of the Mission were centered in Paris. On 25 October, this Headquarters was closed, and on 15 November, the ALSOS Mission was officially inactivated by direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department.

Appendix 1

CIC PERSONNEL IN THE ALSOS MISSION

Name	Rank	Dates of Service with Mission
Boris T. Pash	Col	26 Nov 43 to 1 Dec 45
George R. Eckman	Lt Col	1 Aug 44 to 1 Dec 45
William J. Carr	1st Lt	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
James R. Aldorf	2d Lt	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Ralph T. Cerame	2d Lt	15 Dec 43 to 7 Sep 45
Carl F. Fiebig	2d Lt	25 Dec 43 to 7 Sep 45
Delmore E. Reeves	2d Lt	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Luis Abella	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Perry O. Bailey	S/A	25 Dec 43 to 25 Jun 44
Gerald L. Beatson	S/A	25 Dec 43 to 30 Sep 45
Archie J. Bray	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Joseph P. Crotty	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Henry J. Cullinan	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Gustav V. Edlund	S/A	1 Apr 45 to 10 May 45
Lawrence R. Feindt	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Mason A. Hicks	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Ira Koenig	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Nathaniel W. Leonard	S/A	20 Aug 44 to 15 Oct 45
Nicholas J. Madeira	S/A	31 May 45 to 15 Oct 45
James T. McIntosh	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Peter F. Oates	S/A	5 Jan 45 to 29 Sep 45
Robert M. Peers	S/A	12 Mar 45 to 14 May 45
Marte Previti	S/A	31 Mar 45 to 15 Oct 45
John C. Woolley	S/A	23 Mar 45 to 15 Oct 45

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Part IV: CIC With the Transportation Corps

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Part IV

CIC WITH THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

One of the most perplexing counterintelligence problems which followed the United States' entry into World War II concerned the protection of men and material in transit from the United States to active theaters overseas.

It was a perplexing problem not only because of its tremendous scope but also because of the absence, until the last days of the war, of directives clearly defining counterintelligence and security responsibilities at the Army's huge ports of embarkation.

When war erupted in Europe in 1939, the Army operated only two such ports, one at New York and one at San Francisco. Their security was of only minor concern. But after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the swift flow of troops and supplies to combat areas necessitated the opening of six other ports of embarkation, three cargo ports, and two sub-ports.[129] With the increased threat of enemy sabotage and espionage, port security became a major problem virtually overnight.

The very complexity of an Army port of embarkation spawned many of its security problems. Far more than a mere shipping terminal, the port included not only the actual point of embarkation but also a variety of auxiliary installations in the general area. The Port Commander was responsible for the reception, supply, transportation, embarkation, and debarkation of personnel and the receipt, storage, and transportation of supplies. He had to supervise military traffic between his port and overseas bases. He commanded all troops assigned to the port and its components, including troops staging for overseas movement.[130] During World War II, more than 7,500,000 men and almost 127 million tons of supplies were channeled through the Army ports.[131]

To carry out the multifarious activities of a port of embarkation, services of literally thousands of civilian and military personnel ranging from typists to stevedores were required. At the New York Port of Embarkation alone, more than 50,000 persons were employed in early 1945. This was 20 times the number of persons on the payroll at the outbreak of the war. Personnel employed at all the Army ports totaled 171,000. In addition, thousands of troops staging for overseas movement were stationed at the ports of embarkation at any stated time

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129 The Army Almanac, p 152, Table 14.

130 Interview with F. L. Tobin, former CIC agent at New York Port of Embarkation, (Uncl) (CIC Files).

131 The Army Almanac, p 152, Table 14.

throughout the war. The New York Port of Embarkation, the largest of the eight, operated three staging areas capable of processing 78,099 troops.[132]

The security problems concomitant to operations on such a gigantic scale are obvious. Ammunition, clothing, weapons, food - all these were vulnerable to sabotage while in port warehouses or on ships lying at anchor in the harbor. With a few key "plants" among the thousands of port employees, an enemy could easily learn size and destination of movements of men and supplies. Even careless words by homesick soldiers could provide a clue for enemy agents in the area.

Since the Transportation Corps was charged with the responsibility of moving these men and supplies, it had to assume full responsibility for their protection from the time the troops or goods entered the port of embarkation until they were put ashore in a foreign port. Eventually, the War Department created a special Counter Intelligence Corps detachment to enforce security measures for the Transportation Corps. But evolution of the Transportation Corps CIC was slow. In the early years of the war, there was considerable confusion and duplication of effort whenever the security question arose.

Service Commands Responsible at First

Before Pearl Harbor, safety of Lend Lease shipments was entrusted to the various Service Commands through which shipments passed en route to a port for loading. Security agents from the Service Commands, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Coast Guard all participated in the effort to safeguard the vital supplies.[133]

With the tremendous increase in shipments after the entry of the United States into the war, it soon became obvious that Service Command investigators could not adequately control port security. Port installations embraced a wide variety of activities with which most Service Command personnel were quite unfamiliar. Special knowledge and training were necessary for the proper protection of water-front facilities, for preventing the landing of subversive crew members of foreign ships, for security checks of ships, and for dealing with longshore and marine labor.[134] Just who should be responsible for post security measures was not clear, however.

Part of the confusion stemmed from uncertainty of the role of the Transportation Corps itself. This organization, as it now exists, was not developed completely

132 U.S. Army in World War II, The Transportation Corps, pp 109-110, 123.
133 Interview with Lt Col A. Lamar Benson, 300 Fallsway, Baltimore, Md, (uncl) (CIC Files).
134 U.S. Army in World War II, The Transportation Corps, p 128.

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until World War II. During the evolutionary process, the Transportation Corps absorbed many of the functions of the Quartermaster Corps, other services, and the Service Commands. The integration inevitably brought friction, disagreements, and jurisdictional disputes which were not readily solved.[135] This confusion was reflected throughout the entire structure of intelligence and security activities at ports operated by the Transportation Corps.[136]

Port Commanders Assume Responsibility

Gradually, Port Commanders assumed direct control of security and counter-intelligence matters within their installations under the limited supervision of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Because they were aware of the problems peculiar to their ports, the commanders were in a position to select and train personnel for the specialized security and counterintelligence duties.[137]

As early as March 1942 the Commanding General of the New York Port of Embarkation, through his G1, began earmarking former lawyers, detectives, insurance investigators, and newspapermen for work as special investigators of the Transportation Corps. After completion of a special 54-hour training course in sabotage, espionage, and investigations, the Transportation Corps agents were placed on duty with the investigative branch of the port's intelligence division.

In April 1942, the new port investigators were issued Military Intelligence Division credentials. Quotas were established for several of the men to attend each class of the CIC School in Chicago, although they were not at first considered CIC agents.

In the port areas, the Transportation Corps agents had virtually unlimited jurisdiction. Criminal investigations, collection of positive intelligence from crews and passengers of incoming ships, censorship, and even recommendations for safety programs were tasks performed in addition to usual counterintelligence responsibilities. When leads carried them away from the port, the agents also operated in areas which normally would have fallen under the jurisdiction of either CIC or the FBI. Close liaison was maintained with both those organizations and the Office of Naval Intelligence.[138]

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135. U.S. Army in World War II, The Transportation Corps, pp 28, 80, 105.
136 Report, Intelligence and Security Functions in the Transportation Corps, dtd 1 Nov 45, (uncl) (Office of the Chief of Transportation).
137 U.S. Army in World War II, The Transportation Corps, p 128.
138 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 1955, (Conf) (Historical Proj Files).

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CIC Screens Seamen in Baltimore

The first documented instance of CIC agents being employed on port security in the United States occurred in August 1942, when the Office of Naval Intelligence requested CIC assistance in screening crews of foreign ships tied up in the port of Baltimore. Five agents, preferably Spanish, Portuguese, French, or German linguists, were needed to assist Navy Intelligence personnel in checks of nine neutral European vessels.

The request was granted. Five agents assigned to CIC, War Department, were placed under the supervision of Military Intelligence Division Headquarters, Third Service Command, for the port security operation.[139]

Lack of Uniformity at Ports

Absence of specific policy directives governing counterintelligence functions at ports of embarkation resulted in both operational and administrative lack of uniformity. Some ports, notably that of New York, had their own counterintelligence agents. Commanders of other ports requested and received assistance from CIC agents assigned to Service Commands. Provost marshals and military police were responsible for counterintelligence at still other ports.

Loyalty investigations of port employees exemplified the confusion existing during the early days of the war. At New York and New Orleans Ports of Embarkation, the Provost Marshal's office was responsible; at Boston, the Civilian Personnel office was responsible; port intelligence divisions conducted the loyalty investigations at all other Army ports of embarkation.[140]

A step toward elimination of the confusion was taken in November 1942, when the Office of the Chief of Transportation issued a directive governing control of subversive maritime employees at all Army ports. The directive outlined the procedure for establishing a system of dissemination of information on each undesirable maritime employee, so that each port would have that information in a card index file. Initiated immediately by all ports, the system proved an effective counterintelligence measure. It prevented undesirable seamen who had been refused employment on Army transports at one port from journeying to another and being hired.

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139 Ltr, Hq Third Service Command, MID, Balto, Md, to Chief, Mil Intel Service, War Dept, Wash DC, dtd 17 Aug 42, Subj: CIC Assistance for Control of Foreign Ships, (Conf) (CIC Files).

140 Rpt on Proceedings of Int Sec Conf, Transportation Corps Ports of Embarkation, New York and Wash DC, 14-18 Sep 43, pp 60-62, (Conf) (CIC Files).

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The system was thoroughly outlined and implemented and was uniform at all ports. Distribution of the information contained in "flimsies" made on each undesirable maritime employee included all other ports of embarkation, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Intelligence Division, Transportation Corps, and in some instances FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence.[141]

CIC Recruits Transportation Corps Investigators

By early 1943, many of the Transportation Corps investigators at ports of embarkation were being transferred into the Counter Intelligence Corps. Instead of becoming members of organized CIC detachments, however, these agents were assigned to ports of embarkation with duty stations in the investigative branch of the port intelligence division. At the New York Port of Embarkation, which set the pattern followed by other ports, the new CIC agents continued to work with Transportation Corps investigators who had not been taken into CIC. Their duties were identical.

The importance which the War Department planners placed on CIC's port security operations was indicated in early 1944, when Service Commands were ordered to consolidate CIC and Provost Marshal General agents into a Security Intelligence Corps responsible for both counterintelligence and criminal investigations in the Zone of Interior. Although some Transportation Corps investigators were transferred into the new Security Intelligence Corps, those who had previously been designated as CIC agents retained their identity as such and continued to function at the Army ports under the overall supervision of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Office of the Chief of Transportation.[142]

During the fiscal year of 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944, counterintelligence activities in ports of embarkation were directed by a newly organized Counter-intelligence Branch of the Intelligence and Security Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation. A historical report of that Division dated 29 June 1944 enumerated counterintelligence responsibilities at the ports:

"This Branch supervises and coordinates the counterintelligence activities of the Transportation Corps. This requires taking the proper action on violations of security that occur at ports of embarkation and other Transportation Corps installations which are referred to the Chief of Transportation for determination as to the extent of violation and appropriate action to be taken. It is responsible for the establishment of loyalty of military and civilian personnel assigned to the

141 Directive dtd 2 Nov 42, Office of the Chief of Trans to Intel Officers, Ports and Sub-Ports of Embarkation through the Commanding General or Port Commander, Subj: Coordinating the Files of Undesirable Maritime Employees, (Conf) (Office Ch of Trans).

142 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CCIC Files).

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Office, Chief of Transportation."[143] The report went on to discuss seven categories of persons which Transportation Corps investigators could clear for access to ports of embarkation.

In summing up accomplishments of the 1944 fiscal year, the historical report cited a series of agreements between ports of embarkation and the Coast Guard which "resulted in a more effective security arrangement at all ports of embarkation and a harmonious and prized relationship between the two services." A CIC study of discussion of classified information over telephones at ports of embarkation resulted in establishment of a separate priority category for operational teletypes, specific recommendations as to their use, and a security education program in the ports.

Finally, the report called attention to the unique security and counterintelligence functions of the Transportation Corps:

"The Transportation Corps is one of the few services that have the direct responsibility for internal security of their field installations. The manner in which this job has been accomplished has been recognized to the extent that the Transportation Corps has been given increased independence in the operation of the program at the ports."[144]

Despite the ever-increasing role of the Transportation Corps in solving its own counterintelligence problems, through CIC agents assigned to ports of embarkation, confusion regarding responsibility for counterintelligence and security measures still hampered operations. This confusion was recognized in a report which itemized handicaps to counterintelligence coverage:

"It is believed that the main handicaps experienced in accomplishing the mission were due largely to:

(1) Lack of a firm policy from higher authority in matters involving subversion, sabotage, and security in general, especially those pertaining to investigation and removal of personnel.

(2) Lack of clear cut definition of the functions of various agencies and divisions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Coast Guard.

(3) Lack of uniformity of basic organizational structure (Intelligence and Security) of the ports of embarkation.

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143 Historical Report, Intel and Security Div, Office, Ch of Trans, for fiscal year 1 Jul 43 to 30 Jun 44, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

144 Ibid, p 5.

(4) Lack of personnel.

(5) The responsibility for the solution of field problems presented to officers who had no field experience.

(6) Assignment of officers without special qualifications to duties in this Division requiring highly specialized knowledge and experience in internal security."[145]

Transportation Corps CIC Detachment Authorized

As the scope of Transportation Corps counterintelligence operations multiplied, the Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations requested on 27 November 1944 the creation of a special CIC detachment for the Transportation Corps.

At the time of the request, the Transportation Corps was operating 1,700 vessels carrying troops, secret cargo, and war supplies of every type. More than 500,000 tons of explosives were being shipped through ports of embarkation monthly. More than 130,000 civilian employees had access to the piers and ships operated by the Transportation Corps. To cope with the security problems involved in such a tremendous operation, the Transportation Corps wanted a CIC detachment of from 127 to 175 officers and enlisted men.[146]

A staff study prepared for the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, concluded that Transportation Corps security problems coincided with CIC functions. It was determined impractical to utilize investigative agencies of the Service Commands and theaters of operations to discharge the security responsibilities of the Chief of Transportation. The study recommended formation of a detachment of 40 officers and 157 enlisted men from grades and ratings already authorized for the Transportation Corps. "In the past," the study commented, "the Transportation Corps was forced to rely upon borrowed personnel, special assignment of Transportation Corps personnel, and other makeshift methods. In many cases it was impossible to perform necessary functions."[147]

On 16 February 1945, a letter from the Chief of Transportation to ports of embarkation announced the authority of the Chief of Transportation to establish

145 Memo for the Exec Officer, ATC, dtd 29 Sep 45, Subj: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, Intel and Sec Div, (uncl) (Office, Ch of Trans).

146 Memo, Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie to AC of S, G2, War Dept Gen Staff, dtd 27 Nov 44, subj: Counter Intelligence Corps, (Secret) (CCIC Files).

147 Memo for the Chief of Staff, dtd 2 Feb 45, subj: Org of Counter Intel Corps Det for Trans Corps, (Secret) (CIC Files).

an "Intelligence Agency." This unit was to perform, at ports of embarkation, loyalty, counterintelligence, and criminal investigations and was to gather foreign positive, technical, and domestic intelligence.

Three days later, the Chief of Staff approved the establishment of a Transportation Corps CIC Detachment. In the weeks that followed, plans were made to coordinate work of the Transportation Corps CIC Detachment and Security Intelligence Corps agents assigned to ports under the new Intelligence Agency. Confidential funds were allocated for Transportation Corps use, and arrangements were made to issue CIC credentials to agents procured for the Transportation Corps CIC Detachment. A Table of Organization for the new detachment allotted 40 officers and 117 enlisted men, with the initial authorization set at 20 officers and 49 enlisted men.

The Intelligence Agency was activated on 13 April 1945 and was attached to the Third Transportation Zone in Baltimore for administration.[148] The Transportation Corps CIC Detachment was established on 26 April to function within the Intelligence Agency.[149] Maj A. LaMar Benson was first chief of the Intelligence Agency while Maj Harold E. Hutchings commanded the CIC detachment.[150]

One of the first tasks of the Intelligence Agency was the processing of applications for transfer to the new CIC detachment. By 30 June, 202 persons had been recommended as agents. Investigations were completed on 118 of these people, and 65 were found acceptable. Twenty officers and 37 enlisted men were processed into the Intelligence Agency.[151]

Headquarters of the Transportation Corps CIC Detachment was established at Baltimore, with sub-detachments at New York, San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, New Orleans, and Hampton Roads ports of embarkation. Intelligence and security officers of sub-ports such as Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charleston, and Portland called on the port which controlled them for CIC agents when needed for special missions. The staff of the first headquarters in Baltimore included Capt Dan J. Shaper, Capt Robert J. DeBloise, and 1st Lt Sidney Medoff. M/Sgt Alfred Harrison was sergeant major.[152]

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148 Historical Rpt, Intell and Security Div, Office of the Ch of Trans, for Fiscal Year 1945, dtd 30 Jun 45, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

149 Office of the Ch of Trans, Misc Ltr No. 139 to Commanders, Ports of Embarkation and Zone Transportation Officers, U.S. Army, Third Zone, dtd 26 Apr 45, subj: Transportation Corps Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, (Conf) (CIC Files).

150 Historical Rpt, Intel and Security Div, Office of the Ch of Trans, for Fiscal Year 1945, dtd 30 Jun 45, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

151 Ibid

152 Interview with Capt Alfred Harrison, (uncl) (CIC Files).

117th CIC Detachment Activated

Another change in the counterintelligence structure within the Transportation Corps was the activation on 17 May 1946 of the 117th CIC Detachment as the Transportation Corps investigative unit. The Investigative Agency, now moved to Washington, along with the Office of the Chief of Transportation, continued to supervise the CIC detachment. Capt Richard D. Gray became commanding officer of the 117th CIC Detachment. Sub-detachments continued in operation at major ports.[153]

Two days before the activation of the 117th CIC Detachment, the Intelligence and Security Branch of the Office of the Chief of Transportation was discontinued. Its functions, including those of the Intelligence Agency, were transferred to a new Planning and Intelligence Branch.[154]

Port Security Training

Prior to the establishment of the Transportation Corps' Intelligence Agency, all counterintelligence personnel at ports of embarkation were port personnel, and their training was the responsibility of the port commander. Most ports established brief training schools for investigators, similar to the 54-hour course developed at the New York Port of Embarkation. When agents from the ports attended the CIC School in Chicago or the Provost Marshal's School at Fort Sam Houston, they were instructed in investigative techniques but received no special emphasis on port security.[155]

When the Intelligence Agency was created, it was ordered to "supervise specialized training of personnel in investigations."

An Intelligence Agency survey to determine the state of training of agents under its supervision revealed two distinct categories into which personnel could be placed for training purposes. In one group were those agents who through long experience in the Transportation Corps and extended duty at a port of embarkation were strong on port organization and operation, but lacked experience in intelligence and investigations. On the other hand, experienced intelligence personnel

153 Ltr, AG 322 (7 May 46), AO-I-SPMOU-M, TAGO to CGs, Service Commands, Mil District of Washington, New York Port of Embarkation, and the Ch of Trans, dtd 10 May 46, Subj: Constitution and Activation of Certain Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments, (uncl) (Office, Ch of Trans); Ltr, SPTAA 300.4 GAG, New York Port of Embarkation to All Concerned, dtd 17 May 46, Subj: Orders, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

154 Office of the Ch of Trans, Office Order No. 5-53, dtd 15 May 46, (uncl) (Office, Ch of Trans).

155 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).

knew little of port organization and operation. Most of the personnel in the former category were sent to the CIC School at Baltimore; those in the latter group were given on-the-job training by port intelligence officers.[156]

Although the first classes in CIC training schools did not emphasize port security, on 29 November 1944 a group of 44 CIC student officers from the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, made a two-day training tour of the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation. Maj Harold E. Hutchings, who commanded the student group, recommended that the port visit be continued for other CIC students.[157] The Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, was so impressed by results of the trip that he requested a letter be prepared for the Commanding General's signature authorizing continuance of port security training for counterintelligence officers.[158]

During 1945, in response to a request from the Commanding Officer, CIC Center, Camp Holabird, Baltimore, the New York Port of Embarkation conducted one-week classes in port intelligence for personnel in training for CIC duty overseas. These students were ordered to the New York Port of Embarkation for one week during their period of training at the CIC Center.[159]

Two years later, in 1947, groups of students from the CIC Center at Camp Holabird visited the New York Port of Embarkation for three-day tours of port installations. Agents of the 117th CIC Detachment presented daily lectures on port security to the students from Camp Holabird.[160]

CIC at Work in the Ports

In the early days of the war, when port commanders recruited their own investigators, the duties of the agents in the ports of embarkation were dictated

156 Memo, SPTOI CC 353, dtd 9 Nov 45, Chief Intel and Sec Div, Office of the Ch of Trans, to Dir of Mil Training, Office of the Ch of Trans, Subj: Training of Intelligence Personnel on Duty at Ports of Embarkation, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

157 Memo, Maj Harold E. Hutchings to Ch, CIC Section, dtd 29 Nov 44, Subj: Inspection Trip to Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Va., (uncl) (CIC Files).

158 Memo, Col J. M. Roamer, Dir of Intel, Army Service Forces, to Maj Harold E. Hutchings, undated, (uncl) (CIC Files).

159 Memo, SPTOI CC 353, dtd 9 Nov 45, Ch, Intel and Security Div, Office of the Ch of Trans, to Dir of Mil Training, Office of the Ch of Trans, Subj: Training of Intelligence Personnel on Duty at Ports of Embarkation, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

160 Ltr, Agent Alfred Harrison, 117th CIC Det, to Maj James T. Reitz, dtd 7 Oct 46, (uncl) (CIC Files).

by need rather than by directives. The inevitable result was that agents whose primary job was counterintelligence and security found themselves involved in a host of other duties.

When CIC agents were placed on duty with the ports, under the supervision of the port commanders, the tendency to use them on all types of investigations was already established. At some ports, this practice continued as late as 1946, despite occasional mild protests that CIC agents were improperly employed.

At an Internal Security Conference held in September 1943, port intelligence and security officers discussed the work of CIC agents who recently had been placed on duty in the Army ports. Duties of the investigators included security surveys, countersabotage and counterespionage measures, fire prevention, criminal investigation, collections of positive intelligence, loyalty investigations of port employees, and security lectures to troops in staging areas.

At that conference, Col J. M. Roamer, Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, expressed concern about the practice of employing CIC agents on criminal investigations. "The Military Intelligence Service, the guide for all Army intelligence agencies, has been directed to keep out of criminal investigation," Colonel Roamer said. "The CIC is set up to do certain things; it does not include criminal investigations." In response to questioning, however, Colonel Roamer admitted that it might be necessary for intelligence personnel to conduct criminal investigations when the FBI refused to intervene.[161]

Much of the CIC work in the ports was routine, but in accomplishing the assigned tasks, agents quickly won the respect of port commanders, intelligence officers, and other investigative agencies. At Camp Shanks, one of the staging areas in the New York Port of Embarkation, CIC was so well-known that telephone operators overhearing suspicious conversations would report the incidents to CIC immediately. Civilian employees, made security conscious by CIC lectures, served as unofficial monitors of conversations on buses and in restaurants and other public places near the New York Port. Any suspicious conversations were reported to CIC.[162]

Despite the monotony of much of the port security work, important cases occasionally developed at all the ports - cases which gave CIC agents ample opportunity to prove their investigative skills.

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161 Rpt of Proceedings of Int Sec Conf, Trans Corps Port of Embarkation, New York and Wash DC, 14-18 Sep 43, (Conf) (CIC Files).

162 Interview with Maj T. J. Kraszewski, (uncl) (CIC Files).

CIC Discovers Prisoner Escape Route

One of the earliest cases of note handled by CIC agents assigned to the New York Port of Embarkation involved the escape route used by German prisoners of war fleeing internment camps in Canada.

Late in 1942, a number of German prisoners escaped from stockades in Canada. Although it was believed they were making their way into the United States, authorities were unable to trace any of the escaped prisoners. Then during a routine interview with an informant at the New York Port of Embarkation, CIC agents received a tip that the prisoners were being sheltered by a restaurant owner in Westchester County, New York.

CIC relayed the information to FBI agents, who checked the story and found it to be true. The restaurant owner, a member of the German-American Bund, gave the prisoners food and clothing and arranged for their transportation to Mexico, where German submarines picked them up at designated points along the coast. CIC was credited with the first lead which enabled the FBI to plug the German escape route.[163]

Not all the reports from CIC informants were so accurate, however. Agents stationed at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation once went on emergency duty after they were told that an Army truck transporting secret equipment from Fort Story to Fort Monroe had been hijacked by enemy agents. The story was a hoax but the investigation broke the monotony of after-hour checks of piers, moorings, and docks.[164]

CIC detachments staging for overseas movement were sometimes asked to assist agents at the ports of embarkation on special cases. CIC agents at the New York Port of Embarkation learned through an informant that a soldier assigned to the port was operating a lucrative business of mailing letters outside the port, in violation of censorship regulations. Preliminary investigation indicated that the violator was an enlisted man who worked in the dental clinic.

Since CIC agents and members of the censorship team were known to other military personnel on the post, CIC asked for help from a detachment awaiting shipment in the Camp Shanks staging area. A CIC agent who needed dental treatment was asked to bait a trap for the suspect. He made a dental appointment. While at the clinic, he asked several enlisted men how he could get a letter mailed off post. When the suspect volunteered to mail the letter for a fee, the CIC agent reported him to the port intelligence officer. The suspect was apprehended and punished for violation of censorship regulations.[165]

163 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).
164 Interview with CWO William Hoffman, (uncl) (CIC Files).
165 Interview with Maj T. J. Kraszewski, (uncl) (CIC Files).

One detachment received a special commendation from the commander of the Camp Kilmer staging area, New York Port of Embarkation, for its assistance in port security projects. Col Cecil L. Rutledge praised the "excellent cooperation and superior operation" of the CIC detachment commanded by Capt Edgar E. Cambere. He wrote:

"With disregard for their own personal freedom to leave on authorized passes they often worked long hours on tedious jobs for the benefit of their experience in the assistance in various security projects set up during their stay at this post. It is with pleasure that I commend this unit for its fine work."[166]

CIC Traps a German Agent

What started as a routine investigation of an AR 380-5 violation in June 1944 suddenly turned into one of the most sensational espionage cases handled by CIC in New York.

Agents assigned to investigate the loss of a classified document from one of the port offices traced the missing paper to a WAC typist. At first she insisted that she knew nothing of the document. Later, after further interrogation, she admitted giving the paper to her boy friend. The boy friend, she said was keenly interested in the progress of the war, and from time to time she had given him information regarding movements of troops and supplies from the New York Port of Embarkation to overseas theaters of operation.

The boy friend turned out to be the German-born head waiter at New York City's famous Stork Club. Since he was a civilian, CIC turned the case over to the FBI. Subsequent investigation by the FBI uncovered evidence that the waiter was a German espionage agent. He was imprisoned and later deported.[167]

Most incidents involving disclosure of troop movements were less dramatic. At the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, CIC agents traced an accurate report on the movement of six troop trains to a high school boy. The youth, a part time messenger for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, had told friends he was going to be busy because six troop trains would arrive at Hampton Roads within two days. CIC referred the incident to the railroad with the recommendation that officials stress security to their employees.[168]

166 Ltr, Col Cecil L. Rutledge to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Feb 45, subj: Commendation, (Conf) (CIC Files).
167 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).
168 Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation Weekly Intel and Sec Summary, dtd 11 Apr 45, (Conf) (CIC Files).

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CIC Goes to Sea

From as early as 1943 until the end of the war, CIC agents operating with the Transportation Corps were frequently placed aboard Army transports in undercover capacities. Working as seamen or as scullions in the galleys, the CIC agents at sea were instructed to watch for evidence of any German or Communist courier system operating on Army ships. They also were alert to any security weaknesses on ships, as well as symptoms of disaffection among passengers or crew. Undercover agents on ships bound to Europe occasionally conducted surveillances of German sympathizers traveling abroad.[169]

In 1945, after the creation of the Transportation Corps Intelligence Agency, specific policies were adopted to govern the use of CIC agents aboard ship. Both open and undercover duties at sea were defined:

"In such operations, personnel may be engaged in conducting security surveys, gathering information of counterintelligence interest from returnees, giving security lectures to troops bound overseas, investigating incidents aboard ship in which espionage, sabotage, treason, subversion, disaffection are suspected; conducting surveys to determine compliance with and assisting in the enforcement of the provision of AR 380-5; observing in instances in which there is reasons to suspect espionage, sabotage, treason, subversion, and disaffection.[170]

Undercover operations were more restricted, however:

"the prior concurrence of the Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces will be obtained for each undercover mission undertaken. Concurrence will only be given upon a substantial showing that the mission is reasonably necessary, is calculated to produce the information desired, and probably will be accomplished without compromise."[171]

CIC Recruits Sea-Going Informants

To insure counterintelligence coverage of all voyages, CIC agents at the New York Port of Embarkation during 1943 established an informant net which included crew members of all Army transports entering the New York port. Special Agent John Murphy, who directed the formation of the net, recruited crew members from both the deck and engine room departments of Army ships.

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169 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).

170 Office of the Ch of Trans Misc Ltr 204 to Commanders, Ports of Embarkation, dtd 22 June 45, Subj: Transportation Corps CIC and SIC Activities, (Conf) (CIC Files).

171 Ibid.

Each time a ship entered the New York port informants made a midnight trip ashore to report to the CIC agent who controlled them.

One important result of the informant system was the discovery in September 1944 of a code used by members of the Communist cells aboard ships. The Communists chalked code symbols on the side of the ship near the gangway to warn any couriers coming aboard of the presence of CIC, FBI, or Naval Intelligence agents. The Communist couriers were under orders not to attempt to pass information when intelligence agents were passengers. When an informant reported the code system to CIC, agents made an early morning visit to every ship in the New York port and chalked the message which warned of the presence of intelligence personnel even though such personnel were not present, a measure that materially reduced Communist activity on Army ships.[172]

Prisoners of War Plan Sabotage

German prisoners of war interned in sub-installations of the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation frequently drew the attention of CIC agents in that area. At Camp Hill 35 prisoners secretly organized what they dubbed "Sabotage Group 32." Determined to escape, they also vowed to commit acts of sabotage within the internment camp whenever possible. Their plot was discovered when CIC intercepted a note to one of the prisoners from an unidentified member of an Italian Service Unit. The group was separated; its members were shipped to various camps.[173]

End of the War Brings Change in Emphasis

A comparison of the types of cases investigated during the four war years 1942 through 1945 and the cases which Transportation Corps CIC agents investigated in the four-year period after 1945 reveals a definite shift in emphasis.

While the United States was at war, the emphasis was on possible cases of sabotage and of Nazi affiliation or sympathy. After 1945, however, virtually all the 117th CIC Detachment's work involved loyalty investigations of government employees, both civilian and military, at the ports of embarkation. In June 1948, a typical month, agents completed 176 loyalty investigations but closed only 23 other types of cases, none of them dealing with espionage, or sabotage investigations. At the same time, 496 other loyalty checks were pending.[174]

172 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).

173 Hampton Roads POE Weekly Intel and Sec Summary, dtd 13 Jun 45, (Conf) (CIC Files).

174 117th CIC Det, Monthly Rpt of CIC Activities for June 48, Maj Victor J. Layton to Chief, CIC, dtd 9 Jul 48, (Conf) (CIC Files).

The new emphasis on loyalty investigations resulted in dismissal of numerous government employees who were found to have maintained affiliation with Communist front organizations for years. In some cases, the persons in question had hidden their Communist activities by deliberate falsification of personal history statements.

Other investigations also centered on Communist activities. In New York, a bartender informant warned a CIC agent that Joe Curran, president of the Communist-dominated National Maritime Union, planned to stow away on an Army ship en route to England, where he was to attend a world labor conference. The informant stated that a seaman aboard the ship had obtained forged papers which would permit Curran to sail under an assumed name. CIC permitted Curran to board the vessel but a Military Police officer was waiting to meet him when the ship docked at Southhampton, England. Curran was confined to the ship until it returned to New York.[175]

Communists Infiltrate Army Transport Service

More startling, however, was a 1948 report prepared by CIC agents at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

An informant of the 117th's subdetachment in San Francisco described a 1936 meeting of five Communist Party leaders at which a long-range plan for infiltrating the Army Transport Service was adopted. The plan called for Communists to work through the Communist-dominated Marine Cooks and Stewards Union.

In the fall of 1947, the informant continued, one of the five leaders, who by now was president of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, ordered establishment of a Communist courier system within Army Transport Service vessels operating between West coast ports and the Far East. The informant asserted that there was not a single Army transport sailing from San Francisco that did not have Communists among its crew. He went on to name those people he knew to be Communist Party members.[176]

Even before this time, however, Transportation Corps CIC agents had given general coverage to all meetings of labor groups in port areas, particularly those which were known to be heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party. Reports from the Seattle Port of Embarkation show that as early as 1946, CIC agents were assigned to cover such meetings and to report details on speakers, physical descriptions of prominent leaders, agenda of meetings, and audience reactions.

175 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).

176 SOI, 117th CIC Det, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, dtd 28 Jun 48, Subj: Communist Infiltration of the Army Transport Service by Communist Party Members, (Conf) (CIC Files, No. T-4-179-F, Rpts 38 and 39).

At the New York Port of Embarkation, a suspected Communist was trapped in an attempt to steal radar plans during February 1946. The suspect, a civilian employee of the SS Argentina, was apprehended by a customs patrolman because of suspicious actions on a pier in the east coast port. When a search of the seaman turned up copies of the ship's radar plans, agents of the 117th CIC Detachment were called in to investigate.

A background investigation conducted by CIC revealed that the suspect was an alien, a native of Yugoslavia, and a suspected Communist. He had worked on American ships for three years.

With this information, CIC agents interrogated the seaman. He admitted taking radar plans and told agents he intended to deliver them to a fellow Yugoslavian in Hoboken, New Jersey. Since both men were civilians, CIC turned the case over to the FBI for further investigation.[177]

Less than eight months later, in October 1946, CIC agents smashed a Communist Party cell operating within the Fort Hamilton sub-installation of the New York Port of Embarkation. A tip from an informant touched off the CIC investigation, which disclosed that the organizers of the cell were a man and a woman "holding highly responsible duties" at Fort Hamilton. On the recommendation of CIC, both were discharged from government employment without reemployment rights.[178]

CIC Used on Non-CIC Tasks

Despite the increasing number of cases involving Communists working for the Transportation Corps, CIC agents still were used to investigate criminal cases, racial disturbances, and other incidents not related to counterintelligence.

Pilferage of Army cargo was the most common type of criminal case investigated by CIC. Between 1 February and 31 May 1945 CIC agents at the Army ports opened 2,353 criminal cases.[179] In June 1946 the 117th CIC Detachment submitted 87 summary reports dealing with theft of government property, but only 13 reports were related to all other case categories.[180]

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177 117th CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for Feb 46, dtd 7 Mar 46, (Conf) (CIC Files).

178 117th CIC Det Monthly Rpt for Oct 1946, dtd 6 Nov 1946, (Conf) (CIC Files).

179 Historical Rpt, Intel and Sec Div, Office of the Ch of Trans, for 1946, dtd 30 Jun 1945, (Conf) (Office, Ch of Trans).

180 117th CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for Oct 1946, dtd 6 Nov 1946, (Conf) (CIC Files).

Racial incidents frequently demanded CIC attention. Agents assigned to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation investigated an abortive riot between Negro and white troops aboard the Army transport Admiral Benson on 7 November 1946,[181] and at New Orleans, agents often checked out reports of altercations between American and Puerto Rican soldiers.[182]

Protests by CIC agents who objected to performing duties not related to counterintelligence were unheeded. On 7 October 1946, Alfred Harrison, Chief Agent of the 117th CIC Detachment at the New York Port of Embarkation, complained to Maj James T. Reitz of Counter Intelligence Branch of G2, War Department, of "a flagrant violation of current War Department directives regarding CIC activities and the use of CIC personnel." He wrote:

"I understand that I am circumventing channels to some extent by writing to you in this manner but I am doing so...in the best interests of the organization. The Chief, Intelligence and Security Division, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, has requested additional CIC personnel to meet an increased work load at that port. However, the attached Monthly Report indicates that only criminal investigations are being conducted. I hope that something can be done to correct the situation. I know that CIC work exists at the ports and if only given the opportunity and support, our agents will successfully perform their work to a degree gratifying to both the 117th CIC Detachment and to the Director of Intelligence."[183]

In Washington, however, no action was taken to correct the situation. A penciled memorandum to Major Reitz, signed only "L" and believed to be Lt Colonel Leydecker of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G2, War Department replied:

"With all of our great amount of administration and shortage of personnel in the Branch, I am refusing to accept the responsibility for a crusade against CIC doing non-CIC work. Colonel Forney is also resigned to the fact. No use."[184]

CIC Officers Sail for Greece

One of the most important cases of the 117th CIC Detachment during 1947 involved security of a shipment of arms and ammunition from the United States

181 117th CIC Det, Summary of Investigation, dtd 20 Nov 46, Subj: Racial Incidents Aboard USAT "Admiral Benson," (Conf) (CIC Files).

182 117th CIC Det, Monthly Info Rpt, for May 1946, dtd 10 Jun 46, (Conf) (CIC Files).

183 Ltr, Agent Alfred Harrison to Maj James T. Reitz, dtd 7 Oct 46, (uncl) (CIC Files).

184 Informal Memo to Major Reitz, undated and signed "L", (uncl) (CIC Files).

to Greece. The shipment was scheduled to leave the New York Port of Embarkation early in September on the USAT Lehigh Victory. Since the shipment was the first of several planned under an assistance program, both the War Department and the State Department publicized the event widely. Press and motion picture photographers were notified of the impending shipment. Only routine security measures were considered necessary.

Then on 28 July, the Commanding General of the New York Port of Embarkation received a report through a liaison officer of the Greek government that an attempt would be made to sabotage the shipment when it arrived in Greece. Maj Leon A. Michaelis, commanding officer of the 117th CIC Detachment, was ordered to plan security measures necessary to insure the safe arrival of cargo and crew.

Background investigations on all crew members were quickly completed and anyone with the slightest questionable background was transferred to another vessel. Restrictions on pictures that could be released for publication were hastily imposed.

When the ship sailed on 7 September, Major Michaelis was aboard as cargo security officer. Lt William S. McMahon, also of the 117th CIC Detachment, shipped as an ablebodied seaman. During the voyage, Major Michaelis made daily inspections of cargo, noting any changes in surrounding area which might indicate tampering. Both the captain of the ship and Major Michaelis presented security lectures to the crew.

After an uneventful ocean crossing, the Lehigh Victory arrived at the Port of Piraeus, Greece, on 21 September. The Greek government and the American mission had set up a security check of small boats in the harbor. Everyone boarding the ship was carefully screened. The cargo was safely unloaded.

The ship returned to the United States without Major Michaelis. At Leghorn, by prearrangement, Lieutenant McMahon was "arrested" and removed from the ship. He joined Major Michaelis, and they returned to the New York office by air.[185]

CIC Investigates a Fire

A spectacular fire at the Oakland Army Base, was another incident of suspected sabotage investigated by CIC agents.

On 17 March 1949, a mysterious, $5,000,000 fire broke out on piers at the Oakland Army Base, a sub-installation of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

185 117th CIC Det Rpt of Sec Mission aboard Lehigh Victory, dtd 3 Oct 47, (Conf) (CIC Files).

Two days later, with crates in some warehouses still smoldering, two agents from New York were flown to San Francisco to aid in the investigation.

FBI and Criminal Investigation Division agents already on the scene had failed to turn up a lead when the CIC agents from New York arrived and began questioning Military Police enlisted man who had reported the fire. Detecting flaws in the youth's story, the CIC agents reinterrogated him until he admitted starting the fire. In search of pilferable items, the soldier had used a cigarette lighter to illuminate markings on cases stacked in one of the warehouses. He dropped the lighter between two crates and was unable to recover it. Moments later the entire warehouse was in flames.

Since no sabotage was involved, CIC turned the results of the preliminary investigation over to the Army's Criminal Investigation Division for further action.[186]

Security Pays

In a special report prepared at the end of World War II, the Intelligence and Security Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation, claimed the following results for its security program:

"No case on record has resulted in proof:

(1) That the enemy secured knowledge of the movements of troops or cargo through compromise of the information within the Transportation Corps.

(2) That the Transportation Corps facilities were damaged, or operations hampered, through sabotage, subversion, or willful negligence."[187]

To the CIC agent who stressed security at every opportunity must go a share of the credit for that record.

186 Interview with Maj John Murphy, 21 Sep 55, (Conf) (CIC Files).

187 Memo for Exec Off, Office of the Ch of Trans, dtd 29 Sep 45, subj: Report on Accomplishments and Handicaps, Intelligence and Security Division, (uncl) (Office, Ch of Trans).

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

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HISTORY OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

VOLUME IX

CIC IN BASE COMMANDS

Classified by CDR, USAINTC
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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January 1960

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Fort Holabird
Baltimore 19, Maryland

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MISSION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

"The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the operations of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection, prevention, or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the Army Establishment and the areas of its jurisdiction."

Auth: AR 381-100

* *

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
FORT HOLABIRD, BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND

ACSIH-GC 250/58/M 8 April 1959

SUBJECT: CIC History

TO: All Personnel Reading this Document

1. This volume is a portion of the History of the Counter Intelligence Corps which has been compiled in draft form by this headquarters.

2. Distribution of the History is being made as the volumes become available so that addressees may profit by the problems and accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps in previous years.

3. When completed, the History will cover in as complete and accurate detail as possible, significant incidents and events leading to the organization of the Corps of Intelligence Police during World War I and the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II. Events, accomplishments, changes, and problems encountered up until 1950 will be included in the thirty volumes planned.

4. In spite of the diligence of researchers and writers, there may be inaccuracies and omissions, since no records are available for some of the more than two hundred CIC detachments which were operational during World War II. Even some of the major campaigns were poorly documented.

5. Any comments should be forwarded to the Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland, ATTN: G-3.

Richard G. Prather

RICHARD G. PRATHER
Major General, USA
Commanding

[redacted]

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CIC IN BASE COMMANDS

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Part I: CIC in Alaska

CIC IN ALASKA

Until 1941, counterintelligence functions in the Territory of Alaska were performed by personnel of the Command Headquarters of the Alaskan Defense Forces under the supervision of Col. Lawrence V. Castner, the S2. This was necessitated by the unavailability of trained investigative personnel and, although the establishment of an extensive military and civilian informant system throughout the Territory made the job possible, it did not prevent the accumulation of a large backlog of intelligence work.[1]

To assist Colonel Castner, S/Sgts Thomas J. Chambers and Charles R. Dowling of the Corps of Intelligence Police were sent to Alaska in July 1941. Their work consisted in large part of the investigation of individuals and organizations whose loyalty to the United States had been questioned. As the military forces in the Alaskan area were strengthened, the office of S2 was designated G2 and the responsibilities of the units were markedly increased.[2]

When the Corps of Intelligence Police became the Counter Intelligence Corps after the declaration of WW II, seven more agents from Headquarters Western Defense Command and 4th Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California, were sent to Alaska and placed on detached service with the Command headquarters. By May 1943, 18 Special agents and four officers were serving in the area and were transferred to Detached Enlisted Mens' List, CIC, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Headquarters Western Defense Command, and 4th Army, but remained on detached service with Headquarters Alaska Defense Command.

On 1 November 1943, the Alaskan Defense Command was renamed the Alaskan Department and designated a separate theater of operations. However, at that time, all CIC personnel were placed under Headquarters Ninth Service Command and it was not until April 1944, that they were organized as the CIC Detachment, Alaskan Department. By March 1944, the organization had been broken into a cellular structure and further altered pursuant to T/O and E 30-500 dated 24 January 1944. In April a CIC detachment for the Alaskan Department was organized. And on 26 July 1944, it was officially designated as the 467th CIC

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1 History of CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 1, (Secret) (Kansas City R C, Box C-4308).

2 History of Counterintelligence Activities in Alaska, p 1, undated, (Uncl) (Kansas City R C, Box C-4308).
NOTE: Roster of CIC Detachment in Alaska attached as Appendix 1.

[redacted]

Detachment. At that time the total strength of the unit was six officers and 18 Special Agents and clerks.[3]

After activation of the detachment as a part of the Alaskan Department, the headquarters was permanently maintained at Fort Richardson, Alaska.[4]

A statistical history of the 467th indicates a transfer of the headquarters to Elemendorf, Alaska, Air Force Base between December 1951 and January 1952, but after this period the detachment returned to Fort Richardson.[5]

The Branch Office Network

Colonel Castner retained supervision of the detachment until October 1942, when Lt. Col. Otis E. Hays, Jr., assumed control. It was under Colonel Hays as G2 that the detachment was expanded and a system of branch offices created.

The vast geographic area, nearly as large as western Europe, for which the detachment was given responsibility, necessitated the establishment of a branch and sub-office system. Once a branch became functional it was assigned jurisdiction over a specific area and held responsible for all counterintelligence matters evolving in that area.

The Fairbanks Branch office was set up in April 1943, with offices in the Federal Building, Fairbanks, Alaska. Within its geographic area were six Army air bases, two troop installations and considerable portions of the Alaska Military Highway, the Canada-Alaska Pipeline Project, and the Alaska Military Telephone System.[6]

An office at Juneau, along with a sub-office at Ketchikan, was established in July 1943. Within this area were six major troop installations and two landing fields. Juneau, as the capital of the then Territory, became the center for processing of enemy alien cases and Ketchikan, being the southern-most city in Alaska, served as a port of entry for most commercial visitors to the Territory.[7]

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3 History of CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 2, (Secret) (Kansas City R.C., Box C-4308) and Ltr, dtd 6 Jan 44, Subj: Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel, from L.K. Bauknight, AG, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Br, Box C-4308).

4 Ibid, p 2

5 Historical Data Cards, 467th CIC Det, p 2, (Uncl) (Historical Project Files).

6 History of the CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 4, (Secret) (Kansas City R.C., Box C-4308).

7 Ibid, p 5

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Offices in the Federal Building at Anchorage were opened in October 1943 and for a time this office was held responsible for the entire southern Alaska area as well as the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands. Establishment of an office at Adak in the Aleutians in February 1944 eased to some extent the burden of the Anchorage office, since responsibility for nine installations in the Aleutians was given the Adak Branch. The processing of thousands of War Department civilians employed by contractors in the Aleutians and the presence of limited combat activities in this area made necessary a sub-office to the Adak Branch which was set up at Shemya, Alaska.[8]

CIC in Unique Jurisdictional Situation

Alaska presented CIC with an unique intelligence jurisdictional situation. The responsibility for all intelligence matters within the Territory and within the jurisdiction of the War Department was the sole responsibility of the Commanding General, Alaskan Defense Forces. For counterintelligence matters, the responsibility was assigned to the 467th CIC Detachment. However, a division of counterintelligence responsibility between the CIC, FBI, and the Office of Naval Intelligence was implemented by special War Department directives and by conferences at which all three agencies were represented. While the jurisdiction of the 467th was substantially similar to that of detachments in other theaters, there were two important exceptions.

First, all intelligence activities in the Alaskan Peninsula-Aleutian Island area were the responsibility of the War Department, regardless of the status of the status of the individuals concerned.[9] This meant that CIC had exclusive jurisdiction over all persons in the area, military or civilian, whether employed by the Government or engaged in civilian pursuits. FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence operated in those portions of the Territory, if at all, with the permission and indulgence of CIC.

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8 History of the CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 3, (Secret) (Kansas City R.C., Box C-4308).

9 Ibid, p 4

NOTE: The Alaskan Peninsula area is generally construed to include only that tip of land appended to Alaska on its southern shore and extending toward the Aleutian Island chain. It includes Kodiak Island and that part of the mainland separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of Old Iliamna, and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvicak River and to Kvicak Bay. Records indicate that the award of exclusive jurisdiction to CIC was intended to include only this area and nothing more. It may be presumed that jurisdiction in other areas of the Territory was comparable to that obtained in the continental US.

Second, enemy aliens in the Territory were the responsibility of the War Department and hence CIC, to the exclusion of any other agency.[10]

Area of Responsibility Extensive

Difficulties raised by the extensive area of responsibility assigned to the 467th were pointed up in a memorandum written by Maj. Lowell J. Bradford of CIC Headquarters who made a field inspection of the CIC units there in 1943. Major Bradford found that the 467th was discharging the counterintelligence function of the Alaska Defense Command, the Army Air Force Exempt Stations in Alaska, and those bases of the Air Transport Command within the Territory.

Transportation was a major obstacle. For example, the distance between CIC Headquarters at Fort Richardson and the Fairbanks Field Office, where frequent trips were necessary, was over 275 miles. Inclement weather, absence of an adequate rail and road network and the slowness of water travel were factors to be contended with, and which could not readily be solved.[11] As late as 1945, it was necessary to depend upon dog teams and sleds for access to a relatively populous sector of the Territory.[12]

Weather was a serious hazard. While large parts of the Territory, especially in the southeast, enjoy a mild climate both summer and winter, northern Alaskan temperatures reach extremes of lower than 60 degrees below zero.[13]

Travel Control a Problem

A second problem was that of travel control from within the Territory. A civilian agency, Alaska Travel Control, had primary responsibility for this matter, but Colonel Hays and Col. L. E. Shick, Deputy Chief of Staff, Alaska Defense Command, told Major Bradford that the control agency was generally considered to be a "complete joke." They said there was substantially no control and that the travel and activities of persons coming into Alaska created a constant

10 History of the CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 4, (Secret) (Kansas City R.C., Box C-4308).

11 Memo, dtd 30 July 1943, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

12 Ltr, dtd 14 Mar 45, from Lt Col F.L. Petru, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City R.C., Box C-4308).

13 Information Please Almanac, New York Herald Tribune Edition, 1953, Edited by John Kiernan, MacMillan Company, N.Y.

source of danger and unnecessary work for the detachment, since most of these people sought employment from War Department contractors and drifted from job to job.[14]

A contrary viewpoint concerning the value of the Alaska Travel Control is disclosed in other records. The 467th CIC Detachment felt that the bureau had made an invaluable contribution to the prevention of espionage within the Territory by checking through a fingerprint system the records of all civilians seeking to enter Alaska. This system provided a means for detecting and locating persons with subversive or criminal records and, after detection, those persons were either denied access to military installations or removed to the United States.[15]

Supply Shortages Acute

The detachment was also faced with an acute shortage of supplies and equipment. Major Bradford found that paper work constituted the main bottleneck, and the lack of typewriters, cameras, and sound equipment made borrowing from other units an every-day necessity to successful operation.[16]

Difficulties With Overlapping Jurisdiction

Still another problem arose when a CIC detachment was assigned to Alaskan Wing, Air Transport Command, in September 1943. Since this new unit operated in part within the geographic area of the Alaska Defense Command, the problem arose of integrating the counterintelligence program of separate detachments within an overlapping command. The program was apparently not too successful, for the Air Transport Command unit reported that cooperation being furnished it from within the Alaskan Department was poor,[17] and the author of a history of the 467th CIC Detachment expressed the opinion that the accomplishment of the CIC mission in the theater was being impeded by the assignment of separate detachments to overlapping commands. The same author strongly recommended that all CIC personnel within a theater of operations be assigned to the command

14 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief CIC, from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

15 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 9, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cent, Box C-4308).

16 Memo, dtd 30 July 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

17 Ltr, 30 Mar 44, from 2d Lt Wm C. Smith, Subj: Monthly CI Report, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

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ultimately responsible for counterintelligence operations.[18] This problem is further considered in the chapter on CIC With the Air Forces.

Training Within the Unit

All available material indicates that most personnel assigned to duty with CIC in Alaska were not given sufficient training prior to arrival in the theater. There was a divergence of views, however, as to the degree and type of training that was needed. So long as the training school at Chicago, Illinois, was in operation, the agents furnished were found to be fairly well qualified.[19] With the closing of the training center it was found that personnel arriving in the theater were not sufficiently skilled for the type of operations undertaken by the 467th CIC Detachment. Major Bradford reported that the main training deficiency was a lack of knowledge of proper report writing technique and the use of investigative aids.[20] It was felt by others that there was not sufficient emphasis being given to training for nontactical operations such as were being carried out in the Alaskan Department.[21] In his report, Major Bradford deplored the lack of knowledge concerning the possibility of field security work to be performed in uniform by personnel within a combat area.[22] Still a different source indicated preference for personnel with civilian experience in the investigative field for work in the Alaskan Theater.[23]

In spite of demands by Brig. Gen. Frank L. Whittaker, Deputy Commander, Alaska Defense Command, that fully trained personnel be assigned to the command since there were no training facilities available and Alaska had been termed a combat zone, the 467th found it necessary to establish training schools of its own.[24] General Whittaker took the position that there was no field security mission for the CIC to perform in the front lines of the Aleutians and that for

18 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cent, Box C-4308).

19 Ibid, p 3

20 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

21 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 11, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cent, Box C-4308).

22 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through Northwest and Alaskan Areas, (Conf) (Central Records Facility), p 8.

23 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det History, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 11, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cent, Box C-4308).

24 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, p 8, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

the CIC to fulfill the mission as he contemplated it, agents should be trained to perform nontactical work within the command.[25]

Three schools were in operation by 1945. The courses were designed to deal with general investigative practice and procedure, with special attention to problems regarding CIC operations in Alaska. When the authority to recruit agents from within the Alaskan Department was granted by the War Department on 15 August 1944, the men selected were trained through the Detachment Training School. By June 1945, four of these unit-trained agents were on duty with the 467th CIC Detachment.[26] Records do not indicate when these schools were discontinued, but a "routine report" in 1947 contained the recommendation that the amount of report writing given at the CIC school be at least doubled, and that the technical training given overseas replacements be decreased, and the gain in time be applied to training in investigation and interrogation techniques.[27]

Early Operation Under Cover

Early operations of the CIC in Alaska were performed by agents working solely in an undercover capacity. The agents either took civilian occupations or purported to be employees of various Government agencies. Any connection with Military Intelligence was carefully concealed except with the many persons involved in an extensive informant net.

The operational limitations inherent in such a system led to its abandonment in 1942 but the well established informant system was retained in both civilian and military channels.[28] The undercover technique was still used as an investigative aid and even after agents began to work in civilian clothes, in the open, they were not known as CIC agents, but rather as "War Department inspectors."[29]

Although one CIC agent from the Alaskan Department was stationed at Dutch Harbor during the Japanese air attack CIC personnel were not directly utilized in the combat operations of the Alaska Defense Command. Nevertheless, numerous counterintelligence missions closely associated with the execution of the Attu and

25 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, p 5, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

26 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 3, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cent, Box C-4308).

27 Ltr, 1 Feb 47, from Maj Ralph Sims, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, Rpt File 319.1, (Uncl) (Kansas City Records Cent, Box C-4308).

28 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 6, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

29 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through Northwest and Alaska Areas, p 6, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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Kiska campaigns and the combat operations of the Eleventh Air Force from Alaska bases were carried out by the detachment.[30]

Alien Loyalty Investigations

One of the first tasks given CIC in Alaska was the investigation of the loyalty of enemy aliens in the Territory. All Japanese persons of more than half-blood and all Japanese males of half-blood over 16 years of age were ordered to be evacuated from Alaska. This ruling apparently covered Nisei as well as Japanese citizens. Investigation of the loyalty of Italian and German citizens in the area also required CIC attention. Hand-in-hand with these investigations went searches for contraband goods and assistance to enemy alien Hearing Boards established at various points in Alaska.

When later in the war interned persons were released, CIC conducted investigations which aided the Commanding General, Alaska Department, in considering the applications which many submitted to be allowed to return to the area. If return was allowed, scrutiny of the individuals' activities fell to the CIC.[31]

CIC Checks Civilian Employees

Loyalty checks on civilian employees of the War Department contractors in Alaska constituted a major part of the detachment's work in the theater. Nearly 6,000 such investigations were completed between 1942 and 1945.[32] The investigations were considered extremely important, for no delay in strengthening the Alaskan Defense network could be countenanced. The routine aspect of these investigations was occasionally relieved by incidents such as the Fowlie Case.

In 1944 the 467th CIC Detachment was informed that an Alexander S. Fowlie was claiming in Juneau business and social circles that although he wore civilian clothes, he was in reality a brigadier general of the United States Army and that he was currently engaged in a secret mission for military intelligence. It was reported that Fowlie wore the star rank on the underside of his civilian coat lapel and that he alleged that his business address was the Pentagon in Washington. Fowlie was placed under surveillance by the detachment while a check was made with the War Department. When information arrived that he was neither military or civilian War Department personnel, the case was turned over to the FBI.

30 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist of 467th CIC Det, p 7, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Center, Box C-4308).

31 Ibid, p 8

32 Ibid, p 7

Fowlie was later arrested and in addition to the impersonation charge was faced with a warrant issued for his removal to Juneau on a polygamy charge.[33]

Sabotage Investigations Numerous

Up to 1945 the records of the Alaskan Department do not reveal a single case of enemy inspired sabotage. Several cases of suspected sabotage were investigated. Generally these investigations disclosed security violations. The detachment recommendations usually resulted in corrections. Gross negligence or mismanagement on the part of individuals was often revealed and provided a basis for their removal from sensitive positions.

Employees of War Department contractors in the theater had a high incidence of criminal record, and this often prompted the investigation of all incidents in which sabotage was remotely indicated.[34] This was particularly true in the many instances of highly destructive fire in Alaska. One cause of these fires was the dryness of the many wooden buildings which did not have central heating and yet had to be heated at all times during the winter season.[35] A second causative factor was the negligence of individuals.

A fire involving the loss of over $900,000 at the Station Hospital in Adak, Alaska, in December 1944, was ultimately traced through CIC investigation to a lighted cigarette carelessly tossed into a pile of sawdust. The disposition of the confessedly negligent workman is not revealed but the fire led to the institution of rigid fire control rules in the area.[36]

During the same month a fire at an automotive repair shop in Nome which caused a loss of over $32,000, was traced to negligence of personnel and malfunction of a furnace oil burner.[37]

CIC also investigated a fire aboard the United States Army Transport "Teapa." The vessel was waiting to unload near Seward when a fire broke out in its cargo hold and raged for about 13 hours. Damage to the ship and cargo was extensive;

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33 Ltr, 27 Jul 45, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Lt Col F. L. Petru, Rpt File 319.1, Uncl, (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

34 Hist or CIC in Alaska, Det History of 467th CIC Det, undated, p 8, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

35 Alaska, CIC Hist 1945-1948, File "Hist 1949," undated, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

36 Ltr, dtd 23 Jan 45, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Maj F. L. Petru, p 1, Rpt File 319.1, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

37 Ibid, p4

a lengthy and thorough investigation revealed a leaky fuel line as the principle causative factor.[38]

Sabotage investigations were not limited to fires, although these did constitute the bulk of such work. Early in 1945 an object believed to be a home-made bomb and resembling a hand grenade was found aboard a troop carrier aircraft while in flight. For safety reasons the device was immediately tossed from the aircraft; so thorough investigation was precluded. Replicas of the bomb were constructed after interrogation of the crew, and it was concluded that it was a lethal device, but positive steps, other than the institution of countermeasures were not possible.[39]

The detachment was also faced with instances of malicious destruction which at first glance appeared to be sabotage. A typical incident occurred in late 1944. Within a short period sugar placed in gasoline tanks disabled a transportation truck being used by a civilian contractor and a generator motor in the power plant at Shemya, Alaska. CIC investigation revealed that a civilian employee of the War Department contractor at Shemya had caused the damage in an effort to "get even" with another employee who was responsible for both the vehicle and generator motor. The offending individual was discharged from his position upon the recommendation of CIC and details of the incident were furnished the FBI. Final disposition of the case does not appear in the report.[40]

Security Surveys Made

Many security surveys were performed within the staff sections and units of the army in Alaska. These surveys were designed to determine the safety of communications, transportation facilities, storage and supply facilities as well as the offices and installations involved. Many deficiencies were detected and called to appropriate attention, and it appears that the surveys and subsequent spot checks were generally well accepted.[41]

38 Wd, MID File #IX-101/S-5151, dtd 9 April 43, Subj: Fire, USAT Teapa, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

39 Ltr, dtd 14 Mar 45, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, Lt Col F. L. Petru, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, Uncl, (Kansas City Records Center, Box C-4308).

40 Ltr, dtd 18 Apr 1945, from Lt Col F. L. Petru, Subj: Monthly Info Rpt, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (uncl) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

41 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 10, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

Russian Personnel a Problem

Close operations with Russian Army personnel in the Alaskan area, where lend-lease aircraft and supplies were physically transferred to the Russian Forces, raised many problems for CIC. In his 1943 report Major Bradford emphasized the need for Russian linguists in the theater and forwarded several recommendations for increased security measures with regard to Russian military forces in Alaska.

Unfortunately, the results of these recommendations are not disclosed in subsequent records. Major Bradford found that Russian officers went armed at all times, had free travel throughout the Territory, and frequently used cameras. The Russians were also seen to purchase U.S. Army clothing and insignia. The situation was complicated because it was not clear at this time whether responsibility for security measures regarding these Russian forces should fall upon the War Department or the State Department. The resolution of this problem does not appear in available records, but since it does appear that CIC acted in the situation, responsibility presumably was placed on the War Department. It is seen that in 1943 CIC investigated the suspected murder of an American soldier by two Russians,[42] and in 1944, acted to correct a security conflict between Russian and American report procedures.

In the latter situation it appeared that identical reports were submitted to the War Department by American and Russian personnel and that the American report was classified Secret while the Russian report was sent in the clear. In view of the international aspects of the case, the conflict was resolved in favor of the Russian report system.[43]

CIC Helps Other Agencies

The Alaskan detachments handled many other cases not of a counterintelligence nature. These cases were, in large part, the result of frequent requests by civilian and military agencies for investigative assistance, and it was felt that such cases had a direct bearing on the successful prosecution of the war effort. These requests came from the Provost Marshal and the Inspector General of the Alaskan Department, as well as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Immigration and Naturalization Service relied solely upon CIC reports to determine the suitability of enemy aliens for United States citizenship.[44]

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42 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, to Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through Northwest and Alaska Area, p 10, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

43 Ltr, dtd 29 Dec 44, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Maj F. L. Petru, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

44 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 10, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

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CIC Covers Labor Situation

Among the miscellaneous duties of the CIC in Alaska was the coverage through an informant network of the labor situation, particularly with regard to union elements.[45] G2 periodic reports throughout 1942, 1943 and 1944 contain complete and extensive coverage of labor and union activities within the area of the Alaskan Department but the source of this material is not given in reports and it cannot be conclusively established that CIC furnished the information, although it is the type of work CIC agents in the area were doing.

CIC as Censor and Monitor

Cases involving censorship violations, though not the responsibility of the CIC, were handled by the detachment. It was estimated in 1945, that probably 50 courts-martial convictions for censorship violations were due to CIC investigation in this field.[46]

Monitoring of radio broadcasts was also undertaken by the CIC with the cooperation of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[47] In a report dated 30 March 1944, it is revealed that a detachment with the Army Air Forces Air Transport Command in Alaska went so far with this activity as to have the Signal Corps install a radio receiving set at detachment headquarters. The purpose of the project was to obtain information as to the type of propaganda being broadcast by the Axis into Alaska.

In many parts of Alaska reception on short wave and standard band sets was far better from Japanese stations than from American stations. Since most of these Japanese propaganda programs were labeled by listeners as "bunk" and exaggerated claims, it appeared that most listeners were acting for amusement only, and it was felt that no serious problem existed as a result of these Axis efforts. To counteract the possibility of any ill effects, however, local radio stations were set up at many military installations and interesting news and musical programs were provided.[48]

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45 File, Threat of Strike of Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, 467th CIC Det, undated, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

46 Ltr, dtd 14 Mar 45, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Lt Col F. L. Petru, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

47 Ltr, dtd 30 Mar 44, Subj: Monthly CI Rpt, from 2d Lt William C. Smith, File #39-87, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

48 Monthly Intel Summary, Alaska Defense Command, dtd 10 Nov 42, pp 1, 3, 4, File 39-80, (Conf) (OSI File, Wash DC).

CIC Investigates Japanese Balloons

Another miscellaneous duty which fell to CIC concerned the recovery of incendiary balloons released from Japan to drift and fall on American territory. Typical of these was one handled by the 467th CIC Detachment in January 1945. The pursuit of this balloon involved use of a charter plane and dogsleds; the balloon was recovered intact atop a 45-foot cottonwood tree. Examination of attachments to the balloon by an agent at an improvised laboratory at 467th Headquarters revealed the presence of incendiary acids and chemicals, but no bacterial matter. CIC agents were used in several such cases, according to the detachment report.[49]

Espionage, Subversive Activity Investigations Made

The task of dealing with espionage in the Territory was largely preventive in nature and to this end CIC conducted many security surveys as well as investigations which either caused the removal or prevented the entrance of persons suspected of such activity.[50] Control of communications and travel prohibited, in part, the dissemination of information which might be picked up and a careful examination of all baggage and personal effects belonging to persons leaving the Territory aided in preventing the accomplishment of espionage. The examination of baggage in at least one instance paid rich dividends.

During 1944 a civilian employee who had terminated his employment contract was found to have in a secret compartment in the tray of his foot locker 87 photographs of newly built runways, aircraft and materiel dumps. Investigation revealed the photos had not been approved by the base censor, and it was found that 43 of the photos disclosed classified information. As a result of the investigation a soldier who had aided the civilian in accumulating the photographs was court martialed. Although the violation on the part of the civilian was admittedly willful, he claimed its purpose was the gathering of souvenirs and he was released after being relieved of the photographs.[51]

Investigation of subversive activity was another mission of the detachment in Alaska. Although as late as 1945 it was felt that there was little or no indication of concerted or organized activity, on the part of individuals or groups,

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49 Ltr, dtd 14 Mar 45, Subj: CI Monthly Info Rpt, from Lt Col F.L. Petru, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

50 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 9, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

51 Ltr, dtd 29 Dec 44, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Maj F. L. Petru, Report File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

designed to impede the war effort,[52] several investigations of suspected or potential subversives were conducted.

In March 1944, the unit attached to the Alaskan Wing, Air Transport Command, assigned undercover investigators to conduct a surveillance of an employee at the Watson Lake Air Base. The individual was reported as distributing literature which particularly opposed the United States Government financial policies. The outcome of the case does not appear.[53] In July of the same year, Anna Louise Strong, author of several books and articles praising the Communist Government, was refused transportation to Russia on planes of the Air Transport Command and investigated by the local CIC unit. She had no authority to use Government transportation, but did leave packages to be shipped from the Army Air Base at Great Falls, Montana, through Alaska to Russia. CIC recommended that customs officials carefully examine the packages before shipment, but the outcome of the case is not disclosed.[54]

Food Poisoning Case Investigated

In September 1944, the 467th was faced with a case of food poisoning which involved 471 employees of the War Department contractors at Ladd Field in Alaska.

The extensive investigation which was undertaken by CIC involved interrogation of almost 100 of the victims and distribution of printed questionnaires to all parties involved in an effort to determine what food and drink had been taken by all in common. It was ultimately concluded that the causative agent could either have been artificially introduced into the food or have developed naturally during a prolonged period of storage.

During the course of investigation, it was disclosed that Thomas Stoelting, a civilian interned early in the war as a potentially dangerous enemy alien but later released, was not only in the Alaskan Theater and working on a classified project but had also had access to the tainted food during its preparation. Steps to effect his removal to the United States were recommended and the case was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[55]

52 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 9, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

53 Ltr, dtd 30 Mar 44, Subj: Monthly CI Rpt, from Lt William C. Smith, Summary File 39-87, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

54 Ibid

55 Ltr, dtd 25 Nov 44, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Maj F. L. Petru, with 2 encl, Rpt File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

"...No reason to Question..."

An article in the Chicago Sunday Tribune dated 14 March 1945, prompted an investigation by the 467th of post newspapers and radio stations within the Alaskan Department, and of the Information and Education program sponsored within the Territory. The article stated in substance that a widely read author and alleged Communist propagandist, paper within the The article implied by its headline that he was forcing Soviet views upon American troops and further described his activities and affiliations with the Communist Party. had already been investigated by the agents of the detachment and examination of the records failed to disclose any evidence of subversion or un-American activities. A report of the investigation concluded, "there is no reason to question his loyalty to the United States."[56]

The radio stations, newspapers, and Information and Education Branch were investigated by making close record checks of all personnel involved and if derogatory information was developed, a complete investigation was run. No evidence was found to indicate an effort on the part of these individuals to disseminate Communist propaganda, and the Tribune article was considered to have been satisfactorily refuted.[57]

In view of the essentially preventive nature of CIC's mission in the Alaska Department, it is not possible to tabulate an exact account of services and results in the theater. The record of the 467th CIC Detachment at Fort Richardson, Alaska, however, from the date of its inception through May 1945, provides a typical example:

Loyalty Investigations Completed	5,810
Enemy Alien Investigations	222
Suspected Sabotage Investigations	210
Censorship Violation Investigations	269
Subversion and Disaffection Cases	315

56 Ltr, dtd 19 May 45, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Lt Col F. L. Petru, p 4, Rpt File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

57 Ibid

No figures are available to show the number of suspected espionage cases processed or whether they are included in the above. No totals are given for the multitude of cases falling into the miscellaneous category.[58]

Obstacles and Difficulties Encountered in Alaska

In the administrative field, CIC in Alaska met additional impediments, some unique and others common to CIC operations the world over.

One was the matter of expenses. In 1943, it was felt that the per diem allowance for enlisted agents was sufficient for their needs. But officers were suffering a monetary loss when cut off from the temporary duty allowance which was granted prior to 1943.[59] Authority to pay a similar allowance from what was called the "Task Force Fund" was requested, but the disposition of this demand is not recorded.

A letter in early 1944 over the signature of Brig. Gen. Frank L. Whittaker seems to indicate that the rising cost of living experienced in the area necessitated a re-evaluation of special allowances for CIC personnel. It was stated that the daily expense for food and lodging exceeded the monetary allowance, and the letter cited studies which provide a clear picture of prices in Alaska at this time. A report conducted prior to the war by the Juneau local of the National Federation of Federal Employees compared the cost of living in Alaska with that of Washington, D.C., and revealed that cost to be 116 percent higher in Fairbanks, Alaska, and 88 percent higher in Anchorage.

A report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics completed in January 1943 compared living costs in Alaska with similar expenses in Seattle, Washington, and showed that scale ran higher by 73 percent in Fairbanks and 61 percent higher in Anchorage. It appeared that the scale reduced as the comparison moved farther south, but even at Ketchikan, the southern-most city in the Territory, the index figure was 36 percent higher.[60]

General Whittaker's letter brought some action from the finance branch but that office felt that such financial difficulties were met by all personnel on

58 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, pp 7-10, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

59 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaskan Areas, p 6, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

60 Ltr, dtd 17 Jul 44, Subj: CIC Detachment Situation Summary, from Brig Gen F. L. Whittaker, p 2, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

duty in Alaska, and that a rate in excess of the authorized figures could not be paid to a special group.[61]

The expense situation created a morale problem which was further aggravated by the lack of promotions available to CIC personnel in the Territory. Civilian personnel employed by War Department contractors were considered overpaid even in light of working conditions, according to one Monthly Report. "It is common knowledge that in many instances these civilians are unqualified and incompetent for their positions, and that they are continued in employment at high pay long after their usefulness has expired."[62]

Agents encountered the usual difficulties when their military status was revealed, but this obstacle was generally overcome through the resourcefulness of the agents and the prestige earned by the organization.[63] In 1945, however, it was still felt that the operations of the detachment could be more expeditiously performed if an effort were made to remove restrictive and burdensome military regulations from CIC personnel.[64] As a general rule, the organization received important backing and cooperation from all military and civilian agencies in Alaska.[65]

The best evidence of successful liaison efforts was shown by the CIC unit attached to the Air Transport Command, Alaskan Wing. Reports from this unit in 1944 and 1945 indicate a vigorous program of liaison[66] and significant accomplishments are specifically credited to the relations fostered by this program.

The problems of supply varied among detachments and in most instances it was necessary that field offices be equipped in such a manner that they could operate with complete independence since the geographic distance involved prevented the use of a central facility.[67] Motor transportation for use by CIC was generally in short supply, but through carefully directed utilization in most

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61 Ltr, dtd 31 Jul 44, Subj: Cost of Living, from Lt Col Francis W. Darling, Corres File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Uncl) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

62 Ltr, dtd 30 Mar 44, Subj: Monthly Counter Intelligence Report, from 2d Lt William C. Smith, p 13, Summary File 39-87, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

63 Hist of CIC in Alaska, Det Hist, 467th CIC Det, undated, p 6, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

64 Ibid, p 11

65 Ibid, p 6

66 Ltrs, dtd 30 Mar 44, 29 Jul 44, 29 Aug 44, Subj: Monthly CI Report, from 2d Lt William C. Smith, Summary File 39-87, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

67 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through Northwest and Alaskan Areas, p 8, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

instances proved sufficient.[68] Office and special investigative equipment was often slow in arriving in needed areas, but was ultimately delivered. These delays were sometimes costly and in many instances could have been avoided by careful planning and supervision on the part of responsible administrative personnel.[69]

CIC in Alaska After 1945--Organization

The CIC units in Alaska remained attached to Headquarters, Alaskan Department, until November 1947. At that time, along with the separation of the Air Force from the Army, all CIC personnel were transferred to U.S. Army, Alaska. As might be anticipated, this transfer also altered the jurisdiction of CIC in the Territory.

From 1945 to 1947, CIC jurisdiction was shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. CIC was responsible for matters involving or dealing with uniformed personnel and employees of the War Department. When the Air Force was separated from the Army and set up its Office of Special Investigations, the jurisdiction of the CIC was further narrowed and included only Army personnel and Department of the Army civilians. At the same time, exclusive jurisdiction over the Alaskan Peninsula and Aleutian Islands was transferred to the Office of Special Investigations, which action considerably eased the burden of CIC in the Territory.[70]

In spite of official separation from the Air Force in November 1947, CIC continued to serve the Air Force in Alaska until 30 May 1948. It was on that date that the Office of Special Investigations became operational in the area and had sufficient qualified personnel to carry out a counterintelligence mission.[71]

The picture as to the Field Office structure after the end of the war is not clear. Headquarters of the 467th remained at Fort Richardson, but the detachment with the Air Transport Command was apparently removed from Alaska with the cessation of hostilities. The Juneau Field Office was closed, but the district office in the Aleutians was maintained until the Office of Special Investigations began its operations and took over in the area. It appears that for the most part,

68 Ltr, dtd 29 Jul 44, from 2d Lt William C. Smith, p 16, Subj: Monthly CI Rpt, Situation Summary File 39-87, (Conf) (OSI Files, Wash DC).

69 Memo, dtd 30 Jul 43, for the Chief, CIC, from Maj Lowell J. Bradford, Subj: Field Trip Through the Northwest and Alaska Areas, p 9, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

70 Hist, CIC 1945-1948, in folder A-16 #016221, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308), p 1.

71 Ibid, p 2

agents were sent from Fort Richardson as required in other sectors,[72] and all field offices were closed by December 1945.

The 703d CIC Detachment was stationed in Alaska from June through November 1951, but few records are available to document its six months of activities. Official reasons for the assignment and subsequent removal of the group do not appear in available records.[73]

One explanation for the presence of the 703d was offered by the supply officer of the detachment, Lt. George Munder. Munder felt that the real purpose of sending the detachment to Alaska was to assist the 467th in its summer workload. The weather in the Territory was such that the period during which outdoor construction was possible was extremely limited. During this period, the influx of transient workers was tremendous, and the number of background and incident cases which arose as a result of this increase became too much for one detachment to handle. Maj. Charles Butler commanded the detachment for its six-month stay in Alaska.

In aiding the 467th, it was contemplated that the 703d would handle all cases falling into the labor and construction incident categories. From headquarters at Elemendorf Air Base, agents were sent in teams to Anchorage, Tanacross, Whittier, Kenai, Fairbanks, Haines and Big Delta in order to provide complete coverage. The types of cases handled were not so limited as had been anticipated, however, and investigations of every sort falling within the counterintelligence mission were processed.

Of the seven officers and 15 enlisted men in the detachment, only two men were billeted at military facilities. The others were on a per diem allowance of $11 which proved adequate for civilian food and housing.

As was the experience of other detachments in Alaska, the 703d found its principal difficulties in the fields of transportation and communication. Vehicles performed well in the area if given winter maintenance but were in short supply. Tires were good for only 10,000 miles or less because of the poor condition of roads, and spare parts had to be sent up from the United States if not available in military supply pools. The communication network was poor; only two phone lines connected Anchorage and Fairbanks. In many instances, an air mail letter would be faster than a phone call between these points, as a flight was almost certain to be completed before it was possible to get a reservation for a call between the towns.[74]

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72 Hist, CIC 1945-1948, in folder A-16 #016221, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308), p 3.

73 Hist Data Card, 703d CIC Det, (Uncl) (Hist Proj Files).

74 Interview with George Munder, Gas and Electric Building, Balto, Md, 12 Aug 1955.

Post-war operations proved the value of files which were built up during and prior to the war. As the pace of operations slowed in Alaska with the coming of peace, closer liaison with other intelligence agencies was effected, for mutual advantage.[75]

Such liaison was found to be an absolute necessity to the accomplishment of the CIC mission as the strength of the 467th was sharply cut with the end of the war. In May 1945, there were 19 enlisted men and six officers in the detachment; by October 1945 the total dropped to 11 enlisted men and four officers; and in December of 1945 only one officer and two enlisted men remained on duty. For four months in 1946 only one enlisted man remained on duty; then a gradual buildup of forces began. The detachment did not reach its post-war strength until during the period of the Korean conflict, and strength reports have continued to fluctuate since that time.[76]

In addition to the problem of obtaining personnel, the training of that personnel once it arrived in the theater provided a further complication. In 1947, it was felt still that enlisted agents needed more training in report writing, interrogations, and investigations.[77]

Travel within Alaska remained a problem even after the war and during the winter months was most generally accomplished, of necessity, by aircraft. It was the opinion of one author that because of transportation difficulties, a case which could be completed in a day or two during the summer required a week or more in the winter.[78] The procurement of motor transportation was apparently eased to some extent by making it a matter of local jurisdiction.[79]

Housing for married agents remained a problem in post-war Alaska. Government facilities were so limited as to be almost wholly inadequate while rents for privately owned facilities were prohibitively high, ranging to $250 per month for a four-room apartment, with six months rent required in advance.[80]

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75 Hist, CIC 1945-1948, folder A-16 #016221, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308), p 3.

76 File 319.1, Monthly Rpts, 1949, 1950, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

77 Ltr, dtd 1 Feb 47, Subj: CIC Monthly Info Rpt, from Maj Ralph Sims, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Rec Cen, Box C-4308).

78 Hist, CIC 1945-1948, in folder A-16 #016221, p 2, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

79 Ltr, dtd 19 May 47, Subj: ZI Issue of Civilian Clothing, from Captain Jacobson, Corres File, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

80 Hist, CIC 1945-1948, in folder A-16 #016221, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308), p 3.

As was the case during war time operations, special investigative equipment could be obtained but often involved long delays. A two-month period of correspondence was involved in the procurement of facilities for a photographic laboratory for the 467th in 1947.[81]

Because of the limited selection and high prices of civilian clothes in the Alaskan Territory, arrangements were made in 1947 for agents assigned to the 467th to be issued their initial clothing allowance before reporting to the detachment. From this arrangement it can be presumed that operations were continued with agents in civilian attire.[82]

An informative study of the effect of Alaskan weather on operational and investigative materials in common use was conducted by a Provisional detachment on maneuvers in Alaska during 1950. The 467th CIC Detachment had found through experience that certain inks and carbon paper froze at low temperatures, and that the Bantam type cameras used for investigative purposes had to be heated before use.[83] The 1950 experiments showed that the 35mm Kodak failed to function at low temperatures and that the lens of the Speed Graphic fogged from the heat of the operator's body. Several pieces of sound equipment had to be heated before use to prevent the bursting of vacuum tubes. Some snow vehicles considered for use by CIC were found to be too slow for practical work.[84]

Operations After 1945

In post-war operations, the CIC in Alaska carried on much the same sort of activity that characterized its wartime mission.

Many security surveys were conducted at Army stations within the area, and, where precautions were lacking, remedial steps were recommended.

Background investigations on military personnel and civilian Department of the Army employees having access to classified information were conducted, and it became the practice in the area to complete such checks prior to the effective date of employment.[85] During June 1947, 228 such cases were opened and 248 were closed.[86]

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81 File, Documents--467th CIC Det, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 48, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

82 Ibid

83 Hist of CIC 1945-1948, in folder A-16 #016221, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

84 Monthly Rpt of Activities, dtd 6 Mar 50, CIC Det (Prov), Camp Carson, Colorado, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

85 Hist of CIC 1945-1948, in Folder A-16 #016221, p 2, (Restricted) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

86 Ltr, CIC Monthly Info Rpt, dtd 2 Jun 47, from Maj Ralph Sims, Rpt File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

The detachment continued to be plagued with fire cases, as the wooden buildings in the area became dryer. In 1947, the Noncommissioned Officers Club at Ladd Field burned, causing the death of three enlisted men and a property loss of over $20,000. The possibility of sabotage was explored by CIC investigators but the fire was eventually laid to the use of fuel with a low flash point in the space heaters.[87]

The CIC continued investigation and coverage of labor and union activity in the area, and judging from a 1951 case report, put in considerable time in this pursuit. In compiling the above mentioned report, the detachment relied upon informants as well as agents working undercover and in the open.[88]

87 Ltr, CIC Monthly Info Rpt, dtd 2 Jun 47, from Maj Ralph Sims, Rpt File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308), and Ltr, dtd 2 Jun 47, Subj: Fire at NCO Club, from Major Sims, Rpt File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Secret) (Kansas City Records Cen)

88 File, Annex #II-A, Title: Threat of Strike of Local 375, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

89 Ltr, dtd 2 Jun 47, Subj: CIC Case Activity Rpt, p 2, Corres File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

90 File, 467th CIC Det, Datoff, Harry, AD9648, FtR-CC-002, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

A possible espionage attempt also was reported in the 1947 files. The 467th investigated the attempt by various individuals in the vicinity of Ladd Field to gain military information from a noncommissioned officer, and felt that these individuals might be Russian agents. The disposition of the case does not appear in the incomplete reports available.[91]

91 Ltr, dtd 2 Jun 47, Subj: CIC Case Activity Rpt, from Maj Ralph Sims, File 319.1, 467th CIC Det, (Conf) (Kansas City Records Cen, Box C-4308).

Appendix 1

Roster of CIC in Alaska

CIC Detachment, Air Transport Command

Callaghan, Paul M.
Faulkner, Joseph W.
Hyland, Stanley J.
McLaughlin, John J., Jr.
Nickell, Stanley L.
Walhus, Donald F.
Walsh, E. Taylor
Watson, Richard L.
Wise, William L., Jr.
Wright, James A.
Smith, William C. (Commanding Officer)

703d CIC Detachment

Butler, Charles (Commanding Officer)
Munder, George

No records available.

467th CIC Detachment

Petru, Frank L. (Commanding Officer)
Anderson, Gordon C.
Arnold, Robert F.
Austell, Howard J.
Bacon, William C.
Ball, Spencer F.
Barnard, John D.
Beckett, Andrew J.
Black, August B.
Budryk, John C.
Burke, William J.
Casserly, Norman R.
Cathcart, Wallace, Jr.
Ceteras, James R.
Corey, George H.
Croft, William F.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Roster (cont'd)

DeMarco, Matthew
Dittman, William E.
Dowling, Charles R.
Duell, Jesse
Ferry, Harry W., Jr.
Foote, Edmund L.
Fortier, Edward J.
Freeland, Leonard A.
Freely, John B.
Gillies, Robert H.
Gollop, Oscar H.
Greiner, John B.
Groundwater, James T.
Gusland, Gilbert S.
Guynes, Samuel B.
Heavey, Robert W.
Huc, Harry J.
Hughes, Lawrence F.
Hunting, Harmon H.
Iannone, Nathan F.
Johnson, Edwin M.
Kiernan, Edward F.
Kristiansen, Stanley
Kuckachik, John
Mason, Getha A.
Mason, John
McCoy, Charles L.
McNamee, Delbert E.
Mellinger, Samuel
Mussman, Victor G.
Nelson, Earl R.
O'Connell, Thomas J.
Oliver, Paul E.
Paulsen, Elliot N.
Paulson, Chester R.
Plato, Lyle R.
Reardon, James E.
Rice, Hugh S.
Rickman, Joseph B.
Ridge, Lawrence J.
Roy, Joseph H. R.
Rule, Roland H.
Sande, Charles B.
Sale, Wallace F.
Schuck, Robert D.
Schweers, Leo G.
Scott, James I.
Sheifer, Victor J.
Sims, Ralph
Smith, Kenneth E.
Stallings, Jack W., Jr.
St. Vrain, Lester P.
Szpinalski, George S.
Tidball, John L.
Turechek, Chester S.
Turner, Leon W.
Underhill, Robert F.
Underwood, Donald E.
Weston, Leslie M.
Yohn, Harold F.
Zander, David W.
Zimmer, Willard J.

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Part II: CIC in Bermuda Base Commands

CIC IN THE BERMUDA BASE COMMAND

One of the smallest of the base commands occupied by United States military forces during World War II was that of Bermuda.

The Bermudas, hardly more than a dot on most maps, are a cluster of about 360 tiny islands some 580 miles off the North Carolina coast, yet the total area of the archipelago is only 19 square miles. A crown colony of Great Britain, the Bermudas assumed military importance to the United States in 1940, when the United States obtained 99-year leases on sites for military and naval installations in these Islands.

Construction on these installations was accelerated rapidly in the spring of 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Civilian contractors funneled thousands of workers from the United States into the islands to speed completion of the strategically important bases. Almost overnight Bermuda shed its reputation as one of the world's playgrounds and emerged as a bustling center of feverish defense preparations.

Presence of hundreds of uncleared workers on these restricted projects--and subsequently the arrival of troops to occupy the completed bases--made counter-intelligence coverage of the U.S. installations in the Bermudas a necessity. Since the mass of civilian workers--there were between 3,000 and 5,000--constituted the biggest security threat, it was determined that the first CIC agents should go into Bermuda under cover, posing as civilian employees of one of the construction firms.

Two CIC Agents Selected For Bermuda

Selection of these first agents was as easy as drawing a name from a hat. Preliminary planning had resulted in a decision that two agents assigned to the Washington Field Office, Third Service Command, would be chosen for the undercover missions. As soon as word to that effect got out among the agents in Washington, almost all of them wanted to go. Bermuda itself sounded glamorous enough and the intrigue of an undercover mission made the assignments even more alluring. To settle the question, names of all sergeants and staff sergeants in the Washington Field Office were dropped in a hat. The first sergeant then plucked out the names of and Within weeks, orders were cut transferring them to the Bermuda Base Command.[92]

92 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, John K. Smart, 19 Jul 55, subj: Interview with (MI, Res), (Hist Proj Files).

Actually, three agents--two staff sergeants and one technical sergeant--had been authorized for the command since 12 December 1941[93] but the vacancies were not filled until the spring of 1942.

The haphazard method of selection belied the amount of preparation which went into the mission for which and were chosen. Early in April 1942 both men were placed on temporary duty in New York City to enable them to make arrangements necessary to support their cover in Bermuda.

In New York, and learned that they were to pose as employees of the construction company which was building Fort Bell and Kindley Field on St. David's Island. The agents were hired through the company's normal channels in New York City, and only one official of the firm knew of their connection with the Counter Intelligence Corps. After an intensive briefing on the company's operations in Bermuda and their specific job assignments, and were treated like other civilian employees of the firm. Meanwhile, the agents were given passports, Selective Service cards, and other documents which would substantiate their cover stories. Both were promoted to the rank of staff sergeant.

and Arrive in Bermuda

By the end of April, and had mastered their cover and were ready to go to work. Boarding a plane at Baltimore, they arrived in Bermuda on 1942. Although both were thoroughly familiar with their civilian jobs, neither one had an inkling of the nature of the work he was to do for CIC. Their only instructions before leaving the United States were that they should not reveal their identities as CIC agents until contacted by an intelligence officer of the Bermuda Base Command.

It was a long wait. A month passed without word, and the undercover agents began to wonder whether they had been forgotten. Impatient to begin their counter-intelligence work, they could only wait. Wait and wonder. Wait and learn. Wait and grow sick of waiting. Then the word came.

One night in June, returned to his quarters in the civilian employees' barracks to find a letter returned to him heavily censored. With it was an order to report to the base censorship office. Maj. Eames S. Powers, S2 of the Bermuda Base Command, was waiting for at the censorship office. The censored letter was a ruse to get away from his civilian companions.

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93 Memo, Brig Gen Sherman Miles to TAG, 12 Dec 41, subj: Allotment of Grades of Enlisted Personnel to the Corps of Intelligence Police, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

Major Powers told --and later that they were to concentrate upon security. Weaknesses in physical security measures at Fort Bell and Kindley Field were to be reported. The agents also were instructed to watch for any security leaks among the civilian employees on the island. Any other information of intelligence interest also was to be reported to the S2.

No Glamour in Bermuda

Any ideas and might have entertained about the glamour of their assignment were quickly dispelled. They conducted virtually no investigations and the few cases they were occasionally assigned almost invariably produced negative results. The agents were the "eyes and the ears" of the S2. Their job was a trying one. was required to work seven days a week at his civilian job; sometimes had Sundays off. There was little time for either to devote to his CIC work or to his own interests. When reports to the S2 were necessary, and often had trouble getting away from their co-workers to contact Major Powers.

But their waiting and watching paid. The agents found security measures at Fort Bell and Kindley Field notoriously inadequate. Restricted areas were not nced. Too few guards were available. Identification cards and badges for civilian workers were improperly prepared, and guards often admitted persons who carried no identification at all. Reports by the undercover agents brought quick corrections of these glaring security weaknesses.

Undercover Agents Spot a Security Risk

When the S2 of the Bermuda Base Command made specific assignments to the CIC agents, the cases usually involved only requests for information about civilian workers who were suspected of anti-American sympathies. One such case centered around an employee whose sister was married to a German Luftwaffe officer. In applying for employment, the man had declared that his sister was divorced and was living in Switzerland. however, learned that she actually was still with her husband in Germany. From the subject's co-workers, the agents heard that he displayed unusual interest in fortifications and coastal defenses in the Bermudas. On the basis of these reports, the man was returned to the United States as a security risk. He was searched aboard ship before sailing from Bermuda and photographs and sketches of military installations in the islands were taken from him.[94]

Soon after began their work in the Bermudas, it became evident that an additional CIC agent was necessary for work among military

94 Memo, subj: Interview with

personnel within the Bermuda Base Command. To meet this need, T/Sgt. Philip F. Detweiler was transferred in grade to the Counter Intelligence Corps in January 1943. Detweiler had been working in the S2 office of the Bermuda Base Command since October 1941.[95] Working in uniform, Detweiler conducted all investigations among the troops and took from Major Powers the responsibility of receiving oral reports from and

CIC Gets an Officer

The first CIC officer in Bermuda arrived on 25 January 1943. He was 2d Lt. Benjamin T. Kinsey, who was transferred from the Office of the Director of Intelligence, Third Service Command, Baltimore, to direct CIC operations in the Bermudas.[97]

Lieutenant Kinsey coordinated the work of the three agents in Bermuda, occasionally contacting the two undercover operatives personally. Despite the arrival of a CIC officer, however, Major Powers, the S2, still exercised considerable control over CIC personnel. Lieutenant Kinsey himself was required to perform many duties not normally considered to be CIC functions. Acting as a sort of assistant S2 to Major Powers, he was allowed to devote only about 25 percent of his time to counterintelligence work.[98] Because of his legal experience, Lieutenant Kinsey was often detailed to serve on court martials and boards of inquiry.[99]

and Change Jobs

Completion of major construction projects in the Bermudas in the spring of 1943 threatened to bring the undercover work of and to an abrupt halt. The contract of the civilian construction firm which had employed the agents expired on 1 May 1943, and all but approximately 250 of its employees were returned to the United States. This relatively small group of workers was hired by the Post Engineer, and arrangements were made to transfer both and

95 Ltr, (S2) 200/18 (CIC), Maj Eames A. Powers to Chief, CIC Branch, CIG, MIS, WD, 2 Aug 43, subj: Transfer of Enlisted Man, MIS-CIC, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

96 Memo, subj: Interview with

97 Ltr, Benjamin T. Kinsey, Jr., to Col Ralph E. Leighton, dtd 18 Aug 55, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).
NOTE: Roster of Detachment attached as Appendix 1, Part II.

98 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, Capt Samuel E. Ewing, Jr., Asst Opns Off, CIC, 1 Jun 43, (Conf), (Cen Rec Fac).

99 Ltr, Benjamin T. Kinsey, Jr., to Col Ralph E. Leighton, dtd 18 Aug 55, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

to his office. became early in May 1943. entered as a about a month later.

Although their mission still was to watch for security leaks among civilian workers, the undercover agents were given more freedom of action. The Post Engineer was notified of their true status and was warned that their first responsibility was to CIC rather than to their civilian jobs. This enabled the agents to get away from their office whenever necessary. They were assigned a pickup truck by the Post Engineer which they were permitted to use for CIC work as well. Previously, bicycles had been their only form of transportation around the islands.

But complications also developed from the change in jobs. While working for the civilian construction company, and were permitted to keep their civilian pay in lieu of rations and quarters allowances from the Government. When they switched jobs, however, they were required to return the pay received from their cover employment. Rations and quarters allowances were authorized, but these usually proved insufficient to meet the expenses incurred by the agents in maintaining their civilian cover. Both and were required to sign an Army pay roll for their military pay, despite the fact that their connection with the Army was not supposed to be known.

The agents went to considerable lengths to protect their cover. When a "Home Guard" was organized among civilian workers in Bermuda, both and enlisted. They attended weekly military drills, and eventually was appointed a platoon sergeant in the Home Guard.

But despite precautions, new threats of compromise popped up frequently. Once saw several soldiers whom he had known during his basic training in the United States. He crossed the street and went out of sight before they noticed him. When he reported the incident to Lieutenant Kinsey, was instructed that if he should meet them again, he should tell the soldiers that he was no longer in the Army. Fortunately, these men were transferred out of Bermuda about a week later.

In August 1943, and moved into the home of an English family near Hamilton. In a closet in their room there, the agents found a box of old papers which contained classified blueprints of the Kings Point Naval Base. They carried the blueprints to Lieutenant Kinsey, who turned the case over to the Office of Naval Intelligence for investigation.[100]

By the summer of 1943, Col. H. R. Kibler, Chief, CIC, was questioning the necessity for keeping two agents under cover in Bermuda in view of the drastic

100 Memo, subj: Interview with

reductions in the civilian labor force there. On 5 June 1943, he wrote to Major Powers to ask whether the undercover agents could be eliminated.[101] Major Powers recommended that and who had been in Bermuda for more than a year, be relieved and that one agent be sent to replace them. He pointed out that, of approximately 1,400 civilians employed within the Bermuda Base Command, more than 800 were aliens. At least one undercover agent was essential, he declared.[102]

Replacements Arrive

was selected to replace and in Bermuda. The S2 initiated steps for employment by the Post Engineer as a The Post Engineer then contacted the Division Engineer in New York City and asked that be hired.[103] preparations for his cover were similar to those of and before they entered Bermuda. He left New York for Bermuda on 1943 and arrived in the Islands the same day.[104] and returned to the United States on 31 1943, after 18 months of service in the Bermuda Base Command.[105]

Major Powers also recommended the replacement of T/Sgt. Philip Detweiler, who had been in Bermuda since October 1941.[106] Orders transferring S/Sgt. William B. Stansbury, Jr., to the Bermuda Base Command as a replacement for Detweiler were dated 22 October 1943, to be effective on or about 30 October 1943.[107] Stansbury arrived in Bermuda on 3 November.[108]

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101 Ltr, MID 322.999 CIC (6-5-43), Col H. R. Kibler to S2, Hq, Bermuda Base Cmd, 5 Jun 43, subj: CIC Personnel, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

102 1st Ind by Maj Eames A. Powers, 23 Jun 43, to ltr, MID 322.999 CIC (6-5-43), Col H. R. Kibler to S2, Hq, Bermuda Base Cmd, 5 Jun 43, subj: CIC Personnel, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

103 Ltr, Capt Samuel E. Ewing, Jr., to Director of Intel, Second Service Cmd, Attn: Maj William A. Sullivan, dtd 13 Sep 43, subj: Undercover Assignment in Bermuda Base Cmd, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

104 Memo for the File, 1st Lt Dudley G. Skinker, dtd 5 Oct 43, subj: (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

105 Memo, subj: Interview with

106 Ltr, (S2) 200/18 (CIC), Maj Eames A. Powers to Chief, CIC Branch, CIG MIS, WD, 2 Aug 43, subj: Transfer of Enlisted Man, MIS-CIC, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

107 Memo for the File, 1st Lt Frank J. Reed, Jr., dtd 27 Oct 43, subj: Bermuda Base Command, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

108 Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview With William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

like and before him, continued to work among the civilian employees of the command. Although most of his reports concerned security leaks and expressions of disaffection by the civilian workers, he frequently notified Lieutenant Kinsey of instances of petty theft and other crimes committed by the civilian employees. These complaints were forwarded to the Provost Marshal for investigation.[109]

came by much of his information at drinking and gambling parties aboard a boat in St. George's Harbor. This ship, the Berkshire, was pressed into temporary service as quarters for some of the civilians, and liquor and talk flowed freely during off-duty hours. It was rumored that thousands of dollars often changed hands during the dice games of a single night. Disgruntled losers, usually drunk, took revenge by bitterly assailing the United States' role in the war. Some workers, by their own admission, came to Bermuda to escape the draft in the United States. Their remarks drew special attention from the undercover agent.

Reports, usually verbal, were channeled into the S2 office in a variety of ways, but a night meeting between and Stansbury was the most common method. Stansbury's wife was at Fort Bell as a civilian employee of the Quartermaster. When wanted to contact Stansbury, he walked in front of Mrs. Stansbury's desk and placed a pencil behind his ear. That was a signal for the two men to meet that night in a pre-arranged location. Sometimes they met at Stansbury's home, but more often it was in a back room at the Fort Bell Post Office which was secretly reserved for CIC use.

Stansbury, meanwhile, continued to conduct all overt investigations for the Bermuda detachment and in February 1944, when Lieutenant Kinsey was returned to the United States, Stansbury was designated as Special Agent in Charge of CIC operations in Bermuda. He continued in that capacity until some time in the summer, when a new detachment commander arrived.

Two months before Lieutenant Brown came to Bermuda, Lt. Col. Bates Raney replaced Major Powers as S2. Fortunately for CIC, Colonel Raney was well aware of the CIC mission and was convinced that counterintelligence activities were among the most important of his responsibilities as S2.

Working closely with Stansbury, Colonel Raney revamped detachment files, obtained more equipment and office space for CIC, and concentrated on improving liaison between CIC and Bermudian police, British authorities, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Colonel Raney requested loyalty investigations on scores of

109 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 16 Aug 55, subj: Interview with Augustus F. Brown, III, (Uncl) (Central Records Facility).

Bermudian employees of the Army who had never been given any sort of clearance. Soon Stansbury was ringing doorbells throughout the Islands to complete these personnel checks.

"Lord Haw-Haw" Scares Bermuda

Bermuda had the war jitters in early 1944. German submarines prowled the waters off the coast, and Axis propaganda broadcasts beamed at the Island did not let anyone forget it. "Lord Haw-Haw" was a special cause for consternation. No sooner would a ship tie up in Hamilton Harbor than the propagandist would broadcast its name, location, and assorted information about its crew. Both Stansbury and Coleman were ordered to check the possibility that enemy agents were transmitting information on the troop movements by clandestine radio but investigation proved fruitless. Reluctantly, they concluded that the reports originated from the German submarines.

The possibility that the enemy was smuggling information out of Bermuda remained, however--a possibility strong enough to convince Colonel Raney that more CIC agents were urgently needed in the Bermuda Base Command.

CIC Gets a New Commander

Colonel Raney's first move was to request a replacement for Lieutenant Kinsey. When none came he made a trip to the United States in an effort to obtain a CIC officer for Bermuda. The trip brought results. In the summer of 1944, 1st Lt. Augustus F. Brown, III, arrived to take command of the detachment.[110] Nevertheless, Colonel Raney continued to exercise close supervision over the detachment; the unit shared the same office with the S2, and Lieutenant Brown rarely took any action as detachment commander without first clearing it with Colonel Raney.

Security Measures Tightened

Emphasis during Lieutenant Brown's first months with the Bermuda detachment was on tightening security. Agents made frequent security surveys at Fort Bell and Kindley Field. Lieutenant Brown himself assumed the responsibility of giving security lectures to large groups of persons entering or leaving Bermuda. As soon as a United States ship docked in Bermuda, its passengers and crew were

110 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

hustled to an auditorium, where Brown told them of security measures enforced in the Islands and warned of the consequences of violation.[111]

Stringent regulations were necessary because Bermuda was a rendezvous point for ships and planes bound for Europe to participate in the Allied invasion of France in the summer of 1944. Warships massed at Point X, within sight of the Islands, and Kindley Field was a refueling stop for bombers en route to bases in Europe and North Africa. CIC had to fight the natural tendency of the troops to speculate--publicly--about their destination and time of departure.

To counter this hazard, the detachment persuaded telephone company officials to instruct operators that they were to contact CIC immediately on overhearing conversations in which troop movements of any kind were mentioned. Special monitoring equipment was installed in the secret CIC room in the Post Office building to permit agents to listen to any telephone conversation at a signal from the operator. The plan worked. In one month, shortly before D-Day, agents trapped a captain, a lieutenant and seven enlisted men who disclosed classified information on troop movements in telephone conversations with friends.[112]

Activation of the 460th CIC Detachment

An organizational change was effected on 1 August 1944 with the formal activation of the 460th CIC Detachment, assigned to the Bermuda Base Command.[113] Agents in Bermuda previously were assigned to CIC, Military Intelligence Service, and were placed on detached service with the Bermuda Base Command. With activation of the 460th CIC Detachment, they came under the administrative control of the Bermuda Base Command.

Activation of the new detachment brought an increase in the authorized strength of CIC in Bermuda and touched off a new effort by Colonel Raney to increase its size. By the first of 1945, two officers and five enlisted men were on duty with the 460th.[114] Two agents, Thomas C. Smith and Richard M. Forbes,

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111 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 16 Aug 55, subj: Interview with Augustus F. Brown, III, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

112 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

113 460th CIC Det Statistical Hist, (Uncl) (Central Records Facility).

114 460th CIC Det Monthly Admin Rpt for Jan 45, Lt Col Bates Raney to Cmd Gen, Army Service Forces, dtd 8 Feb 45, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

were recruited locally. An officer, 2d Lt. Aurelio M. Prado, and a clerk, Walter O. Treas, arrived from the United States.[115]

In June 1945, [redacted] left the detachment to attend Infantry Officers Candidate School,[116] and the following month another agent was transferred out of CIC.[117] From that time until the detachment was deactivated in December 1945, its strength was never greater than two officers and three enlisted men.

Agents Use Technical Equipment

Despite its small size, the 460th was a well equipped detachment. A motor vehicle, obtained through Colonel Raney's efforts, was kept ready at all times for exclusive use of the unit.[118] Special investigative equipment included an ultra-violet ray lamp, used to detect hidden communications and markings on mail intercepted and processed by the detachment, a Graflex Fingerprint camera, Kodak Bantam camera, and Speak-O-Phone equipment. The fingerprint camera was often utilized for photographing documents in addition to its more common uses. Agents in the field employed the Bantam camera to photograph evidence of various types.[119]

Special training classes were conducted to familiarize agents with the investigative equipment. In photography, for example, all members of the detachment were assigned subjects to be photographed with certain types of film. After developing their pictures, the agents received a critique from an experienced photographer.[120]

But the detachment's training program was not limited to the use of special equipment. A buddy system of training was adopted, and one officer and three enlisted men who were new in CIC received instruction in the techniques of investigations, report writing, and interrogations from more experienced agents. Late in February 1945, an intensive 13-week training course in conversational Spanish was inaugurated. Classes were held for an hour and a half each Monday

115 Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Central Records Facility).

116 Monthly Administrative Rpt, Capt Alexander G. Green, Jr., to CG, ASF, 8 Aug 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

117 Monthly Admin Rpt, Capt Augustus F. Brown, III, to CG, ASF, 8 Aug 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

118 Monthly Info Rpt, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, 7 Mar 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

119 Ibid, 5 Apr 45.

120 Ibid, 7 Mar 45.

and Thursday night, and attendance was compulsory. Lieutenant Prado and Agent Smith were instructors.[121]

CIC Gets Military Training

Throughout the command, Wednesday mornings were reserved for general military training for all Army personnel. The 460th adopted a program of specialized CIC training for these periods. Based on subject matter taught at CIC schools in the United States, the training included such subjects as these: military cryptography, report writing, office procedure, laws of evidence, preservation of evidence, laws of arrest, testifying in court, intelligence agencies in combat units, fingerprinting, map reading, undercover work, informant systems, countersabotage, and counterespionage. Basic military subjects like close order drill, camouflage, scouting and patrolling, and compass problems also were included. At least twice monthly, agents fired practice rounds with CIC weapons.[122]

A Disguise for an Undercover Agent

The Wednesday morning training sessions complicated things for the undercover agent. Brown, now a captain, believed that the detachment might be transferred to a more active theater, and he was eager for to participate in the training. Still, he was not willing to risk the compromise of identity as a CIC agent. Captain Brown finally devised a plan whereby could train with the rest of the detachment. On Wednesday mornings, did not report to his job. Instead, he donned a tattered fatigue uniform and dark glasses and slipped away to the training area to join the detachment. His identity was never detected.[123]

During July 1945, agents were assigned practical work in observation and description. Certain civilians on the base were chosen as subjects, and each agent was required to submit a full descriptive report, based on personal observation. Classroom discussion and comparison of the descriptions followed.[124]

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121 Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

122 Monthly Info Rpt, Capt Augustus F. Brown, III, to CG, ASF, 10 May 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

123 Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 16 Aug 55, subj: Interview with Augustus F. Brown, III, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

124 Monthly Info Rpt, Capt Augustus F. Brown, III, to CG, ASF, dtd 8 Aug 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

By 1945, most agents assigned to the 460th were working in civilian clothing, especially when their duties required contact with officials of the Bermuda government or British military authorities.

Liaison With Other Agencies

Liaison was maintained not only with the British but also with U.S. Army agencies. The Bermuda Base Signal Officer frequently provided Signal Corps photographers to aid CIC agents in their investigations. Liaison with the Base Censorship Office permitted agents to intercept incoming and outgoing mail of persons suspected of Nazi sympathies.[125] Telephone conversations also could be monitored. Daily lists of money orders purchased on the post were submitted to the detachment by the Postal Officer. Agents examined the lists and noted transmittal of any unusual amounts of money.[126] Whenever suspect civilians left Bermuda for the United States, the detachment forwarded results of police agency checks, along with S2 201 files, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's liaison agent at the Eastern Defense Command.

Operations of the 460th CIC were not spectacular during this period. Besides the undercover agent in the Post Engineer's office, other agents occasionally went under cover to gain first-hand information from observation of neutral ships which docked in St. George's Harbor with known Nazi agents or sympathizers aboard. Lack of sufficient personnel prevented a thorough exploitation of this technique, however.[127]

Much of the detachment's work in late 1944 and early 1945 was operation of an Exit Permit system adopted as a further security precaution. Under this system, which was also accepted by the British, CIC agents screened all persons leaving Bermuda, searching their baggage and personal possessions for any forbidden photographs, correspondence, and the like. Most of this work was dull routine.

CIC Nabs a Pornographer

What started out as a routine check sometimes turned abruptly into an interesting investigation, however. On one occasion when Stansbury was inspecting a cedar chest owned by a soldier who had already returned to the United States, the CIC agent's eyes fell on what appeared to be putty marks

125 Monthly Info Rpt, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, 7 Mar 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

126 Monthly Info Rpt, Capt Alexander G. Green, Jr., to CG, ASF, dtd 6 Jul 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

127 Monthly Info Rpt, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, dtd 7 Mar 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

inside the lid of the chest.. Scraping away the putty, Stansbury discovered screws which held in place a hidden compartment within the lid. Inside were scores of pornographic pictures, along with several photographs of defense installations on Bermuda.

Colonel Raney arranged for CIC agents in New York City to meet the soldier when his ship docked there. Within two days, the owner was back in Bermuda facing CIC interrogators. Captain Brown, Stansbury, and other agents questioned the soldier for two days before he admitted any knowledge of the pictures. A Signal Corps photographer, the man finally admitted that he had used Government supplies to make the pornographic pictures for sale to troops in Bermuda. He eventually was convicted by a Court Martial on a minor charge.[128]

Bermuda Agents Get Into Pacific War

Another group of pictures also touched off an extensive investigation by the 460th CIC Detachment and made its personnel a vital link in the war in the Pacific.

On 13 December 1944, a Negro laborer discovered a cardboard box containing aerial photographs marked "Secret" alongside a path between his home and Kindley Field, where he was employed. He turned the container over to his supervisor and CIC was notified at once.

The box had been opened. The outside wrapper of the package was stamped "Intelligence Material" and the inner wrapper warned that the contents were secret.

By questioning personnel of the Air Transport Command, Kindley Field, CIC agents learned that the box was a part of a shipment from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, to the A2 of the 14th Air Force at Kunming, China. Records indicated that the box had been unloaded from a plane at Kindley Field on 12 December 1944 and placed on an Army truck for transportation to a nearby warehouse. Warehouse records revealed that the box never arrived there.

An inventory of the contents listed more than a thousand secret aerial photographs of Okinawa, in the Pacific Ocean. A check with the office of origin indicated that none of the photographs was missing.

CIC agents, led by Captain Brown, interrogated all persons known to have handled the box of photographs. From the testimony, they reconstructed the

128 Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 16 Aug 55, subj: Interview with Augustus F. Brown, III; and Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, Subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (both Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

story. After the carton had been loaded on the truck, the driver, newly arrived in Bermuda, took the wrong road to the warehouse. As the truck bounced over a rough coral pathway, the driver realized his mistake and turned around. At this point, the box probably fell from the truck onto the path where it was discovered the next day. When the Negro laborer saw the box the following morning, he opened it to see whether it contained anything of value to him. Finding nothing of interest, he gave it to his supervisor.

Captain Brown concluded that the photographs had been lost through an accident and that, though compromised, they had not fallen into hostile hands. Personnel of the Air Transport Command were warned to take adequate precautions in handling classified material in the future.

When United States Forces invaded Okinawa just three months later, agents of the 460th CIC watched the newspaper accounts of battle with special interest; though thousands of miles away and in a different ocean, the Bermuda detachment had played a vital role in the Okinawa campaign by recovering aerial photographs necessary in American military planning.[129]

Plane Crash Draws CIC Attention

Agents of the 460th CIC Detachment were also required to investigate cases of suspected sabotage involving military aircraft, since there was no separate detachment in Bermuda for air investigations. One such case resulted from the crash of a C-54A airplane on 21 April 1945.

The plane, bound for New York City from Casablanca, refueled at Kindley Field. Almost immediately after taking off from Kindley Field, the plane crashed into Castle Harbor Bay, between 300 and 400 yards from the end of the runway. In an effort to determine whether sabotage was responsible for the crash, agents of the 460th CIC interviewed the crew and 13 passengers of the C-54A, together with several witnesses to the accident.[130] Results of the investigation indicated that pilot error, rather than sabotage, was responsible.[131]

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129 460th CIC Det Rpt of Investigation by 1st Lt Augustus F. Brown, III, and Special Agent William B. Stansbury, Jr., dtd 15 Jan 45, subj: Aerial Photographs, Nansei Islands, (Secret), Compromise of, (Secret), (Central Records Facility); and Memo for the Bermuda Base Cmd File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

130 Memo, Special Agent Augustus F. Brown, III, to S2, Bermuda Base Cmd, 23 Apr 45, subj: C-54A (AAF) 42-107452 Plane Crash, Kindley Field, Bermuda (21 Apr 45), (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

131 Summary Rpt, NAAT-97-1, prepared by Maj Robert S. Ratliff, 9 Jun 45, subj: C-54A, AAF #42-107452, Crashed at Kindley Field, Bermuda, 21 Apr 45, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

Even as late as 1945, use of an undercover agent to report on suspicious activities of civilian employees was considered one of the detachment's most important functions. Colonel Raney evaluated the undercover work among civilians in this manner:

> The most effective method of keeping in touch with the civilian employees in general and with certain of them who are under direct observation by this office, is by the use of an undercover Counter Intelligence Corps Special Agent. This Agent is placed in a strategic spot, as for example, in the personnel office where he would have access to the personnel records of the various employees. He is able to gain the confidence of certain employees as directed by S2, and to make reports concerning them. In this Command the presence of such an Agent has been of intestimable value and been worth more to this Command than the total operation to date of the Mass Observer Plan.[132]

CIC Spots a British Spy

One investigation by an undercover agent in the office turned up a foreign agent--but the suspect was revealed to be a British undercover operative rather than a Nazi spy. One a timekeeper for the was investigated as a possible Nazi agent when his peculiar activities aroused suspicion.

appeared to be a cultured, well-educated individual who was out of place performing routine clerical duties. He showed unusual interest in military information and informants told that was spending more money than he earned at his $50-per-week job at Fort Bell.

When a surveillance of failed to produce evidence of disloyalty, CIC agents searched his residence. There they found papers which identified as a British Intelligence agent who had come to Bermuda after completing an assignment in Trinidad. They also found a secret report which had written for the British Admiralty.

Armed with this information, Colonel Raney decided to enjoy a joke at the expense of British officers who had considered CIC an inferior intelligence organization. He went to British Intelligence officers and, during a conversation, casually mentioned that CIC agents were about to close in on a German spy named whom they had discovered working for the

132 Monthly Admin Rpt, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, 8 Feb 45, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

Embarrassed British officers quickly stammered an admission that was one of their men but they tried to minimize his work among the Americans by insisting that he had been placed there temporarily while awaiting assignment. They vouched for . . loyalty--and quickly withdrew him.[133]

80,000 Match Boxes

More often than not, investigations conducted by 460th CIC agents failed to disclose evidence of sabotage or espionage. But the men were thorough, nevertheless. In January 1945, the Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, warned the S2 of the Bermuda Base Command that safety matches manufactured by one American company had been found to contain abrasive material or were covered completely with ignitable material. Agents of the 460th supervised examination of 80,000 boxes of safety matches sent by the American firm to Army and Navy installations in Bermuda. Only one box had been tampered with.[134]

As has been noted, mid-1945 and the cessation of hostilities in Europe brought an end to much of the work of the 460th. When agents were transferred, they were not replaced.

Captain Brown returned to the United States in November 1945 and Lieutenant Prado succeeded him as commanding officer.[135] A month later the detachment was deactivated and its members returned to the United States, their work in Bermuda completed.[136]

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133 460th CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for Jan 45, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, dtd 8 Feb 45, (Secret) (Central Records Facility); and Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, John K. Smart, dtd 19 Aug 55, subj: Interview with William B. Stansbury, Jr., (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

134 Monthly Admin Rpt, Lt Col Bates Raney to CG, ASF, 8 Feb 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

135 Memo for the Bermuda Base Command File, prepared by John K. Smart, dtd 16 Aug 55, subj: Interview with Augustus F. Brown, III, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

136 460th CIC Det Statistical Hist, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

Appendix 1

ROSTER, BERMUDA BASE COMMAND[137]

Officers

Brown, Augustus F., III
Kinsey, Benjamin T.
Prado, Aurelio M.

Enlisted Men

Baesl, John M.
Carpenter, Elmer J.
Detweiler, Philip F.
Fitch, John H.
Forbes, Richard M.
Gardner, Robert W.
McConnell, James C.
Smith, Thomas C.
Stansbury, William B., Jr.
Treas, Walter O.

137 This roster is compiled from monthly information reports, monthly administrative reports, official correspondence, and from interviews with former CIC personnel who served in Bermuda. It is not a roster of a given period, but lists all CIC personnel known to have served in the Bermuda Base Command at any time during World War II.

Part III: CIC in the Caribbean Defense Command

Section 1: Introduction

Section 2: The Panama Detachment

Section 3: The Puerto Rico Detachment

Section 4: CIC in Trinidad

Section 5: The 606th CIC Detachment

Section 6: The 472d CIC Detachment

Section 1

INTRODUCTION

War in Europe and an impending crisis in the Far East forced recognition of the need for intensified counterintelligence coverage in the Caribbean, where the Panama Canal forged a vital link between East and West and where island territories held forth promise of strategic importance as bases for United States ships and aircraft.

The Corps of Intelligence Police had operated in the area since 1922, when two agents were dispatched to the Panama Canal Zone. But as late as 1938, the Corps' strength in the Caribbean had not been increased.[138]

After war broke out in Europe in 1939, the number of agents on duty in the Caribbean was gradually increased until in April 1941 when the authorized number of enlisted men was 19 agents in Panama and 12 in Puerto Rico.[139] The Caribbean Defense Command (CDF) was activated in May 1941 and steps were soon taken to spread counterintelligence coverage throughout the Caribbean area.

For, important as it was, the Panama Canal Zone was not the only U.S. controlled territory in the Caribbean area which had to be protected from military attack or from possible sabotage by the Axis powers. Besides the Canal Zone, leased from the Republic of Panama as a protective buffer zone for the vital waterway, the United States also held other Caribbean territories which served as important military, naval, and air bases.

Puerto Rico, up to July 1952, was an insular possession of the United States. The island was administered by a governor appointed by the President, and federal law, including the Selective Service Act, applied to the island as fully as to the United States. Not only did Puerto Rico serve as an important military installation but it also furnished a substantial number of men for the nation's armed forces during World War II.

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138 The Basic Document from which most of the source material for this Chapter on The Counter Intelligence Corps in the Caribbean Defense Command is a report entitled, "Counter Intelligence Corps, Caribbean Defense Command, 1 January 42 - 31 May 45," prepared by Maj Elbert D. Turner, Jr., dated 1 June 45, (SECRET), contained in "Counter Intelligence Corps Operational History of Base and Defense Commands, (Central Records Facility). Subsequent references to this document will be "Basic Document."

139 Ltr, TAG, 322.999 Intelligence Police Corps, (3-14-41) EB, dtd 21 Mar 41, subj: "Allotment of Grades to the Corps of Intelligence Police and Promotions Therein," as cited in Basic Document.

The Virgin Islands, purchased from Denmark in 1917, were another territory of the United States in the Caribbean. Composed of nine main islands and some 75 islets, the Virgins were used as air and naval outposts. Residents, like those of Puerto Rico, possessed U.S. citizenship.

But the extent of the nation's military jurisdiction--and consequently the jurisdiction of its counterintelligence forces--extended beyond lands owned by the United States. For example, the United States had strategic naval and air bases on Cuba. Under destroyer-base lease agreements with Great Britain, the islands of Jamaica and Trinidad in the British West Indies also became sites for U.S. air and naval bases.

To achieve a workable system of military protection, the Caribbean Defense Command was divided into two smaller areas, or departments. The Panama Canal Department included the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and the following surrounding countries in Central and South America: Guatemala, Honduras, British Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru. The Antilles Department, known as the Puerto Rican Department before 1944, included both the Greater Antilles--Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Southern Bahamas, Virgin Islands, and Jamaica--and the Lesser Antilles, among which Antigua, Martinique, and St. Lucia were important from a military standpoint. In addition, the adjacent islands of Aruba, Curacau, and Trinidad and the Guianas (British, Dutch, and French) and the coastal area of Venezuela all fell within the Antilles Department.

Eventually the organization of CIC in the Caribbean closely paralleled the departmental organization described above. But this was achieved only in 1944, when five numbered detachments were activated within the Caribbean Defense Command. The 470th CIC Detachment was attached to the Panama Canal Department; the 471st, to the Antilles Department; the 606th, to the Sixth Air Force; and the 472d, to the Antilles Air Command. The 469th CIC Detachment was assigned to the Caribbean Defense Command headquarters. As a headquarters detachment, the 469th was concerned primarily with administrative rather than investigative matters.[140]

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140 Basic Doc. NOTE: Partial roster of Caribbean Detachment attached as Appendix 1, Part III.

Section 2

THE PANAMA DETACHMENT

The Panama Canal is a strategic life-line of American military and economic might and a crossroads of the world. Opened in 1914, the Canal cuts through the Isthmus of Panama to form a vital gateway between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its four locks are capable of raising and lowering the largest ocean-going vessels to move the ships through the Canal's 50-mile channel. By a treaty agreement negotiated in 1903, the United States leases from the Republic of Panama a strip of territory extending from coast to coast and roughly five miles on either side of the center line of the Canal. In return for an annual monetary payment, the United States exercises full sovereignty over the Canal Zone.

Because of the strategic importance of the Canal to this country, the need for counterintelligence protection in the Canal Zone was recognized comparatively early.[141] In July 1922, two enlisted members of the Corps of Intelligence Police were sent to the Canal Zone at the request of the Panama Canal Department.[142] Although specific duties of these early agents cannot be determined from existing records, they apparently were assigned to check on strangers in Panamanian villages and the traffic in explosives in Panama, and to investigate persons suspected of subversive activities.[143]

Whatever their jobs may have been, they must have been considered important. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Panama Canal Department, made frequent requests for enlargement of the Corps of Intelligence Police in his area.[144]

But expansion was slow. As late as 1939, only three agents were on duty in the Panama Canal Department. In 1940, four agents were working out of headquarters at Quarry Heights, and an increase of eight members was contemplated by December 1940.[145]

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141 Basic Document.

142 General Orders No. 33, War Dept, Wash DC, 26 Jul 22, as cited in the Basic Doc.

143 Memo, W. P. Ennis, G2 Balboa Heights, Canal Zone, for the Chief of Staff, dtd 20 Jun 1923, cited particular uses for CIP agents in the Canal Zone: to be sent to villages of the Republic of Panama to check on strangers, on the traffic of explosives, and on any other things of interest to G2, as cited in the Basic Doc.

144 Appendix A, Basic Doc.

145 Cablegram, dtd 31 Dec 40 to CG, Panama Canal Dept, from War Dept, Wash DC, as cited in Basic Docu.

Outbreak of World War II

War in Europe accelerated the expansion of the Corps of Intelligence Police in Panama. By June 1941, the War Department quota designated 27 agents for the Panama Canal Department. In accordance with a directive from The Adjutant General, enlisted personnel for the Corps were to be recruited locally when possible, supplementing those CIP agents to be sent to Panama from the United States.[146]

Mounting defense construction in Panama was largely responsible for the increased work load of CIP and the corresponding growth in size of the Panama Detachment. More and more civilian contractors and employees had to be cleared for important military projects, and each new defense establishment multiplied the threat of Axis espionage and sabotage. Security measures had to be tightened. To cope with the problem, the War Department increased the authorized strength of the CIP in Panama to 27 agents by 30 September 1941.[147]

But despite the larger quota, expansion lagged because of difficulties in procuring suitable agent personnel. On 30 September 1941 the Panama Detachment reported only 21 agents on duty--six short of the authorized strength.[148]

Procurement problems stemmed from three factors. First, draft laws in effect in 1941 stipulated that a selectee could not be sent outside the continental United States without his consent; consequently, enlisted men who might have been uniquely qualified for CIP duty in Panama could not be required to serve there. Second, promotions came slowly in CIP, and enlisted men within CDC were reluctant to transfer to an organization that offered less opportunity for advancement than their present line units. Finally, the cloak of secrecy that the Panama Canal Department had wrapped around CIP operations in the area obscured the very existence of CIP to some men who might otherwise have been interested.[149]

In October 1941, the detachment was divided into two field offices, one located over the railroad station in Panama City and the other in the Post Office at Cristobal, Canal Zone. CIP agents in each office operated under the immediate direction of a Special agent-in-charge, who was in turn responsible to an officer, whose headquarters were located in Panama City. Agents in these field offices were considered to be on a confidential status and, for the most part, operated under cover without credentials of any sort. Some agents, however, were

146 Ltr, AG 322.999, dtd 11 Jan 41, The AG to CG, Panama Canal Dept, subj: Intelligence Police Corps, as cited in Basic Doc.
147 Basic Doc.
148 Morning Rpt, CIP, dtd 30 Sep 41, as cited in Basic Doc.
149 Basic Doc.

designated "open agents" and were permitted to identify themselves as members of the Corps of Intelligence Police when their duties required it.[150]

In November 1941, 1st Lt. Albert R. Haney was designated as Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police Detachment, on duty with the Panama Canal Department.[151]

By the end of 1941, after the United States entered the war, the strength of the detachment stood at 53 agents. On 1 January 1942, these agents were transferred in grade to the new Counter Intelligence Corps, which had been designated by the War Department to supersede the old Corps of Intelligence Police.[152]

Expansion and Reorganization

An intense program of expansion and reorganization followed almost immediately. By April 1942, the strength of the detachment stood at 59 agents, most of whom were enlisted men.[153] Even more significant was a reorganization plan pushed by Lieutenant Haney to facilitate handling of new responsibilities which were constantly being assumed by CIC.

Early in the year, the detachment was divided into three parts for operational purposes--the Pacific Sector, the Atlantic Sector, and the Panama Sector, each with a Special agent in charge of investigations. Later, in December 1942, an officer was detailed in charge of the Pacific Sector.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Haney enlarged upon his 1941 plan of distinguishing between open and undercover agents, carrying the separate classifications over into the organization of the detachment's field offices. Instead of requiring his agents to revert from open to undercover status intermittently, Lieutenant Haney established two types of field offices: secret and confidential. "Secret agents" working out of the secret field offices carried no credentials, but were given cover occupations. Their operations were confined to undercover activities, and they were not permitted to be seen in public with other CIC personnel. On the other hand, agents attached to the confidential field offices were furnished official Military Intelligence credentials and were free to make necessary contacts and to open investigations. They could identify themselves whenever necessary. Despite the distinction between types of offices and the restrictions on association between

150 Interview with Special Agent Sol Aronson, as cited in Basic Doc.
151 Appendix A, Basic Doc.
152 Ltr, TAG 322.999, dtd 13 Dec 41, subj: Redesignation of the Corps of Intelligence Police, as cited in Basic Doc.
153 Morning Rpt for 1 Apr 42, CIC Det, Panama Canal Dept, as cited in Basic Doc.

secret and confidential agents, both groups worked together very closely on many cases. Lieutenant Haney justified his new plan of organization in the following manner:

> "For the most part, Special agents must operate in the Republic of Panama where the population is small and the populace is unusually spy conscious. Experience has proven that it is impractical for a Special Agent to work on both undercover and open investigations without being detected. It is extremely difficult to operate successfully undercover in the interior of Panama as the population is sparse and strangers are conspicuous. In the principal cities, Panama and Colon, it has been difficult to operate successfully undercover for any period of time without being detected. It has, therefore, proven necessary to organize the Counter Intelligence Corps in the department into two parts, distinct and separate from each other...Every effort is made to keep separate the two types of agents, therefore each have their respective field offices and are not permitted to associate nor be seen together in public, although the two work very closely on investigations; one handling the undercover aspects and the other, the direct or open contacts..."[154]

Actually, the number of secret field offices was quite small compared with the number of confidential offices. Of 15 field offices established by November 1942, only two were secret.

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The number and location of the detachment's field offices never remained static; frequent changes were made as varying conditions dictated. A reorganization of major importance was effected around November 1943, when the field offices which had been operating as secret offices were either closed or converted to confidential offices.

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154 Memo, Lt Albert M. Haney to AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Dept, dtd 11 Nov 42, subj: Organization and Activities of the CIC as cited in Basic Doc.

155 Ibid

Agent Compromise Serious Problem

In a report prepared in 1945, almost two years after the closing of the secret offices, Maj. Elbert D. Turner cited inadequate cover and repeated compromise of agents' identities as major reasons for discontinuing the operation of separate types of field offices. According to this report, cover stories prepared for agents were flimsy and inadequate, substantiated only by data listed on a "Restricted Area" pass given each secret agent.

Groups of strange men entering and leaving the offices at all hours of the day and night also attracted attention and caused Panamanians to speculate that the offices were fronts for some investigative or intelligence organization. Identities of the undercover agents were often compromised through constant surveillance. And a shipment of new automobiles to the detachment for use in both confidential and secret field offices further compromised the nature of the secret offices. The automobiles, all identical models, arrived at a time when new cars were not available in the area, except for official Government use. Moreover, their license tags were numbered consecutively. From the first, their appearance on city streets invited suspicions and prompted questions regarding the identity of the men who drove the new cars. Because the automobiles were used by both open and undercover agents, the connection of the secret offices with CIC was obvious to the careful observer.[156]

When the separate types of offices were discontinued around November 1943, Field Offices II and III were permanently closed. Secret offices which had been opened a short time before in the Panama Sector were redesignated as confidential offices, and roving agents took over most of the undercover activities in the small villages in the interior.

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Closure of the secret offices did not mean that all undercover operations of the Panama Canal Department Detachment were unsuccessful. Often individual agents were able to acquire and maintain excellent cover which enabled them not only to fulfill their counterintelligence mission but also to gather positive information requested by G2's of the Panama Canal Department and the CDC. Indeed, positive intelligence had been an important part of the detachment's mission since the United States entered the war late in 1941.[158]

156 Appendix A, as cited in Basic Doc.

157 Ibid, p 12

158 Positive intelligence information was submitted to the Office of the AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Dept, in the form of "original" and "special" memorandum reports, on forms which were developed locally. These reports were never forwarded outside the area.

Emphasis on undercover missions by lone agents increased after 1st Lt. Clarence N. Coleman, executive officer under Captain Haney, took command of the detachment in February 1943. By 1 July 1943, when the unit had reached its peak strength of 77 agents, undercover agents were being used in a variety of situations.

Among these agents, who were being used primarily to gather positive intelligence, was one who was employed as Through his frequent contacts with Panamanian officials, he was able to provide G2 with considerable information concerning the local and national governments. Another agent posing as a representative of during 1943 and 1944 was able to gain the confidence of the Spanish Republican group in Panama City and Colon, and to obtain valuable information about the activities of the Falangists, a pro-Fascist group in the area. A former journalist was placed in [159] One agent traveled throughout the interior His job was to report on foreigners residing in the more inaccessible regions of Darien Province, the San Blas Islands, and the Province of Veraguas. Another agent was undercover as at Turbo, Columbia.[160]

Undercover Results in Mismanagement Charge

Undercover activities were the basis in 1943 for a misunderstanding which resulted in charges (unofficial) of mismanagement of the Panama Detachment by Caribbean Defense Command Headquarters. An intensive investigation followed.

Late in 1942, Col. Robert G. Kirkwood, AC of S, G2, CDC, requested the War Department to provide a number of Spanish-speaking agents, equipped with all papers and credentials necessary for them to be placed on undercover assignments anywhere in Central or South America. Colonel Kirkwood indicated that he had specific plans for employment of the agents in important undercover assignments and specified that the men were to be highly trained and carefully selected.[161]

Colonel Kirkwood's request was approved. During November and December 1942, 18 agents were selected from the various Service Commands in the United

159 Memo, S/A Robert B. Underwood to the Officer in Charge, dtd 14 Dec 43, subj: Robert B. Underwood, Re Tour of Duty in Panama, Republic of Panama, and Canal Zone, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

160 App A, pp 10-11, Basic Doc.

161 Memo, E.A.R. to Col S.M. Montesinos, AC of S, G2, CDC, dtd 31 Mar 43, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

States and were transferred to Miami to await shipment to the Caribbean.[162] In Miami, the group was formed into a detachment, under the command of 2d Lt. Nathan R. Preston, who previously had been assigned to the Washington Field Office of the CIC. During briefing sessions in Miami the men were told they had been selected for important, secret work. Most of them understood that they would be sent to Panama for processing and indoctrination, then returned to Miami, where they would be given cover as civilian employees of business firms operating in the area where they were to serve.[163]

However, a change in plans for counterintelligence coverage in Central and South America delayed departure of the detachment from Miami, and the group was held there, without duty, for more than two months. Finally, at the request of CDC, the men were sent to Panama in small groups, the last of them arriving there in April 1943.[164]

Meanwhile, Colonel Kirkwood had been transferred out of the command and his successor, Col. S. M. Montesinos, apparently did not know how the 18 men were to be used. Most of them were placed on duty with the Panama Canal Department Detachment, some in undercover assignments and others in open field offices. Lieutenant Preston, the commanding officer, was assigned to duty in Trinidad.[165]

Shortly after the men arrived in Panama, unofficial complaints concerning their use began to arrive in the United States. One of the earliest was a letter from Lieutenant Preston to Maj. Lowell Bradford at CIC headquarters in Baltimore, in which he stated:

> "...your original plans were completely altered. Colonel Kirkwood was no longer with Caribbean Defense Command, and instead one Colonel Montecines (sic) is the head, with Lt. Col. Edward Rew as his executive officer. Neither of these officers knew of the original plans, nor were expecting the new detachment. As a result, most of the men have been assigned to Panama Canal Department and are working...not at all as you outlined to me.... As nearly as I have learned thus far, there are already too many officers and

162 Memo, Col H. R. Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, dtd 25 Aug 43, subj: CIC Activities, Panama Canal Dept, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

163 Proceedings of a Board of Officers, Hq, CIC, CIG, War Dept, 2327 N. Charles St, Balto, Md, 10 Aug 43 - 13 Aug 43, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

164 Memo, Col H. R. Kibler to Col L. R. Forney, dtd 25 Aug 43, subj: CIC Activities, Panama Canal Dept, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

165 Ltr, 2d Lt Nathan R. Preston to Maj Lowell Bradford, dtd 14 Mar 43, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

men here for the duties involved, and I have visions of slowly rotting in this hole, while I feel there is so much to be done elsewhere..., So you see much of your effort, in arranging cover for the men was wasted..."[166]

Other letters, mailed through unofficial channels to various counterintelligence officers in the United States, set forth specific charges of mismanagement in the Panama Canal Department. One such letter, addressed to Maj. Hugh D. Wise, Jr., then Chief of CIC, cryptically referred to the 18 as "replacement parts" for machinery and charged that "machinery" and "foremen" used in Panama were inferior to those employed in the United States.[167] Letters were also sent to the Director of Intelligence, Sixth Service Command, and to an officer in the Intelligence Division, Western Defense Command. The letters were essentially the same. They charged that the 18 men were not being used as originally planned, that they were not being used for CIC activities, that many of them had no duties at all, that certain CIC facilities and personnel were being used in the smuggling and sale of liquor, and that there was inefficient handling of CIC matters within the Panama Canal Department.[168]

Eventually the letters reflecting these changes reached the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch in Baltimore, where they came to the attention of Col. H. R. Kibler, Chief of CIC. Colonel Kibler ordered the entire group to Baltimore for questioning by a five-member Board of Inquiry he had appointed to investigate the charges.

Examination of the group convinced Colonel Kibler that the complaints were gross exaggerations, representing the views of not more than five men in the group. It was further determined that none of the men were employed on any activities other than normal CIC duties; that the Panama Detachment may have been overstaffed, but that several of the 18 actually were employed in important positions and were doing excellent work. The only changes which had any substance, in Colonel Kibler's opinion, were that some of the men had not received reimbursement of certain per diem due them in connection with their transfer to Panama and that in at least one specific instance, liquor had been sold by CIC personnel from a CIC boat to American soldiers stationed somewhere along the Central American Coast.[169]

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166 Ltr, 2d Lt Nathan R. Preston to Maj Lowell Bradford, dtd 14 Mar 43, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

167 Ltr, C. I. Chalmers to Maj Hugh D. Wise, Jr., dtd 3 May 43, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

168 Ltr, Laurence A. Licalzi, S/A, CIC, to Colonel Furburshaw, dtd 7 May 43; Ltr, Charles L. Sorensen, S/A, CIC, to Maj H.C. Conrad, dtd 25 May 43; (both letters Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

169 Memo, Col H.R. Kibler to Col L.R. Forney, dtd 25 Aug 43, subj: CIC Activities, Panama Canal Dept, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Four members of the group, which had come to be known as the "Notorious Eighteen," were returned to their assignments in Panama. The remainder were transferred to other areas.

Since inspectors did not actually go into the Panama Canal Department to determine the degree of truth in the charges, it is impossible to tell, from existing records, what degree of justification there may have been for the complaints. Several factors must be considered in evaluating the case of the "Notorious Eighteen."

First, the men definitely were led to believe they had been selected for an important undercover mission. Maj. Lowell Bradford, CIC Operations Officer, briefed a few of the group in Washington before they were sent to Miami. Testimony before the Board of Inquiry indicates that Major Bradford stressed the importance and the secrecy of the mission for which they had been chosen. In Miami, Lieutenant Preston conveyed substantially the same impression to the remainder of the group.

Second, the special detachment was not employed in the manner its members expected. Instead of being placed on special undercover assignments throughout Central and South America, they were assigned to the Panama Canal Department Detachment with a variety of duties. It must be noted, however, that in most instances their work was consistent with the CIC mission.

Third, existing records indicate that the men selected to fill Colonel Kirkwood's request were not as highly qualified as he had desired. Colonel Kirkwood had specified that the agents were to be fluent in Spanish and that all were to be graduates of the CIC Advanced school in Chicago. Actually, at least 11 and possibly 12 of the 18 had not attended the Chicago school; a few had not attended a preliminary CIC training course. Three of the group did not speak Spanish, and only four were rated as excellent linguists by their superiors.[170]

Liaison With Panama Secret Police

170 Proceedings of a Board of Officers which convened at Hq, CIC, CIC, WD, 2327 N. Charles St, Balto, Md, 10 Aug 43 - 13 Aug 43, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

Centralization of Organization

A process of centralization, begun in 1943, was culminated on 31 July 1944, when the Panama Canal Department Detachment was replaced by the newly activated 470th CIC Detachment, Caribbean Defense Command, attached to the Panama Canal Department.[171] The change was in name only; the detachment remained the same. Five days earlier, on 26 July, Maj. Elbert D. Turner had become detachment commander. Major Turner moved detachment headquarters from Quarry Heights to Diablo Heights, where it was combined with Field Office I. At the same time, the 606th CIC Detachment which had been operating with the 6th Air Force, Panama Canal Department, since February 1944, was formally activated.[172]

The new plan of organization brought all CIC personnel both in the Panama Canal Department and the Antilles Department more completely under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense Command. He was now to decide overall administrative policies, along with matters of promotions, rotation or reassignment.[173] He also was to supervise investigative procedures and training programs, and to coordinate all Corps activities with the Office of the AC of S, G2, Caribbean Defense Command. Under him came the chiefs of the detachments. The function of the Chief, 470th CIC Detachment, for example, was to direct all of the activities of the agents and officers under his command. He checked reports to insure that they met the standards set by the AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Department, to which the 470th Detachment was assigned. It should be noted that in the Panama Canal Department the detachment commander answered to the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense Command for administrative and policy matters and to the AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Department for the conduct of investigations.[174]

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171 Special Orders No. 168, 25 Jul 44, Hq, CDC, as cited in Basic Doc.

172 Basic Doc.

173 The Chief was Lt Col E. A. Rew. Prior to this time he had exercised some administrative control over the Panama Canal Department Detachment, but to a lesser degree.

174 Ltr, Hq, CDC, to CGs, Panama Canal Dept and Antilles Dept, dtd 2 Dec 44, subj: Counter Intelligence Corps, as cited in Basic Doc.

Decline Begins in July 1944

In the months following July 1944, there was a steady decline in the number of CIC personnel in the 470th Detachment as agents were reassigned to more critical areas and others left to attend Officer Candidate schools. On 31 March 1945, only five officers and 40 agents were on duty with the detachment.[175] During the same period, there were reductions in the number of field offices in the Panama Sector, so that only two, at David and Aguadulce, remained by May 1945.

Capt. Charles F. Berlitz, executive officer, became chief of the Panama Detachment on 9 April 1945, when Major Turner was reassigned to the 469th CIC Detachment at Caribbean Defense Command headquarters.[176] By 10 May 1945, the detachment had dwindled to five officers and 33 enlisted men.[177]

War Brings Change in Mission

Prior to World War II, counterintelligence operations in the Panama Canal Zone were restricted primarily to routine security measures. Before Pearl Harbor, the few Counter Intelligence Police Agents in the area spent most of their time conducting personnel investigations of civilian employees of defense contractors. To be sure, the agents kept watchful eyes on labor agitation, movements of aliens, suspected sabotage, traffic in contraband explosives and small arms, and activities of the scores of cabaret hostesses in the area, but rarely did any of these activities require extensive investigation.

War changed that. Threats of sabotage and espionage multiplied with mobilization. Persons who in peacetime would hardly have interested Counter Intelligence Police required constant scrutiny. Enemy aliens had to be interned, and controls on travel and communications had to be established.[178]

Problems peculiar to Panama Zone further complicated the work of the detachment there. Agents were confronted with investigations which normally would have been conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI was specifically prohibited from performing counterintelligence measures in the Canal Zone or the Republic of Panama,[179] and CIC jurisdiction extended to many civilians who otherwise would have fallen within the scope of the FBI's investigative mission. Language barriers continually stymied agents who were not linguists.

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175 Morning Rpt, 470th CIC Det, 31 Mar 45, as cited in Basic Doc.
176 Ibid, 9 Apr.
177 Ibid, 10 May.
178 Basic Doc.
179 Ltr, AG 383.4 (2-20-42), TAG to CGs, dtd 22 Feb 43, subj: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division, as cited in Basic Doc.

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Spanish was a virtually indispensable tool, and agents occasionally had to deal with persons who spoke only German, Italian, French, or Japanese.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Counter Intelligence Police Detachment assisted the Panamanian Police, the Canal Zone Police, and U.S. Military Police in rounding up Axis nationals for internment. By 27 December 1941, more than 950 Germans, Italians, and Japanese had been interned.[180]

But the initial roundup of potentially dangerous aliens was not sufficient. Some eventually were released, and CIC was forced to keep them under almost constant surveillance. This surveillance was extended to German, Italian, Japanese, Vichy French, and Spanish legations and consulates in Colon. These consulates were watched intermittently to determine their most frequent visitors.[181]

It must be noted that the CIC technically had no jurisdiction in Panama, outside the United States-controlled Canal Zone. But this created no problem. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor the Panamanian government declared a state of "grave emergency" and agreed to assist the United States in all security matters.[182] Except for a brief period in 1941, during the political regime of Dr. Arnulfo Arias, pro-Nazi President of Panama, there was marked cooperation between Panamanian and U.S. authorities throughout the war. Through liaison with various agencies of the Panamanian government, CIC virtually had a free hand within the Republic of Panama.

Positive Intelligence Gained from Travel Control

One of the functions which war thrust upon the Panama Canal Department Detachment was travel control, which netted a wealth of positive intelligence throughout World War II. It began almost by accident.

In January 1942, one agent was detailed to interview a Chilean who was expected to cross the Canal Zone on a commercial airliner. His interview completed, the agent was instructed by Captain Haney to remain at Balboa Airport to establish some sort of control procedures over airline passengers. Soon the agent was asking routine background questions of all incoming and outgoing passengers and occasionally conducting detailed searches and interrogations of suspicious persons. Gradually a Watch List of suspicious persons believed to be traveling was compiled from G2 files and the name of each passenger was checked against this list.[183]

180 App A, p 9, as cited in Basic Doc.
181 Basic Doc.
182 The Dept of State Bulletin, Vol V, Nr 129, Publication 1672, dtd, 13 Dec 41, as cited in Rpt, "Counter Intelligence Corps, CDC, 1 Jun 42 - 31 May 45," prepared by Maj Elbert D. Turner, Jr, dtd 1 Jun 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).
183 Basic Doc.

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Vigilance paid. A year after travel control was begun, a report on its operations stated that secret messages had been discovered in shoes, clothing, and body openings of suspicious persons who had been subjected to thorough search.[184]

In May 1942, several Special agents on duty with CDC were assigned to the Balboa Air Terminal to gather positive intelligence.[185] A year later, in July 1943, CIC and the Office of Naval Intelligence agreed to joint operation of the Travel Control Office, with CIC in charge. During the first year of joint operation, 78,846 passengers were processed. In 1945, approximately 7,000 passengers were being checked monthly.[186]

Liaison with the Port Captain's office in Panama City and Colon enabled CIC to extend its travel control function. In December 1942, agents of the Panama Detachment began checking and clearance of passengers and crews of sea-going vessels in those ports.[187]

Port control eventually was extended to the large ports of Balboa and Cristobal and numerous small ports along Panamanian shores. Agents operating in the "Blue Jacket" and the "Adele," small coastal schooners allocated to CIC, patrolled Atlantic and Pacific coasts and questioned individuals at landing points on both coast lines.[188]

Illegal Radios Frequently Reported

Reports of illegal radio transmitters frequently were received at CIC field offices, and agents used a variety of ruses to investigate the complaints. In Field Office I, for example, one agent was detailed to check all rumors of clandestine radio operations. After making discreet investigations of the occupants of a suspect building, the agent would then conduct a fixed surveillance of the building until he was familiar with the persons who visited it. Then, posing as a fire or water works inspector, telephone repair man, or insurance salesman,

184 Memo, 2d Lt John J. Morrissey to Captain Orth, dtd 8 Apr 43, subj: CIC Operations, Panama Canal Dept, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

185 One of these agents, Charles F. Berlitz, subsequently was commissioned and placed in charge of Travel Control. In April 1945, he became chief of the 470th CIC Detachment.

186 App A, p 12, Basic Doc.

187 Memo, Lt Albert M. Haney to AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Dept, dtd 11 Nov 42, subj: Organization and Activities of the CIC, Panama Canal Dept, as cited in Basic Doc.

188 Memo, Lt Col Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, CIC Branch, dtd 3 Aug 43, subj: CIC Operations in the CDC, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

he would gain entrance to the building for further investigation. When technical assistance was required, it was arranged through liaison with the Signal Corps.[189]

Field Office I also monitored telephone calls in Panama City.

C.

[redacted]

[191]

Agents Perform Photo Censorship

Photo censorship was another wartime function of the Panama Detachment. Approximately 90 percent of all film exposed in Panama was processed at the Panama City plant of Kodak Panama, Ltd. Since all film from U.S. Army posts in the area was developed there, an agent was assigned to the plant in November 1942 to serve as the official censor of films from the Army installations. Unofficially, he also exercised censorship authority over most of the film brought in by Panamanians.[192] Later, another agent performed similar duties at Colon.

Throughout the war, the detachment conducted security surveys of harbors at Balboa and Cristobal, of the Canal locks, and of military installations throughout the area. More emphasis was placed on these surveys as the defeat of Germany appeared imminent and CIC geared itself for its role in protecting the large numbers of troops who soon would be shipped from the European Theater to the Pacific through the Panama Canal.[193]

Assignment of Investigations

All cases investigated by the Panama Canal Department Detachment originated at the request of the AC of S, G2 of the department.[194] When cases were forwarded

189 Memo, S/A Theodore C. Hodges to Chief, CIC, dtd 4 Oct 43, subj: Tour of Duty in Panama, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

190 Monthly Activity Rpt of Panama Canal Dept CIC Det for Feb 42, 1st Lt Albert R. Haney to AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Dept, dtd 28 Feb 42, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

191 Ibid for March, dtd 31st.

192 Memo, 2d Lt John J. Morrissey to Captain Orth, dtd 8 Apr 43, subj: CIC Operations, Panama Canal Dept, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

193 Basic Doc.

194 This was not always true in the case of the "secret" field offices which operated for a period during 1942 and 1943. Often the agents assigned to these offices exercised their initiative in opening investigations.

to the detachment for investigation, the chief or the officer in charge of investigations determined a priority for the case and assigned it to the appropriate sector for action. The officer or Special agent in charge at sector level relayed the request for investigation to the field office which was to be responsible for making a report within the time limits specified by the priority affixed to the case. Priority A was considered "extra important;" it required a telephone report within 24 hours and a complete written report within 48 hours. Cases considered "very important" were labeled Priority B, with a seven day deadline for reporting. Priority C was a routine designation, and no report was necessary for 14 days.[195]

Detachment files reveal cases involving the investigation of suspected espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities. Some of these specific cases, which are typical of the work done by the detachment, are summarized below.

The "Florida" Case

Cabaret entertainers in the Republic of Panama clearly constituted in 1941 a grave counterintelligence problem because of their large number, dubious backgrounds and rapid turnover. In Colon alone there were at least 10 cabarets, among which the "Monte Carlo" and the "Florida Club" were the most outstanding. In Panama City the number was about the same. Each of the night clubs featured hostesses, known locally as "Blue Moon Girls," whose job ostensibly was to mingle with the male patrons, talk with them, and urge the purchase of drinks. Obviously, these girls were excellent sources of information for any enemy espionage agent seeking military and shipping intelligence. The situation was highly fluid, with new women--dancers, singers, hostesses, and prostitutes--constantly arriving from all parts of Central and South America as others changed their places of employment.

Late in 1941, reports were received to the effect that the "Florida," in Colon, was being used as an espionage center where hostesses were allegedly "pumping" military men and merchant seamen for information. This was quite within the realm of possibility. The average cabaret girl was far from being a paragon of virtue and probably would not be averse to earning money by supplying such information. Investigation disclosed that the owner of the "Florida," Manual Cunquero, had purchased the cafe from a known Nazi agent and that he was currently remitting regular sums of money to an Argentine bank strongly suspected of handling Axis interests in South America.

A mail cover placed on the "Florida" in January 1942 revealed that Cunquero was in direct contact with various persons throughout Latin America. Other persons, including certain Honduran contract laborers, working in the Canal Zone,

195 Memo, 2d Lt John J. Morrissey to Capt Charles E. Orth, dtd 13 Apr 43, subj: Operations of the CIC in Panama, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

were also using the place as a letter drop. Among them were workers employed by one George Gough, known as the "King of Belize," a member of a wealthy family in British Honduras that controlled extensive shipping interests in the Caribbean. He had been suspected of rum-running in prohibition days and was a known smuggler. His connection with the "Florida" case stemmed from the fact that some of his ships were being used to transport the Honduran workers who received letters at the "Florida."

CIC informants subsequently reported that Gough's fleet of 10 auxiliary schooners was being used to refuel German submarines in the Caribbean and that he was passing on espionage information gathered by the diligent "Florida" hostesses. On 7 May 1942, Gough's vessels were searched by agents of the Panama Canal Department Detachment, but the ships did not carry a sufficient quantity of fuel oil for refueling purposes. However, the searchers did discover on one boat blueprints of naval air stations at Coca Solo and San Juan, along with numerous uncensored letters. The letters, all of a personal nature, were without apparent subversive intent, but the blueprints were classified. Their discovery led to the confiscation of the vessel and arrest of the crew and 30 passengers who were charged by American authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act. Gough himself was later arrested, and the case received wide publicity in the newspapers, both in Panama and the United States, as the breaking of the "Caribbean Spy Ring." Although Gough and his associates were never brought to trial because of insufficient evidence, the AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Department, claimed that the submarine sinkings in the Caribbean showed a definite decrease after the case was publicized.

In the course of the "Florida Case," the CIC detachment attached to the Panama Canal Department employed a wide variety of investigative techniques. These included surveillance of suspected persons and places, translation of documents, mail cover, use of informants, interrogation of suspects, and raids and searches of the vessels involved. Detachment files indicate that unsuccessful legal prosecution of the case was due principally to a lack of knowledge of the law of evidence and failure to coordinate with the U.S. District Attorney who might otherwise have aided in the preparation of evidence. The files also indicate a certain degree of bias in the report writing of the agents, who tended to build a case on inadequate, circumstantial evidence.[196]

Other Suspects Deported

The "Florida Case" probably was the most sensational investigation conducted by the Panama Detachment. But others, less dramatic, kept the agents busy. One seemingly never ending task was the necessary screening and

196 App A, pp 6-9, Basic Doc.

checking of the cabaret girls in the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. The case of Adriana Barahona is typical.

Barahona was a Chilean girl employed at the Rialto Cabaret in Panama City. Information was received indicating that she had been the mistress of Gen. Friedrick Wolf, German Military Attache to Chile and later to Argentina. Wolf was reportedly the head of the Abwehr, the Intelligence Service of the German High Command, for eastern South America. He had resided with Barahona in Chile during 1942 and in Argentina during 1943 and 1944. Adriana had arrived in Panama on 21 November 1944 with a friend, Ernestyna del Carmen Arias Olave, who claimed to be a close friend of Dr. Arnulfo Arias, former anti-American, pro-Nazi President of Panama. She also worked at the Rialto Cabaret. Both women openly expressed their dislike for Panama. When CIC revealed this information to the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, he requested the deportation of the girls because: "It is more than possible that Barahona and Arias are serving as sources of information to someone in Argentina, and their employment in a place habitually frequented by members of the military service is undesirable..."

Genevieve Batel, French dancer from Argentina and an employee of the Rialto Cabaret, was the subject of a similar investigation in 1944. Through investigation, the 470th CIC Detachment learned that Batel, while in Buenos Aires from 1942 to 1944, had been the mistress of one Dr. Karl Wilhelm Koerner, alias Carlos Guillermo Koerner, who had been arrested by Argentine authorities for subversive activities. Koerner was reportedly known to the American Embassy in Buenos Aires as a Nazi agent and spy, sub-director of the publication "Reconquista," a code operator in a local German Embassy, and partner with one Paul Schultz in the German picture propaganda service, Intergrafico.

When interrogated in Panama City, Batel told CIC agents that while she was living with Koerner she also prostituted herself to other men. This raised the possibility that Koerner had been using her as a tool to gain information. Although she disclaimed any knowledge of Koerner's activities in Argentina, the Commanding General again acted to effect her deportation.[197]

Sabotage Investigations

The threat of sabotage to the Panama Canal was always a major concern of the Panama Canal Department Detachment. Frequently, reports of possession or shipment of contraband explosives had to be investigated. Often the rumors were groundless, but the proof could only follow an investigation. The case of Jose Montalvo, Casa Largo, the subject of such an investigation, is a typical illustration.

197 App A, pp 20-21, Basic Doc.

CIC Investigates Illegal Explosives

On 19 April 1943, the detachment was notified that a quantity of dynamite had been found in the possession of Montalvo, a Panamanian. CIC agents who investigated the report found seven sticks of dynamite, fuses and detonators hidden under the roof of Montalvo's jungle shack. Interrogating him, they learned that he had found the dynamite near Madden Field following some construction work. He insisted that he intended to use the explosives not for any sabotage but for fishing in the Chagres River. The dynamite was confiscated and Montalvo was released after a warning about any further violation of this sort. Montalvo apparently was blissfully unaware that dynamite fishing was illegal or that such a quantity of dynamite was a potential sabotage menace to the Canal.[198]

A similar explosives case concerned the Colombian schooner Lucilla which arrived in Panama from Cartagena, Colombia, carrying as part of its cargo two cases of detonating caps and 100 cases of dynamite. Investigation by the detachment disclosed that the shipment had been arranged by Eladio Grimaldo, a Panamanian businessman who planned to smuggle the dynamite into the Republic of Panama. The Lucilla was searched on two separate occasions. No dynamite was found the first time because it had been hidden near the Colombian border. But 37 cases were discovered on the second search. On 17 March 1944, 20 more cases were picked up by a Colombian gunboat at Acandi, Colombia. The remainder of the shipment was never uncovered.

Brimaldo had arranged the shipment through the firm of Torres Y Torres Cia., of Bogota, Colombia, which had been suspected of being a cloak for Almacenes Hilda, a Swiss firm reported to be a German front organization. There were some tense moments at Cristobal when CIC agents boarded the U.S. barge which had brought the confiscated dynamite from the Lucilla. Excessive exposure to the sun had deteriorated the dynamite into a semi-liquid condition. It was 92 percent nitroglycerine!

Like Jose Montalvo in the previous case, Grimaldo claimed that the dynamite was to be used for fishing purposes. Authorities didn't believe him. Panamanian Police arrested Grimaldo and charged him with "attempted sabotage" despite CIC protests. CIC had suggested that Grimaldo be tried for his obvious violation of customs regulations. As it was, the sabotage charge was dismissed because of insufficient evidence.[199]

198 App A, p 13, Basic Doc.
199 Ibid, p 15.

"Ships at Sea" Cases Frequent

Although cases involving ships at sea may seem inconsistent with the CIC mission, such investigations were commonplace in the Panama Detachment. This was true partly because of the predominance of military forces and partly because of the absence of other investigative agencies. According to a 1943 report on CIC operations in Panama:

> The CIC is the only agency which conducts investigations, generally, of cases concerning espionage, sabotage, disaffection, treason, and sedition in the Panama Canal Zone. The Navy investigates directly only cases within its own personnel and on its posts and ships. Since the military is the dominant power in this area, even in some naval or maritime matters, the CIC in addition to its own duties, has been requested to investigate cases for the Navy, the Civil Authorities, Military Attaches, and the American and British Embassies. No other agency has a field force of investigators in the Panama Canal Department.[200]

One incident of suspected sabotage on the high seas led to an agent of the Panama Detachment being placed undercover aboard the SS Athos II, a French vessel engaged in Army transport work.

On 14 February 1944, a CIC agent, through a member of the Free French Liberation Committee of Panama City, submitted to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Panama Canal Department, a report that pro-Vichy elements on board the Athos were potential saboteurs. A vessel of approximately 24,000 tons, the Athos had been taken over at the time of the North African invasion in November 1942 by American Forces and was being used as a U.S. troop transport, although the crew was still French. While the ship was anchored at Balboa, a French sailor informed the Free French representative that certain pro-Vichy, pro-Nazi individuals were still on board the vessel--that they had never been removed at Algiers by American or Free French authorities.

Then, on 20 February 1944, a cablegram reached Quarry Heights from the Galapagos Islands, announcing a suspicious breakdown of the vessel and the fact that sabotage was suspected by the master. Since the ship was carrying more than 1,500 U.S. Army technicians bound for India, reportedly to assist in establishing B-29 bomber bases, any delay was considered serious. A CIC agent accompanied by two naval officers, was sent by plane to the Galapagos to determine the nature and extent of the damage.

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200 Memo, 1st Lt Thomas J. Carey to Lt Col Neville K. Adkinson, dtd 31 Jul 43, subj: CIC Det, Panama, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

Investigation disclosed that the SS Athos II had been subjected to a series of mysterious accidents since it had been pressed into Allied service. On one occasion, an anchor chain parted, resulting in a minor collision with another vessel in an English harbor. Again, during a bad storm, the ship's rudder suddenly ceased to function, and the Athos threatened to capsize. En route to Cristobal the ship broke down mysteriously on three or four occasions. In a thick fog, near Norfolk, Virginia, the fog horn stopped working. Then engine trouble made it necessary for the vessel to return to Norfolk for repairs before continuing to Cristobal. Outside of Cristobal, there was another unexplained breakdown. Finally, on the way through the Canal, part of the ventilating system in the engine room broke down, and another stoppage occurred in Balboa Harbor on the Pacific side after the ship had passed through the Canal. The engine breakdown near the Galapagos was so serious that the vessel was compelled to turn back to Balboa for major overhauling.

The CIC agent who had been sent to investigate traveled in an undercover capacity aboard the Athos while it was proceeding back to Balboa. Posing as interpreter for the naval engineers who had accompanied him, the agent was able to gain the confidence of several of the ship's officers as well as some of the seamen. The consensus of the crew was that pro-Vichy elements on board were deliberately committing acts of sabotage. However, the agent also learned that while in New York for outfitting as a transport and other repairs, hasty and ill-advised work had been done on the vessel. That raised the possibility that some of the breakdowns, if not all of them, could have been due to the poor workmanship at the New York shipyard. Plans were made to continue the CIC undercover investigation.

At Balboa, the case was taken out of the hands of the CIC by an officer representing AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Department. A board of inquiry, composed of the G2 officer, the ship's captain, one of the ship's officers (who was one of the Vichy sympathizers mentioned in the CIC report of 14 February 1944) and a CIC agent as interpreter, questioned every member of the crew at length.

The board made no conclusive findings as to the cause of the breakdowns. Ultimately, the ship sailed for its destination from Balboa and arrived without further misadventure. It never was determined whether the delays were the result of clever sabotage, accident, or the carelessness of the New York shipyard.[201]

Wandering Ships Investigated

In October 1943, the tanker Y-2 left Balboa Harbor for Salinas, Ecuador, and the Galapagos with a cargo of 1,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. Commanded by

Capt. Moyle S. Swiber, a naturalized United States citizen of German parentage, the vessel failed to arrive at its destination on schedule. Since Axis submarines were known to be active in the Caribbean Sea, the Army Transportation Division was concerned when the vessel became two weeks overdue. Two weeks after his departure, Captain Swiber cabled the Army Transportation Division that his vessel had arrived in Mazatlan, Mexico--3,000 miles from his assigned destination.

Immediately another captain was dispatched to take command of the vessel. At this point, the Panama Canal Department Detachment entered the case to determine whether Captain Swiber had gone off his course with the intention of refueling an enemy submarine.

After the tanker had returned to Balboa, CIC investigation indicated that no U-boat refueling had taken place. The amount of fuel remaining on board showed that only the quantity necessary for the voyage had been consumed. Furthermore, no refueling could have occurred without the knowledge of the crew, who unanimously discounted the idea. The Ulysses-like peregrinations of Captain Swiber, it developed, stemmed from three distinct factors--administrative, semantic and psychological.

When Captain Swiber left Balboa, he was confused about his destination, but asked no questions, fearing that they would result not merely in clarification but also in the impugning of his intelligence. The Army Transportation Department order had stated the destination as Salinas, but the qualifying word "Ecuador" had been omitted. Evidently, the Army Transportation Department dispatcher had assumed that the captain would know that Salinas, Ecuador, was intended, inasmuch as the trip between the Canal Zone and that port was routine. Whether Captain Swiber was obtuse or merely unduly imaginative can only be left to speculation. The Panama Canal Department files do, however, state that "Captain Swiber himself was found to be a man not in complete control of his mental faculties."[202]

Sabotage Case Solved

Early in 1945, agents investigated an instance of communications sabotage which resulted in the arrest and conviction of an 18-year old Panamanian youth. On 18 January 1945, a disruption of official communications led to the discovery that several cables on Venado Island, an uninhabited island off the coast of the Republic of Panama, apparently had been cut with sharp stones.

Unable to locate any persons who had been on the island, CIC agents concentrated their activities at the little mainland fishing village of Camaron. There they

202 App A, p 15, Basic Doc.

posed as iguana hunters and sought a guide who would lead them on an expedition to Venado Island. On 20 January, two days after the severed cables were discovered, an 18-year old boy volunteered to guide the agents. In conversation with the boy, the agents learned that he had been on the island the day the cables were cut.

Intensive interrogation of the youth followed. On 21 January, he confessed to cutting the cables and led investigators to three sections of cable he had removed. Records show that the boy was tried and convicted, but they do not reveal the charge against him or the sentence he received.[203]

CIC Investigations Thwart Conspiracy

Subversive activities did not constitute a great portion of the CIC work load in Panama, although constant movement of aliens in the area always made the threat of subversive acts a real one. Occasionally political unrest or dissatisfaction within the Republic of Panama would result in a series of terrorist bombings, which usually came to CIC attention.

One such incident occured on 19 February 1945, when a U.S. Army officer in Panama City was slightly injured by a crude dynamite bomb which exploded in his automobile. Six days later a similar bomb was detonated between two Panama City cabarets.

A CIC agent was ordered to determine the reason for the bombings without divulging any official American interest in Panamanian political unrest. He was able to secure information about the incidents from a Nicaraguan formerly employed in the Canal Zone as an undercover agent with the Panama National Police. His job had been to check on a group of political exiles at the Hotel Tivoli, in Panama City, and to discover their plans to overthrow the government of Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia. The tale he recounted to the CIC agent was a masterpiece of intrigue, plot and counterplot.

The bombings had been planned to create unrest in the Republic of Panama and to cause the Panamanian people to lose faith in the existing Government. The Nicaraguan and one , a Nicaraguan exiled to Panama after failure in a revolutionary plot in Costa Rica, were to work together at fomenting acts of terrorism. They met with s exiled in the Canal Zone, and planned an elaborate terrorist program. Their fantastic scheme included the kidnaping of the Chief of the Panama National Police, the burning of the Juan Franco Race Track, dynamiting the home of the Minister of Government and Justice; dynamiting a

203 470th CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for Jan 45, Maj Elbert D. Turner, Jr., to CG, ASF, dtd 1 Feb 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

ewspaper and blowing up the gas plants in Panama City, the assassination of Enrique Jimenez, considered to be the government's official candidate for the presidency of Panama, and, just for good measure, the indiscriminate placing of bombs in automobiles. All this was for the avowed purpose of stirring up unrest in the Republic of Panama.

The scheduled spree of murder and terror never came off. The information uncovered by the CIC resulted in the hasty departure of the conspirators from the Republic. The de la Guardia government had been warned in time.[204]

CIC Investigates Criminal Cases

Many of the investigations which CIC conducted did not involve counterintelligence matters. Often they were purely criminal cases, with the investigation conducted in the absence of the appropriate Army agency. In Panama there seemed to be a special pattern. An incident of a political nature would arise and call for investigation on the theory that subversive elements might have been the instigators. Of course, only after investigating could the authorities really know whether the skilled hand of an agent provacateur had masterminded the bombing or coup or any other of countless types of incidents. This was the way the investigation of the "Cotito Massacre" came about.

On 7 July 1941, in the Cotito Colony, located in the Chiriqui Province, a small religious group of Swiss were fired upon by the Panamanian Police, and 11 of the religionists were killed. Newspapers reported that the Swiss opened fire first with the result that the police had no alternative but to fire in self defense. Investigation by the Canal Zone Detachment revealed otherwise.

The Swiss religionists, living in the remote province, had been requested several times to come to the nearby town of David, Republic of Panama, to register as foreigners with the Panama National Police in accordance with law. They failed to comply with these requests and a squad of Panama Police was dispatched to compel registration by the colony members. The leader of the colony insisted that the sect recognized no government but their own religion, and no authority but God. Contrary to published reports, the religious group had no firearms except two shotguns which were never fired. What actually happened was that the leader in charge of the police had fired a shot in the air, intending to speed up the movement of the colony members, who were moving out of a building at the time. Other police took the shot as a signal for them to open fire on the Swiss.

From the standpoint of intelligence interest, there was no indication of subversive activities on the part of the Swiss, nor any evidence that their nationality

204 App A, p 19, Basic Doc.

and loyalty was other than they claimed. The case was listed in CIC files as a "special investigation," but existing records reveal no reason for CIC's interest in the incident.[205]

Travel and Alien Control

Several interesting cases developed from the Travel Control System established by CIC early in the war.

On 28 January 1942, Travel Control intercepted a letter written by Arnulfo Arias, former pro-Nazi President of Panama. The letter had been written in Mexico, where Arias was in exile. Carried by one Silvio Salazar, supposedly Arias' right-hand man, the letter was addressed to a woman, yet the salutation on the letter itself, "Querido Amigo," indicated that it was really intended for a man. In the letter Arias stated that he did not expect the new Panamanian Government to remain in power. He directed the addressee to keep in contact with one "Dr. W" for further instructions. The letter was turned over to Panamanian authorities and was instrumental in preventing Arias from returning to the Republic of Panama.[206]

Another illustrative case may be seen in a Travel Control Report dated 20 December 1944. Eugenia de Ades admitted during interrogation by CIC agents that she was not a Spanish citizen and, consequently, was not entitled to the Spanish passport with which she was travelling. She said her passport had been purchased by her husband. This incident led to the disclosure of a passport manufacturing syndicate; measures were taken to halt the production of the faked documents.

One of the regular informants among travellers who supplied positive intelligence to Travel Control was a . In passing through the Canal Zone, this man, supplied data about secret meetings in New York City. Another informant was a United States citizen, a , who reported on conditions in the different countries he visited in South America. Travel Control agents were encouraged to recruit informants among frequent travellers throughout Panama,[207]

205 App A, p 14, Basic Doc.
206 Ibid, p 10.
207 Ibid, p 20.

Axis Internees Screened

Another phase of positive Travel Control involved the screening of Axis internees being returned to the United States. During the war many Latin American countries rounded up Axis nationals who were sent to the United States, via the Canal Zone, for internment. In 1944 several trips were made by agents of the Panama Canal Department Detachment aboard passenger ships that were to put in at various Central and South American ports to pick up internees to be transported to the U.S.

Agents went to Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Salvador. On each trip every internee was subjected to a search and was interrogated at length about his background, activities, and associates throughout the Western Hemisphere. An extensive card file of friends and connections of Axis nationals was developed in this way. Personal papers and documents were taken from the internees and carefully examined. In some cases, suspicious items formed the basis for further interrogation. Each internee was required to complete a statement of personal history.

On 19 May 1945 a CIC agent interrogated three German internees from Santiago, Chile, two of whom were to be tried in the United States as war criminals. Albert von Appen, one of the two, was a Nazi Party member who in 1939 had been trained for sabotage work in Latin America and later had attempted to destroy Allied shipping. Brois Max Dreher had helped to establish sabotage groups in Colombia and Venezuela after 1940. The third man, Heinrich Hallbauer, possessed Chilean citizenship and was a professor of mathematics in Valparaiso. He was charged with aiding German saboteurs, having disposed of a package of bombs for Von Appen.

Von Appen and Dreher were German saboteurs who had been sent to Latin America sometime in 1939 with the mission of committing sabotage themselves and establishing sabotage and espionage rings among Latin Americans of German descent. Hallbauer probably was an example of the latter class and shows how effectively the Nazis used German nationals and foreigners of German descent living abroad for their own nefarious purposes. Aside from the issue of legitimate dual citizenship, the view taken by Nazi Germany was that no one born of German parents could ever repudiate his allegiance to the Fatherland. Thus, despite any formal renunciation of German citizenship a person of German ancestry might make, the racist doctrine of "once a German, always a German" was held by the Nazis to bind forever. Many Germans living abroad readily accepted this doctrine even though they had long since emigrated from Germany and had adopted new citizenship. Those Germans abroad, who chose to remain loyal to their adopted country, were quite often coerced into serving Nazi interests by threats against relatives still residing in Germany.[208]

208 App A, p 22, Basic Doc.

Change in Types of Cases

During 1943 and early 1944, investigations of suspected espionage accounted for much of the detachment's work, but by November of 1944, the number of espionage and sabotage investigations had declined sharply. By way of comparison, in February 1944 35 espionage investigations were assigned to agents in the detachment, accounting for almost half the total investigations for the month. In November, nine months later, only seven espionage and 11 sabotage investigations were reported. And in January 1945, the detachment checked only two instances of suspected espionage and two of suspected sabotage.

With the decline in espionage and sabotage cases came an increase in investigations of subversive activities and routine personnel investigations. In February 1944 the detachment reported only 15 personnel investigations and no instances of subversive activities. But in January 1945, there were 195 personnel investigations which required 359 interviews and records check. In the same month, agents were assigned 133 cases involving subversive activities.

Other activities included occasional investigations of violations of AR 380-5 and instances of disaffection. As has already been indicated, frequent security surveys were conducted at harbors and Canal installations, and agents occasionally delivered security lectures to military personnel stationed in the area.[209]

209 Monthly Statistical Rpts of the Panama Canal Dept CIC Det for Feb 44, Nov 44, and Jan 45, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

Section 3

THE PUERTO RICAN DETACHMENT

Puerto Rico, one of the Greater Antilles, was occupied for the first time by American forces during the Spanish-American War in 1898. From that time until 25 July 1952, when it became the semi-autonomous Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the island was an unincorporated insular possession of the United States, administered by a governor appointed by the President.

Counterintelligence operations on the island, however, were not begun until almost a half century after the coming of American forces. In 1933, Headquarters, II Corps, under whose military jurisdiction the island then lay, ordered the commanding officer on Puerto Rico to submit regular reports concerning subversive activities on the island. In the absence of CIP personnel in Puerto Rico, certain members of the Intelligence Section of the 65th Infantry, then stationed there, performed this task. Among the men entrusted with this responsibility were S/Sgt. Juan Vazquez and Cpl. Vicente Saras, who later were to become Major Vazquez, Chief, Administrative Section, Office of the AC of S, G2, Antilles Department, and Captain Saras, 470th CIC Detachment, Panama Canal Department.[210]

Not until 1939 was an agent assigned to work full time on counterintelligence matters in Puerto Rico. He was Sgt. Jack B. Cameron, who formerly had served with the CIP at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Cameron arrived in Puerto Rico on 27 November 1939 to work directly under Lt. Col. C. S. Ferrin, G2 of the Puerto Rican Department, as part of the Domestic Intelligence Section of that office.

Special Agent Cameron was a pioneer. Without precedents or established operational standards to guide him, Cameron relied on his initiative and his previous CIP experience in making contacts, gathering information, and investigating whatever cases developed. Initially, his activities fell into four categories: (1) Liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Insular Police, and Immigration, Customs, and Postal authorities; (2) checking manifest lists for aliens and other potential suspects arriving in Puerto Rico; (3) developing and maintaining contact with informants; and (4) surveillance of suspicious persons, groups, and places.[211]

Cameron worked alone until August 1940, when two other agents were assigned to assist him. The two new men were Corporal Saras and Cpl. Adolfo Morales, who were transferred from the 65th Infantry to Detached Enlisted Mens

210 Interviews with Maj Juan Vazquez and Capt Vicente Saras, cited in Basic Doc.

211 201 File, Cameron, Jack B., cited in Basic Doc.

List (CIP). Like Cameron, the new agents operated under the direct control of the G2 of the Puerto Rican Department. For several months, Saras remained in the G2 office as a clerical assistant while Morales was used on undercover assignments in Puerto Rico.

Methods of operation had not been crystalized at this time, and CIP agents were allowed considerable freedom of action. Occasionally the G2 personally assigned cases to the agents. They were also charged with the responsibility of maintaining contact with Government agencies to receive any information which might be of CIP interest. Reports, highly informal, often took the form of a personal note to the AC of S, G2.[212]

Expansion Preceding World War II

The year 1941 was a period of growth for the CIP in Puerto Rico. A backlog of complaint cases involving at least four distinct subversive groups on the island was constantly expanding, forcing attention upon the need for additional investigative personnel. But growth did not come instantly. Even when increases in strength were authorized, procurement problems caused numerous delays.

On 1 February 1941, two agents were sent from the United States to bolster counterintelligence coverage in Puerto Rico. One, Philip Shapiro, was assigned to work at Borinquen Field under the supervision of the base intelligence officer there. The other, Richard W. Moore, later joined Shapiro after a two-month tour of duty at Ponce Air Base (later Losey Field). Shapiro and Moore reported to their respective base intelligence officers carrying letters of introduction from the G2, Puerto Rican Department.

Assignment of Shapiro and Moore to duty on the air bases was the first instance of agents in Puerto Rico being placed on duty outside department headquarters and was a forerunner of the system of field offices which was to be developed within the Puerto Rican Department. Although these agents were supervised by base intelligence officers, they still were accountable for their activities to the G2. Weekly handwritten reports, bearing no signature but the agent's initials, were forwarded to the G2 through Information copies of these reports were given to each base intelligence officer.[213]

212 Interview with Capt Vicente Saras, cited in Basic Doc.

213 201 File, Shapiro, Philip; 201 File, Moore, Richard W.; and Interview with Capt Vicente Saras, all cited in Basic Doc.

New tables of organization for CIP came in rapid succession during the first half of 1941. On 21 March, eight enlisted men were authorized for CIP in Puerto Rico.[214] A month later, a revised table of organization authorized 12 agents.[215] And on 23 June, still another table of organization increased the allotted strength to 25 men, nine of whom were to be placed on duty in Antigua, the Bahamas and Jamaica, British West Indies.[216]

Despite the authorized increase in strength, no new agents were added until summer. The original five agents continued working directly with the G2, until 7 June 1941, when Capt. Milton Buffington and 2d Lt. Pedro M. Velez, Jr., were assigned for CIP duty and a detachment organization began to take shape. Captain Buffington was made commanding officer of the Puerto Rican Detachment, with Lieutenant Velez as executive officer. The Office of the AC of S, G2, continued to handle most administrative matters for the detachment, however.

During the summer of 1941, partly because of concentrated efforts to build the detachment to its authorized strength, 11 Puerto Rican soldiers were transferred to CIP. By 31 September 1941, 15 agents were on duty with the detachment--10 less than the table of organization specified.[217]

Procurement problems stemmed from two factors: scarcity of Spanish-speaking agents in the United States and the low caliber, generally, of native Puerto Rican soldiers. Because of local economic conditions, large numbers of Puerto Ricans volunteered for Army service simply to escape pressing financial difficulties. With a host of volunteers on their hands, selective service officials did not find it necessary to draft large numbers of Puerto Ricans for military service. The result was that most of the Puerto Ricans who entered the Army were poorly qualified for CIP work.

A Period of Confusion

With expansion came confusion. Relatively new in the area, CIP was not widely known among military or civil authorities in Puerto Rico. Even intelligence officers of the various military installations located there were unaware of the

214 Ltr, AG 322.999 Intelligence Police Corps (3-19-41) EG, TAGO, dtd 14 Mar 41, subj: Allotment of Grades to Corps of Intelligence Police and Promotions Therein, cited in Basic Doc.

215 Ltr, AG 322.999 Intelligence Police Corps (4-14-41) EB, TAGO, dtd 19 Apr 41, subj: Allotment of Grades to Corps of Intelligence Police and Promotions Therein, cited in Basic Doc.

216 Ltr, AG 322.999 Corps of Intelligence Police (6-18-41) EAB, TAGO, dtd 23 Jun 41, subj: Allotment of Grades to Corps of Intelligence Police, cited in Basic Doc.

217 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

function of the Corps. Occasionally intelligence officers, insisting on doing their own work, refused to delegate counterintelligence work to CIP agents who had been assigned to assist them. One post intelligence officer held more than 30 pending cases in his desk until he was ordered by the AC of S, G2, to assign the work to two CIP agents.

When agents did receive case assignments, their work was often hamstrung by authorities who refused to recognize their credentials. Agents visiting posts, camps, bases, and stations occasionally were delayed for hours while authorities verified their military intelligence credentials.

These difficulties were gradually eliminated through good liaison between CIP and intelligence officers in the field, Insular Police, and other governmental agencies. One of the first steps in this direction was a meeting of all intelligence officers on the island, at which they were briefed on the proper functions of CIP and were shown how they could cooperate with the counterintelligence agents. Insular Police authorities lent their assistance by requesting all police officers on the island to cooperate with any CIP agents who might visit their offices.[218]

Despite these conferences, CIP's mission in Puerto Rico was not adequately defined. Before September 1941, agents had almost complete investigative jurisdiction within the military establishment, and exercised considerable jurisdiction over civilians. A Delimitations Agreement between Military Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, and FBI in 1940 had defined the jurisdiction of those agencies within the United States. FBI had few agents in Puerto Rico, however, and CIP did not observe the strict delimitations of the agreement until September 1941, when FBI increased its strength on the island and insisted that the 1940 agreement be followed. Nevertheless, jurisdictional lines remained flexible for some time.[219]

There was an abundance of work for everyone in these days preceding Pearl Harbor. At least four subversive groups were active on the island, and cases involving their members were piling up almost daily. Among them were radical elements of all kinds. The Falange Tradicionalista Espanola, or Spanish Falange, was a pro-Fascist group which continued to attract a considerable following even after its official dissolution in January 1941. Another group, perhaps even more dangerous, was the Nationalist Party, whose members occasionally resorted to violence to promote the independence of Puerto Rico. Communist and Nazi organizations also were active. Members of all four groups had entered American

218 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

219 Interviews with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, Maj Juan Vazquez, Capt Vicente Saras, and Lt Cmdr Raymond Rains, cited in Basic Doc.

military service, and CIP was forced to weed them out of sensitive positions. Moreover, the detachment occasionally was requested by G2 to conduct investigations of criminal cases.[220]

Captain Buffington was replaced as detachment commander in September 1941 by Capt. Harry G. Mumm, who served less than a month before relinquishing the position to Lieutenant Velez late in September. Lieutenant Velez directed the work of the detachment for the remainder of the year, with the assistance of 2d Lt. Vicente Saras and 2d Lt. Colin G. Hinds, two agents who had been commissioned. Lieutenant Saras was placed in charge of four agents at Borinquen Field; Lieutenant Hinds was assigned to Losey Field, with two agents under his command. Thus, another step in the development of a network of field offices for the detachment was completed.

Changes Caused by Outbreak of War

The strength of the Puerto Rican Detachment stood at 14 agents and three officers on 1 December 1941. Within a week this small group was to be plunged into hectic, emergency duty that would tax the stamina of every man.

On 7 December 1941 an urgent call went out to all agents in the field. Routine investigations were halted abruptly; agents took up guard posts at public utilities, bridges, and other vital points throughout Puerto Rico. For almost a week, agents stood by on a 24-hour basis until troops could be detailed for this duty. Within the next few weeks, the detachment assisted FBI and Office of Naval Intelligence in rounding up aliens and searching their homes.[221]

Security surveys and security training programs were intensified. At Borinquen Field, Lieutenant Saras organized his agents into sabotage teams and ordered them to attempt to get past guards on the field to perform mock acts of sabotage. When these agents met virtually no resistance, Lieutenant Saras was able to convince the base commander that present security measures were inadequate. Proper precautions were put in effect immediately.[222]

Organizational Expansion

War brought expansion and increased emphasis on the role of counterintelligence in Puerto Rico.

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220 Interview with Capt Vicente Saras, cited in Basic Doc.

221 Interviews with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Capt Vicente Saras, and Maj Juan Vazquez, cited in Basic Doc.

222 Interview with Capt Vicente Saras, cited in Basic Doc.

In January 1942, just after the old CIP was officially redesignated CIC, Maj. Guillermo Pierluisi became officer in charge of the Puerto Rican Detachment. Lieutenant Velez reverted to his former position as executive officer.

Under the leadership of Major Pierluisi, efforts to bring the detachment up to strength were increased. By the end of January, 27 agents were serving with the detachment.[223] Two new officers, 2d Lt. George Banta and 2d Lt. Marvin S. Bennett, were transferred from the United States for duty with the CIC in Puerto Rico, bringing the total number of officers serving with the detachment to six.

The arrival of a new G2 for the Puerto Rican Department brought a definition of new CIC investigative and administrative procedures. Col. Francisco Parra, who became G2 in April 1942, specified that the detachment would investigate only sabotage and subversive activities involving military personnel and civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. Although no authority was granted for creation of an organized system of civilian informants throughout the island, private contacts were encouraged.[224] Previously, the G2 office had handled most administrative affairs of the detachment. But Colonel Parra turned those duties over to the detachment and Lieutenant Bennett became the responsible officer for servicing records, examination of report writing, maintenance of files, and other administrative routine. Four stenographers and two uniformed enlisted men assisted with clerical and messenger duties.[225]

Prestige of the detachment, along with morale of its members, was boosted considerably on 27 April 1942, when its offices were moved to the modern, air-conditioned Medical Arts building in San Juan. Two suites of offices were provided for the detachment commander, his officers, and his agents. In addition, the penthouse of the Medical Arts building was acquired for the Puerto Rico Detachment's Administrative Section. Total floor space of the new quarters was approximately 950 square feet[226]--quite a change from the small, poorly equipped offices originally occupied by the detachment. When the first CIP agents came to Puerto Rico, they were assigned office space in what had previously been used as a small storeroom in the G2 office, and, in June 1941, the detachment had moved to offices in the old Spanish "Beneficencia Barracks," Post of San Juan (later known as Fort Brooke). But Colonel Parra and Major Pierluisi considered these

223 Hq 471st CIC Det, Antilles Dept, Monthly Rpt of CIC Agents under control of AC of S, G2, Puerto Rican Dept, dtd 31 Jan 42, cited in Basic Doc.

224 Interviews with Col Francisco Parra and Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr; CI Memo No. 1, Hq, Puerto Rican Dept, AC of S, G2, dtd 9 Jun 42, all cited in Basic Doc.

225 Interview with Maj Guillermo Pierluisi, cited in Basic Doc.

226 Memo, Maj Neville K. Adkinson, to Chief, CIC, 10 Aug 42, subj: Counter Intelligence Activities, Puerto Rican Dept, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).

offices inadequate and through their combined efforts the space in the Medical Arts building was acquired. Later, during 1943, agents constructed a sound-proof small arms range and a scientific crime detection laboratory in the basement of the Medical Arts building.

From the first, this laboratory played an important part in the investigative work of the Puerto Rican Detachment. Under the direction of Special Agent Tomas Alejandro, who was in charge of the laboratory, new facilities were constantly added and additional uses for the technical equipment were discovered. Investigative photography, fingerprinting, examination of questioned documents, use of moulage and plaster of paris casts, and ballistics work were made possible by the detachment's development of its own lab.[227]

As the detachment grew, its area of operations was expanded. During 1942, agents from the Puerto Rican Detachment provided counterintelligence coverage of Jamaica, British West Indies; St. Thomas, Virgin Islands; and St. Croix, Virgin Islands.

In March 1942, Major Pierluisi reorganized the detachment into sections corresponding to the major subversive groups on the Island, and all agents--except those assigned to Jamaica, the Virgin Islands, and specific Army posts on Puerto Rico--were placed in one of these sections. There were separate sections for Nazi, Nationalist, Spanish Falange, and Communist activities. An officer and from one to four agents were detailed to each section. In addition, a Sabotage and Robbery of Classified Information Sub-Section was established, with one officer and four agents. Two agents were detailed to an administrative subsection.[228]

One major supply problem--transportation--plagued the detachment early in 1942. No Government vehicles were assigned to the detachment, and agents often were unable to obtain gasoline for their personal automobiles. Eventually, the office was able to purchase gasoline, as a war agency, directly from distributors. Fuel thus obtained was stored in drums at an agent's home. Later a rationing system was established and agents were permitted to purchase 24 gallons of gasoline per week.[229]

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227 Memo, S/A Tomas Alejandro to Chief, CIC, Antilles Department, 2 Oct 43, subj: Activities of the Laboratory, Technical Section, CIC, (Conf) (Central Records Facility).

228 Annex B, Basic Doc.

229 Interviews with Maj Guillermo Pierluisi, Sp Agts Luis Guinet, Franco Sotomayor, and Major Velez, cited in Basic Doc.

Agent's Report Brings Investigation

But trouble of a different sort was brewing.

Convinced that laxity on the part of certain intelligence officers was creating a security hazard in Puerto Rico, Agent Laurence T. Bayley wrote to Maj. H. G. Sheen, Chief, CIC, requesting an investigation of counterintelligence activities in Puerto Rico. Agent Bayley prepared a 10-page memorandum for Major Sheen enumerating more than two dozen instances in which he believed certain matters to have been seriously mishandled. Bayley did not send his report through official channels but mailed it directly to Major Sheen. He reported substantially the following:

a. Supervising officers refused to accept agent reports which contained a preponderance of derogatory information.

b. In some instances investigations were waived entirely upon the recommendations of certain officers, even in complaint cases.

c. Personnel investigations were so superficial that persons who had been dismissed from Government jobs in the United States were employed in sensitive positions in Puerto Rico.

d. Time between completion of an agent report and the date of mailing the report often was three weeks to a month.

e. Higher authorities pigeon-holed a special report by Lieutenant Velez on Communist activities on the island.

f. Identities of agents had been hopelessly compromised.

g. Many leaks of information were believed to have resulted from careless talk by employees of the G2 office.

h. Agents were known to be enlisted men and as such were unable to obtain the cooperation of FBI and Office of Naval Intelligence personnel.

i. Agents were required to perform routine administrative and housekeeping duties and were occasionally required to serve as chauffeurs for officers in uniform.

j. Investigations were hampered by excessive restrictions on expenditures.

k. Some cases were closed on the basis of the opinion of an officer not assigned to the G2 rather than upon factual data produced as a result of competent investigation.

l. Unnecessary red tape made expeditious investigative action virtually impossible.[230]

Bayley's report received prompt and serious attention in the War Department. Major Sheen sent the allegations to Col. John T. Bissell, Chief of the War Department's Counter Intelligence Group. Colonel Bissell summarized the report for Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, War Department G2. Colonel Bissell's memorandum to General Strong gives the following indication of the weight which top intelligence officers placed on Bayley's report:

> Sergeant Bayley is an old soldier and has been connected with military intelligence activities for a considerable length of time. This office has no reason to doubt the judgment, ability, or motives of this soldier concerning the action taken by him, and the unorthodox method used by him in making his report lends weight to the belief that the situation in Puerto Rico demands immediate investigation...the nature of this report is such as to warrant immediate corrective action. It is recommended that this Group be authorized to send a commissioned officer to Puerto Rico for the purpose of inspecting military intelligence activities in general and the counterintelligence situation in particular. It is further recommended that three carefully selected, competent, Spanish-speaking agents of the CIC be sent undercover to Puerto Rico on temporary duty for the purpose of determining the exact nature and extent of enemy and subversive groups operating in that Department.[231]

Available records do not indicate whether the undercover agents were sent into Puerto Rico. However, the Commanding General of the Puerto Rican Department was ordered to forward files on specific cases mentioned by Bayley to the War Department, and arrangements were made to interview CIC officers and agents in the United States who had formerly served in Puerto Rico.[232]

A bitter letter to Colonel Bissell from Col. Thomas R. Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Puerto Rican Department, followed the order to send case files to

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230 Memo, Agent Laurence T. Bayley to Maj H. G. Sheen, undated, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

231 Memo, MID 322.999 CIC, Col John T. Bissell to Maj Gen Strong, dtd 29 May 42, subj: Counter Intelligence Corps Activities in Puerto Rican Dept, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

232 Memo, Maj H. G. Sheen to Chief, Counterintelligence Group, dtd 31 Jun 42, subj: Counter Intelligence Corps Activities in Puerto Rican Dept, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

Washington. The Chief of Staff protested that Bayley had a "spy complex" and apparently was disgruntled as a result of his assignment. "...You can be certain that we, who have been here for two years, know all about it and Sergeant Bayley (who has been here since 20 January) knows nothing," Colonel Phillips wrote. "Needless to say, I think this particular matter was improperly handled in Washington."[233]

Maj. Neville K. Adkinson, CIC Executive Officer, was sent to Puerto Rico in July to conduct a thorough investigation of Counter Intelligence Corps activities there. Arriving in San Juan on 26 July, Major Adkinson spent 11 days questioning G2 and CIC personnel, including a six-hour interview with Agent Bayley.

On 10 August, Major Adkinson reported his findings in a 31-page memorandum to Major Sheen. Major Adkinson found that most of Bayley's allegations were based upon conditions which existed prior to Colonel Parra's appointment as G2, and that Colonel Parra had taken steps to correct undesirable situations which had come to his attention. Although Major Adkinson concluded that a majority of Bayley's charges were exaggerated, some were basically true. Among these were statements that persons were being employed in sensitive positions without adequate investigations; that identities of CIC agents had been compromised; that in some instances, agents were being used as chauffeurs for officers; and that "certain deficiencies" did exist in the administration of the detachment.

In talking with the agents of the Puerto Rican Detachment, Major Adkinson found all but one agent working 10 to 12 hours daily, seven days a week. Major Pierluisi had authorized his men to take off on Sundays, but agents were required by the G2 to account for all their time on reports of daily activities. When such reports showed that agents had devoted time to their own activities, they usually were questioned as to the necessity. Major Adkinson learned that Bayley had been subject to considerable criticism and threatened with punishment by Colonel Phillips as a result of the investigation; consequently, it was recommended that Bayley be transferred to one of the Service Commands in the United States.

At the time of the investigation, only 25 agents were on duty in Puerto Rico--13 short of the authorized strength. Major Adkinson also noted a deficiency in certain investigative equipment, particularly photographic equipment. His report included recommendations that at least four trained, Spanish-speaking agents be transferred to Puerto Rican Department and that additional investigative equipment be procured "as soon as practicable." Since some of the agents were found to be inadequately trained for their jobs, Major Adkinson recommended that the Puerto Rican Department be assigned a quota of at least two agents for attendance at

233 Ltr, Col Thomas R. Phillips to Col J. T. Bissell, 19 Jun 42, (Uncl) (Central Records Facility).

classes of the CIC Investigators' Training School until all agents of the detachment could complete the course.[234]

Major Pierluisi was transferred to the Office of the G2 of the department on 6 December 1942, and Maj. Verne O. Jackson became detachment commander. Major Jackson, executive officer of the detachment since August 1942, had come to Puerto Rico from the Panama Canal Department, where he had worked with the G2.[235]

Preliminary Training Course Inaugurated

In December 1942, the Puerto Rican Detachment began what eventually was to become the outstanding CIC training program in the Caribbean. In compliance with the War Department instructions, a preliminary training course designed to prepare agents for the advanced school at Chicago was inaugurated on 14 December 1942. The first session, attended by six agents, ran from 14 December to 9 January 1943. Classes were conducted six days a week, usually seven hours daily.

Agents were instructed by detachment officers in such subjects as Methods of Investigation, Report Writing, Safeguarding Military Information, Anti-American Ideologies, Counterespionage and Countersabotage, Personal Description, and Interrogations. Lectures on the various agencies performing counterintelligence investigations were included in the schedule.[236]

A second session of the school, following a similar pattern, ran from 11 January 1943 to 6 February 1943. The course was repeated during May of the same year, and again in July.

Training was intensified during 1943. With the construction of a small arms range in the basement of the Medical Arts building, agents soon were firing a prescribed number of practice rounds monthly. Weapons instruction and practice included not only the short-barrel .38 caliber revolver, but also the carbine, submachine gun, and the .45 caliber automatic pistol.

Additional training took the form of weekly evening meetings, during which training films were shown. As an aid to new agents arriving on the island, a handbook, "Puerto Rican Handbook for the Counter Intelligence Corps," was

234 Memo, Maj Neville K. Adkinson to Chief, CIC, dtd 10 Aug 43, subj: Counter Intelligence Activities, Puerto Rican Dept, (Uncl) (Cen Rec Fac).
235 Interview with Maj Guillermo Pierluisi, cited in Basic Doc, 1 Jan 42.
236 Ltr, Maj J. D. Lawler to AC of S, G2, War Dept, 9 Dec 42, subj: CIC Training School, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

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prepared by several experienced agents in the detachment. This handbook, containing information about insular geography, politics, social structure, and investigative problems and aids, served as a model for similar publications prepared by other detachments throughout the world.[237]

By the end of 1943 all agents in Puerto Rico had attended the preliminary training school and had gone to the advanced school in Chicago.[238]

Major Jackson was relieved as detachment commander on 22 February 1943, and Capt. Elbert D. Turner, Jr., assumed command.[239] Other changes followed.

A major change was the reorganization of the Caribbean Defense Command on 1 June 1943. The War Department redesignated the Puerto Rican Department as the Antilles Department with the result that the detachment's jurisdiction was extended to all the U.S. Army bases in the British West Indies and British Guiana, which the United States leased from the United Kingdom. The detachment which had been assigned to the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, now incorporated in the Antilles Department, was made a sub-detachment of the Antilles Detachment. As such, the sub-detachment in Trinidad continued to function as a separate detachment, except that the administrative accountability was maintained within the headquarters at San Juan.[240]

Detachment Reorganized

An internal reorganization of the detachment was effected under the leadership of Captain Turner, who felt that grouping of detachment personnel into subversive sections was impractical. Captain Turner established five divisions: Administrative Section, Investigative Section, Technical and Training Section, Inductee Section, and Security Section.[241]

Under this plan, the Administrative Section was charged with the maintenance of files, records, and other administrative matters. Assignment and supervision

237 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in rpt, "Counter Intelligence Corps, Caribbean Command, 1 Jan 42-31 May 45, by Maj Elbert D. Turner, Jr, dtd 1 Jun 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac)

238 Memo, CIC to AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 1 Jan 44, subj: CIC Activities P.R. Section, for the year 1943, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

239 Gen Orders No. 15, Hq, Caribbean Defense Command, dtd 27 May 43, cited in Basic Doc.

240 A discussion of the Trinidad Detachment is presented in a separate section of this chapter.

241 Memo, Maj E.D. Turner, Jr, to Col F. J. Parra, dtd 2 Jul 43, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

of investigations were the responsibility of the Investigative Section, while the Technical Section and Training Section operated all the technical equipment and instructed others in its use.

The Inductee Section was staffed by Major Pierluisi, who was now working in the G2 office, and six agents, who checked all Puerto Rican inductees against subversive watch-lists. During its first year of operations, the section screened 15,170 inductees. The Security Section, responsible for all security surveys within the military establishment on Puerto Rico, conducted surveys of seven major military installations during the last six months of 1943.[242]

As a part of his reorganization program, Captain Turner also established a comprehensive system of field offices designed to give adequate counterintelligence coverage to the entire island. Eight field offices were created, most of them on military installations, and CIC agents were supervised by post intelligence officers to expedite investigations. Field offices and the number of agents assigned to them, as of June 1943, were as follows: San Juan, 15 agents; Losey Field, two agents; Fort Buchanan, three agents; Batista Airport, two agents; Camp Tortuguero, one agent; Henry Barracks, one agent; Camp O'Reilly, two agents; and Borinquen Field, three agents.[243] In addition, agents were occasionally dispatched on temporary duty to St. Thomas, St. Croix, Antiga, and smaller installations within the sector.[244]

The detachment grew rapidly during the first half of 1943, and peak strength of 64 agents was reached in July. During this period of growth, however, Captain Turner noted that prolonged investigations necessary for clearance of agents procured locally was delaying their assignment to CIC for as long as six months from the time of their selection.[245]

Several new officers were assigned to the detachment during 1943. Two first lieutenants, Robert McK. Foster, Jr., and Charles F. Bertlitz, were transferred from the Panama Canal Department, and Lieutenant Hinds was relieved. Later 2d Lt. Keith G. Sebelius came to the detachment from the headquarters of the Caribbean Defense Command.[246]

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242 Memo, CIC to G2, Antilles Dept, 1 Jan 44, subj: CIC Activities, Puerto Rico Sector, for the year 1943, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

243 CIC Monthly Statistical Rpt, for Jun 43, prepared by Capt E. D. Turner, Jr, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac)

244 Memo, Capt E. D. Turner, Jr, to G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 3 Jul 43, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

245 Memo, Capt E. D. Turner, Jr, to Col F. J. Parra, dtd 2 Jul 43, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

246 Basic Doc.

Late in the year, however, there was a gradual reduction in the detachment strength, and by the end of 1943 only 45 agents were on duty. A table of organization for the detachment was revised downward from 100 to 55 agents, with the concurrence of the detachment commander.[247]

Further reduction came in January 1944. Major Turner, convinced that the strength of the detachment was above current investigative requirements, began to weed out agents whom he considered unsuitable for CIC. Nine agents were transferred out of CIC into their former branch of service. Ten others were found unacceptable for service in Puerto Rico because of language difficulties and were sent to other areas.

Antilles Detachment Activated

Compensation for the reduction in strength came through activation on 31 March 1944 of a new CIC detachment attached to the Antilles Air Command. This detachment, the 472d, functioned with the Antilles Air Command until 1948, after the Air Force became a separate branch of service with its own office of Special Investigations. The new detachment relieved the Puerto Rican Detachment of responsibility for coverage of Air Corps personnel and installations and allowed agents who had been engaged in such work to be placed on other duties.[248]

On the other hand, the work load of the detachment was increased when Headquarters, Caribbean Defense Command, directed that investigations of civilians employed by the military establishment be conducted by the CIC instead of the Provost Marshal's office, which previously had performed this function.[249] On 17 May 1944, the War Department announced that CIC personnel, enlisted and commissioned, who since the early part of 1943 had been carried as assigned to CIC, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, would now be assigned to the Caribbean Defense Command. The change was effected on 18 March 1944, and agents serving with the Antilles Department were placed on detached service from the Caribbean Defense Command.[250]

Rugged Training Program Instituted

Another important revision early in 1944 was in the detachment's training program. Believing that many of his agents--if not the entire detachment--might

247 Ltr, CDC, AC of S, G2, 20 Aug 43, subj: Anticipated Transfer of Excess CIC Enlisted Personnel, cited in Basic Doc.

248 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

249 Ltr, Hq Caribbean Defense Command, Office of the CG, dtd 17 May 44, subj: Investigational Functions of the Office of the Provost Marshal General and the Military Intelligence Division, cited in Basic Doc.

250 Ltr, War Dept, dtd 14 Mar 44, subj: Changing Assignments of CIC Personnel, cited in Basic Doc.

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soon be transferred to a more active theater, Major Turner instituted a rugged field training course designed to prepare his men for combat. In January, 14 agents were given special instructions in the operation and maintenance of light and heavy military vehicles. Twelve agents were sent to the "El Yunque Mountain" jungle training area in February for a four-day refresher course in field operations. Later, 21 agents were instructed in wireless transmission, using the Morse Code, and an early morning course in map reading was given daily until all agents were familiar with the use of military maps.[251]

But many of the detachment's training facilities were soon lost. In February 1944, the detachment was ordered to move its headquarters from the Medical Arts building in San Juan to a small, wooden, barracks-type building behind the Bachelor Officers Quarters at Fort Brooke. The move meant loss of the detachment's small arms range, technical laboratory, interrogation room, and training space. However, a new laboratory, smaller than the first, was soon constructed in the new location, and to compensate for the lack of training space, agents were given membership in the San Juan YMCA, where physical training was given three hours weekly.

An additional field office was set up in June 1944 at the newly constructed Fort Bundy in Puerto Rico. One agent was sent to Fort Bundy to work under the supervision of the post intelligence officer.

Pedro M. Velez, Jr., now a captain, became Chief, CIC, Antilles Department, on 31 July 1944,[252] just six days after the detachment had been redesignated as the 471st CIC Detachment, with an authorized strength of 22 agents.[253] Captain Velez stressed general counterintelligence coverage and placed less emphasis on training and administration. Although he found the strength of the detachment too small to carry out all of his plans, no new agents were obtained until September 1944, when additions brought the total number of enlisted men in the detachment to 35.[254]

Shortly after Captain Velez assumed command, the detachment began publication of a weekly news letter, known as "CIC News." Classified CONFIDENTIAL and bearing the admonition "Do not file, destroy by burning." The news letter was distributed to agents at the various field offices of the detachment. It contained summaries of outstanding investigations and personal news items concerning agents throughout the island.

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251 Ltr, Hq, Antilles Dept, G2, Det (MIS) CIC, dtd 3 Feb 44, Subj: Unit Refresher Training, cited in Basic Doc.

252 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

253 SO No. 168, Hqs, CDC, dtd 25 Jul 44, cited in Basic Doc.

254 471st CIC Det Morning Rpt for 31 Dec 44, cited in Basic Doc.

Administration Red Tape Lessened

On 21 October 1944, Col. Eduardo Andino relieved Colonel Parra as AC of S, G2, in the Antilles Department. Working closely with the 471st CIC Detachment, Colonel Andino eliminated much administrative red tape between G2 and CIC offices to speed the flow of information from CIC to G2. Verbal reports, followed by written reports, were authorized.

Colonel Andino was largely responsible for the improvement of the detachment's facilities late in 1944. Nine civilian-type Government vehicles were acquired for use by agents. In November, the detachment moved to new quarters in Templo del Maestro building in San Juan. This made available an adequate interrogation room, a larger technical laboratory, a classroom, and a small day room for agents.[255]

Laboratory facilities were improved early in 1945 with the procurement of technical devices such as weight scales, micrometer, and caliper rules. More chemical reagents were obtained for investigative work.

One project which occupied agents' leisure time between January and May 1945 was the establishment of a detachment museum known as the Operations Display Room. Displays represented 13 of the most important cases solved by the unit. Other exhibits included a collection of anti-American propaganda confiscated by the CIC agents and samples of work done in the technical laboratory. A dual purpose of the museum was explained by the detachment commander in a memorandum to the G2. It not only served as a means of orientation for the new agents, but also boosted morale and organizational pride.

Another facility which the detachment opened in early 1945 was a Post Exchange branch at Detachment headquarters. Profits from operation of the branch PX went into a detachment fund, which was used for recreational purposes. As a part of this program, agents made a boat trip to St. Thomas and on at least four occasions, Sunday picnics for detachment personnel were held at nearby beaches.

With the end of the war came reduction in the size of the 471st CIC. In January 1945, 35 agents and seven officers were on duty, but by December there were only 18 agents and three officers. As a result of the decrease in personnel, the Security Section was reduced to one agent, with no officer assigned to it. Duties of the officer in charge of the Trinidad Sub-Detachment were also eliminated. One officer served as chief and operations officer; another, as executive and administrative officer. The third officer served as assistant operations officer and was also responsible for training. Ten civilian stenographers were employed until the end of September, when the number was reduced to seven.

255 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

Training During 1945

Two sessions of the preliminary training school, each 35 days in duration, were held during 1945, with a total of 17 new agents attending the course during February-March and June-July. Two agents from the 471st attended a two-month course at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. Weekly training sessions at detachment headquarters featured training films of general interest, lectures on investigative techniques, and discussions of the Puerto Rican political situation. Military training stressed subjects needed by CIC personnel serving in active theaters of operations. Besides frequent marches and hikes, agents were given instruction in close order drill, the squad and the platoon, patrolling, interior guard duty, military hygiene, first aid, customs of the service, military courtesy, map reading and aerial photography.

Liaison Activities

Close liaison was maintained between the detachment and Military Police, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Insular Police, and Allied intelligence organizations. Military Police and Criminal Investigation Division occasionally requested the assistance of CIC technical laboratory personnel and attended several lectures given at the detachment's training schools.[256]

Subversive Organizations Cause Major Work

Most of the work of the Puerto Rican Department resulted from activities of four major subversive elements on the island.

The Nationalist Party, small but disciplined and fanatical, was active in political agitation throughout World War II. Because of its strong cry for independence, this group had considerable popular appeal. Openly hostile to the United States forces on the island, the Nationalists were constantly under CIC observation. Nazi and Falange groups espoused the Axis cause, and their members were considered likely to engage in espionage and sabotage. The Communist Party appealed mainly to native workers who were dissatisfied with their low standard of living, but Communist propaganda was also directed at members of the Armed Forces with the intent of creating strife and dissention.

Throughout the war, the Puerto Rican Detachment emphasized preventive measures in their dealings with these subversive elements. In 1942, shortly after the United States entered the war, agents concentrated on gathering

256 Memo, Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, to AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 2 Jan 46, subj: Activities of the 471st CIC Det During the Year 1945, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.)

information concerning membership and activities of the subversive organizations. In addition, data was collected on all individuals who were believed to be anti-American. Information thus obtained formed the basis for extensive watch lists which eventually developed into files containing more than 42,000 folders, 66,000 reference cards, and hundreds of general reports.[257]

One important factor in the detachment's favor was that most of the agents were native Puerto Ricans who were able to operate under cover without excessive danger of compromise. Besides having perfect command of the language, these agents knew the people, places, and customs of the island intimately and were able to keep discreet watch on the subversive elements. Because other Federal investigative agencies on the island employed a majority of continental agents, the CIC detachment often could obtain results that were denied other agencies.[258]

Sabotage Investigations

In 1942, more than 35 sabotage cases--mostly of aircraft--were investigated. Ships and military installations also were sabotage targets. Although there were 46 sabotage investigations in 1943, few were of major importance. Twenty-two of the cases were successfully closed.[259]

In 1942 sabotage investigation centered around a P-40E Army airplane. Black paint had been substituted for oil in the plane's oil reservoir. The paint was traced to an American company, Aqua Systems, Inc., suspected in the United States of espionage and sabotage.[260] Not all the sabotage investigations revealed subversive intent, however. One case involved repeated short-circuiting of Army-leased telephone wires at Borinquen Field. Agents found the wires had been shorted by a psychopathic criminal on parole who only wanted to see the sparks fly.[261]

Agents of the Puerto Rican Detachment also investigated suspected sabotage at Army Transport Service piers in the port of Catano during May 1943. It was reported that as many as 10 tractor tires were being punctured daily in the course of operations. Through the use of informants and surveillance, agents traced the punctures to two civilian employees who admitted deliberately running the vehicles

257 Memo, Maj P.M. Velez, Jr, to AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 2 Jan 46, subj: Activities of the 471st CIC Det during Year 1945, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

258 Basic Doc.

259 Memo, CIC to G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 1 Jan 44, subj: CIC Activities, PR Sector for the Year 1943, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

260 471st CIC Det Sabotage File No. 40506, dtd 3 Aug 42, subj: Foreign Matter Found in Oil Tank of a P40E Airplane, cited in Basic Doc.

261 201 File, Aguiar, Antonio Gomez, cited in Basic Doc.

over a board with large spikes in it. They insisted that they had no subversive intent; they were only dissatisfied with their wages.[262]

In another suspected sabotage incident, agents were asked to determine why Radio Station WKAQ had been unable to announce a blackout alarm. Agents found that a switch had been tampered with, and further investigation led to a confession from a soldier that he had moved the switch in an effort to tune in another station His actions made transmission of the blackout alarm impossible.[263]

Espionage Investigations

A passion for motion pictures caused one would-be spy to blunder into the hands of CIC agents early in the war.

Luis Manuel de la Rosa de Hostos, 18, dishonorably discharged from the Army in the summer of 1942 for repeated instances of AWOL, determined to "get even" with the Army by gathering military information for sale to the highest bidder.

Roaming the streets in a private's uniform and equipped with a supply of forged passes he had stolen before his discharge, the youth was able to wander in and out of military installations undetected, eating and sleeping among the troops and making copious notes everywhere he went.

When this method of collecting information failed to turn up enough military information to satisfy him, de la Rosa began breaking into automobiles owned by Army officers. His first attempt was successful. De la Rosa slashed the top of a convertible and once inside of the car, discovered a folder of confidential and secret documents which contained detailed outlines of air defense plans for Puerto Rico.

Now confident that he had valuable information, de la Rosa was ready to place the stolen documents, along with his personal notes, on the auction block. Using a German-English dictionary, he worded a pro-Nazi letter in German to a San Juan newspaper in hopes that its publications would cause Nazi leaders in Puerto Rico to contact him. When the newspaper refused to print the letter, de la Rosa made plans to sail to Santo Domingo, where he expected to locate German agents.

At Santurce, de la Rosa persuaded a theater manager to accept one of the stolen documents in lieu of the admission price. A week later, he pawned the

262 471st CIC Det Sabotage Files, dtd 29 May 43, subj: Punctured Tractor Tires at ATS Pier, Catano, Puerto Rico, cited in Basic Doc.

263 201 File, Sanchez, Ismael, cited in Basic Doc.

entire package of secret papers to a soda fountain operator for the price of another movie, promising to redeem the documents the next day with two packages of cigarettes.[264]

The man who loaned de la Rosa the money had other ideas. He read the papers and sensing their importance, telephoned the Office of Naval Intelligence as soon as de la Rosa slipped away to watch the movie. Navy investigators turned the documents over to CIC, whose agents already were investigating the theft.

De la Rosa was trapped. When he returned four days later to redeem the documents, Special Agent Philip Shapiro of the Puerto Rican Detachment was waiting to arrest him.

Under interrogation at Puerto Rico Detachment headquarters, de la Rosa vigorously denied any knowledge of the stolen papers. But he could not explain why he tried to reclaim them, nor could he account for a notebook he carried which contained lists of military installations throughout Puerto Rico, including antiaircraft gun and searchlight emplacements and figures on the number of troops at each post.

Under Shapiro's repeated questioning, de la Rosa soon confessed to the theft of the documents and unfolded a tale of abortive attempts at espionage which began almost a year earlier. Even before his induction into the Army, the boy had obtained photographs and maps of U.S. installations in Puerto Rico. He traded the pictures to the German consul in San Juan for German stamps bearing the swastika emblem. During his basic training at Camp Tortuguero, he stole numerous restricted training manuals and constantly quizzed company officers about military installations on the island.[265]

De la Rosa was not a part of an organized espionage net, although he claimed sympathy for the Nazi movement. Had he known how to peddle the information he collected, however, the consequences could have been serious. Fortunately, CIC agents apprehended him before the secret information reached the enemy's hands.

Because de la Rosa was a civilian, CIC released him to the FBI after the initial interrogation. He subsequently was convicted and sentenced to three

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264 Statement, signed by Luis Manual de la Rosa de Hostos, to S/A John R. Jones, FBI, dtd 9 Sep 42, (Uncl) (G2 Central Records Facility, Dossier No. XC017 231).

265 FBI Rpt by John R. Jones, File No. 65-183, dtd 26 Sep 42, subj: Luis Manual de la Rosa de Hostos, (Uncl) (G2 Central Records Facility, Dossier No. XC 017 231).

years in prison for theft of Government property. After this conviction, the United States Attorney in San Juan refused to press the espionage charge.[266]

Censorship Stamp Theft Investigated

Censorship was exercised in Puerto Rico during the war years, and although it was not a CIC function, cases involving censorship came to the detachment's attention. One such case in 1943 involved the theft of a rubber stamp used by the censor to indicate the approval of written material. Agents traced the missing stamp to John Henry Klapper, a writer, who admitted under interrogation that he had taken the stamp so that he could take out of the area certain articles and papers which otherwise would not have passed the censor. Records do not show what punishment Klapper received for his efforts to circumvent the censor.[267]

Another theft investigation involved the loss of an agent's credentials while he was watching a street procession in Santurce. When a newspaper published pictures of the procession, agents went to the newspaper photographer and obtained negatives of all the pictures he had made at the scene. Enlarged prints, made in the CIC darkroom, were carried to an Insular Police office, where police were able to identify two known pickpockets among the throngs. When the pickpockets returned to their homes, CIC agents and police were waiting to arrest them. Agents obtained confessions that the thieves had taken the credentials but had later destroyed them. The pickpockets were turned over to Insular authorities for prosecution.[268]

CIC Prevents a Transportation Tie-Up

The emphasis which the Puerto Rican Detachment placed on general counter-intelligence coverage as a preventive measure has already been noted. That emphasis paid off in 1943, when a confidential informant notified CIC agents that employees of the American Railroad Company of Puerto Rico, only railroad operating on the island, planned a strike to begin at noon the following day. The detachment immediately alerted the Chief of Staff, who in turn warned the Engineers to stand by. Railroad workers walked off their jobs as planned, but the strike was called off after four days when trains, operated by military personnel, ran on schedule.

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266 FBI Rpt by John Miller Davenport, File No. 65-183, dtd 17 Feb 43, subj: Luis Manual de la Rosa de Hostos, (Uncl) (G2 Central Records Facility, Dossier No. XC 017 231).

267 201 File, Klapper, John Henry, cited in Basic Doc.

268 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.

Agents learned that the strike had been instigated by Miguel Sanchez de Leon and Alberto Sanchez, both Communist labor agitators. Its objective was to enable Communist-influenced Confederacion General de Trabajadores to gain control of the independent Railroad Employees Union.

Quick action by the CIC detachment had prevented any sabotage or any halt in movement of vital military supplies.[269]

Criminal Cases Investigated

Not all the investigations conducted by the Puerto Rican Detachment had so direct a bearing on the national security. Agents occasionally were requested by G2 to conduct investigations of cases which were plainly not within the mission of the CIC.

A typical criminal case solved by the detachment resulted in the arrest of a gang composed of both men and women who had been assaulting and robbing American soldiers in the city of Santurce. Women members of the gang would lure the soldiers, on the pretense of amorous interest, to some secluded spot, where their male cohorts would beat and rob the victims. One soldier had been shot, and several others had been seriously injured. Technically, CIC had no jurisdiction, since the case involved criminal acts by civilians. But because of the adverse effect of the robberies on the Army morale and because of the failure of proper authorities to apprehend the mob, the Chief of Staff requested the detachment to investigate. Agents promptly rounded up the entire mob. Four men and two women were arrested and turned over to Insular Police for criminal prosecution.[270]

Task Force Plans Made

In the spring of 1943, it appeared that the Puerto Rican Detachment might participate in tactical operations. Increasing tension with Vichy Forces in the French West Indies led U.S. Army Forces in the Antilles to consider the possibility of landings in Martinique and Guadalupe. A provisional task force was contemplated for occupation of the islands, and CIC representatives were included in discussions of the tentative landings. On the basis of studies of maps and War Department surveys, a plan of operations was drawn up to include the assignment of agents to various towns and villages, with seizure of communication points and gendarmerie headquarters as immediate objectives. It was decided that half the CIC agents selected for this mission would go in uniform as soldiers attached to force headquarters. Others would go in undercover capacities consistent with their civilian backgrounds.

269 Interview with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, cited in Basic Doc.
270 Ibid

In May, all French-speaking agents in Puerto Rico were recalled to detachment headquarters in San Juan. Since they were not told the reason for their recall, there was considerable grumbling--especially when they were given no investigative assignments during the two weeks they were under alert.

However, higher authorities decided against the proposed landings. Participation in landings, peaceful or otherwise, remains an interesting "might-have-been" in the annals of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Caribbean.[271]

U.S. Soldiers in Rally Investigated

Typical of the work of the 471st CIC Detachment in the later years of the war was one case involving participation of U.S. soldiers in a rally staged by a radical group seeking the independence of Puerto Rico.

During the rally at the University of Puerto Rico on 20 November 1944, an American soldier created a sensation by leaping to his feet and declaring that he advocated the independence of Puerto Rico. A confidential informant at the University of Puerto Rico later told CIC agents that a Puerto Rican soldier stationed at Camp O'Reilly, had attended the rally with a continental American soldier who had stated that he was for Puerto Rican independence.

Following up this lead, agents obtained a picture of with an American friend, one who with was a member of the at Camp O'Reilly. Agents questioned other soldiers at Camp O'Reilly and determined that frequently went out together. Organizational pass records revealed that on the day of the incident, both men had been on pass for seven and one half hours.

One agent, concealing his identity, arranged to meet and offered him a ride to a distant town. During this trip, the agent gained confidence and by skillful questioning discovered that had attended the Independence rally together, and that was the continental American soldier who had declared himself. The agent also learned that was very anti-American because he felt he had been subjected to racial discrimination while attending an Army school in Virginia.

Investigation eventually revealed that both were active Communists.

As a result of this and similar cases, Army personnel in the Antilles Department were ordered not to participate in demonstrations, meetings, parades, and

271 App B, p 14, Basic Doc.

rallies either for or against Puerto Rican independence. Despite this ruling, 12 American soldiers attended the Second Pro-Independence Congress at Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, on 10 December 1944.

Undercover agents of the 471st CIC Detachment, present at all sessions of the congress, photographed every soldier attending the meetings and, through discreet inquiries, were able to determine the identity of all of the offenders. Besides the soldiers, two civilian Auxiliary Military Police Guards were identified. The auxiliary guards subsequently were discharged from Government employment, and appropriate action was taken against the soldiers to prevent any further political activities on their part.[272]

A case concluded early in 1945 illustrates the use of the detachment's technical and laboratory facilities.

was suspected of being a Communist because a confidential informant had reported that a person of the same name had signed an application for membership in the Communist Party of Puerto Rico on 1941. Over a period of a year, investigation failed to reveal definitely whether was a Communist or whether he had signed the application. Finally, agents were able to obtain photographs of the signature on the application and of payroll signature. Analysis in the detachment's laboratory revealed 91 points of coincidence and only nine points of noncoincidence in the two signatures. As a result, was identified as the person who had applied for membership in the Communist Party four years earlier.[273]

These cases demonstrate the use of various investigative techniques which were used frequently by the Puerto Rican Detachment--use of informants, records checks, undercover work, use of technical equipment, and general coverage of public places as a preventive measure.

Investigations were initiated at the request of the G2 office early in the war; however, the detachment automatically investigated all reports from Puerto Rican citizens who thought they knew of incidents of espionage or sabotage. Most of these complaints from spy-conscious civilians were of no importance, and the detachment found itself busy with exaggerated stories which did not check when investigated. One such report, for example, was that enemy agents were flashing signals to an enemy submarine from a certain beach. Agents investigated for three weeks, only to find that the lights were being caused by harmless crab fishermen searching beaches with sputtering torches. To preclude such unnecessary investigations,

272 . 471st CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for Dec 44, Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, to CG, ASF, dtd 1 Jan 45, (Secret) (Cen Rec Fac).

273 . Ibid for 1 Jan 45.

the detachment eventually was directed to forward all complaints to the G2 in the form of a Summary of Information. G2 then evaluated the information and determined which reports would be investigated.[274]

Work of the detachment in Puerto Rico multiplied many times as the war progressed. In 1943, agents investigated 950 cases, in addition to the screening of more than 15,000 inductees.[275] But during 1945, the detachment conducted 9,607 investigations while screening 10,900 inductees.

Most of the work in 1945 concerned routine loyalty investigations--there were 9,251 of them of applicants for employment within the Antilles Department. A total of 187 applications were rejected on the basis of CIC reports.

Not reflected in these statistics were the security measures which the 471st maintained as checks against possible espionage or sabotage. Between January 1945 and the cessation of hostilities in August, the Security Section made 104 security surveys and spot checks of military installations, made security recommendations for 65 troop movements, and delivered 42 security lectures.

A travel control function also was assumed by the Security Section, and during 1945 more than 14,550 Army Transport Service passengers and approximately 3,000 air passengers were screened by agents at Trinidad, British West Indies, Borinquen Air Base, Batista Airport, and Army Base Operations at Isla Grande Airport in San Juan.

The agents of the 471st CIC also maintained weekly coverage of secret meetings of subversive groups in Puerto Rico. Some 214 contacts were made during 1945 with confidential informants who were providing information on the activities of such groups as the Executive Committee of the Marxist Movement of Puerto Rico, the Intellectual Communist Cell at the University of Puerto Rico, the National Board of Direction of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, the Pro-Independence Congress, and the Independentist Youth Association. Internal security coverage was provided on 39 assemblies held by subversive groups during the year. Special efforts were made to gain information concerning operations of couriers of known subversive groups and of the actions of prominent foreign subversives who visited the island. Agents constantly checked Communist propaganda books and pamphlets coming into Puerto Rico from Cuba.[276]

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274 Interviews with Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, and Capt Vicente Saras, cited in Basic Doc.

275 Memo, CIC to G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 1 Jan 44, subj: CIC Activities, PR Sector, for the year 1943, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

276 Memo, Maj Pedro M. Velez, Jr, to AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 2 Jan 46, subj: Activities of the 471st CIC Det During the Year 1945, (Secret) (Departmental Records Br, AGO, Alexandria, Va.).

Section 4

CIC IN TRINIDAD

Trinidad, a small British insular possession off the coast of Venezuela in the British West Indies, was important to the United States during World War II as the site of air and naval bases leased from Great Britain. American military forces on the island were governed by the Trinidad Sector and Base Command which fell within the Caribbean Defense Command.

In the summer of 1941, Brig. Gen. Ralph Talbot, Jr., Commanding General of the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, requested the allotment of eight Corps of Intelligence Police agents to his command.[277] Although the request was approved, by 30 September 1941 only one agent had been procured for duty in Trinidad.

Working out of the G2 office at Whitehall, this agent and three others who joined him before 7 December 1941 performed only limited counterintelligence service. Great Britain had been at war since 1939, and British security forces had both the local populace and transient personnel well under control. In addition to counterintelligence measures within the U.S. military establishment on Trinidad, the first Corps of Intelligence Police agents investigated suspected sabotage of Pan American Airways equipment and occasionally looked into purely criminal matters.

Unlike other detachments in the Caribbean, the small group in Trinidad was not plunged into frenzied activity by the entrance of the United States into World War II. During January 1942, the detachment reported only 14 investigations--nine of them routine loyalty checks.[278]

One of the three men who had recently reported from the United States was dismissed from the Corps for misconduct in January 1942, and a private selected locally was assigned as a replacement. Less than a month later he also was dismissed from the Corps. Two Special Agents were acquired from the II Corps Area on 15 February 1944, but still another agent was reduced to private and transferred out of the Corps in April. By July, there were eight agents on duty in Trinidad, and 1st Lt. Richard W. Clement had been assigned as the first commanding officer of the Trinidad Detachment.[279]

Agents saw little activity during the first six months of 1942. They assisted boarding officers in the interrogation of crews of ships calling at Port-of-Spain

277 Ltr, Brig Gen Ralph Talbot, Jr, to TAG, dtd 11 Jul 41, subj: Corps of Intelligence Police Ratings, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

278 Basic Doc, p 34.

279 Ibid, p 35.

and on at least one occasion, in February 1944, boarded damaged ships to determine whether they had been hit by enemy torpedoes or damaged by saboteurs. The detachment was also concerned with labor trouble and possible espionage by employees of defense contractors in the area. Surveillance of harbor areas and places frequented by American military personnel on off-duty hours was continued throughout the war.[280]

Gradually the detachment grew. By November, 17 of 28 authorized vacancies were filled.[281] On 14 November 1942, the War Department was requested to increase the allotted strength to 43 agents, but there is no evidence that this request was given favorable consideration.[282]

Local acquisitions and five agents transferred from Panama boosted the strength of the detachment to 27 agents by mid-March 1944. First Lt. Anthony W. Lobb had come to Whitehall as Chief, CIC, in February, and in March was joined by 2d Lt. Nathan R. Preston who originally reported to Panama with the so-called "Notorious Eighteen."[284]

Six agents were assigned to sector headquarters; four to travel control duties with Air Transport and Troop Carrier Command at Waller Field; two to travel control at Piarco Airport in connection with British authorities; two with the S2 at Curacao; two in Aruba-Curacao; one at Paramaribo; one at Hyde Park, British Guiana; and three

During the spring of 1943, the detachment conducted an average of about 49 investigations monthly--less than two per agent.[285]

Lt. Col. P. N. Derzis, G2 of the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, believed that the detachment was overstrength. On 21 March 1943, after the arrival of five new agents in Trinidad, he protested to Col, S. M. Montesinos, G2 of the Caribbean Defense Command:

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280 Basic Doc, p 36.

281 Ltr, AC of S, G2, CDC, to AC of S, G2, WD, dtd 4 Nov 42, subj: CIC Personnel for Trinidad Sector, cited in Basic Doc.

282 Ltr, TS&BC 322.999, C of S, Trinidad Sector and Base Command, dtd 14 Nov 42, subj: Increase in Allotment of Counter Intelligence Corps Agents, cited in Basic Doc.

283 Basic Doc, p 36.

284 Ibid, p 64

285 Ibid, p 65

"At this time there are more than enough agents on duty at T.S. and B.C. and it is requested that no more be sent here until we can arrange their duties... For the time being, we would like to pare down our unit, weed out the less valuable men, and straighten things out. Until we do this we do not need any more agents."[286]

But Lt. Col. E. A. Rew, Chief, CIC, CDC, scoffed at such suggestions. Commenting on Colonel Derzis' letter, Colonel Rew remarked: "It is obvious... that the Officer-in-Charge of the Trinidad Sector and Base Command Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is not making full use of men." Colonel Rew insisted that additional agents could be used at Aruba, Paramaribo, and Hyde Park, and that men should be permanently placed at Saint Lucia, Barbados, and Tobago.[287] On 8 April 1943, Colonel Rew inspected the CIC detachment in Trinidad and found "much to criticize" in the way agents were being employed.[288]

Apparently Colonel Rew's inspection did not effect immediate reforms. On 1 July 1943 the Trinidad Detachment became a sub-detachment of the Antilles Department CIC.[289] Capt. Elbert D. Turner, Jr., commander of the Antilles Detachment, also was dissatisfied with CIC operations in Trinidad at the time of the change. On 3 July he wrote:

"...I do not feel that proper use has been made of the CIC in Trinidad Sector. Neither the Officers nor Agents of that Detachment with whom I have talked appear to have any clear idea of the meaning of Counter-intelligence. The number of men reduced for disciplinary reasons in that Sector is an indication of either poor selection or poor control on the part of responsible Officers. The paucity of information in Counter-intelligence reports emanating from that Sector cannot be due to a complete lack of subversive activity... Two recent intelligence reports from the Aruba area illustrate what I may term failure of the CIC. The first mentioned possible attempt to use APO to smuggle U.S. currency, the other a woman of questionable reputation had been interrogating members of U.S. Armed Forces. In neither one was there indication of investigation by Counter Intelligence Corps."[290]

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286 Ltr, Lt Col P. N. Derzis to Col S. M. Montesinos, dtd 21 Mar 43, subj: CIC Agents, cited in Basic Doc.

287 Memo, Lt Col E. A. Rew to Col S. M. Montesinos, dtd 29 Mar 43, cited in Basic Doc.

288 Basic Doc, p 50.

289 Ibid, p 65.

290 Memo, Capt Elbert D. Turner, Jr, to G2, Antilles Dept, dtd 3 Jul 43, (Conf) (Cen Rec Fac).

Once the Trinidad agents became a part of the Antilles Detachment, Capt. Marvin S. Bennett and 2d Lt. Keith G. Sebelius were sent from Puerto Rico to direct CIC activities in Trinidad, and the sub-detachment soon was operating to Captain Turner's satisfaction.[291]

291 Basic Doc, p 64.

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Section 5

THE 606th CIC DETACHMENT[292]

Mounting numbers of accidents and incidents of suspected sabotage involving aircraft, coupled with a corresponding increase in the routine work load of the Counter Intelligence Corps, led the War Department in 1943 to provide for activation of special CIC units to work with Army Air Commands.

Until 1943, the investigation of Army airplane accidents and defects in air materiel was a function of the CIC detachment within whose jurisdiction the incidents occurred. However, adequate investigation of such incidents usually required special technical knowledge which the average CIC agent did not have. In the Panama Canal Department, for example, agents lacked both the training and the time to check into aircraft accidents. In keeping with the new War Department policy, a special detachment was activated and attached to the Sixth Air Force, which was an air command in the Panama Canal Department.[293]

Originally, the detachment attached to the Sixth Air Force was designated simply as the Sixth Air Force CIC Detachment. Later, with the general reorganization of the CIC in the Caribbean Defense Command in 1944, its name was changed, on 31 July 1944, to the 606th CIC Detachment.[294]

The nucleus for the 606th consisted of two officers and four Special Agents. Commanding the group was 1st Lt. Rene Menendez, who was promoted to captain on 22 September 1944. There were few CIC personnel in the CDC whose background and abilities qualified them as well as Menendez for service in the Caribbean. Born and reared in Havana, Cuba, Captain Menendez came to the United States when he was 16 years old. As a result of this background he had excellent command of the Spanish language and general familiarity with the Caribbean and Latin American customs. After completing his education in the United States, Captain Menendez worked as foreign accountant handling accounts of Latin American subsidiaries of the Commercial Molasses Corporation in New York.

Executive officer under Captain Menendez was 1st Lt. Ben L. Robertson. He was subsequently given supervision over travel control, security, and crash investigations. His civilian experience included the operation of an oil pipeline company and work as an agent for a group of independent oil operators.

The four agents in the original group were Melvin M. Diggs, a Texan with considerable experience as a civilian investigator for Government agencies;

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292 See also chapter on CIC With the Air Force.

293 App C, p 1, Basic Doc.

294 Par 2, SO No. 168, Hq, CDC, dtd 25 Jul 44, cited in Basic Doc.

Clyde H. Moore, another Texan who had been a school teacher in civilian life; Nealy E. Butler, a Missouri lawyer; and Robert F. Gooch, a law student from California.[295]

They were brought together in Maryland in December 1943. Leaving the Port of Embarkation at New Orleans late in December, they arrived at Cristobal, C.Z. on 9 January 1944. There the detachment set up its headquarters at Albrook Field in a building in the NCO section of the base. Until the arrival of additional personnel, this building also served as quarters for the agents.

Direction and assistance in establishing the new detachment was given by Lt. Col. E. A. Rew, then chief of CIC, Caribbean Defense Command. Unfortunately, officials of the Sixth Air Force had not been given adequate notice of the arrival of the new detachment, and no arrangements had been made for the housing and physical needs of the agents. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the AC of S, A2, who was then Lt. Col. Robert W. Benn, had never worked with CIC and was not familiar with detachment operations. Further complications were the secrecy concerning modus operandi of the unit, and the fact that even the officials could not understand why the agents wore civilian clothes.[296]

On 29 February 1944, a second contingent of 16 agents arrived at Cristobal for duty with the detachment. All but three of these agents had traveled in civilian clothes. When the three in uniform later changed into civilian clothing, there was some embarrassment when they met former traveling companions among military personnel.

[297]

Four agents of this new group were placed [redacted] two of them operating in civilian clothes and two in uniform. The two men in uniform were assigned to France Field, C.Z., [redacted] When this mission was completed, they returned to civilian status at detachment headquarters.

Other agents were assigned as follows: Guatemala City, Guatemala Field Office, two agents; Salinas, Ecuador, Field Office, two agents; France Field, Canal Zone, one agent; San Jose, Costa Rica, one agent; Rio Hato Army Air Base, Puerto Rico, one agent.

For several weeks, agents were briefed on economic, political, subversive, and psychological conditions in the areas in which they would work. One agent

295 App C, pp 2-3, Basic Doc.
296 Ibid, pp 3-5
297 Ibid, p 6

who possessed considerable technical knowledge of Air Force materiel was assigned to the Intelligence Office, Panama Air Depot. The remainder were retained at detachment headquarters to be utilized as necessary. Initial assignments were based on an estimate of current needs. Many adjustments in the disposition of the agents were eventually made to meet unforseen exigencies and to increase the efficiency of the organization.[298]

When the first CIC agents arrived in January 1944 for duty with the Sixth Air Force they were six in number. The strength was increased to 22 by the arrival of the 16 agents in the second contingent. On 31 July 1944, when the detachment was formally activated as the 606th CIC Detachment attached to the Sixth Air Force, Panama Canal Department, only 14 agents and two officers were on duty with the detachment.[299]

All orders which initially attached CIC personnel to the Sixth Air Force specified that their assignments to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, remained unchanged.[300] But on 19 March 1944, CIC agents and officers on duty with the Sixth Air Force were relieved from assignment to CIC, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and were transferred to CIC, CDC.[301]

Mission of the Detachment

Purpose of the 606th was to relieve the Panama Detachment of routine counter-intelligence coverage for the Sixth Air Force and, more important, to provide expert investigation of airplane crashes and sabotage of Air Force materiel. For this latter function, the agents had received special training at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or Chanute Field, Illinois. Aside from the technical aspects of air investigations, the 606th was to operate much the same way as the other detachments in the Caribbean Defense Command.

During the first 12 months of operation, little of the detachment's work consisted of airplane crash investigations. Virtually all such work was accomplished by one Special agent whose prior experience qualified him for the job. At this time, it should be noted, the policy was for the detachment not to concern itself with crash investigations unless sabotage or subversion was indicated in the course of the normal Army Air Force investigations. In the early months of 1945, however,

298 App C, p 8, Basic Doc.
299 Basic Doc.
300 Pars 1-4, SO No. 8, CDC, dtd 10 Jan 44; and pars 1-2, SO No. 50, Hq, CDC, dtd 2 Mar 44, both cited in Basic Doc.
301 Par 6, SO No. 62, Hq, CDC, dtd 18 Mar 44, cited in Basic Doc.

an alarming number of crashes focused CIC attention on the problem and resulted, in March 1945, in the establishment of a crash investigations section within the detachment.[302]

Jurisdiction

The operational relationship between the Sixth Air Force Detachment and the Panama Canal Department Detachment (470th) was first set out in an agreement executed at Quarry Heights, C.Z., in March 1944. This agreement provided that the operations of the 606th would be "confined to Sixth Air Force installations, personnel, facilities, materiel, and equipment in the Panama Canal Department, the use and service of which are confined to the boundaries embracing the physical location of Sixth Air Force bases, stations, positions, and auxiliary fields."

With respect to leads uncovered during investigations, it was provided that requests for the development of such leads would be sent to the Panama Canal Department Detachment or to an Army Military Attache if outside the area where Panama Canal Department agents were operating. Actually, the literal terms of this agreement were modified by a high degree of cooperation between the two detachments and a spirit of mutual aid and coordination among individual agents.[303]

Four months later, the question of jurisdiction again arose with respect to the processing of personnel investigations which the 606th was then undertaking in considerable numbers. With the approval of the AC of S, G2, Panama Canal Department, the commanders of the 606th and the 470th worked out the following agreement: (1) The 606th was to investigate all civilian personnel employed by the Army Air Force in the Panama Canal Department; (2) The 606th was authorized to conduct all necessary investigations in the Canal Zone or in areas outside the Canal Zone where no agent from the 470th was stationed and where on hand there was a resident agent from the 606th; (3) The 470th was to make all record or agency checks in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama, and it was to develop all leads concerning the investigations being conducted by the 606th in the Republic of Panama. It was also agreed that any inter-detachment problems were to be worked out by the respective commanding officers. Informal cooperation between the 606th and the 470th became and remained the watchword in their inter-detachment relationships.[304]

In its relations with higher intelligence echelons of the Caribbean Defense Command, the 606th had two distinct channels, one for administrative purposes and one for operational functions. In administrative matters, the commanding officer of the 606th dealt directly with the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense

302 App C, p 10, Basic Doc.
303 Ibid, p 18
304 Ibid, p 20

Command. Operationally, the detachment was under the direct supervision of the AC of S, A2, Sixth Air Force, who in turn worked closely with the G2, Panama Canal Department. In actual practice, however, it became difficult to distinguish between purely administrative and operational matters with the result that the A2 usually served as an intermediary between the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense Command, and the detachment commander.

Promotion and transfer orders and orders affecting the duty status of agents were usually published by the Caribbean Defense Command at the request of the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense Command. Operational orders, including movement orders and authorizations for allowances in lieu of rations and quarters, were published by the Sixth Air Force as "CIC Letter Orders." Often, verbal orders were used to move agents within the Sixth Air Force.

Field Offices Established

One of the first moves taken by the new detachment upon its arrival in the Sixth Air Force Area was the creation of a network of field offices which would insure adequate counterintelligence coverage for all major installations and bases utilized by the Sixth Air Force. There were five, located as follows: Field Office 1, Albrook Field and Panama Air Depot; Field Office 2, Guatemala City, Guatemala; Field Office 3, Salinas, Ecuador; Field Office 4, France Field, Canal Zone; and Field Office 5, Rio Hato, Puerto Rico.

Field Office 1 was a part of detachment headquarters. The area covered by this office included Albrook Field, the Panama Air Depot, Howard Field, and minor Air Force installations within working distance of Albrook Field. Originally, a "Special Agent-in-Charge" was designated to take charge of this office, but it later proved advisable to make this position an added duty of the detachment's chief investigator. Of the agents assigned to this office, one or two were detailed to duty with the intelligence officer at the Panama Air Depot. Security surveys were initially handled by this office, but a separate Security Survey Section within the detachment was organized later. One distinctive feature of operations was that while agents at all other field offices operated out of the offices of the base intelligence officer, at Albrook Field no agents were detailed specifically to the base A2, although close contact with that officer was maintained.

Field Office 2, in Guatemala City, was normally manned by one agent. This office was concerned with coverage for the Army Air Force installations at Guatemala City and San Jose, Guatemala, and Managua, Nicaragua. The agent-in-charge resided in Guatemala City, but his office was at the Air Force installation. He normally travelled between the various installations by military aircraft, although railroad service was available. Theoretically, the agent-in-charge here was responsible to the intelligence officer. But because the installation was small,

the commanding officer served as his own intelligence officer and the agent was often asked to give intelligence aid directly to the commanding officer. The agent on duty maintained close liaison with United States Military and Legal Attaches in Guatemala City. Occasionally, with the approval of the Military Attache, he conducted investigations within the city itself.

One agent was assigned to Field Office 3, at the Air Force installation in Salinas, Ecuador. Territory covered by this office also included the Army Air Base on the Galapagos Islands and an installation at Talara, Peru. Like the agent in Guatemala City, the Special agent-in-charge utilized military planes for travel in his assigned territory. Functions of the two field offices were much the same. One added function for the agent in Salinas was the clearance of native workers for the Galapagos Islands. Periodically, a boat was dispatched from the Galapagos to the mainland to bring newly-hired workers back to the islands. Meeting officials from the Galapagos Base when the boat docked at Guayaquil, Ecuador, the agent assisted them in hiring workers by making on-the-spot record checks. This procedure was, of course, adequate only for nonsensitive positions; nevertheless, it weeded out many undesirable employees.

The agent-in-charge of Field Office 4 had a desk in the office of the base A2 at France Field. This agent worked closely with the S2 on counterintelligence and security matters. He also developed leads assigned by detachment headquarters, including leads in the Atlantic Sector of the Canal Zone. In such cases, however, the Atlantic Sector office of the 470th CIC Detachment was advised beforehand. For transportation this agent was provided a detachment vehicle and, by using the Trans-Isthmian Highway, he could visit detachment headquarters at Albrook Field frequently.

Field Office 5 was designed to cover installations at David and Aguadulce in the Republic of Panama, in San Jose, Costa Rica, and in Rio Hato, Puerto Rico, where it was located. The duties of the agent assigned here were similar to those of the Special agent-in-charge of Field Office 4.[305]

Within detachment headquarters, the chain of command descended from the commanding officer through the executive officer to a Special agent-in-charge of administration and another who was designated chief investigator. The agent in charge of administration and the chief investigator exercised joint, direct liaison with field offices.

In March 1945, the addition of travel control functions and new emphasis on airplane crash investigations led to revamping of the detachment headquarters

305 App C, pp 16-19, Basic Doc.

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organization.[306] Lieutenant Robertson became security and crash investigations officer. Special agents under his supervision were assigned to direct crash investigations, travel control, and general security measures. Functions of the chief investigator and agent in charge of administration were not changed.

When clerical and routine office duties increased, civilian stenographers were employed to release agents for investigative work. By May 1945, four stenographers were working at detachment headquarters.

Some of these routine duties included maintenance of service records of agents within the detachment. All service records and allied papers were kept at detachment headquarters. Morning reports were routed to the Chief, CIC, CDC, who prepared consolidated morning reports.

In addition to its administrative files, the detachment maintained its own intelligence files and all intelligence files for the A2 of the Sixth Air Force. In March 1945, the A2 intelligence files were transferred to the 606th CIC Detachment and were combined with CIC files. All names appearing in reports were catalogued on small cards which provided a ready index to contents of the files.[307]

Protection of Identity of Agents

Unlike other CIC units in the Caribbean, the 606th was seldom faced with the compromise of identities of its agents. Most agents worked in civilian clothing, and their connection with the Army was classified secret. Agents were paid by check, and only those agents claiming an allowance in lieu of quarters were required to sign the payroll. Quarters usually were provided in the officers' area of the installation on which agents worked. In lieu of rations, agents received a subsistence allowance of $2.25 per day. No restrictions were placed on the movement of agents at the installations where they worked. All-area passes were provided. As a further protection for agents' identities, four civilian-type automobiles were available--three at detachment headquarters and one at France Field. Although few agents of the 606th were fluent in Spanish, this did not result in the compromise of their identities, since new agents worked among the native populace.[308]

Training

In preparation for assignment with Air Force CIC units, 15 of the first 20 agents assigned to the Sixth Air Force Detachment had attended the special CIC

306 2d Ind dtd 7 Mar 45 to Ltr, WD AGO 00.73 (26 Jan 45) OB-S-B-M, dtd 1 Feb 45, subj: Censorship of Communications Carried by Air Travelers, cited in Basic Doc.

307 App C, pp 26-27, Basic Doc.

308 Ibid, p 30

schools in airplane mechanics at either Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or Chanute Field, Illinois. Of the other five, three had acquired experience by contact with the Air Forces as investigators or trainees. As a result, little emphasis was placed on training within the detachment. Daily language classes were held at detachment headquarters, and when the 606th began to recruit replacements locally in mid-1944, new agents were sent to preliminary training schools conducted by the Antilles Department at San Juan, Puerto Rico.[309]

At the outset of the detachment's operations, with 20 agents, there were more agents available than there were duties for them. To relieve this initial congestion several agents were transferred from the 606th to other detachments in CDC. As time went on, however, the 606th took on new responsibilities, and a shortage of personnel arose. Strength reports indicate that the average number of agents present for duty during the first 15 months of the detachment's existence was 16.[310]

CIC Operations

Until the detachment firmly established itself within the organizational framework of the Sixth Air Force, higher officials were prone to assign agents tasks that were not within the CIC mission. This was perhaps inevitable, since most Sixth Air Force officials were unfamiliar with the function of a CIC detachment. Many matters handled in the first months of operation were criminal cases of no counterintelligence interest. For example, of the first 10 cases investigated by the detachment, one involved the suicide of a soldier; another, a shortage of funds at an NCO Club. Both were solved.

Gradually, as the detachment established itself and proved its worth, it was permitted to devote most of its time to its counterintelligence mission. When the CIC detachment caught criminal suspects, its prestige as an investigative agency grew. Usually wide publicity was given to such achievements, and agents gained the reputation of being resourceful and competent men. One task assigned that was only on the periphery of counterintelligence coverage was the placement of agents in base intelligence offices to act in the capacity of base intelligence officers in the absence of regular base intelligence officers. Although these duties were chiefly administrative rather than investigative, the role played by agents so assigned contributed substantially to intelligence standards within the Sixth Air Force. Many base intelligence officers had received little specialized training; by working with the CIC agents assigned to them they were able to learn accepted intelligence techniques. Agents also relieved many of the base A2's to permit these officers to attend a school for Air Force intelligence officers in Orlando, Florida.

309 App C, p 31, Basic Doc.
310 Ibid, p 34

It may be taken as indicative of the high standards of ability and responsibility of CIC agents in the 606th that they were able to assume the staff officer functions of base intelligence officer, and, in many instances, perform them better than the commissioned personnel they relieved.[311]

Counterespionage, in the sense of protecting military information, was a vital part of the detachment's responsibility. Agents made security surveys of every major installation in the Sixth Air Force, and most of the minor bases, to determine their vulnerability not only to espionage but also to sabotage. From such surveys came necessary reforms and corrective measures. Since no known enemy-inspired activity occurred, it may be concluded that the surveys were largely successful.

At the same time, the detachment campaigned for security-mindedness among military and civilian personnel of the Sixth Air Force. Agents lectured on the necessity for safeguarding military information. During June 1944, 13 such lectures were given. Also a part of the security campaign was the distribution of eye-catching security posters, created by an agent with artistic ability. A pamphlet entitled "Back to the States," which combined security information with a handbook of customs and censorship regulations, was also published by the detachment.[312]

During the first 15 months of the detachment's operations, not one instance of known enemy-inspired sabotage or espionage occurred within the Sixth Air Force.

One of the important measures taken to achieve this remarkable result was the screening and clearing of civilian employees. Many of these workers were United States citizens who had received State Department permission to seek employment in the Canal Zone. Background investigations were conducted on applicants for sensitive positions. In the case of alien employees, recruited within the countries where the Sixth Air Force was operating, the background checking and screening was even more extensive. By means of hundreds of background investigations and agency checks, the 606th came to know and follow the activities of potentially subversive employees working for the Sixth Air Force. Several particularly suspect individuals were discharged as a result of this painstaking procedure.[313]

In the first month of its operations, January 1944, the detachment undertook only four investigations. But between July and December 1944, a total of 1,121 investigations were completed. Most of these investigations were the personnel

311 App C, p 13, Basic Doc.
312 Ibid, p 36
313 Ibid, p 35

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type, but in the first 16 months of the detachment's existence there were 26 espionage and 73 sabotage cases, as well as 21 cases dealing with subversive activity. There were also 32 "special cases" which included criminal cases and others not readily classified.

Classification of cases was not always easy. A violation of censorship regulations, for example, might be classified as disaffection, espionage, sedition, or treason, depending on the particular circumstances.

Many of the detachment's accomplishments do not lend themselves to tabulation. The records do not reflect, for example, the valuable travel control function which was undertaken to insure that unauthorized military information was not carried by air passengers. Nor can statistics show the worth of improved intelligence coverage brought about by agents who served as intelligence officers.[314]

314 App C, p 38, Basic Doc.

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Section 6

THE 472d CIC DETACHMENT[315]

The CIC detachment attached to the Sixth Air Force was less than a month old when the first officer and agents arrived in the Antilles Department to organize a similar unit for duty with the Antilles Air Command.

Capt. David B. Dickey, a Military Intelligence officer, arrived at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on 9 February 1944 to assume command of the detachment that was yet to be organized. Within five weeks, he had 12 agents under his command, and a 13th agent was on duty by the end of March. Detachment headquarters was established at San Juan in one of the buildings occupied by Headquarters, Antilles Air Command. On 18 March 1944 Captain Dickey and his agents were transferred from the CIC, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, to the Counter Intelligence Corps, Caribbean Defense Command. They were then placed on detached service with the Antilles Air Command.[316]

On 30 July 1944, the detachment moved with Headquarters, Antilles Air Command, to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico. Up to this time, the detachment had no numerical designation. But with the reorganization of CIC within CDC, the detachment was formally activated as the 472d CIC Detachment, attached to the Antilles Air Command, on 31 July 1944. Its authorized strength was 22 enlisted men and one officer. Although the authorized strength was attained by nominally assigning men to the 472d from other CDC units, the number of agents actually on duty remained about 14. Men nominally assigned to the 472d were almost immediately placed on detached service with other detachments where they were needed more.[317]

Disposition of Agents

During March and April 1944, agents were distributed throughout the various air bases in the Antilles Air Command in the following manner: Atkinson Field, British Guiana, one agent; Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico, four agents; Waller Field, Trinidad, British West Indies, three agents; Batista Field, Cuba, two agents; and Vernam Field, Jamaica, two agents. All agents on duty outside detachment headquarters worked under the supervision of base A2's.

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315 See also chapter on CIC With the Air Force.

316 Interview with Capt G. B. Sargent, Asst A2, Antilles Air Command, 14 May 1945, cited in Basic Doc.

317 472d CIC Det Monthly Info Rpt for April 1945, dtd 1 May 45, cited in Basic Doc.

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Agents assigned to the various field offices were expected to conduct investigations of aircraft accidents, fires, and other incidents which might involve sabotage. They also conducted loyalty investigations of military and civilian personnel in key positions. Other duties included assisting the base intelligence officers in establishing and maintaining base security, investigations of alleged subversive activity and violations of AR 380-5, liaison with other War Department agencies and Allied intelligence officials, and the performance of any special duties which would aid in the accomplishment of the general mission of the CIC.[318]

Training

Most agents of the 472d had received specialized training at various Army air schools throughout the United States in addition to CIC training. Within the detachment, additional training took the form of language classes, the study of aircraft technical manuals and orders, physical exercise, and training films. Agents were also instructed in the preparation of security lectures, photography, fingerprinting, firearms proficiency, and security checks.

Since all of the agents in the 472d were continental Americans, some language difficulty was experienced. Few of the men spoke Spanish. A Puerto Rican interpreter was employed at the Borinquen Field office, and he accompanied agents who found it necessary to travel away from the base during an investigation. In addition, one of the agents stationed at Borinquen Field had formerly taught Spanish in an American university. Six agents were given a course of 20 lessons in conversational Spanish, and all were constantly encouraged to improve their Spanish.[319]

In April 1945, 1st Lt. Keith G. Sebelius, who had previously served as officer-in-charge of the 471st CIC Detachment's field office in Trinidad, was assigned to the 472d as executive officer. Captain Dickey was promoted to major during the same month.[320]

Operation

The primary task of the 472d was the investigation of crashes of military planes in the Antilles Air Command Area. In November 1944, a B-29 training program was initiated at Borinquen Field. A succession of B-29 crashes and accidents which followed called for considerable investigation by the CIC agents stationed there. Several months later this program was extended to Batista Field, Cuba, and Vernam Field, Jamaica. Similar coverage was given these bases by agents of the 472d working in cooperation with Second Air Force CIC agents.[321]

318 App D, p 3, Basic Doc.
319 Interview with Capt G. B. Sargent, cited in Basic Doc.
320 Ibid.
321 Ltr, AC of S, G2, CDC, to AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, undated, subj: Second Air Force Personnel, cited in Basic Doc.

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All agents of the 472d worked in civilian clothing except officers and one administrative NCO stationed at Borinquen Field. Agents in civilian clothing went about the various installations as civilian employees of the War Department. They lived in officers' quarters and ate most of their meals at officers' clubs.[322]

In June 1944, the CIC in the Caribbean Defense Command took over the loyalty and character investigations of civilian employees from the Provost Marshal. Personnel investigations then became the bulk of the detachment's work. Of 137 case investigations performed in January 1945, all but 15 were of this type.[323]

Initially, air travel control was a responsibility of the agents stationed at Borinquen Field, Waller Field, and the headquarters of the 472d when it was located at San Juan. Such control entailed inspection of both baggage and personnel traveling by air. In the early part of 1945, this work was taken over by the S2 offices at both fields, and CIC agents were used for travel control only during rush periods and on Sundays and after hours.[324]

As in the case of the 606th CIC Detachment, the agents of the 472d were often asked to investigate criminal matters of no counterintelligence interest. Lt. Col. E. A. Rew, then the Chief, CIC, Caribbean Defense Command, had taken the position that CIC agents could be used on major extra-jurisdictional or criminal investigations, but he would not approve of their general use as criminal investigators. Actually, the only place where the criminal problem assumed any unusual proportions was at Batista Field, Cuba.[325]

Security surveys of major fields and bases were conducted frequently as a static counterintelligence measure. Similarly, security lectures and, whenever other duties permitted, censorship assistance were given by other agents of the 472d. When important persons, such as Gen. Hap Arnold and Mme. Chiang Kai Chek, arrived at Borinquen Field, agents there were detailed to security surveillance of the distinguished visitors.[326]

Activated late in the war, the 472d CIC Detachment conducted no spectacular investigations before the end of hostilities. Its work was routine, but necessary.

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322 App D, p 9, Basic Doc.

323 472d CIC Det Monthly Statistical Rpt for Jan 45, dtd 1 Feb 45, (Secret) (Central Records Facility).

324 Memo, AC of S, G2, Antilles Dept, to all Base Intelligence Officers in Antilles Dept, dtd 5 Apr 44, subj: Travel Censorship Procedure, cited in Basic Doc.

325 Ltr, Hq Antilles Air Cmd to Base S2's, dtd 10 May 45, subj: CIC Investigations, cited in Basic Doc.

326 App D, p 8, Basic Doc.

Worth of static security measures cannot be measured in statistics, but the fact that no instances of enemy sabotage or espionage were detected within the Antilles Air Command is testimony to the effectiveness of these preventive measures.

Appendix 1

Partial Roster of Agents with the Caribbean Defense Command. Complete Roster Unavailable.

Hanez, Albert R.	Banta, George	Dickey, David B.
Turner, Elbert D., Jr.	Jackson, Verne O.	Angell, John T.
Shapiro, Philip	Sebelius, Keith G.	Baker, Norman
Velez, Pedro M.	Rew, E. A.	Crespo, Emilio
Pierluisi, Guillermo	Diggs, Melvin M.	Gargiulo, Vincent
Bayley, Laurence T.	Gooch, Robert F.	Irizarry-Rodrigues, Leo
Bertlitz, Charles F.	Amster, Leo	Morales, Adolfo
Lobb, Anthony W.	Baker, John O.	Rios, Wilfredo M.
Robertson, Ben L.	Castro-Fernandez, A.	Suarez, Albert J.
Butler, Nealy E.	Espiet, Rafael J.	Surman, Stephen J.
Alejandro, Tomas	Haas, Leonard F.	Rigney, Joseph W.
Baco, Julian	Martin, Carlos	Frambes, Walter B.
Canner, Arthur L.	Perry, Walter W.	Zahour, Edward F.
Cullen, Thomas J.	Saar, William E.	Ruiz, Luis
Guinot, Luis	Young, Marvin N.	Seaton, Charles T., Jr.
Maldonado, Alfonso	Blanco, Ernesto C.	Sotomayor, Franco
Mills, Clemmer B.	Emberling, Lloyd E.	Fdez, Antonio Castro
Rovira-Sanchez, Jose	Malaret, Pedro E.	Daly, Richard W.
Tess, Laurence J.	Peters, Paul E.	Lorusso, Harry J.
Aranda, Juan C.	Cain, Albert P.	Moritz, Bernard
Bonissol, Maurice	Smith, James R.	Standefer, Harmon B.
Hoberg, Wilbur	Crooke, Alfredo	Coen, George W.
Mayoral, Jose	Carlson, Clifford W.	Kearney, James J., Jr.
Baker, James V.	Johnson, Robert B.	Moreno, Jose R.
Silen, Miguel A.	Mark, Seymour	Smith, Warren W.
Tirado, Hilario	Rosales, Joseph T.	Coleman, Clarence N.
Apatsky, Joseph	Bohan, William J.	Carey, Thomas J.
Fernandez, Federico L., Jr.	Franzmathes, Joe E.	Ashdown, Michael H.
Mapes, Robert W.	McMillan, Clarence O.	Koutz, Joseph G.
Reid, James M.	Reisner, David J.	Peralta, Angel L.
Williams, David B.	Berlitz, Charles F.	Rabenold, Elwood M., Jr.
Eveland, Wilbur C.	Cameron, Jack B.	Beck, Willard C.
MacDonald, Henry H.	Buffington, Richard	Cary, William F.
Munguia, Oscar O.	Hinds, Colin G.	Betzig, Edward C.
Enderwood, Robert B.	Bennett, Marvin S.	Franklin, Charles B., Jr.
Preston, Nathan R.	Foster, Robert McK., Jr.	Van Horn, Elvin E., Jr.
Saras, Vicente	Clement, Richard W.	Armanasco, August P.
Moore, Richard W.	Menendez, Rene	Loerke, Roman F.
Mumm, Harry G.	Moore, Clyde H.	Slacke, Robert C.

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Roster (Cont'd)

Ruggless, Charles B.
Byrne, Robert A.
Osborne, Walter
Pierce, Ouid W.
Caballero, Anthony
Flam, Marvin J.
Trombley, Norvell A.
Lively, Asa S.
Hanson, Odella A.
Poynton, Thomas M.
Corona, Moses D.
Middleton, Alexander M.
Cloyes, Robert J.
Fullen, Lilburn S.
Hodges, Theodore C.
Mosher, Frederick G.
Bachrach, William
Purcell, James B.
Ballou, Alfred F.
Adams, Edward G.
Wilson, Perry B.
Lustbader, Albert
Moss, Frank H.
MacQuarrie, Donald
Andrasek, John M.
Gaudreault, Ronald F.
Bolton, Frederick H.
Gray, Joseph O.
Whitehouse, William C., Jr.
Caputo, Joseph D.
Moreno, Jose R.
Merritt, John W.
Sledge, Wayne D.
Gwardiah, Richard
Mattos, Anthony R.
Spears, John H.
Coppolo, Benjamin R.
Rusch, Frederick W.
Bachman, Edward J.
Black, James J.
Knight, Jack W.
Bellar, Arthur J.
King, Alfred A.
Heimoski, Frank J.
Ridge, John M.
McCarty, Kenneth T.
Shaner, Edward M.
Bruno, John J.
Gellatly, Robert N.
Bell, Edward P.
Faboroni, Carl L.
Kaplan, Bernard
Gray, Aulden F.
Miller, James W.
Shutt, Robert H.
Weclew, Robert G.
Aronson, Saul H.
Cloyes, Robert E.
Cooper, Anson A.
Kerr, Earl F.
Holmberg, Frederick W.
Leath, Wilfred T.
Nelson, Andrew G.
Moore, Paul F.
Alcantara, Joseph R.
Howry, Erle
Karlson, Karl H.
Walcoff, Walter
Beebe, John O.
Stuart, Robert A.
Reid, Robert N.
Brooks, John J.
McCoy, Charles L.
Bogan, Myron E.
Martin, Harry K., Jr.
Dailey, Matthew J.
Biafore, Sam F.
Dwyer, John H., Jr.
Morrissey, John J.
Giacobbe, Wadie
Hannaman, George
Jester, Bernard E.

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

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DocumentATM Form ID 041610AGL001

NAME	REFERENCE
AAMODT, Hubert N.	(1)96
AARON, Harold R.	(1)145,(2)350,(29)3997
ABAI (fnu)	(23)3352
ABBOTT, Lyman Jr	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
ABDO, George	(11)1576,1590,1644
ABE, Davis S.	(30)4131
ABELES, Seymour B.	(1)55,(22)3087,3088,3137
ABELLA, Luis	(2)390,(8)1305,(13)1928,(15)2207
ABINEFF, A.M.	(22)3124
ABRAHAM, C.R.	(13)1816
ABRAHAM, George J.	(23)3361
ABRAMS, Gordon C.	(2)393,395,(5)907,(13)1932,(15)2210,2213,(16)2276, 2280,2287,(19)2631
ABRUZZESE, William	(12)1805
ACERNO, Albert V.	(22)3137
ACHIN, Roland M.	(2)376,(15)2191
ACKERMAN, Thomas R.	(23)3358

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHA ‖Rec: 17/239 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ACKLEY, Cortland G.	(30)4136
ADACHI, Shizuo	(30)4130
ADAIR, G.T.	(24)3399
ADAIR, Robert C.	(22)3171
ADAM, Francis O.Jr.	(8)1274
ADAMO, Frank	(23)3361
ADAMS, Arthur A.	(4)577,605,611,(8)1257
ADAMS, Arvel T.	(30)4134
ADAMS, C.M.	(10)1528
ADAMS, E.S.	(1)145,(2)223,(4)667,(5)711,734
ADAMS, Edward G.	(2)393,(9)1448,(15)2210
ADAMS, John J.	(2)381,392,(13)1937,(15)2197,2209,(19)2649
ADAMS, Maria Helena	(16)2264
ADAMS, Robert T.	(12)1805
ADAMS, William J.	(22)3076,3089,3137
ADDISON, Artie A.Jr.	(8)1275
ADKINSON, Neville K.	(1)145,(2)267,284(5)683,685,691,745,894,(6)964,

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(7)1108,1109,1112,1117,1118,(9)1390,1396,1409,1413, 1414,(10)1511,1513,1515,1516,(11)1626,1650
ADOLFO (Dr.)	(23)3372
ADRICULA, Julian D.	(23)3362
AFOOK, Everett J.	(22)3171
AGNETTA, Frederick N.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
AGUIAR, Antonio Gomez	(9)1421
AHN, Harry H.B.	(30)4016,4134
AHN, Jai Hong	(30)4090
AHROLD, Robert W.	(2)393,(15)2211
AIKEN, John N.	(2)393,(15)2210
AIKENS, Keith R.	(22)3137
AIMONE, William F.	(5)907,(22)3164,3166,3171
AITKEN, Malcolm D.	(22)3171
AITKEN, Robert T.	(22)3171
AITKEN, Victor M.	(22)3171
AKERS, Buford L.	(2)378,(15)2194

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
AKERS, Lloyd D.	(23)3360
AKIN, Spencer B.	(23)3309
AKIYAME, Teruo	(30)4131
AKTSINOV, Waldemar	(2)387,(15)2203
ALAJAJIAN, Jerry A.	(1)55,(23)3357
ALBEE, Theodore	(1)50
ALBERA, Rudolph C.	(2)394,(15)2212
ALBERT, Heinrich	(1)145,(2)185
ALBERTSON, Charles H.	(5)920,(23)3246
ALBRECHT, Eric M.	(2)394,(15)2212
ALBRECHT, Hubert	(16)2307
ALBRIGHT, Norman E.	(22)3076,3121,3137
ALCANTARA, Joseph R.	(9)1448
ALCOTTE, Chauncey G.	(2)393,(15)2210
ALDECOA, Fermin J.	(23)3358
ALDEN, Harry E.	(2)380,(15)2196
ALDORF, James R.	(8)1301,1305

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ALDWORTH, Edward K.	(22)3171
ALEJANDRINO, Louis	(23)3318,3324,3372,3374
ALEJANDRO, Tomas	(9)1410,1447
ALEKSIJIEV, Ivan	(19)2606
ALEXANDER, Harold R.L.	(12)1733
ALEXANDER, Harry E.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1931,(15)2208
ALFIERI, Mario P.	(1)55,(25)3583
ALI, Hanufi	(11)1576
ALICKI, John A.	(1)97,104
ALLAN, G.H.	(5)898
ALLEN, C.W.	(5)899
ALLEN, Eldon Leroy	(1)50,55,(2)373,377,(13)1911,(15)2188,2192,(19)2667, 2668
ALLEN, George S.	(8)1274
ALLEN, Holand S.	(2)380,(15)2196
ALLEN, Leven C.	(21)2903
ALLEN, Lyndon B.	(1)55,96,(2)372,(5)921,931,(11)1557,(13)1916,(14)2076

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	,2078,2084,(15)2187,(16)2303,2310,(18)2483
ALLEN, Robert R.	(2)386,(15)2202
ALLEN, Roland G.	(13)1922
ALLEN, Terry	(11)1581
ALLEN, Thomas B.	(2)378,(15)2194
ALLEN, Wayne H.	(30)4134
ALLMOND, Roy C.	(1)50,55,(23)3361
ALLOCCA, Joseph F.	(1)55,(22)3171
ALMIRANEZ, Irineo P.	(23)3362
ALMOND, Edward M.	(12)1753
ALSDORF, James R.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
ALTARAS, Jack C.	(2)372,386,(13)1915,(15)2187,2202
ALTENDORF, Paul Bernardo	(3)475,478-482
ALTER, David E.	(23)3359
ALTER, John E.	(2)388,(15)2205
ALTER, Richard J.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
ALTHAN, Warner F.	(2)394,(15)2212

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ALTMAN, Leo	(8)1199,1200
ALTSCHULER, Franz	(2)390,(15)2207
ALULI, Nane	(22)3171
ALVARADO, Lorenzo	(23)3222
AMANN, Max	(20)2849
AMBERG, Walter A.Jr	(2)386,392,(5)910,(13)1938,(15)2202,2210
AMBROSE, Wayne A.	(8)1274
AMBROSI, Jean	(26)3623
AMDER, Maurice	(1)20
AMERMAN, Harry Lee	(1)55,(2)380,(5)923,(11)1557,(12)1722,1736,1805, (15)2196
AMOLS, Seth G.	(1)55,(12)1805
AMSON, Gaston	(2)375,(15)2190
AMSTER, Leo	(9)1447
ANDERS, ElbertN.	(30)4133
ANDERSON, Alexander A.	(1)55,(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
ANDERSON, Andrew J.Jr.	(8)1274

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ANDERSON, Arthur E.	(1)55,(2)376,(15)2192,(20)2772
ANDERSON, Edmund O.	(2)382,(15)2198
ANDERSON, Elmer F.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
ANDERSON, Ernest E.	(5)912,(22)3171
ANDERSON, Frederick S.	(22)3171
ANDERSON, George K.	(28)3852
ANDERSON, George M.	(2)374
ANDERSON, Gordon C.	(9)1356
ANDERSON, Gordon M.	(1)56,(13)1918,(15)2189,(16)2266,2267,(19)2624,2626, (20)2767
ANDERSON, Harry A.	(23)3363
ANDERSON, Hilding A.	(1)56,(2)388,(13)1912,(14)2060,2062,2072,(15)2205
ANDERSON, James L.	(2)387,(11)1558,(12)1805,(13)2204
ANDERSON, John A.	(1)50,(23)3222
ANDERSON, John H.	(8)1277
ANDERSON, John K.	(30)4072,4131
ANDERSON, John W.	(30)4103

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ANDERSON, K.S.N.	(11)1546
ANDERSON, Leland R.	(23)3364
ANDERSON, Leroy	(10)1473
ANDERSON, Raymond L.	(23)3363
ANDERSON, Robert E.	(23)3360
ANDERSON, Robert G.	(22)3171
ANDERSON, Walter J.Jr	(2)386,(15)2202
ANDERSON, Warren R.	(2)379,384,(12)1715,1805,(15)2194,2201
ANDERSON, Wilber S.	(8)1274
ANDERSON, William A.Jr.	(8)1274
ANDERSON, William L.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
ANDINO, Eduardo	(9)1419
ANDRASEK, John M.	(9)1448
ANDRES, Dolores	(23)3331
ANDREW, Clifford M.	(22)3171
ANDREWS, James J.	(23)3359
ANEDA, Joseph R.Jr	(23)3364

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ANGEL, August D.	(2)392,(15)2210
ANGELL, Ernest	(3)443,507,508
ANGELL, John T.	(9)1447
ANGLE, Rosy S.F.	(23)3357
ANSBACHER, Edgar A.	(1)99,(2)375,(15)2190
ANSTETH, Robert M.	(22)3171
ANTHONY, Harry G.	(22)3171
ANTHONY, Samuel C.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
ANTHONY, William A.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
ANTLER, Gunther	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667,2668
APATSKY, Joseph	(1)56,(2)375,(9)1447,(15)2190
APITOLEH (nfn)	(23)3259
APPEL, Charles S.Jr.	(2)373,(5)909,(13)1916,(15)2188
APPEN, Albert von	(9)1402
APPLEBAUM, Milton	(10)1472
APPLEGATE (fnu)	(15)2197
APPLEGATE, Arthur H.	(2)375,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHA ‖Rec: 170/239 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
APPLEGATE, Thomas W.	(1)108,(2)265,(5)924,(23)3249,3250,3276,3360
APPLETON, Oliver D.	(1)56,96,(2)372,(5)914,(13)1915,(14)2028,2036,2079, 2080,(15)2187,(16)2254,(18)2481,(19)2684,(20)2847
ARANDA, Juan C.	(9)1447
ARASE, Matsuo	(28)3887,3888
ARCHON, Dion J.J.	(2)387,(12)1805,(15)2204
ARDIS, Carlton V.	(23)3356
ARGUELLO, Alfredo	(9)1399
ARIAS, Arnulfo	(9)1389,1394,1401
ARIAS-OLAVE, Ernestyna	(9)1394
ARITA, Katsuyoshi	(30)4131
ARMANASCO, August P.	(9)1447
ARMBRUST, Robert H.	(2)394,(15)2211
ARMIJO, Enrique M.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
ARMIN, Karl Jocheim	(27)3755-3758
ARMOLDY, Marie	(18)2492
ARMSTRONG, F.J.	(12)1715

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ARMSTRONG, Robert F.	(2)388,390,(13)1912,(15)2204,2207
ARMSTRONG, Thomas E.	(22)3171
ARMWOOD, J.H.	(5)905
ARNOLD, B.D.	(30)4132
ARNOLD, Benedict	(1)38
ARNOLD, Frank S.	(1)100,(2)377,(15)2193,(20)2868
ARNOLD, Henry H.	(1)145,(2)319,325,355,(9)1445,(10)1475,(11)1622, (22)3189,3204
ARNOLD, Robert F.	(9)1356
ARNOLD, Thomas D.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
ARNOULD, Jacques	(11)1615
ARONOFF, William R.	(2)375,(15)2190
ARONOWITZ, Marvin	(25)3583
ARONSON, Saul H.	(9)1448
ARONSON, Sol	(9)1380
ARONSON, Zola A.	(1)56,(2)384,395,(13)1937,(15)2200,2213
ARRINGTON, Kenneth H.	(8)1276

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ARRIZABALAGA, Ramon Jr	(1)56,100,145,(11)1609,(12)1748,1749,1796,1799,1805
ASCIUTTO, Alfred S.	(8)1276
ASH, George R.	(30)4119
ASH, William J.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
ASHDOWN, Michael H.	(5)906,(9)1447
ASHMORE, Leon E.	(23)3365
ASHTON, Alfred P.	(8)1254,1264
ASHTON, Jack R.	(11)1609
ASKIN, Leon	(8)1207
ATCHISON, Judson H.	(22)3171
ATKINS, Louis H.	(30)4136
ATKINSON, Harry G.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
ATTWOOD, William	(22)3171
ATTWOOD, William H.	(5)912,(23)3341,3345
ATWELL, George	(4)617
AUBREY, Francoise	(14)2065
AUBREY, Berthe	(14)2065

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
AUCIELLO, Domenico	(2)372,(11)1654,(15)2187
AUER, Bernard M.	(1)56,(22)3058,3059,3137
AULT, Donovan J.	(5)726,900,928,(7)1129,1155,(15)2145
AUNGST, Dean M.	(22)3171
AURAND, Henry S.	(7)1135
AURYANSEN, Eugene C.	(22)3171
AUSTELL, Howard J.	(9)1356
AVANCE, James D.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
AVERILL, Roswell P.	(8)1275
AVERY, Donald G.	(2)381,392,(13)1937,(15)2197,2210,(19)2650
AVISON, Gordon W.Jr	(30)4015,4130
AXMANN, Arthur	(26)3608,3613
AXTELL, Clayton M.	(1)56,(2)377,(15)2192
AYLETT, Orgill W.	(12)1805
AYLOR, John H.	(8)1274,(22)3214
AYR, Allenby H.	(1)98,(2)374,386,(5)915,(14)2076,2097,2098,(15)2189, 2202

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHA ‖Rec: 238/239 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
AZEZEDO, Daniel	(8)1274

NAME	REFERENCE
BABA, Yoshio	(30)4130
BABCOX, Edward S.Jr	(22)3171
BABCOX, Reid B.	(22)3171,(23)3363
BABILYA, Peter J.Jr	(1)56,(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198,(20)2854
BACH, Mathias	(16)2246
BACH, Morton	(22)3171
BACHMAN, Edward J.	(9)1448
BACHRACH, William	(9)1448
BACO, Julian	(9)1447
BACON, Leonard L.	(1)56,(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196
BACON, W.E.	(5)903
BACON, William C.	(9)1355
BACOON, Matthew W.	(25)3583
BADGER, Daniel B.	(1)56,(2)381,(13)1922,(15)2197,(19)2677
BADIO, Silene	(12)1779
BADOGLIO, Pietro	(12)1699,1703,1707,1715
BAER (fnu)	(16)2296,2299,2300

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BAER, David	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BAER, Manfred	(2)380,(15)2196
BAER, Paul H.	(2)394,(15)2212
BAESL, John M.	(9)1374
BAGGIO (French Col.)	(17)2396
BAGGS, Walter M.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BAGLIO, Michael J.	(12)1805
BAGLY, P.N.	(4)586
BAGNALL, Harold M.	(25)3583
BAGOT, Alfred W.	(29)3961
BAI ROSSI, Philip J.	(12)1805
BAILEY, George T.	(16)2246
BAILEY, Howard M.	(8)1276
BAILEY, James M.	(23)3365
BAILEY, Mintel A.	(22)3171
BAILEY, James B.	(1)56,(2)387,394,(12)1805,(15)2204,2212
BAILEY, Perry O.	(2)380,(8)1292,1293,(11)1610,1654,(15)2196

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NAME	REFERENCE
BAILEY, Thomas L.	(25)3539
BAIRD, John E.	(30)4020
BAKER, Bazil L.	(28)3853,3854,3865,3867
BAKER, Charles D.	(23)3356
BAKER, Edgar E.	(2)389,(15)2206
BAKER, Edward M.	(22)3171
BAKER, Elverson E.	(1)108
BAKER, Ernest Sidney	(1)104,(2)382,(5)915,(13)1924,(14)2040,2082,2102, (15)2198,(18)2517,2519
BAKER, George O.	(22)3164,3171
BAKER, Harry W.	(1)114,(30)4127,4134,4139
BAKER, James V.	(9)1447
BAKER, John O.	(9)1447
BAKER, Kenneth	(8)1199
BAKER, L.C.	(1)39,145,(2)177
BAKER, Marion P.(F.)	(2)390,(15)2207
BAKER, Newton D.	(1)43,(3)427,(4)539,548

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 51/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BAKER, Norman	(9)1447
BAKER, Walter B.Jr	(22)3076,3121,3137
BAKER, William C.	(1)56,(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
BAKEWELL, Alexander M.	(22)3171
BALABANOFF, Stefan K.	(25)3536
BALDI, John J.	(22)3171
BALDWIN, George A.	(1)98,(5)915,(22)3171,(23)3274,3307,3356
BALDWIN, Langford	(2)387,(11)1627,1655,(12)1728,1805,(15)2204
BALDWIN, La Verne	(17)2400
BALDWIN, Richard W.C.	(22)3171
BALDWIN, Robert L.	(22)3079,3121,3137
BALDWIN, Wesley	(22)3215
BALGOS, Mariano	(23)3372,3374
BALINTONG, Flaviano	(23)3362
BALKCAN, Robert A.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
BALKNAP, Ivan Carl	(11)1609
BALL, George E.	(1)47

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 68/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

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NAME	REFERENCE
BALL, Milton J.	(1)50
BALL, Spencer F.	(9)1355
BALLENTINE, Douglass K.	(5)926,(22)3098
BALLARD, George H.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BALLES, John J.	(2)375,(15)2190
BALLOU, Alfred F.	(1)57,(9)1448
BALLOU, Lawrence H.	(22)3052,3079,3103-3106,3120,3137
BALLSRUD, Wesley E.	(2)381,(13)1922,(15)2197
BAMBERGER, Werner	(1)57,(2)377,(15)2193,(18)2491,(20)2869
BAMBERTH, Peter H.	(2)379,(15)2195
BANDAWAY, J.H.	(5)929
BANDERA, Stefan	(27)3799
BANFIELD, Nathan F.III	(22)3171
BANFILL, C.Y.	(2)267,301
BANK, Vernon C.	(23)3359
BANTA, George Jr.	(5)899,(9)1409,1447
BANYAR, Frank G.	(1)57,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 85/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BARATY, Edward	(1)57,(2)384,(12)1805,(15)2101
BARAY, Albert A.	(2)393,(15)2210
BARBEE, Frank L.	(1)57,(23)3266,3267,3355
BARBER, Richard	(8)1194
BARBIER, Paul	(16)2315
BARBIERI (Countess)	(12)1769
BARBOUR, Douglas I.	(25)3583
BARCELLONA, James J.	(25)3583
BARDUSCH, William E.Jr	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
BARENGO, Rosmino N.	(25)3559
BARENDSEN, Robert D.	(23)3365
BARES, Pablo	(9)1399
BARGE, Richman I.	(8)1274
BARKER, Clayton	(22)3171
BARKER, Harold O.Jr	(2)384,(15)2201
BARKER, Robert A.	(22)3171
BARLABAS, George	(2)379,390,(13)1929,(15)2195,2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 102/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BARLOCK, Joseph A.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2200
BARNABY, William F.	(2)376,(5)907,(15)2191,(18)2494
BARNARD, John D.	(9)1355
BARNES, Alfred S.	(2)375,(15)2190
BARNES, Everard G.	(2)378,(15)2194
BARNES, Guy E.	(8)1274
BARNES, Julian F.	(23)3233
BARNES, Richard R.	(23)3364
BARNES, Robert L.	(3)481
BARNES, Sidney V.	(5)921,(10)1487-1489,1508
BARNES, Stanley L.	(23)3361
BARNETT, Lynn	(1)57
BARNETT, Oval C.	(8)1274
BARNHART, Francis E.	(22)3098,3120,3137
BARNHOUSE, Wilmer E.	(23)3366
BARR, A.	(14)2060
BARR, Harry S.Jr.	(12)1805

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 119/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BARR, Horace	(1)57
BARR, Norbert G.	(2)381,(15)2197,(19)2680,2681
BARRACCU ((fnu)	(12)1801
BARRASSO, Nedio E.	(12)1805
BARRATT, Peter T.	(23)3362
BARRERA, Jesus	(29)3965
BARRETT, Joseph E.	(1)107,(5)925,(10)1483
BARRETT, Raymond F.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
BARRETT, Victor B.	(25)3583
BARRICK, Ralph O.	(22)3213
BARRON, Thomas J.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
BARROS, Russell D.	(1)57,101
BARROWS, D.P.	(3)426
BARRY, David R.	(23)3359
BARRY, Edward P.	(1)57,107,145,(2)287,(5)919,(10)1483,1498,1503,1505
BARRY, Edwin J.	(1)111
BARSOV, Vladimir	(25)3529

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 136/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BARTH (Sgt)	(3)471
BARTH, George B.	(1)48
BARTNETT, Edmond J.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
BARTON, Victor	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
BARTOULUCCI, Enzo	(12)1805
BASHAM, Sandy L.	(22)3171
BASKIN, John R.	(8)1234,1274,1279
BASKO, James L.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213
BATEL, Genevieve	(9)1394
BATES, John L.Jr	(1)57,(22)3115
BATES, Vernon B.	(5)902
BATES, William M.	(12)1805
BATSAKIS, Nathan G.	(22)3171,(23)3356
BATTIN, Thaddeus G.	(12)1805
BAUDER, Harry P.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
BAUDINO, John M.	(8)1276
BAUER, Albert	(2)378,(15)2193

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 153/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BAUER, Paul	(2)377,(15)2193
BAUER, Philip Jr	(2)386,(15)2202
BAUGHMAN, Billy J.	(30)4136
BAUGUSS, Oran C.	(23)3362
BAUKNIGHT, L.K.	(9)1333
BAULER, Edgar C.	(23)3366
BAUM, Maurice	(30)4133
BAUMAN, Jack M.	(2)382,(15)2198
BAUMANN, Lester H.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
BAYLEY, Lawrence T.	(9)1411-1413,1447
BAYNARD, J.P.	(5)899
BAYSDORFER, Lloyd G.	(26)3625
BEACH, George L.	(2)372,385,(13)1915,(15)2187,2201
BEACH, W.D.	(2)181
BEADLE, Edward S.	(12)1805
BEALL, Sam D.	(2)374,(13)1918,(14)2068,2091,(15)2189,(16)2266,2267, 2269,(20)2767

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 170/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BEAN, Truett E.	(23)3361
BEARCE, Roger M.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2202
BEARD, James W.	(25)3583
BEARD, William L.	(22)3195,3214
BEASLEY, Everard J.	(23)3360
BEATH, Andrew B.	(23)3363
BEATON, Harold D.	(23)3362
BEATSON, Gerald L.	(2)394,(8)1292-1295,1303,1305,(15)2211
BEATTY, Richard H.	(2)377,(15)2193,(19)2628
BEATTY, Walcott H.	(1)57,(2)390,(5)899,(13)1928,(15)2207
BEAUCHAMP, James L.	(22)3048,3058,3137
BEAUCHESNE, Paul	(16)2267
BEAUDETTE, Francis S.	(2)384,(12)1805,(15)2101
BEAULIEU (Sgt)	(3)421
BECHTEL, John G.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BECK, Charles R.	(30)4136
BECK, Emmerich J.	(12)1805

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 187/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BECK, Ernst A.	(1)57,(2)375,(15)2190
BECK, Georgette	(14)2049,2050
BECK, Hermann	(20)2848
BECK, R.M.Jr	(4)608
BECK, Verne Frank	(11)1609
BECK, Willard C.	(9)1447
BECKER (fnu)	(28)3828
BECKER, Jim	(22)3124,3125
BECKER, Max J.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BECKER, T.T.	(5)911
BECKETT, Andrew J.	(9)1355
BECKETT, Nicholas	(4)658
BECKMAN, Morris H.	(30)4136
BECKMAN, Richard J.	(22)3171
BEEBE, John O.	(9)1448
BEEBE, Richard W.	(1)57,110,(2)388,390,(5)908,(13)1912,(14)2029, (15)2118,2204,2207

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 204/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BEERMAN, Fred L.	(8)1274
BEESLEY, Charles H.	(1)57,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
BEGUELIN, Dayton	(2)390,(15)2207
BEHM, Carl M.	(2)390,(15)2207
BEHR, Frank J.	(2)394,(15)2212
BEHR, John L.	(2)385,(15)2201
BEIGHTLER, Robert S.	(22)3175
BEIRDRON, Edward F.	(1)111,(17)2360,(18)2527
BEIRGANZ, Maria	(18)2495
BEISSENHERZ, Lloyd H.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
BEISSINGER, Harvy	(2)376,(15)2192
BEISSINGER, Henry	(2)386,(15)2203,(19)2675
BEISTAL, Arthur E.	(30)4134
BEITZ, Donald G.	(23)3358
BELAK, Frank E.	(2)378,(15)2193
BELCHER, Phillip F.	(8)1274
BELINKLE, Milton H.	(23)3366

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 221/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BELKIN, Paul N.(M.)	(2)374,386,(13)1918,(15)2189,2203
BELKNAP, Edwin S.	(22)3079,3084,3086,3121,3137
BELL, Edward P.	(2)382,(5)905,(9)1448,(13)1923,(15)2198
BELL, J.Franklin	(2)183
BELL, R.A.	(5)912
BELL, Roland	(15)2118
BELL, William L.	(15)2153
BELLACK, Robert O.	(2)377,(15)2193
BELLAR, Arthur J.	(9)1448
BELLATTI, Walter R.	(23)3359
BELLIN, Robert W.	(30)4134
BELLIS (fnu)	(15)2197
BELLIS, Sydney W.	(2)375,(15)2191
BELLOCCHIO, Paul L.	(2)385,(15)2201,(20)2790
BELLONI, Guido	(25)3550
BELSHAW, Marshall E.	(5)898,(8)1202,1204,1206
BELT, George L.	(11)1554,1564,1609,(12)1805

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 238/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BENATI, Teresa	(25)3572
BENECKE, Franklin H.	(22)3171
BENEDICT, Coleman H.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2201
BENEDICT, George H.	(2)373,(15)2188
BENES, Edward	(4)527
BENHAM, Charles C.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
BENJAMIN, Alfred H.Jr.	(1)50,58,(11)1567,1609,1611-1613
BENJAMIN, Lawrence E.	(30)4134
BENKART (Cdr.USN)	(22)3069
BENN, Robert W.	(9)1434
BENNET (Major)	(20)2851
BENNET, Edward	(24)3382
BENNETT, Alfred	(8)1274
BENNETT, Charles R.	(2)390,(15)2207
BENNETT, Clarence W.	(22)3050,3051,3092,3094,3095
BENNETT, Edwin	(1)58,103,145,(2)312,381,390,(5)739,760,761,897 (6)961,(13)1929,(14)2028,(15)2109,2197,2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 255/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BENNETT, Marvin S.	(9)1409,1432,1447
BENNETT, R.O.	(5)898
BENNIGSON (fnu)	(15)2197
BENSON, A.Lamar	(8)1308,1314
BENSON, Dirck	(22)3171
BENSON, Frank E.Jr.	(1)50,58,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2195
BENSUADE, Jose M.	(8)1188, (10)1525,1540B
BENTA, C.Jr	(5)928
BENTLEY, Elizabeth T.	(4)611
BENTLEY, George F.	(29)3999,4000
BEOAODI, Dominick	(25)3583
BEOTONE, Richard D.	(25)3583
BERDAUS, Charles S.	(10)1540B
BERG, Arthur W.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
BERG, John W.	(12)1805,(25)3498
BERGER, Bernhard	(19)2619
BERGER, Fred	(2)377,388,(15)2193,2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 272/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BERGER, Michael	(25)3535,3536
BERGHOF, Herbert	(8)1207
BERGMAN, Harold E.	(12)1805
BERGMAN, Victor C.Jr	(1)58,(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1805,(15)2196,2201
BERGREEN, Bernard	(23)3365
BERGSTROM, Harry V.	(10)1472
BERGUVEN, Paul V.	(11)1558
BERKMANN, Alexander	(3)471
BERLE, Adolph A.	(4)527,613,616,664
BERLE, Gus	(2)380,(15)2196
BERLIN, W.A.	(25)3567,3568
BERLITZ, Charles F.	(4)657,(5)900,(9)1388,1390,1416,1447
BERMES, Friedrich	(26)3621
BERNABE, Alfredo	(25)3551,3552
BERNABE, Anthony A.	(2)375,(15)2190
BERNACCHI, Julian S.	(8)1276
BERNARD, Charles A.	(2)390

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 289/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BERNASCONI, Ermanno	(25)3551,3552
BERNASCONI, Silvio	(25)3551,3552
BERNITZ, Samuel I.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
BERNSTON, Donald B.	(22)3046,3075,3078,3120,3137
BERTHOLET, Frank E.Jr	(23)3357
BERTIN, LeRoy V.	(23)3360
BERTSCHE, William I.	(2)374,(15)2189
BESSMAN, Leonard M.	(1)58,145,(11)1557,1559,1561,1570,1571,1576,1579, 1580,1584-1587,1589,(16)2296
BEST, Vernon A.	(23)3366
BETANCOURT, Alfonso	(22)3182,3213
BETTERSHELL, Harold R.	(2)376,(15)2192
BETZIG, Edward C.	(9)1447
BEZEK, Dan J.	(2)376,(15)2191
BIAFORE, Sam F.	(9)1448
BIANCHI, Armando	(12)1779
BIBEE, Raymond E.	(1)50,(23)3223

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 306/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BICCHIERINI, Marcello	(12)1749
BICKNELL, George W.	(22)3144,3171
BIDDLE, John	(2)183
BIDDLE, Nicholas	(3)441,442,469,471
BIEDENHARN, Albert M.	(1)58,(2)383,385,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
BIEGERT, William A.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
BIEL, Fred W.	(2)387,(15)2203
BIELASKI, A.Bruce	(3)460
BIER, Francois	(16)2319
BIERDRON, Edward F.	(1)111,(17)2360,(18)2527
BIESTEL, Arthur	(30)4012
BIGUERIE, Pene	(22)3192
BIHY, Clarence F.	(23)3364
BILLI, Lotario	(12)1761,1764
BILLING, Gunther	(18)2458,2459
BILLOW, Virgil E.	(22)3171
BINFORD, John R.	(23)3356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 323/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BINGHAM, Charles M.	(1)109,(23)3310,3364
BIRON, Henry A.	(1)58,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
BIRSNER, John H.	(2)375,(12)1805,(15)2190,(20)2859
BIRT, Francis M.	(1)58,(2)376,(15)2192
BISCOE, Henry C.	(5)916,930,(22)3171
BISHOP (Major)	(20)2862
BISHOP, Robert F.	(1)58,(2)378,(15)2194
BISMARCK, Otto von	(27)3784
BISSELL, Clayton	(1)145,(2)289,329,(5)716,(8)1294
BISSELL, Harry Jr	(2)376,(15)2191
BISSELL, John T.	(1)145,(2)243,244,251,(4)618,620,659,(5)684,686,692, 697,706-708,711,714,719,721,722,729,730,741-743 (6)943,967,(9)1412,1413,(10)1513,(24)3408
BISTRITZKY, Sam	(12)1805
BITTMAN, Lyman W.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BIVINS, Horace P.	(23)3357
BJORKLUND, Bob L.	(30)4130

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 340/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BJORNSON, Jon H.	(10)1461,1469,1472
BLACK, August B.	(9)1355
BLACK, James J.	(9)1448
BLACK, Maurice R.	(22)3171
BLACK, Percy G.	(2)243,(11)1547,1564
BLACK, Theodore M.	(1)58,110,(2)388,(5)917,(13)1912,(14)2040,2060-2062, 2066,2074,2095,2096,2102,2104,(15)2127,2205,(16)2243-2246,2248-2253,2257,(19)2630,2672-2674,(20)2786,2824, 2825
BLACK, William W.	(1)97
BLACKBURN, Duane A.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
BLACKLEY, Horace A.	(23)3359
BLACKSTOCK, James	(1)58
BLAIR, Charles E.Jr	(23)3365
BLAIR, D.H.Jr	(5)924
BLAIR, David	(7)1155
BLAIR, W.P.	(5)915

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 357/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BLAKE, Emmet R.	(1)58,(2)384,(12)1805,(15)2201
BLAKE, Frank O.	(1)114,(22)3144,3158,3171
BLAKE, Homer C.	(1)101
BLAKE, Robert	(17)2355
BLAKE, Ward M.	(22)3171
BLAKELY, Allen C.	(22)3206,3212,3215
BLAKENEY, Charles C.	(24)3387
BLALOCK, John H.	(2)389,(15)2207
BLALOCK, William A.	(22)3097,3137
BLANCK, Karl H.	(2)394,(15)2212
BLANCO, Ernesto C.	(9)1447
BLANGENOIS (Major)	(16)2320
BLANKENSHIP, Lonnie R.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1930,(15)2208
BLANKS, Lloyd W.	(22)3213
BLANTON, Charles K.	(2)378,387,(13)1920,(15)2193,2203
BLANTON, William W.	(22)3061,3137
BLASER, Glenn F.	(1)58,(2)385,(15)2201

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 374/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BLAU, Jack Z.	(2)376,(15)2192
BLAUL, Arthur F.	(22)3137
BLAUVELT, Robert W.	(8)1275
BLEDSOE, James A.	(1)108,(5)924,(23)3244,3360
BLEY, Robert W.	(23)3360
BLISS, Tasker H.	(3)404
BLOCK, Joseph D.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
BLOCK, Lloyd R.	(8)1234,1274
BLOEMSNA, Eugene P.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
BLOM (Col.)	(12)1723,1803
BLOMQUIST, Edwin R.	(12)1805
BLOOM, Phillip	(8)1276
BLOSS, Edward G.	(23)3361
BLOSS, J.H.	(19)2695
BLUE, Jack S.	(10)1516-1521,1523
BLUE, John I.	(30)4136
BLUM, Benno	(25)3533-3536

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 391/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BLUM, Walter H.	(2)393,(15)2210
BLUMNER, Lester A.	(2)387,(12)1805,(15)2204
BLUNCK, Rulon D.	(2)394,(15)2212
BLUTHE, Samuel H.	(22)3171
BLY, Nelly	(4)527
BOBERG, Roy H.	(8)1178,1181,1184
BOCCALETTO, Amerigo	(25)3552
BOCH, Alfred L.	(8)1275
BOCHER (Sgt)	(3)421
BOE, Marie Theresa G.	(20)2854
BOEHNKE, E.C.	(13)1867,1873,1876
BOFFERDINGE (fnu)	(16)2282
BOGAN, Myron E.	(9)1448
BOGART, Marcel	(14)2065
BOGATIN, Irvin	(1)59,99,(2)376,(5)914,(13)1919,(14)2040,2047, (15)2192,(16)2319,2322
BOGERT, Regis Z.	(23)3361

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 408/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BOGGS, Robert D.	(1)59
BOGGS, William R.	(22)3079,3103,3115,3137
BOGGY, Dale H.	(23)3356
BOGIN, Isaac	(1)103,(2)381,(15)2197
BOGOTAY, George W.	(1)59,(2)388,(13)1912,(14)2062,(15)2205
BOHAN, William J.	(9)1447
BOJAR, Clement W.	(22)3171
BOKSEN, Herbert	(2)376,(15)2192,(26)3684
BOKU, Retsu	(28)3912
BOLAN, Robert B.	(1)50,59
BOLDEN, Edward S.	(22)3171
BOLLING, Alexander R.	(1)145,(2)206,209,357,364,(4)616,631,634,(6)940,941 (7)1107
BOLTON, Frederick H.	(8)1274,(9)1448
BONE, John H.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
BONELLI, Rocco J.	(23)3356
BONESTEEL, C.H.	(10)1458,1459

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 425/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BONIECKI, Conrad B.	(2)387,(15)2203
BONISSOL, Maurice	(2)394,(9)1447,(15)2211
BONNEVILLE, Benjamin L.E.	(2)176
BONO, Charles A.	(22)3171
BONVINCIN, Emanuel F.	(22)3171
BOOKER, Charles L.	(2)393,395,(13)1937,(15)2211,2213
BOONE, Dana H.	(5)918,(10)1483
BOONE, Henry S.	(23)3341
BOOSEL, Harry X.	(2)380,(13)1922,(15)2196
BOOTH, J.W.	(5)898
BOPP, Franz von	(3)476
BORDNER, Marlin V.	(22)3171
BORDOGNI, Bruno	(12)1752
BOREN, Robert D.	(1)59,(2)385,(5)909,(15)2201
BORGMAN, John H.	(23)3364
BORMANN, Martin	(26)3614,3626,3627,3750
BORN, Harry E,	(23)3359

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 442/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BORTER, Howard	(2)387,(15)2203
BORTICHELLI (Dr.)	(12)1706
BOSWELL, James O.	(16)2309
BOTH, Edwin O.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
BOTT, A.K.Jr	(5)911
BOUCHARD, Ernest M.	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667,2668
BOUDREAU, Amadee R.	(2)378,386,(13)1920,(15)2193,2202
BOULE, L.L.	(5)896
BOURTON, Eugene	(18)2463
BOUSSEAU, Christine	(14)2083
BOWEN, Albert R.Jr	(1)59,103,(2)381,(5)914,(7)1155,(13)1923,(14)2040, 2052,2053,2055,2056,2058,2059,2073,2074,(15)2197, (16)2224,2280-2283,2285,2286,2288,(18)2498,(19)2596, 2610-2613
BOWEN, Philip F.	(23)3357
BOWER, Malcolm B.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
BOWER, Warren	(18)2555,(20)2832,2833

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 459/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BOWER, William N.	(1)59,(2)384,(12)1715,1805,(15)2201,(17)2352,2355, 2366,2375
BOWERS, Roy B.Jr.	(11)1609
BOWERS, William E.	(2)379,(15)2194
BOWLER, Michael S.	(23)3363
BOWLUS, Thomas N.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BOWMAN, Harwood P.	(22)3112,3113,3114
BOWMAN, Walter W.Jr	(23)3358
BOYCE (General)	(23)3227
BOYCE, Bernard F.Jr	(1)59,(2)372,(5)916,(13)1915,(15)2187
BOYCE, Ralph J.Jr	(2)387,(15)2203
BOYD, Edgar E.	(23)3359
BOYD, William S.Jr	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(15)2202,2205
BOYLES, Edward E.	(1)97
BRAAFLADT, James T.O.	(11)1609,(12)1805,(17)2403,2405
BRACCIO, Francis A.	(30)4136
BRADEN, Paul R.	(2)374,386,(13)1917,(15)2189,2202,(26)3675,3676

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 476/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRADFORD, Kermit C.	(2)392,(13)1921,(15)2210
BRADFORD, Lowell J.	(1)145,(2)233,(5)683,684,689,694,700,723,729,732, 733,743,895,(9)1335-1338,1342,1347-1349,1384,1385, 1386,(10)1516,1517,1525,1527,1538,(23)3312,3366
BRADFORD, Lowell L.Jr	(1)59,110,(2)273,267,279
BRADFORD, Philander S.Jr	(23)3358
BRADLEY, Harry L.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
BRADLEY, Omar N.	(1)145,(2)221,248,295,(10)1475,(11)1555,1559,1576, 1581-1585,1589,1590,1620,1622-1624,1628,1629,1635-1637,(13)1814,1826,1847,(14)2027,2029,2034,2039-2041, 2051,2075,2076,(15)2109,2110,2145,2158,(16)2219,2220, 2224,2233,2302,(18)2449,2461,2463,2467,2470,2472, 2480,2521,(19)2586,2695,(26)3661
BRADSHAW, Horace J.	(23)3366
BRADY, Cecil C.	(1)108
BRADY, Even E.	(30)4132
BRADY, John J.Jr	(23)3356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 493/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRADY, Max	(8)1274
BRADY, William T.	(2)381,393,(13)1922,(15)2197,2211
BRAKE, Harold D.	(30)4134
BRALY, James O.	(12)1805,(25)3560
BRAMBACH, Walter	(1)110,(2)389,(15)2206
BRAND, Alex M.	(27)3782-3784,3787,3788,3795,3799
BRAND, Elizabeth	(20)2810
BRANDEIS, Erich	(1)59
BRANNON, Louis T.	(1)59,(2)379,(15)2194
BRANSON, Arthur F.	(2)372,386,(13)1916,(15)2187,2203
BRAS, Edouard	(16)2315
BRASSEUR, Norman	(22)3058,3137
BRASSINGTON, Theodore	(1)50
BRATCHER, Guffy L.	(30)4134
BRATER, Donald C.	(8)1276
BRATTON, Rufus S.	(28)3838,3839,3843,3847,3849,3853,3858,3861,3870,3871
BRAUDE, Emanuel	(2)374,(15)2189,(20)2767-2769,2808,2810

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRAUDE, Steve	(16)2274
BRAUN, Berthold R.	(2)389,(15)2207
BRAUN, Don	(25)3570
BRAUN, Eva	(26)3610
BRAUN, George P.	(23)3356
BRAUNE, Edward L.	(2)381.(13)1923,(15)2197
BRAY, Ann	(1)6,20,(22)3141
BRAY, Archie J.	(2)391,(8)1305,(13)1933,(15)2209
BRAY, James F.	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(14)2077,(15)2202,2205
BREADY, James H.	(2)383,(15)2199
BRECHLER, Kenneth S.	(23)3358
BRECKINRIDGE, James W.	(1)59,(22)3171,(23)3359
BREECHEN, Joel M.	(22)3048,3079,3082,3088,3137
BREITENBACH, Gustave	(2)387,(15)2203
BREMER, August W.	(1)112
BRENKUS, Milan C.	(22)3171
BRENNAN, John J.	(22)3079,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 527/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRENNECKE, Francis C.	(1)59,106,(2)385,(4)667,(5)731-733,746,918,(7)1081, (15)2201
BREOR, Paul J.	(23)3357
BRETT, James	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
BREVOORT (Lt.)	(4)531
BREVOORT, William H.	(3)432
BREWSTER, Carl N.	(23)3366
BREWSTER, R.D.	(5)915
BRIDGES, B.R.	(1)20
BRIDGHAM, Jesse F.	(12)1805
BRIEFS, Henry W.	(2)382,(15)2198
BRIEL, Alfred W.	(2)387,(12)1805,(15)2204
BRIGGS, A.M.	(3)488
BRIGGS, Erny W.	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2668
BRIGHAM, Lindsey R.	(13)1939
BRIGHAM, Morrison	(2)388,390,(13)1912,(15)2204,2207
BRILTY, Francis X.	(2)379,390,(13)1929,(15)2195,2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 544/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRIOSCHI, Renato	(25)3552
BRITT, A.E.	(5)898
BROCK, James G.	(22)3078,3098,3110,3121,3137
BROCK, Lawrence V.	(8)1274
BROCK, Ruebin C.	(23)3366
BROCKMANN, Herman	(20)2775
BROCKMEIER, Robert	(1)60,(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1805,(15)2196,2201, (17)2352,2355,2366,(18)2555,(20)2832,2833
BROD, Mario E.	(2)380,(5)923,(11)1622,1625,1629,1630,1633,1636,1638, 1640,1646,1647,1652,1654,1680,1686,(12)1805,(15)2196
BRODA, Kurt	(19)2652,2653
BRODEUR, Wilfrid J.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2200
BROHAN, William K.	(2)394,(15)2212
BROOK, Kurt D.	(2)377,(15)2193
BROOKENS, John W.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
BROOKS, James D.	(1)60,(22)3058,3060,3103,3137
BROOKS, John J.	(9)1448

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BROOKS, Roy W.	(2)378,(15)2194
BROOKS, Walter	(23)3359
BROTHERTON, Earl	(10)1472
BROTMAN, Stanley S.	(22)3137
BROWDER, Earl	(16)2331
BROWN (Col.)	(30)4121
BROWN, Albert R.	(2)262,(23)3361
BROWN, Augustus F.III	(5)904,(9)1364-1368,1370,1371,1373,1374
BROWN, Charles A.	(23)3362
BROWN, D.R.	(5)899
BROWN, Emmons B.	(8)1234,1274,1279
BROWN, Francis T.	(23)3365
BROWN, George E.	(30)4127,4136
BROWN, George P.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197,(16)2285
BROWN, Gordon K.	(30)4133
BROWN, James R.	(22)3213
BROWN, Jarvis J.	(2)380,(11)1655,(12)1805,(15)2196

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 578/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BROWN, Keirn C.	(1)60,(2)376,384,(11)1609,(12)1719,1805,(15)2191,2201
BROWN, Lytle	(3)493
BROWN, Nathan H.	(22)3171
BROWN, Ralph J.	(23)3358
BROWN, Robert E.	(22)3171
BROWN, S.D.	(5)894,(7)1107
BROWN, Walter C.	(23)3357
BROWN, William T.	(23)3362
BROWNING, Earl S.	(2)391,(5)919,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2208,(19)2631 (27)3705,3716-3718,3721,3723,3729,3731,3734,3736, 3738-3740,3742,3743,3764,3779,3782-3784,3799
BROWNING, Samuel S.	(30)4115,4117,4134,4140
BROWNY, Manfred	(18)2460
BROZ, James L.Jr	(23)3282,3366
BRUCATO, Albert V.	(2)375,(15)2190
BRUCCOLI, Matthew L.	(12)1805
BRUCE, Charles F.	(30)4127

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 595/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BRUDER, Charles W.	(2)373(5)925,931,(10)1473,(15)2188
BRUGGER, Emil	(25)3531
BRUNISCH, Helmuth	(26)3633,3634
BRUNJES, John W.	(2)374,386,(13)1917,(15)2189,2202
BRUNO, John J.	(9)1448
BRUNO, John V.	(13)1939
BRUNSWICK, Edmund J.	(2)382,(15)2198
BRUSCHI, Dominic P.	(2)393,(15)2211
BRUSCHI, Peter J.	(2)393,(15)2211
BRUSKIN (Col.)	(18)2513
BRUSSELL, Abraham W.	(2)384,(11)1610,(12)1805,(15)2201
BRYAN, Edwin H.	(22)3171
BRYDEN, William	(1)145,(2)269,(4)669,(7)1131
BRYSON, Arthur R.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BUCHER, Donald C.	(2)380,(11)1558,1654,(15)2196
BUCK, David F.	(2)393,(15)2211
BUCK, Harold D.	(23)3362

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 612/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BUCKLEY, Carper W.	(22)3213
BUCKLEY, H.W.	(5)913,930
BUCKLEY, Robert G.	(1)115,(30)4131
BUCKLEY, Thomas H.	(2)389,(15)2206
BUCKLEY, William P.	(12)1805
BUCKNER, James F.	(12)1805
BUCKNER, Simon B.	(23)3341
BUCKO, Stephan A.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
BUDAEUS, Kurt	(26)3610,3611,3613
BUDRYK, John C.	(9)1355
BUFFALO, Paul W.	(30)4120-4122,4124,4125
BUFFAN, James E.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
BUFFETTE-CATFORD, Alfred	(16)2332
BUFFINGTON, Milton	(9)1406,1408
BUFFINGTON, Richard	(9)1447
BUFITHIS, Charles P.	(22)3171
BULKLEY, Charles C.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2199

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 629/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BULL, H.R.	(24)3394
BULLITT, William C.	(4)529,530
BULLOCK, Loren J.	(12)1805
BULLOCK, Thomas B.	(2)376,(15)2192
BUMBALL, Stephen W.	(2)394,(15)2211
BUMGARDNER, Richard	(18)2467
BUMS, Peter A.	(2)394,(15)2212
BUNDY, Harvey H.	(5)746
BUNGO, Jimmy J.	(30)4130
BURDETTE, Maurice R.	(1)101,111
BURGESS, Eugene B.	(2)382,392,(13)1924,(15)2198,2210
BURGESS, Marvin R.	(23)3367
BURGESS, Robert M.	(2)383,393,(13)1925,(15)2200,2211
BURGLUND, Oliver O.	(1)60,(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
BURKE, Frank W.	(10)1472
BURKE, James A.	(22)3171
BURKE, Kevin	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667,2668

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 646/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BURKE, Martin P.	(1)60
BURKE, Thomas J.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
BURKE, William A.	(8)1276
BURKE, William J.	(9)1355
BURKEL, John B.	(12)1805,(25)3497,3527
BURKHARDT, Elmo L.	(23)3366
BURKHEAD, B.W.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
BURKLEY, Joseph A.	(1)60
BURNHAM, Bryson P.	(8)1274
BURNHAM, George	(2)373,(15)2188
BURNS, Cecil	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
BURNS, Eugene J.	(23)3362
BURNS, John L.	(22)3137
BURNS, Joseph A.	(2)387,(12)1805,(15)2204
BURNS, Kenneth M.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
BURNS, Lee G.	(8)1275
BURRALL, Charles L.Jr.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 663/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BURRESS, Charles R.Jr	(23)3364
BURRESS, W.A.	(1)145,(2)343
BURRILL, Leon M.	(2)382,(15)2198
BURT, Francis	(1)60
BURTON, George B.	(2)370
BURTON, William C.	(2)376,(13)1919,(14)2047,(15)2192
BURWASSER, Joseph	(2)374,(15)2190
BURZYNSKI, Charles	(11)1615
BUSH, Hobert H.	(8)1274
BUSH, Vannevar	(8)1291
BUSHEY, Mitchell H.	(23)3365
BUSTER, Dan W.	(30)4132
BUTCAVAGE, Anthony J.	(25)3583
BUTCHER, Byron S.	(3)475,476,478-480
BUTCHER, Harry C.	(18)2473
BUTLER, Charles W.	(9)1350,1355,(22)3171
BUTLER, Milton	(2)383,385,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
BUTLER, Nealy E.	(9)1434,1447
BUTLER, R.L.	(30)4136
BUTNER, Roger W.	(22)3171
BUTO, Junichi	(28)3856
BUTTERFIELD, Frederick H.	(10)1540B
BUTTS, Herman R.	(22)3213
BYERLY, Milton R.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
BYRNE, Robert A.	(9)1448
BYRNES, Bernard A.	(19)2618

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHB ‖Rec: 689/689 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CABALLERO, Anthony	(9)1448
CABAZA, Jose E.	(8)1274
CACATAIN, Asuncion B.	(22)3171
CADDELL (CIP Agent)	(3)472
CADDEN, Francis L.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
CAFFEY, B.F.	(12)1720
CAFFEY, Francis	(3)472
CAHOON, Richard C.	(2)392,(5)907,(14)2100,(15)2210
CAIN, Albert P.	(2)392,(9)1447,(15)2210
CAIN, Wilfred W.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
CALDWELL, Robert G.Jr	(2)384,(11)1609,(12)1741,1805,(15)2201
CALEVAS, Harry A.	(1)60,(23)3356
CALHOUN, R.L.	(5)909
CALIFF, John W.	(1)50,60,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
CALIPPE, Gustave	(17)2357
CALLAGHAN, Francis P.	(8)1274
CALLAGHAN, Paul M.	(9)1355

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 17/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CALLAHAN, Francis W.	(8)1276
CALLAHAN, George	(22)3171
CALLAHAN, Leonard M.	(22)3137
CALLAN, Albert S.Jr	(2)384,385,(5)914,(13)1848,1927,(15)2200,2201
CALLES, Plutarco Elias	(3)475,478
CALMA, Tomas	(23)3372
CALVERT, F.A.Jr.	(11)1598,(16)2226,2323,2325-2330,2332
CALVERT, Horace K.	(8)1230-1232,1274,1289
CALVERT, P.A.	(13)1816,1817
CAMBERE, Edgar	(2)393,(8)1319,(15)2211
CAMBRIA, Frank J.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
CAMELL, Kenneth E.	(1)60
CAMERON, A.G.	(19)2669
CAMERON, Gerald G.	(1)60
CAMERON, Gerard G.	(1)50,(2)373,(15)2188,(18)2494,(19)2286
CAMERON, Jack B.	(1)60,96,108,145,(2)380,(5)920,(9)1404,1447,(11) 1550-1552,1554,1564-1566,1574,1607,1609,1619-1621,

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NAME	REFERENCE
	1624,1632,1633,1635,1638,1654,(12)1784,1787,1788, 1805,(15)2196,(24)3420,3440,3441,(25)3496-3498,3508
CAMINER, Jack A.	(2)377,(15)2192
CAMP, Charles S.	(1)60,109,(22)3171,(23)3327,3363
CAMPANA, Jacques	(16)2270,2271
CAMPBELL (Major)	(20)2863
CAMPBELL, Albert M.	(8)1277
CAMPBELL, Boniface	(1)18,47,(2)370
CAMPBELL, Charles II	(8)1276
CAMPBELL, Gordon S.	(18)2510
CAMPBELL, Joseph W.	(30)4130
CAMPBELL, Robert L.	(1)50,60,(12)1796,1805
CAMPBELL, William E.	(23)3365
CAMPBELL-TURNER, Arthur	(3)413,432,452
CAMPERNOLE, Nicholas	(3)413
CANADY, Kenneth M.	(23)3356
CANCIANI, Lidia	(25)3576,3577

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 51/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CANDLER, Asa W.	(5)895,939,(7)1131,(8)1201,1205
CANFIELD, Daniel C.	(2)376,390,(7)1145,(13)1929,(15)2191,2208,(26)3685, 3686,3687,(27)3714,3733,37373,3738,3763,3764,3772, 3774
CANIGLIA, Louis S.	(12)1805
CANNAN, Richard L.	(30)4136
CANNER, Arthur L.	(9)1447
CANNING, Stephen T.	(23)3364
CANNON, Joseph D.	(2)393,395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213
CANNON, Samuel S.	(23)3365
CANOFF, James I.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
CANON, Jack Y.	(1)61,109,(23)3254,3337,3362,(28)3841
CANOSA, James M.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
CANTIN (fnu)	(17)2382
CAPANE, Ralph T.	(2)393
CAPOCCI, Louis D.	(22)3168,3171
CAPPS, T.D.	(5)912

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 68/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CAPPUCCILLI, Edmund D.	(23)3294,3363
CAPUTO, Joseph D.	(9)1448
CARDIN, Gerald	(10)1472
CAREAGA, Leo J.	(3)442
CAREY, Francis W.	(2)393,(15)2211
CAREY, G.W.	(5)909
CAREY, John H.	(23)3362
CAREY, John P.	(2)393,(15)2211
CAREY, Thomas J.	(5)899,928,(9)1396,1447
CAREY, William T.	(1)61,97
CARGIULO, Vincent A.	(2)393,(15)2210
CARIAGA, Roman R.	(22)3171
CARIDAS, Chris N.	(2)394,(15)2212
CARLINO, Alexander	(23)3362
CARLISLE, James L.	(23)3357
CARLSON, Arthur F.	(10)1472
CARLSON, Clifford W.	(2)393,(9)1447,(15)2211

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 85/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CARLSON, Elwood S.	(12)1805
CARLSON, George A.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
CARLSON, Robert R.	(23)3360
CARLSON, Russell F.Jr	(23)3359
CARMELL, Samuel	(30)4136
CARMEN, Thomas R.	(30)4027,4134
CARMODY, Frank E.	(23)3356
CARNAHAN, W.T.	(5)915
CARNANOS, Paul	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
CARNEL, Henri R.	(2)394,(15)2212
CARNELL, Marshall D.Jr	(22)3171
CARNEY, Edwin S.	(2)393,(15)2210
CAROLAN, Edwin J.	(2)383,385,(15)2200,2202
CARPENTER, Chester E.	(30)4127,4134
CARPENTER, Elmer J.	(9)1367,1374
CARPENTER, Francis W.	(2)393,(5)913,(14)2029,2101,(15)2211
CARPENTER, Giles R.	(4)617,(5)689,725,726,(7)1135,1152-1154

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 102/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CARPENTIERI, Peter F.	(11)1645
CARPI, Walter L.	(1)103
CARR, Donald J.	(1)61,(2)387,(12)1805,(15)2204
CARR, James H.Jr	(22)3048,3080,3083,3084,3089,3115,3137
CARR, Joseph F.	(8)1274
CARR, William J.	(8)1305
CARR, William L.	(2)392,(15)2210
CARRANZA, Ignacio	(2)387,(11)1609,(12)1805,(15)2204
CARRANZA, Venustiano	(3)475
CARRE (French Col.)	(17)2387,(19)2592
CARRELLAS, Arthur A.	(12)1805
CARRIS, Kent	(6)952
CARROLL, Joseph F.	(2)393,395,(13)1937,(15)2211,2213
CARSON (Cpl)	(22)3130,3131
CARTER, Ernest R.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
CARTER, Henry S.	(3)390,(15)2207
CARTIER, Normand J.	(2)381,383,394,(13)1925,(15)2197,2200,2212

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 119/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CARTWRIGHT (Capt)	(12)1707
CARTWRIGHT, James	(22)3171
CARTWRIGHT, Peter C.	(23)3359
CARY, William F.	(9)1447
CASE, J.P.	(5)898
CASEMATE, Roger	(3)473
CASEY, Charles J.	(23)3360
CASEY, John P.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
CASEY, William P.	(23)3360
CASS, Donald L.	(2)374,(13)1920,(15)2189
CASSEL, Robert D.	(23)3355
CASSERLY, John P.	(1)61,(2)379,(15)2195
CASSERLY, Norman R.	(9)1355
CASSIDY, Alfred B.	(30)4012,4130,4140
CASSIDY, Charles	(22)3171
CASSIDY, Owen C.	(22)3171
CASTELLI, Guido	(12)1758,1759

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 136/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CASTELLI, Ralph	(12)1805
CASTILLE, Harry S.	(2)394,(15)2212
CASTILLO, Mateo	(23)3372
CASTLE, James C.	(1)100,(2)378,(15)2194,(22)3171
CASTNER, Lawrence V.	(8)1332,1333
CASTON, Homer R.Jr	(23)3358
CASTOR, Russell E.	(23)3362
CASTRO, Pedro	(29)3962
CASTRO-FERNANDEZ, A.	(9)1447
CATE, James G.	(12)1805
CATES, William H.	(2)375,(15)2190
CATHCART, Wallace Jr.	(9)1355
CATOR, William D.	(8)1274
CATROUS (French General)	(10)1495
CATTERSON, W.D.	(1)20
CAUDILL, Julian T.	(23)3364
CAULFIELD, John D.	(23)3362

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 153/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CAUVIN, Robert S.	(3)421,443
CAVALIERI, Henry R.	(25)3583
CAVALIERRE, Angelo J.	(23)3366
CAVALLIE (Capt.-GIS)	(17)2361
CAVALLO, Maria R.	(25)3583
CAVAN, John J.	(23)3356
CAVANAGH (Sgt)	(3)471
CAVE, Franklin	(1)97,(12)1773,1774,1805
CAWTHON, Harold C.	(23)3363
CAZIARC, Dean H.	(1)61,(23)3242,3266,3267,3299,3355
CEDAR, Melvin	(30)4119
CELETTA, Gabriel B.	(12)1805,(25)3567
CELLI, Leonia	(12)1752
CERAME, Ralph T.	(2)387,(8)1292,1293,1296,1298,1305,(12)1805,(15)2204 2211
CERNJA, Diki	(25)3578
CESAR, Edison M.	(24)3425

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 170/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CETERAS, James R.	(9)1355
CHALMERS, C.I.	(9)1385
CHAMBERLAIN, Neville	(20)2807
CHAMBERLIN, Stephen J.	(1)145,(2)336,(24)3393,3394,(27)3791
CHAMBERLIN, Wells F.	(1)61,(2)306,374,384,(12)1805,(15)2190,2201,(17)2382
CHAMBERS, Thomas J.	(8)1332
CHAMBERS, Whittaker	(4)578,605,613,664
CHAMPAGNE, Roger B.	(1)61,(2)375,(15)2190
CHAMPOLLION, Rene C.	(11)1609
CHAN, Cheuk	(22)3118,3119
CHANDLER, Douglas	(2)310
CHANDLER, Robert W.	(23)3357
CHANG, Duk Soo	(30)4097
CHANG, Sei Moo	(30)4062-4064
CHARLES (fnu)	(14)2035
CHARLTON, John R.	(2)377,(15)2192
CHARON, George	(1)61,(23)3355

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 187/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CHARRIER, Robert	(15)2128
CHARVES, James M.	(23)3357
CHEBIKIN (fnu)	(22)3126
CHEEVER, Roger W.	(2)393,(15)2211
CHEN, Chung-fa	(22)3118
CHEN, James E.	(22)3171
CHENERY, Charles E.	(1)109,(23)3361
CHENNAULT, Claire L.	(22)3040,3098
CHERHONIAK, Joseph P.	(30)4119,4120,4123,4124
CHESTER, George A.	(4)656
CHEYNE, L.J.	(5)900
CHIANG, Kai-shek	(22)3040,3042,3117,(23)3227
CHIANG, Mei-ling Soong	(9)1445
CHILCOTE, Lynn W.	(8)1276
CHILTON, Walter C.	(1)109,(23)3363
CHIN, Ching Y.	(22)3171,(23)3366
CHING, Ming Shang	(22)3104,3105

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 204/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CHINN, Young W.	(22)3067,3068,3120,3137
CHITTY, William D.	(1)47
CHO, Isamu	(23)3351
CHO, Kee Nam	(30)4016,4130
CHO, Man Sik	(30)4091,4107,4108
CHODOSKI, Edward J.	(2)373,(15)2188
CHOEVER, Roger W.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
CHOI, Yong Keun	(30)4108
CHONG, Kim Fan	(22)3171
CHOY, Robert C.W.	(30)4136
CHRAPCIAK, Martin J.	(1)61,(2)375,(15)2190
CHRISHOLM, Douglas T.	(2)383,(15)2199
CHRISTIAN, Peter	(16)2293
CHRISTIAN, W.W.	(7)1126
CHRISTIANSEN, Kenneth F.	(2)394,(15)2212
CHRISTIE, Charles B.	(8)1276
CHRISTMAN, George W.	(1)61

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 221/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CHRISTOPHER, Lloyd R.	(8)1276
CHRISTOPHERSON, Kjarton L	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1928,(15)2207,(19)2631
CHU, Kenneth K.	(23)3366
CHUNG, Chin Yong	(30)4096-4099
CHUNG, Han Pum	(28)3912
CHUNG, Pan Sa	(30)4056,4086
CHUNG, Yung Chai	(30)4043
CHURCH, Benjamin	(1)38
CHURCH, Hudson R.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
CHURCH, William K.	(3)4132
CHURCHILL, Marlborough	(1)145,(2)188,(3)459,464,(4)522,531,538,539,543,551 556
CHURCHILL, Winston	(1)145,(2)331,(4)615,(8)1213,(14)2092
CHUZO, Nicolai	(22)3130,3131
CIBOTTI, Philip R.Jr	(1)107,(22)3171,(29)3990,3993
CIESIELSKI, S.A.	(5)903
CIESLOWNA, Janina	(20)2844

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 238/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CIMINO, Eugene L.	(2)392,(15)2210
CINCOTTA, Jack	(2)393,(15)2210
CIUREJ, Frank S.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2288
CLAFLIN, Beecher N.	(1)09,(23)3310,3364
CLANCY (Lt.)	(3)448
CLANCY, Frank B.	(2)373,386,(13)1917,(15)2188,2203
CLANCY, James F.	(8)1274
CLAPP, David B.Jr	(1)61
CLARK, Allen B.	(1)103
CLARK, Arthur S.Jr	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
CLARK, Curtis L.	(5)904,929,(8)1234,1274,1279
CLARK, Dalton	(30)4017
CLARK, Frederick M.	(2)394,(15)2212
CLARK, Joseph P.	(23)3358
CLARK, Mark W.	(1)145,(2)305,(11)1562,1576,1623,(12)1699,1700,1714 1729,1740,1746,1793,1794,(15)2159,(25)3525,3526,3542, 3564,3565

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CLARK, Norman A.	(2)372,(12)1805,(15)2187
CLARK, Philip T.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198,(16)2263
CLARK, William E.	(2)175,379,386,(13)1911,(15)2195,2202,(16)2233
CLARKE, Charles F.Jr.	(8)1274
CLARKE, Herbert W.	(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2503
CLAUSEN, Theodore T.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
CLAXTON, Robert L.Jr	(23)3355
CLAY, Jeff III	(1)99
CLAY, Lucius D.	(26)3598,(27)3700,3701,3717,3745,3767,3791
CLAY, William R.	(2)395,(5)916,930,(13)1935,(15)2213
CLAYTON, Henry	(3)472
CLAYTOS, Don D.	(23)3361
CLEARY, Vincent W.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202,(18)2454
CLELAND, Delmar L.	(11)1609,(12)1805
CLEMENT, Richard W.	(9)1429,1447
CLEMONS, Willis J.	(23)3361
CLIFFORD, Charles E.	(1)61

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 272/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CLIFFORD. Joseph W.	(2)375,(15)2190
CLIFFORD, Paul	(1)132
CLIFTON, Chalmers	(3)507
CLIFTON, Kenneth A.	(22)3171
CLINE, Franklin A.	(23)3362
CLOYES, Robert J.	(8)1209,(9)1448,(10)1540B
COAD, Francis E.	(1)101,(2)379,381,(13)1933,(15)2195,2209,(16)2220
COAKLEY, Daniel J.	(1)61,(23)3296,3366
COATS, Charles E.	(1)110
COATS, Frederick F.	(23)3361
COBB, Ward R.	(2)377,(15)2193
COBEAN, Raymond L.	(1)50,(5)903,(23)3348
COCHET (French Gen.)	(15)2165,2171,(17)2340
COCHIS, George A.Jr.	(10)1472
COCHRAN, Doyce E.	(23)3365
COCKRELL, J.K.	(2)252
CODY, Charles J.	(2)372,384,(11)1609,(13)1926,(15)2187,2200

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 289/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CODY, Francis J.	(2)378,(15)2194,(18)2455
COEN, George W.	(9)1447
COENEGRACHT (fnu)	(18)2502
COHEN, David H.	(23)3365
COHEN, Jack	(29)3966
COHEN, Vera Veronica	(29)3966
COHEN, Victor D.	(2)393,(15)2210
COKENIAS, Nicholas T.	(11)1610-1612,1614,(12)1805
COLBACH, Roman H.	(23)3359
COLBY, Raymond E.	(22)3171
COLE, Buster	(1)61,145,(2)288,(10)1473
COLE, Clinton S.	(8)1276
COLE, Dan M.	(23)3358
COLE, David J.	(2)386,(15)2203
COLE, Francis K.	(2)393,(5)896,(15)2211
COLE, Hazen W.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
COLE, James E.	(2)387,(11)1557,(12)1805,(15)2204

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
COLE, James H.	(10)1473
COLEMAN, Clarence N.	(5)897,(9)1365,1383,1447,(28)3859
COLEMAN, Clair H.	(2)395,(10)1514,1519,1523,(13)1936,(15)2213
COLEMAN, Ernest T.	(2)393,(13)1939,(15)2210
COLGAN, Charles W.	(2)374,(5)916,(13)1939,(14)2097,2098,2101,(15)2138, 2189
COLGATE, Craig Jr	(1)62,(12)1805
COLLANTES, Tony	(23)3372,3374
COLLAS, Edouard	(16)2293,2294
COLLINS, Benjamin I.	(23)3364
COLLINS, Burton W.	(8)1274
COLLINS, George B.	(1)111
COLLINS, J.Lawton	(1)145,(2)303,(4)545,(14)2043,(19)2672,(24)3399
COLLINS, Ulysses S.	(1)62,(2)376,388,(13)1912,(14)2062,2103,(15)2191,2205 (19)2630,(20)2824,2826
COLLISTON, Paul N.	(5)920,(11)1609
COLLYER, Charles H.	(2)382,(15)2198

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 323/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
COLMAN, Daniel A.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
COLOMBO, Frank C.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
COLON, Blas N.	(4)592
COLUCCI, Lucian J.	(23)3358
COLUMBO, Primitivo M.L.	(2)376,(15)2191
COLWELL (Lt.)	(4)531
COMBS, Howard G.	(23)3365
COMBS, LeRoy	(23)3362
COMELLI, Dino	(25)3572
COMFORT, Robert H.	(2)395,(11)1557,(13)1935,(15)2213
COMISKY, William T.	(22)3041,3045,3066,3067,3137
COMPTON, A.H.	(8)1252,1260,1261,1263
CONATY, Francis S.Jr	(23)3362
CONCEPCION, Walfrido Z.	(22)3136
CONDON, Frederick W.	(1)110
CONDON, Gerald T.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
CONICK, Charles B.	(1)62,97,(2)373,383,(5)926,(11)1557,1559,1570,1576,

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	1579,1582,1589,1590,1608,1631,1636,1638,1646,1652, 1654,(13)1814,1925,(14)2036,(15)2188,2199,(16)2296, (18)2506
CONIFF (Capt.)	(20)2863
CONINGSWOOD, Roy	(10)1472
CONKIN, George S.	(2)394,(15)2212
CONLEY, Francis E.	(2)385,(15)2201
CONN, Robert L.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
CONNELL, Donald S.	(10)1456,1458,1473
CONNELLY, Albert Jr	(22)3171
CONNELLY, David I.	(1)62,97,145,(23)3292,3332,3355
CONNELLY, John F.	(23)3366
CONNERS, Eugene M.	(23)3363
CONNOLLY, Donald H.	(10)1498
CONNOLLY, Edward P.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
CONNOLLY, John T.	(30)4133
CONNOR, Charles A.	(22)3213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 357/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CONNOR, Thomas J.	(1)62,(2)379,(15)2194
CONNOR, William R.	(22)3222
CONNORS, Harold T.	(8)1274
CONNORS, Thomas	(17)2354
CONOHAN, Robert J.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
CONOVER, John A.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
CONRAD, Albert H.	(23)3356
CONRAD, Bryan	(14)2103
CONRAD, H.C.	(5)894,(9)1385
CONSODINE, William A.	(8)1274
CONSTANT, Jerry I.	(2)394,(15)2212
CONSTANT, Napoleon A.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
CONSTANT, Samuel V.	(5)702,(7)1083,1110
CONSTANTINO (fnu)	(12)1785-1788
CONWAY, Carl F.	(23)3362
CONWAY, James F.	(23)3365
CONWAY, Joseph L.	(10)1472

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 374/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CONWAY, Norman T.	(25)3583
CONYERS, Ben J.	(1)62,(2)376,(15)2192
COOK, Denver F.	(1)109,(5)917,(23)3300,3364
COOK, Herman F.	(1)62,(2)385,(15)2201
COOK, Richmond	(23)3359
COOK, Robert W.	(23)3365
COOK, Roy L.	(23)3362
COOK, Victor I.Jr	(1)62,103,145,(5)925,(23)3246,3254,3265,3311,3358
COOK, Wilfred C.	(30)4136
COOKSEY, Richard W.	(22)3171
COOLEY, Larry E.	(8)1274
COOLEY, Richard P.	(8)1275
COOLEY, Robert L.	(25)3583
COON, Reagan P.	(22)3171
COOPER, Anson A.	(9)1448
COOPER, Charles E.	(12)1805
COOPER, Dudley M.	(3)452,(4)532

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 391/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
COOPER, Murray M.	(8)1274
COOPER, Paul S.	(5)911,(8)1210,(11)1557
COOSETTI, Manuel O.	(25)3583
COPE, Donald F.	(10)1472
COPELAND, Miles A.Jr	(2)395,(11)1557,(13)1816,1817,1819,1820,1937,(15)2213
COPELAND, Robert	(7)1132
COPLON, Judith	(25)3539
COPPOLA, Alfred A.	(1)62,(12)1731,1732,1805
COPPOLO, Benjamin R.	(9)1448,(22)3171
CORCORAN, John S.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187,(19)2684
CORDELLA, Robert H.	(2)378,(15)2193
CORDOVA, Arthur	(23)3358
CORDOVA, Carlos	(30)4136
CORDTS, Gover W.	(2)392,(15)2210
CORELL, Valentine	(3)470
COREY, George H.	(5)906,(9)1355
CORKERY, Gerard J.	(23)3359

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 408/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CORLISS, John C.	(22)3213,(23)3355
CORNELL, William B.Jr.	(5)923,(11)1551,1566,1609
CORNISH, Lorenzo E.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
CORONA, Moses D.	(9)1448
CORRELL, Philip	(22)3171
CORRY, Durrel W.	(2)394,(15)2212
CORSATEA, Ovid	(5)924,(10)1498
CORTES, Louis J.	(2)380,(12)1805,(15)2196
COSGROVE, William G.	(22)3168,3171
COSTA, Carla	(12)1769-1772
COSTELLO, Harry G.Jr	(1)62,103,(2)380,(5)920,(11)1607,1622,1624-1626,1629 1654,(12)1805,(15)2161,2163,2196,(19)2590,(25)3495, 3496
COSTIGAN, Harry L.	(22)3171
COTTERIL, Charles T.	(10)1473
COUGHLIN, Charles E.	(7)1106
COUGILL, Vernon E.	(23)3360

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 425/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
COULTER, Philemon B.	(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
COURIVAUD (fnu)	(19)2668
COURNAUD (fnu)	(2)373,(15)2188
COURT, Newton H.	(1)62
COUSENS, Charles	(28)3830
COUTURE, Remi A.	(2)387,(15)2203
COVINGTON, Harry R.	(22)3171
COWAN, Edwin F.	(1)62,(11)1610,(12)1805
COWAN, John H.	(8)1277,(30)4136
COWLES, Leonard R.	(2)372,376,(12)1805,(15)2187,2191
COWLES, W.H.	(4)561
COWLES, William W.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
COX, Carroll T.	(5)902
COX, Clarence C.	(1)62,(2)388,(15)2205
COX, James C.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
COX, Joe B.	(1)63,(11)1609,(12)1806
COX, John T.	(22)3063,3069,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 442/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
COX, Landon G.	(4)673,676
COX, Logan F.	(25)3583
COX, Ralph J.	(22)3171
COXE, A.B.	(3)408,(4)539,541,542
COYLE, Peter A.	(12)1806
COYNE, Martin J.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
CRAIG, Malin	(4)597,599
CRAIG, Rowland T.	(30)4119
CRAMER, Robert L.	(23)3357
CRANBERRY, Billy B.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
CRANDELL, Charles A.	(30)4134
CRANE, Ezra J.	(22)3171
CRANE, Rufus S.	(12)1806
CRANE, Winthrop M.III	(12)1806
CRANFORD, P.D.	(5)911
CRAPS, John Ellis	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
CRAWFORD, John J.	(2)377,(15)2193

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 459/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CREETH, John H.Jr	(23)3367
CREGO, Clyde A.	(1)103
CRESPO, Emilio	(9)1447
CRESWELL, Harry I.T.	(22)3042,3047,(28)3838
CRIQUI, Francis B.	(1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(17)2381
CRIST, W.E.	(5)681,733,745,(7)1082
CROCE, Benedetto	(12)1707
CROCKETT, James C.	(5)682,690,(11)1602,1603
CROFT, William F.	(9)1355
CRON, Millard W.	(12)1806
CRONAN, Frank X.	(23)3365
CRONIN, Richard	(10)1472
CRONK, Norman H.	(1)108
CROOKE, Alfredo	(9)1447
CROSBY, Charles C.	(3)421
CROSBY, Robert T.	(2)387,(12)1806,(15)2204
CROSS, Eric M.	(1)63

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 476/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CROSS, James S.	(23)3362
CROSSMAN, William E.	(30)4136
CROTTY, Joseph P.	(2)390,(8)1305,(13)1929,(15)2208
CROUCH, Allor B.	(22)3168,3171
CROW, George D.Jr	(5)923,(22)3177,3191,3206,3214
CROWELL, G.Kenneth	(1)63,98,102,103,106,108,(2)384,(5)920,(11)1608, (12)1700,1714,1806,(15)2160,2167,2173,2201,(17)2337, 2352,2355,2366,2375,2380,(18)2531,2555
CROWLEY, John T.	(8)1274
CROWLEY, William A.	(8)1276
CRUTCHER, Marshall B.	(1)63,(2)385,(15)2201
CRYSTAL, John C.	(1)63,102,103,110,(5)920,(11)1594,(12)1718,1730, 1731,1740,1754,1764,1806
CRYSTAL, Thomas L.Jr	(21)3028,3033,3034
CUDDEBACK, Howard L.	(1)109,(5)926,(23)3334,3365
CUEPPER, Kornell	(18)2468
CULIN, Frank L.	(20)2871

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 493/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CULLEN, John P.M.	(23)3365
CULLEN, Thomas J.	(9)147
CULLINAN, Henry J.	(2)390,(8)1305,(13)1928,(15)2207
CULLINS, Phillip G.	(8)1275
CULP, C.M.	(27)3711
CUMMINGS, Thomas	(3)468
CUMMINS, Peter M.Jr.	(1)50,99,(5)908,(17)2353,2372,2373,(19)2600,(20)2851, 2852
CUNNINGHAM, James S.	(1)63
CUNNINGHAM, John J.	(8)1275
CUNNINGHAM, Paul R.	(1)63,(25)3583
CUNNINGHAM, Robert J.	(1)63,(12)1806
CUNNINGHAM, Robert S.	(1)63
CUNQUERO, Manuel	(9)1392
CUOMO, Anthony	(1)63,(11)1552,1554,1564,1565,1609,(12)1806
CURLEE, Robert G.	(22)3171
CURLEY, Frederick M.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 510/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CURRAN, J.McE.	(5)900,929
CURRAN, Jean A.	(22)3080,3082,3137
CURRAN, Joe	(8)1322
CURRAN, John E.	(8)1276
CURRIE, Laughlin	(4)611,(7)1087
CURRIE, Wilsie A.	(8)1200
CURRY, Glenn E.	(5)923,(10)1491,1492,(29)3997
CURRY, James R.	(23)3361
CURRY, Patrick F.	(2)383,(15)2199
CURTIS, Arthur H.	(23)3365
CURTIS, Montgomery	(5)684,903
CURTIS, Worth M.	(1)106
CURTISS, Robert B.	(2)235,(4)619,895,(7)1125
CUSHMAN, Charles V.B.	(8)1178,1180
CUSICK, Charles A.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
CUTTER, Edward W.	(22)3213
CUTTING, Bronson	(4)531

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 527/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
CYR, Chester H.	(30)4132
CZAJKOWSKI, Anthony F.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
CZJKOWSKI, Casimir J.	(2)379,(15)2195

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHC ‖Rec: 530/530 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DAERR, Robert L.	(8)1276
DAGUERRE, Raymond P.	(2)387,393,(11)1629,1654,(12)1806,(15)2204,2211
DAHMAN, Hans	(16)2226,2227
DAILEY, Daniel H.	(8)1274,(22)3052,3054,3079,3082,3137
DAILEY, Matthew J.	(9)1448,(10)1532
DAILY, Robert H.	(8)1274
DALE, J.Thomas	(1)63,(2)385,(15)2201
DALEY, James L.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
DALEY, John W.	(2)382,(15)2198
DALFERES, Sabin J.	(3)412
D'ALFONSO, Daniel V.	(8)1274
DALGLIESH, George E.	(1)97,104
DALRUMPLE, Lester R.	(1)112
DALTON, Charles C.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
DALY, Daniel J.	(25)3583
DALY, Hugh S.	(28)3824
DALY, John R.	(22)3171,(23)3356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 17/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DALY, Philip J.	(1)63,(2)380,(13)1921,(14)2069,(15)2196
DALY, Richard W.	(9)1447
DALY, Wallace E.	(25)3583
DALY, Walter J.	(1)63,(5)922,(12)1806
D'AMBROSIO, Michael V.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
DAMM, Norman A.	(2)374,(13)1920,(15)2189
DANGLER, Frank J.Jr	(23)3365
DANIEL, Elie	(15)2126
DANIEL, Gately N.	(1)64
DANIEL, Guy S.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2214
DANIEL, Russell	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
DANIELSON, C.H.	(2)309
DANIS, Joseph H.	(22)3171
DANNAHEY, Joseph F.	(2)373,(15)2188
DANNENBERG, Martin E.Jr	(1)64
D'AQUINO, Iva Toguri	(1)147,(2)344,(28)3829-3831
D'AQUINO, Phillip	(28)3830

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 34/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DARBY, Robert	(10)1532
DARBY, William O.	(11)1625
D'ARCY, Stemphen J.	(23)3362
DARDAS, Leon R.	(2)392,(13)1937,(15)2210
DARE, Robyn L.	(23)3350
DARLAN, Jean Louis F.X.	(11)1572-1574
DARLAND, Ted	(18)2465
DARLING, Francis W.	(9)1348
DATOFF, Harry	(9)1353
DATUIN, Bernabe M	(1)51,(23)3222
DAUBE, William J.	(22)3075,3137
DAUPHIN, Edward L.	(8)1276
DAVENPORT, Basil	(2)377,393,(13)1919,(15)2193,2211
DAVENPORT, John Miller	(9)1424
DAVENPORT, Philip B.	(2)390,(15)2207
DAVEY, Floyd B.	(2)378,(15)2194
DAVID (German Col.)	(12)1771

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 51/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DAVID, Kurt D.	(2)387,(15)2203
DAVID, Nella	(12)1771
DAVID, Pablo Angeles	(23)3324
DAVIDSON, Garrison H.	(15)2159
DAVIDSON, Howard C.	(22)3077
DAVIES, Davis	(23)3355
DAVIES, E.C.	(16)2224
DAVIES, John L.	(8)1274
DAVIES, Thomas H.	(22)3171
DAVINE, Edward J.	(2)382,(15)2198
DAVIS, Bruce	(22)3171
DAVIS, Caleb W.	(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
DAVIS, Charles R.	(2)377,(15)2193
DAVIS, Earl H.	(23)3363
DAVIS, George B.Jr.	(5)922,(8)1274
DAVIS, Henry G.Jr.	(8)1275
DAVIS, James H.	(22)3164,3171

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 68/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DAVIS, Jefferson	(2)176
DAVIS, John M.	(29)3973
DAVIS, Joseph A.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
DAVIS, Marlin H.	(23)3361
DAVIS, Monnett B.	(22)3131,3132
DAVIS, Orly	(8)1211
DAVIS, Robert L.	(2)393,(15)2211
DAVIS, T.J.	(13)1897
DAVIS, Thomas C.	(2)376,(13)1911,(15)2192
DAVIS, Thompson B.	(22)3171
DAVISON, Russell C.Jr	(2)383,392,(13)1924,1938,(15)2199,2210
DAVISON, William E.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
DAWSON, James F.	(2)375,(15)2190
DAWSON, Robert	(3)468
DAY, Emmett E.	(1)104,(30)4130
DAY, James D.	(23)3364
DAY, John T.	(1)64,(22)3121

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 85/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DAZZO, Nicholus C.	(8)1274
DEAGLER, F.L.	(3)493
DEAHL, Warren A.	(2)392,(15)2210
DEAL, Glenn M.	(22)3171
DEAN, Howard E.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
DEAN, William F.	(30)4007,4196
DE ANGELIS, Cosimo	(12)1801
DEARING, Albin P.	(1)104,(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2496,(19)2598,2599,2615, 2669,2671,(20)2796,2797,2799,2818,(24)3438
DE BLOISE, Robert J.	(8)1314
DEBOLD, Frank P.	(23)3364
DE BORDES, Arnaud J.	(2)383,393,(13)1925,(15)2200,2211
DEBS, Eugene V.	(3)473
DE CINDIS, Edward A.	(1)99,(2)375,(15)2190,(25)3496
DECKINGER, Harold	(23)3356
DE CLERCQ, Albert	(2)381,383,394,(13)1925,(15)2197,2200,2212
DE FRANCE, Frank J.	(8)1274

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 102/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DE FRANK, Sam J.	(25)3583
DE GAULLE, Charles	(10)1495,(11)1558,(13)1820,(15)2146,2165
DEGRELLE, Leon	(15)2157
DE GROOT, Henry J.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2202
DE GROOTE (fnu)	(14)2098
DE GUINZBOURG, Victor S.	(1)64,71,(2)384,(12)1806,(15)2161,2167,2177-2181, 2201,(17)2351,2375,2376,2380,2395,2396,(18)2543 (20)2834,2835,(26)3620,3623
DEI BRENTI, Anna Maria	(12)1754,1756
DEININGER, Eugene H.	(23)3363
DEININGER, Richard	(2)378,(15)2194
DEITZ, Walter L.	(8)1275
DE LA GUARDIA, Ricardo A.	(9)1399,1400
DELANTY, James E.	(23)3222
DE LA ROSA, Luis Manuel	(9)1422-1424
DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, J.	(17)2337
DELDEBBIO, Bernard P.	(2)389,(15)2206

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 119/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DELFS, Ludwig	(20)2825
DEL GENIO, Nicholas	(5)925,(8)1246,1274,1279
DEL GUERCIO, Mario C.	(2)376,(15)2191
DELIA MALVA, Joseph A.	(23)3222
DELL ARTE, Leonida	(12)1780,1781
DELLING, Eric H.	(25)3575,3583
DE LOACH, Judson B.	(2)388,(5)899,(13)1914,(14)2076,(15)2136,2205
DE LOACH, Wilbur V.	(1)64,96,108,110
DEL TETTO, Ettore	(12)1710,1711
DE LUCA, Andrew A.	(1)109,(23)3361
DEL VALLE, John P.Jr.	(10)1472
DELVIN, William J.	(8)1274
DE MAGISTRIS, Antonio	(12)1715
DE MARCO, Matthew	(9)1356
DE MARE, Paul	(1)64,(12)1795,1796,1806
DEMERS, Armand A.	(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196
DE MERS, Roy G.	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 136/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DEMEY, Emil	(15)2156
DENARDO, Bernard J.	(2)390,394,(13)1928,(15)2208,2212
DENAS, Joseph M.	(1)103,110
DENISTON (fnu)	(1)101
DENLINGER, Richard G.	(1)64,(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
DENNIS, Amos T.	(10)1473
DENNIS, David	(2)394,(15)2212
DENNIS, Harold J.	(25)3583
DENNIS, Walter	(18)2462,2463,2466
DENNIS, William M.Jr	(1)100,(5)917,(12)1741,1806
DENNISTON, Robert N.	(19)2608,2609,(24)3460
DENOVE, Joseph P.	(25)3538
DENTON, Clark W.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
DENTON, James G.	(1)64,(2)376,388,(13)1912,(14)2084,(15)2191,2205, (20)2786
DENTON, William E.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
DE PORTALES, Alex W.G.	(2)387,(5)923,(15)2204

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 153/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DERBECK, Werner	(26)3690-3692
DE RIEMER, Louis M.	(1)106,(27)3711
DERMER, John H.	(2)394,(15)2212
DERMODY, James A.	(2)386,388,(13)1912,(15)2202,2204
DERN, George H.	(4)583
DE RUBEIS, Victor E.	(12)1806
DERZIS, Pete M.	(1)101,(9)1430,1431,(25)3556
DES AUTELS, Roland E.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2214
DE SILVA, Peer	(8)1274
DE SIMONE, Jack A.	(1)64,(12)1806
DESLAURIERS, Conrad E.	(23)3365
DESMOND, Robert	(23)3365
DESOER, Henri	(18)2483
DESSY, Giovanni	(12)1801
DETWEILER, Charles B.	(8)1275
DETWEILER, Philip F.	(9)1374,(22)3060,3137
DEUBEL, Charles C.	(23)3295,3296,3313,3366

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 170/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DEUTZMANN, Fritz	(16)2251
DEVENOW, Chester	(23)3358
DEVERE, Perry A.	(2)380,387,(11)1629,1654,(12)1806,(15)2196,2204
DEVERS, Jacob L.	(13)1821,(24)3427
DE VICTORIA, Manuel	(3)470
DE VICTORIA, Maria	(3)470,473
DEVINE, Robert	(22)3171
DE VLAMING, Daniel L.	(23)3360
DEVOT, Elizabeth	(18)2484
DE VUSSIERE, Marie	(3)470
DE WALT, Clarence W.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189,(16)2266,2267
DEWAN, James T.	(2)393,(15)2210
DEWING, Charles W.	(1)64,(8)1212-1214
DE WITT (fnu)	(15)2197
DE WITT, Erville D.	(2)377,(13)1919,(15)2193
DIAZ, Alvaro Carlos	(3)443
DIBBLEE, Albert	(2)382,(15)2198

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 187/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DI BONA, Louis G.	(1)64,(12)1806
DICKEY, David B.	(5)901,929,(9)1443,1444,1447
DICKIE, Roland B.	(23)3355
DICKMAN, Bentley	(2)389,(15)2206
DICKMAN, Joseph T.	(2)180
DICKSON, Benjamin A.	(11)1555,1559,1562,1576-1578,1582-1585,1587,1590, 1627,1631,1637,1640-1643,1645,1651,1681,1682,(13) 1814,1826,(14)2049,2064,2079,2087-2089,2103,(15)2120, (16)2226,2257,2280,2289,(18)2518,(19)2630,2688, (20)2782
DIEBNER (Dr.)	(8)1301
DIEHL, Fred A.	(2)388,(15)2205
DIES, Martin	(4)664,665,(7)1087
DIETL, Luther L.	(25)3583
DIETRICH, Sepp	(18)2508,(20)2845
DIETZ, Ralph E.	(1)64,(2)388,(13)1912,(14)2063,2103,(15)2205,(16)2250 2251

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 204/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DIGGS, Melvin M.	(9)1433,1447
DI GIOJA, Roger	(2)387,(15)2203
DI IORIO, Emil A.	(2)394,(15)2212
DILLARD, Jack W.	(8)1276
DILLES, Stanley E.	(2)382,393,(13)1923,(15)2198,2211
DILLMAN, Francis A.	(1)64,(23)3358
DILLON (CIP Agent)	(3)472
DILLON, David O.	(22)3171
DILWORTH, John R.	(30)4006,4017-4019,4023,4054,4106,4118,4134
DI MARINO, Charles S.	(25)3583
DINEEN, William P.	(1)51,65,(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
DINEHART, Alan F.Jr	(1)103,(2)380,384,389,(11)1576,1590,1654,(12)1806, (15)2160,2196,2201,2207,(26)3620
DINGEMAN, David R.	(22)3171
DINNING, Woodford W.	(1)65,(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
DINWIDDIE, Harry E.Jr	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
DIRON, Henri	(2)372,(15)2187,(18)2483

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 221/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DISKIN, Maurice J.	(2)394,(15)2212
DITO, Frank E.	(2)387,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
DITTMAN, William E.	(9)1356
DIVILIO, Francis M.	(1)65,(12)1806
DOBROWOLSKI, Joseph L.	(12)1806
DOBSON, Joseph D.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
DOBSON, Kenneth W.	(2)382,(15)2198,(19)2668
DOCKER, Carl J.	(23)3259
DODA, John P.	(2)376,(15)2191
DODGE, Joseph J.	(7)1136
DOENITZ, Karl	(26)3614
DOHRN, William J.	(2)382,(15)2198
DOLL, Frederick S.	(2)278,(7)1125,1128
DOLLAR (fnu)	(26)3624
DOLPH, Robert E.	(2)388,(13)1914,(15)2205
DOMBROWSKI, Henry E.	(2)383,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
DOMINGUEZ, Manuel	(2)176

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 238/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DOMOTO, Kaji	(28)3834
DONAGGIO, Alfred F.	(25)3583
DONAHOE, Bernard M.	(1)65,98,(5)915,(22)3171,(23)3307,3356
DONAHOE, John T.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
DONAHUE, John F.	(22)3215
DONDERO, George A.	(27)3773
DONEHOWER, Wilford J.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
DONLON, Thomas M.	(2)395,(15)2212
DONNELL, Newman R.	(1)98,(2)374,(15)2190
DONNELLY, Andrew J.Jr.	(2)391,(13)1930,1939.(15)2208
DONOHUE, Bernard P.	(22)3171,(23)3272
DONOHUE, Edward G.	(1)110,(2)389,(15)2206
DONOHUE, Joseph T.	(2)382,(15)2198
DONOVAN, Edward P.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
DONOVAN, John M.	(5)902
DONOVAN, Richard	(7)1145
DONOVAN, William J.	(1)145,(2)233,(4)523,649,(11)1675,1676

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 255/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DORAN, Edward F.Jr.	(12)1806
DOREY, Halstead	(1)145,(2)199,(4)572
DORIN, William Jr	(1)101
DORN, Harold C.	(22)3078,3098,3123,3137
DORSETT, James K.Jr	(1)65,103,(2)381,(5)913,(13)1922,(14)2050,(15)2118, 2197,(16)2237,2240,2241,2243,2257,2258,(19)2594
DORSEY, Cam D.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
DORSEY, John J.	(12)1806
DOST (fnu)	(20)2874
DOSWELD, Marcel	(15)2157
DOUCET, Valex A.	(22)3199,3213
DOUD, John L.Jr	(1)65
DOUD, William E.	(1)65
DOUGHERTY, John L.Jr	(1)65
DOUGHERTY, Millard F.	(1)65,102,137
DOUGLAS, Edwin L.	(2)389,(15)2206
DOUGLASS, Arthur R.	(1)110,(23)3310,3365

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 272/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DOVARDO, Joe	(12)1806
DOVE, Jacques S.	(22)3171
DOW, Harry H.	(30)4010,4011,4023,4116,4130,4139,4180
DOW, Lawrence E.	(2)386,388,(13)1912,(14)2062,2083,(15)2127,2202,2205,
DOWD, Thomas H.	(2)390,(5)907,(6)964,(13)1929,(14)2100,(15)2208
DOWLING, Charles R.	(5)910,(9)1332,1356
DOWNING, Frederick G.	(1)65,(2)388,390,(13)1912,(15)2204,2207
DOWNS, Frederick H.	(2)389,(15)2206
DOYLE, fnu	(15)2197
DOYLE, John P.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
DOYLE, Robert H.	(2)395,(5)900,929,(13)1817,1937,(15)2213
DOYLE, William A.	(2)375,(15)2191
DREHER, Brois Max	(9)1402
DRESEL, E.L.	(4)527,530
DRESHLER, Harold F.	(1)65,(2)385,(5)901,(15)2201
DREYER, William J.	(23)3358
DREYFUSS, Erich	(2)373,(15)2188

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 289/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DRISCOLL, Florence J.	(8)1275
DRISKO, Grenfield D.	(1)51,65,(23)3222-3226
DRIVER, Floyd L.	(25)3583
DRIVER, Frank S.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
DROLSUM, Darrel D.	(1)65,(2)374,(15)2189,(16)2315,2316,(20)2812
DRUCKER, Ernest	(2)372,(15)2187
DRUM, Hugh A.	(1)145,(2)196,201,(4)575
DRUM, R.D.	(2)178
DRYE, Richard L.	(23)3362
DRYER, Cecil	(18)2467
DU, Roderick	(22)3085
DUBBS, John	(10)1491
DUBOFSKY, Jack	(2)393,(15)2211
DU BOIS, Rene E.	(23)3355
DU BOIS, Robert	(19)2582
DUBOSE, Eugene Z.	(22)3171,3215
DUDARRI, Antoun H.	(2)374,(15)2189

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 306/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DUDLEY, Herbert M.	(30)4136
DUELL, Jesse	(9)1356
DUERMAYER, Heinrich	(25)3499
DUFF, Russell G.	(28)3839
DUFFY, Paul E.	(22)3117,3171
DUGGAN, James M.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2199
DULANEY, Thomas E.	(2)387,(15)2203
DULLES, Allen	(4)527
DUMM, Paul J.	(2)372,393,(5)916,(13)1916,(15)2187,2211
DUMOND, John L.	(30)4134
DUNBAR, Edward	(1)51
DUNBAR, Glenn S.	(1)66,(23)3348
DUNBAR, Lawrence L.	(2)382,383,386,(13)1927,(15)2198,2200,2202,(18)2497
DUNCAN, Alexander S.	(23)3259,3363,(28)3824
DUNCAN, David E.	(25)3539
DUNCAN, Louis C.	(23)3365
DUNCAN, Thomas N.	(1)66,(2)386,388,(13)1912,(14)2072,(15)2202,2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 323/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DUNGAN, Nelson Van N.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213
DUNLAP, Joseph R.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
DUNLEA, Thomas A.	(23)3367
DUNLOP, Robert H.	(5)695
DUNN, Jack H.	(8)1274
DUNN, Walter K.	(10)1540B
DUNN, William B.	(2)386,(5)914,(15)2202
DUNNING, Floyd S.	(30)4119,4122,4123,4125
DUNNING, John R.	(8)1260
DUNWORTH, Gerald J.	(2)393,(13)1939,(15)2211
DUPREE, Robert P.	(22)3214
DUQUESNE, Fritz Joubert	(3)470
DURAN, Pio	(23)3323,3370
DURAND (Col-French)	(17)2399,2400
DURAND, Martial	(15)2127,2128
DURKIN, Edward	(8)1275
DURKIN, J.T.	(5)910

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 340/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
DURKIN, James H.	(23)3362
DUROW, Lev	(25)3528
DUSSEAULT, Henry J.	(2)387,(15)2203
DUTKO, Joseph J.	(30)4136
DUVALL, Andrew H.	(1)99,(2)375,(15)2191,(18)2494
DUVALL, Andrew R.Jr	(1)66,(19)2600
DUVEN, Edward J.	(23)3356
DWYER, John H.Jr.	(9)1448
DZIMIANSKI, John W.	(8)1276

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHD ‖Rec: 349/349 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
EAGER, John M.	(7)1132
EARLE, Richard G.	(5)919,(23)3246,3359
EBAUGH, Robert C.	(10)1491,1500,1501,1503
EBERLEIN, Carl A.	(30)4013,4134,4140
EBERLEIN, Michael G.Jr	(22)3214
EBERLY, Donald A.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
EBINGER, Robert F.	(8)1276
EBY, G.Hershey	(8)1277
ECKARDT, Stephen A.	(25)3526
ECKBERG, Carlton R.	(8)1275
ECKERMANN (fnu)	(14)2063
ECKHARDT (German BgGen)	(20)2801,2802
ECKHARDT, Henri E.	(2)382,(15)2198
ECKHARDT (fnu) von	(3)475
ECKMAN, George R.	(1)66,108,(8)1291,1293,1304,1305,(24)3410
ECKMANN, Alexander J.	(2)378,(15)2193
EDDINGTON, Thomas A.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
EDDY, Manton S.	(1)145,(2)207,(4)628,631,659
EDGAR, Philip L.	(10)1472
EDGAR, William R.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
EDLER, Horst	(25)3552
EDLUND, Gustav V.	(8)1276,1305
EDRIS, Robert B.	(1)66,(22)3079,3083,3084,3115,3137
EDSTROM, Albert K.	(2)376,(15)2191
EDWARDS, Duval A.	(23)3358
EDWARDS, Frank	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
EDWARDS, Lloyd G.	(28)3835
EDWARDS, Marvin L.	(2)392,395,(13)1937,(15)2210,2213
EDWARDS, Paul M.	(23)3358
EDWARDS, R.	(5)922
EDWARDS, Robert W.	(8)1275
EGAN, Donald H.	(30)4032,4134
EGAN, John M.	(8)1277
EGAN, William P.	(2)385,(13)1927,(125)2202

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
EGGERS, Fred W.	(1)111,(22)3126,3132,3136
EGGERS, Harvey H.	(8)1276
EGGERT, John W.	(30)4136
EHLERS, Kenneth H.	(2)393,(15)2210
EHRENSHAFT, Harry	(2)376,378,(13)1920,(15)2191,2193
EHRHARDT, Werner	(19)2660
EHRLE, John W.	(1)107,(29)3993
EHRLICH, Max	(2)387,(15)2203
EICHELBERGER, James M.	(5)923,(11)1557,1607
EICHELBERGER, Robert L.	(23)3253,3331
EIDAM, Louis C.	(23)3360
EIGRUBER, August	(25)3508,3509
EINSEIDEL (fnu) von	(27)3784
EISENBERG, Jack W.	(2)387,(15)2203
EISENBERG, Max	(2)377,(15)2193
EISENHART, William S.	(8)1275
EISENHOWER, Dwight D.	(1)145,(2)227,230,237,247,331,(4)619,(5)755,756,

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(10)1505,(11)1547,1556-1558,1563,1564,1622,1646,1652, 1656,1666,(12)1699,1705,1720,(13)1814,1848,1851,1867, 1873,1876,1894,1909,(14)2029,2030,(16)2231,(18)2460- -2462,2471-2473,(19)2608,2667,(20)2742,2790,2829, (24)3408.(25)3542,(26)3658
EISENHOWER, John S.D.	(1)145,(2)327
EKEN, Truman C.	(30)4130
ELEBERT, Paul Maurice	(15)2128
ELINE, Alton J.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
ELIOPULOS, Louis	(11)1609,(12)1783,1806
ELKINS, S.B.	(2)179
ELLEDGE, Fred Jr	(23)3362
ELLER, Elbert H.	(30)4013,4016,4019,4022,4110-4112,4127,4134,4139,4140
ELLERD, Arthur A.Jr	(23)3363
ELLERT, Arthur R.	(1)66,(2)372,392,(13)1914,(15)2187,2210
ELLIOTT, Gilbert	(3)409,431,455,493,498,507,(4)532
ELLIOTT, Hugh F.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ELLIOTT, James T.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213
ELLIOTT, Loran L.	(1)104,(2)383,(15)2199,(19)2616,2617,(26)3631
ELLIOTT, William E.	(22)3171
ELLIOTT, William K.	(22)3171
ELLIOTT, William T.	(22)3079,3117,3137
ELLIS, Charles A.	(1)66,(2)236,237,(6)944,(7)1111,(11)1550-1552,1562 1564,1574,1609
ELLISON, Herbert A.	(11)1654
ELLISON, Herbert T.S.Jr	(1)66,(2)380,(12)1806,(15)2196
ELLMAN, Julius	(22)3137
ELLSBERRY, William G.	(2)376,386,390,(13)1919,(15)2192,2203,2207
ELMER, Fred	(1)66,(2)388,(15)2205
ELMORE, William	(22)3171
ELMS, Grady	(2)379,(15)2195
ELSING, William T.	(23)3359
EMBERLING, Lloyd E.	(2)392,(9)1447,(15)2210
EMBLEY, Richard O.	(2)388,(13)1914,(15)2205

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
EMMERLING, John W.	(22)3215
EMMERT, Leonard J.	(5)911,(22)3215,(23)3361
EMMEST, Leonard J.	(1)109
EMMET, L.L.	(5)928
EMMET, Thomas A.	(1)66,(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1806,(15)2196,2201
EMMONS, Delos C.	(22)3143,3147,3151
ENDEL, Charles E.	(8)1277
ENG, Howard W.	(22)3136
ENGEL, Martin	(2)383,(15)2199
ENGEL, Regis F.	(23)3366
ENGELHARDT. Karl	(19)2651
ENGESSER, Gerald W.	(25)3583
ENGLAND, Chester B.	(2)390,(15)2207
ENGLISH, James W.	(23)3358
ENNIS, Frederick T.	(8)1277
ENNIS, W.P.	(9)1378
ENS, William A.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHE ‖Rec: 102/140 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ENSIGN, Robert	(1)66,(2)385,(15)2201
EPP, Franz Ritter von	(26)3655
ERDMAN, Alexander E.	(2)379,(15)2195
ERDOES, Frank F.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1936,(15)2214
ERICKSON, Earlan J.	(22)3171
ERICKSON, H.E.	(30)4126,4191
ERICKSON, Oscar J.	(23)3362
ERMIS, Leo L.	(2)281,(5)906,(13)1923,(15)2197,(16)2288,(18)2498, (19)2596
ERSKINE, David G.	(1)18,66,102,145,(2)213-215,219,238,250,251,368, (4)663,(5)732,733,746,(19)2584-2586,2608,2609, (22)3192-3194,3196,3197,3202,3211,3212,(27)3711,3803
ERWIN, Jack	(1)51,66,(23)3223
ESCUDERO, Charles	(18)2555,2556
ESKES, James N.	(22)3215
ESPIET, Rafael J.	(9)1447
ESPOSITO, Othello V.	(22)3171

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHE ‖Rec: 119/140 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ESSER, Klemmens	(18)2468
ESSER, Peter	(18)2468
ESSIAMBRE, Frank F.	(23)3366
ESTENSON, Lyle O.	(2)393,(13)1920,(15)2210
ESTMAN, Max	(4)534
ETHIER, Raymond T.	(2)393,(15)2211
ETTLINGER, P.L.	(20)2824,2826
EUBANK, Gene M.	(30)4127,4134
EVANS, Albert E.	(2)379,(15)2195
EVANS, James	(2)390,(15)2207
EVANS, Stanley V.	(22)3164,3171
EVANS, Townsend	(1)66,(2)379,(5)908,(15)2195
EVANS, William D.	(23)3359
EVANS, Wiltz	(25)3566
EVELAND, Wilbur C.Jr	(1)67,(5)917,(9)1447
EVERETT, Junius A.	(23)3361
EVERSON, Ausman E.	(22)3171

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHE ‖Rec: 136/140 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
EVERSON, Lloyd R.	(23)3276
EWING, Charles G.	(2)393,(15)2210,(26)3658
EWING, Samuel E.Jr	(5)684,723,730,897,(8)1180,1181,(9)1363
EWING, William S.	(2)389,(15)2206

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FABIAN, Max	(23)3357
FABORONI, Carl L.	(9)1448
FABRICI, Alfredo	(25)3357
FACCIO, Cesare	(12)1729,1770
FAGALY, Joseph J.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
FAGAN, Francis C.	(1)51,(23)3355
FAGAN, James G.	(2)383,394,(13)1925,(15)2200,2212
FAHEY, Gregory J.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
FAHEY, John A.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
FAILEY, James R.	(1)103
FAIN, Douglas W.	(1)67,(2)383,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
FAIR, Fisher A.	(23)3359
FAIRBANKS, Donald F.	(22)3171
FAIRLEY, Paul J.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
FALCHEK, Walter K.	(2)375,(15)2190
FALK, Fred	(2)375,(15)2190
FALKNER, Murray C.	(5)918,(11)1557,1607

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 17/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FALLON, Joseph J.	(22)3171
FANGEL, Lloyd	(2)380,(11)1627,1655,(12)1806,(15)2196,(25)3583
FANNING, Julius N.Jr	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2202
FARELL, Joseph H.Jr	(1)67
FARIN, Andre	(14)2035
FARLEY, Eugene E.	(1)67,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
FARLEY, Louis W.	(23)3365
FARMER, Sam C.	(2)388,(15)2205
FARNAW, Frederick Z.	(2)376,(15)2192
FARRAN, Robert C.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
FARRELL, Martin P.	(1)67,(2)373,(5)908,(15)2189
FARRIS, Charles D.	(22)3047,3089,3137
FARRIS, Ralph W.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
FASOLA, Alfred F.	(1)67
FAULKNER, Joseph W.	(9)1355
FEDDER, Walter F.	(2)379,(15)2195
FEDERICI, Anthony G.	(2)392,(15)2210

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FEDOR, William	(27)3708,3725,3738,3739,3742,3744,3764,3765
FEDOROWICH, Walter	(30)4133
FEE, Orville H.	(23)3357
FEGUSON, Albert C.	(2)389,(15)2206
FEINDT, Lawrence R.	(2)390,(8)1305,(13)1928,(15)2208
FEIST, Herbert B.	(2)389,(15)2206
FELDMAN, Henry	(1)67,(12)1798,(25)3508
FELEO, Juan	(23)3372
FELL, Leonard W.	(12)1806
FELL, Phillip S.P.	(8)1275
FELLERS, Bonner	(23)3283
FELLOWS, Francis E.	(1)101
FELS, Johann	(19)2656
FELTENSTEIN, Paul I.	(2)386,(15)2203
FENDERSON, William H.	(2)373,(15)2188
FENIMORE, William E.	(23)3359
FENNELL, Fred F.	(2)373,393,(13)1917,(15)2188,2211

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FENSTER, Oscar	(25)3583
FENTON, Donald M.	(22)3155,3171
FERANDEZ (Spanish Gen.)	(17)2402
FERDINAND, Howard R.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
FERGUSON, George T.	(23)3356
FERGUSON, Howard M.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
FERGUSON, John M.Jr	(30)4110,4134,4139
FERGUSON, Joseph H.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2136,2188
FERGUSON, Prescott W.	(23)3362
FERMI, Enrico	(8)1263
FERNANDEZ, F.I.	(5)909
FERNANDEZ, Federico L.Jr.	(9)1447,(23)3292,3341
FERNHOLZ, Emil F.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
FERON, Jean	(14)2086
FERRIN, C.S.	(9)1404
FERRIS, Everett Ray	(22)3171
FERRY, Harry W.Jr.	(9)1356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 68/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FERTIG, W.W.	(23)3332
FETTERS, Harold M.	(22)3076,3121,3137
FIAL, Allen I.	(2)379,(15)2195,(20)2781-2783
FIEBIG, Carl F.	(2)393,(8)1292,1295,1296,1298,1303-1305,(12)1716, (15)2211
FIEDLER (German Col.)	(11)1580
FIELDS, Robert E.	(2)386,388,(13)1914,(15)2203,2205
FILLEY, Walter O.	(1)67,(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
FILLPPU, Kaarlo	(2)372,393,(13)1915,(15)2187,2211
FILPPULA, Taisto C.	(1)67,(2)376,(15)2191
FINCH, Heber	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2201
FINCH, Richard F.	(1)67,(2)372,386,390,(13)1914,(15)2187,2202
FINCH, Richard R.	(2)390,(15)2207
FINEGAN, Eugene E.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
FINELY, Bernard L.	(25)3583
FINGERSON, Robert F.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
FINLEY, John C.	(2)395,(13)1932,(15)2213

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FINN, David H.	(1)67,(23)3299,3355
FINNEL (fnu)	(15)2197
FINNELL, Albert T.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
FINNELL, John E.	(8)1276
FINNEMAN, David F.	(1)103
FINNERAN, Michael J.	(8)1276
FINNEY, Oliver J.	(22)3137
FIORELLA, Jack L.	(25)3583
FISCHL, Stephan T.	(2)378,(15)2194
FISCHOFF, Louis	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667,2668
FISH, Lloyd B.	(1)111
FISHALON, Nathan	(2)394,(15)2212
FISHER, James A.	(1)67
FISKE, H.B.	(4)584
FITCH, John H.	(9)1374
FITZGERALD, James C.	(11)1609,(12)1806
FITZGERALD, Paul J.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FITZGERALD, Vincent P.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,1986,(15)2199,2202
FITZPATRICK, James A.	(22)3171
FITZROY, Roland V.Jr.	(8)1276
FITZWILLIAM, Leo M.	(2)393,(13)1920,(15)2211
FLAHERTY, Gordon	(1)106,124
FLAM, Marvin J.	(9)1448,(22)3171
FLANAGAN, Joseph M.	(2)392,(13)1937,(15)2210
FLANNERY, Francis R.	(5)924,(22)3206,3209,3213
FLANNERY, Ian S.	(22)3171
FLECKENSTEIN, Walter A.	(22)3158-3160
FLEETWOOD, Harry B.	(2)393,(15)2211
FLEISIG, Philip F.	(23)3357
FLEMING, Arthur R.	(27)3773
FLETCHER, Charles S.	(12)1806
FLETCHER, Lindsay Z.	(23)3362
FLICKINGER, Chandler	(20)2831
FLINN, Thomas E.	(1)110,(2)388,(5)909,(13)1913,(14)2077,(15)2205

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(22)3171
FLOOD, Thomas W.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
FLORSHEIM, George D.	(2)377,(15)2193
FLOURNOY, Copley W.	(8)1276
FLOYD, Samuel F.	(30)4136
FLOYD, William N.	(23)3361
FLY, Harold B.	(25)3583
FLYNN, Charles F.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
FLYNN, Edward J.	(10)1520,1523
FLYNN, Francis P.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1806,(15)2196
FLYNN, Thomas F.	(2)379,(15)2195
FOELKERSAM, (fnu) von	(18)2467,2564
FOGG, W.A.	(8)1230
FOLEY, Barry S.	(10)1472
FOLEY, Francis J.	(22)3172
FOLEY, John G.	(22)3172
FOLEY, Richard J.	(8)1275

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FOLEY, William J.	(22)3213,(23)3365
FOLLANSBEE, Harvey O.	(2)382,(15)2198
FOLTZ, William D.	(8)1275
FONG, Edmund	(1)67,(22)3041,3044,3045,3081,3084,3085,3088,3090 (22)3137
FONTAINE, Louis	(19)2660
FOOR, Richard A.	(8)1276
FOOTE, Edmund L.	(9)1356
FOOTE, George W.	(11)1609,(12)1806
FOOTHORAP, James F.	(1)68,106,(2)384,391,(5)683,697,704,709,710,713,717, 896,(6)963,(7)1083,1084,1108,1109,1114,1115,(13)1931, (14)2028,2076,(15)2110,2111,2200,2208,(17)2337, (19)2583,(26)3693,3694
FORBES, Richard M.	(9)1366,1374
FORCESSIN, Ivan Isidor	(25)3573
FORD, Homer P.	(5)690
FORD, J.Francis	(8)1197,1198

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FORD, Quintin U.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1806,(15)2196
FORD, Stanley H.	(1)146,(2)197,(4)570,572,595,600,601
FORD, Thomas J.	(13)2010
FORDE, H.M.	(11)1611,1612,1630,1631,1638,1652,1680
FOREL, Bruno	(2)387,(15)2203
FORGATCH, JOSEPH	(8)1276
FORKEY, Leo O.	(1)98(5)925,(12)1722,1723,1806
FORKNER, Thomas F.	(8)1275
FORNARI, Charles	(11)1615
FORNEY, Lester R.	(1)146,(2)251,261,266,275,316,342,347,(5)681,682, 689,700,715,720,721,726,727,735,739,740,742,746 (6)949,950,959,960,962,(7)1085,1086,1095,1100,1142 1151,(8)1178,1324,(9)1384,1385,(11)1598,1651,(24)3383 3385,3386,3388,3403,3407,3412,3413,3415,3435,(27)3790 (30)4119
FORREST, Edward L.	(8)1202
FORREST, Gerald	(2)390,(15)2207

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FORSBERG, William H.	(2)384,386,(13)1926,(15)2200,2203
FORSYTH, James A.	(2)376,(14)2047,2049,(15)2192
FORTE, Saverio	(1)67,(12)1806,(25)3583
FORTI, Ramon M.	(9)1427
FORTIER, Edward J.	(9)1356
FORTUNATO, Nicholas A.	(1)108,(5)905,(12)1791,1806
FOSI, Tommasio	(25)3552
FOSSECK, Theodore R.	(1)104
FOSSIECK, Theodore H.	(1)68,104,106,(2)382,(5)913,(13)1923,(14)2076, (15)2113,2198
FOSSUM, Norman H.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
FOSTER, Curtis M.	(2)379,386,(13)1911,(14)2070,(15)2195,2202,(16)2233
FOSTER, Edward J.	(23)3357
FOSTER, John S.	(1)68,98,(2)374,392,(5)914,(13)1920,1938,(15)2189, 2210,(19)2602,2619
FOSTER, Lon Jr	(22)3172
FOSTER, Robert McK.Jr.	(5)901,(9)1416,1447

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FOTTE, Hilis C.	(8)1276
FOURNESS, John C.	(1)68,(2)373,(15)2189
FOWLE, Eliot R.Jr	(23)3361
FOWLER, Robert	(1)68
FOWLIE, Alexander S.	(9)1339,1340
FOX, Raymond J.	(11)1567,1609,1611,1612,(12)1806
FOX, Richard A.	(30)4126,4132,4191
FOYT, Anton	(1)68,(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
FRAENKEL, George K.	(2)374,(15)2189
FRAMBES, Walter B.	(9)1447
FRANCAZZI, Bruno A.	(1)68,(12)1806
FRANCAZZI, Raniero	(12)1806
FRANCAZZI, Rene R.	(1)68,(12)1762-1764
FRANCIS, Walter G.	(23)3355
FRANCIS, William H.Jr	(2)395,(5)906,(13)1932,(15)2213
FRANCO (Senora)	(17)2400
FRANCO, Albert M.	(23)3356

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FRANCO, Francisco	(17)2402
FRANK, Hans	(2)309,(20)2849
FRANK, Walter	(2)387,(15)2203
FRANKE (fnu)	(26)3608,3610
FRANKENFIELD, William M.	(12)1806
FRANKFURTER, Felix	(3)469
FRANKL, Frederic L.	(2)372,(15)2187
FRANKLIN, Arthur H.	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
FRANKLIN, Charles B.Jr.	(9)1447
FRANKLIN, James W.	(22)3191-3193,3196,3197,3211,3214
FRANZ, Alfred	(18)2465
FRANZMATHES, Joe E.	(9)1447
FRARY, Jerry P.	(2)383,(15)2199,(19)2619
FRAUENHOFER, Franz E.von	(18)2508-2510
FRAUND, William	(2)379,(15)2194
FRAVENFELD, Alfred	(20)2879
FRAZEE, Claude J.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 221/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FRAZIER, Alfred	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
FRECHETTE, Rheo J.	(2)393,(15)2211
FRECHETTE, Telesphore	(30)4136
FREDENDALL, Lloyd	(11)1546,1577
FREDERICK, Harold F.	(1)68,(5)913,(23)3246,3251-3253,3292,3317,3323,3358
FREDERICK, William M.	(1)68
FREDERICK, William W.	(1)104,(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2502,(19)2596,2642
FREDERICKS, Frederick	(3)470
FREDERIKSON, Oliver J.	(26)3597,3599,(27)3700
FREED, Fred P.	(2)387,(15)2203
FREEDMAN, Abraham A.	(2)379,(15)2194
FREEDMAN, Mark O.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2214
FREELAND, Leonard A.	(9)1356
FREELY, John B.	(9)1356
FREESE, Leslie T.	(2)393,(15)2211
FREESE, Theodore L.	(13)1920
FREESTONE, Sampson W.	(12)1729,1806

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 238/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FREMONT, John C.	(2)176
FRENCH, Vernon M.	(12)1806
FRENCH, Woodrow W.	(1)68,(2)306,380,384,(11)1654,(12)1806,(15)2160,2180, 2196,2201,(18)2531
FRESHWATER, Roy L.	(23)3360
FREY, Charles Daniel	(3)488
FRICANO, Anthony S.	(1)68,(10)1466,1472
FRICK, Robert O.	(10)1472
FRIEBOLIN, Brookes	(2)387,(12)1806,(15)2204
FRIEDENBERG, Stanley	(2)375,(15)2190
FRIEDERICH, Robert E.	(1)110,(23)3310,3366
FRIEDLAND, John	(2)394,(15)2212
FRIELINGHAUS, Henry	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
FRIESTEDT, Herman F.	(2)379,(15)2195
FRIIS, Harold P.	(22)3172
FRINGHIAN, Nourhan	(8)1193
FRISBY, John C.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 255/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FRISCHBIER, Karl	(20)2858
FRITSCHE, Nobel S.	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
FRITZ, W.G.	(5)916
FRITZ, William	(22)3172
FRIZZELL, Russell B.	(2)391,(5)906,(13)1933,(15)2208,(26)3657
FRONAUER, Henry J.	(2)393,(15)2211,(20)2857,2862
FRUTCHEY, Russell W.	(1)101,(5)901
FRY, Bernard M.	(8)1275
FRY, William H.	(25)3583
FRYE, Herbert H.	(8)1275
FUCHS, Emanuel	(2)373,(15)2189
FUCHS, Henry	(25)3521,3523
FUCHS, Joseph	(22)3076,3120,3137
FUERTH, Robert S.Jr	(22)3172
FUHR, Walter E.	(2)376,(15)2191
FUJIE, Asa A.	(30)4131
FUJII (fnu)	(23)3225

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 272/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FUJIKAWA (fnu)	(28)3919
FUJIOKA, Yukinobu	(30)4016,4127,4130
FUJITA, Ichiro	(22)3172
FULD, Arthur J.	(1)68,(2)375,(15)2190
FULLEN, Lilburn S.	(9)1448
FULLER, A.F.	(10)1528
FULLER, Francis J.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
FULLER, J.R.	(5)896
FULLER, Marvin E.	(1)68,(12)1806
FULMER, Burton E.	(2)381,392,(13)1937,(15)2197,2210,(19)2650
FULSHER, Remy W.	(2)387,(11)1609,(12)1806,(15)2204
FULTON, Oliver B.	(29)3967-3969,3971
FUNDERBURK, Harold W.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
FUNK, Donald M.	(1)69,(11)1567,1609,1612,1614,(12)1707,1721,1806
FUNK, Paul J.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209,(26)3601,(27)3732
FUNK, Robert L.	(30)4134
FURBERSHAW, W.L.	(5)688,(7)1135,1157,(9)1385

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 289/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
FUREY, Francis S.	(23)3365
FUREY, John B.	(2)394,(13)1939,(15)2211
FUREY, Robert J.	(23)3365
FURNEY, Lester C.	(8)1275
FURNISS, James D.	(1)97
FURNISS, James P.	(1)69,(11)1567,1609,(12)1709,1768,1772,1774,1806, (25)3553
FURNISS, Robert D.	(2)380,(13)1922,(15)2196
FUSS, Karl	(10)1473
FUSSELMAN, William J.	(23)3357
FUTCH, Millard E.	(1)142
FYANES, Francis D.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHF ‖Rec: 301/301 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GABEL, Kurt	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2668
GABERSCEK, Stanislav	(25)3579,3580
GAERTNER (Dr.)	(26)3667
GAFFEY, Hugh J.	(20)2888
GAGAN (fnu)	(2)384,(15)2200
GAGAN, Thomas A.	(1)69,104,107,(2)382,385,(5)705,897,(13)1927,1986, (15)2198,2201,(18)2504,(19)2626,(26)3693,3694
GAGEN, J.E.	(5)911
GAGEN, Joseph	(2)376,(15)2191
GAGEN, Norbert R.	(8)1276
GAHAN, P.J.Jr	(5)907,(8)1275
GAILEY, C.K.	(5)724
GAINES, Gail A.	(1)51
GAKEMEIER, Norman H.	(2)376,(15)2191
GALBRAITH, Robert C.	(1)110,(2)389,(15)2206
GALENO, Lorenzo S.	(22)3172
GALICKI, Edmund	(1)375,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 17/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GALLAGHER, George R.	(2)373,391,(5)902,(13)1933,(15)2188,2208,(16)2237, 2238
GALLAGHER, Philip E.	(1)8,48,(2)370
GALLAGHER, Thomas P.	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
GALLAGHER, William J.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
GALLI, Alesander L.	(25)3570,3583
GALLMETZER, Heinrich	(12)1781,1782
GALLOWAY, Jennis R.	(1)69,108,(2)306,(23)3276,3278,3359,(28)3819,3820, 3822,(29)3948,3949
GALVAN, Frank J.	(10)1540B,(29)3999,4000
GAMACHE, Arthur H.	(22)3172
GAMBRILL, William G.	(1)47
GAME, Morgan F.	(8)1263,1276
GANDHI, Mohandas K.	(22)3096
GANGNES, Clarence B.	(1)69,(12)1754,1759,1760,1806
GANNON, William F.	(1)69,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2194
GANTMER, Elizabeth Ann	(20)2856

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 34/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GARDIN, Vic	(2)378,(15)2194,(18)2455
GARDNER, Hubert C.	(23)3356
GARDNER, James R.	(1)69,(5)933,(11)1557,1576,1581,1582,1588-1590, (12)1806,(25)3498
GARDNER, John E.	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2668
GARDNER, Robert W.	(9)1374
GARGETT, George G.	(28)3841
GARGIULO, Vincent	(9)1447
GARNER, Doniphan M.	(2)379,390,(15)2195,2208
GARNER, Gerard	(2)379,(15)2195
GARO, Raymond	(2)374,(12)1806,(15)2190
GARRISON, John O.	(30)4116,4128
GARRISON, Stewart L.	(22)3222
GARRITY, Hubert M.	(23)3362
GARTLEY, Herbert B.Jr.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
GARVEY, Dale M.	(19)2674
GARZA, Ray B.	(23)3367

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 51/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GARZIARC, Dean H.	(1)97
GASANG (fnu)	(23)3372
GASPAR, Amad Jr	(1)51,(23)3222
GASSINGER, Henry A.	(1)99,(2)376,(15)2191,(18)2494
GATES, G.H.	(1)20
GATSOS, John P.	(12)1806
GAUDRAULT, Robert J.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2201
GAUDREAULT, Ronald F.	(9)1448
GAUGHAN, John J.	(8)1276
GAUGHN, John R.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
GAUGHRAN, Paul F.	(5)902
GAVAN, John P.	(22)3172
GAVRILOFF, Michael	(16)2327
GAYOUT, Jean	(16)2267
GEARHEART, Ernest T.Jr	(2)375,(12)1806,(15)2190,(19)2592,(20)2861,2864, (26)3661,3662
GEARY, Richard L.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 68/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GEARY, Robert X.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
GEBER, Anthony	(19)2604
GEBHART, W.F. Davis	(22)3048,3079,3084,3086,3089,3121,3137
GEENS, Maurice W.	(1)101
GEER, Edward O.	(22)3172
GEERS, John P.	(1)100,(2)378,(15)2193
GEIGER, Friedrich H.	(11)1628,1654,(12)1806
GEISELHART, Richard F.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
GEISLER, Lourance	(8)1200
GEISMER, Alan S.	(1)109,(23)3361
GEISS, Ermal P.	(5)898,(23)3307,3359
GELINEAU, Robert H.	(19)2662
GELLATLY, Robert N.	(2)379,(9)1448,(15)2195
GELVIN, Bernard L.	(2)394,(15)2212
GELWICKS, Harold G.	(1)69,(5)897,(22)3046,3052,3054,3079,3098,3120,3137, (23)3237
GENDRON, Honorat R.	(2)387,(12)1806,(15)2204

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GENGHER, Edward L.	(23)3366
GENNARO, A.D.	(12)1723
GENOVESE, Ernest R.	(23)3359
GENOVESE, Joseph	(30)4116,4127,4128,4132
GENTILE, Charles F.	(1)69,(22)3041,3079,3117,3137
GENTITHES, George H.	(12)1806
GENUNG, Louis T.	(22)3172
GEORGE, George J.	(2)377,(13)1911,(14)2038,(15)2192
GEORGE, Scott T.	(5)910,(22)3172
GERHARDT, Charles H.	(19)2626
GERING, George W.Jr	(30)4134
GERLACH (Dr.)	(8)1303
GERLACH, Charles A.	(22)3061,3107,3108,3121,3137
GERNAND, Carl F.	(2)393,(15)2211
GERNAZIAN, Stephen	(2)377,384,(13)1926,(15)2193,2200,(16)2260
GERNGROSS, Rupprecht	(26)3653-3655,3657
GEROW, Leonard T.	(20)2881

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GEROW, William L.	(23)3356
GETZOV, Morton J.	(23)3365
GIACOBBE, Wadie	(1)69,97,(5)906,(9)1448,(12)1806,(25)3554,3556,3583
GIAMBALVO, Nunzio A.	(2)379,(13)1911,(15)2194,(16)2233
GIAMBRONE, James	(12)1806
GIBBONS, Edward F.	(23)3365
GIBSON, Hartney	(20)2788
GIBSON, Luke M.	(23)3361
GIBSON, William F.	(22)3172
GIESE, Otto C.	(2)389,(15)2207
GIEVINO, Louis	(11)1609
GIKAS, Christos S.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
GILBERT, Georges	(16)2328
GILBERT, Joseph P.	(10)1516-1521,1523
GILBERT, Irvin	(2)376,(15)2192
GILBERT, Reginald E.	(2)392,(15)2210
GILES, Barney M.	(8)1181,1184

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GILINEAU, Robert H.	(1)100
GILLARS, Mildred	(1)145,(2)331,(27)3752-3754
GILLEM, Alvan C. Jr	(22)3131,3132
GILLEN, Edward J.	(2)376,395,(13)1937,(15)2192,2213
GILLES, Robert H.	(9)1356
GILLESPIE, Bryant W.	(2)374,(13)1918,(14)2091,(15)2189,(16)2266,2274
GILLESPIE, Henry	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
GILLESPIE, James J.	(2)394,(15)2212
GILLESPIE, William L.	(2)378,(15)2193
GILLET, Louis E.	(1)110,(2)389,(15)2206
GILLETTE, Hubert J.	(23)3363
GILLETTE, Kirby M.	(1)146,(2)236,244,(5)895,(8)1274,(11)1557,1558, (13)1816,1817,1818,(22)3144,3172
GILLETTE, Lee E.	(8)1276
GILLIES, John A.	(30)4113,4136
GILMORE, Charles E.	(1)109
GILMORE, Gerald E.	(5)926,(23)3300,3364

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 136/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GILMORE, John G.	(1)69,(3)454
GINGHER, Thomas R.	(2)388,(13)1914,(15)2205
GINNIGER, fnu	(1)69
GINOCCHIO, Louis A.	(5)923,(8)1214,(10)1492,1526,1540B
GIORDANO, Anthony B.	(1)51
GIORDANO, Anthony F.	(1)51,(12)1721,1806
GIOVANI, Leon	(22)3191
GIRARD, George K.	(23)3362
GIRAUD, Henri	(7)1119,(10)1495,(11)1573
GITLOW, Benjamin	(4)534,535,557,576,577
GLADNEY, Graves	(2)377,(13)1911,(14)2031,(15)2192
GLADNEY, V.C.	(5)912
GLANTZ, Robert	(1)96
GLASS, Harry B.	(1)51,(23)3222
GLASSER, Harold	(4)664
GLEASON, Edwin J.	(8)1276
GLEASON, Roland E.	(23)3366

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GLEASON, Thomas J.	(2)377,382,(13)1923,(15)2193,2198
GLEAVES, Raymond L.	(8)1275
GLEDHILL, Lee F.	(22)3172
GLENNON, John J.	(2)393,(15)2211
GLOBOCNIK (~~fnu~~) Odilo	(25)3557
GLODIS, Frank J.	(2)375,(15)2190
GLOE, Frederick H.	(1)69,(22)3172
GLUCKIN, Lawrence	(1)69,98,(5)914,(23)3330,3357
GOBER, Anthony	(2)378,(15)2194
GOCHENOUR, John C.	(30)4132
GODDEN, Lawrence A.	(2)393,(15)2211
GOEBBELS, Hans	(20)2891
GOEBBELS, Josef	(19)2638,(20)2785,2837,2891,(26)3614,(28)3828
GOEDEKE, Walter J.	(3)421,452
GOERGEN, Joseph H.	(1)70,(2)373,(15)2189
GOERGES, Jean	(14)2063
GOERING, Herman	(2)311,(14)2092,(20)2785,2840

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GOERLICH, Horst	(18)2471
GOESSWEIN, Stanley J.	(12)1806
GOETTE, Joseph A.	(10)1473
GOETZ, Ferdinand G.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202,(18)2454
GOETZ, John R.	(22)3172
GOFF, Charles D.	(23)3358
GOFF, Marvin C.Jr	(1)70,104,146,(2)289,(5)920,(22)3176,3177,3194,3208, (23)3307,3358
GOFF, William J.	(30)4132
GOGGAN, Walter H.	(23)3356
GOLDBECK, Herman G.	(2)382,391,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2198,2209,(14)2597,
GOLDBERG, Emanuel	(10)1472
GOLDBERG, Morton W.	(12)1806
GOLDBERGER, Alexander	(4)577
GOLDEN, Bernard H.	(2)380,(11)1627,1655,(12)1722,1806,(15)2196
GOLDEN, Philip A.	(23)3366
GOLDENBERG, Paul H.	(2)387,(15)2203

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 187/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GOLDENFELD, Ernest A.	(2)377,(11)1655,(15)2192
GOLDING, George M.	(2)374,(15)2190
GOLDMAN, Emma	(3)471
GOLDSMITH, Albert	(2)387,(15)2203
GOLDSTEIN, Sidney L.	(2)377,(15)2192
GOLDSTEIN, William	(1)51
GOLDSTON, Joseph C.	(8)1275
GOLEC, John R.	(2)394,(15)2212
GOLLOMB, Rudolph P.	(11)1558,1576,1580
GOLLOP, Oscar H.	(9)1356
GOLZ, Paul	(2)387,(15)2203
GONZALES, Richard M.	(1)70,99,(2)376,(5)916,930,(13)1927,(15)2135,2192, (20)2774,(26)3683
GOOCH, Robert F.	(9)1434,1447
GOODRICK, Carl H.	(1)109,(5)919,(23)3310,3362
GOODSON, Carl K.	(1)70,100,(2)378,(15)2145,2194,(18)2492,2493,(20)2888
GORDON, Augustus F.	(2)394,(13)1920,(15)2212

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 204/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GORDON, Jay E.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
GORDON, Jesse F.	(2)393,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213,(18)2514,(19)2631
GORDON, Lewis F.	(2)382,(15)2198
GORDON, Louis A.	(2)390,(15)2207
GORDON, Peter	(1)70,(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1803,1806,(15)2196,(25)3576
GORDON, Victor M.	(2)378,(15)2194
GORDON, Wendell C.	(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1743,1806,(15)2196,2201
GORDON, Will Scott	(1)51,(23)3222
GORDON, William R.	(1)70,(5)914,(22)3172,(23)3341,(30)4009,4134,4139
GORELICK, Harold	(30)4133
GOREY, Ben J.M.	(2)394,(15)2212
GORGIE, Frank J.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
GORGUS, Frederick	(20)2767
GORMAN, Edward A.	(1)70,(22)3172
GORRIE, Robert T.	(23)3366
GOSLING, Glenn D.	(22)3137
GOSS, Thomas T.	(2)394,(15)2211

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 221/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GOSTISHA, John R.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
GOTTARDI, Milton T.	(30)4134
GOTZ, Heinrich	(20)2858
GOUGH, George	(9)1393
GOULD, Frank J.	(19)2599
GOURE, Leon	(2)378,(15)2194
GOWAN, Ralph L.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
GOWDY, Charles M.	(2)379,(15)2195
GOWEN, William E.W.	(25)3583
GOZA, Claude L.	(2)393,(5)919,(13)1816,1939,(15)2211
GRABNER, Francis W.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
GRAF, Ellsworth E.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
GRAHAM, David	(1)97
GRAHAM, Donald M.	(2)390,(5)920,(13)1929,(14)2100,(15)2208,(19)2631
GRAHAM, Earl C.	(2)389,(15)2206
GRAHAM, Ellis C.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
GRAHAM, William J.	(2)383,(15)2199

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 238/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GRAINGER, Charles W.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
GRANHOLM, Alex V.	(5)920
GRANIERI, Evaldo	(25)3552
GRANOWSKI, Henry D.	(22)3215
GRANT, Andrew R.	(1)111
GRANT, Robert H.	(2)390,(15)2207
GRANT, Ulysses S.	(17)2372,2373
GRAVES, Harold P.	(8)1276
GRAVES, W.S.	(3)426
GRAVILLIERS, Pierre	(18)2529
GRAVLEE, George M.	(23)3361
GRAY, A.M.	(5)905
GRAY, Alfred	(2)380
GRAY, Arthur M.	(22)3172
GRAY, Arthur P.	(5)901
GRAY, Aulden F.	(9)1448
GRAY, Eldon A.	(23)3276,3362

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 255/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GRAY, Harry C.	(23)3362
GRAY, Jesse G.	(1)70,(2)374,(12)1806,(15)2190
GRAY, Joseph O.	(9)1448
GRAY, Richard D.	(8)1315
GRAY, Robert V.	(10)1472
GRAY, William P.	(5)759,(6)967,(22)3045,3048-3050,3057,3060,3061,3068,3078,3079
GRECO, Joseph C.	(12)1806
GREEN (fnu)	(25)3570,3571
GREEN, Alexander G.Jr.	(9)1367,1369
GREEN, C.B.	(5)907
GREEN, F.V.	(2)177
GREEN, Francis J.	(30)4136
GREEN, James F.	(12)1806
GREEN, John L.	(10)1540B
GREEN, Martin L.	(23)3360
GREEN, Norman	(12)1806

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 272/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GREEN, Paul H.	(22)3172
GREEN, William B.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
GREEN, William H.	(22)3133,3136
GREENBOUGH (fnu)	(1)101
GREENE, Frank	(1)96
GREENE, T.M.	(30)4136
GREENE, Walter E.	(1)96,(2)372,(5)921,(12)1806,(15)2163,2187,(17)2365, 2383,2384,(25)3496
GREENHALGH, John R.	(24)3446
GREENWALD, Wilard	(23)3365
GREER, Rudy	(2)378,(15)2194
GREGG, Hugh	(22)3079,3137
GREGG, Robert E.	(1)70,(2)375,391,(13)1930,(15)2191,2208
GREGG, Wayne D.	(8)1275,(22)3172
GREGORY, George D.Jr	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199
GREGORY, Stewart E.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
GREGORY, Thomas	(3)460

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 289/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GREIMANN, Theodore E.	(30)4006,4012-4014,4016,4029,4088,4089,4102,4103,4134
GREINER, John B.	(9)1356
GRENNAN, Bernard J.	(11)1609,(12)1708,1709,1806,(25)3583
GRENNAN, Martin J.	(12)1726
GRETCHYN, Paul G.	(12)1806
GREW, Joseph	(4)527
GREY, Alfred E.	(2)390,(11)1654,(13)1928,(15)2196,2207
GREY, Leo	(2)394,(15)2212
GRICE, Luther E.	(2)373,(5)908,(15)2188
GRICE, William E.	(30)4132
GRIDLEY, Frederick D.	(23)3366
GRIEM, Ritter von	(2)311
GRIENER (Col.)	(30)4121
GRIER, Harry D.M.	(2)380,(5)905,(13)1921,(15)2196
GRIESHEIM, Witilio von	(20)2806,2807
GRIEVE, William G.	(1)70,(5)900,929,(22)3052,3054,3055,3079,3098,3137
GRIFFIN, Victor M.	(25)3539

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 306/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GRIFFITH, Billy J.	(30)4136
GRIFFITH, Jack C.	(23)3363
GRIMALDO, Eladio	(9)1394
GRIMES, George R.	(1)101,108
GRIMES, Oscar M.Jr	(1)70,100,(2)378,(15)2194,(20)2818
GRINER, Ellsworth L.	(23)3356
GRIPENSTRAW, Louie L.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189,(16)2263,2266
GRISCOM, Bronson	(8)1180,1181
GROFF, Dana M.	(22)3172
GROGAN, Alvin C.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
GROHS, Lothar	(2)387,(15)2203
GRONN, Ottilie	(20)2860
GROOTMANN, Paul G.	(2)374,(15)2190
GROSS, Eric M.	(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2503
GROSS, Herman	(1)70
GROSS, Israel H.	(22)3172
GROSS, P.	(5)907

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 323/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GROSS, Paul P.	(2)387,(15)2203
GROSS, Philip S.	(1)70,(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
GROSS, William F.	(2)393,(15)2211
GROSSMAN, Morris J.	(22)3136
GROUNDWATER, James T.	(9)1356
GROVES, Leslie R.	(1)146,(2)284,317,(8)1232,1234,1263,1264,1272,1291 1297
GROW, Kenneth A.	(8)1276
GRUBBS, Kenneth R.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
GRUBER, Karl	(25)3501
GRUBER, Wiliam L.	(25)3583
GRUENEWALD, Harold	(30)4132
GRUMBLY, Charles H.	(10)1472
GRUNECK, S.	(24)3399
GRUTIN, E.W.	(2)317
GRYBOS, Anthony N.	(23)3367
GUARNIERI, Fred R.	(2)393,(15)2211

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 340/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GUARNIERI, George T.	(2)393,(5)899,(15)2211
GUASTONI, Salvatore	(12)1801
GUBELLINI, Charles L.	(2)393,(13)1921,(15)2211
GUBITCHEV, Valentin	(25)3539
GUDERIAN, Heinz	(2)317
GUENTHER (Col.)	(5)725
GUENTHNER, Rupert W.	(1)70,99,(2)375,390,(5)924,(11)1627,1636,1637,1639 1644,1649,1655,1681,(12)1701,1702,1704,1806,(15)2163 2174,2190,2207,(17)2358,2368,(18)2524,(19)2592 (20)2856,2860,2862,2863,(26)3653,3654
GUGGENHEIM, Carlo	(12)1712
GUGGENHEIM, Renato	(12)1712
GUIDI, Rachele	(12)1801
GUIFFRE, Matthew R.J.	(24)3410
GUILFOYLE, Thomas D.	(8)1275
GUILLET, Fernand P.	(23)3355
GUINAN, Richard C.	(1)106,(2)385,(15)2201,(19)2640

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 357/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GUINOT, Luis	(9)1410,1447
GUITERMAN, Herbwert T.	(23)3357
GULLION, Alan W.	(8)1266
GUMPEL, Henry J.	(2)389,(15)2206
GUNDERSEN, Ernest C.	(2)382,(15)2198
GUNDERSON, Robert W.	(1)71,(2)377(15)2193,(18)2491
GUNN, P.I.	(23)3227
GUNN, William A.	(23)3356
GUSLAND, Gilbert S.	(9)1356
GUSTIN, Nicholas L.	(29)3983
GUTENBERGER (fnu)	(20)2822
GUTHOEHRLEIN, Oscar K.	(23)3355
GUTHRIE, Wayne L.	(23)3360
GUTIERREZ, Emeterio Jr	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
GUTIERREZ, Robert A.	(2)372,393,(10)1495,(13)1915,(15)2187,2211
GUTMAN, Arthur E.	(22)3172
GUTMAN, Harvey E.	(1)71,(2)376,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 374/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
GUYANT, John E.	(22)3172
GUYNES, Samuel B.	(9)1356
GUYSI, George S.	(23)3361
GWARDIAH, Richard	(9)1448

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHG ‖Rec: 378/378 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HAAN, Kenneth W.	(1)71,(10)1465,1466,1472
HAAS, Karl	(17)2349
HAAS, Leonard F.	(9)1447
HAAS, Richard G.	(22)3172
HABERMAN, Joseph	(2)378,(15)2193
HACKETT, John H.F.	(19)2674
HACKNEY, Eugene O.	(23)3360
HADGIS, Michael W.	(1)71,(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
HAEGER, Robert A.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
HAEP, Christian	(19)2603
HAGEN, Arnold J.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2202,(16)2306
HAGER, Eric H.	(1)71,(23)3357
HAGGARD (Major)	(1)142
HAGGARD, John D.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
HAGGARD, P.L.	(28)3925
HAGNAUER, Maximilian W.	(2)388,(15)2205
HAGOOD, Johnson	(1)146,(2)199,(3)455,(4)571

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 17/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HAGUE, Alfred E.	(23)3366
HAHN, Bela A.	(2)393,(15)2211
HAHN, Edmund J.	(23)3364
HAHN, Edward L.	(17)2360
HAHN, Horace L.	(1)71,111,(2)389,(15)2207,(19)2623
HAHN, John H.	(2)375,386,(15)2191,2202
HAHN, Ross B.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199,(16)2304-2306
HAIG, George	(2)261,268,(10)1476
HAISLIP, Wade H.	(17)2353,2360
HAKIM, Clement M.	(22)3137
HALAL, Charles E.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2214
HALE, Frank C.	(23)3360
HALE, Kenneth B.	(2)392,(5)900,(15)2210
HALES, Delbert R.	(2)392,(15)2210
HALEY, James W.	(8)1234,1236,1274,1279
HALEY, John	(22)3136
HALEY, Sanford E.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 34/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HALFORD, Ernest L.	(5)910,(22)3166,3167,3172
HALL, Charles A.	(23)3362
HALL, Frank B.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2201
HALL, Frank W.	(2)389,(15)2207
HALL, Joseph H.	(2)381,(15)2197
HALL, Joseph W.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
HALL, Lionel J.	(22)3075,3121,3137
HALL, Sam J.Jr	(22)3172
HALL, Thomas W.	(2)387,(12)1806,(15)2204
HALL, W.R.	(3)477
HALLBAUER, Heinrich	(9)1402
HALLEN, Norman R.	(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
HALLET, James B.	(1)71,(2)384,(5)914,(13)1926,(15)2200
HALLIWELL, Thomas D.	(12)1806
HALLORAN, Kenneth A.	(10)1473
HALLORAN, Paul L.	(1)51,(2)380,(12)1796,1806,(15)2196
HALLOWELL, Robert E.	(2)387,(15)2203

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 51/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HALM, Otto	(20)2874
HALPERN, Joseph B.	(2)390,(15)2207
HALSEY, William F.Jr	(23)3291
HAMBURGER, Rudolph	(10)1499,1500
HAMILTON, Hal A.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2199
HAMILTON, John F.	(2)372,(12)1806,(15)2187
HAMILTON, William B.	(1)71,(23)3363
HAMMETT, Dashiel	(9)1346
HAMMITZCH, Martin	(20)2874
HAMMOND, Eugene L.	(22)3137
HAMMOND, John F.	(30)4133
HAMMOND, John G.	(1)71,91,98,(2)374,(5)920,(11)1551,1566,1610,(12)1699 1732,1806,(15)2163,2190
HAMMOND, Richard I.	(30)4020,4136
HAMMOND, William P.	(8)1277
HAN, Chi Keun	(30)4095
HAN, In Sik	(30)4063,4064

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 68/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HANAHAN, James S.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
HANAN, Albert	(23)3355
HANCE, Young D.	(23)3361
HANCOCK (fnu)	(2)384,(15)2200
HANCOCK, Harold H.	(2)385,(5)903,(13)1927,(15)2201
HANCOCK, William A.	(30)4132
HANCOCK, William F.	(28)3874,3881
HAND, Francis M.	(8)1276
HANDVILLE, Melvin	(1)72,98,(2)374,(5)914,(13)1918,(14)2040,2056,2072, 2073,(15)2189,(18)2490
HANDY, Thomas T.	(1)146,(2)199,(4)601,(5)702
HANES, Lloyd L.	(29)3997
HANEY, Albert R.	(9)1380,1381,1390,1391,1447
HANLEY, Martin J.	(22)3137
HANLEY, Martin V.	(23)3358
HANLON, John G.	(1)71
HANNA, David L.	(1)71,(2)379,(15)2195,(20)2786

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 85/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HANNA, Elias	(2)386,(10)1493,1508,(13)1912,(15)2202
HANNA, George R.	(1)71,109,(5)915,(23)3292,3365
HANNAFORD, James J.	(23)3363
HANNAH, Martin J.	(25)3583
HANNAMAN, George	(9)1448
HANNES, Max R.	(2)382,(15)2198
HANNIGAN, John J.	(2)383,386,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
HANSEN, Ernst F.	(2)379,(15)2195
HANSEN, Harry F.	(14)2103
HANSEN, Holger E.	(26)3656
HANSEN, Jarvis B.	(23)3362
HANSEN, Mark K.	(1)117
HANSON, August W.	(1)72,(2)372,(10)1473,(13)1916,(15)2188
HANSON, H.F.	(24)3429
HANSON, Leonard E.	(1)72,(2)373,383,385,(11)1558,1654,(14)2059,(15)2188, 2199,2202
HANSON, Odella A.	(9)1448

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 102/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HARA, Walter S.	(30)4130
HARARY, Joseph A.	(1)72,(10)1509
HARBIDGE, Kenneth R.	(22)3172,(30)4132
HARBIN, Jay B.	(30)4013,4018,4130,4140
HARBORD, James G.	(3)419
HARDAGE, John M.	(2)387,(5)917,(12)1806,(15)2204
HARDESTY, Robert K.	(22)3172
HARDIECK (SS LtCol)	(18)2458,2460,2471,2563,2564
HARDIN, Fariss	(1)72,(5)898,(22)3046,3075-3078,3100,3120,3137
HARDIN, Kenneth E.	(1)72,(2)385,(5)908,(13)1927,(15)2113,2114,2201, (18)2454,2519
HARDISON, Robert F.	(2)384,386,(13)1926,(15)2200,2203
HARING, James J.	(2)383,(15)2199
HARKINS, James J.	(1)72,(22)3215,3356
HARLESS, R.W.	(5)898
HARLEY, Donald J.	(8)1257,1258,1263,1264,1276
HARMON, Ernest N.	(11)1611,(18)2472,(21)3033

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HARMS, John F.	(2)395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213
HARNISH, Carroll	(2)390,(15)2207
HARPEL, William F.	(30)4132
HARRIGAN, Richard J.	(2)383,(15)2199
HARRINGTON, William F.	(22)3172
HARRIS, George H.	(4)532,534
HARRIS, Harold R.	(8)1212
HARRIS, J.A.	(5)908
HARRIS, John D.	(5)902
HARRIS, John R.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
HARRIS, Leonard	(9)1426
HARRIS, Robert H.	(5)756
HARRIS, Thomas A.	(28)3911,3912
HARRIS, William D.	(1)72
HARRIS, William J.	(8)1276
HARRISON, Alfred	(8)1314,1316,1324,(10)1473
HARRISON, Daniel J.	(1)20,(22)3213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 136/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HARRISON, Herbert C.	(23)3366
HARRISON, Leland	(4)527
HARRISON, Leslie R.	(7)1128,(23)3324,3365
HARRISON, Thomas O.	(1)96,99
HARRY, Carl E.	(22)3172
HART, Gale M.	(2)392,(13)1937,(15)2209
HART, Herbert F.	(8)1275
HART, Leo J.Jr	(2)389,(15)2206
HART, Paul M.	(5)897
HARTLEY, Harold T.	(1)97
HARTMAN, W.C.	(5)897
HARTNETT, Robert B.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
HARTNETT, William C.	(23)3311,3355
HARTSELL, John S.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
HARTUNG, Peter H.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2199
HARVEY, Eldon Jr	(2)394,(15)2212
HARVEY, Herbert	(1)72

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 153/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HARVEY, Hugh E.	(25)3579
HARVEY, Sam B.	(8)1276
HARWELL, David J.	(1)72,(2)374,394,(13)1918,(15)2189,2212
HARWELL, Sam E.	(1)72,100,(2)377,(15)2193,(16)2220,(18)2492,(19)2602, 2629,2685,(20)2867
HASELTINE, Marshall	(1)72,(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1806,(15)2160,2196,2201
HASENJAEGER, William R.	(12)1806
HASHIGUCHI, Keiichi	(23)3259
HASHIZUME, Shoichi	(30)4130
HASKELL, George D.	(2)393,(15)2210
HASSE, Karl H.	(12)1806
HASTINGS (CIP Agent)	(3)471
HASTINGS, Martin V.	(10)1472
HATCH, Azol F.	(19)2611,2612
HATCH, R.W.	(30)4096,4136
HAUPTMANN, Gary G.	(20)2795
HAUSER, Max A.	(2)393,(15)2211

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HAUVELHORST, Herman	(2)382,(15)2198
HAVELIN, Alan D.	(1)72,(30)4133
HAVIGHURST, Alfred F.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2202
HAWES, George P.Jr	(1)47
HAWES, Kenneth E.	(2)387,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
HAWKINS, Howard G.Jr.	(8)1276
HAWLEY, Robert L.	(1)96
HAWN, Harry K.	(30)4136
HAY, James	(2)360,(24)3451
HAY, John R.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
HAYDEN, Edward W.	(5)925,(10)1492,1505
HAYDEN, J.M.	(5)908
HAYES, Arthur J.	(8)1274
HAYES, Charles R.	(2)389,(15)2206
HAYES, Emery L.	(23)3360
HAYES, Norman Jr	(22)3215
HAYES, Thomas J.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1930,(15)2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 187/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HAYES, Virgil E.	(2)383,(13)1925,(15)2199
HAYNER, David G.	(22)3172
HAYNES, Alexander G.	(1)72,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
HAYS, Otis E.Jr.	(9)1333,1335
HAZARD, Jeffrey	(2)393,(15)2211
HAZARD, Rowland K.	(1)73
HAZEN, Alfred W.	(30)4134
HEARD, Townsend	(2)237
HEARN, Norman J.	(1)73,107,(2)386,395,(5)895,(13)1937,(14)2099, (15)2109,2202,2213,(26)3590,(27)3711
HEATON, Henry O.	(23)3358
HEAVEY, Robert W.	(2)382,(9)1356,(15)2198
HECHT, Bernie G.	(19)2681
HECK, Albrecht	(18)2462
HEDGE, Harry C.	(23)3357
HEDTKE, Reuel E.	(23)3360
HEEGARD-JENSEN, Paul A.	(1)73,103,146,(2)237,380,395,(5)898,(7)1154,(11)1551,

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 204/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	53,1566,1567,1597,1601,16[illegible],1610,1612,1613,1614, 1625,1626,1629-1631,1633,1641,1642,1647,1648,1650-52, 1654,(13)1939,(15)2110,2196,2213
HEGYI, Herman E.	(11)1654,(12)1806
HEIDEMANN, Willi	(26)3608-3613
HEILMAN, Martin G.	(11)1557
HEIM, Ernest E.	(22)3061,3069,3137
HEIMANN, Raymond A.	(30)4130
HEIMOSKI, Frank J.	(9)1448
HEIN, F.W.	(30)4070
HEINE, Edward	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
HEINTZLEMAN, Stuart	(1)146,(2)192,(4)546,555,556,560,561,564
HEISSMEYER, August	(27)3751,3752,3755
HEITNER, Robert R.	(2)386,390,(13)1927,(15)2202,2207
HELD, Edwin W.	(1)73,(12)1762-1764
HELLMAN, Robert J.	(2)387,(15)2203
HELLRIEGEL, Walter	(2)376,(15)2192

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 221/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HELMAN, Sam C.	(22)3164,3172
HELMICK, Charles G.	(30)4111
HELMKEN, John C.Jr	(23)3355
HELTON, Gordon W.	(22)3172
HEMINGWAY, John H.	(1)73,(2)381,(5)904,(13)1922,(14)2042,(15)2197, (19)2630,(20)2787
HEMPHILL, Roderick J.	(23)3365
HENDERSON, Charles W.	(1)51,(23)3222
HENDERSON, Derrious W.	(23)3364
HENDERSON, George W.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209,(30)4119-4125
HENDERSON, Hubert H.	(22)3172
HENDERSON, John B.	(8)1276
HENDERSON, Marshall J.	(23)3356
HENDERSON, Oliver S.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
HENDERSON, S.L.	(5)896,928
HENDRICKS, Alford C.	(2)389,(15)2206
HENDRICKS, Fred A.	(23)3363

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 238/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HENIGAN, Joseph W.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
HENKE, Robert J.M.	(22)3215
HENLEY, Albert T.	(2)376,(15)2191
HENNESSEY, Mathew J.	(8)1276
HENNESSEY, Robert J.	(10)1473
HENNESSY, Charles C.	(23)3359
HENNING, Arthur	(25)3557,3558
HENRICH, Carl A.	(2)393,(15)2210
HENROTIN, Frederick	(3)420,447,454,(4)532
HENRY, Andrew A.	(12)1806
HENRY, James E.Sr	(3)465-468
HENSEL, L.F.	(4)526
HENSLEY, Charles D.	(8)1276
HEPNER, Sevens J.	(2)374,(15)2189,(19)2624,2626
HEPP, Ludwig	(20)2825
HERALD, Virgil H.	(1)73,96,132,133,(22)3136
HERMANN, Louis G.	(1)73,(23)3355

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 255/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HERMS, John F.	(2)393
HERNANDEZ, Christian	(1)73
HERNANDEZ, Crispin C.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1795,1796,1806,(15)2196
HERNEY, John R.	(2)375,(15)2190
HERRERO, Charles	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
HERRINGTON, James G.Jr.	(8)1275
HERRMANN, Thomas K.	(2)394,(15)2212
HERRNSTADT, Gerald E.	(2)388,(15)2205
HERSHEY, Lewis B.	(5)729
HERT, James B.	(23)3363
HERTNER, Henry	(22)3172
HERZOG, Robert E.	(23)3360
HESS, Walter	(2)375,(15)2190
HESSEVICK, George I.	(1)102,(30)4011,4012,4132,4139,4140
HEUMAN, Stephen	(2)394,(15)2212
HEWISEN, Donald A.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
HEWLETT (fnu)	(23)3227

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 272/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HEYDORN, Howard M.	(22)3172,(23)3359
HEYDRICH, Reinhardt	(26)3668
HEYN, John G.	(10)1478,1480,1481,1484,1486,1506,1508,(12)1806
HEYRMAN, John H.	(2)386,(5)911,(15)2202
HIBBARD, Arthur P.	(12)1806
HICK, William G.	(2)392,(13)1937,(15)2209
HICKEY, William B.	(12)1806
HICKMAN	(1)101
HICKMAN, Glenn H.	(1)73,(2)385,(15)2201
HICKS, Charles D.	(23)3365
HICKS, Mason A.	(2)391,(8)1299-1301,1305,(13)1930,(15)2208
HICKS, W.W.	(4)548
HICKS, William J.	(23)3360
HIGBIE, Traynor W.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
HIGGINS, Edward L.Jr.	(12)1807
HIGGINS, George L.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
HIGGINS, James B.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 289/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HIGGINS, Timothy	(2)388,(15)2205
HILBRUNNER, William J.	(2)383,394,(13)1925,(15)2199,2212
HILDEBRANDT, Richard	(20)2824
HILDRETH, George A.	(25)3583
HILL, Bernard L.	(22)3172
HILL, Clyde C.	(2)386,(15)2203
HILL, J.W.	(5)908
HILL, Leroy C.	(1)108,(6)964,(5)896,(14)2100,(27)3749
HILL, Mark F.	(1)96,(5)912,(10)1473
HILL, R.A.	(5)903
HILL, R.V.	(5)907
HILL, Ralph N.Jr	(2)373,393,(13)1917,(15)2188,2211
HILL, Roy C.	(2)392,(15)2210
HILL, Warren R.	(23)3358
HILL-DILLON, S.S.	(11)1555,1556,1596,1606,(12)1769
HILLARD, Gerald C.	(25)3583
HILLER, Hans A.	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 306/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HILLS, Benjamin O.	(22)3172
HILLS, Wayne W.	(22)3172
HILSZ, August W.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
HIMMELRIGHT, John R.	(1)73,100,104
HIMMLER, Heinrich	(1)146,(2)353,(16)2230,(18)2461,2508,(20)2775,2785, 2850,2870,(26)3621,3668,(27)3751
HINDS, Colin G.	(5)901,(9)1408,1416,1447
HINER, Charles N.	(22)3172
HINES, Canfield M.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2208
HINES, G.W.	(5)915
HINKLE, Wayne W.	(1)73,(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199
HIRAOKA, William T.	(22)3172,3366,(28)3822
HIRECHSTEIN, Ralph	(2)377,(15)2193
HIRTLE, Stanley A.	(5)696
HISKEY, Clarence	(8)1257,1258
HISS, Alger	(4)664
HITCHCOCK, Glenn E.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 323/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HITCHCOCK, Rex W.	(1)73,(2)374,(13)1918,(14)2034,(15)2189
HITLER, Adolf	(4)642,(12)1794,1803,(18)2508,(19)2661,(20)2775,2792, 2802,2807,2808,2839,2840,2842,2874,(25)3509,3512, (26)3608,3614,3633,3660,3667,3683
HJALMARSON, Dori	(5)918,(10)1463,1465-1468,1472
HO, Ying Chin	(22)3114
HOAR, John	(3)421
HOBBS, Ronald E.	(29)3952
HOBERG, Wilbur	(9)1447
HOBSON, Joel J.Jr	(25)3564,3583
HOCHEGGER, Margarete	(25)3535
HOCHSTRASSER, George E.	(22)3213
HOCK, William G.	(1)73
HOCKMAN, Jack A.	(22)3075,3121,3137
HODGE, Horace D.	(10)1500
HODGE, John R.	(1)146,(2)337,(30)4007,4010,4019-4021,4029,4068,4074, 4078,4079,4090,4093,4100,4111,4112

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HODGES, Courtney H.	(24)3446
HODGES, Theodore C.	(9)1391,1448
HODGSON (Capt)	(1)146,(2)350
HODGSON, Ray W.	(1)98,(23)3240,3275,3307,3357
HOEBEL, Henry L.	(1)73,(2)376,(15)2191,(19)2659
HOEFFEL, Donald E.	(8)1277
HOENE, Howard F.	(23)3357
HOENSTINE, Garland W.	(23)3364
HOETOMOE (nfn)	(23)3259
HOFEMANN, Albert G.Jr.	(1)74,(2)380,(12)1807,(15)2196
HOFERBERT, Carl	(20)2841,2842
HOFFER, Edward W.	(19)2664
HOFFER, Wolfgard E.	(2)379,(15)2195
HOFFMAN (fnu)	(15)2197
HOFFMAN, Abraham	(2)375,(15)2191
HOFFMAN, Myron G.	(12)1759,1807
HOFFMAN, Paul L.	(1)74,(2)381,(13)1922,(15)2197

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 357/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HOFFMAN, Robert	(22)3172
HOFFMAN, William E.	(22)3041,3046,3060,3076,3078,3101,3103,3104,3106,3121 3137
HOFFMAN, William S.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
HOFFSTEIN, George R.	(23)3361
HOFFSTOT, Henry P.Jr	(2)375,(15)2190
HOGAN, Elton	(1)97
HOGAN, John P.	(12)1807
HOGAN, Joseph J.	(23)3357
HOGAN, Vincent P.	(2)386,(13)1927,(15)2202
HOGBERG, Rudolph L.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
HOGE, William J.J.	(2)375,(5)908,(15)2190,(18)2494
HOGG, Calvin R.	(23)3359
HOGG, Roy J.	(23)3355
HOJO, Tokichi	(23)3331
HOLABIRD, Samuel B.	(1)46
HOLBROOK, Willard A.Jr	(4)618,621,622,633,643,652,658,664,665,668,707,708

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 374/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(5)712,717,734,747
HOLCH, Carl E.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
HOLDEN, William P.	(1)74,(2)385,(15)2201
HOLDER, Charles L.	(22)3172
HOLEMAN (fnu)	(1)101
HOLEMAN, Benjamin F.	(23)3358
HOLLAN, John D.	(8)1277
HOLLAND, Alvin E.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
HOLLAND, Keith E.	(1)74,(22)3215,(23)3357
HOLLAND, Maurice O.	(2)380,386,(13)1921,(15)2196,2202
HOLLAND, William C.	(1)74,(22)3070,3115,3121,3137
HOLLINGS, Robert M.	(23)3276,(28)3822
HOLLIS, James R.	(1)74
HOLLORAN, William J.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
HOLLOWAY, Geoffrey L.	(1)74
HOLLOWAY, James L.Jr	(23)3361
HOLLOWAY, John L.	(23)3364

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 391/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HOLM, Leo S.	(23)3355
HOLMAN, Frank A.	(2)386,(15)2202
HOLMAN, Natt B.	(1)98,(22)3206,3207,3214,(23)3275,3307,3355
HOLMAN, Richard A.	(29)3952
HOLMBERG, Frederick W.	(9)1448
HOLMEGARD, Henry C.	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1928,(15)2207
HOLMES, Frederick L.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
HOLMES, Harry	(2)383,(15)2199
HOLMES, Van C.	(30)4009,4130,4139
HOLSINGER, H.W.	(5)895
HOLT, Frederick	(2)378,(15)2194
HOLTON, Edgar H.	(2)384,(15)2200
HOLTZNER, Francis J.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
HOMAN, Wayne E.	(2)352,(24)3423,(28)3838,3839,3842,3847,3850-3853, 3855,(28)3861,3884
HOMSTAD, Marvin E.	(2)394,(15)2212
HONIG, Robert S.	(1)74,(2)385,(15)2201

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 408/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HOOPER, Ray E.	(30)4136
HOOTEN, Dwight M.	(22)3213
HOOVER, Harold E.	(8)1277
HOOVER, Herbert	(4)526
HOOVER, John Edgar	(3)460,(4)548,(7)1091
HOPKINS, James F.	(23)3362
HOPKINS, Sam C.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
HOPPER, Marvin C.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
HORAITIS, George L.	(23)3360
HORAN, John A.	(8)1274
HORGAN, William P.	(23)3356
HORNBLOW (Lt.)	(3)503,(4)531
HORNE, Archie A.	(23)3358
HORNER, David S.	(2)385,(11)1557,(12)1807,(15)2201
HORSEMAN, George	(1)111
HORTHY, Miklos	(25)3553
HORTON, D.W.	(5)902

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 425/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HORTON, Harry H.Jr	(2)377,393,(13)1919,(15)2193,2211
HORWITZ, Milton G.	(1)74,(23)3358
HORWITZ, Ralph E.	(2)389,(15)2206
HOSINSKI, Edmund J.	(23)3358
HOSS, Robert L.	(1)74,(23)3358
HOSTERMAN, Frank M.	(1)101,(4)676,(24)3446,3447,(28)3841
HOSTLER, Charles W.	(15)2143
HOTCHKISS, David H.	(2)382,386,(13)1924,(15)2198,2203
HOUDA, Eugene W.	(23)3357
HOUG, Elmer J.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
HOUGH (Major)	(1)146,(2)350
HOUGH, P.O.	(1)107
HOURSTON, Edward M.	(23)3359
HOUSE, Edward M.	(4)535
HOUSER, George J.	(2)388,(11)1655,(15)2204
HOUSER, Paul W.Jr	(23)3357
HOUSH, Lawrence J.	(23)3357

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 442/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HOUSTON, Henry W.	(2)375,(15)2190
HOUT, Ernest G.	(23)3359
HOVEL, Roy B.	(2)377,(13)1919,(15)2193
HOWARD, Barr	(1)74
HOWARD, Charlton T.	(22)3131,3132,3136
HOWARD, Clinton A.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
HOWARD, Edwin B.	(12)1707,1723
HOWARD, Jack J.	(2)388,(15)2205
HOWARD, Taylor D.	(1)97,(30)4134
HOWARD, William C.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
HOWE, John R.	(2)373,(15)2188
HOWELL, Dillard W.	(1)74,(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2504
HOWELL, J.F.	(5)901
HOWELL, Willey	(3)420
HOWER, Alfred	(23)3362
HOWES, Alfred L.	(1)74,(11)1567,1609
HOWRY, Erle	(9)1448

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 459/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HOWSER, Donald W.	(30)4136
HOYLEN, Paul J.	(2)387,(12)1807,(15)2204
HOYT, James L.	(8)1275,1276
HUBBARD, Joseph C.	(1)74
HUBER, Frank	(2)389,(15)2207
HUC, Harry J.	(9)1356
HUCKABA, Donald L.	(23)3366
HUCKINS, Joseph	(1)101,111,114,(30)4011,4021,4023,4036,4037,4126, 4134,4139,4202
HUDSON, Dugald W.	(1)101,(2)379,(15)2195,(17)2360,(18)2426,(19)2665, (24)3496,(26)3676,3678
HUDSON, R.H.	(1)20
HUDSON, Raymond E.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
HUDSON, William A.	(22)3172
HUDSON, William O.Jr	(23)3356
HUEBNER, Arnold G.	(1)110,(2)389,(5)917,(15)2206,(18)2494,(19)2641, (20)2828

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 476/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HUEBNER, Clarence R.	(1)146,(2)343,(13)2010
HUGHES, Frank T.	(29)3985
HUGHES, John A.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
HUGHES, John H.	(1)146,(2)201,202,(4)594
HUGHES, Kenneth T.	(2)372,388,393,(5)917,(13)1913,(15)2188,2205,2211
HUGHES, Lawrence F.	(9)1356,(22)3067,3103,3120,3137
HUGHES, Lloyd L.	(22)3172
HUGHES, Vincent W.	(12)1807
HUGO, Eugene F.	(2)379,(15)2195
HUH, Hun	(30)4082,4098
HULING, Porter B.Jr	(22)3195,3214
HULL, Addis E.III	(2)393,(15)2210
HULL, Allan F.	(1)75,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
HULL, J.N.	(5)926
HULNICK, Robert B.	(23)3356
HUMMEL (fnu)	(27)3761
HUMMEL, Harold S.	(30)4015,4049,4136

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 493/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HUMMEL, Helmut von	(1)148,(2)335
HUMPHREY, C.B.	(2)181
HUMPHREY, Don G.	(23)3364
HUMPHREY, William C.	(2)389,(15)2206
HUMPHREYS, John R.	(11)1554,1565,1609,(12)1807
HUNT, Henry T.	(3)486
HUNT, L.	(29)3967
HUNT, Thomas R.	(23)3362
HUNTER, James R.	(1)75,(22)3114,3115,3117,3137
HUNTER, Woodrow G.	(1)51,75,(23)3262
HUNTING, Harmon H.	(9)1356
HUNTINGTON, Clarence	(1)104,(2)381,(15)2197,(18)2503
HUNTOON, David H.	(1)101
HURLBURT, Arthur S.	(23)3363
HURLEY, James W.	(1)75,(23)3358
HURLEY, Joseph P.	(1)103,(5)902,(23)3274,3292,3332,3358
HURLEY, William F.	(1)75,(2)389,(15)2207

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 510/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HURST, Paul A.	(1)110,118,(5)895,(23)3300,3337,3366,(24)3443-3446
HURT, Wesley R.	(1)75,(2)385,(15)2201
HUSS, Mark C.	(30)4114,4134
HUSTED, Stanley N.	(2)375,(15)2190
HUTCHINGS, Harold E.	(8)1314,1316
HUTCHINS, John A.	(30)4136
HUTCHINS, Leroy W.	(1)111
HUTCHINSON, Edward K.	(10)1472
HUTCHINSON, Howard K.	(5)899,(10)1468,1472
HUTCHINSON, J.K.	(5)900
HUTCHINSON, Joseph C.	(1)75,(2)385,389,(12)1807,(15)2201,2206,(18)2545
HUTCHINSON, Sam C.	(1)96
HUYLER, Coulter D. Jr	(5)897,(22)3062-3065
HWASS, Edward R.	(1)75,(2)385,(15)2201
HYDE, Upshur H.Jr	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
HYLAND, Stanley J.	(9)1355
HYNES, Bart R.	(22)3061,3120,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 527/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
HYUNG, Lyuh Woon	(28)3909

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHH ‖Rec: 528/528 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
IANNONE, Nathan F.	(9)1356
IASH, Gabriel A.	(11)1609,(12)1807
IGETA, Tadao	(22)3172
IKEMORI, Jiro	(22)3172
INCE, Wallace	(28)3830
INGALLS, William L.	(2)393,(15)2211
INGARGIOLA, Henry B.	(1)75,(2)373,(11)1654,(12)1807,(15)2188,(25)3583
INGOJO, Jose B.	(23)3366
INSKEEP, John L.	(27)3711
INTERLANDI, John G.	(30)4131
INWOOD, Jerome A.	(1)111,(23)3307,3366
IRELAND, Fred H.	(2)378,(15)2194
IRETON, Henry H.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
IRION, Wilhelm	(26)3633,3634
IRIZARRY-RODRIGUES, Leo	(9)1447
IRWIN, G.Leroy	(1)146,(2)199,(4)572,(24)3396
IRWIN, John N.	(5)918,(23)3237,3245,3294,3308-3310,3312,3313

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
IRWIN, Stafford	(2)356
ISENBERG (Lt.)	(11)1614
ISHIHARA, James H.	(30)4131
ISKIN, Arnold J.	(2)376,(15)2191
ISSAEFF, Rostislav G.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
ITO, Ritsu	(28)3906
IVERS, John P.	(23)3365
IVERSON, L.E.	(5)910
IWAI, Gero	(1)75,(2)370,(22)3141,3172,(29)3993
IWANOWSKI, J.S.	(5)905

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JACKSON, Arthur J.	(2)394,(15)2212
JACKSON, Brent C.	(2)395,(13)1932,(15)2213
JACKSON, Everett J.	(23)3362
JACKSON, George S.	(10)1472
JACKSON, Merrill R.	(2)376,(15)2191
JACKSON, Raymond E.	(23)3357
JACKSON, Thomas Jr	(23)3363
JACKSON, Thomas S.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
JACKSON, Verne O.	(5)896,(9)1414,1415,1447
JACKSON, William K.	(1)75,(12)1807
JACKSON, William R. Jr	(12)1807
JACKSON, William S.	(30)4136
JACKSON, William S. Jr	(22)3172
JACKSON, William W.	(11)1567,(12)1807
JACOBI, Carl H.	(2)379,(15)2194
JACOBI, William F.	(1)100,(5)904,(14)2028,2030,2036
JACOBI, William R.	(1)75

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 17/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JACOBS, Joseph S.	(2)375,(15)2191
JACOBS, R.C.	(7)1088
JACOBS, Weldon M.	(2)378,(5)906,(10)1456,1457,1473,(15)2194
JACOBSON (Capt.)	(9)1351
JACOBSON, Henry	(2)387,(15)2203
JACOBSON, Milford E.	(2)379,(15)2195
JACOBUS, Philip F.	(1)75
JACOBY, Hans F.	(2)374,(15)2190
JACOVINE, Anthony E.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1807,(15)2196
JACQUES, Philippe J.	(2)385,389,(12)1807,(15)2201,2207,(18)2531
JAHNKE, Kurt A.	(3)476,477,478
JAKOB, Rene Alexander	(18)2529
JAMES, Arthur	(22)3137
JAMES, Edwin S.	(23)3365
JAMES, George E.	(5)916,(8)1215
JAMES, Harold W.	(2)388,(15)2205
JAMES, John E.	(30)4130

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 34/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JANASON, Edward C.	(23)3364
JANSEN, Harold L.	(23)3357
JANSEN, Marvin W.	(2)387,(15)2203
JANSZEN, William A.	(2)377,(13)1919,(15)2193
JANURA, Arthur L.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
JAQUES, Douglas	(22)3172
JARSTED, Gordon K.	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1928,(15)2207
JASMINE, Harold A.	(23)3362
JASTRAM, Cecil A.	(23)3341,3345
JAUDON, Elbert W.	(1)112,(2)381,386,(13)1922,(15)2197,2202
JAY, Leon H.	(1)75,(23)3222
JEFFERSON, Philip L.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
JEKA, Ralph J.	(1)76,(2)382,(13)1924,(14)2071,(15)2198
JENKINS, Arthur D.	(1)96,100,(2)372,(5)914,(13)1915,(14)2029,(15)2187 (16)2220
JENKINS, J.L.	(22)3069
JENKINS, John D.	(22)3172

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 51/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JENKINS, William L.	(2)372,382,(11)1557,1654,(13)1924,(15)2187,2198
JENNINGS, Edmund A.	(23)3358
JENNINGS, William I.	(30)4119-4123,4125
JENSEN, Claire R.	(1)96,134
JENSEN, Elvin C.	(1)52,76,(23)3296
JENSEN, Frederick D.	(22)3172
JENSEN, Garth H.	(1)76,(2)383,385,(13)1927,1986,(15)2199,2201
JENSEN, Harold H.	(8)1276
JENSEN, Leslie A.	(1)76,(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476,2477,2479
JENSEN, Milo M.	(11)1557,1654,(12)1807
JERSIN, Edward A.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
JERVEY, Henry	(4)544
JESCH, Ralph	(18)2465
JESTER, Bernard E.	(9)1448
JEUICK, William	(30)4136
JEWETT, Albert A.	(23)3358
JIMENEZ, Enrique	(9)1400

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 68/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JODL, Alfred	(18)2559,(26)3589
JOHANNESSON, Royden E.	(8)1234,1274,1279
JOHANNISBERG (fnu)	(18)2508,2509
JOHN, Herman Jr	(2)394,(15)2211
JOHNS, William E.	(15)2153,2154
JOHNSON, Alvin	(2)390,(5)921,(10)1472,(13)1928,(14)2028,2100, (15)2207
JOHNSON, Andrew	(23)3360
JOHNSON, Arthur W.	(23)3359
JOHNSON, Carl A.B.	(8)1276
JOHNSON, Carl R.	(22)3215
JOHNSON, Clayton L.	(2)386,391,(13)1933,(15)2202,2209
JOHNSON, Dan W.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
JOHNSON, Darrell L.	(1)76,(2)385,(15)2201
JOHNSON, Edward P.	(22)3172
JOHNSON, Edwin M.	(9)1356
JOHNSON, Harrison H.	(23)3363

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 85/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JOHNSON, Jack W.	(22)3214
JOHNSON, James B.	(28)3823
JOHNSON, Lawrence M.	(2)379,(15)2194
JOHNSON, Lemuel S.	(30)4134
JOHNSON, Louis C.	(24)3448
JOHNSON, Louis W.	(23)3364
JOHNSON, Lyalle E.	(5)923,(8)1235,1274,1279
JOHNSON, Paul H. Jr	(30)4134
JOHNSON, Reginald M.	(2)380,(11)1557,1654,(15)2196
JOHNSON, Robert B.	(9)1447
JOHNSON, V.A.	(28)3921
JOHNSON, William A.	(1)76,(23)3357
JOHNSON, William H.	(23)3358
JOHNSON, Zebulon V.	(22)3172
JOHNSTON, Joe B.	(8)1276
JOLIOT-CURIE, Frederic	(8)1294
JONATHAN, Virgil	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1929,(15)2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 102/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JONES, Carroll E.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
JONES, Edgar C.Jr	(2)393,(13)1933,(15)2211
JONES, Edward C.	(2)391,(15)2209
JONES, George A.A.	(10)1456,1457
JONES, George R.	(1)76,(23)3357
JONES, H.L.	(5)896
JONES, Harold E.	(30)4131
JONES, Jack M.	(23)3361
JONES, James M.	(23)3243
JONES, John R.	(9)1423
JONES, M.B. JR	(23)3357
JONES, Thomas L.	(23)3360
JONES, Thomas O.	(5)900,929,(8)1235,1274,1279
JONES, Tilford A.	(23)3356
JONG, Arthur J.	(22)3120,3137
JORDAN, Dale M.	(1)76,(2)388,(15)2205
JORDAN, Edward J.	(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476,2477

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 119/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JORDAN, Franklin E.	(1)6,8,20,(4)662,(5)731,(7)1081,1092,1096-1101,1130, (27)3707,3723,3725,3741
JORGENSEN, Charles A.	(2)389,(13)1921,(15)2206
JOSEPH, James S.	(11)1609,(12)1807
JOST, Erwin W.	(2)380,(15)2196
JOST, Heinz	(20)2812
JOUSLT, M.	(15)2117
JOVAN, George	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
JOY, Walter S.	(2)387,(11)1649,1650,1655,(12)1704,1807,(15)2204
JOYCE, Herbert M.	(2)380,(8)1275,(11)1654,(15)2196
JUDSON, Clarence H.Jr	(2)380,(5)922,(12)1703,1807,(15)2196
JULIAN, Brooks P.	(1)76,101,(2)379,(5)916,930,(15)2145,2195
JULIANO, Frank V.	(25)3583
JULIARD (fnu)	(22)3192
JULIN, George A.Jr	(2)393,395,(13)1937,(15)2211,2213
JUNDZIL, Stanley J.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
JUNG, Allen D.	(22)3120,3136

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 136/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
JUNG, Richard H.	(2)376,(15)2192
JURCO, Stephen	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
JURDAK, Florian E.	(25)3583
JURY, William H.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHJ ‖Rec: 140/140 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KAPLANOFF, Carl G.	(1)76
KAPOURELOS, Anthony G.	(23)3363
KAPS, Charles T.	(23)3358
KAPUSTIANYK, Paul	(10)1472
KARCZ, Frank R.	(8)1276
KARDWELL, H.P.	(5)913
KARLSON, Karl H.	(9)1448
KARNS, Robert E.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
KARP, W.A.	(5)894
KARTELL, Arthur C.	(2)382,(15)2198
KASEFANG, William E.	(8)1275
KASPAR, Oldrich C.	(2)394,(15)2212
KATIS, Bruno B.	(23)3360
KATZ, Walter J.	(2)387,(15)2203
KATZENSTEIN, Alfred	(2)373,(15)2188
KATZIN, Marshall P.	(23)3367
KAUFFELD, John H.	(2)376,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 51/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KAUFMAN, Harry S.	(2)387,(15)2203
KAUFMAN, Walter J.Jr	(1)76,107,108,(2)394,(5)919,(12)1807,(15)2212, (25)3495,3497
KAVANAGH, William J.	(30)4132
KAVANAUGH, George F.	(2)390,(13)1928.(14)2059,(15)2207
KAWAHARA, Edwin I.	(22)3172
KAWAKITA ("Meatball")	(2)343
KAYSER, Ernest	(2)382,(15)2198
KEAN, William B.	(11)1590
KEANE, James M.	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
KEARNEY, James J.Jr.	(9)1447
KEARNEY, Philip	(2)176
KEARNS, Frank M.	(2)393,395,(5)922,(11)1557,(13)1817,1937,(15)2211, 2213
KEARNS, Lawrence A.	(22)3172
KEARNS, Thomas E.	(2)380,(13)1921,(14)2069,(15)2196
KEASTER, Leonard W.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 68/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KEATING, Joseph P.	(2)378,(15)2193
KEATON, Clyde H.	(23)3358
KEEFE, William E.	(1)77,(2)383,(15)2199,(18)2510,(19)2616
KEELER, Clark B.	(1)77,(2)380,(11)1576,1590,1627,1645,1646,1652, 1655,(12)1807,(15)2196
KEELER, Ralph	(1)52,(23)3223
KEELER, Richard P.	(30)4136
KEENA, Joseph W.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
KEENAN, Albert J.Jr	(1)102,(5)900,(23)3334,3357
KEENAN, John L.	(2)372,386,(13)1915,(15)2187,2202
KEENER, Ulysses G.	(23)3359
KEGEL, Kenneth K.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
KEGGINS, Alfred G.	(2)376,(13)1919,(15)2192
KEHOE, Richard O.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199
KEHRIG, Francis A.	(2)384,386,(13)1925,(15)2200,2203
KEICHLINE, Anna W.	(3)466
KEIFFER, Pierre G.	(2)378,(15)2194

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 85/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KEIFFER, Reinhardt J.	(2)379,(15)2195
KEILTY, Joseph J.	(2)383,(15)2199
KEIM, Karl D.	(2)394,(13)1939,(15)2211
KEIR, Edwin M.	(12)1807
KEITL, Wilhelm	(18)2559
KELCH, Thelford E.	(2)374,393,(13)1920,(15)2189,2211
KELLEHER, Robert L.	(22)3172
KELLER, Alvin J.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
KELLER, George A.C. Jr	(23)3362
KELLEY, Homer F.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
KELLEY, Joseph S.	(23)3366
KELLEY, William T.	(8)1276
KELLMAN, Rudolph G.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
KELLMAN, William	(2)372,(15)2187
KELLOGG, Charles H.	(12)1726,1807
KELLY, Donald A.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
KELLY, Floyd M.	(2)376,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 102/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KELLY, James A.	(8)1276
KELLY, James W.	(12)1766,1802,1807
KELLY, John J.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
KELLY, John J. Jr	(30)4134
KELLY, John M.	(23)3360
KELLY, Robert H.	(8)1275
KELLY, William R.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
KELM, Edwin H.	(1)77,(2)385,(15)2201
KELTIE, James A.	(8)1277
KEMENDO, Joseph P.	(8)1275
KEMENY, Gabor	(25)3552,3553
KEMPH, Eugene F.	(2)389,(15)2206
KENDALL, Clifford	(23)3362
KENDALL, George H.	(22)3172
KENDALL, Thomas H.	(5)905,(22)3041,3052,3076,3079,3119,3137
KENISTON, Walter E.	(23)3360
KENNARD, Claude L.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 119/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KENNEDY, Edward H.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
KENNEDY, Edward J.	(2)391,393,(13)1930,(15)2208,2211
KENNEDY, E.Russell	(4)650
KENNEDY, George B.	(2)382,(15)2198
KENNEDY, George F.	(30)4119
KENNEDY, James H.	(2)383,(15)2199
KENNEDY, John	(1)39,146,(2)176
KENNEDY, Maurice J.	(27)3735
KENNEDY, Roger D.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
KENNEDY, Thomas R.	(12)1807
KENNELL, Christian R.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
KENNEY, John W.	(22)3195,3214
KENNINGTON, Robert J.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
KENNON, Clement R.	(1)77,(23)3358
KENNY, John J.	(14)2059
KENT, Henry	(1)77,(2)381,(15)2197,(19)2677,2678
KERN, Robert B.	(12)1807

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 136/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KERNS, Lawrence A.	(2)377,(5)905,(15)2193,(16)2278
KERR, Earl F.	(9)1448
KERR, J.K.	(5)904
KESSELRING, Albert	(15)2159,(25)3508
KETCHUM, Neal O.	(23)3365
KETTERING, John	(20)2878
KETTERSON (Major)	(12)1707
KEYES, Carlton C.	(1)101
KEYES, Geoffrey	(12)1743
KEYS, Oscar W.Jr	(1)52,77,(23)3362
KEYSER, George V.	(1)46,48,146,(2)350,353,355,(24)3383,3388,3389,3393, 3408,3409,3415,3429,3430,3436,(30)4111
KIBLER, Harold R.	(1)146,(2)245,257,268,271,308,313,329,361,(5)682,683, 685,690.691,693-695,697,698,700-702,704,705,709,711, 715,719-721,725-728,733,738,739,747,753-757,760,894, (6)949,950,959,960-964,966,969,970,(7)1081,1093,1122, 1136,1139,1141,1142,1151,1152,1155,1159-1161,(8)1264,

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 153/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(9)1363,1384,1385,(10)1492,(11)1603,1604,1652,1669, 1671,1684,(13)1817,(22)3041,3042,3209,(24)3381,3383
KIDDER, Harry C.	(22)3164,3172
KIEHL, Marvin E.	(2)388,(15)2205
KIEM, Earl D.	(1)121,122
KIERNAN, Edward F.	(1)111,(9)1356
KIGER, Willie M.	(30)4136
KILEY, George L.	(2)376,388,(13)1912,(14)2062,2104,(15)2191,2205, (16)2252
KILGARRIFF, James E.	(22)3172
KILGORE, James A.	(8)1275
KILLIN, Richard C.	(30)4098,4115,4116,4118,4130,4140
KILPATRICK, Robert W.	(30)4127,4134
KIM, Chul Soo	(30)4081
KIM, Doo Whan	(30)4080,4096-4100,4118
KIM, Harold S.O.	(30)4136
KIM, Hash C.	(30)4136

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 170/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KIM, Il Sung	(30)4042
KIM, Jung Lim	(30)4061
KIM, Kap Soo	(30)4063,4064
KIM, Koo	(30)4078,4089,4091,4092,4095
KIM, Kyu Sik	(30)4078,4090,4091,4094,4095
KIM, Sei Young	(30)4041
KIM, Seung Soo	(30)4090,4096
KIM, Young Tai	(30)4099
KIMBALL, Harvey L.	(1)77,(2)387,393,(12)1807,(15)2204,2211
KIMBALL, Hiter J.	(23)3356
KIME, Otho G.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
KIMMEL, George J.	(23)3364
KIMMEL, Husband E.	(22)3142
KIMPTON, Herbert F.	(22)3172
KINCAID, J.Donald	(12)1807
KINCAID, Thomas C.	(23)3330
KINCH, Robert T.	(2)383,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 187/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KINCHER, Harold W.	(2)375,(15)2190
KING, Alfred A.	(9)1448
KING, Allyn P.	(23)3357
KING, Andrew M.	(2)394,(15)2212
KING, B.J.	(5)895
KING, Edward L.	(4)600
KING, Ernest J.	(10)1475,(11)1622,(22)3189,3204
KING, James C.	(23)3357
KING, John A.Jr.	(5)924,(8)1235,1274,1279
KING, John W.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
KING, Nathaniel P.	(1)77
KING, Timothy R.	(2)394,(15)2212
KING, William H.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
KINGSBERRY, Gordon M.	(22)3172
KINGSLEY, John E.	(23)3358
KINSEY, Benjamin T.	(2)381,392,(5)922,(9)1361,1374,(13)1937,(15)2197,2209
KINYON, Lyle	(10)1473

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 204/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KIRCHHEIMER, Joseph M.	(15)2136
KIREHNERT, Carl	(2)385,(15)2201
KIRKBRIDE, Malcolm C.	(5)902,(10)1461
KIRKLAND, Ira B.Jr	(2)387,393,(12)1807,(15)2204,2211
KIRKMAN, Robert W.	(8)1235,1274,1279
KIRKPATRICK, Stephenson O	(29)3961
KIRKWOOD, Robert G.	(9)1383,1384
KIRSIMAIE, Juhan	(20)2857
KIRSTEIN, William A.	(2)393,(13)1920,(15)2211
KIRWIN, Pat J.	(5)922,(8)1211,1212,(10)1492
KISH, William M.	(30)4133
KISSINGER, Henry A.	(2)377,(15)2193
KIVIMAKI, Elmer N.	(2)383,(15)2199
KLAPPER, John Henry	(9)1424
KLAUS, Bruno	(16)2251
KLAUS, Walter	(2)377,(15)2193
KLEIN, Earl A.	(1)98,(5)903,(23)3273,3307,3357

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 221/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KLEIN, John J.	(10)1473
KLEIN, Keith B.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
KLEIN, Morris J.	(1)77
KLEINMAN, Abraham	(2)379,(15)2195
KLEITSCH, Robert J.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2187
KLEMM, Dieter	(20)2879,2880
KLEMMENS (fnu)	(19)2677,2799,(20)2819,2820
KLERLEIN, Edward T. Jr	(23)3366
KLIKNA, Vincent S.	(22)3172
KLIMEK, John	(2)377,(15)2192
KLINCK, Herbert G.	(2)391,393,(13)1930,(15)2208,2211
KLINE, Robert J.	(2)390,(15)2207
KLINGER, Otto	(20)2804
KLIPA, Edmund X.	(2)393,395,(13)1932.(15)2211,2213,(26)3693
KLISE, Richard W.	(22)3048,3067,3069,3092-3095,3097,3137
KLOCZAK, Walter J.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
KLUBERTANZ, A.J.	(5)901

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 238/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KOHLMAN, Jack L.	(23)3362
KOHN, Louis	(5)923,(23)3249
KOLB, Eugene J.	(29)3991
KOLB, L.J.	(5)898
KOLENBERG, Joseph F.	(12)1807
KOMORI, Arthur S.	(2)229,(23)3222-3227,3231,3360
KONDRATIEFF, Mark D.	(2)394,(15)2212
KONEV, Ivan	(25)3525
KONNO, Yojiro	(28)3903
KONOYE, Fumimaro	(23)3224
KONSTANTAKOS, Nicholas	(22)3172
KONVICKI, Vera	(29)3967
KOONCE, Donald S.	(1)77,(30)4127,4132
KOONTZ, Vance H.	(2)386,(15)2202
KOPANSKY, M.R.	(5)913
KOPCHO, Clarence B.	(23)3366
KOPEC, Roman F.	(2)384,393,(13)1911,(15)2200,2211

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 289/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KOPROWSKI, Joseph S.	(2)387,(15)2203
KORA (Dr.)	(12)1747,1756,1771,1748
KORB, Ralph A.	(22)3195,3214
KORBA, John	(22)3137
KORF, Kurt F.	(20)2821
KORNESHEV, Forma F.	(30)4053,4069
KORNFELD, Jerome M.	(23)3362
KORNFIELD, Ralph E.	(2)374,(15)2189
KORPELA, Elton A.	(2)383,(15)2199
KORTA, Armand	(23)3358
KORTAS, Francis J.	(23)3363
KOSS, Raymond F.	(23)3360
KOSTER, S.W.	(30)4071
KOSTRICH, Max	(2)380,(15)2196
KOTULAK, Bernard J.	(1)77,(22)3116,3137
KOUDELKA, Edward R.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
KOUNTZE, Delancey	(4)527

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 306/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KLUCKHOHN (Major)	(29)3999
KLUNDER, John H.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
KLUNDER, Willard C.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
KNAPP, Harold F.	(2)383,(15)2199
KNAPP, Lealand M.	(23)3355
KNAPP, Todd B.	(1)77,(2)385,(15)2201
KNAPPENBERGER, John D.	(22)3159
KNAUSS, Edward E.	(10)1520,1523
KNIGHT, Harry E.	(1)146,(2)212,(4)564,593,594
KNIGHT, Jack W.	(1)77,(2)383,(9)1448,(15)2199
KNIGHT, John B.	(2)384,(15)2200
KNOLL, Eberhard F.	(2)387,(15)2203
KNOOP, Raymond R.	(2)393,(15)2211
KNOPF, Stacey	(7)1131,(8)1271
KNOWLES, Bertram G.	(5)922,(11)1658,1686,(12)1807
KNOX, Frank	(7)1103
KNUDSEN (fnu)	(15)2197

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 255/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KNUDSEN, Henning A.	(2)375,(15)2191
KNUTOWICZ, Frank	(2)372,(15)2187
KOBAYASHI, Kanae	(22)3172
KOCEM, Felix H.	(2)382,(15)2198
KOCH, Carl H.	(25)3526,3538
KOCH, Harold S.	(2)376,(15)2191
KOCH, Oscar W.	(11)1611,1612,1651,1662,1665,1681,(13)1814,1876
KOCKRITZ, Herman	(8)1276
KOEBER, Kenneth T.	(24)3456
KOELLING, Elmer E.	(12)1807
KOENIG, Ira	(2)391,(8)1305,(13)1930,(15)2208
KOENIG, Wirth H.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
KOENIGSDORF, William J.	(5)919,(23)3246
KOERNER, Karl Wilhelm	(9)1394
KOETTNER, Frank X. Jr	(30)4132
KOGUT, Henry J.	(2)378,(15)2193
KOHL, Herman	(16)2245

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 272/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KOURY, Louis G.	(23)3365
KOUTZ, Joseph G.	(5)906,(9)1447
KOVACIK, Andrew H.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
KOYAMA, S.A.	(28)3868,3879
KOZAK, Alexander	(23)3356
KRAEGE (Col.)	(12)1712
KRAFT, Clarence A.	(23)3357
KRAFT, Lloyd	(23)3362
KRAFT, Richard P.Jr	(2)383,385,(10)1514,1519,1523,(13)1927,(15)2199,2201
KRAMER, Charles E.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
KRASZEWSKI, Thaddeus J.	(8)1317
KRAUSE, Paul	(28)3822-3824
KRAUSER, Francis W.	(22)3075,3076,3078,3137
KRAUSS, Marvin D.	(2)376,(15)2191
KRAUT, Samuel	(2)393,(15)2211
KRCHNIAK, John	(2)390,(15)2207
KREBS, Alfred	(4)657

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 323/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KREBS, William D.III	(22)3213
KREKOW (fnu)	(20)2827
KRELL, James R.	(23)3359
KRIEGER, William D.	(1)77,(23)3355
KRINGS, Louis W.	(5)896,928,(8)1204,1207
KRISANECK, Johann	(20)2853
KRISTELLER, Herman W.	(2)393,(15)2210,(20)2853,2855-2857,2862,(26)3663
KRISTIANSEN, Stanley	(9)1356
KRITSKY, Andrew N.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
KRIZAN, Joseph F.	(23)3359
KROH, Herman	(2)385,(15)2201
KROHLER, William	(20)2853
KROLL (Dr.)	(25)3546
KROLL, George L.	(23)3356
KROLL, Lester H.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
KRONER, Hayes A.	(1)146,(2)231,235,244,256,(5)682,683,705,710,715,718,739,(6)942,958,(7)1081,1151,(10)1527

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 340/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KROWEL, Richard W.	(30)4136
KRUEGER (German Col.)	(20)2778,2779
KRUEGER, Clarance K.	(22)3172
KRUEGER, Walter	(23)3253,3291,3292
KRUGER, Albert	(20)2841,2842
KRUGER, Norman R.	(23)3366
KRUSE, Donald F.	(2)380,(12)1807,(15)2196
KRYS, Joseph F.	(23)3365
KSIENIEWICZ, Casimir A.	(2)384,385,(5)924,(13)1927,(15)2201
KSIENWICZ (fnu)	(2)384,(15)2200
KUBICEK, Robert A.	(1)78,(12)1807
KUBICEK, William H.	(27)3804
KUBIKOWSKI (fnu)	(15)2197
KUCHAR, Keith	(8)1277
KUCK, Thomas	(18)2470
KUCKACHIK, John	(9)1356
KUEHNER, Junior W.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 357/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KUHAR, Steve P.	(30)4127,4136
KUHN, Joseph E.	(3)406,407
KUHN, Karl F.	(2)394,(15)2212
KUJALA, Eino O.	(10)1472
KUJAWSKI, Raymond W.	(23)3222
KUKANZA, Joseph S.	(25)3583
KULA, Clement J.	(2)376,(15)2191
KULESH, William E.	(8)1276
KULIK, Boleslaus J.	(2)394,(15)2212
KULIKOWSKI, Charles J.	(2)375,(15)2191
KUMMER, Albert J.	(1)100,(2)377,(5)923,(11)1608,1628,1655,(15)2192
KUNSLER, Albert M.	(23)3366
KUNUGI, Jimmie H.	(30)4131
KUPISZEWSKI, Michael L.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
KUPPERS, Peter	(19)2619
KURAMOTO, Yoso	(30)4131
KUROWSKI, Steven A.	(2)393,395,(13)1932,(15)2211,2213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 374/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KURTZE, Robert P.	(12)1807
KURZON, Raymond	(1)78,(2)385,(15)2201
KUTZLOW, Steve	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
KUUSISTE, Wayne V.	(2)389,(13)1921,(15)2206
KUYPER, William F.	(2)394,(15)2212
KUZIV, Michael	(2)382,(15)2198
KWAN, Oh Jik	(30)4056
KWAN, Young Kyu	(30)4061

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 382/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LABATT, Blair P.	(1)78,106,(5)922,(23)3237,3239,3240,3245,3276,3283, 3292,3294,3306-3308,3313,3358
LABBERTON, Helios V.H.	(23)3360
LA BELLE (Pvt)	(11)1649
LA BRANCHE, Robert R.	(1)110,(2)388,395,(5)922,(11)1551,1566,1608,1609,1611 1612,1613,1626,1627,1633,1655,(13)1936,(15)2204,2213
LA CHANCE, Herve R.	(2)385,(12)1807,(15)2201
LACHMANN, John W.	(2)372,(15)2187
LACKS, Heinrich	(20)2857,2858
LA COSTA, Thomas	(23)3366
LA CROSSE, Louis T.	(2)378,(15)2194
LADD, Edward T.	(2)373,386,(13)1917,(15)2188,2203
LADNER, George A.	(1)87,(22)3117,3137
LA FLECHE, Normand de	(11)1588
LA FRAMBOISE, Ernest J.	(2)376,(15)2191
LA FRENIERE, Victor H.	(1)78,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
LAGEMANN, Joseph B.	(2)373,382,(15)2188,2198,(19)2667,2668

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 17/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LAI, Kam Fook	(22)3172
LAIRD, Norman W.	(23)3365
LAKE, D.W.	(5)895
LAMB, Henry M.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
LAMB, Kurt L.	(2)373,(15)2188
LAMB, Louis J.	(8)1275,1276
LAMB, William L.	(23)3356
LAMBERT (French Col.)	(12)1784
LAMBRICK, Joseph T. Jr	(23)3355
LAMET, Leon L.	(2)395,(5)897,(8)1192-1195,(13)1936,(15)2213
LAMM, D.S.	(1)20
LAMMERT, Paul E.	(2)377,(15)2193
LAMPE, Alerd S.	(1)96,99
LANDA, Daniel	(2)378,(15)2194
LANDAU, Henry	(3)434,476
LANDER, William T.	(1)111,(23)3366
LANDES, George N.	(11)1557,(12)1807

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 34/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LANDON, C.R.	(21)2903
LANDON, Edward F.	(8)1277
LANDRY, Donald H.	(2)386,391,(13)1933,(15)2202,2209
LANDRY, Joseph A.	(2)393,(15)2211
LANE, Dan R.	(2)383,(15)2199
LANE, Denzil L.	(2)387,390,(15)2203,2207
LANE, Harold A.V.	(30)4136
LANG, James W.Jr	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
LANG, John W.	(3)440
LANG, Julius	(22)3121
LANG, Richard C.	(1)78,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2157,2187
LANGER, Walter C.	(2)386,(15)2202
LANGFORD, Berry F.	(2)379,391,(13)1933,(15)2194,2209
LANGHAM, Edward L.	(10)1473
LANIER, Ward P.	(2)376,(15)2191
LANSDALE, John Jr	(2)284,(8)1230,1232,1274
LANTZ, Clarence T.	(2)395,(5)895,(13)1936,(15)2213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 51/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LA PRICE, Marcel R.	(2)392,(15)2210
LA PURKE, John V.	(12)1807
LARCOM, Charles C.	(8)1275
LARIOS, Ernest E.	(2)390,(5)896,928,(13)1928,(14)2100,(15)2207
LARKIN, Charles E.	(5)919,(10)1457,1462-1464,1472
LARKIN, Joseph C.	(23)3356
LARMON, Leigh R.	(8)1277
LARNED, William E.	(27)3746,3783
LARSEN, Carl W.	(10)1473
LARSEN, Marvin N.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
LARSEN, Ronald F.	(22)3195,3215
LARSON, George F.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
LARSON, Paul E.	(23)3361
LASATER, Roy A.	(2)376,(15)2191
LASSITER, William	(1)146,(2)198,(4)571,599,600
LATHAM, James S.Jr	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210,(23)3240
LAUBACH, Theodore	(18)2490,2491

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 68/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LAUGHLAND, Emerson V.	(12)1807
LAUGHLIN. Glen W.	(2)387,(15)2203
LAUFENBERG, Willi	(18)2495
LAUREL, Jose P.	(23)3319,3320,3369,3370,(29)3962
LAUTEN (Major)	(18)2483
LAVA, Vicente	(23)3372
LAVAL, Pierre	(13)1820,(25)3509
LAVERGNE, Nelson G.	(30)4136
LAVOLD, Ernest	(30)4137
LAW, James E.	(30)4134
LAWES, Herbert J.	(1)46,47
LAWLER, J.D.	(9)1414
LAWLESS, John J.	(23)3357
LAWLESS, Mark J.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
LAWRENCE, E.O.	(8)1262,1263
LAWRENCE, Thomas E.	(4)527
LAYMAN, James B.	(22)3172

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LAYTON, Victor J.	(8)1321
LEACH, James H.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
LEAHY, Daniel A.	(2)388,(11)1655,(12)1807,(15)2204
LEAHY, Frank J.	(23)3242
LEAHY, Richard D.	(2)372,393,(13)1915,(15)2187,2210
LEAR, Darvin E.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
LEATH, Wilfred T.	(9)1448
LEBANO, Ernest J.	(23)3356
LECHARDT, Alois	(27)3756,3757
LE CLERC, Jacques P.	(15)2144,(17)2374,2378
L'ECLUSE, William F.	(23)3360
LEDE, Alfred E.	(23)3360
LEDERMAN, Harry M.	(1)78,(2)373,(15)2189
LEE, Andrew Pang	(22)3070,3120,3137
LEE, Chong W.	(30)4134
LEE, Edwin C.	(16)2221,2227,2228,2254,2259-2261,2280,2311,2316,2319 2328,(19)2633

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 102/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LEE, Francis	(2)378,(15)2194
LEE, John C.H.	(4)546,(25)3565
LEE, Joseph F.	(2)389,(15)2206
LEE, Kang Kook	(30)4041
LEE, Kwan Sool	(30)4056
LEE, Otto C.	(23)3358
LEE, Powell A.	(23)3360
LEE, Randall P.	(23)3363
LEE, Raymond E.	(1)146,(2)226,(4)667,669,(5)682,706,707
LEE, Robert	(22)3136
LEE, Seaward S.	(5)906
LEE, Tan Ya	(30)4081
LEE, Tuk Chun	(30)4067
LEE, W.L.	(5)905,930
LEE, Yong Sam	(30)4061
LEE, Yong Soon	(30)4016,4137
LEE, Yung Chun	(30)4042

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 119/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LE FEBVRE, George A.	(2)385,(12)1741,1807,(15)2201
LEGARE, Eugene V.	(30)4134
LEGER, M.	(14)2063
LEICHER, William	(30)4131
LEIGH, Edmund	(3)487
LEIGHTON, Ralph E.	(9)1361
LEISENRING, Franklin S.	(1)47
LEMAR, Clarence E.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
LE MAY, Curtis	(22)3078
LEMLER, Fremont F.	(1)78,(12)1754,1807
LE MOINE (Lt.)	(12)1720
LEMOINE, Everett C.	(23)3366
LENARD, Thaddeus	(12)1807
LENIN, V.I.	(4)582
LENNON, Ernest J.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
LENZ, Heinrich	(20)2857
LEON, Henry	(2)382,(15)2198

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 136/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LEONARD, Erna	(20)2855
LEONARD, George B.	(8)1274
LEONARD, Nathaniel W.	(2)394,(8)1294,1296,1299,1305,(15)2212
LEONARDI, Nicola	(12)1719
LEONG, Edward Y.K.	(22)3172
LEONG, William B.S.	(23)3358
LEPOSA, Frank	(11)1576,1579,1590
LERCH, Archer L.	(1)146,(2)298,(30)4007
LERCH, John H.	(2)394,(15)2212
LE ROY, Roger V.	(14)2063,2064
LE ROY, Warren S.	(1)99
LERT, Peter J.	(19)2681
LESLIE, John D.	(12)1807
LESLIE, Robert J.	(1)78,(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196,(16)2289,2291
LESTER, Calvin D.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
LESTER, J.A.	(3)420,423
LESTER, James C.	(4)618,620,639

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 153/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LESTER, Thomas C.	(23)3362
LE TALLEC (French Major)	(17)2377
LEVESQUE, Joseph R.	(23)3365
LEVI, Jack	(2)392,(15)2210
LEVINE (fnu)	(15)2197
LEVINE, Ellis M.	(2)375,(15)2191
LEVINE, Irving L.	(23)3365
LEVINE, Robert H.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
LEVINE, Theodore	(2)383,(15)2199
LEVITAN, Irving A.	(23)3362
LEVITCH, Frank R.	(2)377,(15)2193
LEVY, Gaston	(10)1486
LEWIS, Addison W.	(22)3172
LEWIS, Austin A.	(2)386,(15)2203
LEWIS, Crosby	(1)78,103,(11)1559,1570,1576,1579,1582,1587,1589,1590 1627,1644,1652,1655,1668,1672,(12)1717,1743,1807
LEWIS, H.B.	(5)744

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 170/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LEWIS, Irving J.	(2)392,(15)2210
LEWIS, James M.	(1)115
LEWIS, Meriwether	(2)175
LEWIS, Michael J.	(1)103
LEY, Robert	(26)3633
LEYDECKER, C.E.	(1)146,(2)336,344,350,351,(8)1324,(24)3385,3386,3414, 3426,3427,3460
LEYNSE, Humphrey W.	(23)3295,3366
LEYNSE, Waldo H.	(23)3360
LI, Fu Lin	(22)3118,3119
LIBBY, Floyd C.	(25)3583
LICALZI, Laurence A.	(2)396,(9)1385,(13)1936,(15)2214
LICHTBLAU, John H.	(2)389,(15)2206
LIDO, Sara	(12)1721
LIEBEL, Ludwig	(19)2660
LIEBERMAN, James J.	(2)394,(15)2211
LIEBMAN, Sidney R.	(22)3195,3196,3214

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 187/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LIEFFRIGG, Katrina	(11)1615
LIGGETT, Hunter	(4)535
LIGHTNER, Frederick W.	(30)4153
LIM, Joong Kil	(30)4061
LIM, Stuart	(30)4134
LIMB, Ben C.	(30)4093
LIMBACH, Charles	(1)52
LIMBURG, Karl	(18)2462
LINARES, Francisco	(9)1399
LINCOLN, David W.	(23)3360
LINCOLN, Francis H.	(1)146,(2)202
LINCOLN, Rush B.	(22)3180
LINDBERGH, Charles A.	(7)1106,(25)3578
LINDE, Arthur W.	(8)1276,(23)3242
LINDEMANN, Fritz	(12)1709
LINDER, Wayne C.	(1)78
LINDJORD, Haakon	(2)391,(5)919,(10)1472,(13)1931,(15)2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 204/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LINDHOLM, Richard W.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
LINDMAN, Robert C.	(25)3583
LINDQUIST, James J.	(1)78,(23)3356
LINDSAY, Charles D.	(23)3324,3357
LINDSAY, Richard W.	(1)110,(12)1799-1801,1807
LINDT, J.H.	(4)610
LINN, Wayne E.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
LINNANE, William F.	(1)78,(2)375,(15)2190
LINS, Milton K.	(2)379,(15)2195
LI PAOLIS, Joseph A.	(25)3583
LIPER, Milton W.	(2)387,(12)1807,(15)2204
LIPPER, William	(2)376,(15)2191
LIPSCOMB, Joel A.	(3)475,480
LIST, Johannes	(25)3509,3510
LISTON, Raymond J.	(2)386,388,(13)1914,1927,(15)2202,2205
LISY, Clayton J.	(23)3364
LITSCHEY, Joseph	(18)2529,2530

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 221/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LITTELL, Duane O.	(2)375,(15)2191
LITTLE, Allison L.	(23)3359
LITTLE, John W.	(2)372,391,(11)1654,(13)1931,(15)2187,2208
LITTON, Arthur	(29)3952
LIVADITIS, George	(10)1496
LIVELY, Asa T.	(9)1448,(10)1538,1539,1540B
LIVESAY, W.G.	(1)146,(2)303
LIVINGSTON, Robert G.	(25)3583
LIZOTTE, Joseph C.	(30)4137
LLOVARAS, Pablo	(4)602
LLOYD, Charles N.	(2)392,396,(13)1936,1938,(15)2210,2214
LLOYD, David A.	(1)20
LLOYD, Robert S.	(2)389,(15)2206
LOBB, Anthony W.	(1)78,104,(2)383,(5)900,(9)1447,(13)1924,(15)2109, 2199,(16)2304,2305,2308,(18)2492,2500,(26)3592
LOBET (Police Inspector)	(19)2669
LOCKE, Harry F.	(2)386,(5)911,(15)2202

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LOCKE, M.E.	(4)561
LOCKE, Victor	(23)3356
LOEHEL, Willi	(26)3610,3611,3613
LOERKE, Roman F.	(9)1447
LOESCHER, Richard R.	(8)1277
LOFTUS, Frank	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
LOFTUS, John E.	(25)3538
LOMBART, Claude	(15)2118
LONEY, Theodore R.	(2)391,(5)912,(11)1557,(13)1933,(15)2208
LONG (fnu)	(15)2197
LONG (Lt.)	(19)2602
LONG, Fred H.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
LONG, James B.	(6)952
LONG, Maurice R.V.	(22)3182,3213
LONG, Robert C.	(23)3364
LONG, Robert E.	(23)3365
LONG, Stephen	(2)175

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 255/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LONG, Vern V.	(22)3172
LONG, W.D.	(4)558
LONGBOTHAM, Miller P.	(8)1276
LONGE, Leo J.	(12)1807
LONGSHORE, John R.	(1)101,(24)3408
LOONEY, Francis B.	(12)1807,(25)3497
LOONEY, Jack M.	(23)3363
LORD, Donald S.	(5)901
LORD, Richard G.	(2)395,(13)1909,1935,(15)2213
LOREN, Jesus F.	(3)421
LORENZ, William F.	(29)3952
LORUSSO, Harry J.	(9)1447
LOUGHRY, Daniel F.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
LOUIE, Kong T.	(22)3079,3103,3121,3137
LOUNIBUS, Edwin C.	(23)3364
LOVATO, Egiaia	(18)2501
LOVELL, Walter J.	(23)3358

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 272/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LOVETT, Edward C.	(1)79,(2)372,393,(13)1914,(15)2187,2211
LOVETT, R.B.	(16)2224
LOWANCE, Carter O.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
LOWE, Henry W.	(1)20
LOWE, Pardee	(22)3068,3117-3119,3122,3137
LOWE, T.S.C.	(2)176
LOWENHAUPT, Henry S.	(8)1276
LOWENSTEIN, L.A.	(7)1142
LOWRY, Aubrey	(25)3539
LOWRY, Clarence W.	(1)79,(23)3357
LOWTHER, Joseph A.	(5)911,(13)1939,(14)2100
LUBOLD, Klaus E.A.	(19)2647
LUCAIRE, William M.	(1)79,(12)1716,1807
LUCAS, Edgar M.	(22)3191-3193,3215
LUCAS, James R.	(22)3087-3089,3137
LUCAS, John H.	(5)920,(11)1654,(12)1807,(25)3496
LUCAS, Jean	(3)443

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 289/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LUCCHESI, Mario J.	(1)79,(12)1807
LUCHETTI, Lucas R.	(23)3356
LUCHT, George R.	(23)3357
LUCID, Thomas A.	(12)1807,(25)3498,3509
LUCKNER, Felix von	(20)2786
LUDBERG, Colar T.	(7)1121
LUDOW, William	(2)180
LUDWELL, Hubert D.	(22)3172
LUDWIG, Donald P.	(8)1276
LUECK, William O.	(2)373,389,(5)913,(15)2188,2206,(16)2220
LUENING, Robert A.	(22)3137
LUKAS, Peter P.	(2)383,(15)2199
LUNA, Hayes O.	(5)894,(8)1203
LUNDGREN, Allen H.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
LUNDQUIST, Donald C.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
LUNSTEDT, Carl A.	(2)377,(15)2193
LUNT, Horace G.II	(12)1807

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 306/333 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LUONGO, Joseph P.	(12)1807
LUSTBADER, Albert	(9)1448
LUSTIG, Raymond W.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
LUTH (TSgt)	(4)603
LUTJENS, Paul R.	(1)107,112,(29)3973
LUTTERMOSER, Oscar F.	(10)1472
LUX (fnu)	(18)2488
LYAN, George L.	(22)3079,3119,3137
LYDON, John J.	(2)379,(15)2195
LYMAN, Samuel K.	(1)79,(2)388,(13)1914,(15)2205,(22)3172
LYNAM, Patrick J.	(23)3357
LYNCH, George F.	(22)3058,3060,3067,3070,3137
LYNCH, Henry W.	(2)388,(15)2205
LYNCH, James J.	(23)3359
LYNCH, John J.	(8)1276
LYNCH, John T.	(23)3222
LYNCH, Mark J.	(1)79,98,(23)3298,3356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 323/333 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
LYNCH, Patrick W.	(22)3172
LYNCH, Robert J.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
LYNN, Burl G.	(22)3172
LYON, Fendall G.	(1)79,(2)374,(15)2189,(19)2617-2621
LYON, Francis E.	(2)391,(5)930,(13)1931,(15)2208
LYON, H.C.	(11)1619
LYON, Paul E.	(5)925,(12)1807,(25)3492,3495-3497
LYONS, Robert B.	(23)3359
LYTLE, Scott H.	(2)372,387,(13)1916,(15)2187,2203
LYUH, Woon Heun	(30)4095

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHL ‖Rec: 333/333 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MacARTHUR, Douglas	(1)120,122,146,(2)202,255,(4)578,594,655,(22)3152, 3167,3168,3189,3211,(23)3227,3230,3232,3234,3253, 3285,3294,3309,3317,3318,3323,(28)3822,3831,3922, (29)3948,3962,(30)4053,4100
MacARTHUR, Harold A.	(22)3172
MacDONALD, Donald B.	(4)643,652
MacDONALD, Donald D.	(1)146,(2)214,217,(4)658,(10)1512
MacDONALD, Earl G.	(1)79
MacDONALD, Henry H.	(9)1447
MacDONALD, John D.	(12)1807
MacDONALD, Robert A.	(23)3355
MacDOUGALL, Kenneth E.	(30)4012-4016,4019-4023,4052,4053,4079,4087,4094, 4103,4134,4140
MacGANWELL, John E.	(2)379,(15)2195
MacGREGOR, Paul C.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
MacGRUER, John A. Jr	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1807,(15)2196
MACHIDA, Michael S.	(22)3172

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 17/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MacINTYRE, Gould O.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
MacKEITH, James A.	(1)79,(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
MacKENZIE, Donald E.	(1)81,146,(2)277,281,(22)3041,3045,3047,3048,3050, 3051,3054,3058,3060,3061,3068,3070,3081,3089,3090, 3137
MACKEY, James E.Jr	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
MacNABB, Malcolm L.	(23)3361
MacNAMARA, Richard C.	(2)386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
MACOMB, M.M.	(1)41,(2)185
MACOMBER, Robert C.	(23)3357
MacPHERSON, Gordon B.	(2)393,(15)2211,(20)2863
MacQUARRIE, Donald	(9)1448
MacWILLIE (Col.)	(12)1749
MACY, J.Noel	(5)694
MADD, Francis E.	(2)385,(15)2201
MADEIRA, Nicholas J.	(2)394,(8)1305,(15)2212
MADEL, Melvin R.	(2)376,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 34/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MADIGAN, Arthur R.	(8)1275
MADON, Franz	(18)2501
MADSON, John N.	(2)388,390,(13)1912,(15)2204,2207
MADUFFER, Merle C.	(30)4131
MAGARITY, Joseph L.	(12)1807
MAGUIRE, Charles J.	(2)390,(15)2207
MAGUIRE, John J.	(8)1275
MAGUIRE, John N.	(2)391,393,(13)1933,(15)2209,2211
MAH, George C.K.	(22)3041,3079,3098,3110,3111,3113-3115,3119,3137
MAHAR, Joseph	(8)1195
MAHER, William A.	(1)79,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
MAHLAB, Salim S.	(2)383,(15)2199
MAHLUM, Edward K.	(5)921,(10)1472
MAHONEY, Dennis H.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199,(18)2499,2500
MAHONEY, Donald P.	(30)4119
MAHONEY, John H.	(8)1275
MAINCZYK, Steven	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 51/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MAJEWSKI, Henry F.	(23)3358
MAJOR, Thomas H.	(2)265,(5)922,(23)3249,3250,3254,3359
MAJSZAK, Aloysius J.	(25)3565,3583
MALAPIT, Mariano S.	(23)3359
MALARET, Pedro E.	(9)1447
MALBUISSON, Paul R.	(1)79,(23)3358
MALDEN, Henry M.	(23)3362
MALDONADO, Alfonso	(9)1447
MALIAMAN, Dalmacio	(23)3362
MALIN, Morton V.	(2)387,(15)2203
MALLOR, Norman M.	(23)3355
MALLOY, Charles J.	(10)1472
MALONE, Daniel T.	(23)3276
MALONE, William F.	(25)3583
MALONEY, Peter J.	(23)3359
MANGAM, Charles R.	(2)373,(11)1654,(13)1917,(15)2136,2188
MANGES, James H.	(25)3583

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 68/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MANKIN, Paul A.	(2)393,(15)2211
MANLEY, James T.	(2)387,(12)1807,(15)2204
MANLEY, John M.	(3)481
MANN, David	(12)1807
MANN, Thomas J.	(1)102
MANNING, Jack C.	(2)376,(15)2191
MANSOUR, Farris	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
MANWELL, Karl R.	(22)3048,3080,3082,3097,3137
MANYO, Peter A.	(23)3361
MANZIONE, Alfonso	(15)2162
MAPES, Robert W.	(9)1447
MARANDA, Walter F.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
MARCH, Peyton C.	(4)555
MARCHESE, Allesandro	(25)3552
MARCOTTE, Edmund J.	(12)1807
MARCOTTE, Romeo A.	(1)111
MARCUM, Charles P.	(23)3361

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 85/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MARCUM, Herbert C.	(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196
MARCUS, Fred	(2)372,(15)2188
MARECHAL, Louis	(18)2470
MAREK, Walter F.	(2)394,(15)2212
MARFORI, Edmundo J.	(30)4134
MARH, William R.	(26)3631
MARINAS, Paul A.	(23)3222,3226
MARINO, John	(1)79,(12)1748,1807,(25)3550,3551
MARINUCCI, James R.	(8)1275
MARION, Stanley	(1)101
MARJIV, Viktor	(25)3534
MARK, John P.	(2)394,(15)2212
MARK, Seymour	(9)1447
MARK, William R.	(2)374,(12)1807,(15)2190,(19)2593
MARKHAM, Chester A.	(12)1807
MARKLEY, Charles W.	(22)3172,(23)3365
MARKLY, Daniel M.	(25)3539

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 102/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MARKS, Peter B.	(2)394,(13)1921,(15)2212
MARKUSCH, D.L.	(1)20
MARKUSIEWICZ, Anthony	(2)376,(15)2192,(20)2774
MARLEY, John C.	(22)3199,3213
MARQUIT, Harold	(2)389,(15)2206
MARR, Harold E.	(27)3711
MARSH, Edward F.	(30)4127,4134
MARSH, Frank H.	(30)4137
MARSH, Harold	(8)1275
MARSHALL, George C.	(1)146,(2)346,(4)660,(5)747,798,833,(8)1291,(10)1475,(11)1545,1547,1562,1622,1623,1628,1629,1652,(12)1733,(22)3040,3042,3132,3189,3204,(23)3253,3307,3329-3331
MARSHALL, Richard A.	(2)386,(15)2202
MARSHALL, Richard J.	(23)3240,3309
MARSHALL, William R.	(30)4137
MARSTON, Morrill W.	(22)3172

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 119/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MARTENS, Ludwig	(4)548
MARTIN, Arthur R. Jr	(23)3362
MARTIN, Carlos	(9)1447
MARTIN, Duane L.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
MARTIN, Gabriel	(3)412
MARTIN, George E.	(2)379,(13)1911,(15)2194,(16)2233
MARTIN, Harry K.	(9)1448
MARTIN, John L.	(12)1807
MARTIN, John M.	(22)3172
MARTIN, Joseph H.	(10)1481,1494,(12)1807
MARTIN, L.L.	(28)3839,3841
MARTIN, Paul J.	(2)380,(12)1807,(15)2196,(17)2354
MARTIN, Walter F.	(1)79,(22)3213,3355
MARTINCO, John P.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
MARTINELLI, Mario	(12)1769-1772
MARTINI, Francis E.	(20)2877
MARTINOFF, V.D.	(22)3130,3131

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 136/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MARTOWSKI, Patrick S.	(2)372,(12)1807,(15)2187
MARWICK, Lawrence	(2)382,(15)2198,(19)2671
MARYNOWSKI, S.W.	(5)899,928
MARZ, Roy W.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199
MASIN, Lino	(12)1777,1778
MASKREY, Robert M.	(2)389,(15)2207
MASON, Getha A.	(9)1356
MASON, Gordon B.	(1)79,(12)1770,1807
MASON, S.B.	(13)2010
MASON, Walter A.	(23)3363
MASON, Will E.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
MASSEY, Eugene S.	(30)4137
MASSEY, Walter B.	(23)3363
MAST, Phil H.	(23)3340
MASTROLILLO, Antonio J.	(12)1807
MATASAVAGE, Vincent P.	(23)3366
MATEJCEK, Francis J.	(25)3583

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 153/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MATFELDT, Clyburn O.	(7)1146
MATHEWS, Elijah R.	(23)3355
MATHIEU, Henri	(14)2082,(15)2118
MATHIS, Robert W.	(23)3361
MATKO, Frank Jr.	(10)1473
MATSUMOTO, Miles D.	(1)80,(22)3172
MATTEI, Francesco	(12)1796
MATTESON, Robert E.	(1)80,(2)377,(15)2192,(26)3668,3670
MATTHEWS, Charles M.	(22)3206
MATTHEWS, D.M.	(5)900,929
MATTHEWS, Eric F.	(1)111
MATTHEWS, John P.	(23)3364
MATTOS, Anthony R.	(1)80,100,(2)379,(5)925,(8)1188,(9)1448,(10)1525, 1526,1530,1540B,(15)2194,(17)2353,(19)2663
MATTSON, Everett D.	(10)1473
MATUSIK, Mieczyslaus K.	(2)379,(15)2195
MAUCHER, Andrew G.	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 170/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MAUNSELL, R.J.	(10)1480,1481
MAURER, John P.(J)	(2)245,(4)566,579
MAURO, Donald C.	(22)3076,3137
MAUSS, Emil	(20)2774
MAX, Frederick D.	(22)3172
MAXON, Thomas W.	(2)394,(15)2212
MAXWELL, Drummond F.	(1)80,(2)373,(15)2189
MAY, Leo C.	(2)387,(15)2203
MAY, Ralph E.	(2)378,(15)2193
MAY, Robert S.Jr	(1)80,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
MAYA, Manuel	(22)3172
MAYBURY, W.A.	(2)234
MAYER, Franz	(10)1500,1501
MAYER, George A.	(8)1276
MAYER, George H.	(12)1807
MAYER, Josef	(25)3527
MAYER, William F.	(2)387,(15)2203

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 187/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MAYFIELD, Charles T.	(23)3259,3358
MAYFIELD, Ellis O.	(1)80,98,(2)374,(13)1918,(14)2029,2068,2091,(15)2189, (16)2262-2273,(18)2486,2488,2489,(19)2602,2624,2626, 2627,2657,(20)2764-2766,2768,2769,(20)2808,2809, (26)3680
MAYME, R.E.M.	(22)3093
MAYORAL, Jose	(9)1447
MEADE, Paul J.	(2)389,(15)2206
MEADOWS, Charles D.	(2)372,394,(13)1914,(15)2187,2211
MEAGHER (CIP Agent)	(3)471
MEASLEY, Wilber T.	(30)4016-4018,4022,4074,4080,4082,4089,4095,4110-4012 4114,4115,4123,4127,4135,4139
MECKES, Lewis J.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
MEDAGLIA, John D.	(2)380,(12)1807,(15)2196
MEDDAUGH, Leonard S.	(2)390,394,(13)1929,(15)2208,2212
MEDINA, Marcello	(2)374,391,(5)908,(13)1933,(15)2189,2208
MEDOFF, Sidney	(8)1314

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 204/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MEEHAN, John F.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
MEHARA (fnu)	(23)3352
MEHL (fnu)	(19)2664
MEHLING, J.J.	(5)916
MEINHAUSEN (German Col.)	(15)2159
MEINSTEIN, Siegfried	(2)377,(15)2193
MEISEL, George M.	(1)81,(26)3625
MEISETZ, Fred E.	(1)81,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
MEISINGER, Josef Albert	(28)3826,3828
MEIXNER, Leo R.	(1)81
MEJORADA, Celerino Q.	(1)82
MELDRUM, Gilbert S.	(2)388,(11)1557,1558,(12)1807,(13)1815,(15)2204
MELLINGER, Samuel	(5)905,(9)1356
MELSTED, Haraldur F.	(10)1472
MELTON, Horace J.	(8)1276
MENCHINE, William A.	(23)3357
MENDENHALL, George M.	(2)384,388,(13)1912,(15)2200,2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 221/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MENDOZA, Frank	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
MENECHINO, Lewis E.	(22)3172
MENEFEE, William S.	(22)3213
MENENDEZ, H.R.	(5)930
MENENDEZ, R.R.	(5)904
MENENDEZ, Rene	(9)1433,1447
MENENDEZ, Warren F.	(2)372,(11)1654,(15)2187
MENKE, Bernard W.	(2)246,(5)922,(8)1233,1274,1279
MENKE, Howard	(19)2650
MERBACH, Robert H.	(2)376,(15)2192
MERCALDI, Angelina	(12)1714
MERCIER, Alfred J.	(2)378,(15)2194
MERKEL, Walter F.	(10)1473
MERNONE, Dino	(25)3568
MERRICK, Edward J.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
MERRICK, James J.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
MERRICK, Richard L.	(23)3363

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 238/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MERRICK, Thomas L.	(1)98
MERRILL, Frank D.	(22)3080
MERRIMAN, George T.	(12)1807
MERRIMAN, Paul H.	(12)1807
MERRITT, Henry C.	(30)4135
MERRITT, John W.	(9)1448
MERRITT, Melvin J.	(22)3137
MERTENS, Arthur R.	(2)384,386,388,(13)1912,(15)2200,2202,2204
MESS, Charles W.	(2)388,(11)1655,(12)1807,(15)2204
MESSENGER, Marshall E.	(23)3360
MESSINA, Frank A.	(11)1627,1649,1650,1655,(12)1704,1807
MESSING, Gordon M.	(11)1609,(12)1710,1770,1772,1808
METASTAZIO, Arthur P.	(1)82,(2)380,(11)1609,1654,(12)1808,(15)2196
METCALF, Richard	(23)3362
METER, Franziska	(20)2855
METSHARRG, Eduard	(20)2857
METZGER, Donald A.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 255/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
METZGER, Eleanor	(20)2856
METZLER, George	(12)1808
MEULLEN (fnu)	(14)2067
MEURER, August	(16)2251
MEURIN, Erwin E.	(12)1808
MEURLOTT, Byron M.	(1)104,(22)3144,3172,(30)4008,4009,4135,4139
MEYER, Andre O.	(2)387,(15)2203
MEYER, Anton F.	(2)375,(15)2190
MEYER, Dyke F.	(10)1515
MEYER, Fred A.	(2)381,(15)2197
MEYER, Joseph G.	(2)389,(15)2206
MEYER, M.M.	(1)20
MEYER, Rolf Benjamin	(18)2471
MEYERHOFF, Fred R.	(2)392,(15)2210
MEYERS, Charles F.	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
MEYERS, Charles W.	(25)3583
MEYERS, Harry F.	(2)278

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 272/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MEYERS, Howard	(23)3365
MEYERS, Lawrence A.	(11)1609,1655,(13)1924,(14)2071
MEYERS, Vera	(8)1195-1197
MEYERSBERG, Charles H.	(2)386,(15)2203
MEYTER, Charles F.	(10)1473
MICHAELIS, Leon A.	(8)1325
MICHAELSON, Eliot D.	(22)3172
MICHEL (fnu)	(15)2197
MICHELMANN, Oswald C.	(2)391,(5)891,(7)1142,(13)1933,(14)2100,(15)2208
MICHELSON, George J.	(23)3355
MICHOD, Charles L.	(23)3358
MICKEY, Carrol M.	(2)387,(12)1808,(15)2204
MIDDLETON, Alexander M.	(9)1448
MIDDLETON, William L.	(12)1808
MIDIANKO, Frank H. Jr	(30)4130
MIGNOLA, Joseph Jr	(23)3362
MIHAN, Donald E.	(2)383,391,(13)1930,(15)2199,2208

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 289/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MIKAITIS, Daniel W.	(23)3361
MIKOL, Edward G.	(23)3362
MIKSIS, Joseph D.	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(15)2202,2205
MILES, Sherman G.	(1)146,(2)206,(4)527,615,616,618,620,622,624,627, 648,649,658,659,663,667,668,(5)712,731,(6)937, (8)1168,(9)1359,(10)1512
MILETTE, Giovanni	(16)2322
MILLARD, Gerald	(23)3366
MILLER, Albert B.	(1)82,98,(2)374,(5)916,930,(7)1079,1107,(13)1917, (14)2076,(15)2189
MILLER, Arnold R.	(8)1276
MILLER, Charles C.	(30)4137
MILLER, Dwight P.	(1)82,(10)1465,1466,1472
MILLER, Edgar R.	(1)82,(2)378,(5)909,(13)1920,(15)2193
MILLER, George J.	(2)393,(5)911,(15)2210
MILLER, George W.	(23)3358
MILLER, Gilbert	(3)445

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 306/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MILLER, James W.	(9)1448
MILLER, John H.	(23)3356
MILLER, John O.	(8)1275
MILLER, Otto	(20)2795
MILLER, Purviance	(2)393,(15)2210
MILLER, Robert C.	(2)373,377,(13)1916,(15)2188,(22)3172
MILLER, William F.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
MILLIGAN, John	(8)1276
MILLMAN, Leonard	(2)390,(5)918,(13)1930,(14)2100,(15)2208
MILLS, Clemmer B.	(9)1447
MILLS, Jack W.	(1)82,(2)380,(12)1808,(15)2196
MILLS, Ogden	(4)526,535
MILNER, Keith A.	(23)3362
MILNER, Robert S.	(2)376,(15)2191
MILOVANOVITCH, George	(12)1808
MIN (Korean Queen)	(30)4092
MINA, Moises O.	(23)3366

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 323/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MINEGAWA, Sanroku	(28)3886,3887
MINEO, Horace M.	(1)106
MINER, Horace Mitchell	(1)82,103,(2)383,(11)1576-1580,1582-1584,1588-1590, 1607,1621,1627,1631,1636,1637,1640,1643-1646,1651, 1655,1672,(13)1814,1925,(14)2027,(15)2120,2199, (16)2296,(18)2506
MINERVA, Gianpiero	(12)1780
MINET, Edward E.	(23)3363
MINGRONE, Jimmie B.	(10)1472,1473
MINNIHAN, Ira S.	(30)4132
MINOR, Robert	(4)533-535
MIRITELLA, Frank J.	(12)1808
MISENER, Robert J.	(30)4137
MISKOLIN, Mike	(8)1275
MISONOW, Jack	(2)378,(15)2193
MISURACO, Joseph V.	(2)376,(15)2191
MITCHELL, Allen R.	(2)374,393,(13)1918,(15)2189,2211,(16)2266,2267

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 340/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MITCHELL, Charles M.	(2)383,(15)2199
MITCHELL, Charles R.	(25)3583
MITCHELL, D.K.	(1)47
MITCHELL, E.R.	(5)913,(24)3386,3413
MITCHELL, Joseph M.	(2)388,(11)1610,1614,1626,1655,(12)1808,(15)2204
MITZELL, Raymond C.	(2)394,(15)2212
MIYAGASHIMA, Teruo	(1)141,(28)3877
MOCCIA, Albert L.	(10)1498
MOCK, W.T.	(5)921
MOCKLER-FERRYMEN, E.E.	(11)1555,1564,1594,1607
MODDEMEYER, William O.Jr	(1)114,(23)3364
MODEL, Walter	(20)2801,2802,2820
MODESTE, Francois	(15)2116
MOFFAT, Henry C.	(8)1276
MOHAMET (Dr.)	(23)3259
MOHAMMED, Ali	(22)3041,3137
MOHN, Leon	(1)82,(23)3355

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHM ‖Rec: 357/541 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MOHR, Henry A.	(1)97
MOLE, Harry H.	(2#)3414,3415,3460
MOLES, Dale V.	(22)3172
MOLINA, Orlando A.	(30)4011,4051,4075,4135,4139
MOLINET, Fausto E.Sr	(1)82,(2)375,(12)1808,(15)2190,(17)2357,(18)2525, (20)2856,2859,2864,(26)3663,(30)4119,4123
MOLLOY, Edwin T.	(2)390,(15)2207
MOMANI, Lindo D.	(25)3583
MOMII, Tom T.	(1)108
MOMINNI, Gino J.	(12)1731
MONASCH, Walter J.	(2)393,(15)2211
MONDELLI, Joseph A.	(2)377,(15)2193,(18)2492
MONFERRATO, Albert C.	(2)386,388,(13)1912,(14)2062,2066,2083,2102,2103, (15)2202,2205,(25)3583
MONROE, Richard S.	(23)3364
MONSON, Paul J.	(2)374,392,(13)1918,(15)2189,2210
MONTALVO, Jose	(9)1394,1395

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MONTCHAMP, H.	(22)3180
MONTENEGRO, Daniel W.	(2)394,(15)2212,(26)3693
MONTESINOS, S.M.	(9)1383,1384,1430,1431
MONTEZ, Lucia	(2)298
MONTGOMERY, Bernard L.	(10)1487,(11)1584,1623,1643,(12)1702,(13)1848, (16)2220,2231,2233,(18)2463
MONTGOMERY, Charles O.	(2)393,(13)1920,(15)2210
MONTGOMERY, Fleet J.	(23)3358
MONTGOMERY, Ralph W.	(23)3222
MONTIETH, Paul L.	(22)3172
MOONEY, H.T.	(5)925
MOONEY, John T.	(12)1808
MOORE, Cecil I.	(22)3172
MOORE, Clyde H.	(9)1434,1447
MOORE, George A.	(10)1473
MOORE, James M.	(2)391,393,(13)1933,(15)2209,2210,(30)4135
MOORE, Lowell G.	(1)82

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MOORE, Paul F.	(9)1448
MOORE, Richard W.	(9)1405,1447
MOORE, Thomas E.	(23)3364
MOORE, William J.	(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476,2477
MORACE, John J.	(2)378,(15)2193
MORALES, Adolfo	(9)1404,1405,1447
MORALES, Herbert	(25)3583
MORAN (Capt)	(1)146,(2)350
MORAN, Fenton	(2)381,383,386,(13)1925,(15)2197,2199,2202,(19)2677 2679
MORDEN, Max B.	(2)394,(15)2211
MOREL, Edward L.	(2)392,(15)2210
MORENA, Geno	(1)82,(12)1808,(25)3583
MORENO	(3)413
MORENO, Jose	(9)1447
MORENO, Jose R.	(9)1448
MORENO, Miguel	(23)3331

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MORGAN, Charles R.	(1)82,(2)373,(15)2189
MORGAN, Francis E.	(25)3583
MORGAN, Frederick E.	(13)1850
MORGAN, Walter T.	(22)3137
MORGAN, William H.	(8)1276
MORIARTY, James F.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
MORIARTY, Richard P.	(30)4133
MORIN, Ralph J.	(22)3182,3213
MORISON, Absalom K.	(2)393,(15)2210
MORITZ, Bernard	(9)1447
MORLEDGE, John W.	(23)3364
MORMILE, James F.	(12)1808
MOROZAVA, Eugenie	(29)3967
MOROZAVA, Mariana	(29)3967
MORRIS, George W.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2136,2188
MORRIS, James R. Jr	(23)3240
MORRIS, Newbold	(4)533

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MORRIS, Owen M.	(23)3364
MORRISON, Douglas J.	(1)82,(12)1808
MORRISON, Henderson W.Jr	(23)3364
MORRISON, William A.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
MORRISON, William S.	(23)3360
MORRISSEY, George J.	(2)394,(15)2212
MORRISSEY, John J.	(5)906,(9)1390-1392,1448
MORRISSEY, William F.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
MORSE. Alfred W.	(22)3172
MORSE, William R.	(23)3270,3271
MORTENS, Arthur	(13)1986
MORTIMER, Charles G.	(1)47
MORTON, Maurice M.	(1)82,100,(5)915,(12)1738,1808
MORTON, William M.Jr	(1)83,(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
MORUZA, Tito G.	(2)386,(15)2202
MORZE, Gabriel G.	(12)1808
MOSELEY, Frank A.	(1)83,(2)387,393,(15)2204,2211

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MOSELEY, George T.	(1)83,(2)384,(11)1643,1644,1649,1655,(12)1704,1808, (15)2101,(17)2351,2355
MOSES, Albert R.	(30)4012,4131,4140
MOSES, Henry A.	(23)3355
MOSHER, Frederick C.	(9)1448
MOSS, Dalton	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
MOSS, Frank H.	(9)1448
MOSS, J.A.	(4)591
MOSS, Julius O.	(23)3364
MOSTECAK, John	(2)388,390,(13)1912,(15)2204,2207
MOTELL, Curt	(2)377,(15)2192
MOTLEY, Herman H. Jr	(23)3361
MOTRONI, Ralph J.	(2)379,(15)2195
MOTT, William	(2)390,(15)2207
MOTTICE, Earl	(22)3127-3130
MOUNTBATTEN, Louis	(22)3042
MOUNTFORD, Horatio C.	(8)1276

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MOUNTJOY, Pearl B.	(8)1235,1274,1279
MOWER, Harold	(2)387,(15)2203
MOWREY, Elmous N.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
MOYER, Lawson A.	(22)3078,3137
MUCHOV (Russian Major)	(25)3536
MUDD, Robert C.	(25)3583
MUELLER, Ernst J.	(2)389,(15)2206
MUELLER, Robert	(2)374,(15)2189
MUHAR, Andrew V.Jr	(1)96
MUHLEMAN, Harry N.	(2)390,(10)1472,(13)1928,(15)2207
MUIR, Tom L.	(5)902
MULCHRONE, David F.	(2)393,(13)1939,(15)2210
MULDOON, John E.	(22)3137
MULHAUSER, John F.	(2)394,(15)2212
MULKEEN, William J.G.	(2)387,388,(13)1914,(15)2126,2137,2203,2205
MULLIGAN, Regan F.	(23)3360
MULLIN, Roger W. Jr	(23)3358

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MUMM, Harry G.	(9)1408,1447
MUNDER, George	(9)1350,1355
MUNGOVAN, Maurice	(22)3172
MUNGUIA, Oscar A.	(2)392,(9)1447,(15)2210
MUNN, C.F.	(29)3991,3994
MUNN, Howard A.	(3)432
MUNOZ, Anthony	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
MUNRO, Alexander J.	(22)3070,3071,3120,3137
MUNSON, Boardman	(2)389,(15)2206
MURCHISON, Cameron	(10)1472
MURDOCH, George W.	(25)3583
MURGIA, Joseph	(2)384,386,(13)1927,1986,(15)2200,2202
MURPHY (fnu)	(3)471
MURPHY, Edwin A.	(23)3362
MURPHY, Elmer F.Jr.	(8)1275
MURPHY, Francis J.	(1)83,(2)386,388,(13)1914,(15)2202,2205,(23)3359
MURPHY, Francis M.	(22)3168,3172

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MURPHY, G.M.P.	(2)181
MURPHY, Harold G.	(1)52,(11)1557,1559,1570,1576,1580
MURPHY, Harry J.	(12)1783,1808
MURPHY, John	(1)102,(8)1309,1311,1315,1319-1322,1326
MURPHY, John E.	(23)3363
MURPHY, John J.	(22)3172
MURPHY, M.P.	(5)902
MURPHY, Mike	(23)3341
MURPHY, Peter C.	(8)1276
MURPHY, Robert	(11)1563,(27)3700
MURPHY, Robert E.	(2)374,394,(13)1920,(15)2189,2211
MURPHY, Thomas I.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
MURPHY, Vincent L.	(1)83,(12)1808
MURRAY, Donald A.	(22)3213
MURRAY, James F.	(22)3048,3060,3137
MURRAY, James S.	(5)903,(8)1274
MURRAY, John J.	(23)3356

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
MURRAY, John R.	(23)3356
MURRAY, John W.	(23)3363
MURRAY, Thomas A.	(30)4092
MURRAY, W.B.	(5)896
MURRAY, William R.	(1)106,(2)377,391,(13)1933,(15)2193,2209
MURRAY, Winslow H.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
MUSCOLINA, Frank A.	(23)3355
MUSCULUS (fnu)	(18)2563
MUSENGO, Ralph J.	(12)1808
MUSHEN, Robert L.	(10)1517,1518,1520
MUSICK, Joseph W.	(1)97,(2)373,386,(5)904,(13)1917,(14)2028,(15)2188, 2202
MUSICK, Milton	(1)83,(22)3063,3067,3075,3121,3137
MUSSMAN, Albert P.	(12)1808
MUSSMAN, Victor G.	(9)1356
MUSSOLINI, Anna Maria	(12)1801
MUSSOLINI, Benito	(11)1646,1652,(12)1707,1709,1752,1760,1771,1799-1803,

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NAME	REFERENCE
	(18)2449
MUSSOLINI, Romano	(12)1801
MUSUMECI, Joseph	(12)1721,1722
MUSZYNSKI, Anthony J.	(25)3583
MYER, John D.	(1)83,(23)3358
MYERS, Elmer C.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
MYERS, Helen	(30)4055,4124
MYERS, James X.	(8)1276
MYERS, Lawrence A.	(2)382,388,(15)2198,2204
MYERS, Melvin D.	(30)4135
MYERS, William T.	(8)1276
MYHAN, William P.	(23)3365
MYLES, John G.	(1)20
MYLES, Thomas F.	(23)3363

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McADAM, Richard G.	(8)1275
McADOO, William G.	(3)402
McALEER, Frank H.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1931,(15)2208
McARDLE, Paul J.	(22)3041,3044,3067,3069
McAULIFFE, Fred	(1)96
McAULIFFE, J.F.	(1)135
McBEE, John	(2)374,386,(13)1917,(15)2189,2202
McBRIDE, George B.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
McBURNEY, Clark M.	(2)389,(15)2206
McBURNEY, William H.	(1)80,(2)383,(15)2199
McCABE, E.R.Warner	(1)146,(2)203,(4)608,609,615
McCABE, Harold E.	(2)379,(15)2195
McCABE, James V.	(23)3361
McCABE, Thomas R.	(12)1807
McCAFFERTY, John T.	(5)918,(10)1487,1497-1502,1507
McCAFFREY, Albert J.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
McCAIN, W.A.	(4)675

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McCALL, James W.	(1)109
McCANDLESS, Paul D.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
McCANN, Bernard T.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
McCANN, John C.	(23)3361
McCANN, Karl P.	(27)3773
McCARTHY, Claire F.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
McCARTHY, David H.	(23)3362
McCARTHY, Donnell B.	(2)380,394,(13)1922,(15)2196,2212
McCARTHY, Edward J.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2201,(18)2454
McCARTHY, F.H.	(5)906
McCARTHY, Joseph P.	(22)3058
McCARTHY, Robert J.	(23)3359
McCARTY, Kenneth T.	(2)392,(5)907,(9)1448,(14)2100,(15)2210
McCASKILL, Elmer A. Jr	(8)1234,1275,1279
McCAULEY, William H.	(23)3363
McCLELLAN, George	(1)39,146,(2)176
McCLENAHAN, Henry I.	(5)905,(8)1274

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McCLERNAND, E.J.	(2)183
McCLIVE, Robert D.	(2)387,(12)1807,(15)2204
McCLOSKEY, John D.	(23)3359
McCLOSKEY, Manus	(4)548,549,563
McCLOY, John J.	(2)206,(4)619
McCLURE, Billie K.	(22)3214
McCLURE, Donald V.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
McCOLL, James W.	(5)924,(23)3276,3292,3363
McCONNELL, James C.	(9)1374
McCONNELL, Wilmer R.	(23)3362
McCONVILLE, J.V.	(4)562
McCORMACK, C.C.	(5)696
McCORMACK, John G.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
McCORMICK (Capt.)	(19)2619
McCORMICK, Anne	(22)3096
McCORMICK, Edgar T.	(2)392,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
McCORMICK, Francis X.	(2)387,(12)1807,(15)2204

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McCOURT, James E.	(1)80,(23)3365
McCOY, Charles L.	(9)1356,1448
McCOY, John A.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
McCOY, Raymond E.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
McCOY, Scott D.	(1)80,(2)385,389,(11)1655,(12)1807,(15)2201,2206
McCRARY, Walter L.	(23)3365
McCREERY, Richard L.	(12)1793
McCUTCHEON, James B.	(30)4132
McDERMOTT, Joseph R.	(23)3355
McDERMOTT, Richard G.	(9)1447
McDEVITT, Frank D.	(23)3366
McDONALD, George H.	(1)80,(2)376,(15)2191,(18)2557
McDONALD, Herbert P.	(8)1196
McDONALD, John D.	(25)3497,3504,3508
McDONALD, Monroe E.	(12)1807
McDONNELL, John R.	(22)3076,3120,3137
McDONOUGH, John G.	(11)1595,1609,1612,1614,(12)1731,1800,1802,1807

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McDONOUGH, Joseph T.	(2)392,(13)1933,(15)2209
McDOUGALL, K.E.	(25)3541
McDUFF, Alvie L.	(1)80,(2)306,384,(5)913,(12)1807,(15)2201,(20)2835
McELLIGOTT, John F.	(22)3078,3137
McELWREATH, William J.	(8)1276
McGARR, Ian L.	(22)3172
McGARRAGHY, F.I.	(8)1170,1173,1180
McGARRAUGH, Eston A.	(23)3355
McGEE, Harold	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
McGEE, Leo C.	(1)80,(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
McGEOCH, Charles H.	(1)97,(2)373,(15)2188
McGETTIGAN, Edward W.	(1)80,(12)1807,(25)3555,3583
McGILLICUDDY, Daniel F.	(1)109,(5)924,(23)3334,3365
McGOUGH, William P.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
McGOVERN, Harold T.	(1)80,(22)3076,3121,3137
McGOWAN, James P.	(23)3361
McGRAIL, Myles F.	(2)372,386,(13)1915,(15)2187,2202

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McGRANE, Henry M.	(1)81,(2)374,(15)2189
McGRATH, Donald J.	(13)1939
McGRATH, Edward J.	(23)3365
McGRATH, James H.	(23)3355
McGRAW, Edward F.	(23)3356
McGUIRE, Charles J.	(22)3172
McGUIRE, James L.	(11)1654,(12)1807
McGUIRE, Martin E.	(1)81,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2028-2030,2039,2070, (15)2194,(16)2231-2235,(20)2877
McGUIRE, Peter J.	(8)1276
McGUIRE, William F.	(2)394,(15)2212
McINERNEY (fnu)	(2)384,(15)2200
McINERNEY, Maurice F.	(1)81,(2)385,(5)898,(13)1927,(15)2201
McINTOSH, Ashleigh D.	(2)387,393,(11)1610,(12)1807,(15)2204,2211
McINTOSH, C.	(11)1609
McINTOSH, James David	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1928,(15)2207
McINTOSH, James T.	(8)1305

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McINTYRE, Frank	(3)486
McINTYRE, James W.	(2)379,390,(13)1929,(15)2195,2208
McISAAC, Neil K.	(23)3361
McKAY, Morris N.	(1)81
McKAY, Robert L.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
McKEAN, John B.	(1)106
McKEE, Claude M.	(2)380,394,(12)1807,(15)2196,2211
McKEE, Floyd E.	(1)81,(12)1797,1807
McKEE, Howard A.	(2)383,(15)2199
McKEE, James B.	(23)3359
McKEE, Robert L.	(22)3172
McKEE, William C.	(22)3172
McKENNA, James A.	(23)3359
McKENNA, John P.	(1)81,96,110,(2)372,386,388,(5)904,929,(13)1913, (14)2076,(15)2188,2202,2205
McKENNAN, Bradley	(1)81,(2)379,(5)916,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2194
McKEOGH, Francis M.	(2)382,386,(13)1923,(15)2198,2202

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McKEOWN, John F.	(12)1807
McKEOWN, Robert J.	(23)3363
McKILLOP, Archibald C.	(22)3172,(30)4137
McKINLEY, Ambrose A.	(2)387,(15)2203
McKINNEY, James H.	(22)3172
McKINNON, W.W.	(4)526
McLAUGHLIN, Edward F.	(23)3358
McLAUGHLIN, John J.Jr	(9)1355
McLAUGHLIN, Robert V.	(2)389,(15)2206
McLAUGHLIN, Thomas D.	(2)372,(5)915,930,(13)1915,(15)2187,(19)2652
McLENNAN, D.G.	(24)3393
McLEOD, Amos T.	(10)1473
McLEOD, Robert J.	(8)1230,1232,1233,1274,1279
McLEOD, William J.	(23)3363
McLEROY, Thomas P.	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199
McMAHAN, Maurice F.	(22)3072,3137
McMAHON, William S.	(8)1325

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHMC ‖Rec: 136/173 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McMANAMAN, James T.	(22)3172
McMANUS, Alfred B.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
McMANUS, Neil C.	(2)374,386,(13)1917,(15)2189,2202
McMILLAN, Clarence O.	(9)1447
McMILLAN, James L.	(22)3172
McMILLEN, Thomas R.	(1)99,(2)377,(5)914,(15)2110,2192,(16)2311,(18)2491,(19)2660
McMINN, Robert S.	(23)3358
McMULLEN, William E.	(8)1275
McMURRAY, Jonathan H.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
McNALLY, Robert W.	(23)3359
McNAMARA, James G.	(22)3073,3074,3137
McNAMEE, Delbert E.	(9)1356
McNARNEY, Joseph T.	(1)146,(2)282,341,343,(5)747,(7)1088,1167,(27)3700,3701
McNEE, Wesley D. Jr	(23)3360
McNIECE, Harry W.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHMC ‖Rec: 153/173 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McNITT, Andrew R.	(30)4134
McNUTT, Paul V.	(29)3962
McOWEN, William R.	(2)374,(12)1807,(15)2190
McPHERSON, Gordon B.	(26)3662,3663
McQUADE, John C.	(1)97,(2)373,(13)1916,(14)2076,(15)2188
McQUADE, John S.	(1)81,(5)916
McQUAID, John G.	(23)3355
McQUIGG, William G.	(2)373,394,(13)1916,(15)2188,2211
McQUILLAN, John J.	(23)3361
McRAE, Leonard K.	(1)81,(2)377,(13)1911,(14)2030,(15)2192
McREA, J.H.	(1)146,(2)194
McREE, William	(2)175
McSHERRY, Frank J.	(27)3773
McTIGHE, James D.	(22)3095,3096,3137
McTIGUE, William J.	(30)4021,4025,4027-4030,4032,4048,4052,4055,4056,4064,4071,4080,4112,4122,4131,4139
McVAY, Frederick D.	(23)3366

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHMC ‖Rec: 170/173 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
McVEY, William L.	(1)81,(2)385,(15)2201
McWHIRTER, George W.	(30)4137
McWILLIAMS, Walter E.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,1986,(15)2199,2201

NAME	REFERENCE
NACCARRI, Isadore J.	(3)447
NADEAU, Raymond L.	(8)1276
NADEL, Harold	(1)114,(26)3652
NADIR, Nubar	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1808,(15)2196
NAHAS, Albert G.	(1)83,(2)373,(15)2189
NAKAGAWA, Giro	(30)4130
NAKAZADO, Eichiro	(28)3887
NALLY, Charles M.	(8)1275
NAREL, Andrew	(30)4135
NARGI, Italia	(12)1715
NAST, Walter W.	(1)108
NATASIOS, Nicholas A.	(12)1808
NATHANS, David	(2)377,(15)2193
NAVARRE, George	(16)2332
NAVASQUEZ, Leonardode	(12)1755
NAVER, Emil M.	(23)3356
NAWNG, Sinwa	(22)3081

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 17/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NAYKO, Nicholas	(10)1472
NAYLOR, Ralph V.	(2)392,(15)2210
NAYLOR, William K.	(1)147,(2)193,(4)564,569
NEAGOY, George	(1)83,(2)387,393,(12)1808,(15)2204,2211
NEAL, Edgar E.	(22)3215
NEBEL, Ludwig	(17)2348-2351
NEBO, John C.	(22)3074,3137
NECRU, Roger	(16)2302
NEESON, Vincent C.	(1)147,(2)350,(24)3460
NEFF, Frederick L.	(10)1472
NEHREN, Carl P.	(22)3172,(30)4137
NEHRU, Jawaharlal	(22)3096
NEIBAUER, Edwin P.	(22)3172
NEIMAN, Joseph	(2)379,(15)2194
NELSON, Andrew G.	(9)1448
NELSON, Bennett O.	(30)4133
NELSON, Earl R.	(9)1356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 34/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NELSON, Edward J.	(1)83,(2)376,(15)2192
NELSON, O.L.	(1)147,(2)294,(5)751
NELSON, Perry A.	(23)3366
NELSON, Richard M.	(10)1472
NELSON, Richard O.	(30)4132
NELSON, Robert A.	(8)1277
NELSON, Steve	(4)606
NELSON, Wilmer G.	(12)1808
NEMAC, Maz di Ivan	(25)3573
NEMO, Ralph	(24)3402
NERENBERG, James W.	(23)3358
NERI, John G.	(2)383,(15)2199,(19)2617
NERN, William F. Jr	(23)3358
NESMITH, Albert N.	(2)372,(12)1808,(15)2187
NESTER, Raymond J.	(2)387,(15)2203
NEUENSCHWANDER, Lynn E.	(2)374,(13)1918,(14)2068,2091,(15)2189,(16)2267, (20)2767

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 51/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NEUMAN, A.F.	(5)921,931
NEUSS, Henry	(2)372,(15)2187
NEVERICK, Alfred A.	(8)1275
NEVILLE, Francis M.	(2)394,(15)2212
NEVILLE, Stephen J.Jr	(2)376,381,(13)1922,(14)2045,(15)2191,2197
NEVIUS, Blake R.	(2)374,392,(13)1918,(15)2189,2210
NEWBERGER, S.	(5)895
NEWBOLD, David E.	(2)52
NEWCOMER, Lewis W.	(22)3213
NEWHOUSE, Joseph F.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
NEWIRTH, Samuel A.	(2)393,(15)2210
NEWLAND, Leroy T. Jr	(22)3041,3048,3072,3080,3082,3086,3088,3089,3137
NEWMAN, Frank A.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
NEWMAN, Frederick C. Jr	(22)3172
NEWMAN, Paul J.	(12)1808
NEWSTATTER (fnu)	(15)2197
NEWSTETTER, Wilber I.	(2)375,(15)2191

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 68/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NOAH, Mason B.	(25)3583
NOBLE, M.C.	(1)147,(2)329,350,(24)3383,3404,3405,3430,3431
NOCE, Daniel	(2)317
NOCE, Hannibal S.	(12)1808
NOCKELS, Paul F.	(22)3172
NOEL, Robert O.	(8)1276
NOELL, Robert M.	(23)3369
NOGUES (~~French General~~)	(11)1615 Auguste Paul
NOKES, Thomas J.	(1)107,(5)924,(10)1479-1483,1486,1487,1493,1495,1496, 1505,1506
NOLAN, Dennis E.	(1)147,(2)191,196,199,202,(3)402,403,405-407,514, (4)525,532,543,544,546,555,556,567,568,598
NOLAN, Harold D.	(22)3172
NOLAN, James E.	(8)1234,1275,1279
NOLAN, James J. Jr	(11)1609
NOLAN, Richard H.	(8)1275
NOLAN, Walter H.	(8)1276

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 119/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NOLIN, Jules A.	(2)395,(11)1557,(13)1937,(15)2213
NOO, Lucien	(8)1193
NOONAN, Edward J.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
NORBERG (Major)	(28)3870
NORRICK, Gordon D.	(30)4132
NORTHROP, Richard M.	(2)373,(11)1654,(13)1917,(15)2188
NORTHRUP, John R.	(3)427
NORTON, Arthur H.W.	(1)83,(2)389,(15)2207
NORTON, John H.	(1)52,(23)3358,(28)3839
NORVELL, George E.	(22)3137
NORVISH, Franklin	(1)83,(2)381,(13)1922,(15)2143,2197
NOTARO, Frank R.	(23)3359
NOTOPOULOS, Alexander A.	(2)379,(13)1911,(15)2194,(16)2233
NOVAK, George J.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188,(20)2806-2808
NOVIKOV, Yuri	(25)3539
NOWLAN, Donald L.	(2)375,(15)2190
NOWLAN, John	(22)3041,3045,3062,3079,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 136/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NEWTON, Arthur J.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188,(19)2654
NEWTON, Henry	(24)3383
NEWVILLE, Donald F.	(23)3362
NICHELS, Gene A.	(8)1276
NICHOLAS, Thomas A.	(23)3358
NICHOLAS, Woodrow T.	(23)3359
NICHOLS, Charles	(22)3200
NICHOLS, Earl B.	(11)1665,1667,1685,1686,(12)1724,1726,1730
NICHOLS, Harry C.	(23)3365
NICHOLS, Paul R.	(23)3363
NICHOLS, Richard H.	(2)392,(5)903,(13)1938,(15)2210
NICHOLSON, Carl H.	(12)1808,(25)3497,3498
NICHOLSON, Jesse W.	(10)1473
NICKELL, Stanley L.	(9)1355
NICKSON, Albert N.	(2)387,(12)1808,(15)2204
NICOLAI, Wilhelm	(3)432,454,466,515
NIDOSITKO, Michael	(30)4127,4135

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 85/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NIELSEM; Paul H.	(2)387,(15)2203
NIELSEN, Leo J.	(5)920,(23)3237
NIELSON, Earl A.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208,(16)2331
NIEMI, Raymond	(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196
NIERI, Aldo	(12)1773
NIKLAS, Robert J.	(2)377,(15)2193
NIKOLAI (fnu)	(22)3192
NILAN, William F.	(2)391,(15)2209
NIMITZ, Chester W.	(22)3151,3159,(23)3291
NIMOVITZ, Morris	(2)374,(15)2190
NISHIHARU (Japanese Col.)	(23)3228
NISHIMURA, Toshio	(23)3371
NISSEN, Clyde T.	(1)83,(10)1473
NITTI, Joseph A.	(12)1808
NIX, E.J.Jr	(5)904,929
NIXON, George E.	(22)3079
NIXON, Julian H.	(22)3072,3086,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 102/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
OAKES, Benjamin F.	(2)393,(15)2210
OAKES, John C.	(23)3365,(28)3850
OATES, Peter F.	(8)1276,1305
OBATA, Benjamin T.	(1)127,(28)3876
OBERG (fnu) von	(2)313
OBERLE, Norman W.	(2)384,385,(13)1928,(15)2200,2202
OBERLIN, Jerry V.	(2)395
OBERT, Norbert B.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
O'BRIEN, Bernard J.	(25)3583
O'BRIEN, Charles H.	(8)1275
O'BRIEN, Edward M.	(23)3357
O'BRIEN, George M.	(23)3362
O'BRIEN, James A.	(8)1277
O'BRIEN, James F.	(1)84
O'BRIEN, John J.	(12)1808,(30)4119
O'BRIEN, Philip A.	(2)385,394,(11)1609,(12)1808,(15)2167,2201,2211, (17)2349,2351

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 17/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
O'BRIEN, Thomas M.	(2)386,(13)1927,(15)2202
O'BRIEN, William J.	(22)3213
OBRIGHT, William J.	(2)393,(15)2210
OBSENCIA, Peter	(22)3172
OBUHANICH, Nicholas	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
OCHOA, Pedro G.	(2)443
O'CONNELL, Charles W.	(2)387,(12)1808,(15)2204
O'CONNELL, Daniel J.	(23)3363
O'CONNELL, John J.Jr	(5)904,929,(8)1275
O'CONNELL, Thomas J.	(9)1356
O'CONNER, Herbert W.	(2)392,(15)2209
O'CONNOR, Azades	(10)1473
O'CONNOR, Herbert J.	(10)1520
O'CONNOR, Rhea T.	(2)380,(12)1808,(15)2196
O'DONNELL, John B.	(2)377,(15)2193
O'DONNELL, Joseph H.	(22)3172
ODONOCINI, Edvige Pia	(25)3577

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 34/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
NOYES, G.M.	(5)898
NUGENT, D.R.	(28)3933
NUGENT, John H.III	(1)83,(23)3355
NULSEN, Charles K.	(4)603
NUNEZ, Peter	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
NUNN, William A.	(28)3860
NUSINOW, Jack	(2)393,(13)1920,(15)2211
NYE (fnu)	(7)1106
NYE, Harry F.	(23)3355
NYSTEDT (fnu)	(29)3968-3971

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHN ‖Rec: 146/146 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ODRIOZOLA, Arlos A.	(1)52
O'GARA, James A.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
O'GARA, John L.	(8)1275
OGATA, Warren S.	(22)3172
OGG, Lyman	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
OGGS, James R. Jr	(30)4137
OGNANOVICH, John	(2)375,(15)2190
O'GRADY, James M.	(2)390,(15)2207
O'GRADY, William J.	(23)3365
O'HARA, William P.	(2)395,(13)1932,(15)2213
O'HEARN, William G.	(23)3360
OHLIN, Lloyd E.	(2)383,(15)2199
OHMAN (Major)	(28)3870
OLAND, Harold J.	(8)1276
OLBES, M.Z.	(23)3362
OLDEMAN, Howard D.	(2)394,(15)2212
O'LEARY, John J.	(22)3172

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 51/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
O'LEARY, Leo W.	(25)3553,3555,3566
OLIFF, Hershall	(8)1275
OLIVAS, Sabino III	(30)4133
OLIVER, Alfred R.	(2)385,386,(13)1928,(15)2202,(20)2893
OLIVER, Paul E.	(2)384,386,(9)1356,(15)2200,2202
OLIVER, Robert T.	(30)4093
OLMSTEAD, Edward P.	(10)1472
OLOANS, John M.	(23)3360
OLSEN, Erling C.	(1)52,(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
OLSEN, Holden W.	(2)380,(13)1922,(15)2196
OLSEN, James M.	(1)84,(2)376,(15)2191,(19)2659,(26)3687,3692
OLSON, Donald A.	(13)1920
OLSON, Edwin G.	(8)1275
OLTEAN, Charles Jr	(12)1808
O'MAHONEY, F.B.	(8)1180
O'MALLEY, Joseph M.	(8)1276
OMODT, Hollis W.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 68/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ON, Lewis O.	(23)3362
O'NEAL, Carl F.	(1)84,(2)377,(15)2192
O'NEAL, Melvin M.	(13)1920
O'NEAL, Thomas G.	(5)683
O'NEIL, Cornelius B.	(8)1277
O'NEIL, James F.	(1)84,(2)376,388,(15)2191,2205
O'NEILL, Francis S.	(22)3060,3137
O'NEILL, James P.	(2)377,393,(13)1911,(15)2192,2211
O'NEILL, John T.	(2)394,(15)2212
O'NEILL, Harvey J.	(1)84,(2)387,393,(12)1808,(15)2204,2211
O'NEILL, Robert E.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
O'NEILL, T.P.	(28)3925
O'NEILL, Timothy J.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2202
OPP, Raymond H.	(2)389,(15)2206
OPPENHEIM, E.Phillips	(27)3749
OPPENHEIMER, J.Robert	(8)1252,1263
OPPENHOFF (fnu)	(16)2241

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 85/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ORAVEC, Frank T.	(30)4137
O'REAR, Cecil G. Jr	(23)3357
O'REILLY, Michael J.	(22)3172
ORLOV (Russian Capt.)	(25)3535
O'ROURKE, Michael J.	(1)110
ORTEGA, Fernando B.	(23)3362
ORTH, Charles E.Jr	(5)897,(9)1390,1392
ORTMAN, Erik J.	(2)387,(15)2203
ORTNER, John H.	(22)3172
OSBORNE, Harry K.	(12)1808
OSBORNE, Walter D.	(1)84,100,(2)378,(5)916,(9)1448,(13)1920,(14)2028, 2055,(15)2193,(16)2308
OSENBAUGHT, Watson P.	(11)1557,(12)1808
OSENBERG, Werner	(8)1300,1301
O'SHAUGHNESSY, William D.	(23)3358
OSHIMA, Teruo	(22)3172
OSMAN, Robert	(4)582,583

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 102/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
OSMENA, Sergio	(23)3294,(29)3961
OSMUN, R.A.	(1)147,(2)296,(8)1294
OSTERMAN, Victor C.	(2)377,387,(13)1911,(15)2192,2203
OSWALD, William B.	(2)374,386,390,(13)1918,(15)2189,2202,2207
O'TOOLE, Joseph V.	(2)379,(15)2195
OTT, Andrew D.	(2)389,(15)2206
OTT, Eugen	(28)3827
OTTO, Henry S.	(2)432
OUELETTE, Oric D.	(23)3363
OVAKIMIAN, Gaik	(4)605
OVERHOLSER, John D.	(2)389,(15)2206
OWEN, Claude M.	(23)3366
OWENS, Clarence E.	(1)52,(25)3583
OWENS, Kermit P.	(22)3172
OWENS, Walter R.	(2)394,(15)2212
OWENS, William A.	(23)3358
OWSLEY, Charles H.	(2)395,(5)921,(8)1191,(11)1557,(13)1935,(15)2213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 119/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
OYLER, Robert B.	(1)84,(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199,(16)2308

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHO ‖Rec: 120/120 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PACK, Roger A.	(12)1808
PACKER, Olan J.	(1)110
PACKLER, Roy C.	(22)3172
PADILLA, Pedro	(3)421,446,447
PAGE, Merritt G.	(23)3359
PAGE, Proctor Jr	(22)3137
PAGE, Thad	(26)3614
PAGNOTTA, Leo J.	(1)84,(12)1808
PAK, Gerasimovich	(30)4054
PAK, Heun Young	(30)4041,4050,4072,4081,4082,4088
PAK, Kil Yong	(30)4061
PAK, Ro Sun	(30)4042
PALACIO, Lazaro	(23)3372
PALERI, Philip	(3)421
PALMER, Cleddie A.	(23)3365
PALMER, Dorwin L.	(23)3364
PALMER, Hugh J.	(1)84,(2)374,393,(13)1908,(15)2189,2211,(16)2266-2268

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 17/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PALMER, Ralph D.	(2)392,(13)1937,(15)2210
PALOMBO, Thomas R.	(12)1808
PALONE (CIP Agent)	(22)3222
PALOZZI, Gabriel J.	(12)1808
PANARD, Anthony G.	(1)52,84,(2)290,(11)1654,(12)1731,1808
PANELL, Marion R.	(30)4011,4012,4020,4075,4078-4080,4087,4093,4118,4135 4139
PANG, Daniel	(30)4016,4137
PAOLOZZI, Gabriel J.	(12)1715
PAONE, Charles F.	(22)3172
PAONE, Paul	(11)1576,1590
PAPPAS, James Louis	(2)390,(15)2207
PAPPAS, Luke G.	(12)1808
PAPPAS, Thomas	(2)392,(15)2210
PAPURT, Maxwell J.	(1)52,(5)919,(11)1607,(12)1711-1713,1725,1726,1784, 1808
PAQUETTE, Origene J.Jr	(1)84,(2)385,(12)1808,(15)2201,(19)2582

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 34/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PARADISI, Carlo	(12)1763
PARDINI, Ferdinando	(12)1751,1752
PARDO, Pedro J.	(22)3172
PARIS, John	(2)386,(15)2203
PARISEAU, Theodore	(2)390,(10)1473,(13)1928,(15)2207
PARISH, John E.	(2)395,(11)1609,(13)1937,(15)2213
PARISH, John N.	(1)101
PARK, Andrew J.	(2)384,387,(13)1926,(15)2200,2203
PARK, Chauncey C.	(23)3363,(30)4137
PARK, Edwin C.	(2)388,(15)2205
PARK, Harry L.	(2)386,(13)1927,(15)2202
PARK, Woonha	(23)3358
PARKE, Alan L.	(30)4132
PARKER, Frank	(1)147,(2)199
PARKER, Henry C.	(23)3356
PARKER, Jerry J.	(2)373,(15)2188
PARKER, Olan C.Jr	(2)388,389,(5)908,(13)1912,(14)2063,2066,2103,

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 51/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	(15)2205,2206,(16)2245,2246
PARKS, Philip F.	(23)3366
PARKS, L.	(26)3692-3694
PARRA, Francisco	(9)1409,1413,1415,1416,1419
PARSONS, Bernard R.	(2)379,(13)1911,(15)2195
PARSONS, Ernest	(3)486
PARSONS, William B.	(1)147,(2)258,269,(5)894,(6)948,(8)1232,1233,1235, 1274,1279,(11)1550,1551,1553,1564-1567,1569,1570,1574 1608
PARTLOW, Vern	(30)4073
PARTRIDGE, Lloyd S.	(5)703,704
PARTRIDGE, Richard C.	(2)370
PASCAL, Horace E.	(22)3172
PASCUCCI, Dominic A.	(12)1808
PASEK, Henry	(2)393,(15)2210
PASH, Boris T.	(8)1292-1299,1301-1305
PASQUALI, Franca	(25)3550,3552

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 68/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PATCH, Alexander M.	(1)147,(2)306,(17)2337,2353,2355,2360,2375,2376,2379, 2380,(18)2539,(20)2832
PATCHELL, James K.	(30)4011,4014,4075,4130,4139,4186
PATE, William E.	(23)3355
PATRIZI, Marchesa	(12)1712
PATTERSON, Edwin C.	(22)3137
PATTON, George S. Jr	(1)147,(2)202,(4)603,(11)1545,1546,1563,1564,1579-81, 1584,1629,1634,1647,(15)2149,2182,(16)2220,2221, (17)2360,2384,(18)2461,2467,2472,2506
PATTULLO, Ambrose D.	(2)394,(15)2212
PAUL, Alfred	(2)294,(15)2211
PAUL, Willard S.	(24)3388
PAULDING, C.G.	(3)448
PAULEO, Paulette	(20)2818-2821
PAULSEN, Elliot N.	(9)1356
PAULSON, Chester R.	(9)1356
PAULSON, Edgar G.	(25)3583

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 85/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PAVARD (French Major)	(17)2377
PAVONE, Guiseppe	(12)1701
PAWLOSKY, Edward	(2)375,(15)2190
PAWSON, Joseph E.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1808,(15)2196
PEADLE, Edward S.	(2)380,(15)2196
PEARCE, Claude C.	(8)1235
PEARCE, John C.	(1)100,(2)377,382,(15)2192,2198,(19)2600
PEARSON, Drew	(22)3096
PEARSON, Edwin E.	(30)4137
PEARSON, F.J.	(6)944
PEARSON, Walter L.	(23)3353
PECK, David W.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
PECK, W.N.	(2)179
PEDDICORD, Lyle M.	(22)3172
PEDIGO, Walter S.Jr	(1)84,(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
PEDROTTA, Pedro	(12)1761-1764
PEEL, Robert	(23)3363

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 102/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PEEPCKE, Eric	(2)376,(15)2191
PEEPLES, B.S.	(8)1234
PEERS, Robert M.	(2)394,(8)1305,(15)2212
PEGRAM, J.C.	(4)603
PEINE, Gilbert S.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
PEIPER (fnu)	(20)2826
PELL, Joe C.Jr	(1)100,111
PELLEGRINO, Harry M.	(1)84,(25)3583
PELLETIER, Edward C.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
PELO, Richard J.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
PENDER, William E.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
PENDERGAST, John F.	(2)382,(15)2198
PENN, Robert M.	(11)1609,(12)1808
PENNEWELL, Noah A.	(1)85,98,(2)373,(5)901,(15)2145,2189,(18)2486
PENNEY, Charles P.	(22)3121
PENNINK, Karel B.	(23)3359
PENREE, J.C.	(5)915

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 119/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PENTECOST, Hal W.	(2)389,392,(13)1938,1939,(15)2207,2210
PEOPLES, Frederick C.	(22)3137
PEPETZ, Henry	(18)2465
PERALTA, Angel L.	(5)911,(9)1447
PERELLMAN, Charles	(2)392,(15)2210
PERKINS, John W.	(23)3356
PERKO, Kenneth A.	(23)3355
PERNASS, Manfred	(18)2458
PERPER, George A.	(1)85,(2)377,385,(11)1655,(12)1808,(15)2160,2192,2201 (17)2349,2350,2386,(18)2533,(20)2831,(26)3620,3622, 3623
PERRY, Albert L.	(2)377,381,(13)1922,(15)2193,2197
PERRY, Harold O.	(22)3137
PERRY, James F.	(5)746
PERRY, Robert J.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
PERRY, Walter W.	(9)1447
PERSHING, John J.	(1)147,(2)185,186,(3)402,420,421,(4)533,535,555,

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 136/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	623
PERSICO, Thomas M.	(1)85,(22)3121
PETACCI (fnu)	(12)1801
PETAIN, Henri-Philippe	(11)1572,(17)2396,(18)2549,(20)2807
PETERS, Arthur K.	(5)744,899,928,(6)947,953,954,(7)1083-1085,1089-1091, 1094,1097,1098,1110-1118,1120,1121,1123
PETERS, J.	(3)577
PETERS, Jack H.	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(14)2077,(15)2203,2205
PETERS, Paul E.	(9)1447
PETERSON, Aulis A.	(22)3172
PETERSON, Eldon A.	(22)3215,3364
PETERSON, Ernest O.	(2)393,(15)2211
PETERSON, George W.	(23)3366
PETERSON, Henry	(23)3362
PETERSON, John D.	(22)3137
PETERSON, John H.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
PETERSON, Keith M.	(22)3060,3069,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 153/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PETERSON, Ralph J.	(2)392,(13)1920,(15)2210
PETERSON, Virgil L.	(5)746-750,815
PETRIE, Walter E.	(1)119,127,128,131,132
PETRU, Frank L.	(5)897,928,(9)1335,1340-1346,1355
PETTUS, Earle Jr	(1)96,(2)380,(5)921,931,(6)958,(13)1921,(14)2028,2034 (15)2196
PETTY, Estil P.	(23)3356
PETTY, Fern D.	(5)896,928
PETTY, John F.	(1)85,(12)1808
PETZ, Henry	(2)392,(15)2209
PEZZATI, Albert	(2)393,(15)2210
PFEFERBLUM, Max	(2)392,(15)2210
PFEIFFER, John W.	(1)85,(2)389,(15)2207
PFISTER, Arthur E.	(30)4137
PFOTENHAUER, Jay A.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
PHAIR, James A.	(2)384,386,(13)1925,(15)2200,2203
PHANEUF, Bernard G.	(2)375,(15)2190

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 170/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PHELAN, Edward P. Jr	(10)1473
PHIFER, Nelson L.	(1)85,(23)3363
PHILLIPS, Benjamin W.	(1)20
PHILLIPS, Daniel T.	(2)378,(15)2194
PHILLIPS, Dayton E.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
PHILLIPS, Gene K.	(23)3366
PHILLIPS, Jack H.	(8)1276
PHILLIPS, Thomas R.	(9)1412,1413
PHILLIPS, Thomas W.	(23)3362
PHILLIPS, Warren B.	(30)4135
PHOTINOS, Constantinos	(10)1496
PICARD, Lucien L.	(1)108,(2)387,(4)657,(5)920,(11)1609,(12)1713,1723, 1726,1788,1789,1808,(15)2204
PICCA, Umberto	(25)3577,3578
PICCHETTI, Sergio	(12)1761,1762,1764
PICK, Lewis A.	(22)3042
PICK, Theodore	(30)4068,4124

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 187/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PICKETT, Anthony V.	(2)383,(15)2199,(26)3629
PICKETT, Charles A.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
PICKETT, Winston H.	(8)1275
PIEFKE, John B.	(30)4135
PIEKARSKI, Kasimir J.	(10)1472
PIEL, Werner	(20)2802,2803
PIERCE, Edward R.	(12)1808
PIERCE, Ellwood W.	(2)383,386,(13)1924,(15)2199,2203
PIERCE, Gerald J.	(2)394,(15)2211
PIERCE, Ovid W.	(9)1448
PIERCE, Ralph W.	(5)894,(7)1145
PIERCE, Richard A.	(30)4135
PIERLUISI, Guillermo	(9)1409,1410,1413,1414,1416,1417
PIERSON, LeRoy C.	(27)3705,3722,3739-3741,3779,3788,3803
PIETRO (Italian Capt.)	(12)1801
PIETRZOIK, Stanislaw	(16)2316
PIGNATELLI, John C.	(23)3361

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 204/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PIKE, Zebulon	(2)175
PINEDA, Umberto	(30)4137
PINGLEY, Robert L.	(1)85,(12)1721,1808
PINKERTON, Allen	(1)39,147,(2)176,(3)409
PINNEO, Dee W.	(2)390,(15)2207
PINNER, Dee W.	(1)85,111
PINSINCE, Adrian J.Jr	(2)372,386,(13)1914,(15)2157,2187,2202,(18)2483
PINTA, John J.	(25)3583
PIROGOV, Peter	(25)3529
PISAURO, Patrick C.	(30)4127,4135
PISCATOR, Irwin	(8)1207
PISCITELLI, Clement N.	(12)1808
PITTMAN, Herbert C.	(22)3172
PITTMAN, Paul E.	(23)3361
PLANKENHORN, William F.	(2)393,(15)2210
PLATO, Lyle R.	(9)1356
PLATOU, William R.	(8)1276

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 221/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PLATT, John O.	(1)85,(23)3240,3360
PLINATUS, Vladimir	(20)2810
PLOGHOFT, Merl V.	(2)387,(11)1609,(12)1706,1808,(15)2204
POBOSKI, Donald P.	(25)3583
POGLEDICH, Frank Jr	(30)4133
POGUE, Earl G.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1808,(15)2196
POHL, John E.	(1)20
POHLEN, Kurt R.	(3)378,(15)2194
POIGNET, Jean	(18)2552,2553
POIRIER, Philip P.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
POITRAS, Warren E.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
POLCARI, Antonio	(12)1715
POLICARP, Archimandrite	(30)4055,4069
POLK, James W.	(23)3364
POLLACK, Fred	(2)387,(15)2203
POLLACK, Peter I.	(2)389,(15)2206
POLLING, John P.	(8)1277

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 238/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PONGER, Kurt	(25)3539
PONTES, Pedro	(8)1208
PONTI, Frederico	(12)1754
POOLE, Albert E.	(2)386,395,(13)1937,(15)2202,2213
POPPER, Alfred	(2)387,(15)2203
POPPER, Felix A.	(2)376,(15)2192
PORRECA, Albert C.	(2)394,395,(13)1937,(15)2212,2213
PORTER, Lee	(8)1276
PORTER, Marion E.	(1)85,(2)384,(11)1628,1654,(12)1808,(15)2201,(17)2382 (19)2582
PORTER, R.W. Jr	(11)1633,1636,1638,1646,1650,1680
PORTER, Ray E.	(5)702,704
PORTERA, John J.	(25)3583
PORTEUS, John R.	(22)3172
POSNER, Samuel	(2)376,(15)2191
POSPISIL, Frank	(2)373,(15)2188,(18)2494,(19)2623,2723,(20)2894
POST, Harry W.	(1)106

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 255/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
POTRYKUS, Folkert	(27)3733,3771
POTSTADA, Carl	(22)3172
POTTER, David M.	(2)376,(15)2192
POTTER, Fuller	(3)471
POTVIN, Vernon A.	(30)4135
POULIN, Joseph A.L.P.	(2)378,(15)2193
POULIN, Paul J.	(22)3193,3214
POUND, Ezra	(12)1798,1799
POWELL, Francis E.	(1)85,(2)385,(12)1808,(15)2201
POWELL, H.A.	(4)589
POWELL, Irving L.	(1)85,(23)3355
POWELL, Norman R.	(2)389,(15)2206
POWELL, Ward H.	(2)384,394,(13)1925,(15)2200,2212
POWELL, William S.	(23)3364
POWERS (fnu)	(15)2199,(19)2617
POWERS, Daniel M.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2122,2189,(16)2266,2269
POWERS, David F.	(26)3630

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 272/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
POWERS, Eames A.	(9)1361,1363
POWERS, Ralph W.	(1)85,108,(5)921,(11)1594,1607,1686,(12)1767,1784, 1808,(25)3494,3498,3499
POWERS, Thomas J. Jr	(12)1808
POYNTON, Thomas M.	(9)1448
PRADO, Aurelio M.	(9)1367,1368,1374
PRATHER, Richard G.	(1)3,48,(2)173,399,(15)2107,(20)2740 (10):451,(25)3493
PRATT, Orville C.	(22)3173
PRESCOTT, Julian P.	(2)390,(5)913,(13)1930,(14)2100,(15)2208,(16)2631
PRESLEY, Lemuel I.	(30)4135
PRESTON, Nathan R.	(2)383,(5)904,(9)1384-1386,1447,(13)1924,(15)2199
PRESTON, Stuart D.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2201
PRESTWOOD, Clyde L.	(22)3173
PREVITI, Marte	(2)394,(8)1305,(15)2212
PRICE, Byron	(8)1251,(1)39
PRICE, Lindsay E.	(23)3363
PRICE, Marlon J.	(2)394,(15)2212

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 289/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PRICE, Milton H.	(1)108
PRIDGEN, Samuel R.	(23)3366
PRIMAX, Evfimia	(30)4055
PRIMAX, Kondrativitch G.	(30)4055
PRINCI, Eugene M.	(12)1808
PRINCI, Peter W.	(2)380,(11)1627,1655,(12)1808,(15)2196
PRINTZ, Robert G.	(2)383,385,(13)1928,(15)2199,2202
PRISBECK, Stanley J.	(2)393,(15)2211
PRITCHETT, James T.	(22)3173
PROBST, Leo	(16)2278
PROCK, Walter L. Jr	(22)3173
PROCTOR, David G.	(2)383,385,(13)1928,(15)2199,2202
PROCTOR, George P.	(2)384,385,(13)1928,(15)2200,2202
PROCTOR, Redfield	(2)179
PROS, James	(23)3239,3242
PROSSER, Everett	(2)384,386,(13)1926,(15)2200,2203
PROUDFOOT, Harold B.	(2)381,392,(13)1937,(15)2197,2210,(18)2480,(19)2650

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 306/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PROUT, William C.	(23)3355
PROVANCE, Gilson L.	(10)1473
PROVENZANO, John D.	(2)378,(15)2194
PROVOO, John David	(28)3832-3836
PRYM, Axel	(16)2245,2246,2249,2251,2252
PRYM, Hans	(16)2245,2246
PRYOR, William Y.	(22)3173
PUCCIARELLI, Donato D.	(22)3137
PUFAHL, Francis J.	(22)3173
PULEO, Anthony	(22)3173
PULLER, James B.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
PULLMAN, Emmett H.	(22)3173
PUMPELLY, J.W.	(12)1738
PUNZLER, Karl Arno	(18)2495
PUPANEK, Michael R.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1930,(15)2208
PURCELL, Harold A.	(3)421
PURCELL, James B.	(9)1448

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 323/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PURCELL, John K.	(22)3173
PURSELL, H.R.	(5)909
PURYEAR, Robert E.	(5)911,(22)3070,3119,3137
PUTNEY, Walter B.	(2)394,(15)2212
PY, Alfred	(15)2152
PYLE, Ernie	(11)1584,1585

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 329/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RAACK, Walter E.	(2)375,(15)2190
RABENDA, Froninek	(16)2263
RABENOLD, Elwood M.Jr.	(5)906,(9)1447
RACAGNI, Natale	(12)1754,1756,1757
RADABAUGH, Ernest A.	(25)3583
RADELOFF, Walter A.	(23)3355
RADLOFF, William H.	(22)3173
RADOGNA, Vito Antonio	(12)1720,1721
RADOULOVITCH, Vladimir	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
RAE, Nelson S.	(1)52,86,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
RAFAELI, Alexander	(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2504
RAFFELSBERGER, Walter	(25)3544
RAFFERTY, John M.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
RAGAN, Graydon E.	(22)3213
RAGNOR, Ragnor H.	(10)1472
RAGO, Henry A.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
RAGON, Paul H.	(12)1808

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 17/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RAGONETTI, Anthony P.	(1)86,(25)3583
RAGSDALE, Cortis W.	(23)3356
RAINE, Philip	(2)393,(15)2211
RAINE, Sidney	(12)1808
RAINEY, Birt J.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
RAINS, Raymond	(9)1407
RAINWATER, Loye H.Jr.	(10)1472
RAKESTRAW, George F.	(2)379,(15)2195
RAKOW, William J.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1934,(15)2209
RALSTON, David P.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
RALSTON, Robert J.	(2)377,(15)2192
RAMOS, Benigno R.	(23)3368,3370,3371
RAND, Harvey H.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
RANDALL (Col)	(11)1613,1614
RANDALL, Earle S.	(2)387,(15)2203
RANDELL, Robert U.	(30)4135
RANDOLPH (Sgt)	(3)470

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 34/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
QUALTERS, Thomas J.	(1)86,(12)1808,(25)3494
QUARANTA, Francisco S.	(2)393,(15)2210,(20)2861,(26)3659
QUARLES, Edward H.	(27)3718,3723,3733,3750,3752,3755,3762,3781,3786,3801
QUATMAN, Joseph B.	(2)392,(15)2209
QUERY, Leo J.	(2)281,(5)918,(10)1476,1483,1486,1508
QUEZON, Manuel	(23)3319
QUIGG, John	(30)4132
QUINN, Joseph R.	(2)394,(15)2212
QUINN, William W.	(19)2659
QUINTERO, Vincent	(23)3293
QUISENBERRY, Rowland T.	(23)3365
QUON, Wah Foo	(22)3079,3082,3086,3088,3119,3137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHQ ‖Rec: 12/12 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KAAG, Robert L.	(23)3359
KAAR, Joseph W.	(23)3358
KABUS, Siegfried	(27)3761,3762
KADLAC, Joseph H.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187,(19)2684
KADLEC, Walter H.	(8)1276
KAESER, William H. Jr	(23)3362
KAGEYAMA, Bob E.	(30)4130
KAHNER, Gerhard	(28)3826
KAISER, Samuel J.	(2)393,(15)2210
KAISER, Stanley R.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
KAISER, Willi E.F.	(10)1473
KALISCHER, Murray Jr	(23)3366
KALISH, Jacob	(1)76,99,(2)376,(15)2191
KALLAM, John F.	(22)3172
KALLAY, Mathias	(25)3552
KALLEVIG, Steiner	(10)1473
KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst	(18)2461,(20)2804,2850,(26)3600,3668-3670

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 17/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
KAMERICK, Stanley E.	(23)3358
KAMINSKY, Andrew G.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
KANABAYASHI, Torao	(28)3887
KANAZAWA, Kanemi	(22)3156,3172
KANDEL, Paul	(1)76,(2)372,(15)2188
KANDRAC, Stephen C.	(10)1472
KANDT, William C.	(2)385,(12)1807,(15)2201
KANE, James H.	(22)3172
KANE, John D.	(1)76,(23)3364
KANG, Mong Kwi	(30)4043
KANG, Peter	(30)4016,4136
KANGLEON, Ruperto	(23)3294
KANIA, Josef	(18)2468
KANKANI, Takeichi	(30)4130
KANNE, Warren B.	(22)3172
KAPIC, Roman F.	(2)379,(15)2194
KAPLAN, Bernard	(9)1448

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHK ‖Rec: 34/382 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RANDOLPH, A.Philip	(7)1103
RANEY, Bates	(9)1364-1367,1369-1373
RANNAMETS, Elmar	(20)2857
RANNER (fnu)	(2)373,(15)2188
RAPETTI, Alfred J.	(11)1576,1579
RAPP, Oliver L.	(2)384,(13)1817,1926,(15)2200
RAPPAPORT, Armin	(22)3195,3196,3215
RASIN, G.B.Jr	(5)907
RATH, Paul F.	(23)3361
RATHJE, Theron L.	(30)4131
RATHMAN, George J.	(8)1275
RATLIFF, James H.	(2)383,385,(15)2200,2202,(18)2454,(27)3729,3731,3734
RATLIFF, Robert S.	(9)1371
RATZERSDORFER, Marc L.	(2)387,(15)2203
RAUDABAUGH, Robert L.	(22)3173
RAUNER (fnu)	(19)2668
RAVASINI, Lidia	(25)3577

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 51/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RAWE, Hubert	(16)2307
RAY, Edward L.Jr	(1)52,107,108,(2)273,281,285,(5)727,728,918,(11)1557 1597,1607,1650,1656-1658,1661-1666,1668,1669,1671-74, 1676-1686,(12)1700,1701,1711,1722-1727,1730,1784,1788 1808,(13)1823,1824
RAY, James E.	(2)372,384,385,(5)922,(7)1127,(11)1608,1626,1636,1654 (13)1927(15)2187,2200,2201
RAY, Richard R.	(1)110,(5)914,(12)1799,1808
RAYMOND, C.P.	(2)177
RAYMOND, John	(10)1528
RAYMOND, Nelson W.	(1)52,(4)655,(23)3223-3227
RAYNOR, William J.	(12)1808
READ, Clarence E.	(1)108,(2)387,(5)919,(11)1607,1666,(12)1789-1791,1808 (15)2163,2204,(17)2390,2391,(27)3703,3715,3722,3724
READ, Emerson W.	(29)3999,4000
REAGAN, Frank T.	(2)392,(15)2209
REAM, Ellis A.	(30)4012,4135,4140

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 68/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
REAM, Harold D.	(8)1276
REARDON, James E.	(9)1356
REBECK, Henry M.	(22)3173,(23)3356
REBER, John H.	(1)86,(2)381,(13)1922,(14)2042,(15)2197,(19)2680,2681
RECKORD, Milton A.	(1)147,(2)241,277,(5)720,(7)1087,1125
RECOR, Loren E.	(1)112(23)3267,3307,3367
REDDEN, Eugene	(22)3060,3088,3137
REDDING, William J.	(23)3362
REDELLI, Guiseppi di Mass	(25)3553
REDENIUS, Josephine L.	(8)1275
REDMAN, John E.	(22)3074,3137
REDMON, William H.	(23)3356
REDUS, James W. Jr	(23)3362
REED, Clarence	(28)3852
REED, Clark E.	(1)108
REED, Frank J.Jr	(5)899,(9)1363,(10)1527,1529,1531-1533,1535-1537, 1539-1540B

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 85/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
REED, Jack B.	(1)114,115,(30)4009,4011,4020,4022,4056,4067,4084-86, 4135,4139
REED, Jefferson L. Jr	(23)3363
REED, John	(4)530
REED, Sumner C.	(1)86,(23)3358
REED, William O.	(3)413
REED, William P.	(2)374,(13)1911,(15)2194,(16)2233
REED. William R.	(30)4132
REEDER, Joseph C.Jr	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
REEMSA, Gert	(19)2683
REES, Nelson B.	(1)52,86
REESE, Robert M.	(1)101,105,(5)919,(22)3202,3205,3211,3212,3213, (28)3840,3884,3894-3896
REEVES, A.R.	(16)2275,(19)2611
REEVES, Delmore E.	(2)391,(8)1301,1305,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
REEVES, James H.	(1)147,(2)195,(4)566,588,598
REGAN, John F.	(1)86,(12)1808

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 102/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
REGH, Engelbert	(16)2250
REGIS, John G.	(2)387,(15)2203
REGIS, Peter	(1)86,(2)375,385,(12)1808),(15)2190,2201,(26)3623
REHNBERG, James B.	(2)382,(15)2198
REHRIG, Ernest A.	(2)394,(15)2212
REICH, Hans	(18)2460
REICHERT, George F.	(23)3364
REICHMAN, Francis J.	(11)1627
REID, James M.	(9)1447
REID, Luther J.	(22)3050,3051
REID, Robert N.	(9)1448
REID, Thomas P.	(12)1808
REIDER (Capt.)	(22)3159,3160
REIDER, Robert W.	(2)391,(13)1934,(15)2209
REIFER, Harold	(23)3366
REILEY, Robert J.	(22)3173
REILLY, James W.	(23)3366

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
REILLY, John F.	(22)3199,3213
REILLY, John J.	(10)1473
REINACHER (fnu)	(17)2383
REINEKE, Kurt	(2)377,(15)2193,(20)2868
REINERTSON, Arnold B.	(22)3073,3075,3137
REINHARDT, Guenther	(24)3393,(27)3719,3720
REINHART, Frederick E.	(4)583
REIS, Timothy	(26)3657
REISNER, David J.	(2)379,(9)1447,(15)2195,(19)2664
REITZ, James T.	(1)147,(2)350,(8)1316,1324,(28)3824,3866,(30)4121-23, 4125
REJOIN (fnu)	(27)3782
REME, Dottore	(25)3550,3551
REMES, Waino	(30)4133
REMMEL, Leonhard	(20)2857
REMSEN, George W.	(8)1234,1274
RENDLEMAN, John C.	(5)912,(8)1275,(22)3176,3215

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RENDLER, John C.Jr	(2)386,391,(13)1934,(15)2203,2209
RENKE, Harry	(1)99
RENNERT, William J.	(1)86,(22)3173
RENO, Franklin V.	(7)1129
RESNICK, David	(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667
RETTINGER (Capt.)	(22)3093
REUTER, Frederick K.	(23)3359
REW, Edward A.	(5)894,(9)1384,1387,1431,1434,1445,1447
REYES, Arturo O.	(23)3293
REYES, Edward	(23)3359
REYNOLDS, Floyd L.	(2)380,386,(13)1922,(15)2196,2203
REYNOLDS, George L.	(22)3052,3061,3079,3103,3137
REYNOLDS, Robert S.	(30)4132
REYNOLDS, William A.	(22)3079,3137
RHEE (Mrs.)	(30)4093
RHEE, Syngman	(28)3909,(30)4007,4078,4088-4094,4096-4100,4126,4127, 4191,4192

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 153/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RHODES, Fred B.Jr	(5)904,(8)1235,1274,1279
RHODES, Haris C.	(8)1275
RIBACK, Harry W.	(1)100,(5)910,(12)1733,1735,1737,1766,1808
RIBBENTROP, Joachim von	(20)2806,2879
RIBSAM, John P.	(1)108
RICARTE, Artemo	(23)3370,3371
RICCI, John C.	(30)4135
RICCIARDELLI, Albert A.	(2)376,(15)2191
RICE, Hugh S.	(9)1356
RICE, John K.	(1)8,48,(2)357,367,(24)3383,3396,3397,3416,3421
RICE, William M.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
RICH, Albert H.	(2)375,(15)2190
RICHARD, Douglas M.	(10)1473
RICHARDS, Jack A.	(1)114,115,(23)3255,3367
RICHARDS, Robert R.	(1)86,(2)380,384,(11)1654,(12)1808,(15)2198,2201, (17)2352,2355,2366,2375,(18)2555,(20)2832,2833
RICHARDS, Tom	(2)394,(15)2212

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RICHARDSON, John E.	(1)111,(2)390,(15)2207
RICHARDSON, John H.	(1)86,(12)1770,1808
RICHARDSON, Robert C. Jr	(22)3147,3148,3151,3152
RICHARDSON, Ron E.	(8)1275
RICHARDSON, W.P.	(3)426
RICHMOND, Clarence	(18)2487
RICHTER, Bruno C.	(2)387,(15)2203
RICHTER, F.K.	(25)3538
RICKMAN, Joseph B.	(9)1356
RIDDLE, Daniel M.Jr	(1)86,(2)380,(5)923,931,(13)1921,(15)2130,2196
RIDDLEBARGER, George E.	(1)103,110
RIDGE, John M.	(9)1448,(10)1540B
RIDGE, Lawrence J.	(9)1356
RIDGWAY, Matthew B.	(1)122
RIEGLER, Ernst	(12)1781,1782
RIEHL, William K.	(8)1203
RIELLY, Arthur E.	(8)1277

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RIELLY, William T.	(8)1275
RIEPE, John H.	(24)3388,3389
RIFFEL, Carlyle H.	(23)3363
RIGHI, Arriano	(12)1775
RIGNEY, Joseph W.	(9)1447
RILEY, A.H.Jr	(5)915
RILEY, Francis X.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
RILEY, George B.	(1)86
RILEY, Harold L.	(23)3360
RILEY, Sheldon P.	(5)910,(22)3173
RINEHART, Lowell S.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
RINOLDI, Charles J.	(22)3173
RINTELIN, Franz von	(1)41,148,(2)185,(3)434,492
RIOS, Wilfredo M.	(9)1447
RIPLEY, James J. Jr	(23)3311,3358
RISSINGER, Marvin L.	(2)392,(15)2209
RITTER, Herman	(22)3215

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RITZ, Alphonse	(16)2303
RIVIERE (French Capt.)	(17)2395
ROACH, Philip O.	(1)108,(5)925,(23)3246,3360
ROAMER, J.M.	(6)967,(8)1316,1317,(22)3041,3045,3049-3051,(23)3222, (24)3382,3383,3387,3388,3407,3426,3427
ROAMER, Sammy	(18)2471
ROBB, Fred	(23)3363
ROBBS, Robert W.	(14)2042
ROBE, Allen	(25)3498
ROBERSON, I. Jr	(5)907
ROBERSON, Lake	(22)3215
ROBERTS, Bernard V.	(30)4130
ROBERTS, Cyrus D.	(23)3359
ROBERTS, John W.	(2)374,393,(13)1918,(15)2189,2210
ROBERTS, Lloyd D.	(2)389,(5)917,(15)2206
ROBERTS, Theodore J.	(1)114,115,(30)4011,4057,4126,4135,4139,4191
ROBERTS, William L.	(1)118

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROBERTSON, Ben L.	(5)906,(9)1433,1439,1447
ROBERTSON, Howard M.	(3)432,497
ROBERTSON, Robert S.	(2)379,(15)2195,(20)2781,2782-2784
ROBERTSON, Thomas	(25)3583
ROBICHAUD, Albert	(30)4135
ROBICHAUD, Joseph E.	(2)394,(15)2212
ROBICZEK, Fred F.	(2)389,(15)2206
ROBINEAU, S.P.	(3)442
ROBINETT, P.M.	(10)1512
ROBINSON, Alvin E.	(18)2472
ROBINSON, Ernest C.	(23)3357
ROBINSON, Frank L.	(1)53,86,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2194
ROBINSON, George O.	(8)1275,(23)3358
ROBINSON, Harold H.	(2)388,392,(13)1912,(14)2095,(15)2205,2210
ROBINSON, James F.	(30)4133
ROBINSON, Jerome D.	(30)4135
ROBINSON, John H.	(22)3173

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROBINSON, John N.	(30)4019,4112,4122
ROBINSON, Lansing F.	(1)53,(11)1643,1655
ROBISON, H.E.	(28)3932
ROCCO, Robert	(12)1704
ROCK, Alexander P.	(2)383,(15)2199
ROCKWOOD, Joe S.	(2)382,(15)2198
RODEGNIERO, James A.	(2)394,(15)2212
RODELL, Jerome W.	(2)387,(15)2203
RODENHISER, Edward F.	(12)1808
RODERICK, David N.	(30)4135
RODERICK, T.E.	(5)724,741,(11)1595,1661-1663
RODGERS, Max E.	(8)1275
RODRIGUEZ, Alfonso	(5)910
ROE, Paul H.	(30)4127,4135
ROE, Rexford K.	(2)388,(13)1913,(15)2205
ROE, Richard	(24)3390
ROERINGEN, Louisa	(19)2603

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROESCH, Paul C.	(2)389,(15)2206
ROETTER, Jurgen H.	(2)372,(15)2187
ROFFE, Worrell W.	(7)1145,1153,1154
ROGER, Henri	(15)2118,(16)2285
ROGERS, George D.	(22)3137
ROGERS, Herman M.	(30)4135
ROGERS, John C.	(2)394,(15)2212
ROGERS, John D.	(23)3239
ROGERS, Martin	(1)86,(2)388,(15)2205
ROHLEDER, Alfred H.	(2)374,(15)2189,(20)2812
ROHLFES, Bruno O.	(2)393,(15)2211
ROHLFING, Friedrich G.	(19)2647,2648
ROHNER, Emil J.	(1)87,(12)1754,1757,1758,1808
ROLANDER, Carl A.	(8)1275
ROLLE, N.B.	(1)118,119
ROLLEN, Walter R.	(23)3366
ROLLER, Otto J.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1930,(15)2208

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROLLINS, R.G.	(1)20
ROMANO, Salvator S.	(2)392,(15)2210
ROMANO, Vincent	(25)3583
ROMANYENKO (Russian Gen.)	(30)4108
ROMEY, John H.	(1)87,(2)388,(13)1912,(14)2062,(15)2127,2205
ROMITO, Alphonso	(22)3137
ROMMEL, Erwin	(11)1576,1580,(14)2042
ROMNEY, Henry J.	(1)87,(2)376,(15)2192
ROMPEIS (fnu)	(23)3271
RONGHI, Roy H.	(25)3583
RONIS, Fred	(2)379,(15)2195
ROOD, Wilson A.	(1)87,(2)388,(5)909,(13)1913,(14)2076,2077,(15)2205
ROONEY, Joseph W.	(2)383,(15)2199
ROONEY, Julian R.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
ROOSEVELT, Eleanor	(1)147,(2)277,(4)664,665,(22)3211,(23)3283
ROOSEVELT, Franklin D.	(1)147,(2)206,212,282,309,(4)583,611-613,616,642, 643,649,664,(5)746,(8)1168,1201,(11)1547,(28)3831

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROOSEVELT, Theodore Jr	(4)523
ROQUEMORE, Other B. Jr	(22)3213
ROSA, Jose D.	(23)3366
ROSA, Oreste R.	(23)3356
ROSALES, Joseph T.	(9)1447
ROSE, Charles E.	(11)1557
ROSE, Fred	(4)605
ROSE, Hugh S.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
ROSE-INNES, Arthur	(28)3856
ROSEN, Irving	(2)390,(15)2207
ROSEN, Joseph E.	(2)383,386,(13)1924,(15)2199,2203
ROSENMAN, Bernard M.	(8)1275
ROSENTHAL (fnu)	(15)2197
ROSENTHAL, Kenneth L.	(2)375,(15)2191
ROSENTHAL, Robert B.	(23)3356
ROSS, James T.	(30)4137
ROSSEAU, Robert	(15)2128

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROSSELL, John R.	(25)3498
ROSSOW, Dominic	(25)3565,3583
ROSVEARE (Capt.)	(23)3223
ROTH, Edward	(30)4132
ROTH, Rex	(12)1808
ROTHCHILD, David	(28)3835
ROTHSCHILD, Robert G.	(2)377,(15)2192
ROTHWELL, Robert G.	(1)87,(2)372,(13)1914,(15)2187
ROTUNNO, Vito	(12)1759,1808
ROUNDLESS, Samuel J.	(2)382,(13)1924,(14)2071,(15)2198
ROUNTREE, Charles A.	(2)377,381,(13)1922,(15)2193,2197
ROVIRA-SANCHEZ, Jose	(9)1447
ROWAN, Andrew S.	(1)147,(2)179
ROWAN, C.P.	(5)904,929
ROWLAND, J.L.	(5)904
ROWLEY, Joseph G.	(2)393,(15)2210
ROXAS, Manuel	(23)3322,3323,(29)3961,3965

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
ROY, James E.	(1)96
ROY, Joseph H.	(2)387,(12)1808,(15)2204
ROY, Joseph H.R.	(2)394,(9)1356,(15)2212
ROYALL, Kenneth C.	(27)3717-3720
RUBACKY, Charles J.	(25)3560
RUBARD, James J.	(23)3222
RUBIN, Carl F.	(2)386,(15)2203
RUBIN, Lawrence A.	(23)3358
RUBSAM, John L.	(1)53,98,(2)290,(5)920,(11)1594,(12)1702,1721,1722, 1808
RUDICEL, Rex S.	(23)3362
RUDISILL, Edward L.	(8)1277
RUFTY, A.C.	(5)911
RUGE, Neil M.	(1)99,(2)376,(5)913,(15)2192,(16)2220,(19)2602, (20)2772,2773
RUGGLES, Charles B.	(9)1448
RUIZ, Luis	(9)1447

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RULE, Roland H.	(9)1356
RUMATZ, George V.	(2)380,(11)1654,(15)2196
RUMINOFF, Leonid	(2)375,(12)1808,(15)2190,(18)2555,2556,(20)2860,2863
RUNDSTEDT, Gerd von	(18)2449
RUNGEE, Joseph P.	(2)390,(5)913,(13)1929,(15)2208
RUNGEE, T.	(14)2100
RUSCH, Frederick W.	(9)1448
RUSSELL, Bertram R.	(1)87,96,147,(2)294,(11)1557,1576,1590,1608,1625,1647 1648,1654,(12)1701,1724,1808
RUSSELL, Carl A.	(5)722,723
RUSSELL, Edwin O.	(8)1275
RUSSELL, Johnston	(8)1203
RUSSELL, Maurice	(19)2619
RUSSELL, R.D.	(5)907
RUSSELL, Ralph R.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
RUSSELL, Robert F.	(23)3362
RUSSI, David P.	(2)378,(15)2193

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RUSSO, Anselm A.	(25)3583
RUSSO, Edward J.	(12)1808
RUST, Bernard	(27)3751,3752
RUST, Gordon D.	(23)3361
RUSTON, Arthur J.	(11)1607,1609,(12)1715,1808
RUTKOWSKI, Stanley E.	(23)3366
RUTLEDGE, Cecil L.	(8)1319
RUTLEDGE, Frederick R.	(1)104,111,(2)383,(15)2199
RUTLEDGE, P.W.	(12)1744
RUTTKAY, Louis K. III	(23)3360
RUWE, Edward A.	(2)394,(15)2212
RYAN, Alvin F.	(8)1276
RYAN, Donald D.	(22)3180,3181,3213
RYAN, Earl F.	(8)1276
RYAN, Elbert M.	(2)391,(5)917,(13)1931,(14)2100,(15)2208,(19)2631
RYAN, George J.	(12)1808
RYAN, James A.	(2)185

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PROUT, William C.	(23)3355
PROVANCE, Gilson L.	(10)1473
PROVENZANO, John D.	(2)378,(15)2194
PROVOO, John David	(28)3832-3836
PRYM, Axel	(16)2245,2246,2249,2251,2252
PRYM, Hans	(16)2245,2246
PRYOR, William Y.	(22)3173
PUCCIARELLI, Donato D.	(22)3137
PUFAHL, Francis J.	(22)3173
PULEO, Anthony	(22)3173
PULLER, James B.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
PULLMAN, Emmett H.	(22)3173
PUMPELLY, J.W.	(12)1738
PUNZLER, Karl Arno	(18)2495
PUPANEK, Michael R.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1930,(15)2208
PURCELL, Harold A.	(3)421
PURCELL, James B.	(9)1448

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
PURCELL, John K.	(22)3173
PURSELL, H.R.	(5)909
PURYEAR, Robert E.	(5)911,(22)3070,3119,3137
PUTNEY, Walter B.	(2)394,(15)2212
PY, Alfred	(15)2152
PYLE, Ernie	(11)1584,1585

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHP ‖Rec: 329/329 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RYAN, James C.	(8)1277
RYAN, John J.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
RYAN, John P.	(13)1815
RYAN, John T.	(11)1557,1558,1565,1566
RYAN, Lewis H.	(23)3360
RYAN, Richard N.	(1)87,(11)1554,1609
RYAN, Robert N.	(1)87
RYAN, Thomas A.	(2)390,(5)907,939,(13)1929,(15)2208
RYAN, Thomas E.	(1)87,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2195,(16)2231
RYDZEWSKI, Rudolph L.	(8)1275
RYKEN, Peter S.	(1)87,(23)3356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHR ‖Rec: 385/385 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RAACK, Walter E.	(2)375,(15)2190
RABENDA, Froninek	(16)2263
RABENOLD, Elwood M.Jr.	(5)906,(9)1447
RACAGNI, Natale	(12)1754,1756,1757
RADABAUGH, Ernest A.	(25)3583
RADELOFF, Walter A.	(23)3355
RADLOFF, William H.	(22)3173
RADOGNA, Vito Antonio	(12)1720,1721
RADOULOVITCH, Vladimir	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
RAE, Nelson S.	(1)52,86,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
RAFAELI, Alexander	(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2504
RAFFELSBERGER, Walter	(25)3544
RAFFERTY, John M.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
RAGAN, Graydon E.	(22)3213
RAGNOR, Ragnor H.	(10)1472
RAGO, Henry A.	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
RAGON, Paul H.	(12)1808

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RAGONETTI, Anthony P.	(1)86,(25)3583
RAGSDALE, Cortis W.	(23)3356
RAINE, Philip	(2)393,(15)2211
RAINE, Sidney	(12)1808
RAINEY, Birt J.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
RAINS, Raymond	(9)1407
RAINWATER, Loye H.Jr.	(10)1472
RAKESTRAW, George F.	(2)379,(15)2195
RAKOW, William J.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1934,(15)2209
RALSTON, David P.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
RALSTON, Robert J.	(2)377,(15)2192
RAMOS, Benigno R.	(23)3368,3370,3371
RAND, Harvey H.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
RANDALL (Col)	(11)1613,1614
RANDALL, Earle S.	(2)387,(15)2203
RANDELL, Robert U.	(30)4135
RANDOLPH (Sgt)	(3)470

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
RYAN, James C.	(8)1277
RYAN, John J.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
RYAN, John P.	(13)1815
RYAN, John T.	(11)1557,1558,1565,1566
RYAN, Lewis H.	(23)3360
RYAN, Richard N.	(1)87,(11)1554,1609
RYAN, Robert N.	(1)87
RYAN, Thomas A.	(2)390,(5)907,939,(13)1929,(15)2208
RYAN, Thomas E.	(1)87,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2195,(16)2231
RYDZEWSKI, Rudolph L.	(8)1275
RYKEN, Peter S.	(1)87,(23)3356

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SAAR, William E.	(9)1447
SABERHAGEN, Harold A.	(5)920,(10)1464,1465,1472
SABULSKI, Alvin A.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
SACCHI, Vincenzo	(25)3550-3552
SACHERMAYR (fnu)	(25)3508
SACHS, Robert F.	(10)1472
SACKETT, B.Edwin	(19)2674
SACKETT, Harold W. Jr	(30)4132
SAFFERSTEIN, Nathan C.	(8)1276
SAGI, Julius R.	(1)87,147,(11)1609,(12)1710,1809
ST.ANGEL, Frank G.	(1)87,(22)3115
ST.GERMAIN, Jules B.	(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476-2478
ST.JOHN, Robert L.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
ST.VRAIN, Lester P.	(9)1356
SAKAI, Jack	(30)4130
SAKAKIDA, Richard M.	(23)3222-3231
SAKUMOTO, Seiya	(30)4130

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 17/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SALAZAR (fnu)	(23)3293
SALAZAR, Silvio	(9)1401
SALE, Wallace F.	(9)1356
SALEVOURIS, Emmanuel	(5)903,(23)3360
SALINGER, Jerome D.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
SALOMON, Jason	(23)3358
SALOOM, Kaliste J.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
SALSINGER, William L.	(2)377,(15)2193
SALSTROM, Edward D.	(1)87,(2)372,377,(5)905,(13)1911,(14)2031,2038,2064, 2065,(15)2188,2192
SALZ, Louis C.	(1)101,(5)895
SAMPLE (fnu)	(15)2197
SAMPSON, Donald M.	(23)3362
SAMUEL, Nathaniel	(2)395,(13)1937,(15)2213
SANCHEZ, Alberto	(9)1425
SANCHEZ, Ismael	(9)1422
SANCHEZ de LEON, Miguel	(9)1425

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 34/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SIMPSON, Edwin W.	(22)3041,3063-3065,3067,3070,3071,3115,3138,
SIMPSON, Omer R.	(8)1275
SIMPSON, Roscoe P.	(5)909,(22)3173
SIMPSON, William B.	(23)3363
SIMPSON, William H.	(18)2487
SIMPSON, William J.	(8)1274
SIMS, Harry B.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
SIMS, John E.	(1)89,(2)378,384,(15)2193,2200
SIMS, Nathaniel G.	(12)1809
SIMS, Ralph	(1)89,103,147,(2)233,(5)898,(6)964,(9)1351-1354,1356 (23)3255,3358
SING, Tan Po	(23)3271
SINGER, Jerome L.	(23)3356
SINN, Donald F.	(1)96,(22)3173,(30)4131
SKALA, J.W.	(5)912
SKATTEBOL, Lars	(23)3237,3239
SKELTON, Joseph S.	(1)89,(12)1809

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 357/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SKINKER, Dudley G.	(1)109,(5)900,(23)3334,3365
SKORZENY, Otto	(18)2449,2450,2457-2461,2468,2472-2474,2508,2553, 2559-2561,2563,(19)2647,2689,2692,(20)2750,2753,2787 (26)3620,3621
SKRIGAN, Paul S.	(2)384,388,393,(13)1913,(15)2200,2205,2211
SKUBIK, Stephen J.	(2)378,(15)2193
SKVARNA, John	(25)3554
SLABAUGH, Charles W.	(22)3173
SLACKE, Robert C.	(9)1447
SLADEN, Fred W.	(4)568
SLADKY, Eugene J.	(2)393,(15)2210
SLATER, John F.	(2)394,(15)2212
SLATER, Russell R.	(1)89,(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2198
SLATTERY, Arthur R.	(1)101,137
SLAUGHTER, Archie B.	(23)3360
SLEDGE, Wayne D.	(2)392,(9)1448,(15)2210
SLIFER (fnu)	(15)2197

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 374/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SLIM, William J.	(24)3448
SLOAN, Charles V.	(1)53,(2)378,(10)1477,1508,(15)2194,(18)2455
SLOAN, Paul G.Jr	(2)377,390,(11)1610,1628,1655,(13)1928,(15)2192,2207
SLOAN, William W.	(23)3362
SLOCUM, Albert I.	(23)3355
SLUIZER, Hans V.	(2)389,(15)2206
SLUSHER, Golden B.	(22)3173,(30)4137
SMALHOUT, John J.	(2)394,(15)2212
SMALL, George W.	(22)3138
SMALL, Keppel O.	(23)3361
SMALL, Loren E.	(23)3362
SMALLWOOD, Grahame T.	(23)3240
SMART, John K.	(1)20,(9)1363-1368,1370,1371,1373
SMATHER, James C.	(22)3173
SMEDLEY, Agnes	(4)585
SMITH, Alfred T.	(1)147,(2)200,(4)564,574,578
SMITH, Arthur E.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 391/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SMITH, Baldwin B.	(18(2462
SMITH, Bradford	(22)3141
SMITH, C.J.	(5)909
SMITH, C.R.	(10)1526
SMITH, Carlos D.	(2)381,392,(15)2197,2210,(19)2649
SMITH, Charles D.	(13)1937
SMITH, Charles F.G.	(22)3048,3079,3082,3138
SMITH, Edward P.	(2)395,(13)1932,(15)2213
SMITH, Edwin B.	(5)901,(11)1557,1592
SMITH, Eldon K.	(23)3360
SMITH, Elmer L.	(30)4127,4135
SMITH, F.J.	(5)897
SMITH, Fred F.	(22)3173
SMITH, Frederick M.	(2)382,(15)2198
SMITH, Garland F.	(4)619,(8)1214,(10)1492
SMITH, George C.	(22)3213
SMITH, George E.	(2)384,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 408/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SMITH, George S.	(12)1737
SMITH, Gerald L.K.	(7)1106
SMITH, Gregory B.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
SMITH, Guthrie J.	(1)89,(2)379,(15)2194
SMITH, Guy T.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
SMITH, H.B.	(1)39,147,(2)177
SMITH, Harry G.	(22)3067,3069,3138,(23)3364
SMITH, Harvy M.	(25)3583
SMITH, Herbert W.Jr	(5)925,(12)1809
SMITH, Henry G.	(1)106,108
SMITH, Homer F.	(2)391,(13)1934,(15)2209
SMITH, James A. Sr	(23)3365
SMITH, James E.	(2)383,392,(13)1924,1938,(15)2199,2210
SMITH, James R.Jr	(1)96,(9)1447
SMITH, Joseph A.	(22)3076,3138
SMITH, Kelly B. Jr	(30)4137
SMITH, Kenneth E.	(9)1356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 425/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SMITH, Lawrence D.	(8)1275
SMITH, Lawrence G.	(28)3839
SMITH, Lawrence I.	(12)1809
SMITH, Leroy H.	(2)374,387,(13)1917,(15)2189,2203
SMITH, Lewis W.	(1)53
SMITH, Louise H.	(8)1207
SMITH, Lucius S.	(2)383,(15)2199
SMITH, Malcolm	(12)1735
SMITH, Marvin	(8)1203,1205,1207,1208
SMITH, Mathew C.	(4)554
SMITH, Merle J.	(1)103
SMITH, Paul F.	(23)3358
SMITH, Ralph C.	(5)711,742
SMITH, Richard	(2)380,(15)2196
SMITH, Richard J.	(12)1809
SMITH, Richard L.	(11)1654,(12)1809
SMITH, Richard M.	(8)1276

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SMITH, Robert B.	(23)3367
SMITH, Robert F.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
SMITH, Robert L.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
SMITH, Robert O.	(2)383,(15)2199
SMITH, Roderick K.	(30)4135
SMITH, Russell L.Jr.	(10)1473
SMITH, Samuel S.	(2)394,(15)2212
SMITH, Stanley J.	(22)3138
SMITH, Sylvester P.	(6)942-944,951,952
SMITH, Theodore B. Jr	(23)3357
SMITH, Thomas C.	(9)1366,1368,1374
SMITH, Thomas D.Jr	(1)109,(5)913,(23)3292,3363
SMITH, Vincent P.	(30)4127,4137
SMITH, Walter Bedell	(13)1851,1894
SMITH, Warren W.	(9)1447
SMITH, Weldon A.	(1)96
SMITH, Willard R.	(1)89,(23)3359

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 459/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SMITH, William B.	(30)4133
SMITH, William C.	(5)907,(9)1336,1343,1345,1348,1349,1355
SMITHY, Walter S.	(23)3365
SMOOT, Frank L.	(2)394,(15)2212
SMULLIN, Thomas E.	(29)3993
SMYK, Stephen	(5)909,(10)1506
SMYTH, Donald P.	(25)3583
SNODGRASS, Robert S.	(22)3138
SNOW, Samuel H.	(22)3173
SNOWDEN, Floyd C.	(1)106,107,108,(5)918,(11)1594,1607,1608,1679, (12)1777,1809,(25)3494,3497,3499,3501
SNYDER, Earl C.	(22)3076,3138
SNYDER, Jack P.	(2)396,(13)1936,(15)2214
SNYDER, Richard A.	(2)391,(5)902,(13)1931,(15)2208
SOBEL, H.	(5)895,(7)1132
SOJET, Frank A.	(2)376,(15)2192
SOLANA, Frederick J.	(22)3138

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 476/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SOLBERT, C.N.	(3)434
SOLDAN, Wilhelm	(20)2774
SOLOMON, Paul J.	(23)3360
SOMERS, George B.	(2)380,(11)1625,1629,1654,(12)1809,(15)2196
SOMERS, Louis M.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
SOMERVILLE, John F.	(1)104,105,(2)383,(5)915,(15)2199,(18)2556
SONG, Kong Sam	(30)4116
SONG, Kyu Whan	(30)4065,4066
SONNET, Josef	(18)2466
SONNICHSEN, Alex C.	(23)3364
SOPER, Donald R.	(1)53
SORANAGE, William D.	(1)88
SORENSEN, Emil S.Jr	(2)392,(15)2210
SORENSON, Charles L.	(9)1385
SORENSON, Edgar P.	(8)1177
SORGE, Richard	(4)585
SORKIN, Bernard R.	(23)3365

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 493/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SORRENTINO, Gabriele	(12)1752
SOTA (fnu)	(28)3926,3927
SOTO, Jamie	(3)440-442
SOTOMAYOR, Franco	(9)1410,1447
SOUCY, Roy J.	(2)389,(15)2206
SOUDER, Philip	(22)3173
SOUSA, Leo	(30)4119
SOUTHERLAND, James E.	(2)246,(5)924,(8)1274,1279
SOUTHWORTH, Press C. Jr	(22)3076,3120,3138
SOWA, Edward V.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
SPACIL, Joseph	(26)3622
SPAETH, Walter P.Jr	(2)395,(15)2212
SPALT, Harry L.	(23)3356
SPARKS, Bertel M.	(1)89,(2)385,(12)1809,(15)2160,2201
SPARKS, Harold	(22)3215
SPARKS, W.M.	(5)908
SPARKS, William S.	(22)3173

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 510/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SPATCHER, Francis	(1)89
SPATZENEGGER (fnu)	(25)3512
SPEAR, Hans N.	(2)374,(15)2189
SPEARS (Capt)	(12)1781
SPEARS, John H.	(9)1448
SPEER, Claus	(2)372,(15)2187
SPELLMAN, Francis	(12)1798
SPENCER, George B.	(5)909,(22)3173,(23)3274,3360
SPENCER, George D.	(23)3361
SPENCER, George S.	(22)3173
SPENCER, John K.	(22)3173
SPERRY, Lawrence	(8)1277
SPIEGLER, John L.	(1)89,(2)389,(15)2207
SPILMAN, William R.	(23)3365
SPINA, John P.	(11)1654,(12)1809
SPINGARN, J.E.	(3)487
SPINGARN, Stephen J.	(1)89,106,147,(5)918,(11)1566,1568,1608,1609,1663,

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
	1668,1675-1677,1686,(12)1701,1705-1709,1711-1713,1722 1723,1727,1730-1732,1736,1751,1766-1768,1770,1787, 1794,1795,1809,(25)3494,3496,3497
SPITZEL, Herbert S.G.	(2)393,(15)2211
SPITZER, Robert W.	(2)387,(15)2203
SPOHN, William W.	(8)1277
SPOONER, Jack A.	(2)381,(13)1923,(14)2065,(15)2197,(16)2276,2283
SPRING, John C.	(23)3359
SPRINGER, Otto	(6)974,975
SPURGEON, James E.	(23)3362
STACY, John T.	(2)393,(5)898,(15)2211
STADLER, Johann	(25)3507
STAFFEN, A.W.	(7)1149
STAFFORD, Gerald	(2)383,(13)1924,(15)2199,(18)2501
STAHMER, H.G.	(28)3827
STALEY, Jack P.	(2)374,393,(13)1918,(15)2189,2211
STALIN, Joseph	(1)136,(29)3965

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STALKER, Ian F.	(1)97,(2)373,382,(5)912,(15)2188,2198
STALLINGS, Jack W.Jr.	(9)1356
STANARD, Wayne B.	(22)3159,3173
STANCHION, Andrew J.	(2)393,(15)2211
STANDEFER, Harmon B.	(9)1447
STANDSBERRY, Max E.	(8)1274
STANFORD, Lee R.	(23)3362
STANKE, Michael B.	(2)387,(15)2203
STANKEWICZ, Joseph P.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
STANLEY, C.H.	(5)921
STANSBURY, William B.Jr.	(9)1363-1368,1370,1371,1374
STANSELL, Theodore L.	(2)378,(13)1920,(15)2193
STANTON, Francis W.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
STANTON, John M.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
STAPLETON, John T.	(1)109,(5)911,(22)3215,(23)3300,3364
STARBUCK, William H.	(23)3358
STARR, G.J.	(5)894

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STARR, John L.	(23)3365
STARR, Joseph R.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
STARUSKI, Anthony	(8)1276
STASAITIS, Stanley J.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
STAUDT, George L.	(1)147,(2)289,(5)684,757-759,895,(6)964,967,969, (12)1768,(22)3041,3045
STAUTNER, Joseph F.	(2)378,(15)2194
STAYER, Edgar S.	(1)47
STEARNS, J.E.	(1)147,(2)350
STECHER, Christoph	(16)2255
STEDLER, Richard J.	(23)3359
STEELE, Joseph C.	(30)4132
STEFANIK, Thadeus	(2)380,(11)1625,1629,1654,(12)1809,(15)2196
STEFANSSON, Ragnar	(5)919,(10)1472
STEFFINS, Lincoln	(4)529,535
STEGMAIER, Arthur G.	(2)380,(13)1922,(15)2196
STEIERMANN, Gordon L.	(2)377,(15)2193

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 578/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STEIN, Gerhold S.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
STEIN, Herbert J.	(30)4137
STEIN, Jay J.	(12)1809
STEIN, Raymond B.	(8)1277
STEINBERG, Harry C.	(2)391,(13)1934,(15)2209
STEINER, Ellis A.	(30)4013,4132,4140
STEINER, Leopold	(2)387,(15)2203
STEINHARTER, Fred P.	(2)376,(15)2192
STEINWAY, Charles G.	(1)89,96,(2)372,(5)904,(13)1914,2015,(14)2029,2078, 2081,(15)2116,2126,2187,(16)2240,(18)2482,(19)2599, 2682
STEMPLE, Max L.	(1)53,(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2195
STEPANOVICH (LtCol)	(17)2397
STEPHENS, Howard V.Jr	(1)53,89,(2)378,(15)2194,(18)2454,2455,(22)3173
STEPHENS, Roy A.	(11)1596
STEPHENS, Thomas G.	(2)380,(11)1655,(12)1809,(15)2196
STEPTOE, Thomas W.	(5)902,(22)3052,3057,3060,3061,3070,3071,3090,3138

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 595/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STERN, Charles H.	(23)3363
STERN, Frederick S.Jr	(2)386,(15)2202
STERN, Kurt	(2)378,(15)2194
STERN, Siggi	(1)90,(2)373,(15)2189
STERNBERG, Ralph	(2)394,(15)2212
STEUSSY, Fred K.	(2)394,(10)1473,(13)1939,(15)2212
STEVENS, Alan	(8)1276
STEVENS, George B.	(30)4132,4133
STEVENS, Harold L.	(1)90,(2)377,(11)1628,1655,(12)1728,1809,(15)2192
STEVENS, Richard D.	(1)114,(5)918,(10)1456,1458,1462,1472,(13)1817, (26)3591,(27)3711,3793
STEVENS, Stanford S.	(22)3138
STEVENSON, Alfred B.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
STEVENSON, Alvin E.	(30)4132
STEVENSON, Arthur B.	(16)2208
STEVENSON, Campbell W.	(22)3173
STEVENSON, Douglas F.	(2)389,(15)2206

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 612/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STEVENSON, F.R.	(10)1455,1470
STEVIE, Robert J.	(2)389,(15)2207
STEWART, Archibald	(1)108
STEWART, Charles L.	(2)375,384,386,(13)1927,(15)2190,2200,2202
STEWART, Ferguson C.	(1)108
STEWART, Norman Ballie	(2)310
STEWART, Robert H.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
STEWART, Roger S.	(23)3359
STEWART, Sanlon S.	(1)103,112
STIBAL, Frank E.	(23)3357
STICKNEY, Melvin J.	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
STIELAU (German Lt.)	(18)2459
STILES, Allen	(1)20
STILLWELL, H.	(5)914
STILLWELL, Joseph W.	(22)3042,3056,3080
STILWELL, James E.	(1)90,98,(5)912,(23)3307,3356
STIMSON, Henry L.	(2)206,(4)619,(5)746,(7)1103,1142,(11)1547

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STINE, James H.	(30)4137
STINGL, Fred	(2)374,(15)2189
STINSON, F.E.	(5)918
STIRLING, Alexander R.	(1)18
STIRLING, Thomas A.	(8)1274
STOCKBRIDGE, William D.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
STOCKMAL, Joseph	(16)2281
STODICK (German Lt.)	(18)2474
STOKES, Albert G.	(2)375,(15)2191
STOLLAK, Jules	(2)377,(15)2192
STOLLE, Elizabeth	(20)2867
STOLLENWERCK, Edward C.	(2)381,(5)905,(15)2197
STONE, Duane G.	(1)90
STONE, Edward R.	(4)591
STONE, Harlen F.	(4)565
STONE, William H.Jr.	(10)1473
STOOPS, John A.	(30)4135

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 646/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STOPPELLI, Louis F.	(10)1472
STOREY, William E.	(23)3367
STOUGHTON, Claude	(3)470
STOUT, George J.	(10)1473
STOUT, Patrick	(8)1275
STOUT, R.M.	(5)897
STRACHAN, Henry F. Jr	(23)3358
STRACKE, Emil H.	(2)376,(15)2192,(20)2771,2772
STRADINGER, Oscar	(1)90,147,(2)292,380,(11)1557,1576,1579,1589,1590, 1654,(12)1809,(15)2196
STRAITON, K.E.	(5)896
STRAMEL, Bruce E.	(1)90
STRAMEL, Bruno F.	(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2205,(19)2630
STRANGE, R.F.	(5)909
STRATEMEYER, George E.	(22)3078
STRAUSS (fnu)	(15)2197
STRAUSS, Leon	(2)394,(15)2212

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 663/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STREETMAN, Harold E.	(23)3364
STRICKLIN, Henry C.	(25)3583
STROBEL, Charles E.	(23)3363
STROEBEL, George Jr	(30)4127,4135
STRONG, Anna Louise	(9)1345
STRONG, George V.	(1)147,(2)230,241,244,250,257,262,274,275,276,283 (4)609,(5)682,687,689,690,694,696,699,700,702,704, 715,719,720,735,737,739,740,750,751,754,(6)944,946 947,949,953,966,(7)1091,1129,1141,1144,1152,(8)1169, 1172,1173,1175-1177,1231,1232,1269,1272,1291,(9)1412, (10)1458,1459,(11)1546,1555,1572,1592,1596,1602,1603, 1661
STRONG, K.W.D.	(11)1588,1589
STRONG, Vinton L.	(23)3362
STRONG, William B.	(2)376,(13)1919,(15)2192
STROUD (fnu)	(2)384,(15)2200
STROUD, Donald C.	(15)2113

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 680/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
STROUD, Donald R.	(2)385,(13)1927,(15)2201,(18)2519
STROUSE, Lynn	(23)3359
STRUL, Edmund S.	(2)377,(15)2193,(20)2868
STRULLER, Otto	(18)2467,2468
STUART, A.W.	(28)3820,3847,3865-3867
STUART, George B.	(2)390,(13)1928,(15)2207
STUART, Malcolm R.	(2)386,(15)2202
STUART, Robert A.	(9)1448
STUBBLEFIELD, Thomas G.	(10)1473
STUTZ, Walter A.	(22)3213
SUAREZ, Albert J.	(9)1447
SUDER, Robert W.	(2)379,(15)2194
SUGAREK, Charles L.	(30)4135
SUH, Sung Kyong	(30)4116
SULERUD, John C.	(8)1275
SULLIVAN, Daniel B.	(1)90
SULLIVAN, Daniel J.	(1)90,(2)380,385,(11)1652,1655,(12)1809,(15)2196,2201

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 697/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SULLIVAN, Homer	(23)3366
SULLIVAN, John S.	(22)3173
SULLIVAN, Richard M.	(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476,2477
SULLIVAN, William A.	(5)895,(7)1113,(9)1363
SUMAN, John G.	(1)90,101,(2)379,(15)2195,(16)2220
SUMMER, Isidor H.	(8)1277
SUMMERALL, Charles P.	(4)601
SURMAN, Stephen J.	(9)1447
SUSHANSKY, William	(30)4137
SUSSEMANN, Carl	(1)90,(2)377,(15)2192
SUSSER, Heinrich	(8)1199
SUSZAN, Michael J.	(1)90,(12)1809
SUTHERLAND, George R.	(22)3173
SUTTON, Horace A.	(1)90,101,(2)379,(5)901,(15)2195,(19)2664
SWABOWICZ, Anthony J.	(25)3583
SWAN, Charles K.	(2)375,(15)2190
SWANSON, Douglas N.	(30)4137

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 714/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SWANSON, Kenneth L.	(1)108,(23)3312,3361
SWANT, Raymond H.	(2)387,(15)2203
SWANTEK, Andrew H.	(2)390,(10)1472,(13)1928,(15)2207
SWARTZ, Benjamin	(25)3583
SWE, Saung	(22)3082
SWEENEY, Jay P.	(2)391,(13)1934,(15)2209
SWEENEY, John P.	(2)377,(13)1919,(15)2193
SWEENEY, John R.	(2)386,395,(13)1937,(15)2202,2213
SWEENEY, Thomas P.	(2)391,(5)899,(13)1933,(14)2100,(15)2208
SWEET, Francis R.	(10)1472,(30)4132
SWENSON, George W.P.	(23)3362
SWENSON, Glen W.	(22)3213
SWENSON, Munroe C.	(29)3999,4000
SWIBER, Moyle S.	(9)1398
SWINNERTON, Arthur L.	(30)4137
SWOCK, John E.	(2)390,(13)1929,(15)2208
SWONDER, Joseph A.	(30)4132

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 731/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
SYMMES, Howard W.	(2)379,(13)1911,(14)2029,(15)2195,(16)2231
SYRING, William J.	(2)381,392,(13)1937,(15)2197,2210,(19)2649
SZARVAS, Alexander J.	(2)392,(15)2210
SZELESI, Ference	(25)3553
SZOPINSKI, Wlanyslaw	(8)1200,1201
SZPINALSKI, George S.	(9)1356

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHS ‖Rec: 737/737 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TABANIAG, Antonio	(23)3222
TAHMOUSH, Albert J.	(1)90,(2)386,388,(13)1914,(15)2126,2137,2203,2205
TAIT, Charles W.	(2)379,(15)2195
TAIT, Robert N.	(8)1234,1274,(22)3173
TAKAGI, Sakuma	(28)3886
TAKAO, Shunsuke	(28)3887,3888
TALBO, Pedro	(23)3297
TALBOT, Ralph Jr	(9)1429
TANAKA, Francis F.	(30)4131
TANAKA, Thomas T.	(30)4137
TANG, En Po	(22)3116
TANKA, Francis	(30)4016
TANNER, Homer G.	(22)3173
TARADASH, Edwin R.	(12)1809
TARBELL, Albert W.	(1)112
TARBUK-SENSENHORST, Felix	(25)3531 von
TARMAN, Thomas W.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 17/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TARPLEY, Harburd E.	(23)3362
TARR, J.L.	(11)1694
TARRANT, Howard	(22)3136
TARUC, Luis	(23)3318,3324,3372,3374,(29)3963
TATE, Albert Jr	(23)3363
TATGE, Paul M.	(2)386,(15)2203
TATUR, Henry J.	(8)1275
TAUB, Kurt L.	(13)1917
TAUGER, Bernard	(23)3357
TAYLOR, Brainerd	(1)47
TAYLOR, Daniel M.	(2)178,179
TAYLOR, Eugene S.	(2)384,386,(15)2200,2203
TAYLOR, Frank D.	(2)390,(13)1930,(15)2208
TAYLOR, Harry	(4)584
TAYLOR, Henry A.	(3)465
TAYLOR, Irene	(1)20,(17)2354
TAYLOR, James E.	(23)3362

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 34/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

NAME	REFERENCE
TAYLOR, Job	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
TAYLOR, John G.	(22)3136
TAYLOR, John Robert	(26)3687-3690,3692
TAYLOR, Mark N.	(12)1809
TAYLOR, Maxwell	(14)2030
TAYLOR, Merton R.	(23)3364
TAYLOR, Orville J.	(27)3717-3720
TAYLOR, Robert A.	(8)1275
TAYLOR, Robert J.	(30)4133
TAYLOR, Royce R.Jr	(1)103
TAYLOR, Tom H.	(23)3367
TAYLOR, Vernon	(13)1939
TAYLOR, W.E.	(5)912
TAYLOR, W.H.	(14)2060
TAYLOR, William L.	(22)3173
TEAGUE, Charles C.	(2)393,(15)2211
TEALL, E.G.	(22)3192

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 51/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TEEPLE, David S.	(5)925,(8)1274,1279,(22)3215
TEETER, Daniel E.	(22)3063,3070,3138
TEHAAN, F.A.	(5)924
TEJADA, Jose Miguel	(9)1426
TELCHOW (Dr.)	(8)1300
TELLER, Gustav	(2)376,(15)2191
TEMPLETON, William B.	(2)392,(5)921,931,(13)1938,(15)2210
TENNENBAUM, Alex P.	(10)1473
TEPLEY, Elmer	(2)394,(13)1939,(15)2212
TERRELL, Henry Jr	(2)244
TERRY, Ben	(23)3355
TERRY, George V. Jr	(12)1809
TERRY, Thomas A.	(7)1110
TESCHLER, Felix L.	(2)394,(15)2212
TESKE, Clyde L.	(23)3222
TESS, Laurence J.	(9)1447,(19)2639
THAXTER, John H.	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 68/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
THAYER, Sylvanus	(2)175
THEODOLI, Niccolo	(12)1708
THERIAULT, Adrian C.	(12)1809
THEURER, John P.	(12)1809
THEYENIN, Rene	(22)3192
THIELE, Joseph C.	(1)90,(2)380,(13)1921,(15)2196
THIERY, Heinrich	(19)2660
THILL, Vincent J.	(5)921,(11)1557,1597,1658,1665,1668
THOMAS (fnu)	(20)2862
THOMAS, Basil A.	(22)3173
THOMAS, Edgar V.	(2)375,(15)2191
THOMAS, Helal A.	(12)1809
THOMAS, Jacques	(17)2358
THOMAS, Joe E.	(2)394,(15)2212
THOMAS, Lauren F.	(30)4137
THOMAS, Melvin W.	(22)3173
THOMAS, Robert F.	(8)1275

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 85/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
THOMAS, Willard L.	(25)3583
THOMASON, Karl W.	(23)3362
THOMPSON, Basil	(4)527
THOMPSON, Charles O.	(22)3060
THOMPSON, Earle C.	(12)1809
THOMPSON, Francis S.	(8)1275
THOMPSON, Frank D.	(8)1275
THOMPSON, Grover C.	(5)897,(8)1235,1274,1279
THOMPSON, Horace S.	(23)3362
THOMPSON, John B.	(23)3361
THOMPSON, John H.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
THOMPSON, Matthew C.Jr	(2)393,(15)2210
THOMPSON, Richard L.	(25)3583
THOMPSON, William G.	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
THOMSON, Robert B.	(23)3362
THORDARSON, Ingvar M.	(10)1472
THORN, John H.	(1)90,(5)910,(22)3041,3052,3080,3082,3138

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 102/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
THORPE, Elliot R.	(2)307,(23)3233,3236-3240,3244,3309,3310,3312,3313, 3322,3337,(28)3821,3822,3866
THOUMSIN, Servious F.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
THRASHER, William H.	(23)3366
THRIFT, Edgar M.	(23)3359
THUME, Jack G.	(23)3355
THURBER, Philip	(7)1127
THURMOND, Benjamin J.	(2)378,(15)2194
TIDBALL, John L.	(9)1356
TIDRICK, Don L.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
TIERNEY, John J.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
TIGNOR, Patrick H.	(2)381,392,(13)1923,(15)2197,2210
TILL, Charles P.	(22)3173
TILLEY, Eugene D.	(22)3103-3106,3138
TILLI, William J.	(10)1501,1502
TILLSON, John C.F.	(3)411
TIMMONS, William H.	(23)3360

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 119/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TIMOTHY, P.H.	(6)945,946
TIMPANO, Angelo J.	(30)4132
TIMPONE, Joseph P.	(23)3361
TINDALL, Richard R.	(10)1505
TINDALL, Robert K.	(22)3215
TINIUS, Paula	(25)3583
TIPPEN, William K.	(12)1809
TIPTON, Thomas L.	(11)1628,1654,(12)1809
TIRADO, Hilario	(9)1447
TITMAN (fnu)	(15)2197
TITMAN, Paul W.	(2)375,(15)2191
TITTLE, Clarence S.	(2)376,386,(15)2192,2203
TITUS, John L.	(8)1275
TOBER (fnu)	(15)2197
TOBIN, Edward A.	(5)925,(10)1498
TOBIN, F.L.	(8)1307
TOBLER, Frederick C.	(1)91,(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 136/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TODISH, James W.	(29)3999
TOFANT, William J.	(2)379,(13)1911,(15)2195,(16)2233
TOGNETTI, Paul E.	(22)3173,(30)4131
TOJO, Hideki	(1)147,(2)321,(28)3822-3824,3882
TOKOS, George M.	(23)3361
TOKUSHIGE, Carl	(1)91
TOKUSHIGE, William T.	(30)4130
TOLLI, Joseph P.	(2)374,(13)1921,(15)2189
TOMASIC, Steve E.	(2)375,(15)2190
TOMICH, Alex	(2)390,(15)2207
TOMKE, Richard A.	(2)387,390,(15)2203,2207
TOMLIN, John G.	(23)3259,3362
TOMLINSON, Frank J.	(23)3364
TOMPKINS, Edward B.	(10)1540B
TOMPKINS, Francis P.	(15)2141,2153,2154
TOMPKINS, Harry F.	(22)3173
TONGYAI, Singkata	(22)3121,3138

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 153/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TONINI, Melio A.	(1)91,(5)923,(12)1709,1727,1736,1809
TOOMBS, Harry B.	(2)378,(15)2193
TOOMEY, Cornelius H.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
TOORAN, T.	(16)2245
TORMEY, B.A.	(24)3399
TORNETTA, Anthony J.	(1)53,91,(2)373,(15)2188,(19)2667,2668
TORPHY, Francis X.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
TORRES, Amado	(25)3550-3552
TOSCANO, Frank V.	(2)377,(15)2193
TOSTAIN, George	(18)2552,2553
TOTH, Geza	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
TOUMLIN, John	(10)1481,1482
TOURNU, Jean George	(14)2063,2064
TOUSIGNANT, Edmond J.	(2)385,(12)1809,(15)2201
TOWNE, Maurice H. Jr	(1)91,(23)3240,3358
TOWNS, Dorner K.	(10)1472
TOWNSEND, Casper W.B.Jr	(1)100,(23)3357

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 170/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TOWNSEND, E.C.	(6)952
TOWNSEND, Paul B.	(22)3215,3355
TOZIER, Roy G.	(1)91,(2)380,(11)1576,1590,1596,1601,1643-1645,1655, 1686,(12)1809,(15)2196
TRABANT, Warren E.	(1)91,(2)389
TRACY, Richard L.	(2)382,390,(13)1928,(15)2198,2207
TRAICOFF, George	(2)391,(13)1931,(15)2208
TRAIN, H.V.	(7)1091
TRAPP, Robert L.	(23)3359
TRASK, Victor	(29)3997
TRAVER, Robert S.	(8)1275
TRAVIS, A.	(5)923
TRAVIS, Porter M.Jr	(1)91,(2)388,(13)1912,(14)2095,(15)2205,(19)2630
TREADWELL, William	(4)529
TREAS, Walter O.	(9)1367,1374
TREDWAY, Paul W.	(23)3358
TREITEL, Henry D.	(2)388,(15)2205

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHT ‖Rec: 187/246 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TRESCA, Edward	(15)2127
TREVATHAN, Louis B.	(1)101
TREVISAN, Giusto	(25)3577
TREVOR-ROPER, Hugh	(26)3614
TRINIDAD, Arsenio P.	(23)3362
TRIUMPHO, James B.	(2)392,(15)2210
TROMBLEY, Norvell A.	(9)1448
TROUT, Clarence W.	(1)91,98,(5)913,(23)3270,3272,3332,3356
TROY, Francis J.	(8)1277
TRUDEAU, Arthur G.	(1)147,(2)340,370
TRUDEAU, Edmond E.	(22)3213
TRUE, Ralph O.Jr	(1)91,(12)1809
TRUMAN, Harry S.	(26)3603,(27)3790,(29)3965
TRUMBLE, John W.	(1)106
TRUMPS, Shirly R.	(1)103
TRUNKWALTER (fnu)	(27)3796
TRUSCOTT, Lucian K.	(12)1736,1793

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TRUTON, Hallam W.Jr	(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
TSE, Sum F.	(23)3362
TSUCHIYAMA, Tommy	(30)4130
TUBMAN, Richard L.	(22)3173
TUCKER, Knowles	(22)3138
TUCKER, Ralph W.	(17)2396-2403,2405
TUCKER, Robert W.	(2)387,(5)919,(6)953,(11)1607,1628,1654,1666,(12)1809 (15)2204
TUMINO, Ralph	(2)390,(15)2207
TUNAL, Joe R.	(5)911,(8)1215
TUNNEY, Thomas J.	(3)469
TUPAS, Ernest	(23)3229,3230
TURECHEK, Chester S.	(5)903,(9)1356
TURKOWSKI, Leonard S.	(2)376,(15)2191
TURNBLAZER, William J.	(23)3360
TURNBULL, Harry G.	(1)91
TURNER, A.	(5)918

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TURNER, Arthur C.	(1)147,(2)188,281,(3)445,(22)3177,3194,3204,3205, 3208-3211,3213
TURNER, Chapman	(1)106,(5)896,(23)3300,3359
TURNER, Clarence E.	(12)1809
TURNER, Donald C.	(10)1472
TURNER, Elbert D. Jr	(9)1376,1382,1387-1389,1399,1415-1418,1431,1447, (22)3155,3173
TURNER, Emery D.Jr	(2)394,(5)896,928,(15)2211
TURNER, Francis E.	(23)3364
TURNER, Kenneth L.	(22)3093
TURNER, Leon W.	(9)1356
TURNER, Morris	(23)3360
TURNER, Otis D. Jr	(22)3173
TURNER, Roger E.	(30)4137
TUTHILL, David R.	(23)3358
TWITTY, Joseph J.	(22)3144,3173
TWOMBLEY, Joseph G.	(30)4132

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
TWORZYDLO, Francis R.	(5)924,(10)1492,1505
TYLER, Daniel	(2)175
TYLER, Roal	(4)527
TYLER, Russel D.	(22)3128,3129
TYNG, William W.	(1)91,(2)261,(11)1596,(12)1809,(22)3041,3042,3115, 3116,3121,3138,(25)3565
TYNES, S.B.	(1)99,(5)903,(19)2658
TYSON, Kenneth S.	(2)391,(10)1473,(13)1931,(15)2208

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
UANNA, William L.	(5)903,(8)1274
UDOFF, Philip S.	(1)91,103,(2)388,393,(13)1912,(14)2095,2096,(15)2205 2210,(19)2630
UEKI, Hisao	(22)3173
UFF (Capt.)	(15)2130
UHL, Frederick E.	(2)223,(4)633,(7)1142
ULI, Frank	(11)1609
ULIBARRI, Prudencio D.	(30)4014,4015,4029,4045,4057,4058,4088,4135
ULIO, J.A.	(5)697,699,717,718,738,740,798,833,860,883,(6)959, (8)1168,1175,(22)3047
ULMER, Max	(2)384,(15)2200
ULRICH, George W.	(23)3365
UNDERHILL, Robert F.	(9)1356
UNDERWOOD (fnu)	(2)379,(15)2195,(18)2476
UNDERWOOD, Clayton H.	(2)392,(10)1473,(13)1934,(15)2209
UNDERWOOD, Donald E.	(1)92,(2)385,(9)1356,(15)2201
UNDERWOOD, Robert B.	(9)1383,1447

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
UNGER, Sam M.	(1)92,(2)374,(15)2189,(16)2315,(19)2617-2621
UNION, Wilbur M.	(12)1809
UNRATH, Walter J.	(1)20
UPDEGRAFF, William F.	(10)1473
UPTON, Emory	(2)177,178
URBAN, Josef	(26)3658
URBAN, Richard L.	(23)3366
URROZ, Hector C.	(30)4137
URRY, Donald C.	(2)379,390,(13)1929,(15)2195,2208
USAI, Luciano	(12)1791
USHIJIMA, Mitsuru	(23)3351
USHIKAWA (fnu)	(22)3088

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHU ‖Rec: 29/29 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VAIVADA, Anthony S.	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
VALENTE, Frank J.	(2)379,(15)2194
VALENTINE, William I.	(8)1276
VALERIO (Italian Col.)	(12)1801
VALK, Joseph E.	(2)391,(10)1472,(13)1933,(15)2209
VAN CASTEL, Maria	(20)2821
VANCE, John C.	(2)377,396,(13)1936,(15)2192,2214
VAN COTTEN (fnu)	(11)1613,1614
VAN DEMAN, Ralph	(1)41-44,148,(2)185,186,189,(3)401,402,404,406,422 427,434,437,438,457,459,460,469,514,(4)522,523, 525-532,535,546,551,556
VANDENBERG, Hoyt S.	(1)148,(2)329
VANDENBULCKE, Charles E.	(2)382,386,(13)1924,(15)2198,2203
VAN DER PLOEG, Jacob J.	(2)377,(15)2193
VANDERSLUIS, Francis J.Jr	(23)3362
VANDOORNE, Valentin	(15)2157
VAN DYKE, Gerald M.	(22)3173

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHV ‖Rec: 17/99 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VAN HORN, Elvin E.Jr.	(9)1447
VAN KIRK, Arthur H.	(2)387,(5)921,(11)1632,1654,(12)1809,(15)2204
VAN LEEUWEN, George H.	(30)4131
VAN NATTA, Thomas F.	(3)434
VANNET, Leonard O.	(12)1809,(25)3583
VAN NUYS, Hervey A.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
VAN OTTEN, Andrew C.	(1)92,(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189,(16)2269,(18)2488, 2489,(19)2656
VAN RUYN (fnu)	(11)1612,1613
VARENICK, Michael I.	(1)92,(2)381,(13)1922,(14)2043-2045,(15)2143,2144, 2197
VARGA, Emery E.	(22)3199,3213
VARGAS, Frank A.Jr	(2)381,384,386,(13)1922,(15)2197,2200,2203
VARGAS, Getulio	(8)1188,1190,1191,1210
VARGAS, Jorge B.	(23)3319,3320
VARINI, Arnaldo	(12)1798
VASSE, Louis L.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VASSO, Edward S.	(1)103
VAUGHAN, Spruill J.	(8)1275
VAUGHN, Bradley W.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
VAUGHN, Cleatis L.	(23)3362
VAUGHN, Roland C.	(22)3195,3214
VAUTRAIN, Robert G.	(22)3076,3121,3138
VAZQUEZ, Juan	(9)1404,1407,1408
VEACH, John L.	(2)378,(15)2194
VEASEY, Henry A.	(24)3437
VEAZEY, Harold A.	(1)101
VEGA, Simon	(9)1399
VEINERMAN, Jenny	(29)3966
VEITNER (fnu)	(20)2826
VEKICH, John D.	(2)375,(15)2190
VELEZ, Pedro M.Jr.	(5)897,(9)1406-1411,1415,1417-1421,1424,1425,1427, 1428,1447
VELIE, John D.	(22)3173,3199,3213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHV ‖Rec: 51/99 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VELLA (Lt.)	(3)441
VELLA, Vincent J.	(25)2583
VENABLE, John D.	(23)3360
VENARD (fnu)	(22)3192
VENDE (Dr.)	(20)2819
VENGROUSKIE, Victor J.	(2)380,(11)1629,1654,(12)1809,(15)2196
VERBER, Otto	(25)3539
VERITY, Felix S.	(2)394,395,(13)1932,(15)2212,2213
VERNEUILL, Francoise	(17)2350
VERTIOCHIO, Paul C.	(12)1809
VETTELL, Charles T.	(8)1275
VICTOR, Oliver A.	(1)100,(2)377,(5)915,(13)1919,(14)2040,2082,2092,2093 (15)2118,2193,(16)2223,2276-2278,2327,(19)2601 (26)3674
VICTOR, Robert C.	(23)3363
VIDAL, Joseph	(1)96,(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204,(17)2400
VIGNOVICH, Demetri	(1)97,(25)3554,3556

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VILLONE, William L.	(22)3173
VILLYARD, James G.	(30)4037,4137
VINCENT, Arthur T.	(2)387,(11)1609,(12)1708,1709,1809,(15)2204
VINCIGUERRA, John V.	(8)1275
VINE, William A.	(23)3364
VINES, William	(2)392,(15)2210
VINEY, William E.	(5)901,(11)1609,1652
VINSON, John B.	(2)390,(13)1930,(15)2208
VITROTTI (fnu)	(25)3570,3571
VITTORIA, Fuchs	(25)3552
VLIEGEN, Ferdinand	(17)2350
VODDEN, Herbert C.	(23)3357
VOELKEL, Otto	(18)2528
VOERTMAN, Russell	(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200
VOGEL, Charles C.	(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189
VOGEL, Ernst	(20)2780
VOGEL, Rudy C.	(1)92

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHV ‖Rec: 85/99 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
VOGT, Albert D.	(2)376,(15)2192
VOIGHT, Erich J.	(2)393,(15)2210
VOITLE, Robert F.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1809,(15)2196
VOLKER, Leopold	(20)2878,2879
VOLKERT, Karl	(20)2838,2839
VOLKMAR, William J.	(1)39,(2)178
VOLPE, Joseph Jr.	(8)1274
VOLPE, Julius A.	(12)1809
VOLPONE, Julius J.	(25)3583
VORHEES, John D.	(1)92,(22)3070,3071,3138
VOSKA, Victor	(1)41,148,(2)184
VREELAND, Albert L.	(2)281,(5)918,(23)3244,3245,3247,3272,3276,3278
VREELAND, George Harry	(1)92,(2)394,(15)2211
VYTH, Arnold	(2)393,(15)2211,(20)2855

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHV ‖Rec: 99/99 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WAARA, Robert	(10)1472
WABERSKI, Paul (Pablo)	(3)478-481
WAERING, Peter K.	(23)3365,(29)3952
WAGENER, William S.	(8)1275
WAGERMANN, Hans	(16)2245
WAGNER, Arthur L.	(1)148,(2)181
WAGNER, Charles W.	(23)3362
WAGNER, Emil C.	(8)1275
WAGNER, John J.	(2)395,(10)1473,(13)1935,(15)2213
WAGNER, Oscar S.	(22)3173
WAGNER, Walter (NMI)	(23)3358
WAGNER, Walter C.	(23)3242
WAGNER, Walter W.	(2)392,(15)2210
WAHLSTER, Edouard	(19)2659
WAINWRIGHT, Jonathan M.	(23)3226-3228
WALCOFF, Walter	(9)1448
WALCOTT, John C.	(1)53,(5)922,(12)1809

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WALDNER, Paul F.	(8)1275
WALDREN, Taylor C.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
WALDRUCH, Friedrich	(18)2508,2509
WALHUS, Donald F.	(9)1355
WALKER, Albert E.	(23)3366
WALKER, Andrew A.	(8)1275
WALKER, Aubrey W.	(23)3364
WALKER, Dewey S.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
WALKER, Dow E.	(23)3363
WALKER, George D.	(2)386,391,(13)1933,(15)2202,2209
WALKER, George H.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
WALKER, John E.	(1)92
WALKER, Kenneth O.	(2)382,384,(13)1925,(15)2198,2200,(18)2497
WALKER, Stewart	(22)3081
WALKER, Theodore J.	(1)148,(2)235,269,(4)650,894,(6)944,948
WALL, Merrill C.	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
WALLACE, Henry	(30)4124

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 34/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WALLACE, Lew	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
WALLACE, Thomas L.	(23)3361
WALLACE, Wayne S.	(22)3173
WALLACE, William C.	(5)925,(22)3191,3193,3194,3206,3214
WALLACE, William H.Jr	(1)96,100,(2)377,393,(5)901,929,(13)1911,(15)2192, 2211
WALLACE, William J.	(14)2100
WALLBAUM, Robert F.	(1)53,(23)3222
WALLEN, Alois	(16)2319
WALLENHORST, Harry H.	(2)381,(13)1923,(15)2197
WALLER, Hans J.	(30)4046,4047
WALLER, John W.	(2)392,396,(13)1936,1938,(15)2210,2214
WALSH, Charles E.	(23)3360
WALSH, Edward D.	(8)1275
WALSH, E.Taylor	(9)1355
WALSH, Harry R.	(8)1234,1275,1279
WALSH, Robert L.	(2)265,(10)1526,1527,(27)3717,3791

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WALSH, Thomas F.	(8)1277
WALTENS, Sumner	(2)394,(15)2212
WALTER, Mercer C.	(6)969,(11)1552,1565,1625,1638
WALTER, William F.	(30)4053,4054,4124,4135
WALTERS, David W	(23)3285,3360
WALTERS, Mack G.	(10)1538
WALTON, Louis S.	(1)92
WALZER, Howard B.	(2)382,(15)2198
WANNER, Maximilian R.	(2)377,(15)2193
WANVIG (Col)	(11)1666
WARD, Alfred W.	(23)3357
WARD, Andrew L.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
WARD, Cabot	(1)7,(2)188,(3)407,414-416,420,430,431,438,454,489 493,494,496,497,504-511,(4)524,526,648,662
WARD, James	(28)3822
WARD, James A.	(23)3366
WARD, John O.	(23)3360

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 68/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WARD, Palmer W.	(30)4135
WARD, Paul F.	(5)903,(22)3078,3138
WARD, William G.	(30)4072,4110,4131,4139
WARDELL, Hilliare P.	(1)92,103,(2)380,(15)2145,2196,(19)2644
WARNER, Jack R.	(1)92,(2)374,(13)1918,(15)2189,(16)2266
WARNER, William L.	(8)1275
WARREN, Alba H.Jr	(1)92,(12)1709,1770,1772,1809
WARREN, Edmund A.	(23)3359
WASHBURN, F.Sanders	(25)3572
WASHBURN, Robert S.	(25)3583
WASHINGTON, George	(1)9,38,148,(2)175
WATERS, Arthur R.	(22)3215
WATHEN, Frank J.	(1)109,(5)905,(23)3365
WATKINS, James E.Jr	(2)386,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
WATKINS, John B.	(3)415,451,494,504,512,(4)525
WATKINS, Victor	(22)3136
WATKINSON, Edwin H.	(12)1809

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WATLINGTON, Thomas M.	(30)4019,4126,4191
WATSON, Richard L.	(9)1355
WATT, Robert J.	(12)1809
WATTIGNY, Charles C.	(30)4135
WATTS, Lawrence	(1)48
WATZINGER, Alfred	(26)3673
WAUGH, Sanford A.	(2)378,(15)2194
WAYNE (fnu)	(15)2197
WEASHER, Warren K.	(2)387,(15)2203
WEASTON, Robert Q.	(2)388,(15)2205
WEATHERHOLT, Charles S.	(30)4072,4131
WEAVER, Monteith	(22)3173
WEBB, Dennis	(30)4132
WEBB, Martin L.	(5)924,(8)1274
WEBER, Eugene F.	(23)3357
WEBER, Gerald J.	(1)92,148,(11)1568,1609,(12)1708,1709,1809,(25)3497
WEBER, Hugh A.	(25)3583

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 102/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WEBSTEN, Harvey O.	(25)3583
WEBSTER, Dean H.	(1)97
WEBSTER, James P.	(1)96
WEBSTER, James R.	(5)915,(22)3173,(23)3268,3269,3307,3355
WECHSLER, Henry C.	(2)386,(15)2203
WECKERLING, John	(2)364,(5)696,(7)1149
WECLEW, Robert G.	(9)1448
WEDEL, Theodore C.	(22)3215
WEDEMEYER, Albert C.	(22)3099,3100,(30)4107-4109
WEEKS, Clarence A.	(23)3356
WEEKS, John W.	(4)548
WEEMS, Julian T.	(1)92,(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
WEHRLE, Henry L. Jr	(23)3367
WEI, Katie	(18)2483
WEICHSELBERGER, Rudolph	(25)3535
WEIDE, Roman H.	(22)3173
WEIDNER, Clinton R.	(1)93,99,(2)375,(5)908,(15)2190,(18)2556,(19)2628

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WEIGHT, Harold H.	(2)389,(15)2207
WEIL, David M.	(10)1498
WEIL, Eric L.	(1)103,(2)380,(15)2196
WEIL, Frank E.G.	(2)394,(15)2212
WEIL, Joseph	(2)373,(15)2188
WEIMER, Robert M.	(1)93,(2)372,(5)917,(13)1914,(15)2187,(26)3678
WEINBERGER, Harry	(3)471
WEINBERGER, Howard W.	(30)4132
WEINGART, Karl	(27)3768
WEINGARTEN, John L.	(8)1275
WEINSTEIN (fnu)	(15)2197
WEINSTEIN, Benjamin J.	(1)93,(23)3355
WEIR, Alfred	(2)377,(15)2193
WEIR, George M.	(27)3773
WEIS, Joseph	(26)3678
WEISENFELD, Karl Heinz	(18)2460
WEISKOPF, William J.	(2)375,(15)2191

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WEISS, Albert L.	(23)3366
WEISS, Sylvester	(8)1199
WEISSGLAS, Simon	(2)374,(15)2189
WEISSKOPF (fnu)	(15)2197
WEITZ, John H.	(2)394,(15)2212
WEITZEL, Walter M.	(23)3359
WEITZENKORN, Paul	(2)378,(15)2193
WELBORN, Charles	(2)374,377,(15)2189,2193
WELCH, Ernest G.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
WELCH, James V.	(22)3173
WELCH, Leo E.	(2)392,(15)2209
WELLS (LtCol)	(22)3108
WELLS, Gordon S.	(2)372,(13)1915,(15)2187
WELLSPRING, Thomas M.	(23)3366
WELSH, Jay Y.	(2)374,(13)1917,(15)2189
WELSH, Paul E.	(2)393,(15)2211
WEMPLE, Richard I.	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WEN, Ch'ing	(22)3105
WENDT, Charles F.	(8)1275,(23)3359
WENDT, William F.	(2)379,(15)2195
WERRENRATH, George H.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
WEST, Bill C.	(2)378,(15)2194
WEST, John B.	(22)3173
WEST, Thomas J.	(2)372,386,(13)1915,(15)2187,2203
WESTENDORF, John R.	(23)3361
WESTFRIED, Alexander H.	(22)3120,3138
WESTLING, Delbert S.	(1)93,(22)3173
WESTON, Leslie M.	(9)1356
WESTON, Payson G.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
WESTRELL, Harlan A.	(23)3367
WETHERBE, Horace S.	(10)1473
WEYER, John J.	(2)379,(15)2195
WHALEN (fnu)	(2)379,(15)2194
WHALEN, James J.	(30)4135

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 170/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WHALEN, Joseph R.	(2)377,382,(13)1911,(14)2031,(15)2192,2198,(19)2667
WHALEY, Byron A.	(2)374,386,(13)1918,(15)2122,2189,2203,(16)2266
WHEATON, George W.	(8)1275
WHEELER, Arthur D.	(2)375,(15)2190
WHEELER, Burton	(8)1207
WHEELER, Donald L.	(2)377,(13)1911,(15)2192
WHEELER, Ernest W.	(30)4137
WHEELER, R.E.	(5)914
WHEELER, Richard W.	(2)373,(13)1917,(15)2188
WHEELER, Robert H.	(30)4135
WHEELER, Walter B.	(5)916,(10)1472
WHELAN, Patrick J.	(2)373,(15)2188
WHELLEY, Thomas P.	(22)3061,3082,3120,3138
WHITAKER, Albert E.Jr.	(8)1274
WHITAKER, Donald P.	(30)4015,4101,4107,4130,4139
WHITE (fnu)	(14)2071
WHITE, Alan G.	(22)3173

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WHITE, Charles V.	(5)925,(8)1274
WHITE, D.M.	(24)3446
WHITE, Edward S.	(5)698,906,(22)3047,3052,3065,3070,3098,3110,3111, 3113-3115,3117,3138
WHITE, Everett B.	(30)4132
WHITE, Frederick J.	(2)393,(15)2211,(20)2862,2863,(26)3658
WHITE, Harold	(7)1142
WHITE, Harold R.	(8)1275
WHITE, Harry Dexter	(4)611,664
WHITE, John D.	(23)3356
WHITE, M.G.	(5)701,702
WHITE, Robert E.	(12)1809
WHITE, Robert S.	(2)391,(13)1930,(15)2208
WHITE, Rollie H.	(22)3138
WHITEHEAD, Vinson O.	(8)1276
WHITEHOUSE, William C.Jr.	(9)1448
WHITNEY, Courtney	(28)3932

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WHITSETT, John D.	(13)1921
WHITTAKER, Frank L.	(9)1337,1347
WHITTLESEY, Percival W.	(3)421
WHITWORTH, Milton T.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2213
WHRAUGH, Robert S.	(2)282
WHYTE, Michael	(22)3067,3138
WICKSON, Edward J.	(23)3359
WIDNER, Frank M.	(22)3121,3138
WIEBE, Austin R.	(2)394,(15)2212
WIEDEMAN, Fritz	(2)300
WIENCKOWSKI, Louis	(2)387,388,(13)1913,(15)2203,2205
WIESE, Friedrich	(15)2159
WILCOX, A.M.	(28)3849
WILCOX, J.B.	(30)4070
WILCOXON, James J.	(22)3173
WILDE, Guido	(20)2844
WILGUS, Sidney D.	(2)382,(13)1923,(15)2133,2198

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WILKIE, Wendell	(7)1106
WILKINS, Ernest J.	(1)93,(2)382,(13)1924,(15)2198
WILKINS, Lloyd H.	(23)3359
WILLER, James F.	(1)93,(2)378,(15)2194
WILLEY, Arthur K.Jr	(2)373,(13)1916,(15)2188
WILLIAMS, David B.	(9)1447
WILLIAMS, David S.	(1)93,(2)385,(15)2201
WILLIAMS, Donald H.	(12)1809
WILLIAMS, Garland H.	(1)148,(2)208,212,(4)621,622,643-648,650,(6)938
WILLIAMS, George F.	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188
WILLIAMS, George P.	(2)394,(10)1473,(15)2212
WILLIAMS, Harold B.	(2)387,393,(12)1809,(15)2204,2211
WILLIAMS, Richard J.	(2)380,(11)1654,(12)1809,(13)1921,(15)2196
WILLIAMS, Robert H.	(1)93,(2)372,(4)533,535,(13)1915,(15)2187,(16)2255
WILLIAMS, Tony R.	(12)1809
WILLIAMSON, Royden	(3)407,410-413
WILLIFORD, Duane A.	(1)93

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 238/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WILLIG, Marvin	(22)3214
WILLIS, Albert G. Jr	(22)3173
WILLIS, Cecil A.	(23)3363
WILLOUGHBY, Charles A.	(1)123,(23)3223,3233,3235,3236,3284,3322,3323, (24)3430,(28)3838,3841,3843,3847,3849,3853,3857,3865, 3867,3870,3871,3922
WILLS (Sgt)	(4)665
WILMOT, Chester	(16)2236,2245
WILPERS, John J. Jr	(23)3359,(28)3822-3824
WILSON (fnu)	(8)1209
WILSON, Alton A.	(23)3359
WILSON, Alvin M.	(1)93,(2)379,(15)2194
WILSON, Benjamin O.	(23)3360
WILSON, George L.	(1)101,102,107,(5)921,(22)3041,3043,3044,3047,3062, 3065,3067,3090,3091,3138,(27)3746
WILSON, Gerald M.	(23)3358
WILSON, Henry Maitland	(11)1694

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View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WILSON, Howard E.Jr	(2)281,395,(5)919,(13)1817,1937,(15)2110,2213, (26)3591,(27)3711
WILSON, Hugh Jr.	(11)1609
WILSON, Jackson L.	(30)4132
WILSON, Joe	(22)3083
WILSON, Joseph P.	(23)3362
WILSON, John H.	(4)634
WILSON, M.E.Jr	(5)931
WILSON, Meredith R.	(2)381,390,(13)1928,(14)2028,2100,(15)2197,2207, (19)2595,2631
WILSON, Milo D.	(23)3365
WILSON, Paul	(12)1809
WILSON, Paul T.	(24)3410
WILSON, Paul W.	(8)1276
WILSON, Perry B.	(9)1448,1540B
WILSON, Robert E.	(23)3364
WILSON, W.H.	(4)573

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 272/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WILSON, W.K.	(4)570
WILSON, Woodrow	(4)524-526
WILTZ, Evans E.	(25)3583
WIMER, Walter	(2)393,(15)2211,(20)2854
WINCHELL, Walter	(14)2092
WINCHESTER, George A.	(23)3362
WINDMOELLER, Henry	(25)3541
WINETSKY, Morris	(23)3362
WING, Ernest H.	(23)3366
WINGATE, Orde C.	(22)3082
WINGFIELD, Hale	(30)4131
WINGREN, Richard H.	(8)1277
WINKLER, Carl E.	(29)3952
WINKLER, Mark	(2)389,(6)968,(15)2206
WINSTEAD, Charles B.	(8)1274
WINTER, Samuel	(2)374,(15)2190
WIRTH, Otto	(1)93,(2)384,(13)1926,(15)2200

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 289/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WIRTSHAFTER, Robert J.	(2)387,(15)2203
WISE, Hugh D.Jr	(1)148,(2)216,230,235,257,(4)621,634,650,665,670, (5)681,684,685,686,689,691,702,708,710,712,719,728 730,734,745-747,757,894,(6)966,(7)1096,1107,1108,1111 1112,1115,1131-1133,1139,1141,1143,1144,1151,1157, (9)1385,(10)1469,1477-1480,1482-1486,1488,1490,1492- 1495,1497,1498,1500,(11)1592,1595,1604,1657,1659-1661 1672,1673,1683-1685,(13)1815-1817,1819-1823,1826,1827 (22)3176
WISE, William L.	(9)1355
WISEMAN, T.J.	(30)4135
WISHART, John W.	(23)3365
WISNIEWSKI, Leo R.Jr	(1)93,(22)3120,3138
WITHROW, Edward S.	(22)3120,3138
WITKOWSKI, T.E.	(24)3424
WITSELL, Edward F.	(24)3389,3390
WITT, W.H.	(5)895

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICHW ‖Rec: 306/375 ‖ ‖ Caps

View and edit fields.

NAME	REFERENCE
WITTENBERGER, Park	(2)387,(15)2203
WITTIG, Lawrence M.	(23)3364
WITTROCK, Norbert B.	(1)93,(2)380,(11)1652,(12)1809,(15)2196
WITTWER, Wallace K.	(30)4027,4101,4102,4131,4139
WITZKE, Lothar	(3)476-482
WOJCIECHOWSKY, Henry A.	(30)4133
WOJUSCHONSKI, Henry A.	(1)93
WOLF, Charles H.	(23)3360
WOLF, Edwin II	(2)394,(15)2212
WOLF, Frederick	(9)1394
WOLF, Karl	(25)3536
WOLFE (fnu)	(15)2197
WOLFE, Albert E.	(27)3742
WOLFE, George	(5)910
WOLFE, Gomer A.	(10)1473
WOLFE, Havard A.Jr.	(12)1809
WOLFE, Hiram N.Jr	(1)102

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NAME	REFERENCE
WOLFF, Frank A.	(20)2759
WOLKOMIR, Maurice N.	(2)384,386,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
WOLTZ, Robert K.	(2)391,(13)1921,(15)2208
WONG, Albert T.	(22)3136
WONG, Andrew S.	(22)3173
WONG, Bing Y.	(30)4138
WONSON, Henry J.	(2)394,(15)2212
WOO, Sick-foon	(22)3083,3084,3121
WOOD, Alvin R.	(1)94,(23)3367
WOOD, Eugene H.	(1)109,(23)3361
WOOD, Glenn	(23)3365
WOOD, H.G.	(5)897
WOOD, James	(28)3822
WOOD, James L.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
WOOD, Kenneth I.	(2)387,(12)1809,(15)2204
WOOD, Leonard	(1)40,(2)183
WOOD, Roy	(8)1213

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NAME	REFERENCE
WOOD, Stuart	(23)3223,3227
WOOD, W.S.	(28)3838
WOODALL, John B.	(2)384,(13)1925,(15)2200
WOODLE, Albert D. Jr	(22)3173
WOODMAN, Richard S.	(23)3355
WOODRING, Harry H.	(4)613
WOODRUFF, R.B.	(4)541
WOODS, Arthur A. Jr	(30)4130
WOODS, John T.	(1)53,94,(2)374,(15)2189
WOODS, Rudolph A.	(23)3356
WOOLETT, Leroy A.Jr	(2)387,(11)1609,(12)1809,(15)2204
WOOLLEY, John C.	(8)1305
WORDEN, Donald A.	(22)3214
WRIGHT, Arthur W. Jr	(23)3359
WRIGHT, C.D.	(8)1199-1201
WRIGHT, Charles E. Jr	(30)4132
WRIGHT, David	(1)94,(2)381,(13)1922,(15)2197

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NAME	REFERENCE
WRIGHT, Edwin W.	(23)3360
WRIGHT, George B.	(2)392,(13)1938,(15)2210
WRIGHT, James A.	(9)1355,(10)1540B
WRIGHT, Joseph	(28)3841,3857,3861,3864,3875,3878,3879,3922
WRIGHT, Lee	(1)96
WRIGHT, Robert P.	(2)394,(15)2212
WRIGHT, Thomas S.	(30)4119
WRIGHT, Turbutt M.L.	(23)3355
WULF (fnu)	(18)2563
WULFF, Alvert V.R.Jr.	(8)1275
WURTZ, Robert H.	(30)4135
WUSSOW, Paul A.	(1)94
WYCHE, I.T.	(4)604
WYLES, Paul V.	(1)94,(2)373,(15)2189
WYLIE, Robert H.	(8)1313
WYLLIE, Robert	(1)94,(30)4132
WYMAN, Paul H.	(2)393,(15)2210

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NAME	REFERENCE
WYPER, David	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188

NAME	REFERENCE
YAEGER, Edwin R.	(2)379,392,(13)1939,(15)2195,2210
YAKOBIAN, George J.	(23)3281,3366
YAKOVLOV, Anna Pavlovna	(30)4055,4124
YALE, E.B. Jr	(22)3173
YAMAGATA, Clarence	(23)3225-3227
YAMAGUCHI, George T.	(1)53
YAMAOKA (fnu)	(28)3926
YAMASHIRO, Kiyoshi	(22)3173
YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki	(23)3231,3298,3370
YAN, Ke Hen	(30)4054
YANG, Stephan S.S.	(30)4016,4138
YANORSKY, John	(1)102
YARBOROUGH, William P.	(1)99
YARDLEY, Herbert O.	(3)470,473
YARNEVICH, Ernest N.	(2)384,385,(5)908,(13)1927,(15)2200,2201
YASTER, William A.	(22)3213
YEAMAN, William R.	(23)3364

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NAME	REFERENCE
YEATON, Ivan D.	(22)3122
YENSER, Herbert K.	(23)3365
YIM, Louise	(30)4093
YOH, Franklin C.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
YOHN, Harold F.	(9)1356
YOON, Chong Tam	(30)4043
YOSHIDA, John D.	(30)4130
YOUKER, Malcolm P.	(23)3366,(29)3952
YOUMANS, David R.	(2)395,(15)2212,(22)3215
YOUNG, Charles F.	(22)3173
YOUNG, George D.	(1)94,100,(2)378,(5)901,(15)2194,(16)2220,(19)2663
YOUNG, Jon L.	(2)391,(10)1472,(15)2209
YOUNG, Marvin N.	(9)1447
YOUNG, Oscar	(2)393,(15)2211
YOUNG, Ralph D.	(22)3173
YOUNG, S.B.M.	(2)181
YOUNG, Stuart A. Jr	(2)372,(13)1916,(15)2188

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NAME	REFERENCE
YOUNG, Stuart Adams	(10)1473
YOUNG, Thomas C. Jr	(11)1651,1665
YOUNG, Wesley I.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2199,2202
YOUNG, Wilbur	(1)133
YOUNG, William	(1)96
YOUNG, William G.	(2)391,(13)1933,(15)2209
YURKO, Albert	(30)4135

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NAME	REFERENCE
ZABALDENO, Frank C.	(1)99,(2)376,(15)2191,(19)2660
ZACHIS, Russell	(22)3098
ZAHN, Richard T.	(2)394,(15)2212
ZAHOUR, Edward F.	(9)1447
ZAJAC, Peter	(2)388,(13)1912,(15)2204
ZANARDI, Ivo	(12)1775
ZANDER, David W.	(9)1356
ZANDER, Wilhelm	(26)3614
ZANIBONA, Tito	(12)1707
ZANZUCCKI, Albert A.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
ZEENDER, John K.	(2)383,385,(13)1927,(15)2200,2202
ZEGOLIS, George	(1)112
ZELLAR, Jan B.	(1)94,(2)373,(15)2189
ZELLENLEITER (fnu)	(19)2610
ZELLER, Maurice	(17)2350
ZELLER, Theodore R.	(2)395,(13)1935,(15)2213
ZEMAN, George	(2)376,(15)2191

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NAME	REFERENCE
ZERNICKE, George A.	(1)94,99,(2)373,(15)2189
ZEUTHEN, Leon H.	(10)1472
ZICKA, Ralph L.	(2)394,(15)2212
ZIELASKO, Gustave W.	(2)373,381,394,(11)1609,1654,(13)1922,(15)2188,2197, 2211
ZIFF, Bertram A.	(2)392,(13)1934,(15)2209
ZIMMER, Willard H.	(8)1275
ZIMMER, Willard J.	(9)1356
ZIMMERMAN, Arthur	(3)475
ZIMMERMAN, Charles F.	(23)3359,3364
ZIMMERMAN, Joseph	(16)2316
ZIMMERMAN, Richard G.	(2)394,(13)1916,(15)2211
ZIMMERMAN, William E.	(23)3360
ZIMMERMANN, Heinrich	(20)2771,2772
ZIMWALT, Dean E.	(8)1277
ZINDLE, Harold J.	(8)1275
ZINK, Joseph M.	(23)3362

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NAME	REFERENCE
ZINN, Charles W.	(22)3138
ZINOVIK, Fred	(25)3583
ZINSMASTER, Arthur J.	(23)3364
ZINTZ, David	(2)376,381,394,(13)1923,(15)2116,2192,2197,2212
ZIPPRIAN, Alfred I.	(22)3120,3138
ZOCCA, Louis R.	(2)387,(15)2204
ZOELLER, Bilbert J. Jr	(10)1472
ZOLLER, Alvin	(2)376,(15)2191
ZOLLNER, Hans	(2)394,(15)2212
ZOLNA, Walter J.	(2)375,(15)2190
ZUDIN, Sergei	(30)4053
ZUELCH, Karl	(16)2329,2330
ZUK, Peter	(1)94,(2)378,(15)2194
ZULLO, Frank	(1)94
ZUNDEL, E.A.	(1)48,(2)356,(24)3383,3396,3397,(27)3720,(28)3824, 3868
ZUSPANN, Eugene P.	(2)395,(13)1936,(15)2214

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NAME	REFERENCE
ZWEIG, Michael H.W.	(2)387,(15)2203

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

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1st (1)50,57,58,60,67,75,78,79,87,89,93,96,(2)372,(5)835,(13)1830,(14)2027 2029,2034,2038,2059,2069-2071,2078,2081,2095,2097,2103,2104,(15)2111, 2112,2116,2129,2148,2187,(16)2240,(18)2463,2468,2469,2482,2483,2571, (19)2599,2600,2622,2682,2683,(26)3664,(27)3711,3712

2nd (1)52,60,80,81,86,92,96,122,123,126,132,133,142,143,(2)372,(5)835, (14)2027,2029,2039,2071,2102,(15)2187,(16)2288,(17)2462,2463,2466, 2468,(18)2571,(19)2652,(20)2803-2805,(24)3455,3456

3rd (1)52,67,84,96,123,131,133,134,143,(2)372,(5)835,(12)1805-1809, (15)2163,2187,(17)2365,2378,2379,2383,2385,2439,2441,(18)2529,2530, 2540,(24)3450

4th (1)59,72,74,79,93,96,(2)372,(5)835,(14)2027,2028,2032,2036,2038,2039, 2042-2047,2079,2080,2085,2091,(15),2123,2124,2130,2140,2187,(16)2254- -2256,2293,2294,(18)2459,2480-2482,2572,(19)2600,2602,2622,2684, (20)2847,2848,(24)3455

5th (1)65,84,96,(2)372,(5)835,(14)2076,2078,2084,2085,2097,(15)2130,2148- -2153,2187,2188,(16)2302-2304,2309,2311,(18)2483,2484,2491,2572, (19)2600,2622,2653,2654,(20)2760,2761,(24)3450

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7th (1)61,69,71,86,93,96,123,142,143,(5)836,(22)3159,3160,3166,3167, (23)3292,3298-3300,3341,3344-3346,3348-3350,(30)4008,4009

8th (1)97,(2)373,(5)836,(14)2076-2078,(15)2188,(16)2288,2294,(18)2573, (19)2654,2673,2682,2690,(20)2805

9th (1)97,(2)373,(5)836,(14)2027,2028,2033,2047,(15)2136-2139,2188, (16)2237,2238,2253,2254,(18)2490,2573,(19)2622,2655,(20)2761,2762, 2806,(24)3443,(26)3651,3652

10th (1)55,70,90,97,(12)1773-1775,1802,1805,1806,1808,1809,(24)3454, (25)3495,3545,3546,3552,3553,3560

11th (1)51,97,(5)836,(23)3299,3308,3326,3355,(24)3448,3449,(28)3819,3839

13th (1)97,(2)373,(15)2188,(18)2494,(19)2616,2623,2666,2668,(20)2894,2895

16th (1)97

17th (1)53,55,60,91,97,(2)350,353,373,(15)2188,(18)2485,2494

18th (1)97

19th (1)97

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21st    (1)97
22nd    (1)97
23rd    (1)97
24th    (1)62,97,122,123,135,136,(5)836,(23)3292,3293,3296-3298,3331-3333,
        3355,(28)3819
25th    (1)98,123,137,(5)836,(22)3205,3206,(23)3275,3307,3326,3355
26th    (1)67,68,70,78,80,82,83,85,90,94,98,(2)373,(15)2145,2189,(16)2317,
        (18)2486,2574
27th    (1)66,98,(5)836,(22)3159,3160,3166,3167,(23)3341,3345,3348,(28)3819
28th    (1)82,98,(2)374,(5)836,(14)2076,(15)2189,(16)2254,2288,(18)2574
29th    (1)56,72,73,80,84,92,98,(2)374,(5)837,(14)2027,2029,2034,2035,2038,
        2039,2054,2059,2066,2068,2081,2084,2085,2091-2094,2097,2098,2102,2103,
        (15)2122,2131,2134,2139,2189,(16)2222,2225,2259,2262,2264-2274,2317,
        2318,(18)2452,2486-2489,2574,(19)2601,2602,2623-2326,2656,2657,
        (20)2744,2763,2766-2770,2808-2810,(26)3680-3683,3687
30th    (1)98,(2)374,(5)837,(14)2040,2054,2056,2059-2062,2067,2072,2073,


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31st    (1)98,(5)837,(23)3270-3272,3331-3333,3356
32nd    (1)98,(5)837,(23)3298,3307,3326,3356,(28)3819
33rd    (1)98,(5)837,(23)3272,3307,3326,3356,(28)3819
34th    (1)51,85,98,(2)290,(5)837,(12)1722,1805,1806,1808,1809
35th    (1)53,65,68,79,81,92,94,98,(2)374,(5)837,(14)2076,2082,2084,2092,2097,
        2098,2101,(15)2138,2152-2154,2189,(16)2313,2315,(18)2574,(19)2602,
        2617,2619,2621,2642,(20)2770,2771,2811,2812
36th    (1)98,(2)374,(5)837,(12)1805-1809,(15)2162,2163,2169,2172,2173,2190,
        (17)2349,2350,2361,2439,2441,(19)2591,2592,(20)2849,2850,(26)3631-3643
37th    (1)98,(5)838,(23)3307-3309,3314,3319,3326,3356
38th    (1)98,(5)838,(23)3300,3326,3356
39th    (1)63,(8)1192
40th    (1)98,123,(5)838,(23)3273,3307,3310,3324,3333,3334,3357,(30)4008,4009
41st    (1)98,(5)838,(23)3330,3331,3333,3357,(28)3819
42nd    (1)98,(2)311,313,374,(15)2190,(18)2557,(20)2850
43rd    (1)52,86,98,(5)838,(23)3275,3307,3311,3326,3357


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45th (1)70,82,99,123,(2)375,(5)693,838,(12)1805-1809,(15)2163,2174,2175,2190,(17)2357-2359,2368,2439,2441,(18)2524-2526,2544,2555,2556,(19)2591-2593,2627,(20)2852-2860,2864,2865,(26)3604,3653-3655,3658--3664,(27)3744

47th (1)99

59th (1)99

60th (1)99

63rd (1)57,61,78,88,93,99,(2)375,(15)2190,(18)2556,(19)2628,2657,2658,(20)2851,2852,2865,2866

65th (1)99,(2)375,(15)2190,(19)2658

66th (1)99,(2)359,360,375,(15)2190,(18)2494,(19)2605,(26)3591,(27)3705-3711 3725,3727-3729,3738,3742,3783,3793,3803,3808,3810

69th (1)66,99,(2)375,(15)2191,(18)2494,(19)2595,2600,2628,2658,(20)2812

70th (1)60,62,70,73,76,80,84,99,(2)376,(15)2191,(18)2556,(19)2658-2660,(20)2866,2885

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75th (1)67,84,99,(2)376,(15)2191,(18)2494,2574

76th (1)67,94,99,(2)376,(15)2191,(18)2494,2498

77th (1)55,70,88,(22)3167,(23)3300,3340,3345,(28)3819

78th (1)55,87,99,(2)376,(15)2192,(16)2220,(18)2490,2575,(19)2602,(20)2771--2774

79th (1)58,59,70,83,99,(2)376,(14)2040,2047-2050,2076,2077,2085,2086,2102,(15)2111,2113,2116,2133,2135,2138,2139,2192,(16)2317,2319-2322,(17)2439,2441,(18)2546-2548,(20)2775,(26)3664-3668,3683,3684

80th (1)56,80,90,99,(2)310,377,(15)2110,2138,2192,(16)2311,2312,(18)2490,2491,2575,(19)2660,2661,(26)3668

81st (1)99,(5)839,(22)3164-3166,3203,(28)3819

82nd (1)81,100,(2)377,(5)839,(14)2027,2028,2030,2031,2033,2036,2038,2063,2065,(15)2192,(16)2235,(18)2457,2575,(19)2600,2602,(20)2877,(24)3448

83rd (1)100,(2)377,(5)839,(14)2040,2057,2080-2082,2092,2093,(15)2118,2121,2130,2147,2148,2151,2193,(16)2223,2256,2276-2278,2280,2327,(18)2484,2575,(19)2601,2661,2662,(20)2813-2816,(26)3670-3674

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84th (1)100,(2)377,(15)2193,(16)2220,2259,2260,(18)2575,(19)2640,(20)2817,
2818

85th (1)82,86,100,(5)839,(12)1738,1739,1805,1806,1808,1809,(25)3495

86th (20)2880

87th (1)57,59,71,71,100,(2)377,(15)2193,(16)2220,(18)2469,2491-2493,2575,
(19)2587,2602-2604,2628,2629,2684-2687,(20)2753,2867,2868,2870,2872

88th (1)57,82,100,(2)290,(5)839,(12)1733-1735,1805-1808,(25)3495

89th (1)100,(2)378,(15)2193,(19)2662,(20)2872-2875

90th (1)80,83,89,100,(2)378,(5)839,(14)2027,2028,2042,2055,2077,(15)2193,
(16)2308,2309,(18)2575

91st (1)62,80,100,(5)840,(12)1741,1765,1805-1808,(25)3495,3553

92nd (1)81,100,(12)1748-1753,1796-1799,1805,1806,1808,(25)3495

93rd (1)100,(5)840,(23)3357

94th (1)58,70,93,94,100,(2)378,(15)2145,2194,(18)2492,2493,2575,(19)2604,
(20)2883,2884,2888,2891,2892,(26)3590

95th (1)100,(2)378,(15)2194,(16)2220,2302,(18)2491-2493,2575,(19)2629,2687,
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97th (1)70,88,100,(2)378,(15)2194,(20)2777,2778,2799,2818

98th (5)840,(19)2596,(22)3159,3168,(28)3819

99th (1)53,89,94,100,(2)378,(15)2194,(16)2220,2293,2294,(18)2154,2455,2575,
(19)2600,2630,2663,(20)2780,2781,(26)3625

100th (1)62,89,93,100,(2)300,303,379,(5)840,(15)2194,(17)2353,2389,2439,
2441,(18)2549,2550,(19)2593,2604,2663,2664,(20)2875,2876,(26)3643-3645

101st (1)69,81,86,87,101,(2)379,(14)2027-2030,2033,2039,2070,2081,(15)2194,
2195,(16)2231-2235,(18)2493,(19)2591,(20)2877

102nd (1)90,(2)379,(7)1156,(15)2195,(16)2220,2259,(18)2575,(19)2664,2665,
(20)2822,2823

103rd (1)101,(2)309,379,(15)2195,(17)2360,2441,(18)2526,(19)2591,2602,2665,
(20)2812,2837,2877-2880,(25)3496,(26)3676-3679

104th (1)61,66,71,76,101,(2)379,(15)2145,2195,(16)2225,(18)2575,(19)2665,
2673,2683,(20)2759,2781,2785-2787

106th (1)76,101,(2)379,(15)2195,(16)2220,(18)2475-2479,2494,2575

107th (24)3442-3444

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109th  (1)101,(2)359,(24)3447,3448
110th  (24)3447
111th  (1)101,142,(2)349,(24)3439,3449,3450
112th  (1)101,(2)354,360,(24)3450,3451
113th  (1)101,(2)356,(24)3408,3452-3454
114th  (1)101,(24)3452,
115th  (1)122,(2)343,(24)3454,3455
116th  (1)101,(2)360,363,(24)3439,3456,3457
117th  (8)1315,1316,1322-1325,(24)3444
118th  (2)336,338,(24)3429
119th  (1)102
120th  (1)102
121st  (1)102
122nd  (1)102
123rd  (1)102
125th  (1)102


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 153/543       ‖       ‖

                        View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
128th  (1)102
129th  (1)102
130th  (1)102
132nd  (1)102
134th  (1)102
136th  (1)102
137th  (1)102
138th  (1)102
151st  (1)102,(12)1718,1730
163rd  (1)102
181st  (1)65,102,123,126,137,138,(2)367
182nd  (1)102,(5)840,(23)3334,3335,3357,(28)3819
191st  (1)102,123
199th  (1)102
201st  (I Armored Corps):(2)380,(15)2196
201st  (I Corps):(1)61,64,103,123,127-132,(5)840,(23)3307,3311,3326,3358,
       (28)3819


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 170/543       ‖       ‖

                        View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE----------

202nd (1)58,69,77-79,82,90,93,103,(2)380,(5)840,(11)1559,1576-1582,1588, 1590,1628,1646,1652,(12)1717.1718,1743,1805-1809,(15)2196,(25)3495

203rd (1)69,74,77,83,92,103,(2)380,(15)2145,2196,(18)2493,2498,2569,(19)2595 2643-2647,(20)2753-2756,2837-2839

204th (1)50,63,64,69,73,78,79,87,88,103,(5)840,(12)1759-1761,1764,1795,1796, 1805-1808,(25)3495,3552

205th (1)63,78,86,90,103,(2)380,(5)841,(13)1830,(14)2027-2029,2097,(15)2130, 2196,(16)2219,2222,2257,2289-2293,(18)2470,2495,2567,(19)2690,(20)2757 (24)3450

206th (1)62,74,82,103,(2)310,380,(5)841,(12)1700,1703,1714,1715,1805-1809, (15)2161-2163,2168,2169,2196,(17)2354,2377,2439,2441,(18)2531,2542, 2551,2552,2554,(19)2590-2593,2648,2664,(20)2840,(25)3495,(26)3658

207th (1)56,65,73,74,77,83,86,88,92,94,103,(2)381,(5)841,(14)2027,2028, 2032-2034,2041-2046,(15)2118,2197,(16)2219,2225,2249-2252,(16)2253, 2257,2258,(18)2496,2568,(19)2594,2610,2629,2630,2634-2636,2647,2655, 2658,2663,2666,2672,2674-2679,2681,2683,2688,2690,2691,(20)2758,2759, 2760,2786,2787,2791,2793-2795

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 187/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE----------

208th (1)59,103,(2)381,(5)841,(14)2052,2055,2058,2070,2072-2074,(15)2197, (16)2220,2224,2225,2257,2275,2276,2280-2288,(18)2498,2499,2568, (19)2595,2596,2603,2610,2611,2614,2615,2648,2649,(20)2845-2847,2867, (26)3651

209th (1)103,123,(28)3819

210th (1)60,103,123,141,(2)367,(5)841,(23)3274,3292,3293,3297,3298,3300,3329 3331-3333,3358,(28)3819

211th (1)103,(5)841,(23)3272,3326,3358,(28)3819

212th (1)58,73,89,103,(2)381,(5)841,(15)2109,2197,(16)2219,2222,2318,2319, (18)2480,2569,2570,(19)2649,2650,2654,(20)2778

213th (1)104,(2)381,(5)842,(15)2197,(16)2220,(18)2502,2503,2571,(20)2796, 2798

214th (1)104,(5)842,(23)3307,3309,3313,3314,3326,3358,(28)3819

215th (1)56,68,89,104,(2)382,(5)842,(14)2076,(15)2113,2133,2198,(17)2439, 2441,(19)2664,(20)2856

216th (1)65,67,68,73-75,90,104,(2)382,(15)2198,(18)2502-2504,2571,(19)2596- -2598,2642,2643,2654

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 204/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT--	REFERENCE
218th	(1)50,104,(2)382,(14)2040,(15)2198,(18)2468,2479,2490,2494,2497,2568, (19)2598,2599,2615,2616,2667-2671,(20)2796-2802,2818,2821,2822
219th	(1)70,76,104,(2)382,(5)842,(13)1830,(14)2040,2051,2054,2059,2061,2062, 2066,2071,2078,2082,2097,2102,(15)2198,(16)2219,2262,(18)2486-2488, 2504,2505,2517,2571,(19)2599,2650,2651,(20)2803,2814
220th	(1)73,78,84,104,(2)383,(5)842,(15)2109,2121,2147-2151,2199,(16)2219, 2304-2308,(18)2492,2493,2498-2501,2570,(19)2651,2841-2845
221st	(1)104,(2)383,(15)2199,(18)2556
222nd	(1)87,104,(2)383,(15)2199,(18)2498,2510,(19)2595,(20)2881,2882,2884
223rd	(1)77,80,104,(2)383,(15)2199,(18)2498,2510,(19)2616,2617,(20)2881, 2884-2888,2893,(26)3628-3631
224th	(1)104,(5)842,(22)3159,3160,3166,3167,(23)3292,3298,3299,3341,3348, (30)4008-4010,4015,4016
229th	(2)361,(29)3972-3974
231st	(1)104
233rd	(1)104
235th	(1)104

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 221/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT--	REFERENCE
237th	(1)104
238th	(1)104
239th	(1)104
240th	(1)104
242nd	(1)104
244th	(1)105
245th	(1)105
248th	(1)105
252nd	(1)105
254th	(1)105
255th	(1)105
257th	(1)105
260th	(1)105
261st	(1)105
262nd	(1)105
263rd	(1)105
264th	(1)105

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 238/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT--	REFERENCE
266th	(1)105
268th	(1)105
271st	(1)105
272nd	(1)105
273rd	(1)105
275th	(1)105
277th	(1)105
278th	(1)105
279th	(1)105,(2)366
280th	(1)105
282nd	(1)106
283rd	(1)106
284th	(1)106
285th	(1)106
286th	(1)106
288th	(1)106
289th	(1)106

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 255/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT--	REFERENCE
301st	(1)58,62,76,106,(2)383,384,(13)1830,(14)2027,2036,2077,(15)2199,2200, (16)2289,2294,2296,2297,2300,(18)2458,2459,2470,2472,2497,2506-2508, 2567,(19)2622,2634,2635,2678,2682,(20)2749,2752,2818,2847,(24)3443
302nd	(1)64
303rd	(1)56,57,60,71,84,93,106,(2)384,(5)843,(13)1830,(14)2076,(15)2151, 2200,(18)2469,2511,2568,2569,(14)2636,2637,(20)2835,2836,2884,(24)3426 (26)3592,3593,3628,3648-3650,3660,(27)3714
305th	(1)63,64,69,75,79,86,87,89-92,106,(5)843,(10)1478,1506,(11)1565,1567, (12)1705,1707-1713,1727,1736,1737,1744,1747,1748,1751,1766-1772,1774, 1785,1788,1794,1795,1805-1809,(18)2506
306th	(1)52,76,106,(5)843,(23)3292,3296,3300,3306-3309,3314,3318,3322,3358, (24)3455,(28)3819,3832
307th	(1)57-61,66,68,71,72,80,83-86,89,106,(2)299,335,384,385,(5)843, (12)1805-1809,(15)2161,2163,2167,2174,2177,2178,2201,(17)2337,2339, 2349,2355,(17)2366,2375,2377,2379,2380,2382,2384,2386,2395,2396,2439, 2441,(18)2531,2533,2534,2542-2544,2546,2554,(19)2582,2591,2637,2639, 2684,(20)2830-2835,2850,2851,2865,2879,(26)3620-3628,3644,3657,3661

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 272/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
308th  (1)106,123-126,128,142,(22)3202,3211,3212,(23)3300,3326,3329,3359,
       (28)3819,3822,3827
309th  (1)57,106,(2)385,(5)843,(15)2145,2201,(18)2512,2513,2570,(19)2639-2641
       (20)2790,2791
310th  (1)50,52,(5)843,(22)3159,3160,3167,(23)3341,3342,3345-3350
311th  (1)106,(2)359
315th  (1)58,59,62,63,65,66,73-78,81,88,92,93,106,(2)385,(15)2201,(20)2881
316th  (1)106,(24)3450
321st  (1)70
330th  (1)107
332nd  (1)107
333rd  (1)107
334th  (1)107
338th  (1)107
340th  (1)107
341st  (1)107
342nd  (1)107,(2)366


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 289/543       ‖       ‖

                          View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
343rd  (1)107
346th  (1)107
347th  (1)107
351st  (19)2599,2616,(24)3454
357th  (1)107
369th  (29)3991,3997
400th  (1)107,(2)325,(5)844,(10)1476-1484,1486,1487,1490-1492,1494,1498,1502-
       -1509
401st  (1)107,(2)354,(5)844,(22)3169,(29)3990,3993,3994
402nd  (5)844,(22)3169
403rd  (5)844,(22)3169,(28)3819
404th  (5)844,(22)3169
405th  (2)309,311,326,334,(5)845,(22)3047,3053,3058-3061,3066,3067,3069,3091,
       3095,3097
406th  (5)845,(22)3047,3052,3053,3055,3057,3060,3061,3075,3080,3088-3090
407th  (5)845,(22)3047,3053,3055,3061,3066,3067,3075,3080,3083,3090
408th  (5)845,(22)3047,3053,3055,3067,3069,3080,3083,3089,3090


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 306/543       ‖       ‖

                          View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE----------

409th (5)845,(22)3047,3059-3061,3069-3072,3075,3090
410th (5)845,(22)3047,3072-3075,3090,3095
411th (2)306,(5)845,(22)3047,3054,3055,3079,3090,3101
412th (2)306,(5)845,(22)3047,3052,3054,3055,3076,3079,3101,3118,3119
413th (2)306,(5)845,(22)3047,3067,3075-3078,3102
414th (5)846,(22)3047,3052,3053,3080,2083,3084,3089,3090,3102
415th (5)846,(22)3047,3054,3055,3079,3090,3101,3102,3126,3130-3132
416th (1)107,(2)309,(5)846,(22)3047,3052,3053,3078,3083,3090,3102
417th (5)846
418th (1)81,107,(2)385-387,(5)846,(13)1832,1836,(14)2098,2099,(15)2109,2113,
2115,2142,2144,2201-2203,(16)2295,2303,(18)2454,2493,2519,(19)2607,
2617,2621,2641,2646,2675,2676,(20)2758,2881,2885,2893,2894,(26)3589,
3590
419th (5)846,(19)2595,2631
420th (1)107,(5)846,(12)1805,1807,1808,(16)2331,(18)2493,(19)2631,(20)2895
421st (1)57,79,(5)847,(18)2515,(19)2631
422nd (5)847,(16)2308,(19)2632

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 323/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE----------

423rd (5)847
424th (5)847,(16)2276,2277,2279,2280,2287,(18)2514,2515,(19)2597,2605,2631
425th (1)107,(5)848,(12)1805-1809,(25)3495
426th (1)84,108,(5)848,(12)1777,1778,1780,1782,1783,1805-1809,(25)3494,3495
427th (1)108,(2)387,(5)848,(12)1788-1791,1805-1809,(15)2163,2164,2204,
(17)2342,2390-2393,2395,2397,2398,2400,2402,2405,(27)3712
428th (1)51,62,68,71,82,85,108,(2)317,318,325,354,(5)848,(11)1686,(12)1783,
1784,1804-1809,(15)2164,(17)2397,2399-2402,(25)3494,3553,3554
429th (1)108,(2)387,(5)848,(12)1805-1809,(15)2163,2204,(17)2391,(19)2631,
2683
430th (1)73,108,(2)310,315,317,335,344,(5)849,(12)1784,1785,1788,1792,1804-
-1809,(25)3493-3506,3509,3510,3515,3516,3521-3523,3527-3529,3533,3536,
3542-3544
431st (1)108,(5)849,(12)1791,1792,1806-1809
432nd (2)323,(5)849,(10)1527-1540
433rd (2)314,(5)849,(22)3201,3203,3205,3206,3211-3213
434th (5)849,(22)3184,3200,3205,3206,3213

BROWSE ‖<C:>‖CICH1 ‖Rec: 340/543 ‖ ‖

View and edit fields.

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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
435th  (5)849,(22)3205,3206,3213
436th  (5)849,(22)3184,3200,3205,3206,3213
437th  (2)302,(5)849,(22)3194,3205,3206,3214
438th  (5)850,(22)3205,3206,3214
439th  (5)850,(22)3205,3206,3214
440th  (5)850,(23)3286,3310,3326,3359
441st  (1)66,108,118-120,122,124,127,139,(2)290,299,312,314,318,321,323-325,
       329,331,344,347,348,352,370,(5)850,(22)3212,(23)3231,3237,3245,3266,
       3272,3278,3279,3285,3286,3290,3306,3309,3315,3320,3328,3333,3336,3359,
       (28)3818-3821,3824,3825,3827,3833,3834,3836,3838-3855,3857-3862,3865-
       -3869,3872-3874,3881,3882,3884,3886,3887,3889,3894-3896,3898-3900,3911
       3912,3914-3922,3928,3929,3931,3933-3935,(29)3948,3949,3951,3953,3962,
       3976,3988,(30)4009,4012,4016,4018
442nd  (1)72,123,(5)850,(23)3286,3307,3310,3326,3359
443rd  (5)850,(23)3359
444th  (5)850,(23)3360
445th  (5)850,(23)3360


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 357/543       ‖       ‖

                          View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
446th  (1)51,(5)851,(23)3360
447th  (1)108,(5)851,(23)3360
448th  (1)108,(5)851,(23)3360
449th  (1)108,(5)851,(23)3272,3286,3360
450th  (1)108,(5)851,(11)1551,(23)3312,3361
451st  (1)109,(5)851,(23)3286,3361
452nd  (1)109,(5)851,(23)3286,3361
453rd  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3286,3361
454th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3286,3361
455th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3286,3361
456th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3362
457th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3310,3315,3326,3362
458th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3300,3363
459th  (1)109,(5)852,(23)3292-3294,3300,3363
460th  (5)853,(9)1366-1374
461st  (2)310,(5)853,(10)1465,1468
462nd  (2)310,(5)853,(10)1465,1468


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 374/543       ‖       ‖

                          View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
463rd  (5)853,(10)1465,1468
464th  (2)310,(5)853,(10)1465,1468
465th  (2)310,(5)853,(10)1465,1468
466th  (5)854,(10)1521
467th  (5)854,(9)1332-1356
468th  (5)854,(10)1498,1506,(28)3819
469th  (5)854,(9)1377,1388
470th  (5)854,(9)1377,1387,1388,1390,1394,1399,1404,1436,(29)3997,3998
471st  (5)854,(9)1377,1418-1420,1422,1426-1428,1444,(29)3997,3999,4000
472nd  (5)854,(9)1377,1417,1443-1445
473rd  (1)109,(23)3363
474th  (1)109,(23)3363
475th  (23)3333
476th  (23)3332,3333
477th  (23)3333
478th  (23)3310,3326
479th  (1)109,(23)3327-3329,3363


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 391/543       ‖       ‖

                        View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
480th  (1)109,(23)3300,3329,3364
481st  (1)109,(23)3310,3326,3364
482nd  (1)109,(23)3300,3364
483rd  (1)109,(23)3300,3364
484th  (1)109.(23)3310,3326,3364
485th  (1)109,(23)3324,3326,3365
486th  (1)109,(23)3334,3365
487th  (1)109,(23)3334,3365
488th  (1)109,(23)3334,3335,3365
489th  (1)109,(23)3333,3365
490th  (1)110,(23)3310,3326,3365
491st  (1)110,(23)3300,3326,3366
492nd  (1)110,(23)3300,3336,3366
493rd  (1)110,(23)3306,3312,3314,3315,3325,3326,3336,3366
496th  (23)3353,(28)3819
498th  (28)3819
501st  (1)64,65,72,110,(5)855,(12)1718,1730,1740,1775,1776,1799,1802,1805-


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                ‖Rec: 408/543       ‖       ‖

                        View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
       -1808
502nd  (1)55,57,65,67,68,70,110,(2)388,(5)855,(13)1830,(14)2027,2029,2039,
       2078,(15)2118,2204,(16)2259,2260,(18)2571,(29)3987-3990
503rd  (1)56,59,62,64,66,86,87,90,91,110,(2)388,(5)855,(14)2040,2054,2059-
       -2062,2066,2072,2074,2083,2084,2095,2096,2102,2103,(15)2117,2119,2125,
       2127,2128,2205,(16)2238,2243-2253,2257,2291,(18)2490,2592,(19)2585,
       2607,2629-2631,2672-2674
504th  (1)110,(2)335,388,(5)855,(14)2076,2077,(15)2205,(16)2317,(18)2572
505th  (1)50,59,110,(2)388,(5)855,(14)2076,(15)2153,2205,(16)2256,2294,
       (18)2572,(20)2826-2828,(24)3452
506th  (1)64,79,110,(2)388,(5)855,(14)2076,(15)2126,2131,2132,2135-2137,2151,
       2152,2205,(16)2313,2316,2317,(18)2573,(19)2653
507th  (1)110,(2)389,(5)856,(15)2109,2110,2149,2206,(16)2259,(18)2476,2477,
       2479,2573,(19)2653,2690,(20)2788
508th  (1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(18)2494,(19)2640-2642,(20)2828
509th  (1)50,91,110,(2)389,(15)2206,(16)2220,2288,(18)2484,2485,2573,(19)2640
       2643


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 425/543        ‖       ‖

                              View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
510th  (1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(16)2220,2309,(18)2543,2544,2573
511th  (1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(18)2494,(26)3645
512th  (1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(17)2381,2441,(18)2552
513th  (1)110,(2)389,(15)2206,(20)2880
514th  (1)71,75,81,83,85,91,111,(2)389,390,(15)2207,(17)2360,2441
516th  (1)111,(2)390,(15)2207,(20)2880,2886,(26)3666
520th  (1)85,111,(2)390,(15)2207,(20)2880,(24)3452
521st  (1)111
522nd  (1)111
526th  (2)354,(29)3972,3982,3983,3985,3986
530th  (24)3448
536th  (1)111
600th  (24)3449
601st  (2)297,(8)1186,1217
602nd  (2)297,(8)1186,1197,1198,1218,1219
603rd  (2)297,300,(8)1186,1219,1220
604th  (2)297,(8)1186,1220,1221


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 442/543        ‖       ‖

                              View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
606th  (5)856,(9)1377,1387,1433,1435,1436,1439-1441,1445,(29)3997
607th  (5)856,(22)3144,3159,3161,3162,(29)3987
608th  (5)856,(8)1191,(15)2213
609th  (1)51,(5)857,(8)1192-1195,(15)2213,2214
611th  (1)65
613th  (1)111,(5)857,(23)3366
700th  (2)297,(8)1186,1201,1221
701st  (1)111,(2)297,326,(8)1186,1221,1222
702nd  (1)111,(2)297,313,(8)1186,1195-1201,1222
703rd  (2)297,307,(8)1186,(9)1350,(22)3079
704th  (1)111,123,141,(2)297,326,(8)1186,1222
705th  (1)111,123,(2)297,326,367,(8)1186,1202-1204,1206,1207,1222,1223,
       (30)4016
706th  (2)297,326,(8)1186,1207-1215,1223,1224
707th  (2)297,326,(8)1186,1224-1227
766th  (1)111
801st  (1)111,124,141,(23)3292,3293,3295-3298,3307,3313,3317,3326,3329,3366,


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 459/543       ‖       ‖

                              View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
       (28)3819
810th  (1)111
811th  (1)111
820th  (1)111
837th  (1)111
847th  (1)111
861st  (1)112
862nd  (1)112
867th  (1)112
890th  (1)112,(24)3448
901st  (1)112
902nd  (1)14,112,(23)3307
904th  (1)112,(23)3267,3307,3311,3326,3367
906th  (1)112
912th  (1)112
913th  (1)112
914th  (1)112


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 476/543       ‖       ‖

                              View and edit fields.
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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
915th  (1)112
916th  (1)112
917th  (1)112
918th  (1)112
919th  (1)112
922nd  (1)112
924th  (1)112
926th  (1)112
927th  (1)112
928th  (1)113
929th  (1)113
930th  (1)113
931st  (1)113
932nd  (1)113
934th  (1)113
935th  (1)113
936th  (1)113


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 493/543       ‖       ‖
                                View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
937th  (1)113
938th  (1)113
939th  (1)113
940th  (1)113
941st  (1)113
942nd  (1)113
943d   (1)113
944th  (1)113
945th  (1)113
946th  (1)113
947th  (1)113
948th  (2)113
949th  (1)113
950th  (1)113
951st  (1)114
952nd  (1)114,(23)3326
953rd  (1)114,(23)3310,3326


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 510/543       ‖       ‖
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UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
954th  (1)114,(23)3310,3326
955th  (1)50,114
956th  (1)114
957th  (1)114
958th  (1)114
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960th  (1)114
961st  (1)114
962nd  (1)114,(23)3367
963rd  (2)318,(23)3344,3347,3349,3352,3353
964th  (1)114,(2)287,318
965th  (2)318
966th  (1)114
967th  (1)114
968th  (1)114,(22)3158,3160,3168,3169
969th  (1)114,(22)3158-3160,3168,3169
970th  (1)86,89,114,(2)310,313,325,331,343,344,348,349,(8)1199,(21)3012-3015,


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 527/543       ‖       ‖
                                  View and edit fields.

UNIT-- REFERENCE-------------------------------------------------------------
970th  (1)86,89,114,(2)310,313,325,331,343,344,348,349,(8)1199,(21)3012-3015,
       (24)3426,3432,(26)3590-3593,3614,3619,3626,3628,3644,3648,3652,3653,
       3661,3670,3671,3674,3676,3683,3687,3692,(27)3701-3705,3711,3714-3724,
       3729,3731,3738-3743,3749,3788,3790,3794,3795,3798,3799,3806
971st  (1)114,(2)320,(30)4004,4009-4018
972nd  (1)114
973rd  (1)114
974th  (1)114
999th  (1)115
1034th (30)4009
1035th (30)4009
1036th (30)4009
1108th (1)115
1110th (1)115,(30)4009
1111th (1)115,(30)4009
1135th (1)115,(2)329,331,(29)3948,3949,3951-3953,3955-3957,3959-3970,3972,
       3976-3982


BROWSE          ‖<C:>‖CICH1                    ‖Rec: 543/543       ‖       ‖
                          ===> Add new records? (Y/N)
                             View and edit fields.
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